Filed 6/13/16 In re Jazmin H. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re JAZMIN H

. , et al., P erson s Coming Under the Juveni le Court Law. B 269370
(Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAUL H ., Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. DK10808)

APPEAL from an order of the Superio r Court of Los Angeles County, Rudolph A

. Diaz
, Ju dge

. Affirmed.
Jamie A. Moran , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant

. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Acting Assistant County Counsel, and Je ssica S. Mitchell , Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________2

The juvenile court sustained a dependency p etition a lleging that Rita G. ’s mental health problems and drug use placed her children at risk of harm

. The c hildren’s noncustodial parent, Raul H., requested custody of the children pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 361.2. The court, however, assessed his request under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c) (1) , concluding tha t placing the children with him would be a substantial danger to their safety and was therefore not appropriate

. Father argues the trial court erred in assessing his custody request under section 361, subdivision (c), which governs the circumstances und er which a child may be removed from a custodial parent, rather than under 361.2, subdivision (a), which governs

a noncustodial parent ’s request for custody of a child that has been removed from a custodial parent . We affirm , con cluding that although the court applied the wrong
statute, th e error was harmless.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Referral and Detention
1. Events preceding the section 300 petition Rita G. (mother) was living i n an apartment with her 22

- year

- old son Samuel H.,
her 15

- year

- old d aughter Jazmin H. and her two

- year

- old son Alfonso H

. The children’s presumed father, Raul H. (father)
, did not reside with the family and was not involved in
the ir lives.
On April 2, 2015, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Service s ( DCFS ) received a referral alleging mother had stated she “wanted to kill herself and take her children with her.” Mother was placed on a psychiatric ho ld at an urgent care facility , where sh e received a urinalysis that tested positive f or marijuana and methamphetamine. On April 3, 2015, an employee of the facility informed DCFS mo ther was returning home

. The employee explained that mother’s children had not been present
when she disclosed her suicidal thoughts, and that she had remained calm and

coo perative throughout her hospitalization. The employee also stated that m other denied3

having any suicidal ideations when she left the hospital, and had promised to follow through with mental health services. The employee confirmed mother had tested positi ve for methamphetamine and marijuana.
DCFS travelled to mother’s apartment to interview the family about the referral allegations

. Mother explain ed that the incident began after she informed her “ GAIN ” representative ( see Anderson v. Superior Court (198 9) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1334 [ describing “ GAIN” as a California “work program for welfare recipients”]) she wanted
mental health counseling. The representative instructed mother to fill out a questionnaire
in which she disclosed she had thought about kill ing herself and “taking her kids with
her

. ” Mother informed DCFS that despite the statement in her questionnaire, she had

never actually intended to harm her children . Mother explained that she occasionally felt

“ overwhelmed ” by Alfonso , who exhibited “a utistic symptoms ” that included limited speech capabilities and an inability to follow directions. Mother stated that Alfonso was currently working with two therapists to address his issues. Mother also admitte d she had been taking drugs to “ cope” wit h h er depression and loneliness

. Mother stated that she had separate d from father when Jazmin was one year old.
Mother briefly renewed her relationship with father in 2011, at which time she became pregnant with Alfons o. Mother reported that father had b een physically and emotionally
abusive toward her
, and believed the family was better off without him. Father’s abuse included calling mother a “worthless bitch” and throwing food at her. Mother also stated that father was not involved in the children’s lives
, and had never helped her support
them. According to mother, father had previously “ failed to reunify ” with his two other
children during “a prior DCFS case.”
Jazmin informed DCFS mother had previously told her she “felt like committing
suicide b ut that was in the past.” Jazmin stated that mother had never actually attempted
to hurt herself or made any recent statements about want ing to do so, and had never
threatened to hurt Jazmin or her siblings. Jazmin explained m other was frustrated with
Al fonso, who “ throws toys everywhere ” and “acts cr a zy.” Jazmin had never seen mother under the influence of drugs, and did not believe that she took drugs. Jazmin also stated4

that she had never been subjected to any physical or mental abuse
, and that she f elt safe
around mother

. Jazmin r eported her father was “not involved in their lives,” and that she
had not seen him in more than a year

. DCFS also interviewed Samuel , who said he was not aware that mother had sought mental health services or that she fe lt like she wanted to hurt herself. Samuel also
said he had never seen mother use drugs, but had smelled marijuana in the car. He stated
that his father was not involved in the family’s life, and that he did not want to have any
contact with father

. Sam uel said he was his willing to care for his siblings with hel p from
his mother’s relatives

.

2. Section 300 petition and detention
On April 14 , 2015 , D CFS filed a petition alleging Jazmin and Alfonso fell within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under We lfare and Institution Code section 300,
subdivision (b)

. 1 Count one of the petition al leged m other had a history of substance
abuse that endangered the children ’s “ physical he a l th and safety. ” Count two alleged mother had a history of men tal and emotion a l problems that rendered her unable to care
for the children
, and placed them at “risk of serious physical and emotion al harm. ”
DCFS filed a detention report in support of the petition summarizing the results of
its initial investigation

. The r eport st ated that DCFS had been un able to locate father,
whose whereabouts were unknown

. The report contained a printout from the “ California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System ” (CLETS ) (see People v. Martinez (2000 ) 22 Cal.4 th 106 [discussing CLETS ]) show ing father had prior felony convictions
for drug possession (1996 , 2006 ), robbery (1999), possession of a firearm by a felo n ( 1999) and violation of parole (2001, 2003, 2007). The CLETS report also listed several misdemeanor convictions and juvenile matte rs. In its evaluation and summary, DCFS concluded that mother’s substance abuse
and mental health issues , combined with Alfonso’s young age and developmental

1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory citations are to the Welfare and I n s t itutions Code.5

problems , placed the family at high risk of abuse. DCFS recommended that the court
detain the ch ildren from mother and place them with Samuel. At the detention hearing, t he juvenile court found DCFS had provided prima facie
evidence that the children w ere person s described in section 300 and ordered them
detained

. The court ordered DCFS to provide mother reunification services, and scheduled a jurisdictional hearing.

B. Jurisdiction and Disposition
1. Summary of Jurisdiction /Disposition Report and the jurisdiction hearing
On May 18 , 201 5 , DCFS filed a “Jurisdiction/Disposition Report” stating that
Jaz min and Alfonso had been placed with Samuel in mother’s home

. Mother had agreed
to leave the home
, and was residing with the maternal grandmother. DCFS reported that
it had still not located father

. T he jurisdiction report summarized a ddi tional intervie ws the agency had
conducted with the family . Mother informed DCFS she had star ted dating father when she was 13 years old
, and had remained in a relationship with him for 12 o r 13 years.
Mother was 16 years old when she gave birth to Samuel, and 22 years old when she gave
birth to Jazmin . Mother said she ended her relationship with father because he was

“ alway s in pri s on. ” Mother also stated father wa s in a gan g named “ Street Saints .” Mother reported that Al fonso had recently been diagnosed with autism
, and that Jazmin
had been placed in special education classes at her school . Mother expressed concern about Jazmin’s mental heal th, explaining that she hoped the child would receive
treatment and services.
DCFS reported that it had not interview ed fathe r because he had made no effort to participate in the proceedings or visit his children. According to DCFS, its investigation
revealed that father had an “extensive criminal history including felony convictions [] for

pos s essing of a controlled substance, robber y , weapons and assault

. ” These convictions
had resul ted in “several prison sentence s .” DCFS also reported father had “failed to reunify with t wo other children in a previous dependency case, [had] fail e d to provide for6

the basic need of his childre n, and [had] failed to m a i n t ain contact for at least 6 months.” DCFS concluded that although father was not “a named parent on the petition, it [would] certainly not be in the children’s best interest for [father] to have unlimited access to his
children. ” DCFS recommended that if father did cho o se to contact Jazmin or Alfonso, the court should only provide him enhancement services “until . . . he can address any and all issues that may place his children at risk of harm.” At the juris diction hearing, t he court sustained the section 300 petition and ordered DCFS to provide reunification services for mother only

. The court sc heduled a disposition hearing for June 22, 2015.

2. Summary of “Addendum/ Disposition Report ” and disposition h earing On June 22, 2 015, DCFS provided an “Addendum/Disposition Report” updating the court on the agency’s “ attempts to notice father. ” The report included a “ Declaration of Due Diligence ” describing the agenc y ’s efforts to contact father, all of which were
unsuccessful. Ac cording to DCFS, father remained “ uninvolved, and disinterested in his children’s lives.” The agency requested that the court: (1) find d ue d iligence as to father had been completed; (2) order the children “suitably placed”; (3) provide mother
reunificat ion services and monitored visitation; and (4) provide father enhancement
services. Following a hearing, the court entered an order removing the children from the mother’s custody . The court also ordered DCFS to continue providing mother
reunification s ervices
, but denied s ervices to father based on his absence from the proceedings. ( See § 361.5, subd. (b)(1) [“ Reunification services need not be provided to a parent

. . . when the court finds

. . . That the whereabouts of the parent or guardian is
unkn own”].) The court scheduled a progress h earing for September 21, 2015 , and a six month review hearing (see § 366.21, subd

. (e) ) for December 18, 2015.7

C. Denial of Father’s Custody Request
1. Father’s initial request for custody On September 21, 2015, DCFS f iled a n “Interim Review Report” informing the
court that father had contacted the agency and said he wante d to be “involve d in visiting
with the children and

. . . reunify with [them].” The interim report included a summary of father’s prior dependency hi story

. On October 27, 2011, the court had sustained a petition against father alleging he had fai led to provide his then four

- year

- old daughter
Sien n a H

. and his then two

- year

- old daughter Scarlett H

. the “necessities of life
, including food, clothing, s helter and medical treatment as father has been incarcerated on numerous occasion of which some have been drug related.” The 2011 petition further alleged that father’s “ failure to provide ” and “history of incarcera[tion ] ” placed the
children at risk of h arm. Although father was initially provided reunification services, his
services were terminated in December of 2012 , and the children were placed with their
mother.
At the progress report hearing , the court announced it i ntended to authorize
reunific ation services for father

. F ather ’ s counsel , however, informed the court that
father wanted immediate custody of the children . The c ourt o rdered DCFS to interview
father and make a recommendation on the issue. The court scheduled a hearing for
October 2 0, 201 5.

2. Court’s denial of father’s custody request On October 20, 2015, DCFS provided a report summarizing its interview with father, who was then working full time and living with the paternal grandmother . Father
admitted he had a “past criminal history ” that included convictions for “ fire arms and conspiracy.” He denied, however, any prior convictions for substance abuse, which
conflicted with the information in his CLET S report. In response to questions about his
2011 dependency case, father stated that he was “ not present when the case got open ed
and felt that he should not have had to fulfill [c]ourt requirements because it was not his fault.” Father stat e d that the juvenile court had ordered him to attend a parenting class,8

which he had do ne, and to participate in a substance abuse program and drug testing.
Father stated that although he had not complied with his case plan in the 2011 matter, he
did intend to comply with whatever requirements the c ourt might impose as a condition
of reuni f ying with Jazmin and Alfonso

. DCFS reported that father’s prior dependency case file indicated he had failed to comply with drug test ing requiremen t s , resulting in his termination from the drug program for “lack of compliance.” Father had also failed to demonstrate compliance with an order requiring individual co u ns e ling

. DCFS confirmed that t he children at issue in the 2011 petition had reunif ied with their mother , and that father’ s reunification services
were terminated.
DCFS recommended that Jaz min and Alfonso remain placed with Samuel, and that both parents continue to receive reunification services. DCFS also recommended
that the court order father to comply with a substance abuse program with random drug testing

. At the October 20 th hearing , the court informed the parties that it intended to provide father reunification services. Father’s counsel objected to reunification services, explaining that father wanted the children “release d to his custody and to have family
maintenance service s i n place.” Counsel argued that placement with father was appropriate because he was a “non

- offending ” parent under the current petition , a nd
because no “new allegations had been brought against him.” Counsel contended that “the lack of new charges against father after a lengthy investigation by the Department” was “evidence” that he had resolved all of the issues that gave rise to his dependency case in
2011.
Counsel for Alfonso and Jazmin opposed father’s custody request, arguing that returning the child ren to his care w ould be improper under section 361 .2 : “Your honor, [under] 361.2, even if the father is non

- offending, . . . there is a detriment to returning the
children to his care at this time. . . . This father has an unresolved case history

. He h ad
reunification services with two other children fo r

. . . criminal acti vity and for drugs. He
did no t participat e in the serv ices. There [i] s no evidence that fath e r has addressed or9

re s olve d the issue that brough t those children into court . Further, fa t her has not had
contact with the ch il dren [in this case] for quite some time. I think it would be premature
to release t he children to him.”
DCFS also opposed father’s request, arguing that “pu r s u ant to 361.2, the Legis la ture abs olutely envisioned a s cenario where a . . . non

- offendi ng parent can still

p o s e a detrime nt to tha t child and that is this case

. ” Counsel for DCFS explained the agency “ could accommodate

. . . father and file a petition [ against him , but] though [t] he
would want reunification services

. . . . I would ask the court to find a detriment under
361.2.” In response, the court explained that DCFS “ certainly could have filed a pe t i ti on and requ ested no [reunification services ] specifically as to [father] because he does have a prior child who was removed and not returned. S o the Department . . . was pretty generous in recommending that he be given an opportunity for reun i fi cation services. I’m going t o deny father ’ s request

. . . . I don’t thin k it ’ s appropriate. ” The court was the n asked to clarify whether its statements constituted a “find[in g] that there’s detriment

. . . .”
The court stated: “I have to make findings. [¶]. . . [¶] The court has considered the
evidence , . . . [and] finds by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to section 361(c) that there is a substantial danger if the children were returned home to the physical health, safety, protection, physical or emotional well

- being of the children. There are no reasonable means by which the children’s physical health can be protected without removing the children from father’s physical custody. The court orders the children are removed from father’s custody.”
The court also ordered father “to participate in the following reunification serv ice s case plan . . . A DCFS court

- approved program for dru g and alcohol services, a full drug and alcohol program with aftercare, . . . random or on

- demand drug and alcohol testing

. Father shall also participate in individual counseling to address a ll case issues, including
those c o ntributing to father’s lengthy criminal lifesty le and unresolved substance abu s e history, as well as father ’ s neglect to parent any of his children
, including father’s family
reunification service s being terminated i n 2011 for two older children.”10 DISCUS SION Father appeals the court’s order denying him custody of Alfonso and Jazmin

. Father contends we must reverse the juvenile court’s ruling because it e rroneously
assessed his custody request under section 361, subdivision (c), which is a removal

statut e applicable to custodial parents, rather than section 361.2, whic h governs a noncustodial parent’s request for custody of a child who has been removed from the custodial parent

.

A. Summary of Relevant S tatutes

“ The dependency statutory framework distinguishe s between a parent with whom the child was residing at the time the section 300 petition was initiated (custodial parent), and a parent with whom the child was not residing at the time the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provis ions of section 300 (noncustodial parent). (§§ 361, subd. (c), 361.2, subd. (a).) ” ( In re V.F. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 962 , 969 ( V.F. ) .) Section 361, subdivision (c) describes several circumstances under which a child may be removed from the phys ical cust ody of a custodial parent . Subdivision (c)(1) provides, in relevant part: “A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her [custodial parent or parents ]

. . . unless the juvenile court finds clea r and convincing evidence of any of the following circumstance . . . [¶] (1) There is or
would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well

- being of the minor if the minor were returned home
, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’ s physical health can be protected without removing th e minor from the minor’s parent’s or guardian’ s physical custody .”
S ection 361.2 , in contrast, governs the child’s placement following his or her removal from a custodial parent. Subdivisio n (a) of the statute requires the court to initially consider placement with a noncustodial parent: “ When a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume11

custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unl ess it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well

- being of the child. ” Section 361.2,
subdivision (c) further requires the court to make “ a finding either in writing or on the
record of the basis for its determination under subdivisions (a )

. ” A lthough the statute
do es not specify the burden of proof necessary to deny a noncustodial parent’s custody request, our courts have held that “[t] o comport with due process, the detriment findi ng [under section 361.2, subdivision (a)] must be made under the clear and convincing
evidence standard .” ( In re C.M. (2 014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 140 0 ; see also In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 292 , 302 ( D’Anthony D. ) [“ there [must be] clear
and convincing evidence of detriment before placement with a noncustodial paren t can be denied”] .)
In sum , despite the similar standards set forth in section 361, subdivision (c) (1)
and section 361.2 , subdivision (a) , the statutes serve separate purposes and apply to different categories of parents. S ection 361, subdivision (c) governs the remo val from a custodial parent and “‘does not , by its terms, encompass the situat ion of the noncustodial parent.’” ( V.F. , supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 969.) S ection 361 .2 , subdivision (a), on the other hand, “is not a removal statute ” ( ibid. ) , but rather governs “ placement [of a removed child] with a noncustodial parent .” ( D’Anthony D. , supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at
p. 303 [ “ section 361 applies to a custodial parent, while placement with a noncustodial parent is to be assessed under section 361.2 ” ]; see also R.S. v. Superior Court (2008) 154 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270 [ § 361, subd. (c) “ does not

. . . encompass the situat ion of the noncustodial parent.’ [Citation.]

. . . . Rath er, section 361.2 governs the child’s

. . . p lacement with the noncustodial parent ”].)

B. Although t

he Court Erred in Applying Section 361, S ubdivision (c), the Error Was H

armless

DCFS does not dispute mother was a custodial parent of Jazmin and Alfonso, and that father was a noncustodial parent. Nor do es it dispute that because father was a12

noncustodial parent seeking custody of child ren who had been ordered removed from
the ir custodial parent, the court should have assessed his custody request under sec tion
361 .2, subdivision (a), rather than under section 361, subdivision (c) (1)

. DCFS contends, however, that the record demonstrates there is no reasonable probability the court would have reached a different result had it appl ied section 361.2, rendering the court’s error harmless.

“ Before any judgment can be reversed for ordinary error, it must appea r that the error complained of ‘ has result ed in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI , § 13.) Reversal is justified ‘only when the court, “ aft er an examination of the entire ca use, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reach ed in the absence of the
error.’ [Citations.] A reasonable probabi lity for these purposes does not mean an absolute probability; the likelihood that the error affected the outcome need not be greater
than the likelihood that it did not. [Citation.]” ( In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069
, 1078

- 1079 ( J.S. ) .) Our court s have previously held that this “harmless error” analysis is applicable to the specific type of error at issue in this case: improperly assess ing a noncustodial parent’s custody request under section 361, subdivision (c) (1), rather than
section 361.2 , su bdivision (a) . ( See D’Anthony D. , supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 303;
In re Abram L

. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452 , 463

- 464 [ erroneous decision to apply
section 361 rather than section 361.2 could not be “ reverse [d] . . . unless

. . . ‘“ it [was] reasonably pro bable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been

reac hed in the absence of the error” ’” ] ; cf

. J.S. , supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p p . 107 9

- 10 80 [juvenile court’s failure to make findings required under § 361.2, subd

. (c) subject to
har mless error analysis].)
In D’Anthony D. , supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 202 , the court found that a juvenile
court’s misapplication of section 361 was harmless under circumstances analogous to those presented here

. DCFS filed a section 300 pe tition alleging mo ther had p hysical ly
abuse d her two children, placing them at substantial risk of harm

. The father, a noncustodial parent living in Mexico , requested that the children be released to his13

custody. During a subsequent DCFS interview, b oth children stated th at father had previously struck his son with a belt. The son provided similar statements at the disposition hearing , testifying that father had recently struck him in the face and hit him
with a belt

. The juvenile court denied father’s custody request, stating that it had found “ ‘by clear and convincing evidence there exist[s] a substantial danger to the children’s
health.’ ” (

D’Anthony D. , supra, 230 Cal.App.4th a t p. 297.) The court explained that after hearing the child ’s testimony , it was “‘ not com fortable releasing [the children] to [father] period.’ ” ( Ibid .) Following the hearing, the juvenile court filed a minute order

“ reflecting its substantial danger findings pursuant to section 361. The court made no finding with respect to section 361.2.” ( Ibid .) Father appealed the order, arguing “ that the juvenile court erred by failing to consider his request for custody under section
361.2 .” ( Id. at p. 298.) The appellate court agreed that because father was a noncustodial parent, the juvenile cour t should have assess ed father’s custody request under section 361 .2, rather than section 361, subdivision (c)(1)

. The court further concluded, however, that th e error was harmless “[i]n view of the juvenile court’s ‘substantial danger’ finding under secti on 361, subdivision (c)(1), and the evidence supporting that finding with respect to father .” ( D’Anthony D. , supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 303.) In its analysis, the court noted the

“ similarity between ” the “substantial danger” finding necessary to remove a child under section 361, subdivision (c), and the “detrimen tal” finding necessary to deny custody to a noncustodial parent under section 361.2. ( I bid .) The court further explained that the
record demonstrated the j uvenile court had made an “unequivoca l ” finding against father

“ under section 361” ( i d . at p. 304), and that the finding was supported by evidence he had physically abused his son. The court concluded that “in view of this evidence, and the court’s express finding under se ction 361, we canno t say it is ‘reasonably probable’ that the court would have made a different finding had it considered whether the placement would be detrimental to the children’s safety or physical well

- being under section 361.2. ” ( Id . at p. 304 .)14

We agree with D’Antho ny D. ’s analysis, which applie s equally here. As explained
in D’Anthony D.
, the mandatory finding necessary to remove a child from a custodial parent under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) is very similar to the finding necessary to deny a noncustodial par ent custody request under section 361.2, subdivisi on (a). U nder section 361, subdivision (c)(1), the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that returning the child to the custodial parent would be a “substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well

- being of the child

. ”
U nder section 361.2, subdivision (a) the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that placing the child with the noncustodial parent “ would be detrimental to t he safety, protection, or physical or emotional well

- being of the child. ” To the extent the two standards differ, section 361 , subdivision (c)(1)’s requirement of a “substantial danger” findings appears to impose a stricter standard than the finding of “d etriment” required under section 361.2. In this particular case, a s in D’Anthony D.
, the trial court made an express finding that placing the children with father would be a substantial danger to their “ physical health, safety, protection, physical or e motional well

- being.” The court’s decision was based on evidence in the record showing that: (1) father had previously failed to reunify
with two other children who he had neglected ; (2) father had an extensive criminal history that included firearm s offe nses, drug offenses
, violent crimes, parole violations
and several periods of incarceration; and (3) father had previously neglected Alfonso and Jazmin, and had not seen them for approximately one year

. In view of this evidence, and the court’s express finding against father under
sectio n 361, subdivision (c)(1), it is not “reasonably probable” the court would have
made a different factual finding had it considered whether the placement would be
detrimental to the children’s well

- being under section 361 .2.15 DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed

.

ZELON, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS , P. J.

B LUMENFELD , J

. 

 Judge of the Los Ang eles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.