SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4512-17T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

LUIS A. PADILLA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted October 29, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 11-05-

0839. 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Suzannah Brown, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Christopher L.C. Kuberiet, Acting Middlesex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Patrick F. 

Galdieri, II, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 27, 2020
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Defendant Luis A. Padilla appeals from an order denying his postconviction relief (PCR) petition without an evidentiary hearing. Having 

reviewed the record in light of the applicable law, we affirm. The PCR court 

correctly determined defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of 

ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.

I.

We set forth the facts supporting defendant's convictions in our decision 

on his direct appeal, State v. Padilla, No. A-5557-12 (App. Div. Mar. 28, 2016) 

(slip op. at 25), and recount the pertinent facts here. A grand jury charged 

defendant in an indictment with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or

(2); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and 

second-degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-4(a).

The trial evidence showed the victim, Kevin Meisnest, lived in a second 

floor apartment on the property of his employer, Car Guys Auto Repair (Car 

Guys). When Meisnest did not appear for work on November 24, 2010, the 

owner of Car Guys called the Edison Police Department and requested a welfare 

check. Two officers responded to Meisnest's apartment and found him lying on 

the kitchen floor in a pool of blood. He was pronounced dead at the scene.
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Meisnest died of multiple gunshot wounds to his head, chest, and back. 

The police investigation did not reveal any signs of forced entry into Meisnest's 

apartment. The police recovered a spent bullet that fell from Meisnest's head; a 

spent projectile under his body; and a live .357 magnum bullet on a table. No 

useful fingerprints were obtained.

The police recovered audio and video recordings from surveillance 

cameras located on the Car Guys' property and video recordings of the property 

from a neighboring business's surveillance cameras. The recordings captured 

the Car Guys' parking lot and the entrance to Meisnest's apartment.

Defendant and Meisnest were friends. Car Guys' owner knew defendant, 

had socialized with him at Meisnest's and defendant's homes, and was familiar 

with the Ford pickup truck defendant drove. The owner reviewed the 

surveillance recordings from the evening of Meisnest's murder and observed 

defendant's pickup truck going in and out of the Car Guys' parking lot.

The video recordings further showed that at 11:00 p.m. on the evening of 

the murder, Meisnest and another individual left his apartment and got into his 

flatbed truck. As they backed out, the driver exited the vehicle and engaged in 

a brief conversation with someone in a pickup truck. Both vehicles then left the 
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Car Guys' property. Nine minutes later, the pickup truck returned and the driver 

entered the doorway to Meisnest's apartment.

The flatbed truck returned six minutes later, and Meisnest exited the 

vehicle, slammed the door, saying "motherfucker" and "fuck." It also appears 

he punched or kicked his truck and said, "Lou, fuck you, what the fuck." 

Meisnest then entered the building in which his apartment was located, after 

which someone is heard saying, "Lou." Five gunshots are heard, and within 

minutes, the pickup truck left the parking lot. Testimony during trial described 

the unique physical similarities between the pickup truck shown on the 

recordings and defendant's vehicle.

Defendant's employer testified defendant did not appear for work on the 

day following Meisnest's murder. The employer called defendant, but he did 

not answer. The employer later spoke with defendant's aunt, Aida Padilla, who 

reported defendant was at her Brooklyn, New York apartment.

Defendant's girlfriend, with whom he lived, testified he left their home the 

evening of Meisnest's murder, but he never returned. She awoke at 4:00 a.m.

and called him, but he did not answer. She continued calling him later in the 

morning and did not receive a response. She later learned defendant was at Aida 

Padilla's apartment.
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The police determined defendant's cellphone was located in Brooklyn and 

that his aunt lived there. The police went to Aida Padilla's apartment. She 

initially advised the police defendant was not present. Her home healthcare 

aide, however, told the police defendant was in one of the bedrooms. Defendant 

was taken into custody.

Defendant agreed to give a statement to the investigators at a Brooklyn 

police station. He showed the police the location of his pickup truck and 

consented to a search of his belongings and the truck. Nothing of evidential 

value was recovered.

During his lengthy statement to the police, defendant indicated he had 

been at Meisnest's apartment "no later" than 8:30 p.m. the previous evening. 

The officers advised defendant that video recordings showed him at Meisnest's 

apartment at a later time, and defendant said he returned to the property about 

10:00 or 10:30 p.m. to smoke marijuana with Meisnest. He said he changed his 

version of the events because he was reluctant to admit smoking marijuana.

During his statement, defendant repeatedly and consistently denied killing 

Meisnest. He told the police that in the video, he and Meisnest spoke about 

smoking marijuana, he then left for a short period of time to do something else, 

and, when he returned, he waited in the hallway for Meisnest because Meisnest
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had not yet arrived. Defendant said that after Meisnest returned, they spoke and 

smoked marijuana. Defendant said he then left. The evidence showed Meisnest

called defendant's phone seven times between 10:06 and 11:23 p.m. on the night 

Meisnest was murdered.

Aida Padilla testified at trial that a young man came to her door at 1:30 

a.m. on the morning following the murder with defendant's truck keys in his 

hand. She said she demanded the keys, the man relinquished them, and he said 

the truck could be driven without the keys. She said she never told defendant 

about the man or reported the incident to the police during her initial statement 

to them.

Aida Padilla also testified she never gave defendant a gun. She also 

denied ever having a .38 Colt revolver that had been owned by a relative, but 

she later admitted having the gun briefly in 1984 or 1985. She said the gun was 

later stolen. Defendant's father testified the police searched his home, and he 

gave them a bag of bullets. He first explained that some of the bullets were 

missing, but later testified only one bullet was missing – the one taken and tested 

by the State's ballistic expert.

The State's ballistic expert testified all the bullets recovered from 

defendant's father could be fired from a .38 Colt revolver. He also explained 
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the projectiles recovered from the murder scene were fired from the same gun. 

He could not specifically identify the type of projectiles, and could only assort

them by a "class" of calibers, including .357, .38, and 9-mm.

Meisnest's cousin testified he was with Meisnest on the evening of the 

murder. Meisnest drove his flatbed truck to his cousin's home, where they had 

dinner. After dinner, Meisnest and his cousin went to a pub in Meisnest's truck

and then to Meisnest's apartment to feed his cats. When they left the apartment, 

the cousin recalled Meisnest spoke to a "guy in [a] pickup truck" who Meisnest

referred to as "Luis." The cousin testified Meisnest and the individual appeared 

to have some type of disagreement. Meisnest then returned his cousin to his

home. The cousin learned the next morning that Meisnest was dead.

The jury convicted defendant of the charges in the indictment. The court 

imposed an aggregate life sentence, subject to the requirements of the No Early 

Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, with a fifty-year period of parole 

ineligibility.

We affirmed defendant's convictions on appeal, Padilla, slip op. at 25, but 

remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for 

certification, State v. Padilla, 226 N.J. 213 (2016). On remand, the court 

imposed an aggregate life sentence subject to NERA's requirements with a sixty-
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three-and-three-quarter-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant did not 

file a direct appeal from his sentence on remand.

Defendant filed a timely first PCR petition, alleging his trial counsel was 

ineffective by "erroneously allow[ing] improper evidence of the crime scene [to] 

be submitted to the jury"; "allow[ing] improper cross-examination of the defense 

medical examiner"; "putting forth a[n] all or nothing defense"; and "failing to 

call a second expert for . . . [d]efendant." Following the assignment of PCR 

counsel, defendant further argued his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to:

meet with defendant prior to trial; object to improper questions posed by the 

prosecutor during trial; and file a motion to suppress defendant's statement 

during the lengthy interrogation.

After hearing argument, the PCR court denied defendant's petition without 

an evidentiary hearing. In a detailed bench opinion, the court rejected each of 

defendant's claims. In pertinent part, the court determined defendant failed to 

demonstrate his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the 

admissibility of defendant's statement to the police.1 The court analyzed 

1

 We limit our discussion of the court's decision to its findings concerning 

defendant's contention his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge 

the admissibility of his statement to the police because on appeal defendant 

argues only that the court erred by rejecting that claim.
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defendant's claim under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 

105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), and concluded defendant failed to satisfy his burden of 

establishing a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. More 

particularly, the court found defendant relied only on bald assertions his 

counsel's performance was deficient, and it further concluded the record clearly

established trial counsel made a reasoned, strategic decision to utilize the 

statement because it "allowed . . . defendant to effectively deny any involvement 

in the crime without being subjected to cross[-]examination."

The court entered an order denying defendant's PCR petition. This appeal 

followed. Defendant presents the following argument for our consideration:

POINT I

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD 

AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON MR. PADILLA'S 

CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED HIM 

WITH INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

BY FAILING TO PURSUE SUPPRESSION OF HIS 

STATEMENT TO POLICE.

II.

We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris, 

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review applies to mixed 

questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. Where, as here, an evidentiary hearing 
10 A-4512-17T1

has not been held, it is within our authority "to conduct a de novo review of both 

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court." Id. at 421. We 

apply that standard here.

An evidentiary hearing on a PCR petition is required where a defendant 

establishes a prima facie case for PCR under the standard established by the 

United States Supreme Court in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, and the existing 

record is inadequate to resolve defendant's claim, State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 

354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)); see also State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-

63 (1992). To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a defendant must meet the two-part test articulated in Strickland. Fritz, 105 N.J. 

at 58. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. 

. . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Under Strickland's first prong, a defendant must show "that counsel made 

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by 

the Sixth Amendment," ibid., and that counsel's handling of the matter "fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688. To satisfy the second 

prong, a defendant must show "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 

the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable," id. at 687, and that 
11 A-4512-17T1

there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694. A 

failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard requires the denial of a 

PCR petition. Id. at 700; State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013).

Defendant argues the PCR court erred by finding trial counsel made a 

reasonable strategic decision not to challenge the admissibility of defendant's 

statement without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. Defendant claims 

"[a]ny benefit of the statement was clearly outweighed by its detriment," and the 

statement was damaging to defendant even though it included his repeated 

denials of any involvement in Meisnest's murder. Defendant also claims the 

"six-hour long interrogation" and the "manner of questioning" constituted 

"circumstances which could have been used to demonstrate the statement was 

not voluntary" and that those circumstances "suggested . . . there was a 

meritorious basis for pursuing a suppression motion." Defendant argues the 

PCR court should have held an evidentiary hearing to "determine whether a 

motion to suppress would have been successful."

Where a defendant claims trial counsel's performance was deficient by 

failing to move to suppress evidence, he or she must demonstrate there is a 

reasonable probability the motion is meritorious. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
12 A-4512-17T1

U.S. 365, 375 (1986); State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (1998). The showing 

must be supported by more than bald assertions. See State v. Cummings, 321 

N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). A defendant must allege specific facts 

sufficient to support a prima facie claim trial counsel's performance was 

deficient with "affidavits or certifications based upon the personal knowledge 

of the affiant or the person making the certification." Ibid. "It is not ineffective 

assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless motion." State 

v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007).

Defendant made, and makes, no showing supported by evidence that the 

motion to suppress he argues his counsel should have filed would have been 

meritorious. Indeed, other than his conclusory assertions about the length of the 

interrogation and the manner of some of the questioning, defendant presents no 

evidence demonstrating the State would have been unable to satisfy its burden 

of proving beyond a reasonable doubt he was advised of his Miranda2rights; he 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights; and his statement 

was voluntary and not the product of coercion, see State v. Cabrera, 387 N.J. 

Super. 81, 99 (App. Div. 2006), or of "pressures that over[bore]" his will, see

State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 563 (2004). Defendant acknowledges no such 

2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13 A-4512-17T1

showing was made; he instead argues that an evidentiary hearing was required 

"to determine whether a motion to suppress would have been successful." We 

reject the argument because "[t]he purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to permit 

[a] defendant to prove that he or she was improperly convicted . . . ; it is not an 

occasion for the defendant to question witnesses in an indiscriminate search for 

. . . grounds for" PCR. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997).

Defendant's failure to demonstrate the putative suppression motion would 

have been meritorious required the denial of his PCR petition. See Kimmelman, 

477 U.S. at 375; Fisher, 156 N.J. at 501. Absent such a showing, defendant did 

not sustain his burden of establishing either that his trial counsel's performance 

was deficient, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, or that there is a reasonable 

probability, but for his counsel's alleged error in failing to make the motion, the 

result of his trial would have been different, id. at 694. We therefore are 

convinced the PCR court correctly found defendant failed to sustain his burden 

of establishing a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the 

Strickland standard. See id. at 700; Nash, 212 N.J. at 542.

Because defendant failed to sustain his burden of satisfying either prong 

of the Strickland standard on his claim his counsel was ineffective by failing to 

move to suppress defendant's statement, it is unnecessary to address the merits 
14 A-4512-17T1

of the court's finding counsel's decision to rely on defendant's statement

constituted a reasoned trial strategy. We note only that given the absence of any 

showing a motion to suppress would have been meritorious, and the "strong 

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, the record supports the 

court's finding counsel made a reasonable and well-grounded strategic decision 

to rely on the statement. The statement supplied the jury with defendant's 

version of the events and his consistent denial of wrongdoing in response to the 

officers' questions without subjecting him to the rigors of cross-examination. 

See, e.g, United States v. Kopp, 562 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding the 

withdrawal of a motion to suppress the defendant's statement "was a 

quintessential strategic decision, as he withdrew [it] with the intention of getting 

the entirety of his statements, which included both self-serving exculpatory and 

non-relevant passages, in front of the jury").

Affirmed.