AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed June 7, 2019.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-18-00170-CR

No. 05-18-00171-CR

JASON DANIEL STRICKLAND, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F15-76631-V

Trial Court Cause No. F16-00834-V

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Brown, and Nowell

Opinion by Justice Brown

Appellant Jason Daniel Strickland appeals his convictions for one count of trafficking a 

child1 and one count of sexual assault of a child.2 In three issues, appellant contends (1) article 

38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure violates his right to due process, (2) the trial court 

abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior convictions, and (3) the evidence is 

insufficient to support his conviction for trafficking a child. For the following reasons, we affirm 

the trial court’s judgments. 

 

1

 Trial court cause number F15-76631-V; appellate cause number 05-18-00170-CR.

2

 Trial court cause number F16-00834-V; appellate cause number 05-18-00171-CR.
–2–

BACKGROUND

Appellant entered pleas of not guilty to indictments charging him with one count of 

trafficking a child and one count of sexual assault of a child. Before trial, the State filed a notice 

of intent to use evidence of appellant’s previous convictions on five counts of rape pursuant to 

article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

38.37, § 2(b). At a pretrial hearing, appellant objected to the evidence as irrelevant and overly 

prejudicial. He also challenged the constitutionality of article 38.37. The trial court overruled 

appellant’s objections. 

At trial, complaining witness V.P. testified she was fifteen-years-old and living with her 

parents in Allen, Texas during the summer of 2015. She was not doing much other than some 

babysitting and spent time communicating with people over the internet on her IPod Touch or an 

old IPhone. Her parents did not know she had downloaded a number of applications, some of 

which she was supposed to be eighteen to use. And, V.P. had been doing “things online that [she] 

was not proud of,” including sending some nude pictures of herself. A recipient of the pictures 

threatened to tell V.P.’s sister, and V.P. was terrified and felt trapped. She determined she needed 

to get away, and began contacting people over social media to ask if she could stay with them. 

V.P. first communicated with appellant, who was in his early thirties at the time, in an 

online chat forum. She told him her parents were really strict and she wanted to get away. After 

she asked if he could “help [her] out,” appellant suggested they could have a relationship if she 

came to live with him. He talked about sex “pretty much all the time” and requested pictures, 

including a picture of V.P.’s “private area” and another of her holding a sign saying that she 

belonged to appellant. When appellant asked about doing sexual things, V.P. said “Sure. maybe” 

because she had learned from talking to guys on social media “for a couple months” that he would 

be more motivated to let her live with him. 
–3–

V.P. testified she told appellant she was fifteen-years-old. On cross-examination,

appellant’s counsel asked if she recalled telling appellant she was twenty-two. V.P. testified that 

she did not recall that, but then responded “I guess not” when appellant’s counsel asked if she 

“explicitly told him [she was] 15.” V.P. acknowledged telling guys on the internet that she was 

older than fifteen, but she would have been surprised if appellant thought she was twenty-two 

because she did not look twenty-two in the pictures she sent him. Additionally, they had discussed 

that their plan could be “dangerous” for them because she was underage.

Twice, V.P. and appellant planned for appellant, who lived in Alabama, to pick her up, but 

he was unable to come. He then asked if she could travel to him by bus. V.P. found a ride from 

her house to the bus station when a seventeen-year-old boy she met on a messaging app told her 

his father would pick her up, take her to a motel where they would wait overnight, and then take

her to the bus station in the morning. Appellant did not help V.P. arrange the ride, but told her 

beforehand that she was “probably going to have to do something . . ., like sexual favors, because, 

you know, people don’t just do things for free.” After V.P. told appellant she had arranged the 

ride, he said, “yeah, he’s going to want to have sex with you and you should do it – you need to

do it.” V.P. told appellant she was “not ready for that,” but appellant told her to call him when she 

was at the motel.

Cuauhtemoc Munoz, a man in his mid-forties, picked V.P. up at her house. He admitted

there was no seventeen-year-old boy and he had been communicating with V.P. He took V.P. to 

a motel, where he removed her clothes and they “had sex.” V.P. called appellant, as he had 

requested, on Munoz’s telephone. Appellant asked her to touch and suck Munoz’s penis. Munoz

and V.P. then had vaginal and oral sex while appellant remained on speaker phone. Later, Munoz 

“started having sex” with V.P. again in the shower; she told him to stop “over and over,” but he 

did not.
–4–

At appellant’s suggestion, Munoz got V.P. a TracFone before dropping her off at the bus 

station. She and appellant spoke while she waited for the bus, and he told her she might want to 

wear some makeup to look a little older. Appellant then called V.P. while she was on the bus 

because her father had called him.3 Appellant was very upset and told her not to come see him or 

mention him to her parents. V.P.’s parents picked her up in Birmingham, Alabama. V.P. testified 

appellant was the only reason she got on a bus to go to Alabama and arranged with Munoz for a 

ride to the bus station. 

The State introduced evidence of telephone company records that tracked text messages 

and calls to and from V.P.’s, appellant’s, and Munoz’s phones. There were “a lot of” text 

messages between V.P. and appellant the day before she left home. Then, at 12:38 a.m., there 

was an outgoing text from appellant’s phone to Munoz’s phone, followed by six texts back and 

forth that ended at 12:47 a.m. Cell tower mapping data showed Munoz entered Allen shortly 

thereafter, at approximately 12:53 a.m. And, around 3:16 a.m., there was a long telephone call, 

lasting just under an hour, from Munoz’s phone to appellant. 

Munoz also testified at trial. For his conduct, Munoz had pleaded guilty to charges of 

sexual assault and trafficking a person. He initially testified that he first spoke with appellant after 

he and V.P. had sex, but later corrected his testimony to reflect that he spoke beforehand with 

appellant, who wanted Munoz to “have sex with her.” Afterward, appellant and Munoz spoke, 

and appellant asked “questions as far as how was she and stuff like that.” Munoz admitted he had 

fabricated “stories” to the police detective because he was nervous and had a natural inclination to 

lie. However, he consistently told the detective that appellant called and wanted to hear the 

intercourse.

 

3

 After he discovered she was missing, V.P.’s father found a list of phone numbers she left in her bedroom. He called the numbers, one of 

which was appellant’s. 
–5–

The State introduced evidence of appellant’s prior convictions for rape offenses committed 

in Oklahoma when he was approximately twenty years old. The evidence consisted of a 2006 

judgment and sentence showing appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of rape, a district attorney 

narrative report showing the complainants in those cases were females between the ages of thirteen 

and fifteen, and appellant’s sex offender registration records. 

Following trial, the jury found appellant guilty of both offenses as charged in the 

indictments. The trial court sentenced appellant to confinement for life in each case with the 

sentences to run concurrently.

ARTICLE 38.37

Generally, evidence of an extraneous offense is inadmissible if offered to prove a person’s 

character to show the person acted in conformity with that character. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). 

Notwithstanding rule 404(b), evidence that a defendant on trial for certain sex offenses against a 

child committed a separate sex offense against another child may be admissible under section 2(b) 

of code of criminal procedure article 38.37.4 See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2(b). The evidence is 

admissible for any relevant purpose, including as proof of the defendant’s character and propensity 

to act in conformity with his character. Id. 

In his first issue, appellant asserts article 38.37 violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 

process guarantees by “revers[ing] the historic practice of excluding character propensity 

evidence.”5 An appellant bears the burden of demonstrating a statute is unconstitutional. See 

 

4

 Specifically, section 2(b) provides:

Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Teas Rules of Evidence, and subject to Section 2-a, evidence that the defendant has 

committed a separate offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) may be admitted in the trial of an alleged offense described 

by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant and 

acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.

CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2(b). Both trafficking of a child and sexual assault of a child, as charged in these cases, are included in the offenses 

described in subsection (a)(1). See id. § 2(a)(1)(A), (D).

5

 In addition to section 2(b), appellant cites section 2-a (requiring trial court to conduct hearing outside jury’s presence to determine whether 

the evidence will be adequate to support a jury finding the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt) and section 3 

(requiring State to give defendant thirty days’ notice before trial of its intent to use extraneous-sexual offense or sexual-misconduct evidence in its 

case in chief) as “relat[ing] to” his constitutional challenge. Appellant, however, only generally complains about the “use of propensity evidence.”
–6–

Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The court of criminal appeals has 

yet to address the constitutionality of article 38.37, section 2, but this Court and other courts of 

appeals have upheld its constitutionality under similar, if not identical, due process 

challenges. See, e.g., Mayes v. State, No. 05-16-00490-CR, 2017 WL 2255588, at *18–19 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas May 23, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Fronek v. State, 

No. 05–14–01118–CR, 2016 WL 3144243, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 6, 2016, pet. ref’d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication); Buxton v. State, 526 S.W.3d 666, 685–89 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d); Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 209–13 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2016, pet. ref’d); Bezerra v. State, 485 S.W.3d 133, 139–140 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, 

pet. ref’d); Belcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 840, 843–47 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.); Harris v. 

State, 475 S.W.3d 395, 398–403 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). Because 

appellant does not distinguish his case from this prior authority or raise any new argument, we 

conclude he has not satisfied his burden to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of article 38.37. 

We overrule his first issue.

RULE 403

In his second issue, appellant contends that, notwithstanding article 38.37’s applicability, 

the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions for rape under Texas Rule of 

Evidence 403. TEX. R. EVID. 403. Appellant complains the evidence was not probative because

it was unnecessary and the underlying offenses involved different conduct and were too remote in 

time. He also contends the evidence was inherently inflammatory, likely to distract given its 

“emotional content,” and likely to cause unfair prejudice because the previous offenses were “more 

heinous.” 

Admission of evidence under article 38.37 is limited by rule 403’s balancing test, which 

authorizes a trial court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
–7–

outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, mistaking the jury, undue 

delay, or needlessly cumulative evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 403; Belcher, 474 S.W.3d at 847; 

Fahrni v. State, 473 S.W.3d 486, 492 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d); Robisheaux, 433 

S.W.3d at 217–18. Probative value is the measure of how strongly the evidence serves to make 

more or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the litigation, coupled with the 

proponent’s need for the evidence. Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2006). Unfair prejudice refers to a tendency to tempt the jury into finding guilt on an improper 

basis, such as an emotional one. Id. Confusion of the issues refers to “a tendency to confuse or 

distract the jury from the main issue in the case.” Id. 

A rule 403 analysis requires balancing the following factors:

(1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with (2)

the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to

suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse

or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be

given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative

force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will

consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.

Id. at 641–42. In practice, “these factors may well blend together.” Id. at 642. We presume the 

probative value of relevant evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice from 

admitting the evidence. Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Because

the trial court is in the best position to assess the impact of relevant evidence, we reverse a rule 

403 determination “rarely and only after a clear abuse of discretion.” Id.

The State introduced evidence that appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of raping female 

complainants between the ages of thirteen and fifteen. The offenses took place in 2002 and 2003, 

one when appellant was nineteen-years-old and four when appellant was twenty-years-old. The 

State introduced the evidence following the testimony of V.P. and Munoz, which the State relied 

upon to prove the elements of the trafficking of a child and sexual assault of a child offenses. 
–8–

During cross-examination, appellant challenged the credibility of both the witnesses, focusing on 

evidence that V.P. misrepresented her age to people on social media and Munoz’s admission that 

he fabricated stories to the police. Appellant also attempted to develop testimony to show V.P. 

was “kind of the puppet master” to support his defense that he neither trafficked V.P. nor caused 

or contributed to her sexual assault. He argued V.P. contacted a number of people in her efforts 

to run away and ultimately made the arrangements, including getting a ride from Munoz, to leave 

town. Under these circumstances, the probative value of evidence showing appellant was sexually

attracted to and had raped young, underage females the same age as V.P. was significant to counter 

the attacks on V.P.’s and Munoz’s credibility and rebut appellant’s defensive theory that he was 

simply a victim of V.P.’s plans. 

We are not persuaded by appellant’s argument that evidence of the convictions had no 

probative value because the underlying facts of the prior offenses are not sufficiently similar to the 

conduct at issue in these cases. Although appellant did not physically assault V.P., the evidence 

that he was sexually attracted to and assaulted a number of young females V.P.’s age in the past 

was probative of the facts that he groomed V.P. for “sexual favors,” enticed her to come live with 

him in Alabama, and even directed her to perform sex acts with Munoz while he listened on the 

phone. Nor does the fact that the previous offenses took place twelve years earlier mean the 

evidence is not probative. Remoteness of an extraneous offense reduces the probative value of the 

evidence, but it is not sufficient alone to render an extraneous offense excluded under rule 403; 

instead, it is one aspect of whether the offense is probative. See Gaytan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 218, 

226 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d); see Newton v. State, 301 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2009, pet. ref’d). Here, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the inherent 

probative force of the evidence of appellant’s prior convictions, coupled with the State’s need for 

the evidence, was considerable and weighed in favor of admissibility. 
–9–

Clearly, the prior convictions had “a tendency to suggest a verdict on an improper basis 

because of the inherently inflammatory and prejudicial nature of crimes of a sexual nature 

committed against children.” See, e.g., Newton v. State, 301 S.W.3d at 320. However, the 

evidence, consisting of three documents in two exhibits, was straightforward and very limited in 

scope. The State simply published the exhibits to the jury; there was no testimony regarding the 

underlying offenses. Further, the trial court admonished the jury that it could consider the evidence 

only if it found and believed beyond a reasonable doubt appellant committed the wrongful acts

and, if so, only for proper purposes under article 37.38. The trial court included a similar 

instruction in the jury charge. We presume the jury obeyed these instructions. Thrift v. State, 176 

S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). An appellant may rebut this presumption with evidence 

the jury failed to follow the instruction, see id., but appellant identified no such evidence. 

Therefore, the trial court could have reasonably concluded admitting evidence of the prior 

convictions would not have a tendency to be given undue weight by the jury, suggest a decision 

on an improper basis, or confuse or distract the jury from the main issues. 

Appellant nevertheless claims the evidence had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict because it was introduced on direct examination and 

was “the focus” of the State’s opening statement and closing argument. We disagree. During 

opening statements, the State advised the jury it would learn appellant was a registered sex offender 

with rape charges out of Oklahoma for sex with a minor. During guilt-innocence, the exhibits 

were admitted and referred to over approximately ten pages of a two-volume reporter’s record; 

almost two of those pages consisted of the trial court admonishing the jury. After the State 

published the exhibits, it referred only to the sex offender registration records briefly during the 

testimony of Dallas police detective Eric Weast, who was able to identify and locate appellant after 

subpoenaing the records. Finally, during closing argument, the State reminded the jury that 
–10–

appellant “got fifteen years for raping five different girls,” but only after appellant’s counsel argued 

detective Weast was “more interested” in appellant than Munoz because appellant was “a 

registered sex offender who might have committed a new offense.” After reviewing the record, 

we conclude there was little or no likelihood the evidence was either repetitive or consumed an

inordinate amount of time. 

Having considered the relevant factors,6 we conclude the trial court reasonably could have 

determined the prejudicial effect of the convictions did not substantially outweigh its probative 

value. Indeed, in cases like these, the probative value of extraneous offense evidence is 

presumptively very high, and the rule 403 balancing test normally will not favor excluding 

evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual assaults of children. See, e.g., Belcher, 474 S.W.3d at 848. 

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s 

objection to the evidence. We overrule appellant’s second issue.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his third issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to show he “trafficked” a 

child or compelled sexual assault as required to support his sex trafficking conviction. Instead, he

maintains V.P. “set this entire incident in motion . . . [and] created the plan and she orchestrated 

the actions of everyone involved.” Thus, according to appellant, there is no evidence that, but for 

his actions, “what happened . . . would not have happened.” 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all evidence in the light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdict and determine whether any rational juror could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

 

6

 Appellant concludes his rule 403 argument by noting “it is difficult to imagine how a juror could have considered the inflammatory, 

prejudicial evidence only for non-character purposes.” However, the evidence was admitted under article 38.37, which explicitly allows a jury to 

consider evidence that appellant committed other acts of sexual misconduct precisely because of its relevance to a propensity to commit the crime 

charged. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, §2(b). 
–11–

318–19 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). We defer to the 

jury, which must weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the testimony, and draw reasonable 

inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. 

We presume the jury resolved any conflicts in favor of the verdict. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. 

We determine only whether the State presented a legally sufficient case of the offense and the 

evidence presented supports the jury’s verdict. Id. 

To establish sex trafficking of a child, the State was required to prove appellant knowingly

“trafficked a child and by any means causes the trafficked child to engage in, or become the victim 

of” a sexual assault. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 20A.02(a)(7)(C). ‘Traffic’ means to “transport, 

entice, recruit, harbor, provide, or otherwise obtain another person by any means.” Id. § 

20A.01(4). A “[c]hild” is defined as “a person younger than 18 years of age.” Id. § 20A.01(1).

“A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his 

conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause 

was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.” PEN.

§ 6.04(a); Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Wooten v. State, 267 

S.W.3d 289, 296 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). Whether there is a sufficient 

causal nexus between a defendant’s conduct and the charged harm is a fact issue for the jury to 

decide. Id. The State may use circumstantial evidence to establish the causal connection. Id. 

And, a jury may draw reasonable inferences regarding the ultimate facts from basic facts. Id. 

In asserting his conduct did not cause the harm V.P. suffered, appellant cites evidence that 

V.P. (1) sought to run away before she ever communicated with appellant, (2) admitted she 

misrepresented her age to people on social media; (3) arranged for a ride to the bus station on her 

own; and (4) “agreed to have sex with [Munoz] on her own.” Appellant also points to evidence 

that he and Munoz did not communicate until after Munoz had already assaulted V.P. 
–12–

Appellant simply ignores his own conduct. V.P. testified that, but for appellant’s promises 

that she could live with him, she would have never left home. Although V.P. first contacted 

appellant and asked if he could “help [her] out,” he then fostered a relationship with her in which 

he talked about “sexual favors” “pretty much all the time,” had V.P. send him provocative pictures 

of herself, and told her he wanted to be her boyfriend. He twice planned to pick her up himself 

and, when that did not transpire, he proposed she travel to him by bus. Before she even made 

arrangements to get to the bus station, appellant advised her that she would probably have to have 

sex because “people don’t just do things for free.” And, after she arranged for the ride, appellant 

said, “Well, this man is doing you a big, like, a huge favor, and he’s going to expect [sex]. So 

you’re going to do it for him.” Appellant told V.P. to call him once she arrived at the motel and, 

when she did, directed her to perform sex acts and listened on the telephone while Munoz sexually 

assaulted her. Afterwards, appellant spoke to Munoz about “how [she was] and stuff like that.” 

Although Munoz testified he did not know or speak to appellant prior to taking V.P. to the motel, 

there was evidence the two men texted back and forth that evening before he arrived at V.P.’s 

house. 

The jury was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, the weight to be given their 

testimony, and, in this case, whether there was a sufficient causal nexus between appellant’s 

conduct and the harm to V.P. See Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622; Wooten, 267 S.W.3d at 295–96. 

The evidence is clear that V.P. considered running away and contacted a number of people, 

including appellant, about staying with them. However, she never left home, encountered Munoz, 

or had sex with him as directed by appellant until after she and appellant planned, at appellant’s 

suggestion, that she get on a bus to Alabama. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s 

verdict, a rational factfinder could have found (1) V.P.’s conduct was insufficient by itself to 

produce the harm that resulted and (2) appellant enticed V.P. and his conduct alone or concurrently 
–13–

with V.P.’s conduct was sufficient to cause her to “engage in, or become the victim of” sexual 

assault. See PEN. §§ 6.04(a); 20A.02(a)(7)(C). Accordingly, we conclude the evidence is legally 

sufficient to show appellant trafficked V.P. and compelled sexual assault as required to support his 

trafficking of a child conviction. We overrule appellant’s third issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/Ada Brown/

ADA BROWN

JUSTICE

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

180170F.U05

 
–14–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

JASON DANIEL STRICKLAND, 

Appellant

No. 05-18-00170-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F15-76631-V.

Opinion delivered by Justice Brown; 

Justices Bridges and Nowell participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 7th day of June, 2019.
–15–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

JASON DANIEL STRICKLAND, 

Appellant

No. 05-18-00171-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F16-00834-V.

Opinion delivered by Justice Brown; 

Justices Bridges and Nowell participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 7th day of June, 2019.