2015 WI 26

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2014AP2732-D

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against 

Christopher S. Carson, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant,

 v.

Christopher S. Carson,

 Respondent.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CARSON

OPINION FILED: March 10, 2015

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT:

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT:

COUNTY:

JUDGE:

JUSTICES:

CONCURRED:

DISSENTED:

NOT PARTICIPATING: 

ATTORNEYS:
2015 WI 26

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2014AP2732-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Christopher S. Carson, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant,

 v.

Christopher S. Carson,

 Respondent.

FILED

MAR 10, 2015

Diane M. Fremgen

Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license 

suspended. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. We review a stipulation filed pursuant 

to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.12 by the Office of Lawyer 

Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Christopher S. Carson. In the 

stipulation, Attorney Carson agrees that he engaged in eight 

counts of misconduct involving four clients. Attorney Carson 

also agrees that a 90-day suspension of his license to practice 

law in Wisconsin is an appropriate sanction for his misconduct. 
No. 2014AP2732-D 

2

The OLR does not request restitution, and it also does not seek 

the imposition of costs against Attorney Carson. 

¶2 After careful review of the matter, we approve the 

stipulation and agree that a 90-day suspension of Attorney 

Carson's license to practice law is an appropriate sanction. 

Because this matter is being resolved without the appointment of 

a referee, we do not impose any costs on Attorney Carson.

¶3 Attorney Carson was admitted to practice law in 

Wisconsin in 1992. The most recent address furnished by 

Attorney Carson to the State Bar of Wisconsin is New Berlin, 

Wisconsin. 

¶4 In 2008, Attorney Carson was privately reprimanded for 

misconduct in two matters. In one matter, he wrote to a judge 

without copying the other lawyers. In the second matter, he 

failed to obey a court order. Private Reprimand 2008-15.

¶5 In 2009, Attorney Carson was publicly reprimanded for 

misconduct in a divorce matter. Public Reprimand of Christopher 

S. Carson, No. 2009-10.

¶6 On November 26, 2014, the OLR filed a complaint 

alleging that Attorney Carson engaged in eight counts of 

misconduct involving four separate clients. The OLR and 

Attorney Carson contemporaneously filed a stipulation 

incorporating the allegations of the complaint. 

¶7 The first client matter detailed in the complaint and 

stipulation involved Attorney Carson's representation of N.S. 

In or around April of 2010, N.S. retained Attorney Carson to 

represent her in two operating while intoxicated cases and a 
No. 2014AP2732-D 

3

forthcoming felony drug possession case. Prior to commencement 

of the lawyer-client relationship, no consensual sexual 

relationship existed between N.S. and Attorney Carson. 

¶8 N.S.'s initial court appearance in the drug possession 

case occurred in August of 2010. N.S. and Attorney Carson both 

attended the court appearance. The court set a signature bail 

bond which provided that N.S. was not to possess or consume any 

alcohol or drugs. The drug possession case was concluded in 

late May of 2011. The terms of the August 2010 bail bond 

remained in effect.

¶9 In April of 2011, Attorney Carson and N.S. engaged in 

sexual relations on two occasions. 

¶10 The OLR's complaint alleged three counts of misconduct 

with respect to Attorney Carson's relationship with N.S.:

[COUNT ONE] By purchasing two alcoholic drinks 

for N.S. on April 23, 2011, when the bail bond that 

N.S. signed on August 11, 2010, in Carson's presence 

prohibited her from consuming alcohol, and while the 

conditions of the bail bond were still in effect, 

Carson violated SCR 20:1.2(d).1

[COUNT TWO] By engaging in sexual relations with 

N.S., a current client, on April 23 and 24, 2011, 

while he was representing her on criminal charges, 

 

1 SCR 20:1.2(d) provides:

A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or 

assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is 

criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the 

legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct 

with a client and may counsel or assist a client to 

make a good faith effort to determine the validity, 

scope, meaning or application of the law.
No. 2014AP2732-D 

4

when a consensual sexual relationship did not exist 

between them when the lawyer-client relationship 

commenced, Carson violated SCR 20:1.8(j).2

[COUNT THREE] By denying to OLR's District 

Committee that he purchased clothing for N.S. during 

their trip on April 23, 2011, and by stating to OLR's 

District Committee that it was impossible for him to 

have looked through a back window at N.S.'s home and 

observe her and her boyfriend in the living room on 

April 24, 2011, because there was no such window, and 

it would have been impossible for him to see into the 

living room from the back porch, when one or both of 

such statements were misrepresentations, Carson 

violated SCR 22.03(6)3 and SCR 22.04(1).4

¶11 The second client matter detailed in the complaint and 

stipulation involved Attorney Carson's representation of M.G. 

In 2005, M.G. was sentenced to 13 years of prison for repeated 

first degree sexual assault of a child. The judgment of 

conviction ordered M.G. to have no contact with minor children 

unless approved by his offender agent. 

 

2 SCR 20:1.8(j) provides, in relevant part, that "[a] lawyer 

shall not have sexual relations with a current client unless a 

consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the 

client-lawyer relationship commenced."

3 SCR 22.03(6) provides that "[i]n the course of the 

investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 

relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 

documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 

are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 

in the grievance."

4 SCR 22.04(1) provides that "[t]he director may refer a 

matter to a district committee for assistance in the 

investigation. A respondent has the duty to cooperate specified 

in SCR 21.15(4) and 22.03(2) in respect to the district 

committee. The committee may subpoena and compel the production 

of documents specified in SCR 22.03(8) and 22.42."
No. 2014AP2732-D 

5

¶12 M.G. and his wife wanted M.G. to have visitation with 

their recently born daughter during his incarceration. They 

sought permission for visits from M.G.'s social worker and 

agent. Their requests were denied. They sought review of the 

denial from the warden, who upheld the denial, subject to 

reconsideration upon successful completion of treatment 

programs. 

¶13 In September of 2005, three weeks before the warden 

sustained the denial of visitation, the circuit court amended 

the judgment of conviction to permit M.G. to have supervised and 

monitored prison visits with his daughter. However, the amended 

judgment did not strike the pre-existing order prohibiting 

contact with minor children without the approval of M.G.'s 

agent. 

¶14 Visitation was further denied to M.G. by prison 

officials later in 2005 and again in 2006 and 2007. In each of 

those instances, M.G. and/or his wife were informed of their 

appeal rights. 

¶15 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 310 provides the 

administrative remedy framework for review of inmate complaints, 

the Inmate Complaint Review System (ICRS). Under the ICRS, 

inmate complaints are first processed by the institution 

complaint examiner, who makes disposition recommendations to the 

reviewing authority. An inmate dissatisfied with the reviewing 

authority's decision generally may appeal it. The appeal is 

initially reviewed by a corrections complaint examiner, who 

recommends a decision to the secretary of the Department of 
No. 2014AP2732-D 

6

Corrections (DOC). The secretary's decision is final. M.G. 

never used the ICRS to contest any denials of visitation in 

prison with his daughter. He never appealed under the ICRS any 

denials of visitation to the secretary of the DOC. In addition, 

M.G. failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the DOC 

for each of the denials of visitation.

¶16 In early 2009, M.G.'s wife retained Attorney Carson to 

take legal action seeking to permit M.G. to have prison 

visitation with his daughter. M.G.'s wife provided Attorney 

Carson with a copy of M.G.'s prison case notes, which state that 

there is an appeal process. Attorney Carson never independently 

investigated whether M.G. exhausted his administrative remedies 

regarding prior denials of visitation with his daughter.

¶17 M.G. filed three separate motions for writ of mandamus 

in the criminal case seeking to compel the DOC to permit 

visitation. Each of the motions were eventually withdrawn. 

¶18 The OLR's complaint alleged the following count of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Carson's handling of M.G.'s 

case:

[COUNT FOUR] After being hired to represent an 

incarcerated man who had unsuccessfully sought prison 

visitation with his minor child, and after being 

provided with "prison case notes" stating that an 

appeals process had been explained to the man and that 

notice of appeal rights had been sent to the man's 

wife, by failing to obtain information about the 

administrative appeal process within the Department of 

Corrections or familiarize himself on the relevant law 

and codes on the appeal process; and/or by thereafter 

seeking visitation rights by filing a series of three 

motions in the client's prior criminal case instead of 

first exhausting the client's administrative remedies 
No. 2014AP2732-D 

7

and by failing to file a motion against the State of 

Wisconsin in the proper venue, Carson violated 

SCR 20:1.1.5

¶19 The third client matter detailed in the complaint and 

stipulation involved Attorney Carson's representation of L.W., 

who was sentenced in Milwaukee County circuit court to 42 months 

in prison, followed by 42 months of extended supervision, 

following his conviction for possession with intent to deliver 

THC. On July 20, 2010, while on extended supervision, L.W.'s 

extended supervision was revoked by the DOC for two counts of 

sex with a child and one count of failing to report to his 

agent, all of which occurred in 2009. 

¶20 Two days later, L.W. was convicted in Milwaukee County 

circuit court for two counts of second degree sexual assault of 

a child and one count of child enticement. The child involved 

was the same child that was the subject of L.W.'s extended 

supervision revocation. On the new conviction, L.W. was 

sentenced to nine years in prison, followed by seven years of 

extended supervision.

¶21 In late 2011 or early 2012, L.W. retained Attorney 

Carson to challenge the 2010 revocation of his extended 

supervision from the 2002 drug case, on the basis that L.W. 

received ineffective assistance of counsel at the extended 

supervision revocation hearing. The time to file a petition for 

 

5 SCR 20:1.1 provides that "[a] lawyer shall provide 

competent representation to a client. Competent representation 

requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 

preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
No. 2014AP2732-D 

8

writ of certiari from the extended supervision revocation had 

expired in 2010, so Attorney Carson filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in Milwaukee County circuit court. Wisconsin 

Stat. § 801.50(4)(b) requires that a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus be filed in the county "[w]here the liberty of the 

plaintiff is restrained if the action seeks relief concerning 

any other matter relating to a restraint on the liberty of the 

plaintiff." At the time Attorney Carson filed the habeas 

petition, L.W. was incarcerated at Redgranite Correctional 

Institution (RGCI), which is located in Waushara County. 

¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 782.04(1) provides that a habeas 

petition must state "the person by whom imprisoned and the place 

where, naming both parties, if their names are known, or 

describing them if they are not." Attorney Carson failed to 

name the warden at RGCI in the petition. Wisconsin Stat. 

§ 782.10 requires that a habeas petition be served upon the 

warden or left with an underofficer at the institution that has 

charge of the inmate. Attorney Carson only mailed the petition 

to the warden. Wisconsin Stat. § 782.04 requires that a habeas 

petition be verified. The petition filed by Attorney Carson was 

not verified.

¶23 In the conclusion of the habeas petition, Attorney 

Carson requested "the remedy of immediate release." However, if 

the writ was granted, the remedy would be a new hearing on 

L.W.'s ineffective assistance claim, not release. In addition, 

at the time the petition was filed, L.W. was less than two years 

into a nine-year prison sentence for the sexual assault of a 
No. 2014AP2732-D 

9

child conviction, so no action of the circuit court on the 

habeas petition could have resulted in release from 

incarceration. 

¶24 The assistant legal counsel for the DOC filed a motion 

to dismiss the petition and to declare a "strike" against L.W. 

under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. The assistant legal 

counsel filed a separate motion for sanctions against Attorney 

Carson, seeking a finding that the habeas petition was frivolous 

and seeking an award of actual attorneys fees. Attorney Carson 

voluntarily dismissed the habeas petition, and the DOC's 

assistant legal counsel agreed to dismiss her motions to dismiss 

and for sanctions.

¶25 In February of 2012, Attorney Carson filed a new 

petition for writ of habeas corpus in Waushara County circuit 

court. The DOC's assistant legal counsel filed a motion to 

dismiss the second petition and to declare a "strike" against 

L.W. under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. The assistant 

legal counsel filed a separate motion for sanctions against 

Attorney Carson, again seeking a finding that the second habeas 

petition was frivolous and seeking an award of actual attorneys 

fees. 

¶26 Attorney Carson thereafter filed his own motion for 

sanctions against the DOC's assistant legal counsel. The second 

habeas petition and the sanction motions were heard in April of 

2012. The circuit court denied the second habeas petition and 

set the matter for additional briefing and a continued hearing 

as to the sanctions motions. In May of 2012, Attorney Carson 
No. 2014AP2732-D 

10

withdrew his motion for sanctions against the DOC's assistant 

legal counsel. The hearing continued in September of 2012. At 

the close of the hearing, the circuit court concluded that the 

second habeas petition was frivolous. The parties exchanged fee 

submissions and at an October 2012 hearing, the circuit court 

ordered Attorney Carson to pay attorneys fees and costs totaling 

$1,788.50. Attorney Carson appealed, and the court of appeals 

summarily affirmed and remanded for the determination and 

assessment against Attorney Carson of attorneys fees and costs 

reasonably incurred by the State in the appeal.

¶27 The OLR's complaint alleged the following count of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Carson's handling of L.W.'s 

case:

[COUNT FIVE] By making multiple errors in a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus that he filed in 

Milwaukee County Circuit Court on January 3, 2012, 

including filing the petition in the wrong county, 

failing to verify the petition by signing it under 

oath, misstating the number of charges of which his 

client had been convicted, and seeking an

inappropriate remedy, eventually dismissing the 

petition and filing a revised petition in Waushara 

County in which he corrected some, but not all, of his 

previous errors, Carson violated SCR 20:1.1.

¶28 The final client matter detailed in the complaint and 

stipulation involved Attorney Carson's representation of A.E. 

A.E. met with Attorney Carson in July of 2010 for a consultation 

regarding possible divorce representation. At the conclusion of 

the consultation, A.E. gave Attorney Carson a $700 advanced fee, 

but instructed him not to use the funds and to take no further 

action on her behalf unless her husband filed for a divorce. 
No. 2014AP2732-D 

11

Attorney Carson did not deposit the $700 into his office trust 

account but rather deposited it into his office business 

account. Attorney Carson later told an OLR investigator that he 

deposited the $700 advanced fee into his office business account 

because it was a flat fee for representation of A.E. in an 

uncontested divorce. Attorney Carson never provided A.E. with 

the written notice set forth in SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m).

¶29 By March of 2011, A.E. began to consider initiating 

the divorce proceedings and met with Attorney Carson for legal 

advice. She paid Attorney Carson an additional $200, which 

Attorney Carson deposited into his office business account. On 

March 17, 2011, A.E. wrote to Attorney Carson saying she still 

had not decided when to file for divorce. On March 31, 2011, 

A.E. sent Attorney Carson a certified letter informing him that 

she and her husband were reconciling and that she would not need 

Attorney Carson's services. A.E. requested a refund of the $700 

advanced fee she paid in July of 2010. Attorney Carson did not 

respond to A.E.'s refund request.

¶30 On June 3, 2011, A.E. sent Attorney Carson a second 

certified letter indicating that the letter was her final 

request for him to return her $700 advanced fee. Later in June, 

Attorney Carson informed A.E. that she was not entitled to a 

refund of any portion of her advanced fee.

¶31 A.E. filed a grievance with the OLR against Attorney 

Carson in August of 2011. Attorney Carson told an OLR intake 

investigator that the $700 constituted a flat fee. The intake 

investigator directed Attorney Carson to provide A.E. with the 
No. 2014AP2732-D 

12

SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) written notice regarding fee accounting and 

dispute resolution upon termination of representation. Attorney 

Carson prepared a letter titled "Termination of Services Letter 

and Accounting of Fees" addressed to A.E., which indicated that 

it was to be sent to her at the email address shown on the 

letter. Attorney Carson sent the letter to that email address, 

but the address contained a typographical error and consequently 

was not received by A.E. 

¶32 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of 

misconduct with respect to Attorney Carson's representation of 

A.E.:

[COUNT SIX] By receiving a $700 advanced fee 

from [A.E.] on or about July 26, 2010, in anticipation 

of possible representation in a divorce and depositing 

those funds into his business account without 

utilizing the alternative fee placement measures 

permitted under SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m), Carson violated 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(4).6

[COUNT SEVEN] Having received a March 31, 2011, 

letter from [A.E.] in which she terminated the legal 

representation and inquired as to the possibility of 

having her advanced fee returned to her, by failing 

until June 2011 (and only after subsequent inquires 

from [A.E.]) to address the matter of the advanced fee 

either by refunding a portion of the advance or by 

promptly informing [A.E.] that no refund was 

 

6 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in 

par. (4m), unearned fees and advanced payments of fees shall be 

held in trust until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant 

to sub. (g). Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for 

payment of costs shall be held in trust until the costs are 

incurred."
No. 2014AP2732-D 

13

forthcoming in light of work performed, Carson 

violated SCR 20:1.16(d).7

[COUNT EIGHT] In September 2011, by sending a 

"termination of services letter and accounting of 

fees" to [A.E.] (at an incorrect email address) that 

incorrectly stated that a refund of an advanced fee 

was possible only in hourly fee cases, and only 

sending his letter more than five months after 

[A.E.'s] termination of the legal representation in a 

belated effort to comply with the alternative fee 

placement measures permitting deposit of an advanced 

fee into a business account, Carson violated 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b.8

 

7 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 

Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 

shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 

to protect a client's interests, such as giving 

reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 

employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 

property to which the client is entitled and refunding 

any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 

been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers 

relating to the client to the extent permitted by 

other law.

8 SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b. provides:

Upon termination of the representation, the 

lawyer shall deliver to the client in writing all of 

the following:

1. a final accounting, or an accounting from the 

date of the lawyer's most recent statement to the end 

of the representation, regarding the client's advanced 

fee payment with a refund of any unearned advanced 

fees;

2. notice that, if the client disputes the amount 

of the fee and wants that dispute to be submitted to 

binding arbitration, the client must provide written 

notice of the dispute to the lawyer within 30 days of 

the mailing of the accounting; and

(continued)
No. 2014AP2732-D 

14

¶33 In the stipulation, Attorney Carson represents that he 

fully understands the misconduct allegations, fully understands 

the ramifications should the court impose the stipulated level 

of discipline, fully understands his right to contest the 

matter, and fully understands his right to counsel. The 

stipulation also avers that Attorney Carson's entry into the 

stipulation was made knowing, voluntarily, and without coercion 

by any person or agency, and that his entry into the stipulation 

represents his admission of all misconduct recited and his 

assent to the level and type of discipline sought by the OLR 

director.

¶34 Upon careful consideration of this matter, we approve 

the stipulation and adopt the stipulated facts and legal 

conclusions of professional misconduct. We further find that a 

90-day suspension of Attorney Carson's license to practice law 

in Wisconsin is an appropriate sanction for his misconduct. 

Because Attorney Carson entered into a comprehensive stipulation 

under SCR 22.12, thereby obviating the need for the appointment 

of a referee and a full disciplinary proceeding, we do not 

impose any costs in this matter.

 

3. notice that, if the lawyer is unable to 

resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of the client 

within 30 days after receiving notice of the dispute 

from the client, the lawyer shall submit the dispute 

to binding arbitration.
No. 2014AP2732-D 

15

¶35 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Christopher S. 

Carson to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 

90 days, effective April 9, 2015.

¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Christopher S. Carson shall 

comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 

a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 

suspended.

¶37 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 

conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See

SCR 22.28(2).
No. 2014AP2732-D 

1