[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-15255

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-14044-KAM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BRANDON KEITH GALLANDER, 

 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(July 16, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Defendant Brandon Keith Gallander pled guilty to one count of receiving 

and distributing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and 

(b)(1). The district court imposed a sentence of 222 months, which was below the 

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Defendant appeals, arguing that his 

sentence is substantively unreasonable because his history and personal 

characteristics justify a greater downward variance, because the district court gave 

too little weight to the arbitrary nature of the child pornography guidelines, and 

because the court placed undue emphasis on unsubstantiated acts of past 

misconduct. After review, we affirm. 

We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion using 

a two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). 

We look first to whether the district court committed any significant procedural 

error and then at whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the 

totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.1

 Id. Although in 

choosing the sentence, the district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors, the 

district court is not required to address each factor separately. United States v. 

 1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, 

to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for 

deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed 

educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the 

Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) 

the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to 

victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2006). The party challenging the sentence 

bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1189. We 

will reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court 

committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving 

at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the 

facts of the case.” Id. at 1191 (quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Defendant has identified no procedural errors nor has he shown that 

his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Defendant’s 222-month sentence is 

below his advisory guideline range of 240 months’ imprisonment. Our precedent 

indicates that we ordinarily expect a within-guideline sentence to be reasonable. 

See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, 

while we do not apply a presumption, we ordinary expect a sentence inside the 

advisory guidelines range to be reasonable). It logically follows then that 

Defendant’s more lenient, below-guideline-range sentence enjoys an even more 

robust expectation of reasonableness, at least with respect to his argument that his 

sentence was too harsh. Additionally, Defendant’s sentence is below the 240-

month statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). See United States v. 

Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing the fact that the sentence 

imposed was well below the statutory maximum as an indication of 

reasonableness). 

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In determining that only a 18-month downward variance was warranted 

(instead of the 60-month variance Defendant had requested), the district court 

specifically acknowledged Defendant’s disturbing behavior in connection with the 

offense relating to his ten-year-old daughter, Defendant’s troubled past, 

Defendant’s past actions involving his ex-wife, and the court’s general agreement 

with the defense that the guidelines in child pornography cases were generally 

greater than necessary to provide just punishment. Specifically, the district court 

explained that it was “somewhat torn” between its normal practice of varying 

downward in child pornography cases because it thought the guidelines were too 

severe, and its concern that, in light of Defendant’s comments regarding his 

daughter and his past actions involving his ex-wife, he posed a danger to the 

community. However, the district court ultimately concluded that, in light of 

Defendant’s troubled past, which probably contributed to his behavior, a sentence 

that was slightly below the guideline range would be sufficient, but not greater 

than necessary to comply with the § 3553(a) factors. 

Defendant has certainly had a troubled past, which he says included being 

regularly raped by his stepbrother while Defendant was between the ages of two 

and twelve years old, with his parents doing nothing more than seek counseling;

drug abuse by both Defendant and his mother; abandonment by his mother; and

subsequent sexual abuse at the hands of an older man. But we discern no abuse of 

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discretion in the district court’s determination that these facts, as well as the 

severity of the child pornography guidelines, did not warrant a greater downward 

variance when balanced against Defendant’s willingness to involve his daughter in 

the present offense and his past actions involving his ex-wife, which raised 

concerns for the district court regarding Defendant’s future danger to the 

community. See United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating 

that “[t]he weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed 

to the sound discretion of the district court.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

Specifically, Defendant exploited his minor daughter in order to obtain child 

pornography. In chats with people with whom he was seeking to share child 

pornography, Defendant discussed “playing with” his daughter, but not penetrating 

her; sent her picture to other people; offered that an individual could do whatever 

he wanted with Defendant’s daughter, including have rough sex with her; and 

sought help accessing his old email address so that he could find a naked picture of 

his daughter that he had previously shared. Defendant also solicited eight or nine 

individuals to come to his house and rape his then-wife, whom he planned to first 

drug. When arrested for the offense involving his wife, Defendant admitted his 

action and was allowed to complete a pretrial diversion program. As the district 

court acknowledged, Defendant’s chats regarding his daughter were probably 

fantasy, and he perhaps did not have the ready ability to subject his daughter to that 

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type of abuse because her mother had custody. However, such behavior 

understandably raises concerns about Defendant’s mental state and his potential for 

future criminal conduct. 

Contrary to Defendant’s argument, a greater downward variance is not

needed to avoid disparities in sentencing similarly-situated defendants. Defendant 

points to United States v. Riley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (applying a 

downward variance to 60 months from a range of 210-240 months in part because 

the offender had no criminal history and had a low risk of reoffending), and United 

States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding a downward 

variance to 84 months from a guideline range of 151-188 months when the 

defendant had a “clean criminal record,” even though he previously molested 

several children). While these cases are similar and demonstrate that we will

uphold a term less that that imposed in the present case, they do not show that 

Defendant’s sentence is outside of the reasonable range of sentences. Moreover, 

unlike the defendants in Riley and McBride, Defendant had several previous 

convictions, placing him in criminal history category III, and, as the district court 

noted, his fantasies about his daughter created a realistic potential for future harm. 

For all these reasons, Defendant has not met his burden to show that his 222-

month sentence is substantively unreasonable. 

AFFIRMED.

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