# C_2015081EN.01002102.xml

| 9.3.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 81/21 |
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Action brought on 4 December 2014 — Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology v Commission

(Case T-793/14)

(2015/C 081/28)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Tempus Energy Ltd (Reading, United Kingdom); and Tempus Energy Technology Ltd (Cheltenham, United Kingdom) (represented by: J. Derenne, J. Blockx, C. Ziegler and M. Kinsella, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; and |
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| — | order the defendant to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the applicants. |
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Pleas in law and main arguments

By their action the applicants seek the annulment of the Commission’s Decision C(2014) 5083 final of 23 July 2014 in case SA.35980 (2014/N-2) — United Kingdom, Electricity Market Reform — Capacity Market.

In support of the action, the applicants rely on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that, by failing to open the formal investigation procedure, the Commission violated Article 108(2) TFEU, the principles of non-discrimination, proportionality and legitimate expectation and made a wrong assessment of the facts. The applicants submit that:
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the Commission failed to properly assess the potential role of Demand-Side Response (‘DSR’) in the UK capacity market; —
the restrictions on the duration of DSR contracts under the capacity market violate the principles of legitimate expectation and non-discrimination, and are based on a wrong assessment of the facts; —
the requirement for DSR operators to choose between transitional and enduring market auctions violates the principles of legitimate expectation and non-discrimination; —
the capacity market’s cost recovery methodology violates the principles of non-discrimination, legitimate expectation and proportionality; —
the use of open-ended capacity events rather than time-bound ones in the enduring auctions of the capacity market is contrary to the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate expectation; —
the capacity market’s bid bond requirement to obtain access to the auctions violates the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate expectation; and —
the capacity market’s failure to provide for additional remuneration for savings in transmission and distribution losses from DSR violates the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate expectation. | — | the Commission failed to properly assess the potential role of Demand-Side Response (‘DSR’) in the UK capacity market; | — | the restrictions on the duration of DSR contracts under the capacity market violate the principles of legitimate expectation and non-discrimination, and are based on a wrong assessment of the facts; | — | the requirement for DSR operators to choose between transitional and enduring market auctions violates the principles of legitimate expectation and non-discrimination; | — | the capacity market’s cost recovery methodology violates the principles of non-discrimination, legitimate expectation and proportionality; | — | the use of open-ended capacity events rather than time-bound ones in the enduring auctions of the capacity market is contrary to the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate expectation; | — | the capacity market’s bid bond requirement to obtain access to the auctions violates the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate expectation; and | — | the capacity market’s failure to provide for additional remuneration for savings in transmission and distribution losses from DSR violates the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate expectation. |
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| — | the Commission failed to properly assess the potential role of Demand-Side Response (‘DSR’) in the UK capacity market; | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| — | the restrictions on the duration of DSR contracts under the capacity market violate the principles of legitimate expectation and non-discrimination, and are based on a wrong assessment of the facts; | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| — | the requirement for DSR operators to choose between transitional and enduring market auctions violates the principles of legitimate expectation and non-discrimination; | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| — | the capacity market’s cost recovery methodology violates the principles of non-discrimination, legitimate expectation and proportionality; | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| — | the use of open-ended capacity events rather than time-bound ones in the enduring auctions of the capacity market is contrary to the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate expectation; | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| — | the capacity market’s bid bond requirement to obtain access to the auctions violates the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate expectation; and | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| — | the capacity market’s failure to provide for additional remuneration for savings in transmission and distribution losses from DSR violates the principles of non-discrimination and legitimate expectation. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the Commissions failed to provide adequate reasoning in the Decision. |
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