United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 7, 2018*

Decided December 13, 2018

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

Nos. 18‐1382 & 18‐1852

ROY A. MITCHELL, JR.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

DAVID MAHONEY, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 16‐cv‐352‐wmc

William M. Conley,

Judge.

O R D E R

Roy Mitchell, Jr.,1 sued various Dane County officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that the conditions of her pretrial detention at the county jail violated her

due‐process rights. The district judge entered summary judgment for the officials in a

thorough, well‐reasoned order. The judge concluded that Mitchell had not presented

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the defendants had

actual knowledge of any hazard to her health or that the jail’s conditions in fact harmed

her. The officials filed a bill of costs, and, over Mitchell’s objection, the court taxed costs

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

1 The appellant, a transgender woman, uses her legal name and feminine pronouns in

this proceeding, so we do, too.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
Nos. 18‐1382 & 18‐1852    Page 2

in their favor. Mitchell separately appealed the two rulings, and we consolidated the

appeals for disposition.

In her summary judgment appeal, Mitchell’s brief is incomprehensible. We

liberally construe pro se filings, but to decide an appeal, we must be able to ascertain a

party’s argument and the basis for it. Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir.

2001). That is why even pro se plaintiffs must comply with Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 28, which requires a section of the brief containing “appellant’s contentions

and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on

which the appellant relies.” FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); accord Anderson, 241 F.3d at 545.

Even liberally construing Mitchell’s brief, we cannot discern a sufficient argument that

the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, we dismiss the

appeal. See Anderson, 241 F.3d at 545.

Mitchell also filed a second brief arguing that, because she is indigent, the district

court erred when it granted costs to the officials. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54

creates a strong presumption that a court will award costs to the prevailing party, and

our deference to the district court’s awarding of costs is “virtually complete.” Manley

v. City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir. 2001). Although an exception to the

presumption exists if the nonmoving party is indigent, the burden was on Mitchell to

prove her inability to pay. Corder v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 162 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1998).

Mitchell did not submit evidence of her inability to pay costs, and therefore she did not

meet her burden.   

Appeal No. 18‐1382 is DISMISSED, and in appeal No. 18‐1852, we AFFIRM.