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The State of the Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic 

in the World of Social Media

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Heidi A. Urben

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Center for Complex Operations Case Study

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The State of the Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic 

in the World of Social Media

Heidi A. Urben

C

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L

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

May 2017
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for 

public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided 

that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a 

courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.

First printing, May 2017
v

Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Executive Summary 1

Past research contends that with the exception of 

voting in presidential elections, military officers’ 

political participation is fairly muted. Moreover, 

most allegations of political outspokenness tend to be 

levied at retired officers, not those on active duty. Department of Defense directives provide guidelines on permissible but traditional forms of political expression for 

active duty members of the military, but largely neglect 

social media as a forum for political activity. Through 

a survey of more than 500 military elites attending the 

United States Military Academy and National Defense 

University, this project seeks to establish the nature and 

extent of political expression by members of the military 

throughout social media and whether or not such expression is in keeping with the norm of nonpartisanship.

Findings suggest that while most military elites continue to identify as conservative and Republican, fewer appear to do so today than at any other time over 

the past 30 years. Second, military elites actively use 

social media networking sites, although younger elites 

are more prolific in their use. Third, while respondents’ 

nonmilitary friends were more politically active than 

their military friends, both active duty and retired military actively participate in multiple forms of political 

and partisan expression, from posting comments on 

political issues to “friending” political figures. Fourth, 

party identification and political ideology elicit different 

responses and behavior about politics on social media. 

Military elites who identify as liberals and Democrats 

are more likely to have more politically diverse military 

friends on social media, but are also more likely to report feeling uncomfortable by their friends’ politics. Finally, a striking percentage of those surveyed—50 percent in some cases—indicated their active duty military 

friends have engaged in insulting, rude, or disdainful 

comments directed at politicians, elected officials, and 

the President, with liberals and Democrats more likely 

to report they observed such normative violations. Together, these findings suggest Republican and conservative military elites may be more likely to see social media 

as their echo chamber and raise further questions about 

the politicization of the force. This study concludes by 

considering the implications these findings carry for the 

norms of an apolitical, nonpartisan military.

Executive Summary
Technology and social media make it seductively 

easy for us to broadcast our private opinions 

far beyond the confines of our homes. The 

lines between the professional, personal—and 

virtual—are blurring. Now more than ever, we 

have to be exceptionally thoughtful about what 

we say and how we say it.1

—General Martin E. Dempsey, USA (Ret.)

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Introduction 3

This study seeks to establish the nature and extent of political expression by the military in the realm of social media and whether or not such 

expression is consistent with Department of Defense 

policy and the norms of an apolitical, nonpartisan military. Past research contends that with the exception of 

voting in presidential elections, military officers’ political participation is fairly muted. Moreover, most allegations of political outspokenness tend to be levied at 

retired officers, not those on active duty. Department 

of Defense directives provide guidelines on permissible 

but traditional forms of political expression for active 

duty members of the military, but largely neglect social 

media as a forum for political activity. In this introduction, the author reviews the debate about charges of politicization within the military, examines past research 

into the political participation habits of members of the 

military, and evaluates current Department of Defense 

policies and guidance on political activity, social media, 

and the 2016 election.

The Ongoing Debate About Politicization

Since the late 1990s, a prevalent debate within the field of 

civil-military relations has been whether or not the military, namely its officer corps, has become politicized. 

Politicization is a broad term, though, and the discussion tends to crystallize around three main charges: that 

the officer corps is too partisan, too politically vocal, and 

too involved in political affairs. In recent times, journalist Tom Ricks may have been the first to lead the “too 

partisan” charge with his book, Making the Corps, where 

he found anecdotal indications of an increasingly conservative, Republican military that was out of step with 

the American public.2 Around the same time, Ole Holsti 

provided richer empirical data from the Foreign Policy Leadership Project (FPLP), which charted a steadily 

increasing rate of affiliation with the Republican Party and growing conservative ideology among military 

officers from 1976 to 1996.3 And in 2001, Peter Feaver 

and Richard Kohn published the most comprehensive 

project aimed at exploring the civil-military gap in their 

Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) study, confirming similar levels of ideological and partisan identification Holsti documented in the late 1990s.4

 Both the 

FPLP and TISS studies concluded that by the late 1990s, 

well over 60 percent of military elites affiliated with the 

Republican Party and described themselves as politically conservative, and a significant gap emerged between 

the attitudes of these military elites and a comparable 

sample of civilian elites.

Central to the “too partisan” claim has been the concern that close and open affiliation with one party relegates the military to interest group status and reflects a 

gap between the military and civil society.5 However, a 

small chorus of civil-military observers has challenged 

this; they argue that voting, which is essentially a private 

act and right of citizenship, is the only real partisan activity those in the military undertake, and that charges 

that the officer corps had soundly abandoned partisan 

neutrality were overblown.6 Others have suggested that 

while partisan uniformity may characterize the officer 

corps, officers account for less than 20 percent of the 

military, and attitudes of enlisted members are more diverse and more representative of the general public.7

Introduction
While enlisted views should not be overlooked or 

assumed to be in complete concert with those of officers, 

the attitudes of military elites and the ensuing interplay 

between senior military and civilian policymakers are 

more critical determinants of the state of civil-military 

relations. And while scholars like Joseph Collins may 

be right to argue that “a disproportionate number of 

Republicans . . . in the military, however, does not in 

and of itself mean anything,” recent research has found 

that partisanship does translate into moderate differences in substantive outcomes on certain issues.8

 For 

example, Republican officers in the Army report slightly higher levels of distrust toward civilian leadership 

and are more apt to feel that in order to be respected as 

commander-in-chief, the President should have served 

in the military. Likewise, Democrats in the officer corps 

are more likely to report being uncomfortable expressing their political views with coworkers and more likely 

to report that others in the military have tried to influence them to vote a particular way. Finally, Republican officers are somewhat more likely to suggest the 

proper role of senior military leaders during certain 

scenarios in wartime is to be insistent with their civilian overseers, as opposed to being neutral, advising, or 

advocating.9 In other words, as Feaver has succinctly 

observed, some officers struggle with one of the basic 

principles of civilian control: that civilians have the 

right to be wrong.10

The charge that the military is “too vocal” refers 

to the perception that the military has abandoned its 

neutrality in the public sphere and actively participates 

in the political process beyond the act of voting. In recent times, the early years of the Clinton administration are often viewed as the nadir in civil-military relations, where some active duty members of the military 

were vocal and contemptuous toward their commander-in-chief. Kohn has recounted a litany of these sins, 

including the time when the “Air Force Chief of Staff 

had to issue an open demand to his service to respect 

the President and for proper behavior to be accorded to 

him and still had to retire a two-star general for disparaging remarks made in public.”11

While such outspokenness by some in the military 

during the Clinton administration may have been an 

aberration, a “revolt of the generals” where some have 

boldly waded into political waters has continued, but 

largely by those who have retired. The phrase, “revolt 

of the generals” has now come to refer to the specific 

instance in April 2006 when six retired generals called 

for then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation due to his handling of the Iraq War.12 This particular instance witnessed a resurfacing of the normative debate of whether or not retired generals should 

be publicly airing their grievances, especially since it 

occurred so soon after they had retired from active 

duty. On one end of the spectrum, Richard Swain offers a legal interpretation, insisting that retired officers, 

who still draw a military pension, never leave the military and are still bound to its norms and regulations.13

Kohn, too, has likened retired four-stars in particular 

to “princes of the church [who] represent the culture 

and the profession just as authoritatively as their counterparts on active duty.”14 At the very least, the public 

participation in political affairs by retired general and 

flag officers raises an important, but unanswered question—who speaks for the profession?15

 Despite calls from some in the civil-military arena 

for retired officers, especially retired general and flag officers, to cease and desist from making public, partisan 

endorsements, they have only increased in magnitude 

on both sides of the aisle since former Marine Corps 

Commandant, General (Retired) P.X. Kelley, endorsed 

George H.W. Bush in 1988.16 In 2012, for example, 500 

retired general and flag officers took out a full-page advertisement in the Washington Times to endorse former 

Governor Mitt Romney’s campaign for President.17 Additionally, James Golby has examined campaign contributions by retired four-star general and flag officers, 

which calls into question how private their politics truly 

were while they were on active duty.18

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Introduction 5

Notwithstanding these calls from civil-military relations scholars for retired officers to refrain from making political pronouncements, recent research into the 

attitudes of active duty Army officers found that most 

disagree with the notion that retired officers should keep 

their politics private. For example, 80 percent of active 

duty Army officers felt it was okay for retired officers 

to publicly criticize senior civilians in government and 

to be able to express their political views like any other 

citizen. And nearly 70 percent felt it was fine for retired 

generals to publicly express their political views. Moreover, a substantial minority even felt the restrictions on 

active duty members should be lessened, with 36 percent 

feeling active duty members should be able to express 

their political views like any other citizen.19 At the same 

time, actual levels of political participation by those on 

active duty beyond the act of voting remain fairly subdued. Approximately 20 percent of Army officers have 

admitted to having given monetary campaign contributions, 13 percent have put a campaign bumper sticker on 

their cars, and far fewer admitted to having ever joined a 

political club or attending a political rally or debate.20 In 

all of these measures, the rates reported by Army officers 

were about on par with the general public as measured in 

the American National Election Studies surveys.

Finally, the allegation that the military is “too involved” in political matters tends to refer to interactions 

between senior military leaders and senior civilians at 

the highest levels of government, especially their perceived willingness to challenge or resist civilian authority. In some cases, scholars have taken issue with senior 

military leaders straying into political issues beyond 

their military expertise or have questioned the manner in which they have offered their military advice. In 

Feaver’s “principal-agent” theory of civil-military relations, the extent to which the military obeys its civilian 

overseers is dependent upon the manner and degree 

to which the civilian authority exercises its oversight. 

Based on their perceptions of how the civilian authority 

will act, the military decides whether it will “work” or 

“shirk.”21 Shirking, as all good bureaucrats know, may 

not be outright refusal to comply, but could take the 

form of providing inflated estimates of a military operation’s costs, making “end runs” or leaks, or slow-rolling 

implementation of a policy.22 These are not simply theoretical conjectures, but are backed up with evidence. 

A famous example is General (Retired) Colin Powell’s 

public opposition to military intervention in Bosnia, 

evident by an on-the-record interview he did as sitting 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with The New York Times

that was then followed up by an op-ed on the eve of the 

1992 presidential election.23 While some defend Powell’s actions as consistent with his authority and insist he 

never directly challenged the administration’s policy in 

Bosnia, others think he crossed the line or, at the very 

least, his actions typified shirking.24

Eliot Cohen has documented the increasing and 

purposeful involvement by the military into the political 

sphere, from serving on congressional staffs to studying 

international politics at war colleges. In Cohen’s view, 

while building political awareness may be valuable for 

the officer corps, too often in practice these efforts result in placing value on the ability to manipulate the 

political process for the military’s own ends.25 Feaver, 

likewise, has lamented the growing sense that military 

elites feel they must insist that civilian leaders adopt 

their recommendations, and these sentiments within the officer corps have been well documented in the 

TISS study’s survey research and subsequent research 

into Army officer attitudes.26 Feaver has broadly termed 

this sentiment as “McMasterism,” arguing it rests on a 

wide misinterpretation of H.R. McMaster’s Dereliction 

of Duty.

27 While McMaster simply concludes that the 

Joint Chiefs failed to sufficiently advise President Johnson during the Vietnam War, the misinterpretation of 

McMasterism suggests that the Joint Chiefs should have 

more forcefully opposed Johnson’s Vietnam strategy to 

the point of their resignation.28

As with the “too partisan” and “too vocal” charges, 

the “too involved” claim has its critics. They argue that 
Samuel Huntington’s theory is full of limitations, most 

notably the fallacy that a clear delineation between 

purely military and purely political spheres exists, especially at the highest levels of government.29 Moreover, 

military officers who believe they can ignore all things 

political do so at their own peril, and ultimately limit 

their own effectiveness.30 These arguments acknowledge 

one of Clausewitz’s central principles, that “war is not 

merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, 

a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with 

other means.”31 While Huntington devotees are quick to 

reference his oft-quoted line that “politics is beyond the 

scope of military competence, and the participation of 

military officers in politics undermines their professionalism,” Huntington also conceded that “the top military 

leaders of the state inevitably operate in this intermingled world of strategy and policy.”32

A simplistic, but not-too-far-off-the-mark, summary 

of the three debates that form the larger discussion over 

whether or not the military is politicized tends to oscillate 

between two extreme positions: that the state of civil-military relations is in a constant, near state of crisis; or, that 

everything is overblown, and we are nowhere close to 

the sometimes-poisoned state of civil-military relations 

that our country has seen earlier in its history. The problem with the former assessment is that it becomes hard 

to distinguish magnitude, change, and emerging areas 

of friction when everything is assumed to be in constant 

crisis. The problem with the latter is that celebrating the 

fact that a military coup in the United States is nearly impossible or that none of the tensions between senior military leaders and their civilian bosses today approximates 

the MacArthur-Truman episode is equally unsatisfying 

and misses an important nuance.33 This author assumes 

a middle ground, stopping well short of characterizing 

today’s civil-military relations as in crisis, but suggesting 

there is some merit to each of the politicization charges, 

and acknowledging that fault lines in the military’s adherence to civilian control have emerged that merit closer 

study. This paper explores those issues and the politicization charge in greater depth, namely, the claims that the 

military is both “too partisan” and “too vocal,” by examining the nature and extent of political expression by the 

military in social media.

Current Department of Defense Policy and 

Guidance

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1344.10, Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces, is the 

primary policy document that addresses political behavior for members of the military.34 The directive’s opening 

paragraph sets the tone of the overall policy, framing it 

as a challenge between “carry[ing] out the obligations of 

citizenship” and adhering to the “traditional concept” 

of the military refraining from partisan political activity.35 Invoking the normative aspect vice a technical-legal framework is an important observation here, as the 

Department of Defense chose to nest its authority under 

the longstanding norm of nonpartisanship. And while 

the document closes with the reminder that it constitutes 

a lawful order and that violations are punishable under 

the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Department 

of Defense arguably approaches the prosecution of such 

violations with unease, wary of being seen as abridging 

Servicemembers’ basic rights of citizenship.36

At the very least, the enforcement of DoDD 1344.10 

is uneven. Because many such violations are largely addressed at the unit level through letters of reprimand, 

it is nearly impossible to track instances at the service 

level in which Servicemembers violated the principles 

of DoDD 1344.10. In one of the more public violations, 

where Army Reservist Specialist Jesse Thorsen appeared 

in uniform at a political rally to endorse then-Representative Ron Paul’s bid for President in 2012, the Soldier’s punishment was a relatively light letter of reprimand.37 However, Marine Sergeant Gary Stein was 

discharged from the U.S. Marine Corps in 2012 with an 

other-than-honorable discharge for calling President 

Barack Obama a coward and an enemy on Facebook, for 

vowing that he would not salute the President or follow 

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Introduction 7

his orders, and for creating an Armed Forces Tea Party website.38 Both incidents are among the more-publicized deviations in recent memory, and because they 

made national-level news and were absolutely clear violations of Department of Defense policy, the decisions 

to hold the two offenders accountable were unambiguous ones for the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. It 

is less clear how uniformly other less-publicized and 

less-inflammatory deviations from DoDD 1344.10 are 

prosecuted across the Services.

While the enforcement mechanism rests at the unit 

level and therefore is left for unit leaders to weigh and 

interpret, the language of DoDD 1344.10 is fairly clear, 

listing traditional political activities that are allowable 

for Servicemembers and specifying those that are not. 

For example, Servicemembers can vote, encourage 

others to vote, and express their personal opinions on 

candidates and political issues; they can write letters to 

the editor expressing political opinions, as long as they 

make clear their views do not necessarily reflect those 

of the Department of Defense; and they can put political bumper stickers on their cars.39 Prohibitions include 

speaking before partisan political gatherings, performing work on the behalf of a political candidate or party, or displaying a political sign or banner in their front 

yard if they live on a military installation.40

The directive also includes a noteworthy catch-all 

statement that “activities not expressly prohibited may 

be contrary to the spirit and intent” of DoDD 1344.10 

and should still be avoided.41 Again, rather than relying on an overly legalistic interpretation, the directive 

attempts to appeal to the better judgment and prudence 

of members of the military. While certain activities may 

not be forbidden, the Department of Defense encourages Servicemembers to exercise an abundance of caution, lest their political activity imply official approval 

or endorsement. While the directive’s language is clear, 

and the examples provide even greater fidelity, the policy focuses on traditional forms of political activity—

attending rallies, donating to campaigns, and marching 

in parades—measures that may seem outdated or a bit 

alien to those serving in the military today. Meanwhile, 

the directive is noticeably silent on political behavior 

within the realm of social media and on the Internet 

more broadly. This is most likely due to the fact that the 

directive is nearly 8 years old and does not reflect recent 

changes in both technology and political behavior.

Prior to both the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections, the Department of Defense issued supplemental 

public affairs guidance regarding political campaigns 

and elections.42 Most of the guidance is devoted to regulating and restricting the use of military installations 

by political candidates during campaigns and elections. 

However, both documents issued in advance of the 2012 

and 2016 elections also included a section regarding the 

use of social media for political purposes.43 While the 

Department of Defense public affairs guidance invokes 

DoDD 1344.10, its language leaves a bit more open to 

interpretation. At the very least, it draws a line between 

political and partisan activity, between which most citizens, let alone members of the military, would be hard 

pressed to differentiate.

Nonetheless, words are important, and even if the 

regulations are ambiguous, a baseline of terminology for 

this paper is important. Partisan refers to support for a 

particular side, faction, or political party. Political, borrowing Harold Lasswell’s definition, relates to “who gets 

what, when, and how.”44 But like partisan, the word political suggests there are positions to be taken and sides 

to be chosen—the haves and have nots, for example. Just 

as nonpartisan is to have no allegiance to a particular 

party, being apolitical is to have no stance on an issue. 

Even the Merriam-Webster dictionary struggles in separating political from partisan, defining political as “of, 

relating to, involving, or involved in politics, especially 

party politics.” Likewise, in a “Frequently Asked Questions” document about the Hatch Act and social media 

circulated to federal employees in late 2015, the Office of 

Special Counsel defined political activity as “any activity 

directed at the success or failure of a political party or 
partisan political group or candidate in a partisan race.”45

Regardless of the semantics, political and partisan are 

hardly two separate, clearly defined spheres, and there 

are few, if any, political issues in America that lack partisan implications.

The public affairs guidance aims to maximize a Servicemember’s right to free expression, but in doing so, 

presents a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies. 

First, it allows a Servicemember to “express his or her 

own personal views on public issues or political candidates via social media platforms . . . much the same as 

they would be permitted to write a letter to the editor of 

a newspaper”—but then provides two caveats.46 If it is 

reasonably clear on the social media site that the individual is on active duty, Servicemembers are obligated 

to include the standard disclaimer that these represent 

their personal views and not those of the Department of 

Defense. The public affairs guidance also notes that active duty members must refrain from partisan political 

activity. This language is problematic for a few reasons. 

In seeking to apply a disclaimer, the public affairs guidance aims to hold Servicemembers’ social media activity 

to the standard of published, written work. Moreover, 

it is not clear how well this policy is understood, adhered to, or even heard of throughout the ranks or how 

practical it is. Should the disclaimer be used each time a 

Servicemember “likes” a political post on Facebook? Or 

should the disclaimer be used only when one comments 

on a thread or “retweets” on Twitter? It is unclear, but 

it reflects the view that political expressions on social 

media are more akin to a published article than to a spoken conversation—perhaps a reflection that the former 

leaves a lasting digital trail while the latter does not.

A second concern with this language is the cloudy 

distinction between political and partisan activity. In the 

allowable example, Servicemembers can express personal 

views on political issues and candidates, but cannot engage in partisan political activity. Yet it is difficult to envision a scenario in which political issues or candidates are 

devoid of partisan implications. The language also implies 

that Servicemembers, or any citizens for that matter, can 

clearly distinguish between political and partisan activity. 

This also makes things even more difficult for unit leaders 

who have to enforce the policy as they, too, must be able 

to discern between political and partisan expression.

The public affairs guidance attempts to provide more 

clarity by acknowledging that Servicemembers may “become a friend of or like the Facebook page, or follow the 

Twitter account of a political party or partisan candidate, campaign, group, or cause,” but cannot encourage 

others to do the same, as that would constitute political 

activity as described in DoDD 1344.10.47 Again, while 

the attempt to clarify and provide examples is well intentioned, it raises even more questions. If a Servicemember 

“follows” or “likes” a particular party and candidates of 

that party, and the Servicemember’s social media site is 

adorned with imagery and written material of that party and its candidates, does that not constitute partisan 

activity, regardless of whether the Servicemember is encouraging others to do the same?

Authors of the Department of Defense public affairs guidance for the 2016 election may have concluded that “liking” a political candidate’s Facebook page is 

the equivalent of putting a bumper sticker on a car, an 

allowable act according to DoDD 1344.10. However, 

other examples of political expression that are in-person vice those made in social media may be less comparable. At the very least, there is the question of reach 

and magnitude. DoDD 1344.10 states up front that 

Servicemembers are allowed to express their personal 

political opinions. And while DoDD 1344.10 does not 

explicitly state so, the underlying norm of nonpartisanship implies that such expressions should be in private.48 Later, DoDD 1344.10 prohibits Servicemembers 

from the very public act of speaking before a political 

gathering or advocating for a political cause on a radio 

or television program. Yet political expression on social media, the modern day town square, raises more 

questions—questions that are not answered in the Department of Defense public affairs election guidance. If 

8 Like, Comment, Retweet
Introduction 9

posting a political comment on Facebook, where a post 

can be quickly read by thousands of people, is inherently a public act, is the Department of Defense public affairs guidance for presidential elections consistent with DoDD 1344.10? Likewise, the public affairs 

guidance compares a political post on social media to 

a letter to the editor, which DoDD 1344.10 classifies 

as allowable. But a letter to the editor must meet certain publication guidelines and usually pass a public 

affairs screening, and it is hard to conceive of a situation where a Servicemember could have one or several 

letters to the editor published each day; but, in social 

media, there are few, if any, barriers to or reviews of 

one’s own political commentary. The accessibility, volume, and reach of political expression in social media 

are far different from the traditional measures identified in DoDD 1344.10. As the next section explores, 

this is not only a matter of consistent policy guidance, 

but also one of normative implications.

Implications for the Profession

While DoDD 1344.10 attempts to appeal to the better judgment of those in the military, the Department 

of Defense nonetheless grants considerable latitude to 

Servicemembers when it comes to political expression. 

However, the two most recent Chairmen of the Joint 

Chiefs, Admiral (Retired) Michael G. Mullen and General (Retired) Martin E. Dempsey, often argued throughout their tenures for a stricter adherence to the nonpartisan ethic and a more conservative interpretation of 

DoDD 1344.10. Both suggested the nonpartisan ethic 

should extend into retirement, and General Dempsey, 

writing in the lead-up to the 2012 presidential election, 

argued for greater restraint in Servicemembers’ political 

expression on social media, as highlighted in the quote 

that began the introduction to this paper.49

Mullen’s and Dempsey’s admonitions are instructive, as they are undoubtedly reactions to what they 

perceived to be repeated violations in political and partisan activity by members of the military. Both Mullen 

and Dempsey raise an important question about political expression by members of the military: even if it is 

allowable, is it proper? In their landmark TISS study, 

Feaver and Kohn address this normative issue and argue that most military officers underestimate the impact 

their seemingly personal views and expression have:

Officers who maintain (as many do) that they separate their personal views and voting behavior from 

their duties may underestimate the subtle and potentially corrosive effects of partisanship on their behavior, leadership, morale, and attitude towards the 

president. Soldiering is a “24/7” business, and such 

compartmentalizations are not normally accepted by 

military officers in other areas of their professional 

life. Officers have the right to vote, but those who go 

beyond the private exercise of that right need to be 

aware of the implications for civil-military relations.50

Feaver and Kohn characterize the effect of military officers’ overt partisanship as “corrosive,” implying 

a slow degradation of trust and confidence over time. 

During his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey also emphasized the principle of trust, 

arguing that a breakdown in the nonpartisan ethic 

threatens to erode the trust between the military and 

the American public: “One of the things that marks us 

as a profession in a democracy is it’s most important we 

remain apolitical. That’s how we maintain our trust with 

the American people. The American people don’t want 

us to become another special interest group. In fact, I 

think that confuses them.”51

The Gallup Poll, which annually measures the 

American public’s confidence in institutions, reported in 

2015 that 72 percent of Americans had a “great deal” or 

“quite a lot” of confidence in the military, putting it atop 

the list of all institutions measured for the past 18 years 

in a row.52 Dempsey and other scholars of civil-military 

relations question the durability of such trust and confidence levels if the American public begins to view the 

military as a politicized or partisan organization.
As this study proceeds, it aims to answer the following questions: what are the nature and extent of political 

expression by members of the military on social media? 

How does political expression on social media vary between active duty and retired members and between 

members of the military and nonmilitary alike? Do 

members of the military violate the nonpartisan ethic 

on social media, and is there a distinction between the 

political expression of active duty and retired members 

of the military? And finally, what kind of partisan linkages to Servicemembers’ social media political expression, if any, can be discerned?

Through a survey of U.S. military students attending the five colleges of the National Defense University 

(NDU) and Cadets attending the United States Military 

Academy, this project aims to gain a better understanding of the nature of political expression by members of 

the military. While the broad topic of politicization in 

the military garners significant attention among civil-military scholars and interested practitioners, only a 

handful of military public opinion surveys on political 

attitudes over the past 25 years exist, and none to date 

provide insights into the military’s political behavior on 

social media. The findings from this study are meant to 

inform both students of civil-military relations as well 

as senior military leaders and defense officials who aim 

to safeguard and promote the nonpartisan ethic, especially in the emerging realm of social media.

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Methodology 11

This paper relies upon the observations of a sample of military officers attending the National Defense University (n = 230) and Cadets attending the United States Military Academy at West 

Point (n = 307). While West Point Cadets are future 

officers still in a pre-commissioning status, this study 

often refers to the entire sample of both National Defense University (NDU) students and West Point Cadets as military elites, following a classification used in 

similar past research.53

To avoid potential social desirability bias, this survey 

primarily asked respondents questions about their observations of the behavior and attitudes of their military 

and nonmilitary friends on social media websites, as opposed to asking respondents to report details about their 

own political expression on social media. While this approach may help reduce the likelihood of respondents 

to under-report or over-report in an attempt to provide 

what they believe is “the correct” answer to a somewhat 

sensitive question, it is not without its own limitations. 

Chiefly, it relies upon the survey respondents to serve as 

accurate observers of their friends’ political expression 

on social media, and this of course entails some bias. 

Nonetheless, given the dearth of survey research on political attitudes and participation by members of the military, and given the untapped arena of how such attitudes 

play out on social media, this sample of convenience is 

sufficient to draw some initial conclusions about the behavior and attitudes of members of the military at the 

intersection of politics and social media.

From December 1 to 18, 2015, and again from January 14 to 21, 2016, this Internet-based survey (appendix A) was administered to military officers enrolled in 

the five main colleges within NDU: the National War 

College, the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, the College of International Security Affairs (CISA), the Information 

Resources Management College, and the Joint Forces 

Staff College (JFSC). The majority of officers surveyed 

across NDU were students attending senior service college, although officers enrolled in CISA and JFSC were 

not exclusively senior service college students. Students 

attending CISA also included a cohort at Fort Bragg 

enrolled in the Joint Special Operations Master of Arts 

Program, while officers surveyed in JFSC included 

those enrolled in both the Joint Advanced Warfighting School and the Joint and Combined Warfighting 

School. From December 8 to 18, 2015, the same survey 

was administered to sophomore Cadets at West Point 

enrolled in the core course, Introduction to American 

Politics. All Cadets are required to take Introduction to 

American Politics while at West Point, usually during 

their sophomore year, and therefore this population 

represents roughly half of the class of 2018. Additional 

information on response rates and sample demographics can be found in appendix B to this study.

Methodology

Findings 13

F

indings from the Politics, the Military, and Social 

Media Survey are grouped into four main sections. The first section reviews the party identification and political ideology of the survey’s respondents 

and compares those findings against surveys of the officer corps over the past 30 years. While the partisan 

and ideological make-up of the officer corps is not the 

primary focus of this study, both factors denote significant differences in the military’s nature and extent of 

political expression through social media. This paper’s 

analysis must begin there.

The next section details the extent of social media 

usage by respondents, noting the significant impact that 

age or generational cohort has on social media use, frequency of access, and friend groups, and the extent to 

which politics intersects with social media. Following 

that, the subsequent section examines the nature and 

extent of political discussions on social media. Analysis here centers on relative comparisons among the 

levels and types of political activity undertaken by nonmilitary, active duty, and retired military social media 

friends. The fourth and final section of findings begins 

by assessing the degree of alignment between the political views of respondents and their social media friends. 

It then explores to what degree respondents are made 

uncomfortable by their friends’ political posts and 

whether or not they sever social media ties with those 

friends. Finally, this section closes with a look at political 

behavior on social media that is considered at odds with 

the military’s apolitical, nonpartisan ethic. Throughout 

all of this, the nuanced role that party identification and 

political ideology play will be closely studied.

Party Identification and Ideology

Party affiliation and political ideology are two currents 

that run through this entire paper. While not the study’s 

central focus, both factors have tended to illuminate 

differences in more substantive matters in civil-military 

relations.54 It only follows that party identification and 

ideology may also suggest different attitudes about political participation and expression within the military 

and varying levels of participation across social media.

Table 1 summarizes the party identification of 

West Point Cadets and NDU students along both a seven-point and three-point scale. Overall, 54 percent of 

those surveyed identified themselves as Republicans, 

compared to 24 percent who identified as Democrats 

and 14 percent as Independents. Despite the age difference, the results for West Point Cadets and NDU 

students are fairly similar, although West Point Cadets 

were slightly more likely to affiliate with the Democratic 

Party, while NDU students were somewhat more apt to 

identify as Independents.55 The seven-point scale is also 

useful in identifying strength of partisanship. Only 18 

percent of respondents are considered strong partisans, 

the most of whom are Republicans, while the vast majority of those surveyed are weak partisans.

The strong tendency of the officer corps to identify 

with the Republican Party has been well-documented 

since the advent of the all-volunteer force.56 Table 2 

shows a comparison between the party identification of 

respondents in this study and findings from past surveys of comparable military elite samples going back to 

1988.57 First, while this study confirms that a majority 

of military elites continue to identify as Republicans 

Findings
today, NDU students questioned in this study were 

anywhere from 6 to 12 percentage points less likely to 

affiliate with the Republican Party than those of equal 

rank queried in surveys done over the past 30 years. 

This observation should not be overlooked since, with 

the exception of periodic Military Times surveys, this 

survey might be the first since the late 1980s to find 

that less than 60 percent of military elites self-identify 

with the Republican Party.58 Second, while rates of affiliation with the Republican Party have remained relatively the same among West Point Cadets over the past 

12 years, a growing trend may be emerging where a 

larger proportion seem to be self-identifying as Democrats, evident by just 9 percent who indicated they 

were Democrats in 1998‒1999, compared to 28 percent 

today. This trend is mirrored among NDU students. 

About 19 percent of NDU students identified as Democrats today, compared to just 5 to 7 percent who did 

so in the 1980s and 1990s.

It is unclear if these changes in party affiliation 

are the result of partisan relabeling. Past research has 

found partisanship to be highly durable over time, 

and while some people’s attitudes change over their 

lifetime, other research has found little-to-no evidence of officers changing their affiliation after joining 

the military.59 A possible explanation is that a cohort 

effect is in play here, where a slightly greater proportion of Democrats have joined the military over the 

past 20 years and are continuing to join. Although a 

majority of the officer corps will still likely identify 

with the Republican Party in the years to come, it may 

no longer be at the record rates that characterized the 

past three decades.

Party identification and ideology, while often highly correlated, are two different things. Ideologies are 

loose belief systems, often abstract, while parties can be 

thought of as coalitions that form in order to win elections and achieve policy objectives.60 Nearly 60 years ago, 

Huntington wrote that the military ethic, shaped by its 

“functional imperative,” could be characterized as realist 

and conservative in nature, and in doing so, he laid the 

groundwork for what has become nearly an unassailable 

belief over time: that military elites are ideologically political conservatives as well.61 As with the data presented 

Table 1. Party Identification of Military Elites

Party Identification 

percent checking each option

Strong 

Democrat

Weak

Democrat

Lean 

Democrat Independent

Lean 

Republican

Weak 

Republican

Strong 

Republican Other

TOTAL (n = 521) 3.84 5.37 14.59 14.40 26.30 14.01 13.82 7.68

West Point Cadets 3.63 6.93 17.16 10.89 26.07 14.19 15.18 5.94

NDU Students 4.19 2.79 10.70 19.53 26.51 13.95 12.09 10.23

O4s 6.45 0.00 12.90 19.35 29.03 12.90 9.68 9.68

O5s 3.87 3.87 9.68 20.65 26.45 15.48 10.97 9.03

O6s 3.57 0.00 14.29 14.29 25.00 7.14 21.43 14.29

Democrat Independent Republican Other

TOTAL (n = 521) 23.88 14.40 54.13 7.38

West Point Cadets 27.72 10.89 55.45 5.94

NDU Students 17.67 19.53 52.56 9.57

O4s 19.35 19.35 51.61 9.68

O5s 17.42 20.65 52.90 9.03

O6s 17.86 14.29 53.57 14.29

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

To create a 3-point party identification scale, Independent “leaners” are counted as Democrats or Republicans.

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Findings 15

on party identification over time, empirical evidence has 

largely backed up that assumption, perhaps until now.

The political ideology of those surveyed in this study 

is summarized in table 3. While 47 percent of those surveyed self-identified as some degree of conservative, as 

shown in the seven-point scale, more respondents identified as moderates than any other category. Few have 

extreme ideological views, evident by the 75 percent of 

respondents clustered in the middle of the seven-point 

scale, identifying as moderate, somewhat liberal, or somewhat conservative. As with party affiliation, responses by 

West Point Cadets and NDU students are quite similar, 

although a slightly larger proportion of West Point Cadets self-identified as liberal than NDU students. 

Just as levels of party affiliation appear to be undergoing a slight change within the officer corps, political 

ideology is also experiencing a noticeable shift. Table 4 

provides a comparison of respondents’ ideology against 

ideology of officers in past surveys. The ideology of 

both West Point Cadets and NDU students has changed 

considerably, with the percentage of those self-identifying as moderate or liberal outnumbering those who 

describe themselves as conservative for perhaps the first 

time in decades. The most dramatic shift has come in 

NDU students over time, where 75 percent described 

themselves as conservative in 1988 compared to only 46 

percent today. West Point Cadets have witnessed a similar but less dramatic decline, while the net result has 

Table 2. Party Identification of Military Elites Then and Now: A Comparison to Past Surveys

Party Identification Among Select Groups of Military Elites, 1988–2016

percent checking each option

Democrats Independents Republicans Other/No Preference

Triangle Institute for Security Studies Survey, 

1998–1999 West Point Cadets (n = 272) 8.82 20.22 48.53 22.43

West Point Cadet Pre-Election

Survey, 2004 (n = 871) 12.00 27.00 61.00

Civil-Military Relations in a 

Time of War Survey, 2009

Army O1s/O2s (n = 646)

23.68 14.86 52.94 8.51

Politics, the Military, and Social

Media Survey, 2015–2016

West Point Cadets (n=307)

27.72 10.89 55.45 5.94

Foreign Policy Leadership Project, 1988, NWC 

Students (n = 91) 6.59 26.37 60.44 6.59

Foreign Policy Leadership Project

1992, NWC Students (n = 103) 4.85 22.33 66.02 6.80

Triangle Institute for Security Studies Survey, 

1998–1999 

NWC and ICAF Students (n = 109)

6.42 18.34 63.30 11.93

Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War Survey, 

2009

Army O5 & O6s (n = 1,216)

13.16 16.20 65.38 5.02

Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 

2015–2016

NWC and ES Students (n = 148)

18.92 19.59 54.05 7.43

TISS Survey question, “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?”

2004 Cadet Pre-Election Survey question, “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?”

Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War Survey and Politics and Social Media question, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as 

a strong Democrat, a not very strong Democrat, an Independent who leans Democrat, an Independent, an Independent who leans Republican, a 

not very strong Republican, a strong Republican, or what?” 

Independent “leaners” in the Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War survey and Politics, Military, and Social Media survey are counted as 

Democrats or Republicans.
Table 3. Ideological Self-Identification of Military Elites

Ideological Self-Identification

percent checking each option

Very Liberal Liberal

Somewhat 

Liberal Moderate

Somewhat

Conservative Conservative

Very

Conservative

TOTAL (n = 519) 1.73 6.36 13.49 31.79 19.46 22.16 5.01

West Point Cadets 2.29 7.84 14.71 30.07 17.65 22.22 5.23

NDU Students 0.95 4.29 11.90 33.81 21.90 22.38 4.76

O4s 3.23 12.90 6.45 32.26 25.81 16.13 3.23

O5s 0.66 3.29 12.50 36.18 19.08 23.68 4.61

O6s 0.00 0.00 14.81 22.22 33.33 22.22 7.41

Liberal Moderate Conservative

TOTAL (n = 519) 21.58 31.79 46.63

West Point Cadets 24.84 30.07 45.10

NDU Students 17.14 33.81 49.05

O4s 22.58 32.26 45.16

O5s 16.45 36.18 47.37

O6s 14.81 22.22 62.96

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

Table 4. Ideological Self-Identification of Military Elites Then and Now: A Comparison to Past Surveys

Ideological Self-Identification Among Select Groups of Military Elites, 1988–2016

percent checking each option

Liberal Moderate Conservative 

Triangle Institute for Security Studies Survey, 1998–1999

West Point Cadets (n = 272) 15.07 21.32 54.41

West Point Cadet Pre-election Survey, 2004 (n = 871) 20.00 19.00 61.00

Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War Survey, 2009 

Army O1s and O2s (n = 641) 18.25 29.64 52.11

Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015–2016

West Point Cadets (n = 306) 24.84 30.07 45.10

Foreign Policy Leadership Project 1988, NWC Students (n = 91) 3.30 19.78 76.92

Foreign Policy Leadership Project 1992, NWC Students (n = 103) 3.88 20.39 75.73

Triangle Institute for Security Studies Survey, 1998–1999

NWC and ICAF Students (n = 109) 5.50 33.94 60.55

Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War Survey, 2009 

Army O5s & O6s (n = 1,215) 10.04 23.13 66.83

Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015–2016

NWC and ES Students (n = 145) 17.93 35.86 46.21

FPLP and TISS Survey question, “How would you describe your views on political matters? Far left, Very liberal, Somewhat liberal, Moderate, 

Somewhat conservative, Very conservative, Far right.”

Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War Survey and Politics and Social Media question, “Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views 

that people might hold are arranged from very liberal to very conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale? Very liberal, Liberal, 

Somewhat liberal, Moderate, Somewhat Conservative, Conservative, or Very Conservative?”

2004 Cadet Pre-election Survey question, “In terms of politics and political beliefs, where would you place yourself? Extremely liberal, Liberal, 

Slightly Liberal, Moderate, Slightly Conservative, Conservative, or Extremely Conservative?”

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Findings 17

roughly the same percentage of West Point Cadets and 

NDU students identifying as conservative today.

While the percentage of those self-identifying as conservatives has dropped, there has been an ensuing increase 

in the percentage of moderates and liberals. Roughly a 

quarter of West Point Cadets identify as liberal, up from 

15 percent in the late 1990s, and 30 percent now identify as moderate, an increase in 9 percentage points over 

the same timeframe. NDU students also are more apt to 

identify as liberal or moderate today than they were in 

the late 1980s, with 18 percent now identifying as liberal 

compared to just 3 percent in 1988 and 36 percent identifying as moderate today, up from 20 percent in 1988. 

What does this all mean? First, while more research 

is necessary, the political make-up of military elites may 

be changing for the first time in decades, and that carries important implications that are beyond just the interest of political scientists. As past studies have shown, 

both party affiliation and ideology trigger differences in 

other, more substantive areas of civil-military relations. 

It is also significant because this is one of the first surveys in many years to suggest military elites are not all 

overwhelmingly conservative Republicans. To be sure, 

clear majorities of military elites still are conservative 

Republicans, but the changes occurring over time indicate perhaps a more politically diverse group is joining 

the military than in years past. Alternatively, it could 

be that military elites today are less likely to identify as 

Republicans due to the fractious nature of the 2016 Republican presidential nomination contest or changing 

dynamics within the Republican Party.62 More immediately, these findings also set the stage for the remainder 

of this study’s observations and reaffirm the centrality 

that party affiliation and ideology have in shaping our 

understanding of political behavior on social media.

Social Media Usage and Characteristics

Findings from the Politics, the Military, and Social Media 

Survey depict an officer corps actively engaged in social 

media networking sites, with age or generational cohort 

signaling predicted, but significant differences in the extent to which respondents use social media. As table 5 

shows, 71 percent of those surveyed responded that they 

have multiple social media accounts and only 9 percent 

reported they have none at all. More officers reported 

having a Facebook account than any other type of social 

media account measured (87 percent), although Facebook use was higher among West Point Cadets (94 percent) than among NDU students (77 percent). Age and 

rank have other expected impacts on social media use. 

For example, a significant disparity exists between West 

Point Cadets and NDU students’ likelihood of having 

LinkedIn accounts, with only 15 percent of West Point 

Cadets having this account compared to 58 percent of 

NDU students and 82 percent of officers in the grade 

of O6 specifically. This is not surprising, as LinkedIn is 

a professionally-geared social media networking site, 

used predominantly by employed college graduates, 

and it may be the only social media site where the proportion of 50- to 64-year-old users is higher than the 

proportion of 18- to 24-year-old users nationwide.63

Likewise, West Point Cadets were more likely to report 

having Twitter and YouTube accounts than their senior 

officer counterparts. With the exception of LinkedIn, we 

would expect West Point Cadets to be more prolific in 

their social media use and more diverse in the variety 

of accounts they have than more senior officers because 

of their young age or generational cohort, and findings 

from this survey confirm that.64

Differences in social media use based on party affiliation and ideology are not statistically significant. It 

should be noted, however, that the Pew Research Center’s 

2012 study, “Social Media and Political Engagement,” did 

find statistically significant differences in the use of social 

networking sites and Twitter, with Democrats reporting 

higher rates of use than Republicans and liberals higher 

rates than conservatives.65 Future research involving a 

larger, nonrandom sample of military officers may find 

differences in social media usage based on partisanship 

and ideology that are more meaningful.
Table 5. Social Media Use by Military Elites

Military Elites with Social Media Networking Accounts

percent checking each option

Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Google+ YouTube

No Social 

Media 

Accounts

Multiple 

Social Media 

Accounts

TOTAL (n = 526) 86.88 31.18 33.27 26.05 44.30 9.32 70.72

West Point Cadets 93.81*** 36.81*** 15.31*** 27.36 56.68*** 4.56*** 73.62

NDU Students 76.85*** 23.15*** 58.33*** 23.15 27.31*** 16.20*** 66.20

O4s 87.10 25.81 58.06 29.03 48.39 12.90 77.42

O5s 74.36 23.72 53.85 23.08 24.36 17.95 62.18

O6s 78.57 17.86 82.14 17.86 21.43 10.71 75.00

Democrats 90.32 32.26 26.61 30.65 58.06 7.26 75.00

Independents 85.33 18.67 40.00 25.33 40.00 14.67 66.67

Republicans 86.52 34.75 35.11 24.47 39.36 8.16 71.28

Liberals 91.07 26.79 28.57 30.36 58.04 8.93 73.21

Moderates 87.27 31.52 35.15 26.06 48.48 8.48 75.76

Conservatives 85.54 33.06 34.30 24.38 35.54 9.50 66.5

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

*** Difference between West Point Cadets and NDU students significant at p < .001 

in all categories except Google+ and Multiple Social Media Accounts.

Table 6. Frequency of Social Media Usage by Military Elites

How Often Military Elites Access Their Social Media Accounts

percent checking each option

Several Times 

a Day

About Once a 

Day

A Few Days a 

Week

Every Few 

Weeks Less Often I’m Not Sure

TOTAL (n = 476) 55.04 24.16 13.45 4.41 2.73 0.21

West Point Cadets 70.21*** 20.55* 7.53*** 1.03*** 0.34*** 0.34***

NDU Students 31.49*** 29.28* 23.20*** 9.39*** 6.63*** 0.00*** 

O4s 51.85 18.52 22.22 3.70 3.70 0.00

O5s 29.69 31.25 21.88 8.59 8.59 0.00

O6s 20.00 28.00 32.00 20.00 0.00 0.00

Democrats 64.35* 20.87 11.30 1.74* 0.87 0.87

Independents 46.88* 29.69 14.06 7.81* 1.56 0.00

Republicans 55.43 21.71 13.95 5.04 3.88 0.00

Liberals 60.78 25.49 11.76 0.98* 0.98 0.00

Moderates 54.30 23.84 13.25 6.62* 1.99 0.00

Conservatives 53.21 22.94 14.68 4.59 4.59 0.00

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

*** Difference between West Point Cadets and NDU students significant at p < .001 

in all categories except “About Once a Day,” which is significant at p < .05

* Difference in proportions test statistically significant at p < .05: between Democrats and Independents 

for “Several Times a Day” and “Every Few Weeks;” and between liberals and moderates for “Every Few Weeks.”

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Findings 19

The frequency of social media use among respondents is also largely a function of age or generation. As 

table 6 shows, while 55 percent of respondents indicated 

they check their social media accounts several times a 

day, 70 percent of West Point Cadets reported doing so, 

compared to just 31 percent of NDU students. While an 

argument could be made that college students simply 

have more time on their hands compared to more senior military officers at work all day, West Point Cadets, 

with their famously packed schedules, are also not your 

typical college students. Moreover, age or the proxy 

variable of rank shows further variation in frequency 

of social media access. For example, 52 percent of O4s 

(majors and lieutenant commanders) reported checking their social media accounts multiple times a day 

compared to 30 percent of O5s (lieutenant colonels and 

commanders) and 20 percent of O6s (colonels and captains). Party affiliation also highlights a slight difference 

in the frequency of social media use, with 64 percent of 

Democrats accessing their accounts multiple times a day 

compared to 47 percent of Independents. However, the 

absence of any discernible difference in the frequency 

of social media access between Democrats and Republicans suggests that party affiliation is not a significant 

factor in the frequency of social media access, at least 

in this sample. Ultimately, age seems to explain most of 

the variance in social media usage among military elites.

The impact of party affiliation is a bit more evident 

when examining to what degree military officers enjoy 

talking about politics and to what extent they get news 

about politics from social media. As depicted in table 7, 63 

percent of respondents indicated they enjoy talking about 

government and politics with friends and family, a figure 

that did not vary substantially based on rank or political 

ideology. However, subtle differences in party affiliation 

and partisan strength are evident. A higher proportion of 

Republican respondents (66 percent) reported enjoying 

talking about politics compared to Independents (53 percent), but the proportions of Republicans and Democrats 

were virtually indistinguishable. What is more evident 

than partisan identification, however, is the impact of partisan strength, as a larger proportion of strong partisans 

(75 percent) indicated they enjoyed talking about politics 

than weak partisans (63 percent). This latter finding is 

consistent with past research that has shown strong partisans to have a greater interest and involvement in politics, 

better knowledge about politics, and higher voter turnout 

levels than weak partisans and pure Independents.66

Respondents’ degree of interest in politics is an important factor in this study, as much of the analysis of the 

military’s political participation in social media is based 

on respondents’ observations of their military friends’ political activity on social media sites. Respondents who are 

generally interested in politics are likely to be cognizant 

of their friends’ political behavior, as opposed to those 

who might have an aversion to politics altogether. AnothTable 7. Military Elites’ Interest 

in Talking About Politics

percent checking “a lot” or “some”

How much do you enjoy talking about government 

and politics with friends and family?

TOTAL (n = 520) 63.46

West Point Cadets 65.25

NDU Students 60.85

O4s 66.67

O5s 60.78

O6s 57.14

Democrats 64.46

Independents 53.33*

Republicans 66.43*

Strong Partisans1 74.73*

Weak Partisans2 63.23*

Liberals 62.39

Moderates 60.00

Conservatives 67.08

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016. 1

Strong Partisans are respondents who self-identified as Strong 

Democrats or Strong Republicans.

2

Weak Partisans are respondents who self-identified as Weak 

Democrats, Independents Who Lean Democrat, Independents Who 

Lean Republican, or Weak Republicans.

* Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .05: 

between Republicans and Independents and between Strong 

Partisans and Weak Partisans.
er gauge of political awareness important to this study is 

whether or not respondents consume news about politics 

through their social media networking sites, as portrayed 

in table 8. Notably, 68 percent of those surveyed indicated 

they get some news from Facebook, by far the top social 

media vote-getter among respondents.

As with overall social media use, the impact of age 

or generational cohort is again evident, with 80 percent of West Point Cadets indicating they get some of 

their political news from Facebook compared to only 

49 percent of NDU students.67 This age or generational impact is expected and consistent with past research. 

For example, a 2014 Pew Research Center study found 

that 61 percent of Millennials (those aged 18 to 33 in 

2014) reported consuming political news on Facebook, 

compared to 51 percent of Generation Xers (those aged 

34 to 49 in 2014) and only 39 percent of Baby Boomers 

(those aged 50 to 68 in 2014).68 That West Point Cadets 

had a higher rate than Millennials surveyed in the Pew 

study is not surprising. First, the West Point Cadets are 

probably better educated than the Pew sample, as the 

latter would have included both college graduates and 

noncollege graduates, and college students and graduates are more apt to consume political news in the first 

Table 8. Military Elites Who Use Social Media as a News Source

Military Elites Who Get News from Their Social Media Networking Accounts percent checking each option

Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Google+ YouTube

TOTAL 67.99 16.14 3.14 4.19 19.08

West Point Cadets 79.86*** 18.09 1.37** 3.41 27.30***

NDU Students 49.45*** 13.26 6.08** 5.52 6.08***

O4s 51.85 11.11 0.00 7.41 7.41

O5s 53.49 15.62 7.03 3.91 5.47

O6s 28.00 4.00 8.00 12.00 8.00

Democrats 76.52* 17.39 3.48 5.22 26.96*

Independents 59.38* 7.81* 0.00 4.69 12.50*

Republicans 67.95 18.15* 3.47 3.09 16.22*

Strong Partisans 74.42 22.09 3.49 2.33 18.60

Weak Partisans 69.44 16.67 3.47 4.17 19.79

Liberals 79.41* 10.78 1.96 6.86 25.49*

Moderates 66.45* 17.22 2.65 3.31 19.21

Conservatives 64.38* 17.81 4.11 3.20 15.98*

Enjoy Talking Politics 69.67 18.06 3.68 4.01 20.07

Dislike Talking Politics 64.74 12.72 2.31 4.05 17.92

(n) 478 477 477 477 477

Pew American Trends Panel 48 9 3 6 14

Millennials (Ages 18–33) 61 14 2 7 23

Generation X (Ages 34-49) 51 9 3 6 11

(n) 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901

Sources: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016 and Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel (Wave 1), 2014.

*** Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets and NDU Students for getting news from Facebook and YouTube statistically 

significant at p < .001.

** Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets and NDU Students for getting news from LinkedIn statistically significant at p < .01.

* Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .05: for getting news from Facebook between liberals and conservatives, between 

liberals and moderates, and between Democrats and Independents; for getting news from Twitter between Independents and Republicans; for 

getting news from YouTube between Democrats and Republicans, between Democrats and Independents, and between liberals and conservatives.

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Findings 21

place. But more importantly, age once again is a critical 

factor, as the Millennial cohort included individuals in 

their early 30s, while everyone in the West Point sample 

was between 18 and 24 years old. Younger digital natives 

are more active and more comfortable on social media 

than older digital natives, and certainly more so than 

digital immigrants.69

Although age or generation is the most noteworthy effect here, political ideology and partisan identification indicate slightly different patterns in news 

consumption through social media. A greater proportion of liberals (79 percent) reported getting political 

news through Facebook than both moderates (66 percent) and conservatives (64 percent), just as a greater 

proportion of liberals (25 percent) reported getting 

news from YouTube than conservatives (16 percent) 

did. Likewise, a higher percentage of Democrats (77 

percent) reported consuming news through Facebook 

than Independents (59 percent). Of note, there were 

no discernible differences in political news consumption on social media between those who naturally enjoy talking about politics with their friends and family 

and those who do not. Nor was strength of partisanship a factor. Again, of the variables measured in this 

study, age or generational cohort has the strongest association with social media use, in terms of variety of 

accounts, frequency of access, and propensity to consume news about politics through such sites.

The size and composition of respondents’ social 

media networks also highlight significant differences 

between the samples of West Point Cadets and NDU 

students. Figures 1a and 1b present histograms of social media friend networks as reported by West Point 

Cadets and NDU students, respectively. The average 

number of friends reported by West Point Cadets was 

794 (standard error = 35.66, median = 629) compared 

Figure 1. Number of Social Media Friends:

A Comparison Between West Point Cadets and NDU Students

Figure 1a. Number of West Point Cadets’ Social Media Friends

Number of Social Media Friends

As Reported by USMA Cadets

Mean = 794.29 S.E. = 35.66 Median = 629

Number of Friends

Percent

25

20

15

10

5

0

0 1000 2000 3000 4000

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.
to NDU students’ average of 265 friends (standard error = 17.65, median = 200).70 The West Point Cadet 

histogram displays much more variance, with a higher standard error, compared to the NDU student histogram, which has a more narrow distribution and 

smaller standard error. Nonetheless, the difference 

between the two samples is significant and striking.71

West Point Cadets have nearly three times as many 

friends on social media than senior officers who are 

twice the Cadets’ age.

At the outset, the difference in the sizes of friend 

networks seems remarkable, if not counterintuitive, 

given the relative young age of West Point Cadets compared to their more senior officer counterparts. Yet it 

is probable that West Point Cadets have been active on 

social media accounts longer than their elders, and the 

findings in this Politics, the Military, and Social Media 

Survey are not dissimilar from past Pew studies. According to a 2013 Pew Research Center study, the average number of friends for adult Facebook users was 

338, and the median was 200—statistics similar to those 

of NDU students.72 Yet the median number of friends 

of 18- to 29-year-olds in the Pew study was 300, and 

nearly one-third of that age group had more than 500 

friends—far more comparable to the large social media 

networks reported by West Point Cadets.

While the West Point Cadets’ networks of social 

media friends are far larger than the NDU students’ networks, the make-up of these friend networks also varies 

considerably. Figure 2 shows the proportion of respondents’ social media friends who are affiliated with the military (active duty or retired) compared to those who are 

civilian or have no military affiliation. Again, the differences between West Point Cadets and NDU students are 

striking, but not unexpected. NDU students’ social media friends exhibit a normal distribution curve, with the 

largest proportion of respondents indicating that 40‒60 

percent of their social media friends had some affiliation 

with the military. In contrast, the West Point Cadet curve 

is heavily skewed, with nearly half of Cadets reporting 

Figure 1b. Number of NDU Students’ Social Media Friends 

Number of Social Media Friends

As Reported by NDU Students (04s, 05s, 06s)

Mean = 265.41 S.E. = 17.67 Median = 200

Number of Friends

Percent

25

20

15

10

5

0

0 500 1000 1500

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

22 Like, Comment, Retweet
Findings 23

that less than 20 percent of their social media friends 

were affiliated with the military. While West Point Cadets 

have far larger social media friend networks than NDU 

students, Cadets’ friend groups were probably formed in 

high school and reflect limited exposure to others in the 

military at this stage in their careers. Their friends affiliated with the military are probably other West Point Cadets 

or friends from high school who enlisted in the military, 

joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps, or attended a 

sister service academy.73

Nature and Extent of Political Expression 

on Social Media by Servicemembers

Much of this study’s findings regarding political expression on social media by members of the military relies 

upon respondents’ observations of their social media 

friends’ behavior. To this end, respondents were first 

asked whether or not their military friends, either active 

duty or retired, often talk about politics on social media 

networking sites. Overall, 45 percent of respondents responded affirmatively, but this figure varied significantly, 

with 51 percent of West Point Cadets indicating that their 

military friends talk politics compared to just 35 percent 

of NDU students (see table 9). This finding offers some 

initial evidence in support of the proposition that the 

nonpartisan ethic is largely a function of professionalism 

over time. Officers in the grade of O5 or O6 have made 

the military a career and are more likely to reflect institutionalized norms and values of the profession, whereas 

those in a pre-commissioning status have not been socialized to the profession to the same extent and may feel less 

bound to the constraints associated with the profession. 

Figure 2. Percentage of Military Elites’ Social Media Friends 

Who Are Also Affiliated with the Military

USMA Cadets

NDU Students*

Percentage of Respondents

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Less Than 20% 

of Social Media 

Friends Affiliated 

with Military

20–40% of Social 

Media Friends 

Affiliated with 

Military

40–60% of Social 

Media Friends 

Affiliated with 

Military

60–80% of Social 

Media Friends 

Affiliated with 

Military

More Than 80% 

of Social Media 

Friends Affiliated 

with Military

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

* NDU Students include O4s, O5s, and O6s.

Percentage of Respondents’ Social Media Friends Affiliated with the Military
Still, as the data in table 9 shows, this idea of socialization to the profession is not perfectly linear. Fifty-six 

percent of officers in the grade of O4 (majors and lieutenant commanders) indicated their military friends on 

social media often talk about politics—a figure closer to 

that of West Point Cadets than to O5s and O6s. Admittedly, O4s form a small segment of the overall sample (n 

= 31), but it is somewhat surprising that their response 

more closely mirrors that of Cadets nearly 15 years their 

junior as opposed to O5s who are only a couple years 

older than they are. It could be that O4s have a more diverse set of military friends than either their more junior 

or more senior counterparts. At this point in their careers with over 10 years of service, most O4s have probably made the decision to stay in the military for a full 

20-year career, yet it is likely a good number of their military-affiliated friends on social media are more junior. 

Therefore, O4s may have a more diverse group of military friends on social media, whereas the more junior or 

senior cohorts may more closely reflect their peer group.

Two other variables elicited statistically significant 

responses that are worth examining a bit further. First, 

a significant difference of 12 percentage points exists 

between liberals and conservatives with respect to having friends who often talk about politics on social media. There are at least two ways to interpret this. First, 

liberal officers may be more likely than conservatives to 

indicate their friends often talk about politics, because 

their friends are mostly liberal, and liberal members 

of the military may be more outspoken about politics 

than their conservative peers. Conversely, a second explanation is liberal officers may report their friends talk 

about politics a lot because their friends share dissimilar political views, and liberal officers are more conscious of political dialogue since they are a minority 

in the officer corps. It is unclear at this point, but this 

theme will be revisited in later sections, when the role 

ideology and partisan identification play in social media discourse is more apparent.

A second variable here is worth highlighting. As table 

9 highlights, respondents who enjoy talking about politics were more likely to indicate their military-affiliated 

social media friends also often talk about politics. Several 

things could explain this. It could be that people who enjoy talking about politics tend to also have friends who 

also like to talk about politics, just as those who dislike 

talking about politics tend to associate with like-minded people. Alternatively, even if people who enjoy talking 

about politics have both friends who actively talk about 

politics and those who do not, they may be more sensitized to and cognizant of discussions of politics compared to those who have a general dislike of politics.

While the data in table 9 is useful in providing a 

simple snapshot of political activity by members of 

the military on social media, a relative comparison is 

needed to make better sense of the magnitude of this 

Table 9. Members of the Military Talking About 

Politics on Social Media

percent checking “strongly agree” or “agree”

My military friends (both active duty and 

retired) often talk about politics on social media 

networking sites.

TOTAL (n = 520) 44.54

West Point Cadets 50.85***

NDU Students 35.00***

O4s 55.56

O5s 35.43

O6s 12.00

Democrats 48.25

Independents 37.50

Republicans 43.63

Liberals 53.47*

Moderates 45.03

Conservatives 41.10*

Enjoy Talking Politics 49.16**

Dislike Talking Politics 36.05**

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

*** Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets 

and NDU Students statistically significant at p < .001.

** Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < 

.01: between those who enjoy talking about politics and those 

who do not.

* Difference of proportions test between liberals and 

conservatives statistically significant at p < .05.

24 Like, Comment, Retweet
Findings 25

data. For example, do respondents’ military friends talk 

about politics more or less than their civilian friends? 

And, within the category of military friends, are active 

duty members more or less politically active than retired military? The results of these questions are displayed in tables 10 and 11.

A few caveats are in order, as these relative comparisons have a number of limitations. First, just as the overall survey sample is not intended to be representative of 

the entire military or officer corps, respondents’ civilian 

friends are by no means representative of the broader civilian populace. Nonetheless, having respondents contrast the political activity of their military and civilian 

friends provides a baseline comparison that is useful, 

absent any results from large-scale, random-sample inquiries. Second, while differences between West Point 

Cadets and NDU students have characterized much of 

the preceding analysis, comparisons between the two 

subsamples are less useful in this next section due to the 

low confidence in the data reported by West Point Cadets. While West Point Cadets have a sufficient sample 

of military friends on social media to provide valuable 

insights throughout this study, it is less likely they are 

able to draw meaningful comparisons between active 

duty and retired military, given the likely composition 

of their social media friend network. Many West Point 

Cadets may have no retired military friends whatsoever, except those with family members who might have 

served careers in the military. Thus, while data from 

West Point Cadets is nonetheless reported in tables 9 

and 10, the focus of this analysis centers on NDU students, who arguably have a more diverse circle of military friends from which to draw comparisons.

As table 10 outlines, 46 percent of respondents indicated that their nonmilitary friends talk about politics 

on social media more often than their military friends, 

while 24 percent responded that their military friends 

talk about politics more. Responses by West Point Cadets and NDU students were fairly similar, although the 

more senior the NDU students were, the more likely 

Table 10. Most Active Friends Discussing Politics on Social Media 

Who Is Most Active in Discussing Politics on Social Media? Your Military or Nonmilitary Friends?

percent checking each option

My Nonmilitary 

Friends Talk About 

Politics More

My Nonmilitary 

Friends Talk About 

Politics As Much as 

My Military Friends Do

My Military Friends 

Talk About Politics 

More I’m Not Sure

TOTAL (n = 475) 45.68 24.42 20.63 9.26

West Point Cadets 43.30 25.43 24.40* 6.87*

NDU Students 49.72 22.65 14.92* 12.71*

O4s 37.04 22.22 33.33 7.41

O5s 47.66 26.56 13.28 12.50

O6s 72.00 4.00 4.00 20.00

Democrats 41.74 27.83 24.35 6.09

Independents 42.19 28.12 12.50 17.19

Republicans 48.25 22.57 20.23 8.95

Liberals 41.18 31.37 21.57 5.88

Moderates 44.37 22.52 23.84 9.27

Conservatives 48.39 23.04 18.43 10.14

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

* Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .05: between West Point Cadets and NDU Students for “my military friends talk 

about politics more” and “I’m not sure.”
they were to report their nonmilitary friends talk about 

politics more. Of note, party affiliation and ideology 

elicited no statistically significant differences. 

Table 11 displays the comparison of political expression on social media by active duty and retired military. 

As table 11 shows, 55 percent of NDU students indicated 

their retired friends talk about politics more than their 

active duty friends. As mentioned earlier, little stock 

should be put in the responses of West Point Cadets, 

given the low likelihood they have a sufficient sample of 

retired friends on social media. This is confirmed by the 

high degree of uncertainty in their responses, with 45 

percent of West Point Cadets unsure who among their 

social media friends talks about politics more.

Even NDU students exhibited some ambiguity 

answering this question, as 27 percent indicated they 

were not sure who speaks about politics more. There 

are at least two explanations for this. One reason for 

this ambiguity may simply be that military respondents 

do not pay enough attention to the political chatter by 

their military friends on social media, so they cannot 

distinguish who more actively discusses politics. Yet 

this study has already established that the majority of 

respondents who have social media accounts access 

them every day, consume news about politics through 

social media, and have a general interest in discussing 

politics, so this explanation does not seem adequate. 

An alternative explanation is that respondents cannot 

distinguish who talks about politics more, because the 

active duty and retired distinction, or at least their political opinions, is blurred even in respondents’ minds. 

This carries larger implications for the norms of nonpartisanship and being apolitical, because if military 

respondents tend to blur the opinions of their active 

and retired friends, civilians are even more likely to do 

so. Even if retired military are more politically outspoken than their active duty counterparts, their friends 

on social media, especially those with little connection 

Table 11. Most Active Friends Discussing Politics on Social Media

Who Is Most Active in Discussing Politics on Social Media? Your Active Duty or 

Retired Military Friends?

percent checking each option

My Active Duty 

Friends Talk About 

Politics More

My Active Duty 

Friends Talk About 

Politics as Much as 

My Retired Military 

Friends Do

My Retired Military 

Friends Talk About 

Politics More I’m Not Sure

TOTAL (n = 463) 18.14 10.80 33.05 38.01

West Point Cadets 26.33*** 9.25 19.22*** 45.20***

NDU Students 5.59*** 12.85 54.75*** 26.82***

O4s 7.41 25.93 44.44 22.22

O5s 5.56 11.11 57.94 25.40

O6s 4.00 8.00 48.00 40.00

Democrats (NDU only) 9.38 21.88 46.88 21.88

Independents (NDU only) 6.06 6.06 63.64 24.24

Republicans (NDU only) 5.26 13.68 51.58 29.47

Liberals (NDU only) 3.57 17.86 57.14 21.43

Moderates (NDU only) 6.35 17.46 46.03 30.16

Conservatives (NDU only) 5.95 8.33 59.52 26.19

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

*** Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets and NDU Students statistically significant at p < .001 in all categories except, “my 

active duty friends talk about politics as much as my retired military friends do.”

26 Like, Comment, Retweet
Findings 27

to the military, may see no qualitative difference, concluding simply that the military in general tends to actively talk about politics on social media. 

Table 12 looks at the different political activities taken by respondents’ military friends, both active duty and 

retired, on social media. Seven different measures of political participation are listed across the top row, and, for 

the most part, are arrayed in ascending order of political 

activism from left to right. For example, reposting or sharing a link to a political story is the most restrained form 

of political expression listed, while encouraging others to 

take action on a political issue is the most active form. 

Of note, all forms of political activity are allowable according to DoDD 1344.10 and the Defense Department’s 

Public Affairs Guidance for the 2016 election, with the 

exception of the last category: encouraging others to take 

action on a political issue, which is expressly forbidden.

Well over three-quarters of respondents indicated 

their military friends participate in the first four measures of political expression. While the percentage of 

positive responses from West Point Cadets was higher 

than NDU students in all four categories, more than 70 

percent of NDU students still responded affirmatively, 

with reposting or sharing political stories and posting 

Table 12. Military Friends’ Activity on Social Media Networking Sites

Do Your Military Friends Ever Do the Following on Social Media Networking Sites

percent checking “Yes”

Repost or 

share links to 

political stories

Post links to 

political stories 

or articles for 

others to read

“Like” or promote material 

related to political issues that 

others have 

posted

Post their own 

thoughts/ 

comments on 

political issues

“Friend” or 

follow political 

figures

Encourage 

others to 

vote

Encourage 

others to take 

action on 

political issues

TOTAL 84.42 82.91 77.05 76.00 41.56 32.98 36.71

West Point Cadets 88.01** 88.01*** 80.82* 78.42 51.20*** 30.34 40.07

NDU Students 78.89** 74.86*** 71.67* 72.78 26.11*** 36.67 31.28

O4s 88.89 88.46 88.89 81.48 48.15 40.74 46.15

O5s 79.53 74.02 70.87 74.22 25.20 37.01 31.50

O6s 68.00 68.00 60.00 58.33 8.00 32.00 16.00

Democrats 84.35 84.35 78.26 81.58 44.35 35.96 42.61

Independents 79.69 85.94 74.60 68.75 34.92 32.81 36.51

Republicans 86.05 81.32 76.06 74.52 40.70 29.96 34.11

Liberals 88.24 90.10 84.31* 85.15** 46.08 37.25 44.12

Moderates 83.44 81.46 71.33* 70.20** 36.42 30.67 34.67

Conservatives 84.33 81.57 77.98 76.15 43.06 32.87 35.02

(n) 475 474 475 475 474 473 474

Pew 2012 Survey 33 28 38 34 20 35 31

Ages 18–29 36 33 44 42 25 34 36

Ages 30–49 32 28 40 34 20 36 31

(n) 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209

Sources: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016 and Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project, “Civic 

Engagement Tracking Survey 2012.”

*** Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .001: for posting links to political stories and friending political figures between 

West Point Cadets and NDU students.

** Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .01: for reposting or sharing links to political stories between West Point Cadets and 

NDU Students; for posting their own thoughts and comments on political issues between liberals and moderates.

* Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .05: for liking political material that others have posted between West Point Cadets 

and NDU Students and between liberals and moderates.
links to articles on politics cited as the most commonly performed activities. As table 12 shows, 76 percent 

of respondents overall indicated their military friends 

posted their own thoughts or comments on political issues, which is consistent with past research on political 

participation by Army officers, albeit not in the realm 

of social media. A 2009 survey of more than 4,000 active duty Army officers found that 74 percent indicated 

that they had expressed their personal opinion on political candidates or issues to others.74 Those categories 

with reported high rates of participation are not only 

allowable political activities, but relatively benign on the 

spectrum of political activity.

The next category of political participation has 

more activist, partisan overtones. Approximately 42 

percent of respondents acknowledged that their military friends have “friended” or “followed” political 

figures on social media, but this statistic varied substantially by subsample with 51 percent of West Point 

Cadets reporting this compared to just 26 percent of 

NDU students. While this was nonetheless an allowable 

activity per the Department of Defense’s guidelines, it 

is a more overtly political act than the previously mentioned four activities and carries clear partisan connotations. It is perhaps, then, unsurprising that only 

one-quarter of NDU respondents indicated their military friends do this compared to the younger cohort of 

West Point Cadets who have not been fully socialized 

to the norms of the profession yet. 

The last two categories of political activity measured 

in table 12 are encouraging others to vote and encouraging others to take action on a political issue. Encouraging others to vote, with the obvious caveat that it is not 

done to influence the vote in a particular direction, is embraced by the all-volunteer military. High voter turnout 

rates within the military in recent years are attributed to 

the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 

Act of 1986, and a 2009 survey of Army officers found 

that 80 percent of respondents acknowledged having encouraged others in the Army to vote at some point during 

their careers.75 As table 12 shows, roughly one-third of 

respondents indicated their military friends had used 

social media to encourage others to vote. Why the nearly 50 percentage point difference? Officers may be more 

inclined to make direct, in-person appeals to their work 

colleagues, reflecting adherence to laws and regulations 

adopted over the past several years aimed at providing 

voting assistance and education for military Servicemembers. Many officers view voting and affording others in the military the opportunity to vote as a duty and 

obligation of citizenship, and it makes sense that they are 

more apt to encourage Servicemembers with whom they 

work to vote than their military friends on social media.76

The final category measured was whether or not 

respondents’ military friends encouraged others on 

social media to take action on a political issue. As table 12 highlights, 37 percent of respondents responded 

affirmatively, with a higher proportion of West Point 

Cadets (40 percent) indicating so than NDU students 

(31 percent). This is sensitive ground, as this activity 

clearly violates Department of Defense guidelines that 

prohibit partisan activity and political advocacy. Because respondents were not asked to differentiate between their active duty and retired military friends, it is 

entirely possible that the majority of those responding 

affirmatively had in mind their retired friends, who are 

not subject to the same constraints as those on active 

duty. Yet while that could be true for NDU students, 

40 percent of West Point Cadets indicated their military friends encourage others to take action on political 

issues, and their pool of retired friends is likely quite 

low. Regardless, the data point is noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First, the data here show that military 

members, regardless of their status, discern differences 

along the spectrum of political participation. The large 

proportion of respondents who indicated their military 

friends share political news stories or comment on political articles stands in sharp contrast to the proportion 

of those willing to advocate publicly for a political issue. Yet this last category, which clearly crosses the line 

28 Like, Comment, Retweet
Findings 29

in terms of permissibility, has more than just a small 

number of outliers; nearly two in five respondents indicated their military friends do this.

Comparisons between elite and mass samples are 

full of difficulties and are not the focus of this study. To 

draw meaningful comparisons, a civilian elite sample 

is needed. Yet a brief look at rates of political activity 

among the broader American public is useful, if for no 

other reason than to question the claims of other civil-military relations scholars who have argued that assertions of a politicized military are much ado about 

nothing. Lance Betros argues that while voting is a partisan activity, it is inherently a private one, and voting 

alone cannot constitute a violation of the nonpartisan 

ethic. Moreover, Betros contends that those who argue 

the military is politicized “ascribe to military voters a 

level of partisanship that is uncharacteristic of the voting 

public. The vast majority of people who cast ballots for 

Democrats or Republicans are not partisans.”77 Richard 

Hooker agrees, arguing that “there is no real evidence 

that the military has become increasingly partisan in an 

electoral sense.”78 Thus, Hooker and Betros argue that 

claims that the military has abandoned political neutrality are misleading, because they rely solely on voting 

as a measure of political activity.

Some data supports Betros and Hooker’s argument 

that claims of politicization might be overblown. A 2009 

survey of Army officers queried them on six measures 

of traditional and allowable political activity, ranging 

from donating to political candidates to putting a political bumper sticker on a car. With the exception of 

voting and encouraging others to vote, political participation among Army officers was fairly muted, and they 

appeared no more politically active than the general 

public, as reflected in the American National Election 

Studies surveys.79 But the findings of this study challenge 

the notion that the military is less politically active than 

the general public, at least when it comes to political 

expression on social media. A 2012 Pew Research Center study queried the general public on the same seven 

measures of political expression on social media. The 

military friends of those surveyed in this study were significantly more active in five of the seven categories and 

about equal to the general public’s rate of encouraging 

others to vote or take action on a political issue.80 While 

military officers may be more restrained in traditional 

forms of political activity, such as attending rallies or 

putting bumper stickers on their cars, they appear less 

so in the realm of social media. Scholars who are quick 

to dismiss the politicization charge would be well served 

to consider the implications of a politically active officer 

corps, even if the nature of such political expression may 

be beyond the confines of traditional forms of political 

participation. The very public nature of political expression on social media merits such a reexamination.

Challenges to the Norm of Nonpartisanship

This final section probes the tone and tenor of social 

media posts by members of the military and the extent 

to which they are consistent with the norm of nonpartisanship. To assess that, it is important to revisit 

the interaction between respondents and their military friends. Table 13 shows the degree of alignment 

in political views between respondents and their military friends on social media. Overall, only 26 percent 

of those surveyed responded that the political views of 

their military friends on social media were almost always or often in line with their own views. West Point 

Cadets and NDU students showed remarkable consistency here, with nearly identical percentages reported.

The variance among respondents, however, is clearly 

evident in partisan identification and political ideology. 

Republican respondents (34 percent) were more likely to 

indicate that their military friends on social media shared 

similar political views than both Independent (20 percent) and Democrat (16 percent) respondents. Ideology 

followed even a more pronounced pattern with 39 percent of conservatives indicating similar political views, 

compared to just 15 percent of liberals and 16 percent of 

moderates. When strength of partisanship and ideology 
is taken into account, the differences become magnified. 

For example, 48 percent of strong Republicans indicated they share similar political views with their military 

friends on social media compared to just 6 percent of 

strong Democrats. Likewise, 44 percent of strong conservatives reported similar political leanings, compared to 

zero percent for strong liberals. This evidence shows that 

Republican and conservative respondents are more likely 

to see social media as their echo chamber, seeking to reinforce their own political beliefs, than their Democrat, 

Independent, liberal, and moderate counterparts.

These findings are in line with past research conducted by the Pew Research Center, where a 2014 

study found that “consistent conservatives” were 

twice as likely as average Facebook users to report 

that political posts they saw were consistent with 

their own views. And while “consistent liberals” in 

the Pew study reported a more diverse range of political opinions on Facebook, 32 percent still reported 

sharing similar political views—a far larger proportion than liberals and strong liberals in this study 

reported.81 The military sample from this study may 

mirror trends in the broader American public, where 

Republicans and conservatives are more likely to have 

military-affiliated social media friends with similar 

political views than Democrats and Independents, as 

well as liberals and moderates. However, the proportion of Democrats and liberals in the officer corps is 

also significantly underrepresented compared to the 

broader civilian populace—a finding that not only impacts military elites’ friend networks but also shapes 

respondents’ views of online discourse and how they 

respond to such discourse.

Table 14 delves into this a bit more with a review of 

the politics of “unfriending,” in which respondents were 

asked whether or not they have ever severed ties with 

social media friends, and specifically, if the politics of 

their social media friends were to blame. As discussed 

earlier, West Point Cadet responses regarding retired 

military members should be discounted given the low 

likelihood they have a sufficient number of retired military friends from which to draw comparisons. As table 14 indicates, while West Point Cadet responses are 

included, cross tabulations with other variables focus 

on NDU student responses only. Overall, 68 percent of 

respondents indicated they have unfriended or blocked 

nonmilitary friends on social media for nonpolitical 

reasons, compared to 39 percent who have unfriended 

active duty friends and 30 percent who have unfriended retired military friends. Both West Point Cadets and 

NDU students were far more apt to unfriend nonmilitary friends than military friends.

What this study is really interested in, however, is 

the degree to which officers unfriend or block their social media contacts, especially other military friends, for 

political reasons. Generally speaking, more respondents 

Table 13. Alignment in Political Opinions by 

Military Friends on Social Media

Degree of Alignment in Political Opinions by Military Friends on Social Media

percent checking “almost always” or “often”

Thinking about the opinions your military friends 

post about government and politics on social 

media networking sites, how often are they in line 

with your own views?

TOTAL (n = 473) 26.43

West Point Cadets 27.15

NDU Students 25.70

O4s 25.93

O5s 24.41

O6s 33.33

Democrats 16.07***

Independents 20.31*

Republicans 33.72***

Liberals 15.15***

Moderates 15.89***

Conservatives 39.45***

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 

2015‒2016.

*** Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < 

.001: between liberals and conservatives; between moderates 

and conservatives; and between Democrats and Republicans.

* Difference of proportions test between Independents and 

Republicans statistically significant at p < .05.

30 Like, Comment, Retweet
Findings 31

reported unfriending their nonmilitary friends than 

military friends based on political reasons. Yet surprisingly, NDU students unfriended their active duty and 

retired military friends for political reasons at roughly 

the same rate. This calls into question the oft-cited assumption by many in the officer corps and even some 

civil-military commentators that political outspokenness is largely a province of those who have taken off the 

uniform at the end of a career.82 Whatever it is about the 

political opinions of their military friends that is turning respondents off is happening equally for their active 

duty and retired friends alike. 

Also, party affiliation and political ideology suggest 

subtle differences when it comes to unfriending based 

on politics. Republicans were less likely to report they 

unfriend due to political reasons than Democrats and 

Independents, and conservatives were less likely to 

unfriend than liberals and moderates. This generally 

tracks with findings from past research, most notably, 

a 2014 Pew study that found “consistent liberals” are 

Table 14. The Politics of Unfriending on Social Media 

Have you ever hidden, blocked, unfriended, or 

stopped following anyone in the following groups on 

a social media site for nonpolitical reasons?

Have you ever hidden, blocked, unfriended, or 

stopped following anyone in the following groups on 

a social media networking site because you did not 

agree with something they posted about government 

and politics?

percent checking “yes” percent checking “yes”

Nonmilitary 

Friends

Active Duty 

Friends

Retired Military 

Friends

Nonmilitary 

Friends

Active Duty 

Friends

Retired Military 

Friends

TOTAL 68.22 38.59 29.84 40.51 25.74 18.42

West Point Cadets 72.66** 41.81 27.24 43.99* 27.84 14.91*

NDU Students 61.11** 32.96 33.15 34.44* 22.22 23.60*

O4s 62.96 22.22 22.22 44.44 18.52 23.08

O5s 60.16 33.07 33.33 32.28 21.26 21.43

O6s 66.67 45.83 45.83 36.00 32.00 36.00

Democrats (NDU only) 69.70 42.42 42.42 42.42 30.30 28.12

Independents (NDU only) 66.67 36.36 33.33 45.45 36.36* 39.39**

Republicans (NDU only) 56.84 29.47 29.03 28.42 15.79* 15.96**

Liberals (NDU only) 75.86 31.03 41.38 44.83 31.03 32.14

Moderates (NDU only) 58.73 25.40 33.87 31.75 25.40 26.98

Conservatives (NDU only) 59.52 17.86 31.33 33.33 17.86 19.28

Those Who Have 

Unfriended for Nonpolitical 

Reasons (NDU only)

50.46*** 56.90*** 55.17***

Those Who Have Not 

Unfriended for Nonpolitical

Reasons (NDU only)

11.11*** 6.36*** 8.41***

(n) 472 469 449 474 474 456

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

Most difference in proportions tests based on partisan identification and ideology barely miss statistical significance, although the difference 

between Independents and Republicans for unfriending active duty friends because of politics is statistically significant at p < .05 and for 

unfriending retired military friends because of politics at p < .01.

*** Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .001: between those who have unfriended for nonpolitical reasons and those who 

have not for nonmilitary friends, active duty friends, and retired military friends.

** Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets and NDU Students for blocking nonmilitary friends for nonpolitical reasons 

statistically significant at p < .01.

* Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets and NDU Students for blocking nonmilitary friends and retired friends for political 

reasons statistically significant at p < .05.
more likely to unfriend someone because they disagreed with that person’s political opinions on social 

media.83 This paints a complex picture of how the factor of party affiliation manifests itself on social media. 

In this study, Democrats and Independents, as well as 

liberals and moderates, are less likely to have social 

media friends who share their political views, but they 

are more apt to unfriend or block friends on social media because they disagree with something they posted 

about politics. Republicans and conservatives are more 

likely to have social media friends who share their same 

political views and understandably are less likely to unfriend for political reasons.

A final measure of interaction between respondents and their military social media friends is provided in table 15. When respondents were asked how often 

they felt uncomfortable about their active duty military 

friends’ political posts on social media, only a few respondents—just 15 percent—reported “almost always” 

or “often.” While not shown in table 15, another 34 

percent of respondents reported they “sometimes” felt 

uncomfortable, while 42 percent reported they hardly 

ever felt uncomfortable. 

Party identification and political ideology trigger 

quite different responses. As table 15 shows, 25 percent 

of Democrats reported being almost always or often uncomfortable, compared to just 9 percent of Independents 

and 13 percent of Republicans. Likewise, 25 percent of 

liberals reported being uncomfortable, while only 16 

percent of moderates and 10 percent of conservatives 

did. Finally, respondents who have political views dissimilar to their social media friends (19 percent) were 

more apt to indicate they often feel uncomfortable compared to respondents who share similar political views 

with their social media friends (9 percent).

What does this all mean? While overall, most respondents are generally not too bothered by the political opinions their active duty friends post on social media, Democrats and liberals generally tend to feel more 

uncomfortable more often. This is consistent with past 

research of a large sample of active duty Army officers, 

where Democrat-affiliated officers felt more uncomfortable talking about politics in the workplace than their 

Republican peers.84 This raises a number of important 

questions: do Democrats and liberals feel more uncomfortable because they disagree with the politics being 

discussed by their Republican and conservative peers 

who outnumber them? Or do Democrats and liberals 

feel uncomfortable because the nature of the political 

discussions is normatively contrary to the military’s 

spirit of nonpartisanship, and Republicans and conservatives are somehow less sensitive to such violations? In 

other words, is discomfort a function of being a political minority, or is discomfort a function of sensitivity to 

Table 15. Degree of Discomfort with Active Duty 

Friends’ Political Discussions on Social Media

percent checking “almost always” or “often”

How often do you feel uncomfortable by the 

political content your active duty military friends 

discuss on social media networking sites?

TOTAL (n = 471) 15.29

West Point Cadets 17.65

NDU Students 11.73

O4s 18.52

O5s 10.94

O6s 8.70

Democrats 25.44**

Independents 9.38*

Republicans 12.99**

Liberals 24.75***

Moderates 16.00

Conservatives 10.23***

Those Who Have Similar Political Views

as Their Military Social Media Friends 8.80*

Those Who Have Dissimilar Political Views 

as Their Military Social Media Friends 18.69*

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 

2015‒2016.

*** Difference of proportions test between liberals and 

conservatives statistically significant at p < .001.

** Difference of proportions test between Democrats and 

Republicans statistically significant at p < .01.

* Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < 

.05: between Democrats and Independents; and between those 

who share similar political views and those who do not.

32 Like, Comment, Retweet
Findings 33

normatively inappropriate political behavior? From this 

data alone, it is unclear, but it is likely that the answer 

lies somewhere in the former explanation, not the latter. 

Data from the next three tables sheds more light on the 

influence of partisanship, ideology, and normatively inappropriate behavior.

Thus far, this paper’s analysis has focused on the 

following: the extent to which military friends discuss 

politics on social media; comparisons in the political 

discourse among social media friend groups; the types 

of political activity performed on social media; and 

the degree of alignment in the political views between 

respondents and their friends. As the data in table 15 

showed, few respondents routinely felt uncomfortable because of the political opinions their active duty 

friends post on social media, which suggests that if 

normative violations of the nonpartisan ethic exist on 

social media, they are probably rare. Yet one-fourth 

of respondents admitted to unfriending active duty 

friends because of something they posted about politics; thus, it is unclear to what extent normatively inappropriate behavior is prevalent among the military 

on social media, whether active duty or retired. Tables 

16, 17, and 18 more acutely probe whether or not the 

political content on social media expressly violates the 

military’s nonpartisan ethic and, even worse, could be 

labeled as insulting, rude, or disdainful.

Tables 16, 17, and 18 summarize respondents’ observations of their social media friends’ political tenor 

that clearly crosses the line. Respondents were asked 

if they ever observed their nonmilitary, active duty, or 

retired military friends use or share insulting, rude, or 

disdainful comments directed at specific elected officials, politicians running for office, or the President of 

the United States. This question is especially delicate, as 

it touches upon expressly prohibited activities and punishable offenses under the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice. Under Article 88 of that code, contemptuous 

Table 16. Rude Comments Against Specific Elected Officials on Social Media

Have you ever observed the following friends use or share insulting, rude, 

or disdainful comments directed against specific elected officials on a social 

media networking site?

percent checking “yes”

Nonmilitary Friends Active Duty Friends Retired Military Friends

TOTAL 75.90 34.53 43.71

West Point Cadets 78.01 39.86** 37.59***

NDU Students 73.18 26.40** 53.67***

O4s 96.30 44.44 66.67

O5s 70.87 23.02 52.80

O6s 62.50 25.00 45.83

Democrats (NDU only) 81.82 39.39* 60.61

Independents (NDU only) 66.67 36.36 54.55

Republicans (NDU only) 71.58 21.05* 52.13

Liberals (NDU only) 89.66 37.93* 69.87

Moderates (NDU only) 69.84 33.33 52.38

Conservatives (NDU only) 72.29 16.87* 50.00

(n) 473 472 453

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

*** Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets and NDU Students for retired military friends statistically significant at p < .001.

** Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets and NDU Students for active duty friends statistically significant at p < .01.

* Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .05: between Democrats and Republicans for active duty friends; and between 

liberals and conservatives for active duty friends.
words by a commissioned officer against the President, 

Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense or 

secretaries of military departments, Secretary of Homeland Security, governors, or state legislatures is an offense punishable by court martial.85 As with the majority of this survey’s questions about political behavior, 

respondents were asked for their observations of their 

friends’ social media activity, not their own, in order to 

avoid putting respondents in a compromising position.

A large majority of those surveyed—over 

three-quarters—responded that their nonmilitary 

friends had posted or shared rude comments about 

elected officials, politicians running for office, and the 

President. This finding alone is revealing, as it attests to 

broad incivility throughout social media. Yet this study’s 

primary interest is in whether or not active duty and retired military exhibit the same lack of civility in political 

discourse. As tables 16, 17, and 18 show, albeit not at 

the same scale, active duty and retired military members follow suit in such behavior—an alarming finding 

to students of civil-military relations. More than half 

of NDU students reported that their retired military 

friends posted or shared rude comments about elected 

officials, politicians, and the President; and active duty 

members are equally guilty, with well over one-third of 

all those surveyed indicating their active duty friends do 

the same. Thus, while retired members of the military 

feel less constrained to make or share such controversial 

statements, active duty members are by no means silent. 

For all three categories—elected officials, politicians, and the President—the variable of longevity of 

service or age indicates varying degrees of professionalism on social media by their active duty friends. West 

Point Cadets were far more likely to report normatively 

inappropriate behavior by their active duty friends than 

NDU students in each category. The largest gap between 

West Point Cadets and NDU students is in the category 

of politicians running for office, where 59 percent of CaTable 17. Rude Comments Against Politicians Running for Office on Social Media

Have you ever observed the following friends use or share insulting, rude, or 

disdainful comments directed against politicians running for office on a social media 

networking site?

percent checking “yes”

Nonmilitary Friends Active Duty Friends Retired Military Friends

TOTAL 80.42 50.21 50.56

West Point Cadets 84.30* 58.90*** 46.30*

NDU Students 74.86* 36.72*** 57.95*

O4s 88.89 55.56 70.37

O5s 74.80 35.20 58.06

O6s 62.50 25.00 45.83

Democrats (NDU only) 84.85 48.48 63.64

Independents (NDU only) 72.73 46.88 68.75

Republicans (NDU only) 72.63 33.68 54.26

Liberals (NDU only) 82.76 55.17* 68.97

Moderates (NDU only) 76.19 38.71 61.29

Conservatives (NDU only) 73.49 30.12* 52.44

(n) 475 472 449

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

*** Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets and NDU Students for active duty friends statistically significant at p < .001.

* Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .05: between West Point Cadets and NDU Students for nonmilitary friends and 

retired friends; and between liberals and conservatives for active duty friends.

34 Like, Comment, Retweet
Findings 35

dets reported observing their active duty friends direct 

inappropriate comments toward these politicians compared to just 37 percent of NDU students. Again, this 

reinforces the assumption that the longer one serves in 

the military, the more the member is exposed to and 

adopts the norms of the profession. 

Within the three categories, respondents’ active 

duty and retired military friends were most vocal toward politicians running for office, with 50 percent of 

those surveyed indicating their active duty friends have 

posted rude comments, and 58 percent of NDU students 

indicating their retired friends have done the same. It is 

also instructive to note that the active duty friends of 

both West Point Cadets and NDU students especially 

seem to draw a distinction among the three categories 

as to who is most “fair game” for rude comments and 

criticism, and this was even evident within the NDU 

student sample. While 37 percent of NDU students indicated their active duty military friends post or share 

rude comments about politicians, that figure drops to 

25 and 26 percent for the President and other elected 

officials, respectively. This is important, because despite 

the clear normative violations occurring, it shows that 

at least some active duty members recognize the tenets 

of the nonpartisan ethic and, more acutely, provisions 

of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and other pertinent regulations. Whether it is appropriate for active 

duty members to be engaging in such behavior toward 

politicians is another matter, but the difference in response rates among NDU students nonetheless is indicative of some degree of understanding of applicable 

policies, regulations, and norms. 

From a relative comparison, respondents were less 

likely to report that their active duty friends were guilty 

of posting rude or inappropriate comments about individuals in the three measured categories, compared to the 

Table 18. Rude Comments Against the President of the United States on Social Media

Have you ever observed the following friends use or share insulting, rude, or 

disdainful comments directed against the President of the United States on a 

social media networking site?

percent checking “yes”

Nonmilitary Friends Active Duty Friends Retired Military Friends

TOTAL 77.33 33.69 46.90

West Point Cadets 81.44* 39.52*** 41.39**

NDU Students 71.35* 24.72*** 56.25**

O4s 85.19 44.44 66.67

O5s 69.84 22.22 56.45

O6s 66.67 16.67 45.83

Democrats (NDU only) 75.76 39.39* 65.62

Independents (NDU only) 60.61 30.30 63.64

Republicans (NDU only) 72.63 21.05* 54.26

Liberals (NDU only) 79.31 37.93** 75.86*

Moderates (NDU only) 71.43 33.33** 54.84

Conservatives (NDU only) 68.67 13.25** 51.22*

(n) 472 472 452

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

*** Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets and NDU Students for active duty friends statistically significant at p < .001.

** Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .01: between West Point Cadets and NDU students for retired military friends; 

between liberals and conservatives for active duty friends; and between moderates and conservatives for active duty friends.

* Difference of proportions test statistically significant at p < .05: between West Point Cadets and NDU students for nonmilitary friends; between 

Democrats and Republicans for active duty friends; and between liberals and conservatives for retired friends.
strong majorities of their nonmilitary friends and retired 

military friends. Yet the scope of active duty friends engaging in the same behavior can by no means be written 

off as a mere outlier. True, the question asked of respondents was if they had ever observed their friends engaging 

in such behavior, and we do not have a true sense how 

often such inappropriate behavior is occurring on social 

media. Nonetheless, even if the offenders form a small 

proportion of a respondent’s overall active duty friend 

group, the fact that a sizable minority of respondents attest that this is occurring—or 50 percent in the case of 

politicians running for office—is extraordinary.

As with previous analysis regarding the politics of 

unfriending, the degree of alignment in political views 

between respondents and friends, and the extent to 

which respondents feel uncomfortable by their friends’ 

politics, the responses in tables 16, 17, and 18 also vary 

based on party identification and political ideology. Liberal-leaning respondents were twice as likely as conservatives to indicate their active duty friends posted rude 

comments about all three categories of individuals. 

Likewise, Democrats were more likely than Republicans 

to report their active duty friends posted or shared inappropriate comments against specific elected officials 

and the President. As mentioned earlier, this does not 

suggest Democrats or liberal members of the military 

are more likely to post rude comments about elected 

leaders. Nor does it necessarily mean that because Democrats are more apt to identify politically inappropriate 

behavior on social media, Republicans and conservatives must be the ones who are committing these political fouls. It simply means that Democrat and liberal 

officers are more likely to observe and report normatively inappropriate political behavior on social media; 

but inferences can be made that Democrats and liberal 

respondents are suggesting Republicans and conservatives are the source of the offending behavior. 

However, it is also unclear to what extent this may 

be a case of partisan rationalization. Both this survey 

and the 2009 survey of Army officers were conducted 

during the Obama administration.86 If this survey were 

to be completed during a Republican presidential administration, would Democrats still be reporting higher 

levels of normatively inappropriate behavior, especially geared toward the President? Or would Republicans be more apt to identify political activity contrary 

to the nonpartisan ethic? It is unclear, especially given 

the large number of Republicans in the officer corps. In 

other words, even if these findings might reflect partisan rationalization, magnitude is a factor that cannot be 

ignored, and the voices of a large crowd tend to overpower those of a minority.

The findings about rude comments toward the 

President should be especially startling to senior military leaders and interested observers of civil-military 

relations. While attitudes toward the President generally mirrored attitudes toward other elected officials, the 

military has but one commander-in-chief. Two of five 

respondents overall reported their active duty friends 

engage in disdainful comments toward the President, 

and a quarter of the NDU sample reported the same. 

This finding carries the most significant implications for 

civil-military relations of any in this study, as it not only 

suggests a lack of respect and decorum within active 

duty military, but it also questions the military’s overall deference to civilian authority. How well assured is 

subordination to the commander-in-chief if members 

of the active duty military engage in sarcasm or vitriol 

against him in a public forum? 

Past research that examined the attitudes of Army 

officers in 2009 also found a worrisome lack of respect 

toward the President, evident by nearly one-third of 

respondents who felt that in order to be respected as 

commander-in-chief, the President should have served 

in the military.87 This also split along party lines, with 

Republicans more than twice as likely as Democrats to 

feel this way. While this finding comes nowhere near 

the level of impropriety associated with disdainful 

comments directed toward the President in a public 

forum, it nevertheless raises further questions about 

36 Like, Comment, Retweet
Findings 37

the durability of adherence to the bedrock of civilian 

control of the military. No serious student of American 

civil-military relations suggests a coup in the United 

States is possible, but views and behavior such as this 

that threaten to undermine the legitimacy of civilian 

control cannot be ignored.

This is not the first time that members of the military 

have been seen to be harboring resentment toward their 

commander-in-chief. In recent history, the Clinton administration stands out as a period of strained civil-military relations, where a level of disrespect within the 

ranks toward the President was widely assumed if not 

frequently observed.88 Resistance to President Clinton’s 

policies, such as his attempt to integrate gays in the military or intervention in Bosnia, were viewed as further 

manifestations of this disrespect. But the policy resistance debate centers largely on a handful of senior military leaders at the highest levels of the military and their 

interactions with the executive branch. What makes today different, and involves a much larger segment of the 

military, is the accessible, public outlet available for such 

disrespect. Even if normatively inappropriate behavior is 

somewhat limited to a small proportion of the military, 

such behavior is being publicly broadcast to wider audiences than ever before, and this challenges the principle 

of subordination to civilian authority.

The last set of findings in this study relates to the 

very public nature of social media, the debate over 

what constitutes private and public expression, and 

the perception that one’s personal political views 

imply official endorsement by the military. To get at 

these issues, respondents were asked if they had ever 

observed their active duty friends on social media 

use a disclaimer to note that their personal political 

views do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense. As mentioned earlier in this paper, 

the Department of Defense’s Public Affairs guidance 

for the 2016 election stipulates that if individuals can 

be identified as active duty Servicemembers on their 

social media site, the standard disclaimer should accompany any political views they post. Yet, as table 19 

shows, only 23 percent of respondents indicate they 

have observed their active duty friends on social media comply with this. Surprisingly, West Point Cadets 

(30 percent) were more likely to indicate their active 

duty friends used disclaimers than NDU students 

(12 percent). This seems counter to the professionalization argument, which holds that the longer one 

serves in the military and is exposed to its norms and 

regulations, the more likely one is to adhere to and 

adopt them. A potential explanation for this could be 

that while the more senior NDU students are well acquainted with the norm of nonpartisanship, they are 

unfamiliar with the relatively recent and specific guidance about social media guidelines. It is possible that 

West Point Cadets received particular emphasis about 

this, along with other social media etiquette, as part of 

their general instruction at West Point.

Table 19. Use of Disclaimers by Active Duty 

Friends on Social Media

percent checking “yes”

Have you ever observed an active duty military 

friend post a disclaimer on a social media 

networking site that his/her political views are 

those of the individual only and not those of the 

Department of Defense?

TOTAL (n = 474) 22.78

West Point Cadets 29.79***

NDU Students 11.73***

O4s 7.41

O5s 11.90

O6s 16.00

Democrats 19.30

Independents 18.75

Republicans 24.51

Liberals 14.71**

Moderates 20.00

Conservatives 29.03**

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 

2015‒2016.

*** Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets 

and NDU Students statistically significant at p < .001.

** Difference of proportions test between liberals and 

conservatives statistically significant at p < .01.
While party affiliation did not elicit a statistically significant difference between responses by Democrats and Republicans, ideology did. Conservatives 

were twice as likely as liberals to indicate their friends 

use disclaimers on social media. This is interesting, especially given the findings of greater political homogeneity among conservatives’ social media friends. Are 

conservatives more likely to show discretion and adherence to Department of Defense policies on political 

activity by using disclaimers? And, if so, how does this 

reconcile with other findings that liberals are more likely to observe normatively inappropriate political behavior among their more politically heterogeneous friend 

groups? This could be a situation where conservatives 

are reporting that their conservative friends employ disclaimers while liberals are reporting their conservative 

friends do not. Regardless, this muddles our ability to 

draw clear conclusions about what types of friends—

conservative or liberal—are more apt to use disclaimers. 

More research is required, especially into the composition of social media friend groups.

Lastly, even if respondents lack the requisite Department of Defense disclaimer, it could be that military members’ affiliation with the military is not widely 

visible on their social media networking sites. Clearly, 

the overwhelming majority of their friends must know 

whether they are or were in the military, but how well 

would the general public be able to discern military 

affiliation from a social media site alone? A simple 

shortcut is whether or not military members include 

photos of themselves in uniform. Table 20 displays the 

findings for responses by West Point Cadets and National War College students, where 92 percent indicated that some, most, or all of their military friends had 

photos of themselves in uniform. Of note, this varied 

somewhat by age or cohort, with 97 percent of West 

Point Cadets reporting this compared to 74 percent of 

National War College students. Regardless of the difference in subsamples, strong majorities indicate their 

military friends do post photos in uniform, further 

blurring the lines between the perception of public and 

private personas on social media.

Table 20. Photos in Uniform on Social Media

percent checking “all,” “most,” or “some”

Among your military friends, how many have 

photos of themselves in uniform on their social 

media networking sites?

TOTAL (n = 364) 92.03

West Point Cadets 96.56*

National War College Students 73.97*

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 

2015‒2016. 

* Difference of proportions test between West Point Cadets and 

NWC Students statistically significant at p < .001.

38 Like, Comment, Retweet
Conclusions 39

This study advances our understanding of political activity by uniformed military beyond traditional, if not outdated, measures of political participation. It also adds to the debate of whether or not 

the military is politicized by examining the impact partisanship and political ideology have on political expression in social media. First, findings suggest that while 

most military elites continue to identify as conservative 

and Republican, fewer appear to do so today than at any 

other time over the past 30 years. Second, military elites 

actively use social media networking sites, although 

younger elites are more prolific in their use, including 

the extent to which they consume political news on social media and the extent to which their friends discuss 

politics on social media. Third, while respondents’ nonmilitary friends were more politically active than their 

military friends, both active duty and retired military 

actively participate in a number of forms of political 

and partisan expression. In some measures, the levels 

at which members of the military express political opinions are considerably higher than the levels of members 

of the general public, who should theoretically be less 

constrained in their expression. 

Fourth, party identification and political ideology 

elicit different responses and behavior, evident by the 

variance in the political heterogeneity of military social 

media friend networks, the degree to which military 

elites feel uncomfortable by their active duty friends’ 

political posts, and the willingness of military elites to 

sever social media ties with their military friends for political reasons. While some of the differences are subtle, 

military elites who identify as liberals and Democrats 

are more likely to have more politically diverse military friends on social media, but are also more likely to 

report feeling uncomfortable by their friends’ politics. 

And fifth, a striking percentage of those surveyed indicated their military friends, both active and retired, 

have engaged in insulting, rude, or disdainful comments directed at politicians, elected officials, and the 

President. Again, differences are evident in political ideology and party affiliation, with liberals and Democrats 

more likely to report they observed such normative violations. These findings suggest Republican and conservative military elites tend to see social media as their 

echo chamber and raise further questions about the politicization of the force and its impact on the profession.

This study notes several significant differences between age or generational cohorts, as well as ideology 

and party identification, but stops short of suggesting 

that clear causal relationships exist between those variables and levels of political activity. Relationships, nonetheless, do exist, and future research is needed to more 

acutely probe the real impact these have in determining 

political behavior. Likewise, a larger, random sample of 

military elites may find stronger effects and differences 

than this study did, given its modest sample size and 

nonrandom nature. 

This study also identifies gaps and inconsistencies in 

regulations and policies about political behavior, which 

should be quickly rectified given how prolific social media usage is among members of the military today. Department of Defense guidance on political activity, including political expression on social media, turns out 

to be fairly permissive, erring on the side of the ServiceConclusions
member’s right to free speech rather than erring on the 

side of caution and the norms of an apolitical, nonpartisan military. The policy guidance is also ambiguous and 

inconsistent at times, assuming a clear distinction exists 

between political and partisan and that the rank and file 

can clearly discriminate between the two. Moreover, the 

guidance has the implicit value judgment that “political” 

is acceptable—it is only “partisan” that can get you in 

trouble; but this is flawed reasoning. Nevertheless, according to this study’s findings, members of the military 

active on social media are largely ignoring Department 

of Defense guidance, as reflected by the small minority 

to report ever having seen their friends use disclaimers 

accompanying their political opinions on social media. 

Moreover, the sizable percentage of respondents who 

reported their active duty military friends have posted 

or shared inappropriate comments about political figures, to include elected officials and even the President, 

suggests that enforcement of such policies is lacking. 

At the root of the debate over political expression 

on social media is the distinction between public and 

private spheres. While unstated in DoDD 1344.10, implicit in the norms of being apolitical and nonpartisan 

is the idea that a Servicemember’s political opinions and 

activity should be private. This is why DoDD 1344.10 

goes to great lengths to distinguish activity that could 

be construed as implying official endorsement from the 

relatively private acts associated with “the obligations 

of citizenship.”89 Social media, despite its veneer of security and closed friend networks, is fundamentally a 

public sphere, a fact the Department of Defense fully 

acknowledges through the services’ respective social 

media guidelines.90 Moreover, unlike a discussion with 

colleagues or friends, political commentary on social 

media becomes a written, lasting record with an exponentially public reach, as friends of friends continue to 

share or pass on an original post or comment. 

Here, the Department of Defense seems to have 

missed an opportunity to emphasize the unique implications of political expression in social media and how 

this varies from more traditional means of political activity. Instead, the Department has chosen to split hairs, 

arguing that Servicemembers cannot use their affiliation 

with the military on social media to promote their political views, but can do so as long as they caveat that 

their opinion does not reflect those of the Department 

of Defense. In doing so, it sidesteps the issue of whether such public, political commentary by the military 

is appropriate and whether or not it contributes to the 

charges outlined at the beginning of this paper—that 

the military is too partisan and too vocal. It also seems 

to suggest that as long as a disclaimer accompanies Servicemembers’ political posts, then there is “no harm, no 

foul”—regardless of the tone or content of the political 

commentary. Yet, each time Servicemembers post their 

political opinions, especially those with unmistakable 

partisan connections, they publicly reveal their politics, 

even if disclaimers are used. Given the historically strong 

but waning affiliation of military elites with one particular political party, this raises questions about the aggregate effect a steady stream of political commentary by 

members of the military has toward gradually eroding 

the nonpartisan, apolitical ethic.

The Department of Defense should update DoDD 

1344.10 to include clearer, more consistent language 

about political activity and expression on social media. 

In doing so, it should use this opportunity to eliminate 

any ambiguity and revisit the currently allowable practices of “liking” political candidates or parties, as both 

constitute partisan activity, regardless of whether or not 

a Servicemember encourages others do the same. Next, 

senior military leaders should be more vocal and consistent in talking about the importance of being apolitical and nonpartisan and how violations of this norm 

threaten the level of trust and confidence in which the 

American public holds the military. Rather than focusing 

on what is allowable and what is not, discussions should 

center on whether or not such political activity is appropriate—even, and perhaps especially, those activities that 

are allowable. In doing so, senior leaders may strength40 Like, Comment, Retweet
Conclusions 41

en the nonpartisan ethic and reignite discussions about 

what it means to be part of a profession. Both Admiral 

Mullen and General Dempsey were strong advocates of 

an apolitical, nonpartisan ethic, but it is not solely the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to initiate 

such discussions, nor must they only occur on the eve of 

a presidential election. Service chiefs and general and flag 

officers across the services should be more vocal in stressing to their subordinates the need to remain apolitical. 

The normative violations discovered in this study suggest 

more attention, not less, is required. Accordingly, this 

should be a topic addressed at every level of professional 

military education and routinely at the unit level. 

Finally, given some of the violations of decorum 

that seem to be occurring on social media by active duty 

military members, the military services should exercise 

greater enforcement of the policies already in existence. 

An institution that is subordinate to civilian authority 

cannot tolerate rude and disparaging comments made 

by its members toward the President or other elected 

leaders. This is not a call to establish a police state, where 

every political post must be reviewed and scrutinized, 

but instead to deter inappropriate political activity from 

ever occurring in the first place. Moreover, commanders are already charged with maintaining the good order and discipline of their units, and the extension of 

that framework to include modeling prudent political 

behavior on social media is consistent with the scope 

and nature of their authority. Routine sensitization to 

the bounds of appropriate political discourse on social 

media should better regulate the political expression of 

those on active duty while reinforcing the norm of nonpartisanship. In short, by more effectively linking political neutrality on social media to broad standards of the 

profession, it should encourage members of the military 

to “think before they post.”

The author wishes to thank Joseph J. Collins, Peter D. Feaver, and Jay M. Parker for their input on the 

survey instrument and earlier drafts, and Stephanie 

Zedlar, Stephen Mariano, and Heidi Demarest for their 

assistance in the deployment of this study’s survey at 

the National Defense University and the United States 

Military Academy.

Appendix A 43

Survey Instrument

Politics, the Military, and Social Media Research Study

This survey is part of an approved research fellowship 

being conducted at the National War College. It seeks to 

examine the nature and extent of political expression on 

social media and will help researchers better understand 

the state of civil-military relations today. 

Throughout the survey, your anonymity will be preserved, and identification of respondents will not be recorded. This survey should take no more than 5-10 minutes to complete. It is only with the generous help of people 

like you that such research on the professional military 

ethic can be successful. If you have any questions about 

the survey or would like to receive a final copy of the findings, please contact the chief researcher, LTC Heidi Urben, 

at heidi.a.urben.mil@gc.ndu.edu. 

Thank you for your time and consideration. 

Informed Consent

By completing this survey, I consent to participate in this 

study. I understand my participation is strictly voluntary.

Your Social Media Use

1. Which of the following social media networking 

sites do you currently have an account with? (please 

check all that apply)

 ̈ Facebook

 ̈ Twitter

 ̈ LinkedIn

 ̈ Google+

 ̈ YouTube

 ̈ I do not have any social media networking 

accounts (If you selected this response, 

skip to question 22.)

2. Which social media networking sites did you 

get news about government and politics from in the 

past week? (Please check all that apply. If you are unsure, leave it unchecked.)

 ̈ Facebook

 ̈ Twitter

 ̈ LinkedIn

 ̈ Google+

 ̈ YouTube

Appendix A
3. How often do you access your social media networking accounts?

 ̈ Several times a day

 ̈ About once a day

 ̈ A few days a week

 ̈ Every few weeks

 ̈ Less often

 ̈ I’m not sure

4. About how many friends do you currently have 

on social media networking websites?

Please specify the approximate number 

__________

5. Approximately what percentage of your friends 

on social media networking sites are affiliated with the 

military, either active duty or retired?

 ̈ Less than 20%

 ̈ 20 – 40%

 ̈ 40 – 60%

 ̈ 60 – 80%

 ̈ More than 80%

 ̈ I’m not sure

Social Media Observations

6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with 

this statement: “My military friends (both active duty 

and retired) often talk about politics on social media 

networking sites.”

 ̈ Strongly Agree

 ̈ Agree

 ̈ Neutral

 ̈ Disagree

 ̈ Strongly Disagree

7. Generally speaking, who is more active in discussing politics on social media networking sites, your 

military friends or non-military friends?

 ̈ My non-military friends talk about politics 

more

 ̈ My non-military friends talk about politics 

as much as my military friends do

 ̈ My military friends talk about politics more

 ̈ I’m not sure

8. Generally speaking, who is more active in discussing politics on social media networking sites, your 

active duty military friends or retired military friends?

 ̈ My active duty friends talk about politics 

more

 ̈ My active duty friends talk about politics as 

much as my retired friends do

 ̈ My retired friends talk about politics more

 ̈ I’m not sure

9. Generally speaking, among all of your military 

friends, who is more active in discussing politics on 

social media networking sites, your officer friends or 

enlisted friends?

 ̈ My officer friends talk about politics more

 ̈ My officer friends talk about politics as 

much as my enlisted friends do

 ̈ My enlisted friends talk about politics more

 ̈ I’m not sure

44 Like, Comment, Retweet
Appendix A 45

10. Do your military friends ever do the following on social media networking sites? 

Yes No I’m not sure

1. Repost or share links to political stories  ̈  ̈  ̈

2. Post links to political stories or articles for others to read  ̈  ̈  ̈

3. “Like” or promote material related to political issues that others 

have posted

 ̈  ̈  ̈

4. Post their own thoughts/comments on political issues  ̈  ̈  ̈

5. “Friend” or follow political figures  ̈  ̈  ̈

6. Encourage others to vote  ̈  ̈  ̈

7. Encourage others to take action on political issues  ̈  ̈  ̈

11. Of the following list of topics related to government and politics, please check which ones your 

friends often discuss on social media networking sites (please check all that apply).

Your non-military 

friends

Your active duty 

military friends

Your retired military 

friends

1. The 2016 election  ̈  ̈  ̈

2. The war in Afghanistan  ̈  ̈  ̈

3. Russian President Vladimir Putin  ̈  ̈  ̈

4. ISIS  ̈  ̈  ̈

5. President Obama  ̈  ̈  ̈

6. Congress  ̈  ̈  ̈

7. The economy  ̈  ̈  ̈

8. Immigration  ̈  ̈  ̈

9. Gun control  ̈  ̈  ̈

10. Health care  ̈  ̈  ̈

11. LGBT issues  ̈  ̈  ̈

12. Women in combat  ̈  ̈  ̈

13. The federal budget and sequestration  ̈  ̈  ̈

14. Veterans affairs  ̈  ̈  ̈
12. Thinking of that same list of topics related to government, which are the top 3 most commented 

upon topics by your friends?

Check 3 for each grouping of friends

Your non-military 

friends

Your active duty 

military friends

Your retired military 

friends

1. The 2016 election  ̈  ̈  ̈

2. The war in Afghanistan  ̈  ̈  ̈

3. Russian President Vladimir Putin  ̈  ̈  ̈

4. ISIS  ̈  ̈  ̈

5. President Obama  ̈  ̈  ̈

6. Congress  ̈  ̈  ̈

7. The economy  ̈  ̈  ̈

8. Immigration  ̈  ̈  ̈

9. Gun control  ̈  ̈  ̈

10. Health care  ̈  ̈  ̈

11. LGBT issues  ̈  ̈  ̈

12. Women in combat  ̈  ̈  ̈

13. The federal budget and sequestration  ̈  ̈  ̈

14. Veterans affairs  ̈  ̈  ̈

13. Among your military friends, how many have 

photos of themselves in uniform on their social media 

networking sites? 

 ̈ All have photos of themselves in uniform

 ̈ Most have photos of themselves in uniform

 ̈ Some have photos of themselves in uniform

 ̈ Most do not have photos of themselves in 

uniform

 ̈ None have photos of themselves in uniform

 ̈ I’m not sure

14. Thinking about the opinions your military 

friends post about government and politics on social 

media networking sites, how often are they in line with 

your own views?

 ̈ Almost Always

 ̈ Often

 ̈ Sometimes

 ̈ Hardly Ever

 ̈ I’m Not Sure

46 Like, Comment, Retweet
Appendix A 47

17. How often do you feel uncomfortable by the 

political content your active duty military friends discuss on social media networking sites?

 ̈ Almost always

 ̈ Often

 ̈ Sometimes

 ̈ Hardly Ever

 ̈ I’m not sure

18. Have you ever observed an active duty military 

friend post a disclaimer on a social media networking 

site that his/her political views are those of the individual only and not those of the Department of Defense?

 ̈ Yes

 ̈ No

 ̈ I’m not sure

15. Have you ever hidden, blocked, unfriended, or stopped following anyone in the following 

groups on a social media networking site because you did not agree with something they posted about 

government and politics?

Yes No I’m not sure

Your non-military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

Your active duty military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

Your retired military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

16. Have you ever hidden, blocked, unfriended, or stopped following anyone in the following 

groups on a social media networking site for nonpolitical reasons?

Yes No I’m not sure

Your non-military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

Your active duty military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

Your retired military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

19. Have you ever observed the following friends use or share insulting, rude, or disdainful comments directed against ______________ on a social media networking site?

Specific Elected Officials

Yes No I’m not sure

Your non-military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

Your active duty military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

Your retired military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈
20. Have you ever observed the following friends use or share insulting, rude, or disdainful comments directed against ______________ on a social media networking site?

Politicians Running for Office 

Yes No I’m not sure

Your non-military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

Your active duty military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

Your retired military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

21. Have you ever observed the following friends use or share insulting, rude, or disdainful comments directed against ______________ on a social media networking site?

President of the United States 

Yes No I’m not sure

Your non-military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

Your active duty military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

Your retired military friends  ̈  ̈  ̈

22. Below are a number of terms used to describe the overall tone of political discussions on social 

media networking sites. Please check which terms most accurately represent the tone of political discussions among your different groups of friends (please check all that apply):

Your non-military 

friends

Your active duty 

military friends

Your retired military 

friends

1. Restrained  ̈  ̈  ̈

2. Active  ̈  ̈  ̈

3. One-sided  ̈  ̈  ̈

4. Diverse  ̈  ̈  ̈

5. Agreeable  ̈  ̈  ̈

6. Confrontational  ̈  ̈  ̈

7. Informative  ̈  ̈  ̈

8. Combative  ̈  ̈  ̈

9. Balanced  ̈  ̈  ̈

10. Polarizing  ̈  ̈  ̈

11. Non-Partisan  ̈  ̈  ̈

12. Partisan  ̈  ̈  ̈

48 Like, Comment, Retweet
Appendix A 49

Your Beliefs and Background

23. How much do you enjoy talking about government and politics with friends and family?

 ̈ A lot

 ̈ Some

 ̈ Not much

 ̈ Not at all

24. Generally speaking, do you usually think of 

yourself as a strong Democrat, a not very strong Democrat, an Independent who leans Democrat, an Independent, an Independent who leans Republican, a not 

very strong Republican, a strong Republican, or other?

 ̈ Strong Democrat

 ̈ Not very strong Democrat

 ̈ Independent who leans Democrat

 ̈ Independent

 ̈ Independent who leans Republican

 ̈ Not very strong Republican

 ̈ Strong Republican

 ̈ Other (please specify) 

____________________

25. Here is a 7-point scale on which the political 

views that people might hold are arranged from very 

liberal to very conservative. Where would you place 

yourself on this scale?

 ̈ Very liberal

 ̈ Liberal

 ̈ Somewhat liberal

 ̈ Moderate

 ̈ Somewhat conservative

 ̈ Conservative

 ̈ Very conservative

Demographics

26. What is your age group?

 ̈ 18-24 years old

 ̈ 25-29 years old

 ̈ 30-34 years old

 ̈ 35-39 years old

 ̈ 40-44 years old

 ̈ 45-49 years old

 ̈ 50-54 years old

 ̈ 55 or older

27. What is your branch of service?

 ̈ U.S. Air Force

 ̈ U.S. Army

 ̈ U.S. Coast Guard

 ̈ U.S. Marine Corps

 ̈ U.S. Navy

 ̈ Other (please specify) ____________

28. What is your current status in the military?

 ̈ Active Duty

 ̈ Reserve

 ̈ National Guard

 ̈ Pre-commissioning

 ̈ Other (please specify) 

____________________
29. What is your current grade?

 ̈ Cadet / Midshipman

 ̈ O-1 / O-2

 ̈ O-3

 ̈ O-4

 ̈ O-5

 ̈ O-6

 ̈ Other (please specify) _______

Thank you for participating in this study. 

50 Like, Comment, Retweet
Appendix B 51

Survey Background and Additional Tables

Survey Deployment

At the National Defense University (NDU), the author relied upon the directors of institutional research at 

each of the five NDU colleges to administer the survey 

to their military students. As a result, there was some 

variance as to precisely when the surveys were emailed 

to students and the number of reminder emails sent. 

Likewise, at West Point, the Director of American Politics and faculty members who taught Introduction to 

American Politics administered the survey to their Cadets on the author’s behalf.

Response Rate

The survey received an overall response rate of 44 

percent with a total of 537 respondents (see table B-1). 

For results based on the entire sample, one can say with 

95 percent confidence that the error attributable to 

sampling is plus or minus 3.25 percentage points. The 

highest response rate (74 percent) came from within 

National War College, where the author was a student 

during Academic Year 2015‒2016. The lowest response 

rate (20 percent) came from the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) and is at least partially attributed to the fact 

that the 191 students attending Joint and Combined 

Warfighting School (JCWS) graduated two weeks prior 

to the survey launch date. The JFSC administrators sent 

the survey to the JCWS graduates’ personal or military 

email addresses as opposed to the .edu email addresses they had while they were enrolled students at JFSC. 

Finally, for an indeterminate amount of time between 

December 10 and 11, 2015, the survey link was down 

due to a server failure at the Joint Staff. It is unclear what 

impact, if any, this had on survey response rates.

Demographics and Representativeness

Table B-2 provides a brief demographic breakdown 

of the survey respondents. While it may appear the U.S. 

Army is dramatically overrepresented in this sample, 

West Point Cadets are counted as Army officers in this 

table. However, the West Point sample consists mainly 

of first semester sophomores, who arguably have more 

in common with their counterparts at the other service 

academies at this point in their careers than they do with 

active duty Servicemembers in the Army. While not a 

perfect substitute, they are a fair proxy for pre-commissioning status regardless of service. Age and rank are 

closely correlated, and the two largest subsamples include the 18‒24-year-old group and the 40‒44-year-old 

group, which largely corresponds to the rank of Cadets 

and O5s (lieutenant colonels and commanders).

While this sample is by no means intended to be 

representative of the entire U.S. military, or the officer 

corps for that matter, it does provide unique insights 

into the tenor and volume of political activity on social media by the military, both active duty and retired. 

Most significantly, it provides a suitable sample of military elite opinion, bookended by those on the path to 

commissioning and senior officers approaching the pinnacle of their careers.

Appendix B
Table B-1. Response Rate by Subsamples

# Surveyed # Responded Response Rate %

Overall 1,226 537 43.80

National Defense University 623 230 36.92

National War College 121 90 74.38

Eisenhower School 171 59 34.50

Joint Forces Staff College 222 44 19.82

College of International Security Affairs 99 33 33.33

Information Resources Management College 10 4 40.00

U.S. Military Academy at West Point 603 307 50.91

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

Table B-2. Survey Sample Demographics

n percent

West Point Cadets 307 58.48

O3s 3 0.58

04s 31 5.90

05s 156 29.71

06s 28 5.33

Total 525 100.00

U.S. Air Force Officers 80 15.27

U.S. Army Officers* 369 70.42

U.S. Coast Guard Officers 5 0.95

U.S. Marine Corps Officers 20 3.82

U.S. Navy Officers 50 9.54

TOTAL 524 100.00

Pre-commissioning 307 58.37

Active Duty 210 39.92

Reserve 6 1.14

National Guard 3 0.57

TOTAL 526 100.00

18–24 age group 307 58.48

25–29 age group 0 0

30–34 age group 6 1.14

35–39 age group 36 6.86

40–44 age group 119 22.67

45–49 age group 44 8.38

50–54 age group 13 2.48

Over 55 age group 0 0

TOTAL 525 100.00

Source: Politics, the Military, and Social Media Survey, 2015‒2016.

For this table, West Point Cadets are counted as U.S. Army Officers.

52 Like, Comment, Retweet
Endnotes 53

Notes

1

 Martin E. Dempsey, “From the Chairman: Putting Our Nation First,” Joint 

Force Quarterly 65 (April 2012), 4.

2

 Thomas E. Ricks, Making the Corps (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1997).

3

 Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and 

Civilian Society: Some Evidence, 1976‒1996,” International Security 23, no. 

2 (Winter 1998/1999), 5‒42.

4

 Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The 

Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT 

Press, 2001).

5

 Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, “Grand Army of the 

Republicans,” The New Republic, December 8, 1997; Eliot A. Cohen, “Are 

U.S. Forces Overstretched? Civil-Military Relations,” Orbis 41, no. 2 (Spring 

1997), 179; and Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians, 466.

6

 Lance Betros, “Political Partisanship and the Military Ethic in America,” Armed Forces & Society 27, no. 4 (Summer 2001), 514‒515; Richard 

D. Hooker, “Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military 

Relations,” Parameters (Winter 2003‒04), 9; and Joseph J. Collins, “Correspondence: Civil-Military Relations: How Wide is the Gap?” International 

Security 24, no. 2 (Autumn 1999), 199‒203.

7

 Jason K. Dempsey, Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American 

Civil-Military Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); 

Donald S. Inbody, The Soldier Vote: War, Politics, and the Ballot in America

(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).

8

 Collins, “Correspondence: Civil-Military Relations,” 201.

9

 Heidi A. Urben, “Party, Politics, and Deciding What’s Proper: Army 

Officers’ Attitudes After Two Long Wars,” Orbis 58, no. 2 (June 2013), 

351‒368; Heidi A. Urben, “Wearing Politics on Their Sleeves? Levels of 

Political Activism of Active Duty Army Officers,” Armed Forces & Society

40, no. 3 (July 2014), 568‒591.

10 Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians, 464.

11 Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military 

Relations,” The National Interest 35 (Spring 1994). The Air Force two-star 

general in question was Major General Harold Campbell who, in a speech to 

250 Servicemembers and their families at a base in the Netherlands, referred 

to President Clinton as a “dope-smoking,” “skirt-chasing,” “draft-dodging” 

commander-in-chief. Eric Schmitt, “General to Be Disciplined for Disparaging President,” The New York Times, June 16, 1993.

12 David Cloud, Eric Schmitt, and Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Faces 

Growing Revolt by Retired Generals,” The New York Times, April 13, 2006; 

and Martin Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional 

Ethics,” Parameters (Spring 2008), 4‒15.

13 Richard Swain, “Reflection on an Ethic of Officership,” Parameters

(Spring 2007), 18‒19.

14 Richard H. Kohn, “Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the 

United States Today,” Naval War College Review 55, no. 3 (Summer 2002), 

28.

15 Cook, “Revolt of the Generals,” 7; Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. 

Snider, eds., American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a 

New Era (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 303.

16 Matthew Moten, Presidents and Their Generals: An American History 

of Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2014), 377; Richard 

H. Kohn, “General Elections: The Brass Shouldn’t Do Endorsements,” The 

Washington Post, September 19, 2000; James Golby, Heidi Urben, Kyle 

Dropp, and Peter D. Feaver, “Brass Politics: How Retired Military Officers 

Are Shaping Elections,” Foreign Affairs, November 5, 2012.

17 “We, the Undersigned, Proudly Support Governor Mitt Romney as 

Our Nation’s Next President and Commander-in-Chief,” Washington Times, 

November 5, 2012.

18 Using publicly available data on campaign contributions by retired 

four-stars from 1977 to 2002, Golby found that Republican Presidents 

almost always appoint conservative senior officers, while Democratic 

Presidents typically appoint liberal senior officers when Democrats control 

the Senate. James Golby, “Duty, Honor Party? Ideology, Institutions, and the 

Use of Force” (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 2011).

19 Urben, “Wearing Politics on Their Sleeves?” 582‒583.

20 Ibid., 577.

21 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

22 Ibid., 68.

23 Michael R. Gordon, “Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using 

Limited Force in Bosnia,” The New York Times, September 28, 1992; and 

Colin L. Powell, “Why Generals Get Nervous,” The New York Times, October 

8, 1992.

24 Feaver, Armed Servants, 259‒263; Kohn has written: “If civilian 

control is defined first by the relative influence of the military as opposed to 

civilians in military affairs, and second by the appropriateness of the areas in 

which the military exercises its influence, then it was under Colin Powell’s 

tenure that civilian control eroded the most since the rise of the military 

establishment of the 1940s and 1950s.” Kohn, “Out of Control.” 

25 Cohen, “Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?” 179.

26 Ole R. Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs 

of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium,” eds. 

Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, Soldiers and Civiliansan , 86‒87; and 

Urben, “Party, Politics, and Deciding What’s Proper,” 363.

27 Peter D. Feaver, “The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and 

the Iraq Surge Decision,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011), 94.

28 Feaver and Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians, 465; Cook, “Revolt of 

the Generals,” 6; Mackubin Thomas Owens, “What Military Officers Need 

to Know About Civil-Military Relations,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 

2 (Spring 2012), 75.

29 Nielsen and Snider, eds., American Civil-Military Relations, 291.

30 Brian Babcock-Lumish, “Uninformed, Not Uniformed? The Apolitical Myth,” Military Review (September‒October 2013), 48‒56.

31 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.

32 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: 

Belknap Press, 1957), 71, 73.

33 Owens, “What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-Military 

Relations,” 72.

34 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 

1344.10, Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces (Washington, 

DC: February 19, 2008). Often updated prior to a presidential election year, 

the current version was last published in February 2008.

35 Ibid., 2.

36 Ibid., 10.

37 Leo Shane III, “Army Reservist Who Endorsed Ron Paul Receives 

Reprimand,” Stars and Stripes, March 30, 2012.

38 Tony Perry, “Marine Who Criticized Obama Will Be Dismissed 

from the Service,” Los Angeles Times, April 26, 2012.

39 Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, 2‒3.

40 Ibid., 3‒4.
41 Ibid., 5.

42 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 2016 

DoD Public Affairs Guidance for Political Campaigns and Elections, 2016.

43 Ibid., 9‒10.

44 Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How (New 

York: Whittlesey House, 1936).

45 Civilian employees in the executive branch of the federal government are bound by the Hatch Act, which has similar provisions to DoDD 

1344.10 and prohibits employees from engaging in certain types of political 

activity. “The Hatch Act: Frequently Asked Questions on Federal Employees and the Use of Social Media and Email,” U.S. Office of Special Counsel, 

November 2015.

46 Ibid.

47 2016 DoD Public Affairs Guidance for Political Campaigns and 

Elections, 10.

48 General (Retired) Martin Dempsey seems to make this point in his 

quote that leads off this introduction. By contrasting the far reach of social 

media against “the confines of our homes,” his implicit assertion is that 

while Servicemembers have the right to personal, political expression, such 

views should be made in private, not in a public forum.

49 Michael G. Mullen, ‘‘From the Chairman: Military Must Stay Apolitical,’’ Joint Force Quarterly 50 (July 2008), 2‒3; Michael G. Mullen, “Speech 

Delivered at National Defense University Commencement” (Washington, 

DC: June 11, 2009); Martin E. Dempsey, “Civil-Military Relations and the 

Profession of Arms,” Chairman’s Corner Blog, June 25, 2012, available at 

<www.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/06/civil-military-relations-and-the-profession-of-arms/>.

50 Feaver and Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians, 466.

51 Jim Garamone, “Dempsey: Political Activity Erodes Trust in Military,” Armed Forces Press Service, August 12, 2012.

52 Jeffrey M. Jones, “Confidence in U.S. Institutions Still Below 

Historical Norms,” Gallup, June 15, 2015, available at <www.gallup.com/

poll/183593/confidence-institutions-below-historical-norms.aspx>. 

53 Holsti, “Of Chasms and Convergences,” 20.

54 Feaver and Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians; Golby, “Duty, Honor 

Party?”; Jim Golby, Kyle Dropp, and Peter Feaver, “Listening to the Generals: How Military Advice Affects Public Support for the Use of Force,” 

Center for a New American Security, April 2013; and Urben, “Party, Politics, 

and Deciding What’s Proper.”

55 Hans Noel, Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and E.E. Schattschneider, Party 

Government (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004).

56 Feaver and Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians; Holsti, “A Widening 

Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society”; Jason K. Dempsey, 

Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); and Heidi A. Urben, “Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms” 

(Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 2010).

57 To ensure valid comparisons to past surveys, responses from only 

National War College students and Eisenhower School students are displayed in table 2.

58 Military Times episodically conducts surveys of its subscribers’ party 

identification and political ideology, but these are nonrandom samples with 

plenty of bias. Nonetheless, they have charted a drop-off in affiliation with 

the Republican Party within the officer corps and the military writ large 

over the past 10‒15 years. See Urben, “Civil-Military Relations in a Time of 

War”; and Stephen Losey, “America’s Military: A Conservative Institution’s 

Uneasy Cultural Revolution,” Military Times, December 21, 2014.

59 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald 

E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960); Donald Green, 

Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political 

Parties and the Social Identities of Voters (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 2002); and Urben, “Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War.”

60 Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” 

Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), 

206‒261; and Noel, Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America. 

61 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 79.

62 Moreover, this could be evident of a social desirability bias, where 

military elites are temporarily suppressing their affiliation with the Republican Party for any of the aforementioned reasons, especially if military 

elites are more akin to the “Republican establishment.” John Sides, “Why 

Are So Many Democrats and Republicans Pretending to Be Independents?” 

Monkey Cage Blog, April 4, 2016; Hans Noel, “Why Can’t the G.O.P. Stop 

Trump?” The Washington Post, March 1, 2016. See also, Claire Malone, “The 

End of a Republican Party,” fivethirtyeight.com, July 18, 2016 and David 

Frum, “The Great Republican Revolt,” The Atlantic, January/February 2016.

63 Maeve Duggan, “The Demographics of Social Media Users,” 

Pew Research Center, August 19, 2015, available at <www.pewinternet.

org/2015/08/19/mobile-messaging-and-social-media-2015/2015-08-19_social-media-update_10/>.

64 The correlation between a binary variable representing the 

18‒24-year-old demographic and having a Facebook account is weak but 

positive (r = 0.24, p < .001), while the correlation between the 18‒24-yearold age bracket and having a LinkedIn account is moderate and negative (r 

= -0.45, p < .001). 

65 Henry Brady, Lee Rainie, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Aaron Smith, 

and Sidney Verba, “Social Media and Political Engagement,” Pew Research 

Center, October 19, 2012, available at <www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_SocialMediaAndPoliticalEngagement_PDF.

pdf>.

66 See generally: Bruce E. Keith, David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, 

Elizabeth A. Orr, Mark C. Westlye, The Myth of the Independent Voter

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, and Mark C. Westlye, “The Myth of the Independent Voter 

Revisited,” in Facing the Challenge of Democracy: Explorations in the Analysis of Public Opinion and Political Participation, eds. Paul M. Sniderman and 

Benjamin Highton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); and 

Michael Lewis-Beck, William Jacoby, and Helmut Norpoth, The American 

Voter Revisited (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008).

67 A positive correlation exists between the 18‒24-year-old cohort and 

getting news from Facebook (r = 0.32, p < .001). 

68 Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, and Katerina Eva Matsa, “Millennials and Political News: Social Media—the Local TV for the Next Generation?” Pew Research Center, June 1, 2015, available at <www.journalism.

org/2015/06/01/millennials-political-news/>.

69 Marc Prensky was the first to use the term “digital natives” to 

describe those who have grown up in the digital world of new technology. 

In contrast, “digital immigrants” were not born into this world but try to 

embrace most aspects of it. See Marc Prensky, “Digital Natives, Digital 

Immigrants,” On the Horizon 9, no. 5 (October 2001).

70 Clearly, a few responses from West Point Cadets are outliers, including the four respondents who reported having over 3,000 friends. 

71 Difference of means test for average number of social media friends 

between West Point Cadets and NDU students was statistically significant at 

p < .001 (t = 13.29).

72 Aaron Smith, “Six New Facts about Facebook,” Pew Research 

Center, February 3, 2014, available at <www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-facebook/>.

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Endnotes 55

73 It should be noted that a small percentage of each West Point Class 

consists of former enlisted Servicemembers with prior military experience. 

For the Class of 2018, 17 of the 1,223 students admitted were combat veterans. Cadets with prior military service likely have a higher proportion of 

their social media friends who are in the military, but this still comprises a 

small percentage of any given class. “Profile of Class of 2018,” United States 

Military Academy, available at <www.westpoint.edu/oir/Class%20profiles/

Class%20of%202018.pdf>. 

74 Urben, “Wearing Politics on Their Sleeves?” 577.

75 Ibid., 573‒576.

76 Past research into Army officers’ attitudes found that 93 percent 

of Army officers agreed with the statement that members of the military 

should vote, and 81 percent of Army officers stated they voted in the 2008 

presidential election—far outpacing voter turnout levels for the general 

public. Urben, “Wearing Politics on Their Sleeves? ” 575.

77 Betros, “Political Partisanship and the Military Ethic in America,” 

514‒515.

78 Hooker, “Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations,” 9.

79 Urben, “Wearing Politics on Their Sleeves?” 577.

80 Brady, Rainie, Schlozman, Smith, and Verba, “Social Media and 

Political Engagement.”

81 Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Jocelyn Kiley, and Katerina Eva 

Matsa, “Political Polarization and Media Habits,” Pew Research Center, October 21, 2014, available at <www.journalism.org/files/2014/10/Political-Polarization-and-Media-Habits-FINAL-REPORT-7-27-15.pdf>. 

82 See generally: Kohn, “General Elections: The Brass Shouldn’t Do 

Endorsements”; Golby, Urben, Dropp, and Feaver, “Brass Politics: How 

Retired Military Officers Are Shaping Elections”; Swain, “Reflection on an 

Ethic of Officership”; Kohn, “Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in 

the United States Today”; Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in 

Professional Ethics”; and Nielsen and Snider, eds., American Civil-Military 

Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era.

83 Mitchell, Gottfried, Kiley, and Matsa, “Political Polarization and 

Media Habits.”

84 Urben, “Wearing Politics on Their Sleeves?” 580.

85 10 U.S. Code § 888 - Article 88, Contempt toward officials.

86 Urben, Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War.

87 Urben, “Party, Politics, and Deciding What’s Proper,” 361.

88 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Tradition Abandoned: America’s Military in a 

New Era,” The National Interest 48 (Summer 1997); Kohn, “Out of Control”; 

and Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military Today,” Naval 

War College Review 40, no. 3 (June 2002). Much of the military’s apparent 

aversion to President Clinton can be traced to the revelation during the 

1992 campaign that he avoided the draft through multiple educational 

deferments and by joining the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) but 

never serving in it, along with the fact he joined in protests of the Vietnam 

War while overseas. A letter he wrote to the head of the University of 

Arkansas’ ROTC Department, in which he admitted to having loathed the 

military, probably did not help. “The 1992 Campaign; A Letter by Clinton 

on His Draft Deferment: ‘A War I Opposed and Despised,’” The New York 

Times, February 13, 1992.

89 Department of Defense Directive 1344.10, 2.

90 Department of the Army, The United States Army Social Media 

Handbook, April 2016, available at <www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/

socialmedia/army_social_media_handbook.pdf>; Department of the 

Navy, Navy Command Leadership Social Media Handbook, Chief of Naval 

Information, Fall 2012, available at <www.navy.mil/ah_online/OPSEC/

docs/Policy/Navy_Social_Media_Handbook_2012.pdf>; Department of 

the Air Force, Air Force Social Media Guide, 4th edition, 2013; and Defense 

Media Activity, Marine Corps Production Directorate, The U.S.M.C. Social 

Media Principles, available at <www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/Docs/

Social-Media-Handbook%20REVISED.pdf>.
Colonel Heidi A. Urben was commissioned as a Distinguished Military Graduate through the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps at the University of Notre Dame 

in May 1997. A career Military Intelligence Officer, her 

past assignment highlights include deployments to Bosnia (1999–2000) and Afghanistan (2004–2005, 2010–

2011); various staff positions in the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and 25th Infantry Division (Light); 

command of an intelligence company in Hawaii; Military Aide to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates; Operations Officer and Executive Officer for a counterintelligence battalion at Fort George G. Meade; Assistant 

Professor of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy in 

the Department of Social Sciences at the United States 

Military Academy; and Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion in Hawaii. Colonel Urben is 

currently assigned to the Joint Staff in the Pentagon.

Colonel Urben holds a BA in Government and International Studies from the University of Notre Dame; 

an MPM, MA, and Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown University; and an MS in National Security Strategy from the National War College. A Visiting Research 

Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at 

the National Defense University, Colonel Urben’s research interests include civil-military relations, mass 

media and politics, and public opinion. Her dissertation 

is titled “Civil-Military Relations in a Time of War: Party, Politics, and the Profession of Arms.”

About the Author

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