In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 20-2048, 20-2049, 20-2080, 20-2086, 20-2087, 20-2088, 

20-2100, 20-2115, 20-2116, 20-2117, 20-2133, 20-2208, 20-2229 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

KENTREVION WATKINS, et al.

Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 1:18-cr-10036 — James E. Shadid, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2022 — DECIDED JULY 8, 2024 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and LEE, Circuit 

Judges. 

LEE, Circuit Judge. The Bomb Squad was a street gang that 

used violence against anyone who threatened its reputation, 

turf, or drug sales. Fourteen gang members were charged 

with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), along with other crimes. One member, Jovan McCree, pleaded guilty. The remaining defendants 
2 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

went to trial and were convicted by a jury; they are Kenwan 

Crowe, Lloyd Dotson, Mytrez Flora, Keith Gregory, Eugene 

Haywood, Ezra Johnson, Andre Neal-Ford, Raevaughn Rogers, Lance Washington, Kentrevion Watkins, Torieuanno 

White, Sherman Williams, and Jahlin Wilson.

These defendants now seek to vacate their convictions on 

numerous grounds. Their principal argument is that the district judge ran afoul of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), 

when selecting the jury. For the reasons provided, we retain 

jurisdiction of the appeal and order a limited remand to permit the district court to make supplemental findings as to this 

issue. As for the remaining arguments defendants raise on appeal, we find no reversible error and affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The Bomb Squad street gang terrorized the Peoria area 

from 2013 to 2018. Its members committed and attempted to 

commit numerous murders, trafficked in illegal drugs, and 

engaged in multiple robberies. Within the loose hierarchy of 

the Bomb Squad, its leaders had the authority to order lowerranking members to rob, shoot, or murder rival gang members. A lower-ranking member’s ruthlessness earned greater 

respect and standing within the organization. Although 

Bomb Squad members often identified themselves within 

smaller subgroups, such as 2300, Magnolia, Harrison Homes, 

Family First, Marco Movement, or Geek Team Squad, they 

demonstrated their affiliation and allegiance to the larger organization through hand signals, clothing, tattoos, slogans, 

and rap lyrics. What follows is a sample of the Bomb Squad’s 

criminal activities the government presented at trial.
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 3

To protect their reputation and territory, Bomb Squad 

members often turned to gun violence. For example, after being chased and disrespected by rival gang members in June 

2013, Haywood obtained a gun from fellow Bomb Squad 

member Zarmere Barnes. Within hours, Haywood and another member, Johnson, rode bikes to where Haywood had 

been chased. Haywood then shot at the men who had chased 

him killing one of them, Eric Brown. On another occasion, just 

one month later, Bomb Squad leader Raheem Wilson warned 

his colleagues to be on the lookout for Antonio Scott, a rival 

gangster whom Wilson had robbed. A few days later, Haywood, along with fellow gang members, Dotson and Flora, 

shot at Scott’s car, fatally injuring a passenger, Tyrann Chester.

Bomb Squad members retaliated aggressively against 

even trivial slights. For instance, after White’s sisters were 

kicked out of a party in August 2015, White shot at rival gang 

member, Sam Powell, in an alley outside of the party.

The Bomb Squad also zealously protected its territory, 

shooting at rival gang members on multiple occasions. In February 2015, for example, Haywood shot at a suspected rival 

gang member. Haywood then passed the gun to another 

Bomb Squad member before the police arrived. Haywood 

pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to unlawful use of a 

weapon by a felon. About a year later, White and another 

Bomb Squad member shot at two suspected rival gang members in a car parked in Bomb Squad territory, hitting the 

driver multiple times.

On one evening in the spring of 2016, members of Zone 4, 

a rival gang, began shooting at people and buildings in Bomb 

Squad territory. Later that night, McCree, who was a Bomb 
4 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

Squad leader, ordered fellow members, Wilson and Crowe, to 

encroach into Zone 4’s territory and shoot Zone 4 members 

“CB” and “Freebands” in retaliation. 

In May 2016, Neal-Ford shot at a car that he believed was 

occupied by rival gang members. This occurred near Arago 

Street and Humboldt Street in Bomb Squad territory. That 

same month, Wilson robbed an individual, Isaiah Richardson, 

and shot him during a dice game in Bomb Squad territory.

In May 2017, White and Flora shot at suspected rival gang 

members as they drove a truck past the Harrison Homes 

apartment complex in Bomb Squad territory. That same 

month, Gregory, Johnson, and White agreed to shoot a suspected rival gang member who had just completed maintenance work at a market in Bomb Squad territory. As the man 

sat in the passenger seat of his co-worker’s car, Gregory shot 

him multiple times.

In August 2017, Courtney Jones was walking to his aunt’s 

house in Bomb Squad territory and happened to get into an 

argument with a group of men. As Jones approached his 

aunt’s front doorstep, a Black man with dreadlocks, later 

identified as Haywood, rode up on his bicycle, asked Jones 

whether his name was Courtney and said, “I heard you had 

some words with my people.” Haywood then shot Jones 

twice.

The gun violence the Bomb Squad perpetrated was not 

confined to its own territory. Washington shot Martell Perkins 

in the leg as he left a nightclub in July 2016. Perkins was affiliated with Moe Block, a rival gang.

That same year, Bomb Squad members made several attempts to murder another rival gang member, Demoney 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 5

Coleman, in surrounding areas. Rogers shot at Coleman in 

August 2016. Crowe and Neal-Ford fired numerous shots into 

Coleman’s house when he was hosting relatives on Thanksgiving Day. And Rogers and Crowe separately shot at Coleman on different occasions in March 2017. 

After a Bomb Squad leader, Raheem Wilson (nicknamed 

“Boosie”), was murdered in February 2017, Dotson retaliated 

against an individual named Ryan Greenwood, because Dotson believed Greenwood was to blame. Dotson fired eighteen 

shots at Greenwood’s car as Greenwood was picking up a 

passenger in rival gang territory in May 2017. One bullet 

struck the passenger in the back. Dotson was later found with 

a gun that matched the one that was used during that shooting.

While at a Bradley University party in April 2018, Watkins 

identified Anthony Polnitz as a rival gang member and 

handed a gun to fellow Bomb Squad member Jermontay 

Brock. Brock then shot Polnitz once in the face and twice in 

the back, killing him. One of the bullets went through Polnitz 

and killed Nasjay Murray, a Bradley student.

In addition to committing gun crimes, members of the 

Bomb Squad operated numerous trap houses, where they 

stored firearms and distributed crack, heroin, and marijuana. 

During its investigation into the group, government agents 

coordinated a number of controlled buys from Bomb Squad 

members, including Dotson, Johnson, and Williams. For instance, in March 2018, Dotson supplied a Bomb Squad member with approximately 3.5 grams of crack to sell to an undercover federal agent. A subsequent search of Dotson’s apartment revealed two digital scales and ten baggies of crack. On 

another occasion, Johnson gave fellow gang member Jordan 
6 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

Timothy one gram of heroin to sell to an undercover agent. 

And Williams sold fifty-eight grams of marijuana to an undercover agent through Bomb Squad member Juan Faulkner 

for $500. Williams advertised his marijuana sales on Facebook.

Bomb Squad members also robbed people of their money 

and property. For example, in 2016, White, Gregory, and others accosted two individuals at gunpoint and stole a cell 

phone, alcohol, and marijuana. Williams, Crowe, and others 

also burglarized a house in August 2017 and stole a safe containing twelve firearms that they distributed to other Bomb 

Squad members.

B. Procedural History

After a seven-week trial that included over eighty witnesses, the jury convicted all thirteen defendants of engaging 

in a RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Dotson, Gregory, Haywood, Johnson, Washington, White, and 

Wilson were also convicted of assault with a dangerous 

weapon and attempted murder in aid of racketeering activity 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) and (5), as well as brandishing and discharging a firearm while committing a crime 

of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii). 

Additionally, the jury found White and Wilson guilty of possessing firearms while felons in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) and Dotson, Johnson, and Williams guilty of possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). In the end, the district court sentenced Haywood to life imprisonment, and the 

other defendants received lengthy prison terms.
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 7

We first will address the common issues defendants raise, 

before turning to their individual arguments.

II. Discussion

A. Jointly Raised Issues

1. Batson

We begin with the defendants’ contention that the government improperly selected jurors based on race. In Batson, 

476 U.S. 79, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that 

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory challenge to 

strike a prospective juror because of the individual’s race. In 

so doing, the Court adopted a three-step process for trial 

courts to follow to determine whether an Equal Protection violation has occurred. Id. at 93–98. 

First, a defendant must “make out a prima facie case of 

purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the 

relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 93–94. To establish a prima facie case, a defendant 

must indicate that “he is a member of a cognizable racial 

group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory 

challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race.” Id. at 96 (citation omitted); see Hernandez v. New 

York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (acknowledging Latinos as a cognizable ethnic group under Batson). Furthermore, “the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that 

practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.

Second, once a defendant establishes a prima facie case of 

discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the 
8 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

government, and the prosecutor must articulate race-neutral 

reasons for the peremptory challenge in question. Id. at 94. 

Third, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the government’s explanation is credible. Id. at 98 n.21. 

Typically, “we review the district court’s Batson findings 

for clear error.” United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 663 (7th 

Cir. 2009). But when a defendant challenges the manner in 

which the district court conducted the Batson inquiry, our review is de novo. See id. Here, the defendants assert that the district court applied the wrong legal standard at step one and 

failed to make the necessary credibility determination at step 

three.

All thirteen defendants are Black males, and the district 

court called five panels of potential jurors.1 The first panel included Juror 26, a Black man who recently had been employed by Peoria’s public housing authority; Juror 58, a 

woman with a dark complexion who taught Spanish and English as a Second Language (ESL) at a private school; and Juror 

154, a white female who was a retired public elementary 

school teacher.2 Following voir dire of the first panel, the district court allowed counsel to exercise their peremptory challenges, and the government struck all three individuals without explanation.

1 Defendants assert that the jury consisted of all white jurors, but we 

are unable to find any indication in the record of this, one way or the other.

2 Although the district court and counsel had access to the names of 

the individual panel members, they were referenced by juror number to 

maintain their anonymity. We shall do the same.
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 9

Citing Batson, the defendants objected on the grounds that 

the government had used two of its peremptory strikes to remove the only non-white individuals on the panel—Juror 26 

and Juror 58. As for Juror 26, the defendants observed that he 

was the only Black person on the panel and that he might be 

the only opportunity for the defendants to have a Black man 

on the jury. As for Juror 58, defendants contended that Juror 

58 was also non-white because she spoke with a heavy Hispanic accent, had a dark complexion, and taught Spanish and 

ESL.

In response, the government argued it was unclear 

whether Juror 58 was a member of a racial or ethnic minority. 

Left with Juror 26, the government continued, the defendants 

could not establish a pattern of discriminatory conduct.

The district court agreed that it could not readily ascertain 

Juror 58’s race or ethnicity. The court did not address the defendants’ contention that Juror 58 had spoken with a heavy 

Hispanic accent, but it agreed to preserve the audio recording 

of the jury selection proceedings. The court emphasized, however, that, even if Juror 58 was non-white, it still would hold 

that the defendants had failed to demonstrate a prima facie

case under Batson because, even if the government had used 

two peremptory strikes to exclude minority panel members, 

the defendants had not established a pattern of discrimination. “I must make a determination as to whether the side 

claiming racially discriminatory peremptory challenges has 

carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination,” the 

district court stated when discussing step one, “and I don’t 

think the record would support that you have done so.”
10 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

But a defendant’s burden at step one is “light.” Bennett v. 

Gaetz, 592 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 2010). He need only indicate 

“circumstances raising a suspicion that discrimination occurred.” United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 512 (7th Cir. 

2005). Indeed, to satisfy his burden to establish a prima facie

case under step one, a defendant is not required to “prove” 

purposeful discrimination, by a preponderance of the evidence or otherwise. Id. Here, the district court committed legal error by requiring the defendants to do just that.3

Moreover, the district court and the government apparently assumed that the defendants were relying on the existence of a pattern of discriminatory challenges to satisfy their 

burden under Batson. But it is worth noting that “‘a consistent 

pattern of official racial discrimination’ is not ‘a necessary 

predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.’” Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing 

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14 (1977)). Depending on the 

circumstances, the use of a single discriminatory peremptory 

strike can be enough. See Morse v. Hanks, 172 F.3d 983, 985 (7th 

Cir. 1999) (“A prima facie case of purposeful discrimination 

can be established where the prosecution uses a peremptory 

challenge to strike the only black venireman in the panel.”); 

Bohen v. City of E. Chi., Ind., 799 F.2d 1180, 1186 (7th Cir. 1986); 

see also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169 (2005) (“[A] 

prima facie case of discrimination can be made out by offering 

a wide variety of evidence, so long as the sum of the prof3 The government attempts to downplay the district court’s comment 

as an inartful misstatement. But that statement was the court’s only mention of the defendants’ burden at step one of Batson, and so we have little 

choice but to assess the court’s ruling using its own words.
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 11

fered facts gives ‘rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’”) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 94) (footnote omitted).

Next, the defendants argue that the district court failed to 

satisfy Batson’s third step by not making a finding as to 

whether the government’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons 

for exercising its peremptory challenges were credible. See 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. After concluding voir dire of the first 

panel, the district court revisited the defendants’ Batson challenge after the lunch break. After stating that it remained convinced the defendants had not met step one, the court nevertheless invited the government to provide race-neutral reasons for striking both Juror 26 and Juror 58 to supplement the 

record (which is good practice in the event of an appeal).

As for Juror 58, the government steadfastly declined to offer any explanation, despite persistent prompting by the 

court. It tries to do so now, but, having forfeited its opportunity below, the government has relinquished its right to 

supply its reasons on appeal. See United States v. Gimbel, 782 

F.2d 89, 91 (7th Cir. 1986) (“It is well-settled that an issue not 

presented in the district court cannot be raised for the first 

time on appeal[.]”).

By contrast, the government presented four reasons for 

striking Juror 26. It noted that Juror 26 knew a potential government witness. Additionally, he worked for the Peoria 

Housing Authority, which managed Harrison Homes, a complex where members of the Bomb Squad had trafficked drugs 

and was the scene of multiple incidents alleged in the indictment. Juror 26 also had a prior arrest for domestic violence. 

And he himself had previously lived in the part of town 

where some of the alleged events occurred.
12 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

The defendants questioned whether these were the actual 

reasons for striking Juror 26 or merely after-the-fact concoctions. The prosecutor responded that the reasons were formulated before striking Juror 26, at which point the district court 

remarked, “I will find those are race-neutral reasons.” This 

was the entirety of the district court’s third-step analysis, 

which the defendants argue was insufficient.

We previously disapproved of a nearly identical statement 

because it fell well short of the credibility finding Batson requires. See Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019). “While 

we can glean some information from this record,” we wrote, 

“we have no way to know whether the attorneys were credible.” Id. at 715. As a result, we remanded the case so that the 

district court could make the necessary findings and conduct 

a new trial, if necessary. Id.

To its credit, the government concedes that Lisle is on all 

fours with this case. Accordingly, here too, we remand this 

case to the district court for the limited purpose of correctly 

employing the three-step process under Batson to evaluate the 

merits of the defendants’ objections to the government’s use 

of its peremptory challenges as to Juror 26 and Juror 58. Of 

course, we express no opinion on the outcome of the credibility issue, a matter for the district court to consider in the first 

instance. Depending on its findings, the district court may order a new trial, if necessary.

We shall retain jurisdiction of the appeal while the district 

court makes its additional findings. See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2005). If the district court 

deems a new trial unnecessary, the parties may file position 

statements in this court seeking appellate review of the Batson

determination. If the district court deems a new trial 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 13

necessary, it should inform this court of its conclusion. We 

will then issue a final resolution and the mandate.

We recognize that the remainder of this opinion may be 

largely mooted if the district court orders a new trial. But because the district court may not order a new trial or, if it does, 

certain issues raised by the defendants likely will be relevant 

to any retrial, we proceed to the remaining issues in the interest of judicial economy. 

2. Disqualification of Prosecutor

Next, Flora, Dotson, and Wilson assert that the district 

court should have disqualified Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Ronald Hanna for having a conflict of interest. In 

2012, Bomb Squad member Terrance Herron and thirteen others, none of whom are defendants in the instant case, were 

indicted for committing various federal crimes, including 

drug trafficking, between approximately January 2009 to February 2013. Herron pleaded guilty in July 2013 to possessing 

a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime 

and was sentenced in November 2013. Hanna had represented Herron in that case from October 2012 to September 

2014, prior to joining the United States Attorney’s Office.

In June 2017, federal investigators commenced a new investigation into the Bomb Squad, and Hanna, now an AUSA, 

became the lead prosecutor on that investigation in September 2017. This led to the indictment in this case, which was 

returned in June 2018 and alleged criminal conduct starting in 

about January 2013. 

In the defendants’ eyes, Hanna’s prior work representing 

Herron raised a clear conflict of interest, and they moved to 

disqualify him on that basis. The district court disagreed.
14 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

We generally review a district court’s denial of a motion to 

disqualify an attorney for abuse of discretion. Watkins v. Trans 

Union, LLC, 869 F.3d 514, 518 (7th Cir. 2017). But where, as 

here, “the district court does not hold an evidentiary hearing 

or make findings of fact to which we must defer, ‘district 

courts enjoy no particular advantage over appellate courts in 

their formulation of ethical norms.’” Cromley v. Bd. of Educ. of 

Lockport Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 17 F.3d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir. 

1994) (quoting Freeman v. Chi. Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 

715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982), and applying abuse-of-discretion and 

de novo review). 

Flora and Dotson contend that American Bar Association 

Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 mandates Hanna’s 

disqualification. (Before the district court, they relied on Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9, but that rule is more or 

less identical to the Model Rule.) Also, they argue for the first 

time on appeal that the district court’s ruling contravened Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, issues we review 

for plain error. See United States v. Mikulski, 35 F.4th 1074, 1077 

(7th Cir. 2022) (stating that issues raised for first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error). What’s more, Wilson 

adopts his co-defendants’ arguments, and because he did not 

seek Hanna’s disqualification below, we review this too under the plain error standard. See United States v. Lara-Unzueta, 

735 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 2013). 

“Most federal courts use the ethical rules of the states in 

which they sit[.]” Huusko v. Jenkins, 556 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 

2009); see C.D. Ill. Local Rule 83.6(D) (stating that the Central 

District of Illinois has adopted the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct). Federal prosecutors are generally subject to 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 15

the state’s rules of professional conduct and local federal 

court rules. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a); 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(b). The defendants’ contention that the district court should have disqualified Hanna are unpersuasive.

First, Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 did not require Hanna’s disqualification. That rule prohibits a lawyer 

from representing a client “if the representation involves a 

concurrent conflict of interest,” such as where “the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client.” 

Defendants cite Board of Managers of Eleventh Street Loftiminium Ass’n v. Wabash Loftiminium, L.L.C., 876 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 2007). But, in that case, the law firm in question had 

represented the individual defendants as well as the corporations they held at the same time. Id. at 75. By contrast, Hanna’s 

representation of Herron was limited to a specific matter, and 

Hanna did not represent Herron and the government simultaneously.

Turning to Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9, it provides in pertinent part: 

(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are 

materially adverse to the interests of the former 

client unless the former client gives informed 

consent.

***

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm 
16 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

has formerly represented a client in a matter 

shall not thereafter:

(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would 

permit or require with respect to a client, 

or when the information has become 

generally known; or

(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would 

permit or require with respect to a client.

“Rule 1.9 is a prophylactic rule to prevent even the potential 

that a former client’s confidences and secrets may be used 

against him.” Havens v. Indiana, 793 F.2d 143, 145 (7th Cir. 

1986). 

While we are mindful of the ethical considerations involved, the district court did not abuse its discretion (let 

alone, commit plain error) in denying the defendants’ motion. 

We recognize that the conspiracy for which Herron was indicted and the conspiracy alleged here may have overlapped 

in January and February 2013. But the defendants have not 

presented any relationship, substantial or otherwise, between 

the overt acts alleged in Herron’s case and those the government presented at trial. Nor is there any overlap between the 

defendants in the two cases, and none of the defendants in 

Herron’s case testified in this case.

The defendants point out that the government did approach one of the defendants from the prior case to see if he 

would be willing to assist the investigation that led to this 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 17

case. But we think this, without more, is insufficient to establish a violation of Rule 1.9.

The cases the defendants cite are of little help. For example, in United States v. Goot, the prosecutors had previously 

represented the same individual who was being prosecuted. 

894 F.2d 231, 233 (7th Cir. 1990). In United States v. Volpendesto, 

the defense attorney had represented an individual who was 

scheduled to testify against his current client. 746 F.3d 273, 

283 (7th Cir. 2014). In some of the cases the defendants cite, 

the attorney in question was challenging the validity of a contract against a party that he had previously advised regarding 

the same contract. See, e.g., Cromley, 17 F.3d at 1063. And, in 

others, the attorney faced the possibility of cross-examining 

current or former clients at trial. See, e.g., Wheat v. United 

States, 486 U.S. 153, 155–56 (1988), United States v. Turner, 594 

F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2010); Hall v. United States, 371 F.3d 969, 

971–72 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. O’Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 

790 (7th Cir. 1986). Here, Hanna has never represented any of 

the defendants or witnesses in this case.

Nor is there evidence in the record that Hanna gained any 

privileged information during his representation of Herron 

that was useful to the government here. Herron was not called 

as a witness, and the government did not seek to admit any of 

Herron’s statements at trial. That said, Herron’s name did 

come up once during the trial. John Thomas, a Bomb Squad 

member who was cooperating with the government, mentioned Herron when he was asked to identify the individuals 

in a photograph. Hanna then asked Thomas whether Herron 

was a Bomb Squad member and to identify the gesture Herron was making with his hand.
18 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

The defendants do not contend that this was privileged information Hanna obtained during his representation of Herron, nor could they. Herron’s involvement in the Bomb Squad 

and the prior case was a matter of public record. See Havens, 

793 F.2d at 145 (finding no constitutional or ethical violation 

where a prosecutor, who had previously represented a defendant, cross-examined him about his membership in a gang 

at a subsequent trial, because the prosecutor would have had 

access to information about defendant’s background, including gang membership). And the defendants can only speculate that Hanna must have learned from Herron that Flora 

was one of the shooters that killed Chester in July 2013. But 

three cooperating witnesses testified to this fact at trial, and 

the defendants do not contend that any of them were involved 

in Herron’s case.

For these reasons, the district court did not commit reversible error when denying the defendants’ motion to disqualify Hanna. Nor did its ruling deprive Flora, Dotson, and 

Wilson of their rights to a fair trial. That said, we do think it 

advisable in the future for the United States Attorney to exercise great care when assigning cases so that the impartiality of 

the government is beyond reproach.

B. Individually Raised Issues

1. Williams: The Indictment

Williams contends that the Third Superseding Indictment 

was so vague as to render it unconstitutional. That is why, in 

his view, the jury convicted him of engaging in a RICO conspiracy (Count 1) and possession with intent to distribute marijuana (Count 41), but acquitted him of two other predicate 

acts.
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 19

Although the government argues Williams has waived 

this issue below, we address the merits because the issue is 

easily dispatched under de novo review. See United States v. 

Ramsey, 406 F.3d 426, 429 (7th Cir. 2005). An indictment “adequately set[s] forth the elements of a racketeering conspiracy” 

if it (1) identifies “a proper enterprise and the defendant’s association with that enterprise” and (2) charges that “the defendant knowingly joined a conspiracy, the objective of which 

was to operate that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.” United States v. Tello, 687 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir. 

2012). A RICO conspiracy indictment need not allege “that the 

defendant committed two predicate acts of racketeering” or 

“that any such acts were ultimately committed by anyone.” 

Id. at 792. The indictment also need not identify the specific 

predicate acts or overt acts that the defendant agreed would 

be committed. Id. at 795; see Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 

52, 63 (1997). 

Count 1 of the Third Superseding Indictment alleged that 

(1) the Bomb Squad was an “enterprise” within the meaning 

of the statute; (2) Williams agreed to conduct or participate in 

the Bomb Squad’s affairs; and (3) Williams agreed that one or 

more Bomb Squad members would commit at least two predicate acts of racketeering—here, murder, attempted murder, 

assault, robbery, arson, and drug trafficking. Nothing more 

was required.

2. Dotson: Severance

Dotson argues that the district court erred in denying his 

motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants, an issue we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jett, 908 

F.3d 252, 275 (7th Cir. 2018). Dotson bears the “extremely difficult burden” of demonstrating that the joint trial caused him 
20 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

“actual prejudice.” See United States v. Maggard, 865 F.3d 960, 

971 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). To do 

so, he must do more than show that he “would have had a 

better chance of acquittal” in a separate trial; he must demonstrate that he was “unable to obtain a fair trial without severance.” See United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d 1113, 1124 (7th Cir. 

2016). Dotson offers two arguments to meet his burden.

First, Dotson points to the cross-examination of Amos Stimage conducted by counsel for a codefendant, in which Stimage expressed his belief that Dotson was cooperating with 

the government to avoid prosecution. According to Dotson, 

this indicated to the jury that Dotson was guilty. Stimage’s 

statement, however, had little chance of swaying the jury because, after all, Dotson was on trial and, unlike the other cooperating witnesses, he did not testify against his fellow 

Bomb Squad members.

Dotson also argues that the vast array of evidence the government introduced to incriminate his codefendants irreparably tainted the jury’s view of him as well. But the district court 

properly instructed the jury to consider the evidence against 

each defendant separately, without allowing its decision as to 

one defendant influence its decision as to any other. See Zafiro 

v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993); United States v. Morales, 655 F.3d 608, 625 (7th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, even if 

Dotson had been tried separately, the government would 

have been permitted to introduce evidence of the Bomb 

Squad’s other racketeering activities, along with Dotson’s assent, to prove that Dotson had knowingly participated in the 

RICO conspiracy, even if he had not committed them personally. See Morales, 655 F.3d at 627. Given this, the district court 

acted well within its discretion in denying his motion to sever.
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 21

C. Sufficiency of Evidence and Motions for 

New Trial

We now turn to the arguments each defendant raises to 

attack the sufficiency of evidence supporting his individual 

conviction, as well as the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motions for a new trial or judgment as a matter of law.

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Foy, 50 F.4th 616, 622 (7th Cir. 

2022). “De novo review applies to the denial of a motion for 

judgment of acquittal; practically speaking, however, the 

standard of review is that for sufficiency of the evidence.” Peterson, 823 F.3d at 1120. “In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge after a jury verdict, we review the evidence presented 

at trial in the light most favorable to the government and 

draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” United States v. 

Anderson, 988 F.3d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 2021). “[W]e respect the 

exclusive function of the jury to determine the credibility of 

witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable 

inferences.” United States v. Godinez, 7 F.4th 628, 638–39 (7th 

Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We will overturn a conviction only if, after reviewing the record in this 

light, we determine that no rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Anderson, 988 F.3d at 424. “This burden is a high 

one—one we have described as ‘nearly insurmountable.’” 

United States v. Fitzpatrick, 32 F.4th 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Anderson, 988 F.3d at 424). 

1. Dotson: No RICO Enterprise

According to Dotson, his conviction on Count 1 should be 

overturned because the government failed to prove that the 
22 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

Bomb Squad was a RICO enterprise. To prove a RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d), “the government must show (1) an 

agreement to conduct or participate in the affairs (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern of racketeering activity.” United 

States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2006). “[T]he existence of an enterprise is an element distinct from the pattern of 

racketeering activity and proof of one does not necessarily establish the other.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 947 

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

An “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership, 

corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union 

or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 

entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). In turn, an association-in-fact is a 

“group of persons associated together for a common purpose 

of engaging in a course of conduct.” Boyle, 556 U.S. at 944 (internal quotation marks omitted). An association-in-fact “need 

not have any structural features beyond ‘a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.’’’ United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667, 682 (7th 

Cir. 2020) (quoting Boyle, 556 U.S. at 946). 

Dotson asserts that, although various defendants came together at various points to engage in the predicate acts, they 

were independent participants involved in unrelated criminal 

activity that lacked any organization or structure. But this 

gloss casts the facts in a light most favorable to him, rather 

than the government.

As outlined above, the trial evidence clearly showed that 

the Bomb Squad was a distinct group that protected specific 

territory in Peoria. Several witnesses testified that the Bomb 

Squad and its members were identifiable by special 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 23

handshakes, hand signs, and tattoos. See Brown, 973 F.3d at 

684 (considering tattoos and hand signs as evidence of an enterprise). These outward displays of an alliance appeared in 

numerous videos and photographs.

What’s more, the Bomb Squad also held meetings at the 

homes of members to discuss plans to shoot rival gang members, sell drugs, and punish members for infractions like stealing from the gang. Typically, higher-ranking members, including Raheem Wilson (nicknamed “Boosie”) and Haywood, made the decisions, while lower-ranking members 

strove to higher ranks by committing acts of violence and 

ruthlessness. And members loaned each other guns to commit 

these crimes and sometimes posted bond for each other when 

they were arrested. Moreover, multiple witnesses testified 

that the defendants carried out robberies, assaults, arson, attempted murders, and murders in order to protect the gang’s 

territory and to retaliate against rival gang members.

The jury also heard evidence of the Bomb Squad’s coordinated drug-trafficking activity. The gang operated trap 

houses where illegal drugs were stored and distributed. And 

its members, including Dotson, Rashaad Flora (Mytrez Flora’s 

cousin), Johnson, and Williams, used these locations to distribute their illegal drugs.

In short, there is ample evidence from which a reasonable 

jury could conclude that the Bomb Squad was a RICO enterprise.

2. Dotson and Watkins: No Agreement to Join 

RICO Conspiracy

Dotson and Watkins separately challenge the sufficiency 

of the evidence that they had agreed to join the racketeering 
24 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

conspiracy. To make its case, the government needed to prove 

that Dotson and Watkins agreed to two things: (1) that they 

would participate in the affairs of the Bomb Squad through a 

pattern of racketeering activity, and (2) that a member of the 

conspiracy would commit at least two predicate acts in furtherance of it. See Domanus v. Locke Lord LLP, 847 F.3d 469, 479 

(7th Cir. 2017). It is not necessary for the government to show 

that Dotson and Watkins actually were members of the Bomb 

Squad. See Morales, 655 F.3d at 629. Nor did they have to agree 

to personally commit the predicate acts themselves. See United 

States v. Amaya, 828 F.3d 518, 530 (7th Cir. 2016). 

The record contains ample evidence of Dotson’s agreement to participate in the racketeering conspiracy. For example, in July 2013, Dotson (along with Haywood and Flora) 

shot at the car of a rival gang member, Scott, killing a passenger. Then, in February 2017, to retaliate for Boosie’s murder, 

Dotson helped burn down a bakery owned by the family of a 

rival gang member, Greenwood. And, in May of that year, 

Dotson fired eighteen shots at Greenwood’s car, striking a 

passenger. Dotson committed these acts to support the Bomb 

Squad’s criminal activities.

The same is true for Watkins. At a Bradley University party 

in April 2018, Watkins pointed out a rival gang member, 

Polnitz, to a Bomb Squad member and passed a gun to him to 

shoot Polnitz. The Bomb Squad member obeyed, killing 

Polnitz and a student. In addition, Watkins agreed to hold 

guns for Bomb Squad members and appeared in a social media video to promote Rashaad’s drug sales.

There is more evidence, but the evidence noted above was 

sufficient for the jury to find that Dotson and Watkins agreed 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 25

to conduct the Bomb Squad’s affairs and actively participated 

in numerous predicate acts in furtherance of the gang’s goals.

3. Haywood and Dotson: Additional Findings

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), the government sought 

maximum sentences of life for Haywood based on his involvement in the murders of Brown and Chester and for Dotson based on his participation in Chester’s murder. Although 

the standard statutory maximum sentence for a RICO conspiracy conviction is twenty years’ imprisonment, it increases 

to life imprisonment “if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment.” § 1963(a). For this enhancement to apply, the 

jury must make additional findings of fact regarding the racketeering activity at issue. Here, the jury did so on an additional verdict form the court provided for that purpose. Haywood and Dotson challenge the district court’s application of 

§ 1963(a) to their individual sentences on several grounds.

a) Haywood

1) Mislabeled Verdict Form

Haywood first objects to the additional verdict form itself, 

which was entitled “Government’s Proposed Additional 

Findings” rather than just “Additional Findings.”4 According 

to Haywood, this implicitly endorsed the government’s desired outcome to his detriment. Because Haywood did not 

timely object to the verdict form during the trial, we review 

for plain error. See United States v. Gonzalez-Velez, 466 F.3d 27, 

4 Although the court had given the jury replacement pages for Haywood’s verdict form with the “Additional Findings” caption, the jury mistakenly used the old form to record its verdict.
26 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

36 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that verdict-form issue raised by a 

defendant who did not timely object to a special verdict form 

during conference was subject to plain error review); see also 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993) (“If the forfeited 

error is plain and affect[s] substantial rights, the court of appeals has authority to order correction, but is not required to 

do so.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

It is difficult to see how the jury could have viewed the 

mislabeled caption as the court’s endorsement of the government’s position. After all, it merely suggests that the government requested the findings and leaves it up to the jury to 

agree (or not) to them. If anything, the caption reminds the 

jury that it was the government’s burden to prove the allegations in the case.

Nor did Haywood suffer any prejudice as a result. Upon 

discovering the mislabeling, the district court polled the jury 

to determine whether amending the caption would have 

made a difference to its verdict; each juror replied in the negative. Thus, the court’s use of the incorrectly captioned verdict 

form was not plain error.

2) Brown’s Murder

As noted, for a maximum life sentence under § 1963(a) to 

apply, the government must prove that the RICO violation is 

based on “a racketeering activity for which the maximum 

penalty includes life imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a); see 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The government pointed to Haywood’s killing of Brown in June 2013 as 

the “racketeering activity” that triggered § 1963(a)’s life sentence maximum. And, because the murder took place in Illinois, we look to Illinois law to see when murder can carry a 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 27

life sentence. See United States v. Perez, 21 F.4th 490 (7th Cir. 

2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 257 (2022). 

“Illinois law authorizes a sentence of life imprisonment for 

first-degree murder when certain aggravating factors are present.” Id. at 493. Here, the government relied on two aggravating factors that, it believed, made Haywood eligible for life 

imprisonment. First, Haywood’s killing of Brown was “committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human 

life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being 

would result therefrom.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-1(b)(11); 730 

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b). In the alternative, the government posited, Haywood “personally discharged a firearm 

that proximately caused ... death to another person.” 730 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii). The jury found that the government had proved each of these things beyond a reasonable 

doubt.

Haywood argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

support these findings by the jury. In his view, two of the trial 

witnesses failed to identify him as the shooter, and certain factual inconsistencies between the surveillance video and witness testimony undermined the government’s theory that he 

was the shooter. This, he says, created reasonable doubt that 

he was the one who shot Brown.

The jury’s additional findings find ample support in the 

record. Faulkner testified that he was at a house with Johnson, 

Barnes, and Dominick Wilson on June 23, 2013, when Haywood arrived. Haywood told Faulkner and Johnson that 

members of Zone 4 had just chased him near Western Avenue. 

Haywood said that he needed a “pipe,” meaning a gun, and 
28 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

Barnes gave him a .22-caliber long-barrel gun, one that does 

not eject shell casings. Then Haywood and Johnson left on bicycles.

Shortly thereafter, Brown, a member of Zone 4, was shot 

near Western Avenue. Before Brown’s murder, an eyewitness 

saw two men on bicycles cross Western Avenue. Another eyewitness, Christopher Edwards, saw one of the bicyclists 

stopped between two houses, across the street from a house 

where Brown and others had gathered. The bicyclist drew a 

gun and fired several shots at the group of men, and a .22-

caliber bullet pierced Brown’s arm and struck the side of his 

chest. Brown died afterward from wounds caused by the bullet.

According to Wilson, within an hour after Barnes had 

given Haywood the .22-caliber gun, a sweaty Haywood and 

Johnson returned to the house, and Haywood handed the gun 

back to Barnes. Johnson recounted that there was a shoot-out 

and someone had gotten shot in the side. And Haywood later 

told Thomas and Terry Moss, another Bomb Squad member 

who cooperated with the government, that he had shot and 

killed Brown.

The police found no shell casings at the murder scene, but 

a nearby store’s surveillance camera captured two bicyclists 

riding away from the area less than thirty seconds after the 

shooting. When Faulkner viewed the video at trial, he identified the bicyclists as Haywood and Johnson.

From this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found 

that Brown’s murder was part of the Bomb Squad’s RICO conspiracy and Haywood was complicit in it. Furthermore, from 

these facts, a reasonable jury could have concluded that 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 29

Haywood had planned to commit the murder in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner that could reasonably be 

expected to result in Brown’s death and that Haywood had 

personally shot and killed Brown. Thus, the district court 

properly denied Haywood’s motion for a new trial or judgment as a matter of law.

b) Haywood and Dotson: Chester’s Murder

As part of its additional findings supporting maximum 

life sentences as to Haywood and Dotson, the jury also found 

that Chester’s murder was part of the RICO conspiracy to 

which Haywood and Dotson assented. But the jury stopped 

short of finding that they had committed the act in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner that could reasonably be 

expected to result in the death of a human being as Illinois 

law required. Thus, Haywood’s and Dotson’s contention that 

the record did not support an enhancement under § 1963(a) is 

moot.5

4. Wilson, Washington, and Haywood: Sufficiency of Evidence

Wilson, Washington, and Haywood separately argue that 

the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for 

assault and attempted murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) and 

use of a deadly or dangerous weapon during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). We first address a 

5 To the extent that Dotson asserts that his convictions for Counts 26 

and 27 also relate to Chester’s murder, he is mistaken. Those counts relate 

to the assault and attempted murder of Greenwood and for use of a deadly 

or dangerous weapon during that crime. And Dotson has not raised any 

arguments specific to Greenwood.
30 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

common issue raised by these defendants, then proceed to 

their individual arguments.

Section 1959(a) requires proof that a defendant (1) committed assault with a dangerous weapon or attempted or conspired to commit murder (2) “for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity.” See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1959(a)(3), (5); Amaya, 828 F.3d at 530. Section 924(c), in turn, 

prohibits using a firearm “during and in relation to any crime 

of violence,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which requires the government to prove (among other things) that the defendant 

committed a predicate crime of violence. United States v. Morrow, 5 F.4th 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Each of these defendants contends that the government 

failed to present sufficient evidence that he committed a predicate offense for the purpose of maintaining or increasing his 

position in the Bomb Squad. But the record speaks otherwise.

Thomas testified that gang members achieved higher status by committing acts of violence, and the most ruthless 

members were the most respected. Faulkner explained that a 

member with a reputation for shooting and killing others 

earned respect and recognition within the gang. Moss admitted that he had participated in violent acts of retaliation 

simply because that was what Bomb Squad members were expected to do.

When Wilson, Washington, and Haywood committed 

their respective offenses—Wilson’s shooting of Richardson on 

May 12, 2016; Washington’s shooting of Perkins on July 10, 

2016; Haywood’s shooting of Jones on August 6, 2017—they 

did so in front of, alongside, or in defense of, other Bomb 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 31

Squad members. And, afterwards, they told or bragged to 

other Bomb Squad members about their deeds to ensure they 

received credit. From these facts, a reasonable jury could find 

that they each had engaged in the offenses to maintain or increase his position in the Bomb Squad.

a) Wilson: Assault and Attempted Murder

Wilson was convicted of assaulting and attempting to 

murder Richardson under § 1959(a) (Count 12) and using a 

firearm in furtherance of a violent crime under § 924(c)(1)(A) 

(Count 13). According to Wilson, the record contains insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and, alternatively, he 

is entitled to a new trial because the conviction was against 

the weight of the evidence.

Richardson was a heroin dealer unaffiliated with the 

Bomb Squad. According to his testimony, he was playing a 

dice game with Washington and others behind a liquor store 

on May 12, 2016. During the game, Wilson tapped Richardson 

on the back, pointed a gun at his face from a couple of feet 

away, and demanded his money. When Richardson did not 

comply, Wilson shot him in the hand. Richardson then threw 

his money down and began to run away, and Wilson shot him 

in the back. After Richardson fell to the ground, Wilson stood 

over him with his gun. Richardson raised his hands in anticipation of being shot again when the other players told Wilson 

not to kill Richardson. Wilson then took everyone’s money 

and fled the scene.

Richardson’s account is corroborated by other Bomb 

Squad members. Faulkner testified that he saw Wilson snatch 

everyone’s money and shoot Richardson that day, but that 

Wilson later returned money he had stolen from Bomb Squad 
32 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

members. Moss and Timothy both testified that Wilson admitted that he had shot Richardson that night. 

For his part, Wilson argues that Faulkner, Moss, and Timothy cannot be believed, because they were cooperating with 

the government to gain reduced sentences. But this still leaves 

the unrebutted testimony of Richardson himself, and, in any 

case, the credibility of witnesses is for the jury to decide. 

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to convict Wilson on Counts 12 and 13. Nor did the district court abuse its 

discretion in denying Wilson’s motion for a new trial.

b) Washington: Assault and Attempted Murder

Washington asserts that he is entitled to an acquittal or a 

new trial because the government obtained his conviction for 

assault and attempted murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) 

and (5) (Count 16) and for use of a firearm during a crime of 

violence under § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 17) based entirely on his 

uncorroborated admissions that he had shot Perkins on July 

10, 2016. “It is a settled principle ... that a conviction must rest 

upon firmer ground than the uncorroborated admission or 

confession of the accused.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 

471, 488–89 (1963). For example, “an admission of homicide 

must be corroborated by tangible evidence of the death of the 

supposed victim.” Id. at 491 n.15. And for crimes involving 

“physical damage to person or property,” a confession may 

be corroborated with evidence “that the injury for which the 

accused confesses responsibility did in fact occur, and that 

some person was criminally culpable.” Id.; see United States v. 

Baltrunas, 957 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1992) (evidence that bank 

robbery occurred is sufficient to corroborate a defendant’s 

confession).
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 33

The purposeof this requirement is “not to establish the admission itself, but rather to ensure its reliability.” United States 

v. Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 507 (7th Cir. 2003); see United States v. 

Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1106 (7th Cir. 1970). “It is sufficient if 

the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth.” Opper v. 

United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954). 

At the trial, Thomas testified that Washington had told 

him that he had shot Perkins, a member of Moe Block, a rival 

gang. Washington recounted that, on July 10, 2016, he, Crowe, 

and another Bomb Squad member, Tremaine Drummond 

(nicknamed “Misal”), saw Perkins and Austin Woods standing outside of a club. Drummond did not have a gun, but 

Washington and Crowe did, and they shot at Perkins and 

Woods. Washington bragged that he had shot first and that he 

knew he had hit Perkins because Perkins fell to the ground.

Thomas also spoke to Crowe about the shooting. Crowe 

confirmed that he and Washington carried out the shooting, 

and that Drummond was there but did not have a gun. When 

Thomas reported to Crowe that Washington had bragged 

about shooting Perkins, Crowe laughed and said Washington 

was lying because there was no way to know whether Crowe 

or Washington had shot Perkins.

According to Moss, he saw Washington and Crowe about 

thirty minutes after the Perkins shooting. Washington told 

Moss that he had shot Perkins, stating, “I popped his ass.” 

Moss saw that Washington still had the gun on him, which, as 

Moss recalled, was “a 9 or a .40.” During the conversation, 

Crowe disagreed with Washington and claimed that he was 

the one who had shot Perkins.
34 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

The evidence at trial corroborated the essential facts in 

Washington’s admission to Thomas. First, Perkins testified 

that he indeed was shot in the leg on July 10, 2016. He also 

confirmed that Woods was with him that night and that two 

Black males had yelled at them that night. Moreover, he told 

a police officer at the hospital immediately after the shooting 

that he had been shot in the leg by two people.6 Furthermore, 

police officers recovered 9mm shell casings at the scene, substantiating Moss’s recollection that Washington was carrying 

a “9 or a .40” that evening. And there was ample evidence that 

Washington had access to firearms of all types during this 

time and of the animosity between the Bomb Squad and the 

Moe Block gang.

Washington takes issue with Thomas’s credibility as a cooperating witness and the gaps in Perkins’s testimony. But the 

essential elements of their testimony are corroborated by the 

trial evidence. And the district court committed no error in 

denying his motion.

c) Haywood: Assault and Attempted Murder

The jury also convicted Haywood of the assault and attempted murder of Jones under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) and (5) 

(Count 30), as well as the use of a firearm during a crime of 

violence under § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 31). Haywood argues 

that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of these 

charges. He also generally asserts that the district court erred 

in denying his motions for acquittal and a new trial.

6 During his testimony, Perkins occasionally contradicted prior statements about the event or claimed he did not remember, but the jury was 

entitled to evaluate his testimony as a whole and in the context of the other 

evidence in the case.
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 35

Jones, who is unaffiliated with any Peoria gang, testified 

that, on August 16, 2017, he walked past three to four young 

Black men and had “minor words” with them on his way to 

his aunt’s apartment in Harrison Homes. They said, “Ahh, 

there he go right there.” As Jones opened his aunt’s screen 

door, a Black man with braids or dreadlocks rode up on a 

BMX bike. The man shot at Jones twice: one of the bullets 

struck Jones’s right knee, and the other hit his cell phone in 

his right front pocket. 

Jones’s cousin, Danaja Dillard, testified that she was outside when the shooter rode up on his bike and shot Jones. She 

saw Jones trying to get into her house, but the door was 

locked. So, Dillard ran to the back door to enter the house and 

ran through the house to unlock the front door for Jones. She 

recounted that she saw the shooter, that she knew his name 

was “Nunu” (which three other witnesses confirmed is Haywood’s nickname), and that he had dark skin with dreadlocks.

Officer Shannon Parnell testified that he was the first to arrive at the apartment. He found Jones, who was animated, excited, and obviously in pain. As Parnell applied pressure to 

Jones’s wound, he asked Jones who had shot him, and Jones 

responded, “Nunu,” based on what Dillard had told him.7

7 Haywood contends that Parnell’s statement was based on inadmissible double hearsay, an issue we review for an abuse of discretion, see

United States v. Bell, 28 F.4th 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2022). The district court’s 

decision was not an abuse of discretion because Dillard’s and Jones’s statements were admissible.

First, Dillard’s statement to Jones was admissible as a prior consistent 

statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) because Dillard testified at trial, her statement was consistent with her trial testimony, the 
36 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

Queen Hatcher, who is Jones’s aunt and Dillard’s mother, 

testified that she was a witness during Haywood’s criminal 

proceedings in state court regarding the shooting of Jones. 

She recalled that “Wody” (Ezra Johnson’s nickname) came to 

her home, asked to speak to Dillard about Haywood, and 

stated that he had $500 for Dillard. Hatcher ousted Johnson 

from her house, but not before he warned: “Well, we can get 

on some gangsta shit.”

Like her mom, Dillard also stated that she was scheduled 

to be a witness in Haywood’s criminal trial in state court. She 

also remembered that Johnson had come to the house and offered her money not to testify against Haywood, but she did 

not take the money. 

Johnson’s visit to Hatcher’s and Dillard’s home lends further support for the government’s contention that Haywood 

had shot Jones. Because Johnson had previously helped Haywood commit Brown’s shooting, a rational juror could conclude that Johnson was close to Haywood. Furthermore, a 

statement was offered to rebut the insinuation on cross-examination that 

she was fabricating the statement, and the statement was made before 

Dillard had a motive to fabricate. See United States v. Stoecker, 215 F.3d 788, 

791 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 

801(d)(1)(B) does not bar the introduction of a prior consistent statement 

through the testimony of someone other than the declarant, so long as the 

declarant is available for cross-examination about the statement at some 

time during trial.”).

Turning to the next level of hearsay, Jones’s statement to Parnell falls 

under the exception to the hearsay rules for excited utterances because it 

“relat[ed] to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was 

under the stress of the excitement caused.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). Parnell 

spoke to Jones on the heels of the shooting and reported that Jones was 

animated, excited, and in pain. Under these facts, we cannot say that the 

district court abused its discretion in admitting Parnell’s testimony. 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 37

jury could reasonably infer from Johnson’s attempts to dissuade Dillard from testifying, that her identification of Haywood as the shooter was credible.

Other evidence also tied Haywood to the shooting. Jones 

described the shooter as a “Black male” with “some braids or 

dreads,” and Dillard described him as a dark-skinned man 

with “dreads.” A photograph of Haywood on the day of the 

shooting matched those physical descriptions.

Both Jones and Dillard recalled that the shooter arrived on 

a bike. Haywood had previously used a bicycle to travel to 

the scene of Brown’s murder.

Lastly, a rational jury could have found that Haywood 

shot Jones after Jones “had minor words” with the three or 

four men on the way to his aunt’s house, especially when 

Haywood shot him after saying, “I heard you had some 

words with my people.” Based on this evidence, a jury could 

reasonably find that Haywood shot Jones to maintain or increase his position in the Bomb Squad.8

When viewing all of this evidence in the government’s favor, there was ample evidence allowing a jury to find Haywood’s guilt as to Counts 30 and 31 beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The district court did not err in denying Haywood’s 

motions for acquittal or a new trial on this basis.

8 Contrary to Haywood’s assertion otherwise, the government was 

not required to prove that Jones was shot because he was selling marijuana in Bomb Squad territory. Counts 30 and 31 do not contain that allegation. And although Count One’s Overt Act (gg) included that allegation, 

it was not essential to the charge and, therefore, is “mere surplusage.” See 

United States v. Swanson, 394 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 2005).
38 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

D. Sentencing

Lastly, Watkins and Flora challenge various aspects of 

their sentences. Watkins asserts that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Flora argues that the district court erred 

when it found him ineligible for credit for time served on a 

state court conviction.

We review the district court’s legal interpretation of the 

Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Ford, 22 F.4th 

687, 691 (7th Cir. 2022). We review a sentence’s substantive 

reasonableness for abuse of discretion and the district court’s 

underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 379 (7th Cir. 2022). 

1. Watkins

Watkins challenges the reasonableness of his sentence for 

his conviction under Count 1, the racketeering conspiracy. 

Based on his total offense level of 43 and criminal history category of IV, the bottom end of Watkins’s guideline range was 

240 months’ imprisonment. He received a custodial sentence 

of 228 months, below the guideline range. In such cases, 

“there is a nearly irrebuttable presumption that a below-range 

sentence is reasonable.” United States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 

527 (7th Cir. 2016). A defendant can only rebut this presumption “by showing that the sentence does not comport with the 

factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Patel, 

921 F.3d 663, 672 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Solomon, 892 F.3d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 2018)). 

In considering Watkins’s sentence, the district court took 

note of the numerous aggravating factors—the serious and violent nature of the RICO conspiracy; Watkins’s pattern of rebuffing chances to lead a law-abiding life; the need to deter 
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 39

him from future crimes given the high risk of recidivism; the 

need to protect residents of Peoria’s south side from his violence; as well as Watkins’s personal involvement in Polnitz’s 

and Murray’s murders. Against this, the district court also 

weighed the various mitigating factors, including the statement of Demario Boone, a school safety officer, that Watkins 

has the potential to make something of himself. The district 

court’s careful consideration of these and other relevant factors satisfy the requirements of § 3553(a). 

Watkins attempts to trivialize his criminal conduct, claiming that he merely handed Brock the gun that was used to 

murder Polnitz and Murray. But Watkins did much more than 

that. He pointed out Polnitz as a rival gang member to Brock 

and then gave him the gun, after which Brock shot at Polnitz, 

killing Polnitz and Murray. It was not clearly erroneous for 

the district court to find that Watkins gave the gun to Brock, 

knowing (indeed, wanting) Brock to shoot Polnitz.

Watkins also complains that the length of his sentence is 

unreasonable when compared to those of McCree and Moss, 

who were convicted of a greater number of offenses. But, unlike Watkins, McCree and Moss pleaded guilty prior to trial. 

Moreover, Moss cooperated with the government and testified at trial. This distinguishes McCree and Moss from Watkins for sentencing purposes.

Put simply, Watkins has not rebutted the presumption that 

his below-range sentence was reasonable. Accordingly, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing 

Watkins to a prison term of 228 months.
40 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

2. Flora

Lastly, Flora argues that the time he served on his state 

weapon-possession conviction related to Chester’s murder 

should have been credited to his federal sentence. As he sees 

it, the district court erred in concluding that his weapon-possession offense did not constitute relevant conduct, thereby 

making inapplicable a downward departure under United 

States Sentencing Guideline § 5K2.23. 

Section 5K2.23 permits a downward departure for a completed term of imprisonment if § 5G1.3(b) “would have provided an adjustment had that completed term of imprisonment been undischarged at the time of sentencing.” Section 

5G1.3(b), in turn, authorizes a sentencing adjustment where 

the defendant has an undischarged term of imprisonment for 

an offense that “is relevant conduct to the instant offense of 

conviction” under § 1B1.3(a)(1), (2), or (3). 

Flora was convicted of RICO conspiracy, so § 2E1.1 provided his offense level.9 See U.S.S.G. App. A. Under 

§ 2E1.1(a)(2), Flora’s base offense level was “the offense level 

applicable to the underlying racketeering activity.” Application Note 4 provides that a RICO-conspiracy count may 

charge certain conduct “as a part of a ‘pattern of racketeering 

activity’ even though the defendant has previously been sentenced for that conduct.” But if such a prior sentence “resulted 

from a conviction prior to the last overt act of the instant offense,” Application Note 4 specifically states that the 

9 Although Flora argues that the court should have applied § 1B1.3(a) 

to determine whether his prior offense constituted relevant conduct, he is 

incorrect. That section starts out with the qualification “[u]nless otherwise 

specified.” Here, § 2E1.1 specifies otherwise.
Nos. 20-2048, et al. 41

predicate act should be counted as a prior sentence under 

§ 4A1.2(a)(1), rather than part of the RICO offense. U.S.S.G. 

§ 2E1.1 cmt. n.4; see United States v. De La Cruz, 897 F.3d 841, 

843 (7th Cir. 2018); Morales, 655 F.3d at 639. 

Flora pleaded guilty to weapon possession in 2013. He 

served approximately thirty-two months in prison and was 

released in 2016. The district court found that Flora remained 

a member of the RICO conspiracy through at least May 9, 

2017, when he acted as an accessory to the attempted murder 

of the worker at Starr Street Market. Because Flora’s 2013 conviction occurred prior to the last overt act of the RICO conspiracy, the district court correctly treated his prior sentence 

for weapon possession as part of his criminal history, rather 

than relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, cmt. n.4. Thus, 

Flora’s 2013 conviction did not entitle him to a downward departure under § 5K2.23.

III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, we issue a limited remand so that 

the district court may make additional findings under Batson

consistent with this opinion and, after doing so, order a new 

trial if it deems it necessary. We express no opinion on the 

outcome of the district court’s rulings. 

We shall retain jurisdiction of the appeal while the district 

court makes its additional findings. If the district court deems 

a new trial unnecessary, the parties may file position statements in this court seeking appellate review of the Batson determination. If the district court deems a new trial necessary, 

it should inform this court of its conclusion so that we may 

issue a final resolution and the mandate.
42 Nos. 20-2048, et al.

As we noted at the outset, if the district court does order a 

new trial, much of this opinion becomes moot. But, because 

the court may not order a new trial or, if it does, certain issues

likely will be relevant to any retrial, we have addressed the 

remaining issues raised by the defendants in the interest of 

judicial economy and find no reversible error.