[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as In re Estate of Shaffer , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6672.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -6672
I N RE E STATE OF S HAFFER
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as In re Estate of Shaffer , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6672.]
Probate

— Competency of witnesses to a noncompliant will

— Ohio’s voiding statute applies to both wills executed in comp liance with formal requirements and those that fail to adhere to them

— Judgment reversed. (No. 2019-0364—Submitted March 11, 2020—Decided December 16, 20 20.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-17-1128,
2019-Ohio-234.

_________________ D ONNELLY , J. {¶ 1} We accepted this discretionary appeal to address the relationsh ips among three statutes that govern Ohio wills: R.C. 2107.03, whic h governs the formal requirements for the execution of a written will; R.C. 2 107.24, which provides a process for admitting a purported will to probate de spite its failure to fully adhere to those formal requirements; and R.C. 2107.15, wh ich voids a will’s
devise to a witness if that witness was essential to establishi ng the validity of theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 will. Noting that R.C. 2107.03 and 2107.15 mention “competent” witnesses but R.C. 2107.24 does not, the Sixth D istrict Court of Appeals conc luded that R.C. 2107.24 eliminates the requirement of witness competency and th at therefore, the voiding provision of R.C. 2107.15 does not apply to essential w itnesses to a
remediated will. {¶ 2} We hold that R.C. 2107.15 controls the testamentary disposition s to essential witnesses as a matter of law after a will is admitted to probate regardless of whether it is admitted pursuant to R.C. 2107.03 or 2107.24. Further, the plain language of R.C. 2107.24 neither r efers to nor provides alterna tives to R.C. 2107.15 or to any statutes that govern t he competency of witnesses. Th e voiding provision of R.C. 2107.15 therefore applies equally to essential witnesse s to both formally compliant and remediated wills. Accordingly, we reverse the ju dgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals.
BACKGROUND {¶ 3} On August 11, 1967, Joseph Shaffer—a psychologist and later, a part owner of sleep clinics—executed a formal will instructing that if his wife predeceased him, his estate would pass through trust to his two sons, Mark and appellant, Theodore (Terry) Sha ffer. Joseph’s wife predeceased him. Joseph died on July 20, 2015, and the Lucas County Probate Court admitted h is will to probate on September 15, 2015. In January 2016, appellee Juley Norman filed a claim against the estate as a creditor for the care and services that she had provided to Joseph. Juley attached a copy of a note handwritten and signed by Joseph Shaffer in 2006 on a three-by-five-inch notecard. The notecard read:

Dec 22, 2006 My estate is not completely settled all of my sleep networkJanuary Term, 2020

3 stock is to go to Terry Shaffer Juley Norman for
her care of me is to receive 1⁄4 of my estate Terry is to be the

executor. This is my will.

The card had no other signatures. {¶ 4} Terry, the administrator of his father’s estate, rejected this claim. In July 2016, appellee Zachary Norman, Juley’s son, to whom Joseph had given the notecard for safekeeping, filed an application in the probate c ourt to treat the notecard as a will subject to probate. He also filed an amendm ent to the list of Joseph Shaffer’s devisees, adding Juley as a beneficiary. {¶ 5} A magistrate held the hearing required by R.C. 2107.24 to consi der
whether the handwritten notecard th at did not conform to the re quirements of formal will-making in R.C. 2107.03 should be admitted to probat e. Juley testified to her close relationship with J oseph and the circumstances of his writing the
document. She further testified that Joseph had referred to th e document several times thereafter and had sought assurance from Zachary that he had put it in a safe place. {¶ 6} The probate-court magistrate held that Zachary had not establis hed by clear and convincing evidence that the document was intended to be Joseph’s will. The magistrate further held that R.C. 2107.24, which allows non conforming documents to be treated as wills in certain circumstances, does not eliminate the competent-witness-attestation requirement of R.C. 2107.03 and i s intended to
remediate wills whose nonconformit y results from an inadvertent mistake inS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 execution rather than from ignorance of the law. The magistrat e therefore recommended that the probate cour t deny Zachary’s application t o probate the 2006 document and strike the proposed amended list of J oseph’s devis ees. The probate court overruled Zachary’s subsequent objections to the magistra te’s decision and adopted the decision in full. {¶ 7} In his appeal from the judgment of the probate court, Zachary a sserted that unlike R.C. 2107.03, R.C. 2107.24 does not require the wit nesses to a noncompliant will to be “competent witnesses,” and therefore, t he voiding provision of R.C. 2107.15 does not apply to a purported will th at may be remediated pursuant to R.C. 2107.24. He argued that the General Assembly deliberately omitted the word “competent” in R.C. 2107.24 to elevate a testa tor’s intent over statutory formalities. Rather, the General Assembly sought to ensure the same protections provided by such formalities through a required hea ring at which the proponent of a purported will must establish all the necessary elements by clear and convincing evidence. The Sixth D istrict Court of Appeals agree d and reversed the probate court’s judgment. {¶ 8} The Sixth District determined t hat the probate court had erred by concluding that the 2006 document did not meet the requirements for admission to probate under Ohio law and by concluding that the bequest to Ju ley must be voided. 2019-Ohio-234, ¶ 44-45. The appella te court held t hat “the pur pose of the purging statute, R.C. 2107.15, has been eliminated by the grant of auth ority to the probate court to evaluate the credibility of the interested witness and weigh the evidence” pursuant to R.C. 2107.24. Id . at ¶ 44. The court concl uded that “if the probate court finds the testator truly intended to make a will, despite the failure to comply with the requireme nts of R.C. 2107.03 or the fact that a witnes s was also named as a beneficiary under the will, the court must admit the document to probate as a
will.” Id.January Term, 2020

5 {¶ 9} Terry Shaffer sought our discre tionary review of the Sixth Dist rict’s decision. We accepted the appeal on the following proposition of law:

Ohio’s Voiding Statute applies equally to wills executed in compliance with R.C. 2107.03 and wills submitted pursuant to R. C. 2107.24. If the will is witnessed by a devisee, either by the devisee’s signature or by the devisee’s testimony, the bequest to the int erested
witness is void.

See 156 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2019-Ohio-2496, 125 N.E.3d 913.
ANALYSIS {¶ 10} The issue raised in this appeal—and the context in which it has been raised—requires us to examine the role that witnesses play in t he execution of a valid will, the laws that apply to witnesses under Ohio law, an d the laws that apply to the document itself under Ohio law. The interplay among the relevant statutes
reveals that a witness’s status as a devisee does not control w hether a document is a valid will. The particular method used to recognize a docume nt as a valid will does not control whether the will’s devise or bequest to an ess ential interested witness is void. Irrespective of whether R.C. 2107.24 allows i ncompetent witnesses to establish that a document is a will, the voiding p rovision of R.C. 2107.15 applies to devises contained in any will. Accordingly, Shaffer’s proposition of law is well taken. General Requirements for an Admissible Will under Ohio Law {¶ 11} Generally speaking, admitting a written will to probate require s a court to determine, from the face of the document itself, that it was executed in compliance with the law. R.C. 2107.18. R.C. 2107.03 governs t he method of creating a written will in Ohi o. The statute provides:S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 Except oral wills, every will shall be in writing, but may be handwritten or typewritten. The will shall be signed at the en d by the testator or by some other person in the testator’s consciou s presence and at the testator’s e xpress direction. The will sha ll be
attested and subscribed in the c onscious presence of the testat or, by two or more competent witnesses, who saw the testator subscribe , or heard the testator acknowle dge the testator’s signature.

{¶ 12} If a will bears all the signatures indicating due execution and attestation, the court must admit the will to probate irrespect ive of whether the will’s validity could be challenged on other grounds. In re Elvin’s Will , 146 Ohio St. 448, 451-452, 66 N.E.2d 629 (1946). If the face of a purpo rted will does not exhibit compliance with all of R.C. 2107.03, a court may still admit the document to probate but only if the propone nt of the document satisfies the requirements of R.C. 2107.24. That statute provides:

(A) If a document that is executed that purports to be a will is not executed in compliance w ith the requirements of section 2107.03 of the Revised Code, that document shall be treated as if it had been executed as a will in compliance with the requirements of that section if a probate court , after holding a hearing, finds that the proponent of the document as a purported will has established, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the following: (1) The decedent prepared the document or caused the document to be prepared. (2) The decedent signed the document and intended
the document to constitute the decedent’s will.January Term, 2020

7 (3) The decedent signed the document under division (A)(2) of this section in the conscious presence of two or
more witnesses.

{¶ 13} The standards of R.C. 2107.24 provide a narrow exception to the formalities required in R.C. 2107.03, primarily by excusing a w itness’s failure to sign the will. Frank, Harmless Error, or Not? Applying R.C. 2107.24 , 17 Ohio Prob.L.J. 38 (2006). If the docum ent submitted to probate does not satisfy the requirements described in R.C. 2107.03, subject to the narrow e xception in R.C. 2107.24, then the document is simply not a will. See Bloechle v. Davis , 132 Ohio St. 415, 418, 8 N.E.2d 247 (1937). The court’s role at the poi nt of admission to probate is not to examine the va lidity of the will’s contents b ut to verify that the document was validly executed. In re Hathaway’s Will , 4 Ohio St. 383, 386 (1854). Accordingly, the validity of the contents of the will, includin g devises or bequests to any particular person, does not dictate whether a will may b e admitted to probate. Witness Requirements for an Admissible Will {¶ 14} The language of R.C. 2107.03 most pertinent to this appeal is t he language requiring the involvement of “two or more competent wi tnesses” and requiring that the written will be “attested and subscribed” by those witnesses. {¶ 15} The term “competent witness” is not expressly defined in R.C. Chapter 2107, but the general definition of “competency” is fou nd in R.C. 2317.01:

All persons are competent witnesses except those of unsound mind and children under ten years of age who appear incapable o f receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respec ting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 {¶ 16} We have previously held that a witness is competent as required by
R.C. 2107.03 if the witness satisfies the elements of R.C. 2317 .01. Rogers v.
Helmes , 69 Ohio St.2d 323, 432 N.E.2d 186 (1982), paragraph one of th e syllabus. We have also observed that a person’s competence to witness the execution of a will is not affected by the fact that the person will gain an i nterest from the will; the General Assembly has separately specified when “disinterested,” rather than merely competent, witn esses are required. Id. at 327, citing R.C. 2107.60 (the execution of oral wills requires “two competent disinterested w itnesses”). Looking to a witness’s general competence rather than any potential int erest in the will is
consistent with the notion that t he specific contents of the wi ll do not dictate whether the document constitutes a will that may be admitted to probate. {¶ 17} Although “competent” describes what a witness must be, the requirement that the will be “attested and subscribed” controls what a witness must do. Attestation and subscription connote two acts: (1) an “act of the senses” by personally observing the signing or acknowledgement of signatur e by the testator and (2) a physical act of signing the document, under the obser vation of the testator, to prove that the attestation occurred. Tims v. Tims , 22 Ohio C.D. 506, 14 Ohio C.C.(N.S.) 273 (1911), quoting Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Wills , Section 330 (2d Ed.1892). {¶ 18} The purpose of requiring the two acts of attestation and subscription—and of requiring w itnesses at all — “is to prevent the diversion of a
decedent’s estate from those who would take it under the statut es of descent and distribution except in instances where the decedent has clearly and deliberately expressed an intention to so divert it.” Sherman v. Johnson , 159 Ohio St. 209, 222, 112 N.E.2d 326 (1953). The ultimate goal of will-formality req uirements is to protect the testator’s intent g iven that “the succession proces s suffers from what is known as the ‘worst evidence’ problem: decedents cannot speak u p to correct the record, clarify their wishes, or protect their interests.” Wei sbord andJanuary Term, 2020

9 Horton, Inheritance Forgery , 69 Duke L.J. 855, 861 (2020). But despite the intent underlying the witness formalitie s required in the law of wills , the historically harsh repercussions for even the smalle st deviations from formal requ irements led many
to believe that the formalities themselves did more to undermin e testamentary intent
than nefarious would-be devisees. Id. Ohio’s R.C. 2107.24 is a remedial measure against certain harsh results, as it excuses the requirement th at the will be “subscribed” by the witness and allows a witness’s attestation to be proved by other

means. {¶ 19} As stated above, if the will sub mitted to probate appears to co mply with all the required formalitie s of R.C. 2107.03 and bears the signatures of the testator and two witnesses, the court must admit the will to pr obate. Elvin’s Will , 146 Ohio St. at 451-452, 66 N.E.2d 629; R.C. 2107.18. Thus, in the case of a facially valid will, a trial court need not scrutinize the comp etency of witnesses and
the fact of their attestation w hen the will is admitted to prob ate. Id. Such scrutiny may be required, however, at a hearing pursuant to R.C. 2107.24 to determine the validity of a facially noncompliant will when the probate court has the discretion to weigh evidence for or against the validity of the document as a will. See , e.g ., In
re Jordan , 4th Dist. Pike No. 08CA773, 2008-Ohio-4385, ¶ 5; In re Estate of
Pittson , 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008 CA 00014, 2009-Ohio-1862, ¶ 4-5; Estate of
Hand , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-02-034, 2016-Ohio-7437, 73 N.E.3 d 880, ¶ 23. No matter the process, the consideration of an applicati on to admit a will to probate remains focused on whether the submitted document is a will; it is not a proceeding that allows parties to address or contest the conten ts of the will. See Hathaway’s Will , 4 Ohio St. at 385. Accordingly, a will’s contents, including devises or bequests to any par ticular person, are outside the s cope of a hearing conducted pursuant to R.C. 2107.24 and are not relevant to the process of admitting a will to probate.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 Limitations on Dispositions in a Will {¶ 20} Even after a document is recognized as a valid will and admitte d into probate, the dispositions contained in Ohio wills are controlle d by statute. In re
Miller’s Estate , 160 Ohio St. 529, 117 N.E.2d 598 (1954), paragraph three of t he syllabus. Ohio’s statutes “contain many provisions which limit the right of testamentary disposition and annul provisions in a will which a re contrary to such
statutes.” Id. at 538. For example, a “convict ed murderer [cannot] take unde r the will of the person whom he murdered.” Id. at 539; R.C. 2105.19. R.C. 2107.15, which Terry terms the “voiding statute,” provides another limit ation:

If a devise or bequest is made to a person who is one of only two witnesses to a will, the devise or bequest is void. The wi tness shall then be competent to testify to the execution of the will , as if the devise or bequest had not been made. If the witness would have
been entitled to a share of the testator’s estate in case the w ill was not established, the witness take s so much of that share that d oes not exceed the bequest or de vise to the witness.

{¶ 21} In essence, if a person stands to gain an interest from a will and if the validity of the will hinges on that person’s acting as one of two essential witnesses to the execution of the will, that person’s interest under the will is
eliminated as a matter of law. Rogers , 69 Ohio St.2d at 330, 432 N.E.2d 186. Interested-witness laws like R.C. 2107.15 serve the purpose of preventing fraud while also protecting a testator’s intentions and innocent bene ficiaries by invalidating only the portion of the will related to the witnes s’s devise rather than
the entire will. See Fowler v. Stagner , 55 Tex. 393, 398 (1881); In re Klein’s Estate , 35 Mont. 185, 88 P. 798, 804 (1907); In re Estate of Pye , 325 F.Supp. 321, 322 (D.D.C.1971), citing 2 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 376-377January Term, 2020

11 (1854); Hairelson v. Estate of Franks , 130 Ohio App.3d 671, 675, 720 N.E.2d 989 (10th Dist.1998). {¶ 22} Although the phrasing of R.C. 2107.15 might lead some to infer that all interested witnesses are incompetent subject to subsequent restoration by the provisions of R.C. 2107.15, we came to a different conclusion i n Rogers . In that case, we noted that the common-law rule that interested witness es were incompetent per se was abrogated by Ohio’s statutory scheme gov erning wills, “subject to the safeguards built into R.C. 2107.15.” Rogers at 327. Rather than directly controlling the issue of witness competency when a wil l is executed, R.C. 2107.15 protects against the potential dangers posed by an inte rested witness by eliminating the interest as a matter of law at the time of prob ate. Id. at 330. Accordingly, R.C. 2107.15 does not control whether a witness is competent to establish that a document is a will that should be admitted to probate; it controls whether a disposition containe d in an already a dmitted will mus t be annulled. R.C. 2107.24 Does Not Affect the Applicability of R.C. 2107.15 {¶ 23} Because a probate court is able to assess the credibility of an interested witness during the evidentiary-hearing process of R. C. 2107.24, the court of appeals concluded that the purpose behind R.C. 2107.15 was e liminated and that the voiding provision of R.C. 2107.15 therefore did not apply. 2019-Ohio-234 at ¶ 44. Appellees additionally contend that the legislature’s fa ilure to use the term “competent” in R.C. 2107.24 signals a clear departure from stri ct will formalities in favor of allowing a decedent’s “full intent to be carried ou t.” They assert that this omission is in line with a national trend led by the Natio nal Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in proposing the Uniform Pr obate Code (“UPC”), which allows intereste d witnesses to take under wills. The plain language
of the statutes does not support either assertion. {¶ 24} When analyzing statutory provisions, our paramount concern is t o ascertain and give effect to the intention of the General Assem bly. Henry v. Cent.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 Natl. Bank , 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 (1968), paragraph two of the syllabus. We determine legislative intent primarily from the p lain language of a

statute. Summerville v. Forest Park , 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18. By its plain language, R.C. 2317.01 governs the specific subject of witness competency, whereas R.C. 2107.03 and 2107.24 govern the formalities required for a document to constitute a will, and R.C. 2107.15 governs devises or bequests under a will to a certain class of people. The plain language of R.C. 2107.24 does not govern competency, and so its failure to use t he word “competent” is of little import. Similarly, R.C. 2107.24 fails to specify that the decedent must have testamentary capacity pursuant to R.C. 2107.02, but no one disputes that R.C.
2107.02 1 applies to all wills. {¶ 25} Although a probate court might gain a better view into the circumstances behind a particul ar will and the credibility of t he parties through the evidentiary hearing required for formally noncompliant wills, t he court is limited to determining whether the decedent (1) prepared the document, (2) signed the document and intended it to be his will, and (3) signed the doc ument in the conscious presence of two or more witnesses. R.C. 2107.24(A). Nothing in R.C. 2107.24(A) authorizes the court at a hearing to determine that an interested witness poses no risk of perjury or mal feasance and that R.C. 2107.15 s hould therefore not apply to any devises or bequests to the witness once the docume nt is admitted to probate as a will. An application to admit a will to probate i s not a process in which parties can address or contest the contents of a will, Hathaway’s Will, 4 Ohio St. at 385, and it is inappropriate for the probate court to rule on t he contents of a purported will before determining that the document is a will. {¶ 26} R.C. 2107.24 also does not indicate that the purpose of relaxin g the strict formalities related to witness attestation and subscript ion is to allow a

1. R.C. 2107.02 states, “A person who is eighteen years of age or older, of sound mind and memory, and not under restraint may make a will.”January Term, 2020

13 decedent’s “full intent to be carried out,” including the inten t to make specific devises or bequests to a particular party. The probate court’s only inquiry regarding a testator’s intent when executing a purported, formally noncom pliant will is
whether the decedent “intended the document to constitute the d ecedent’s will.” R.C. 2107.24(A)(2). The testamentary intent that must be prove d to establish that
a document is a will is distinct from the decedent’s intent tha t certain provisions
within the will be construed or applied a certain way. Estate of Hand , 2016-Ohio7437, 73 N.E.3d 880, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.), quoting In re Estate of McIntosh , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-75556, 1976 WL 189970, *2 (June 7, 1976). {¶ 27} Finally, the language of neither R.C. 2107.24 nor 2107.15 indic ates that Ohio has joined the movement , reflected in the UPC, to enf orce all devises or bequests specified in a will irrespective of the status of the beneficiaries. A crucial difference between Ohio law and the UPC is that the UPC explici tly abolishes “voiding” or “purging” statutes b y providing that “[t]he signin g of a will by an
interested witness does not invalidate the will or any provision of it .” (Emphasis added.) UPC 2-505(b). By contra st, the voiding provision of R .C. 2107.15 is still
in effect in Ohio. {¶ 28} Our conclusion that R.C. 2107.24 does not affect the applicabil ity of R.C. 2107.15 is consistent with a reading of the statutory sche me as a whole. If we were to accept appellees’ argument, the alleged exception to th e voiding provision of R.C. 2107.15 would subsume the entire law, because any essen tial interested witness could defeat the voiding statute by simply refusing to sign an otherwise conforming will. {¶ 29} While the General Assembly i n enacting R.C. 2107.24 removed some of the formal barriers to creating a will, it did not remo ve the substantive barrier in R.C. 2107.15 that annuls dispositions to interested witnesses that were essential to establishing the validity of any will, whether thr ough subscription or through testimony at an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, if a d evise or bequest isS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 made to a person who is one of only two witnesses to a will, th e devise or bequest to that witness is void whether the will is executed in complia nce with R.C. 2107.03 or submitted pursuant to R.C. 2107.24.
CONCLUSION {¶ 30} We conclude that Zachary Norman’s claim fails because Ohio’s voiding statute, R.C. 2107.15, app lies both to wills executed i n compliance with R.C. 2107.03 and those submitted pursuant to R.C. 2107.24. The probate court correctly applied R.C. 2107.15 and determined that Juley Norman could not be included in the list of beneficiaries of Joseph Shaffer’s estat e. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Sixt h District Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the p robate court. Judgment reversed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , F ISCHER , D E W INE , and
S TEWART , JJ., concur.

_________________ Zachary Norman and Juley Norman, pro se. Robison, Curphey and O’Connell, C orey L. Tomlinson, Paul E. Cro y, Sarah J. Corney, and Kayla L. Henderson, for appellant.

_________________