NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BYRON LEE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

AT&T SERVICES, INC., a Delaware 

Corporation; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

JAIME V. BENAVIDES, individually and 

as agent/employee/supervisor of AT&T 

Services, Inc./Pacific Bell; LEE VAGATAI, 

individually and as 

agent/employee/supervicor of AT&T 

Services/Pacific Bell, 

Defendants.

No. 18-56415 

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-04642-FMO-SS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 3, 2020**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 11 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-56415 

Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges. 

Byron Lee appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 

diversity action alleging state law claims arising out of defendants’ termination of 

his employment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de 

novo. Fuller v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 865 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017). We 

affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lee’s breach of 

contract claim because the claim was preempted by Section 301 of the Labor 

Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and Lee failed to 

exhaust his remedies under his union’s collective bargaining agreement as required

under the LMRA. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 986 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (“[A]n employee’s failure to exhaust contractually mandated procedures 

precludes judicial relief for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and 

related claims [under the LMRA]”). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lee’s claim under 

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) alleging wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy because Lee failed to raise a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether his termination violated public policy. See 

Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1032-33 (Cal. 1994) (to prevail on 

a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy, a plaintiff must 
3 18-56415 

demonstrate that his termination violated a policy that is “(1) fundamental, (2) 

beneficial for the public, and (3) embodied in a statute or constitutional 

provision”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lee’s intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim because Lee failed to raise a triable dispute as 

to whether defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct. See Hughes v. 

Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 976 (Cal. 2009) (elements of an intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim); Pitman v. City of Oakland, 243 Cal. Rptr. 306, 311-12

(Ct. App. 1988) (termination from employment does not, by itself, constitute 

extreme and outrageous conduct). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lee’s negligent 

infliction of emotional distress claim because Lee failed to raise a triable dispute as 

to whether defendants breached a legal duty owed to him. See Marlene F. v. 

Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278, 281 (Cal. 1989) (elements of 

a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lee’s request for an 

extension of time to file a supplemental summary judgment opposition because

Lee did not demonstrate good cause. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 

F.3d 1253, 1258-60 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and discussing 

good cause requirement for extensions of time).
4 18-56415 

We reject as meritless Lee’s contention that he was not an employee of 

Pacific Bell Telephone Company. 

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not 

consider documents not presented to the district court. See United States v. Elias, 

921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

AFFIRMED.