AYearof

GlobalEngagement

AJournalofInternationalSecurityCooperationManagement

Annual,Vol.3

2014
This inaugural hard copy edition of The DISAM Journal of 

International Security Cooperation Management will be published 

annually, highlighting past articles from the online DISAM Journal

(www.disamjournal.org) and incorporating new articles exclusive 

to this publication. This journal is not an official publication of the 

Department of Defense (DOD); in the event of a conflict between 

any information published herein and official policy guidance, the 

current official regulation, directive, or other instruction should be 

followed. Unless otherwise stated, the views expressed herein are those 

of the contributing authors or the DISAM editorial staff, and are not 

necessarily those of DOD, other government agencies, departments, 

or any of their organizational elements. Material may be reprinted if 

credit is given to The DISAM Journal and to the author, except for 

copyright material, which requires special reprint authority. Readers 

are encouraged to submit articles and items that may be of interest 

to the security cooperation community. Articles are normally between 1500 and 5000 words and should be 

prepared according to The Chicago Manual of Style. Images should be submitted in JPEG or TIFF format at a 

minimum resolution of 200 pixels per inch, or 300 pixels per inch or larger for cover use consideration. JPEG 

or TIFF images inserted into Microsoft Word documents should also be sent as separate files. In the interest 

of clarity and brevity, DISAM reserves the right to make minor editorial changes to articles submitted for 

publication.

Please send all submission materials intended for The DISAM Journal, along with any necessary clearance and 

approval, to DISAM/DR via e-mail (disam.journal@us.af.mil). You may also mail information to DISAM/DR 

using the address listed below. It is DOD policy that all information prepared by DOD employees be reviewed 

for clearance by appropriate security review in public affairs offices. The DISAM Journal release form may be 

accessed from the DISAM website: http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pages/pubs/. This form should be completed by 

the appropriate public affairs official and forwarded with your submission.

All submissions and or changes are preferred in electronic format using Microsoft Word. 

Requests for changes to The DISAM Journal distribution list should be directed to 

disam.journal@us.af.mil or mailed to DISAM/DR, 2475 K Street, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH 45433-

7641, DSN: 713-3311; Commercial: (937) 713-3311. 

Visit the online DISAM Journal for regular updates: www.disamjournal.org

The DISAM Journal of International 

Security Cooperation Management

Editor

Mr. Gregory W. Sutton

Managing Editor

Ms. Victoria E. Ebert

Art and Graphics

Mr. Danny L. Palmer
i The DISAM Annual, December 2014

The DISAM Journal of International 

Security Cooperation Management

Welcome to the 3rd DISAM Annual Journal of International Security Cooperation Management. We 

circulate this annual hard-copy publication as a supplement to our Online Journal, which can be accessed 

at www.disamjournal.org. We sincerely hope the Online Journal is of benefit to you in your daily activities 

and welcome any feedback you may have for improvement of it or this annual edition at: disam.journal@

us.af.mil. A highlight article that we always hope to have in time for the annual publication is the recap of 

the current/upcoming fiscal year recap of security assistance and security cooperation legislation and policy. 

That is contained in this edition for FY15. I want to commend Mr. Ken Martin for his work on this article, 

and his service for over 26 years as a DISAM faculty member and journal contributor. Ken will be retiring 

in a few months and his diligence in following legislation throughout the year has had a dramatic impact on 

the Journal and even more particular on DISAM curriculum currency. Ken will be missed and we wish him 

and his wife, Pat, the very best.

In addition to the traditional authorization and appropriation legislation that we consolidated for you here, 

this year also looks to be a year in which reforms in the U.S. Export Control System will be considered in 

conjunction with the Administration’s efforts to rationalize the two control lists maintained by the Commerce 

and State Departments. (See that article here as well.)

I won’t highlight each article here as that would take pages in and of itself. This annual contains articles 

covering various issues facing our community and what a number of our organizations are doing to meet 

those challenges. Also, and most particularly, we have a broad cross-section of thought provoking articles 

in the “Perspectives” section – likely something there that you’d be interested in reading. There is always 

something happening in the training environment, so check out what we have included here from both 

DISAM as well as the Army Command & General Staff College. As with our continually updated online 

Journal, we have a number of contributors to this annual edition.

With the circulation that our annual receives, I must not fail to mention DSCA’s Vision 2020 Strategic 

Plan released in October. You can find it on the DSCA website at http://www.dsca.mil/2014-strategic-planvision-2020. It focuses DSCA and our community on important goals, and accompanying initiatives that 

will help us reach them – thus a work in progress! In VADM Rixey’s own words, “The intention of this 

strategic plan is to leverage DSCA resources both to build on the community’s strengths and address our 

weaknesses in order to better achieve U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.”

Please to let us know if you found this edition particularly helpful in your organization, and any 

recommendations for future editions: gregory.sutton.2@us.af.mil. 

DR. RONALD H. REYNOLDS

 Commandant
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 ii
iii The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Table of Contents

Legislation and Policy

Recap of FY 2015 Security Assistance/Cooperation Legislation ........................................................ 1

By Kenneth Martin, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

The U.S. Export Control System and the Presidential Reform Initiative ............................................ 5

Bridging the Divide: How Can USAID and DOD Integrate Security and Development

More Effectively in Africa? ................................................................................................................. 7

By G. William Anderson, Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs

Next Steps on Egypt Policy ............................................................................................................... 23

The United States and Colombia-Strategic Partners.......................................................................... 25

By Office of the Press Secretary, The White House

Security Cooperation Community

Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands

Utilize to Build Partner Capacity....................................................................................................... 29

Locklear Briefs on Asia-Pacific Partners, Security............................................................................ 31

By Cheryl Pellerin, DOD News, Defense Media Activity

Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability................. 35

U.S. Security Cooperation in Foreign Policy: Looking Past Human Rights Paradigms................... 39

By James P. Toomey, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Christopher Dias, Research Assistant, Lockheed Martin, 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

USCG’s FMS Customers Shifting Focus from Procurement of New Assets

to Enhanced Maintenance Support .................................................................................................... 49

By Ben W. Posil, Office of International Acquisition, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters

A Vision for Global Aviation Enterprise Development ..................................................................... 53

By Mort Rolleston and Lt Col Peter Garretson

U.S. Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division

Leading the Army’s Security Assistance Enterprise .......................................................................... 63

By USASAC Public Affairs

Human Trafficking in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region ......................................................................... 69

By Hannah Collins, Regional Research Assistant, Lockheed Martin Services

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 iv

Perspectives 

The Role of the Export Credit Agency in Supporting Arms Transfers:

A Comparative Analysis .................................................................................................................... 79

Considerations for the Future National Military Strategy Opportunities and Challenges ................ 93

By Christopher Krolikowski, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Lessons Learned - An IG Inspection of Your Security Cooperation Office (SCO)........................... 97

By Dan Dagher, Col, USAF, Director of Security Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey

A Closer Look at Strengthening Security Cooperation Organization Operations 

with a Civilian Workforce ............................................................................................................... 107

By Timothy J. O’Sullivan, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Military Justice Engagement and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): 

A Case Study in the Potential for Defense Institution Building in Austere 

African Environments ..................................................................................................................... 115

By LTC McCullough, USA, Branch Chief, U.S. AFRICOM, J5

Public Opinion and Security Cooperation in the Middle East and Central Asia ............................ 121

By Dr. Carlos Braziel, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Joshua Cummins, Research Assistant, Lockheed Martin, 

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

FMS Training

Mobile Cooperation Training (MCT): Enhancing Engagement ...................................................... 133

By Major Rob Taylor, USA, Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC)

DISAM Online Learning ................................................................................................................. 139

By Lt Col Marc Ferguson, USAF, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

SCIP Improvements, Capabilities, and Training.............................................................................. 143

By John O’Connor, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
1 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Recap of FY 2015 Security 

Assistance/Cooperation 

Legislation

The following summary is a compilation of documents in the public record and 

is provided to the community in single document.

By Kenneth W. Martin, SC/SA Programs Functional Manager

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Later FY 2014 Legislation

•	 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations

Resolution, P.L.113-145, 5 August 2014.

•	 Provides an additional appropriation of $225M of DOD procurement

available through FY 2015 for additional Iron Dome missiles for Israel.

Continuing Resolutions

•	 Continuing Appropriations Resolution,

2015, P.L. 113-164, 19 September 2014.

	 •	 Until other legislation is enacted, extends

FY 2014 authorities and appropriations

into FY 2015 through 11 December 2014.

	 •	 Authorizes the use of FY 2014 S/

FOAA authorities and appropriations

to be obligated at a rate for operations

as necessary to sustain assistance for

Ukraine and independent states of the

Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central

and Eastern Europe to counter external,

regional aggression and influence.

	 	 •	 Inter alia, includes the security assistance programs of Economic Support

Fund (ESF), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

(INCLE), Nonproliferation, AntiTerrorism, Demining, and Related

Programs (NADR), and Foreign

Military Financing Program (FMFP).

	 	 •	 SecDef is authorized, in coordination with SecState, to provide

assistance, including training,

equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian groups and individuals for specified purposes.

•	 Further Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015, P.L. 113-202, 12 December 2014.

•	 Amends P.L. 113-164, extending

FY 2014 authorities and appropriations through 13 December 2014.

•	 Further Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015, P.L. 113-203, 13 December 2014.

•	 Amends P.L. 113-164, extending

FY 2014 authorities and appropriations through 17 December 2014.

FY 2015 Appropriations Legislation

•	 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (CROmnibus),

2015, P.L. 113-235, 16 December 2014.

•	 Funds the government through the

end of FY 2015, except the Department of Homeland Security which is

funded only through 27 February 2015.

•	 In addition to “enduring appropriations,” includes $5.4B of emergency funding to prepare for and respond to the Ebola outbreak,

$73.7B for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), and $6.5B for disaster aid.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 2

Supplies; small-scale construction, not to

exceed$750,000perproject; andTraining.

•	 Codifies the prohibition on use of DOD

funds for assistance to units of foreign security forces that have committed a gross

violationofhumanrightsas10USC2249e.

•	 Repeals Section 1206, NDAA, FY

2006, as amended, P.L. 109-163, 6

January 2006, and codifies it as 10

USC 2282. Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Security Forces.

•	 Authorizes the new DOD 1206 program of training security forces and

associated security ministries of foreign countries to promote respect for

the rule of law and human rights. Program expires 30 September 2020.

•	 Amends Section 1208, NDAA, as

amended, FY 2005, P.L. 108-375, 28

October 2004, supporting special operations to combat terrorism. Extends the

authority through FY 2017 and increases the annual amount to $75,000,000.

•	 Authorizes SecDef to provide assistance

to vetted Syrian opposition groups and

individuals through 31 December 2016.

•	 Authorizes the provision of logistic support for the conveyance of certain defense

articles to foreign forces training with the

U.S. armed forces. The authority is only

during fiscal years 2015 and 2016 and not

to exceed $10,000,000 each fiscal year.

•	 Extends Section 1222, NDAA, FY 2013,

as amended, P.L. 112-239, 2 January 2013,

authorizing the transfer of defense articles

and provide defense services to the military and security forces of Afghanistan

by one year through 31 December 2015.

•	 Authorizes SecDef to provide assistance to Iraq, including Kurdish and

tribal security forces or other local security forces, to counter the Islamic State

in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) through

31 December 2016. $1,618,000,000 in

DOD OCO is authorized to be appropriated for FY 2015 for this program.

•	 Division C of P.L. 113-235 provides FY

2015fundingfortheDepartmentofDefense

to include the following OCO programs:

•	 $4,109,333,000 for the Afghanistan Security Funds Fund (ASFF),

•	 $1,618,000,000 for the requested

Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF),

•	 $1,300,000,000 for the requested Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CPF), and

•	 $175,000,000 for the requested European Reassurance Initiative (ERI)

•	 Division J of P.L. 113-235 provides FY

2015 funding for the Department of

State, Foreign Operations, and Related

Programs (S/FOAA) to include the following security assistance programs:

•	 $2,632,529,000 for enduring ESF

•	 Plus $2,114,266,000 for OCO ESF

•	 $853,055,000 for enduring INCL

•	 Plus $443,195,000forOCOINCLE

•	 $586,260,000 for enduring NADR

•	 Plus $99,240,000 for OCO NADR

•	 $144,993,000 for enduring Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

•	 Plus $328,698,000 for OCO PKO

•	 $106,074,000 for International Military Education and Training (IMET)

•	 $5,014,109,000 for FMFP

•	 Plus $866,420,000 for OCO FMFP

National Defense Authorization Act, FY 2015

•	 Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1915, P.L. 113-291, 19 December

2014, inter alia, to include the following:

•	 Retitles Section 1004, NDAA, FY

1991, as amended, P.L. 101-510, 5 November 1990, to read “Section 1004.

Additional Support for Counter-Drug

Activities and Activities to Counter Transnational Organized Crime.”

•	 Amends Section 1207, NDAA, FY 2012,

P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011, Global

Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to include equipment, including routine maintenance and repair of such equipment;
3 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

•	 Also Amends Section 38(f), AECA,

with a new Section 38(f)(6) regarding

the notification and reporting of MDE

removed from the USML. The President shall ensure that any MDE listed

on the 600 series of the CCL shall continue to be subject to the notification

and reporting requirements as follows:

•	 Section 516(f), FAA, grant EDA,

•	 Section 655, FAA, 1 Feb annual military assistance report,

•	 Section 3(d)(3)(A), AECA, Third

party transfer,

•	 Section 25, AECA, Javits Report,

•	 Section 36(b), AECA, FMS notification,

•	 Section 36(c), AECA, DCS licensing

notification, and

•	 Section 36(d), AECA, DCS technical

assistance or manufacturing licenses.

•	 Amends Section 502B(d), FAA, for the

definition ofsecurity assistance to include

licensing of 600 series items on the CCL.

•	 Amends the AECA notification requirements throughout to include

the HFAC in addition to the Speaker of the House and the SFRC.

•	 United States – Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014, P.L.113-296, 19 December 2014, inter alia, includes the following:

•	 The U.S. will continue to provide Israel with robust security assistance

to include the procurement of the

Iron Dome Missile Defense System,

•	 Stating the sense of Congress that Israel is

a major strategic partner of the U.S.,	

•	 Amends Section 514(b)(2)(A), FAA, extendingtheWarReservesStockpileAuthority (WRSA) with Israel through FY2015,

•	 Congress findsthatIsrael has adopted high

standards in the field of export controls,

•	 Congress also finds that Israel has

declared its unilateral adherence to

the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group,

and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and

•	 Section 2015, NDAA, FY 2012, as

amended, P.L. 112-81, 31 December

2011, is amended to authorize OSC Iraq

to provide training to Iraqi forces during

FY 2015 not to exceed $140,000,000.

Other Recent Legislation

•	 Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, P.L. 

113-272, 18 December 2014, inter alia, authorizes specified defense articles, services,

and training IAW the AECA and the FAA

to the government of Ukraine. Also authorizes annual appropriations to SecState for

$100,000,000 during FY 2015, $125,000,000

during FY 2016, and $125,000,000

during FY 2017 for such assistance.

•	 Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013, P.L. 

113-276, 18 December 2014, authorizes the EDA transfer of two FFG-7 class

ships to Mexico and the FMS transfer of three FFG-7 class ships to Taiwan.

•	 Additionally, amends the AECA with

a new Section 36(i), requiring a thirty day notification prior to a shipment of defense articles upon the joint

request of the chairman and ranking member of the HFAC and SFRC.

•	 Amends Section 516(g)(1), FAA, regarding the annual value of grant EDA

to be transferred to now $500,000,000.

•	 Amends Section 38, AECA, with a

new Section 38(k) to allow the license

granted by State Department also authorizing the export of items subject

to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) if such items are to be

used in or with the defense articles controlled on the USML. A separate Commerce approval will not be required.

•	 Amends Section 38(f), AECA, with a

new Section 38(f)(5) authorizing the

President to approve the transformation

of any MDE listed on the 600 series of the

CCL into a defense article if determined

appropriate to U.S. national interests and

the HFAC and SFRC are notified consistent with Section 36(b)(5)(A), AECA.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 4

•	 Amends Section 36(h), AECA, regarding certification requirements relating to

Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME):

•	 Detailed explanation of Israel’s capacity to address the improved capabilities provided by such sale or export,

•	 Detailed evaluation of (i) how such

sale or export alters the strategic

and tactical balance in the region,

including relative capabilities, and

(ii) Israel’s capacity to respond to

the improved regional capabilities provided by such sale or export,

•	 Identification of any specific new capacity, capabilities, or training that

Israel may require to address the regional or country-specific capabilities provided such sale or export, an

•	 Description of any U.S. security assurances to Israel made, or requested to be made, in connection with,

or as a result of, such sale or export.
5 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

The U .S. Export Control System 

and the Presidential Reform 

Initiative

The 113th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system. The balance between

national security and export competitiveness has 

made the subject of export controls controversial

for decades. Through the Export Administration Act (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act

(AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and other authorities, the

United States restricts the export of defense items 

or munitions; so-called “dual-use” goods and

technology—items with both civilian and military applications; certain nuclear materials and

technology; and items that would assist in the 

proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological

weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to

restrict exports to certain countries on which the 

United States imposes economic sanctions. At

present, the EAA has expired and dual-use controls are maintained under IEEPA authorities.

The U.S. export control system is diffused among 

several different licensing and enforcement

agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies—as well as some military items, are

licensed by the Department of Commerce—munitions are licensed by the Department of State,

and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Treasury.

Administrative enforcement of export controls 

is conducted by these agencies, while criminal

enforcement is carried out by the Department of Commerce, units of the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) and by 

the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Aspects of the U.S . export control system have 

long been criticized by exporters, nonproliferation

advocates, allies, and other stakeholders as being too rigorous, insufficiently

rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or 

any combination of these descriptions. In August

2009, the Obama Administration launched a 

comprehensive review of the U.S. export control

system. In April 2010, then-Defense Secretary 

Robert M. Gates proposed an outline of a new

system based on four singularities:

• a single export control licensing agency 

for dual-use, munitions exports, and

Treasury-administered embargoes.

• a unified control list,

• a single primary enforcement 

coordination agency, and

• a single integrated information 

technology (IT) system

The rationalization of the two control lists has 

been the Administration’s focus to date. Interim

steps have also been taken to create a single IT 

system and to establish an export enforcement

coordination center. No specific proposals have 

been made concerning the single licensing

agency, although elements of a future single system such as the consolidated screening list and

harmonization of certain licensing policies have 

been achieved. The Administration reportedly

has prepared legislation for the final stage of the 

reform effort, but no legislation was introduced

concerning export control reform in 

the first session of the 113th Congress.

In considering the future of the U.S. export 

control system, Congress may weigh the merits of a
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 6

unified export control system—the end result of 

the President’s proposal—or the continuation of

the present bifurcated system by reauthorizing 

the present EAA or writing new legislation. In

doing so, Congress may debate the record of 

the present dual-use system maintained by

emergency authority, the aims and effectiveness 

of the present non-proliferation control regimes,

the maintenance of the defense industrial base, 

and the delicate balance between the maintenance

of economic competitiveness and 

the preservation of national security.

To access the entire report: http://www.fas.

org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf
7 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Bridging the Divide: How Can 

USAID and DOD Integrate Security 

and Development More Effectively in 

Africa?

By G. William Anderson

Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs

Effective collaboration between the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID) and the 

Department of Defense (DOD) is a critical element of 

the U.S. government’s approach to security, governance, 

and development in Africa. USAID assistance and 

DOD security cooperation in Africa currently reflect 

a minimal level of interagency coordination at both 

regional and country levels. A more integrated approach 

in Africa to U.S. security and development objectives 

will support African economic growth and poverty 

reduction; accelerate African progress in reaching its 

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); reduce 

the number and Intensity of conflicts; and block 

the growth of violent extremism among vulnerable 

populations, such as disenfranchised and unemployed 

youth in fast-growing mega-urban centers.1 Such 

progress clearly serves U.S. national interests and 

security objectives in Africa.

This article explores four principal questions: 

(1) what is the potential for USAID and DOD 

collaboration in Africa; (2) what are the challenges 

facing DOD/USAID coordination; (3) what are 

the risks some see in a closer USAID and DOD 

relationship; and (4) what can be done now to improve 

cooperation between USAID and DOD in Africa.

THE POTENTIAL FOR USAID AND DOD 

COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD

The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, 

the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review (QDDR), and the World Bank’s 2011 World 

Development Report (WDR), Conflict, Security, and 

Development, emphasize the interdependence between security and development.

2 To quote former 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “You can’t have development without security, and you can’t have security 

without development.”3 Development assistance orU.S. agencies, like DOD, pursuing 

U.S. national security objectives 

cannot achieve their objectives 

without a foundation of broadbased development, which 

provides long-term stability.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 8

What Would Effective DOD/USAID Collaboration 

Look Like?

Effective USAID and DOD collaboration 

in Africa would have multiple characteristics. The 

first characteristic, a prerequisite, would involve mutual 

understanding of what each agency brings to the 

table in financial resources, capabilities, and field assets. 

Second would come knowledge of what each agency 

is doing regionally and in each country where both

USAID and DOD are present. Experienced field staff 

in multi-year assignments would be able to build long 

term relationships. Third, and based on this broader 

understanding, USAID and DOD would plan together 

at both regional and country levels so that long term 

strategies and individual projects are complementary. 

Fourth, joint coordination of program implementation 

would follow collaborative program design. Fifth, the 

more that monitoring and evaluation of program results 

were undertaken jointly, the more easily both agencies 

could improve designs of DOD security cooperation 

and USAID development assistance programs to exploit 

each agency’s comparative advantages. For example, 

under State Department coordination, USAID’s 

Regional Mission in East and Central Africa (based 

in Nairobi) could lead the development of a mediumterm (3-5 years) regional conflict prevention and 

mitigation strategy focused on current and future

conflicts, involving State, DOD, and USAID staff and 

representatives from African regional institutions 

and other aid donors. Based on that strategy, DOD’s 

regional African Command (AFRICOM) could host 

a week-long workshop of USAID, State, and DOD staff 

from the field and Washington to define regional and 

country-level priorities and responsibilities for moving

forward. The resulting U.S. government and multilateral 

efforts would seek to achieve U.S. government security, 

development, and diplomatic objectives. 

What Opportunities Do USAID and DOD Offer 

Each Other for Effective Collaboration?

DOD. The potential for fruitful collaboration 

between USAID and DOD is substantial. The 

principal contribution that DOD and AFRICOM

ganizations like USAID cannot operate effectively 

without a minimal level of security. Successful security and justice sector reform (SJSR), in which 

both USAID and DOD play major roles, is necessary

to transform local institutions in fragile or conflictprone states over the long-term. This reform process 

“provides citizen security, justice, and jobs” and thus 

deters or mitigates violence.4 U.S. agencies, like 

DOD, pursuing U.S. national security objectives 

cannot achieve their objectives without a foundation of 

broad-based development, which provides long-term stability.

The current policy discussion emphasizes employing all elements of national power to address conflict and crisis situations.5 Although U.S. forces are 

not currently deployed in a combat role on the African 

continent, the United States faces challenges and opportunities in Africa that require the full range of its 

civilian and military capabilities.6 Half of the forty-seven fragile states identified by the Development 

Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Organization for 

Economic Cooperation and Development’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) lie 

in Africa.7 Current conflicts in Mali, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan, which have resulted in 

tens of thousands of internally displaced people illustrates some of the challenges fragile states face.

Pursuing U.S. diplomatic, development, 

and security objectives in Africa, including more 

effective crisis prevention, requires cooperation 

with international partners, host governments, the 

private sector, and civil society.8 The QDDR makes 

a number of recommendations to enable civilian 

agencies like USAID and the State Department to 

lead conflict response and prevention efforts, including 

more integrated security and justice sector reform.9 

Further, the policy guidelines of the recently approved 

U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy make clear that 

U.S. security assistance should complement overall 

U.S. foreign assistance objectives; enhance interagency 

collaboration; promote economic development; and 

undergo rigorous monitoring and evaluation.10
9 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

institutions over the long term and addressing major 

issues such as food security. Further, by improving 

delivery of improved health and education services 

and by helping accelerate inclusive economic growth that

reduces poverty and human suffering, USAID can 

support stability and help prevent conflict. Former 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made this point in 

2010, saying, “Development is a lot cheaper than 

sending soldiers.”13 USAID’s field presence covers 

more than forty-three of the fifty-four countries in 

the AFRICOM area of operation, which includes 

North Africa. USAID implements its assistance

programs through twenty-four bilateral missions and 

four regional USAID missions which support regional 

organizations like the African Union (AU) as well as 

cross-border trade, infrastructure, river basin programs, 

and conflict early warning systems. Three experienced 

USAID Officers, one with a General Officer/Flag 

rank, presently serve at AFRICOM Headquarters. 

Therefore, USAID’s Africa Bureau and its field staff in 

both bilateral and regional USAID missions manage

billions of dollars of assistance, much of which is 

aimed at strengthening institutions critical for citizen 

security, and therefore of direct relevance to DOD and 

U.S. government objectives of security and stability.

Directly relevant to DOD security cooperation 

programs, USAID can quickly field assessment teams 

for strategic planning, to design programs to address 

all aspects of development, including conflict or 

can make to USAID’s foreign assistance efforts lies 

in the security sector through a range of security 

cooperation programs. These programs are aimed at 

building professional militaries that are accountable 

to civilian governments, respect international human 

rights standards, are regarded by local populations as 

protectors, and contribute to regional peacekeeping

missions.11 USAID and its NGO partners cannot 

make much of a difference in people’s lives without 

accountable governance, which includes militaries 

that local populations respect rather than fear. 

Building more professional and accountable militaries 

is an important aspect of comprehensive security and 

justice sector reform, which integrates the capabilities

of “the military, the police, the justice system, and 

other governance and oversight mechanisms,” including 

legislatures and civil society.12

DOD carries out a range of security cooperation 

programs through AFRICOM and its more than 1000 

headquarters staff based in Stuttgart, Germany, service 

component military personnel stationed in Europe, and

additional DOD staff assigned to embassies in Africa. 

The principal long term DOD staff in-country include 

Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs) and Offices of Security Cooperation (OSCs). However, AFRICOM 

does not yet have long-term OSC staff posted in all 

twenty-three African countries with fully-staffed USAID missions. In the absence of an OSC, the DAO is 

responsible for security cooperation, but because of his/

her other duties, usually limits those activities to a few 

high priority programs. These usually consist of foreign 

military sales of U.S. military weapons systems and

training of local military contacts at DOD training facilities.

Except for a few large personnel concentrations 

in Africa like the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn 

of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based in Djibouti, DOD 

staff numbers in individual countries are much 

smaller than USAID mission staff in U.S. embassy 

country teams. Few USAID staff in Washington or 

Africa are aware of the full range of DOD’s security

cooperation programs in their countries.

USAID. USAID contributes to U.S. national 

security objectives in its capacity to strengthen weak 

and fragile states by building accountable governance 

USAID contributes to U.S. 

national security objectives in its 

capacity to strengthen weak and 

fragile states by building 

accountable governance 

institutions over the long term 

and addressing major issues 

such as food security.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 10

by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, 

persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy

processes.”16 Although the 2010 National Security 

Strategy emphasizes the “integration of skills and 

capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, 

so they complement each other and operate seamlessly,” 

multiple obstacles and perceived risks have impeded 

DOD/USAID collaboration in Africa.17

Although both DOD and USAID plan at 

multiple levels—global, regional, and country—little 

coordinated or joint planning takes place. Minimal 

mutual understanding of each other’s programs and 

operations exists, and differences in language, style, 

and culture complicate communication. Senior 

leaders in both agencies have failed to emphasize 

the necessity of expanded cooperation or to change 

agency incentive structures to reward such efforts or 

interagency assignments. In several African countries, 

no long term DOD security cooperation, staff exist 

to maintain effective working relationships with their 

USAID counterparts. The government has moved 

slower than glacially to shift its emphasis from crisis

response to conflict prevention, in which USAID and 

State Department have clear comparative advantages. 

Further, the continuing lack of experienced personnel 

in USAID and other civilian foreign affairs agencies

since the end of the Cold War hampers expanded 

cooperation. Finally, perceived risks of closer DOD/

crisis situations, to provide immediate assistance, or 

to evaluate assistance programs. USAID’s Office of 

Foreign Disaster Assistance and its Office of Transition 

Initiatives can mobilize teams in days to fund disaster 

relief or crisis mitigation efforts, in which DOD personnel 

are often involved.14 USAID’s strategy to address

violent extremism, insurgency, and similar issues in preconflict situations and the underlying analysis that led 

to this strategy show clearly how USAID development 

assistance can and cannot contribute directly or indirectly 

to U.S. government counterinsurgency and stabilization 

efforts that DOD is often implementing.15 In addition, 

USAID bilateral and regional missions possess strong 

planning, implementation, and evaluation capabilities 

across all development sectors as well as in crosscutting areas, such as youth, gender equality, climate 

change, and conflict and crisis response, management, 

and mitigation. Three USAID regional missions in 

Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, and the Joint Sahel 

Programming Cell provide legal, procurement, and 

financial accountability backup to USAID sub-Saharan

bilateral missions and support regional initiatives in 

collaboration with the African Union and other regional 

institutions. Finally, USAID representatives to the 

international donor and NGO communities, can provide 

clear channels for AFRICOM contacts with these 

organizations and networks, if used by AFRICOM.

WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES FACING DOD/

USAID COLLABORATION?

Given the potential, the level of effective 

cooperation between USAID and DOD at the 

regional level (through AFRICOM) and at country 

levels is surprisingly limited. Most effective DOD/

USAID collaboration occurs in specific areas like 

disaster and pandemic preparedness and HIV/AIDS

prevention. Outside of these specific areas, none 

of the characteristics of effective USAID/DOD 

collaboration discussed in the preceding section are

present to any significant degree. The causes of this 

minimal cooperation are both general and specific. As 

former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote, “in 

general, the United States’ interagency tool kit is still a 

hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained 

Perceived risks of closer 

DOD/USAID cooperation, such as 

apprehension by the NGO and wider 

development communities that DOD 

will take over a greater share of 

U.S. foreign assistance, limit efforts 

to work together in both strategic 

and more practical ways.
11 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

and governance, climate change, health, and 

education. These strategies also target areas such as 

youth skills training and employment, conflict early 

warning, food security, and community resilience that 

are directly relevant to AFRICOM regional security 

plans and broader U.S. government foreign policy 

objectives. Moreover, DOD currently carries out little 

effective monitoring and evaluation of its full range of 

security cooperation programs for which information 

is publicly available.19 With better coordination, 

USAID’s experience and systems could enable 

AFRICOM to establish stronger evaluation systems that 

are also compatible with existing USAID monitoring 

efforts.

USAID’s Senior Development Adviser and 

other staff assigned to AFRICOM are available to 

facilitate visits by USAID mission direc- tors, but 

these rarely happen. On such visits, USAID mission 

directors could educate AFRICOM senior leaders 

regarding USAID strategies and programs and 

learn from AFRICOM planning and program staff.

Few such visits are encouraged by senior USAID 

Africa Bureau leaders in Washington. Other lost 

opportunities include incorporation of briefings by 

USAID staff of AFRICOM senior leaders who visit 

countries with USAID missions. Neither USAID 

directors nor AFRICOM senior leaders take advantage 

of the full range of opportunities to initiate coordinated 

or joint planning.

The lack of coordinated and integrated planning 

carries over into existing interagency programs, such 

as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership 

USAID cooperation, such as apprehension by the 

NGO and wider development communities that DOD 

will take over a greater share of U.S. foreign assistance,

limit efforts to work together in both strategic and 

more practical ways.

Common Issues Reported by Senior USAID 

Officers in the Field

Difficulties reported by USAID officers in the 

field refer primarily to DOD’s ponderous bureaucracy 

and to challenges with community-level projects 

funded under DOD’s Humanitarian Assistance Program 

(HAP). The huge difference in scale between DOD’s 

$100,000 to $200,000 village projects versus 

USAID’s national health or education programs 

totaling tens of millions of dollars raises questions

about the usefulness of working with DOD community 

project teams.

Often, OSC civil affairs teams developing a 

community project rotate with little notice and fail 

to brief the incoming DOD team who takes over. One 

senior USAID officer described a ribbon-cutting 

ceremony for an intensive care unit (ICU) in a major 

city refurbished by DOD. Because the USAID 

health staff in-country had not been engaged in 

project planning, the ICU was completely empty with 

no medical equipment, supplies or personnel. It thus 

amounted to an embarrassing, unsustainable white

elephant in a major urban hospital.18

Lack of Coordinated Programming

The fundamental problem that inhibits effective 

USAID/DOD coordination is lack of collaborative 

program planning, execution, monitoring, evaluation, 

and learning from experience. Since both USAID 

and DOD engage in planning and implementing 

programs at multiple levels, their lack of coordination 

is perplexing. AFRICOM develops a comprehensive

regional theater campaign plan, a regional security 

cooperation plan and individual security cooperation 

plans at the country level. USAID’s African Missions 

develop five-year regional or bilateral strategies and 

programs focused on a wide range of development 

sectors, such as private sector development, democracy 

The fundamental problem that 

inhibits effective USAID/DOD 

coordination is lack of 

collaborative program planning, 

execution, monitoring, evaluation, 

and learning from experience.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 12

training course exists to inform either agency’s 

staff on what their counterparts bring to the table. 

The one exception is a brief (one and one-half day) 

Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) 

focused on interagency coordination in disaster 

response situations. USAID’s Office of Foreign 

Disaster Assistance (OFDA) delivers JHOC

courses annually to AFRICOM headquarters and 

component staffs as well as to all other regional DOD 

commands and components around the world.

Such an approach could be expanded to include all 

of USAID and copied by DOD to educate USAID 

staff on the relevant DOD capabilities and resources.

Senior Leader Commitment in AFRICOM Needed 

for Expanded Collaboration

AFRICOM senior leadership has 

not established strong incentives for their 

midlevel headquarters and field staff to build 

collaborative relationships with USAID, engage 

in joint planning and evaluation, or to seriously 

investigate the capabilities of USAID regional and 

bilateral missions to complement DOD’s security 

cooperation programs. When AFRICOM’s

commander or either deputy travel, they do not 

include in their itineraries a substantial time to 

meet with USAID staff, visit relevant project 

sites, or participate in NGO or donor community 

roundtables hosted by the USAID country director.

Although USAID’s Office of Civil-Military 

Cooperation (CMC), OFDA, and OTI have worked to 

expand coordination regarding disasters and complex

emergencies, USAID senior leaders have not made 

DOD/USAID collaboration a high priority nor 

reoriented personnel incentives to encourage USAID 

staff to take initiative in this area. The USAID 

Assistant Administrator for Africa (AA/Africa) 

does not insist on inviting AFRICOM senior leaders 

to African Mission Director Conferences. AA/Africa 

does not instruct Washington senior staff or mission 

directors in Africa to look for ways to include 

AFRICOM staff, nor does AA/Africa request 

AFRICOM or CJTF-HOA to detail staff to each of the 

regional missions in Africa to search for opportunities 

for collaboration. Therefore, neither AFRICOM, 

(TSCTP), the Partnership for Regional Africa 

Counter-Terrorism, and the CJTF-HOA. In these 

counter-terrorism programs, U.S. interagency partners 

struggle to attain even the basic level of “visibility” or 

knowledge of the programs of the other members of 

the partnership. Although guidelines in the new U.S. 

security assistance policy urge greater interagency 

collaboration as well as more “rigorous analysis, 

assessments, and evaluations of impacts and results” 

of security cooperation, implementation of these 

guidelines may be long incoming.20

In DOD’s efforts to build professional militaries 

in Africa, no systematic planning approach is evident. 

No defense sector assessment tool or other form of 

systematic analysis exists that is required and widely 

used to assess the existing problems in an African 

military. No strategic planning method or tool, such 

as USAID’s results framework, is used by DOD to

conceptualize the outline of a strategy for resolving 

priority problems in a particular local military or 

for a long term capacity development effort of the 

defense sector in a particular country with clear 

objectives, outcomes, indicators of progress and targets 

for accomplishment. Therefore, how DOD designs 

individual programs or projects that are part of a larger 

capacity development effort aimed at professionalizing 

an African military remains a mystery. Clearly, DOD 

and AFRICOM could profit from USAID’s capabilities 

and experience in this area.

Who’s On First? Minimal Mutual Awareness and 

Understanding

In general, AFRICOM headquarters and field 

staff continue to have limited understanding of 

how USAID works and of the full range of capabilities possessed by USAID bilateral and regional 

missions in Africa. One senior USAID officer in 

Africa referred to the “total lack of understanding

about what USAID does and how we work.” 

21 This is mirrored by a lack of knowledge and 

appreciation within USAID of DoD’s capabilities 

and resources. Without a clear grasp of what 

both DOD and USAID bring to the table, it is 

difficult for each party to identify the best ways 

to complement the other’s efforts. No in-depth 
13 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Additionally, no DOD field staff are detailed to 

any USAID regional missions in Africa to develop a 

DOD understanding of the capabilities of such missions. Also, with the exception of USAID/Ethiopia, no 

DOD field staff have been detailed to bilateral USAID 

missions in fragile states where a coordinated security and justice sector reform program could experiment

with an Embassy-led unified U.S. strategy, as the U.S. 

ambassador in the Philippines has done with Mindanao, to help prevent or mitigate conflict.24

Insufficient Emphasis on Conflict Prevention versus 

Response

Given recent conflicts in Mali, the Central African 

Republic (CAR), and South Sudan, prevention of such 

crises versus responding after they have happened 

should command high priority for DOD, USAID, 

and State. Both DOD and USAID pay some attention to conflict prevention in their work at the country level and regional levels. At least two of the three 

USAID Africa Regional Missions work on conflict 

early warning and mitigation with regional African organizations like the African Union and the Economic 

Community of West African States (ECOWAS). One

of AFRICOM’s “Four Cornerstones” is “prevention 

of future conflicts.25 In Washington, USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) 

pioneered the development of a conflict assessment 

framework (CAF), which was further developed by the 

State Department for use as an interagency tool, and 

developed a series of nine toolkits addressing land,

women, and youth with concrete options for addressing 

causes of conflict. Recent research suggests that assuring food security for vulnerable regions and populations, in which USAID enjoys strong capability, can 

play a major role in preventing violence.26

Yet, other than the overcommitted National Security Staff (NSS) in the White House, no U.S. government department or agency possesses a clear leadership role for conflict and crisis prevention; has authority 

to act within the Executive Branch; or can commit the 

U.S. government in the international community.27 

Notwithstanding the creation of a new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) in the State De

nor USAID’s Africa Bureau in Washington nor

field staff, get a clear message from their main 

boss that they should put a priority on seeking 

innovations in joint planning, implementation, or 

evaluation with their opposite agency’s colleagues.

“This Won’t Get Me Promoted”

Weak incentives for interagency assignments 

have generally discouraged both DOD and USAID 

officers from pursuing assignments with each

other, with State, in both regional and functional 

bureaus, or in the National Security Staff. This 

lack of strong incentives is also true for USAID 

senior development advisor (SDA) jobs, which 

are reportedly derided by USAID staff as “not 

real jobs” compared to USAID jobs in the field.22 

No explicit guidance to USAID promotion panels 

exists to require interagency assignments, such 

as as SDAs to DOD regional commands, for 

promotion to senior ranks. Therefore experienced 

USAID foreign service officers (FSOs) are reluctant

to bid on such positions for fear of losing ground 

in their careers. Similarly, DOD staff who accept 

assignments as heads of field OSCs are considered

to have ruled themselves out for consideration 

for promotion to Flag rank (General or Admiral).

Lack of Long-term DOD Field Staff

Although progress has occurred over the last two 

years, several countries in Africa remain without DOD 

OSCs. While this expansion of OSC offices represents progress and reduces by half the number of 

countries with USAID missions that lacked such 

long-term OSC staffs in 2010, five countries with 

USAID missions still remain without long-term OSC

staff—Namibia, Zambia, Malawi, Benin, and Madagascar. The presence of long-term DOD staff in OSCs 

makes it possible for USAID and DOD staff to work 

on a continuing basis to link security and development 

cooperation more closely.23 When country teams do 

not include long-term OSC staff, USAID missions 

cannot coordinate or plan effectively with DOD incountry.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 14

Nobody’s Home in USAID

Another fundamental obstacle for effective 

collaboration between USAID and DOD has been the 

weakness of USAID, as well as the State Department

and other U.S. civilian foreign affairs agencies in 

staffing, programming, and management systems. 

From 1990 until 2008, USAID lost more than 40 

percent of its staff, even though foreign aid budgets 

and the number of USAID missions were increasing, 

especially during the last Bush administration. As staffing 

declined, USAID’s basic programming systems degraded 

to a dangerous level, and in 2006, the agency lost 

its Washington-level budgeting and policy planning 

capability to the new Foreign Assistance Bureau (the 

F Bureau) in the State Department. Those functions 

were not re-established at USAID until 2011. Over 

the same two decade period, the State Department 

suffered similar but not as extreme staffing losses,

and benefited from a substantial boost in hiring in the 

early years under Secretary of State Colin Powell. 30

Since 2008, USAID has built its staffing 

levels and technical capabilities by hiring 850 

new Foreign Service staff under the Development

Leadership Initiative (DLI). Following the arrival of 

Administrator Rajiv Shah in early 2010, the agency 

embarked on a series of ambitious reforms known 

as USAID Forward, which included reviving basic 

programming systems and expanding training of staff 

in these systems, re-establishing budget and policy 

offices, and issuing an agency policy framework for 

2011 to 2015. Nevertheless, rebuilding technical staff 

with program expertise will continue for several years, 

assuming adequate funding levels.. In addition, although 

USAID’s human capital and program management 

capabilities are rapidly improving, its overall weakness 

over more than ten years has meant that its ability 

to engage robustly with DOD at all levels, play its

appropriate role in the field, and protect its prerogatives 

has been weak. This weakness has compromised 

the achievement of U.S. security, foreign policy, and 

development objectives in Africa and other regions. 

Current budget pressures could again cripple USAID 

and the State Department and reverse current efforts to 

rebuild civilian capabilities, especially in USAID.31

partment, no coherent U.S. government strategy to prevent crises and conflicts yet exists.28 Despite multiple 

references to conflict prevention in the 2010 National

Security Strategy and the QDDR, most of the discussion 

on conflict in both these documents refers to response to 

post-conflict situations, not prevention of them.

The World Development Report 2011: 

Conflict, Security, and Development concludes that 

“Building capable and legitimate institutions to 

deliver citizen security, address injustice, and create 

employment is key to breaking ...cycles of violence” 

which takes a generation.29 Building such institutions 

requires the commitment of local governments, private 

sector and civil society combined with help from the

international community. This meansthat in addition to 

clear interagency roles and responsibilities a coherent

U.S. government conflict and crisis prevention 

strategy must also engage bilateral and multilateral 

partners. Until it has its own house in order, the U.S.

government will lack credibility in the international 

community on multilateral prevention efforts.

Other than the overcommitted 

National Security Staff (NSS) in the 

White House, no U.S. government 

department or agency possesses a 

clear leadership role for conflict and 

crisis prevention; has authority to act 

within the Executive Branch; or can 

commit the U.S. government in the 

international community. 

Notwithstanding the creation of a new 

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization 

Operations (CSO) in the State 

Department, no coherent U.S. 

government strategy to prevent crises 

and conflicts yet exists. 
15 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

These Folks Don’t Talk or Act Like Me

In spite of some significant similarities, USAID 

and DOD also differ widely in language, style, 

and culture. For example, the term “humanitarian 

assistance” to USAID means short-term assistance 

to populations afflicted by natural disasters or other 

emergencies. For DOD, the same term means short 

term assistance to populations afflicted by natural disasters 

or other emergencies. For DOD, the same term means 

civic assistance projects, such as schools, health 

clinics, water, and sanitation projects, which for 

USAID are often part of longer-term development 

assistance programs in education and health.32 

Moreover, USAID focuses on growth through 

long-term capacity development in institutions and 

sustainable changes in socio-economic systems. 

DOD focuses on security threats, whose imperatives 

usually favor quick results. USAID field staff 

generally serve four years in a country, while DOD 

generally deploys its personnel in short-term teams for 

engagement at the country level comprises short-term 

teams arriving to conduct military exercises, training, 

or community-level projects.

USAID missions maintain a large country footprint, the majority of which are foreign service nationals. Most USAID staff have substantial cross- cultural, 

area, and language expertise. The number of DOD staff 

in individual OSCs are quite small compared to total USAID mission staff. DOD lacks enough knowledgeable field staff with country expertise and cultural 

sensitivity. This training or exercise activities. With 

few exceptions, DOD increases USAID’s burden of 

working with DOD on community projects and other 

security cooperation activities that relate to USAID assistance. Put simply, USAID’s preferred operating style 

is to examine the problems to be addressed, then build 

agreement for the proposed solution among stakeholders in country. DOD’s normal style is to respond immediately to a problem in some way, a style which could 

be described as “Don’t just stand there; do something!” 

If not reviewed by experienced USAID staff, DOD’s

“action first” style can result in community, ethnic, or religious tensions and unsustainable projects.33 Finally, 

USAID uses empirically-based strategic and program 

planning, including with in-country assessments and 

problem analyses. While DOD has many experienced 

planners, it employs top-down strategic planning derived from theater campaign and security cooperation

plans. DOD’s planning systems for humanitarian assistance and security cooperation are less robust than 

USAID’s revamped planning systems in the areas of 

systematic assessment, strategic planning and project design, monitoring and evaluation, and learning.

None of these differences by themselves prevents expanded collaboration between USAID 

and DOD in Africa, but their cumulative effect is 

complicates cooperation. Successful collaboration 

requires that each party understand how the other 

works, its objectives, and its language. Disagreements on approaches to problems must surface 

early and be resolved transparently, even if issues 

have to be raised to higher-level decision-makers 

in both agencies. Such comprehension requires effort, training, and sufficient time working together.

CONCERNS AND RISKS OF USAID/DOD 

COLLABORATION

Concerns about greater collaboration 

between AFRICOM and USAID emanate from 

within and outside the U.S. government. They include

concerns about the militarization of U.S. foreign 

assistance; uncoordinated security and justice 

sector reform efforts; the risk of DOD assuming 

more responsibility non-military foreign assistance; 

and the hazards for the United States if it fails to link 

security and development efforts in Africa effectively.

Apprehension from NGOs and the 

Development Community

NGOs and the development community fear 

that greater collaboration in Africa between DOD 

and USAID will mean that U.S. foreign assistance 

will be perceived as militarized, and that DOD 

community assistance projects will be uncoordinated 

with USAID, poorly designed, unsustainable, and 

exacerbate ethnic or regional tensions. NGOs also 

fear that aid workers operating in conflict-prone 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 16

environments may be threatened if DOD HAP 

teams and NGO staff are operating in the same areas.

While these are serious concerns, those who raise 

these points often are not aware that U.S. economic 

assistance resources from USAID and other civilian 

assistance agencies allocated for Africa dwarf the 

level of AFRICOM funding for security cooperation 

programs of all kinds in Africa. AFRICOM’s budget 

for all security cooperation programs in Africa, which

comes from different appropriations accounts than 

economic assistance, totaled less than $500 million for 

fiscal year (FY) 2010.34 By comparison, total U.S. 

economic assistance committed to Africa in 2010 was 

$6.9 billion and rose to $7.2 billion in FY 2011. This 

means that fears by NGOs and the larger development 

community that DOD’s security cooperation and 

related assistance budget for Africa will overwhelm 

civilian-managed economic assistance are exaggerated.

DOD funding for civic assistance programs, 

which tend to be hot buttons for critics of 

AFRICOM foreign assistance, totaled less than 

$15 million in 2010. Compared to USAID budgets 

in health, education, and water, AFRICOM funding 

for community projects represents a tiny proportion of 

total U.S. economic assistance to Africa. Nevertheless, 

it is true that DOD civic assistance teams have had 

problems in the design, placement, and sustainability of 

community assistance projects in Africa.35 In addition, 

DOD objectives for access and influence in particular 

geographic areas may conflict at times with USAID’s 

impact and sustainability objectives. If activities in the 

same area work at cross purposes, this can complicate

USAID relationships with host country partners.36

Current DOD guidance for civic assistance 

programs directs AFRICOM and DOD field staff 

to consult with USAID in the early stages of 

programs to identify and design activities and to “seek 

concurrence from the USAID Mission Director prior 

to the Chief of Mission... for approval.”37 USAID 

and Washington staff agree that coordination with 

DOD has improved on community assistance activities 

of all kinds.38 Although as noted earlier, USAID 

officials have experienced problems in coordinating 

with DOD OSC staff and civil affairs teams on 

individual projects, past experience demonstrates 

that this can be done successfully with some effort.

In one case in a remote Sahelian town, 

DOD teams worked with USAID and the State 

Department on a joint community project. DOD 

provided a substantial quantity of vegetable seeds, 

and USAID provided farmer training along with a 

new water pump. The U.S. ambassador visited the 

town with USAID and DOD several times to support 

the townspeople who had initiated the project.39 A 

second case involving interagency collaboration 

on an East African project aimed at easing cross 

border pastoralist tensions. The U.S. ambassador and 

USAID were set on limiting AFRICOM’s civil affairs 

teams to security issues, which required a high level 

of labor-intensive oversight. The USAID mission’s 

new country five year strategy includes a specific 

objective for whole of government work to bring peace 

and security to the same regions with AFRICOM’s 

civil affairs teams focused on security issues.40

These two examples suggest that many 

concerns with AFRICOM community assistance 

projects can be dealt with by robust engagement 

by USAID with DOD. In the two cases cited 

above, senior USAID and State Department 

officers exerted such pressure with positive results.

Risk of Uncoordinated USAID and DOD 

Assistance Efforts in Fragile States

If budget reduction pressures intensify over 

the next few years, the political will of the executive 

branch and Congress to continue to rebuild USAID 

and other civilian foreign affairs agencies over 

the long term may ebb. If the U.S. government 

cannot stay the course to rebuild these institutions, 

Congress and the executive branch may again ask 

DOD to take responsibility for a larger share of 

U.S. foreign assistance. If asked, DOD will accept. 

However, the costs will be great. Having DOD 

take on a greater responsibility in development and 

other economic assistance will dilute DOD’s focus 

on security challenges. Greater DOD involvement 

in economic assistance will send a message to 

the international community that U.S. foreign 
17 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

assistance is becoming militarized. DOD lacks the 

capability, skills, and modes of operation to plan 

and implement long term development assistance 

and, especially, to develop sustainable institutional

capacity outside of the defense sector.41 As former 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates freely admitted 

in a public roundtable with Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah, 

development is “not our (DOD’s) core competency.”42

WHAT TO DO NOW TO IMPROVE DOD/

USAID COLLABORATION

Although some aspects of the DOD/USAID 

working relationship require high level policy changes, 

important actions can be taken now at the level of 

AFRICOM and USAID’s Africa Bureau to advance 

effective collaboration. Senior leaders in AFRICOM 

and USAID’s Africa Bureau should work together to 

improve coordination in areas of complementarity. 

State, DOD, and USAID should initiate a joint effort 

to assess and use lessons from assistance to fragile 

states, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Zimbabwe, 

Mali, DRC-Congo, especially those involving conflict.

In planning, DOD and USAID together with State, 

should involve each other in each agency’s strategic 

and project planning and carry out joint monitoring 

and evaluation in areas of mutual interest. To improve 

coordination on community projects, USAID should 

employ “robust engagement” to make sure DOD 

community projects are consistent with larger USAID 

programs. AFRICOM and USAID’s Africa Bureau, 

including USAID missions in Africa should expand 

their efforts to increase their mutual awareness 

and understanding of what each agency brings to 

the table. To encourage staff from both agencies 

to link up creatively, DOD and USAID should 

strengthen organizational and personnel incentives 

for interagency collaboration versus bureaucratic 

competition. Finally, so that USAID missions have 

long-term DOD staff to work with, DOD should

expand the number of OSCs to the remaining 

countries with USAID missions but which lack OSCs 

and detail AFRICOM headquarters staff to each of the 

three USAID regional missions and the Sahel Joint 

Planning Cell to educate AFRICOM headquarters 

and field staff on how USAID regional capabilities 

can contribute to DOD objectives and vice versa.

Senior Leaders Must Lead and Persist

Under the coordination of the State Department, 

USAID’s AA for Africa and the AFRICOM Commander should launch a joint initiative for improved 

collaboration at AFRICOM headquarters, USAID missions, and in country teams. The first step would be a 

joint decision message to their respective AFRICOM 

and USAID senior staff. That joint directive would

state that the AFRICOM Commander and the USAID AA/AFR expect to see immediate, continuing 

progress in expanding DOD/USAID collaboration in 

Africa in coordinated programming and in increased 

mutual awareness and understanding. The joint message would announce a set of actions to improve incentives for expanded partnership and personnel incentives to bolster this effort. The AFRICOM commander 

would assign his two deputies and other senior leaders 

to supervise progress, emphasize the importance of 

this initiative to DOD field staff, and report at each

senior staff meeting on their plans and progress. USAID’s AA/AFR would act similarly with regard to senior staff in Washington and with African missions. 

Both AFRICOM’s commander and USAID’s AA/AFR 

would persist over time in pressing forward this priority.

Learn from Experience

Many cases exist of fragile states in which USAID 

and DOD have both provided substantial assistance 

over long periods. These countries include Mali, Ivory 

Coast, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Chad, Nigeria, 

Liberia, and others. To inform future coordination, 

joint USAID, DOD, and State assessment teams 

should analyze cases and identify lessons, especially in

the interrelated areas of security, governance, and justice 

sector reform and as well as in combatting violent 

extremism and insurgency. USAID development 

assistance has a major role to play in all these areas.43

In areas of successful DOD/USAID 

collaboration, such as disaster assistance, pandemic 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 18

planning, preparedness, and response, and HIV

prevention and supportive care, especially in fragile 

states, USAID, DOD, and the State Department 

should jointly evaluate results by country, synthesize 

best practices, and advance collaboration accordingly.

Coordinate Programming

DOD’s and USAID’s assistance programs 

both start with planning, and each agency undertakes 

strategic and project planning at several levels. In both 

its regional and country security cooperation plans 

AFRICOM should engage USAID regional and 

bilateral mission staff more broadly in conferences 

and as part of the teams that develop such plans. 

USAID regional and bilateral missions should invite 

AFRICOM headquarters and field staff to participate 

in the development of their five-year regional and

Country Development Cooperation Plans (RDCSs 

and CDCSs)—and in their regional and bilateral 

project designs, which bring their strategies to 

life. The State Department new strategic planning 

processes, which include a multi-year integrated 

cooperation strategy (ICS) for each country team

and a security and justice strategy, could support more 

collaborative planning between DOD and USAID.

Yet planning is only one step in programming and 

must be followed by program execution, monitoring, 

evaluation, and learning from experience. Broadened 

DOD/USAID partnerships in these other programming 

steps are essential as well because these steps constitute 

a cycle in which feedback from one step affects 

other steps. Joint program monitoring and evaluation 

encourages greater awareness and understanding 

of each other’s relative strengths and weaknesses 

and contributes better approaches for new activities.

EMPLOY ROBUST ENGAGEMENT

As a tool in effective coordination, USAID 

mission management and staff should employ robust 

engagement in coordinating activities with DOD—

with the OSC staff assigned to their countries, with 

the short-term civil-affairs teams who design and 

implement community activities, or with both. Robust 

engagement means that the USAID mission director 

and his/her staff and the U.S. ambassador oversee DOD 

activities closely from planning to execution; raise 

issues; and object, if necessary, to DOD plans and 

actions on the ground that do not meet basic standards 

of interagency coordination or of sustainability. Such 

assertive action is expected and generally welcomed in 

DOD’s bureaucratic culture, both by DOD field 

staff and especially by senior AFRICOM staff. If the 

USAID mission director does not succeed in obtaining 

needed adjustments to a DOD project, he/she should raise 

the issue to the ambassador. If such interventions do 

not work, then the USAID director and the ambassador 

should raise their issues to their superiors in Washington.

Expand Mutual Awareness and Understanding

Once senior leaders like the commander of 

AFRICOM and USAID’s AA/AFR clearly direct 

their staffs to work more closely together, many

other actions can follow. Although each of USAID’s 

four regional missions in Africa work intensively on 

conflict early warning, food security, and trafficking 

in persons, few AFRICOM senior leaders take the 

time, during visits to countries housing such regional 

staffs to obtain a sense of their capabilities in areas 

like conflict early warning or governance and resources. 

Similarly, few USAID regional mission directors add 

to their travel to or from the United States a twoday visit to AFRICOM headquarters to (1) brief 

AFRICOM senior staff on his/her regional programs 

and relation to AFRICOM’s security cooperation 

efforts and (2) learn how his/her mission could work 

more cooperatively with DOD staff in his/her region.

When the AFRICOM commander or other senior 

staff visit a country with a USAID mission, his 

schedule should always include a USAID briefing 

on its programs relevant to security issues, a site visit 

to a relevant USAID-funded program, and a roundtable 

discussion, arranged by the USAID director, with 

representatives of the NGO or donor communities. 

When USAID bilateral mission directors are 

traveling through Europe to or from their posts, they 

should schedule a two-day stopover in Stuttgart to brief 

AFRICOM planning and program staff on their current
19 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

USAID country development strategy and programs 

and receive similar briefings on AFRICOM assistance 

and other events coming up in their country. Currently, 

these simple types of coordination occur because senior

management of both DOD and USAID do not make 

clear such collaborative efforts are a high priority.

Other necessary actions to improve mutual 

understanding more systematically include 

introductory training, both online and in person, for 

each other on their agency’s resources, capabilities, and 

field assets. The existing USAID Joint Humanitarian 

Operations Course (JHOC) should be expanded to 

cover all that USAID does and offered annually to 

AFRICOM headquarters and service component staff 

as well as to AFRICOM’s field staff. AFRICOM should 

do the same to educate USAID staff on relevant DOD 

capabilities and resources. AFRICOM and USAID’s 

Africa Bureau should invite each other more frequently 

and in greater numbers to participate in conferences 

and exercises, and include in the agendas of such 

meetings ample time to explore improved coordination.

Strengthen Personnel and Career Incentives

Joint efforts to coordinate program planning and 

implementation, learning from experience, improve 

mutual understanding, and other actions by large 

numbers of DOD and USAID staff will not take 

place unless organizational and career incentives 

support such actions. Most people in organizations 

behave most of the time in ways that support their career 

interests. Although public advocacy by USAID and 

DOD leaders for broader collaboration is a necessary 

step, USAID and DOD staff, including active duty 

military personnel with a more clearly defined top-down 

chain of command, will look beyond statements 

by leaders directing them to collaborate with each 

more actively for strong evidence that promotions,

onward assignments, awards and increased pay will 

follow such statements by their superiors. To strengthen 

incentives for coordination, AFRICOM and USAID 

leaders should also highlight the importance of 

interagency assignments and insist that employee work 

objectives and personnel evaluations demonstrate 

achievements in broader DOD/USAID and other 

interagency collaboration. For example, 

USAID could revise promotion precepts 

that determine staff promotion rankings and 

require successful interagency experience for 

consideration for senior management positions.

Deploy Staff to Create Field Partnerships

Even with the actions mentioned above, 

USAID and DOD cannot build collaborative 

relationships if they don’t have partners over 

time. AFRICOM should immediately request 

additional resources for establishing OSCs 

in the five African countries that have USAID 

missions but still lack OSCs and sufficient longterm DOD security cooperation staff to work 

closely over time with their USAID colleagues. 

For all USAID missions with AFRICOM 

OSCs, including regional missions, USAID

directors should place a high priority on 

finding creative opportunities for partnerships 

and joint programming with DOD staff, such 

as joint strategic planning, program design and 

evaluation. These could include taking DOD

staff on USAID field trips and project site visits, 

or rotating USAID staff in the OSC office 

and OSC staff through USAID mission offices.

To strengthen incentives for 

coordination, AFRICOM and 

USAID leaders should also 

highlight the importance of 

interagency assignments and insist 

that employee work objectives and 

personnel evaluations demonstrate 

achievements in broader 

DOD/USAID and other 

interagency collaboration.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 20

In South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, and 

Senegal, where USAID has regional missions 

and, in Senegal, the Joint Sahel Planning Cell, 

AFRICOM should detail for at least six months 

one mid-level AFRICOM staff officer to each 

of the four regional USAID offices learn as 

much as possible regarding regional USAID 

programs and capabilities that is relevant to 

AFRICOM programs. Those AFRICOM 

detailees would then return to AFRICOM 

and be expected share their experience and 

recommendations to AFRICOM senior leaders 

for advancing collaboration with USAID.

LOOKING AHEAD: CONFRONTING 

UNDERLYING ISSUES

Much can be done by AFRICOM and 

USAID’s Africa Bureau to deepen coordination 

under existing authorities. While significant, 

these actions are limited. Their extent depends 

on the continuing commitment of the AFRICOM 

Commander and the USAID AA/AFR, whose 

periods of service rarely last beyond three years. 

Nevertheless, a vigorous joint effort could establish 

a model for their successors to emulate and blaze the 

trail for other DOD regional commands and USAID 

regional Bureaus. However, improving results on both 

development and security objectives in Africa over 

the longer term can occur only if (1) U.S. conflict 

and crisis prevention efforts in Africa improve in 

effectiveness and (2) rebuilding of U.S. civilian 

foreign affairs agencies, especially USAID, continues.

Enhancing U.S. Conflict Prevention Capabilities

Formulating a cohesive U.S. government 

conflict and crisis prevention strategy supported by an 

interagency framework with clear authority, roles, and 

responsibilities is a prerequisite for effective conflict 

prevention in Africa over the long term. Prevention 

allows sustainable development efforts to continue 

and “is a lot cheaper than sending solders,” to quote

former Defense Secretary Robert Gates.44 Focusing on 

prevention in Africa is crucial because Africa’s high 

number of fragile states, and exposure to droughts 

makes the continent more vulnerable to conflict.

Preceding fundamental changes at the 

Washington level, more effective U.S. government 

crisis prevention in Africa can occur through improved 

coordination between AFRICOM and USAID 

under the coordination of the State Department. 

Beginning with a few priority countries, AFRICOM, 

USAID, and State should develop integrated plans 

to (1) identify and address causes of conflict, (2) 

combat violent extremism and insurgency; (3) 

strengthen accountable governance; and (4) accelerate

comprehensive security and justice sector reform. For 

this effort, USAID would draw on its Africa Bureau 

and its specialized Washington staff in the Bureau for 

Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance 

or DCHA; State, its Africa Bureau and its new 

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations; and 

AFRICOM, its relevant headquarters and field staff.

The European Union’s (EU) interest in 

cooperation on security and development in Africa 

under the US-EU Development Dialogue, early 

engagement with the EU and with like-minded EU 

member statesshould contribute to the choice of priority 

countries in Africa and lead to a robust multilateral 

dimension in the U.S. government conflict prevention

strategy.45 In the field, these USAID/AFRICOM 

efforts should be under-taken in coordination 

with the U.S. ambassador and embassy staff.

For the U.S. government as a whole, the 

president should designate a lead federal agency for 

conflict prevention, provide necessary authority, and 

request sufficient resources for the new responsibility.

Rebuilding and Maintaining Civilian Foreign 

Affairs Agencies

Ultimately, USAID success in building a 

collaborative relationship with AFRICOM and DOD 

field staff in Africa requires sufficient experienced 

USAID staff in the field of appropriate rank so that 

AFRCOM views USAID as a credible partner on 

the ground. It also requires that the AFRICOM 

commander take his relationship with USAID 

seriously and move forward in building a closer 

relationship with USAID field missions, using the 

USAID senior development advisor on his staff. For 
21 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

DOD, a more productive DOD/USAID relationship

requires an expanding number of DOD field staff 

who have area expertise and cultural sensitivity in 

working with partner governments and communities. 

DOD field staff with such expertise will have 

higher credibility with USAID mission staff.

In this period of emphasis on budget cuts, 

the ongoing process of rebuilding civilian foreign 

affairs institutions is threatened. The political

struggle over budget levels will be fought in Washington, 

but DOD, USAID, and the State Department 

must all strive to protect civilian agency 

budgets for Africa. Without continuing, long

term rebuilding of civilian agencies, the United 

States cannot succeed in advancing its security, 

development, and diplomatic objectives in Africa.46

Effective collaboration between USAID and 

AFRICOM is a fundamental cardinal building block 

for a successful U.S. security and development strategy 

in Africa. Through a more integrated approach, the 

United States can demonstrate more effective conflict 

prevention and response in Africa and other regions, 

which will yield great benefits. Reduced conflict will 

enable African leaders and institutions to reap the 

benefits of Africa’s impending demographic transition, 

accelerate inclusive growth and poverty reduction, 

strengthen accountable justice and governance, and block 

violent extremism among vulnerable populations.47 

While improving the lives of millions in Africa, these 

developments will also serve fundamental U.S. interests. 

_____________________________________

About the Author

G. William Anderson is a Visiting Professor of Practice at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs and a recent USAID Representative 

to the European Union. Mr. Anderson is a former 

USAID Senior Foreign Service Officer, with longterm overseas service in Senegal, DRC-Congo, 

Tanzania, and Eritrea, and as the Director of the 

Office of East and South Asia in USAID’s Asia 

Near East Bureau. He served as the USAID Senior Development Advisor to U.S. European Command and to U.S. African Command in its initial 

stage. Mr. Anderson is also a principal and founding member of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, a reform coalition of international 

development and foreign policy practitioners, and 

private sector organizations. The author wishes to 

express his thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Jon Giese 

(USAF-Ret.) for his contributions to an earlier draft 

of this article and for his encouragement to think 

more creatively about DOD/USAID collaboration.

In the interest of brevity, the author’s ENDNOTES 

can be accessed at: 

http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/38-1_Anderson1.pdf
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 22
23 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Next Steps on Egypt Policy

[Prepared]Testimony by A. Elizabeth Jones, 

Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Statement Before the House Foreign 

Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, October 

29, 2013 - Chairman Royce, Ranking Member 

Engel, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting us to discuss next steps on U.S. policy toward Egypt this 

morning. This is a summary of my full statement.

Egypt and the U.S.-Egypt relationship 

matter to us. Egypt is a vital partner. Our longstanding partnership is predicated on shared 

interests: Promoting a stable and prosperous Egypt, securing regional peace and maintaining peace with Israel, and countering extremism and terrorism throughout the region.

This partnership has brought the United 

States significant benefits: as you have each 

mentioned, easy transit through the Suez Canal; military overflights that facilitate our activities; and the counterterrorism and counterproliferation gains that come from Egypt’s 

efforts to control its borders with Gaza and 

security challenge countries like Libya.

There is no doubt that a reliable Egyptian partner is in U.S. strategic interests. We 

firmly believe that the best, most reliable 

Egyptian partner is a democratic Egypt. A sustainable, inclusive, nonviolent transition to a 

democratically elected government will give 

Egypt the best opportunity to succeed. And 

Egypt’s success can be the region’s success.

Since the January 2011 revolution, 

Egypt’s history has centered on what Egyptians want for democracy: political and economic reform and how their government can 

meet their aspirations. Following the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and 

Justice Party won the parliamentary elections. 

And in 2012, President Morsi was voted into 

power, an election viewed as free and fair.

However, Mr. Morsi proved unwilling or 

unable to govern inclusively, alienating many 

Egyptians. Responding to the desires of millions 

of Egyptians who believed the revolution had 

taken a wrong turn and you saw a return to security and stability after years of unrest, the interim 

government replaced the Morsi government.

But the interim government has also made 

decisions inconsistent with inclusive democracy. 

We were troubled by the July 3 events and the 

violence of mid-August. The decision to remove 

Morsi, excessive force used against protesters in 

August; restrictions on the press, civil society 

and opposition parties; the continued detention of 

many members of the opposition; and the extension of the state of emergency have been troubling.

We have also consistently and strongly 

condemned the heinous violence and acts of 

terror against Coptic churches and the Coptic 

community. At the same time, we have condemned the continuing attacks on the security forces in the Sinai and elsewhere in Egypt.

After the events of mid-August, the president said we could not continue business as usual 

with respect to our assistance. That decision -- after careful review, we recently announced a recalibration of this assistance. That decision ensures 

that assistance is directed towards core U.S. interests, including helping Egypt secure its borders 

in the Sinai, preventing the flow of weapons into 

Gaza that threaten Israel and countering terrorists seeking to attack U.S. and Egyptian interests.

We will continue military training and education as well as a sustainment of certain U.S.-

origin military systems. However, we are holding 

the delivery of several major weapons systems: 

F-16s, M1A1 tank kits, Harpoon missiles and 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 24

ests in Egypt and the region, we need to have 

the ability to continue U.S. assistance to Egypt.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Engel 

and distinguished members of this committee, 

we want to work closely with Congress to obtain the flexibility needed to continue our assistance relationship with Egypt consistent with 

the law and our national interest and to encourage progress on Egypt’s democratic transition.

Apache helicopters. We will work to provide 

economic support that directly benefits Egyptian 

people, including in the areas of health and private 

sector development but are not moving forward 

with any further cash transfers to the government.

We will review these decisions informed 

by credible progress on the interim government’s political roadmap toward a sustainable, 

inclusive and peaceful transition to democracy. 

This recalibration reflects our effort to advance 

U.S. core interests in Egypt and the region 

while impressing upon the Egyptian leadership the importance of making progress toward 

a democratic transition, progress we believe 

the Egyptian people want. Our decision is designed to use our assistance to encourage such 

a transition and a strong private-sector- led 

economy that can reinforce political stability.

We welcome the interim government’s 

commitment to a political roadmap to restore a democratically elected civilian government. We continue to urge the government to be inclusive, respect the rights of all 

Egyptians and respect the rule of law, freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, the 

role of civil society and religious freedom.

Beyond issues related to the roadmap, the 

United States has stayed firm to its principles and 

interests of advancing civil society engagement 

by encouraging the passage of an NGO law that 

conforms to international standards and Egypt’s 

own international commitments. We have registered concerns over the June trial verdict 

against NGO workers and have urged redress.

We have also raised our concerns 

about state of emergency, which the government recently announced would not be extended when it expires on November 14.

On the economy, we are encouraging the interim government to maintain economic stability, 

help restore growth and investment and create jobs.

Egypt has an enormous opportunity now 

to pursue the aspirations of the 2011 revolution and to provide for the needs of the Egyptian people. The United States wants to help. To 

do that and to actively advance our core inter-
25 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

The United States and ColombiaStrategic Partners

The United States and Colombia – Strategic Partners. Today President Barack Obama 

hosted Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos at the White House. Their visit underscored 

the close ties between the United States and 

Colombia, founded upon shared democratic 

values, deepening economic ties, and a long 

history of shared security goals. The visit highlighted our cooperation in the following areas:

Economic and Social Opportunities

•	 Free Trade Agreement:The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement continues to

benefit both nations.U.S. exports to Colombia

increased by nearly 19 percent in the first year,

while Colombia diversified its export base with

more than 1,300 companies exporting goods to

theUnitedStatesforthefirsttime.Both countries’

businesses and economies are benefitting from

eliminated or lowered tariffs and increased trade 

opportunities, and both are committed to ensuring all aspects of the agreement are fully observed 

in order to maximize opportunities for growth.

•	 Labor Action Plan: The United States

and Colombia continue to work on implementation of the Colombian Action Plan Related to

Labor Rights, which was announced in April

2011 before the trade agreement entered into 

force to address labor concerns. The United 

States and Colombia decided to hold formal 

meetings through at least 2014 on Action Plan

commitments, and recognize advances under the

Action Plan and areas where challenges remain.

•	 Strengthening Colombia’s Energy Market: In early 2014, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency intends to host a commercial

workshop in Bogotá, Colombia, aimed at creating state-of-the-art electricity transmission and 

distribution projects in Colombia, as well as a 

visit to cities in the United States, to help upgrade Colombia’s wholesale electricity market

into the most efficient and advanced in Latin

America.Through the Department of State’s

Unconventional Gas Technical Engagement

Program (UGTEP), Colombian and U.S. officials are working to help create the basis for

environmentally sustainable unconventional gas 

development in Colombia. On December 2, 

the Department of Energy also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Colombia’s

Ministry of Mines and Energy to strengthen cooperation in the energy sector and to promote regional leadership on energy and climate change.

•	 Expanding Opportunity for Vulnerable Populations, including Afro-Colombians:

In June 2013, the United States and Colombia 

held a session of the U.S.-Colombia Action

Plan on Racial and Ethnic Equality (CAPREE),

hosting government and civil society representatives from both nations to collaborate on 

long-standing challenges faced by indigenous 

and afro-descendent communities in Colombia and the United States. The resulting work 

plan, the first under CAPREE, aims to expand

educational, cultural, and economic opportunities for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.

One CAPREE program hopes to engage 1,415

Afro-Colombian youth leaders, at-risk youth,

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary, For Immediate Release December 03, 2013 FACT SHEET
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 26

est in preventing transnational illicit networks 

from conducting, planning, and supporting operations aimed at harming our populations, including through the exploitation of financial

systems, international trade, and transportation systems.

In August 2013, the Department

of Homeland Security (DHS) broadened security cooperation with the Colombian Ministry 

of Finance and Public Credit through the Joint

Statement to Establish a Cargo Targeting Center

and the Joint Statement on Global Supply Chain 

Security. The U.S. Trade and Development 

Agency is also facilitating, via a technical assistance grant, the Colombian National Tax and

Customs Directorate’s acquisition and implementation of non-intrusive inspection systems.

Regional and Global Partnership and Integration

•	 Global Economic Integration:In 2013,

the United States supported the invitation to 

Colombia to begin accession proceedings with 

the Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD).Colombia’s future

OECD membership will strengthen its economic

growth, creating opportunities for Colombian 

and American businesses and workers.To further expand economic opportunity, Colombia

joined Mexico, Peru, and Chile as part of the

Pacific Alliance, a regional organization intended to harmonize trade policies and expand

commerce. The United States was welcomed as 

an observer on July 19, and Secretary of State 

Kerry discussed next steps with his Pacific Alliance counterparts in New York in September.

•	 Partners in Regional Security Cooperation:

Colombia has evolved into a regional exporter ofsecurity expertise,sharing its knowledge

to help develop the capacity of other countries to 

improve citizen security and confront the effects

of transnational organized crime, including illicit drug trafficking.

Through the U.S.-Colombia

Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation,

the United States and Colombia have formalized

support to selected third countries. In 2013, this 

coaches, and teachers to promote sports for 

social change and to prevent youth violence.

Peace, Security, and Rule of Law

The United States reaffirmed its longstanding defense and security partnership with 

Colombia, and strongly supports Colombia’s

unwavering commitment to seeking a durable 

peace, including through the peace talks now underway, in order to permit Colombians the greater peace, security, and prosperity they deserve.

•	 Land restitution:The United States continues its collaboration with Colombia to assist 

its people, particularly in the areas of rural development and land restitution, key concerns 

at the heart of the Colombia’s ongoing conflict.

USAID announced $68 million in support of Colombian efforts to: 1) restore land to victims of

conflict; 2) issue land titles; and 3) generate opportunities for viable rural livelihoods for small 

farmers.In addition, USAID will help expand

the coverage of legal protection of land rights, especially those of small farmers, by strengthening 

the Colombian government’s land titling efforts.

•	 Building Rule of Law and Assisting Victims: The United States and Colombia

continue to partner on strengthening the rule 

of law and protection of human rights in Colombia, including in the criminal justice system.

Over the past five years, the United States

has provided nearly $100 million dollars of

rule of law assistance to the Colombian Attorney General’s Office focused on human rights,

victim assistance programs, and the investigation and prosecution of criminal organizations.

•	 Humanitarian Demining:In cooperation with the Organization of American

States, the United States provided more than 

$4 million in FY 2013 to support demining

in Colombia, to both clear mines that threaten communities and to help victims. With 

this support, non-governmental organization

HALO cleared its first mine in September 2013.

•	 Secure Movement of Goods and People:

The United States and Colombia share an inter-
27 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

recognizes Colombia’s leadership in marine

conservation, most recently demonstrated by 

efforts to protect marine species at risk due to 

international trade under the auspices of the 

Convention on InternationalTrade inEndangered

Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).

The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration collaborates closely with

Colombia’s Ministry of Environment, National

Authority ofAquaculture and Fisheries, and local

non-governmental organizations to promote

healthy and productive marine environments. 

•	 Cleaner, Responsible Mining:Colombia

is working to address the destructive effects on 

the environment of illegal mining operations.

To support Colombia’s efforts, in 2013 USAID

launched a three-year $6.5million programto formalize artisanal gold mining operations, improve

working conditions, and reduce mercury and other contamination, and plans to expand work in

the mining sector by at least $10 million in 2014.

In 2013, the Department of Labor announced a

separate four-year, $9 million project in collaboration with the Ministry of Labor to combat child

labor and promote a safe work environment in 

the mining sector. In addition, the Department 

of the Interior is working with Colombia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy to design a tool that

will measure and monitor mining activities in 

Colombia and the broader Andean Amazon.

•	 Smart Technology:Colombia is undertaking an ambitious infrastructure development 

and modernization effort.Colombia will assess

optionsforintelligenttransportation system(ITS)

technologies as a means of reducing congestion 

and improving the effectiveness of its control 

and management of highway and other transport 

systems through a U.S. Trade and Development 

Agency grant with the Ministry of Transport.

Education

•	 100,000 Strong: In March 2011, President Obama launched “100,000 Strong in the 

Americas,” an initiative to increase international

study in Latin America and the Caribbean.Cosecurity assistance included 39 capacity-building activities in four Central American countries

focused on areas such as asset forfeiture, investigations, polygraphs, and interdiction. The United States and Colombia announced the Action

Plan for 2014, which aims to increase assistance 

through 152 capacity-building activities in six

countries in Central America and the Caribbean.

•	 Expanding Energy Access and Security: Colombia and the United States continue 

to engage bilaterally and regionally on Connect 

2022, a hemispheric initiative the two countries 

launched in Cartagena in 2012 to achieve universal access to electricity through enhanced electrical interconnections, power sector investment, 

renewable energy development, and cooperation. 

Environment, Science, and Innovation

•	 Conserving the Environment and Livelihoods: Both the United States and Colombia 

emphasize and support conservation efforts that

preserve valuable ecosystems.In 2013, USAID

made a new $10 million commitment to conserve biodiversity and reduce deforestation in 

the Colombian Amazon.Under the Initiative for

Conservation of the Andean Amazon (ICAA),

the United States is partnering with Colombia 

to slow the expansion of the agricultural frontier, while creating corridors for critical biodiversity.

In addition, with support from USAID,

the U.S. National Park Service and Colombia’s

Parques Nacionales aim to expand their long history of collaboration, to include cooperation on 

climate change adaptation, concessions development and management, environmental education and interpretation, and the development 

of “Sister Parks.”Renewable energy is also

expected to be deployed in several Colombian

parks by the USAID Clean Energy Program.

•	 Protecting Marine Species and Ocean

Ecosystems:The United States and Colombia

share similar responsibilities and challenges in 

conserving and sustainably managing marine 

species and ocean ecosystems in Pacific and

Caribbean coasts and waters. The United States 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 28

lombia is a priority country for the initiative, 

and the United States is providing $1 million in

economic support funds and has leveraged $2.6

million in private sector funds to build the capacity of universities to boost exchanges.

More

than 6,500 university students from Colombia are currently studying in the United States.

•	 Sports Diplomacy and Leadership: The

United States and Colombia are deeply committed to furthering educational opportunities for at-risk youth, through sports exchange

programs such as in baseball, track and field,

and basketball. With support from the U.S. 

Embassy, Mónica González - a former professional soccer player and ESPN analyst - established soccer academies in Santa Marta, Quibdó,

Medellín, and Bogotá to teach leadership and 

sporting skills to girls from vulnerable areas.

•	 Bilingual Colombia:Colombia is working to strengthen its international competitiveness through stronger bilingual education. The 

Department of State is partnering with Colombia’s Ministry of Education to implement a twoyear program to train up to 500 public school instructors on English instruction.

In September, in

cooperation with the U.S. Embassy, DIRECTV

launched a distance learning education program, 

“Inglés en lasAulas” (English in the classrooms).

•	 MLK Fellows program:The MLK Fellows Program, established in 2005, provides 

English language and leadership training to outstanding Afro-Colombian university students.

The U.S. Embassy has supported 230 MLK

fellows to date, with another 120 talented AfroColombian university students starting in 2014.

•	 Fulbright Scholars:The United States

has helped fund scholarships for more than 

750 Colombian scholars during the last ten 

years, including more than 100 in 2013.
29 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Review of Security Cooperation 

Mechanisms Combatant 

Commands Utilize to Build 

Partner Capacity

A RAND Report - Security cooperation has 

long been an important instrument of the U.S. 

government and the Department of Defense for 

advancing national security objectives vis-à-vis 

allies and partner countries, including building critical relationships, securing peacetime 

and contingency access, and building partner 

capacity (BPC). One of the key challenges for 

policymakers and combatant commands is gaining a more complete understanding of the real 

value of BPC activities. Assessments of prior 

and ongoing BPC activities, in particular, have 

become increasingly important given the current 

fiscal climate and budgetary limitations. But it 

is no easy task to assess the value of what are 

essentially qualitative activities, and data limitations severely hinder assessments. The tools 

available — such as resources, authorities, programs, processes, and organizational relationships — may or may not be the optimal ones 

for the delivery of BPC activities to partner 

countries. This report characterizes security cooperation mechanisms used by combatant commands for BPC, produces a detailed database of 

the mechanism elements, develops and applies 

a preliminary means of evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of select mechanisms, and 

draws on the analysis from the case studies to 

recommend ways to improve the effectiveness 

and efficiency of those mechanisms in the future.

KEY FINDINGS:

Efficiency and Effectiveness Are the Same 

Across Commands for Some Mechanisms

• Lack of flexible, multiyear authorities hinders 

effective planning and efficient execution.

• Foreign military financing is slow, not 

prioritized against objectives, inflexible, and difficult to control once disbursed.

• Constraints on certain funding availability, sustainment potential, and working with non-ministry-of-defense partners 

limit its effectiveness, while associated 

equipping efforts can be onerous on staffs.

• Education programs generally score 

as highly effective; however, some 

processes are onerous on staffs.

• Military-to-military authorities are effective 

as foundations of building partner capacity but 

cannot be used to support training and equipping; those controlled centrally are not efficient; some authorities are left to interpretation.

• Mechanisms for cooperation with regional organizations are limited.

For Other Mechanisms, Experiences Differ

• The European Command has been 

able to effectively utilize some funding programs with coalition partners 

that other commands find less effective.

• Lack of training/equipping authorities in 

the Southern and Pacific Commands force 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 30

reliance on indirect mechanisms for building partner capacity in counterterrorism.

• Dedicated training/equipping mechanisms provide Africa Command with flexible means of 

building partner capacity in counterterrorism.

Recommendations

• Establish a working group to explore existing 

authorities for missile defense activities executed by the commands with allies and partners to determine if additional, specific authorities are needed to accomplish objectives.

• Seek to establish a new global authority for rapid, inexpensive equipping to meet the demand, 

particularly to support current operations.

• Explore ways to enable greater partner capability sustainment and institutional reform.

• Seek additional, global authorities to broaden dedicated counterterrorism training.

• Provide the commands with clear, current 

interpretations of all relevant spending authorities on an annual basis to enable effective leveraging of available mechanisms.

• Consider simplifying requirements 

for annual justification of ongoing programs to improve efficiency.

• Explore options for developing and managing the growing number of Foreign Military 

Sales pseudo cases to improve efficiency.

• Consider seeking approval to lengthen 

time for select spending authorities and 

funding sources beyond two years (to a 

minimum of three years) to enable effective institutionalization of capabilities.

• Take maximum advantage of existing training programs to demonstrate the need for 

expanding authorities to build partner capacity with armed forces under the authority of 

ministries other than ministries of defense.

To access the entire report: http://www.

rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR413.
31 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Locklear Briefs on Asia-Pacific, 

Partners, Security

By Cheryl Pellerin

DoD News, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, July 30, 2014 – The 

commander of U.S. Pacific Command briefed 

Pentagon reporters yesterday, discussing the 

U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, successful engagement with partners there and 

conditions for continued stability and security.

Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III described some of PACOM’s most important activities so far this year, including a visit to Hawaii by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, who 

in April hosted the first informal meeting on 

U.S. soil of defense ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN.

The meeting, Locklear said, “was an 

excellent opportunity to build upon the 

friendships and strengthen our bilateral relationship with ASEAN member nations.”

Next, the Admiral said, Rim of the Pacific, 

or RIMPAC, the world’s largest maritime exercise, began June 26 and will end Aug. 1. More 

than 25,000 military personnel from 22 countries are participating, including troops from 

China, who are participating for the first time.

Locklear said the exercise has been 

“an excellent training opportunity for all nations involved,” and added that PACOM 

continues to “work hand in hand with our 

allies and partners to help ensure stability and security across the Indo-Asia-Pacific.”

The Admiral also took questions from 

reporters, including one about whether 

unrest in Russia and Ukraine would require 

a reconsideration of U.S. and NATO posture 

in Europe, and whether that would affect 

the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.

Locklear agreed that given the ongoing environment in Europe, a relook at U.S. 

force posture there and NATO posture in general is important, but he said he didn’t think 

in such terms about the Asia-Pacific region.

“Our forces are globally deployable no 

matter where they’re stationed, and the United States military has put a lot of time and efNavy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, commander of U.S. 

Pacific Command, listens to a reporter’s question during 

a news conference at the Pentagon, July 29, 2014. DoD 

photo by Cheryl Pellerin .
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 32

key partners and allies and to work on skills 

that are unique to army-to-army interactions.

On specific countries in his area of responsibility, Locklear took questions on India, political tensions between Japan and South Korea, 

and North Korea and nuclear proliferation. He 

congratulated a reporter from India on the country’s recent elections and the new administration headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

“We look forward to enhancing our 

[military-to-military] relationships with India,” the Admiral said. “A couple of years 

ago, President [Barack] Obama reiterated 

that we will need to build a long-term and 

... a stronger relationship with India, and 

that includes our mil-to-mil participation.”

The relationship between the countries 

also is a whole-of-government effort, he 

added, with Secretary of State John F. Kerry 

and Defense Secretary Hagel both visiting 

India in August, Locklear said, adding that 

he hopes to visit the new team in the future.

“We have had, for a number of years, 

very good relationships between ... PACOM 

and the services there, and we have an ongoing number of exercises that seem to have 

worked pretty well for our growing partnership,” he said. “So we look forward to 

the road ahead. We think it’s all positive.”

In answer to questions about political tensions between Japan and South Korea, Locklear said it’s very important for both the Japanese and the South Koreans to recognize that 

they have many mutual security interests 

that can benefit by better bilateral, and trilateral and military-to-military cooperation.

Both countries have a huge common 

concern with North Korea, he added, and the 

United States encourages them both to work 

together to overcome their political difficulties so the United States can help provide a 

better security environment in the region.

fort into being able to get forces where we 

need them, when we need them, on a timeline that makes sense for us,” he explained.

The severe budget cuts of sequestration, scheduled to resume in fiscal year 2016, 

may force decreases in force structure and 

put greater stress on the force to be able to 

stay forward in numbers that most combatant commanders would like, the Admiral said.

“But the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is a 

lot more than just about military, but the military piece of it is moving forward,” Locklear 

added. “We’re seeing tangible evidence across 

all elements of the rebalance, not only in force 

structure, ... so I think we remain on course. I 

don’t get the sense that we’re backing away 

from the Asia-Pacific rebalance because of 

other events occurring in the rest of the world.”

A military part of the rebalance involves 

the Army, the Admiral added. A plan called 

Pacific Pathways allows the Army to develop 

small units that will be forward-deployed for 

quick response to humanitarian emergencies 

or regional threats. It also lets the Army create 

a semi-permanent presence in parts of the Pacific where it isn’t feasible to establish bases.

“As we started to draw down out of Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and we found that the Army 

was able to return to some of its historic roots in 

the Asia-Pacific, we started looking for opportunities to get the Army more involved in what 

we do day-to-day in the Pacific,” Locklear said.

Seven of the 10 largest armies in the world 

are in PACOM’s area of responsibility, he added, 

“so it makes good sense for us to have good cooperation, good interaction between our armies.”

The idea, Locklear added, is to take Army 

units under PACOM command -- some of those 

that might be stationed on the U.S. West Coast 

-- and put them into exercise cycles that allow them to be more present in the region with 
33 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

it’s a demonstration to the world that they 

can do it. And a concern I have is that ... 

over and over and over again, you see it and 

you become somewhat numb to it ... and you 

start to say, ‘Well, it’s not such a big deal.’”

Locklear added, “There’s wide debate throughout the intelligence community about how much capability they have, 

the ability to weaponize it, the ability to put 

it into warheads and those types of things.”

As a military commander, the Admiral said, he has to plan for the worst.

“And I have to plan for, No. 1, what 

the North Koreans say they have, and they 

say they have it, ... so I take it seriously,” 

he said. “I believe that they have continued 

to make steady progress in both their missile technology and in their nuclear capability, and that they desire to continue to do that.”

For example, Locklear said, Japan and 

South Korea, who have very credible missile defense capabilities, are not able to communicate 

with each other because of information-sharing 

restrictions that are of a political nature, not of 

a military nature. “This degrades their ability to 

defend their own airspace, their own nations,” 

he said. “It’s a fact, and they understand that.”

It’s important, the Admiral added, “that 

we keep articulating to the people of Japan 

and South Korea that from a military perspective we understand the serious political issues 

and social issues that have to be overcome. But 

... they are an impediment to your security.”

Locklear was asked about actions taken this 

week by the U.S. House of Representatives and 

the United Nations to bolster sanctions against 

North Korea based on weapons proliferation.

“We have a growing interest among nations in the region and throughout the world 

and participating in our counterproliferation 

exercises,” he said. “We’re growing our capabilities across nations and institutions to be 

able to better anticipate and deal with this, so I 

think in the long run we’re getting better at it.

“That said,” Locklear continued, “the proliferation activities of North Korea, their desire 

for nuclear missiles and nuclear capabilities, as 

we’ve said over and over again, are highly threatening to the global security environment, and 

denuclearization of North Korea is an essential 

part of the way ahead in that part of the world.”

The Admiral said the long-term concern 

is that every time North Korea does something 

the international community has told them not 

to do, particularly as it relates to missile technology or nuclear technology, “you have to assume that it’s a step forward in technology. 

Otherwise, they probably wouldn’t be doing it.”

In doing so, he said, “it’s a demonstration to themselves that they can do it, [and] 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 34
35 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Afghan National Security Forces: 

Actions Needed to Improve Weapons 

Accountability

WHAT The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Reviewed:

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 

supplies weapons to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as part of international 

efforts to train and equip the Afghan National 

Army and the Afghan National Police. DOD has 

provided over 747,000 weapons and auxiliary 

equipment valued at approximately $626 million to the ANSF since 2004. Included in these 

figures are over 465,000 small arms—weapons 

such as rifles, pistols, machine guns, grenade 

launchers, and shotguns. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) 

is the primary DOD component responsible for 

overseeing the delivery and transfer of weapons 

to the ANSF. It works with the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to acquire these 

weapons. Section 1225 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. 

L. No. 111-84, requires DOD to implement a

program to provide for the registration and 

monitoring of defense articles transferred to 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. DOD is also responsible for the oversight and accountability of 

these weapons after they are transferred to the 

ANSF. This audit focuses on DOD’s procedures to account for weapons provided to the 

ANSF. Specifically, we (1) evaluated the controls used to account for weapons before DOD 

transfers title to the ANSF, (2) evaluated the

controls used to account for weapons after DOD transfers title to the ANSF, and (3) 

determined the extent to which the number of weapons provided by DOD and coalition partners reflects current ANSF requirements and changes in ANSF personnel levels.

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

The U.S. Department of Defense 

(DOD) maintains information on weapons purchased for the ANSF in two primary Information systems: the Security

Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) 

and the Operational Verification of Reliable Logistics Oversight Database 

(OVERLORD). SCIP is used by DOD

personnel to track the shipment of weapons from 

the United States, while OVERLORD is used for 

tracking the receipt of weapons in Afghanistan.

Errors and discrepancies often occur because these 

two systems are not linked to each other and require manual data entry. When SIGAR compared

the data in the two systems, it found that the databases did not always match; some records were 

duplicated, and some records were incomplete.

The discrepancies listed below show examples 

of where DOD was not in compliance with its 

internal operating procedures and accountability

requirements, and where missing information could result in the inability to locate 

weapons. Specifically, SIGAR found that:

• Of the 474,823 total serial numbers 

recorded in OVERLORD, 43 percent, or 203,888 weapons, had missing information and/or duplication.

• 24,520 serial numbers in OVERLORD 

and 22,806 weapon serial numbers in 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 36

• At the ANP 22 Bunkers Depot—the 

national depot for the ANP—SIGAR 

was unable to conduct a fully inclusive inventory test; however, SIGAR’s 

limited testing verified the quantities 

of weapons in each storage container, 

and SIGAR did not find discrepancies 

in the weapons it was able to inspect.

• At the ANA Kandahar Regional Military Training Center, SIGAR was unable 

to obtain a complete inventory record, 

which limits the assurance of accurate 

and reliable weapons accountability.

• At the 1st Afghan National Civil Order Police Garrison Facility, SIGAR 

could only conduct a limited physical inspection of the inventory because no inventory list was available. No discrepancies were noted 

in the limited weapons inspection.

This poor record keeping by the ANA and 

ANP limits DOD’s ability to monitor weapons 

after transfer to the ANSF, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010. The U.S. and coalition partners provide 

weapons to the ANSF according to the quantity 

and type agreed upon in the Tashkil—the Afghan government’s official list of requirements 

for the ANSF. The Tashkil has changed over 

time, with some weapons requirements increasing and others decreasing. SIGAR found that, as 

of November 2013, more than 112,000 weapons 

provided to the ANA and ANP exceed requirements in the current Tashkil. In some cases, 

excess weapons were provided because ANSF 

requirements changed. For example, the ANA 

has 83,184 more AK-47s than needed because, 

prior to 2010, DOD issued both NATO-standard weapons, such as M-16s, and non-standard 

weapons, such as AK-47s. After 2010, DOD 

and the Afghan Ministry of Defense determined 

that interoperability and logistics would be enhanced if the ANA used only NATO standard 

weapons. Subsequently, the requirement was 

changed. However, no provision was made to 

SCIP were repeated two or three times, 

meaning that there are duplicate records of weapons shipped and received.

• OVERLORD contained 50,304 serial numbers with no shipping or 

receiving dates, and SCIP contained 59,938 serial numbers with 

no shipping or receiving dates.

While DOD uses SCIP and OVERLORD 

to account for weapons it purchases and transfers to the ANSF, the Afghan National Army 

(ANA) tracks weapons using an automated inventory management system called Core Inventory Management System (CoreIMS). However, 

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Security Assistance Office 

(SAO) officials stated that the information contained in CoreIMS is incomplete and cannot be 

relied upon for accurate information. CSTC-A 

SAO officials concluded that this is due, in part, 

to the ANA not entering information correctly 

into the system. A 2008 report by the DOD Inspector General also raised concerns about the 

ANA’s record keeping process including CoreIMS. As for weapons provided to the Afghan National Police (ANP), there is no standardized or 

automated system to account for them. Instead, 

the ANP uses a combination of hard copy documents, handwritten records, and some Microsoft 

Excel spreadsheets to maintain inventory records.

To test the accuracy of weapons data in the various 

inventory systems and hard copy sources used by 

the ANSF, SIGAR conducted physical inventory

testing at four ANSF depots and storage facilities 

in Afghanistan. Although testing at these locations 

was challenging for a variety of reasons, including

the lack of inventory information, SIGAR was 

able to assess, to some degree, the reliability of information maintained at these sites:

• At the ANA Central Supply Depot, 

SIGAR found that 551 weapons documented on the Afghan inventory record, called a “property book,” did not 

match a physical count of the inventory.
37 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

return or destroy non-standard weapons, such as 

AK-47s, that were no longer needed. DOD officials told SIGAR that they do not currently have 

the authority to recapture or remove weapons 

that have already been provided to the ANSF.

This issue will be compounded as the 

number of ANSF personnel decreases to lower levels in the coming years. Without confidence in the Afghan government’s ability to account for or properly dispose of these 

weapons, SIGAR is concerned that they could 

be obtained by insurgents and pose additional risks to Afghan civilians and the ANSF.

For more information, contact SIGAR 

Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.

pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.

WHAT SIGAR RECOMMENDS

To account for weapons procured for and 

transferred to the ANSF, SIGAR recommends 

that the Commanding General, CSTC–A, in coordination with the Director, DSCA, (1) perform 

a full reconciliation of OVERLORD and SCIP 

and correct any data errors identified between 

the two systems within 6 months. SIGAR also 

recommends that the Commanding General, 

CSTC-A (2) work with the ANSF to complete a 

100 percent inventory check of small arms transferred to the ANSF, and (3) determine what action can be taken to either recover or destroy U.S. 

and coalition-provided weapons that the U.S. 

and Afghan governments jointly identified as being in excess of the current Afghan requirements 

as stated in the Afghan Tashkil, and develop a 

plan that addresses the potential future excess of 

small arms if the ANSF force strength is reduced.

In commenting on a draft of the report, DOD 

concurred with SIGAR’s first recommendation 

and partially concurred with the second and third 

recommendations. DOD’s proposed actions 

are responsive to SIGAR’s recommendations. 

DOD’s comments, along with SIGAR’s response, 

are reproduced in appendix II of this report.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 38
39 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

U.S. Security Cooperation in Foreign 

Policy: Looking Past Human Rights 

Paradigms

By James P. Toomey, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Christopher Dias, Lockheed Martin, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 

Research Assistant

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the 

view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Introduction

On February 24, 2014, Ugandan President 

Yoweri Museveni signed an anti-homosexuality 

bill into law. In response, the Obama administration pulled approximately $6.4 million of foreign 

aid, which supported the Inter-Religious Council 

of Uganda (IRCU). The IRCU is an organization that publicly supports anti-gay legislation, 

yet has received millions of dollars in grants 

from the United States (U.S.) to help fight HIV/

AIDS. Nevertheless, and almost simultaneously, 

the Obama administration sent four special operations aircraft and additional special operation 

and service support troops to Uganda to continue international efforts linked to tracking down 

Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army 

(LRA). Observably, there are inconsistencies 

in American foreign policy rhetoric and foreign 

aid allocation to a state that has undermined the 

civil liberties and human rights of its citizens.

The purpose of this article is to highlight 

a need for research, which the authors intend 

to pursue in the coming months. The followon project will serve two purposes. First, 

it is intended to generally test competing 

theories of international relations, including 

realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to 

determine which theory supports the current 

American policy practices concerning subSaharan Africa. Second, it further hopes to 

analyze which specific factors, human rights 

practices or strategic significance, influence 

our foreign aid allocation, more specifically, 

security cooperation efforts. By using security 

cooperation as a dependent variable and strategic 

significance and human rights as independent 

variables, we intend to test which casual factor 

has the most influence on U.S. foreign policy.

Realism assumes that states pursue a policy 

of self-interest in an international system. This 

theory predicts that U.S. security cooperation 

will have a stronger correlation with states 

that have strategic significance, such as key 

resource providers. Liberal policies focus on 

human interests, or, as Forsthye wrote, “at least 

redefine the national interest so as to incorporate more individual interests including those 

of foreigners” (1995, 111). If liberal theory is 

accurate, a state’s human rights record should 

matter in U.S. foreign policy decisions, particularly political rights and civil liberties. Audie 

Klots presents a constructivist view and writes, 

“Constructivist theory argues that global norms 

are part of the explanation for the definition of 

state and individual interests” (2011, 478). Human rights, and thus, the protection of those 

human rights are considered as de jure if not 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 40

supporting the need for analysis in this particular 

region. Officially, AFRICOM’s purpose is to:

...strengthen our security cooperation with 

Africa and help to create new opportunities to 

bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people 

of Africa and promote our common goals of 

development, health education, democracy and 

economic growth in Africa (Sprance 2008, 8).

Skeptics argue that AFRICOM only aids 

U.S. interests, and “will benefit the U.S. Military, 

U.S. defense contractors, U.S. oil companies, 

African governments interested in repressing 

indigenous, minority, activist, environmentalist 

and resistance groups, and terrorists, who win 

adherents to their causes” (Besteman 2008, 

20). Others argue that the true purpose of the 

command is to counterbalance China’s rise and 

interests, and combat terrorism in Africa. These 

critics claim that AFRICOM only serves U.S. national interests at the expense of the African people, and undermines democracy and security in the 

region (Besteman 2008, Keenan 2008). Whether 

these arguments are accurate or not, AFRICOM 

has taken on a slightly more unique strategic role 

than other combatant commands. It has quickly 

become a deeply interagency organization, with 

at least nine other U.S. federal agencies (beyond the Department of Defense) occupying 

important positions within the command. At 

the same time, AFRICOM has placed continuing focus on non-traditional military operations involving the execution of security cooperation programs, primarily via grant assistance. 

 Naturally, AFRICOM’s role has been 

guided by evolving U.S. foreign policy. The 

United States has stated that it has no aspiration 

for direct military engagement or to commit 

troops to the area, and “officials stress that 

there are no plans to establish any new military 

bases in Africa” (Ploch 2011, Cochran 2010). 

So, now that six years have passed since 

the creation of AFRICOM, enough data exists 

to test certain theoretical assumptions regarding 

AFRICOM’s role in foreign policy. Those 

de facto international norms, and should therefore contribute significantly to the decision 

making process in American foreign policy.

 A principal goal of United States foreign 

policy is to promote the increased observance 

of internationally recognized human rights 

by all countries. Title 22 U.S. Code § 2304 

prohibits U.S. security assistance to a foreign 

government that engages in a consistent pattern 

of gross violations of internationally recognized 

human rights unless the President certifies 

that extraordinary circumstances warrant the 

provision of such aid. Although human rights 

practices are not the only criterion, and although 

legislation does permit certain limited waivers 

of this consideration, a foreign state’s respect for 

human rights very often plays a determining role 

in whether or not security cooperation exchanges 

will occur. Most scholars tend to generalize that 

the U.S. uses foreign aid for national security, to 

address threats, and win allies (Poe and Meernik 

1995). Other scholars researching military assistance and state cooperation found that military aid is allocated to states that the U.S. depends on for security reasons, while the “states 

receiving aid...exhibit lower levels of cooperation.” In addition, many also claim, “there 

is no relationship at all between recipient state 

dependence on U.S. aid and recipient state behavior” (Sullivan, Tessman and Li 2011, 291).

Africa and AFRICOM

Africa, and in particular, the countries 

within the United States Africa Command 

(AFRICOM) area of operations (AOR), present 

a suitable and still relatively unexplored 

arena for testing competing theories of 

international relations. Additionally, fairly 

recent developments in U.S. foreign policy 

(primarily the very creation of an entirely 

new geographic combatant command in 

2008 to manage African security interests as 

well as interagency political-military policy) 

confirm that the United States views Africa 

as a significant location of interest, further 
41 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

known as the gatekeeping stage. Research on 

the post-Cold War period tried to predict a shift 

away from U.S. foreign policy based critical 

military and economic interests or a change in 

national interests reflecting liberal values and 

positive human rights practices in receiving 

states. The findings, however, are mixed and 

there does not seem to be a major shift away 

from the traditional strategic factors used to 

determine the direction of U.S. foreign aid.

The predominant scholars each offer their 

own methodology for determining foreign 

policy consistency with the law and rhetoric 

of human rights and other liberal values. Their 

arguments, the controversy surrounding their 

findings, and strengths and weaknesses are 

the focus of the remainder of this review.

Lars Schoultz analyzed the relationship be Schoultz analyzed the relationship between U.S. economic aid and military assistance 

versus human rights violations in Latin America. By using foreign aid as an independent 

variable, he found that “during the mid-1970’s, 

United States Aid was clearly distributed disproportionally to countries with repressive governments” (Schoultz 1981, 167). Recognizing the 

inconsistency of foreign aid in relation to human 

rights adherence and advocacy, Congress “passed 

25 pieces of legislation between 1976 and 1979 

linking the human rights practices of foreign nations to U.S. foreign policies” (Cingranelli and 

Pasquarello 1985, 540). After the passage of 

legislation joining foreign aid and human rights, 

Carlton and Stohl compared and contrasted the 

Carter and Reagan Administrations foreign aid 

allocation in relation to states’ human rights practices. According to Carlton and Stohl, publically, 

the rhetoric between to the two administrations 

was “radically” different. However, “The practice of the Carter and Reagan Administrations 

has been remarkably similar. Neither administration has acted in accordance with the established 

human rights legislative package” (Carleton 

and Stohl 1985, 227). Up to this point, scholars 

only focused on bivariate analysis, a weakness 

Cingranelli and Pasquarello aimed to correct.

central to this piece include: Do human rights 

matter when the U.S. chooses AFRICOM 

partner nations? Or, do U.S. military and 

economic interests play a dominant role in Af- dominant role in African foreign policy? More importantly, which 

set of interests equates to greater security cooperation grant assistance at a country level?

Analysis and Trends in Literature:

Human rights and U.S. foreign policy 

analysis has evolved over the years, most notably

after the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act 

of 1961 and a subsequent 1974 amendment 

mandating foreign aid considerations based 

upon national human rights practices. In 1988, 

the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 

found, “Human rights concerns have been 

incorporated into security assistance decisionmaking in an often inconsistent manner... 

decision makers tend to focus on a recipient 

country’s foreign policies and the perceived 

defense needs both of that country and the 

United States, often to the near exclusion of 

that country’s human rights record” (1988, 59).

The literature surrounding the topic of 

human rights and our foreign aid presents 

alternative views on this subject: human rights 

do not matter in foreign policy; or, human rights 

do matter in foreign policy, but to a lesser degree 

than other national interests. Based on these 

assumptions, there have been two approaches 

linked to different time periods of analysis, Cold 

War era and the post-Cold War era. The literature 

surrounding the Cold War era is the most 

extensive and typically supported neorealism 

philosophies positing that the U.S. Government 

allocates foreign aid based on critical national 

interests. Most scholars have indicated that, 

during the Cold War era, foreign aid was 

used to influence states to create international 

leverage over or a balance of alliances against 

the Soviet Union. Some scholars did find that 

our foreign aid was linked to human rights, 

along with other lesser strategic interests, at 

least at the initial decision making stage, also 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 42

1974 amendment of the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961 mandated a relationship between 

human rights and aid, empirical research has 

had difficulties in proving such a relationship.

Steven Poe also recognized a developing 

controversy between human rights and 

military assistance. Poe praised Cingranelli 

and Pasquarello’s study for its groundbreaking 

contributions, but he also identified several inconsistencies. “Specifically, Cingranelli’s and 

Pasquarello’s use of the Department of State›s 

reports on nations ‘human rights practices as 

their sole source for human rights data” (Poe 

1991, 206). Poe’s contribution focused on the 

allocation of military assistance, “and the probability of a country being allocated U.S. military assistance” based on human rights practices 

(Poe 1991). Instead of using a single year for 

his study, he focused on a multiyear study from 

1980 and 1984, and improved his measure of 

human rights support by using multiple sources — Freedom House, Amnesty International, 

and the State Department. Poe also utilized a 

strategic importance control variable. Poe’s 

improved multivariate analysis found, “human 

rights records have been important in determining which countries are allocated aid” (Poe 

1991, 211). Adding to Poe’s previous work, Poe 

and Merrick used a pooled cross-sectional time 

series analysis and a two-stage Heckman model that found, “Taken as a whole...our results 

clearly indicate that human rights concerns are 

balanced against other, more self-serving motives” (Poe and Meernik 1995, 408). However, 

they also found that once a decision was made to 

allocate aid, human rights violations no longer 

were considered (Poe and Meernik 1995, 406), 

and that political and strategic variables were 

more important. To this point, human rights 

and foreign aid research focused on the Cold 

War era has decisively indicated that strategic 

and political decisions played the predominant 

role in foreign aid decision making. Moreover, the only area of consensus where human 

rights were weighted equally in foreign policy 

decisions in both eras of history was during the 

Adding to Schoultz and focusing again on 

Latin America, Cingranelli and Pasquarello applied a multiple regression statistical analysis, 

using foreign aid as a dependent variable, and 

created one of the first studies to quantify human 

rights through content analysis and multivariate 

analysis of military assistance. They also developed a two-stage analytical framework. The 

first stage focused on “gatekeeping.” Cingranelli 

and Pasquarello define gatekeeping as, “some 

countries were systematically excluded from 

the recipient pool while others were passed on 

to the second stage” (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 540). Additionally, “the gatekeeping 

stage involves the decision of whether or not a 

country is to be given aid” (Apodaca and Stohl 

1999, 189). The second stage focused on the 

amount of aid a nation received (Cingranelli and 

Pasquarello 1985, 540). They found “no evidence that human rights practices were related 

to the levels of military aid provided in Latin 

American nations or that short-term changes in 

human rights practices of nations had much effect upon economic or military aid decisions” 

(Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 542). However, they also discovered that a state’s human 

rights practices were significant at the decision 

level (gatekeeping stage) of U.S. policy development, and were playing a more significant 

role in policy decisions. States with poor human rights records were likely excluded from 

receiving military assistance and those with 

improved records tended to be included. Ultimately, after a decision was made, human 

rights no longer played a significant part in 

determining the level of assistance a state received (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 554).

 Responding to Cingranelli and Paquarel Cingranelli and Paquarello, McCormick and Mitchell took issue with 

the design method used in their previous study 

that excluded El Salvador, and developed an 

analysis that included all Latin American states 

that received aid. Their results found that human rights practices were not important factors in U.S. foreign aid decisions (McCormick 

and Mitchell 1988, 232). Even though the 
43 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

many other variables such as alliances and bilateral trade, matter at the gatekeeping stage (1999, 

30-31). Additionally, they found that, despite the 

emphasis on human rights and liberal values rhetoric in the post-Cold War era, the impact of human rights considerations has not increased over 

time (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2005, 30).

Employing a Heckman model, Lai focused 

on the “onset of aid, or who gets aid for the 

first time in any given year” (Lai 2003, 105). 

His results found that in the post-Cold war era, 

human rights did not matter at the initial stage 

or in terms of annual aid allocation. Moreover, 

“while human rights and democracy do not affect 

the decision to give aid, they do affect how much 

aid is initially allocated” (Lai 2003, 119). More 

importantly, “security considerations play just as 

important a role, if not more so, in who gets aid 

in the post-Cold War period as in the Cold War 

period” (Lai 2003, 124). Furthering their earlier 

work, Demierl-Pegg and Moskowitz found that 

the levels of economic development are important factors in determining aid in the post-Cold 

War era; however, “both human rights and regime type significantly determine allocation 

amounts. These distinctions show that shifts in 

the international environment have, in fact, altered the calculus of U.S. foreign aid” (DemirelPegg and Moskowitz 2009, 196). Another significant finding by Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 

was that America does not hold developed states 

or transitioning regimes accountable for their 

human rights practices (2005, 196). More mature autocracies with poor human rights records 

were the only states where high standards were 

exercised, possibly as a reward-punishment 

scenario to promote better human rights practices (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009, 196).

Overall, these scholars have contributed 

significantly to our understanding of U.S. 

foreign aid allocation and its relationship to 

states’ human rights practices. The consensus:

the U.S. Government considers a state’s human 

rights practices at the initial or gatekeeping 

stage to determine if foreign aid, or what 

type of foreign aid, is appropriate. However, 

gatekeeping stage (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Poe 1991; Poe and Meernik 1995).

Realizing the gap in the literature that 

focused on the Cold War, Apodaca and Stohl con- Stohl conducted their own research involving the Carter 

through Clinton administrations. Their contribution compared each administration and revealed 

that human rights played a role in the foreign aid 

decision-making process at the gatekeeping stage 

(with the exception of the Clinton administration, 

where human rights practices had no effect on 

foreign aid decisions); however, other national 

security interests were generally more important 

(Apodaca and Stohl 1999, 195). They also state 

one critical point when discussing human rights 

and foreign aid allocation: “Even the most optimistic human rights advocate would not believe 

that the United States would forego its strategic interests in favor of human rights concerns” 

(Apodaca and Stohl 1999, 187). Surprisingly, 

they found that past aid was the most significant indicator that a state would receive present 

foreign aid (Apodaca and Stohl 1999, 189).

The next significant development in the 

literature involves comparisons between Cold 

War and post-Cold War aid allocations. Blanton 

analyzed the role of human rights and democracy 

in influencing U.S. arms exports (2000; 

2005). Her two-stage model found that, at the 

gatekeeping stage, the United States prefers to 

deal with states that respect human rights and 

values associated with democracy (Blanton 2000, 

129). Furthermore, human rights and democracy 

are significant influences in determining levels 

of arms transfers in the post-Cold War era 

(Blanton 2005, 663). Demirel-Pegg and Mos- Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz conducted similar research focused on 

human rights and economic aid allocation from 

1979 to 2000. They preferred an economic 

model because, “Military aid by definition implies strategic interest while economic aid tends 

to imply a broader array of interests such as strategic, commercial, and humanitarian concerns” 

(Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2005, 7). Their 

findings coincide with findings of previous research that human rights practices, along with 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 44

other variables play equally important roles, 

such as more critical strategic interests, 

economic conditions, and prior aid receipts.

The Direction for the Proposed Research:

While scholars have linked state human 

rights practices to military aid allocation, 

there are three significant gaps in the current 

literature. First, most of the research does not 

focus on nor capture the entire scope of U.S. 

military assistance. Moreover, the Department 

of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State 

do not recognize the term “military aid” or “military assistance.” Security assistance and security cooperation are the terminologies used when 

referring to foreign aid that focuses on defense 

and security partnerships, and may include activities not normally considered as military assistance, but which serves as complimentary 

supports or multipliers to other forms of military 

aid in the execution of our foreign policy. In 

other words, scholars and researchers have not 

generally considered DOD’s more comprehensive collection of foreign engagement activities, defined as security cooperation. DOD 

describes security cooperation (SC) as:

...Department of Defense (DOD) interactions 

with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. 

security interests, develop allied and friendly 

military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with 

peacetime and contingency access to a host nation 

(Joint Pub 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 2010).

Security cooperation comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense 

(DOD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to 

achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD 

interactions with foreign defense and security 

establishments, including all DOD-administered 

Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build 

defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA 

activities; develop allied and friendly military 

capabilities for self-defense and multinational 

operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. It 

is DOD policy that SC is an important tool of 

national security and foreign policy and is an integral element of the DOD mission. SC activities 

shall be planned, programmed, budgeted, and 

executed with the same high degree of attention 

and efficiency as other integral DOD activities. 

SC requirements shall be combined with other 

DOD requirements and implemented through 

standard DOD systems, facilities, and procedures 

(Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2008).

Additionally, when operationalizing 

a measure of U.S. military interaction and 

influence on foreign policy, scholars tend to 

define it as an aggregate or coded variable that 

only entails bilateral military grants, loans, troop 

presence, and arms sales (Poe 1991, Poe and 

Meernik 1995, Sullivan, Tessman and Li 2011, 

Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985). These are 

only four limited dimensions of persuasive (versus coercive) military interaction that, in actuality, consists of over 100 programs; the more 

comprehensive conceptualization of military 

interaction becomes especially important in research on Africa and AFRICOM. For fiscal year 

2013, the total aggregate loans or foreign military financing (FMF) for African nations within 

AFRICOM’s area of responsibility amounted to 

only about $40 million, while the total value of 

our military engagement with Africa was arguably well over $500 million based on the size 

of AFRICOM’s operations and maintenance 

budget, other DOD security cooperation funding 

provided under Title 10 programs and authorities, 

and Department of State Title 22 funding. Researching the factors that motivate America to 

provide foreign military aid to African states demands a more comprehensive analysis of security cooperation programs not previously applied.

The second gap in the literature concerns 

accounting for other variables related to the 

strategic significance of a state at the gatekeeping 

stage. Strategic significance includes two 
45 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

descriptive indicators. First, is a state’s strategic 

value, including level of terrorist activity, 

geographic location, current U.S. presence or 

engagement and the presence of Chinese or 

other opposing powers. Second, is the presence 

of key resources. Key resources are, “The resources having the greatest bearing upon policy, 

and therefore looming largest in geopolitics, are 

generally considered to be energy and strategic 

materials...For the United States, the key resources are energy and strategic minerals” (Anderson and Anderson 1998, 3-4). The Strategic 

and Critical Materials Stock Pile Revision Act 

(1979) refers to strategic materials as those that 

“...would need to supply the military, industrial 

and civilian requirements of the United States 

during an emergency... [and] are not found or 

produced in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet such need” (Anderson and Anderson 

1998, 4). Strategic Minerals must meet three criteria: “The resources are critical for defense and 

defense-related industries and essential civilian 

uses; there is a marked degree of import dependence; and there are a few significant sources of 

the supply” (Anderson and Anderson 1998, 5-6).

Scholars have avoided or unintentionally 

ignored DOD’s own declarations that, “SC comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to encourage and enable 

international partners to work with the United 

States to achieve strategic objectives... promote 

specific U.S. security interests” (Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2008). Observing this 

critical statement by the DOD, which is based on 

direction provided from the President’s National 

Security Strategy (2011), and therefore a direct 

outgrowth of foreign policy, human rights are 

only one factor among many that drive military 

aid, and the specific weight or relevance of this 

factor may not be equivalent to other foreign policy interests. Further research is needed to compare state strategic variables in relation and relative value to our foreign policy, including such 

factors as the level of terrorist activity within the 

state or generated by elements residing within its 

national territory, geographic location, and the 

presence of strategic materials/minerals, along 

with human rights practices, in order to conclude which indicators have the most significant 

influence on the allocation of American foreign 

military aid and general engagement. More importantly, and more consistent with DOD’s own 

policy, research focused on decision making at 

the gatekeeping stage may reveal that U.S. decision makers establish first if a proposed recipient 

state strategically matters to the United States 

before any other variables are considered. Researchers thus far have not adequately addressed 

the gatekeeping stage and have only shown 

that at this stage policy makers consider human 

rights along with other variables. They have not 

identified which variable is dominant or which 

variable is ranked first—human rights practices 

or strategic significance. Additionally, they have 

not adequately addressed how policy makers are 

able to provide military aid to states with poor human rights records, essentially ignoring the law.

Analyzing food aid, Fariss found that, 

“the conditional relationship between human 

rights and strategic interests is an important part 

of the determination of the type of foreign aid 

that country receives” (Fariss 2010, 126). This 

identifies another gap in the military aid literature. Because scholars have generally failed 

to include all aspects of security cooperation 

into their analysis, research should also be accomplished that considers not only the presence and “quantity” of U.S. military assistance 

with various states, but also the type and “quality” of military aid. Furthermore, researching 

security cooperation programs that appear to 

contradict the scope and intention of the Foreign Assistance Act may discover significant 

nuances in the way American decision makers 

provide military aid to strategically significant 

states with histories of human rights violations. 

The final gap in the literature is the lack 

of scholarly research which recognizes a third 

and clearly defined era in the continuum of U.S. 

foreign policy history: the post-9/11 period. The 

United States currently has security cooperation 

programs with at least 49 of 53 African states in 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 46

the AFRICOM AOR. Therefore, it seems that our 

leaders may be undermining their own rhetoric 

concerning the promotion of human rights and 

liberal values, given the human rights records of 

countries such as the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, the Central African Republic, Burundi, 

Algeria, Morocco, and many other African states.

Conclusion

In this more complex, current era, Africa’s 

fundamental strategic importance (its geographic location and abundance of natural and other 

strategic resources) is coupled to a complex mix 

of other more emergent (and sometimes transient) political interests linked to instability, terrorism, genocide, and Western social values, to 

include human rights concerns. In the face of 

such complexities and changes, a new, finer degree of analysis is required to draw firm conclusions on what truly drives U.S. foreign policy, 

whether it is traditional strategic issues supported by realism or human rights concerns linked to 

constructivism and liberalism. Further research 

in this area should likewise take into account the 

full range and significance of African security 

cooperation engagement by the United States 

and its relative importance as a tool of foreign 

policy. Additional research aimed at creating a 

better understanding of our security cooperation 

efforts in Africa, as well as an understanding of 

the choice and mix of security cooperation used 

with particular countries based on a broad range 

of properly weighted foreign policy interests, 

will contribute significantly to existing literature. As our research project develops, the authors welcome comment and criticism in guiding the analysis, the results of which we hope to 

report in a future article in the DISAM Journal. 

______________________________________

About the Authors:

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) James Toomey 

is an Associate Professor at the Defense Institute 

of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). 

During his military career, he served as a SubSaharan African (48J) Foreign Area Officer 

(FAO) for the U.S. Army for over fourteen 

years, with tours of duty at five U.S. embassies 

overseas, including service as a Defense Attaché 

in Haiti and Liberia, an assignment as the Chief, 

Central Africa Branch at the U.S. European 

Command (EUCOM), and brief tours as the 

first Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation 

for the new republic of South Sudan and as the 

first Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché in 

Djibouti. He possesses four degrees related to 

international business/political affairs, including

Master’s degrees from Columbus State University and the University of Florida, where he 

also obtained a certificate in African studies.

Christopher Dias is a Lockheed Martin 

contractor at the Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management (DISAM). He received 

his bachelor’s degree in political science 

from Wright State University in 2013, and is 

currently a graduate student in the International 

Comparative Politics program at Wright 

State University. He also was a former U.S. 

Air Force enlisted aeromedical evacuation 

technician with tours in Iraq and Germany.

Works Cited

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and Global Geo-Economics. New York: John 

Wiley & Sons, 1998.

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(1999): 185-198.

Besteman, Catherine. “Beware of Those 

Bearing Gifts: An Anthropologist’s View of 

Today 24, no. 5”(2008): 20-21.

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and U.S. Arms Exports.” International Studies 

Quarterly 49 (2005): 647-667.

Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. “Promoting 

Human Rights and Democracy in the Devel-
47 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

oping World: U.S. Rhetoric versus U.S. Arms 

Exports.” American Journal of Political Science 

44, no. 1 (2000): 123-131.

Carleton, David, and Michael Stohl. “The 

Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and 

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229.

Cingranelli, David L., and Thomas E. 

Pasquarello. “Human Rights Practices and the 

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(SAMM). DOD Directive 5105.65, 2008.

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Analysis of U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation.” International Studies Association. Honolulu, Hawaii, 

2005. 1-33.

Demirel-Pegg, Tijen, and James Moskowitz. “U.S. Aid Allocation: The Nexus of Human 

Rights, Democracy, and Development.” Journal 

of Peace and Research 46, no. 2 (2009): 181-

198.

Fariss, Christopher J. “The Strategic Substitution of United States Foreign Aid.” Foreign 

Policy 6 (2010): 107-131.

Forsythe, David P. “Human Rights and 

U.S. Foreign Policy Two Levels, Two Worlds.” 

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111-130.

Klotz, Audie. “Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions 

Against South Africa.” International Organizations (49) 3 (2011): 451-478.

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1991- 96.” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 1 

(2003): 103-125.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 

“Linking Security Assistance and Human 

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3 (1988).

McCormick, James M., and Neil Mitchell. 

“Is U.S. Aid really Linked to Human Rights in 

Latin America.” American Journal of Political 

Science 32, no. 1 (1988): 231-239.

Pandey, Shri Nayan Pandey. “The United 

States of America’s Africa Command and the 

Dilemma of Security and Stability in Africa.” 

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India CXLI (2011).

Ploch, Lauren. Africa Command: U.S. 

Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. 

Military in Africa. CRS Report for Congress, 

Washington D.C.: Congressional Research 

Service, 2011.

Poe, Steven C. “Human Rights and the Allocation of U.S. Military Assistance.” Journal of 

Peace and Research 28, no. 2 (1991): 205-216.

Poe, Steven C., and James Meernik. “U.S. 

Military Aid in the 1980s: A Global Analysis.” 

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Richards, David L. “Rhetoric and Reality 

Revisited.” Journal of Human Rights 11 (2012): 

337-343.

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Sprance, William R. “The New Tournament of Shadows: The Implications of China›s 

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and Xiaojun Li. “U.S. Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation.” Foreign Policy Analysis 

7 (2011): 275-294.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 48
49 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

USCG’s FMS Customers Shifting 

Focus from Procurement of New 

Assets to Enhanced Maintenance, 

Support

By Ben W. Posil

Office of International Acquisition, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the 

view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

The USCG has carved a unique niche in the 

world of the U.S. Government’s Foreign Military 

Sales (FMS) program. Despite being far smaller 

than most of the government’s FMS organizations, the USCG FMS program has transferred 

nearly $750 million in equipment, training, and 

related support to foreign allies over the last five 

years alone. While maritime vessels still make 

up a large portion of this total, the USCG has seen 

a significant increase in the role that follow-on 

training and technical support plays in their projects. The fact that countries are beginning to shift 

a larger percentage of their FMS dollars to manufacturer-provided sustainment efforts is already 

proving to be a sound strategy for all involved.

“Success” in the FMS world can be measured in a number of ways. It can be quantified by raw numbers including the amount of 

assets transferred or the total dollar value of 

goods and services delivered. It can be measured in the delivery of capabilities to partner 

nations, who can then perform missions the 

U.S. forces may otherwise have to conduct on 

their own. It can also be judged by less tangible measures, such as the U.S. Government’s 

ability to maintain a bilateral relationship 

with one country or gain influence in a region.

Defining “failure” in the FMS world is also 

highly subjective. What happens all too often is 

that the U.S. Government delivers military equipment to our allies, only to see that equipment fall 

into disrepair far earlier than its “standard” service life would forecast. Whether this is caused 

by a lack of expertise, a lack of interest, or a failure on the U.S. Government’s part varies from 

case to case and is often the subject of debate.

What is far clearer however is that when this scenario plays out, the partner nation fails in their 

efforts to enhance their capabilities and the U.S. 

Government regresses in its foreign policy goals.

The USCG’s FMS program has found that 

most partner nations understand the key role that 

maintenance plays in the long term “success” 

of these programs. In many cases, they are also 

able to determine that their organizations lack 

the organic resources, expertise and experience 

to provide the required support. As FMS dollars 

of all types become scarcer and scrutiny of “best 

practices” increases, even the most regular recipients are no longer able to count on having new 

equipment delivered annually to replace “broken” equipment from previous years. In an increasing number of instances, follow-on support 

packages delivered by the original equipment 

manufacturers in a continual, iterative fashion 

provide a solution. These “enhanced” support 

packages provided through FMS cases have become the most efficient way to bridge the capa-
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 50

vision’s own scarce resources and preexisting international commitments, the FMS program has had limited ability to incorporate 

those teams into FMS cases for new boats.

With few organic options in the USCG, there 

are several different ways that this additional 

support can be delivered through an FMS case.

As part of the “total package” concept, there is an 

initial training program built in to every USCG 

FMS boat delivery. Generally this includes two 

to three weeks of training, delivered by a team 

from the boat manufacturer, at a location of 

the recipient’s choosing in their home country.

Historically, this has been the only in-country support delivered, at least via the FMS case.

As most veterans of maritime FMS programs 

will tell you, this initial training is simply not 

enough. More time is always needed, whether 

it is to enhance familiarity, incorporate more 

personnel, or just to compensate for inefficiencies caused by translation requirements, cultural 

differences, or logistical delays. Regardless of 

how smoothly the initial training goes, refresher training is needed after the partner nation 

has had the opportunity to operate their boats.

Several years ago a small number of countries who received boats through the USCG FMS 

program began inquiring as to how they could 

procure additional in-country support from the 

manufacturers. These inquiries lead to several 

cases that delivered multiple iterations of supplemental, manufacturer-provided assistance.

The practical value of these programs became 

immediately apparent, as the additional involvement of the manufacturers had a direct impact 

on increasing the utility and availability of those 

assets. This concept gained traction, and in just 

the last year, more of than half of FMS cases 

for boats have included multiple iterations of 

in-country support. Additionally, another half 

dozen countries have requested that the residual 

funding on existing cases for boats be utilized 

to fund follow-on iterations of training and/or 

technical assistance. Some of these requests 

have come directly from the partner nations, 

some have been incorporated via recommendability gap and significantly extend the lifespan of 

equipment delivered through the FMS program.

So why is the USCG at the forefront of this 

trend? For starters, it is likely a byproduct of 

necessity. With only five FMS case managers 

and a limited number of support personnel, 

there is a heightened premium on developing 

solutions that can be procured, managed, and 

executed efficiently. Having the ability to 

dictate the itinerary for the work effort, direct 

the time and place with minimal notice, and 

remain unburdened by some of the operational 

constraints that restrict uniform service members operating overseas, gives maximum flexibility to the case managers in setting up incountry support. This is especially useful when 

accommodating for scheduling delays resulting from shipping issues, local Customs procedures, and the myriad other unforeseen challenges that upend even the most succinct plan.

From a procurement standpoint, contracting for these additional iterations of support is 

a straightforward process. Whether in-country 

support focuses on training, maintenance, technical support, or all of the above, ultimately 

what is being purchased is the manufacturer’s 

time. When a dollar value is placed on each 

day of time, and travel costs and other incidentals are built in, it is very easy to determine the 

costs associated with additional in-country support. Divide the total cost for one iteration into 

a country’s available funding, multiply the result 

by the standard length of time between iterations (i.e. every six months), and the U.S. Government can easily project how many years of 

support that country will receive. The compartmentalized costs and easily defined requirements 

mean that with an active FMS case and available 

funding in place, actual delivery of additional 

in-country support can take place within as little as 90 days from receipt of a formal request.

Additionally, the USCG’s FMS program 

has very limited access to USCG “blue suiter” training teams. While the USCG maintains a Training Division at Yorktown, VA, 

for several reasons including the Training Di-
51 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

become a point of contention amongst the stakeholders. The higher the level of overall capabilities that a partner nation is able to maintain, 

the greater the level of utility they will generate from their FMS-acquired assets. This means 

more “bang for the buck” from every dollar spent 

by foreign countries on FMS and a greater collective satisfaction with the program. Mr. Tod 

Reinert, who leads the USCG’s International Acquisition Programs, sums up the shift by saying, 

“Our mission is not to make sales or deliver assets, but instead to deliver capability and establish or further develop long-term partnerships.

What we are seeing with this enhanced, vendorprovided, follow-on support is a very positive 

trend and is absolutely aligned with our mission.

The bilateral relationship is enhanced further by a regular schedule of follow-on visits, 

provided by the manufacturer, which directly 

address the technical and training shortfalls 

in that partner nation. Ultimately, when partner nations dedicate resources to maintaining 

their own assets, it ideologically aligns with 

the U.S. Government’s goal of developing the 

concept of “ownership” amongst our allies. 

While it may seem counterintuitive, the 

manufactures also benefit when partner nations shift away from “new boats” as the automatic answer to their maritime needs. On the 

most basic level, a shift from boats to follow-on 

support does not necessarily result in a loss of 

revenue; much, if not all, of the available funding still ends up going to the manufacturer, but 

for the procurement of services (which generally have much larger profit margins) instead 

of material goods. The ongoing involvement 

with equipment operated by the partner nations 

affords the manufacturers an opportunity to 

help maintain the equipment at optimal levels.

Representatives of the boat manufacturers that 

work directly with the partner nations have a 

vested interest in the success of those FMS programs, perhaps more than any other stakeholder. Their livelihood depends, at least to some 

degree, on the relationships and ultimately the 

success of those boats and the resulting sense 

tions from the USCG, and others were the result 

of ongoing dialogue between the stakeholders. 

These follow-on sessions are usually delivered six to nine months after completion of 

the previous session and focus on a combination of repairs, maintenance and operator training. This sequence leaves the vast majority 

of the maintenance burden on the partner nation, but guarantees anything that cannot be 

resolved at the local level will be addressed by 

the manufacturer in a matter of months, during 

their next visit. It also helps maintain proficiency amongst the operators and maintainers, 

and mitigates the impact of loss and/or rotation 

of personnel. The USCG has several countries 

that are now into their third or fourth year of 

this format, and one partner nation has already 

submitted a Letter of Request to extend their 

in-country support to a full time, “24/7” presence, in support of their fleet of response boats.

Ultimately, the benefits of contractor-provided training lead to a genuine “win-win-win” 

for the three primary stakeholders (partner nation, U.S. Government, and commercial entity) 

in the FMS process. In the forefront of this trifecta is the recipient country, which reaps the 

most tangible benefits. The repair efforts, conducted in “train the trainer” format, not only 

directly address existing maintenance issues, 

but also serve as a practical training program 

for that partner nation’s maintainers. The incountry presence of the manufacturer at intervals well beyond the initial delivery of the boats 

serves as a de facto replacement for warranty 

coverage in areas where warranty support is 

not practical. The more manufacturer-provided 

follow-on support that can be provided through 

an FMS case, the more the utility of newly acquired assets can be increased and the more 

the lifespan of those assets can be extended.

The U.S. Government also has much to 

gain from the shift to enhanced support packages. Buying new boats for another country may 

be considered a “win” in the FMS world, but if 

the boats are out of commission six months after delivery that short-term victory will quickly 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 52

______________________________________

About the Author

Mr. Ben W. Posil is the senior FMS case 

manager in the Office of International Acquisition, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters.

He currently manages a broad portfolio of 

30 FMS projects, primarily with countries 

in the AFRICOM and CENTCOM AORs.

of “ownership” incentivizes a heightened level 

of service. The more satisfied a partner nation 

is with the boats (or any other equipment) they 

have received and the support from the manufacturer to keep those boats running, the more 

likely they will choose to spend future FMS 

dollars with that same manufacturer, whether 

it be for more equipment or additional support.

Mr. Henry Irizarry is the Director of International Sales and Support for Metal Shark Boats, 

one of the manufacturers that has numerous ongoing FMS projects with the USCG. As a former 

USCG officer who worked for years in the Security Assistance arena, he also has first-hand experience developing FMS packages for maritime 

support with partner nations. He too has seen the 

shift in focus. “Their desire to maximize their 

operational capability ... has led partner nations 

to team up with boat builders and protect their 

investment by establishing long-term strong 

working relationships that include training and 

technical support. This decision has led many 

countries to forego an additional asset to ensure 

training and support is included in their procurement”. The more effective this change in strategy is, the better the result for all stakeholders.

The shift in focus from procuring new assets 

towards enhanced support packages for boats already in operation is spreading across geographical boundaries, differing capability levels, and 

the full range of force sizes. The USCG has active cases with countries in nearly every COCOM 

where partner nations have chosen to spend their 

available funding on enhanced support packages 

for their existing boats, instead of simply going 

out and buying new ones. While there are a number of motivating factors, the cost/benefit analysis being done by the partner nations is more 

frequently resulting in a sustainment plan that 

extends well beyond the initial delivery. Whatever the motivation for the shift, the new strategy is proving to be universally beneficial and an 

undisputed “win” for the USCG FMS program.
53 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

A Vision for Global Aviation 

Enterprise Development

By Mort Rolleston and Lt Col Peter Garretson

U.S. Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division

Any opinions, analysis, or recommendations offered by the author(s) are those of the author(s), and do not 

necessarily reflect the views of DISAM, DSCA, DOD or the USG.

Introduction

A key pillar of the President’s National 

Security Strategy (NSS),[1] which guides the 

entire U.S. government, is to leverage partnerships with other nations and international organizations to address the unique strategic, economic, and fiscal challenges facing the United 

States (U.S.). Leveraging partnerships includes:

• Creating and strengthening alliances 

and relationships 

• Improving interoperability and cooperation between the United States and 

foreign militaries 

• Improving intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with other nations 

• Strengthening weak and failing states 

• Working with others to foster economic 

development, strengthen institutions of 

democratic governance, and solve major 

international problems and crises.[2]

An important way of leveraging such 

partnerships is to assist partner nations (PNs) 

with their aviation enterprise development 

(AED). The United States Air Force (USAF) 

describes AED as “the plans, programs, and 

activities undertaken to develop the systemof-systems necessary for a nation to optimize 

employment of national aviation resources. The 

total aviation resource capacity and capability 

of a nation is defined by the sum total of 

all air domain resources including humans, 

aircraft, processes and infrastructure in both 

the civilian and military/security sectors.”[3]

While the U.S. Government has assisted 

PN AED for years, such assistance has generally 

been ad hoc or short-term reactions to crises. For 

U.S. AED assistance to leverage partnerships 

effectively as directed by the NSS, it must 

instead be a deliberate, targeted, long-term effort 

closely tied to enduring American strategic 

...we must focus American engagement on strengthening international institutions and 

galvanizing the collective action that can serve common interests such as combating 

violent extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; 

achieving balanced and sustainable economic growth; and forging cooperative solutions to 

the threat of climate change, armed conflict, and pandemic disease. The starting point for 

that collective action will be our engagement with other countries...We are expanding 

our outreach to emerging nations, particularly those that can be models of regional 

success and stability, from the Americas to Africa to Southeast Asia.”

– President Barack Obama, National Security Strategy – May 2010, 3 (emphasis added)
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 54

interests articulated in the NSS: values, 

prosperity, security, and international order.

Values and the Air Domain. The NSS 

includes “respect for universal values at 

home and around the world” as an enduring 

U.S. strategic interest.[5] The air domain 

enables large-scale international travel and 

the corresponding mobility of ideas, capital, 

people, and associated values. According to 

recent statistics, 1,568 commercial airlines 

flying 23,844 commercial aircraft between 

3,846 airports serving 34,756 city-pair routes 

commercial aviation transported over 2.6 

billion passengers worldwide.[6] In addition, 

a significant part of AED assistance involves 

experts from the United States, Western Europe, 

and other nations working with the militaries 

and civilian authorities of various partner 

nations. Among other benefits, such cooperation 

and relationship building often helps expand 

universal democratic and human rights values.

Prosperity and the Air Domain. The 

NSS lists “a strong, innovative, and growing 

U.S. economy in an open international 

economic system that promotes opportunity and 

prosperity” as another enduring U.S. strategic 

interest.[7] The commercial use of the global 

air domain has significantly contributed to 

America’s prosperity by directly generating U.S. 

economic activity and enhancing international 

commerce that benefits the United States.

For example, the U.S. civil aviation industry:

• Generates $1.3 trillion in total U.S. 

economic activity each year 

• Supports 10.2 million American jobs 

• Accounts for 5.2 percent of the 

American economy[8]

• Contributes $86 billion in export sales 

to the U.S. economy (and is America’s 

strongest export sector).[9] The 

United States exports 42 percent of all 

aerospace production and 72 percent of 

all civil aircraft it produces.[10] These 

exports, in turn, also have a major 

global economic impact given aviation’s 

interests. To achieve this, the U.S. Government 

should produce a vision and associated 

strategy for global AED, either separately or 

as part of broader U.S. assistance guidance.

This article suggests a starting point for 

such a whole-of-government AED vision. It 

achieves this by first highlighting the importance 

of the global air domain to American strategic 

and economic interests overall and reminding 

that these benefits came, in part, from similar 

deliberative, strategic U.S. AED assistance 

after World War II. The article then argues why 

America should once again think strategically 

about its AED assistance given that U.S. 

strategic and economic interests are becoming 

increasingly tied to the emerging economies of 

Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Latin 

America, which are all poised to greatly expand 

their aviation enterprise. It then suggests a vision 

for the United States to guide its AED assistance 

to these emerging economies to ensure that 

America continues to benefit from the global 

air domain going into the foreseeable future 

While written from an Airman’s 

perspective, this suggested global AED vision 

deliberately considers the broad economic and 

security interests articulated in the NSS as well 

as Department of Defense (DOD) strategic 

guidance and regional plans. We have attempted 

to look beyond DOD equities and seek natural 

whole-of-government synergies that will 

enhance U.S. national security and freedom of 

action associated with the global air domain.

However, any actual whole-of-government 

AED vision will undoubtedly need to include 

additional content than what is suggested here.

How the Global Air Domain Benefits the 

Nation

The United States is an air-faring nation 

that benefits tremendously by using the 

global air domain.[4] For example, America’s 

utilization of the air domain has been essential 

in advancing all four enduring U.S. strategic 
55 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

later, PNs with a capable aviation enterprise 

often assist the United States in addressing 

its security challenges because many internal 

security challenges of PNs – such as terrorists, 

transnational criminal organizations, and 

insurgents - also often threaten U.S. interests. The 

more PNs can address these mutual challenges 

to U.S. and PN security, the less the United 

States will need to deploy its forces directly.

International Order and the Air Domain.

Finally, the NSS lists “an international order 

advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes 

peace, security, and opportunity through 

stronger cooperation to meet global challenges” 

as an enduring strategic interest.[20] Most of the 

benefits of the air domain to international order 

are discussed later in this article’s suggested 

global AED vision. In short, aviation enables the 

United States, its allies, and its PNs to conduct 

operations that contribute to international order, 

both directly and in terms of improving the 

internal security and stability of key partners.

Returning to a Strategic Mindset in the 

Global Air Domain

These benefits of the air domain to the 

United States did not appear exclusively by 

chance. They were, in part, the result of important 

contributions by both U.S. civilian and military 

thinkers in the post-World War II reconstruction 

period who understood the strategic value of 

aviation. At a time when American leadership 

was shaping the institutions of the world and 

industrial policy at home, they drafted and 

executed a global U.S. AED strategy that had two 

key components: (1) investing at home in aviation 

transportation technology and infrastructure; 

and (2) shaping global AED through laws, 

institutions, infrastructure, and sales.

Abroad, the United States led the creation 

of international legal regimes. It convened 

the Chicago Conference, which set global air 

norms and provided a clear basis for overflight 

and the development of institutions such as the 

total global economic impact (direct, 

indirect, induced, and tourism catalytic) 

is estimated at $2.2 trillion or 3.5 percent 

of global gross domestic product.[11]

Aviation’s contribution to American 

prosperity is likely to increase even further 

in the future given that global air traffic is 

expected to double over the next 15 years.[12]

Furthermore, aviation significantly 

contributes to American prosperity through the 

medium of international trade. Indeed, aviation 

accounts for roughly one-third (34.6 percent) 

of global trade by value.[13] The U.S. share 

of this global trade is substantial. The United 

States annually exports roughly $1.5 trillion 

in merchandise and imports $2.3 trillion,[14]

accounting for eight percent of all global 

exports and over twelve percent of all global 

imports.[15] In terms of the U.S. economy 

in 2012 ($15.7 trillion in GDP), that trade 

represents nearly $1.4 trillion in additional 

American income. Indeed, one analysis shows 

American real incomes are nine percent higher 

than they would otherwise have been as a result 

of trade liberalizing efforts since World War II.[16]

Security and the Air Domain. The NSS 

also identifies “the security of the United States, 

its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners” as an 

enduring strategic interest.[17] It highlights 

America’s primary security issues or challenges 

as homeland security, counterterrorism 

counterproliferation, Middle East peace, 

investment in the capacity of strong and 

capable partners to improve regional stability 

and prevent conflict, and a secure cyberspace 

domain.[18] America’s direct use of the global 

air domain is an essential enabler of activities 

to address these security challenges. In broad 

terms, American air power protects U.S. territory 

and American forces abroad from air attack.

It also enables world-wide ground and naval 

operations by enabling direct effects, rapidly 

moving people and supplies across the globe, 

and providing essential global scale surveillance 

and reconnaissance.[19] Conversely, as detailed 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 56

as post-World War II reconstruction saw the 

development of many European and East Asian 

states, globalization[22]is expected to enable 

some three billion of the world’s poorest citizens 

in these regions to urbanize and participate in the 

global economy over the next two decades.[23]

This presents both major challenges and 

opportunities for the United States and its enduring 

strategic interests of values, prosperity, security, 

and international order. In terms of promoting 

universal international values, if the expected 

AED in these regions is enabled by U.S. assistance, 

an excellent opportunity would arise for those 

values to spread and solidify in these regions.

In terms of prosperity, the expected rapid 

forthcoming AED growth in these regions 

provides a huge economic opportunity for the 

U.S. aviation industry as well as American trade 

writ large that can leverage the improved aviation 

infrastructure and stability. For example, within 

Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Latin 

America, Airbus projects the number of airports 

handling more than 10,000 long-haul passengers 

per day (“aviation megacities”) to increase 

nearly four-fold (from 8 to 31) over the next 

International Civil Aviation Organization. The 

United States also assisted allied AED by funding 

the development of overseas runways in Europe 

and East Asia for both civil reconstruction 

and military posture. This was critical in their 

recovery and economic development after 

World War II. It also ensured an economically 

strong web of alliances that today form the 

stable zones of the world and the most vibrant 

nodes in the global economy.[21] In addition, 

these efforts put in place the infrastructure 

that the United States has successfully relied 

upon since to prevent and respond to crises 

in Europe, East Asia, and their periphery.

Today, America is confronted with a similar 

opportunity to help shape the global air domain to 

support its enduring strategic interests, this time 

in the emerging economies of Southeast Asia, 

South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The 

global transportation map above highlights the 

differences between the extensive air networks 

of the industrialized world, developed in part 

by the global AED efforts of the United States 

after World War II, and the relatively sparse 

air networks in these emerging regions. Just 
57 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

for International Development, the Federal 

Aviation Administration, and the Departments 

of State, Homeland Security, Transportation, 

Commerce, Justice, as well as Defense. In 

addition, given ongoing fiscal challenges, the 

United States cannot afford to build partnerships 

everywhere. Therefore, it must make “thoughtful 

choices” about where to focus these efforts 

to best achieve its strategic objectives.[25]

A Proposed Vision for American AED 

Assistance 

Below, we propose a starting point for 

a whole-of-government vision for global 

aviation assistance in the form of four desired 

end states. Each end state is focused on 

advancing the Nation’s ability to fully leverage 

the distinctive capabilities of the global air 

domain and the American aviation enterprise 

– especially associated with the emerging 

economies previously described. Each provides 

lines of effort in which interagency planning 

and coordination is essential for success.

U.S. AED assistance should be focused 

on creating a global air domain in which:

1 - Partner Nations Have the Aviation 

Resources to Achieve Internal Security and 

Contribute to Regional Stability

Many PNs lack the aviation enterprise 

necessary to achieve their own internal security, 

much less contribute to regional stability. This 

often leads to ungoverned and under governed 

spaces where terrorists, transnational organized 

criminals, and other challenges to U.S. strategic 

interests can thrive. Even the most basic aviation 

enterprise can extend a PN’s reach by enabling 

rapid response and improving situational 

awareness to combat internal threats and 

provide local humanitarian assistance. Using 

aviation to extend state reach contributes to PN 

internal security and supports global efforts to 

reduce ungoverned spaces where terrorists and 

twenty years. This accounts for almost half 

of the expected growth in aviation megacities 

(42 of 92) worldwide during this period.[24]

In terms of security and international order, 

many U.S. security interests associated with 

terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, transnational criminal organizations, 

and secure trade routes are located in these 

emerging regions. As highlighted by the NSS 

and other strategic guidance, addressing these 

interests requires the assistance of PNs there to, 

among other things, to help prevent conflict, and, 

if necessary, to provide access to the United States 

and the international community during a crisis.

America’s key strategic and economic 

competitors know this and are already very 

active in these regions – particularly China 

and Russia. If the United States wants to 

shape this unfolding change to ensure the 

global air domain will continue to effectively 

support its enduring strategic interests, it is 

time to again think strategically about where 

targeted U.S. AED assistance in these emerging 

regions will best advance these interests.

The Need for National AED Guidance

Proactively shaping this evolving global 

air domain, however, requires U.S. AED 

assistance to be a deliberate, targeted, longterm effort closely tied to enduring American 

strategic interests, as envisioned in the recent 

Presidential Policy Directive 23 on security 

sector assistance (SSA). By contrast, for many 

years most U.S. AED assistance has been ad hoc 

or short-term reactions to crises. To address this, 

the U.S. Government should produce a vision 

and associated strategy for global AED, either 

separately or as part of broader U.S. assistance 

guidance, to guide and coordinate the wholeof-government effort. The U.S. Government 

already has the necessary resources in terms of 

expertise, authorities, and programs. However, 

they are spread out among various services 

and agencies such as the United States Agency 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 58

Second, the United States cannot effectively 

respond to every crisis in the world and needs 

the help of capable PNs that can contribute 

aviation resources (such as airlift) for rapid 

assistance. Therefore, U.S. AED assistance 

should also facilitate the acquisition of airlift 

in capable PNs that can effectively respond to 

crises and coordinate agreements between them 

to enable regional and global crisis response.

Lastly, neither the United States nor the 

international community can rapidly respond to 

crises if they fail to build and maintain overflight 

rights for the necessary route structures.

Therefore, the United States should work with 

PNs to design a desired global route structure 

that permits rapid crisis response worldwide 

and secure the necessary enabling partnerships.

3 –The Global Aviation Enterprise 

is Safely Operated, Secure, and WellSupported

As previously noted, the global air domain 

is a key conduit for the movement of people, 

technology, capital, and information around the 

world. This greatly benefits America’s economic 

and security interests and helps spread universal 

international values. Maintaining these benefits 

requires all nations to have access to a global 

aviation enterprise (especially non-military 

civil aviation) that is safely operated, secure, 

and well-supported. A safely operated aviation 

enterprise is one whose operations and activities 

are conducted in a reliable manner according 

to international standards. A secure aviation 

enterprise is one that deters and prevents bad 

actors from attacking or otherwise disrupting 

operations and from using air transport as a vector 

of illicit activity or attack. A supported aviation 

enterprise is one that is effectively sustained 

over time to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

Therefore, U.S. AED assistance should also be 

used to ensure the global aviation enterprise is 

safely operated, secured, and well-supported.

transnational criminal networks operate. Such 

visible, practical, and effective means to improve 

governance and provide basic services for the 

populace also enhances PN legitimacy.[26]

The aviation system required to support 

these ends must be capable of light lift, 

surveillance, and airdrop to provide lifelines to 

local communities that lack adequate road, river, 

or rail networks. Such an aviation system also 

must include airfields with sufficient support 

equipment, airfield operators, mechanics, 

logisticians, aviation medicine capability, 

and aircrews. This basic aviation system 

would lay the foundation for more advanced 

capabilities and could eventually enable some 

PNs to directly contribute to regional security or 

support coalition operations in regional security 

environments. Therefore, U.S. AED assistance 

should focus on developing the aviation 

enterprise of select PNs for our mutual security.

2 - The International Community Can 

Effectively Respond to Crises Anywhere in 

the World 

Achieving this has three separate, but 

related, aspects. First, when a crisis grows 

beyond a nation’s internal ability to handle, that 

nation must have an aviation enterprise capable of 

receiving outside help. However, many nations 

in the emerging regions of the developing world 

(especially in Africa) lack the basic aviation 

infrastructure (such as airports, airport security, 

storage, and/or cargo unloading capability) 

necessary to effectively receive international help 

– even humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Therefore, U.S. AED assistance should facilitate 

the construction or upgrading of aviation 

infrastructure to enable effective international 

assistance during a crisis. An important step 

forward would be the creation of a U.S.-proposed 

international standard to certify airports for 

humanitarian/disaster response operations.
59 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

these needs of emerging air forces compared to 

its strategic competitors.[29] Former Defense 

Secretary Robert Gates wrote that America’s 

interagency tool kit is “still a hodgepodge of 

jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated 

and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent 

shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.”

In the meantime, he noted “other countries that 

do not suffer from such encumbrances have been 

more quickly funding projects, selling weapons, 

and building relationships.” Secretary Gates 

also added that “convincing other countries 

and leaders to be partners of the United States, 

often at great political and physical risk, 

ultimately depends on proving that the United 

States is capable of being a reliable partner 

over time.”[30] Unfortunately, however, existing 

laws and authorities rarely enable security 

assistance beyond a year or two at a time. In 

addition, Assistant Secretary of PoliticalMilitary Affairs Andrew Shapiro recently 

alluded to various complaints by potential 

partner nations about the U.S. arms transfer 

process such as: onerous rules and procedures, 

intrusive monitoring, rigorous investigations 

of potential violations, and an unpredictable 

and uncertain export control process.[31]

However, one reason the United States 

is not the aviation security partner of choice 

in these emerging markets may be that it has 

not developed a concerted program to offer 

them what they need.[32] The aviation needs 

and resources of emerging air forces are often 

different from those of fully developed air forces.

They may only need to learn basic airmanship 

and gain experience with maintenance 

and operations. Many need to obtain and 

operate transferable, affordable, modular, and 

sustainable aircraft that more closely resemble 

what the United States uses for customs, border 

protection, and law enforcement as opposed 

to advanced combat. By contrast, America’s 

security related aviation sales and assistance 

processes are clearly geared towards other 

advanced militaries. Therefore, within the limits 

4 - America Becomes the Aviation 

Security Partner of Choice to Nations with 

Emerging Aviation Enterprises

The United States seeks to be the 

security partner of choice and pursue new 

partnerships with a growing number of 

nations.[27] U.S. AED assistance can be an 

effective tool in achieving this objective. The 

aviation enterprise is a complex system. When 

a country purchases capabilities to enhance its 

aviation enterprise, it is usually entering into a 

multi-decade relationship with the seller nation 

that often includes opportunities for improved 

interoperability, access, and future sales.

However, the United States is clearly 

not the aviation security partner of choice 

throughout the emerging regions of the world 

discussed here. For example, the United States 

only accounted for 17 percent of supersonic 

combat aircraft, one percent of subsonic combat 

aircraft, 11 percent of other military aircraft, and 

14 percent of military helicopters delivered to the 

developing world between 2004 and 2011. This 

adds up to a total “market share” of sales in the 

developing world of all military aircraft types of 

only 13 percent during this period. In three of 

the emerging regions of particular interest to this 

article, U.S. market share of military aviation 

sales is mostly worse: 16 percent in Latin 

America, 7 percent in the Asia/Pacific region, 

and zero percent in Africa during this period. By 

comparison, China and Russia combined have 

a 42 percent military aviation market share in 

the developing world globally during the same 

period, 29 percent in Latin America, 54 percent 

in the Asia/Pacific region, and 44 percent in 

Africa. This would not be as much of a concern 

if close U.S. allies were filling much of the 

remaining market share, but they are not.[28]

The specific reasons why this is so vary 

country by country. In part, existing U.S. laws, 

policies, and authorities governing security 

cooperation and assistance often do not position 

America to effectively and affordably address 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 60

of existing U.S. laws, policies, and authorities, 

U.S. AED assistance must serve the actual needs 

of emerging air forces throughout the world to 

advance our mutual security and prosperity.[33]

Conclusion

To summarize, the United States is an airfaring nation that benefits tremendously by using the global air domain to support its enduring 

strategic interests of security, prosperity, values, 

and international order. In part, these benefits 

have been a result of a deliberate, strategic U.S. 

AED assistance effort that followed World War 

II, especially among what is widely considered 

the industrialized world in Europe and parts of 

Asia. Given American strategic interests are becoming increasingly tied to the emerging economies in Southeast and South Asia, Africa, and 

Latin America, and those areas are all widely 

expected to pursue significant AED, America 

should once again think deliberately and strategically about its AED assistance in these regions.

This is especially critical if the United States intends to shape AED in these emerging economies rather than cede such influence to its strategic competitors. Such an AED assistance effort 

requires a strategic perspective as well as wholeof-government planning and collaboration. It 

is our hope the above suggested framework offers a starting point for a whole-of-government 

AED vision and strategy to provide this focus.

Bylines:

Mort Rolleston

Defense Policy Analyst

USAF Irregular Warfare Strategy, Plans, and 

Policy Division

Lt Col Peter Garretson, Chief

USAF Irregular Warfare Strategy, Plans, and 

Policy Division

______________________________________

About the Authors:

Mort Rolleston: Mr. Rolleston is onsite Scitor 

contractor working in the U.S. Air Force 

Irregular Warfare Strategy, Plans, and Policy 

Division. Previously, he spent nearly ten years 

as an onsite strategic planner for the U.S. Air 

Force Strategic Planning Directorate, three 

years as the lead analyst for the Joint Staff›s 

Information Operations Joint Warfighting

Capabilities Assessment, and three years as a 

Legislative Assistant for a Member of Congress.

Mr. Rolleston has an M.A. in Security Policy 

Studies from George Washington University 

and a B.A. in Central and Eastern European 

Affairs from the University of Colorado.

Lt Col Peter Garretson: Lieutenant Colonel 

Garretson (USAFA; Master of Aviation Human 

Factors, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University) 

is a transformational strategist at Headquarters 

U.S. Air Force, Pentagon, Washington, DC. He 

serves as the division chief, Irregular Warfare 

Strategy, Plans, and Policy. During his last 

assignment, he served as an airpower strategist 

on the Air Force chief of staff’s Strategic 

Studies Group. Earlier, he was the first U.S. 

Air Force Fellow at the Indian Institute for 

Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi, 

where he examined Indo-U.S. long-term space 

collaboration, sponsored by the Council on 

Foreign Relations. Lieutenant Colonel Garretson 

also served as the chief of Future Science and 

Technology Exploration for Headquarters U.S. 

Air Force’s Directorate of Strategic Planning.

______________________________________

[1]While an updated NSS is being written at the 

time of this article, the themes of the forthcoming 

version are consistent with the NSS themes cited 

here (and, if anything, are further emphasized).

[2]President of the United States, National 

Security Strategy – May 2010, 11-12, 26-27.
61 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

[3]U.S. Air Force, 2011 USAF 

Global Partnership Strategy, 38.

[4]By the “air domain,” we mean “the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon [air] operations become negligible.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control 

for Joint Air Operations, 12 January 2010, GL-5.

[5]President of the United States, National Security Strategy – May 2010, 17.

[6]Aviation Benefits Beyond Borders, Air 

Transport Action Group, March 2012, 2-4.

[7]President of the United States, National Security Strategy – May 2010, 17.

[8]Federal Aviation Administration, 

“The Economic Impact of Civil Aviation on the U.S. Economy,” August 2011, 5.

[9]U.S. Department of Commerce, “The Aerospace Industry in the United States,” http://

selectusa.commerce.gov/print/industrysnapshots/aerospace-industry-united-states.

[10]U.S. Department of Commerce, “Resources for Aerospace Manufacturers and 

Their Suppliers,” http://www.commerce.

gov/blog/2011/06/20/resources-aero -

space-manufacturers-and-their-suppliers.

[11]Aviation Benefits Beyond Borders, Air 

Transport Action Group, March 2012, 2, 7.

[12]“Developing a Global Safety Strategy That 

Responds to States’ Varying Needs,” International Civil Aviation Organization Journal, Vol. 

68, No.5, 2013, 6. See: http://www.icao.int/

publications/journalsreports/2013/6805_en.pdf.

[13]Aviation Benefits Beyond Borders, Air 

Transport Action Group, March 2012, 4.

[14]See the World Trade Organization website at: 

http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=U.S..

17]President of the United States, National Security Strategy – May 2010, 17.

[18]President of the United States, National Security Strategy – May 2010, 17-28.

[19]For a U.S. Air Force perspective on how air 

power benefits U.S. national security, see Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for 

America, 2013. For a U.S. Navy perspective on air 

power, see Naval Aviation Vision, January 2012.

[20]President of the United States, National Security Strategy – May 2010, 17.

[21]For background, see: http://www.

au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/space/terrill.pdf, 

http://www.archives.gov/research/guidefed-records/groups/340.html, http://www.

hsdl.org/?view&did=463321http://www.

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14145,http://

www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.

php?pid=77956,http://www.presidency.

ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77956, http://www.

icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx.

[22]There are various definitions of “globalization” that touch on the same concept. We 

use the Defense Intelligence Agency’s definition: “reduction of barriers to free movement ofgoods, people, information, services, ideas, and money internationally, 

producing a more interconnectedworld.” Defense Intelligence Agency, “Joint Strategic 

Assessment 2010 – 2030,” 21 May 2010, 16.

[23]For a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing and projected growth and development within the developing world, see United 

Nations Development Programme, Human 

Development Report 2013 - The Rise of the 

South: Human Progress in a Diverse World.

[24]Airbus, Global Market Forecast 2012-

2031: Navigating the Future, 2012, 37, 40.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 62

vice, Washington, DC, 24 August 2012, 64-68.

[29]For details, see, for example, Livingston, Thomas, “Building the Capacity of 

Partner States Through Security Force Assistance,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 5 May 2011, 51-54.

[30]Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010. See: http://www.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/66224/robertm-gates/helping-others-defend-themselves. 

[31]Shapiro, Andrew, “Remarks to Defense 

Trade Advisory Group,” 26 July 2012, See:

www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/195609.htm.

[32]For example: “Air component staffs agreed 

in their interviews that they need platforms that 

not only can be employed to conduct [irregular warfare] IW and [building partner] BP missions, but must also be transferrable, affordable, 

modular, and interoperable (TAMI). If there are 

no adequate U.S.-made platforms for this purpose, the only alternative is that other suppliers (primarily Russia and China) will fill this 

role and diminish U.S. influence.” U.S. Air 

Force Irregular Warfare Tiger Team: Observations and Recommendations, 22 May 2009, 5.

[33]Indeed, PPD-23 emphasizes that “partner capacity can only be sustained over the long term 

when partner governments have the political 

will, absorptive capacity, credible and effective 

institutions, willingness to independently sustain 

U.S. investments, an equal stake in the success 

of SSA initiatives, and policy commitment to 

security sector reform. United States Government SSA efforts must be sensitive to these requirements, including anticipation of partner 

capacity, sustainment and oversight needs...”

President of the United States, “Presidential 

Policy Directive/PPD-23,” 5 April 2013, 4-5.

[15]See the World Trade Organization website at: 

http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=U.S..

[16]See the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative’s website at: http://www.

ustr.gov/trade-topics/economy-trade .

[25]“A reduction in resources will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our 

support for allied and partner interoperability 

and building partner capacity. However, with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to 

be made regarding the location and frequency of 

these operations.”President of the United States, 

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities 

for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, 5-6.

[26]The Department of Defense defines “irregular warfare” (IW)as a “violent struggle among 

state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 

influence over the relevant populations.” U.S. 

Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

148. The IW Joint Operating Concept further 

emphasizes “the contest for legitimacy and influence over a population will be won primarily 

through persistent effort to enable a legitimate 

and capable local partner to address the conflict’s 

causes and provide security, good governance, 

and economic development.” U.S. Department 

of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular 

Threats Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0, 

May 17, 2010, 16-17. Finally, USAF IW doctrine similarly notes that “the desired IW end 

state is a self-sufficient partner with a supportive population.” Air Force Doctrine Document 

3-2: Irregular Warfare, March 15, 2013, 12.

[27]President of the United States, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 

21st Century Defense, January 2012, 3.

[28]Grimmett, Richard and Kerr, Paul, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011,” Congressional Research Ser-
63 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Leading the Army’s Security 

Assistance Enterprise

By USASAC Public Affairs

Unifying numerous and diverse organizations toward a common goal is a challenge 

even when leadership exercises direct authority 

over the supporting entities. But “leading when 

you’re not in charge,” may seem impossible.

The U.S. Army Security Assistance 

Command (USASAC) directs a large enterprise 

that executes Security Assistance and Foreign 

Military Sales programs for 145 different 

countries and agencies. It is currently executing 

the largest, most complex program in the 

U.S. Army’s history. USASAC is aligned by 

Combatant Commands, but its 71 Country 

Program Managers (CPMs) are the focal point for 

the U.S. Army’s Security Assistance relationship 

with countries across the globe. USASAC 

employs six governing principles in leading this 

enterprise of multiple organizations, the same 

organizations that acquire, field and sustain 

systems for U.S. Army units (Army Materiel 

Command’s Life Cycle Management Commands, 

the Program Executive Offices, Army Contracting 

Command, TRADOC amongst many others).

The principles have provided a unifying 

framework that has dramatically improved all 

aspects of managing our FMS cases, thereby 

strengthening the relationships we enjoy with 

our international partners. While these rules 

have been effectively applied in the Army 

Security Assistance Enterprise (ASAE), 

they’re equally applicable in directing any 

large network of disparate organizations that 

work together to meet a common mission.

Our six rules for “leading when you are 

not in charge” include: 1) Establish Coherent 

Authorities; 2) Establish a Common Operating 

Picture for all members; 3) Communicate 

Enterprise Priorities 4) Focus on Outputs 5) 

Exercise Proactive Leadership; and 6) 

Cooperate and Collaborate. They have shaped 

both the culture and integration of the ASAE.

Establish Coherent Authorities

Establishing coherent authorities required 

defining the responsibilities of enterprise members at each step in a very prescriptive, complex 

FMS process. The collaborative revision of Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 

12-1, “Security Assistance Procedures and Operations” by all agencies yielded a framework 

to describe supported and supporting relationships throughout the FMS execution process.

“This document, for the first time in 

many, many years lays out what each of the 

ASAE elements should be doing in their areas 

of functional responsibility,” Ulysses (Dusty) 

Rhodes, Deputy Director of USASAC’s G-5 

Directorate explained. “Whether an organization 

has the lead or is a supporting element of a 

particular program, DA PAM 12-1 provides 

the guidance on integrating the process.”

The pamphlet provides detailed 

instructions and procedures for implementing 

the policies contained in Army Regulation 

(AR) 12-1. It addresses the initiation, 

administration, implementation, and 

execution of FMS cases, as well as other 

assigned Security Assistance (SA) programs.

“I think reading the PAM gives you a 

perspective of the entire process and not just 

your own little piece,” Sandy Long, Director 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 64

the data into one system providing visibility 

for all enterprise members, the customized 

dashboards are what really take the enterprise 

to the next level, according to Brown.

“It focuses the user on what needs 

immediate attention in their areas or 

responsibility,” Brown explained.

The dashboard was originally developed 

for senior leaders (Senior Enterprise Leader 

Dashboard, or SLED) to pinpoint issues and 

priorities without having to “drill down” 

through the COP. The success of the initial 

dashboard spawned a Country Program 

Managers (CPM) dashboard, a Regional 

Operations (RO) dashboard and a SAMD 

dashboard (currently in development) and will 

eventually produce a DASA-DEC dashboard.

The CPMs developed their dashboard requirements, according to Leslie Davis, a CPM in 

the CENTCOM Regional Operations Directorate.

“The CPMs wanted a more personalized 

tool ... one that would provide more detail to help 

us manage the process, alert us when an action 

is required on our end to keep things moving, 

and one that would allow us to collaborate, 

within it, with key players across the enterprise.”

Similarly, for the SAMD-level dashboard, 

Meredith described the requirements as including, 

“Expanding the sorting ability – SAMD needs 

to be able to sort by their unique organizational 

structures (divisions, case managers, weapon 

system managers, etc.), so each individual 

can tailor the COP to their specific needs.”

Meredith also touched upon wanting a 

“drill-down” capability, giving the example of 

the dashboard reflecting 50 FMS cases in development, the SAMD would need to be able to 

see all cases that are in development with their 

respective status and all applicable information. 

The results being one-click in the dashboard providing all relevant case development information.

The new COP and dashboard technologies 

suggested the enterprise needed to change its operational procedures to fully exploit the new capabilities they provided. USASAC changed the 

focus of the weekly Enterprise Synchronization 

of Policy of Resources, Office of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense 

Exports and Cooperation (DASA-DEC), added.

Establish a Common Operating Picture for 

all Enterprise Organizations

Establishing coherent authorities also 

meant that enterprise members needed more 

visibility of not just their portions of the process, 

but also required the ability to “see” what others 

are doing, when milestones are reached, the 

status of each and every FMS cases, or more 

simply put, a Common Operating Picture (COP).

The COP essentially attaches a GPS tag to 

each FMS case, allowing all in the enterprise 

to take appropriate action in the expeditious 

development and execution of cases. The 

COP integrates case information from several 

data sources to provide end-to-end visibility 

of the FMS process ... from initial Letters 

of Requests from countries to ultimate case 

closure. The COP facilitates better coordination 

across all enterprise agencies throughout 

the life-cycle of a case in areas such as 

requirements definition, contracting, acquisition, 

finance, logistics, and even training support.

“The COP provides a unified representation 

of several contracting, financial and supply 

database systems, and by linking these systems, 

it creates enterprise-wide visibility critical for 

the FMS and acquisition communities,” James 

Meredith, Communications and Electronics 

Command (CECOM), Life-Cycle Management 

Command (LCMC) Security Assistance 

Management Directorate (SAMD) director, 

explained. “This has been extremely beneficial 

in eliminating boundaries between CECOM, 

USASAC and other organizations,” he added.

The technical leaps made by the enterprise will not necessarily lead to a cultural change, but it does pave the way 

for a new dynamic among members.

“Technology can transform some aspects 

of the environment,” Robert Brown, USASAC 

G-6 director, said. While the COP consolidated 
65 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

the benefits of incorporating Army Contracting 

Command (ACC) information and personnel 

more prominently into the SYNCH meetings so 

“they can hear what the priorities are and know 

what contract award they should shift, if need be.”

Focus on Outputs

It’s very easy for operators within a tedious 

process to confuse activity with results and think 

of meetings, emails, phone conversations, etc. 

as indicators of success. The fourth rule, Focus 

on Outputs, demands all enterprise operators to 

remain focused on the many intermediate milestones, actions and deliveries that move a FMS 

case expeditiously through the process. It is essential that enterprise leaders establish the “measures that matter,” those important milestones 

and indicators that ensure the U.S. Army keeps 

its promises to our international customer/partner. USASAC actively “leads” each FMS case 

through the many segments of case development, implementation and execution by focusing 

on the end product of each intermediate segment 

in the process – one organization’s output is another’s input for the next task to be performed.

USASAC has drastically reduced the 

time required to deliver a valid offer of goods 

and services in response to a country’s request 

– all done by focusing on the hand-off of 

outputs between the many players involved 

in case development. Finished products, 

of much higher quality, are being “moved” 

through the process much faster as a result of 

better visibility and this focus on production.

John Neil, Director of USASAC’s 

Performance Management Office, describes how 

a schedule promise for delivering a system to our 

customers becomes a Line Commitment Date 

(LCD) that drives the enterprise’s activities. 

USASAC will measure performance based on 

offering the item for shipments by this LCD date 

resulting in a percent shipped by LCD as the 

metric. Through collaboration with the Army’s 

Contracting Command, USASAC can now “see” 

all pertinent contracting milestones supporting 

Meetings (SYNCH) to a more detailed review 

of performance in specific segments of the FMS 

process, with all enterprise members participating. This enabled the close scrutiny of all 4600+ 

cases every month vice the previous attention on a few high priority countries and cases.

Communicating Enterprise Priorities

The third principle, Communicating 

Enterprise Priorities, is accomplished through 

flagging of specific high-priority cases in the 

COP to provide awareness to all enterprise 

agencies on a continual basis. Next, the weekly 

SYNCH meeting evolved from preparing for 

the monthly Equipment Distribution Review 

Board (EDRB) with Department of the 

Army and Defense representatives focused 

almost entirely on case priorities for Iraq, 

Afghanistan and Pakistan into a meeting that 

focuses on both priority and routine cases 

across all Combatant Commands (COCOMs).

“There was a conscious decision by the 

Commanding General (Maj. Gen. Del Turner) 

to expand the scope of the SYNCH from 

the CENTCOM-focused EDRB to a virtual 

EDRB-type review of all COCOM programs. 

Eventually the virtual EDRB yielded to our 

current COP-driven SYNCH meetings,” Col. 

Marvin Whitaker, USASAC G-5 director, 

said. “This ... had a unifying effect on 

participants. The COP incorporated more cases 

in development, contracting information, and 

then ACC (Army Contracting Command) 

regional contracting officers were participating 

alongside the SAMD directors and this led to a 

more strategic meeting,” Whitaker explained.

Meredith sees first-hand the benefits the 

SYNCH has had on communication priorities. 

Meredith explained: “The COP has impacted the 

overall operational standard in a positive way. 

By utilizing this system, all SYNCH participants 

can prepare and execute using the same set of 

data. This is allowing everyone to continuously 

be on the same page during the meeting and 

making the best use of time.” Meredith also sees 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 66

actively leads a case from development through 

execution – coordinating and synchronizing 

those disparate actions. USASAC’s CPMs 

and Regional Operations Directors, enabled 

by the COP, can now provide that leadership.

Visibility of each case’s progression through 

development and execution allows leaders at all 

levels to influence actions to meet promises to 

customers. Leaders know which cases are tagged 

as COCOM priority cases and intensively manage 

their successful completion. Country Program 

Managers are able to more effectively lead their 

enterprise teammates in the development and 

completion of routine cases. Leaders at each 

of ACC’s Contracting Centers focus on timely 

execution of contracting actions to ensure ontime delivery of goods and services to allies.

Leaders and managers now have the tools to 

be proactive; they must also possess the personal 

skills to lead effectively. USASAC is executing 

a very rigorous operational training program that 

will extend to major enterprise organizations in 

the future. A program of computer-based and 

contact training, developmental assignment 

program and institutional training provided 

by Defense Institute for Security Assistance 

Management (DISAM) ensure that all Army 

enterprise practitioners are fully qualified.

The increased emphasis on training has helped standardize knowledge and promote a cultural change.

“Many years ago, when I was a Security Cooperation Officer, the CPM was the point of contact for the FMS process throughout the life-cycle 

of the case, but there seems to have been a departure from that at some point,” Whitaker noted.

Turner believes the shift came because 

of disruptions from the Base Realignment and 

Closure (BRAC) that relocated USASAC HQs 

from Fort Belvoir, Va., to Redstone Arsenal 

AL. The BRAC move resulted not only in 

lost experience but also a change in culture.

“We are now seeing the ‘focal point’ 

shift back to the CPMs and USASAC to 

‘lead’ the enterprise and oversee the lifecycle of the process,” Whitaker concluded.

FMS sales and deliveries. Since initial receipt 

of this data in early 2013, the improvement 

in meeting our LCDs has been significant.

“For items where we see both Acquisition 

Requirement Package (ARP) data and Contact 

Award Date (CAD) data in our system we have 

about 14 percent better performance in meeting 

the LCD. This information allows our leaders to 

more effectively collaborate with ACC to adjust 

contracting priorities to meet promises we’ve 

made to our customer. Receiving the contracting 

milestones has been huge for us; we’ve seen great 

improvements in our performance and we expect 

that to continue to in the future,” Neil stated.

Much of customer satisfaction is based on 

feedback from the Foreign Procurement Group 

(FPG), which is a large group of FMS customers 

that engage the Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA) and industry on issues of 

concern common to all FMS customers. Their 

top two priorities for 2013-2014 are: “1) Increase 

FMS customer visibility and participation in the 

FMS acquisition and contracting process, and 

2) seek greater FMS process improvement.”

Neil briefed the FPG last year, and members 

indicated they would like to have visibility of 

the contracting milestones. According to Neil, 

these could be provided to customers through 

the Security Cooperation Information Portal, 

or SCIP, as the Army has no issue with the 

release of these data points because there is 

no sensitive contracting data provided such as 

price negations. In seeking greater FMS process 

improvement, much like the priority for visibility 

of the acquisition and contracting process, 

customers are looking for greater transparency 

of reports and information when required.

Exercise Proactive Leadership

The fifth rule, Exercise Proactive 

Leadership, is an essential mindset for directing 

enterprise actions. With fragmented agencies 

required to perform separate, distinct and 

complex tasks to ensure a legal, executable 

FMS offer, it is necessary that one “trail boss” 
67 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

“These are changes that could not be made 

through the classic, corporate, hierarchical 

model, but came through the individual enterprise 

components adhering to a set of six simple rules.”

Two essential command functions support 

USASAC’s leadership of the enterprise through 

these guiding principles – an “operationalized” 

strategic planning process and effective alignment 

of enterprise resources to the mission workload.

USASAC employs a dynamic strategic 

planning and execution process that continually 

assesses its progress toward the future vision 

for the enterprise through developing and 

reviewing POIs that operationalize that vision. 

As the six principles were being implemented, 

it became clear that the enterprise did not 

have all the capabilities or tools required 

to effectively operate. Specific, actionable 

initiatives were developed to move toward a 

more collaborative, “self-organizing” enterprise 

and to track the improvement efforts across 

the enterprise. Progress on these initiatives are 

reviewed at quarterly leadership “huddles” 

and the portfolio is refreshed annually; 

initiatives are prioritized and resourced, 

added and deleted, consistent with the vision.

USASAC allocates resources to its primary 

enterprise members (the SAMDs in the LCMCs 

and the ACC) for civilian pay/allowances, travel 

and operational expenses. The very dynamic 

nature of foreign sales, of many systems and 

services, coming from 145 different countries 

significantly impacts workload variance 

across the enterprise. Recent sales are good 

forecasts of future workload. USASAC now 

utilizes Activity-based Costing to accurately 

allocate funding to projected workload levels.

For Turner, the success of unifying the 

enterprise is seen in a wide-range of improvements 

such as the increase in customer satisfaction 

metrics, continuation of strong sales, exceptional 

close-outs of special Department of Defense 

programs such as Section 1206 and Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF) programs. 

And most importantly, process improvement has 

resulted in significantly lower processing times 

Cooperation and Collaboration

Cooperation and Collaboration, the 

sixth guiding principle, also relies on all three 

Portfolio of Initiatives (POIs), but is most 

significantly impacted by the “See” POI. The 

COP, and its newest counterpart, Casebook, 

are designed to move enterprise members 

away from the two-communication methods 

of phones and e-mail, and move toward 

what Brown sees as the new social business 

network. Casebook, in particular, allows for 

more dynamic coordination of each FMS case 

by all enterprise residents in a virtual meeting 

space. It will allow documents and information 

to be posted for all enterprise members to see, 

discuss and follow, and to focus discussions and 

create “groups” that focus on areas ranging from 

countries, to weapon systems or lessons learned. 

Casebook also prevents institutional knowledge 

that may be lost in e-mail documentation 

that is not retained when employees depart.

Summary

Turner views leading and unifying the enterprise as not just process improvement, but as a necessity.

“The environment is changing ... our 

workload has dramatically increased. We are 

executing twice the number of cases we did 

just ten years ago, with more amendments and 

modifications associated with each of those 

cases. We are executing cases with over 20 new 

countries from just seven years ago. Programs 

and authorities are also becoming increasingly 

more complex ranging from additional funding 

authorities, all with different executing 

parameters, to increased use of the Excess 

Defense Articles (EDA) divestiture (USASAC 

is currently developing or executing over 70 

separate requests from 30 countries for some 

70,000 excess articles),” Turner said. He points 

to progress being made through more integrated 

operations, improved visibility throughout the 

enterprise and improved workforce proficiency. 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 68

for Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA); 

a decrease in the percentage of deficient cases 

submitted to DSCA’s quality control division Case 

Writing Development (CWD) returns; a decrease 

in problem Supply Discrepancy Reports; and 

decrease in the number of problem EDRB cases.

Turner is enthusiastic about the results, 

“In just about every ‘customer satisfaction’ 

metric, we are doing better than twice 

as good as we did just a few years ago.”

“I have travelled to over 40 countries over 

the past two plus years and met with over 300 

senior leaders of foreign militaries. They all love 

USASAC and the job the Security Assistance 

Enterprise is doing to deliver equipment, 

training and services, on time and within their 

budget. More importantly, they have tremendous 

respect for the United States and our Army. 

They very much want to maintain our strong 

relationships. And that’s what it’s all about.”

“We know where we are going as an 

enterprise, and how we are going to get there,” 

Turner concluded. “We’re all about promises, 

process and people. Our people are what make 

the process and promises happen, and they have 

taken the enterprise to a new level.” And it was all 

done while “leading, without being in charge.”
69 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Human Trafficking in the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific Region

By Hannah Collins 

Regional Research Assistant, Lockheed Martin Services

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the 

view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

WHAT IS HUMAN TRAFFICKING?

It has been stated by President Obama and 

acknowledged by many world leaders that trafficking in persons is a form of modern slavery 

that violates human rights, country security, 

economies, and public health in every state (State 

2014). For this reason, the United States has been 

playing an active role in combating human trafficking at home and abroad in an effort to protect U.S. interests, security, citizens, and allies.

Human Trafficking is a complex system 

that encompasses a wide variety of behaviors 

and actions. The United States simply defines 

trafficking in persons as ‘The use of force, fraud, 

or coercion to compel a person to provide labor, services or commercial sex. This includes 

elements of recruiting, harboring, transportation, providing or obtaining a person for the 

purpose of exploitation.’ The three most common forms of trafficking that are recognized by 

the U.S. include Labor Trafficking, Sex Trafficking, and Child Soldiering (Defense 2014).

Figures of how many victims are involved 

in human trafficking and the revenue this crime 

brings in each year are all estimations based on 

arrests and survivor accounts. Accurate figures 

are not available due to the secrecy of the crime 

and fear on behalf of the victims in escaping 

or reporting their captors, in large part in fear 

of physical retribution to themselves or family. 

Today there are believed to be 12 to 27 million 

people enslaved and exploited through human 

trafficking. This illicit crime network brings 

in $30 billion dollars annually (USAID 2013).

Traffickers violate many state and international laws while exploiting victims. When 

trafficking in persons, the main objective of a 

trafficker is to keep the victim under control as 

much as possible until payment is received. To 

accomplish this, victims are usually transported 

to different countries, commonly through highly 

traveled economic trade routes but also through 

illegal avenues such as borders with limited security. Trafficked persons are typically taken to 

other countries because of the unfamiliarity with 

the environment, culture, and language which 

makes trafficked persons isolated and solely 

dependent on the Trafficker. Traffickers rely on 

the use of fake passports or papers and bribery 

of boarder security guards and other officials 

to cross borders. Victims are commonly physically abused and threatened which also aids in 

the compliance to traffickers’ demands. While 

it is common for victims to be transported outside the country of origination, trafficking can 

and does take place inside the country of origin. The common feature between trafficking 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 70

ters were sold into prostitution by drug addicted family members for money to support this 

habit. A few families sold their daughters into 

prostitution due to basic poverty. Other women 

chose prostitution due to their own poor finances 

or abusive living situations (Gronewold 1985).

There were specific brothels for the gentry, the middle class and the poor. Younger 

girls who were believed to be pretty were commonly placed in the gentry brothels or were 

even lower gentry themselves. As the girl got 

older, and her looks decreased, she was usually sold to different houses, typically progressing lower in status. The excitement and pomp 

and circumstance surrounding the virginity of 

young prostitutes aided in the attractiveness of 

young girls over older ones. Families received 

higher payments from brothel owners, and the 

owner received a significant amount of money as well from their sale (Gronewold 1985).

Women entered this system in debt to the 

brothel owner which accounted for the money 

given to her seller. Women were given a small 

wage for their services but were required to pay 

the brothel owner rent and work related materials such as clothing and make up that the brothel 

owner required women to wear. This left the 

women with very little or no money and increased 

their debt to the owner, which strengthened the 

debt bondage. Not many women were able to 

escape this system but those who did typically 

used tips and gifts given to them from clients to 

pay off her debts. Rarely, some women were able 

to leave this system through a client who would 

purchase a favorite prostitute to be a concubine, 

to become one of his multiple wives, and at 

times, even more rarely, to be his first wife. More 

commonly, women would spend their time being 

sold from one brothel to another where she would 

finally end her career and life in abject poverty 

at the lowest class brothel. China’s system of 

prostitution was similar around the Asian region 

such as in Japan and Korea (Gronewold 1985).

This unique cultural practice of prostitution 

aided in the expansion of exploitation later in the 

region. In 1931, after the colonialization of the 

within a country and outside of it is that victims 

are moved from their home location where they 

have personal connections to an area that they do 

not know well and have no personal connections.

While trafficking affects every demographic of the world’s population, women and 

children are the most vulnerable to being trafficked. It is estimated that 70% of trafficking 

victims around the world are women. This is 

due to multiple factors that include the inequality of women in society-which comprises the 

social constraints of duty to family, lack of or 

poor education, and poverty (Anstadt 2013).

The system of human trafficking is highly organized and relies on multiple people 

to carry out its goal of exploitation. There is 

typically a recruiter, transporter and maintainer at the basic level with multiple people involved in each category which can, and does, 

span across countries, regions, and the world.

It is common in this organized crime 

for traffickers to participate in other areas of 

crime alongside human trafficking. Drug trafficking is commonly found alongside human trafficking due to the established routes 

and connections already in place within the 

human trafficking network (Munro 2012).

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE

INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

History

The Asian region has a history of condoned 

prostitution. In the 1800s, China had a system 

of prostitution that correlated to the classes in 

society and typically exploited women. Many 

women were sold into prostitution by family 

members due to the cultural idea of the ‘lesser 

value’ of girls compared to boys. Families believed that girls were a cost to the family as they 

would leave the family once married and they 

were obligated to pay a dowry for this marriage 

which could incur financial hardship. During 

this period of China, opium addictions were 

prevalent among the population; many daugh-
71 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

period. Military officers paid a very small fee 

to attend, but the women received very little to 

none of the money(Chung 1997, Tanaka 2002).

The Comfort Stations became very popular throughout the Japanese military. As such, 

the military began increasing Comfort Stations 

throughout military instillations and opened the 

practice to all members. As the Comfort Stations 

expanded, there were no longer enough Japanese 

prostitutes to fulfill the demand so Japan looked 

to women of other nationalities. Comfort Stations were set up everywhere the Japanese military was present. As the war became more brutal, Comfort Stations were even set up on front 

lines. Due to their popularity and wide spread 

use, there were never enough women to fill the 

demand for Comfort Stations. The Japanese military drew heavily upon Korean colonists, where 

the majority were living in abject poverty due 

Korean peninsula and the beginning of World 

War II in the East, Japan began a system of militarized sexual slavery in Northern China. Military 

officers noticed the determent of venereal diseases on military personnel which they attributed to 

members’ relations with Chinese prostitutes. In 

an effort to control the spread of venereal diseases and to curb the military rape of the native 

population, the Japanese military created a program commonly referred to as ‘Comfort Women.’ Military brothels were established on and 

near military bases and staffed with prostitutes 

that were required to receive monthly medical 

inspections. Prostitutes were first brought from 

Japan as the Chinese prostitutes were assumed 

to be disease ridden. The first Comfort Women 

stations were for officers and were encouraged 

to attend as a leisure activity since they typically 

received no leave to return home during this time 

The map above illustrates Japanese expansion during World War II. Everywhere the military was present so were 

Comfort Stations and the exploitation of women. Numerous countries experienced the exploitation of their women at 

the hands of the Japanese (Burns 2012).
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 72

tention (Tanaka 2002). This issue has not yet 

been resolved and still continues to disrupt relations between both Koreas and Japan. In current events, the issue has gained more fervordue 

to the idea of limited time for reconciliation of 

the dwindling numbers of living former Comfort Women. Of the 200,000 total estimated 

Comfort Women in World War II, 80% are 

estimated to have been Korean, and only 55 

known women are alive today (Hancocks 2014).

The Japanese military mobilization 

of women for the use of sexual slavery is a 

form of human trafficking that the Asian region had to contend with in the past, and 

in some cases still today. Today, the demographic of victims trafficked in the Indo-AsiaPacific region is still dominated by females. 

Causes of Human Trafficking

While trafficking occurs across the globe 

and within states, intra-regional human trafficking is high within the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. 

Poverty is a major cause of the intra-regional 

trafficking due to the large disparity of economic 

growth between states. Many persons from economically struggling states seek better opportunities outside of their own country, which has led 

to a large movement of skilled and unskilled laborers. Some scholars have claimed that it is not 

always the poorest of the population being trafficked as some victims pay up to $7,000 to traffickers who are believed to be ‘brokers’ of travel 

or employment before they are enslaved (Larsen 2010). Indonesia is a major source nation 

for human trafficking as many of the victims 

are looking for work. The Indonesian government estimates there are six million Indonesians 

working abroad. Malaysia is a major destination country for the Indonesians (State 2014).

It is important to note that there is a difference between smuggling and trafficking. Both 

persons who are smuggled into a country or trafficked can be required to pay large sums of money to the transporter. In smuggling, persons are 

moved from one country to the other illegally. 

to the region’s exploitation by the Japanese and 

were kidnapped, coerced, or lied to in order to 

fill Comfort Women positions. This practice of 

coercion and force was also used towards native 

populations to help fill positions. Korean women 

commonly served three years as Comfort Women but many served longer if they were far from 

home. Native populations typically served lesser 

time, anywhere between three months to a year 

(Chung 1997, Henson 1999). The Japanese military continued the practice of Comfort Stations 

until the end of World War II even though Comfort Stations did not curb the spread of venereal diseases or the abuse of native populations.

Women in the Comfort Stations were horrifically mistreated. Physical abuse at the hands 

of soldiers was a common occurrence. Women 

would be forced to work long hours and saw anywhere from 20 to 40 men a day, which they were 

never allowed to turn away. Due to such practices, many women became infertile, suffered 

physical deformities, developed posttraumatic 

stress disorder, and dealt with social stigmas and 

shame from society if they were eventually able 

to return home. Women who contracted venereal 

diseases were ‘sent away’ which is understood 

to be that they were killed by military overseers 

of the Stations. Some women became pregnant 

and chose to have an abortion, which they performed themselves, as Comfort Stations would 

not allow the women to keep children. As the 

war was nearing its end and the fighting became 

even more severe, Comfort Stations, along with 

the women, were abandoned. Many women lost 

their lives due to military advances and withdraws. Those who survived such abandonments 

usually never made it back to their homes. Some 

women who were favored by Japanese soldiers 

were murdered alongside them as they committed suicide (Henson 1999, Tanaka 2002).

The Japanese government kept the military mobilization of sexual slavery a quiet issue until 1991 when a group of Korean former 

Comfort Women filed a lawsuit against the Japanese government for their actions against them 

in World War II and the issue gained world at-
73 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

with working regulations, are not followed on 

these ships and have many times resulted in ship 

fires, which often times result in death. Similar 

conditions and experiences are common in factories and construction. Employers take advantage of human trafficking due to the cheap labor 

they provide and the limited pressure to abide 

by state regulations (State 2014; Larsen 2010).

As previously mentioned, women dominate the trafficked population in the Indo-AsiaPacific region. Like their male counterparts, 

many are lured into trafficking with the promise of work opportunities. The demographics 

of the women who are trafficked are in poverty and typically have low education. Many 

women sign up for employment as domestic 

servants, which is the largest form of trafficking of women in this area. Once captured these 

women are held against their will, sent to different countries within the region and without, 

and receive very little to no wages for their work. 

Women are not only vulnerable to trafficking because of poverty, but due to cultural 

elements as well. In many societies within this 

region, women are viewed as less valuable 

than men due to the idea of changing loyalties 

once a woman is married. Moreover, the burden placed on the woman’s family to provide 

a marriage dowry and the idea of purity further 

exacerbates the problem. Women in poverty are 

sold by their families to traffickers as a way for 

the family to receive some income, lessen living expenses of the family, and be relieved of 

the burden of marriage dowries. Dowries in 

places like India can be very high which puts 

a strain on family resources. Some families are 

convinced they are sending their daughters to a 

job that will benefit whole the family by having 

another working family member and are given 

advancement on wages. This ‘advancement’ 

leaves the daughter indebted to the trafficker. 

Other families are tricked into paying for their 

daughters to be placed with traffickers that they 

believe are marriage brokers (Anstadt 2013).

The idea of purity also impacts women’s 

vulnerability. If a woman has relations with a 

Once persons are in the designated country, of 

which they know that they are entering, they are 

released from any obligation to the transporter. 

In trafficking, persons are also moved from one 

country to another illegally but once they are 

within country they are not free from the transporter. Many transporters claim that the persons 

being moved still owe money for their services 

and become indebted to the trafficker, others 

are taken to a different country than originally 

planned, while still others are forced into different work than originally agreed upon. It is very 

easy for a person who is smuggled to fall victim 

to trafficking since they are relying solely on the 

transporter for movement. Oftentimes, persons 

who are trafficked through smuggling have their 

falsified papers withheld for an indefinite amount 

of time and are forced into servitude to receive 

their papers back (Munro 2012; Larsen 2010).

Many people seeking a better life are lured 

by traffickers with the false promises of employment with better wages and better working conditions. Persons who fall prey to the trafficker’s 

lies find the promised employment involves 

very poor or no pay, and horrible work conditions, often with physical and mental abuse, 

by the employer. These people are held against 

their will as the trafficker withholds identification papers and leverages the victims’ lack of 

knowledge and connections with the area, and 

even their education level in regards to reading and understanding contracts. Traffickers 

are also able to exert control over victims due 

to the fear many victims have of being identified by the destination country as an illegal 

immigrant and suffering legal consequences 

for such actions (Anstadt 2013; Munro 2012).

Fisheries are a large area of forced labor in 

South Asia, as exemplified in Thailand. Victims 

are enticed by employment where they are promised decent wages and working conditions. What 

is found is that laborers are forced to work long 

hours on ships in the waters of the destination 

country, given the most grueling jobs, are beaten, not provided breaks or limited food, and pay 

is typically withheld. Health regulations, along 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 74

rea and Japan (Anstadt 2013). ‘Sex tourism’ has 

also promoted trafficking of women and children 

as men from places such as Japan, travel to areas like Thailand and Malaysia to engage with 

women. Racism from the idea that other nationalities such as Indonesian or Cambodian women 

are exotic and “always want it,” has justified 

actions for some men who engage in sex tourism. The fear of contracting AIDs has increased 

the trafficking of children for sex tourism as 

they are typically viewed as pure (Munro 2012).

Corruption and limited border controls 

have enabled human trafficking to continue 

and thrive. Traffickers commonly pay off border patrol guards for false documents and entry into the country. Often times, border patrol 

guards are not well paid and so they use entry 

bribes as a means to supplement their income. 

But corruption of this nature does not stop at 

border control guards, many governmental officials also engage in bribery. Unprotected 

borders provide a second means of entry for 

traffickers. Such unprotected borders are common between India and Bangladesh, which has 

marshlands that are hard to control. Also, the 

borders of Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos suffer 

from limited protection (Munro 2012). In 2004, 

ASEAN created the Declaration Against Trafficking Persons Particularly Women and Children. Their effort to combat human trafficking 

has been made more difficult by the amount of 

corruption within member nations (News 2011).

The U.S. Response 

In 2000, the United States Congress passed 

the ‘Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA). This has been a pivotal 

piece of legislation that defines what human trafficking comprises, the protection of victims, the 

prosecution of traffickers, and also strengthens 

the rights of persons who are more susceptible to 

being trafficked such as women and children. This 

legislation has guided United States’ actions to 

combat trafficking in persons at home and abroad. 

man not approved by her father or before marriage, she is typically cast out of the family 

home, which increases her vulnerability of being trafficked. Violence against women has 

also been a common occurrence in this region. 

In India, women have been physically harmed, 

such as through acid throwing, when society 

has believed her to be impure or even turning 

down a man’s advances. Rape, to include gang 

rape, is a growing and serious problem in India. 

After being harmed, these women are stigmatized in society and usually cannot find suitors 

or work, leaving them destitute and a burden to 

their family which increases their vulnerability 

to being trafficked (Anstadt 2013; Park 2013).

The impact of China’s one child policy and 

India’s cultural preference for males has left 

large populations with more men than women. 

This gender imbalance has created high demand 

for women that has fueled trafficking of women 

to both nations. Acquiring women and girls for 

the purpose of brides has become a common 

occurrence in the region. Females are obtained 

through multiple ways such as coercion and force 

that have been previously mentioned, but also 

through kidnapping. Kidnapping has become a 

common means for acquiring women and children as the migration of populations between and 

within states increases the ability for kidnapping 

to occur. In China, persons traveling from the 

countryside to cities are extremely vulnerable to 

kidnapping as paths traveled are not always high 

trafficked routes (State 2014; Baculinao 2004).

Sex trafficking is the second most prevalent way for women to be trafficked. Often times 

women found in sex trafficking have signed up 

for employment as domestic servants and are 

forced into the sex industry by traffickers. They 

are also held against their will and receive no 

or little money and are abused physically and 

mentally (Larsen 2010). Women in sex trafficking are found many places such as brothels, karaoke bars, and dance bars. Specific places that 

have been identified in the sex trafficking of 

women include casinos on the boarder of India 

and Bangladesh, and ‘Juicy Bars’ in South Ko-
75 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

standards, or are making significant efforts to 

comply, are provided resources and aid, such as 

educational material and monetary funds, from 

the U.S. to continue their efforts. USAID has 

played a large role in distributing and working 

with states for this support (TVPA Sec 109; USAID 2013). Likewise, States who do not comply 

with the minimum standards, and are assessed a 

tier ranking of 3, incur penalties form the U.S. 

that include withholding non-humanitarian and 

non-trade related assistance for the next year 

(TVPA Sec 110). The visibility of the TIP report and the consequences and benefits related 

to the rankings has motivated many states to 

take greater action in combating the crime of 

trafficking in persons within their own borders.

The Indo-Asian-Pacific 

region is composed of states 

from every ranking of the TIP. 

The majority of states are found 

within tier 2 as illustrated below; 

As mentioned earlier, human trafficking is a highly organized criminal activity that takes 

place within every country and 

through a network that spans the 

globe (USAID 2013). With this 

understanding, scholars and the 

U.S. government use such phrases as ‘place of origin’, ‘place of 

transport’, and ‘place of destination’, to help distinguish the path 

that victims have taken over the course of their 

enslavement. ‘Place of origin’ refers to the place 

where a victim was first trafficked, typically 

their home nation. ‘Place of transport’ refers to 

the place that the victim is moved through, and 

‘place of destination’ refers to the place that victims are headed or end up. While every country 

is a place of origin, transport, and destination due 

to the nature of the crime, many countries have a 

majority of trafficking victims that fit into a category such as origin or destination. For example, 

Indonesia is largely a place of origin in the IndoAsia-Pacific region in part due to the high migration of people looking for better work. The 

In an effort to combat trafficking, the TVPA 

establishes the Office to Monitor and Combat 

Trafficking in Persons. This office is armed with 

the minimum standards of what comprises country actions in combating human trafficking that 

has been set by Congress (TVPA Sec. 108). Along 

with the minimum standards, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons is required 

by the TVPA to publish the U.S. Trafficking in 

Persons report (TIP) annually. This report details 

the kinds of human trafficking taking place within countries, including the U.S., the protection 

of victims, and the prosecution of traffickers for 

every state in the world. Once the report is compiled, each state is assessed a tier ranking. There 

are four rankings that can be given which include;

As can be observed by the tier ranking system, countries are not assessed on the amount 

of trafficking taking place within their region 

but on what actions are being taken to address 

this issue. The TIP reports are available to every country for review once they are published. 

Along with the detailed report of trafficking 

within a country, and the assessed ranking, the 

U.S. also provides suggestions on how the state 

could better address the specific trafficking issues detailed in the report. Most importantly, the 

U.S. uses the TIP report and rankings as a way to 

work with other states to effectively combat trafficking. States that comply with the minimum 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 76

the government has also been working to combat 

trafficking within its own boarders. U.S. military 

members and governmental employees are required to take annual human trafficking awareness training that provides some education on 

this prevailing issue (Defense 2014). This training is based online and gives an overview of 

what composes human trafficking, suggestions 

on how to personally combat the crime, and a 

reminder of the extraterritoriality that the U.S. 

maintains over U.S. military, personnel, and persons associated with the U.S., such as through 

work agreements, overseas. The U.S. has a zero 

tolerance policy against persons who knowingly engage in human trafficking abroad (Preston 

Indonesian government estimates that there are 6 

million Indonesians working abroad today (State 

2014). Below is a chart of the countries in the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific region organized by origin, 

destination, or origin, transport, and destination. 

The category of transport was not included as 

no state under review fit solely in this category (State 2014). The chart below was compiled 

by reviewing the U.S. TIP report for each state.

The categories of origin, transportation, and 

destination do not influence the U.S. TIP report 

ranking; it only illustrates a small portion of the 

trafficking that is taking place within a country. 

While the United States has been working 

to combat human trafficking around the world, 
77 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

______________________________________

About the Author

Hannah Collins is a Lockheed Martin 

Services (LMS) employee and the PACOMIndo-Asia-Pacific Seminar Research Assistant 

at DISAM. She is currently working towards 

her Master’s degree in International and Comparative Politics from Wright State University. 

Her Master’s thesis concerns governmental 

use of historical memory to increase nationalism within the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Her 

other research interests include Indo-Asia-Pacific politics, history, and US foreign policy. 

2006). Military personnel are subject to discipline under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 

for any violation of trafficking laws. The U.S. 

has chosen to adopt extraterritoriality for personnel overseas, as not all countries have laws 

and regulations to combat trafficking, or the laws 

do not meet acceptable standards that the TVPA 

sets. By holding U.S. personnel to U.S. laws and 

regulations of trafficking, the U.S. is helping to 

ensure that citizens are not promoting crime and 

human rights violations within other nations, 

thus helping to maintain U.S. security abroad.

Education has been deemed as a vital component to combating human trafficking at home 

and abroad. Through the TVPA, the U.S. government awards grants to U.S. states to fund rape 

prevention and education programs to combat 

violence against women for public and private 

entities that include such areas as non-profits 

and college and universities (TVPA Sec. 1401). 

USAID also provides educational materials to 

foreign nations regarding abuse and human trafficking to help educate foreign populations to the 

crime and dangers of trafficking (USAID 2013).

Human Trafficking is a modern form of 

slavery that undermines human rights and national security around the world. As Luis CdeBaca, Ambassador-at-Large in the Office to 

Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 

states “Our moral obligation against this crime 

is clear, but it is also imperative. Modern slavery 

undermines the rule of law. It feeds instability, 

breeds corruption, fuels transnational crime and 

taints supply chains that drive the global economy.” (CdeBaca 2014). The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is especially susceptible to this crime given 

the regions past history of human trafficking, the 

economic disparity and high migration between 

countries, and the inequality gap between men 

and women. The U.S. government has taken an 

active role to combat trafficking in persons but 

to end human trafficking it also takes the active 

involvement of every nation and every citizen.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 78
79 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

The Role of the Export Credit 

Agency in Supporting Arms 

Transfers: A Comparative Analysis

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not 

necessary the view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In an environment of shrinking defense 

budgets and increased Chinese influence and 

investment in the developing world, the U.S. 

Department of Defense (DOD) seeks to identify ways to maximize security cooperation 

opportunities with existing funding streams, 

making these programs more affordable; foreign military sales are a major component of 

the U.S. security cooperation program portfolio. The world’s major arms exporters, with 

the exception of the U.S., rely exclusively on 

their respective national Export Credit Agency 

(ECA) to facilitate competitive, and at times 

concessional, financial arrangements in order 

to secure business for domestic arms exporters.

This paper performs a comparative analysis of 

how the U.S. and other major arms exporting 

countries, particularly China, utilize their ECA 

to facilitate arms sales, making the recommendation that the U.S. should reevaluate how it 

currently employs the Export-Import Bank as a 

measure to increase affordability of arms sales 

for developing nations in the current competitive environment.

INTRODUCTION

The last decade has featured two important catalysts that have altered the international landscape: a global financial crisis and 

the continued economic ascent of the BRIC 

(Brazil/Russia/India/China) nations. Within 

this context, the U.S. has prosecuted two costly, 

decade-long conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

while acknowledging that in the process, resources and attention have been diverted from 

other global regions of strategic importance.

Consequently, this paper will address how these 

macro-level catalysts are impacting U.S security cooperation programs through the lens of 

ECA competition among major arms exporting nations, addressing the question “should 

the U.S. reevaluate its policy concerning Export-Import Bank support of military sales”?

a. Security Cooperation

United States DOD security cooperation 

programs are an important element of the U.S. 

National Security strategy, establishing and 

strengthening military-to-military relationships 

between the U.S. and partner nations. These programs promote mutual understanding between 

militaries, as well as interoperability through joint 

exercises and foreign military sales (FMS) programs. As the last of the two wars winds down, 

it is of interest to maximize limited funding in 

order to further future security cooperation opportunities, as the DOD global footprint is downsized amid a constrained budgetary environment, 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 80

the following section will examine the current 

ECA competitive commercial environment and 

identify how military sales fit into this framework.

1. The ECA Competitive Environment

National ECAs provide official support for 

sales of defense articles and services for many of 

the same reasons that such support is provided 

for commercial sales, filling a gap that markets 

are unable or unwilling to fill due to political 

or country financial risk associated with sales 

to a particular country. But unlike commercial 

sales, the sale of major defense equipment presents unique challenges to commercial lenders in 

that the unproductive assets being procured do 

not generate a revenue stream that the lender can 

lay claim to as collateral, and military sales can 

generate unwanted publicity and controversy 

that can threaten commercial operations[3]. As 

a result, military sales financing provided by the 

world’s major arms exporting nations – U.S.[4], 

China, Russia, U.K, France, Germany – is generally reliant on the national ECA to mitigate 

these risks, provide the generous financing and 

repayment periods that commercial lenders do 

not offer, and compete with the ECAs of other 

major arms exporting nations to make their domestic exporters more competitive. Because the 

OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported 

Export Credits states in article 5c that exports of 

military equipment are exempt from the arrangement, ECAs of OECD member states are free to 

exercise a similar degree of flexibility as China 

in creating financial incentive packages for arms 

sales. This exemption recognizes the importance 

of the defense industry to major arms-exporting 

nations as both an exercise of national sovereignty and an important sector of the national industrial base.[5] As a result, major arms-exporting 

nations exercise a great deal of freedom in how 

they utilize ECAs to promote defense equipment 

exports. Because two of the major arms exporting 

nations are not OECD members, Sweden’s 1993 

initiative to bring exports of military equipment 

under OECD Arrangement authority failed.[6]

and competing influences from BRIC nations, 

most notably China, challenge U.S. interests.

b. Fiscal constraints

Aside from the current estimate of $2 trillion spent thus far executing the combined wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, the full financial impact 

of both wars is estimated to eventually encompass $4 - $6 trillion, as the post-war experience 

of prior conflicts suggests that continued medical care and benefits for veterans will be the 

main cost driver to be realized over the next few 

decades.[1] Therefore, the financial impact of 

these wars should not be viewed as a short-term 

financial impact that diminishes after hostilities 

have ended, but instead as a longer-term impact 

that will claim an increasing share of the annual 

DOD budget. This reality implies that DOD 

will need to seek more effective ways of maximizing security cooperation opportunities with 

existing funding streams by increasing affordability of these programs for partner nations.

Arms sales are treated as sacred in most 

arms exporting nations. Consequently, transparency and standardization of financing offered by 

major arms exporting countries, including both 

OECD and non-OECD member nations, is lacking. This deficit of standardization and transparency associated with concessional financing 

of arms sales is a challenge that threatens the 

regional influence of U.S. security cooperation 

programs by making them prohibitively more 

expensive and thus less attractive. While terms 

of finance do not constitute the only, nor necessarily the main consideration associated with 

arms procurement decision calculus, the global 

recession has increased the weight of this factor, especially in developing nations. Notably, 

China has been well positioned to leverage this 

dynamic, aggressively pursuing strategic access to natural resources and establishing new 

markets for arms exports to developing nations 

in Asia, Africa, and South America through 

concessional ECA supported financing.[2]

Before addressing this topic in further detail, 
81 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

and compare this historical activity to current 

policy governing ECA involvement in supporting foreign military sales, addressing existing 

authorities and methods used by the U.S. to support arms transfers outside the ECA framework.

1. DCS versus FMS

An important distinction in how the U.S. 

primarily facilitates arms sales in relation to the 

rest of the major arms exporting nations is the 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process in which 

the U.S. government (USG) serves as the procuring agent on behalf of the purchasing nation, 

with privity between the U.S. and the purchasing nation and between the USG and the defense 

firms involved. The benefit of the FMS process 

for the defense industry is that contracts are with 

the USG, mitigating country political and financial risk to the contractor. The purchasing nation 

benefits by being able to leverage the expertise 

of Department of Defense as the largest procurer 

of defense equipment and associated economies 

of scale. In contrast, any military sales transactions financed through the Defense Export Loan 

Guarantee (DELG) program or potentially, in 

the future, through the Export-Import Bank are 

termed ‘Direct Commercial Sales’ by the USG, 

since the purchaser procures the equipment, 

service, or training directly from the defense 

firm. USG involvement, in these cases, would 

be restricted to financing and relevant export licensing; this is similar to how most major arms 

exporting countries facilitate arms sales. Therefore, the USG FMS program is unique among 

arms sales programs, with arms exporting nations such as U.K[10] and South Korea[11] 

having recently expressed interest in adopting a 

similar arms sale regime to better facilitate sales.

A discussion of the major grant and financing programs associated with the U.S. FMS 

process is beyond the scope of this paper, but 

the importance of distinguishing the FMS and 

DCS arms export processes is to acknowledge 

that the U.S. provides multiple programs of 

grant aid and financing support that are primari1. “Three Universes of Trade and Investment 

Finance”

In its June 2012 report to the U.S. Congress on global export credit competition, the 

Export-Import Bank of the United States identified ‘three universes of trade and investment 

finance’ as a means of providing a framework 

for analyzing the competitive operating environment: OECD regulated, OECD unregulated, and non-OECD/BIC (Brazil, India, China) export finance programs.[7] The report 

estimated OECD unregulated and BIC 2011 

export credit activities at $160B ($100B and 

$60B respectively)[8], concluding that although 

there appears to be no immediate threat to U.S. 

exporter competitiveness, further research is required to better ascertain the likely impact that 

this growing volume of strategic actions will exact in the future. While this report does not specifically address the role of ECAs in promoting 

defense exports since Exim Bank is prohibited 

by U.S. law from financing defense articles and 

services,[9] the ‘three universes of trade and finance’ construct remains relevant and useful in 

categorizing the financing activities of the other 

OECD (UK, France, Germany) and non-OECD 

member (Russia, China) major arms-exporting 

nations, since defense sales are not subject to 

OECD arrangements and unregulated OECD 

and non-OECD account for an ever increasing 

share of global trade and investment activity.

As China is the driving force behind the rise 

in non-OECD/BIC trade and investment activity, 

as well as a growing player in the global arms 

market, the following sections will compare how 

the U.S. and China utilize their respective national ECAs to support domestic defense industries.

1. United States

This section will distinguish between U.S. 

Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military 

Sales processes, review the history of ExportImport Bank involvement in financing military 

sales from U.S. exporters to foreign nations, 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 82

tion was further cemented as the global recession 

in the 1980s led to costly debt defaults by developing countries on military sale financing guaranteed through the Federal Financing Bank.[17]

However, defense industry proponents for 

this policy change argued that domestic industry was at a competitive disadvantage to firms 

operating in other major arms exporting countries, who benefitted from generous official 

government financing support offered to the 

purchasing nation, also citing the fact that the 

Export-Import Bank failed to utilize several billion dollars in annual loan guarantee authority 

which could presumably have been used to support foreign military sales.[18] It was finally the 

War on Drugs serving as a catalyst in the 1980s 

that prompted Congressional action, via Bank 

charter amendment, to permit bank involvement 

with guaranteeing sales in support of counternarcotics operations, particularly in Central and 

South America.[19] An additional exception 

that remains today was initiated via Public Law 

103-428 on October 31, 1994, authorizing the 

Export-Import Bank to utilize no more than 

10% of its annual export finance authority in 

support of dual-use (military/civilian) exports 

that are primarily intended for civilian use.

[20] From this brief history of Export-Import 

Bank support of foreign military sales since 

the 1960s, it is evident that its role has been altered frequently in response to a combination 

of changes in the international security environment and domestic policy considerations.

1. Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) 

Program

Acknowledging the competitive environment 

faced by U.S. defense exporters, and due to legal restrictions prohibiting the Export-Import 

Bank from financing or guaranteeing financing for foreign military sales, the Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) program was 

established via the Fiscal Year (FY) 1996 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to 

provide more attractive financing terms for 

ly geared toward FMS customers, making it one 

of the largest subsidizers of the arms industry 

among major exporters. However, this support 

is limited to relatively few countries, with over 

90% concentrated primarily on the two parties 

to the Camp David Peace Accords[12]. Without 

grants to procure defense equipment through 

the FMS program, many countries would not be 

able to obtain affordable commercial financing 

to support purchases. The following section examines how efforts to utilize the Export-Import 

Bank, through the DCS arms export process, 

have been implemented in the past to increase 

affordability for customers unable to obtain 

commercial financing or sufficient grant aid.

1. ECA History

The United States has not always maintained its current policy of prohibiting ExportImport Bank support for sales of strictly defense 

articles and services to foreign nations. In the 

mid-1960s the U.S. Congress established the 

precedent for authorizing the bank to partner 

with DOD by providing financial backing in 

support of military sales to developing nations, 

totaling just under $2B in activity from 1962-67.

[13] This authorization was reversed in 1968, 

with Congress specifically revoking ExportImport Bank support to developing nations due 

to increasing concerns of military sales activity 

before taking action to revoke all foreign 

military sales finance support in 1974.[14] Before this change in policy, Iran was a large beneficiary of Export-Import Bank support for defense equipment sales, which set the stage for 

strong institutional resistance once the Shah was 

overthrown in 1978, having just received the last 

F-14 aircraft as part of a $2.2B sale.[15] The 

unanticipated political upheaval in Iran, coupled 

with the domestic stagflation experienced in the 

late 1970s, prompted policy makers to resist 

persistent lobbying from the defense industry for 

restoration of access to competitive financing for 

military exports, such as that previously offered 

through the Export-Import Bank.[ 16] This posi- [16] This posi-
83 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

trative synergies could possibly be achieved 

by administering DELG under Exim Bank.

In summary, the narrow scope of eligible 

countries and aforementioned conservative, 

risk adverse policies are viewed as the reason for the program’s failure to produce the 

desired level of interest in DELG. However, 

supporters of the program cite the success of 

DELG’s first loan guarantee in 1997, to Romania for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 

purchased from AAI corporation, as an example of how DELG can successfully compete 

against officially supported sales from defense 

industry in other countries. The following 

sub-section will address this in further detail.

i. The Romania Transaction

Finance is only one factor in a country’s 

decision to procure defense equipment. In the 

case of Romania, the AAI vice president and 

chief financialofficer, stated that Romania’s desire to pursue closer ties to the U.S. weighed 

heavy in its decision to procure UAVs from 

domestic firm AAI corporation, despite having 

concurrently initiated conversations with French 

and Israeli firms.[26] Therefore in this case, the 

willingness and ability of the U.S. government 

to finance this sale through DELG may not 

have been the deciding factor for Romania, 

but it effectively prevented the loss of a sale 

given Romania’s inability to afford the $16.7M 

principal amount in one year and commercial 

bank unwillingness to lend that amount to 

Romania.[27] Through DELG, the ICRAS assessment and corresponding risk assigned produced an exposure fee of 21.23% of the principal 

amount, equating to around $3.5M with a 5-year 

principal repayment period, which Romania was 

responsible for financing.[28] These terms made 

the program affordable for Romania, securing 

the sale for AAI; DELG financing was certainly 

not attractive, but it helped Romania implement a 

foreign military sales transaction in pursuit of its 

strategic goal of pursuing closer ties to the U.S.

qualified nations.[21] To the dismay of its 

supporters, this program is widely viewed as 

having failed to reach the primary objective of 

increasing the level of defense exports, with 

low activity levels that threaten its existence, 

since the NDAA stipulates that DELG program 

administration and operation costs are to be 

funded by an administrative fee assessed to 

each effort and cannot be subsidized by the 

government.[22] In accordance with the same 

public law that established DELG, the General 

Accounting Office (GAO) completed a twoyear program status review in 1998. From this 

report, the following criticisms were levied:

• The NDAA specifies which countries are 

eligible for DELG, limiting participation to NATO members, select major nonNATO members (Australia, Egypt, Israel, 

South Korea, Japan), Central European 

countries that have transitioned to democratic governance, and non-Communist 

APEC member countries. Consequently, 

this program cannot be utilized to compete in countries in Latin America, Africa, 

and Asia where China has concentrated its 

defense exports, such as Bolivia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ecuador, Kenya, etc.[23]

• In accordance with the Inter-Agency Country Risk Assessment System (ICRAS)

[24] score, nations must “fully cover 

[their] assessed risk of default as well as 

administrative fees”[25], or ‘exposure 

fee’, which can range from less than 5% 

of the loan guarantee for low-risk countries to more than 30% for higher risk 

countries per their ICRAS assessment.

• In contrast to Exim Bank finance of dual-use exports, which permits exposure 

fees to be incorporated into the guaranteed loan portion, DELG requires that 

countries cover the exposure fee in full.

• DELG is a DOD managed program modeled after the structure of the Export-Import 

Bank; lacking the scale and depth of financial expertise of the latter, greater adminis-
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 84

is reasonable to assume that a large portion of 

arms sales must be financed or guaranteed with 

generous state credit terms that would be captured 

in this non-OECD/BIC activity.[31] The two 

principal institutions supporting this activity are 

China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation 

(Sinosure) and Export-Import Bank of China 

(China Exim Bank), seeking opportunities abroad 

for state firms by lending at rates – hundreds of 

basis points - far below the lowest domestic commercial rates in order to mitigate high levels of 

political risk and increase competitiveness.[32]

In response to such activity, President 

Obama declared his administration’s willingness to support the U.S. Exim Bank, under existing authorities, to match ‘noncompetitive’ 

financing that does not meet OECD international export credit guidelines in order to assist 

American companies competing for domestic 

and third country sales.[33] This stated policy 

directly confronts the ‘non-OECD/BIC third 

universe’ activity that threatens trade and finance 

activities covered under the OECD Arrangement 

on Officially Support Export Credits, but it does 

not empower the U.S. Exim Bank to become 

further involved in the support of arms sales 

financing for U.S. defense firms, due to the legal 

prohibition of Exim Bank support of military 

sales. Consequently, this policy will remain 

irrelevant until the Exim Bank is empowered to 

assume a greater role in support of defense sales.

a. In Transition

Traditionally an exporter of primarily small 

arms, China has made great progress toward 

transitioning into capital-intensive major conventional weapon exports, displacing the United Kingdom as the 5th largest arms exporter in 

the world as a result of its rapid growth in this 

sector: 162% growth from 2008 - 2013.[34] A 

recent example of China’s progress at moving 

up the defense export value chain is Turkey’s 

decision to commit to the Chinese HQ-9 longrange missile defense system over the widely 

In conclusion to this section, the U.S. has 

a history of utilizing the Export-Import Bank to 

initiate loans and loan guarantees in support of 

military sales programs. Due to domestic political considerations, international security environment, the economic environment of the mid1970s, and Credit Reform Act of 1990, military 

sales support has been phased out of the ExportImport Bank, which supports primarily dual-use 

sales and limited sales of military equipment related to counter-narcotics operations. Lobbying 

from industry and a declining international arms 

sales environment in the mid-1990s intensified 

competition, prompted the creation of the DELG 

program in 1996, whose purpose is to effectively 

function in the capacity of the Export-Import 

Bank for guarantees of military sales. This underutilized program has faced scrutiny for its limited scope of eligible nations and conservative 

policies; it has been unable to attract customers 

based on the terms of finance but has proven to be 

able to enable sales for which procurement decisions have been made due to other considerations.

1.China ECA Support

Operating in the ‘non-OECD/BIC’ universe 

of trade and finance, China arms exporters, most 

of which are state owned[29], benefit from operational cost subsidies that reduce unit costs 

and aggressive state supported credit terms for 

customers. The scope of such activities, to include specific credit terms, is difficult to estimate 

given that most governments of major arms exporter nations do not publish such information, 

with all parties typically bound by confidentiality agreements. The Exim Bank 2011 report on 

ECA competitiveness reflects this opaqueness 

in its assessment of Chinese ECA activity, using a conservative estimate that it acknowledges could actually be 50-100% lower than 

actual activity levels, which would surpass both 

OECD regulated ($94B) and OECD unregulated 

($91.3B) activity in 2011.[30] Given that China 

exports arms mainly to developing nations with 

a corresponding higher country risk level, it 
85 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

ANALYSIS

Regional Focus

One of the advantages that Chinese policy has over U.S. policy is its principle of 

non-interference in the internal affairs of purchasing nations and its willingness to initiate arms sales with existing diplomatic relations as the chief prerequisite to conducting 

business.[38] This flexibility to initiate arms 

export relationships and willingness to provide 

attractive state supported financing provide it 

an advantage over the U.S. in competing for 

arms sales in developing countries. For the 

U.S. Department of Defense to be positioned to 

better compete with growing Chinese influence 

in Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia and 

elsewhere, the domestic political will must exist 

to permit the extension of financing assistance 

to those countries that do not have documented 

records of gross human rights violations. 

Utilizing the SIPRI arms transfer database, the 

following paragraph analyzes the list of country 

recipients of Chinese arms exports from 2000-

2012, comparing each country to the list of 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) recipients 

in FY 2012[39], indicated with an asterisk (*).

presumed front runner produced by U.S. firms 

Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.[35] Even 

more perplexing is the fact that Turkey, a NATO 

member, chose a missile defense system that is 

largely incompatible with the missile defense 

logistical infrastructure utilized by other NATO 

members that would present a perceived security 

risk in allowing a Chinese system to integrate 

with NATO. Justifying the selection, Turkey’s 

Undersecretary of Defense Industries cited 

“price, technology, local work share, technology 

transfer and credit financing terms” as areas where 

the Chinese firm, China Precision Machinery 

Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC), 

outperformed competing bids.[36] Increasingly, 

especially in an over-supplied market, customers 

can demand the best price, near concessional 

or concessional financing, and co-production 

arrangements from supplier nations and contrac nations and contractors[37]. In China’s case, this aggressive subsidizing of industry abroad can be viewed as a symptom to the problem of over-capacity resulting 

from inefficient, subsidized national companies.

Algeria E.Q. Kuwait Nepal* Sierra Leone Venezuela

Argentina Gabon Laos Niger* Sri Lanka* Zambia

Bangladesh* Ghana* Malaysia Nigeria * Sudan Zimbabwe

Benin Guyana Mali Oman* Syria

Bolivia Indonesia* Mauritania* Pakistan* Tanzania* 

Cambodia* Iran Mexico* Peru* Thailand*

Chad* Iraq Morocco* Rwanda Timor-Leste

Congo Jordan* Myanmar Saudi Arabia Turkey

Ecuador* Kenya* Namibia Seychelles Uganda*
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 86

is in direct conflict with U.S. industry interests.

Paralleling this general trend, Chinese arms sales 

have traditionally focused on small arms exports 

to developing nations where the U.S. defense industry – concentrating on capital-intensive major defense equipment – is not as largely active, 

implying that the two nations have traditionally 

competed in different arms sectors in different 

countries. A new trend is changing this dynamic; 

in an October 2013 New York Times article, European Aeronautic Defense and Space head of 

strategy and marketing acknowledged China’s 

transition into the export of more sophisticated, 

capital-intensive weapons systems and the corresponding future increase in competition posed:

“China will be competing with us in 

many, many domains, and in the high end, [...] 

Out of 100 campaigns, that is, the commercial 

prospects we have, we may have the Chinese 

in front of us among the competitors in about 

three or four. They have the full range of capabilities, and they are offering them.”[41]

This statement acknowledges that as 

China expands its military industrial base, 

refines technology, and improves manufacturing 

practices, U.S. and European arms exporters will 

face competition from China outside its traditional 

domain of developing countries, as Turkey’s initial 

selection of a Chinese missile defense system 

over the favored U.S. system demonstrated.

The same article quotes IHS Jane senior 

military industry analyst Guy Anderson placing 

the current arms export competitive environment 

into context of the global financial recession: 

“We are in an era of ‘good enough’ — the 90 

percent solution that will do the job at the best 

possible price, [...] In some cases, that may even 

mean buying commercial equipment, upgrading 

it slightly and painting it khaki.”[42] While arms 

procurement decisions are multi-faceted, Chinese 

encroachment into a traditionally Western 

domain will necessitate more competitive 

financing options to counter the lower unit costs 

of Chinese defense equipment and address the 

reality that cash strapped nations face in the 

wake of a global financial crisis. Therefore, 

The above listing of nations receiving arms 

from China shows that the U.S. approved FY 

2012 FMF funding for several of these nations, 

demonstrating a desire to build relationships and 

establish influence in many of the developing 

countries where China activity has been most 

aggressive. However, the FMF funding provided 

– which with few exceptions, must be used for 

only the government-government FMS process – 

is very limited since over 90% is spread between 

Egypt and Israel each year.[ 40] As a result, de- [40] As a result, developing nations, without sufficient commercial 

financing options, often have insufficient national 

funds to support FMS sales for the procurement, 

training, and subsequent sustainment of defense 

equipment. This is where a program such as 

DELG, or potentially the Export-Import Bank, 

could be leveraged to enable a DCS – purchasing nation to U.S. exporter - sale that commercial lenders are unable or unwilling to engage in.

However, most of the developing nations 

purchasing Chinese arms are not authorized by 

the NDAA to participate in the DELG program. 

Based on the analysis provided in prior sections, the conservative terms of finance underlying the DELG cannot compete with concessional financing offered by Chinese ECAs, but 

such a program can serve as a tool to enable a 

sale once other factors have influenced a country 

preference to procure from U.S. industry (political, logistical, technical, etc). Therefore, additional research should address why DELG was 

given such a limited scope of eligible countries 

as well as any obstacles to expanding its scope, 

especially given the program’s risk adverse financial policies and DOD’s current desire to 

become more competitive in and influential 

among developing nations in these key regions.

b. Expanding Scope

As noted in the Export-Import Bank’s report 

on the ECA competitive environment, although 

the scope and volume of Chinese ECA activity 

– outside the OECD arrangement – is alarming, 

it is not immediately apparent that this activity 
87 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

major arms exporters, particularly the U.S., have 

little incentive to advocate for incorporation of the 

defense industry under the arrangement as long 

as Russia and China remain outside of OECD.

I. CONCLUSION

In order to compete with Chinese arms 

exports and growing influence in developing countries, the U.S. must reevaluate its 

policy regarding Export-Import Bank involvement in military sales financing.

Because developing countries have no access to commercial financing for purchases of 

defense equipment, failure of the USG to facilitate financing will result in lost sales, and more 

importantly, relationships. As the Romania UAV 

procurement demonstrated, the Defense Export 

Loan Guarantee program – which was established to fill the void left after Exim Bank was 

prohibited from financing military sales – can 

serve as an enabler despite its conservative terms.

But for such a program to successfully compete 

with China in developing countries, access to the 

program must be increased beyond NATO and 

select Central European and Asian countries.

Furthermore, in accordance with Exim Bank policy for commercial transactions, providing the 

purchasing nation the option to finance the ‘exposure fee’ into the loan amount should be permitted, given that such fees can reach in excess 

of 30% of the principal amount for higher risk 

customers, making the financing program unaffordable or undesirable for potential purchasers.

This will prove to be increasingly important in competing for and securing sales, as 

cheaper Chinese weapon systems with better financing terms are gradually entering the 

more capital-intensive defense sectors long 

dominated by U.S. and European defense industry, and expanding their customer base in 

the process, as NATO member Turkey’s initial 

selection of a Chinese firm to provide its long 

range missile defense system demonstrated.

Finally, taking into consideration the altered 

geo-political environment since the Exim Bank 

additional research should address the feasibility 

of removing the prohibition of Export-Import 

Bank support of military sales. In contrast to the 

way in which Exim Bank was utilized to issue 

loans and guarantees to support military sales in 

the past, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 

has mandated better accounting standards that 

now conservatively hedge against the risk of 

default with the establishment of a standardized 

risk assessment process, ICRAS, whose outcome 

translates into a risk commensurate ‘exposure 

fee’ in the case of foreign government default.

The principal advantage offered by Exim Bank 

is the ability for countries to finance exposure 

fees within the loan or loan to be guaranteed, 

which is not an option under DELG.[43]

c. Additional considerations

Supporting U.S. national security interests 

through security cooperation and seeking new 

opportunities for the U.S. defense industry are 

not primary motivators of policy change with regard to promoting defense exports to developing 

nations. Even in the hypothetical case that the 

political will existed to match the concessional 

financing offered by China ECAs in support of 

arms exports, U.S. policy makers would face the 

moral dilemma of encouraging higher levels of 

debt in developing countries already awash in 

debt. Furthermore, most defense equipment is 

economically unproductive for the purchasing 

nation, increasing debt levels with no justifiable 

economic return to society. Aside from moral 

argumentation, increased resources devoted to 

government subsidy of arms exports represents 

an opportunity cost; resources are taken from 

the private sector where they can be used more 

productively to yield higher economic returns 

as opposed to the political returns of promoting 

national security interests and maintaining the 

U.S. industrial base during periods of declining 

defense spending and investment. However, the 

reality remains that the defense industry is not 

subject to the OECD Arrangement on Officially 

Supported Export Credits, and OECD-member 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 88

prohibition on financing military sales was enacted 

over two decades ago, it is time for this policy 

to be revisited as a potential supplement to the 

successful Foreign Military Sales governmentto-government program. In the absence of grant 

aid, developing country participation in the FMS 

program is severely constrained; allowing the 

Exim Bank to provide the services for military 

sales transactions that it currently does for 

commercial transactions will support the goals 

of supporting domestic industry, furthering 

partnerships, and countering the influence of 

an ascending China in the developing world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bloomberg News. “China’s Easy Money Flows Abroad While Credit Squeeze 

Hurts,” July 28, 2013. Accessed on January 

14, 2014 from http://www.bloomberg.com/

news/2013-07-17/china-s-easy-money-flowsabroad-as-credit-squeeze-hurts-at-home.html

Broeck, Martin. “Paper on Export 

Credit Agencies and Arms Trade,” Campagne tegen Wapenhandel. Updated on 

March 3, 2003. Accessed on January 5, 2014 

from http://stopwapenhandel.org/sites/stop- http://stopwapenhandel.org/sites/stop- http://stopwapenhandel.org/sites/stopwapenhandel.org/files/imported/publicaties/boekenbrochures/ECAsBremen_0.pdf

Chuter, Andrew. “UK Considers Adapting FMS Framework for its Exports,” DefenseNews, November 18, 2013. Available from http://www.defensenews.com/

article/20131118/DEFREG01/311180030/UKConsiders-Adapting-FMS-Framework-its-Exports

Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year 2014, 

Available fromhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208292.pdf, p. 7-10

Congressional Research Service, “Export-Import Bank: Background and Legislative Issues,” April 3, 2012. Accessed on 

February 2, 2014 from http://digital.library.

unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc85401/m1/1/

high_res_d/R42472_2012Apr03.pdfp. 17

Erwin, Sandra. “Defense Dept’s Export 

Loan Program Mired in Uncertainty,” National 

Defense, March 2000. Available from http://www.

nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2000/

March/Pages/Defense_Dept4382.aspx

Eun-jung, Kim. «S. Korea to adopt foreign 

military sales for arms exports,» Global Post. 

January 7, 2014. Available from http://www.

globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-newsagency/140107/s-korea-adopt-foreign-militarysales-arms-export

Evans, Peter. “The financing factor in 

arms sales: the role of official export credits and guarantees,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Accessed on 

January 6, 2014 from http://www.sipri.org/

yearbook/2003/files/SIPRIYB0313D.pdf

Export-Import Bank of the United States, 

“Report to the U.S. Congress On Export Credit 

Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the 

U.S. For the period of January 1, 2011, through 

December 31, 2011. Accessed on January 4, 

2014 from http://www.exim.gov/about/library/

reports/competitivenessreports/upload/2011_

Competitiveness_Report-1.pdf, p. 107, 110.

Financial Times, “China confirms Libya arms sale talks,” September 5, 2011. Accessed on January 4, 2014 from http://

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a06b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2tJqbAlw2

General Accounting Office, Status of the Defense Loan Guarantee Program. December 1998. (Accessed December 14, 2013). Available from http://www.

dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA358958, p. 2
89 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Holtom, Paul, Mark Bromley, Pieter Wezeman, and Siemon Wezeman. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2012,” (2013, March). Accessed on January 4, 2014. Available from http://

books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=455

Kurtzleben, Danielle. “The Total Iraq 

and Afghanistan Price Tag: Over $4 Trillion,” US News, March 28, 2013. Retrieved 

on December 26, 2013 from http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/03/28/the-totaliraq-and-afghanistan-pricetag-over-4-trillion

Meick, Ethan. (2013, Dec 18); “China’s Potential Air Defense System Sale to Turkey and 

Implications for the United States,” US-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission 

Staff Report. Accessed on January 20, 2014 

from http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/

files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20

Potential%20Air%20Defense%20System%20Sale%20to%20Turkey%20and%20

Implications%20for%20the%20US.pdfp. 2

Public Law 104-106-Feb. 10, 1996. 

National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), 104th Congress, Accessed on 

March 6, 2014. Available from http://www.

dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/1996NDAA.pdf

Report to the U.S. Congress on Export Credit 

Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the 

United States. (2012, June). Pg. 107. Accessed on 

December 20, 2013, from http://www.exim.gov/

about/library/reports/competitivenessreports/

upload/2011_Competitiveness_Report-1.pdf

Wong, Edward, and Nicola Clark. “China’s 

Arms Industry Makes Global Inroads”. The 

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on Jan 4, 2014 from http://www.nytimes.

com/2013/10/21/world/asia/chinas-armsindustry-makes-global-inroads.html?_r=2&

[1]Danielle Kurtzleben. “The Total Iraq 

and Afghanistan Price Tag: Over $4 Trillion”. US News. March 28, 2013. Retrieved 

on December 26, 2013 from http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/03/28/the-totaliraq-and-afghanistan-pricetag-over-4-trillion

[2]Edward Wong and Nicola Clark. “China’s Arms Industry Makes Global Inroads”.

The New York Times. October 20, 2013. 

Accessed on Jan 4, 2014 from http://www.ny- http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/21/world/asia/chinas-armsindustry-makes-global-inroads.html?_r=2&

[3]General Accounting Office, Status of the Defense Loan Guarantee Program. December 1998. (Accessed December 14, 2013). Available from http://www.

dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA358958, p. 8

[4]U.S. is currently prohibited by law from 

utilizing its ECA to support military sales; its 

inclusion in this listing of nations is to identify it as a major arms exporting nation. However, the U.S. Export-Import Bank has been 

utilized in the past to support military sales to 

developed and developing nations. (Assuming 

here that you are considering the Export-Import Bank as the U.S. ECA. If that is so, and if 

they are prohibited, under what authority were 

they utilized?) I realize you discus in footnote 

9. below, but is confusing until you get there.

[5]Martin Broeck. “Paper on Export 

Credit Agencies and Arms Trade,” Campagne tegen Wapenhandel. Updated on 

March 3, 2003. Accessed on January 5, 2014 

from http://stopwapenhandel.org/sites/stop- http://stopwapenhandel.org/sites/stop- http://stopwapenhandel.org/sites/stopwapenhandel.org/files/imported/publicaties/boekenbrochures/ECAsBremen_0.pdf

[6]Peter Evans. “The financing factor 

in arms sales: the role of official export credits and guarantees,” Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute. Accessed on January 6, 2014 from http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2003/files/SIPRIYB0313D.pdf, p. 540
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 90

[7]Report to the U.S. Congress on Export Credit Competition and the ExportImport Bank of the United States. (2012, 

June). Pg. 107. Accessed on December 20, 

2013, from http://www.exim.gov/about/library/reports/competitivenessreports/upload/2011_Competitiveness_Report-1.pdf

[8]Ibid. p. 109

[9]U.S. law authorizes export finance support of ‘dual use’ articles that are non-lethal and 

will be used for primarily civilian purposes.

Additionally, a limited waiver can be obtained 

to finance export of strictly defense material in 

support of drug interdiction activities. Any such 

item on the U.S. Munitions list, a Presidential Determination of National Interest must be granted.

[10]Chuter, Andrew. “UK Considers 

Adapting FMS Framework for its Exports,” DefenseNews, November 18, 2013. Available from 

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131118/

DEFREG01/311180030/UK-ConsidersAdapting-FMS-Framework-its-Exports

[11]Kim Eun-jung. “S. Korea to adopt 

foregn military sales for arms exports,” Global 

Post. January 7, 2014. Available from http://

www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhapnews-agency/140107/s-korea-adopt-foreignmilitary-sales-arms-export

[12]Evans, Ibid p. 550

[13] Evans, Ibid p. 548

[14]Ibid

[15]Ibid

[16]Ibid, p. 549

[17]Government Accounting Office, 

Status of the Defense Loan Guarantee Program. December 1998. (Accessed December 14, 2013). Available from http://www.

dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA358958, p. 2

[18]Ibid

[19]Ibid

[20]GAO, Ibid p. 11

[21]GAO, Ibid p. 1

[22]Public Law 104-106-Feb. 10, 

1996. National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA), 104th Congress, Accessed on 

March 6, 2014. Available from http://www.

dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/1996NDAA.pdf

[23]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) arms transfer database. Available from http://portal.sipri.org/publications/pages/transfer/splash

[24]ICRAS was formed in response to the 

Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 as a measure to standardized the credit risk assessment 

process for countries, involving major agencies involved in international credit activities.

[25]GAO, Ibid p. 12

[26]Sandra Erwin. “Defense Dept’s Export 

Loan Program Mired in Uncertainty,” National 

Defense, March 2000. Available from http://www.

nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2000/

March/Pages/Defense_Dept4382.aspx

[27]Erwin, Ibid

[28]GAO, Ibid p. 7

[29]Financial Times, “China confirms 

Libya arms sale talks,” September 5, 2011. 

Accessed on January 4, 2014 from http://

www.ft.com/cms/s/0/77a3e566-d7bb-11e0-

a06b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2tJqbAlw2

[30]Export-Import Bank of the United 
91 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

States, “Report to the U.S. Congress On Export 

Credit Competition and the Export-Import Bank 

of the U.S. For the period of January 1, 2011 

through December 31, 2011. Accessed on January 

4, 2014 from http://www.exim.gov/about/library/

reports/competitivenessreports/upload/2011_

Competitiveness_Report-1.pdf, p. 107, 110.

[31]Evans, Ibid p. 547

[32]Bloomberg News. “China’s Easy 

Money Flows Abroad While Credit Squeeze 

Hurts,” July 28, 2013. Accessed on January 

14, 2014 from http://www.bloomberg.com/

news/2013-07-17/china-s-easy-money-flowsabroad-as-credit-squeeze-hurts-at-home.html

[33]Congressional Research Service, 

“Export-Import Bank: Background and Legislative Issues,” April 3, 2012. Accessed on 

February 2, 2014 from http://digital.library.

unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc85401/m1/1/

high_res_d/R42472_2012Apr03.pdfp. 17

[34]Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley, Pieter Wezeman, and Siemon Wezeman. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2012,” (2013, March). Accessed on 

January 4, 2014. Available from http://books.

sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=455

[35]Edward Wong and Clark N. (2013, 

Oct 20) “China’s Arms Industry Makes Global Inroads”. The New York Times. Accessed 

on Jan 4, 2014 from http://www.nytimes.

com/2013/10/21/world/asia/chinas-armsindustry-makes-global-inroads.html?_r=2&

[36]Ethan Meick. (2013, Dec 18); “China’s 

Potential Air Defense System Sale to Turkey and 

Implications for the United States,” US-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission 

Staff Report. Accessed on January 20, 2014 

from http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/

files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20

Potential%20Air%20Defense%20System%20Sale%20to%20Turkey%20and%20

Implications%20for%20the%20US.pdf, p. 2

[37]While most major arms supplier nations are directly involved in securing what is 

termed an ‘offset’ agreement, which can include 

co-production and technology transfer arrangements with the purchasing nation, the U.S. government does not facilitate, guarantee, nor is it 

a party to any offset agreements associated with 

arms sales. Such agreements are viewed as market distorting and politically risky; however, 

U.S. defense contractors may decide to enter 

into offset agreements with a purchasing nation.

[38]Wong, Ibid

[39]Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year 2014, 

Available fromhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208292.pdf, p. 7-10

[40]Evans, Ibid p. 551

[41]Wong, Ibid

[42]Wong, Ibid

[43]Evans, Ibid p. 554
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 92
93 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Considerations for the Future 

National Military Strategy

Opportunities and Challenges

 By Christopher Krolikowski

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the 

view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

future NMS; Force Planning, Budget and Acquisition Processes, and Interagency Cooperation.

Force Planning

It is no secret the current strategic 

environment is ever changing with the roles of 

both state and non-state actors. As a result, it 

is increasingly difficult to categorize potential 

contingency types (i.e., conventional or irregular 

warfare).2It is also no secret U.S. defense spending cannot maintain its current “burn rate”. For 

these reasons, the U.S. military must look to and 

rely upon international partners and the interagency to share resources, advance military technologies, and ultimately develop a “united force”.

With the numerous potential contingency 

types in the current environment, international 

cooperative security is paramount. The core tenet 

of cooperative security is working with partner 

countries against common security challenges 

such as terrorism, piracy, and illicit trafficking of 

weapons, drugs, and people.3 To build operational capacity in our partners for these mission challenges, the DOD must seize the opportunity to 

work closely with the Department of State (DoS) 

and ensure these efforts align with foreign policy. 

Aligning DOD efforts with DoS objectives can 

relieve the stress on U.S. military resources. First, 

Introduction

Over the last twenty plus years, six different Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 

have laid out a National Military Strategy (NMS) 

for the U.S. Military Services to use as a guide to 

fulfill the President’s National Security Strategy 

(NSS) and the Secretary of Defense’s National 

Defense Strategy (NDS). In addition, early in its 

existence, the NMS developed a secondary purpose. It evolved to become an unclassified document to communicate with the American people, 

rather than just being internal military guidance. 

All six previous documents published addressed 

the current and future strategic environment. But 

just as importantly, they all addressed the force 

planning and resource allocation (sometimes with 

even recommendations to the Secretary of Defense) to achieve the U.S. military’s desired outcomes in those strategic environments. Resources and tools are variables to carefully consider 

in strategy development.1 In the current political 

and economic environment, now more than ever, 

the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Military Services must be flexible in force structure 

and resource allocation to successfully achieve 

strategic objectives. The following discussion 

addresses three areas in support of creative resource allocation that should be addressed in the 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 94

mal processes as its decision and management 

system. The desired end state is a force structure 

that is relevant and effective at a cost that is efficiently managed.5

 The challenge in getting to the 

desired end state is in translating and defining current DOD warfighter needs, along with international partner needs, to the acquisition community. Because the current DOD acquisition system 

was developed during the Cold War to counter a 

communist threat at an undetermined time in the 

future, the system stresses performance and does 

not necessarily emphasize a reduced material solution delivery time. This was effective at that 

time, but is a challenge in the current environment when DOD warfighters need solutions delivered in 12-24 months (or DOD is competing 

in a business environment to provide solutions to 

our allies and support to our DOD warfighters). 

This disconnect lends itself to DOD acquisition 

reform/streamlining in order to make the process more responsive, in turn positively impacting force planning decisions and force structure.

Unfortunately, DOD acquisition reform has 

been occurring continuously for decades. Those 

past reform efforts have often just added an additional layer of review and greater centralization 

to solve whatever shortcomings exist. Reforms to 

date have not achieved the outcome of shortening 

lead times and therefore achieving U.S. military 

objectives in the current environment. Ultimately, affective acquisition reform has to change the 

culture. Changing the culture means convincing 

the acquisition community they no longer need 

multi-level bureaucracy. The acquisition personnel need to make decisions. The culture must 

change so that it is recognized that even reasonably well-managed acquisitions carry some risk. 

Accepting reasonable risks can make the system 

more responsive, and again, in turn positively 

contribute to U.S. force structure decisions.

Organizational Behavior and Interagency 

Cooperation

Positively influencing force structure and 

reforming DOD acquisition can be achieved 

if DOD engagements with international partners 

are congruent with DoS policy, unique funding 

and appropriations, not otherwise accessible, can 

be leveraged. Second, through this “shared investment approach”, DOD can increase partner 

nations’ capabilities, pass on certain missions to 

allies, and reduce requirements for major U.S. 

military interventions and the associated costs.

These opportunities bring obvious challenges. In attempting to leverage DoS resources, 

the DOD must effectively communicate with 

the interagency and justify its proposed requirements to another layer of U.S. government bureaucracy. To be successful in this increased 

interagency activity, DOD personnel must understand the organizational behaviors of other 

U.S. government agencies and international allies. It is vital for personnel to increase language 

and cultural capabilities and capacities in order 

to improve integration with other U.S. agencies 

and partners.4 Another challenge is using the 

lengthy government budget process and an often 

bulky DOD acquisition system to build partner 

nation capacity and capability. These processes 

and systems are purposely filled with checks and 

balances to ensure the DOD develops the right 

material solution in an often non-competitive environment. This can be an obstacle in fulfilling 

international partner requirements. Often times 

the U.S. solution is competing against third 

countries (to include U.S. allies) and the defense 

industry to fulfill those same needs. Our current 

acquisition system regulations and requirements 

could inhibit the U.S. from effectively competing and providing the capability that builds our 

partner’s defense capacity, in turn negatively 

contributing to U.S. force structure decisions.

Budget and Acquisition Processes

In the U.S. Government, national resources 

are allocated to develop capabilities and 

military force structure. This process involves 

the Executive and Legislative branches of 

government. The U.S. applies significant 

resources to national defense, and DOD uses for DOD uses for-
95 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

understand and educate the U.S. military on the 

view points and behaviors of other organizations 

can aid in interacting with the acquisition 

community to more efficiently fulfill requirements 

and reform its culture. And if requirements are 

fulfilled and material solutions are supplied more 

efficiently, force structure and resource allocation 

for the U.S. military can be more flexible.

Similarly, if DOD can communicate more 

effectively with DoS, DOD can more easily leverage DoS programs to engage international 

partners. And improved engagements with international partners enables DOD to integrate 

and consider improved partner capabilities and 

enhanced capacity in U.S. military force planning decisions. For these reasons, the upcoming 

NMS needs to address force planning, budget 

and acquisition process reform, and organizational behavior and cooperation. Leadership’s 

emphasis in these three areas, and their relationship with each other, will have a two- and threefold impact on U.S. military achieving its desired 

outcomes in the current strategic environment.

About the Author

Christopher Krolikowski is an Assistant 

Professor of Security Assistance Management at 

DISAM with a concentration on the FMS Process 

and FMS Financial Management. His field experience includes work as a defense contractor supporting security assistance programs at the U.S. 

Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC) 

and the U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems 

Center (ASC) International Programs Office. 

Additionally, as a government civilian, he was an 

Acquisition Program Manager in the ASC, Mobility Systems Wing, FMS New Business Office. 

He was awarded a Master of Business Administration (International Business) degree from the 

Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio and a 

Bachelor of Science (Biomedical Engineering) 

from Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana. He is currently pursuing Joint Professional 

Military Education from the Naval War College.

through improving international, interagency, 

and intra-agency relationships. The obvious way 

to improve any relationship is to enhance communication. To solve a simple problem, such as 

lack of communication, continuous and effective 

training and education programs are required. 

Preparing competent leaders starts with adequate 

doctrine, but doctrine alone is not enough. Having a shared body of common knowledge and 

practices is one thing. Doctrine does little good 

unless it is taught to people who are capable 

and practiced in execution. Proper education of 

interagency organizations for all DOD would 

enable both civilian and military personnel to 

break out of agency stovepipes, leverage other 

U.S. agencies processes, and ultimately lead to 

better coordinated and more cost-effective and 

time-sensitive interagency solutions. Specific to 

the DOD-DoS relationship, DOD is viewed as 

a “vertical organization,” with a chain of command and hierarchy of decision makers. On the 

other hand, the State Department is a very “flat 

organization.” “Subgroups in the State Department do not tend to rally around particular kinds 

of missions, as in the case of the some agencies 

or the military services. Rather, they take sides 

over the relative attention to be given to different issues, such as human rights, democracy, or 

narcotics, in particular in bilateral or regional 

relations.”7 This behavior leads to discussion, review, and, often times, unanimous consensus before a decision is made. All affected get a say in 

a decision based on both local and regional impact, thus the reason DoS is described as a “flat 

organization.” This is an example of an organizational behavior that DOD as a whole, and as individuals, needs to recognize in dealing with international, interagency, and intra-agency issues.

Summary

The NMS should address numerous 

opportunities and challenges that affect U.S. 

national interests and security in today’s strategic 

environment. The three topics discussed are 

related. For example, taking the opportunity to 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 96
97 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Lessons Learned - An IG Inspection 

of Your Security Cooperation Office 

(SCO)

By Dan Dagher, Col, USAF

Director of Security Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey

[Editor’s Note: Col Dagher has multiple GCC 

SCO assignments in his portfolio, but the reader 

should be aware that each Geographic Combatant Command may have variations in how 

they approach IG or other type inspections]

The purpose of this editorial is to aggregate successful techniques found in preparation 

for and execution of Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) inspections that have taken place 

throughout three Geographical Combatant Commands (CCMD). It also includes some perspectives from MGen (ret) Mark Zamzow’s editorial 

on “Top 10 ways to dazzle the IG” and highlights 

how they are still relevant in ODCs worldwide.

Each inspection of a Security Cooperation Office (SCO) by an Inspector General (IG) 

brings with it Lessons Learned and may add 

to trends that, if adopted, can prevent repeaterrors found throughout the SCO community.

In today’s international environment, changes 

to tactics, techniques, procedures, and requirements happen so quickly that it is easier to use 

the successful ideas of others rather than finding out about a change after the fact and reinventing the wheel for each change in policy.

This article brings together inspection results from eighteen IG inspections of 

ODCs and OMCs from three CCMDs. It 

presents preparation techniques to limit the 

most common FINDINGS and OBSERVATIONS, and is broken down into four sections:

Long-lead techniques one can use in the 

months and weeks leading up to the inspection;

1. Immediate actions your SCO can take 

for final preparation;

2. Techniques SCO personnel can do 

to help themselves during the actual 

inspection; and

3. Key considerations for post-inspection, 

to assist future SCO personnel for their 

inspection.

Each of the above sections has three perspectives: strategic planning, leading the 

ODC, and managing tactics for success.

LONG LEAD ITEMS

Several long-lead items should be accomplished in the months leading up to the inspection:

1. Establish the ODC tone for the inspection;

2. Know the strategic plans for the 

Partner-Nation (PN);

3. Obtain Best Practices from other inspections and bring relevant ones into 

the SCO;

Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it (George Santayana).
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 98

Request (MRR). Understanding these strategic 

plans enables alignment and consistent execution 

of SCO planning. Understanding strategic goals 

also provides a clearer picture of funding prioritization for various U.S.-participatory events like 

exercises, International Military Education and 

Training, Foreign Military Financing, engagements, event attendance, public diplomacy, etc.

The IG will know the CCMD strategic 

goals for the PN before arrival and will ask SCO 

personnel. These strategic objectives are defined by (in EUCOM terminology) the Lines of 

Effort (LOE) and Lines of Activity (LOA). Expect to show the IG which in-country tasks have 

been established within the applicable LOAs.

In EUCOM, the LOEs and LOAs are reviewed 

annually at the EUCOM Strategy Implementation Conference (ESIC), as part of the Strategy 

Implementation cycle. Also, the IG will ask if 

the ODC has added any tasks into the Theater 

Security Cooperation Management Information 

System (TSCMIS). These TSCMIS events are 

reviewed by LOA POCs annually or biennially 

in some PNs, to ensure ODCs are working towards accomplishing CCMD strategic plans.

Gen Zamzow: “Competence means knowing your job inside and out, and performing 

those duties to the best of your ability despite 

the inspection scenario or the inspector’s glare!”

Competence for ODCs: IAW DODI 5132.03, 

the mission of a Security Cooperation Office is 

to build partnerships; that’s why SCOs exist. We 

build those partnerships for the purpose of accomplishing the Joint Pub 3-22 SCO tasks listed.

Knowing the mission, i.e., building milto-mil partnerships must be understood by every person in your Security Cooperation Office.

Obtain Best Practices (BP) from other inspections. IGs expect to see BPs proliferate 

across ODCs in the same CCMD. Focusing on 

programs that work is efficient and productive.

The challenge with geographically-dispersed CCMDs is that personnel in one SCO do 

not always know what has worked with engagements or strategic planning execution in other 

SCOs. Additionally, SC success stories in one 

4. Conduct two separate self-inspections 

including one with the IG SC checklist 

and one with the CCMD security office checklist;

5. Ensure any write-ups from the previous 

ODC inspection are cleaned up; and

6. Manage resources.

Further:

1. Establish the tone within the ODC for 

the pending inspection. The philosophy 

of the inspection comes in many forms, 

and it’s important to note which one 

prevails in your ODC leadership and 

what the tone will be throughout your 

organization. The following are some 

examples, both good and not-so-good:

2. Don’t fear the IG.

3. This is your report card.

4. If the minimum weren’t good 

enough it wouldn’t be the minimum.

5. My expectation of you is no FINDINGS.

6. I expect no FINDINGS and no OBSERVATIONS.

7. There’s no way to do well on 

these things, just aim for passing.

8. Don’t do anything dumb, dangerous, 

or different.

9. Since this is my report card, you can 

bet it’s your report card as well (from 

ODC Chief to other ODC personnel).

10. The only bullets that make it to your 

FITREP (from this inspection) are the 

Best Practices and any Commendable 

personnel or Outstanding Contributors.

11. Just do what you do everyday.

The tone ODC leadership sets will be reflective of how personnel approach everything from 

inspection preparation through to the inspection 

itself. Gen Zamzow: “Lead by words and actions, formally and informally by motivating, 

communicating, and setting a positive example!”

Know the CCMD and Ambassador strategic plans for the Partner-Nation (PN), derived 

from the Country Cooperation Plan, the Regional Campaign Plan, and the Ambassador’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS)/Mission Resource 
99 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

tion (EUCOM, AFRICOM, and PACOM have 

them published on their websites). A line-byline comparison of IG checklist items against 

what your office does every day to comply with 

those items will ensure that what you are doing falls under the regulations and instructions, 

and are what’s expected by the CCMD. Also, 

accomplishing this month›s in advance allows 

ample time to fix any problems discovered.

Once a line-by-line comparison is accomplished by the SCO, it should be done a second time, independently, by the ODC leadership. If any questions arise, there will be plenty 

of opportunity to engage with other recentlyinspected ODCs, or to ask the IG directly, to 

ensure no misunderstanding of expectations.

One technique, funding permitting, would be 

to request a neighboring ODC send someone 

to conduct the independent self-inspection.

Naturally, the favor could be returned before 

their inspection as well. This cross-pollenization of good ideas will help raise the standard 

of both ODCs. No matter how the self-assessment is accomplished, it is an easy method to 

fix challenges before they become major problems highlighted during the inspection itself.

Use the CCMD security inspection checklist to accomplish security self-inspection 

within the ODC. Regardless of whether the 

inspected ODC is located within the U.S. embassy compound, general security and adherence to COMSEC procedures are two 

things for which every IG member looks.

If a DOD Security Manager is co-located at 

the ODC, that individual should perform a secuODC are not always known by other ODCs.

Most experienced ODC Chiefs will direct their 

personnel to the published Best Practices so they 

can see what the norms are, what works, and 

what has been recognized as successful. Three 

weeks at Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), as well as the annual CCMD Security Cooperation conferences, 

are not enough for SCO personnel to learn the 

ODC norms and programs that achieve results.

That is why the Best Practices are published on 

the CCMD IG webpage, the DISAM webpage, 

and via the Joint Lessons Learned Information 

System (JLLIS). It is an opportunity for the 

CCMD commander (through the IG) and the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (through 

DISAM) to emphasize noteworthy programs.

The IG will ask SCO personnel if they have 

incorporated any BPs from other ODCs into the 

ODC being inspected. If one ODC has a particular technique or program that reduces waste 

or improves efficiency, the IG may be inclined 

to highlight it as a BP, which could save money 

or reduce efficiency in other ODCs utilizing the 

same SC program. The IG is one catalyst in making this cross-pollenization of ideas happen. If 

relevant information is missing from the CCMD, 

DISAM, or JLLIS websites, the next step is to 

call or email the applicable ODC and learn directly from the personnel who developed those BPs.

Conduct two separate self-inspections; one with the IG SC checklist and one 

with the CCMD security office checklist.

Use the IG’s inspection checklist to accomplish a Security Cooperation self-inspecMultinational Education Facilities and Infrastructure Projects

Multinational Exercises Humanitarian Assistance

Multinational Experimentation Intelligence Cooperation

Multinational Training Information Sharing

Counternarcotics Assistance International Armaments Cooperation

Counter/Nonproliferation Security Assistance (FMS)

Defense and Military Contacts Other Programs and Activities

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 100

easier because the SCO responses are readied for each question. Utilize ODC-standardized/identical tabs in each. One format technique for the tabs in the electronic folder:

• CCMD checklist

• Appointment letters

• Required References from Inspection 

checklist

• CAVEATS

• Results of prior inspections

• Appropriate ODC generated SOPs or 

Policy Letters

• Supporting Documentation, to include 

the Theater Security Cooperation 

Management Information System 

(TSCMIS) products/displays

This standard presentation format highlights to the IG that the individual being inspected has already checked the applicable 

programs in detail and knows where their eguidance material is. Another benefit [because 

every IG question can have the answer or response placed next to it and identify the AFI 

or DOD regulation linked to it] is it leaves no 

doubt where the requirement can be found.

These electronic continuity folders must be 

accessible to all ODC personnel. The e-continuity book should be on a shared drive so anyone else can access it without having to learn the 

passwords of others. The e-continuity folder 

needs to be stored in a folder marked FOUO, in 

accordance with CJCSM5760.01A vols I and II.

Familiarize the team with the governing 

regs/AFIs/DODIs and where they are located.

Prepare for the inspection by consolidating and 

knowing where to locate governing e-documents, e-regulations, AFIs, DOD instructions, 

and of course the primary SCO directive, Joint 

Pub 3-22 or it’s pending e-pub. The IG is usually 

an expert in only one or two fields, and is rarely 

smart on every job or task performed in the SCO.

Therefore the IG will look to Security Cooperation personnel to fill in missing information 

and substantiate it with governing documents.

Ensure electronic document use. Advanced 

USG approved software is available to allow 

rity inspection encompassing the CCMD checklist. These checklists can be obtained from the 

CCMD Security Manager. Some 2013 common 

COMSEC FINDINGS or OBSERVATIONS 

include: 1) unclass desk-phones or NIPR computers too close to SIPR computers; 2) not removing cell phones from the room when working on SIPR; 3) classified trash in safes (have a 

shred party); 4) missing classifications on CDs; 

5) and missing green or red UNCLASS or SECRET stickers on phones and/or computers.

That old story about finding classified material 

in unclassified wastebaskets just doesn’t happen that often (thankfully). The key is to make 

personnel aware early on that a high standard 

exists with regards to COMSEC in the SCO.

Ensure any write-ups from the previous ODC inspection are cleaned up. There is 

no excuse for a repeat write-up, as it implies 

an ODC ignored the previous IG findings, and 

also implies the ODC has not been complying 

with regulations and instructions for at least 

2 years or more (since the last inspection).

The IG will arrive at the inspection location 

with a copy of the previous IG inspection results 

in-hand and know the previous OBSERVATIONS 

and FINDINGS. Any experienced IG will figure 

out in the first 15 minutes of looking at a program 

whether it is a part of the standard operating procedure for that ODC or whether it was thrown together in the last minute for the inspection. The 

IG will not do a surface glance at something and 

move on but will, in many cases, do a deep dive 

with questions that highlight how much thought 

and effort have gone into a particular program.

Manage resources. Being as efficient as 

possible with the resources given. This means 

knowledge management, program management, 

and people management are factors to consider 

in long-term preparation. Putting information 

and people in the right place at the right time.

Develop continuity of operations e-folders for each inspected program in each office. Developing e-continuity folders makes 

preparing for the inspection simpler and more 

organized, and it makes the IG’s job much 
101 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

It’s never too late to iterate expectations, to ensure personnel understand the level of performance expected, and most importantly, to understand the importance of a positive attitude.

The pep talk itself doesn’t have to be a 

Patton-esque speech, but it should repeat the 

expectations (the same ones briefed up months 

earlier during long-lead prep). Comment on 

personnel appearance requirements (applicable 

uniforms, standard uniforms throughout ODC, 

etc.) and adherence to customs and courtesies.

Explain some of the norms and set the expectation of professionalism, like greeting the IG 

with a hand-shake and introducing other ODC 

personnel/staff. Gen Zamzow: “Look people 

in the eye, pop that sharp salute, and exceed 

those standards for uniform, boots, and hair!”

Pre-coordinate meetings with the IG and local, Partner-Nation, military personnel with whom 

the US Security Cooperation personnel interact 

often, as well as with the PN IG, if able. Meetings 

with personnel of like rank or one level up lends 

credibility to the ODC partnership-building 

mission and highlights a qualitative edge in how 

the Security Cooperation Office does business.

The Partner-Nation is usually warmed by 

a sense of buy-in when participating in a U.S. 

process and this technique reflects the ODC 

working relationship with the Partner-Nation.

The SCO leadership will have control over 

who the IG meets, so make it someone with 

whom the SCO personnel have developed a 

great relationship. Also, take this opportunity 

and use the IG to help accomplish ODC mission tasks via an engagement. Brief the IG up 

on a strategic plan the ODC is in the middle of 

executing, and provides the IG with messages to pass when talking to Partner-Nation personnel that help support that Line of Activity.

Download the same ODC information the 

IG will show up with. Have a meeting within the 

ODC to ensure strategic plans are understood, as 

well as how they relate to CCMD Lines of Effort.

The IG may show up with a 2-inch thick, 

3-ring binder full of info about the SCO. Information could include: a comparison of your ODC in 

personnel to make margin notes on e-copies of 

all documents. Referencing an outdated copy of 

the regulation or AFI is not the appropriate thing 

to do during the inspection. The IG will not expect the SCO project officer to know everything, 

but will expect that person to know where to 

find everything in the governing e-documents, 

etc. And if the governing documents are not 

readily available, that sends another signal that 

maybe the directives are not referenced often.

Manage resources -- set Leave and PCS 

expectations early on. This will provide an 

element of continuity for the inspection, and 

will provide the ODC being inspected stability 

in personnel moves leading up to the inspection. It is also important that the CCMD and 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency country 

desk officers are made aware of the pending 

inspection, so that they can plan to minimize 

disruption or taskers during inspection week.

Personnel should not plan to take Leave 

during the inspection itself. SCO leadership 

should notify all personnel of this and set the 

expectation months in advance. This one is 

self-explanatory but needs to be accomplished 

early enough to where personnel can advanceplan other Leave dates, should the requirement exist. Also, contact the J1 at the CCMD 

and request a freeze on PCSs in or out in the 

month (or two) preceding the inspection. Again, 

like Leave, this requires a long lead time.

FINAL PREPARATION

A few days before the IG visit, it’s 

time to take care of final items in preparation for the visit. Some things to consider:

1. Re-energize the tone to ODC personnel and iterate expectations.

2. Prepare the hosts to meet the IG.

3. Go with what the IG knows.

4. Consider miscellaneous logistics.

Re-energize the tone to ODC personnel 

and iterate expectations. For those in a leadership role, provide an inspection pep-talk to 

ODC personnel a few days before game day.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 102

the CCMD (Foreign Military Sales, International 

Military Education and Training, Enhanced End 

Use Monitoring, mil-to-mil engagements, Foreign Military Financing, the ODC budget, and 

ODC manpower); the CCMD Theater Security 

Cooperation Management Information System

(TSCMIS) readout; some Security Cooperation 

Information Portal (SCIP) products; the applicable CCMD dashboard product (in EUCOM this is 

the Theater Security Cooperation Decision Support Dashboard); and a list of your FMS cases, 

EEUM listing, Exercise picture for the FY, etc.

The IG will also have a listing of ODC Lines of 

Activity. The ODC should pull this information in 

advance, review the products for open issues, and 

be prepared to discuss some of the strategic plans 

and, in some cases, individual events, being executed to accomplish the CCMD Lines of Effort.

Miscellaneous Logistics

Cleanliness vs clutter–Reduce clutter in the ODC offices. Clutter and disorganization creates a negative perception.

ODC personnel do not have to worry about 

the white gloves coming on for an inspection but 

first impressions count; and that first impression 

when an IG walks into an office sets a tone. The IG 

can usually tell how an office is going to perform 

in an inspection based on how the ODC Chief 

presented themselves and their offices. In fact, 

based on those initial impressions, they could deduce physical fitness scores (in general), status of 

annual online training, and promotion rates. So 

the right answer is to control what’s within one’s 

circle of influence. Before the IG arrives, cleanup workspaces and desks which are vacant. With 

the budget pendulum in full swing towards less 

people and more unused desk space, it’s important 

not to let desk space become the repository for 

all things not wanted in the office. With tight 

budgets, a supply NCO (if you have one) may 

sometimes have an empty shelf for a particular 

item that can be found in a long-vacant desk.

Clean up the COMSEC. This is a final 

chance to do a COMSEC inspection before 

the inspection. Burn the full burn-bags, shred 

what needs to be shredded, check safes, applicable stickers on phones, check procedures, etc.

Prepare ODC equipment -- ensure it works, 

so there are no surprises when you present an 

ODC brief to the IG. This may sound unimportant, but some SCOs don’t get many DVs coming 

through, and therefore don’t use their projectors 

or other presentation equipment often. Coordinate or accomplish miscellaneous logistics considerations: pre-coord entry badges into your 

facility; who will meet/greet the IG upon arrival 

into town; ensure they have a clean, private conference or gathering area; computer access; internet access; telephone availability; access to a 

safe; and check access to SIPR. Prepare contact 

cards to provide the IG; they should include key 

phone numbers and instructions for how to dial 

out. Determine who will provide a safety briefing, maps, and go/no-go locations around town, 

to include jogging locations. A list of tourist 

sites and places to check out after-hours is always appreciated. Many of IG personnel may 

be in a given country for the first time and want 

to take advantage of what there is to see. Plan 

to brief the IG on: the ODC building or Embassy 

lay-out; local security assessment; location of an 

ATM or place to get local currency in relation to 

hotel and ODC/Embassy; safe-haven areas within the building; and OSI or Intel brief of local 

area for the week. It is important for the Security 

Cooperation lead to remind DSCA and the J5 

Help Desk (or equivalent at the CCMD) that personnel will be preoccupied with an inspection.

Lastly, ensure the CCMD homepage is a homepage at computer startup for all ODC personnel.

GAME DAY

It’s time to make a good first impression 

and it’s never too late to fix those things that 

are broken, even during the inspection itself.

1. Leaders, set the tone for ODC 

personnel.

2. Be professional in setting the tone for 

the IG.
103 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

3. Communicate, communicate, 

communicate.

4. What to do if the IG identifies a 

FINDING or OBSERVATION.

5. Highlight successes the IG can relay to 

other ODCs world-wide.

6. This is a team effort, nothing says it 

has to be 1v1 with the IG.

Leaders set the tone for ODC personnel! Personnel will be looking at SCO leadership to see how to act. Leaders set the example! Good leaders will make a good impression 

with plenty of hustle and drive, and a positive 

attitude. Motivation or concern for the outcome of the inspection is reflective of ODC 

leadership’s motivation and how leadership 

carries out the mission. Gen Zamzow, “Display a positive attitude, recognize enthusiasm 

is contagious, and that problems always arise 

in the “fog of war” and they can be overcome!”

Be professional in setting the tone for the 

IG. Professionalism goes a long way in first 

impressions. Provide the IG with a mission 

brief. They will already know it, but it gives 

them that ODC’s perspective on priorities and 

concerns. Introduce the ODC team and their respective jobs. Customs and courtesies are important. If the IG walks into a room to inspect, 

even if the same rank equivalent is in the room, 

stand-up and greet them with a hand-shake.

Communicate, communicate, communicate. The inspector will want to ensure each ODC is communicating important information to applicable agencies.

ODCs should disseminate and/or communicate information to a greater extent. There are 

two major avenues of communication; up and 

out of the ODC, and down and in to all the personnel working in the ODC. There are multiple 

organizations who can gain benefit from SCO 

information: the Ambassador; the CCMD Commander; the CCMD SCO or ODC assistance 

desk or team; the applicable Partner-Nation office; the SDO/DATT; industry; DSCA; the Implementing Agencies; other SCOs; various USG 

agencies; etc. SCO personnel should make arrangements for the IG to meet the Ambassador 

or at least the DCM (for larger ODCs). Some 

IGs like to sit in on Country Team meetings.

Other IGs will want to understand how often and 

with what information a particular ODC interacts 

with other ODCs in the same CCMD. Within 

the inspected ODC, simple questions related to 

upcoming events, security procedures, or recent Security Cooperation information or guidance put out by the CCMD, are ways the IG will 

assess communication flow within the ODC.

Recently modified internal processes or 

policies should be clearly explained to the IG.

Early in the inspection process would be the 

right time to explain new internal ODC procedures with regards to Security Cooperation 

programs and how they accomplish goals with 

greater efficiency. This gives the IG the chance 

to look at new practices with a fresh set of eyes 

and make inputs or recommendations. Nothing precludes a last-minute change to how 

CCMD Lines of Activity are accomplished, as 

long as the IG is aware, and it behooves SC 

project leads to ask for IG advice on any techniques to better inculcate changes to policy.

If an OBSERVATION or FINDING is discovered, correct it immediately (if able), as the 

inspection continues on. Quickly correcting 

problems discovered during the inspection is 

critical if the systematic issue hinders successful 

and efficient ODC mission execution, but is also 

important because the problem may continue to 

manifest until fixed, costing the U.S. government money. Additionally, attacking the problem immediately after discovery reinforces the 

sense of urgency IGs are looking for in SCOs.

For example, when the IG discovered one 

ODC did not have a required formalized method of obtaining course feedback from PN students upon their return from an IMET course, 

the Training lead contacted the ODCs in Belgium and France to find out how they do it 

(coincidently, both of these ODCs were next 

in the queue to receive IG inspections). Within two hours of the OBSERVATION the ODC 

being inspected began the process of placing 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 104

a written feedback questionnaire in each student trip folder before student departure. The 

IG was appreciative for the sense-of-urgency 

displayed in response to the OBSERVATION.

Highlight successes the IG can relay to other ODCs world-wide. General Zamzow, “visibly 

exude pride in yourself, your unit, your mission, 

and your base: Looking Good, Feeling Good, 

Being a Winner!” Show off what you have.

Highlight your strengths to the IG. Brief them 

on innovative programs, processes that improved 

efficiency, and money-saving ideas. Explain if 

you applied a Best Practice from another ODC, 

and emphasize any improvements you made to it.

Everything is an efficiency drill due to budget cutbacks. The IG inspection is an opportunity 

to highlight success stories. The IG has so many 

programs to review it is up to the SCO team to advocate the highlights. Good work doesn’t usually 

speak for itself. You have to speak for the work.

The inspection of individual programs is a 

team effort. There is no reason a program-look has 

to be 1v1 with the IG, especially if there is more 

than one expert in the ODC on a particular subject

Some SCO personnel like to look up the 

responses in the regs/AFIs, etc, first, whereas other SCOs answer the IG via discussion, 

without the help of the E-SAMM or DOD regs 

and then double check their answer with the 

E-SAMM or regs. Both techniques display an 

understanding of job basics and it also highlight 

who is in the books/e-pubs enough to know 

where the answer is (CNTRL-F works well).

POST INSPECTION

The IG has departed; it is not time 

to forget the inspection and move on.

There are still a few actions required:

1. Capture and disseminate Lessons 

Learned.

2. Thank Partner-Nation personnel who 

assisted.

3. Fix the OBSERVATIONS and FINDINGS

List some Lessons Learned immediately after the IG look. First, it captures important lessons while they are still fresh in the 

mind and second, the next ODC in line for an 

inspection can use the Lessons Learned to 

help themselves during their own inspection.

The Lessons Learned could include IG 

questions not related to the IG’s checklist.

Other Lessons Learned include any additional information the SCO needed in order to respond appropriately to IG questions. These 

Lessons Learned can be placed in a continuity 

folder until preparation for any future inspection; and the LLs should be sent to the JLLIS and/or DSCA for publishing [via SCIP]

The CCMD IG webpage will have a listing 

of which ODCs are next in line for inspection. In 

some instances, the IG report from one particular 

IG inspection will not be published with enough 

time for the next SCO to review the write-ups 

and make any last-minute corrections before 

their inspection. SCO Chiefs should email After 

Action Reports or Lessons Learned to the next 

ODC’s in-line for inspection for that reason.

Draft letters or certificates of appreciation (for Ambassador Signature), addressed to any Partner-Nation personnel that 

helped the ODC succeed in the inspection.

For the Americans, bullets on Best Practices and outstanding contributions will make 

it to their OERs, OPRs, NCOERs, FitReps, 

etc, but for the international personnel, those 

letters of appreciation or certificates will be 

on their walls for decades, as will the presentation photo that goes along with it.

Correct any OBSERVATIONs or FINDINGs 

ASAP after the inspection. Letting the corrective 

action linger means the ODC is in the wrong.

Also, the solution set should be institutionalized 

into the daily ODC process and norms in such 

a way that the problem is no longer a concern.

Creating an internal process that everyone understands as the norm will fix the problem and make 

it a normal operating procedure within the ODC.

There are several keys to success SCO 

leadership can accomplish before, during, and 
105 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

after an IG stops by the ODC. While it’s always important for leadership to develop strategies that build partnerships with the PartnerNation, it is just as important to prepare for 

the IG review of the programs SCO leadership have put in place to execute those strategic plans. Learning the lessons of past inspections will help SCOs prepare for that IG review.

______________________________________

About the Author

Colonel Dan Dagher is the Director of 

Security Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey. He 

is an Air Force pilot and Regional Affairs Specialist, with Masters Degrees in International 

Political Science and Aerospace Science. He 

attended DLI at both Monterey and Washington DC, and speaks Arabic and French.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 106
107 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

A Closer Look at Strengthening 

Security Cooperation Organization 

Operations with a Civilian 

Workforce

By Timothy J. O’Sullivan

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author(s), and is not necessarily the 

view of DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Helping other countries better provide for their 

own security will be a key and enduring test of 

US global leadership and a critical part of protecting US security, as well. Improving the way 

the US government executes this vital mission must be an important national priority.1

—Robert M. Gates, Former Secretary of Defense

Introduction

With ongoing funding cuts and the prospect of reduced military forces, it is vital that 

the Department of Defense (DOD) maximizes its existing resources. In April 2013, The 

White House published Presidential Policy 

Directive (PPD 23) on Security Sector Assistance which provides specific guidelines to effectively achieve the President’s Security Sector Assistance goals by aligning its resources 

with National Security priorities. Specifically, 

the PPD provides a guideline to be more selective and use resources for the greatest impact.

In the Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Assistance (SA) arenas, DOD civilian professionals are potentially significant force multipliers. Whether supporting short-term gaps or 

long-term assignments, civilian workforce personnel can provide the expertise and stability in 

Security Cooperation Organizations (SCO’s) to 

ensure U.S. National Security Objectives are met.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel recently stated, “The Pentagon has been rethinking not only its priorities, but also its policies 

and practices. This will require significant 

change across every aspect of our defense 

enterprise.”[i] As a result, creating a formalized civilian security cooperation training program, to support Security Cooperation Organizations would provide needed relief for the 

Military Departments, save DOD appropriated 

funds, provide operational continuity, strengthen partner relationships, and advance our civilian security cooperation workforce experience. 

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is developing a SC Workforce Development Program Initiative that outlines 

specific requirements needed to obtain certification levels and outlines SC career development objectives for the military and civilian 

workforces. As part of the existing initiative, 

this article proposes a concept using the DOD 

SC civilian workforce to deploy and support the critical mission of SC Organizations.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 108

tion of SCO staffing costs from current year 

and projections for the next budget year. SCO 

military personnel support costs executing the 

SA program are funded with U.S. Code Title-22 

(T-22). In some cases, SCOs can also be augmented to support SC activities by DOD personnel under U.S. Code Title 10 (T-10) authorities.

DSCA and the GCCMDs have the overall 

responsibility to ensure that the SCOs are appropriately staffed. The Joint Staff (JS) J1 manages the Joint Manpower Validation Process 

(JMVP) through which the SCO Joint Tables 

of Distribution (JTDs) are validated and updated at least annually. When GCCMDs determine that a new or increased SA workload 

requires additional staffing, the formal JMVP 

is put into effect and the GCCMDs oftenshift 

billets between SCOs within their Areas of Responsibility (AoR). Repositioning of those 

billets is closely coordinated with DSCA, the 

Joint Staff, and the effected U.S. Ambassador.

There is no standard size or make-up of a 

SCO; it largely depends on the number and magnitude of SA/SC activities conducted with the 

PN and the regional goals identified by the GCCMD for that country. In addition, any changes 

to the existing size or composition of the Embassy post will also require approval of the AmbasSCO Responsibilities and Manning 

Before we explore this article’s proposed 

concept, you first must understand how a typical SCO is organized along with its governing 

authorities’ roles and responsibilities. Under the 

authority of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 

1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control 

Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended, the role of the 

SCO is to be the primary interface between the 

DOD and the Partner Nation (PN) on all DOD 

assigned SA activities. Moreover, the SCO is 

the lead organizations within each Geographic 

Combatant Command (GCCMD) for execution 

of SC/SA programs for the country assigned and 

are a crucial member of the U.S. Ambassador’s 

Country Team. Section 515(a) of the Foreign 

Assistance Act (FAA), outlines seven required 

functions for assigned Embassy military personnel with respect to SA programs. Those required functions are identified in the Table 1-1.

The FAA also specifies that the number 

of armed forces personnel assigned to a SCO 

conducting SA is not to exceed 6 unless specifically authorized by Congress. Funding for 

the SCO staffing is derived from the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) submitted to 

Congress. Included in the CBJ is the SA porTable 1-1

Mandated SA Functions

1. Equipment and services case management

2. Training management

3. Program monitoring

4. Evaluation and planning of the host governments military capabilities and requirements

5. Administrative support

6. Promoting rationalization, standardization, interoperability (RSI), and other defense cooperation measures

7. Liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance
109 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

The civilian SC/SA workforce 

In 2009, the DEPSECDEF directed a concentrated effort to train the SC Workforce as part 

of ten High Priority Performance Goals reported 

to the Office of Management & Budget. The ultimate goal was, and continues to be, to maintain 

and train 95% of the SC workforce at appropriate skill levels as designated by their supervisory 

chain. The Security Cooperation Workforce Database (SCWD – pronounced “squid”) is the tool 

created to monitor the level of training earned by 

the Security Cooperation (SC) workforce around 

the world. The SCWD is a web-based tool that 

performs two separate but interwoven functions. First, it identifies all the SC-associated 

positions globally and the required level of training for that position, and second, it identifies 

the personnel occupying the positions and their 

current level of training achieved. With these 

pieces of information, it is possible to compute 

the percentage of people who are trained to the 

appropriate level.[iii]According to SCWD, there 

are approximately 8,517 civilian personnel currently employed in the SC workforce. Those positions include a variety of staff personnel such 

as case managers, IT professionals, program 

managers, strategists, desk officers, policy makers, and educators. The training levels currently 

established are provided in Table 1-3 below.

The Concepts

This article’s concepts are not new. Some 

GCCMDs are currently utilizing civilians in a 

few deployed SCO organizations. This article 

does not address civilianizing the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) 

program or all of the current military positions.

The proposed concepts focus on providing sustained and temporary expertise to the SCOs.

The first concept would be to position and develop career SC civilians as deputies to the SDO/

DATT (SCO Chief). Using CENTCOM as an example, Table 1-3 lists a few of the current military 

sador in consultation with the State Department, 

under the direction and authority of the National Security Decision Directive 38 (NSDD 38).

There are currently 152 SCOs worldwide 

(See Table 1-2) executing foreign military sales 

and a multitude of individual country relevant 

security cooperation programs. To successfully accomplish this mission, it takes a group of 

well-trained and experienced cadre who understand the latest SC policies and nuances of executing those programs and activities. In 2012, 

the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

published a report to Congress on DOD’s efforts towards SC reform which identified concerns that there are challenges within the existing workforce structure. A specific statement in 

the report quoted the following concern, “SCOs 

noted that they were insufficiently staffed or rotations in the field were not long enough. For 

example, some SCOs reported having only 

one security cooperation officer, and rotations 

sometimes lasted only 1 year, which was often 

less than the cycle time to develop and execute 

a Security Assistance (SA) Agreement.” [ii]

Embassy SCOs by 

Geographic Combatant Command

Table 1-2
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 110

Foreign Area Officer’s (FAOs), Regional Affair 

Specialists (RAS) and Political Affairs Specialists (PAS).Experience as a joint country program 

managers at commands such as the GCCMDs, 

the Joint Staff, the Defense Security Cooperation 

Deputy SCO positions and tour lengths located in 

the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).

The requirement and qualification standards 

for those civilian positions would preferably be 

former military Security Cooperation Officer’s, 

Security Cooperation Certification Levels

Table 1-3

Level Position Level Details

1 Positions needing only an awareness of basic SC terminology or Senior Commanders 

and Staff indirectly responsible for SC supervision.

2

Positions needing only a basic understanding of SC program terminology and 

processes or positions directly responsible for some aspects of SC, but for which 

extensive knowledge of SC programs is not required.

3 Positions working SC programs directly involving the transfer of military articles, 

services, and training of supervising that work.

4 Positions requiring advance understanding of SC/SA processes and policy.

CENTCOM Deputy Positions

Table 1-3 (Some CENTCOM SCOs were not included due to their minimal staffing.)

Country Title Rank Service Tour Length

Bahrain Deputy Chief O5 USAF 2 Years

Egypt Deputy Chief O6 USA 2 Years

Jordan Chief O5 USA 2 Years

Kazakhstan Deputy OMC O4 USAF 2 Years

Kuwait Vice Chief O6 USAF 2 Years

Lebanon Deputy Chief O5 USA 2 Years

Oman Deputy Chief OMC O5 USA 2 Years

Pakistan Acting Deputy Chief O6 USAF 1 Year

Qatar Deputy Chief O4 USA 2 Years

Saudi (USMTM) Deputy Chief O6 USMC 1 Year

UAE USLO Deputy Chief O5 USAF 1 Year

Uzbekistan SCO Chief O4 USA 2 Years

Yemen Deputy Chief O5 USAF 1 Year

Iraq Deputy SAO O5 USAF 1 Year
111 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

ity and operational stability. As Table 1-3 illustrates, the average SCO tour in USCENTCOM 

is approximately two years. In most SCOs, the 

first year on assignment is spent building PN 

relationships, finding supporting agency points 

of contacts, understanding the PN hierarchy, 

and learning about the PN SA/SC programs. 

Finding the right civilian for a position involves a number of complicated variables. The 

size of the existing country team, the country’s significance in the relationship with the 

U.S., and the number and complexity of SA/

SC activities being conducted should be key 

deciding factors. The deployed officer billets 

salaries are currently funded by the owning 

service under Title 10 authorities and various 

support costs are covered under Title 22. Using table 1-4 below as an example, the CENTCOM deputy positions listed in Table 1-3 cost 

the Military Departments a Rough Order of 

Magnitude (ROM) of $1.5M annually. To replace those positions with civilians, the ROM 

civilian cost would be around $1.2M annually.

The second proposed concept is to develop 

a cadre of civilians from the SC/SA workforce 

that are SC coded in SCWD to help support 

short term gaps requested by the GCCMD on 

an as needed TDY basis. The type of activity 

the individual supports would determine their 

funding source (e.g. SA/SC). In some cases, 

professional development funding could also be 

Agency (DSCA), and the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, with applicable 

language skills and basic cultural knowledge of 

the PN would be desired, but not necessarily required. However, non-prior military service civilian personal with a wide range of experience 

applicable to the particular assignment requirement should also be considered. The civilian 

grade would be dependent on the size and complexity of the position and the SCO. The main 

objective is to establish longer partner relationships and build trust where a stable relationship 

is a critical part of the PN culture. Building a 

relationship takes time, patience, commitment, 

and requires significant investment. In many 

places, personal relationships trump professional 

ones. The SCO business is not a “flash in the 

pan enterprise,” it requires sustained commitment over time to be successful. For example, in 

a recent discussion with a partner nation’s FMS 

selection committee, the senior officer was quick 

to point out frustration with ongoing turnover in 

the SCO at the U.S. Embassy. The officer stated, 

“Just when we establish a good relationship with 

our action officer, he or she leaves and it takes 

a long time to establish a new relationship and 

for the replacement to understand our desires 

and background of our program, so we consistently feel we have to start all over again”.[iv]

A significant advantage of a civilianized 

concept is to aid the SCO with better continuAverage Cost Comparison of Annual Military Compensation by Pay Grade

Table 1-4 (Endnote [v])
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 112

considered. The gap fill requirements would be 

short in duration to help support a critical mission need or an interim loss of personnel. There 

are many times when a critical military billet is 

vacant for an extended period of time (months) 

until the owning service identifies and provides a 

permanent replacement. There are also circumstances where an unforeseen SCO mission will 

require additional personnel support (Large 1206 

deliveries, Enhanced End Use Monitoring, etc.). 

In theory, when the SCO determines temporary civilian support is the best method to 

sustain the mission, the SCO would provide a 

formal request with the required qualifications to 

the GCCMD. The GCCMD would submit the 

request and justification to DSCA for approval. A mass email would be sent to the qualified 

SC civilian workforce based on their SCWD certification level and DISAM courses attended to 

solicit nominees. Individuals would need supervisory approval to ensure that the SCO assignment supports improving their existing qualification standards and requirements identified in 

their workforce development plans. Exposure 

in a SCO would help strengthen an individual’s 

breath of experience and be extremely beneficial to incorporate the experience and perspective into their organization upon return. The 

program would benefit civilians who teach SA/

SC curriculum or work specific SC programs 

at MILDEPS and various DOD organizations.

Programs as a Benchmark

DOD and State Department have rotational 

advisor programs which can serve as benchmarks for this article’s proposed concept. The 

Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program and Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands 

are similar programs designed to develop a reach 

back capability from a cadre of experts (civilian and military) who are rotational advisors to 

develop deeper relationships and a better understanding of PN internal issues. In particular, the MODA Program matches senior DOD 

civilians with partner-identified requirements at 

the Ministry of Defense level. While deployed, 

the advisors exchange expertise with foreign 

counterparts in similar defense specialties.

State Department’s Foreign Service, Hard 

to Fill (HTF) Program allows State Department’s non-Foreign Service civilian employees to bid on Foreign Service positions. The 

objective is to allow non-Foreign Service civilian employees to participate directly in the 

Department’s overseas mission and experience 

life and work at an embassy or consulate. The 

program is designed to help meet critical State 

Department overseas staffing needs while providing a unique career development opportunity 

for its non-Foreign Service civilian personnel.

The Challenges

No new program or idea goes without numerous challenges. For the purpose of this article, we will highlight two of the major challenges that often affect our enterprise (personnel and 

funding). To start, in order to make the concept 

successful, positions replaced by civilians would 

require a minimum tour length that supports the 

SDO/DATT’s continuity and is designed to sustain a good PN relationship. A formalized DOD 

Foreign Service Security Assistance (FSSA) 

program very similar to the State Department’s 

Foreign Service program would need to be established. Individuals accepting a SCO Deputy assignment would need a follow on career 

path or have return rights to their previous job 

to alleviate concerns of what’s next after serving 3-5 years at a post (e.g. DSCA, MILDEP, 

Implementing Agency, GCCMD, JS, OSD, etc.).

Additionally, recruiting individuals willing to take positions in less desirable locations 

could pose a challenge. As a result, assignments 

known to have poor living conditions and an increased security climate would require recruiting incentives to be incorporated, such as Funded Environmental and Morale Leave (FEML). 

The FEML requirement would be approved on 

a case-by-case basis through the GCCMD and 

by Joint Staff. Other incentives for recruitment 
113 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

could also include a follow on assignment preference at CONUS or other SCO opportunities.

As with anything in our current environment, funding is always one of the biggest 

challenges. Since the Military Departments 

currently supplement the existing military personnel deputy positions with appropriated funds, 

a decision based on the roles and responsibilities of the position would determine the appropriate source of funding for each position – appropriated or FMS Administrative Surcharge 

funds. If the amount of ongoing SA activity is 

significant at the assigned SCO and the FMS Administrative Surcharge is appropriate, it could 

provide potential cost savings to the Military 

Departments. A reserve is maintained in the 

FMS Trust Fund Administrative Surcharge Account. Any new additions to the FMS Administrative Surcharge Account could affect the 

existing reserve balance and potentially current percentage (3.5%) charged to our Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) customers. The FMS 

Administrative Surcharge Account is closely 

monitored by DSCA. Regardless of the appropriate funding source, each position will require 

budgetary consideration for either T-10 or T-22.

Conclusion

In 2010, the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force conducted a series of workshops and provided recommendations to include 

workforce development. This article proposes 

additional recommendations that could offer significant improvements to the SC workforce structure, SCO operations, and support 

the DOD’s ongoing SC/SA reforms and President’s Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector 

Assistance. Further in-depth evaluation of this 

proposal and any existing efforts should be examined and considered by the DOD, JS, DSCA, 

and MILDEPs with support from the GCCMDs.

______________________________________

About the Author

Timothy O’Sullivan is a DISAM Instructor of Security Cooperation and a retired U.S. 

Air Force Officer. While in the Air Force, his 

security cooperation tours included serving as 

a Joint Staff Officer in USCENTCOM J5, Security Cooperation Division (Oman and Qatar 

Desk Officer) from 2008-2011, embedded advisor in 2007-2008 to the Iraqi Army 10th and 

14th Division and US Air Force Special Operations. His other tours included Air Force Material Command/Acquisitions, Air Combat 

Command, Air Mobility Command, Executive 

Officer and Instructor at the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology. His Academic Degrees 

include Bachelors in Professional Aeronautics 

and a Master’s Degree of Aeronautical Science 

from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University.

______________________________________

[i]Robert, B. (2013, November 5). Hagel 

Warns of Dangers in Deep Cuts to Defense. Retrieved November 5, 2013, from ABC News: 

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/hagelwarns-dangers-deep-cuts-defense-20787119

[ii]U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2012). DOD’s Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance 

Program Management. Washington D.C.: 

U.S. Government Accountability Officer.

[iii]The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management http://www.disam.dsca.

mil/pages/programs/hppg_scti/default.aspx

[iv]Committee, B. F. (2013, October 23). 

United States Field Studies Program (Home 

Seminar). (T. J. OSullivan, Interviewer)

[v]Government Accountability Office. 

(1996). DOD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save Money. Washington 

D.C.: Government Accountability Office.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 114
115 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Military Justice Engagement and 

the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo (DRC): A Case Study in the 

Potential for Defense Institution 

Building in Austere African 

Environments

By LTC McCullough, USA, Branch Chief

U.S. AFRICOM, J5

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the view of the 

USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Rule of law and human rights education is a 

significant engagement tool not only in the DRC 

but also in many countries worldwide. Watching 

the news, one will notice that rebel activity, 

loosely controlled militaries, and competing tribal 

interests plague many regions in Africa. The U.S. 

country team in Kinshasa, in cooperation with 

the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), 

has designed an engagement strategy that 

takes a holistic approach to addressing the 

challenges surrounding the military justice 

system in the DRC. This approach facilitates 

defense institution building (DIB) in a country 

where defense spending is extremely limited. 

The strategy addresses three areas: education 

(recruit through Legal Magistrate), application 

of technology to facilitate defense/prosecution, 

and mentorship (Prosecution Support Cell).

Education and the DIILS Mission in 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Taking the lead on education and providing 

the groundwork for DIB is the Defense Institute 

for International Legal Studies (DIILS). DIILS 

is a joint command located at the Newport 

Naval Station in Newport, RI. It is part of the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 

within the Department of Defense (DOD) and 

is tasked with delivering legal training on the 

rule of law, the law of armed conflict, human 

rights and other subjects throughout the world. 

It is another tool in the security cooperation 

toolbox that can impact our relationships 

with foreign military and security forces.

DIILS activities in the Congo are resourced 

through two different sources, International 

Military Education and Training (IMET) 

program and the Peace Keeping Operations 

(PKO) program. Initially, most security 

cooperation organizations (SCOs) are acquainted 

with DIILS training capabilities via the 

combatant command (CCMD) hosted Security 

Cooperation and Education Training Working 

Group (SCETWG) held once a year in Gar�

misch, Germany. SCETWG is the venue where 

SCOs typically plan the application of IMET 

funding via a full array of USG military pro�
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 116

FARDC. The average class size is 30 to 40 

students, but there are smaller groups when 

the focus is purely on the legal community 

and there are larger groups such as training 

conducted at the FARDC military academy.

In early 2014, DIILS demonstrated great 

flexibility in meeting COCOM, country team 

and partner nation (PN) requirements, when two 

groups of 3,000 trainees each were identified as 

available for training on short notice. The training 

timeline between notification and execution was 

less than 60 days due to the unpredictable nature 

of the FARDC unit assignments. Thanks to the 

existing DIILS infrastructure on the country 

team and the relationship between FARDC 

centers of Instruction and the Office of Security 

Cooperation (OSC), DIILS was able to train the 

largest audiences in the organization’s history 

(1,687 recruits at Base �

cruits at the Mura Center of Instruction). A 

second example of flexibility and capacity was 

demonstrated during March 2014 when DIILS 

modified training to provide a seminar to the 

FARDC Inspector General’s office. This event 

has opened the door to greater relations between 

the U.S. Embassy and one of two 4-star Generals 

in the FARDC. Additionally, the activity assisted 

a PN in increasing the capacity to professional�

ize and reduce corruption. Having worked as a 

security cooperation officer in two COCOMs 

and at the Army Component level, I have never 

come across an organization that has been as 

consistent and successful as DIILS. I strongly encourage the SCO community to consider 

adding DIILS to country engagement plans.

Technology:

The second element in the military justice 

DIB effort was the implementation of technology 

in order to facilitate case development (prosecu�

tion and defense). The technology was implement�

ed through a program entitled the DRC Military 

Justice Regional Resource Center (MJRRC). In 

essence, an intranet, library, and the skills nec�

essary to use these resources were established.

grams. In the DRC, PKO is primary and IMET 

is secondary in resourcing DIILS activities.

The DIILS mission in the DRC began 

in 2008. Originally, the in-country program 

staff consisted of a U.S. Navy O-5 or O-6 JAG 

officer and a U.S. Navy E-7 based at the U.S. 

Embassy in Kinshasa, DRC. The in-country 

team is further supported by a locally employed 

staff member at the embassy. The job of the 

in-country staff is to run the program locally, 

work with the “Forces Arm�ées de la R�épub�

lique Démocratique du Congo” (FARDC), and 

other government officials to facilitate training 

opportunities; they also work with the UN and 

other international governmental organizations 

(IGOs) as well as certain nongovernmental or�

ganizations (NGOs) working on rule of law is�

sues to help compliment the efforts of all of the 

parties interested in moving the DRC govern�

ment toward a system built upon the rule of law.

The FARDC is the DRC’s primary force.

The FARDC is minimally funded and not 

very mobile. Therefore, DIILS has traveled 

extensively to deliver the training to various 

commands throughout the country (see graphic). 

The DRC is very large, about 2/3rds the size of 

Western Europe or about 1/4th the size of the U.S., 

and has a very poor transportation infrastructure. 

Fortunately, the UN flies to most places where 

there are concentrations of the FARDC. DIILS 

utilizes UN flights to a particular area and then 

uses UN or locally procured transportation to 

reach the FARDC. Most training missions are 

executed over the course of a two-week period.

The training has focused on both the 

FARDC military magistrates’ community, 

which is the equivalent of each of the U.S. 

Armed Services respective JAG Corps, and 

the FARDC officer corps. Training has been 

conducted on a variety of subjects including the 

rule of law, the law of armed conflict, human 

rights, international humanitarian law, sex 

and gender based violence, and international 

criminal law. The DIILS program is also 

integrated into other U.S. contractor programs 

to reach an even broader audience within the 
117 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

For the centers which have problems with 

electricity supply such as Kikwit, Mbandaka, 

Kananga, Kindu, Goma and Bukavu, the following 

equipment has been added for proper operation:

• 2 solar panels

• 3 batteries 100 AH

• 1 regulator

• 1converter

• 1 toolbox

Below is a graphic representation of 

the locations where the program deliv�

ered training on equipment, individuals who 

were provided training and the specific type 

of equipment provided to each location.

Since the implementation of the MJRRC 

project in 2010, the program assisted the con�

nection of 34 resource centers equally dis�

tributed between the Prosecutor’s Office and 

the Military Court. The program conducted 

training for all the key personnel in the vari�

ous centers, including systems administrators 

who now conduct their own training under 

State Department-funded mentors. Each re�

source center is equipped with the following:

• 1 laptop with charger and storage bag

• 1 multifunction color printer

• 1 modem with a Vodacom SIM card

• 1 power strip

• 1 stabilizer

• 1 digital camera for the Prosecutor’s Office

• 1 range of books for the law libraries
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 118

Conclusion

In summary, the aligning of three sepa�

rate security cooperation programs: education, 

technology, and mentorship have provided a 

defense institution building capacity by the 

USG for the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

The results of this comprehensive approach to 

the creation of rule of law is paving the way to 

a more educated and professional military that 

is becoming more accountable for its actions. 

“Buyer Beware”...though this article paints a 

rosy picture of this effort, many challenges re�

main, primarily related to sustainability of the 

Prosecution Support Cell (PSC)

The third element of this effort which facili�

tated DIB is the Prosecution Support Cell (PSC). 

The role of the PSC is to help mentor partner 

nation (PN) prosecutors in the application of 

their skills. PSCs typically operate in war-torn 

Eastern Congo where most of the human rights 

violations occur. The PSCs are not allowed to 

personally partake in the military justice process, 

hearings or trials. Additionally, the PSCs (fund�

ed by the Department of State) provide feedback 

to the technology and education providers in or�

der to refine the first two elements in this effort.
119 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

program and its application in a very unstable 

defense system. Regardless, the aligning of pro�

grams that create a venue for DIB is a measur�

able effort that can demonstrate a positive im�

pact of U.S. security cooperation that distances 

the U.S. from the misbelief that the U.S. only 

focuses on arms sales and provoking conflict.

Special thank you to Frank Robards (USN, 

ret.) who provided outstanding DIILS training 

in the Congo and contributed to the historical 

information on the DIILS program in the DRC.

______________________________________

About the Author

LTC McCullough is a Branch Chief at U.S. 

AFRICOM, J5. He was commissioned in 1993 

from the Washington State University ROTC 

program as an armor officer, and became a FAO 

in 2002. His FAO assignments include Chief, 

Office of Security Cooperation, U.S. Embassy 

Kinshasa/Brazzaville, Operations Chief for the 

Multinational Training Division - USAREUR 

G3, J9 USFORA-S Afghanistan, ODC Chief 

Yerevan, Caucasus Team Chief and Deputy 

Division Chief for Counter Terrorism at RAF 

Molesworth, UK; and Deputy Commander 

USNIC Sarajevo.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 120
121 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Public Opinion and Security 

Cooperation in the Middle East and 

Central Asia

By Dr. Carlos Braziel, Middle-East Regional Director

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Joshua Cummins, Lockheed Martin Regional Research Assistant

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Any opinions, analysis, recommendations, or conclusions should be attributed to the author, and is not necessary the 

view of the USCG, DISAM, DSCA, DOD, or the USG

Over the last three years, the Middle East 

has experienced tremendous challenges to its 

regional stability and security. The United States 

(U.S.), and its partners across the United States 

Central Command (USCENTCOM), had to 

frantically adjust their strategy to mitigate the 

fallout associated with the Arab uprisings, toppled 

governments, civil war, and military coups. At 

the core of these world-changing events is public 

opinion, which has consequences for Security 

Cooperation (SC), a cornerstone of U.S. foreign 

policy in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Security Cooperation is defined as a list 

of activities “undertaken by the Department 

of Defense (DOD) to encourage and enable 

international partners to work with the U.S. to 

achieve strategic objectives” (U.S. Department 

of Defense, 2014). SC is administered through 

various programs, which provide training, 

equipment, and support multilateral exercises that 

align with U.S. strategy. Thus, USCENTCOM 

is placing more emphasis on SC as a responsible 

approach “to reduce U.S. military presence...

and by partnering with regional nations to 

distribute more of the security burden” in the 

Middle East and Central Asia (Mattis, 2013).

Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs) 

are key military members establishing and 

fostering professional working relationships 

to advance U.S. strategic interests through SC.

SCOs accomplish their mission by using their 

influence, advice, and expertise to help the U.S. 

implement its foreign policy as well as secure 

its access and influence in critical areas across 

the USCENTCOM region (Moroney, Thaler 

& Hogler, 2013). Yet, there are times when 

regional and/or local politics, public opinion, 

and attitudes toward the U.S. and its foreign 

policy may negatively affect the SCOs’ ability 

to influence their host nation counterparts within 

USCENTCOM. That said, the previously 

stated factors may beg the following question:

Is the ability to build relationships and enact 

diplomacy affected by negative views of the United 

States in the Middle East and Central Asia?

The DOD stated in a report, “Negative 

attitudes and the conditions that create them are 

the underlying sources of threats to America’s 

national security and reduced ability to leverage 

diplomatic opportunities” (Defense Science 

Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, 

2004, p. 15). What causes negative views of 

the U.S. or anti-Americanism? A recent study 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 122

affect other partners in the region by stating, 

“distrust of the United States, or bias against it, 

could conceivably lead other governments to 

refuse to participate in American-led efforts” (p. 

274). Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) also add, 

“anti-Americanism will prevent the United States 

from achieving important political objectives 

that can only be attained through extensive 

international cooperation” (p. 274-275).

Therefore, it is important for SCOs operating 

in the USCENTCOM AOR to be familiar with 

the subject of anti-Americanism and its potential 

damage to U.S. foreign policy and interests.

However, in order to fully understand public 

opinion in the Middle East and Central Asia, 

one must understand the competing theories.

“Their Fault” vs “Our Fault” Theories

The literature on anti-Americanism in the 

Middle East and Central Asia has largely been 

split into two separate arguments: the “their 

fault” argument and the “our fault” argument. 

The “their fault” theory asserts conflicting values 

and norms, and the increase in extremism, cause 

some in the Middle East to hold negative views 

of the U.S.. Political scientist Vaughn Shannon 

(2007) writes, “The ‘their fault’ camp suggests 

that anti-U.S. sentiments and violence result 

from radical ideology, incompatible values, 

psychological malaise, and political exploitation 

that fuels some elites and groups to hate the U.S. 

and its values and policies.” The “our fault” 

theory contends that it is U.S. foreign policy 

that directly causes negative public perceptions 

of the United States. Shannon (2007) continues, 

“The ‘our fault’ studies suggest U.S. actions and 

policy have fueled anti-U.S. sentiments that lead 

to violence against U.S. citizens and institutions.”

The “their fault” scholars believe antiAmericanism has emerged in the Middle East 

and Central Asia because of “who we are.” These 

scholars believe contrasting values, culture, and 

religious differences cause hatred of the U.S. in 

the Middle East. Political scientist Stephen Walt 

found a correlation between U.S. military 

intervention in the Middle East and an increase 

in negative public perceptions of the U.S. 

in the region (Cummins, 2012). This article 

explores the theories surrounding public 

opinion in the Middle East and Central Asia, 

its relationship with U.S. foreign policy, and 

its relevance to SCOs working in the region.

Public Opinion in the Middle East and 

Central Asia

Do global perceptions of the U.S. affect 

SCOs operating in the Middle East and Central 

Asia? Many scholars have identified several 

consequences associated with anti-Americanism 

and its impact on U.S. foreign policy and 

U.S. citizens abroad. The body of literature 

indicates anti-Americanism has substantial 

consequences, which range from fostering 

terrorism, to paralyzing host nation leaders from 

cooperating with U.S. diplomats for fear of 

losing popular support in their country (Caves, 

Donahue, Falin, Ham, Jean-Baptiste, Kim, 

Metzger, Schmidt, Wilsey & Winsberg, 2010).

Stephen Brooks, a scholar on public opinion, 

argues the consequences of anti-American 

sentiment became apparent on September 11, 

2001 and “terrorism that lacks a base of popular 

support is far easier to deal with” (Brooks, 2006, 

pp. 155-156). Unfavorable opinions of the U.S. 

can also damage American economic and political 

interests abroad. In particular, anti-Americanism 

can lead to boycotts of American goods and limit 

American investments abroad, which would be 

detrimental to the U.S. economy (Brooks, 2006).

Prominent political scientists, Peter 

Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, assert that 

anti-Americanism can damage U.S. “soft 

power” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007). In 

other words, this phenomenon could impede the 

U.S. government’s ability to enact multilateral 

diplomacy and build security partnerships with 

other countries. Katzenstein and Keohane (2007) 

explain how anti-Americanism can spread and 
123 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

contend that anti-Americanism exists because 

of U.S. support for Israel. Accordingly, Andrew 

Kohut (2005) cites a 2003 Pew survey, which 

shows that “enormous majorities in Arab and 

Muslim countries (at least 90% in Jordan, the 

Palestinian Authority, Morocco, and Lebanon) 

believed the U.S. favors Israel too much” (p. 1).

Other “our fault” scholars argue foreign 

military intervention is the definitive cause of 

anti-Americanism and also a very significant 

factor in suicide terrorism within the Middle 

East (Pape, 2010). Political scientist Robert Pape 

(2010) insists over 90% of international suicide 

terrorism is anti-American and a direct result 

of local regions being threatened by foreign 

troops. Abdel Mahdi Abdallah argues antiAmericanism also increases in the Middle East 

when the civilian population associates the U.S. 

with their oppressive rulers. Abdallah (2003) 

writes, “Another source of anti-Americanism 

has been America’s support for some 

authoritarian Arab regimes that are unpopular 

with their own people” (p. 68). Esposito (2007) 

calls it “democratic exceptionalism,” or the 

policy of “supporting authoritarian regimes 

in the Arab and Muslim world while not 

promoting democracy there as it did elsewhere 

after the fall of the Soviet Union” (p. 3)

Some scholars claim it could be a 

combination of the two arguments or that the 

solution may lie outside this debate. Walt (2005) 

argues that anti-Americanism in the Middle East 

is both “their fault” and “our fault”. He claims 

that some in the region do see our culture and 

values as a problem, but that U.S. foreign policy 

has also had negative consequences. Lynch (2007) 

contends that neither argument is fully satisfying. 

He writes, “If policies have nothing to do with 

anti-Americanism, then why did such sentiments 

spike in 2002...If U.S. policies alone explain 

anti-Americanism, then how do we explain its 

persistence across different administrations 

with what appear to be very different policies” 

(Lynch, 2007, p. 197). While the “their fault” and 

(2005) writes, “From this perspective, opposition 

to the United States is an inevitable, and thus 

unavoidable, reaction either to the concentration 

of power in U.S. hands or to the specific political 

and cultural values that the United States 

represents” (p. 70). Scholars, such as Barry 

Rubin, argue that political leaders and religious 

leaders in the Muslim world have blamed the 

U.S. for their own domestic problems or have 

used cultural or religious differences to advance 

hatred of the U.S.. Rubin (2002) writes, “AntiAmericanism has served as a means of last resort 

by which failed political systems and movements 

in the Middle East try to improve their legitimacy” 

(p. 1). Scholars that prescribe to the “their fault” 

theory claim that American culture spawns 

anti-Americanism because of divorce rates, 

sexuality, and parenting out of wedlock (Walt, 

2005). Others claim that American culture is 

rejected because of materialism, individualism, 

violence, and democratic values (Walt, 2005).

Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. Huntington add 

to the “their fault” argument by insisting that the 

differences between the Middle East and the U.S. 

is a religious “clash of civilizations” that cannot 

be reconciled. Huntington (1995) writes that the 

differences in religion are “far more fundamental 

than differences among political ideologies and 

political regimes” (p. 25). Huntington further 

contends that the Middle East will be a “fault 

line” where increased conflict will occur between 

Western civilization and Islamic civilization.

The scholars who prescribe to the 

“our fault” theory blame the spread of antiAmericanism in the Middle East and Central 

Asia on “what we do.” Scholars that make 

this claim, argue it is not about U.S. values, 

culture or power, but rather, how the U.S. uses 

its power that causes anti-Americanism. John L. 

Esposito (2007) writes, “The widespread antiAmericanism among mainstream Muslims and 

Islamists results from what the United States 

does—its policies and actions—not its way of 

life, culture, or religion” (p. 5-6). Some scholars 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 124

in approval of the U.S.. However, the largest 

and most significant difference occurs between 

2002 and 2003, when the U.S. invaded Iraq. The 

regional statistical mean experienced a 15.83% 

drop in approval of the U.S. in just one year, and 

every country except Egypt and Turkey witness 

their lowest approval ratings of the ten year study. 

Jordan and Morocco also witness their largest 

decrease in U.S. approval, both decreasing by 24%.

The intervention in Libya did not cause 

nearly as much disapproval of the U.S. as the 

intervention in Iraq. The region witnessed a 

2.33% drop in approval of the U.S. with four 

out of the six countries experiencing a drop in 

approval except for Lebanon, which remained 

constant, and Saudi Arabia, which increased by 

6%. This difference between interventions could 

be based on the type of intervention. For example, 

the intervention in Libya was of a much smaller 

scale and did not include the use of ground 

forces by the U.S.. The intervention in Libya 

was also facilitated by the UN and approved by 

states in the international community, while the 

intervention in Iraq did not go through the UN 

and was seen as a unilateral use of force by many 

in the international community (Benvenisti, 

2004). Many in the Middle East also supported 

U.S. efforts in Libya, including the Arab 

League, which was not the case in Iraq in 2003 

(Bronner & Sanger, 2011). These findings show 

“our fault” theories do not completely solve the 

issue of anti-Americanism, they do shed some 

light on factors which lead to negative views of 

the U.S.. To test these theories, a recent study 

analyzed U.S. foreign policy and its possible 

links to public opinion in the Middle East.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Middle Eastern 

Public Opinion

Should SCOs be aware of how U.S. foreign 

policy affects public opinion in their partner 

country? To answer this question, a recent study 

analyzed U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East 

between 2002 and 2011 while tracking approval 

levels of the U.S. in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 

Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (Cummins, 

2012). Although the study focused on the 

Middle East, the findings may also be relevant 

to SCOs working in Central Asia. The study 

found a significant correlation between U.S. 

intervention and the increase in anti-American 

sentiment in the region (Cummins, 2012).

Table 1 displays level of approval toward 

the U.S. prior to and after the U.S. intervention 

in Iraq in 2003 and U.S. intervention in Libya 

in 2011. The numbers shown represent support 

for the U.S. in percent, ranging from 1 to 100. 

The lower numbers reflect negative views of the 

U.S., while the higher numbers reflect positive 

views of the U.S.. In both cases there is a drop 

Table 1: U.S. Intervention and Public Opinion of the U.S.
125 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

government delayed the purchase of F-16s as 

a result of the public protests during the “Arab 

Spring.” In February 2011, when the Iraqi 

government was set to make its first payment, 

protesters hit the streets speaking out against high 

food prices (The World Post, 2011). In response, 

the Iraqi government assured the people it would 

delay the nearly $3 billion F-16 deal, and instead 

use the money on food rations (Iraq-Business 

News, 2011). As a result, the F-16 FMS case 

was delayed because of the outcry of negative 

public opinion; however, the U.S. was able to 

overcome this delay and the deal was reinitiated 

in September 2011. Even though these protests 

were not anti-American in nature, the case of 

Iraq still displays the possible effects that public 

opinion can have on host nation decision-making.

Public opinion also played a major role in 

U.S. relations with Pakistan. In December 2010, 

thousands of classified U.S. diplomatic cables 

were released through the website WikiLeaks. 

Dozens of these cables discussed U.S. concerns 

over Pakistan’s nuclear program and its 

support for militant groups, which sparked 

anti-American protests throughout the country 

(Bajoria, 2010). Furthermore, in January 2011, 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contractor, 

Raymond Allen Davis, was arrested in Lahore 

after killing two Pakistani men (Mazzetti, 2013). 

Anti-American sentiment in Pakistan erupted, 

calling for Davis to be tried and executed. New 

York Times reporter Mark Mazzetti (2013) 

writes, “Pakistan’s Islamist parties organized 

street protests and threatened violent riots if 

Raymond Davis was not tried and hanged for his 

crimes” (p. 9). Anger toward the U.S. in Pakistan 

worsened in March 2011 when Davis was freed 

and quickly escorted out of Pakistan, after 

reports that the victims’ families were paid off 

(Daily Mail, 2011). Mazzetti (2013) writes, “But 

the secret deal only fueled the anger in Pakistan, 

and anti-American protests flared in major cities, 

including Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore” (p. 

11). To make matters worse, two months later the 

U.S. covertly sent a Navy Seal team into Pakistan, 

a correlation between U.S. military intervention 

in the region and an increase in anti-American 

sentiment. However, the findings also show 

that the type of military intervention matters. 

For instance, a smaller scale, multilateral 

intervention with regional support garners 

much less anti-Americanism than a more 

heavy handed “boots on the ground” approach.

What does negative public opinion mean 

for SCOs in the Middle East and Central 

Asia? A SCO’s military counterpart will likely 

understand the strategic reasoning behind U.S. 

intervention, and therefore will not hold the same 

anti-American sentiment that could be found on 

the “Arab street.” However, as Katzenstein and 

Keohane (2007) point out, it is also possible for 

foreign governments and militaries to harbor 

resentment toward U.S. foreign policy. In 

particular, the U.S. government’s relationship 

with Israel is a source of criticism for many in 

the Middle East and Central Asia. From time to 

time, SCOs may experience resentment because 

the U.S. downgraded or disapproved the host 

nation’s request for certain defense articles and 

services because of the Qualitative Military 

Edge (QME) commitment to Israel (Wunderele 

& Briere, 2008). In addition, the perceived 

unconditional U.S. diplomatic and military 

support to Israel may be a point of friction during 

SCO and host nation counterpart interactions.

SCOs may also face resistance as a result 

of issues that happen inside their partner 

country such as the ”Arab Spring” protests, the 

2011 killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, 

or the burning of Qurans by U.S. troops in 

Afghanistan. This may lead to a lack of access 

for SCOs, delays in decision making by the 

partner nation’s government, or a failure 

in diplomacy. In the worst-case scenario, 

it could also put the SCOs life in danger.

Strong public opinion can also affect host 

nation government decisions and derail actions 

and strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia. 

This occurred in February 2011 when the Iraqi 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 126

which led to the death of Osama bin Laden. 

Once again, protesters hit the streets outraged 

that their sovereignty had been violated by the 

U.S. (Reuters, 2011). Shortly after the killing 

of bin Laden, the Pakistani military responded 

by cutting the U.S. military training program 

and limiting visas on U.S. personnel in Pakistan 

(Wolf, 2011). The U.S. responded by withholding 

nearly $800 million in security assistance aid to 

Pakistan (Schmitt & Perlez, 2011). This severely 

damaged the SCOs’ ability to build relationships 

and gain access to their military counterparts.

Another major issue occurred several months 

later in November 2011, when a North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrike killed 

over 25 Pakistani soldiers near the AfghanistanPakistan border (Masood & Schmitt, 2011). In 

response, the Pakistani government ordered 

the U.S. to vacate a key location instrumental 

to combat operations. Pakistan also closed the 

Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC), which 

were the two main NATO supply routes into 

Afghanistan (Martinez, 2012). As a result, the 

rift in the U.S./Pakistani relationship widened, 

prompting the U.S. to reroute supply lines through 

the Northern Distribution Network, at a reported 

cost of $104 million per month (Martinez, 2012). 

Nearly seven months later, the U.S. was able 

to somewhat repair its diplomatic relationship 

with Pakistan and negotiate the reopening of the 

GLOC (Reuters, 2012). However, the case of 

Pakistan shows that public opinion can severely 

strain the ability for SCOs to gain access, build 

relationships, and enact U.S. foreign policy.

Similarly to Pakistan, a combination of 

events in Afghanistan in 2012 led to a massive 

anti-American movement that put the lives of 

SCOs in danger. Public opinion took a turn for 

the worse in January 2012 after a video of U.S. 

Marines urinating on the dead bodies of Taliban 

soldiers went viral (Bowley & Rosenberg, 2012). 

Protests over the U.S. presence in the country 

soon broke out. To make matters worse, a month 

later in February 2012, it was released that U.S. 

soldiers burned Qurans at a NATO military base. 

This severely damaged U.S. relations with the 

Afghan government and civilian population. 

Soon, thousands of protesters hit the streets in the 

cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Herat (Deutsche 

Welle, 2012). The protests quickly turned violent 

as the situation in Afghanistan worsened. The 

situation hit a breaking point as two U.S. officers, 

including one SCO, were killed in the Afghan 

Interior Ministry building by one of their Afghan 

counterparts (Bowley & Rubin, 2012). New 

York Times journalists Bowley and Rubin (2012) 

write, “The shooting of the two American officers 

took place in the Interior Ministry’s command 

and control center, a highly restricted area where 

officials monitor conditions around the country” 

(p. 4). This attack was the worst possible 

outcome for the SC mission in Afghanistan. 

It broke the trust between the U.S. and their 

Afghan counterparts, severed communication 

and access for the U.S., and cost a SCO his 

life. The U.S. responded by withdrawing all 

military advisers from the country, which made 

it increasingly difficult for SCOs to repair this 

broken relationship (Bowley & Rubin, 2012).

The three previous cases demonstrate the 

extent of damage that can be caused by negative 

public opinion within the partner country. The 

cases also speak to the study, which linked 

U.S. military intervention with rising levels of 

anti-Americanism. In all three of these cases, 

the U.S. had a military presence in the host 

country, which led to negative public opinion 

and ultimately affected the SCOs ability to 

enact U.S. foreign policy objectives. Events 

that happen within the partner country can 

quickly lead to anti-Americanism and negatively 

affect the SCO’s ability to complete his or her 

mission. Public opinion can lead to limited 

access, distrust from the military counterparts, 

or even put the SCO’s life in danger. These 

events are often out of the SCOs control, but 

the SCO must have a plan in place on how to 

react and overcome negative public opinion.
127 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Recommendations for SCOs in the Middle 

East and Central Asia

SCOs must take into account the 

operational environment when developing a 

strategy for implementing U.S. foreign policy in 

USCENTCOM. When regional dynamics, such 

as anti-Americanism festers in the Middle East 

and Central Asia, host nation politicians and 

military leaders may feel pressured to disalign 

with U.S. interests due to negative public 

opinion. In turn, the effects of anti-Americanism 

may trickle down to the host nation counterpart, 

making them reluctant to make decisions in 

support of U.S. interests or even trust SCOs. 

Thus, it is vital for SCOs to recognize and address 

the affects of anti-Americanism on their ability 

to build relationships. According to Lindberg 

and Nossel (2005), “There have been a host 

of ambitious reports on what to do about antiAmericanism released in recent years, though 

very few of their recommendations have ever been 

implemented and even fewer consistently so” (p. 

26). Therefore, this paper offers the followings 

recommendations for SCOs dealing with antiAmericanism in the Middle East and Central Asia.

To respond to anti-Americanism in 

the Middle East and Central Asia, the U.S. 

government and SCOs themselves must play 

a role. The U.S. must focus its foreign policy 

efforts on diplomacy and military actions that 

benefit both the U.S. and the partner country. 

Unilateral intervention should be avoided if at all 

possible. Anthony Cordesman (2007), chair for 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

writes, “Military cooperation can only succeed if 

the U.S. can deal effectively with the diplomatic 

and political sides of security cooperation” (p. 2).

At the tactical level, SCOs must first remain 

professional and attempt to understand the 

causes of negative public opinion. Although 

the SCOs may not agree with the opinions of 

the host nation population, understanding the 

causes of resentment will help them demonstrate 

respect and empathy toward their military 

counterpart. Another consideration for SCOs 

is to develop their cross-cultural awareness 

competency. Delving into the culture and 

learning about host nations’ values and customs 

will aid in demonstrating empathy, which will 

enable SCOs to see things from the host nation 

counterpart’s perspective while expressing a 

genuine concern in the process (Gregersen, 

Morris, & Black, 1998). However, SCOs must 

balance their ability to sympathize with the host 

nation counterparts, with mission objectives, 

thus avoiding going “native.” Cross-cultural 

awareness will go a long way in building strong 

relationships that can overcome negative public 

opinion in the Middle East and Central Asia.

SCOs must remain aware of the political 

developments throughout the USCENTCOM 

region. Establishing a daily reading schedule 

and keeping up with regional news and 

scholarly articles is essential for SCOs to stay 

abreast of emerging political views, opinions, 

and rhetoric deemed harmful to U.S. foreign 

policy. Also, “Muslim populations are vocal 

about what is important to them” (Douglas 

& Neal, 2013 p. 7). Besides developing host 

nation language capability, SCOs should also 

solicit the talents of locally employed staff to 

fully understand the true essence of debate in the 

local vernacular expressed in local newspapers 

and broadcast news (Douglas & Neal, 2013).

In regard to execution of SC strategy, SCOs 

should look at expanding International Military 

Education and Training (IMET) and Exchange 

Officer programs to help host nation counterparts 

develop a “more sophisticated understanding” 

of American society, values, doctrine, and 

policy (Caves et al., 2013). Additionally, 

incorporating more humanitarian assistance/

humanitarian civic activities, which help 

improve the local community’s infrastructure 

and economy, is a prudent way to make U.S. aid 

more visible and increase goodwill among the 

local population. U.S. sponsored projects that 

improve the local population’s quality of life 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 128

are a low cost approach to helping overcome 

anti-American sentiment (Caves et al., 2013).

Lastly, SCOs need to get outside their offices 

and routinely meet with their counterparts. The 

number one priority for SCOs is to establish and 

maintain close personal relationships with host 

nation counterparts that would support U.S. 

foreign policy. SCOs must also be willing to 

share their own personal stories. These “stories” 

of perseverance and hard work are what make 

lasting connections and can ultimately “win 

over” the hearts and minds of the host nation 

counterpart and public population. SCOs may 

not be able to change the opinions of people 

who harbor resentment toward the U.S., but 

if they listen, become comfortable with the 

culture, and share their personal stories it 

will go a long way in building relationships.

In conclusion, the recently performed study 

draws a connection between anti-American 

sentiment and U.S. foreign policy decisions in 

the Middle East and Central Asia. Furthermore, 

the three case studies of Iraq, Pakistan, and 

Afghanistan show the degree to which public 

opinion can affect the SCOs ability to complete 

his or her mission. This can range from delays in 

decision making, a lack of access, or even put the 

SCOs life in danger. SCOs must be able to address 

these difficult situations by listening and showing 

empathy, embracing the cultural differences, and 

sharing their own personal stories of adversity 

and perseverance. Ultimately, by sharing their 

“story” with host nation counterparts, they 

can connect on a personal level. Thus, during 

difficult times when U.S. foreign policy and antiAmericanism clashes, the SCO’s relationship 

may be the only option for diplomacy.

______________________________________

Notes

1. Soft Power: Describes the ability to 

persuade and influence the behavior of 

countries through prosperity and shared 

values instead of threats and bribes.

2. Arab Spring: Refers to the wave of 

revolutionary protests, uprisings, riots, and 

civil wars occurring throughout the Middle 

East which began in December 2010.

3. Arab Street: A political expression or 

metaphor referring to public opinion in 

the Arab world, which is often contrasted 

to the opinions of Arab governments.

______________________________________

About the Authors

Dr. Carlos Braziel is an assistant professor 

and the CENTCOM-Middle East/Central 

Asia Seminar Director at DISAM. He is 

also a retired U.S. Air Force officer who 

has served in a variety of operations and 

positions in the Middle East as an Air Force 

civil engineer and a U.S. defense contractor. 

He holds a doctoral degree in organizational 

leadership from Indiana Wesleyan University.

Joshua Cummins is the CENTCOMMiddle East/Central Asia Seminar research 

assistant at DISAM. He received a Master’s 

in International and Comparative Politics 

from Wright State University in 2012. He 

completed his Master’s thesis on Middle 

Eastern public opinion, and his other research 

interests include Middle Eastern politics, U.S. 

foreign policy, and Middle Eastern history.

__________________________________

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The DISAM Annual, December 2014 132
133 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

Mobile Cooperation Training (MCT): 

Enhancing Engagement

By Major Rob Taylor, USA

Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC)

At the end of an air load train-the-trainer (T3) 

engagement with the U.S. Air Force Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT) 

in Entebbe, Uganda in 2013, the author recognized that these recently certified Ugandan 

trainers could accompany the ADAPT Mobile 

Training Team (MTT) to an upcoming air load 

training engagement in Burundi, and potentially to other states in the East Africa Region.

The author approached the Chief of Training 

for the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Air Force 

(UPDAF[i]) who readily agreed to export his 

regional ADAPT trainers. At the completion 

of the event, the ADAPT Team Leader informed 

the author that he considered the Ugandan 

T3 cadre “ready to train ADAPT anywhere.” 

Following the Mobile Cooperation Training 

(MCT) model, the author first secured approval 

from the Office of Security Cooperation in Kampala, then gained acceptance from the Office of 

Security Cooperation in Burundi, which was the 

site of the next ADAPT engagement. With the host 

country and the MCT provider country on board, 

the AAFRICOM regional director readily accepted, but bureaucracy then prevented the export of 

the Ugandan trainers due to a short lead-time 

and a shortage of funding. However, thus began 

the concept of MCT, in using regional trainers 

to augment U.S. MTTs, and eventually conduct 

MCT on their own. The next few steps of the MCT 

model would have involved senior military decision makers and the embassy country teams from 

the host and exporting countries (Burundi and 

Uganda, respectively), as well as regional and 

local SC planners to ensure smooth execution.

The inclusion of UPDAF personnel on the 

standard U.S. MTT represents an expansion of 

the traditional mobile training concept and fulfills 

the regional strategic objectives of promoting 

greater cooperation among regional partners and 

encouraging these actors to take part in improving their own security environment. At a more 

developed level, the UPDAF could field its own 

mobile team and export it to countries that need 

the training. Furthermore, Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) Military Police (MP) personnel could potentially form an MP MTT and 

export it, as well as could an Ethiopian counterinsurgency (COIN) MTT for MCT purposes.

This concept does not yet enjoy wide practice and 

some regions may not currently have the capacity to execute it, but the possibility exists, such 

cooperation has its benefits, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2014 calls for it.[ii]

In recent Security Cooperation (SC) history, numerous training events and exercises have 

enhanced the competence of partner militaries in 

various skills. Many are ready to export these 

skills to others who need them. Because certain 

states lack the ability to conduct their own training, Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) 

utilize specialized mobile teams to fill this training gap. Normally, U.S. MTTs fill this role.

The capability exists now, however, to augment or replace U.S. MTTs with regional trainers 

using the MCT concept. The construct of MCT 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 134

say describes MCT as a method of increasing 

cooperation at the regional state-to-state level.

One option for building partner capacity in 

a specific region is to send entire military units 

to a central training base, such as the Combat 

Training Centers (CTCs) of the U.S. military.

Entire units deploy to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, for example, to receive collective training and improve readiness, 

but the CTC concept does not operate without its 

obstacles. Although CTCs may fulfill the ideals 

of having a habitual relationship, depth in logistical details, and the stability of consistency, the 

cost of the centralized training location readily 

emerges as a large obstacle. Planners recognize 

that transporting entire units to regionally central 

locations becomes cost-prohibitive as well as loenhances mobile training by integrating certified 

regional trainers into the teams of U.S. personnel. Enhanced MTTs thus bring all the benefits 

of having a regional face on training: They complete required training but also increase cultural 

awareness and cooperation. This new training 

construct fulfills the strategic objectives of the 

QDR by including regional partners as trainers instead of fielding only U.S.-led MTTs.

Security Cooperation has come to play 

a large role in the current international environment, and has a large effect in maintaining stability. Cooperation yields far more 

development and progress than conflict,[iii] 

and SC offers improved security and stability for partner states, as well as productivity for the international community. This esFigure 1: Partner militaries possessing certified trainers export MTTs to other countries in the region. Air load 

trainers from the Uganda People’s Defense Air Force prepared to accompany U.S. ADAPT training in Burundi.
135 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

partner states, so that at a mature level of MCT, 

capable regional partner states field their own 

independent MTTs. This development represents the pinnacle of cooperation training readiness. The MCT construct thus refines the MTT 

concept, providing the next steps in increasing 

access and cooperation in a regional program.

MCT fulfills the requirement of exporting MTTs 

to those partners that need it, but enhances the 

cooperative effort by placing the regional face 

on training instead of consistently casting foreigners – U.S. personnel – as trainers. In this 

manner, regional partners increase cooperation, 

familiarization, and readiness by sending MTTs 

in their respective skills. This paradigm fulfills 

an objective of the QDR 2014, regarding the 

“emergence of international partners with the 

capacity to play productive and even leading 

security roles in their respective regions.”[iv]

MCT execution requires only a moderate 

amount of additional cooperation and coordination than the normal MTT effort. MCT involves 

the same actors as standard regional cooperation 

training, meaning the U.S. cooperation teams 

and the military cooperation teams of the exporting and trainee states. Training support also requires agreement from the regional cooperation 

team at the GCC and/or the service component 

command, respective country teams, and senior 

government officials of participating partner 

states. Lines of communication and coordination 

among these actors already exist, and as a bonus, 

the MCT concept requires additional coordination among these actors for the events to take 

place. The increased interaction of MCT thus 

serves the following three strategic objectives.

gistically more tedious than sending MTTs. Few 

militaries have standing training cadres to support 

habitual training centers, and the MTT concept 

and other SC engagement events already fulfill 

this role. The idea of a centralized training location thus marks a possibility of refining regional 

cooperation training, but the details of transporting units and maintaining cadres prevent it. The 

MTT concept, however, avoids large costs by 

importing small teams of trainers to approximate 

the effect of the CTC. The advantages of MTT 

are its low cost and smaller logistics profile, and 

they meet the training requirement well. Mobile 

training is not new, of course. Mobile teams allows recipients to conserve funding and time 

by importing smaller cadres to their home stations instead of sending entire units to a CTC, 

and training readiness increases. The MTT thus 

plays a large role in regional training, and MCT 

capitalizes on and expands these advantages.

MCT combines the logistical and financial advantages of MTT training with the strategic 

objectives of increased cooperation involving 

regional partners in their own security. Indeed, 

MCT enhances regional training readiness.

The concept of MCT combines the benefits 

of mobile training by including trainers from regional partners on the training teams, and thus 

expands the engagement focus of the combatant 

command. The paradigm builds on the concept 

of mobile teams by incorporating qualified regional partners as trainers to function along with 

normal team members. The MTT concept is not 

new but including regional trainers is, and it represents the next step in enhancing regional cooperation. As readiness progresses in a region, various states can become proficient in certain tasks 

and skill sets, and in turn could export MTTs to 

1. Increased	
  regional	
  training	
  readiness.

2. Increased	
  cooperation	
  and	
  familiarity	
  among	
  personnel	
  of	
  participating	
  states.

3. Increased	
  access	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  for	
  sponsoring	
  states.

Figure	
  2:	
  	
  Strategic	
  Objectives	
  from	
  the	
  QDR	
  fulfilled	
  by	
  MCT
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 136

all offices approve the training, coordination is a 

simple affair that develops according to the established procedures of each respective SC office.

Challenges and Benefits

As in all training events, MCT has its obstacles. The bureaucracy could not react on such 

short notice to accommodate the T3 personnel 

from Uganda to Burundi in 2013, and funding 

always presents an issue. Administrative requirements such as country clearances, passports, and visas can also become obstacles, and 

this assumes acceptance and seamless coordination from offices of security cooperation (OSCs), 

regional offices, recipient and trainer militaries, 

and country teams. Participation also requires 

partners to have the flexibility to execute such 

events, implying a need for depth of qualified 

personnel and available scheduling to export 

trainers. Disagreements or hostility between regional countries may also impede MCT and even 

prevent it. According to the model, OSCs are the 

primary actors to both recognize the possibility of 

MCT and overcome factors that would prevent it.

MCT also provides its benefits. The increased cooperation and facilitation of regional 

partners engaging in joint training represents the 

fulfillment of regional and even theater strategic 

objectives. As not every force possesses competency in all skills necessary in a region, MCT 

capitalizes on existing competencies, distributes 

them through decentralized training, and builds 

Planning

Generally, the same offices that plan existing cooperation training; conduct planning and 

coordination for MCT. These includes planners 

from participating countries’ governments 

and militaries, Security Cooperation Offices 

(SCOs) and Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs), 

combatant command regional desk offices, and 

country teams from respective embassies. The 

only difference with MCT is that training events 

involve two countries at once, meaning the trainer 

and trainee states, instead of only the training 

recipient. Additionally, all actors must possess 

the flexibility to execute MCT, because of the 

additional coordination involving the details of 

the exporting state as well as the trainee state.

Implementation

Implementation begins with the coordination of involved SC personnel. The first step is 

to identify countries capable of participating in 

MCT and gain acceptance from respective SC offices. This includes both the country hosting the 

MCT as well as the exporter of trainers for MCT 

events. Ideally, all security cooperation offices 

within a region establish a standing agreement regarding MCT, where possible and feasible. The 

next step is to gain approval from higher decision makers at the combatant command and Service Component Command (SCC) regional offices, and from all country teams involved. Once 

A	
  possible	
  checklist	
  follows,	
  and	
  these	
  actions	
  need	
  not	
  occur	
  in	
  order.

1. Identify	
  countries	
  capable	
  of	
  participating	
  in	
  MCT.

2. Present	
  MCT	
  plan	
  to	
  following	
  actors	
  and	
  gain	
  acceptance.

a. Respective	
  security	
  cooperation	
  offices

b. Participating	
  country	
  military	
  personnel

c. Regional	
  planners

d. Respective	
  country	
  teams

3. Proceed	
  with	
  training	
  event	
  according	
  to	
  established	
  regional	
  procedures.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   Figure	
  3:	
  	
  Steps	
  in	
  Establishing	
  MCT	
  Events
137 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

______________________________________

[i]Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces spelling form the UPDAF, http://www.gov.ug/ministry/ministry-defence.

[ii]Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 

chapter six, p. 1.

[iii]Axelrod, Robert M. “The Complexity of Cooperation.” Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1997.

[iv]Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 

chapter six, p. 1.

cooperation and relationships between regional 

partners along the way. It also strengthens the 

training base of regional militaries, which improves the security and by extension the stability of partner states. As host militaries improve 

their training readiness through MCT and other 

engagements, they can then export their MTTs 

and further extend cooperation and readiness.

Conclusion

MCT thus offers a new paradigm of fulfilling regional strategic and security cooperation objectives by engaging regional partners 

in joint training events. Mobile training teams 

composed of regional trainers promote cooperation and cultural awareness among regional 

partners, and ultimately increase access to regional countries by bringing regional actors 

together and adding a regional face to security cooperation training. Although mostly in 

the conceptual phase, MCT offers the potential of enhancing security cooperation training 

and fulfilling regional strategic objectives.

About the Author

MAJ Rob Taylor instructs joint and strategic operations at the Army’s Command and 

General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He also instructs the security 

cooperation and Africa Studies electives of 

the CGSC. His security cooperation experience is primarily in sub-Sahara Africa assignments including Mozambique and Uganda.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 138
139 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

DISAM Online Learning

By Lt Col Marc Ferguson, USAF

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

The Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management (DISAM) provides professional 

education, research, and support to advance U.S. 

foreign policy through security assistance (SA) 

and security cooperation (SC). DISAM’s target 

audience includes U.S. government civilians, 

military, and defense industry personnel working 

both CONUS and OCONUS. DISAM trains international partners as well. To reach this global 

audience, DISAM’s Online Learning Directorate 

(DISAM/DO) offers a variety of online courses, 

as well as learning guides, for the SC community.

Within the first 6 months of FY14, DISAM graduated 7,845 students. Of those 

graduates, 5,085 students were online graduates. With 65% of DISAM’s educational 

“market share” during that timeframe, online 

learning is clearly DISAM’s dominant academic medium, presenting significant outreach 

potential over conventional teaching means.

DISAM offers four online courses. They 

are the Security Cooperation Management 

Familiarization Course (SCM-FA-OL), the 

Security Cooperation Management Orientation Course (SCM-OC-OL), the International Programs Security Requirements 

Course (IPSR-OL), and the Missile Technology Control Regime Course (MTCR-OL).

Security Cooperation Management 

Familiarization Course (SCM-FA-OL)

SC-FA-OL is an entry-level course designed to provide basic familiarization on SC as 

conducted by the U.S. government with many 

partner nations around the world. SCM-FAOL is a SC Workforce Development (SCWD) 

Level 1 course. This course is available to everyone, including international partner personnel. This course serves as a familiarization to 

SC as conducted by the U.S. government with 

many partner nations around the world. Students gain an awareness of information on SC 

policies, programs, planning, implementation and execution by the DOD in support of 

U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. The course includes a 4-page printable Continuity Book which captures the main 

instructional points in each of six modules.

Security Cooperation Management 

Orientation Course (SCM-OC-OL)

SCM-OC-OL is an orientation course designed primarily for personnel who are new to 

the SC field, or who perform SC duties on a parttime basis. SCM-OC-OL is a SCWD Level 2 

course. It provides an overview of the full range 

of SC activities, to include legislation, policy, the 

foreign military sales (FMS) process, logistics, 

finance, training management, and international 

programs security requirements. SCM-OC-OL 

contains ten modules on topics in most functional areas of security assistance and SC management. It is available for U.S. and international 

government personnel and defense industry personnel. U.S. government employees are defined 

as U.S. civilians, military, Locally Employed 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 140

participating in international activities, including SC programs. This required training can 

be satisfied via this online course or via the 

three-day in-residence classroom equivalent 

IPSR course. Students must be a U.S. person 

as defined by the International Traffic in Arms 

Regulations (ITAR) Section 120.15. The IPSROL course also covers the principles, policies, 

and procedures that govern international technology transfer, export controls, and foreign 

disclosure. Specific lessons address processes 

for international program security, controlled 

unclassified information (CUI), foreign government information (FGI), the National Disclosure 

Policy (NDP), and the ITAR. This course covers the export approval and licensing process, as 

well as the role of the Defense Security Service 

(DSS). Other topics include visits and assignments of foreign nationals; the Committee on 

Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS); Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI); 

international transfers of classified information; 

Staff (LES) working in U.S. embassies around 

the world, and support contractor equivalents.

The course offers the advantage of immediate 

training beyond that of the SC-FAM-OL course 

for employees as soon as they are assigned to 

a SC position. SCM-OC-OL also serves as a 

prerequisite for DISAM’s resident SCM-C inresidence course and SCM-C-X onsite course.

International Programs Security 

Requirements Course (IPSR-OL)

IPSR-OL is a course which meets the DOD 

Directive 5230.20 requirement to train DOD 

employees involved in international programs 

on the security arrangements, laws, policies, 

and procedures that protect sensitive and classified U.S. technology and other information.

This requirement applies to all DOD employees who participate in international programs, 

including those responsible for negotiating, 

overseeing, managing, executing, or otherwise 

Figure 1: Screenshot from SCM-OC-OL online course
141 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

cases. Discussion of the FMS process and the 

relationship of the MTCR to the Arms Export 

Control Act (AECA) and ITAR provide the students with a framework for understanding the 

need for thorough reviews of items provided on 

Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). The 

course includes a basic missile overview to assist students in understanding general terminology, types of missiles, and components associated with controlled items on the MTCR Annex 

to the U.S. Munitions List. In addition, this 

course introduces students to the roles and responsibilities of the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense. U.S. government civilians, 

U.S. military, U.S. support contractor government employees, and U.S. industry personnel 

are eligible for this course. U.S. government 

and industry personnel should be programmed 

for or assigned to positions that require oversight of missile-related technologies. Personnel 

include those in program management offices, 

Program Security Instruction (PSI); and Multinational Industrial Security Working Group 

(MISWG) documents. IPSR-OL also serves as 

a prerequisite for DISAM’s resident SCM-C inresidence course and SCM-C-X onsite course.

Missile Technology Control Regime Course 

(MTCR-OL)

DISAM designed the instructor-facilitated 

MTCR-OL online course to train selected DOD 

personnel in recognizing and controlling the export of missiles, UAVs, and related technologies 

that have the potential for use in the delivery of 

weapons of mass destruction. The regime and 

supporting documentation assists in the implementation of national export controls to monitor, 

control, and deny exportation of these critical 

technologies. The MTCR-OL course provides 

familiarization with the MTCR basic guidelines and the relevant review process for FMS 

Figure 2: Screenshot from the LOA Interpretation Guide.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 142

as a reference and for professional development. Therefore, DISAM does not award certification for completing these learning guides.

Students can find more information 

on online courses and learning guides under the Online Learning tab on the DISAM 

homepage: http://www.disam.dsca.mil/

pages/courses/online/catalog/default.aspx.

______________________________________

About the Author

Lt Col Marc Ferguson is the Deputy Director of Online Learning and an instructor at 

DISAM. He has been at DISAM since August 

2013 and an active USAF officer since 1998. He 

has a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Tennessee, a Master of Science degree in Operations 

Research from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a Master of Military Operational 

Art and Science degree from Air Command and 

Staff College. Please contact him at marcus.

ferguson@us.af.milwith any specific questions.

key service acquisition personnel, the Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA), SA or SC personnel 

responsible for FMS cases, and U.S. contractors.

DISAM’s online courses require student 

registration. Students may apply for DISAM 

online courses by submitting an online registration form on DISAM’s website. Most courses 

are self-paced, meaning the student may register and start at any time. Students earn certification upon course completion. Defense 

Acquisition Workforce members may also 

obtain continuous learning points (CLPs).

DISAM Online Learning Guides

DISAM’s learning guides provide those 

working in Security Cooperation with “just-intime” training on specific topics to support them 

in performing their duties. DISAM learning 

guides act as a supplement to DISAM courses.

These guides cover Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) resources, the FMS process, logistics, 

acquisition, international training, the Security 

Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) as well 

as other miscellaneous topics. The following 

guides are currently available on the DISAM 

website: Acquisition, Annual Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Update, Army 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) for SCOs, Civilian 

Diplomatic Attire, Contracting for FMS, Direct 

Commercial Sales (DCS) and FMS Comparison, Ethics for SCOs, FMS Financial Management, FMS Process, International Military Student (IMS) Pre-departure Briefing, International 

Training Management, Intro to SC Management, 

International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 

101, Logistics, Letter of Offer and Acceptance 

(LOA) Interpretation Guide, Letter of Request 

(LOR) Writing Guide, Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) for 

FMS, Protocol, SCIP, SCIP Case Status Demo, 

SCO Personal Entitlements, SCO Responsibilities, and Visitor Management for SCOs.

All of these learning guides are available 

for the general public without requiring student registration. Learning guides serve only 
143 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

SCIP Improvements, Capabilities, 

and Training

By John O’Connor, Assistant Professor

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM)

The Security Cooperation Information Portal 

(SCIP) continues to be improved with new capabilities regularly added via planned systematic 

improvements that are managed by the SCIP Program Office with oversight by DSCA. With the 

frequent and numerous system updates, and the 

extensive array of SCIP capabilities, some common questions that current and future SCIP users 

may ask are listed below. This article is written to 

address and provide answers to those 3 questions.

1. “What are the future (or recent) improvements in SCIP?”

2. “What features and capabilities are there 

in SCIP should I be aware of and use?”

3. What SCIP training and help resources are available to SCIP users?

(1) What are the future (or recent) improvements in SCIP? 

When SCIP is updated, announcements are 

posted in the applicable SCIP Community to 

alert users. Some recent notable SCIP system 

improvements to communities that authorized 

United States Government (USG) and International Purchasers’ users can both access includes:

SCIP System Improvements: Upgrades to 

new Web Servers and new Collaboration servers 

has provided users with improved memory, load 

balancing, and redundancy on the SCIP system.

Case Information Community:

• A Term of Sale Adhoc report was added recently. This report allows users to query the 

Term of Sale, Term of Sale Name, and Term 

of Sale Value for each version of a case.

• Data refresh status portlet now displays 

a separate update date for Defense Integrated Financial System (DIFS) data

• Case Detail Report now displays the Actual 

Closure and Interim Closure Dates for cases

• Document Timeline now displays 

the Actual Closure and Interim Closure Dates for cases. This data is populated by data received from DIFS.

• A new report option, Export All to Excel, 

has been added to the report type dropdown to allow users to export all of the selected case report data directly to Excel.

• A new field, Status Date, has been added for users to quickly tell the status 

date for a specific version on a case.

• Active Requisitions Detail Report - An enhancement has been made in SCIP to now 

include applicable requisitions that have alpha line numbers. Previously some of these 

requisitions with alpha line numbers were 

inadvertently excluded from SCIP. These 

alpha line numbers will display as the 

converted numeric line number as established in DSAMS on requisitions in SCIP.

• Army Cancellation Remarks have 

been added for all CA Cancellations 

so the customer can be informed as to 

the reason for the CA Cancellation.

• The Longest Lead Time field the line associated with the longest lead time has 

been added as a hyperlink. Clicking on 
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 144

there are a significant number of SCIP capabilities. But, while SCIP capabilities, reports, and 

data are extensive, and continue to expand and 

improve (as already noted in this article), certain 

SCIP system capabilities and reports though are 

‘heads-and-shoulders’ above the rest. The following is a compilation of those significant SCIP 

capabilities that all SCIP users should be aware 

of and be proficient with if pertinent to their Security Cooperation management responsibilities:

Case Information Community:

•	 Case Information Adhoc Reports– Very 

powerful capability that permits users to 

develop/design their own report to answer 

their question(s) of interest at multiple levels including Case, Line, Active Requisition, 

SDR, Payment Schedule, Document Timeline, Delivery Set, Term of Sale. From my 

own experiences in the last 3 years, every 

time a USG or Foreign Purchaser user has 

asked me whether or not they can get their 

question(s) answered via SCIP, my typical 

response (if I didn’t know another way) has 

been that if possible, Adhoc will be the way 

to do it. When we subsequently tried Adhoc, 

we have always gotten the answers and reports that the user wanted. Additional powerful features of the Adhoc reports are the capabilities to export results to Excel and also 

save the Adhoc query so that the user can 

rerun it at some future date without having 

to redesign/develop the report once again.

•	 Real Time Metrics– Great example of SCIP 

of being able to quickly develop country/

region FMS ‘strategic view’ information/

graphics (Historic Implemented Cases, Documents, Cases / Documents by Current Status 

Code, Open Offers, Offer/Acceptance Comparison, AOD Past and Current Performance) 

and then just as quickly ‘drill-down’ as required to get detailed Case Reports of interest.

•	 Requisition Status - Providing users the 

capability to filter for specific requisition(s) 

of interest, export results to Excel file, and 

‘drill-down’ to view/use applicable Case 

Reports that was used to initiate the requithe line number will display the Case Line 

Detail Report associated with that line.

• Requisition Status report added providing users the capability to filter for specific requisition(s) of interest, export 

results to Excel file, and ‘drill-down’ 

to view/use applicable Case Reports 

that was used to initiate the requisition

• Capability to retrieve/display/save 

Real Time Metrics (e.g. cases, documents, AOD performance, etc.)

Navy Community:

• Significant improvements to the “Information Warehouse” (i.e. Adhoc report 

capability) user interface and options

• Addition of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) International Frigate Working Group linked page

• Parts and Repair Ordering System (PROS): 

Provides capabilities for authorized users 

to search and view details for PROS requisitions on Navy (“P”) managed FMS cases

• Link to Case Execution Performance 

Tool (CEPT) results for specific case 

that user is looking at via the Case Reconciliation Review (CRR) Report

Case Execution Community:

• Enhanced Freight Tracking System 

(EFTS) Training capabilities including: 

capabilities to develop reports and metrics with training data (i.e. Bandaria)

• Tutorials and details on Introduction to EFTS 

presentation, responsibilities for Freight 

Forwarder, Country User/Expeditor, Director / Case Manager, EFTS User Guide, etc.

(2) What features and capabilities in SCIP 

should I be aware of and use?

The initial thought of an experienced SCIP 

user upon hearing that question might be confusion on where to begin first in responding. One 

reason for the confusion is that the applicability 

of SCIP’s capabilities somewhat depends on the 

specific Security Cooperation management responsibilities of the user. Another reason is that 
145 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

•	 Case Reconciliation Review – View all 

case and line financial and logistics details (i.e. commitments, obligations, expenditures, deliveries, etc. by case and line

•	 Annual Case Review Sheets – View current and historical case reviews (including 

case manager comments) for any case of 

interest that the user is authorized to view

•	 Information Warehouse – Powerful Adhoc Capability with newly redesigned and improved user interface

•	 Supply Discrepancy Reports (SDRs) – 

View all details, comments, and timeline 

for any open or closed SDR on any case 

that the user is authorized to view. Provides 

significantly more information than is available in the Case Information Community

•	 Naval Sea Systems Command 

(NAVSEA) International Frigate Working Grouplinked page with 

a specific link for applicable countries

•	 Parts and Repair Ordering System 

(PROS):Provides capabilities for authorized 

users to search and view details for PROS requisitions on Navy (“P”) managed FMS cases

•	 Case Execution Community:

•	 Enhanced Freight Tracking System 

(EFTS)– Provides authorized users with 

numerous significant capabilities to develop shipping reports, metrics, and data

•	 Emall – Provides authorized users with 

capability to research Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and commercial 

source stocks to make better informed 

purchasing decisions (e.g. EMALL Supportability Analysis Stock Out Report)

•	 Asset Visibility - Provides authorized users 

with capability to research MILDEP stocks to 

make better informed purchasing decisions

•	 Web RoR – Department of the Navy 

capability that automates end-toend the repair of repairable process

•	 End Use Monitoring (EUM) Community: 

Provides authorized users for the capabilities and reports that they need to fulfill their 

EUM responsibilities for their FMS applisition. Another great example of SCIP of 

being able to quickly develop country/region FMS ‘strategic view’ information and 

then just as quickly ‘drill-down’ as required 

to get detailed Case Reports of interest.

•	 Information Extracts– Provides authorized 

users with the capability to extract all requisition data for a particular case within 24 hours 

of requesting with a limit of one case per day

•	 FMR Case Sheets – Provides users with 

the capability to dynamically develop their 

FMR Case Sheets of interest to either prepare for a Financial Management Review 

(FMR) or just to review high-level financial information for case(s) of interest

•	 Inputs – Provides authorized users with capability to electronically submit (at no additional cost to the user) requisitions (either 

single or via batch) and Supply Discrepancy 

Reports (SDRs along with attachments as 

required) to the applicable MILDEP ILCO

•	 Navy Community: Provides numerous and 

significant capabilities and reports to authorized users/managers for Department of the 

Navy (Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) 

Security Cooperation cases. The Navy 

Community provides much greater case 

and line financial transparency (i.e. commitments, obligations, expenditures, etc. by 

case and line) than is otherwise available 

via the Case Information Capability. Navy 

Community capabilities that authorized users should be aware of and using include:

•	 Case Execution Performance Tool 

(CEPT) – Incredible application that used 

pre-defined DoN business rules to determine and show (including stop light colors) whether or not a case is meeting overall, logistics, and financial requirements.

If a business rule has been violated, the 

rule is identified and color coded for applicable manager’s attention and resolution.

•	 Case Financial Summary – Quickly 

get financial details on any case of interest that user is authorized to view
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 146

(3) What SCIP training and help resources 

are available to SCIP users?

The USG Security Cooperation Information 

Portal (SCIP)is designed to be relatively ‘userfriendly’ and intuitive despite the significant number of communities, capabilities, and reports that 

are available to SCIP users. Examples of SCIP’s 

‘user-friendliness’ are the case reports hyperlinks 

that provide word/phrase definitions and meaning of codes, standard design and implementation of filter and report formats, info prompting 

via user ‘mouse’ hovering, etc. In addition to 

all those ‘user-friendly’ advantages, there are 

numerous other SCIP training and help resources that are available to SCIP users including:

SCIP Help Community: Provides user with 

capabilities to:

• Submit online help ticket for issues or recommended system improvements that is 

sent directly to the applicable SCIP subject matter expert for response and resolution while keeping user updated of progress from beginning to end of the process

• Online posting on SCIP of over 40 detailed 

user guides (see DISAM SCIP Handbook Appendix 2 for list) with examples and graphics 

provided to train, assist, and guide users of 

the SCIP Community capabilities and reports

DISAM Online Training:

• “DISAM Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) Practical Exercises and Handbook”

• Is posted on the DISAM web page 

and can be accessed via the “Publications” and the “SC Tools” web links.

• The current DISAM SCIP Handbook includes thirty-one (31) SCIP exercises including Process (Exercises #1 through #5), 

Logistics (Exercises #6 through #16), Financial (Exercises #17-26), and Miscellaneous 

Advanced (#27 through #31) exercises.

• All thirty-one (31) of the SCIP exercises in the handbook can be completed even without a SCIP account as 

cable munitions acquisitions per the LOA 

Standard Terms and Condition section 2.7.

•	 Security Cooperation Management Suite 

(SCMS) Community: SCMS resides within 

the SCIP and is a joint service, web-based 

capability that provides U.S. officials with a 

common operating picture of the SC process. 

SCMS has joint U.S. military and civilian 

users globally from all branches of the U.S. 

armed forces and associated support Commands, which increases joint communication resulting in enhanced decision making. 

SCMS provides USG personnel with key information used to track high priority FMS and 

Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, 

and is especially useful during the oversight 

process for expiring funds and those FMS 

cases that are funded via U.S. appropriated 

sources. SCMS allows data input and customization through its multiple reports showing 

information by appropriation and program 

which allows for intense information sharing among multiple program participants. 

Although initially conceived to support the 

war effort in Iraq, the utility of SCMS was 

recognized by additional communities within DSCA. SCMS has been expanded for use 

with all the Building Partner Capacity (BPC) 

programs, which proved to be of great benefit to U.S. decision makers when planning 

how to best build partner nation capacity.

•	 Partner Info Community: Provides 

numerous briefs, documents, and 

info to keep Spanish users informed 

on applicable Security Cooperation 

activities and responsibilities including:

• Foreign Procurement Group (FPG ) meetings

• International Customer User Group (ICUG) 

meetings

• Tri-Service meetings

• Contract Summits

• Visitor Info
147 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

• Training goals: 

• Familiarize students (with emphasis on areas especially applicable to their assignments)

• Highlight/emphasize to them why SCIP is 

an essential system tool for their success

• Minimal screen captures – Only 

background/ overview info

• Maximize online demos and student handson exercises

• Real world data for USG CONUS and 

OCONUS students 

• USG OCONUS SCO students use their 

own (obtained per DSCA Policy Memo 

11-58) SCIP accounts throughout course

• USG CONUS students use either their 

own SCIP accounts or DISAM Training 

tokens with their country of interest data

• International and LES students use training 

(Akadia, Bandaria, Zastavia) data or their own 

accounts with their country data if available

• EUM inventory data entry training for 

SCM-O and SCM-LO via training tokens

• Course details for all DISAM courses 

posted on DISAM Course Catalog. Following are list of DISAM courses that 

provide SCIP training with specifics on 

what type of SCIP training the students receive that attend each of the listed courses: 

•	 U.S. Government employee (USG) 

SCIP training in DISAM curriculum 

for in-resident and on-site students.

Training is conducted at basic, intermediate, or advanced level depending upon the 

course and the student’s SCIP knowledge:

• Security Cooperation Mngt CONUS 

Course (SCM-C) 

• 0.7 hour SCIP introduction, orientation and demonstration followed by 

1.3 hours of hands-on SCIP practical 

exercises in the SCIP Case Information, Case Execution, and SCMS 

Communities

there are case examples (using training 

country data) for each of the exercises.

• As stated on the Preface page of that SCIP 

Handbook, “A basic understanding of the 

Security Cooperation FMS process, logistics, and finance subjects is needed to 

comprehend, interpret the materials, and 

complete the exercises in the handbook.”

• DISAM has also posted “Introduction to 

Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)” PPT presentation that can be 

downloaded and used. It can be accessed 

via the DISAM “Presentations” web link.

• DISAM has developed an online SCIP 

training module that is included in the just 

released operational SCM-OC-OL, Security Cooperation Management Orientation 

Course(MASL IIN D178258), which users 

can register for and take online. That module 

per the course objectives is intended as an 

introductory orientation to SCIP including 

high level insights into its capabilities, limitations, data sources, account registration, etc.

• DISAM is also developing additional online training modules / ‘vignettes’ for SCIP 

that will focus on many of the typical user 

SCIP questions (e.g. how to logon, navigate between SCIP communities and capabilities, develop reports, metrics, etc.).

DISAM expects to begin posting those 

(and more) online ‘vignettes’ on the DISAM web page during the upcoming year.

DISAM SCIP Training in curriculum conducted in-residence at DISAM, online, and at 

onsite locations:

• 20 Block of Instruction (BOI) in DISAM 

curriculum – Supports DISAM ‘Functionals’ (i.e. Process, Finance, Logistics, SCO 

Ops, etc. curriculum focus areas) and Course 

Managers in support of DISAM Mission.

Following are some overview highlights 

of DISAM’s SCIP training curriculum:

• Significant growth (150% increase) in the last two years

• Continually updated to incorporate SCIP enhancements and changes
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 148

• SCIP usage highlighted throughout course in process, finance, and 

logistics

• Security Cooperation Management Financial Management Course (SCM-CF) 

§	 0.7 hour discussion and demonstration of Financial automation tools 

followed by 1.8 hours of SCIP financial practical exercises at the basic 

or intermediate/advanced level (depending upon the student proficiency) in the SCIP Case Information and 

the Security Cooperation Management Suite (SCMS) Communities.

§	 Security Cooperation Management 

Logistics Support Course (SCM-CS) 

§	 0.5 hour SCIP logistics discussion 

and demonstration followed by 1.5 

hours of hands-on SCIP logistics 

practical exercises at the basic or 

intermediate/advanced level (depending upon the student proficiency) in the SCIP Case Information 

and Case Execution Communities.

§	 Security Cooperation Management Program and Case Management Course (SCM-CM) 

§	 0.5 hour SCIP Case Management discussion and demonstration followed 

by 2.0 hours of hands-on SCIP case 

management practical exercises at the 

basic or intermediate/advanced level 

(depending upon the student proficiency) in the SCIP Case Information, 

Case Execution, and Security Cooperation Management Communities.

§	 Security Cooperation Management USG Executive and U.S. Defense Industry Course (SCM-E) 

§	 1.5 hours USG only SCIP Executive level demonstration and discussion that includes an optional 0.5 

hour hands-on practical exercises.

§	 Security Cooperation Management Orientation Course (SCM-OC) 

§	 0.8 hour introduction, overview, demonstration, and discussion of SCIP capabilities presented either in-class or 

via online presentation depending upon 

the class the student is registered in.

§	 Security Cooperation Management 

Action Officer Course (SCM-AO) 

§	 0.5 hour introduction, overview, 

demonstration, and discussion of 

SCIP capabilities from USG Action Officer (AO) perspective.

§	 Security Cooperation Management Locally Employed Staff (LE 

Staff) Orientation Course (SCM-LO) 

§	 0.8 hour SCIP introduction, orientation and demonstration

§	 SCIP usage highlighted throughout 

course in process, finance, and logistics

§	 4.0 hours of hands-on SCIP case 

management practical exercises in 

the SCIP Case Information, Case 

Execution, End Use Monitoring 

(EUM), and Security Cooperation 

Management (SCMS) Communities.

§	 Security Cooperation Management Overseas Course (SCM-O) 

§	 0.7 hour introduction, overview, demonstration, and discussion of SCIP capabilities

§	 5.0 hours of hands-on SCIP case 

management practical exercises in 

the SCIP Case Information, Case 

Execution, End Use Monitoring 

(EUM), and Security Cooperation 

Management (SCMS) Communities.

§	 2.0 hours of additional hand-on 

SCIP logistics focused practical exercises for those students in the Advanced Logistics training ‘track’.

§	 USG OCONUS SCO students are registered for (in accordance with DSCA 

Policy Memo 11-58) and use their 

own SCIP accounts throughout course

§	 International Purchaser SCIP training in DISAM curriculum for in-resident International Purchaser students:
149 The DISAM Annual, December 2014

§	 Security Cooperation Management International Purchaser Orientation Course 

(SCM-IO), TMASL IIN D178088, 8 Days 

§	 1 hour SCIP introduction, orientation and demonstration

§	 SCIP usage highlighted throughout 

course in process, finance, and logistics

§	 Security Cooperation Management International Purchaser Advanced Financial and Logistics Courses (SCMIF / IL), TMASL IIN D178266/ 

TMASL IIN D178267, 4 Days 

§	 5 hours of hands-on SCIP Practical Exercises in Finance or 

Logistics depending upon student’s selected training ‘track’

§	 DISAM training in-country. Four standard 

METs are available to the international 

purchaser via DISAM Mobile Education 

Teams (METs), TMASL IIN D305024, 

E-IMET TMASL IIN D305013): 

§	 International Purchasers Orientation 

Course (SCM-IO) - 5 Days

§	 International Purchasers Course with 

Concurrent Tracks (SCM-IO/IL/IF/

IT) - 8 Days

§	 International Purchasers Course 

(SCM-I) - 10 Days

§	 International Purchasers Executive 

Course (SCM-IE) - 3 Days

___________________________________

About the Author

John O’Connor is an Assistant Professor at 

the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM - http://www.disam.dsca.mil/) 

where he has been teaching (Process, Finance, 

Logistics, Acquisition, Tech Transfer/Exports, 

Navy Seminars, SCO Operations, Legislation, 

SCIP, Training, etc.) since 2010. He is also the 

DISAM SCIP project lead responsible for developing, maintaining, and integrating SCIP lessons 

in the DISAM curriculum. Prior to working at 

DISAM, he was a U.S. Naval Aviator for twentysix years, and a systems and financial analyst in 

industry (supporting DOD and Homeland Security) for four years. He has a Bachelor of Science 

Degree (U.S. Naval Academy with honors) in 

Engineering / Resource Management, Master of 

Science degree (Naval Postgraduate School with 

honors) in Computer / Information Systems, is 

certified by DSCA as Level III in International 

Affairs, is a DOD Acquisition Workforce member that has been certified by DOD as a Level III 

Program Management Acquisition professional, 

and served as a Country Program Director (CPD 

at Navy International Programs Office (Navy 

IPO). (http://www.nipo.navy.mil/). He can be 

contacted at John.OConnor@disam.dsca.mil.
The DISAM Annual, December 2014 150
The DISAM Annual Annual Vol. 3

"...As a start, the country must know that the men and women 

who serve have the soul of the servant that the only entitlement 

we feel is that we are entitled to serve the nation. Fortunately, 

very fortunately, most of you, most of your peers and most of 

those out there every day serving, signed up and understand 

just that...So I end where I began, all of us must reinforce the 

reasons that our nations put their trust in us and we must 

demonstrate the same tenacity, resilience and creativity that our 

people bring to the fight, those on the forward edge and then 

come back to lead at home."

Excerpt from Gen. Dempsey's Remarks

at the National Defense University