A Command Post at War 

First Army Headquarters 

in Europe, 1943- 1945 

by 

David W Hogan, ),: 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WA SHINGTON, D.C .. 2000 
Library of Congr·ess Cataloging-in-I)ubli cation Data 

Hogan, David W. 

A comma nd post at war: First Army headquarters 111 Europe, 

1943- 1945 I by David W. Hogan, Jr. 

p. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

I. World Wa r, 1939- 1945-Regimcntal histories- Unit ed Slal csArmy, First. 2. United Stales. Army. Army, lSI- History. 3. World War, 1939-

1 945- Campaigns- Europc. 4. Command of troops- His lory. I. Titl e. 

0769.25 .11642000 

940.54'21 - dc2 1 

eMH rub 70- 60 

First Printing 

00- 029448 
Foreword 

World War II remai ns the defining ex pe ri e nce for Ih e U.S. Army in the 

twentieth century. It ha s had a la stin g impact on th e nation and its pl ace in 

th e world and on the Army and the way it orga ni zes and fights. Although 

histori ans have written numerous volumes concerning this g lobal confli ct, 

some gaps in the literature remain. In particular, the subj ect of an Ame ri can 

field army headquarters a nd ils orga ni za tion a nd role have attracted liltlc 

attention. Studi es on Ihe personal ities and styles of individua l commande rs 

ex ist, but the command posts themselves- the ways in which they we re structured and opera ted and th e functions they performed- have not been much 

ex plored . 

With A COII/II/olld Posl al War: First Army Neadqll(/I"Iers ill Europe. 1943-

1945, the Cente r of Military History attempts to redress this sho rtcoming. This 

stud y addresses the First Army headquarters in the European theate r from its 

activation in October 1943 to V- E Day in May 1945 . Under Genera ls Omar N. 

Bradley and Courtney H. Hodges, the Fi rst Army headquarters oversaw the 

American landings on D-Day, the breakout from the Normandy beachhe<ld, the 

battle of the Hlirtgen Forest along the German front ier, the defense of th e northern shoulder durin g the Batt le of the Bulge, and the crossi ng of the Rhine River 

at Remage n prior to th e rinal American drive into central Ge rmany. In examining the First Army headqmmcrs' rol e, this vol ume shows the army headquarters of World War I [ as a compli cated organization with functions ran ging from the immedi ate su pc rvision of taelieal ope ratio ns to long-ran ge 

ope rational planning and the susta ined su pport of frontline units. The COIllmander and sta ff fa ced the problem of coo rdi nation with Allied couillcrparts 

as well as with headqu arters and units from oth er se rvices. Inadequa te information a nd the lim itations of technology add ed to their c ha llenges. The 

human dime nsion was a lways important, and at times critical, in affecting the 

work of the hcadquarte rs und cr the stre sses of a difficult campaign agai nst 

an obst inatc and resourceful foe. 

Although times ha ve changcd and the mode rn Army foc uses more on 

regional eonnicts and contingencies than on global w<lrfarc, we can still 

learn 111u c h frolll the experience of th e First Army headqua rt crs. The Gulf 

War reempha sized the rol e of a n a rmy headquart e rs in a thel.lIcr of operations as a pertine nt issue for today's mili tary professional. By examining 

'" 
th e ex pe ri ence of soldiers in past conni cts we gain the deeper pe rspec ti ves 

and und e rsta ndi ngs necessary to meet th e chall enges fuc ing th e Army today 

and in th e future. 

Washington, D.C. 

2 1 June 2000 

IV 

JOI-IN S_ BROWN 

Brigadier Ge nera l, USA 

Chie f of Military History 
The Author 

David W. !-I ogem, Jr., is .1 histori an in the Histories Division, U.S. Army 

Center of Military History. A native of Michigan. he graduated from Dartmouth 

Coll ege in 1980 and received his Ph.D. from Duke University in 1986. Afte r 

leaching Ameri can military history at Elon College, he joined the Ce nter of 

Military History in 1987. He is th e author of Raiders or Elife fl(fallflY? The 

Changing Role of fhe u.s. Arlll)' Ral/gers Frolll Dieppe (0 Grenada and u.s. 

Army Special Opera/jolls ill World H1u' II and has contribut ed to Theodo re A. 

Wilson. ed., D Da),. 1944, and Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, cds., 

The Whirlwi"d /": The Unired SIMes Army i ll Opera/iolls DESERT SfIIEI.D alld 

D ESERT STORM. He has received grants from the Ce nt er of Military History. the 

U.S. Army Military History Institute, and the U.S. Military Academy. At the 

University of Maryland in Col lege Park, he tcac hes an honors course on American attitudes towa rd warfare and the military, and he is currcntl y prepa ring an 

article on tha t subjec t. 

v 

Preface 

Since th e early nin eteenth cent ury, th e command slrUClUrcs for controlling 

arm ies in the fi e ld have become increasingly complex. Early mili tary organizations cou ld combine command functions in one ind ividua l as long as the ir 

forces remained small and occ upied a limited a rea for a short peri od. With the 

emergence of the mass armies of th e nation-state and of corps ope rating over 

broader fronts, however, commande rs had to adopt morc decentralized command struc tures and more spec ial ized stilfTs iflhey wished to remain e ffecti ve. 

As the size, complexity, mobilit y, and dispersion of mi litary forces in creased, 

the challenges of obta ining and disseminating information and of main taining 

control in creased as we ll. Expanded staffs, improved organization and procedures, and new technology- including the telegraph, te lephone , radi o, airplane, 

and automobil e- could a ll eviate some of these diffi culties, but th ey also c reated new probl ems for commanders to so lve. 

This study examines the response of the First U.S. Army headquarte rs to 

the challenge of command at the army level from its activation in England in 

Oc tober 1943 to the coll apse of Nazi Germany in May 1945. 11 focuses on the 

role of Ihe First Army headqua rters at what current Army doctrine ca lls the 

"ope rational leve l of war," the level betwee n the grand strat egy of nations and 

theat ers and the tactica l combat of corps and smaller units. More spec ifi call y, 

it analyzes the operations, inte ll igence, logisti cal, and administrati ve fu nctions 

of an army-l eve l headquarters, the procedures evolved to ea rry out those functions, and the impact of the personaliti es of the commander and staff chiefs on 

th e inner workings and styl e of the organizat ion. Although th e U.S. Army has 

taken great pains over the years to ensure that final responsibi lity a nd authorit y 

rest with th e commande r, dee isionmaking with in milita ry organi zations has 

become in creasingl y compl ex and diffuse, a nd the li nes of influence bhlrrcd, 

by th e invol veme nt of indi vidua ls other than the commander, who may not eve n 

be the dominant character in his own headquarters. A true command study, 

th ere fore, must go beyond doctrinal desc riptions to mke into account the interplay of personalities and style in the operation of a headquart ers. 

For a ll th e vast literature on World Wa r I I, the pe rspecti ve of an army headquarle rs ha s received little att ention. Among the Ameri can army headquarlers 

of that eonni et, only Ge neral George S. Patton, Jr.'s Third U.S. Army has found 

much of a pl ace in th e literature, and studi es of the Third Army tend to focus 

VH 
more 0 11 the striking personality of Patton than 011 the ope ration of his command pOSI. The subj ect of an army headquarters in World War 11 may seem 

a rchai c in an age of more limited wars and smalle r military fo rces. Yc t th e 

issues of command at echelons above corps remai n a subject of great interest 

in the current Army, espec iall y given the intermitt ent need for an army-leve l 

ground component headquarters that can hand le support, joint, combined, and, 

occasionally, operationa l functions in a thea ter of ope rations- as wa s the ca se 

in the Pe rsian Gulf War. As an exampl e of an army headquarters during World 

War II , the First Army is es pecia lly wel l suited. Perh aps no other American 

army of that war faced as many difTerent conditions and cha ll enges on as great 

a scale as the Fi rst Army. 

In thc course of preparing this work, the author <l ccumli lat ed numerous 

debts of gra titude. Fi ve indi viduals in p<lrticular deserve special mention. LI. 

Col. Roger Ciri llo, USA (Rcl.), brought to bear his cxtensive knowledgc of 

World War II , his background as an instructor at thc U.S. Army Command and 

Gcne ral Staff Coll egc, and his familiarity with thc tcrrai n to go over scvera l 

drafts of the manuscript and makc countless inva luabl e suggestions on con tent 

and sources for furth cr research. G. Patrick Murray of Valley Forge Mil ita ry 

College generously shared mate rials, inc luding many essential inte rviews that 

he had collected during his research for a biog raphy ofGcneral Courtney H. 

I-lodges. Ann L. Brownson, secre tary of the First Army headquarters vct erans 

association, he lped me conta ct several First Army veterans whose recollections and support were indispcnsable for this proj ect. Col. Wi lli am T. Bowe rs, 

USA (ReL), th e chief of the Historics Di vision during most of the prepamtion 

of this work, and Graham A. Coslllas, my branch chief for most of the process, 

made numerous he lpful suggestions and showed great patience with the travails cncounte red while simultaneously nudging th e projcet along to completion . 

Those unsung he roes of historical work , thc arc hivists, dese rve spec ia l 

thanks for their efforts. At thc National Archives and Records Admin istra tion, 

Richard L. Boylan, Wilbert B. Mahoney, Timothy K. Nenninger, Mitchell A. 

Yockc lson, the late Edward J. Reese, and the capable staffs in the Still Picture 

and Cartographic and Archit ectu ra l Branches spa red no effort to ensure that I 

rece ived the materials that I needed. Richard J. Sommers, David A. Keough, 

Pame la A. Cheney, Randy W. Hackenburg, Louise Arnold-Fri end, and John J. 

Slonaker did the samc al the U. S. Army Mi li ta ry History Institute at Carlisle 

Ba rracks, Pennsylvania. AI th e Dwight D. Eisenhower President ial Library in 

Abilene, Kan sas, David J. Haight guided me through thc ext ensive coll ections 

on World War II in Europe , whi le Kat hl een A. Struss pc rformed yeoman work 

with the photog raphs. Those who visit the spec ia l coll ectio ns at the U.S. Milita ry Academy Li bmry will be ass ured of a fri endl y receptio n from Alan C. 

Aimone, who, al ong with Jud it h A. Sibl ey, assisted me with several coll ections 

of essent ial papers. At the Command and General Staff Coll ege archives at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kan sas, Karla C. Norman he lped me locate nume rous curri cula r mate rials on the school durin g the inte rwa r yca rs. Esse ntial tables of 

orga ni zation for an army headquarters durin g World War II we re supp lied by 

Susan Canedy of Training and Doctrin e Command in Fort Monroe, Virginia. 

viii 
M.llthew Pri ewe of the Strom Thurmond Institut e at Clemson Uni versity in 

Clemson, South Carolina , provided copies o f photog raphs from Senator 

Thurmond 's collecti on, tilld the George C. Marshall Library at the Virginia Military Institute in Lex ington, Virginia , sent copi es of photographs of Colone l 

Mars hall durin g World War I. And, at the U.S. Army Center of Mi lita ry History, 

Geraldine K. I-Iarcarik , Donald A. Ca rter, Mary L. Haynes, and 0111' indefatigabl e libra rian, James B. Knight, rende red vital assistance with my countl ess 

searches and interlibrary loan requests. 

Several indi viduals read all 0 1' portions of th e manuscript and provided hclpful suggestions. Je tTrey J. Cla rke, the Chief Historian at th e Cente r of Mili tary 

History, fo[lowed th e project from its inception and painstakingly reviewed th e 

ri nal product. The panclthat reviewed the manusc ript, including noted World 

War [I historian Martin Blumenson, G. Patri ck Murray, Lt. Col. Roge r Cirillo, 

Graham A. Cosllla s, Col. Clyde L. Jonas, and John W. Elsberg, was kind in its 

praise and discerning in its criti c isll1 . Others at the Center who read the manusc ript and o tTered many helpful comments included Edga r F. Raines, Jr.; Thomas A. Popa; Col. Robert H. Sholl y; and John B. Wi lson. 

The support from the " Fusa lie rs," th e vetcrans assoc iation ofthc First Army 

headquarters, ha s becn ove rwhe lming. Many- incl udin g Dempscy E. Allphin ; 

William A. Cart er, Jr.; Edward M. Dannemiller; Arth ur Garson; Pete r C. Hains 

[II ; Cheste r B. Hanse n; Wi ll iam B. Kunzig; Andrew T. McNamara; Roger Ray; 

J. Strom Thurmond; and Walt er W. Wendt- not only consented to oft en lengthy 

int erviews but a lso went over the transcripts of th osc discussions and gracefully acquiesced to fo ll ow-up inq uiri es. Anothe r veteran, General William C. 

Westmore land. USA (Ret.), provided insight on a parti cu[arl y controversial inc ident in th e First Army story. Ralph G. Atkinson and Antho ny J. " Bo" 

Bochicchio a lso suppl ied he lpful insights, and Bo, des pit e a se rious illness, 

helpcd put me in touch with reade rs for the manuscript. In the end, several 

ve terans of th e First Army sta ff ag reed to review the manuscript and add th eir 

suggestions. These inc luded Dempsey E. A llphin ; Robe rt M. Blanchard ; 

Frederick C. Bold, Jr. ; George W. Crawford ; Lincoln M. Cummin gs; Edward 

M. Dannemiller; Arthur Garson; Petc r C. Hains II I; Chester B. Hansen; Fred 

W. Jacks; William B. Kunzi g; Elme r L. Littc ll ; Wi ll iam B. Patte rson ; Mill erO. 

I)c rry; John and Roger Ray; Robe rt A. Ri esman; Euge ne R. Wood, Jr.; and W. 

H. Ste rling Wright. Others, such as Dempsey E. Allphin, Robert M. Bl anchard, 

Joseph S. Dickenso n, Louis Furgiue le, Arthu r H. Klobe, George H. Me lvin, 

Stuyvesant Wainwri ght [I, and Eu ge ne R. Wood, supp lied photographs for lise 

in th is study. Upon short not icc, Stuyvesant Wa inwri ght invit ed me to his Long 

Island home and allowed me to borrow his cxtensive albums of his service with 

th e Fi rst Army for usc in thc proj ec t. Frances F. Myers, Col. Peter C. Hai ns, and 

Coli n and William D. S. Dickson kind ly suppli ed pc rmission fo r the usc o f 

int erview transc ripts and other mate rials. 

In the Ccnter's Production Services di vision, John W. Elsberg shephcrded 

the project to publicati on wi th th e assistance of Catherine A. I-i ee rin. chi ef of 

the Editorial Branch. Diane Sedore Arms, my manuscript editor, pati ently navigat ed throu gh 111 y prose and endnot es and othe rwise preparcd th e manuscript 

ror pu bli cati on. The manuscript is th e bctter for her di lige nt e tTorts. Susan Ca rroll 

IX 
compi led the index. Arthur S. Hardyman of the Graphics Branch helped me 

pare down my exte nsive wish lists for photographs, maps, and c harts. Teresa K. 

Jame son and Bet h F. MacKenzie a lso e ndured considerable spadework in obtaining the photographs and laying out the graphics for the final product. Many 

of the photographs came from the camera of Roge r Wright, the Center's resident photograp her, who devoted substantia l time to answering what must have 

seemed my interminable requests fo r additional pictures. 

Several others helped in various ways in the course of the project. Dan iel 

R. Mort ensen, th e Air Force 's expert on close air support during World War II , 

gave me a d raft of his histo ry on the subj ect and cheerfully responded to my 

many inquiries. Timothy K. Nen ninger provided a draft of his informative article on Pershin g and command in the American Expeditionary Forces and otherwise made himself available for co nsultati on on the subj ect. Ca rl o D' Este 

shared free ly from his vast store of knowledge on World War [I. Linda Cull en 

of Smit hso nian Institution Press and Kathy Williams of Corbis-Bellman Pictures responded promptl y to my permission requests for the use o f graphi cs 

from thei r publications. Others who COlltributed in various ways to the project 

included Walter H. Bradford, Ph ilip C. Cockrell, Hugh M. Cole, A[be rt E. 

Cowdrey, John DaCrosta, James W. Dunn, John S. D. Eisenhower, John P. 

Finnega n, Col. Gregory Fon tenot, Marylou Gjernes, Terrence J. Gough, Charles 

D. Hendricks, Thomas A. Hughes, Lawrence M. Kaplan , Renee Klish , Clayton 

D. Laurie , Col. Jerry D. Morelock, Susan Pelter, Forrest C. Pogue, Rebecca R. 

Ra ines, Michael W. Rodgers, Philip L. Shiman, Carol E. Stokes, Ad rian G. 

Traas, Stcve R. Waddell , Wi ll iam J. Webb, Thomas Wells, Harold R. Wi nton, 

Robert K. Wright, Jr. , and Roger T. Zei mct. I would also like to thank for thei r 

support two former Chi efs of Military History, Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nclson, 

USA (ReL), and Brig. Gen. John W. Mountcastle, USA (Re!.); the current Chief 

of Mi lita ry Histo ry, Brig. Gell. John S. Brown, USA ; the current chief of Histories Di vision, Richard W. Stewart ; and my current branch chie f, Joel D. 

Meyerson. 

My deepest gratitude goes to Illy wife Page, who has g racefully tolerated 

my preoccupation with the First Army over the past several yea rs. 

The a uth or a lone is responsible for all interpretations and conclusions in 

the following work, as we ll as ally errors that l11ay appear. 

Washington, D.C. 

2 1 June 2000 

x 

DAVID W. I·IOGAN, JR. 
Contents 

ChfllJler 

I. The Ameri can Army HC<ldqllarlcrs, 1900- 1944 .....•. . . • .. 

2. 

3. 

Beginn ings at Bristol. ..........................•......•.. 

"To Secure a Lodgement on th e Continent" ........•......•.. 

4. First Test in Normand y ...................... . •... . . . ..... 

5. I-lodges Sleps Up the Pace ......................... . 

6. Frustra tion at the West Wa ll ......... . ..... . . . .... . . . 

7. "The Rock of Gibraltar": The First Army Headquarters 

at the Bulge ............................ .. ... .. . 

8. " First To Reach the Rhine ... First To Mcc llhc Ru ssians" 

9. Conc lusion ....................... . ..... ... ..... . 

Appendi xes 

A. Table of Organizat ion (TO) 200- 1, Neadquarrers. Arm)" 

I July 1942 ........................................ . 

B. Headquarte rs, Fi rst U.S. Army, Staff Memorandum 24, 

18 March 1944, Command and Ope rational Control ........ . 

C. Locations or First Army Command Posts ................... . 

D. Troop Buildup Over the Normandy Beaches, 6-30 June 1944 .. . 

E. Supply Buildup Over the Normandy Beaches, 6- 30 June 1944 .. 

F. Veh icle Buildup Over the Normandy Beaches, 6- 30 June 1944 .. 

G. Di vision Buildup, 6 June- 25 July 1944 . ... . 

H. Tactical Troop Movements, First U.S. Army, 

17- 26 December 1944 ................................ . 

I. IX Tacti cal Air Command 's Support orthe First Army, 

6 JU I1C 1944- 8 May 1945 .. ..... ... ... ... ..... . 

XI 

3 

21 

39 

77 

121 

157 

205 

239 

285 

298 

300 

302 

304 

305 

306 

307 

308 

3 10 
Bibliograp hical Not e .... . ... . . ...... . . ,. , . . . . . .. . . . . .. . , . . .. . 3 J I 

Military Map Symbols ..... . . .•.. .. . . . ,. , . . . ... , . . . .. ... . . . . . 333 

Indcx 335 

Charts 

No. 

I. U.S. Army Doctrine for th e Typical Orga nization o f a Theate r 

o f Operations, 1943 . ..... . ......... . ...... . . . ....... .. 15 

2. Headquarters, First U.S. Army, Chier of StafT Scction, 

Fun ctio ns, 21 April 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 

3. ETOUSA's Organization After the Consolidation of 17 January 1944 . . 42 

4. Planned Command Arrangements for OVERLORO: Early Pha ses . . . 57 

5. Pl anned Command Arran gements fo r OVERLORD: After U.S. 

l SI Army Group Becomcs Operat ional ................. . 58 

6. IX Tacti cal Ai r Command (TAC) Immediat e Support System, 

Summe r- Fall 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 

7. Composition of the First Army Headquarters Tacti ca l Echelon ... 126 

8. Ficld Armi es and COM Z Evacuation Responsibility.. . . . . . . . . . 191 

9. First Army Signals Intell igence and Monitoring (S IAM) Radio Net . . . 264 

Tables 

I. First Army Supp ly and Consumpt ion Leve ls, 

19 August- 19 Septembe r 1944 .. . . .. . .......... . ..... . . . 144 

2. Fi rsl Army Suppl y and Consumption Leve ls, 

20 Septembe r- 19 October J 944 . ... . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . ... . 163 

3. Fi rst Army Suppl y and Consumption Leve ls, 

20 October- 19 Novembe r 1944 ...... . .......... , . .. . .... 180 

Maps 

I. The Fi nal NEPTUNE Pl an 

2. General Montgomery's Grand Design . . 

3. The Drive to Cherbourg, 6- 26 Jun c 1944. 

4 . First Army Zone, 3- 20 July 1944 .... . . . 

5. COBRA: The Breakthrou gh, 24- 29 Jul y 1944 

X" 

54 

62 

80 

92 

108 
No. Page 

6. First U.S. Army, 30 July- 6 August 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I II 

7. Closing the Falaise-A rgelltan Pocket, 8- 17 August 1944 .. . . . . . 129 

8. Drive to th e Se ine River, 16-25 August 1944................. 134 

9. Pursuit 10 Ihe Ge rman Border, 26 August- IO Septembe r 1944 140 

[0. Ge rman Border Batt les, 25 September- 22 October [944 . . 158 

II. German Border Battles, 26 October- I 5 Deecmbe r 1944 . . 183 

12. The Ardennes, 15 December 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 

[3 . Waeht am Rhein , 16- 25 December 1944 .................... 2 10 

14. Erasi ng the Bulge, 26 December 1944- 25 Ja nuary 1945 ....... 226 

15. Advance to Ihe Rhine River, 27 January- 7 Marc h 1945........ 242 

16. Drive Into Germany, 24 Ma reh- 4 Apri l 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 

17. Thc Drive Into Germa ny. 4-18 April 1945 ........... , . , , , . . . 260 

Il lustra tio ns 

Col. George C. Ma rshall With Maj. Gell. Henry T. Allen 

A Class on the Infantry Di vision at th e Command lind Genera l 

Siaff School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ... .......... . 

Lt. Gen. Oma r N. Bradley and Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Deve rs ........... . 

Gene ra l George S. Patton, Jr .............................•. . . . .. 

Cli fton Coll ege ..... .... ................................•.... 

Maj. Gen. William 13. Kean .................•................. . 

Col. Charles F. Will iams ........ . ... •. ....... . . . .•............. 

Col. Samuel L. Mye rs .......... . ........... . ... .... ... .. . .. .. . 

Col. Joseph J. O' Hare . . . . . . . . . ..... . ...... ... . . ... .. . . ... . . 

Col. Benjamin A. Dickson . . . . . . ........ .. ..... . . . ........•.... 

Brig. Ge n. TrUlll1Ul C. Thorson ............... • ....... . ..... •.... 

Brig. Gen. Robert W. Wi lson ......•. • . . . .•..• .. . . •. • . . . ... .. . .. 

Bryanston Court .... . ............. • . . . . . ... . . . ...... . ...•. .. . 

Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ..... .... . . .. . 

Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Coll ins ............................... . • ... 

Brig. Gen. Cha rl es H. Corl ett .............................. . ... . 

First Army Staff Personnel at Work al Clifton College ... ...... .. .. . 

Col. Grant A. Williams . . .... . . .. ....... . ..... ... . ............ . 

Gene ral Brad ley and Bri tish Commande rs, Genera l Si r Berna rd L. 

Montgomery and Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey, in Normand y .. 

Orga nizing the Beach at OM AliA During the Ea rly Days 

of th e Invasion ................................. . 

Col. Cha rl es G. PatterSOIl ............... . ..... . 

Brig. Gcn. Cha rl es E. Hart .............. . ................. . 

Maj. GCIl. Elwood R. " Pete" Quesada With Generals Bradley 

and Kean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................... . 

XI II 

8 

II 

22 

24 

27 

28 

28 

29 

29 

32 

33 

34 

47 

52 

53 

53 

65 

78 

79 

82 

87 

96 

97 
I'flge 

Lt. Gen. Courtney H. I-lodges.. . . ....... .......... .. . ......... .. 122 

Genera l Wilson and Brig. Ge n. John B. Mcdaris...... ... .. . . . ..... 123 

Ordnance Va n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 

Brig. Gen. John A. Roge rs.... . .................... ............ 136 

Col. Andrew T. McNama ra. ........... ... .... . ..... ..... ... .... 145 

Kean, I-lodges, Di ckson, Thorson, and Hart Sur veying th e Ma p 

in the Map Room at the First Army Command Post. .. 148 

First Army Command Post a\ Verviers . . . . . 159 

Shells Stacked by Type To Fac ili tate Iss ue. . . . . . . . .. . . 166 

Spa, Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 

Hote l Brilanniqlle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 

First Army G- 2 (Air) Subsection Plols Reports.. .. . . . .. .. .. . . . . . . . 177 

Sehwammenallcl Dam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1 

Conference on the Western Front: Maj. Gen. Raymond S. Mc Lain, 

Kean, Bradley, l'lodges, and LI. Gen. Will iam H. Simpson. . . . . 187 

Maj . Gen. Troy I-I. Middleton . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1 

First Army Ga soline, Oil, and Lubricant Rese rves Stored Along the 

Roadside Ncar Spa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 14 

General Collins, Field Marshal Montgomery, and Maj. Gen. 

Ma llhew B. Ridgway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 220 

Col. Ru sse ll F. "Red" Akers, Jr.. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .•. 224 

Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebncr .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .• . .. .. . . .. . . . .. . 240 

Maj . Gen. John Mi lli kin .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .. .. . ... . 245 

Maj. Gen. Wi ll iam A. Carter, Jr. ........ .. ................ . .. 248 

View of Remagc ll and the LudendorfT Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 

Ponton Boats and Floats on the Way to the Rhine in the Remagen 

Arell .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .... . . . .............. .... ....... 251 

Ge ne ral James A. Van Fleet... . . .. . . .. ........... ....... ....... 254 

Col. Damon M. Gunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 266 

Soviet-Ameri can Banquet Aft er Meeting at Torga u ......•.. . . . ,.. 27 1 

Col. George A. Miller Gels the Legion of Me rit .......... . ,.... .. 272 

Illustrations courtesy of the fo ll owin g sources: pp. 8, 11 ,32,52, 53 (left), 65, 

97, 122, 172, 173, 211, 220, 224, 240, 245, 25 1, 254, 266, 271, 272, Na l;onal 

Arch;vcs; pp. 22,24,27,28 (I'; ghl), 29 (left), 33, 34, 53 (r;ghl), 78, 96, 123, 

136, 145,250, U.S. Army Milita ry History Institut e; Pl'. 29 (right), 248, ss ~ 

cia tion of Gradua tcs, Unit ed Sta tes Military Acadcmy, Assembly. West Point, 

New York; p. 79, Co rbi s~ llrnann ; p. 87, Arthur Klobe; p. 127, Stuyvesant 

Wa inwright; PI'. 148, 187, Dwight D. Eisenhowe r Presidential Libra ry, Abi lene, 

Kansas; p. 159, Dempsey Allphin: and p. 177, Robert Blanchard. All other 

illustrations from the files of Department of Defense. 

X>v 
A Command Post at War 

First Army Headq uarters 

in Europe, 1943- 1945 
, 

, 

I 

j 
1 

The American Army Headquarters, 1900-1944 

Until 1900, the U.S. Army's experience with command echelons larger tha n 

a corps had been negli gibl e. Surrounded by oceans and weak ne ighbors, 

Ihe Un ited Sta tes could aITord to limit its Army to a constabu lary of small 

garrisons scatt ered alUong isolated fronticr posts. Armi es had consisted o f a ll 

the units within a particular gcogmp hi c department, distri ct, or di vision and 

I'lIrc ly exceeded a few thousand men. Give n such small forces, army commanders could cont inu e the tradition of pe rsonal command, combining wi th in themse lves the functions o f department head, fi e ld force commander, administrator, 

and troop leader. Many saw command less as a technique of scient ific management than as an inspirationa l, large ly intuitive art, in whi ch some ind ividuals 

naturally excell ed and others did not. The comma nders' small staffs had co nsisted of a few intimates, who served as aides, and of tec hnica l spec ia lists, of 

whom th e adjutant general usuall y served as th e de fac to ch ief of staff. The 

qmdity of staff personnel had improved over timc with the advent of the U.S. 

Mil itary Academy and post- Civi l War trends toward greater professionalism, 

but instruction in command and staff work had been virtually nonex istent. The 

one notable exception to the Army's small-unit heritage, the Civil War, had left 

lillie enduring impact. Although commanders had adopted some in formal spec ia li zation wi thin thei r staffs and had used new technologies to direct the mass 

armies o f III at conflict, organi zat ion and doctrine for a rmy- level staffs had deviated remarkab ly little from the esta blished patte rn .

1 

Wit h the turn of the century, the expa nding responsibilities of the Army of 

an eme rging worl d power, a long with deficienc ies exposed by the Span ishAmerican War, stimu lated the most thorough reconsideration of doc trine for 

hi gher-level headquart ers in the Army 's history. To provide a corps-leve l echelon for supervising and supporting di visions operating independ cntl y in the 

rough Ame rican terrain, as well as to establish a basis for organ izing Regular 

and reserve divisions, the War Department adopted th e European concept of 

the fi eld a rmy, form ing the First Fi e ld Army in 19 10. 2 Under the new orga nization, the old army-leve l ec he lon, according to the fie ld service regulations of 

1914, wou ld concern itse lf on ly with broad missions, strat egy, and milita ry 

pol icy, leaving det ails o f operat ions to the new fi e ld army headqu arte rs, which 

took th e pla ce of the corps. The 1914 manual also provi ded for an army- leve l 

chief o r staff, a ro le that had changed from a me re cle rk to the commande r's 
4 A COII/mand POSI al Hill' 

leading adv ise r and executor. Under him was a staff divided along a ge neral 

staff's fUllctionallines of operations, inte ll igence, and administration, in cl uding su pply. By 1917, innucnccd by operations along the Mexican border, Army 

doctrine abandoned its expe rimen t with the new rield army and returned to the 

corps structure, but the organ ization and fu nctions orthe traditional America n 

army headquarters, to whic h the Army now reven ed, remained unresol ved:) 

To man the headq uarters, whatever form they look, th e Army ex panded its 

educational system. The Spanish-Ameri can War had shown the need for systematic st afT training o f office rs whose vision all 100 often was bounded by their 

particular branch or regiment. Although thc ncw Army Wa r College stressed strategic planning by the War Department Gene ral StatT, it increasingly covcred tacti ca l a nd logistical probl ems up to the corps level. 4 Meanwhile, at Fort 

Leavenworth , Kan sas, the Genera l Service and Staff College devoted the second 

year of its two-year cou rse to the instruction of a chosen few in strategy, the 

duties o f a general staff, large-u nit tactics, log istics, weapons, and military history. Shortly before the war with Spain, Maj. Art hur L. Wagner and Capt. Ebe n 

Swift, instructors at Leave nworth , had initiatcd a class 0 11 the preparation of standard fivc-paragraph orders, using the German form as a modcL The school now 

incorporated this class into a curriculum of map problems, war games, and fi e ld 

exerc ises, emphasizing German genera l sta ff techniques. Undcr the stri ct su pervision of Brig. Gen. Joh n F. Morrison, such future staff officers as Hugh A. Drum 

and George C. Marshall solved map probl ems that, Ma rshall remembered, "contained a knockout if you fa iled to recognize the pri nci ple involved."s Despitc its 

growing renown, the second year of thc course, largc ly because of statutory limits Oil the size of the gene ral sta ff corps, had produced only 400 graduates by 

Apri l 191 7, when the United States intervened in World War 1.6 

World War I was a watershed for the U.S. Army's doctrine of higher-leve l 

command. The sheer size and increasing mechani zatio n of All ied and German 

armi es on th e Western Front, the lengthy fro nts ovcr wh ich they ope rated, and 

thc limitations of primitive wire and wireless communications created enormous problems of command and control. The magnitude of the effort oftcn 

forced commanding gene rals to seclude themselves a nd their staffs in comma nd posts far to the rear and attempt to exercise cOlllrol almost entirely through 

the telephone and telegraph li nes that rad iated to the ir subordinate lInits.7 

The Ame ricans responded to this challenge by attempting to main tain a 

hi gh degree of independence from European ways wh ile simultaneously borrowing from the practices of their all ies. Their inexperi ence with th is Iype of 

warfare did not esea pe the notice of the British and Frcnch, who wou ld have 

preferred that the new arrivals si mply furnish raw manpowe r and leave command problems to their morc seasoned generals and staffs. The Americans could 

not have accepted this arrangemcn t, which wou ld have transformed Maj. Gen. 

John J. Pershing's Ame rican Expeditio nary Forces (AEF) into a massive replacement depot. Nevertheless, to form the thealer-Ievel statT of the AEFwith its large-sca le stra tegic and suppo rt functions- as we ll as the corps, army, 

and othe r higher headquarters, they required a more mature doctrine a nd a far 

larger general staff eorps than the tiny cont ingen t of Leavcnworth grad uates. 
The Americall Al'my /-Ielldqlllll'fel's. 1900- 1944 5 

At La ngres in November 19 17, with the hel p of several British and French 

instructors, the AEF esta blished a Ihree·month course thaI used twenty map 

problcms to train staff officers in the principles of staff opera tions. Even with 

th is acce le rated sched ul e, however, it wou ld take some time before the school 

cou ld produce enough staff officers to meet the demand.

s 

While the AEF struggled to expand its genera l starr corps, it also devel· 

oped stafTdoctrine using French and British models. Shortly after Pe rshin g's 

arri va l in France, the AEF commande r sent officers to study French and Bri t· 

ish staffs wit h a view toward establ ishing simila r org'l1Ii zalions in the AEF. 

Simult aneously, th e War Department sent a mission unde r Col. Chauncey B. 

Baker to France for the same purpose. Wa ry of two groups presenti ng d issimila r recommenda tions, Pershin g asked the Bake r mission to confer wi th 

th e AEF starr before mak ing its re port. Hav ing consulted with the AEF, Baker's 

group visit ed both the British First Army and the French Second Army but, in 

its rinal report , seemed to favor the sta rr organiza tion of the French. The 

Frenc h general staffor "0 " system had a 0 - 1, or perso nnel, section 10 hand le 

perso nne l iss ues; a 0 - 2, or intcll igence, sec tion to gathe r and ci rcu lat e informa tion on the enemy and the te rrain; a 0 - 3, or ope rations, section to plan 

and issue orders fo r movements and to handle li <l ison with <ldj acent a rmie s; 

and a 0 - 4, or suppl y, section to su pe rvise the supply depa rt ments and technical services. In addit ion to th ese gene ral starr sections, spec i<l l starr office rs 

h<lndled spec ific administrat ive, technical, or service funct ions. Antici pat ing 

a close r wo rking relat ionship with the French, in its ge nera l orders of Febru· 

ary 19 18 the AEF adopted a slightly mod ified ve rsion of the French system. 

It a lso tra nslated many French command ma nua ls an d doctrinal pamphle ts 

into English for the use o f its staff office rs.' 

Five more months would pass be fore th e AEF co uld incorporate the new 

system in to an army headquarters. It took ti me to <lssemb le and train enough 

di visions in France to j ustify the crea tion of a corps, let alone a higher·leve l 

headq uart ers, and in the interim , Oeneral John J. Pcrshing had to resist repeated 

Allied attempts to divert the new American levics into British and French uni ts. 

The process was delayed further in th e spri ng of 191 8 by a Ge rman offensive, 

which caused th e American high command to th row its ava ilable di visions into 

the breach and to bring overseas more combat units at the expense of se rvice 

troops. Nevertheless, by July 191 8 Pershing was ready to begin the formation 

of the stafTfor an a rmy, whic h he would cOlllmand in addition to the AE F. On 4 

July he selected Col. Hugh A. Drum as his <lrllly ehief ofstaffand directed him 

to assemble the headquarters. 

At Cou lommicrs and latcr at La Ferte-sous·Jouarre nca r Chateau· Thierry, 

Drum worked from dawn to dusk to select and organize the statT. While forming I Corps headq uarters as pan of its progressive process of assemblin g everhi gher command echelons, the AEF had begu n sepa ra tely to form an army 

arti ll ery headquarters. Drum now added this headq uarters to the emerging army 

slaff. He also brou ght back the army 0-4 sect ion, whi ch had been temporarily 

assigned as th e I Corps' 0 - 4 section pending th e fo rmat ion of an army. Since 

Pe rshing was div idin g his time between th e <lrmy and AEF headq uarters, he 
6 A COII/II/al/d Pos, til War 

ollowcd Drum considerable discretion in his task. On 10 July 19 18, Marshal 

Ferdinand Foeh, the supreme Allied commander, gave his otTicial approval for 

the fo rmation orlhe First U.S. Army, which wou ld reporllo AEF headquarters 

for administration and mOSI of ils supply and, at [cast initially, wou ld come 

unde r the French commande r in chief, General Henri r etain, for opera tions. 

Two wee ks lalcr Pe rshing annou nced activation of the First Army, effective 10 

August. 'O 

A general order in early August laid out the organization and duties of Ihe 

Fi rst Army headquarte rs. The new command wou ld carry oul tactical, administra tive, and logistical functions. A deputy chief of stafT hand led det ails of su pport, fre e ing the chief of staff to focus on tact ica l problems. To the four G 

scctions, Drum added a 0 - 5 section fo r trai ning and a spec ial sta ff consistin g 

of an adjuta nt general, inspector genera l,j udge advocate gene ra l, provost marsha l, ch ief q ua rtermaste r, chief surgeon, c hief engi neer, c hief signal officer, 

and ch ie f ordnance officer and the chie fs of the ai r scrvice, motor transpo rt 

co rps, chem ical warfare se rvicc, and tank corps. The chicf of artillery, who 

hcaded a separate hcadquart crs, a lso served on the spec ia l staff. In practice, 

the Fi rst Army headq uarters split into forward and rea r ec hc lons." 

The st aff soon settled into a routine. Following the arrival of the cor ps 

eve ning reports about 2200, the G- 3 section prepared a formal o perations report and map, which it sen t about midnight by courier to higher eche lons, and 

it a lso drafted instructions for the following day. About 0730 the next mornin g 

the corps chie fs of staff reported to th e army 0 - 3 about the lat est deve lo pmcnts, and the G- 3 me t with his chie f of st aff to hea r the army commande r's 

g uidance. Wh en the mect ing conc luded about 0830, thc G- 3 revised thc draft 

field order according to a new fo rm, morc complcx tha n the dra ft and based on 

the French model, and forwarded the d raft order to thc corps, cnabling them to 

begin preparations to carry out the fina l order. At thc morning meeting of staff 

section chiefs, th e G- 2 wou ld o utline the enemy situation, the G- 3 would lay 

out the First Army's status, a nd after a general discussion the group wou ld 

rece ive the commander's orders. To e nsure coordi nation, the staff sections and 

c hief of statT and their count erparts at lower leve ls conferred frequently and 

ci rculated memorandums, and the deputy chief of staff and assistant chiefs 

were authorized to issue orders in the name of the commande r regarding all 

subjec ts with in the scope of thc ir sections. To handl e its varied tasks, the headquartcrs sta tT, in the end, would rcq uire 600 officcrs and 1,500 en listed men, a 

scale beyond the d reams of prewar American officers.12 

T he critical role that Drum, Lt. Co l. George C. Mars hall , and o ther 

Leave nworth grad u,lIes played on the slatT was not always apprec iated by subordinate comma nders. Army doctri ne was often contrad ictory rega rding the proper 

sphere of the st aff. The 191 7 sta ff manual and numerous War Department directives had stressed th e supremacy of the commander and the staff's lack of authority over troops and departments. Nevertheless, field service regulations implicd 

amp le autonomy for thc sta ff, and instructors .11 Lcavenworth had even stated 

that the chief of staff could act in thc place of his commander where immediate 

action was required. I } Through these contradi ctions and the Army's inexperience 
The Americall Army I'/eadql/arters, /900- 1944 7 

with a general stafT system, misunderstandings frequen tl y occurred. In their 

di rect contacts with opposite numbers at lower levels during the Meuse-A rgonne 

offensive, th e First Army staff ofTice rs frequentl y issued orders to corps starTs 

without reference to Persh ing or to the corps com manders. To make mailers 

wo rse, brash, young Leavenworth gradua tes at differcnt echelons often displayed an overbearing altitude in dealings with older subordinate commanders, 

a disdain reciproca ted by the laller, who resented the intrusions, real and supposed, on their authority and often viewed ex peri ence as the onl y val id schooling for offiee s.l~ 

In ea rl y August 1918 the forward echelon of the First Army headqullrters 

moved to the key rai lroad center of Nc ufchateau. There it began planning for 

the First Army's baptism of fire, the o ffensive against the 5t. Mi hiel sa lient. 

The First Army 0-4 section supe rvised the process of obtaining suppli es from 

the Services of Supply through a regulating station in the army rear area and 

then pushing them forwa rd directl y to the division railheads. While the G-4 

section su pervised supply to the U.S. I, IV, and V Corps and, with the aid ofa 

French liaison contingent, the French II Colonia l Corps, the 0 - 3 sect ion preparcd march tables, plans, and orders. In ea rly September, however, the sta rT 

recei ved a major new chall enge when Foch changed th e First Army's mission 

to a limited attack on the salient, followed by a major redeployment sixty miles 

to the nort h and an orTensive in the Meuse-A rgonne region. The move involved 

the transfer of 500,000 men, 2,000 gu ns, and 900,000 tons of supplies over 

three crowded roads within a two-week span. It would have been an imposing 

task for an ex perienced staff, Ict alone the g rccn Fi rst Army headquart ers. Following the successful conclusion of the SI. Mihi el attack on 13 September, 

Col. George C. Marshall in the G- 3 section coordinated the shift to the MellscArgonne, dividing men and vehicles between the three roads, adjusting march 

schedu les on short notice, and working wit h a French liaison officer to avoid 

entanglemcnts wit h adjacent French units. By the night of 25 September every 

First Army unit had reached its position for the attack the next day.1 5 

Once the Mcuse-Argonne offensive sta rtcd, however, it encountered major 

problems. The ruggcd terrain, lack of good roads, inccssant rains, chronic shortages of scrviee units and transportation , and a stubborn enemy de fense 

presented enormOliS obstacles, all of them compollnded by the starT's inexperience. The initial attack order was confusin g and set unreasonable goa ls for the 

fi rst day's advance. Because of the large number of green troops, the army 

headquart ers delineated corps and di vision boundaries and objectives in such 

detail that, when Pershing finally allowed more discreti on, corps com manders 

had lillIe idea how to usc it. 

Other difficulties plagued command in the First Army during the offensive. Inadequate communi cations were a constant bane. Portable radios were 

unavai lable, signal wi re was often cut by bombardmcnts, and motor couriers 

were slowed by massivc traffic jams on the few available roads. Unable to follow developmen ts because ofthcse glitches, the First Army headquarters relied 

heavily on the AEF's rov ing inspectors, who provided the G- 3 with daily information on the si tuat ion at the front and the problems they encountered in return 
8 A Com lilt/lid Pos/ 01 War 

Colollel Man/IlII1, le ft. wi,h Maj. Gell, Hellry T. AI/ell, CO/l/i//(llule/: VIII Corps 

fo r summaries of the nex t day's orde rs. In the end, however. communicat ions 

were so poor that the First Army headqua rters resorted to dropp ing its dail y 

order by plane. Frustrated by the slow pace of the advance, Pe rshing re lieved 

th e command ers of one corps, three divisions, and several brigades by the end 

of October, bUllhc changes did litt le to sp ur the adva nce. The First Army sur. 

fercd one fina l embarrassment when, within a week of th e a rmisti ce, a ca reless 

order perm itted the V Corps to send th e 1st In fantry Division ac ross the III 

Corps' front in an effort to will the race to Sedan. The First Army staff soon 

sort ed out the resulting chaos, but the episode left red f<l ees <II both the AEF 

and First Army headqu<lrters. '6 

Wilh the armistice, the Army entered a twe nty·yea r period in which a ll of 

its army headquarters barely existed except on pa per. During the first six mon ths 

of 19 19 the First Army headquarters and the Second U.S . Army staff, wh ich 

had been organ ized during October 19 18 and had j oined the campa ign at the 

end o f the wa r, were demobil ized. The new Th ird U.S. Army rema ined to ad· 

min ister the occupation o f th e west bank o f th e Rhine ncar Koblenz until it 100 

was demobilized in July 1919. Under the 1920 amendme nt to the Nat ional 

Defense Act of 1916, th e War Department provided fo r the esta blishment of 

three army headq uart ers to command the ni ne corps areas into which it had 

divided the conti nenta l United States, but it sti pulated th e assignment of com· 

mande rs and staffs only as the need arose. Alt hough mobi lization plans as of 

1923 called for six armies in th e initial mobili zed force, no army headq uart ers 

existed during the 1920s. In 1932 Army Ch ie f of Staff General Do uglas 
The Americal/ Army fleadqua rler!)', / 900- / 944 9 

MacA rthur moved to consolidate the Army's tactical units under four army headquarters. MacArt hur was concerned that no army-leve l headquarters existed as 

a basis for planning and mobili zation for even minor cOllti ngencies. [n his concept, each army headquarters, under the senior corps area commander within 

the army area , wou ld plan the defense of its particular arell and supervise training and army-level maneuvers with in that area, leaving most administrat ive 

tasks to its subord inate corps arcas. Although the Army activated four armies 

in 1933, they existed only in theory. The First Army's permanent staff in New 

York, for exampl e, consisted of onl y two officers. 17 

Skeleton staffs and la ck of rca listic large-sca le mancuvers left th e stillimmaturc American doc trine for th e army headquart ers in a largely theoretica l sta te between th e wa rs. Army leaders coul d, and did, draw some lessons 

on high command from thei r abbreviated expe ri ences in World War I, notably 

th ro ugh the report of a postwar committee established by the AEF un der the 

chairmanship of Brig. Gen. Willi am D. Connor to in vestigat e the subj ect of 

ge neral staff organi zation . Th e committe e, which reported to the AEF 's 

Superior Board on Organi zation and Ta ctics, reempha sizcd thc sole authority 

of th e commander and dominance of the ge neral staff ovcr th e spec ia l staff 

while leaving room fo r se rvice ch iefs to wo rk direct ly with thei r counterparts 

in other command eche lons through techni cal channels. Its conelusions COIltribut ed to the 1923 Field Service Regulaliolls and the 1928 SUI/f Officers 

Field Mal/llal, but these manuals still provided lill ie gui dance on th e subject 

of echelons above the di vision leve l}S The Army tried to redress this deficiency throu gh th e Mallllal for Commcllldel's of Large VllilS, whose first 

volume on operations appeared in 1930 and whose sccond volume 011 organization and adm inistration came out in 1935. In October 1939 revised fi eld 

se rvice regulations attempted to combinc these two volumes in an update of 

th e 1923 regulations, with mixed res ults. I') 

As the Army struggled to generate offi cial doctrine on large-unit operati ons, it also sought to develop a broader base of expertise in high-leve l commaml and staff work through its schools. Because o f its experience in World 

War I, the Army's leade rship was determined to avoid sho rtages of trained statT 

office rs in any future mobi li zation. Conseque ntl y. thc schools, parti cularly the 

Command and Gencral Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, which reopened in 

191 9 after a wartime hiatus, cmphasized the educa ti on of a large number of 

competent statT o ffi cers schooled in a common approach to solving tactica l 

problems. Although the main focu s of instructio n at Leavenworth remained the 

division and combined arms, th e school devoted at least some attention to the 

army leve l in its map problems, exerc ises, conferences, and lectures. 2o Especially after 1924, the Army War College was supposed to concentrat e more on 

the thea ter and army level. In fa ct, th e content of its curriculum osc illated between grand strategy and " preparation for war" on th e one hand and, on the 

other, fi eld command and st aff work, communi cations, and tact ics by an army 

operating cithcr independentl y or as part o f an army gro up. After 1935 the War 

Coll cge devoted grea ter attention to army-level c0111mand and control to meet 

th e Army's immediate need for staff officers in the fie ld.!1 
10 A Commalld Post (I( IIi',r 

What did the ma nuals a nd sc hools teach about an army headqua rte rs'! 

Although they drew some lessons from the positional warfa re of Wo rl d Wa r 

I, th ey focu sed more on th e role of an arilly in le ss controlled, more fluid 

"ope n warfare," espec ially on the Ame ri can cont inent. Ma nua ls and textbooks 

at first defined the army a s the " unit of di rection," an eche lon ha ving "territorial , strategical , nnd ta cticn] functions," in cont rast to the role of th e corps 

as the unit ofexcclIlioll and maneuvcr. 22 Lat e r manuals showed a slight shift 

in empha sis from a stra tegic toward a more ta cti cal role for the arllly. They 

stal ed Ihal, " fundame ntally, th e a rmy is the ba sic unit of man Cli ve r, but , wh en 

the a rmy is part of a group of armies, a nd usually aftc r contact is obtained 

with th e hostil c forces, stratcgy becomes me rged in ta cti cs a nd th e lalle r 

becomes the predominant fa ctor." u 

Wha tever the ir diffe re nces on the level of invo lveme nt of the army, both 

sets of manuals agreed all the basic tasks of the a rmy headq uarters. They de -

rined that agency 's role as pla nni ng and exec llting " broader phases of stratcgic 

and tactica l operations necessary to carry out that part o f a given strat egical 

mission assigned to it by higher authority."24 The army commander gave to 

eac h corps a clear mission, assigning zo nes, spcc ifyin g direction and objectives for an attack, and allotti ng di visions and othe r resources among th e corps. 

He followed the batt lc c losely, issuing clear and timely orde rs, coordinating 

corps movements, a nd committing his reserves of a rtill e ry, aviation, ta nk s, and 

other un its where necessary.!5 

One wartime precede nt that the Army look great pai ns to exorc ise , with 

limited success, was the specte r of "staff comrnand." Heeding the wa rnin gs o f 

th e Connor committee, manuals stressed th e rol e of th e commander l.IS " th e 

con troll ing head ... th e maste r mind," from whom nowed " the energy and 

impulse wh ic h are to an imate all under hirn."24 Stall offi ce rs, as sllch , had no 

com mand authority; they only gave orders when authorized by the commander 

or " pursuant to routine established procedu res."27 The chi e f of staff, th e "chi e f 

ad viser and personal rcpresentati ve of th e commander," exerc ised some powers 

"cocx te nsive" with his responsibil ities for the sta ff a nd the co ntrol a nd coordination of troop operations, but he was only the instrument of the commander, 

acting under his orders or in his name when he was absent. 2s The Army's postwa r leaders were inte rested in empha siz ing in the se rvice schools command as 

an art separate from the skills of the staff office r, a nd the Army War Coll ege 

during th e ea rly 1920s treat ed command as such in its c urri c ulum. By the c nd 

of the decade , howeve r, th e War Coll ege had rejoined Leavenworth in teaching 

command within a starT settin g. In stressing teamwork, th e instructi on seem cd, 

in some ca ses, to view th e commander as litt le more than th e highest-leve l starT 

offi cer or mana ger.

29 

How cou ld a commande r ex tend his control and energy not jusllO the staff 

but th roughout the command? School tex tbook s gave lengthy ex positions on 

the subj ect, to the poi nt o f prescribing the number o f visits a comma nder should 

make to his staff secti on c hi efs and the speci fi c procedure for st a tT confe re nces. Before a major ope rati on, th e manua ls stated, a commande r should a lways supp lement his writt en orde rs with persona l confere nces with his stall" 
The Alllericall A rilly Headquarrel's. 1900- 1944 II 

A class ollilie illfall/I)' llil';!)';oll (ilihe COlli lilli/ill (/lid Gel/eral SllIjJSclwol. 

Felmllll), 1942 

and subordinate commanders to ensure that they understood his plans and 

intent. Once the battl e began, he should station himse lf where he could best 

control th e ac tion. His command post offered the advantage of good com munications and control of the unitns a whole, but manuals underscored the importan ce o f personal visits to inspire confidence and cnsurc that his orders were 

understood and be in g exec ut ed. Sin ce the commander could not bc evc rywhere 

at once, doctri ne allowed ror visits by staff office rs to lower eche lons and, increasin gly, the lise of lia ison officers to clarify the commander's intent to his 

subordinates and provide him with an independent source of information from 

the front.JO 

The question arose of how much cont rol a com mander shou ld exercise. By 

1923 Army doctrine had accepted considerable decentra lizat ion, but the tentati ve fi eld service regu lations of [939 sta ted, "So long as the commande r can 

exercise effective control. he docs not decentralize." Perhaps adva nccs in communi cations, es pec ially radio, Icd doctrinal planncrs to bcli cvc it possible to 

maintain centra l control, desp ite othe r technological trends whi ch accelcra tcd 

the pace and increased the dispcrsion of operations. Then again, the French 

Army, on wh ich the Americans had modcled much o fth ci r high-level doctrine, 

was moving in the samc dircction.J' 

As for the headquartcrs itse lf, manuals and schools laid out in great detail 

thc organiza tion and dutics ofthc gcneral and spec ial statTs, although they oftcn lumped functions of staffs at the army, corps, di vision, and other Icvels 
12 A COlllmand Post af War 

within an overall discllssion of staff fun ctions. The G sec tions of the ge ne ra l 

staff, an Army War Coll ege lecture noted in 1924, d id not constitut e an op ~ 

aling agency," but rather a bod y which presc ribed poli cies and le ft execution of 

those polic ies to th e techni cal, administrative, and supp ly chie fs orthe specia l 

staff. 32 The instructor compared the re la tionship to that between an a rchit ect 

and a builder. Among th e Gs, considera bl e cooperation and coord ination must 

exist, as eac h section had to keep informed o f current plans and dec isions to 

carry out its functions. Doctrine a lso emphasized th e duty of each specia l staff 

chief to kee p th e commander and the general sta ff consta ntly awarc of the condition and capabiliti es of his pa rti cula r arm or serviceY 

The J uly 1929 tab le of organi zation fo r an army headquarte rs unde rwcnt 

some mi nor changes. In it, th e Army retained the World War I concept of forward and rear echel ons, the deputy c hi e f of staff, and the chic f of the a ir service. who. in addition to his staff dut ies, wou ld command the a ir units attached 

to th e army by theater headquart ers. The table dropped th e G- 5 fo r train ing and 

the chiefs of the tank corps and motor transport corps, whi le adding c ivil a ffairs and fi nance o ffi cers an d a chaplain. Although the ta ble stipu lated 25 1 

offi cers a nd 777 enlisted me n in an army headqua rte rs, the War Depa rtment 

quickly slashed th e auth ori zation to 128 offi cers and 466 enlisted men so as to 

keep large sla ffs 10 a min imum. As it turned out, th e armi es of th e in te rwar 

pe riod could not eve n come c lose 10 Iha t leve l. H 

The outbreak of Worl d War II caused the Army to take a new look at ils 

army headquarte rs. In Novembe r 1939 th e War Dc partment acted to provide II 

minima l staff for each of these headquart ers and directed army commande rs to 

take charge ofall activiti es directl y rc lating to preparations for war, inc luding 

fie ld tra inin g for units la rger than di visions, orga nizati on of coast de fenses, 

and supervision of ope rationa l and administrative plann ing. Ove rall responsibi li ty for trainin g rested with Genera l Headquarters (G I-I Q), whi ch the Wa r 

Departme nt acti va ted in July 1940 as a prospective command post for a theale r 

o f ope rati ons. Nevert he less, GHQ's chie f of staff, Brig. Gen. Lesley J. McNa ir, 

wishcd to dc legat e the auth ority for tra ining di visions to the various army headquarte rs. Toward that end, in October 1940 the War Department se parat ed th e 

command of corps areas from th e a rmy comma nds, de signated army command· 

e rs and distinct army staffs, and le ft th e responsibil ity for logistics, constru ction, and the tra ining of se rvice troops to th e corps headquart ers. This action 

e ffecti vely imp lemented MacArthur's four-a rmy conce pt of 1932 and he lped 

bring a rmy staffs to th e ir highest level of readi ness as pros pecti ve commands 

fo r future theaters o f war.35 

Partl y to tra in thesc slaffs, the Army condu cted un script ed mane uvers of 

army-size units during th e autumn o f 194 1. Although somc a rmy stalTs had 

carri ed out ma ne uvers be fore th e war, they lacked the manpower and other 

resources to attempt mu ch mo re th an highly fo rmali zed command post exerc ises.J6 As th e new Army fighti ng div isions th at had bee n mobi lized in 1940 

reached an advanced stage of traini ng, G HQ dec ided 10 try large r, more rea listic maneuvers to int egrate these formations into th e a rmy and corps headquarte rs. Many of the lessons c ited by GHQ from the Louisiana ma ne uve rs in 
The A merieall Army Headqllarters, /900- J 944 13 

September 1941 dea lt wit h armor and a ir support, but the exercise also 

revea led ongoing defects in staff doctrine and practice, especia lly the use of 

excessive unit frontages and orders which we re either too complex or vague . 

GHQ made many of the same criticisms of the First Army headquarters in the 

Ca roli na maneuve rs later that fall, chiding Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, Pershing 's 

former ch ief ofstafTand now th e First Army commander, and his statT for their 

inadequat e suppl y system, overly lengthy field orders, probl ems of communications, and location of thcir command post far to the rea r. Both maneuvers 

showed that command and staff doctrine had not yet entirely shed the outmoded 

practices o f World War I for the mobil e war to come.

J ? 

Only a week after the final phase of the CarolilHl maneuvers, Japanese planes 

attacked Pearl Harbor, and the United States became a fu ll-n edged belligerent 

in the war. In the aftermath of Pea rl Harbor, army headqua rters in the continental United States he ld no more maneuvers on the sca le of those in Louisiana, 

focusi ng instead on lower-level unit and staff exercises. As Army units prepared to deploy overseas, Army Ground Forces, GHQ's successor as the Army 

agency responsi ble for orga ni zation and trai ni ng, tri ed to keep the size of staffs, 

including army sta ffs, to a minimulll . It also abol ished the old " type army" 

orga nization, which specified a standard set of format ions as a model for army 

units, and instead gave to eac h a rmy ,1 mixture of units according to the particu lar conditions under which it would operate. In Army Ground Forces' view, 

these steps would not only reduce administration but a lso makc more efficient 

use o f the limited number of ava ilable staff officers. During 1940 the Command and General StafTSchool had changed its program to a three-month course 

for reservists and a ten-wcek cou rse for general staff officers, and the Army 

War Collcge had sllspe nded c lasses to free instructors and studen ts for the fi e ld. 

Still, the Army never seemed to have enough qua lified staff officers, especia lly 

those with actua l headquarters experience.38 

While the Army rushed to orga nize and trai n staffs, it also tried 10 upda le 

its army doctrine. A new manual for large- unit ope rations, publishcd in June 

1942, stressed tact ics, but it also furt her defi ncd the ro le o f the army as the 

" fundamental unit of strategic ma neuver," th e unit whi ch the theater commande r 

or commander of field forces used as the basis for planning ,md executing operations. Focusing on long-IeI'm planning, the army would provide broad, overall guidan ce to the corps, but the corps would normally ha ve great freedom of 

action in pursuing the ir missions.)9 A revised staff ofTicers fie ld manual conceded tha t, to expedite the execution of his orde rs and promote teamwork, a 

commander migh t authorize his staff to contac t staff officers o f other echelons 

about details o f orders and rout ine technical matt ers but confirmed tha t orders 

to subordinate units must pass between the commanders . .\O 

Drawing on the World War I model. Army doctrine also presented the army 

headquarters as the main administrati vc and logistical echelon in the cOl11b<H zone, 

although, in practi ce, the army groups would evelltually assume several support 

functions. Through a regu lating officer, who would ma nage supply traffic and 

set prioriti es accordi ng to information provided by the army, the communications zone wou ld deliver suppli es to ra ilh eads, depots, or ot her installations in 
14 A COII/malld Pos' (I( War 

the army zone. If the supported uilits were close to those army fac ilities, unit 

transport would pi ck up the supplies; where distances were 100 great, army transport would carry the supplies forward to the units.4L (Char' /) 

Offic ial doctrine showed othe r adjustments. It initially said little abOlIi coordinating a ir and ground c lements. Indee(~ while addi ng personnel, the new 

tables of organi zation actually del eted the chief of the ai r service, perhaps because of the separation of Army Air Forces from Army Ground Forces under 

the War Departme nt reo rgani za tion of Ma rch 1942 . L;lIe r, of course, offi cia l 

doc trine would provide for centrali zed control by Ihe nirmc n of the a ll ocation 

of air sorties in support of ground forces and the establishment of air superi orit y as a prerequisite to close air suppo rt. Organizationa l tabl es did add an ant iaircraft officer in respon se to the th rea t from e nemy aircraft, as we ll as a 

spec ial service office r to advise on matters relatin g to morale.42 Reacting to the 

coordinated lise by the Germans of aircraft, tanks, and mechanized forces in 

the so-called blitzkrieg, the Army provided greate r mobilit y for mobil e army 

headquarters, using improved radio links and rOlli ng suppl y depots to cope 

with fast-moving mechani zed warfare. Neverthe less, with its ca ution abou t ope n 

fl ,mks and emphasis on concentration and a rtill e ry prep,mllion to force breakthroughs. official doctrine still re fl ected the influ ence of World War 1.4J 

Not surprisingly, doctrine for army-level command requi red further alterations when America n armies app li ed it in the Mediterranean and Pacific in 

1943. The rugged terrain and poor roads of Sici ly and Italy, as we ll as the long 

seaborne communi ca tions, inadequate existing facilities, and underdeveloped 

transportation network of th e Southwest Pacific, prese nted challenges unforeseen by prewa r doctrine. 44 Amp hibious assaults highlighted joint operat ions, a 

subj ect inadequately treat ed in prewa r doctrine. In Sicily, Italy, and the Pac ifi c, 

army commanders complained of informal command arran gements which compli cated provision of ai r and naval gunfire support, and th e ir staffs added a ir 

sup po rt office rs to the G- 2 and G- 3 sections in an attempt to ensure closer ti cs 

with supporting aviation eommands. H Nor did coa lition wa rfare make matt ers 

any simpler. In the Southwcst Pac ifi c, MacArthur used the Sixth Army's commander, staff, and troops to c reate a new "A lamo Force," thereby circumve ntin g his Australian grou nd commander, and thc Fifth Army headquarters in Italy 

included separa te national co ntingents to support All ied troops under its 

command. Despite Army Ground Forces' efforts to ho ld the li ne, staffs expanded to meet the needs o f the ir theaters. The Fifth Army staff added a G- 5 

section for civil affairs as we ll as special staff sections 10 ha nd le amph ibious 

issues, transporta ti on, public affairs, and histo ri ca l matters, while the Seventh 

Army's headquarters added a deputy chief of staff for administra tion and a 

sect ion for interpreting aerial photographs. 46 

The cha llenges posed by distances and highly mobile wa rfare fo rced a hi gher 

degree of decentralization than the Army had been prepared to accept during 

the interwar period. In the SOllthwest Pacific, LI. Gen. Walter Kruege r's Sixth 

Army headquarte rs found not onl y its units but even its own eche lons se pafilled by hundreds of miles of ocean, forcing heavy rel iance on li aison aircraft 

and radio. Al though Krueger dili gently visited forward commands by plane, 
C HART I- U.S. ARMY D OCTR INE FOR Ti lE T YI'ICAL ORGAN IZATION OF A 

THEATER OF OI'ERAT IONS, 1943 

, 

, 

" ~ 

Z 

0 , N , ~ , ~ , -

~ 

0 

U 

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, 

, 

, 

., 

, 

I I 

Frunl Unc 

, , , , 

, 

, 

, 

, 

, 

__ -'-__ )0\;<1. __ -' __ _ 

Army $en'icc Arc3 

, 

" I 

, 

, 

, 

., 

'" 

___ L-__________ ;<I.;<I.XX _________ L-_ 

Advance SC(;lion 

_________ 000 ________ ___ 

Inlermediale Sc<:lion 

---------000 -----------

Bnse SC(;lion 

-----------------------

BOllmlMy Legend: 

--,,--- Division 

--xxx -- Corps 

-- x.~"x -- Army 

_ _ 000 __ Sc<:lion. ConUllllllicnl;ons Zone 

-- _ -- Communications Zone 

Su,,,.c .... : War Departmenl Fr.1 100 10.l'i,,1<1 S<'.~'lcr H<'X"/(II;",'.': "d",;";.",,,/;OI. (Wash,nglC)ll, D.C.: 

C""",rnn>enl Pr,ming Office, IlIn), p. I L 
16 A COll/mand Post ar War 

Icavi ng his chief of statT in charge of his headquarters, he had to grant co si ~ 

crable leeway to relatively slnall task forces conducting the bulk of the Sixt h 

Army's opera lions:n In Sici ly, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.'5 Seventh Army 

carried out a mobil e campaign in whic h he re lied on general directi ves \0 subordinates, bu t he was not shy abo ut interven in g in battles, to the point ofjulllping the c hai n of command. A fi nn be liever in persona l command, he devoted 

mu ch of his time to visiting command posts, leaving the de tai ls of runni ng the 

Seventh Army to a slatT whic h some saw as incompetcnl.48 In Ita ly, LI. Gen. 

Mark W. Clark of the Fi nh Army benefi ted from the slower pace of opera tio ns, 

copious employment of liaison officers, and the usc of opera tions instructio ns, 

ra ther than fie ld orders. to exercise close control over his co rps commanders 

whi le providing them with adequa te support. Of these three army headq uarters, the Fi fth Army's was the one to wh ich the First Army headq ua rters wou ld 

tur n as a model. 4

'1 

Th us, by ea rly 1944 th e U.S. Army's doctrine and organization for an army 

headquarters with logist ical, administrative, joint, and broad tactical funct ions 

was maturing, but the Army was st ill relatively new at the business of armylevel comma nd. Except for the aberration of the Civil War, the Army had acqu ired no experience with the comma nd and control of a mass army until World 

War I. Even in the Grea t War, the Second Army saw little action, a nd the First 

Army se rved for only three months be fore the armistice. Thus the Americans 

had lillI e time to adj ust, or eve n become accustomed, to an a rmy doctrin e borrowed substantially from the Allies. Determined at least to produce large numbers of competent staff office rs for the next war, the inte rwar Army devoted 

considerable time to higher-level command a nd staff methods in its educational 

system. Nevert he less, doctrine remained largel y theo ret ical, and officers acqu ired little pract ica l ex perience, especially since army-level staffs durin g the 

19205 and 1930s reprcscn ted little more th<ln paper orga niza ti ons. Alt hough 

the Army sc hool system belated ly tried to address the new c hall e nges and opportun ities offered by the rap id advances in mili tary tech no logy, Army doctrine remained close ly tied to the convent ions of World Wa r I. The successfu l 

organizations, procedurcs, and policies ultimiltely adopt cd by the Army in Worl d 

War 11 were the refore the imperfect product of war time ex peri ences. They varied greatly from thea ter to theater and continually evolved as the c ircumstances 

fa c ing each army chilngcd ove r the course of time. 
Notes 

I For Ihe development orlhe U.S. Army from the Rcvohl1ion through Ihe nineteenth cc nhlry, 

sec Ru ssell F. \Yeigley, /lis/Oly of the VI/ired SWles Army. 2e1 cd. (Bl oomington: Indinna 

University Press, 1984). For the development of stalTs in the U.S. Army, sec J. D. I-little, TIle 

Milil"ry Slaff: lIS His/OIY muf f)cl'CfOPIIIIJIII ( Harrisburg. 1':1.: Military Service Publish ing. 1949), 

pp. 149- 74. 

l John B. Wilson, "Army Readiness Planning. 1899- 1917:' MilifUlJ' Ren"ew 64 (July 1984): 

6 1- 65; Edgar F. Raines, Jr., "Major Gene ral J. Frankl in Bell and Milita ry Reform: The Chief of 

SlnrrYcars," 2 vo ls. (l'h.D. diss., Un iversi ty o(Wisconsin, 1976),2:549- 50; War Department. 

OtTice of Ihe Chief of Starr, Field Service Regllhlliolls. Unifl!fl SIMes AI'lI1y (Wnshington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Officc, 1910), p. 13. 

J Wnr DcpnrCmcnt , OlTice of the C hie f o f Sta ff, Field Sen'ice Reglila/ions: Unifetl Stales 

AI"III)' (Washingcon. D.C.: Government Princ ing OITice. 19 14). pp. 9- 10,117- 18; U.S. Army, 

Office of thc Chicf o f Staff. Field Sen'ice Regllfmiolls. Unitet/ SUlles Arm)' (Washingcon . D.C.: 

Government Printing Office. 1917). pp. 130- 3 1. 

• Hnrry P. Ihll, OIResl'ollsible Comlllt/lld: A HisIOIJ' oJthe u.s. Arlll)' War CQllege (Carlisle 

Barrnc ks, Pa.: Alumni Associncion, U.S. Army Wnr College [USAWC]. 1983), pp. 94, 10 I. 106, 

124. 139. 

S Marsha ll quot e from Fo rrest C. Pog ue. GeOl"1;c C. Mar.I·lIall: Tile Edll{:miOlI olrl Gel/eml 

(New York: Viking, 1963). p. 99. and see nlso pp. 94- 98.100- 101 , 107. 

• Timothy K. Nen ni nger, "Americnn Milicnry EfTeeCiveness in the First World War," in 

Militar)' E.ffectillelle.u. vol. I, Th e First fl orid /Vrll', cd. Allan R. MilieU and Williamson Murmy 

(Boston : Unwin 1·lymnn, 1988). p. 134. 

1 Mnrtin Vnn C reveld. COlllllltllld ill flhr (Cambridge: Harva rd University Press, 1985), pp. 

184- 88; MS, Timothy K. Nenninger, John J. Pershi ng nn d Command in the A me rican 

Expeditionary Forces, 19 17- 191 8, I). 2, nuchor's personal files (herea fkr eiCed ns DW 1·1). U.S. 

Army Center of Military History (CMH ), Wnshington, D.C. 

I Donnld Smythe. ~e,.shillg: Gel/em! oJlhe Armies (lJloomington: lndinna University Press, 

1986), pp . 8, 69- 72; Nenninger, "American Military EfTectiveness," p. 130: Hillie. The Mililtll")1 

SuifJ, p. 190; l. 13. Ho lley, Jr., Gel/emf Johll M. Palmel: Cili;:el/ Soldiers. tllUllhe Arm)' oJ 

IJelllocmc),. Contributions in Military History 28 (Westport. Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982). 

pp. 327, 336. 

• 1·litt lc, The MiIi/tlIJI SltifJ, pp. 188- 91: U.S. Army. Uniretl SImes Arlll)' ill Iile 1I'0I"it1 II"iIl: 

191 7- 1919, vol. I. OI"1;(miZalion oJ Ihe American £'Ipedilimwry Porces, 2d cd. (Wnshingto n, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Cent er of Military Il istory, 1988), pp. 55, 77- 79; John J. I'ershing, MJI 

Experiences ill Ihe World Wor, 2 'loIs. (New York : Frederic k A. Stokes Compa ny. 1931), I: 100-

101 : Smythe. Per.l·hing, p. 36: l'lolley, PI/fmer, pp. 301 - 02. 

I~ U.S. Army. First U.S. Army, Rel'm'l oJtlle First Arm)" Amel"ic(U1 E.I."Clliliol/f/lY Porces: 

OI"1;tllli;;(1/ioll tlml O,Jemliolls ( Fort Leavenwonh. Kans. : Geneml Service Schools Press, 1923), 

pp. I , 13; Pershi ng, My E.lperiellces ill tile II orM m".. 2: 175: U.S. Army. Army \\Inr College. 

Historical Section, The Gellesis oJ Ille Americml Firsl AI'my (Washi ngton, D.C.: Govc rnmcnt 

Pri nting OlTi ce, 1938). pp . 43. 52: Ed ward M. CotTman. The IV(//" To Eml All Wtlrs; 11Ie American 

Mililtll")' £xperiencI' ill World W(lr I ( New York : Oxford Universit y Press, 1968). PI). 262- 63, 

267- 68. 

II Gelle.~i$ oJlhe Firsl Arm)'. pp. 70- 73. 

Il Report oJllw First Army, pp. 4- 5: George C. Marshnll. Memoirs oJM)1 Service.f ill the 

m~rltl " hI' (Boston: Houghton Mimin. 1976). pp. 157. 186- 87. 

I) MS. Nenn inger. Jo hn J. Pershi ng, pp. 20, 24- 28; Arthur L. Wngne r. Orgtllli;:miOlI (///(/ 

Taclics, 71h cd. (Kansas City, Mo.: Frank lin lI udson. 1906), Ill'. 26 28, 197- 98; Coffman . The 

mil' To End All mll'S, pp. 264- 6 7. 

" !lolley, PI/fmer. p. 328: MS, Nenn inger. Jo hn J. Pe rshing, PI). 9, 28- 29, 39- 40: Nenninger. 

"'American Military EffCClivcncss," pp. 1]5 36; A linn R. Millett . T" (' Gell eml: Robel"! L. 8ull(lrd 

(llId Officcl"Ship il/ Ihe Vni/CII SI(l/es Army, 1881- 1925, Contributions in Milill1Ty Studies 10 
18 A COll/mal/d Pos, (If War 

(Westport, Conn.: Grccl\woollllrcss, 1975). pp. 400- 401. Sec !llso Edward M. ColTman. "The 

Amcriclln Military Generation Gal' in World War I: The LC:l\'Cll\\'orlh Clique in the AEF," in 

ComlllOlld til/{/ COII/IIIIII/(/ers ill Mode,." A/ilil(llT 11i.~/(}/J': Proceedil/gs oj 'he S('(:OIl(/ MiliulI')' 

!-lis/my Symposilllll, US Ai,. FOI"Ce Item/em),. 1- 3 May 1968. cd. William Geffen (Washington. 

D.C.: Office of Air Force lIistory, lIeadquarters. U.S. Air Force. and U.S. Air Force Academy. 

1971). PI'. 35- 41. 

's HellOl"I of rhe Fi"~'1 /lI"I/IY. PI'. 10-45: Marshnll. Meilloirs, PI). 126- 57; Pershing, My 

E.rpedellces ill Ihe 1I'0,.{(/ J!'al'. 2:285- 86: ColTman. Thc WI//' 1(1 flld AfllJ~/r.~. pp. 263- 72, 300-

304. 

' b Rel)f)I" ojlhe Firs/Arm)', PI}. 53- 54; Marshall, Memoirs, PI). 186. 189- 91; Hunter Liggell, 

AEF: Tell lew".!' Ago ill I';rmcc (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1928), 1)1), 2 16- 19: Nenninger, "American 

Military Effectiveness," I»)), 135- 40; MiliCI!. TI,e Gelleml. pp. 399-411: Coffman, Tire Ifi,,' Tt) 

£lId II" mil".!', )))).300- 303,330,348- 53; MS. Nenninger. John J. Pershing. pp. 9- 10. 34- 38: 

MS. Joseph W. A. Whilehorlle. The Inspectors Gcnenll of the Ullited States Army, 1900- 1939 

119931. eh. 6, p. 12, CMI I: Joseph T. Dickman, Tile Grefll Cn/Sll(lc: II N"I"Intil'e o/Ihe 11 0,.,(1 

11'111" (New York: Appleton, 1927). pp. 181 - 93, 285- 88. 

17 Jean R. Mocn!;, II In~lOr)' of COIIIII/(///(I tII/(1 COli/IV' of Army Forces ill Ihe COlllillellwl 

Ulliled Slates. 1919- /972 (Fort Monroe, Va.: Conti nental Army COlllmand, 1972), pp. 4. 9 10: 

"A S" lute to the Numbered U.S. Armies," Army Illforlllalioll Oigesl 17 (October 1962): 32- 39: 

War Department General Orders (GO) 50. 20 Aug 20. p. 2, Orgalliz:nional History Branch, 

CM H: Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry. Hiswry (If MilillllJI MolJili:mioll ill Ihe Ullill!d 

S/(IIl~S Arm)'. 1775- 1945 (Washington , D.C.: Department of the Army. 1955), I). 40 I; D. Clay tOil 

James, rile YeflrS 0/ ,\lucAn/wI'. 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton M i min, 1970), I :367- 68. 

I' Files on Board of Officers-Directi ng Head. and General Staff Organization·Connor 

(copy). in U.S. Army, American Expeditiona ry Forces. General lIeadquartcrs. Board of 

Officers: General Staff Organizations. box 2199, Record GroUI) (RG) 120, National Archives 

and Records Adminislration (NARA). Washington. D.C.; W:lr Department. Chief of Staff. 

Field Sen'ict' Regu/tlliolls. UllilCd Slt/les AI"II/)'. 1911 (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing 

Office. 1924); War Department Field Manual (FM) 10 1- 5. S/(fffOjJiccr.~ Fiehl Mali/wi. Ulli/c(1 

Stlltes Army, ch. I, "Starr I'rinci pl es and Functions" (W;lsh ington. D.C.: Government !'rint ing 

Office. 1928). 

19 W:tr Department, ,I Mal/ual for COIUII/{/lIdcl"s of Lorgc Ullil~' (Provisiollal). vol, I. 

01J/:m/iolls (Washington, D.C.: Governmcnt Printing Office. 1930); U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff School, Mall/llIl fiJI' Commtwdcl".I' of Lmge UllilS (TClltllli.-c), vol. 2, Olgallitali(1II 

(II1t1 Adll/illis/mlioll (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General Staff School Press, 1935): 

War Department FM 100- 5. Telllmil'e Field Ser",'ce R(:gufmiolls: Opem/iolls (Washington, D.C.: 

Go\'ernment Print ing Office. 1939). For more on tlte background to the 1939 field service 

regulations. sec William O. Odolll. "The Rise and Fall of U.S. Army Doctrine. 1918- 1939" 

(l)h.D. diss .. Ohio State University. 1995). 

It Timothy K. Nenninger. "Creati ng Officers: The Leavenworth Expericnce. 1920- 1940:' 

MilillllY Review 69 (November 1989): 59- 68; Timothy K. Nenninger. "Leavenworth and Its 

Cri tics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. 1920- 1940." )olll"l/al of Military 

Iliswl")158 (April 1994): 201 03. 226-3 1: Philip C. Cockrell, "Brown Shoes and Mortar Boards: 

U.S. Army Profcssional EduC;ltion ;[t the C0l11mand ;lI1d General Staff School, ForI Leavenworth. 

K<lnsas, 1919- 1940" (Ph.D. diss .• University of South Cnrolinn. 1991). I'p. 85- 86. 190- 91 . 

359- 60. 

l ' Oall, ofne~pollsibl(' COIIIII/(lIId. pp. 155. 17 1- 72. 179. 185, 195. 198- 99,212- 14.227. 

238. 

U "Open warfare" is from Smythe. PCI'SIIillg. p. 72. "Unit of direction" is from U.S. Army. 

General Service Schools. School of the Line. Gelleml TtIt:licall' lIIlcliollS 0/ LlI/ger UllilS (Fort 

Leavenworth. KaliS.: General Service Schools. 1922). p. 19. Last quote is from Piehl Sen'ice 

Reglll(l/ioll ~. 1923. p. I . 

II Quote from U.S. Army. Geneml Service Schools. GCI/eml Ttlcliclll FllnClions o/LtII"gcr 

UllilS, rev. cd. (Fort Leavenworth. Kans.: Command and Gencml StaffSchooll'ress. 1927). p. 

11 3. M(llI/wl fOl" COII/II/(li/(Icl"s vf /.al"ge Ullits. 1930. I: 15. 
rite A lIIericlIl/ A rilly /-Iellt/qlflll"lers, 1900- 1944 19 

1. Quote from Field Sen'ice R('gufa/ions, 1921, p. I. Mml/wf for COllllllamfel's of L(lI"ge 

V lli/.f, 1930. 1:1 5. 

I) Genl!ml Tat/ielll FIIIIC/iolls o/Large,' Ullits, 1922, p. 19; Mins, Military OrgllllizMion 

(MO) 9, Organization of Army Corps ~nd Field Armies. conferenec chaired by Maj C. L. 

Sampson, PI). 19 24, Command and General Stall School. 1924- 1925, U.S. Army Command 

and General StafT College Archi ves. Fort Leavcnworth, Kans.; General fllClietlf FIII/Clious of 

L" fgt'I'Vllits. 1927. p. 118: Notes. LI. Col. W. S. Grant. "The Army Commander; The Type 

Army:' lecturc delivered at thc U.S. Army War Collcgc. Washi ngton Barracks. 9 Feb 25. U.S. 

Army War College files, U.S. Army Military lIistory Institute (USAMI-II), Carlisle Barracks. 

I'a.: Field Sen'ice R('glll(/tiolll~. 1913. PI). I, 78; Malllwi/ol" Co",,,UlI/del".f 0/ Lmge Ull it.f. 1930, 

I: I 5- 17. 20: Mmlll,,1 fa,. ClJIlIIl/(/lIlle"l' of i.mge Ulli/s. 1935. 2:8- 13, 18. 43-45: Notes on 

Organiz'lIion, ill Infnntry Discussion. 1920, Organizationaillistory Branch. CM IL 

l . Quotc from neld Service Reg llflllifwS, 1913 , p. 4. Tellia/il'e neld Sen'ice llegufaliQlls: 

Opem/iolls. 1939, p. 33. 

:J FM 101 - 5, S/(tjJOffi"('l's FieM '\/mlll"l, 1928, p. 3. 

n neld Sen ';ce Regulmiolls. 1923, p. 5. 

~ Ibid .. pp. 4 5; FM 101 - 5. S/(IffOfficel's Fielt/ MtIII/ml, 1928. pp. 3. 8, 17; M(ll/Iwlfol' 

COIIIII/(//U/('I'S of La,.ge VlliiS. 1930, 1: I 5; Tell/a1il'e Fiel£l Sen 'ice R('glllaliolU: Of}{!raliolls. 

1939. pp. 33- 35; Cockrell. "Bro\\'n Shoes lind Mortar o~rds:' pp. 18 1- 82. 194 99: Ball. Of 

Respoll.l"ible CO/l//I/(II/d. pp. 17 1- 72, 179, 2 12- 13. 

) 0 Cockrell. "Bro\\'n Shoes and Mortar BO<lnls," p. 196; Pielll Service Regula/iolls. 1923, 

Pl'. 4. 79; I'M 101 5. Swf{OD1cers Field MlIlI/wl. 1928. PI'. 2. 5; MlIlI/wf/ol" COlllllllllulel':' of 

1.(11'1;1' Vllits, 1930, 1:5 6, IS; Tell/mi l'(' Fiefd Sc'n'ice Reglllm;olls: Opem/iolls. 1939, pp. 33-

37.56- 57. 

} I Quote from Tell/lI/h'e Fiel£l Senice Rl'glllllfiO/u': Opera/iolls, 1939. p. 34. Fieltl Sen'ice 

R('gllfmiolls. 1913, p. 79; FM 101 - 5. S/ftjJOfficl'l's Fiel£l MlIIllllIf. 1928. pp. 2. 5: Robcrt A. 

Dought y, The Seeds of Di.WI.y/er: The Del'elol'/11elll of Frellch AI'II/)' Ooc/r;lIe. 1919- 1939 

(Ilnmden. Conn .: Archon Books, 1985). pp. 83, 93.179. 

Jl Rpt , Duties ofG- 1 of Armies. Group of Armies, and GIIQ. supp!. 2. p. I. Rpt of 

COlllmittee II. G- I Course 21, 23 Dce 24, Army War Collegc filc s, USAMHI. 

II Geneml 7(,ctk"lIf F/Illclial/s of LCI/ger Unils, 1922, p. 48 : M(lIII/(lI/or COIIIIII{/lulers 0/ 

I.arge llit~·. 1930. pp. 16- 17: Rpts and lecturcs. in Army WarCollegc fil es, USAM HI: Notcs. 

"0 3. Theatcr ofOpcrations," 1934 Army War Collegc Iccturcs. box 3, Courtncy H. lIodgcs 

I'npers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Librnry, Abiicne, Knns.; Tell/atil'e Field Sc'n'ice 

Regl/llI/iolls: Opcl1lliollS, 1939, p. 36: Coc krell, "Brown Shoes and Mortar BOMcls," pp. 199-

202. 

l' Tablc ofOrgnnization (TO) 202- W, 111"111)' HemllfllllrlCrs. Field Arm)" War DcpHtment, I 

July 1929, and TO 202- I- W, Ar/l/y Ilcadql/al'/el's. Field Ar/l/)' (II/ilial O"gC/l/;zMiol/), WM 

Dcp:lrtment. I October 1929, both in Organizational History Branch. CM H: Moenk. Cmlllllfllld 

mill COlllml, p. 10. 

I) Mocnk. COII/II/ulld (/Illf COII/IVI. PI'. II IS; Kcnt R. Green field. Robert R. Palmer, and 

Bell L Wiley, The O'gal/izmioll of GIVIIIIlI COII/b(u Troops, U.S. Army in World War II 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 1·listory, 1947). pp. 6- 9 . 

.. Jean R. Moenk, A lIil'/ory of Lurge-SClIfe Arll/)' Mlilw /II'e/"s ;11 Ihe Ull i/ed Sfllle.f. 1935-

1964 (Fort Monroe, Vn .: Continental Army Command, 1969),1)1>.23- 26. 

11 Christol)her R. Gabel, "The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuve rs of 1941 " (Ph.D. diss. , Ohio 

Statc University, 1981). PI'. 76- 77, 152- 53,206: Bclil. Wiley and William 1'. Govan, Hi.VIOI)' (if 

/lte Secom/ Army, St udy 16 (Washington. D.C.: Ilistorical Scction, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 

pp. 23- 29; Frnncis G. Smith. HislOryoflhe TIIiI7IA,.,,,y, Study 17 (Washington, D.C.: Il istorica l 

Section. Army Ground Forccs, 1946),1)1'. 15- 23: Rpts. Commcnts on First Phase- First Army 

vs IV Army Corps Mancuvcrs. 1941. 1941 - 1944 Subjcct fil c. Critiquc Carolina Mancuvcrs, 1st 

and 2d Phascs (Nov. 1941 ), bo)( 3, '·Iodges Papers, Eisenhower Library, and Comments on First 

Army Versus IV Army Corps Mancuvefl;, November 16- 30. 1941, Gf IQ Gene ral Correspondcnce, 

1940- 1942,354.2 (First Army), RG 337, NARA. 

JI Moenk. A Hi.I·IVI)' of Large-Scllfe ArlllY k/(III('UI'ers ill Ille Vlli/efl SlmeN. PI). 72, 78. 
20 A Command Post (If War 

"Type army" is discussed in Greenfield. Palmer, and Witey. The O'"g(//Ii;mioll o/Groll/ld Commll 

T,.oops. p. 279. and sec also pp. 280. 352 65. Nenni nger, "ercaring Officers," p. 67; Bnlt. OJ 

Re,rpol/sible COII/Illa/It/.p. 257. 

-" Quole from Wnr Department FM 100- 15, Field Sen'le/! Regulatiolls: Lorge/' VllilS 

(Washi ngton . D.C.: Government Printing OlTice, 1942), p. 5 1, and sec also pp. 33- 34, 52- 58 . 

.IQ War Department FM 101 - 5, Slaff OJ)1cel's Field Mali/wI: The S/(iff (/1/(/ Comb(ll Onkrs 

(WnshiligtOIl. D.C.: Government ')ri nting OlTice, 1940). JlJl . 1- 5. 16- 17. 3 1- 32 . 

.. RPI, U.S. Army. ETO, GcncrnJ J3 oard, Study or AdllliniSlralivc Fune1ions of Ihe Army 

Group I-Icadqu:lncrs. SHldy 29. pp. 1- 7. CM H Library: Wnr Dcp'II'[I11CIlI FM 100- 10, I'Idd 

Se/'vic(' HeglilMiolls: Ildmillislralil)11 (Washington. D.C.: Govern me nt rrinting Office, 1940), 

pp, 47- 56, 59- 61; War Department FM 100- 10. Fiehl SI'/"\'icl' Rl'glllflliolls: Adlllilli.t/raliu/l 

(W:lshi ngton, D.C.: War Department, 1943). pp. 59- 7 1. 

'I War Department FM 100- 20. COlllmand wltl Empfo)'illcill of Air Power (Washington, 

D,C,: Go\'crmuellt Print illg Office. 1943), pp. 1- 2: TO 200- 1. Ilcadqllllriers. Hefll Arm)" War 

Departnlent. I Ja nuary 1941, Training a nd Doctrille Comlliand Archives, Fort Monroe. Va.: TO 

200- 1. lIellllqllllr,crs. AI"III)'. War I)epartrllent, I July 1942, Organizational History Branch. 

CM H. 

~J I' M 100- 15, Field SI~/"\'ice Regllimiolls: Lmger Ullil.~'. 1942. PI}. 33-34, 51 - 58: War 

Department I'M 100- 5. Fiefd Sen'ice Regll/(llion.r: Opera/iollS (Washington, D.C.: Government 

Pri nting Office. 1941 ). pp . 102- 09, 120, 135; Rpl. Organiz:ltion of Large Units, supp!. 3, The 

Org:lIlization of the Army :lIld the Group of Armies. Rpt of Commi ttee 4. 9 Oct 39. Army Wnr 

Co llege file s. USAM HI. 

.4 Coc kre ll , "Brown Shoes and Mortar Boards," p. 355: Charles S. D'Orsa, "The Trials llild 

Tribul1llions o f an Army 0 - 4." Militt/I)' Relliew 25 (J uly 1945): 24- 21: Robert J. Wood. "The 

Fifth Army Learned !" Milillll)' Relliell' 24 (October 1944): 45- 48; Walter Krueger. FI'OIII /)011'11 

Umlerlo Nippon: The SI(JI), ofSi.\·II,/]I"IIIJ' ill 1V0rid Jl'i"lr II (WashinglOn. D.C.: Combat Forces 

I'ress, 1953), pp. 8- 15, 39-41; Inten', Lt Col Dan H. Ralls. USAWC. with Genera l George II. 

Decker. USA (Ret.), 9 Nov 12, sec. 2, pp. 13- 19,27- ]0, Senior OlTieers Debriefing I' rogram. 

USAM HI. 

., Mark W. Clark, C(I/culolell Ri.~k (New Yo rk: Ha rper. 1950), I'll . 160, 185- 86; D'Orsa, 

"Army G-4," pp. 24- 28: Wood, "The Fifth Army Learned!" PI}. 45-48: Marti n I3l umenson, cd .. 

TIll! POIIOII Popel's. 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mimin. 1974), 2:281: Carlo D' [ ste, /Jiller l'icIOIJ': 

The /JollIe for Sicily, 1943 (New York: E. I'. DuH oll . 1988). p. 155; Krueger, Frolll 0011'1/ VI/de/' 

10 Nippoll. PI). 8- 10: Int erv. Lt Co l L. G, Smith and Lt Col M. O. Swindl er wi th General Clyde 

D. Eddleman. USA (Rel.). 28 Jan 75, sec. 2, p. 23. Senior Officers Debrie fin g Program. 

USAM HI . 

... Cockre ll. "Brown Shoes and Mort ar Boards," p. 328; Krueger. F,.o/ll Dowi/ UII(/('r 10 

Nil'llOll, pp. 10.39-41; D'Orsa, "Army G-4," pp. 2]- 21: Wood. "The Fifth Army Learned!" Ill'. 

45- 48: Rpts, U.S. Army, Fifth U.S. Army. Fifth Army Ilisto ry (rel>O rt of Fi fth Army's operations 

in North Africa and Italy). 9 vols .. 8:53- 54, and U.S. Army. Se\'cnth U.S. ArIllY. Report of 

Operations of the United States Sevent h Army in the Sicil i.Ul Campaign. 10 J uly- I? August 

1943, I Oct 43, pp. a-12. e-2. e-5-c-1, A-I. both in CM H Libra ry. 

47 Krueger, FrulI/ /)011'11 UmlerlO NippOlI , pp. 12- 15, ]9: Interv. Ralls with Decker, 9 Nov 

12. sec, 2. PIl , 13- 17.25- 30, 

., Oscar W. Koc h with Robert G, Hays, G- 2 1Il1elligellcefo/" 1'011011 (Philadelphia: Whitmore. 

1911), pp. 2.26: D'Es1e, Biller Vil:IOIJ'. pp. 122,416- 17, 48 3; Nige l Hamilton. MU,I'lero/llle 

Buo/efield: MOlllys WI/r )('ors. 1'i42- /944 (New York : McGraw Hill . 1983 ), pp. 30 1,336- ]7. 

351, 

., Wood. "The Fift h Army Learned!" p. 48; Questionn'lire, prepared by Th ird Army staff 

and completed by Fifth Army staff. 1943 Report o f Visit to Nort h A frican Theater of Operations 

(Oct 28- No\' 23). bOle 6. l'lodges Parlers. Eisenhower Library: Rpts, First Army Obser\'ers, 

Reports. Operation, 1943- 1945 through Report ofObscrvatioli. Fifth Army, in box 1, U.S, Army. 

Ileadquarters, First U.S. Army, Assistant Chie f of Staff. G- 3, Reports ofObSCfvation. RG 3]8. 

Washington National Records Center (WNRC). Suit land, Md. 
2 

Beginnings at Bristol 

After Pearl Harbor brought the Unit ed St ales inlo World War II , American 

strat egists pressed for a cross-Channe l in vasion of the German-he ld COIlti nent as the surest, most direct pat h to victory. Despite British misgivings about 

launchin g suc h an ,llll bitious cnorl before other opcmlions had weake ned Gcrman power, the Allies form ed a combined staffundcr British LI. Ge n. Frede ric k 

E. Morgan in Ap ril 194310 prepare an outline plan for the assault. This group, 

dubbed the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COS SAC), exami ned prospecti ve landing beaches a nd prepared plans and est imates of th e 

required resou rces, notably landing craft. In August at Quebec the Combined 

Chi efs of Staff- the Anglo-American committ ee o r service chiefs who conducted the war under the supervision or President Franklin D. Rooseve lt and 

Prime Minister Winston S. Churc hill- approved COSSAC's preliminary plan 

ror two British di visions to land nca r Caen while an Ame ri can division came 

as hore rarth er west. Building ils strength 10 eighteen di visions by th e rourteenth day or th e invllsion, this roree would est<lblish II lodgment roughl y between the Seine and Loire Ri vers and reorga ni ze and acc umulate supplies ror a 

dri ve east across the Se ine. COS SAC had served ils pur pose. The corps, armi es, 

army groups, <lnd supreme headqua rters or the inva sion rorce ilsel r would draw 

up the more deta il ed pl<lllS ror OVEKLORO, the invasion or northwest Europe 

sc hedu led ror 1944. 1 

Althollgh by July 1943 the British had activa ted two army and one army 

group headquarters ror the invasion, the Ameri cans did not move to rorm parallel comma nds until late August. Responsibility for this task rested with the 

European Theater orOperations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), the headq uarters whi ch 

had exe rcised planning and ope rat ional control over Ame rican rorees in northwest Europe and logistical and administrative authorit y ove r Army elements 

the re sin ce mi d-1942. As early as th e spring of 1943 the ETOUSA commander, 

LL Gen. Frank M. Andrews, had recOlllmended est ablishment of an army headqua rte rs, and aft er Andrews' death in a plane crash in May, his successor, LI. 

Gen. Jacob L. Devers, a lso ca lled ror sllc h an organ ization. Both proposals 

made lill ie headway, largely beca use or a dispute with in the coa litio n over COIllIlland or the invasion. The small size or the assault rorce- three div isio nswou ld normally have called ror a co rps headquart ers. Give n th e interservice 

and inter-Allied considerations in vo lved in the assa ul t, however, COS SAC 
22 

wanted an army to direct the opera· 

lion. Partl y out o f concern for the rea l 

problems of mergi ng IwO national ities unde r one comm,l1ld and partly 

from longsta nding opposition to 

Americans going int o battl c unde r 

what would probabl y be a Bri tis h 

army headquarters, Devers suggested 

that an American and a British corps 

co nduct th e assa ult under th e direct 

control of the supreme comma nder. 

AI Quebec in mid-August All ied leade rs agreed in princ ipl e on COSSAC's 

a pproac h, but th e de ta ils remained 

un se ttl ed. In the interim, the Wa r 

Department decided to form in Britain the Ameri can army starr that became the First U.S. Arrny,2 

On 3 September Lt. Gell. Omar 

N. Bradley, commande r of the U.S. II 

Corps in Sic ily, reported to the forwa rd command post of Alli ed Forcc 

Headquart ers in Catani a, wherc he 

II Commalld POSI (II IYtH' 

Gel/eml8nulley. left, lIlItl Gelleral Del'ers 

lea rned of his appo in tment to lead the First Army. Qu iet, modest, a nd rat her 

home ly in his plain olive-drab un iform and glasscs, the fifty-yea r-old Missollrian had the look of a country schoolteache r, an appea rance that be lied his 

success in commanding a combat corps in No rt h Afri ca and Sicily.] A ca rc ful , 

thorough tacti cian, his plans reflected th e strong innuence of the Infantry School 

and th e hi gher-lcvc l cduca ti onal inst itutions o f the int erwa r Army and would 

lat er be c riti cized, pa rticularly by armor offi ce rs, fo r lacking boldness and imagina ti on. Neve rthclcss, fcw co uld de ny th e stron g character, keen se nse for 

terrain, aptitude for numbers and logistics, apprceiation of intelligcnce, a nd 

fce ling for the enlisted soldier that led his West Point classmate, General Dwight 

D. Eise nhower, to desc ribe him as "about the best rounded, well balanced, senior o fficer that we have in the se ce."~ Cal m, even in a crisis, Bradley proj ected an air of sercne confidence a nd common se nse that reassured superiors 

and subordinates a li ke .

5 

In his command style, Bradley provi ded a father fig ure: warm, understa nding, considerate, but leaving no doubt who wa s in charge. He pre fe rred dealin g 

pcrso na lly with subord inates, keeping in freq uent tOllch with his commanders 

by phone or personal visits, and usi ng large dai ly meetings to layout concisely 

his decisions and plans to his staff.!> He left the staff to work out technical and 

administrative de ta ils but kept c lose watch ove r ope rations, onen conductin g 

his own planning and estimates. As he late r explai ned, "G- 2 existed to te ll me 

what shou ld be done on the basis of his information concern ing the enemy. G4 was to te ll me what co uld be done in view of our limit ations on supply, Then 
Begillnings (If Bristol 23 

once I made my dec ision, G- 3 was to do it." At times, he became bogged down 

in detail. Ever the infantry battalion commander, his fascination wit h small· 

unit tactics imprcssed subo rdinates like Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin but often 

involved him in issues more suitabl y handl ed by lower echelons. He did, how· 

ever, permit subord ina tes su bsta ntial discret ion. As commander o f the II Corps, 

he issued only about twenty forma l directives for the entire campaign in Tuni· 

sia , and when he did issue an order, he generally confined hi11lselfto one·page 

overlays that spec ified objectives and unit bounda ries. 7 As long as a subordi· 

nate performed well, Bradl ey usually left him alone, but he did not hesitate to 

interfere with or re li eve an individual who failed to meet expectations. Behind 

th e genial exte ri or lay a cool professionalism and toughness forged in Tunisia 

and Sicil y.s 

Bradley brought with him to England about thirty seasoned officers from 

his II Co rps sta ff in the Mediterran ean. That autumn, few hi gh· level Ameri can 

st aITs co uld match the combat experience of these veterans. This group had 

originally deployed to Great Britain in June 1942 und er Maj. Gen. Ma rk W. 

Clark, who, as the corps commander at the time, had taken pains to ensure that 

his sta ff consisted of yo unger, and presumably more energe ti c, st aIT officers. 

[n Britain, they partic ipated in early pl anning for the cross·Channei invasion 

before their reassignment to TORCll, the inva sion of French Northwest Africa. 9 

Under Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, who had returned to the command of the 

II Co rps after Clark's se lection as deputy commande r of th e invasion force , the 

staff conducted th e TORCII landings in November with energy and determina· 

tion, but this success inspi red overconfidence. 

The batt le of Kasserine Pass gave a rude awakening to the I I Corps staff. To 

be sure, many factors, incl uding long lines of communicat ions and a poor road 

and railroad network, lay outside its co ntrol. Neverth eless, Fredendall and his 

headquarters dcsel've crit ic ism ror scattering thei r units among too many dif· 

ferent missions, for tol erating confused lines of command, for contributing to 

cool relations with allies, for establish ing an often haphaza rd supply system, 

fo r neglecting co ntin gency plan ning, and for issuing orders that invaded the 

proper sphe res of subordinat es. Fredellda ll himself rarely left his command 

post to visit units, quarreled with superiors and jun iors alike , and traumatized 

his young stafr. To outside observers, the II Corps headquarte rs seemed alter· 

nately aloof and harassed, unaware of events at the front, and bungling in its 

response to the Ge rman thrust. 'o 

It took the leadershi p of Patton and Bradley, then both major generals, to 

bring the II Corps out of the doldrums. Temporarily transfcrred from the [ AI'· 

mored Corps to replace Fredendatl, Patton quickly caught the staff's attention 

with his orders to close the breakfast mess at 0730, as we ll as his tighter unifo rm regu lati ons. At fi rst, the new commander thought littl e of the statT, sta ting that "with few exceptions, his [Fredendall's] staIT was wort hless due to 

youth and lack of leadership." But he soon cha nged his mind as he observed 

some of his more able statT officers, notably the G- 2, Col. Benjamin A. " Monk" 

Di ckson; the G-4, Col. Robe rt W. Wilson; the artillery officer, Col. Charlcs E. 

" Eddi e the Cannon" I-Ian; and the corps q uartermaster, Co l. And rew T. 
24 

McNamara. In the month and a half that 

Patlon led the II Corps, he replaced 

only the chief ofstafT, who had already 

departed with Frcdendall, and the G3 among the main stafTc hi efs." 

Bradley likewise made changes 

when he succeeded Patton, now a 

lieutenant general , in mid-April 1943 

upon Ihe Ialler's return to the J Armored Corps to begin planning for 

the inva sion of Sicily. The new commander brought in Col. Will iam 8. 

Kenn as his ch ief of staff, reduced the 

size of his forward eche lon, opened 

his command meetings to more statT 

officers, and demanded the kind of 

careful , method ica l staff work for 

wh ic h the II Corps staff would latcr 

be known. [n ils difficult shift across 

British lines of communications to 

the northern front in Tunisia, in the 

rinal assault on Bi zerte, and in the 

invasion of Sic ily, the staff showed a 

new co nfide nce and an ability to 

A COIIIII/and Pasl al War 

General PlIIfOIl 

([945 pholo) 

learn from its early mistakes. As a staff for a reinforced corps, responsible for 

administ ration and supply as well as planning for two amphibious operations, 

II Co rps officers acq ui red experience and a mutual trust that would serve them 

well in their future role with the First Army. 

Even while gaining invaluable experience, however, the II Co rps staff also 

acquired resentments that wou ld linger for some time. Although the staff established warm relations with individual British officers, it bridled at the co ndescending views of others, es pecially the "so-ca ll ed observers" who seemed 

10 be everywhere after Ka sserine. No r did the staff's Anglophobi a improve in 

Sicil y, where the II Corps headquarte rs o ft en clashed over boundaries with its 

counterpart at the British Eighth Army. In his tent, Bradley, now a lieutenant 

general, displayed a map of Sici ly that contrasted the relat ively meager gains 

of the Eighth Army in red wit h Ihe huge blue areas taken by Patlan 's Seventh. 

Patton himself became the ta rget of much rancor. Whether due to the staff's 

rcaction to his tough measures after Kasserine or to Bradley's instinctive disl ike 

for Pattoll 's style, the I [ Corps headquarters viewed the Seventh Army cOlTImander 

as a boorish, overbearing adolesccn t whose vu lgarity, showmanship, inattention 

to detail, and lendency to jump the chain of command were inappropriate in a 

high-leve l commander. The [[ Corps comma nder and staff did not have a much 

higher regard for Patton 's statT, "Ihat great sil ence we ca ll Army," whi ch they 

accused of neglecting su pply and communi cations with forward units. [n Sicily, 

Bradley said, "we learned how not to behave from Patton's Seventh Army."'2 
Begillllillgs at Bristol 25 

From Sici ly, the II Corps personnel se lected by Bradley and Kea n journeyed in early October 1943 to England, where they were joined by another 

group from the former First Army headquarters at Governor's Island, New York. 

[n the hope that he would take the headquarters ove rseas, General Drum had 

taken great care in assemblin g his staff. As Dickson, the new army G- 2, wryly 

noted, " I fhe [Drum] wanted a stenographer, he took a court stenographer. Where 

hc wan ted a draftsman, he acqu ired an architect. No sultan ever chose brides 

for his harem as carefully as Drum pi cked out his officers." According to BradleY, lhe Gove rnor's Island contin ge nt had ex pecled to remain intact for the campaign in Europe and were crestfa llen to learn that he was bringi ng personnel 

from his former corps. in cluding his chief of statT, three of his four general 

starT chiefs, and nine of the eighteen heads of special staff sections. By necessit y, the two groups accommodatcd each other, but somc tensions that appeared 

later co uld be traced to these ea rly di visions. In the end, of the 361 officers on 

the st<l ffin June 1944,38 eame from the II Corps sta ff in Sicily, 37 came from 

Drum 's st<lff on Gove rnor's Island, 100 joi ned the Gove rnor's Island contingent 

just prior to its depart ure for Europe, and 186 joined in Britain. LI 

Reflectin g Bradley's own background and prefcrence, the First Army sta fT 

was dominated by Regula r infantrymen. Although the vast majority- over two 

hund red fifty- of the headq uarters' staff officers at the time of the invasion of 

Europe came from the Organized Reserves or National Guard, the 56 Regula rs 

held the key positions, including the chief of sta ff, depu ty chiefs, G- I, and G- 3. 

On the spec ial staff, only the ordnance officer, the headquarters comma ndant, 

and th e chiefofl he publicity and psychological warfare section were reservists. 

Compared 10 the Army as a whole, the percentage of infa ntry officers, and indeed of combat officers gcnerally. was higher. The Fi rst Army headq uarters drew 

approximately 24 perccnl of its offi ce rs from the Infantry Branch, 12 percent 

from the Field Artillery, and 4 percent from the Cava lry, whi le the Army as a 

whole had an officer corps of about 12 percent Infantry, 5 percent Field Artillery, 

and I percent Cavalry as of 30 June 1944. Infantrymen clea rly enjoyed the Illost 

influence in the headquarters. Of the eighty-seven inf<lnlry officers on the staff 

at the time of D-Day, thirty-two served in the ge neral staff and the all-important 

command group, whi ch consisted of the commander and dcputy commander, 

chief of staff, his deputies, and th eir aides. Six orthe infa ntrymen in the general 

sta ff served in the critical G- 3 section. Infan trymen held the posts of deputy 

commander, chi ef ofslarT, G- I, and G- 3. Field artil lerymen held forty-four slots 

ovc rall and fifteen positions in the command group and general staff, notably the 

G-4 and th e execlltive officer of the G- 3 section. The Corps of Engineers and 

Quartermaster Corps furnished sixty-two officers between them, but only a handful served on the command group and general staff. By contrast, the Cavalry, 

which included Armor, suppli ed only fourteen officers on the entire staff. When 

Ihe First Army hit the beaches on D-Day, infantrymen would be runn ing the show 

at the First Army headquarters,, 4 

Of the First Army statT section ch iefs in June 1944, mOSI had attended at 

least one of the Army's upper-level schools. The command in g general , deputy 

commander, chie f of statT, deput y chief of staff for adm inistration, G- J, army 
26 A COlllmand Post (1/ !¥tn" 

surgeon, inspector general, and armored, amphibious, and chemical officers 

had all gone through the prewar Command and General Staff School. Many 

othe r sectio n heads, in c luding the deputy chie f of staff for operations, G- 2, 

G- 3, G- 4, adjutant general, and an tiaircraft, artill e ry, signa l, and special 

service officers, had attended the ten-week staff cou rse established by the Command and General SlaffSchool in 1940 to turn out large numbers of staff officers in a limited time. Only a handful of office rs, including the commander and 

deputy commander, the deputy chie f of siaff for administration, and the amphibious and chemica l officers, had attended the Army War College. In the 

First Army headquarters, as in so many othe r American command echelons, 

the Command and General Staff School would havc a major innuence on how 

st aff officers cond ucted business. IS 

On 20 October 1943 , the Fi rst Army headq uarters officially opencd its command post in the west England commercial town of Bristol and assumed the 

responsibility fo r administration and training of a ll American troops in the 

United Kingdom. 16 For lodgings, the staff took over the V Corps' qua rters at 

Clifton Coll ege, where an imposing stone wall enclosed a camp us of old, Gothic 

buildings, we ll-trimmed lawns, and cricket fields. The main building, a threestory edifice, housed the staff sec tions, whil e officers stayed in the masters' 

houses lining the centra l fi eld and the enlisted men bunked in the field house 

at the lower end of the campus. Bradley and his section chie fs stayed at a residence a mile fro m the coll egc. At the college chapel. the Fi rst Army's commander we lcomed the new arri va ls, spoke brieny of the task ahead. directed 

them to show all due courtesy to their British hosts, and warned that those who 

presented disc iplinary problems would soon find themselves in a front line llllil. 

Having received their leader's benediction, the assembled staff turned to the 

dauntin g enterprise before them. l? 

The initial step, organization of the headquarters, presen ted a major tas k. 

In this, the First Army leaders followed the general lines o f the staff officers 

field manual and the July 1942 version of Table of Organ ization (TO) 200- 1, 

wh ich called for an army headquarters of228 office rs, 23 warrant officers, and 

508 cn listed men. (See Appelldix A.) This table had been prepared by Army 

Ground Forces without the benefit ofreccnt field experience and thus requ ired 

some revision. Thc First Army organizational ordcrs of 23 October 1943 provided a chie f of staff, two deputy ch iefs, a secre tary of the gencral staff, foUl' 

gcnera l staff section chiefs, and fourteen special staff section heads. The spec ial staff included an adjutant genera l, antiaircraft officer, artillery officcr, 

cha pl ain, chemical officer, e ngineer officer, finance offi cer, inspector general, 

judge advocate gcneral, ordnance officer, quartermaster, signal officer, special 

scrvice officer, and surgeon. FOLir olher office rs were not provided by the table 

but received slots on thc spccia l sta ff: a hcadqua rters commandant, a provost 

marshal, a civil affairs officer, and an accommodations office r. The in clusion 

of a civil affairs officer followed Allied policy of integrating civil affairs functions into field staffs, while another addition, the accommodations officer, had 

the task of helping British offic ials and theater headquarters billet the Ameri -

can troops nooding into Bri tain by the autUllln of 1943. 18 
Beginllings af BriSfol 27 

Cliftoll College 

Following doctri ne, the First Army moved to centrali ze logistical and 

administrative func tio ns and thereby free su bordina te corps headquarters to 

fOCllS on the ir tac tical combat role . According to 11 sta ff memorandum of 23 

October, the army headquarters, both before and aner the invasion of the Conti nent, would deal directly with the combat divisions on routine matters such as 

the circulation of all regu lations and the submission of all reports. To reduce 

the areas that they would have to administer, the corps wou ld keep their rear 

boundari es as close as possible to the rear boundaries of their divisions. Such 

procedures would relieve the corps of ma ny onerous responsibilities, but the 

re su lt ing flow of admi nistra tive detail into the First Army headquarters was 

massive. As a result, the First Army's leaders eventually adopted command practices and st andard operat ing procedures that allowed staff sections to handl e 

the bulk of the army's administrative rcquiremcnts without re ference to the 

general staff chiefs. the chief of sta tT, or the commander. Seve ra l months of 

field operations were neccssary before the headquarters could clearly define 

the li ne between army-Icvel tasks and those of the theater su pply services or 

find the right balance between maintaining the commandcr's authority and 

delega ting to the sta tT enough tasks to free the commander to focus on key 

issues. 'Q 

Along with organization and procedures, personalities would great ly influence the ope rati ons of th e First Army staff. 20 Of the command group, 

Brad ley's old friend and deputy commander, Lt. Gen. Courtney H. l'lodges, 

did not leave his prior position with the Third Army in Te xas unti l late Jan ll-
28 A COlIIlII(llld Post (1/ IVor 

Gel/eraf Kellll Col. Ch(lrles F Williams 

ary and did not report to Bristol un til the end of February.21 For the immediat e fut ure, Hodges' absence woul d nO I matte r muc h. T he de puty comma nde r's 

sial, not even listed on Ihe Army's organiza tional wblcs for an a rmy headquarters, bo re a rat her supe rnumerary characte r, possessing only those dut ies 

tha t th e comma nde r c hose to give it. Once Hodges Illoved up to the command 

of the First Army upon Brad ley's e levat ion to the command or an army g roup, 

the position of de puty commander wou ld disappea r, and th e First Army c hie f 

ofslaffwQuld, in effec t, perfo rm the role, a lt houg h, a s a staff officer, he d id 

no t formally have the powe r to command except when delegat ed by the comma nd er to act in his name. Th us, the ch ief of staff wou ld occupy a domi na nt 

position in the First Army hi e rarchy.22 

Bradley's command group offered a mix of II Corps ve te ran s and new arrivals fro m the United States, with the veterans ho ldi ng the positions of real 

power. For his c hief of staff, Bradley turn ed to Brig. Gen. Wi lli am B. Kea n, a 

stocky, ro und-faced, 46-yea r-old West Pointer with no combat ex pe rience as a 

line ofTi cc r, but an ex tensive backgro und commandin g troops at va rious posts 

in the interwar Army. Kean had a q uick, inc isive mind ,md stern , no-nonsense 

manner. As e hie f of starr of the II Co rps, he had established a reputation as 

both an efficient admi nistrator and rut hless taskmaster; from rue fu l subo rdinates, he would earn the nickname of "Capta in Bligh."H Under his di rect supervision were a sec reta ry of th e ge nera l staff- who routed and fo ll owed up o n 

commu nicat ions, directives, and st aff pa pers- and two deputy chiefs of staff. 

(Chari 2) The deputy chief of staff for administra ti on was a bespectacled Regula r 

engineer named Col. Charles F. Wi ll iams. He supervised and coordina ted th e 
Beginnings (II Brisfol 29 

Colollel Myers Colollel 0 '!-Iare 

work o r the inspector ge neral, judge advocate ge neral, special Iroops, and, 

through the 0 - 1 section, the adjutant ge nera l, spec ial se rvice officer, chap lain, 

and, cxccpt in procurcmcnt cases, th e rinance office r. The othcr sections rcportcd dircctl y or through thc G- 2, G- 3, and 0 - 4 sections to th e deputy chier 

or sta ff ror opera tions, the 38-year-old Col. Samucl L. Myers, a cava lryman 

who had held thc samc post on the II Corps staff. For their personal staff, Bradley, 1·lodges, and Kean cou ld call on seve ral abl e aides, most notably Cap\. 

Chester B. Hansen for Bradley, Maj . William C. Sylvan for 1·lodges, and WOJG 

Dempsey Allphin ror Kean.N 

The four general stafT secti ons constitut cd the coll ective brai n of the staff. 

They assisted the com mandcr, aelcd liS his agcnts in coordinllt in g the agenc ies 

undcr th eir supe rvision, prepared detailcd instructi ons to impl cmcnt his pl ans, 

and thcn supcrviscd thcir exceution. Of lhe general stafT sections, the G- I seclion formulated and supervised administration or policies regarding individual 

personnel, rep lacements, and prisone rs of war. In the course of the campaign, 

Ihe section handl ed such issues as officer promotions and rec lassifi ca tions, 

replacements, leave and recrelltional se rvices, and decora ti ons. It also coordinated the work of the spec ial seclions on such issues as graves registrat ion, 

posl<11 services, disc ipl inary act ions, and cncmy wa r cri mes.!S A small sect ion, 

it contained tcn officers, mostly reservists and National Guardsmen, at the time 

or D-Day. 1·lcadin g the sec tion was Col. Joseph J. "Red" O'Ha re, the on ly general staffscction chie rwho had not previously se rved with the II Corps. A big, 

hard-drinki ng, namboyant Irishman with a fiery temper, Red O' Hare supposedly remarked, " People expect G- I to be a sonll vabi tch, and I'm just the guy to 
CHART 2-HEADQUARTERS. FIRST U.S. ARMY. CHIEF OF STAfF SECTION. FUNCTIONS, 21 APRIL 1944 

CHIEF OF STAFF (CIS) 

Brig. Gen. W. B. Kean 

I 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (DClS) FOR ADMIN 

Col. C. F. Williams 

I. To degree delegated by CIS. general supervision and 

coordination of activities of: 

0- / 

AO 

Spec Svc Ofcr 

Red Cross 

Chaplain 

(Provo Marshal- POWs)' 

Direct 

10 

JA 

co. Spec Troops 

Finance (less procurement of funds)' 

2. Supervision of all miscellaneous items of 

adminiSlration. 

3. Member of Awards and Promotion Board. 

4. lnlerview \'lsitors whose business does not require 

decisions of Commanding General (CG) or CIS. 

l 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPNS 

Col. S. L. Myers 

1. To degree delegated by CIS. general supervision and 

coordination of activities of: 

0 - 2 

Air Intel 

(Publicity & 

Psych War)' 

(Engrs)' 

(Signal)' 

0- 3 

AA 

Arty 

Air Liaison 

(Engrs)' 

Signal 

CWS 

Armd 

(Provo 

Marshal)' 

0-' 

0" OM 

Med 

Engrs 

(Signal)' 

(CWS)' 

Direct 

Provo Marshal 

Civ Affairs 

I-lQ Comdt 

Publicity & Psych War 

Ground Liaison 

Finance 

(procurement)' 

(Provo Marshal)' 

2. Supervision of miscellaneous items of operational 

nalure. 

3. Selection of command posts. 

4. Member of Awards and Promotion Board. 
SECRETARY GENERAL STAFF 

Maj. E. F. Pegram 

1. Supervises operations of Headquarters Liaison Section. 

2. Coordinates correspondence involving more than one section. 

3. Receives and properly distributes all communications for CG. CIS. and DC/S. 

4. Maintains office of temporary record for eG. C/S. and DC/S. 

5. Establishes "follow-up" system to ensure prompt action on and return of papers. 

6. Receives all visiting officials. 

7. Collects statistical data for CG. CIS, and Dc/S. 

8. Supervises movement of section. 

9. Responsible for organizing the clerical stafTand the supervising of their work. 

-Each special Slaff scel10n rcponcd primarily 10 a specific gene1111 Slaff SCi:lion. HO\\'c\cr. dcpcnding on the subjcct. thc special slaff seelion might 

report 10 other gcneral staff sections. as illUSlraled by the parentheses. 

Source. Benjamin A. Dickson Papers. U.S. Milil~ry Academy Librory. Wesl Point. N. y, 
32 

prove il to thcm."26 In th e view o f 

morc than a few at First Army headq uarte rs, he was quite sllccessful in 

that e nd eavor. A former fo o tball 

teammate of Bradl ey's at West Po int, 

his first task was to help his old fri end 

sift the cont ingent from Governor's 

Island for those who would accompany th e headqua rte rs to Fra nce,l1 

One of those who would clash 

1110SI frequentl y with O' Hare was the 

controversia l G- 2, Colonel Di ckson. 

A West Poi nte r reca lled to active dUly 

in 1940. Dickson found his niche in 

a spec ialty that had suffered frOIll low 

status and neglect in the interwar 

Army. With th e [I Corps in North Afri ca, where he had supposedly predi cted the German allaek at Kassel'i nc 

Pa ss, he ea rned a reputation in some 

quarters as an alarmist and pessimist, 

but both I>allo n and Bradley had a 

A COII/mand Post af War 

Colollel Dick.\·oll 

high rega rd for his abil itic s. Dilige nt, mercuria l, a bit insccurc, but a fi ne storytel lcr with a keen sense of hUlllor, the ta ll, l1lustHchioed G- 2 WHS Hn engaging 

conversationalist, although his lengthy monologues o n a wide range of interests struck some as boorish. 1-1 is g rasp o f seve ra l languages, including German, 

and intuitive sense for the German mind could lead to some brilliant insights, 

but they were often lost amon g o ther possibilities, largely due to the Ame rican 

system of estima tes a nd Dickson's own tende ncy to hedge his eoncl usions.21 

His deputy, th e quiet, anal yti cal LI. Col. William R. Sil vey- a World War I 

hero and form e r enginee r at Bell Telephonc- was th e pe rfect compl ement to 

his oft en temperamental supc rio r. The th irteen other officers and twenty-two 

enlistcd mcn were chosen large ly according to their competence in Ge rman 

and French. The G- 2 o rgan izat ion va ried, but Dickso n usually divided his section into administrative, liaison, plans, combat int e ll igence , o rde r o f ba ttl e, 

counterint e llige nce, and photo int erpretat ion subsections, as well as a miscellaneous subsect ion which ga th ered data for propaganda. 29 

Dickson 's co unte rpart itlthe G- 3 section , Col. Truman C. Thorso n, co uld 

not have been more different fro m the in tell igence chief, with whom he wou ld 

quarrel frequently. G rim, ne rvous, a chain -smo ker, and peanut-butter addi ct, 

the G- 3 had a ta ll, lean frame that be li ed th e nick name, "Tubby," IO A former 

regime nta l commande r under Bradley in the 28t h Infa ntry Di vision, he had 

se rved o nly brieOy in Sic il y as the 11 Corps G- 3 before Bradley called him to 

England. He thus possessed littl e combat ex pe ri e nce and, accordin g to Myers, 

gavc sca nt c rcdit to those who did. The 11 Corps vcterans believed two o f the ir 

numbcr to bc morc qual ified to serve as the G- 3: Col. Robert A. Hewitt, a 
Begillllil/gs al Brislof 

calm. balding artille ryman who had 

preceded Thorso n as the II Corps 

G- 3 and now served as his executive 

officer, and Col. Russel ] F. " Red" 

Akers, Jr. , the stocky, red-haired 

G- 3 ope rat ions chief, who was so innuential that o ne Brit ish lia ison 

officer thought that he , not the commanding general, actually ran the 

First Army. Hewitt . in particular, 

served as a sooth ing counterbalancc 

to his chief's sporadi c excitability.JI At 

the time o f D-Day, six of the sixteen 

officers in the G- 3 section were Regulars, the highest proportion among the 

four genera l statT sections.J2 

The G- 3 sect ion sta rted with subsections for admin istra tion, opera -

tions, troop movements and Iraining, 

and organizat ion. In terestingly, the 

G- 3 statT did not have a plans subsection, although the combination of 

33 

Gel/emf ThorSQII 

ope rations and plans in the same statT subun it was not uncommon in ETOUSA. 

In Norma nd y Akers would dividc his operations subsection into a planning 

group, consisting of himself and Lt. Col. John L. Throckmorton, and an opel'lllions group, which included two majors and a captain. The planning group 

wou ld formulate detailed plans, prepare estimates and orders, and "maintain 

c lose contact with corps G- 3 through freq uent visits."'u The operations group 

wou ld track tactica l developments and ma intain the sit ua ti on Illap and other 

G- 3 data in the sec tion area , the confere nce te nt, and the war room ; prepare 

situation reports and the G- 3 summary; and keep a 24-hour wat ch in the 

operations tent. J4 

The mission of the G- 4 staff section and its chief was to prepare pOlicies 

for supply, evacuation, traffic, transportation, co nstruct ion, and re lated administrative issues and supervise their implementation. Given the broad logisti ca l 

responsibi lities of an army headquarters, the Fi rst Army 0-4 section also plilyed 

a key role advising Bradley on ope rational mattcrs and coordinating th e service sect ions at theater, corps, and division levels. The G-4, Colone l Wilso n, 

was a calm, taciturn , polite Philadelphian who had se rvcd wi th the artillery in 

World War I and then resigned to go into business. Called back into se rvice as 

a reservist in June 1941, he had earned Bradley's admiration with his handling 

of several supply shortages during his tenure as the II Corps 0-4 in North 

Africa. For his deputy, Wilson chose Col. Walter W. Wendt, a youthfu l former 

FBI agent, National Guardsman, and th e G--4 of th e 45th Infan try Di vision in 

Italy. From the United States came Lt. Col. Walter A. Huntsberry, a West Pointer 

who directed th e opera tions subscction ; LI. Col. James R. Mull en, a fonner 
34 

trucki ng exec liti ve who headed the 

transportation subsection and its 

sepa rat e traffic section that a llocated 

priorities of motor transportation: 

Maj. Charles R. Kea rney, who took 

ovcr the Sllpply subsect ion ; and Maj. 

Frede ri ck C. Bold, Jr. , who ran the 

administrative s ubsection. For the 

initial amp hibious phase , the G- 4 

section wou ld a lso in clude a water 

transportation subsection, which coordina ted arrangements for the crossChannel movement with the Navy:u 

Under the supervision of these 

four general staff sections, and occasiona lly under the direct control of 

the ch ie f of siaff 01' his deputies, the 

eighteen spec ial sta ff sections provided tactical and technical advice, 

hand led techn ica l details, and coordinated their work with the rest of the 

staff. Although these sections were 

A COII/mand PO!;I at War 

Gel/eral Wilsoll 

supposed to keep the genera l staff informcd of thcir work, thcy o Ocn werc in 

grcater da ily con tact wi th their counterparts at ETOUSA or the Scrvices of 

Supply (SOS), thc theatc r logisticlli organ ization. Thcy submitted kcy poli cy 

decisions through the ge neral stafT to Kean for app roval, but they passed routine matters through the appropriate gene ra l staff section to the adjuta nt 

genera l for dispatc h. The duties of the purely admi nistrative sections- the 

<ldjuta nt genera l, chapla in, finance officer, inspeclOr general, judge advocate 

general, and spec ia l service office r- were largely rOlltine in nature <lnd had 

re latively liltl e impact all command decisions. The ant iaircraft officer, chemical wa rfllre officer, provost mllrshal , surgeon, lind helldquarters commandant, 

wh ile more visible, did not have a major vo ice beyond their techn ical speci<llties. Most influenti<ll were the artillery officer, Colonel Ha rt; the army quartermaste r, Colonel McNamam; the ch ief enginee r, Col. Will iam A. Carter, Jr. ; 

and, to <I lesser exte nt, the ordnance officer, Col. John B. Medaris; and signal 

officer, Col. Grant A. Williams. Young and hard-driving, these five officers, a ll 

II Corps veterans, would make a mark both on the First Army staff and all their 

respecti ve arms in the postwar Army. 36 

Although positions remained open and some command issues awaited resolution, the First Army staff had in place its basic orga nizatio n and leading personnel by ea rl y January 1944. Its structure and procedures refl ected ex isting 

doctrine modified in light of experie nce in the Mediterranean and the prospect 

of another major amphibious landing. Two other fac tors wou ld innucnce the 

work of the headquarters. While most of the stafTconsistcd of reservists, Regular infa ntry officers educa tcd at Leavenworth occupied thc key slots. It wou ld 
Beginnings at Bristol 35 

definitely be an infantryman's headquarters, with an infantryman 's outlook and 

approach. Finally, the II Corps veterans- with their experience. strong personalities, and suspicions of outsiders- would dominate the headquarters. It wou ld 

sometimes take Bradley's personal touch to keep in line such touchy. assertive 

egos as those of Kean , O'Hare, Dickson, and Thorson. Neverth eless, the First 

Army headquarters had a sol id, experi enced ~taIT for the mighty endeavor that 

lay ahead. 
Notes 

I Gordon A. Harrison, CrosS-Chal/llef AI/ad. U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 195 1), ehs. 1- 3, Sec also Ma\lrice Matloff and 

Edwin M. Sndl, Slralegic P/(IIlIIillgjor COlililioll Wtllflll'/!, 1941- 1942, U.S. Army in World 

War [I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army CC1l1cr of Military History. 1953); Maurice Matlofr, 

Slmfegic PIli/wing/or Coalilioll Wm!are. /943- /944. U.S. Army in World War II (Wn5hil1glon, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Cenler of Military History, 1959). 

j Harrison, Cross-Challnel A/{{/ck, pp. 5), 105- 14; Roland G. Ruppenthal. Logistical 

SIIPPO/"l oj Ihe Armies, Volullle I: Ma)' 1941- Septelllber 1944, U.S. Army in World War II 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of M ililary H iSlory. 1953), pp. 39- 40, 191; Frederick E. 

Morgan, O\'eI"wre 10 OVERLORD (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1950), Pl'. 184- 86: Ralph 

Ingersoll , Top Secrel (New York: Harcourt, Bracc & Co. , (946), pp. 31 - 35; OI11<lr N. llradley, A 

Soldier :\. SIOIY (Ncw York: 1·lolt. 1951). pp. 172- 73. 

J Bradley, A Soldier:\' StOlY, pp. 6- 8; Geoffrey Perrct, There"s (/ 11'(11' To fJ e H"OI/: The U. S. 

Army ill World IVaI' 1/ (New York: Random l'louse, 1991), p. 161; Ingersoll, Top Secrc/. pp. 

311 - 12 . 

• Eisenhowcr quote from Stephen E. Ambrose, nc Supreme Comlll(lIId/ ,.: Th e mil' )I?ars 0/ 

Genera/ Dwigh/ D. Eisenhower (Gardcn City, N.V.: Doublcd;ty. 1970), l'. 189. Intervs, Col Earl 

D. Bevan, USAR, with Maj Gen Rober! A. Hcwill, USA (Rc!.), I Oct 81 , p. 115, :lI1d Col 

Francis O. Kish, USA, with Generaillruee C. Clarke. USA (ReL), 23 Feb 82 , p. 288. both in 

Senior Officers Oral History Program. USAM HI; Blumenson, cd., The 1'(11/011 Papers. 2:398-

99.482. 

l Ltrs, Eisenhower to M;Lrshall , 24 Aug 43. and Eisenhower 10 Marshall, 27 Aug 43. both 

in Alfred D. Chandler, cd., The Papel's 0/ Dwighl Dm'id Eisellhower: The mil' Yem·s. 5 vols. 

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1970), 2: 1353, 1357; I ngersoll, Top Secrel, Pl'. 31 1- 12; I nten', 

Maclyn P. Burg with Lt Gen Elwood R. Qucsa<l<l, USAF (Re!.), 13 Nov 74, p. 105, Oral History 

Interviews, Eisenhower Library . 

• MS, William A. Carter. Jr.. Carter's War. ch. 10, p. II , Offiee of History, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers (hereafter citcd as COE), Alexandria, Va.; Edmund F. Ball, Siaff O./fieel· 

Will! the Flflh Arll/)' (New York: Exposition Press, 1(58), p. 177; [ntervs, LI Col George R. 

Robertson with Gencra l Willi;lLll M. Hoge, USA (ReL). sec. 4. 16- 17 Apr 74, p. 38, Senior 

Officers Debriefing Program. USAM H I. and Bevan wilh Hewitt, I Oct 81, pp. 114- 15; Ingersoll, 

Top Secret, pp. 31 1- 12. 

7 Quote from ]3rndlcy, A Soldier:r Slm}" p. 39. D' Este, Biller Viclory, p. 309; Chester Wilmot. 

The S/l"IIgg/efill" EUIYJpe (New York Harper, (952), p. 464; Intervs, Bevan with Hewiu, 1 Oct 

81, IIp. 119- 20, and G. l'mriek Murray with Col Chnrles G.Pattcrson , USA (ReL). 23 Aug 73, 

p. 4, General Counney H. l'lodges Owl Hislory Project, Senior OlTicers Oral History Program. 

USAM Hf. 

" Intcrv, author with Col Walter W. Wendt, USA (Re!.), 29 Apr 91 , pp. 36- 37, DWI'I; Daniel 

I). Bolger. "Zero Defects: Command Climatc in First U.S. Army, 1944- 1945," ,\li/ilm), Rel'iew 

71 (May 1991): 67- 68. 

~ Bradley, II Sn/dier:\' SIQI}'. p. 11; Clark. Galell/a/ed Risk, Pl'. 20- 23. 

LO Dwight D. Eisenhower. Cl"llsade ill Ellrope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubled;IY, 1948), Pl'. 

141 -42, 150. Llr, Eisenhower to Fredendall, 4 Feb 43 , Llr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 Mar 43; 

Msg, Eisenhower to Patton , 6 Mar 43 ; and Msg, Eisenhower to Operations Division, War 

Department, 20 Mar 43. All in Ch;mdler, cd. , Eisenhower Papers, 2:940, 1006, 1010, 1045, 

respectively. Ernest N. Harmon with Milton MaeKaye ;LIld William Ross MacKayc, Comh(1/ 

Commal/der: AlilObiogmphy o/a Soldier (Englewood Cli ffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1970), pp. 111 -

20. 

II Pallon quote from I3 luIlletlson. cd. , The Palloll Papers. 2: 188. and see also 2: 181 , 184, 

193. Koch and Hays, G- 2111Ielligence/or PmlOlI, PI'. 14- 15 ; lnlerv, Col Jnck Ridgway, USAWC, 

and Lt Col Paul Walter. USAWC, wi th General Barksdale Hamiel!, USA (Re!.), 4 Feb 76. sec. 

3. pp. 18- 19, Senior Officers Debriefing Report, USAM HI. 
Begillllings (If Bristol 37 

12 First quote from [nterv, Bev;lIl with Hewill, I Oct 81, p. [07, Second and Bradley 

quotes from D'Este, Biller ViCIOI )'. p. 483/1 and p. 483. respectively. Chester B. Hansen 

Diary, [1 - [2 Feb 45 , USAMH I; Ba[L S/(/ffOfficel" Wilh Fifth Mill)" pp. 177- 78; JHmcs M. 

Gavin. 01, 10 Berlin: IJ(l/I/es of (III Ail"bome Comm(lnder. 1943- /946 (New York: Viking. 

1978), pp. 10- 11; Intervs, Murray with Patterson. 23 Aug 73, pp . 5- 6, Hnd with Myers. 15 

Apr 74. PI}. 24- 26: Ltr. Col John Ray, USA (ReL), to author, 6 Dec 96. DWI'I; Intcrvs, G. 

Pntrick Murray with Col Benjamin A. Dickson. USA CRet.). 22 Sep 72. pp. 25- 32, 44 , 

DWH, nnd nuthor with Wendt. 29 Apr 91 , p. 36; Hnmilton , MOSIer of fh e Bmllejieftl, pp. 

306- 08.336- 37.358 

Il M S, Benjamin A. Dickson, G- 2 Journal: A Igiers to the Elbe, pp. 95, 99. box 5, Benjamin 

A. Dickson Papers. U.S. Military Academy (USMA) Library, West Point. N.V.; Rpt, U.S . Army, 

First U.S. Army, Report of Ope rat ions, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944,7 vols., I: 13- 14, CMI-[ 

Libr,lry; Andrew T. McNamara, QU{//·lerm(I.~lel· Activilies oj II Corps Thm A fgeria, TUl!i~·i(j. (lIId 

Sicify (Illd Fir.\'1 Al"llIy Tlm( Europe (Fort Lee. Va.: Army Quartermaster School. (955). pp. 87-

88,99- 100; Bradley, A Soldier's SIOIY. p. 176; MS , Rcmnrks of Nelson M. Lynde, MG, USA 

(Ret.). on First U.S. Army Operations. p. 10, G. Patrick Murray Papers, DWH. 

I. Cir. HQ, First U.S . Army, 10 lun 44, OfTicer Roster by Section, 101 - 1.8 G- I Rosters, 10 

Jun 44, box 1827, U.S. Army, Adjutant General's Office, World Wnr II Operations Reports, 

1940- 1948: 1st Army (hcreaftcr cited as WWII Ops Reports), RG 407, WNRC; Rpt , U.s. Army, 

Adjutnnt General's OtTice, to War Department General StafT, Strength of the Army, 30 June 

1944, CM H Library. 

~ Cir, I-lQ. First U.S. Army. 10 Jun 44. Officer Roster by Section: individulli staff officers 

listed in War Department, Adjutant Gcneral's OfTice, Official A 1"11/)' Negis/el: ,.1(1111/(11), 1944 

(Washington. D,C.: Government Printing OfTiee. 1944): graduating classes listed in U.S. Army, 

Command and Genera l StafT School. OI!IIll(//ldollf~·. Siaff, Focllfty. ali(I GmtlllMes. 188 f- I 939 

(Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General StafT School Press, 1939): gradlHltes listed 

in U.S. Army. COllHlland and Gcneral StafTSchool, Gmt/uales oflhe Geneml SI(ljJtllld Sen'ice 

SwffC/(lsses. 1941- 1944 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General StafT School Press, 

1944); [nterv, author with Weml1. 29 Apr 91. PI'. 7- 8, 25. 33. 

I. Rpt . First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944, I; 13. 

17 MS, Dickson. Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 97.100; MS. Carter, Carter's War, ch. 8. p. I; 

Bradley. A Soldie,. .j' S/()!)', [l[l. 174- 75. 

II Rpts. First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. 20 Oetobcr 1943- 1 August 1944. I: 15- 16; 

Draft. First U.S. Army Rcport of Operations, 20 Oct 43- 1 Aug 44. sec. 2. P[l, 4- 5, folder I, box 

I. U.S. Army, 1st Anny HeadqlHlrters: Records, 1943- 1955. Eisenhower Library; and U.S. Army, 

European Theatcr of Operations (ETO). Genera l Board. Report on the Organization of the Army 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Study 24. p. I. CMH Library. TO 200- 1, 

Headqu(ll'Iers. Army . War Depllrtlllcnt. I July 1942. 

I. Rpts, First U.S . Army, Report ofOI)erations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944, 1:16, and 

Draft, First U.S. Army Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43- 1 Aug 44, sec. 2, pp. 5- 6. 

l~ Imerv, G. Patrick Murray with Lt Gen Samuel L. Myers, USA (ReL), 15 Apr 74 , p, 7, 

DWH. 

I I Smith, NislOl)' oflhe Thil"dArm),. p. 125; Special Order (SO) 59, HQ, ETO. U.S. Army, 

28 Feb 44. 1943- 1946 Orders, box 8. Hodges Papers. Eiscnhower Library. 

II TO 200- 1. Hemlquarters. Army, War Departmcnt. I July 1942; FM 10 1- 5, SlajJOjJicel's 

Field Mal!ual, 1940, p. 7. 

jj Memo, Maj A. J. Bochicchio, Asst Adj Gen. First Army, for Commanding General (CG), 

ETOUSA, 2 Mar 44, sub: Historical Data. 10 1- 1.1 9, Biographical Sketches, box 1831. WWII 

Ops Reports. RG 407. WNRC; MS. Mrs. Ki llY Bradley, Revised Transcription of Tapcd 

Interviews with Gencral Omar N. Bradley, 1966. rcel I, pp. 65- 66, Omar N. Bradley P"pcrs, 

USMA Library; Telecon. ,\lIthor with WOJG Dempsey E. Allphin. AUS (Rc!.). 9 Dec 93 , DWH: 

lnterv, Murray with Dickson, 22 Sep 72, p. 8. Regarding the nickname "C;lptain Bligh;' see 

Intervs. G. Patrick Murray with Lt Col Adolph G. Roscng~lrtcn , Jr. , NGUS (Re!.). 3 Mar 75. p. 

34, OWl-I, and with Maj Gen Nelson M. Lynde, Jr .. USA CReL), p. 43 , General Courtney I-I. 

['Iodges Oral History Project, Senior OfTicers Oral History I'rogram. USAMIII. 
38 A Commal/d Postal /Vt". 

:. Cir, I-IQ. First US. Army, 2 J Apr 44 . Functional CharI, Chief ofSlafTScction, unnurnbercd 

box, Dickson Papers, USMA Library: fI.'lemo, Bochicchio for eG, ETOUSA, 2 Mar 44. sub: 

llistorical Data: Rpl. Drart, First U.S. Army Report of Opera lions. 20 Oct 43- 1 Aug 44. sec. 2, 

p. 5; MS. Organization and Opcralioll of an Army 1-lc:H1<luartcrs in Combat , p. 7. DclbcrI L. 

Brisiol Papers, Mrs. Vivian Bristol, Florissant, Mo.; Cir, IIQ. First U.S. Army, 10 Jun 44. Officer 

Roster by Section. l' RPI, U.S. Army. First U.S. Army, Combat Operations Data, First Army, Europe. 1944-

1945, 18 Nov 46 (hcrc:lflcr cited as RPI, First Army, COD. 18 Nov 46), pp. 145- 53, eM il 

Libmry: I'M 101 - 5. S/(/ifOfficCI".\" Field Mfllwal. 1940. PI}. 5 6.9 10. 

1. O'Hare qUQte from Bmdley,.-I Soldiel':~ S/OIJ', p. 177. 

I I Ibid.: Cir. 1-IQ. First U.S. Army. 10 Jun 44. Officcr Roster by Section: Intcrv. Murray 

with Pallerson. 23 Aug 73, p. 2: Tclecon, author with Col Chester B. 1 lansen, AUS (Rel.). 5 Mar 

93, DWI-I. 

11 Bradley. A Soltlicr $ S/()I),. pp. ]], 46- 47: Inten'. Murray with Pallerson. 23 Aug 73.pp. 

102 03: MS, Bradley. Revised Transcription of Bradley Interviews. reel I, p. 68. Intervs, Forrest 

C. I'ogue with Col J. O. Curtis, 16 May 50, p. 2: with Brig Gen E. T. Williams. 30- 31 May 47, 

p. 5: and with Col Benjami n A. Dickson. USA (Ret.). 22 Dec 47. pp. I 2. All in Mise 314.82 

Interviews- U.S. Army in WW[I. The Supreme Command (hereafter cited as Pogue inten'iews). 

USAM I-II. Inlo:rvs. MUrrllY with Myers, 15 Apr 74, pp . 7 8, aud with Rosengarten. 3 Mar 75, p. 

22; Telceon. author wilh Hansen, 5 M<lr 93; MS. Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe. pp. 40. 47; 

Illuillenson, cd .. The Pal/oil Popel'.I". 2: 193: Charles B. MneDonald. Ii Tilllefor 7hllllpe/s: Tile 

UII/old 5/(1)' of/III! Bailie ofl/le IJulge (New York: Wi ll iam Morrow, 1985), I)P. 54- 55. Regllrdillg 

the low prewar status of illtclligenee, sec Koch 1llld I-lays, G -2111/efligcm.'efor P(lI/OI!. pp.;d 

.... ii: Eisenhower. Cl'us(ldc ill fllm!'c. p. 32. 

~ Rpls. First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. 20 Oelober 1943- 1 August 1944. 5:121 

22. 132. and First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. p. 158: MS. Dieksoll, Algiers to Ihe Elbe, Pl'. 99-

100; lIr, Col Roger Ray, USA (Rei.), to author. II Jan 97. DWII. 

10 Inter". Murray wilh PallerSOIi. 23 Aug 73, p. 100. 

JI Bradley. 11 Soltlicl" s SIOIJ'. PI>. 176- 77; Hansen Diary. 16 Apr 45; [ntervs. Murray wilh 

Myers. 15 Apr 74. PI'. 89; wilh I}allerson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 100 103.108- 10: and Forresl C. 

I'ogue wilh AdoJI)h G. RosengMten. Jr .. 22 Dec 47. I). I, Pogue inlerviews, USAM lll ; MS, 

BrHdlcy. Revised Transeril)\ion of Bradley Interviews, reel I. I). 67: Ltr, Brig Gen William B. 

Kunzig to author, 23 Jlln 97. I)WII. On Akers running the First Army, see Nigel Hamilton, 

MOIII)': Filial Ycal's oflhc Field M(m·lm/. 1944- /976 (New York : McGrail' Hill. 1987), I). 307. 

J: Cir, 11Q, First U.S. Army. 10 Jun 44, Officer Roster by Section. 

lJ Cir, Organizations and Funelioning of G- 3 I'lans and Ol'er:llions. n.d .. 101 - 3.3 G 3 

Journal file, WWII Ops Reports. RG 407. WNRC. 

J.l lbid.: Rpts. First Army, COl), 18 Nov 46, PI>. 173 76, lind U.S. Army, Third U.S. Army, 

After Aelion Report, I August 1944- 8 May 1945.2 vols .• vol. 2. pl. 4. p. I. CM H Library. 

II Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report ofOperalions. 20 October 1943 I August 1944.5:137, 

145. and First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. p. 209; Bradley, A So/died' Story, pp. 47-48; MS, Brod ley, 

Revised Transcription of Bradley Interviews, reel I, p. 68: Interv, author with Wcndt. 29 Apr 

91. pp. 2- 1 J, 15- 17: Telccon, author with Hanscn. 5 Mar 93. 

j . Sec relel'ant sections of Rpl . Firsl Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. Sec also Cir, HQ, First U.S. 

ArIllY. 2 1 Apr 44. Functional Chart, Chief of StatT Sectioll: I'M 101 5, Siaff Officcrs ndrl 

t\flllum/, 1940, pp. 16- 17; MS, Willinm A. Cn rter. Jr" Employment nnd Staff Procedures of 

Engineers with Di vision, Corps. and Army, 15 Mar 46. I'p. 34- 35. COE: MS. Carter, Carter's 

W;U. eh. 8. pp. 3-4, 8: Intcrvs, G. I'ntrick Murray with II Gen Charles E. Hart, USA (Ret.), 

1973. p. 15, Gcneral Courtney ll. Hodges Oral llislory Project, Senior Officers Or,ll Jlistory 

Program, USAMHI, and with P'lllerson. 23 Aug 73. PI'. 8 10: Tcleeon. author wilh Hansen. 5 

Mar 93: lIansen Diary, 9 and 19 Oct 44. 
3 

"To Secure a Lodgement on the Continent" 

As Britons celebrated their fifth Ch ristmas season orlhe war, Bradley called 

together his slalT for three co nferences to layout COSSAC's blueprint for 

the invasion. Little altered since the Quebec Conference, Ihe plan cal led fo r a threedivision assault on the Norman coastline in the Baycux area and a gradual ex pansion orthe beachhead twenty-th ree miles SOlllhwcS1 IO Sl. La and fifty-three miles 

norlhwesllo the port ofCherbourg. The port lay Hl th e tip orthe Cotenlin Peninsula 

and flanked the invasion benches from the west. Bradley's First Army headquarters 

wou ld dirccllhe operation unde r the command orthe British 2 1 Army Grollp headquarters, which would assume overall command in France when enough British 

units had landed to form an independent British army. The 2 1 Army Group would 

continue in overall command until the buildu p of American troops wa rranted the 

introductio n of an American army gro up headqua rters. I By Decembcr 1943 

Bradley's staff had already devoted a month to preparing R ANKIN, the proposed 

emergency landing on the Continent in the event ofa German collapse. Even though 

the Alli es never implemented R ANKIN, formulation of the plan provided a valuable 

training exercise for planni ng O VEl{LORD.l 

Hav ing already partici pated in two amp hibious landings, the II Corps 

vetera ns on the First Army staff had acqui red strong views on the number of 

service units, suppli es, and eq uipmen t they would requ ire for the invasion. By 

December 1943 the varioLls staff sections had a lready begun to prepare estj· 

mates of what they would need to suppo rt an army of 3 corps, 6 infantry divisions, and 2 armored divisions. At the instigatio n of the War Department, the 

theate r headquarters had been working on estimates o f the eq uipment required 

for OVERLORD since J une 1943, a nd the theater Icc lmi cal service c hiefs welcomed the input of Brad ley's veteran s. Aware of the challenge of mainta inin g 

the supply now across beaches with lillIe initial help from railroads Or ports, 

the army staff chiefs submitt ed esti mat es of units and equipment far beyond 

the old "type army" leve ls. Many staff sect ions wanted administrative group 

headq uarters as intermediate command echelons between thc army headquarters on the one hand and army supply installations and units on the ot her, providing direct supe rvision of the installations and units. The lengthy wish lists 

of the army staff experts caused their counterparts in Washington to cringe. 

Given OVERLORD'S high priority, however, they obtained most of what they asked 

for, including requests for equipment beyond that provided in tables.] 
40 A COII/malld Post af War 

The number and types of army units that the First Army staff wanted for 

the invasion was truly st aggering. McNamara's staffplunllcd for I quartermaster group headq uarte rs, 12 battalions, and 49 companies, including 23 truck 

companies. The plan that Carter's engineers prepared ca ll ed fo r 12 engineer 

combat groups, 30 engineer combat battalions, 2 heavy ponton battalions, and 

I topographical battalion as well as 20 e ngineer compan ies of vario lls types. 

Mcdaris and his ordnance officers envisio ned 10 ordnance battalions, including 2 ammunition battalions, 8 bomb disposal squadron s, and 57 ordnance companies, including 13 ammunition companies. Meanwhi le, Williams' signalmen 

laid plans fo r I operations, 2 construct ion, and 3 signal battalions, not including 3 addit iona l signal compani cs and 12 photo company detachments. Col. 

John A. Rogers' med ica l sta ff planned for 3 medical groups, 11 medical battalions, 24 med ical companies, and I co nva lescent and 9 evacuation hospitals. 

The antiaircraft units in cluded I brigade headqua rters, 5 group headquarte rs, 5 

gun batta lions, and 24 automati c weapons battalions, while Hart 's artil lery section planned for I brigade and 6 group headquarters, 2 observation battalions, 

18 field artill ery battalions, 3 tank destroyer group headquarters, and 12 tank 

destroyer battalions. The plan also stip ulated 5 milita ry police battalions, 3 

cavalry g roups and 6 caval ry reconnaissance squadrons, and 2 chemical battalions and 3 chemical compani es, in addi tion to the 3 corps, 6 infantry divisions, 

and 2 armored divisions. 4 

As the planning process con tinued, the First Army staff was more receptive 

to equipment innovations than many have believed. l]Jthe case o f the ingenious 

specialized tanks developed by the British 79th Armoured Di vision, a board 

chaired by the First Army ordnance officer, Medaris, a nd including representatives from the G- 3, G- 4, art illery, e ngineer, and quartermaster sections, and 

the 2d Armored Di vision rejected the flail tanks for clearing paths through 

mine fields. It stated that tests in North Africa demonstra ted them to be slow, 

unreliable, ove rly sensiti ve to terrain, an d not as e ffective as other means of 

clearin g minefields and obstacles. On the ot her hand, the board did recommend adoption of thc 79 th's amphibious, flam ethrower, and bulldozer tanks, 

and Bradley approved the recommendat ion. For some reason- perhaps the problem offitling them on available ships, the difficulty in obtaini ng enough tanks 

for train ing prior to D-Day, or the differen t composition and gradients of the 

American and British beaches- American pl anners, in the end, turn ed agai nst 

the 79t h's devices, except for the amphibious tanks. Given the difficult ies e ncoun tered by th e V Cor ps in its assau lt on D-Day, the decision not to adopt 

most of the tanks offered by the British wou ld be highly controversi al.5 

The decision on specialized tanks was nOI the only ordnance action of these 

ea rly months 10 inspire controversy later. Almost as soon as he had estab lished 

the First Army headquarters in the autumn, Bradley had pressed the theater to 

establish new "un it of fire" and "basic load" ammunition esti mates as a first 

step toward determining ammun ition requirements for the comin g campai gn. 6 

Assisted by Medaris' ammunition ofTice r, Lt. Col. John Ray, and by estimates 

that drew on Allied combat experience in the Mediterranean, Brig. Gen. Henry 

B. Sayler's ETOUSA ordnance office reviewed thea ter levels of ammunition as 
"To Secure (I Lodgemem 0 11 rh e COl/linelll" 41 

authorized by th e War Department and in January sll bmilled estimates of its 

needs to Washington. Unfortunate ly, as Medaris recognized, such estimates were 

uncertain at best, espcc iall y givcn th e earl y sta gc of planni ng. In early March, 

as th e date for OVERLORD approached, War Department planners cal cula ted, on 

the basis of the lat est data from the Itali an campaign and revised "acti vit y 

fa ctors" fo r arti ll ery weapons, that ETOUSA's estimates were too low. To compli cate mattc rs further, thcat er planners discovcred that, despite th e communication among the headquarters, the European th eater and the fi e ld commands 

had been cal culatin g req uirements diffe rent ly, with ETOUSA using an obsolete troop basis. Hurri ed meetings in May produced a revised set of estimates, 

but it would take time to make up th e lost g round. Meanwhil e, Medaris resisted 

ETOUSA's efforts to have him adjust his estimates based on availab ility, rath er 

than projected need.

7 

The debate over ammunition estimates re fl ec ted some of the tension between the hard-driving spec ial staff heads at th e First Army headquart ers and 

th eir tec hni ca l chi efs at the th eatcr levc l- tcnsion resulting large ly from an 

awkward command structure that the ad vent of an army-l eve l headquarte rs had 

created in the British Isles. With the simultaneous activation of th e Fi rst Army 

and I st U. S. Army Group headquart ers and the ass umpti on by th e two new 

staffs of planning and operational responsibiliti es, ETOUSA had qu ickl y found 

its long-range planning tasks reduced to littl e more than that of its administrati ve and logisti cal component , th e Se rvices of Suppl y. The lines of authority 

among th eater, army group, and army headq uart ers and the SOS became increasingly blurred. By the time Eisenhower arri ved in mid-January to take command o f COSSAC's successo r- Supreme Headquart ers, Alli ed Expeditionary 

Fo rce (SHAEF)- the Ameri can staffs had worked out an arrangement in which 

Eiscnhowcr would command both SHAEF and a united ETOUSA-SOS theate r 

organi zation. (CharI 3) ETOUSA·SOS would hand le administration and supply for the Ameri can ground forces and leave th c bulk of th c pl ann ing and 

actua l operati ons to th e army group and army headquarters. Still, the lines of 

res ponsibility among SHAEF, ETOUSA-SOS, and army group and army headquarters remained fuzzy. The First Army ec l staff had the responsibility for 

cnsuring that th e First Army's assigned and atta ched units had access to certai n 

sc rvices, but ETOUSA-SOS enjoyed authority over army units in Brita in and 

oft en ran army insta ll ations th e.~ 

Fortunat e ly, whil e th e First Army spec ia l staff chi cfs reali zed th c ir ba sic 

res ponsibility to Bradley, th ey fo rged strong working rela ti onships with th eir 

th eater chi efs at ETO USA-SOS, re lyi ng on thcm for guidan ce on techni cal 

matters. [n this rega rd, th e sentiments of Maj. Gen. Paul R. 1·lawl ey, the chi ef 

surgeon of ETOUSA, regardin g his re lations with Colonc l Roge rs, th e First 

Army surgco n, seem typi cal : " With allthcsc new heresies of staff control tha t 

have sudd enly burst upon our Army, it is re freshin g to have a surgeo n in a 

subordinate eche lon who adhe res 10 th e old and tricd doctrine of tec hni cal 

control through staff channels as distinct from command control through command channcls."') Through consultation, th e two groups worked out thc ir differences, avoiding most confronl ations.

1o 
CHART 3-ETOUSA's ORGANIZATION AFTER THE CONSOLIDATION OF 17 J ANUA RY 1944 

Thealer Supreme I 

Commander Commander. AEF 

Depuly Thealer 

Commander 

Chief of Staff 

Chiefof 

Deputy Chief ~ Staff.AEF 

of Staff 

l G-' I I 0 -2 I I 0-3 I I 0-4 l , 

I J.,,< II """", I II Ch"r I I Adjutant Public I Amorican I ,,~,~oo I \d"(Knl~ Dcp.:mmcnl Ch~plain GCI\/::ral Rdations "hoo' I "",,,, I II ,;, .. , I Med,cal J 

Office Co:nIO' ServIce Sen',ec St ..... ,.c 

I M:nhat ,,",0' l r SI:r.'C6 '0«'" l II ~~lC I 1'=;1 r TcchnM;";llI '" ll,'"·-'I Rcpb=no:-nl I-~I rc<~'l A= I Sc:""',C<: Secl;on S~cm Sen kc: Pu",h~'nll 

Agenl Scn,c<: 

I ",-.., S«11On II, Comm,ffiOO C"~ ,I PRINCIPAL COMMANDS I <"==, 

.... 

s.: 

'3rfart 

.... ·ICC 

I r _or 

Sen

1m>\0"l" 

'icc 

l '-~I ""~ 

L ISIArm~ 

Group J l Service$ 

of Supply I 1 us. SIr:IlC1lic 1 Air forttS 

s.~ RobndCi R"f'IICI'IIIaI. w,;.,ti .... , s..n- qf",.,,, .. k~ II}/_I .II ... I'}.I/~ 191~. U.S. Arm)' '" I\OtId W>Jt II (I\»lunl"Oft. V.C.: US.Ann:rCc'"'' <>fMihwy lIi>rory. 19~1~ p. 199. 
"To Secure tI Lodgemelll 011 Ihe COl/til/el/1 " 43 

Thus, whi le ETOUSA·SOS hand led most arnmgemcnts ror rccding, cloth· 

ing, eq uipping, and housing the uni ts pouring into Britain, the First Army head· 

quarters also played a role. By February ETOUSA-SOS had assumed the task 

or locating and readying bille ts, leaving the First Army accommodations or· 

ricer with little betler tha n a liaison ro le. On the other ha nd, the First Army 

staff oft en made suggest ions on where its un its should be st ationed. Simi larly, 

ETOUSA-SOS had the basie responsibility ror equ ipping units as they arrived 

in the United Kingdom, but the First Army headquarters closely ro llowed the 

process and set priorities for spec ia l or criti cal items. Medaris, for examp le, 

helped ETOUSA-SOS institute the process by which army ordnance un its rece ived th ei r assigned eq uipment rrom SOS depots. He also made recomme nda -

tions for extra equipment and such spec ial items as beach packs and provided 

SOS with est imates on stockage or spare parts, ba sed on his experience in the 

Medit erran ean. 11 The innux of Ame ri can troops, who seemed to rill every 

cobbl estone street and loca l pub in southern England, created the potential for 

friction with the local inhabitants and British troops, es pecia lly given the need 

to bil let some Ame rican troops in private homes. Through participation in th e 

inter-A lli ed Join t Army Commillee and institution of exc hange programs with 

British units, along with encouraging close re lations with mayors and community olltreach programs, the First Army headqua rt ers hel ped reduce much of 

the tension.

12 

Unrortunately ro r th e First Army 0 - 1 section, many arriv ing units needed 

pe rsonnel to reach rull strength or to replace the unfit. In parti eul"r, the engineer spec ia l brigades, the provisiona l engineer special brigadc group, and th e 

teams that would adjust nava l gu nrire support we re badly undermanned ro r 

their essenti al tasks. Severa l corps and divisio n starrs requi red res huffling 

a ft er the reliefoftheir cOlllmanders, and suspect qual ifications of many ub ~ 

ordi na te officers led G- I office rs to grumbl e that seve ral of th em should 

have been removed before their dep'.II'ture rrom th e Unit ed Sta tes. I n res ponse 

to these problems, the G- I section se t broad poli eies, but illef! most details 

in the hands orthe adjutant gene ral section. When superiors deemed officers 

inadequate ror their posts, th e G- I personnel subsect ion inte rviewed the orficers concerned and often arran ged for their reassignment to other ullits rather 

than inflic t the sti gma of official reclassifi cation. In the end, reclassification 

procedures were initi ated ro r 3 colone ls, 5 lieut enant colonels, 5 majors, 14 

captains, and 62 lieutenants prior to D-Day. Of these, I lieute nant colonel, I 

maj or, 3 ca ptains, and 37 li eut elwnts received discharges. The Fi rst Army 

headqu arte rs obtained replacement orrice rs rrom stat eside sources, rrom SOS 

units within the theatc r, from other units with in th e First Army, and rrom 

ETOUSA's replaeement system. To kee p track or th e many pe rson nel moves 

during th e preparatory period, th e pe rsonnel subsect ion maintai ned a Kardcx 

record file of each field grade offi ce r and important company g rade officer 

in the First Arl11y. ll 

Wh ile the First Army headq uarte rs (lnd ETO USA-SOS made a rrangements 

for the a rri vi ng troops, the main task or planning, involving the collaboration 

or several echelons, had begun in London. Eve n before the activation orS J-I AEF, 
44 A CQII/malld Post af Wa r 

COSSAC had turned over planning for the land po rtion o f the c ross-Channe l 

attack to its gro und compon enl, the British 2 1 Army Group. The 2 1 Army 

Group's commander, Genera l Sir Be rnard P<l gCI, w<lnlcd his stafTto work with 

the nava l and ai r component staffs to produce an "executi ve plan" as a genera l 

framework with in wh ich lower-level headq uarte rs would conduct their plan -

ning. As plannin g became morc detai led, howeve r, th e Fi rst Army staff bccamc 

morc involved in the pro ccss.l~ 

In mid-December Brad ley brought members of his G- 2, G- 3, and G- 4 sections to London . They joined th e ir counterpa rts from th e 2 1 Army GrollI' on 

ove r twenty-five committees, or "syndi cates," eac h of which was responsibl e 

for preparing a parag raph, annex, or some other portion of the plan. These 

committees discussed such topics as road and bridge construct ion, poli c ies for 

reinforcement and re pillceme nt, the mounting plan, the bui ldup, a nd inter-Alli ed commun ications. Although ma ny of the America ns possessed abunda nt 

combat staff experience in North Africa and Sici ly, they lacked the background 

or the ir British opposite numbers in high-level combined planning. They wryly 

no ted that each sy nd icate had a British offi cer as its senior membe r and that 

the British look ca re to draft minu tes in advan ce of each meeting, used th em as 

an age nda, and then published them almost ve rbat im as th e offic ial minut es of 

Ihe meeting. The Americans cou nte red the British practice with their own prepre pared versio ns. In the course of the discussions, it became cl ea r tha t the 

America ns needed a larger con tingent, and in mid-January Brad ley broadened 

the "First Army Planning Group" to include representatives of a ll of his ge ne ra l a nd specia l stafT sect ions, including most of the staff chie fs. Among the 

represe ntatives was a co ntin ge nt from Ihe 1st U.S. Army GroupY 

The 1st Army Grou p's leade rship and exact ro le had bee n somewhat un -

c lear in th e earl y planning. Formed by ETOU SA at the same time as th e First 

Army headquarters, th e 1st Army Group headq uarte rs in December consisted 

of a skeleton staff in London unde r easygoi ng Maj . Gen. Leven C. Allen , a 

forme r commandant o f the Infantry Schoo l. Specula tion ran rampant over who 

would fi na lly assumc command, with the names o f Devers, McNa ir, and Pallon 

achieving prominence. For the moment, Bradley held th e post in addition to his 

duties with the First Army, a lthough to skeptica l army group staff officers, he 

seemed to be more a tourist th an a commander in his first visits. In retrospect, 

he appea rs to have been audition ing fo r the job; if so, he quickly satisfi ed his 

superiors. AI some point in midwi nter, it beeamc clear th at he would eventually 

move up to the lsi Army Grou p and that Hodges would succeed him in command orthe Fi rst Army, although this successio n arran gement did not become 

offici al until 18 May. 1·lodges apparently be li eved that he should havc assumed 

command o f the First Army upon his <! lTival in Britain, allowing Bradley to 

move lip to 1st Army Group, but he recognized the benefits of having a man of 

Brad ley's experience in command oftlte actua l assault. In any case, the promotion of Bradley to army grou p command over Patton without giving Bradley 

some experience in commanding an army wou ld havc been awkward. '6 

Bradley and All en were breaking new ground at the 1st Army Group. The 

U.S. Army's expe ri ence with an army group headquarters was even scantier 
"To Secure 1I Lodgemell' 011 'he COl/lil/ent " 45 

than fo r an army headquarte rs, and the la ck of a role in the initi a l phase of 

OVERLORD did not make the 1st Army Group's search for an identity any easie r. 

In theory at least, the First Army headquarters was to focus on th e de tails of th e 

assa ul t and the ini tial buildup, while the 1st Army Grou p headquarte rs coord inated admin istrative and supp ly arrangements with th e SOS for the phase beginni ng two wee ks afte r D-Day and cond ucted strategic planning for the pe riod 

after it became aClive on the Continent. In practice, the separa tion o f labor was 

hardly tha t dislinetY 

Along with office rs from the two army g roups, ETOUSA-SOS, and the 

Bri tish Second Army headqu arters, the First Army Planning GrollI' dealt with 

representati ves from the othe r two se rvices in the sy ndi cates. With the Navy, 

rela tions were genera ll y amia ble, even if lower levels occasiona lly grumbled 

ove r what they saw as the tendency of the ir Navy cou nterparts to forgo detailed plan ning until the last mi nute:' Fortunately, th e Navy's Western Ta sk 

Force, which wou ld support the First Army, was unde r Rear Adm. Alan G. 

Kirk, a 56-yea r-old vete ra n who had se rved as com mande r of the Atlanti c 

Flee t's amphibious for ces and had d irec ted sup port for th e 45th Infan try 

Di vision's landing in Sicily. I-I e knew amphibious warfare and the British, 

and, best of a ll, he kn ew Bradl ey.19 

In contrast, the First Army planners knew little about the two Army Ai r 

Forces generals with whom the First Army headquart ers wou ld have the most 

contact. LI. Ge n. Lewis 1-1. Bre reto n of the Ni nth Air Force was a veteran who 

had been ex posed to the Royal Air Force 's tactica l a ir support organi zation and 

methods in Li bya. [n Engla nd, he was instrumental in th e establishment of 11 

use fu l se ries of ori entation lectures for senior ground officers on tact ica l ai r 

support. Neverth e less, to some at the Fi rst Army headquarters, he seemed the 

archetypical airman, distant and ove rly enamored with the virtues of air powe r. 

The soldiers, however, quickly wa rmed to Maj. Gen. Elwood R. " Pete" Quesada , 

th e affable, innova tive Mediterranean theater veteran who commanded the Ninth 

Ai r Fo rce 's IX Tactica l Air Command. An old friend o f O' Hare, Ques<lda was 

one of the few se nior airmen invo lved in tac ti c<l [ air support with a ge nuine 

interest in c lose air support of ground troops and not just interdi ction of enemy 

communicat ions. To Bradley, he even offered to drill his pilots in a rtill ery spotting, somethi ng that the strategi c a ir ent husiasts wou ld neve r have proposed in 

1944. Quesada wou ld form a close bond with the First Army commander in th e 

co rni ng months.20 

Despite the efforts of all concern ed, joint and combined planning co uld go 

only so far until the <llTiva l of the permanent commander of the 2 1 Army Group, 

Gencral Sir BenHH'(i L. Montgomery. on 2 January. Oneil cold, insensitive, and 

egotistical, Montgome ry could be difficult, espec ia lly fo r his supe riors. Neverth eless, his direct man ner, willingness to listen, loyalty, and careful , systemati c 

professional ism, honed by yea rs of devoted study and experience, had earned the 

respect and gratitude of his subordin ates. As a commander, Montgomery believed in strong, firm di rection from the lOp and, in line with the British system, 

rigidly centra lized control, exemplifi ed by detailed orders and closely supervised 

execution. Recognizing the need to accommodate the America n point of view 
46 II Commalld Post (// Wa,. 

and th e looser American concept of command, however, he told Bradley shortly 

after his arrival thai he would closely direct British and Canadian troops but Ii mil 

his directives to Bmdley to suggestions for schemes of m<lneuvcr. As Bradley 

later recalled, Montgomery's accession to the command of the 21 Army Group 

was 110t at allullwelcome at the First Army headqua rters. Indeed, he and his staff 

recogni zed that Montgomery's personal self-assurance and public stature as the 

victor of the Desert War provided the aura of success essential to OVERLORD, 21 

To the 2 [ Army Grollp headquart ers, Montgomery also brought from the 

British Eighth Army many ex perie nced st aff officers who were familiar to 

Bradley's II Corps veterans. The able and geni al Maj. Gen. Si r Francis de 

Guingand assumed the post of chief of statT; the brilliant Oxford don, Brigadier EdgarT. Williams, became the intelligence chief; and the handsome, you ng 

Maj. Gen. David Belchem took over as operations c hi ef. The army group st atT 

included only a few Americans, 111os1 of whom were on detail from 1st Army 

Group, to assist with planning, ensure smooth communi cation and liaison, and 

hand le the separate American administrative system.22 

Armed with an authori zation from Eise nhower to act on his behalf pending 

his arri va l, Montgomery plunged into preparation of an "initial joi nt plan" for 

the operation. For security reasons, the Allies rena111ed the operation N£I'TUNE, 

although they co ntinu ed to use OVERLORO to re fer to th e ovenlll concept of an 

invasion of northwest Europe in 1944. N ErTu NE sough t " to secure a lodgement 

on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be deveioped."2J 

Perceiving- as did Eisenhower and several others- that the three-division assa ult provided in the COS SAC plan was 100 weak and too na rrow, Mon tgomery 

called for an assault by five divisions along a fifty-mile front. One of these 

divisions woul d land on the east coast of the Cotentin to bypass the marshes 

along the base of the peninsula and thus expedite the drive on Cherbourg. The 

expanded concept also called for an initial assault by two American eorps under an American army and two British corp s under a British army, all unde r the 

overall command of the 21 Army Group. Each corps woul d have its own sector 

on the beaches, the reby avoiding th e complicati ons that would result from passing through another's zone. Two American ai rborne divisions would land in the 

Cotentin. One of these wou ld land near Carentan, a town positioned at the head 

of an estuary between the invasion beach at the base of the Cotentin and the 

beaches farther east. Two British airborne brigades would descend east of the 

Orne River, the eastern boundary of the invasion beaches. 24 

Through the syndicates and communi cation with Montgomery 's headquarters, Bradley's staff participated in the formulation of the initial joint plan prior 

to its formal issue on I February. The initial joint pl an set the boundary between the two Allied armies and established the D-Day objectives. These included Caen, Normandy's major c it y, ten mil es inland on the eastern end of the 

British beaches; Bayeux, seventeen miles west of Caen; Carentall; Isigny, a 

tiny port on an est uary six miles east of Cm·CtHan; and Sle. Mcre-Eglise , a 

small Cotentin village which lay eight miles north ofCarentan. The plan wcnt 

over resources for suppl y ac ross the beaches, laid out Ihe air and naval support 

available to the two arm ies, and designated concentration and marshal ing areas 
"To Secul'e (/ Lodgemelll 011 'he COl/ fil/elll" 47 

OI)'(lIIS(OIl COllr( 

in Grcat Britain for th c assau lt and buildup. Most significantly, it clarified th e 

overall First Army mission: the ca rty capture of Cherbourg and expansion o f 

the beachhead south loward SI. La in conformit y with the inland ad vance of 

the British Second Army. Al l preparations, th e plan stated, wcre to be compl eted by 3 1 M1.1Y, the target dale o f the ope ration.u 

The First Army headquarters now needed to develop its own plan, coverin g 

the first fourteen to twent y days of the invasion Y' Lights burned lat e at the 

planning group's officcs at Brya nston Court, a row often redstone houses on a 

fa shionabl e residential street in London's West End. Ncxt door, the 1st Army 

Group stafT had established its lodgings, and many other importa nt headquarters were nearby, including SHAEF at Bushy Park, thc naval and air components at No rfo lk House in SI. James Sqll<lfe , and the 2 1 Army Group at SI. 

Pau l's School in West Kensi ngto n. Activi ty in thc First Army officcs centered 

on an attracti ve, second-noor drawing room with rirepla ces of Italian marble, 

orna tc rococo ccilings, and a pleasant view of the block-Jong, trce-shadcd square. 

Fi eld desks and top sec ret maps had convc rted this idyllic settin g into a wa f 

room. At onc cnd, two sc rgcants from Tubby Thorson's G- 3 section wcrc usually typing revised troop lists, whiJe on th e other side Monk Di ckson's G- 2 

analysts went ovc r their data and cSlimatcs.27 
48 A Command Posl (If "''tIl" 

Security was tight, as the First Army G- 2 section worked with counterinte lligence spec ialists and the British poli ce to preserve the most c losely guarded 

secret in Brit'a in : Ihe time and place of the invasion. As pari of its securit y 

procedures, COS SAC had adopted a specia l procedure, known as BIGOT, under 

whi ch access to info rmati on on Ihe li me and location afllte invasion was li mited to a se lect grou p ofotTiccrs and mcn. 28 Mil itary police kept a 24-llOur vigil 

at the door to the war room, allowing en trance only to those with a B!GOT classification. The conseque nces ofa security breach could be seve re for the delin -

quent. A major on a spec ia l mission for the antiai rc raft o fficer, Col. Charles G. 

Patte rso n, was nearly court-martia led aftcr leavi ng a pouch with plans fo r the 

invasion on a ra ilroad station bench. Patterson was abl e to postpone the tri a l 

until after D-Day, when the officer served with disti nction. No doubt, other 

First Army staff personnel ex perienced th e kind of anx iety fe lt by one G- 2 

officer be fore a coll eague at the British Theater Intelligence Se rvice return ed 

his missi ng ste nog rapher's notebook, full of se nsitive information. 29 

Despite its importance, counterintelli gence at G- 2 took a backseat to the 

preparat ion of estimates of th e enemy situa ti on. For sources, the G- 2 sect ion 

relied heavi ly on the British, who co uld call on the reconnaissa nce squadrons 

of the 2d Tacti ca l Air Force as well as their ex tensive fi les on beaches, gradie nts, and tides. Through the winte r and spring of 1944, Dickson and his G- 2 

officers poured over rad io inte rcepts, French Resista nce reports, in te rrogat ion 

summaries of German and escaped All ied prisoners, captured docume nts and 

mat erie l, and even sna pshots take n by Brit ish fam il ies vacationing in prewar 

Normandy. Keen ly awa re of the va lue of aerial reconna issa nce, Di ckso n developed close contacts with his a rti llery colleague, Hart, and Hart 's aeria l obse rve rs; Quesada's intell igence chief at IX Tactica l Air Command; a nd the IX U.S. 

Reconnaissancc and Photographic Squadro n at Midd le Wa ll op. To work with 

th e reconna issa nce squadron, Di ckson orga nized a provisional photograph inte rpretation detac hment, based on a brie fing by a First Army engineer fa mili ar 

with the Fifth Army's system in Ita ly. Collocated at Middle Wallop wi th the 

reconnaissa nce squadron, the detachment obtained prints, still wet from the 

hi gh-s peed printing process used by the airmen, and sent the photos, via a primiti ve fax machine, to the G- 2 secti oll.

JO 

As the dat a accumulated, analysis o f the information ind icated tha t the 

German coastal defenses, wh ile formi dable, were nol impregnabl e. The extensive batteries, mine fi elds, wire, and obstacles that th e Germans had erected 

were often incomplete and, in many cases, had al ready bee n damaged by Allied 

bombi ng. The G- 2 planne rs estimated that two static, coasta l di visions, consisting o f a high proportion of fore igners o f low mora le, he ld the strongpoints 

in the area of the assault, with another, mobil e division o f higher morale near 

SI. Lo. The NEPTUNE plan ca lled for more da ta on German nava l and ai r power; 

on the nature of th e beaches and their defenses; on the identity, strengt h, and 

mora le of units man nin g those de fenses and the ir reserves; and on enemy reaction plans. 1 1 In th e end, its appraisa l proved fairly accuratc . The big oversight, 

one shared by othe r All ied inte lligence agencies, was the omission o f the 352" 

IlIftmllY Divisioll's movcment to thc coast three months be fore the invasion. At 
" To Secure (/ Lodgemelll 0 11 the COl/tinellt " 49 

the la st moment, the G- 2 section discovered the prese nce of the 352d and broke 

radio silencc in an att cmpt to alcrt thc V Corps, but the troops, sca led aboard 

thei r ships, ncver received the news. Although th e V Corps co uld no t have 

changed ils plan at that la te da te, knowledge of th e division 's presence might 

have eased th e psychological shock ex peri enced by the Ame ricans who unex· 

pectedly encoun te red the division on OMAI IA BeachY 

The failure to detect the 352d I/!folltry Divisioll later became the subj ec t o f 

much controversy, espec ia lly aft er the disclosure in 1974 that the Alli es, fo r 

most of the war, had been dec iphe ri ng intercepts of Ge rman mil itary radio com· 

muni ca tions. At the First Army headquart e rs, the data from these in te r· 

cepts, code· named ULTRA , came to the des k of Lt. Col. Adol ph G. Rosengarten, 

Jr. , a Phi ladelphia lawye r and forme r Nat ional Guardsman who had joi ned the 

G- 2 section on 15 May. Rosengart en held an unenviabl e position on the Fi rst 

Army sla fr. Only the commandi ng gcne ral, Kean, Dickson, Thorson, and three 

or four others in the G- 2 section knew of his aClual mission, and his special 

sta tus a roused suspic ion among his less privil eged colleagues. At fi rst, Dickson 

ehose to deliver personally all ULTRA mate rial 10 the command ing general. Ove r 

time, however, Rosengarten pe rsuaded his chief to at least permit him to sort 

and edit the raw da ta be forehand. Prior to D·Day, ULTRA helped the First Army 

headquarters evaluate age nt reports and the e ffectiveness of the plan to co ~ 

vince the Germans that Ihe invasion would come at the Pa s de Calais. Never· 

Iheless, ULTItA produced no dala on the 352(( II/jrllll!'y Divisioll, whi ch reli ed 

minimally on rad io, and dependence on special inte ll igence in this case may 

have misled the First Army planne rsY 

On the othe r side of the room at Bryanston Court , 0 - 3 and 0 - 4 planne rs 

we re figurin g shi pment prioritie s that would ensure th e ri ght mi x of comba t 

and support troops to se ize, defend, and ex pand the beachhead. The First Army 

sta ff wan ted to bui ld supp ly levels to ten days of rat io ns by the eightee nt h 

day, seven days of fue l by the fift eeJlt h day, an d ten units of fire of ammuni· 

lion as soon as possible. The Navy provided data o n th e ava il able lift, and the 

special sta ff sectio ns appl ied whateve r guida nce the G- 3 section cou ld pro· 

vide on the li kely course of th e c<lm pa ign to esti ma te th eir requirements in 

tonnage. Using this da ta, Army doctrine, and their own expe ri ence in the Mediterranean, Thorson's and Wilson's planners alloca ted space fo r troops, mat e· 

riel, and supplies among the ships, an end less tas k due to constan t changes in 

th e ava il ability of th is transport. Two or Ih ree times pcr day, Kean would bring 

problems to Bradl ey, rece ive his decisions, and coord inate staff pl an nin g 

aro Ll nd those decisiollsY The a rduo lls, methodi c,lI process, with its focLls on 

mi nut iae and th e ever· present need to stretch scarce resources, oft en caused 

tempe rs to run short. To those compl aining abo ut th e drastic cutbac ks in all 

but the most essential transporta tion, Thorson sardonica ll y res ponded, " If you 

find yo urself sho rt bec ause you arc stumped on truck s, just call for me and 

I' ll piggyback you to Pa ris." Even the laconi c Wilson, pl agued by demands 

fo r sca rce shippi ng space, wou ld answe r curt ly that he wou ld arran ge for the 

items in question to land one day be fo re the invasion, when they co uld have 

all th e lift desired.

15 
50 A COII//J/ol/d Pos, til War 

Availability arlin was also centra l 10 the planning of tile 0 - 1 statT. Theater 

policy allowed assau lt units to maintain troop levels greater than those lltltho· 

rized by organizalionallablcs, bu t the 0 - 1 plan for NEPTUNE reduced the strength 

of the ilSSatdt and follow-up units to "the barest comba t cssentials."J6 Troops 

deemed surplus by this reduction, termed "residues," would go to special 50Sdesignated camps, where they would remain until th ey rejoined their units 011 

the Continent in accorda nce with the bu ildup sc hcdtdc. These residues, upon 

thei r arrival , would help mainta in unit strengths for the first five days of the 

invasion. After that, the FirSI Army sta ff planned to rely on rep laccments fur~ 

nished on the basis of advance requisi tion s prepared by units before the start of 

the invasion. Norma l requisitions for most units wou ld not begin until the ninth 

day, when, under the NEt'TUNE plan, the First Army replacement depot would 

arrive on the Continent. Prior to D~Day, each infan try division received an ex~ 

tra regimcntal commander and three surplus battalion commanders, carefu lly 

choscn through examinations of records and interviews to provide replacements 

for commanders lost in the ea rly fighting. The 0 - 1 plan also envisioned eg in ~ 

Ilillg postal delive ry on the third day and est ablishin g unit exchanges by the 

thirtieth day of th e invasionY 

The plans of the general st aff were necessarily based on figures provided 

by the special staff after careful pl anning in frequent consultation with coun~ 

terparts from other eche lons and services. Using loss estimates provided by 

S HA EF's medical officer, Rogers' medical section selected those medical units 

tha t would take part in the assault, augmented some of them, and planned for 

the growth of the medical establ ishme nt during the buildup, always negotiating 

with ot he rs for shippin g space. Under the sect ion 's arrangements, all wou nded 

except nontransportables we re to be evacuated to the Uni ted Kingdom by sea 

and, as soo n as possible, by air. As hospitals dep loyed to the beac hhead, the 

First Army would g raduall y convcrt to a policy of evacua ting only those who 

required hospita lization for ove r seven day s. As the invasion prog ressed, the 

minimum for evac uation to Communicatio ns Zo ne (COMZ) rac ilities in En ~ 

gland and on the Continent would increase to fifteen , and later to thirty, days.J8 

While Rogers and his medica l officers Itlid out evtlcuati on policy, McNamara 

and his quartermasters were determining the rood, cquipment, and fuel that 

soldiers should bring ashore and laying out plans for the establishment of in ~ 

sta l1 atiolls on the Contin cnt. Remembering his Mediterranean experience, 

McNamara tried to kccp the eq uipment allocations to a minimulll, even recom~ 

mending against shoepacs with the approach of d ri er summer weather. Maintc~ 

nan cc stocks of Class II an d IV suppl ies (ma inly c lothing and equipment) would 

begin to arrive on th e rourt h day or the invasion- and reserve stocks ten days 

later- to establish a reserve of rourteen days by the rort y~fi st day. Along with 

pl ann in g ror rati o n rcscrvcs, thc First Army c hi cr quartermaste r provided ror a 

daily maintenance of 60 percent C rations, the basic 01 light field ration, and 

40 percent orthe even lighter K rations through thc third day, after which ha ir 

of the rations arriving would be the compositc 10~in~1 rations, eac h or whi ch 

had enough food for te n mcn. As soon as facilities and transportation could 

hand le them, he wa ntcd to introduce full B rations, the normal bu lk ri e ld 
"To SeclI/'e a Lodgemelll 011 Ihe COlllinelll" 5 1 

rations. Quartermaster pl ans also arranged for vehicles to carry extra fue l ashore 

wit h them and for shipments o f bulk fuel to begin arriving afte r two weeks.J9 

The othe r spec ial statT sections wcre j ust as busy. In thc ordnance section, 

Mcdaris and his office rs carefully chose units to support the engi neer specia l 

brigades in the early days on the beaches. To ease the problem of res lip ply, they 

arranged to have those units carry extra suppli es ashore. At the same time, Ray 

requested SOS planners to obtain an exemption from British rcgulations to 

ship togcthc r ditTe rent paris of the same ammunition round on the same vessel.40 Si mult aneously, Ca rter's engineers made arrangements for enginee r su pply and worked out construction priorities, enginee r Iroop lists, and map plans. 

Meanwhile, Williams' signal section determined the wire and rad io nets to be 

established on the Continent by its signal crews, notably the joint assa ult signal 

companies, wh ich wou ld install communi ca tions on the bcachcs. The new civil 

atTairs scetion estimated the amount of supplies necessa ry to support the populace and thus prevcnt disorder that might impede operations. Wheneve r possi ble, these suppli es wou ld come from loca l resources.

41 

In this pha se too, much of the planning invol ved the Army Air Forces and 

the Navy. The air planners listed their priorities as establishmcnt of the rcqu ired deg rec o f air superiority, prevcntion of the movement of encmy troops 

and supplies into the theater of opera tions. and "parti ci pation in a combined 

efTort of the Air and Ground Forces, in the battle area , to ga in objectives on the 

immediat e front o f the Ground Forces." Wit hi n these priorities, th ey laid out a 

nine-phase pl an that called for strikes against key coastal batteries in the NEPTUNE area and key roads and railroads in the days be fore the in vasion. These 

pha ses would be followed by strik es by fighter-bombcrs aga inst the beach defe nses an d by heav y bombe rs against the battcries and the road een tc r o f 

Ca rentan just prior to H-holll', and th ey wou ld continue with fi ghter-bombe r 

missions against the batteri es, cable j unctions, road centers, and Loire bridges 

after l-I-houl'. The Ninth Air Force would also perform aerial reconnaissance 

and provide cont inuous fi ghter cove rage over the beaches; each corps would 

have a squadron of fi gh tcr-bombers on cal l. To coordinate air support, the Ninth 

Air Force would place an air support party with cach regimcnt on shore. As 

higher echelons came ashore , the su pport parties would station themselve s with 

those eehelons.42 

For nava l gunfire support, naval planners envisioned a bombardment group 

of 3 batt lesh ips, I monitor, 4 heavy c ruisers, 6 li ght cruisers, and 37 destroye rs. They put together a three-phase plan in which the naval bombardment force 

at each beach, led by two battleships at OMAH A and one battl es hip at UTAH, 

would begin counterbatt cry fire at fi rst li ght. From H minus 20 to !-I -hour, 

elosc support destroyers and landing craft would direct "drenc hing fire" aga inst 

selcet ed bcach defenses. Afte r that, nava l shore fire control parti es, nine of 

which accompani ed cach assa ult di vision, would direc t naval gu nfire aga inst 

targe ts on the beachcs.4l 

On 25 February th e First Army headquarters submitted its plan for Opera -

tion NEPTUNE. As amended on 20 May. the plan called for a composite force of 

the I sl and 29th Infa ntry Di visions and two Ranger battalions, under the diree-
52 

lion of t he V Cor ps, to assault 

beaches in the Viervillc arca, codenamed OMAHA, and push forward to a 

line from Isigny to the Baycux area 

by th e end of D-Day. AI the sa me 

time, the 4th Infantry Di vision or the 

VII Corps would land to the west, on 

the beaches cocle-named UTAI. along 

the eastern shore orthe Cotcntin Peninsu la, and move inland to link up 

with the 82d and IOl sl Ai rbo rn e Divisions. Under the origi na l plan. the 

airborne troops would drop across the 

southern Cotcntin; ancr intelligence 

found the 9/sl III/aml)1 Division in 

this a rca in late May, plann e rs 

changed the drop zones to areas Illore 

directly be hind U TAII Beac h. (Map I ) 

Once assault units had seized Ihe 

beaches, th e 5th and 6th Engineer 

Specia l Brigades on O MAIIA and the 

I st Engi neer Specia l Brigade o n UTAH 

would organize the beac he s for unA Comlllaud Posl af War 

Geneml Gerall' 

(Photograph taken in 1948.) 

loading and evacuation. In line with amphibious doctrine, Kirk would command both g round and nav"l forces, and under Kirk the sen ior cOlllmander in 

each corps secto r would comma nd First Army units in that secto r, until Bradley 

had landed and est ablished his headq uarters asho re. Detail ed a nd we ig hty, the 

plan included annexes o n everything from allocation of ships a nd the va rious 

stages of the buildup to provisions for smo ke to cover the landing. Indeed. it 

may well have bee n too detailed. Among other things, it established defi nite 

but infl ex ibl e beach sector boundaries thaI did not match the frontages to be 

covered by the assault units.44 

Des pite its faults, Plan NEI'TUNE, as approved by the 21 Army Group in late 

Fe brua ry. did provi de a foundation on which th e corps planners could build. As 

a first step. the First Army headquarters ca ll ed its subordinate corps commande rs to London, briefed them on the plan, and ordered them to pre pare detailed 

plans for their part in the invasion. The corps commande rs, in turn, established 

sma ll planni ng g roups of th eir own in Lo ndon, where they could more easil y 

incorpora te c hanges by hi ghe r ec he lons. The First Army sta ff also senl officers 

to corps cOlllmand posts to help with detailed planning. Because the First Army 

headquarters was not sc hedu led to become operationa l o n the Conti nen t until 

a ft er D-Day. the corps would shoulder considerable responsibility in the initial 

st ages for a host of support func tions that they did no t normally handle. Each 

corps needed to prepare for the First Army statT a list of targets for prearranged 

naval and air support and a priority list of troops lInd suppli es ror the bui ld up; 

on thaI basis. the First Army sta ff would ye t again revise ils own priority list. 
"To SeclIre (/ Lodgemellt 011 the COlllillelll" 53 

Gel/emf Collills Gel/eral Coriell 

(Photograph taken early in the war.) 

The First Army headqua rters took recommcndations from its divisions and corps 

to the 2 1 Army Group, which usually gave oral app roval to the changes and 

then incorpora ted those changes into formal orders. One importa nt a lt eration 

in the origina l pla n was the need, after the discovery o f underwa ter obstacl es 

on the Normandy beaches in February, fo r the corps to prepa re plans for engi~ 

neers and naval combat demolition units to clear thelll.45 

Corps and division commanders were chosen main ly on the basis of combat 

experie nce, bu t politics also playcd a rolc. With the permission of Genera l George 

C. Marsha ll and Eisenhower, Bradley sent some of his di vision commanders horne 

but accepted most on the basis that they had trained their units and deserved a 

chance to lead them in bailie. Selection of corps commanders fell to Marsha ll 

and Eisenhower, although Bradley had some infl uence. Despite a dearth of comba t experience, Maj. Gcn. Leonard T. Gerow, the court ly Virginian who led V 

Corps, kept his post, ostensi bly because of his heavy involvement in early planning, bu t more li kely due to his close friendship wit h Eisenhowe r and Bradley. 

The less fortunate Maj. Gen. Roscoe B. WoodrufTo f VII Corps and Maj. Gen. 

Wi llis D. Crillenberger of XIX Corps received tra nsfers to the Pacific and Mediterranean, respectively. Unable to obtai n Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., who 

had distinguished himself in amphib ious and conventiona l operations in the 

Mediterranean, the supreme commander settled for two Pacific veterans, Maj. 

Gen. J. Lawton Coll ins and Maj. Gell. Charles 1-1. Corle tt. Young and aggressive, with boundless self-confidencc, Collins had commanded the 251h Infantry Di vision in the South Pacific and would now take the VII Corps. The tough, 
M AI' l 
LrJ 

I 

~29H , 

~1('J 

1 

• 

• 

THE FINAL NEPTUNE PLAN 

= Drop Zone 

ElEVAl lON IN METERS 

I 

'00 lOO 0<><1 Abo .... 

" , 
56 A COII/malld Post {II War 

leathery Corlett, who had directed amphibious landings in the Aleu tian and Gi lbert Islands, was sent by Ma rshall 10 command the XIX Corps and lend his amphibious expertise to OVI RLORD. But he did nOI arrive until mid-March, al which 

lime pJanning was so fa r along that few wanted 10 lisICn to a newcomer fro111 

another Ihcater.~(' 

By March some of the lingering uncertainty over command organ ization 

for the invasion had begun to dissipate. A SHAEF directive in January had 

confirmed th e British 2 t Army Group's overall co ntrol of ground operations 

untillhc I SI U.S. Army Group arrived in France. NOlunt il Ma rch, however, did 

SHAEF give to the 2 1 Army GrollI' overall command of suppl y and administration on the Continent, also until the 1st Army Group went into action. This 

authority in cluded the initial development of the Communicat ions Zone, SOS' 

successor as the theater agency responsible for the logistical support of U.S . 

army groups and armies cond ucting combat operations on the Continent. To 

help the 21 Army Group carry Ollt this task, the I st Army GroliP was to furnish 

an administrative contingent- the Forward Echelon, COMZ- to Montgomery's 

headquarte rs. 41 (Cllorts 4 (llId 5) 

In the early stages of the invasion, the First Army would enjoy an unusual 

amount of authority for an army headqua rters. Under the direction of 

Montgomery's 2 1 Army Gro up headqua rters, the First Army headqua rters would 

have full authority over planning, operations, administration, and supply in the 

U.S. zone for the first two weeks. After those two weeks, an Advance Section 

(ADSEC) of the COMZ would take control of logistics behind a rear boundary 

designa ted by the First Army headquarters, but the First Army headquarters 

wou ld still generally supe rvise ADSEC's activities. On the forty-first day of 

the invasion, COMZ 's fo rward headquarters echelon would move to Fra nce and 

assume control of ADSEC, while U. S. g round forces woul d come under the 

newly arrived I st Army Group. About ninety days after the invasion, SHAEF 

and COMZ wou ld move to the Continent and assume direct control. The exact 

sequence of introduction of higher-level headquarters from corps to theater 

wou ld, of course , depend on the success of the assault and rate of expansion of 

the eachhead. 4~ 

Recognizi ng that harmonious joint relationships wou ld be criti cal to the success oflhe operation, the staffs of the First Army and Western Task Forcc worked 

to define those relationships in greater detail. They worked within the framework of SHAEF's operational 111emorand u111s, which laid out stamlardized procedures for training and operations by an all ied force. The First Army's Plan 

NEI'TuNE provided for cooperative arrangements at the highest level, naval shore 

fire control parties to accompany the di visions, and naval gunfire lia ison officers 

attached 10 the division arti llery headquarters and each fie ld arti llery battalion 

directly supporting Ihe assault. Thejoinl agreement of 10 February assigned to 

Army planners such tasks as al locating units, vehicles, and suppl ies aboard ships 

and establishing priorities for the discharge of vessels and cargo, but it left to the 

Navy such matters as th e timing of the discharge of the cargo and the release of 

ships. Thc commanders of the engi neer spec ial brigades, with their atlached naval beach battalions, received the responsibi lity for organizing and clem·jng the 
CIIART 4 - PLANNED COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR O VERLORD 

EARLY PHASES 

I 

ETOUSA Supreme War Office Commander SOSor COMZ 

I~ , 

, , I ~ , 1 , 

, Forward Echelon , 

British Allied Naval Allied COMZ British 21 Army Administnuivc Expeditionary Forcc Expeditionary 

U.S. 1st Group Air Staff Force 

Army Group 

I 

I 

U.S. First British Sccond 

Army Army 

-.l -.l 

Advance B,~ 

Section Subarea 

._ Admm,sn:loli,.., aUlhoril) 

Sol/mo-: Ruppenthat. i.og",;ru/ S"PPI'I"I of Iw Armi~s. lull/~'~ I. p. 2H. 
CHART 5- PLANNED COMMAND ARRANGEM ENTS FOR OVERLORD 

AFTER U.S. 1 ST ARMY GROUP BECOMES OPERATIONAL 

CGETO Supreme 

COMZ Commander 

I I 

..---- Forward Echelon U.S. 1 st 

COMZ ..---- Army Group ..----

f-- Advance First 

Section I-- Army r--

Other Third L....- Base Sections L....- Army -

y = General Eisenhower was commander of both SHAEF and ETO. 

Source: Ruppenthal, Logistical Support oJthe Armies, Voilime I, p. 225. 

I I 

British 21 Army Allied Naval 

Group Expeditionary Force 

British 

Second Army 

Canadian 

First Army 

Line of 

I Communications 

I 

Allied 

Expeditionary 

Air Force 
"To Secure a Lodgemelll 011 Ihe COl/fillell/ ., 59 

beaches; under them, the Navy had the task o f establishing installa ti ons seaward 

of the high-watcr mark, whil e the Army would do the same on the in land sidc. So 

complic<ltcd were the lincs of control and responsibi lity laid out by the two services that both nava l and ground officcrs contended after the operation thaI all 

join! issues, except for mailers of policy, could h<lvC been handled simply through 

li aison between the agcncies concerned. 49 

Air-ground command relationships look somcwhat longer 10 clarify. Based 

on their ex pe rience in the Mediterranean, Army Ai r Forces planners wa nted to 

centra li ze control over air support at a high levcl , thus avoidi ng the waste of 

resources they saw as endemic to control at lower echelons. Therefore, they 

gave res ponsibility fo r air-g rou nd coordination 10 the Combined Contro l 

Center of the 2 ] Anny Grollp and the A lli ed Expediti onary Air Fo rce (AEA F), 

SHAEF's he<ldqua rters fo r its t<lctica l air component, at Ux bridge. Air support 

parties with armi es, corps, divisions, and regimellltil combat teams would send 

req uests for ai r support, bombli nc repo rts, and other air support comnlllllic<ltions dircctly- or, in the case of regimen ts, through the divisio ns- to th is center, which wou ld rcview and act on them. Air support pa rti es at highc r echelons 

wou ld monitor the radio nets of subordinate units and not ify Uxb ridge of any 

requests tha t they disa pproved. The Army Air Forces envisioned that most <lir 

support missio ns would be plan ned by the center on the evening before they 

were carried out. Under the First Army NEt'TUN!: plan, however, one fighterbomber squadron was to be on ca ll ove r each corps beach, and air-g roun d 

pla nning also le ft some unall ocated sorties in rese rve to respond to ca lls for 

immediate support. So fi xed were the air planners on the idea or centralized 

control that U.S. air support parties had strict orde rs not to contact planes overhead, even to stop attacks on friendly troops or the wrong targets, unless specifi ca lly aut horized to do so. The key role of air suppo rt in the invasion caused 

the First Army headquart ers to add morc ai r liaiso n officers.5o 

The Fi rst Army staff was al ready undergoi ng a genera l expansion of person nel to pe rform tasks unforeseen by the War Depa rtment's outdated orga nizational table_ By army order, a headquarte rs commandan t, provost ma rshal, 

and civil affai rs officer had been present on the staff since October, and du ring 

the spring they were ab le to form spec ial stafT sections. Because of the presence of an armo red section on othe r staffs, the specia l sta ff added an armored 

section on 4 March. The First Army headquarte rs also added a publicity and 

psychologic<l] wa rrare section on 26 March, <l nd a two-man amphi bious section on 24 Ap ril. Un like other staffs, it did not, however, add a separate transpOI-tat ion officer, ostensibly becmlsc Bradley and McNamara did not wa nt to 

entrust this importan l lask to an incx pe rienced organ ization on the eve ofOV!:KLORD_ Meanwhile, the existing sections were add ing subsections in response to 

new requ irements, notably air support, passive air defense, and liaison subsections in the G- 3 section; antitank and ae ria l obse rvation subsect ions in the 

arti ll ery section; and an cnlarged casua lty div ision under the adjuta nt general. 

Drawing on an ETOUSA authorization ror ]70 more spaces, the headquarters 

expanded to 36 1 officers, 25 w<lrranl office rs, and 596 enlisted men by June. 

Even th is increase would soon prove inadequate.51 
60 A CQII/mond Post af War 

The augmentat ion of the Fi rst Army spec ial slafT sectio ns wou ld enable 

them to lake advan tage of the greater a utonomy that Bradley and Kca n were 

now prepa red to allow them. On 18 Ma rc h the Fi rst Army headquarte rs adopted 

the new policy of operational control by the spec ial starr. (See Appelldix E.) 

Under th is policy, the commande r retained only adm inistrative functions and 

de lega ted to the chief of eac h special staff section the au th ority to di rect, COll* 

11'01, and coordinate the opera tions of army un its within his specialty. Th us, a 

specia l sect ion head cou ld shift troops wit hin the army zone, issue norma l operations orde rs and trai ning directives, and reallocate supplies without drawing 

on th e persona l authorit y of the commander or the genera l staff. Suc h personnel matters as promotions, decorations, and indivi dua l transfers st ill needed to 

go through the G- I and adj utant gene ra l's sections. The spec ia l staffs wou ld, of 

course, have prefe rred even grea ter authority, but the new directivc a ll owed 

considerable freedom of action, especi a lly with in tec hn ical channe ls. S2 

Obviously, the new policy strengthe ned the hand of staff officers vis-a-vis 

subordinate commanders, as in the case o f the ant iai rcraft section. When the 

First Army headquarters in iti a lly came in to ex istence, I)a lle rson, a 35-year-old 

lieuten ant colo ncl at th e ti me, served as the execut ive o fficer to Col. Charles R. 

Fin ley, a classmate of Eisenhower and Brad ley at West Poi nt and a ca reer coast 

arti ll eryman who had been the First Army antiairc raft officer unde r Drum. To 

obtai n a brigadier genera l's sta r fo r Finley and a colonel's eagle fo r Pa tterson, 

Bradley a nd Kean brought in th e 47th An tiaircraft Brigade as the headquarters 

for antiairc ra ft units in the Fi rst Army, placed Fi nley in command of it, and 

promoted Pa tterson to the post of antia ircraft office r. Soon after, the theater 

transferred the 47th frOlllthc Fi rst Army, repl ac ing it with the 49th Antiaircraft 

Brigade under Brig. Gen. Edward W. Timberlake. Not surprisingly, Pattc rson 

,md Timberl a ke squabbled freque ntl y over who, in fact , commanded the ant iairc ra ft un its in the First Army. The combat ive Pauerson, whose nicknamc at 

West Poi nt had bee n "Stinky," also clashed wit h the statesidc antiai rcraft establishme nt, wh ich co ntinually tried to replace hi m with a more sen ior officer 

from the Un ited States. Ba cked by his commanders, Patte rson won most of 

these battles, but his notoriety probably contributed to his inabilit y to rise above 

colonel in the postwa r Arrny. ~J 

Apart from the operationa l contro l pol icy, the First Army headquarters made 

one othe r major orga nizationa l innovlltion. Based on their expe rience with the 

[] Corps in Sicily and on their concern abou t the prospect of the various headquarters components bcing separated by the English Channel , Brad ley and the 

other It Corps ve terans rejected the doctrinal division of the staff into forward 

and rear ec helons in favor of a divisio n into comnHlnd, supp ly, and base eche lons. Corresponding close ly 10 the fo rmer forwa rd echelon, the command echelon, located near the corps' rea r boundary, would contai n th e chief of staff, 

chiefs of the G sections, and other staff requ ired by the commandin g general to 

pre pare plans and supervise operations. The su ppl y eche lon would bring 

forward from the fonner rea r eche lon those representatives of army supply agencies- including the enginee r, ordna nce, quartermastcr, signa l, and medical sections- tha t the army needed in a more accessi bl e location near the command 
" To Secure (/ Lodgemel/I 01/ Ihe COlllinelll " Gl 

echelon. The base echelon would follow far to thc rear with th e bu lkier record s 

and those statT scctions from th e fo rmer rear echelon- primarily the G- I , j udge 

advocate genera l, inspector ge nera l, cha pl ai n, and adj uta nt genera l- that were 

concerned with army admi nistration. While on the move, each echelon wou ld 

main ta in commu nications via a message cent er in a vehicle. The new system 

sure ly would hc lp the statT cond uct NEPTUNE, but command post cxcrcises and 

the final pl an revea led a tendency to phase pe rson ne l fo rward, somewhat defeating th e original purpose of se parate lon s. ~ 

Wh il e the First Army headquarte rs supe rvised co rps plann ing and reorganized its statT, it worked with Montgome ry and th e 2 1 Army Group statT to 

develop a plan for expanding the initia l beachhead into a lodgment betwee n th e 

Se ine and Loire. Durin g Februa ry SHAEF supe rvised OVER LO RD plan nin g, 

focused on la rger pol itica l and adm inistrati ve issues, and prepa red long-term 

plans fo r the campa ign fo llowing OVERtORD. Simulta neously, Montgome ry met 

severa l times with Brad ley and Lt. Gen. Sir Miles Dempsey, commande r of the 

British Second Army, to consider post- D-Day operations. 

Ove r th e next few mon ths, Mo ntgome ry deve loped fu rth e r his gra nd 

design for th e Normandy camp<lign. Since the war, this pl an has become th e 

subject of int ense debat e, but, if the outli ne prepa red by his plans offi cer in 

early May is any indication, he produced a flexi ble plan that stressed keeping 

the in itiative and tak ing ad vantage of wha teve r opportun ities th e Germans presented. Under th is concept, th e All ies wou ld launch an a ll-out attack on D-Day 

to secure a footho ld and link a ll th e invasion beaches as soon as possible. The 

British Second Army would the n drive south to seize th e Caen- Fa laise plai n, 

whi le the First U.S. Army adva nced west and nort h into the Colentin Peninsula 

to take th e port of Cherbourg. Once th e Allies had th is lodgment, th e First 

Army woul d drive sout h to Renn es at th e ba se o f th e Brittany Peni nsul a, cuttin g off Brittany and c learing the way fo r the Third U. S. Army to enter th e 

battle and das h west into th e peninsula, se izing the key ports the re. With Brittany sec ured, the America ns would pivot to the cast toward Paris, achi evin g the 

goa l o fa lodgment be tween the Se ine and the Loire by the ni neti eth day of the 

invasion. Shoul d the Germans mass against the First Army, Mon tgomery wo uld 

adva nce the Second Army southeast, up th e Se ine Va ll ey, threat ening th e 

enemy rea r. Through al te rn ate thr usts by th e First U.S. and British Second 

Armi es, he could force the Ge rmans to disperse thei r strength, opening the way 

for a breakout. (M ap 2) At Exerc ise TIiUNOERClAI' in London on 7 April, Montgomery wenl over th e plan with his top subordinates and tested the ir reac tions 

to diffe rent continge nc ics. By th e fina l briefings on 15 May, his ge nera ls 

appa rently had a c lear idea ofthe i .. respec ti ve es. ~~ 

Despite the best efforts. th e First Army's planning for the expansion of the 

beachhead was marred by a major fl aw. Whet her because of the fu zzy de li neation o f responsibil iti es with th e 1st Army Grou p or, more likely, th e immense 

care and attention to detai l invol ved in phmning the beachhc<ld assault, th e 

First Army statT simp ly did not devo te enough attention to th e obstael e posed 

by th e bocage region. Ex tending in a 25- to 50-mi le-wide belt fro m Cherbou rg 

in the northwest a lmost to Alencon in the southeast, the bocage was cha racte r-
GENERAL MONTGOMERY' S 

GRAND DESIGN 

Allied Route of Attack 

Phase Line 

ELEVATION IN METERS 

I I I I 

100 200 and Above 

4,0 Miles f----.-----'--.--rl ''--,,_---'-_ _ ---' 

40 Kilometers 

, co 

/ 

M AP 2 

64 A COII/mand POSI til IVaI' 

izcd by a lattice-l ike network of hedgerows- massive, irregula rly squ are walls 

of eart h, five fe ct high and lopped by hedges.

56 The chief of the British Impcriill Gene ra l Staff, Field Ma rshal Si r Alan Brooke, who had passed through the 

region during the campai gn of 1940, had communicat ed his conce rn to Ihe 

COSSAC planners, who prominently mentioned it in th eir topographi c estimate. Mon tgomery foresaw to some deg ree tha l th c "di ffi cult bocage Coulltry" 

could present a ba rrier, alt hough the degree of his conce rn remai ns a mane r of 

conjectu re.

57 Yel the First Army planners, although they knew of the existence 

of th e bocage, we re appa rently too int ent on the assault and ra pid buildup ofa 

force suffi cient to ho ld the beachhead to devote much thought to th e probl em it 

posed . The topographic estima te in their Februa ry pl an men tioned but gave 

littl e idea o f th e bocage's real na ture, and "essent ial e lements of informatio n" 

sought by the G- 2 focuscd on the beaches. In fairncss to the First Army head -

qua rte rs, the corps, which we re responsibl e for the ta cti cal plans, bore at least 

some of the responsibi li ty for the ove rsight.$8 

On 15 Ap ril, lo ng before th e ri na l bri cfings for the OVERLORD plan, the 

First Army Planning Group fi nished its work in London and retur ncd to Bristol, 

whe re the remainde r of th e staff had bee n devoti ng mu ch of its time 10 supc rvisin g tra ining. Almost every American un it in Britain had expe rienced combat 

or had undergone trai ning in the United Stat es up to and incl udi ng maneuvers. 

Thus, th e First Army's trainin g plan empha sized pe rfection o f skills and the 

specific mission of an assault land ing. From the ope rations subsection, the G3 tra ining subsection obtai ncd th e cxpected D-Day comba t missions o f each 

uni t to determine the required spec ial trai ning. Its dircctives to subord inate 

echelons stressed the necd for instruction in such areas as combined arms, minc 

detection, supply disc ipline, preventi ve mai ntenance, and rev iews of basic sma llunit tra ini ng. Beyo nd selling gcnera l trai ning objectives, however, the First Army 

headqu arters le n the actual conduct of instructio n to subord inate un its and confin ed itse lf mostly to ove rall supe rv ision and, given the lack of time, to visits in 

li eu o f more deta iled inspections. The biggest trai ning probl ems fac ing the First 

Army staff were a lack o f suitab le fa ciliti es in c rowded England and shorta ges 

o f instructional mate ria ls. Th rough carefu l sc hedu ling, the use of SOS service 

faci li ties, and improvisation, the First Army headq ua rte rs managed to overcome sllch hurdl es.$9 

The First Army's efforts toward joint traini ng mct with mixed results. Train -

ing with the Navy ge ncrall y wen t we ll, as enginee r spec ial brigades and the 

attached nava l beach batta lio ns achi eved a high deg ree of illutual respect and 

coope ra tion, and I-I a rt's a rtil lery staff wo rked with Kirk 's Western Task Force and 

the I I th Amph ibiolls Force to train naval shore fire control parties and the crews 

of self- propell ed gun s that would provide close support from landing craft. The 

First Army headq uart ers responded slowly to the discovery in February of lI nde rwater obstacles off the beaches and to the Navy's need for help in clearing those 

obstacles, but, by mid-April as joint planners worked out a demolition plan, engi neer combat battal ions were tra ining to aid nava l combat demolition units.60 

Air-ground traini ng provcd more diffi cult to achi eve. The Ninth Air Fo rce 

did institute co urses for the ground lia iso n officers who would brief a ir st affs 
"To Seclire 1I Lodgemelll 011 'he COlllillell' " 65 

First Army slajJpel'Solllle/ (If lI'ol'k ill olle of the office ~ aI Cljfio" College 

and crews on the ground situation and relay intc llige ncc ga ined from ai r missio ns to ground headquarters. On Bre reton's list of priorities, however, joint 

trai ning ranked be low orga ni z in g and train ing air units newly arri ved in Britai n, aChievin g air superiorit y, and inte rdicting German communica tions in 

Fnlllce. The Ninth Air Force was in the process of co nfiguring and training 

fi ghters for dive-bombing and strafin g, wh ile contacti ng the Roya l Air Force 

and Twe lfth Air Force in Ita ly for data on close " ir support. Thus, it se ldom 

partic ipated injoint exc rc ises, and poor weather restri cted its role in other training events.61 In one or the rew exercises in which airme n did take part, ground 

rorces incorrec tly marked the ir rront lines, and communications were so bad 

that one observer recommended using pigeons in the ruture. Duri ng ea rly May 

Brereton finall y ex pa nded the Ninth Air Force's ro le in the First Army's training maneu ve rs, but by then the First Army had a lmost finished its training "nd 

was beginn ing fin,,1 preparations ror Nm'TuNE. In rairness to the Ninth Air Force, 

the First Army headquarters, abso rbed in ils own prioriti es, apparcn tl y did not 

press overly hard ror joint training with thc airme n.

62 

Even while super vising the trai ning or subordinates, the First Army staff 

was conducting command post exe rcises of its own. Early exercises in Decembe r and January had a lready shown the need for a new arrangeme nt o r hCtldqua rt ers echelons to replace the forward-rea r orga ni za tion. During February a 

signal detachmcnt tested communi cations equipment and procedures at the army 

leve l as part or CAREFREE, a British signals excrcise in wh ich both the America ns and Canad ians part ic ipated. These procedures were tested rurther in CANDLE 
66 A Command POSI til "'.1(1/' 

during the first two weeks of April. CANDLE was intended to test both wire and 

radio procedures, but il omitted radio because th e exe rc ise area was too near 

the combined headquarters in Plymollth and would interfere with ils important 

nets. Neverthe less, CANDLE provi ded numeroliS lessons, parti cularly rega rd ing 

the integration of British a nd American commun icati ons. The First Army staff 

he ld a final command POSI exerc ise in late May. Titl ed BRA SS HAT, the two-day 

exercise was designed to train the command and suppl y echelons in the orderly 

movement and reestablishment o f the command post and its communications 

systems.

6l 

On those ra re moments when not busy with command post exercises, 

supervision of training, or other preparat ions, First Army personne l sought 

amusement whenever they could find it. Training visits provided one of the 

few di ve rsions avai lable to the sta ff in wartime Britain. Staff officers would 

long remember the journeys a long narrow country roads, the stops at Channe l 

ports, and the coll ections o f old houses located on bays and inl ets with neighboring hills sloping down almost pe rpendi cular to the water. 64 In Bristol they 

could watch movies, attend an occasional performance of Irving Be rlin's "Th is 

Is the Army" or th e London Phi lharmon ic Orchestnl, or visit the c ity zoo, where 

some G- I offi ce rs perce ived an uncanny resemblance between a gorill a named 

"Alfred" and th e ir chi ef, Red O ' Ha re. Those seekin g more variet y for the 

pala te than the Army offered cou ld find lilli e other tha n fish, sa usage, and 

tomatoes in the Bristol markets.65 On the other han d, Bristol provided more 

opportun ities to ming le wit h the local populatio n th an had been the case in 

North Africa or Sic ily. Staff officers and en listed men made friends amon g 

local fa mi lies and <lllended the "Strangers Club," an organiza tion of musicians, 

artists, and you ng professiomlls who met once II month in an old house in Bristol 

to drink , converse , and liste n to musical pe rforman ces by group members./'/\ 

For a population unde rgoin g strict wartime ratio ning, th e amount of creature 

comforts available to the Amcrieans could seem overwhelming. One Eng lishwoman in Bristol, puzzled by a fri end 's interest in a certai n cn listed man. found 

that he worked in the First Army headquarters kitchens. where he had access to 

food unimag ina ble to most wa rtime BritonsY 

The First Army headquarte rs' time in Bristol was growing short. In late April 

and early May the headquarters supe rvised two final , fu ll dress rehearsa ls at the 

lIrmy amphibious traini ng ce nter at Slapton Sand s on the south coast of Devon. 

The re. it sought to test the lIssault plan under the most realistic conditions possible. In Exercise TIGER for the VII Corps on 27- 29 April and Exerc ise F AIJIUS for 

(he V Corps on 3- 8 May, assault troops rehearsed the entire cross-Channe l assault. They shifted to assembly areas near the Channel, moved to forward a reas 

and boa rded craft, came ashore after a nava l bombardment, reduced pi llboxes 

a nd cut barbed wire, and, in the case of TIGER, advanced inshore to link lip with 

a irborne troops dep loyed by trucks in the absence of suffic ie nt aircraft. Both 

exercises encounte red some probl ems with traffic congestion in the embarkation 

phase, bu t, on the whole, they went we ll. Tragedy struck TIGER, however, when 

German torpedo boats penetrated the convoy's protective scree n and sa nk two 

LSTs (landing ships. tank). More soldiers died inlhe raid than would be kill ed in 
"To Secure (I Lodgemellt 011 'he COlltillelll" 67 

the VII Corps' assau lt on D·Day. The episode not only caused the First Army 

staff to revise once again its sh ipment schcdules to compensate fo r the loss of 

landing craft, bllt also aroused conce rns ovcr the chance that the eneountcr mi ght 

have compromised the inva ion .b~ 

Even while the rehea rsals were lak ing place, the Allies had begu n the ma s· 

sive, enormously complex task o f positioning for shipment to Ih e Continent 

th e 130,000 soldiers schedul ed 10 ma ke th e initial assa ult and Ihe ove r one 

million troops slat ed 10 fo ll ow in th e first ninety days. This huge operation, 

which would continue well beyond D-Day, involved three steps. First, the troops 

asscmbled at th eir concentration areas, normally th eir home stations, where 

units se parated out surplus personn el and vehicles and waterproofed and packed 

equ ipment. Second, they moved to their marshaling sl;lIions, where they were 

briefed on the opera tion, received ra tio ns and other necessities, and formed 

into loads for the different c raft. Third, they shifted 10 their embmkation points, 

lIsually only a few mil es away. Responsibil ity for the operation rested wit h 

ETOUSA·SOS, but the First Army headquarte rs would pl ay a key role , selling 

and, when necessary, changing priorit ies for troop movements, adj ustin g the 

loading of suppli es to match those priorities, and helping to supervise th e flow 

of uni ts, su pplies, and ma teriel ac ross the Channel.69 

The First Army headquarters wou ld have conside rab le in put in the buildup 

process. To su pe rvise that process, SHAEF created an Alli ed committ ee of rep· 

resentat ives from th e diffe rent services, includin g aft er 24 April the First Army 

G- I and G- 3 secti ons. This eommillee rece ived the designation "Buildup Con· 

trol (BUCO) (West)," with " West" added to conform with th e efforts to dece ive 

the Ge rmans on the landing site. Changes in American buildup priorities, both 

before and aner D-Day, would remain the res ponsibility of the First Army head· 

quarters up to the acti vation of the 1st Army Group. From its headquarters at 

Fort Southwick ncar Portsmouth, BUCO (West) would implemenllhose changes, 

coordinating movements of ships and c raft and of units to the ir embarkation 

points. Under BUCO (West), Movemen t Control, an organi zation of Alli ed trans· 

port agencies, would write detai led orders fo r movement of troops from home 

stations to embarkation points, wh il e Turn·Round Control, a nava l agcncy, was 

to keep track of the status of ships ca rryin g troops, supplies, and materi el across 

the Cha nnel. Fo r the Fi rst Army stafT, the whole mall cr of establishing and 

alt ering priorities promised to be a consumin g task. and on 29 May it creat ed, 

initi ally with in the G- 3 section of the command echelon and later as a separate 

agency within th e headquarte rs, " Littl e BUCO." Drawing representatives from 

the I st Army Group, the Th ird Army, the Navy, and COMZ, this agency would 

sc reen requests for changes in priorities prior to dispatch to BUCO (West). It 

remained to be seen whether th is compli cated array of j oint and combined com· 

millees could handl e an extremely complex task, now onl y a wee k away.70 

Leaving behind the base echelon, the First Army headquarters left Bristol in 

ea rly Junc. At Plymouth on 3 June Bradley, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, Di ckson, 

Thorson, Wilson, Maj . Chester B. Hansen, and a few journal clerks and dra fts· 

men boarded the heavy c ruiser Alig IISW , where the Navy had established a war 

room with wa ll maps and a plotting tabl e in a sheet meta l shed on the afterdec k. 
68 A Command Post at War 

Hodges and representatives of the several staff sections boarded tbe converted 

cargo ship Achernar, ready to assume control if the command ship were sunk or 

incapacitated. Most of the headquarters split into three contingents, each of which 

had representatives from all the staff sections. The separate groups under Myers, 

Hewitt, and Grant Williams, respectively, then boarded three LSTs at three different ports. SHAEF had set D-Day for 5 June, but by the time the First Army 

staff awoke on the morning of 4 June, the weather had turned soupy and wet, 

with a lack of visibility. Shortly afterward, the command group on the Augusta 

learned of the 24-hour postponement. The staffspent a restless morning, pouring 

over recent aerial photographs of the German defenses while Bradley, in his cabin, 

read A Bell for Adana. In the afternoon, the commander and his staff conferred 

with Kirk and his officers on courses of action in the event of another postponement. The need for contingency plans soon became academic, for at midnight 

they received word of Eisenhower's decision to proceed.

71 

As the First Army headquarters watched the invasion armada cross the 

Channel, it could take pride in its first seven months as a staff. By its nature, an 

amphibious assault was a frontal attack with little room for maneuver, requiring the invading army to throw as much force ashore as possible before the 

enemy could react. The lack of ships made it all the more essential to plan the 

buildup with care and leave enough room for flexibility to respond to the tactical situation. In short, planning and preparation for the cross-Channel invasion 

demanded more attention to detail than usually fell to a World War II American 

army headquarters. It was the kind of careful, painstaking task for which the 

seasoned, methodical First Army staff was well suited. At times, the planners 

went too far, laying out beach sectors and other details that could have been 

left to the subordinate echelons, and the intelligence section, while it generally 

performed well, missed the movement of the 352d Infantry Division to OMA HA 

Beach. The biggest mistake made by the First Army headquarters, however, lay 

in its inattention to the ohstacle posed by the hedgerows. Focused on the formidable mission of obtaining a foothold on the far shore and engrossed in the 

myriad details involved in that task, the First Army headquarters did not adequately recognize the problems involved in expanding the beachhead. But a 

headquarters less attentive to detail might never have reached that stage of 

O VERLORD. 

!I. 
Notes 

I Rpl, First U.S. Army, Report ofOpcfnlions, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 1: 25. 6: 125 : 

Mins. Meeting of 10int Commanders in Chief:!! SI. Paul 's, 7 December 1943, blank file. Pogue 

interviews. USAMHI: Harrison, Cross-Clu/lwel AI/ack, p. 116. 

l Bradley. A Soldier~' S/Ol)', pp. 199- 200: MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbc. pp. 100- 101: 

Harrison, Cross-Clu/IIJ/el AI/lick, p. 485. 

J Rpts. First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 1: 2 1. 

6:54,121 - 22, and Draft, FirSI U.S. Army Report of Opera lions. 20 OCI 43- 1 Aug 44, sec. 2. 

pl. C, pp . 1- 5; Ruppenthal, LogisliClil SIIPPO/"l o/lheArmies. Volllllle I, p. 260: Lida Mayo, 

The Ordl/lIlICe Dept/I"/II/elll: all Bet/chhead (lild Ball/efrolll, U.S. Army in World War II 

(Wllshington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1968), pp. 2 19. 237- 38; George R. 

Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, The Sigllal Corl's: The Oil/come (Mid-1 943 Through 1945), 

U.S. Army in World War II (Washington . D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1966). 

p. 94: William F. Ross and Charles F. Romanus, Tile Quarlermasler Corps: Ol'ermiolls ill Ih e 

Hill" Agaillsi Gel"lI/allY, U.S. Army in World War JJ (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Army Ccnter of 

Militnry History. 1965). pp . 320- 21,457: McNamnrn, QII(I/"Ier/l/t/s/er ilClil'ilies. pp. 93- 95: 

Brook s E. Kleber and Da le Birdsell, Tile Chemical Hill/are Sen'ice: Chemicufs ill Comba/. 

U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1965). 

pp. 70,459- 60 . 

• Cir, HQ. First U.S. Army, an. 3a to First United Stntes Army Operations Plan NIlPTUNE, 

0 - 1 Plan. Troop List. 381 Decimal file, box 169. HQ, FUSA, Adjutant General Section. General 

Correspondence, 1940- 1947. RG 338, WNRC. 

, Mayo, 011 Beachhead (lml Balllejrolll. pp. 229- 30; Rpt. Kean to CO, 21 Army Group , 

14 Feb 44 , sub: Committee Proceedi ngs on Special Equipment, U.S. Army, 12th Army Group. 

337 Conferences, RG 331. NARA. For more on American development of tanks that explode 

mines. sec Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The 

Ordllt/llce Depafllllelll: Plallllillg MllllilioIlS /OI·lJ'tlr, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, 

D,C.: U.S. Army Cc nter of Military 1·listory, 1955), pp. 389- 90; Cir, MillC Exploders TIEl: 

Mine Excavator T5E3 , in Wa r Department , Office of thc Chicf of Ordnllllce, Limited 

Procurement Supplement of Cataloguc of StandlHd Ordnance Items, I March 1945, CMH 

Library. For criticism of the decision not to use the 79th Armoured Division's tanks, see 

Wilmot, H e S/J'lIggfe jor Ellrope, p. 265; Russell F. Wcigley, t.-isellhower ;\. Uell/elu/Ills: The 

Climpaiglls oj Fl"(lIIce (11/(1 GermallY. 1944- 1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 

1981 ), pp. 86- 87. 

~ Under the definition that ETO USA adopted in Dccember, unit of fire "is a yardstick or 

unit of mellsure used in the supply of ammunition during initial stages of combat and in specifying 

stock levels for Army depots. It is that amount of ammunition which may be eXI)ected to be 

expended in one day of intense combat or 2.5 days of nvcrage combat. It is expressed in rounds 

per typc weapon." (IncL Lt Col Ri chard P. Fisk , Asst Adj Gen, ETOUSA. to Distribution. 10 

Dec 43, sub: Unit of Fire, in Mcmo, Sayler for CG, ETOUSA. 29 Dec 43, sub: Recommended 

Ammunition Day of Supply, Ammunition file , box 598. U.s. Army, Records ofOCMH, Rccords 

of Historical Services Division, Publications, Unpublished Manuscripts and SUpporting Records, 

1943- 1977: 2- 3.7 CP 3 The Technical Services: The Ordnance Dept. . Ordnance Overseas, RG 

3 19, NARA.) The basic load II'llS "a prescribed allowance of ammunition, supplies, and equi pment 

carried by a unit." (War Dcp,lrtment Technical Manual [TM) 20- 205. Dicliomll), oj Vlliled 

Sw/(:s Army Tenus [Washington. D.C.: War Department, 1944], p. 39.) 

1 Quote from Ruppentha I, I.ogislical SUPPOI"I 0/ Ifte ArmieS. Volt/me I , p. 537, and see also 

p. 538. Memo, Sayler fOf CO, ETOUSA, 29 Dec 43. sub: Recommended Ammunition Day of 

Supply; Conference, 12th Army Group. 337 Conferences, USAS file , ORB, Conference on 

Ammunition, 9 May 44 , Discards folder, box 598, Rceords ofOCM H, 2- 3.7 CP 3, RG 319, 

NA RA ; Rpls. U.S. Army. ETO, General Board. Ammunition Supply for Field Artillery, Study 

58, pp. 4- 11. CMI·I LibrlLry, and First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 Octobe r 1943- 1 

August 1944, 6:64- 65; Mayo, all Be(lchhead (lild Ballfejrolll, Pl'. 227- 28. 
70 A COII//J/alld Post at War 

I RllppCn(hul , Logi~'li lll SIIPP0r/ oj Ihe Arlllic~·. Vollime I. PI). 191. 195- 201 . 209: Rpt. 

First U.S. Army. lh~I)\)rl of Operations, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 6: 122: Kleber and 

Birdsell. Chelllic{//~' ill Combul, p. 69. 

9 Hawley quote from Graham A. Cosmas and Alben E. Cowdrey, The Medicol De,)(/I"I/IICIII: 

Mediw/ Sen,jce ill l/ie Elllvp('(11/ Theater ofOpermioll.l'. U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, 

I),C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1(92), pp. 67- 68. 

10 McNamara, QlI{/rlerlll{/~'le,. AClil'ilie.l', pp. 97- 99: Llrs, Mcdaris 10 Maj Gcn Leven 1-1. 

Cmnpbc\l, Chief of Ordmmcc. War DCP:H1111C11I. 24 NOli 43. and Sayler 10 Campbell, 30 Nov 4], 

both in file 7. ETQ, October 1943- May 1944, box 4, Henry 13. Sayler Pnpcrs. Eisenhower Libr;ny: 

Ross and Romanus, Operalions in Ihe lIilr AgainSI Ger/l/(jll)', p. 733. 

II Rpts. First U.S. Army, Report ofOper:ltions, 20 Octobcr 1943 - 1 August 1944. 1:15.20-

22,5: 172, 210. 6:54- 55, 122- 23, and Dran, First U.S. Army Report OfOpcfiltions, 20 0(,;t43-

I Aug 44. sec. 2, Ill. C, pp. 1- 5: Mayo. Oil Bellcllllt.:(J(1 alld Oalliefroni. p. 227: MS. Carter. 

Employmcnt and Staff Proccdures, p. 44; McNamanl. QU(I/"/(>I"II/(/sier AClil'ilics. pp. 100- 10 I. 

12 Rpl. First U.S. Army. Report ofOI)erations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 1:21- 22: 

llr<idlcy. A Soldier:~ S(O/Y. p. 238: D<ivid Reynolds. Rich l?eJatiolls: Tltc Americ(l/! OCCIII/lilioll 

of Britaill. 1942- 1945 (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 184. 

1.\ Rpts. First U.S. Army. Report ofOpcrations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944.5:6 1- 63. 

and First Army, COD. 18 NOli 46, pp. 147- 48, 156 . 

.. Mins. Mecting of Joint Commanders in Chicf:" S1. Pau1"s. 7 Deccmber 1943. 

" Quote from Rpt. First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 

1944.1:25. Sec also Rpt, Dran, First U.S. Army Rel}Qrt ofOperntions. 20 Oct 43- 1 Aug 44, 

sec. 3. pI. A. pp. 2- 3: Bradley. A Soldier :1' SlOt)'. Pl'. 221 - 22: MS. Cartcr. Carter's War. eh. 8. 

1'1'.9- 11. 

16 Morgan. Opel'llIre 10 OV£I?LORD. p. 184; Rpt , U.s. Army. 12th Army Group. Report of 

Operations (Final After Action Report). 12th Army Group. 14 vols., 1:5- 6. CMH Libr:lry; 

Ingersoll, Top Secrel. pp. 86- 87; Intervs, Forrest C. Pogue with General Omar N. Bradley, 14 

Oet46, p. I, nnd 6 Nov 46. p. 5. both in Pogue interviews. USAM HI; I3radley. A Soldier :1' SlOt")', 

pp. 179- 80, 210- 11 ; Ruppenthal , Logi.\·lical Slipporl of Ihe Arll/ies. Voluille I, p. 226: Int erv. 

Murray with Hart. 1973, pp. II , 13. 

n Rpt. Dran, First U.S. Army Report of Ope Tat ions, 20 Oct 43- 1 Aug 44. sec. 3, pI. A, Pl'. 2, 

5- 6; Bradley, II Soldier:~ SIO/)', pp. 210- 1 I: Ruppenthal, Logislical Suppo,., oflheAl"Il/ics. Joll/Ille 

I. pp. 205, 226: Alfred M. l3eek el aI., The COIPS of Ellgilleers: The m/r Ilgail/Sl Ger/l/(lIIY, US. 

Army in World War 11 (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Army Cellter of Military History, 1985), p. 287. 

On prewar army group doctrine. see Mllllnal fOJ ' COIII/JW/ldel·.I· vfLarge Ullils. 1930. I: 13- 1 5. 

" Rpt. U.S. Army, Provisional Engineer Speeiall3rigade Group, Operation Report: NErTUNI: 

(report of the activities of the Provisiona l Engineer Special I3rigade Group fro lll 26 Fcbruary 

1944 to 26 Junc 1944).30 Scp44. p. 135, CMH Library. 

to Samuel Eliot Morison, The 11II'(lsiOIl of FlYIlICe alld GeJ"/l/(/II)'. 1944- 1945, History of 

United St,ltes Naval Opcrations in World War II (Boslon: Little, Brown. 1962), pp. 29- 30: 

Bradley, A Soldied' SI(}I)" pp. 121 - 29 . 

.!O w. A. Jacobs, "The [lallie for France," in Case SllIdie ~ illihe DevefoplllclIl ofCfoseAir 

SuppoJ"/, cd. Benjamin F. Cooling, Special Studies (Washington, D.C.: OtTice of Air Force I-I istory. 

1990). pp. 244-45, 251 ; Lewis H. Brereton, The Br{WelOlI Diaries: The Hilr ill Ihe Air ill Ihe 

Pacific. A·fiddle Easl. and £lImpe. 3 OClober 1941- 8 May 1945 (New York; William Morrow. 

1946), pp. 226. 229, 232- 33; Miehaell3echthold, "Close Air Support in Normandy: The Casc 

of First U.S. Army and IX Tactical Air Command: A Question of Doctrine. Training, and 

EXpcrience" (M.A. thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1993). pp. 77- 78; Intefvs, Burg with 

Quesada. 13 Nov 74, pp. 85- 88, 105- 08. and John L. Luter with Lt Gen Elwood R. Ques,lda, 

USA I' (Re!.), 12 Sep 67, I'p. 6- 7, Eiscnhower Library; Bradlcy, II Soldier"s SI(}I)', Pl'. 250, 337; 

Thomas A. Hughes, OVERLOI?D: Gel/eml Pele Quesada alld Ille TrilJlllpil ofTaclical Ai,. Power 

ill World IJ'ru' fI (New York Free Press. 1995), pp. 37, 123. 

l ' Bernard L. Montgomery, Normandy /0 Ille B(lI,ic (Boston: Houghton Mimin. 1948), p. 

6: Hamilton, ,',,/tlsler oflhe Ballleflefd. pp. 502- 03; Wilmot, 1"Ile Sll"IIggle fOI" £lJrope. pp. 463-

65: Carlo D'Eslc, Decisioll ill NOl"lI/alldy (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1983), pp. SO- 53: Intervs. Lt 
"To SeclIre a Lodgemel/f 01/ tile COli/iI/em" 71 

Col Robert St. Lou is. USA. with Gen Chnrles H. Bonesteel [[ I. USA (Ret.). 9 Nov 72. p. 140. 

Sen ior Officers Ornl 1-1 istory Progrnm. USAM H I. nnd K ish with Clnrke. 23 Feb 82. pp. 29 1- 92; 

Max Unstings. OVERLORD (New York: Simon nnd Schuster. 1984). pp. 3 1- 33; [ngersoll. Top 

Secrel. pp. 92- 93; Bradley. Ii Soltlie,. :\. Slnl)', [)[). 208- 09. 

n Francis Dc Gui ngand. Operali(1II VICTOR}' (London: [[ odder and Stoughton. 1947), I). 

348. [ntervs. Forrest C. Pogue with Bri g Gcn D:wid Belchern. 20 Fcb47. p. 4. Pogue interviews. 

USAM HI: Pogue :md Gordon Hnrrison with Col Charles II. Bonesteel III , 18 Jun 47. p. 3, 

Pogue fi les- Eisenhower Ltrs. Aug 44. Pogue interviews. USAM lll : St. Louis with Bonesteel. 

9 Nov 72. p. 140; and Pogue with Brndley. 14 Oct 46, p. I. MS. Dickson. Algiers 10 the Elbe. p. 

102: Ruppenthal. Logislica/ SIfPPOI"I of Ille AI"II/ies. VOllIlIIl! I. p. 206; D·Este. DecisiQIf ill 

Normandy. p. 58. 

B Quoles from Rpl. First U.S. Army. Report of Operntions. 20 October 1943- 1 August 

1944, 2: 13. Sec a lso Ruppenthal. Logi.\· liwl SIIP/IO/'I oJlfle Armies. Volllille /. I). 175; Harrison. 

C/"O.U-CJWIlIle! Alwck. p. 485. 

2~ Montgomery. Norlll(llld), 10 lite: fiu/lic . pp. 5- 6. 10- 15; Mins, Minutes or Meeting 

Convcned by Supreme Commander. A Hied E)(pedit ionary Force. in Room 126. Norrol k 1·louse 

at 1030 1·lours on Friday. 2 1 st January 1944. ~I EF Minutes ofChier of StalT Meeti ngs. bo)( I. 

R,IY W. Barker Pap·ers. Eisenhower Libr.lry. and NOles Taken on Meeting of Army Commanders 

and Their Chie fs of StnlT at Headquarters, 2 1 Army Group, 7 Jallunry 1944. blnnk rile. Pogue 

interviews. USAM III; Brad ley. A 8ofdie"~' SIO/),. pp. 2 12- 14, 2 18- 20; O'Estc. Decisioll ill 

NO/"/l/II/u/y, pp. 57. 62- 68. 

lj Rpts. FirSl U.S. Army. Report ofOI}erations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 1:25. 2: 13-

89. and Draft. First U.S. Army Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43- 1 Aug44, sec. 3. pI. A. PI'. 2- 3; 

Interv. I'ogue with Williams. 30- 3 1 May 47. p. 10; Bradley, A Soltlie,-:' 81m),. pp. 221 22. 

:. Rpt. Draft. First U.S. Army Report of Operations. 20 OCI 43- 1 Aug 44. sec. 3. pI. A. p. 3. 

11 Bradley. A Soirlier~' Slot)'. pp. 181. 222- 23; Montgomery, Nor/l/II//(f), 10 lite liul/ie. p. 16. 

n Forrest C. I'ogue. The Supreme Com/ll(Uul, U.S. Army in World War II (Washingtoll, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. 1954), p. 162. 

N Bradley. A Sofdied'SIDI)', PI'. 223- 24; MS , Dick son, Al giers to the El be. pp . 108- 11; 

Interv, Murr,lY with Pnllerson. 23 Aug 73, pp. 67- 70; Llrs. Col Fred W. Jacks. USA (Ret.). to 

author. II Dec 96. DWH. and Lt Col Robe rt A. Riesman. USA R (Ret.). to author, 4 Feb 97. 

DWH. 

M MS. Dickson. Algiers to the Elbe. pp. 104- 06. 113- 14; Rpts. First U.S. Army. Repon or 

OI)Crat ions, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944.2: 126. and Rosengartcli to Col Telford Taylor. 21 

May 45, s ub: Report on ULTRA Intell ige nce ot First U.S. Army. SRI I- 023 PI. I. box 9, Records 

of the National Security Agency. RG 457. NA RA; Memo. First Army G- 2 Memorandum, 25 

Nov 43. s ub: Role ofG 2 in Planning nn Aml)hibious Assau lt . Dickson I'ape rs. USMA Library; 

Llr. RiesnHII1 to author. 4 Feb 97. 

J I Rpt. First U.S. Army. Re port of Ope Tat ions. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944.2: 114- 23. 

3:9- 10. 

}l Interv, I'ogue with Williams. 30- 31 May 47. 1' . 3; MS. Dickson. Algiers to the Elbe. p. 

117: Inte ry. Pogue with Rosengarten. 22 Dec 47. p. 1; Ilarrison. Cmss-C/'m/llel Aliac/;. pp. 

319f. 

JJ Rpt . Rosengarten to Taylor. 21 May 45. sub: Repon on UI.TItA Intell igence at First U.S. 

Army: Adolph G. Rose ngarten. Jr .• "With ULTI~A From OMA IIA Beach \0 We imar. GermnnyA Personal View." ,'vlilil(U)' Ilffllirs 42 (Oc tober 1978): 128; Intcn'. Murray with Rosengurten, 3 

Mar 75. pp. 2.8: Ra lph Hen nell. ULTRA ill Ihe U'/>Sl: The: Norlllalld), C(lIII/migl/, /944- 1945 

(New York: Charles Scribner's, 1979). I). 45; Martin Blulllenson, "Wil l ULTRA Rewrite lIistory'!"' 

AI"II/)' 28 (August 1978): 42- 43. 

J' Rpts, First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944.3:46- 48. 

and Draft. First U.S. Army Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43- 1 Aug 44. sec. 3. pI. A. p. 4: 

Bradley. A Soldier~' SIOI)'. pp. 224- 25; MS. Bradley, Revised Trnnseription of Bradley Intcrviews. 

feel I. p. 66; Interv. Oevnn with Hewitt. 1 Oct 8[, Jl]J. 126- 29; MS, Dickson, Algiers 10 the 

Elbe. p. 104; hllCI·VS. Murray with Myers. 15 Apr 74. pp. 57- 59. and iluthor with Wendt , 29 Apr 

9 1. Pl' . 11- 12,23- 25.29.33. 
72 

35 Thorson quote from Bradley, A Soldier:r Story, p. 225. 

36 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 192. 

A Command Post at War 

J7 Quote from Rpt, First U.S. Army. Report of Operations, 20 October 1943- 1 August 

1944, 2: 177, and see also 1:23-24, 2: 177-81, 185, 192, 5:61, 64-65, 70, 76. Rpt, First Army, 

COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 154. 

38 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944,3:65; 

Cosmas and Cowdrey. Medical Service in the European Theater ajOperations, pp. 157-72. 

39 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943-\ August 1944,3:85-100; 

Ross and Romanlls, Operations in the War Against Germany, pp. 333- 37, 557- 58, 648; 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support a/the Armies, Volume f, pp. 440- 41. 

40 Mayo, On Beachhead and Ball/efronl, pp. 233-35; Telecon, author with Col John Ray, 

USA (ReL), 25 Nov 96, DWH. 

4\ Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943-1 August 1944,4:76-100, 

170-81. 

42 Quote from Ibid., 4:68, and see also 4:49- 56, 68- 72. 

" Ibid. , 4:56- 58, 221 - 24. 

44 NEPTUNE Plan in Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943 1 August 

1944, 2:91~108, with annexes. See also Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 224; Harrison, CrossChanne! At/ack, pp. 185 86; Rpts, Draft, First U.S. Army Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43- \ 

Aug 44, sec. 3, pc A, pp. 5, and Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, Operation 

Report: NEPTUNE, 30 Sep 44, p. 32. 

45 Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943-1 August 1944, 1:27, 

4:258 59, and Draft, First U.S. Army Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43 1 Aug 44, sec. 2, pt. A, 

p. I. Intervs, Pogue with Bradley, 14 Oct 46, pp. 3; Lt Col Charles C. Speraw, USA, with Gen 

1. Lawton Collins, USA (Ret.), pp. 155-60, Senior Officers Oral History Program, USAMHI; 

and author with Wendt, 29 Apr 91, pp. 30- 31. Ltr, Jacks to author, II Dec 96; Ruppenthal, 

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, pp. 301 - 02; Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, 

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, U.S. Army in World War" (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1957), p. 255 ; Beck et aI., The War Against Germany, pp. 

304-05. 

46 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 175,227-29; Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, p. 48. 

Ltrs, Eisenhower to Marshall , 18 Jan 44 ; Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Jan 44; Eisenhower to 

Marshall, 29 Jan 44; and Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Feb 44. All in Chandler, ed., Eisenhower 

Papers, 3: 1665- 67, 1695- 96, 1736. Intervs, Maclyn P. Burg with Gen Roscoe B. Woodruff, 

USA (Ret.), 16 Mar 72, pp. 42-43, 47-48, Orall-listory Project, Eisenhower Library, and Speraw 

with Collins, pp. 68- 69; Charles H. Corlett, Cowboy Pete (Santa Fe, N.M.: Sleeping Fox 

Enterprises, 1974), pp. 88- 89. 

47 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, pp. 203-13, 225. 

48 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943-1 August 1944, 1 :31; 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume 1, p. 213; Cosmas and Cowdrey, Medical 

Service in the European Theater of Operations, p. 157. 

49 Memo, First U.S. Army and U.S. Naval Task Force 122, Joint Agreement Between 

Commanding General First U.S. Army and Commander Task Force One Two Two for Amphibious 

Operations (annex listing principles of joint operations to be followed in NEPTUNE), 10 Feb 44, in 

Rpt, Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, Operation Report: NEI'TUNE, 30 Sep 44, app. C, 

pp. Ii-Ix. Sec also Rpts, Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, Operation Report: NEPTUNE, 

30 Sep 44, pp. 137- 39,318, and First U.S. Army, Operations Plan NEPTUNE, an. 21, Artillery and 

Naval Fire Support Plan, in Rp!, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943- 1 August 

1944, 4:222. For more on the SHAEF operational memorandums, see SHAEF General Staff, G3 Division, Administrative Section, Subject file, 1942- 1945, box 45, RG 331, NARA. 

50 Cir, CWO Henry G. Capucille, Asst Adj Gen, First Army, to Distribution List, 18 May 

44, sub: Direct Air Support, OVERLORD, 101 - 1.5 G- l Plan OVERLORD Direct Air Support, 18 

May 44, box 1827, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Jacobs, "The Battle for France," in 

Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. Cooling, p. 254. For more on the 

Army Air Forces' background with close air support, see Daniel R. Mortensen, A Pattern for 
"To Secure a Lodgemelll oil/he Conlinenl" 73 

Joilll OperMiolls: World 1ft//" fI Close Air SlIpporl. NOr/h Ajric(I, Historical Analysis Series 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force l1 istory and U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

1987). 

" Rpts, U.S. Army, ETO, General Board. Report on the Organization of the Army 

lIeadquarlers and Headquarte rs Comp,my, Study 24, p. I. and First U.S. Army, Report of 

Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. I: \5- 16. 5:74.6:53; Msg. Brig (jcn 1-1 . B. Lewis, 

Adj Gen, 1 st Army Group. to CG. ETOUSA, 30 May 44. sub: Increase in Non·T/O Grades ,md 

Ratings fo r Armies, alld other correspondence in 320.3 TIO Volumes 1- 2, box 126. U.S. Army. 

Headquarters, 12t h Army Group, Speei:ll Storr, Adjutant General Section, Administrative Branch, 

Decimal fil e. 1943- 1945. RG 331. NARA; [nter .... author with Maj Gen Peter C. Hains III , USA 

(ReI.), 29 May 91, pp. 2- 8, DWH ; Mayo, On 8e(lehheml (II/(/ 8mlle/roll/. p. 235: Ross and 

Romanus, Operaliolls ill Ihe lI'i1r Agoills/ Ge/"ll/(III)" pp. 352- 53. For morc on the controversy 

over the prOI>cr pl ace ofdvil affairs in a fi e ld headquarters. see Ilarry L. Coles and Albert K. 

Weinberg. Civil A//(I;rs: Soldiers Become Gm'eruo!"s. U.S. Army in World War [I (Wash ington. 

D.C.: U.S. Army CenterofMilitllry History. 1964), Pl'. 673- 78; Pogue, The SlIpreme Commt/lld. 

Pl'. 75- 84. 

'I Rpts. First U.S. Army. Rel>O rI ofOpcrations, 20 October [943- 1 August 1944. I: 16- 18, 

and Draft. First U.S. Army Rcport of Opcratiolls, 20 Oel 43- 1 Aug 44. sec. 2, 1)1. A, pp. 6- 7: 

Mayo, 011 8ef/cMend (lII(IIJ(llIlejiulIf, pp. 235- 36: MS, Carter, Employment and Staff Procedures, 

p.36. 

'J Llr, Jaeks to author. II Dec 96: U.S. Mili tary Academy Association of Graduates. Regisler 

f/jGr(li!lIfllel' (///(( Former C(/( .~ o/Ihe Vlliled SImes ",.". lilm)' l !eadem)': Eisellhower Celllellllill/ 

flliliall (West Point, N.Y.: Association ofOraduates, U.S. Military Academy, 1990), pp. 348, 

42 1; Interv. Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, I)P. 14- 18.38- 44.86- 93. 

,.. Rpls. Firsl U.S. Army. Report ofOpcrations, 20 Oclober 1943- 1 August 1944. I: 18, and 

Draft, First U.S. Army Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43- 1 Aug 44, sec. 2. pl. A, pp. 7- 8: Cir. 

HQ, First U.S. Army, Swndard Ol)erating I'roeedure (SOP)- First U.s. Army, 1 May 44, pp . 

37- 38.1 01 - 1.15 G- I 1st Army, I May 44, box 1829, WW II Ops Reports, RO 407. WNRC; 

MS, Organ ization and Operation of an Army Headquarters in Combat. Bristol Papers, pp. 19-

20: Interv, Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74, PI). 4- 5. 

5' The best discussion or Montgomery's planning for OVEIlI.OIII) is in D'Estc, IJeci.fioll ill 

No!"mllnd),. PI'. 7 1- 104. Sec also Pogue, Tile SlIpreme CUII/mund. PI'. 66. 68: Montgome ry. 

Nor/l/alldy 10 Ihl' fJO/lic, PI'. 20- 24: Dc Guing:tnd, Operalioll VICTORY, pp. 356- 60; Bradley. II 

Soldier :\. SIOI)" PI). 239-4 1. Inl(:Tvs, Pogue with Bradley, 14 Oct 46, p. 2: with Lt Gen W;llter B. 

Smith. 9 May47. p. 3. Pogue interviews, USA MHI: with Oen Sir Miles Dempsey, 12- 13 Mar4 7. 

Pogue interviews. USAM H I: with Bclehem. 20 Feb 47. p. 3: Pogue and Uarrison with Bonesteel. 

18 Jun 47, pp. 3- 5; and Pogue with Dickson, 22 Dec 47, p. I. Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of 

Operations, 20 Oetober 1943- 1 August 1944, 4:2 13; Hastings, OVERLORD, pp. 37- 38: Omar N. 

Uradley and Clay Blair, A Ge/lem/s Life (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1983), p. 234. 

,. Michael D. Doubler, IJII,\'li/lg Ille Bocage: Americall Combilled IlnllS Opera(iolls ill Frlll/ce, 

6Jlllle- JI Jill)' 1944 (Fori Lea ... enwort h, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), pp. 14-15; 

Martin Blullienson, OreakOll1 ami Pursuil, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington , D.C,: U.S. 

Army Centcr of Mili tary History, 1961). pp. 11 - 13. 178. 

'1 Montgomery quote froml lamilton. Muslero/tlle 8mllefle/d, p. 588. and sec a lso p. 633. 

Rpl. U. K. War Cabinet, Chiers of Staff COllim ill ee, Ope rat ion OVEII LORIJ: Report and 

Appreci,ltion, app. 5, Topography of Caen Sector, Ri ver Dives to Ri ... er Vire (terrain study of 

Caen region). 30 Jul 43. in U.S. Army War Co llege, Selecle(1 Rei/dings. Conc/llcl o/U'(I/': COllrse 

9: Application a/Power: ThemeI' Opemliolls OVERLORD Camplligll PllI/ming, 2 ... ols. (Carl isle 

Darracks, I'a .: U.S. ArIllY War College, [984), I :13- 108: Morgan, Overillre IQ OVERLORD, pp. 

157- 58. Intervs, SI. Louis with Bonesteel, 9 Nov 72, pp. 155- 57, 164; Pogue and Hnrrison wilh 

Donesleel, 18 Jun 47, p. 5: and I'ogue with Smith, 9 May 47, p. 3. Blumenson, Hrellkoll/ (/lid 

PllrSllil, p. 13. 

j ' Quote from Intellige nce Pl an, in Rpe , First U.S. Army, Report of Operat ions, 20 October 

1943-1 August 1944,3:9, and see also 2: 125. 3: 10. [nlerv, I'ogue with Dickson, 22 Dec 47, p. 

2: Bradley and Blair. If Gelleml s Life, p. 234; Inlerv, Thomas F. So.1PCS with Brig Gen Henry J. 
74 A Commal/d POSf af War 

M:l1chctt, USA (Rct.), 1976, p. \ 7, Eisenhowe r Libr:HY: Llrs, Ri CSI1Wr1 10 :uuhor, 4 Feb 97. and 

Bri g Gcn Robe rt M. 13!a nchard. Jr., USA (Rct.), to author, Jan 97. DWn. Il11 erll, ;lIlthor with 

We ndl. 29 Apr 91. p. 40: 13lul11cl1sol1, Brca/iollllllld Pursuit. p. 1]. 

~9 RPIS, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943- 1 AlIg ns\ 1944, I: 18- 2 1. 

27.5:63,138 , 258- 59, 6:53, and Dr,lft, Firsl U.S. Army Report of Operations, 20 OC1 43- 1 Aug 

44, sec. 2. pI. 13, pp. 8- 10; Memo. 1944 Inspection TrillS to the United Kingdom (MM- May). 

box 7. \'/odges Pape rs. Eisenhower LibrllrY; Mayo. A" BC(lchlleod (llId /J(llIlefrolH, pp. 228- 29; 

Beck C\ a1.. Tile IVar Agaills{ Ger/l/ouy. p. 293; McNamarn. QlIlIrlel"lllllSler AClil'ilies, p. 101: 

Ross and ROlllanus, Opel"(lliolls illihe WarAgaillst GermallY, p. 353 ; Interv. Murr,lY wi th Myers, 

15AIH 74. p. 14; Rey nolds, Rich Relations. p. 121. 

W Rpts. Provisional Eng inee r Speeinl Brigmtc Group. Operntion Report : NEPTUNE, 30 Sell 

44, pp. 41 - 42, 136- 37, <lnd app. C, p. li. <lnd First U.S . Army, Report ofOpenllions. 20 October 

1943- 1 August 1944.5: 1 69- 70: Bec k et <II.. 1'fIe War Agaill.I·1 Gcrll/al/Y, pp. 305- 11. 

6 \ MS, John Ibmsey. Ninth Air Force in the ETO: 16 October 1943 to 16 April 1944. Army 

Air Forces Historical Study 32.1945, pp. 9 1. 103- 09.113- 14. CMH Library: Brereton, Brerelo/l 

Diaries. pp. 213- 14. 245. 249. 25 1. 255, 261 - 65: Bec hthold, "Close AiT SUpl}Orl in Norma ndy." 

PI'. 79- 85 . 

• 2 Bradley. A So/dicd' SIOI)', pp. 247- 49; Hansen Diary. 7 Dec 44, USAM HI : RpL First 

U.S. Army, RepoT1 of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944, 5:258 ; Bechthold, "Close 

Air Support in NOTl11<lnd y:' pp. 85- 87: Rpl , ETO. Army Air Forces Eva luation Board. Tnetics 

nnd Techniques Developed by the U.S. Tactical Air Command in ETO (report of lessons learucd 

in lactical air SUppOT1), p. 2. box 1. Elwood R. Qucsada Papers. Eisenhower Library; Charles E. 

1-laT1, "Artillery Wilh an American Artily ill Europe." Field Arlillel), JolIl'llal37 (January- February 

1947): 53- 54; Hughes, OV£RLORD, 1'1'.118- 23. 

M Rpts. First U.S . Army. RepoT1 of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 1:1 8. 

6: 10. and 12t h Army Group. Report of Operatio ns, 11 : 161 - 63; Cir, Capt Joseph E. Morrissey, 

Asst Adj Gen. Firsl Army. to Distribution List , 14 May 44, 353 Training. and Msg. Grant Williams 

to Thorson, 28 Jiln 44. 353 , both in box 138. U.S. Army, He adquarters, First U.S. Army. Adjut<l nt 

General 's Section, General Correspondence, 1940- 1947. RG 338, WNRC . 

... MS. Ca rter. Carter's Wnr. 8:1 4- 17. 

oj Ibid .. 8: 46; MS. Dickson, Algiers to the Elbc, p. 106; Te leeon. author wit h Maj Art hur 

Garson. USA R (ReL), 14 Oct 92. p. 23. DWH: Hansen Diary. 12 Sep 43, USAM I-II, 

... MS, Carte r. Carter's War. 8:18- 19 . 

• 1 Reynolds. Rich Relatiolls, p. 264 . 

•• Rpt, First U.S. Artny, Repo rt of Operati ons. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 1:20: 

RUI)pent ll[ll. Logisth.'o/ SIII'POI'I oflhe AI'II!ies. Volume I, pp. 350- 53; Bradley. A So/(/jcr :f SI01)'. 

1)1',246- 49; Illge rsoli. Top Secn:l. pp. 103- 05; Tc1ceon. author with Lt Col Edward M. 

Dannemiller, USA (Rel.). 6 Nov 92. pp. 4- 5, OWH. For a discussio n of Ihe controversy 

surrounding the TIGER deb:lc1c, sec Reynolds, !licll Rdlllioll~' , pp. 364- 65. 

6'1 Rpts. First U,S. Army. Report of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944, 1:29- 30. 

33, and Draft, First U.S. Army Report of Opcfntions, 20 Oct 43- 1 Aug 44, sec. 4. pI. A- I. pp . 

1- 8; MS. Carter, Cnrter's War, 8:30- 3 1. 50- 5 1. For more on th is operation. sec Ruppenthnl. 

Logistical SIII'I'0rt of the Arlllie.I·, VO/llllle I. pp. 357- 73: Harrison, ClVss-Cfwlllle/ AI/ac/;. pp , 

269- 72; Rpl. U.S. Army, ETO, General Board, Mounting the Operation OVF-RLORD. Sludy 129. 

PI'. 1- 28. CM H Library. 

10 On BUCO (West), sec Rpt. Draft , First U.S. Army Repo rt of Operations, 20 Oct 43- 1 

Aug 44. sec. 4. pI. A. no. 2, 1}]l . 7- 8. On lillie BUCO. sec RPI, U.S . Army, ETO. General Board, 

Control of Troops Build-up in Cross-Channel Amphibi ous Operat ion, Slud y 22 . PI). 6- 7, 11 -

13. CMH Library. Rpt. First U.S. Army. Report ofOper<ltions. 20 October 1943- 1 Aug ust 1944, 

1 :30- 3 1: Inlerv. <l uthor wi th Wendt. 29 Apr 91, p. 32: Ruppe nthal . Logistical SlIpport of tile 

Armies. Volt/Ille I, pp. 363- 64; Bykofsky and Larson, Opcnttiolls Ol·el'se(ls. Pl'. 249- 50; Willi:ll11 

G. Weaver, Ya/lkee Doodle Dalldy (A nn Arbor. Mich.: Edwnrds Bros., 1958). pp. 110- 12: 

Montgomery. NOI'/!!alldy 10 tile B(lllic, p. 45. 

1\ l-l ansen Diary. 1- 5 Jun 44 ; Brnd ley, II Soltlier:~ SlOt)', pp. 250- 65; lnterv. Bcva n with 

Hewitl, 1 Oct 81. pp. 143- 44. 148: McNamara. QuartermaSler Activifies, pp. 120- 2 1: Rpt , 
"To Secure a Lodgemelll 011 Ihe COll/illell/" 75 

First U.S. Army. Report of Opcnllions. 20 October [943- 1 August 1944. 5: [42; MS. Dickson. 

A[giers to the Elbe. p. 116: MS. eHrler. ellrler's War, 8:53- 54: Roster. Gellcrlll Hodges' Stnff 

Aboard USS Acfw/"II(/r. First U.S. Army Memor,lbi [ia. J nV:lsion of Europe. JurH .. --Octobcr [944, 

box 25. 1·lodges Papers. Eisenhower Library. 

4 

First Test in Normandy 

With the battle in the hands of subordinate eche lons, the First Army headquarters could do little on 6 June 1944 but watch and hope. To the west, 

Collins' VII Corps sec ured UTAII with relative ease and began its adva nce inland 

to lin k up with the paratroopers. To the cast, however, Gerow's V Corps was 

having a hard lime on O MAI·IA. In an operations center on th e Acliel'l/a/', th e G- 2 

and G- 3 sections monitored commu nications, charted the battle 's progress and 

enemy unit identifi cations, and se nt the data by radio and visual signa ls to the 

sma ll group on the AugllsUt. Throughout the morning, rcports from the V Corps 

command ship we re few, with most information coming from an engineer in an 

amphibious vehicle ncar the beach. From him and from intercepts of ship sinkings, 

heavy enemy fire, and chaos on the beaches, the First Army command group on 

the Augusta kn ew that the assault on OMA IIA was not going well and that the 352d 

Divisioll was prese nt in force. As alarming reports continued to reach the bridge 

of the Allgusra, the chi ef of statT, at~ and the G- 3, Thorson, cou ld bare ly conceal their anxiety, and the G-4, Wilson, ex pressed conce rn over the impact of 

congestion otT O r.IA IIA on the buildup schedul e. Bradl ey remained calm, but 

inward ly he was considering the di ve rsion of follow-on units to UTAII and the 

British beaches. About 1300, good news fina lly arri ved. Aided by naval vesse ls 

firi ng on ta rgets of opportunity and urged on by th eir leaders, the assault troops 

were advan cing up the he ights. By midnight the V Corps had ex panded its beac hhead to an avenlge depth of2,000 ya rds, still not enough progress to remove the 

beach from observed e nemy artill ery fire .

1 

For the First Army headquarters, a ditTic ult day had bee n made even more 

tense by poor eOlllmuni cations with th e troops ashore, other command ships, 

and eche lons in Britain. Congestion of craft o ffshore made the use of wire 

cable among th e ships impractical, a nd th e naval dispatc h boat se rvicc, whi ch 

was supposed to co nn ect headqu art ers ships and the beac hes, broke down eulllpl etely due to the poor condition of the nin e dispatc h cra ft obtained from the 

British. As ,I resu lt, the First Army headquarters had to rely heavily on radio 

and liaison officers shuttling be tween vesse ls and between ship and beac h.

2 

To foll ow deve lopments, the First Army staff adopted several expedients. It 

monitored the radio nets of the V Corps at O r.·IA IIA and the 4th Infantry Di vision on UTA H and listened to th e periodic repo rts broadcast ill the c lear by the 

G- 2 liaison with the IX Tactical Air Command's aerial reconna issance squad-
78 

ron at Middle Wallop. II also insta lled 

a command radio nel encompassin g 

the corps headquarters, the AlIgusla 

and Acltel'llor, and the base eche lon 

thro ug h the signal cen ter at Plymou th , and it establ ished a separat e 

nel for ai r-ground coo rdination. With 

the air-ground Combined Control 

Ce nter at Uxbridge, communica tions 

were re latively good, but procedures 

for the control of close air support 

took so much time that the Ninth Air 

Force headquarters finall y arranged 

for several squadrons to be placed at 

the direct disposal of the senior air 

representative on the V Corps' command ship. The First Army headquarte rs also entered the two radio nets 

of the British 21 Army Group headquarters' tactical and main eche lons 

to keep in touch with highe r levels. 

Despite Montgomery's lengthy report 

A Comm(llld POSI al /fIar 

Col. Gmll' A. Williall/!)' 

to S HAEF late on the evening of D-Day, Eisenhowe r later compla ined about 

the lack o f informatio n from the First Army headquarters, but Bradley's staff 

officers had been rorwarding a ll the data available to them. Heavy radio traffic, 

which slowed the decoding process at the army group level, appears to have 

bee n the culprit l 

On the seco nd day of the invasion Bradley was a lready exercising some of 

the independe nce wh ich Montgomery would allow him as the senior American 

field commander. To the cast, the British Second Army had joined two or its 

three beaches and advanced within three miles of Bayeux but was unable to 

ca pture COlen. Alt ho ug h the Vll Corps had not reached its D-Day objectives in 

the northern sector of U TA Il , it cou ld show fine gains to the sou th; in contrast, 

the V Corps held o nly a small footho ld, leaving all of OM AliA within range of 

enemy artillery. (Map 3) When Montgomery visited Bradl ey on the morning of 

7 June , he decided to del ay the dash for Cherbourg, and he directed the First 

Army to capture its D-Day objecti ves and connect its two beachheads prior to 

an advance across the Cotentin to isolate the port. Mea nwhile, Dempsey's British Second Army would ca pture Caen by envelopme nt and swing its western 

flank south across the Caen-Bayeux road. 4 Bradley ag reed with the need to li nk 

up OM AIIA and UTAII, but he also did not want to allow the Cherbourg garrison 

time to improve its defenses. Thus, his o ra l orders to Coll ins allowed some 

discretion, although he repeated the priority of the linkup in his wri tten directive of 9 June. By then, the V Corps had reached its D-Day objectives and 

co ntacted the British, but not until 10 June did the V a nd VII Corps meet nort h 

of Ca re ntan. At a meeti ng that day, Montgomery and Dempsey ex pressed ea-
Firsl Tesl ill Normalldy 79 

Len to right: Gener(ll Bl'(ulley (lnd Br;';.'1'" Gellemls MOllfgolllery (II/(I Dempsey at 

,"eirfirsl meeting ill Nor/l/(lluly. 10 Jlllle 1944 

gerness for a V Corps adva nce to protect the British western flank. Bradley 

promised little, aware tha t thc V Corps- VII Corps link was sti ll tcnuous and 

that the buildup on Ot.'IAIlA was a day behind sehed ule .

s 

The reports reaching the 0 - 4 section from the engi neer specia l brigades 

ind icated that the First Army's ca refully calculated plans for the buildup we re 

already showing signs ofbreakdowll. According to plan, the engi neer brigades 

we re su pposed to orga ni ze a beach maintenance area by init iall y forming beach 

dumps about 1,000 yards inland and latcr establishing consolidated dumps up 

to five miles inland. On UTAI I, the buildup was progressing ncarly on schedule 

on 8 June, despite inadequate mechanisms for the control of shipping and the 

late arrival onshore of the naval officer responsible for the control of ferry 

craft and the berthing of vesse ls. On OMAIIA, however, the First Army had fallen 

behind on D-Day and had neve r recove red. Wrecked landing craft, uncleared 

obstacles, turbulent weat her, and shortages of fe rry vessels, trucks, and se rvice 

troops slowed the unloading process to such a degree that by 8 June, an enormous backlog of sh ips had ga thered without any special effort to berth them 

according to priority of unloading. According to plan , the First Army headquarters was supposed to obtain departure times of vesse ls by radio from TurnRound Control and manifests or cargo lists by launch and plane from the 50S' 

Transportation Corps, enabling army logisti cians to unload cargoes according 

to prioritie s. Bul manifests were delayed or misplaeed, many going by mistake 

to the British beaches and nOI returning for two or three weeks, leaving th e 
M AP 3 
• 

• 

THE DRIVETO CHERBOURG 

6-26 June 19" 

Fronl tine. 13 Jun 

" " " " " " j 

Fronl Une. 18 J"n 

F,ont Une, 28 Jun 

nMA Boach Main ten.nce Area 

U.EYAllON IN METERS 

" , 
82 A Command Post at War 

Organizing the beach in/roil! o/tlle £- 1 draw, OMAHA, during the early days oflhe 

invasion 

First Army staff, engineer special brigades, and naval officer in charge at OMAHA 

with no idea of what each of the waiting vessels contained. Navy officers and 

engineers were reduced to circulating through the fleet in small boats, asking 

the cargo of each ship ' 

Under the strain of trying to catch up with their buildup targets, tempers 

soon flared between the two services. The First Army headquarters, anxious to 

push ammunition and other essential items ashore as soon as possible, insisted 

on selective unloading, while the Navy, more concerned about turnaround time , 

wanted to unload completely each vessel as it arrived. Underlying the dispute 

was the old Army suspicion that the Navy was too careful with its ships, while 

the Navy felt that the Army did not understand the requirements of operating 

and berthing a vesse1.' 

After several intense, often lively, conferences, Bradley, Kean, and Wilson 

worked out a solution with representatives from the V Corps, ETOUSA-SOS, 

and the Navy. On 10 June Bradley finally bowed to circumstances and agreed to 

unload each LST and landing craft, tank (LCT), and, later, to unload every ship 

without regard to cargo, at least until the backlog of ships offshore had eased. For 

its part, the Navy, freed at last from concern over shelling by the expansion of the 

beachhead, agreed to beach LSTs with the receding tide, enabling direct unloading onto the beaches. Within the next thirty-six hours, the discharge rate rose 

rapidly, and the backlog of ships began to clear, although total buildup figures 

through 12 June still fell short of those expected by that date. To compensate for 
Firsr Tesr ill NO/'/I/(/Ildy 83 

shortages, the First Army drew on giant ammunition-l"den barges that it had 

beached on D_Day.3 It also called on suppl emental shipments, incl ud ing "Red 

Ball" ca rgoes of key 100-ton packa ges, emergency "Green li ght" shipments o f 

ammunition and engineer construction materials, and air tra nsport"tion of li ghter 

but criti ca l items. such as signal eq uipmen t and maps. The maps arrived by C-47 

in response to an urgen t radio ca ll from Carter, the First Army engineer, 10 his 

superior a1 ETOUSA-SOS. To hel p meet the problem of inadequate information 

on cargoes, Water Transportation Control, large ly consisting of personne l from 

th e ADSEC transportation section, was fo rmed within the First Army amphibiOLlS section to maintain complcte dMa on the shippin g of suppli es to th e Continent. Water Transportation Control stayed with the First Army sta ff until abou t 

19 June, when the First Army headquarters aHached the amphibious secti on to 

ADSEC to he lp ADSEC with the operation o f the beach a rea. 9 

Underlying the First Army's race to build up troops and materie l was the everprese nt threat of a major German Counterattack. Lights burned late in the G- 2 

rooms on the Ache/"lw/", where Dickson and his subsections for planning and order 

of battle collated and ana lyzed dM" . Under the NEI'TUNI: plan, G- 2s of corps, separate di visions, and army units were supposed to submit, in addition to the normal 

periodic report, a summary to the First Army G-2 by 0 I 00 each day. The section 

also drew on summaries and reports from higher levels, reports of prisoner interrogations, aerial and photographic data from the G- 2 (Air) subsection in Britain, and 

radio intercepts from signal inte ll igence and ULTRA. Aner providing lillI e in the 

fi rst few days, ULTRA became increasingly valuable, especially as a source of in forn1<ltion on the arrival of German reinforcements and as a confirmation of other 

order of battle data. Indeed, the 0 - 2 section du ring this period mi ght have re lied 

too much on ULTRA, to the point that it neglected other sources of radio intercept 

inte ll igence. Based on the data from ULTR}\ and other sou rces, the G- 2 section 

issued summaries to higher, lowe r, and adjacent echelons li t 0900, 1800, and 2400 

each day and a periodic daily report, which it wrote between midnight lmd 0900 

each day. On occasion, Dickson would prepare a special estimate. To fa cilitate the 

collation of in telligence on artil lery, air, and other significan t targets and th e transmission of these targets to the IX Tactica l Air Command, the arti llery, and the 

corps, the G- 2 section formed a new target subsection, which it normally st"tioned 

with the G- 2 (Air) at the IX Tactic.1I Air Command.'o 

Compared to othe r sources, inte lligence provided by the Office of Strategic Services (aSS) did not have liS hi gh a status in the First Army G- 2 secti on. 

The ass had stationed a detach ment with the Fi rst Army 0 - 3 section as a 

liaison agency with the French Resistan ce. Among othe r du ties, it fo rwarded 

inte ll igence, in c ludi ng reports fro111 French agents and partisans to th e G- 2 

sec tion. Based on his experiences in North Africa and Sic ily, Dickson though t 

lillI e of the contributions of the ass opera tives, who he bel ieved did not coope ra te with one anothe r, ope rated outside the mili ta ry clwi n of command, "!ld 

produced little for all the effort and resources ex pended on them. Given the 

co ntributions of the Resistance to th e survival of the beachhead, as well as the 

fa ct tha t ETOUSA and th e stateside Army contributed most of the ass resources, 

the 0 - 2's statement was a bit unfa ir, bu t, as an organ ization outside th e usual 
84 A COII/malld Pos' til War 

military structure, the ass did require special arrangemen ts, making it a nuisance to busy staff chi efs. Late r in Ihe campaign, Bmdley ordered a ll ass 

pe rsonnel, except for Capt. Stuyvesant Wainwright 's counte rintelligence seclion, to leave th e First Army area. II 

As reports from the ass lind other sources arrived, th e G- 2 officers breathed 

casie r. The Allied deception pla n, whi ch soughllo induce the Germans to hotd 

th eir troops in the Pas de Calais in anticipation ora land in g th ere, was working 

beaut ifully. Alli ed bombing, sabotage, and guerrilla activities were reduc ing to 

a crawl th e movement orlhase panzer divisions Ih'" were shining to Normandy, 

and most of the enemy rese rves appearing on the G- 2 maps were massing against 

the British near Caen. The Germa n infantry div isions faci ng the First Army 

could make only pi ecemeal aHacks to co ntain the Americans. '2 

With the buildup proceedi ng more smoothly and concern over a counterattack casing, the First Army headquarte rs fina lly actcd to establish its command 

post ashore. (For a list of command posts, see Appelldix C.) Not wan ting to tie up 

landing cra ft at such a critical time, Bradley waited 10 move his headquart ers to 

the beach until after the Navy disembarked Ihe foll ow-up force. The NEPTUNE 

plan of 25 February had provided for the First Army's initial continental C0111 -

Inand post to be loca ted ncar the tiny port ofGrandcamp-les-Bains, west OfO/l1Al lA 

Beac h. After a suitable reconna issance, Bradley 's staff picked a site in an apple 

orchard surrounded by hedgerows and pastu res cast of Gra ndcamp and behind 

Pointe du Hoc, the dominati ng cl iffs that the Rangers had stormed on D-Day. 

Thcre, the First Army staff established a spartan ten t c ity, devoid of amenities 

except for a portabl e, enclosed la tri ne fo r the usc of the commanding general. By 

10 Jun e, when the contingent from the Augusta came ashore, teams of the 35th 

Signal Construction Battalion had install ed cable communications with the V 

Corps and the Provisiona l En gincer Spec ial Brigade Group on OMA II A. Unti l the 

V and VII Corps could meet ncar Carentan, the First Army headquarters would 

have to rel y on radio and even carrier pigeons to maintain contact between the 

two beaches. Within three days, th e First Army headquarters a lso installed re liable radio communicati ons with its own ba se ec helon in Grea t Britain and the 2 1 

Army Group's tactical headqua rters on the beachhead.u 

For all the postwar controversy surroundin g Montgomcry and the Americans, re lations between the 21 Army Grollp and First Army headq uarte rs in 

Normandy were gencra lly cord ia l. As promised, Montgomery allowed Brad ley 

considerably more discreti on tha n he permitted Dempsey. Ove r the tclephone 

or in conferences, the 2 1 Army Group commander wou ld indicate to I3radl ey 

his gcneral design and leave il to his American subordinate to wo rk Ollt a dctail ed plan, which Mont gomery would then in corporat e into his own orders. 

The process requ ired a hi gh degree of diplomacy on Montgomery's part, more 

tha n many Americans we re willing to admit. u 

When he WtlS not attendin g conferences wi th his army chi efs or visiti ng 

units in the fi eld, Montgomery examined maps in a spec ial van at his command 

post, hea rd reports from liaison officers, and read radio reports from British 

PIIANTOM det achments. Thesc small ce lls, stati oned wi th co rps and division 

headquarters in the British Second Army and occasiona lly in the Fi rst U.S. 
FirSI resl ill Normalldy 85 

Army, pe riodica ll y radioed up to dat e reports on the situation and stat e of 

moral e in their areas to their PI IANTOI'.'1 squadron headquarters, usually stationed 

at Ihe field army's command post. Meanwhile, PHANTOM units at surrounding 

headquarters simultaneously monitored these transmissions and provided the 

da ta to th e commanders at their host headquarte rs. By such means, high evel 

commanders could obta in information from Ihe fro nt more qui ckly than wa s 

normally possible via th e chain of eommand Y 

Thc First Army staff, of course, had its own liaison group, but not as xt ~ 

sive as Ihat of the 21 Army Group headq uarters. In Britain, the First Army ad ~ 

quartcrs had acted late to obtain liaison offi cers, and whcn it di(~ it provided thc 

offi cers with little guidance on their mission. Initially unde r the supervision of 

the secretary of the general staff, Maj. Earl F. Pegram, and later unde r the G- 3 

operations officer, Colonel Akers, ten liaison officers informed higher, lower, 

and lldjacent echelons of the First Army's situation and intentions and brought 

back sim ilar informa ti on from those headquarters to the First Army. For example, 

Maj . Edward M. Dannemill er, Ihe Regular cavalryman who served as the liaison 

offi ecr to the British Second Army headquarters, would daily shuttle by jeep 

from thc Second Army to the First Army command post. There, he would confer 

with Akers, an(~ briefly, with 13radley himself on the First Army's situation and 

plans, bring the First Army staff up to date on the Second Army's position and 

intent ions, and then return to the Second Army to exchange information with 

Dempsey. At bot h ends of the ir commute, the American liaison offi cers provided 

information that signals communi cations could not convey. In addition to the tcn 

grou nd liaison offi cers, the First Army headquarters also used air liaison ~ 

nel and, now and then, sent offi cers to visit fron tl ine units in certain sectors. For 

the demands placed on it, a ten man ground liaison eorps was miniscule, but the 

First Army headquarters showed no sense, as yet, of a need fo r an increase. 16 

As it settled into its commanci post and established liaison and communi ~ 

cations links, the First Army headquarte rs followed the ex pansion of the beach~ 

head. By the morning of 12 June Gerow's V Corps to the cast had made major 

gai ns, especially toward Caumont, ncar its boundary with the British Second 

Army. The British were encountering heavy resisl<!nce, fi ghting off German 

counte rattacks, in their bid to encircle Caen with a pincers movement from the 

Orne bridgehead east of C<len and the Seulles Ri ver vall ey to the west. To the 

west and north of th e V Corps, Collins' VII Corps was making slow progress 

into the interior of th e Cotentin, too slow for Bradley and his staff, but it had 

expanded th e width of its beachhead. During the previolls ni ght, the 101 st Ai ~ 

bo rne Division of the VI I Corps had captured Carentan, strengthening the tenu ~ 

ous link between the V and VII Corps. 

Despite th ese All ied successes, Dickson felt uneasy as the day progressed. 

Reports indicat ed that the stalled British ad van ce and th e major ga ins by th c V 

Corps were exposin g the corps' fl ank . More threatening, reports and ULTRA 

int ercepts indi cated that the Germans were assembling armor west of St. La to 

retake Ca rentan and split th e V and VII Corps. 11 That evening, the First Army 

G- 2 went to Bradley, who had spent a busy day hosting Eisenhower, Kirk, and 

th e U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bradley had already allaehed the 2d Armored 
86 A Comll/and Post af War 

Division orlhe not-yet-arrived XIX Corps to the V Corps to guard the V Corps' 

easte rn nank, but on refl ection, he dec ided the threat to Ca rentan was morc 

urge nt. Despite Gerow's concern for his flank , he again intervened to divide 

the 2d Armored Di vision , telli ng the V Corps commander to send a battalion of 

tanks and a ballalion of armored infantry from the division to the Carentan 

area. When the J 7,h SS Pal/zer Grelladier Division strll ck the next morning, 

the tankers helped the paratroopers repel the thrllst. 1g 

I-laving solidified its hold all Carenlan, the First Army could now turn north 

to Chcrbourg. Freed from concern about Carentan, Montgomery wanted the 

First Army, in addition to its advance on Cherbourg, to use Corlett's XIX Corps, 

newly inserted between the V and VII Corps, to drive southwest on St. L6 and 

COlltances, sixtee n miles west of St. L6, bringing the First Army closer to a 

breakout into Brillany. '9 But Bradley, not wishing to pursue two major thrusts 

simultaneously, demurred. Though catching up, the buildup sti ll lagged behind 

schedule, especially in ammunition. A fter the British drive west o f Caen stalled 

at Villers*Boeage, just east of the V Corps boundary and thirteen miles south 

of Bayeux, G- 2 reports indicated two panzer divisions near the V Corps' ex* 

posed Oa nk. The 17th cou ld strike again at Carcntan, and Di ckson was still 

looking for the 1st and 2d 55 Pal/zer DivisiollS, which he expected to appear 

soon on the First Army fron t. In addition, the 29th Infantry Di vision had rlln 

into stiff opposition on the approach to St. Lo. Unconvinced of the value ofSt. 

L6, Bradley co nferred with Thorson. With Montgomery's co nsent, he decided 

to concentrate on the original plan to cut the peninsula, establish an easily dc* 

fensible line from Carentan west to the Biscay coast along the Douve River, 

and then turn toward Cherbourg. After beginning its drive west across the 

Cotentin on the morning of 14 Junc, the VII Corps reached the west coast of 

the Cotentin on 18 Jun e.lO 

Whi le it followed the drive across the Cotentin, the First Army headquar* 

ters a lso tightcned ils control over the supply process. During the first week of 

the invasion, the engineer specia l brigades had controlled beach operations, 

initially under the two corps headquarters and later under the First Army head* 

quarters o nce it camc ashore. By that time, the beachhead had expanded to 

such a degree that the brigades could move dumps inland and establish Ihe 

beach maintenance area. On 12- 13 June , as the inland dumps were starting to 

function , the First Army headquarters d rew corps rear bounda ries and assumed 

direct con trol over service troops and installations. The move freed the corps 

staffs from a lmost all suppl y responsibilities and limited the engi neer bri gades 

to the tasks of unloading cargoes and moving them to the army supply points 

inland. The engineer brigades protested that the shift in control created confu* 

sion and should have waited until the First Army headquarters was prepared to 

ope rate installations without brigade personnel and equipment. The First Army 

supply chiefs, however, remembered all too well the disarray that had resu lted 

in Sicily, whcn the I st Engineer Special Brigade had tried to run the buildup 

independenlly. 21 

Having taken direct control of the buildup, the First Army headquarters was 

reluctant to surrender it to COMZ. Abollt the fourteenth day of the invasion, 
Firs, Test ill Normalldy 

under the OVERLORD plan, the First 

Army headqua rters was supposed to 

draw an army rear boundary and transfer ope rations behind that line to 

COMZ's Advance Scc tion , whic h 

wou ld work under loose First Army 

supervision until the arri val ofCOMZ. 

In practice, alt hough the Advance Section began operations on the Continent 

on 16 Jun e, th e First Army headqua rtc rs turn cd ove r opc rations o n th e 

beaches to that agency only gradually, 

wit hout establishin g an army rear 

boundary or yieldi ng overa ll control. 

The added wait was underst anda ble, 

given the desire of Fi rst Army headquarters to mainl<lin control of its supply in an unexpectcdly constra ined 

lodgment. However. the delay in installing COMZ o n th e Continen t 

would have rcpcrcussions later. 22 

In the mcantime. thc First Army's 

spec ial statT chiefs movcd quickly to 

87 

Colollel PlIlferSOIl 1II hi.f de: .. k ill 

Normm,,'y 

establish facilities ashore. Whi le in Normandy, McNamara 's quarterma stcrs usually all ocated twO Class I (rations) and two Class III (petro lcum and lubricants) 

truckheads- unloading points fo r trucks- to each corps, with another of each 

c lass in the army rea l' a rea. The First Army headquarters also establ ished two 

dumps fo r construction mate rials (Class II), clothing (Class IV), and other Class 

\I and IV su pplies, which began arri vin g in quantity on 12 Ju ne. Meanwhile, 

Mcdaris' ordnance section insta ll ed ammu nition (Class V) supply points and 

positioncd an ordnancc battalion and a coll ecting point to provide forwa rd support to eac h corpsY Whcn not investi gat ing false alarms of poison gas attacks, 

Col. Joseph D. Coughl an's chem ical wa rfarc section oversaw the establishmen t 

of depots to support smoke generator units and chemica l morta r ba ttalions.N 

Next door to the chemical section, Rogers and his medica l statT superviscd the 

instal lation of fi e ld, evacuation, and conval escent hospitals, all of which reported 

dircct ly to the army surgcon, and arra ngcd with the Ni nth Air Force to usc transport planes returning from the beach's airstrip for air evac uation. This airstrip, 

which the engi nee r spec ia l brigades comp leted 011 8 June, was the fi rst airfield 

available in the beachhead. So successrul was evacuation by air that it all but 

supplanted the use of LSTs.u Elsewhere, Ca rler's engineers installed their depots, including two map depots, and Patterson, usi ng army rather than co rps or 

div ision antiaircraft units to ensure continuous opera ti on, landed enough units 

by 10 June to preve nt heavy air strikes on the lodgme nt.1b 

By 19 J un e the spcc ial staffs had settl ed into a rOlltine . Under the G- 4 

section, eac h spec ial staff section had its own system. In the quarlermastcr 
88 A COII/mand Post (II IVaI' 

scction,lruckhcad chiefs submitted II status report eve ry evening to McNamara , 

who arranged to restock the truck heads wit h the following day's de li ve ries. 

Meanwhile, the engi neer stalT worked close ly wi th corps engi neers and enginee r groups in the fi c ld, mapping current road conditions and requiring daily 

reports from subordinate units regard in g changes in [oeal ion, losses, inte lligence, operations, bridgi ng data, wa tcr supply, and equipment shortages. Armed 

wi th this data, it provided daily situation reports to the army group headquarte rs, with which it coordinated the allocati on of army enginee r units be tween 

the First Army and adjace nt armi es. Once a day th e princi pal spec ial slatT chiefs 

o f the First Army held a meet ing, but otherwise they relied on phones and 

cou ri ers, who deli ve red reports from the spec ial statT sections every hour to the 

G-4 section. Every day, the G-4 st atT also coll ec ted stock status and evacua -

tion reports from the spec ial st atTY 

Whi le statTs perfected the ir procedures, un loading was proceedin g at a bette r rate. By the third week of the inva sion tota l disc harges of men and ma terie l 

across both beaches had re<lched 72.8 percent of tonnage planned, and 011 some 

days unloading exceeded pre-invasion targets. (See Appelldixes D. E. aJ/(1 F.) 

As of 19 June the First Army had accumulat ed a re serve of 10 days of rations, 

5 1

/1 days of fue l and lubri ca nts, 2.9 units of fire for artill ery ammunition, <l nd 

3.6 units of fire for small arms ammunilion. ~K 

Then came a nca r-disaster. On the morning of 19 Jun e hi gh winds, 11 gray 

sky, a nd cold rain hera ld ed the approac h of a majo r gale from the northeast. 

Fo r three d<lYs, a storm, wit h four- to eight-foot waves, swamped fe rry c raft 

and amphibious vehicl es, demolished the artific ial port- dubbed MULB ERRYthat the Allies had constructed on AIIA, and brought unloading across the 

beac hes to a standstill. Wh en Gene ral Bradley visi ted the beaches on 22 June, 

he wa s appalled at the devastation. Hundred s of craft lay aground or washed 

ashore , partially blocking some beach exits. Colonel Carte r late r claimed that II 

pedestrian could ha ve wa lk ed from olle end ofO IAI A Beach to the other on the 

wrecks of vesse ls and concrete caissons littering th e sa nd. As damaging as the 

destruc tion of eq uipment was to the operation, th e loss of time was even more 

critica l. By 23 June the First Army reserves had nearly va nished. Alt hough 

beach operat ions recovered qui ckly, it would take weeks for logisti cians to make 

up the time losl on the buildup schedule.19 

The storm had devastated the already meager supply of ammunition, 11 probIcm wh ich atTected all units but especially the artille ry formation s. It origi· 

naled in the low fore casts prepared by ETOUSA in coope ration with the Fi rst 

Ariny staff durin g the winter and was now exaccrba ted by the low tonn age 

beach crews cou ld move across the beaches. Poor records management complicated the probl em. Beach c rews often could not locate stocks eve n when they 

had a lread y been brought ashore by the Navy, and Ray, the a rmy ammunition 

ofTice r, and Lt. Col. Morgan Wi ng, Jr., the S- 4 of th e arti lle ry sec tion, had 10 

work laic into the ni ghllo check ammunition slocks in the beach dumps. On 15 

June the First Army headquarte rs, for the first timc, ann ou nced restrictions on 

the use ofammllnition. Although emergency mcasures, including the beaching 

of ammunition coasters and prestowed barges and a ru sh shipment of 500 tons 
First Test ill Normandy 89 

o f ammunition in one day by air, cased the shortage for a time, the storm caused 

thc First Army to ti ghten restrictions and even for a time to rcturn to the practice of selective unloading. A board of representativcs from thc G- 3, G-4, 

artillcry, and ordnancc sections mct in carly July and, <lnCr an investigation, 

estimated for Bradley the predi cted availability of lllnmunition and number of 

weapons in action for the nex t th irt y days. On this basis, th e Fi rst Army standeve lopcd a ncw rationing system that all ayed the probl em but did not wholly 

solvc it. Namcd by Bradley in mid-Ju ly as the most intractabl e probl em facing 

his force, ammunition shortages would plague the First Army almost to the end 

of thc wa r.311 

Ammunition was not the only difficulty plaguing the First Army's logistics 

in mid-June. As thc buildup pi cked up speed, the First Army headquarters sought 

selcctive unloadin g of essent ial items. In the process, it drew a chiding from 

ETOUSA for permitting partially un loaded coasters to ride at anchor. Part of 

the faul t lay with the old problem of mani fests. On 25 June I3radl ey wrote to 

Eisenhower that the First Army headquarters still cou ld not obtain more than 

halfofthe manifests fr0111 the ships in the transport area and that, when he and 

his sta fT complained to SOS, all they received were promises. Eisenhower vowed 

quick act ion, and within days the manifests arrived.;l 

The presence of the manifests helped, but it solved only part of the problem. As the First Army headquarters altered the planned bui ldup priorities in 

favor of more combat troops and fewer support and Army Air Forccs units, the 

e ffi c ient un loading of esse ntial suppli es and se rvicc pcrsonnel became evcn 

morc important. The shin in prioriti es ca used a massive headache even wit h 

th e presc nce of coord inating organiza tions like Bui ldup Control (West). Whcn 

the time came to deploy to the Contine nt, many of the units that the First Army 

headquarte rs wanted had not recc ivcd thc ir movement orders, and others lacked 

equipment or supplies. Some had not evcn left the Un ited Statcs. As with manife sts, the problcm co uld be traced to a huge, complex systcm being forced to 

run as fast as possibl e while making frequent changcs.J2 

The difficulties involved in usi ng the beaches as ports, problems brought 

home by the storm, on ly intensified the desire to capture Cherbourg. The commanders and staffs of the First Army and VII Corps had originally planned an 

attack on the north Cotent in port by two infantry di visions with a th ird blocking the corridor a long the west coast. Whcn Brad ley, Collins, and the VII Corps' 

division commanders confe rrcd on 18 June, however, they noted the German 

disorga ni za tion on the Cotentin , disrega rded Di ckson's warnings of a possible 

counterattack toward Isigny or Bayeux, and decidcd to go for a quick kill by 

ex panding th e allack to three divisions, including the fres h 79th In fantry Division. The dri vc north to Cherbou rg began on 19 Junc. 3] Meanwh ile , Maj. Gen. 

Troy H. Midd leton's new VII I Corps formed two divisions in a line ac ross the 

base of the Cotentin. Under Montgomery's 18 June directive to advance south 

to Coutan ccs as soon as possible, Bradley was also planning an attack south by 

the VI II Corps to a line running cast from thc village of Lessay, just off the Bay 

or l3iscay and thirty mil es south orCherbourg. The storm cha nged that. On 2 1 

June the First Army G-4 section announced that a ll corps and divisions, except 
90 A COlllmand Pasl a/ H'tll" 

those attacking Chcrbollrg, were restricted to a third of a unit of fire per day. 

Tak ing Medaris' advice, Bradley reluctantly postponed the VII I Corps drive 

until after the fall ofChe bourg .3~ 

As the VII Corps penetrated the oute r defenses ofCherbollrg on 21 June , it 

sought naval and a ir support through the First Army headquarters. The Navy 

had provided gunfire support in the drive along the Colentin coast, but when 

the First Army staITcontacted the Navy for help in the attack on Chc rbollrg, the 

Navy could not help unt il 24 June due to the slorm, which had dispe rsed its 

bombardment group. The First Army planners then turned to the Ninth Air Force. 

In consultation with planners from the British 2e1 Tactical Air Force and th e 

Allied Expedit ionary Air Force, the Ninth Air Force's staff hastily drew up a 

plan for sa turation bombing of the area despite the grave misg ivings of many 

Army Air Forces planners about the suitability of fighter-bombers from th e ir 

IX Bomber Command for the mission. No army representatives took pari in the 

final preparation of the plan, and Ninth Air Forcc planners new to France to 

present it to the ground commanders on thc morning of 22 J une. Thc attack 

late r that day proved a disappointmcnt. Despite provisions to withdraw units 

1,200 feet from the bomblinc, some ground troops were hit by bombs falling 

short of thei r targets, and coordination of ground aU<leks and air strikes wa s 

faulty. Pcrhaps in response , Bradley took special ca re to delineate the conditions for the Navy 's bombardment of25 June, stipulating that the NHVy would 

fire only on targets designated by the ground force s and cleared by the VII 

Corps artillery liaison 011 board the flagship of the bombardment group. In the 

end, the VII Corps clearly valued th e naval and air support it received in Ihe 

attHck on Cherbourg. lS 

The fall of Cherbourg on 26 June all owed the First Army to turn its full 

attention to the drive south. If anything, pressure for an early American offensive 

had increased. The British had made liule progress since their setback at Vi ll ersBocage, and planners at several levels were pondering ways to break open the 

front in Normandy. While SHAEF was considering landi ngs on the French Atlantic coast to clear the way into Brittany, the 21 Army Group staff, with apparently minimal First Army involvement, was drawing up an outli ne plnn for LUCKY 

STRIKE, a blueprint that bore great resemblance to the event ual breakout. The 

original OVER LORI) plan had provided for the First Army to launch its breakout 

from the St. Lo-Colltances line, bu t as early as 20 J une Bradley informed 

Eisenhower that he would have to begin his offensive from positions farther north. 16 

The First Army supply situation was also improving. More ammunition 

was arriving. By mid-Ju ly a new pipe line from Port-en- Bessin to a 25,000-

barrel storage tank in Balleroy was de live ring 600,000 ga llons of gasoline each 

day. A tank truck company which arrived on 26 June was also facilitating the 

flow of gasoline to the front. In addition to the fourtcen truc k companies assigned to the engineer special brigades, airborne divisions, and corps and army 

headquarters, by I July the First Army 1110tor transport pool consisted of twentynine truck companies, with an average of forty- five trucks pe r company.)7 

As the VII Corps converged on Cherbollrg, Bradley and his staff had rushcd 

to draft a new plan that would enable the First Army to move to its next task 
First Test ill Normal/dy 91 

with the minimum delay. They rejected the 111m-shy terrain south of Ca rentan 

and the route southwest to SI. La, which they bel ieved was the strongest sector 

of th e Germa n line, in favor of a drive soulh by the VII I Corps on the First 

Army's western flank , down the coastal road to Lessay and Coutanees. On 26 

June. after talks among Bradley, l'lodges, Kean, and Thorson, the First Army 

headquarters direc ted Ihe VI II Corps to attack on or after I July, with the othe r 

corps 10 follow on order. The Fi rst Army fie ld ord er specified that the VII I 

Corps would make its milin effort on its eastern flank , but the army headquarters otherwise allowed the corps to make their own dispositions for the attack. 

Ifa ll went well, the attack in the west wou ld pinch out the XIX Corps- that is, 

cut across the XIX Corps front in such a way as to leave the XIX without a 

sector- and take the high ground near St. La. Bradley was imprecise about his 

goa ls, but he clearly hoped that the attack would open the way into Brittan y. 3~ 

With in three days, Bradley reluctantl y postponed the attack to 3 Jul y. NOI 

al l of Ihe VIII Corps' troops had arrived, nor had the VII Corps, slated 10 attack 

southwest on the VIII Corps' easte rn flank, fi nished its work on the Cotentin. 

Dickson fea red that the delay would permit the Germans to bring up reinforcements, notably the /I SS Pallzer Corps, and to improve their fortifications in 

what already was a strong dcfensive line. Bradley. on the other hand, figured 

that the British had drawn the German reserves, opening th e door for a major 

breakthrough by the First Army. He wrote Eisenhowe r, " I am ve ry anx ious that 

when we hit the enemy th is time, we wi ll hit him with such power that we can 

keep goi ng and cause him a major disaster."39 Bradley's delay disappointed 

Montgomery. who was concerned about the buildup of German a rmor against 

the Dritish Second Army. but he would not stampede his American subordinate. I-lis new order of 30 June incorporated the plan of the Fi rst Army headquarters, directing that the Second Army hold the enemy's main forces in Ihe 

Cuen area , while the First Army advanced south to the Caumont~Vire·MortainFougcres line and then southeast to the Le Mans- Alell(;on line, driving the 

encmy agai nst the lower Sei ne and opening the door into Brittany. Over the 

next two days, the First Army headqua rters completed its preparations, adjusting its boundary with the Second Army, allocating artillery, placing the fresh 

3d Armored Di vision in rese rve, and movin g its command post to a more celltrallocation in an apple orchard cast of Isigny.40 

The First Army ofTensive opened on 3 Jul y with high hopes, but it soon 

bogged down in the rain and the Norman hedgerows. (Map 4) Bradley watched 

the attack close ly, arranging for ai r support and touring corps and division command posts to encourage field commanders. When the XIX Corps' attack on 7 

July se ized a foothold over the Vire Rive r- the nort h-south stream which bi~ 

seeted the XIX Corps front at St. Lo- Bradley, largely on the basis of Hodges' 

reports from the front, thought he saw only a thin sc reen and comm itted the 3d 

Armored Division. Unwi lli ng to restrict Corle tt 's discretion, he wou ld on ly tell 

the XIX Corps commander 10 use the 3d in support of the 30th Infa ntry Di vision. Bradley's reluctance to int erfere in corps operations was proper, but th e 

inexperienced XIX Corps under an ill Corle tt missed its chance, as vague corps 

orders, poor coord ination, and congestion in the narrow bridge head caused 
s,.SaU",""'· I .. .vkom," 

MAr 4 

{ _."" , .. " u;'" 0201 Abo> lh'" 

901" 1)1< 

, 
B 11.1 A 

, 

FIRST ARMY ZONE 

3- 20 July 1944 

ffonl line. 3 Jul 

F.ont line. 11 Jul 

Ffontline. 14 Jul 

Ii Ii iii "" FUml line. 20 JUI 

, 

Bead> Maintenance At .. 

El!:VAl1ON IN METERS 

1'-

I~.r>d_ 

• 
94 A COII/m and POSl a/ Hi ll' 

e ntangl ement of th e two di ion s. l Lookin g for anoth er way 10 speed the advan ce, Bradl ey took th e suggesti o n of I-lod ges and Collins thai he move the 

bo undary between th e VII and XIX Corps 10 the cast and commit the 9th Infantry Di visio n on th e VII Corps' easte rn fl ank, east o f th e TallIe Rive r, whi ch 

bisected the First Army fro nt in that arca. The di visio n co uld th en outflank the 

e nemy defending Pe ri crs, fifteen mit es northwest of SI. La, and prot ect the 

XIX Corps' western nank . The 9th had hardly entered th e line when it wa s hit 

by a COllnterallack, which it halt ed only with diffi culty. By 11 Jul y both th e VII 

and VIII Co rps had sta ll ed, and th e XIX was unabl e to ex tend its footh old over 

th e Vire .

42 

The sta lemate se nt reverberati ons through the Alli ed chai n of command. 

Cha fin g to join th e battl e with his Third Army, Patton ra ged in his diary, " Bradley a nd Hodges are suc h nothings . . .. They try to push all al o ng th e front and 

have no powe r anywhere."43 At the First Army headquarte rs, Bradl ey and his 

staff were disappointed over th e performan ce of some units, but they be li eved 

that they had no opt ion to the sl ugging match, g ive n the terrai n and the skillful 

Ge rma n de fense. They rece ived some encouragement from Dic kson 's reports, 

whi ch stat ed that th e attac ks were fo rc in g th e enemy to commit his reserves 

and that heavy casualties and low mora le wc re beginning to take a toll. Still , 

the Germans appeared to be shiftin g the 2d 55 POllzer Di vision and the Pal/zer 

Lellr Division from th e British sector to fa ce the First Army, and ma ny o n the 

staff expressed irritation that the British we re not do ing more on thei r fr nt. ~ 

Althoug h Mon tgomery wished tha t th e American s would not att ac k o n slleh II 

broad fro nt, he unde rstood that difficult terrain, poor weath er, and c hroni c 

ammunition shortages were hampe rin g the First Army's ad van ce. The commande r o f th e 2 1 Army Group knew th at he needed to mai nta in the pressure on 

thc British front to stop the flow of German rese rves toward th e First Army, 

and he wa s also und er press ure from Eise nhowe r and Churc hill to act. Aft er 

fa ilin g in a noth er attempt to outflank Caen from th e west at th e e nd of June , th e 

British Second Army, with the suppo rt of heavy bombe rs, fin a ll y ca ptured th e 

c ity in a fro nta l attack on 8 July, but the Ge rmans still held th e hi g h ground to 

th e so uth .

H 

Fo r an olTensive in whic h Midd leto n's VII I Corps wa s supposed to have the 

main e lTo rt, Bradl ey's plan and dispositions appea r rath er c urious. On 3 July 

the VIII Corps had he ld about the same amo unt of front as the XIX and V 

Corps o n th e easte rn flank o f the First Army front and muc h mo re th an the VII 

Corps next to it. Under th e final fi eld orde r for th e dri ve, the V Co rps in cluded 

a n a rmored division and two infantry divisions; the XIX Corps two infant ry 

di visions; th e VI I Corps three infantry divisions; and thc VII I Corps three infant ry di visions a nd, fo r th e initia l stages, th e 82d Airborne Di vision . Even 

more striking was th e a llocati on of artill ery, rou ghly the same for each o f the 

four corps, alth ough th e army artill e ry headquart ers- the 32d Fi eld Artill e ry 

Bri gade- was attached to thc VII I Co rps. Both th e V and VII Corps had more 

a nti a ircraft batt a lions (five) than th e VII I Corps (four) and th e XIX Corps 

(three). Four chemi ca l mo rtar battalio ns and nine tan k battali o ns we re eve nly 

distributed amo ng the four corps. Fina lly, the 3d Armored Div ision in the First 
First Test in NorlJlandy 95 

Army rese rve wa s not stationed behind th e VIII Corps, but in a more central 

location behind the XIX Corps front. Not surprisin gly, anal ysts of the campaign in France and Germany in 1944- 1945 havc often criti cized Bradley for 

not concentrating his attackin g forces for th e Jul y offensive. 46 

Wh ether greate r concentration would have enabled a breakt hrou gh is problemat ic. The Fi rst Army planners were g reatl y limited in the ir options by the 

nature of the bocage region. In the XIX, VII , and part of th e V III Corps sectors, 

the First Army was making its way through marshe s, swamps, ditches, and canals that channel ed movcment out of the Carent an area, about ten mil es inland, 

into th e hedgerows. These natural fortresses di ve rted attacking forces into 

sunken lanes and we ll-defin ed corridors easily cove red by German mortars, 

machine gu ns, tanks, and antitank weapons. I nfantry units that assaulted through 

a hedgerow ran into a with ering crossfire from th e embankments nanking the 

pasture inside th e hedgerow. A successful attack on such positions demanded 

careful coordination of infantry, tanks, eng ineers, and artill ery, coordination 

that would take some time 10 develop. Given the broken terrain and a stubborn 

defense, simply massing men and mat eriel mi ght only have further inhibited 

mobility and made the attackers more vulne rable to enemy firepowe r.47 

Poo r tank-infantry coordination was onl y onc of th e problems facing Col. 

Peter C. Hains' armored sec ti on. A vcteran tanker who had served in Tunisia , 

Hains saw his biggest job as educating commanders, from Bradley down th e 

chain of command, on the need to use armor in ma ss to maxim ize its mobility 

and shock effe ct. Des pite Hains' best efforts, Bradley, in need of rese rves, occasionall y broke up his armored divisions and parceled combat commands and 

sma ll e r lltl its to other di ion s.4~ Nor was th e probl em of miSlise the end of 

Hains' chall enges. Wh en reports filt ered back to the First Army command post 

of the inferiorit y of American Sherman tanks to German Tige rs and Panthers, 

Brad ley directed his armored offi cer and artill e ry offi cer to obtain a Ge rman 

tank and test various calibers of guns aga inst it. Using tanks sa lvaged by Mcdaris' 

ordnan ce units, Hains and Hart found that even the updated 76-mm. gun on 

some She rmans cou ld not mat ch th e Tiger tank 's 88-mm. gun or penetrate its 

frontal armor. The First Army headqu arters could onl y grit its teeth and work 

with SHA EF to obtain a more powerful gun for th e tanks from the United States, 

whil e American tan ke rs deve loped tacti cs that took adva nta ge of th e Shennan's 

maneuverabil ity and superior numb .~ 9 To preserve those superior numbers, 

Hains devoted much of his time to instruc ting commanders on th e need for 

proper maintenance and sal vage of tanks. [n cooperation with th e Signal Corps, 

his section also experimented with phones, mi c rophon es, and radios on the 

back o f tanks in an attempt to improve coordination with the infantry.so 

With all the probl ems of tank-infantry coordination, th e First Army re li ed 

heavily on th e infantr y-arti ll e ry tearn. Hart orga ni zed his artil le ry sectio n 

rou ghl y a long gene ral starT lincs. It inc luded an executi ve offi cer, an S- 2 for 

inte llige nce, an S- 3 for ope rati ons and traini ng, an S- 4 to handl e supply and 

pe rsonnel, a chi ef cl erk subsec tion, an air obse rvation subsection, and an antitank subsection whi ch came unde r the S- 3 administrati ve ly but report ed directly to Hart. The First Army arti ll ery offi ce r saw his fun cti on not onl y as 
96 

advising the comma nder all arti ll ery 

mailers, but a lso maintai ning contact 

with the chi ef of statT, 0 - 2, 0 - 3, and 

G- 4 to keep ab reast of the situation 

an d make th ese offi cers " arti ll ery 

111 ndcd :' 1 In his view, an army art illc ry office r s hou ld a lso ac t a s a 

trouble shooler, act ively looking for 

probl ems through frequent visils by 

himse lf or his staff to co rps artille ry 

commande rs and the divisions. Depe nd ing on the situation, he also exerc ised conlrol, under the ope rationa l 

control policy, of the army artillery, 

the 32d Field Artillery Brigad e . In 

gene ral, the First Army's employment 

of the brigade's 240-tllm, howitze rs 

and 8-inch guns depended on the 

width of th e corps fronls and the 

brigllde's mission. If the co rps fronts 

were narrow, the brigade controll ed 

its own units in support of the corps 

A Command Post {II War 

General flur' 

artil lery or in general support. I fthe fronts covered a greate r dist ance, the First 

Army headquarte rs would attach at least some of the army artill ery to the corps, 

espec iall y if communicat ions presented a problem.

52 

In Normandy, shortages of artillery ammunition and poor fie lds ofobserva t ion in the bocage presell ted c ha ll enges for the arti ll cry sectioll. As th e S-4 

worked wit h the army ammunition officer lind G- 4 section to obtain mo re artill ery ammunition, Hart improvised by emp loying tank de stroyers and othe r 

sc i (-propelled guns in close suppo rt of th e infantry. The nature of the ten·a in 

and opera tions left th e First Army with little opport un ity to employ the brigade 

as a concen tra ted force during the fi rst two mon th s of combat, a nd Hart, to 

ensu re coverage of the who le front, attached the brigade's un its, as they arri ved, to the corps. To compensate for impedimc nts to ground observation, he 

stationed a liaison officer at Di ckson's G- 2 scct ion to obtai n the latest data on 

possible targets and to forward them to corps fi re di rect ion ce nt s. ~.l 

Arti ll ery in the First Army a lso re li ed greatly on aerial photog raphy, obse rva ti on, and adjustme nt of fire to overcome the challe nge of the hedge rows. 

Hart could calion more than 200 aircraft belonging to the arti ll ery battalions 

:l11d a rtill ery headqua rters at different eche lons o f th e First Army. He cou ld 

a lso turn to visual and photogra phic observation by the planes o f tile IX Tactica l Air Command. A fter the move of IX Tacti cal Air Comma nd 's adva nce headquarters and its First Army liaison section to the Continent on 10 June, he 

conti nued to detai l an officer to maint ain close contact with the G- 2 section's 

Ii'lison un it and the photo interpre tation det ac hment, whi ch rema ined at Middl e 

Wa ll op un til mid-J un e. These age ncies processed requests for ac ri:'11 reconn ais-
Firsl resl ill Norll/(tl/(~)' 

Left to right: Genemf Quesada willt Gel/em/s Bradley and Keal/ al Firsl Army 

lte(l(lq 1/(1 I'/ers 

97 

sallee from the corps, channe led them to the I X Tactical Air Command 's reconnaissance officer, and forwarded results to the rest of the staff by plane, radio, 

or fax. In the case of aerial photography, corps and separate army units submitted thei r requests for missions at 1800 each day to the army headquarters, where 

they were coordinated by the G- 2 section . Army li aison aircra ft or couriers 

would deliver the photographs to the G- 2 of the corps originating the req uest, 

or the army G- 2 for sep<lrate units. The process improved when, after experiments with different methods of aerial observation coverage of the army fron t, 

the IX Tactica l Air Command adopted the First Army headquarters' suggestion 

that tactical reconnaissance missions be suba llotted to the corps for constant 

and simultaneous coverage of corps zo nes. 54 

As important as artill ery was to the First Army, shortages of arti ll cry ammunition madc closc air support more critica l than planne rs had anticipated. 

Having deploycd an advance echelon to the Continent on 10 June , the IX Tactical Air Command headquarters on 17 June assumcd effec tive contro l of close 

air support for the First Army, excepting only req uests that exceeded the limits 

of its resources.55 Applying arrangements worked out prior to D-Day, Quesada 

sel up his command post in a field adjacent to Brad ley's. The two commande rs encouraged close coope ration between their operations and int elligence 

sections, to the point o f placing the IX Tactical Ai r Command's stafTand th e 

First Army's air represen tatives under one roof. At a joint conference every 

evening, the G- 3 (A ir) subsection laid out the ground fo rce's requirements 
98 A COII/II/alld Post (If War 

fo r air sup port, ba sed on requests from the co rps, a nd th e a ir ope rati ons office r 

all ocated available squadrons. At the airfi e lds, ground li a ison offi ce rs bri e fed 

pilots on bomblines- lincs drawn to provide safety margins between friendly 

and opposing fo rces- enemy anti a ircra ft conce ntrations, and oth er cruc ial Information. Whe re an immediate need existed durin g th e day, air-ground coordin ation parties at the di visio n or corps level se nl a requ est 10 th e arlllY 

G- 3 (Air) subsection, which arranged with the I X Tacti cal Air Command head -

quart ers for di version or an a ir unil. 56 (CharI 6) The system wo rked we ll , especially as aircra ft re located from En glish bases to Norman fi e lds, some onl y 

400 to 500 ya rds behind the front. In spite of rain and fog durin g much of July, 

th e IX Tacti cal Air Command hit e nemy communi cat ions and positions and 

established such a deg ree of air superiorit y that one Ame ri can regime nt halted 

its attack and complained to hi gher levels when it was strafed by two enemy 

planes.

S7 

Even with air support, the battl e of the hedgerows had become a costl y 

end eavor, as th e First Army's G- I and adjuta nt gene ra l sec tions co uld testify. 

Most of th e G- l section was supposed to remain in Bristol with the army base 

eche lon until we ll after D-Day, but probl ems with rec lassification, unit awa rds, 

and a more compl ex da ily estimat ed loss report caused the shift of additiona l 

G- l perso nn e l to France within days of th e land ing. For those wh o remai ned, 

th e passage of each headquarters ba se eche lon through th e marshaling process 

upset the cas ualt y re portin g proce ss and slowed the now of reports. The a rmy 

ba se eche lon compe nsated to a deg ree by arranging for di vision casual ty reports to bypa ss th e corps ba se ec he lon while the corps deployed. 

Whe n th e casualt y division of th e adjutan t ge ne ral sec ti on reached 

Normandy one month afte r D-Day, it found a huge backlog of baili e cas ua lt y, 

hospital , and burial reports to check, rcconc il e, and process. Bailie casualty 

reports, prepared by regimental and separat e unit pe rsonnel offi ce rs on the 

basis of morning reports from thei r subordinate units, had passed through di vision and corps eche lons to the First Army casualt y di vision. Aided by a ma ssive innux of person ne l from th e remainde r of th e adjutant gene ra l's sect ion, 

this di vision processed hal f of th e 10,000 outstandin g battle casua lty re ports 

within 48 hours. Neve rth e less, it still fa ced the chall enge of keeping up with 

casua lt y reports from a growing army that a lready boasted 4 corps, 16 di visions, and 190 separate units. To keep informati on as time ly as possibl e, the 

cas ua lt y div ision used messenge rs to ru sh re ports to the First Army headquarters, whe re th ey we nt directly to th e casualty di vision . Even with such measures, however, it took time for battl e ca sualty reports to reach th e First Army 

headquart ers. Daily esti mated loss reports, arri ving at the First Army cOlllmand 

post from the eorps about 0730 each day, usually provided the army commande r 

by 1000 with a qui ck, fa irly acc urate pi cture of unit strength s as o f lhe previolls 

midni ght.s8 

Afte r fewe r losses than ex pected in Jun e, casualt ies rose sharpl y, testing 

the replacement system. For two months aft er D-Day th e First Army headquarters co ntroll ed its own enlisted replacement system, as th e G- l section and th e 

adjutant ge ne ral 's classifi cati on subsec tion processed un it req uisitions and 
CIIART 6- [X T,\CnCAL AIR COM/l.1ANIl (TAC) [,\lMEDIATE SUPPORT SYSTE~I 

SUM/l.IER \LL ! 944 

, I 

, I 

" I 

I xx 

:11c:+'z 

xxx 

xx ~ xxxx 

,. 

+ 

+ " 

~~'-------, -;-:::::;;-f-!~~: \1 Combined { Army 0 - 210- 3 

[ Opcn'ltions Comb:u OI)S 

8 Center (TAC A- 2/A- 3) 

FDP 

, 

I. Division air~ground coordination party (AG Cr ), statTed by tactical air party o lTiccr 

(TA PO) and division 3 (Air), send direct support request to An ny G- 3 at Combined 

Ope rations Ccnter (CDC), also informin g corps 3 (A ir) so co rps AGe p can mon itor 

or inte rvene as necessary. 

2. Corps AGe ]> mo nitors commu nications net. 

3. COC, consistin g of Army 2 and 3 together with [X Tacti cal Air Command 's 

A- 2 and 3 (termed Combat Operations), con sults with Army HQ and TAC HQ on 

request; then G- 3 and 3 each approvc it. 

4. A- 3 at Combat Ops rellLY s support rcquest Hnd recommended course of Hction to 

Tactical Control Cent er (TCC), also termed Fig hter Control Center. 

5. Forward director post (FO P), in constant communication with TCC, prov i<[ es 

conti IIUOUS updates on locat io n of fri end [y and e nemy ai r lIliits using microwave early 

warning (MEW) radar Inlc king. 

6. TCC relays strike request to airborne "on-ca ll" fig hter-bombers. 

7. FOP, using SCR- 584 radar, furn ishes prec ise gu idance and na vigat ion information 

to strike n igh t en rout e to th e target. 

8. Di vision AGCP prepares for incoming strike night by arranging for artillery fire to 

mark ta rgets with co lored smoke and to suppress cnemy air defenses; AGe ]> wi ll 

maintain comllluni cation wit h strike n ight during attack. 

SOl/ree: Richard P. Hallioll, Sirike jimn lite Sk)': rhe lfisIOI:)' of Btllliefieli/ Ail" A /lack. 191 J1945 (Washington, D.C.: Smilhsoni<ln Institution Press, 1989), p. 198. Used by permission of 

the publisher. 
100 A Commalld Pos, til War 

ship ped them to the three repl acement batta lions, each su pporting a corps. 

Normally, un its wou ld rece ive fille rs from these ba ttalions wit hin 24 to 48 hours 

of the ir requ isitions or, if urgently needed, wit hin 12 to 24 hours. Meanwhi le, 

the army headquarters would prepa re consoli dated requ isitions, based on the 

unit requisitions, for the thea ter's Gro und Force Replacement System, which 

wo uld th en send 250~mall de tachments to rep lenis h the re placeme nt batt ali ons. 

Even thou gh th e 14t: l Replacemen t Depot arri ved on the Co ntin ent on 22 J un e, 

il did not begin work until I July and never became directly invo lved in requisition procedures be fore the breakout at the end of the month. During the early 

days of the invasion, the automatic now of fi ll ers provi ded by the NEI'TUNE plan 

proved amp le, and the First Army did not begi n requisitions by un its until 18 

June. By the cnd o f the first week of July, however, the Fi rst Army coul d not 

fi nd enough repl acements on the Continent to replace losses, especia lly of infa ntry rinemen. Respondi ng to urgent caBs from the Fi rst Army st aff, ETOUSA 

alerted 20,000 in fantry fillers in England for shi pmen t to the Continent. This 

rush shipmen t hel ped, but infantry rin emen remained a sca rce commodity in 

the th eater rcpl acemcnt pipcline durin g the campaign. Oft en, th e G- 3 section 

had to sel pri orit ies amo ng units fo r availab le l'cpl acemcnts.s9 

Repl acement ofofTicers li kewise presented a problem. With the large number o f new divisions and resu lt ing demands on leadersh ip, the First Army was 

tak ing heavy losses among offieers and fi nd ing that others did not meet the 

test of combat. First Army policy authorized un it commanders to send any 

officer they recommended for reclassi fi cation to thei r corps headquarte rs via 

intermediate echelons. If these echelons did nol reassign him, a recorde r from 

ETOUSA's Reclassification Board inte rviewed the offi cer at corps headq uarters Ill d helped the unit commander prepare a fi le on the officer for his reclassifica tion hea ri ng. Many who scemed lac king in leadership we re dumped by 

thcir commands in neuropsych iatri c hospitals. The First Army inspcctor ge neral investigated ma ny incidents to separa te ge nuine medi cal cases from those 

more suited to court-ma rtia l or recl assifica tion. To repl ace li eutenants and ca ptains, the First Army headquarters hoped mainly to rely on promotions with in 

organiza tions, but it adopted a tough initial policy on ba ttlefie ld promotio ns, 

approving on ly the most deserving cases. Late r. it cased the policy to allow 

more second lie utenants in command positions to receive sllch eleva tions. 

Meanwhile, the practice of fo ur extra regimental and batta lion commanders 

with each division Illid wo rked quite well. As the ini tia l all otment became 

ex hausted, howeve r, the di visions requested more fie ld grade offi cers, rat he r 

than fill the ga ps with vetera n j un ior o rri ce rs as th e 0 - 1 section had hoped. 

The sect ion had to turn 10 its sources wi thin the army or ETO USA fo r mo re 

such o fficers.60 

The search for suita bl e commanders extended to the highest levels. In gene ral, Brad ley and Eisenhower we re satisfied with the Fi rst Army's corps commande rs, espec ially Colli ns who was already eme rging as the sta r of the group. 

They were quic k, howeve r, to axe division commande rs whose units did not 

meet expec tations. From 6 June to 1 August, nine ge nera l officers in the First 

Army were relieved, including the commande r of the 8th Infa ntry Di vision and 
Fi,.st Test ill No,./l/al/dy 101 

two commanders of the 90th Infantry Division. Although Bradley hesita ted to 

lay the entire blame for the poor initi al performance of these units on their 

rel ieved commanders, he later stated that the first commander of the 90th Div ision, as an artill eryman, lacked a gra sp of combined arms, and that his successor would not leave his command post and visit the front. Bradley's critics later 

charged that he used reliefs as quick fixes for tactica l probl ems, tha t he 

relieved senior officers without taking into account the difficult ies faccd by 

inexperienced divisions, and that the rllsh to "cut heads" created a needlessly 

tense command climate. In this, the First Army presented a contrast to the Britis h Second Army, which, according to Carlo D'Este, retained unsatisfactory 

commanders far beyond when they shou ld have been rel ieved. 61 

When one looks at speci fic cases, howevcr, Bradley's actions appea r justified . Although all three di vision commanders had been approved fo r combat 

service by Army Ground Forces ill the United States and one- Maj. Gen. Euge ne M. Landrum- had led a div ision in the Aleutians, all three in Normandy 

displaycd major defic iencies in combat leadership. Given the fact that the U.S. 

Army in World War II was trying to form div isions- and find division commanders- for a mass force on the basis of the small prewar constabu lary and 

officer corps, the inability of some di vision commanders to measure up to the 

cha ll enge of combat should not have been su rprising. Bradley perhaps cou ld 

have done more to help these commanders work through their difficulties, but 

both he and Eisenhowe r felt that, at that point in the war, with so much at stake, 

they could not afford to to lerate mistakes by senior leaders, especia lly given 

the availability of officers who had shown potential for division command in 

combat. The ir attitude, harking back at least to Pershing, was that a commande r 

must takc responsibility for the performance of his unit, imposing his wi ll in 

person if necessary to accomplish his mission. While pe rhaps a bit harsh at 

times, the First Army reliefpolicy was understal1(lable given the circumstances. 62 

Bradley's anxiety over high-leve l leadership renected in part his concern 

for troop morale. In the early days of the beachhead, the First Army headqua rters co uld do litt le for moral e beyond sporadic command visits to the fighting 

troops. From the beginning, it placed all towns in the army area off limits for 

admin istrat ive and disciplinary reasons, and, despite the best efforts of First 

Army special se rvices, it co uld not establish a rest area before the breakout at 

the end of July. Much of the early spec ial se rvices effort was haphazard, large ly 

due to the confusion of unloading, the necessa ry emphasis on combat troops 

and suppl ies, and the lack of understanding of spec ial services in the Army. 

Because of the difficulty of locating the newspapers on ships, distribut ion o f 

th e Srars and Stripes did not begin unti l II June, and daily circulation did not 

start until 21 Jun e. As late as August exc han ge items were reach in g troops in 

limit ed amounts, augmented only by American Red Cross su ppli es, including 

donuts and coffee dispensed by five clubmobil e groups that began to arrive on 

the Continent in mid-July. To help the Red Cross support these and other 

activities, the First Army quartermaste r section stored and issued Red Cross 

supplies in cooperation with a Red Cross official assigned to the First Army. 

Meanwhile, to meet the demand for enterta inment, the Stars alld Stripes de-
102 A COII/maild Post (I f War 

tachlll en! showed movies to about 62,000 troops. Only in Jul y were the fi ve 

special ser vi ce compani es aHached to the First Army able to enact a more ~ 

mane nl program, including United Service Organi zatio n (USO) shows, whi ch 

began o n II Jul y.6l 

Whi le th e special service section struggled to establish moral e- building 

acti vities, th e publi c ity and psychological warfare sec tion was unde rgo in g its 

own g rowin g pains. Hav in g jusljoincd th e staffin Ma rch, th e new section had 

to ba lance two ostensibly similar but separate ta sks. In its re lations wilh the 

press, the section bene fi ted from the strong rapport betwee n co rres pondents 

and Bradley, who look a strai ghtforward approach to reporte rs at th e es~ 

tion of Hansen, his aide and a former journalism student. Di ckson and Thorson, 

th e G- 2 and G- 3, gave reg ula r brie fin gs, and Bradley himse lfwould cc si on ~ 

all y spenk off th e record on his plans. [n pari, th e system work ed because o f the 

re lati ve ly uncritical nature of th e 5~ man First Army press corps, but Bradley's 

candor undoubtedly paid dividends in mutual trust. It did not, however, spare 

th e First Army headquarters from th e growing impati ence of reporters who 

feared a stal emate, complaints about the initial separation of th e press camp 

from the headquarters, and grumblin g over the inadequa te army signal instal -

lations for transmitt ing news copy from the beachh ead. Alread y in a diffi cult 

position, th e section chi e f, Col. David P. Pagc, Jr., was rel ieved in late J uly for 

re leasin g the news o f th e death of Bradl ey 's fri e nd, Brig. Ge n. Theodore 

Rooseve lt, Jr. , be fore Roosevelt 's wife could be notifi ed. He was re pla ced by 

th e army spec ial se rvi ce oiTicer, Lt. Col. Fl ynn L. Andrcw, who was succeeded 

in his form er post by Col. William MayY 

Alon g with maintaining a press camp, transport, and transmission fa ili ~ 

ti cs for newsmen, th e sec tion a lso supported propaganda acti viti es. It collect ed 

data , prepared leafle ts and broad casts for tacti cal propaga nda, and arra nged 

through SI-I AEF for leafl et drops from Britain. Although the First Army sta ff 

seemed to regard such warfare as a toy, it notcd with re lish th e successful use 

of propaganda , notably at Che rbourg, wh ere leaflets and broadcasts adorn ed 

with Stra uss walt zes he lped to induce sllrrenders.6s 

Propaganda , in the form of newspapers and broadcasts, a lso he lped thc 

First Army civil affairs personncl to maintain orde r among c ivilians in th e rear 

areas. In these ca rly wee ks th e ta sk o f the First Army c ivil a ffai rs section was 

simplificd by th e absence of large urban a reas with th e sole exce pti on of 

Che rbourg. The prox imit y ofa rich farmin g area , th c lac k of refugees, and the 

presence ofa capa ble French local administration also hc lped. To conduct c ivil 

a ffairs in rea r areas, c ivil affairs de tachments were attached to the First Army 

from th e Europea n Civil Affai rs Di vision. Ope rating under the supervision of 

th e First Army civil a ffairs section, they worked with Fre nch o ffi cia ls to keep 

order, detect agents and collabo rators, transfer capt ured documents, and distribut c reli ef suppli es in the army area. In corps and di vision areas, these detachme nts operated unde r the supervision of corps a nd di vision c ivi l affairs 

office rs, but they co uld turn to the army c ivil a ffa irs sect ion fo r ex pe rtise in 

slich areas as publ ic hea lth, publi c safcty, la bor, in dustry, ag ricu lture , and finan ce. As the First Army adva nced and rear boundaries movcd fo rward, the 
First Test il/ NO/'II/al/dy 103 

detachmcnts staycd in pla cc, passin g from division to corps to army control.(,/, 

De spite prejudices aga inst c ivil affairs amon g 11 Corps vc tcrans, Bradley, in 

line with SHAE F's policy of establishing civil affai rs sections at the general 

staff level, raised Col . Damon M. Gunn's seclionto th e status ofa gcneral staff 

section (G- 5) on 18 July.61 

Other First Army staff sections also maintained orde r in rear areas by roundin g up stragg le rs, guarding enemy prisoners of war, and otherwise poli cing the 

area. Unde r th e supe rvision of th e disc iplinary subse cti on of th e provost 

marshal 's section, military poli ce from 13 June to I Au gust pi cked up 462 straggle rs at tralTi c control points and brought thcm to coll ection ce nte rs. There 

they stayed, until their corps, notifi ed by th e First Army headquart ers, call ed 

for them. The disciplinary section not onl y kept records on straggling, but also 

supervised cnforcement of pol icc regulations, operat ed th e First Army int errogation center and stockad e, and workcd with th e judge ad vocate general to try 

disc iplinary ca ses, most of wh ich involved looting and rape . Military poli ce 

guards esco rting stragglers back to thc ir corps on en pa ssed Ge rman prisone rs 

in di vision supply tru cks on their way to enclosure s that the Fi rst Army had 

established. At times, espec ially aner the fall ofCherbourg, the influx ofprisoncrs threatened to, but ncve r quite did, overwhe lm the system. In some disciplinary cases and qu estions invol vin g prisone rs, the provoslmarshal worked at 

different times with the judge ad vocate general , inspector general, civil affairs 

section, and G- 2 counterint e lligence subseclion.68 

The First Army rear areas actually suffered more from congesti on than from 

disorde r. Exc luding the Cotentin Peninsula, its beachh ead was onl y tcn to twent y 

miles deep. Within that area, army, corps, di vision , and ADSEC insta llatio ns 

were crowded into seemingly evcry availabl e space, Gi ven th e lack of usabl e 

rail transport, the First Army had to rely on tru cks to shuttl c troops and criti ca l 

it ems on th e few availabl e roads, most of whi ch were narrow g ravel or dirt 

lancs borde red by th e steep hcdge rows. Traffi c jams soon became common, 

cspec iall y al int ersections along th e mai n lat eral route from Montebourg to 

Bayeux .

69 The situation demanded c lose cooperation among th e G- 3 troop 

movements subsec tion, the G--4 tratTic hcadquart ers, th e traffi c subsecti on of 

the provost marshal section, th e spec ia l staffs, and subordin ate ec he lons. Stationed in adja ce nt tents at th e supply cchelon, thc G- 3 troop movements subsection and G--4 traffi c headquart ers prepared schedul es, whil e the engi neer 

secti on supervised constru cti on o f traffi c circles and onc-way bypasses through 

towns. Meanwhil c, the provost marshal placcd military pol ice at cvery major 

and most minor intersections. By sll ch mcans, the First Army headq uarters 

gain ed some control of th e situation, with probl ems ecntcred around poo r 

coordinati on and pl annin g by th e dispatchin g agencies.

1(1 

For a ll of th e staff's efforts, th e congestion could onl y become worse ove r 

time unl ess the Alli es ex panded thc il' lodgment. By early Jul y th e First Army 

headqua rt ers supervised 4 corps and 13 di visions, in cl uding 9 infantry, 2 ar~ 

moreel, and 2 a irborn e di visions. During th e rest of the month th e First Army 

headq ua rt ers continucd to cmphasize the buildup of combat troops, to the poi nt 

th at by 25 July the command included 14 in fa ntry, 6 a rmored, and 2 airborne 
104 A COli/JIll/lid POS! at War 

divisions. Although the two ai rborne divisions were returning to England for 

reorgani zation, the Ilumber of other divisions was becoming too unwieldy for a 

single army headq uarters to handle.

71 (See Appelldix G.) 

The bui ldup of su ppli es also co ntribu ted to the congesti on. Despite the 

disrupti on of the storm, the buildup actually approached planned goals by late 

July. At that point, the First Army had assembled large stocks of rations and 

gasoline, although the depots still reported shortages of ammunition, signal 

equipment, and some sma ll arms. Port facili ties remained a major conce rn. 

Not ull til 16 July did Cherbourg become operational , and only a trickle of SlIPplies came through the minor ports of Carcntan, Grandc<lmp, Isigny, and St. 

Vaast. Most of the First Army's suppli es still arrived over the beach aboard 

LSTs or were borne ashore by light ers and various amphibious craft from offshore shipping. The ent ire Allied force needed both new ports and additional 

spacc in thc 10dgmcnt. 12 

Following Mon tgomery's ovcrall dcsign in his 30 June order, Bradley turned 

his atten tion about 8 Jul y to a plan that would enable the First Army to clcar the 

bocage and turn Middl eton 's VIII Corps so uthwest into Brittany. Even before 

D-Day, he had considered the use of heavy bombers to blast a hole in the German li ne, and he now moved to translate that co ncept into rea lity. In his command truck and an adjacent tent where Hansen, his aide. had erected a huge 

map of thc beachhead, he dcvotcd two nights to cxami ning tcrrain, comparing 

roadncts, laying out boundarics, and othcrwise outlining options. Encouragcd 

by intelligcnee data that indicatcd a lack of reservcs bchind Gcrman lincs, Bradley drew up a plan for an offensive so uth . He would precedc it with a massivc 

air strike and lise the SI. Lo- Peri ers road- wh ich cut across the First Army 

front from southeast 10 northwcst- and not the St. Lo- Colltances route- an 

east-west route farther south- as his li ne of departure. Once Bradley had th e 

basic design, he called in Hodges and then Kean, Thorson, and Di ckson for a 

preliminary critiqLlc.

1J Montgomery and Dempsey hea rd th e plan at a meeting 

on 10 July, and Montgomery approved the concept while instructing Dcmpsey 

to conti nue to hold the Germans on his front. Hc also recommended to Bradlcy 

a grcater concentra tion at the point of attack. About the samc time, Bradley 

notifi ed Collins, whose VII Corps would ca rry out the plan, and Coll ins suggested a three-mil e sector along the SI. Lo- Periers road near Marigny as the 

focal point. After the other corps commanders and Quesada critiq ucd the dcsign at a [2 Ju[y co nference, the First Army headquarters issued its outline 

plan, code- named COBRA.

N 

The deep involvement of the Fi rst Army commandcr and sta ff in the planning of COBRA was unusual for an army headq uarters, but not inappropriatc, 

given the importance of this operation, Bradley's close rclationship with Collins, 

and the VII Corps commander's tactfulness in inserting his ideas into the design. The army outli ne plan of 13 Ju[y, with Collins' input, went beyond th e 

usual role of an army headq uarters in laying out not only the genera l scheme 

and objectives, boundaries, and changes in division attachments for the attack, 

but also the specific arca of allack and, on the ove rl ay, the missions of thc 

di visions. It allowed g reat freedom of action to the corps comnl(lllders dlll'ing 
First Test ill NorlJ/andy 105 

the th ird, or consol idation, phase, detailing no boundary between the VII and 

VII I Corps. Among the First Army planners, I-I art wanted to rely more on his 

artillery to break the German line, but Brad ley doubted that the First Army 

possessed enough ammunition and guns to provide the necessary in tensity. For 

the most part, he and Colt ins allowed their staffs to handl e details, while in 

daily conferences they worked out any major modifications. Intelligence re~ 

ports remained encouraging, as the First Army G- 2 estimate of 18 July indicated that the Germans lacked the Iroops and suppl ies to hold the SI. Lo- Periers 

li ne and would likely fight a delaying action to cover a retreat south to a li ne 

nea r Coutances. 75 

In drawing up bis final plan, Cott ins made some changes 10 Bradley's design. To ensure a penetration, he obtained an infantry division from th e Fi rst 

Army reserve to add to the two infantry divisions already deployed for th e 

initia l attack. I-Ie a lso revised the ex ploitation of the penetration by two armored di visions and an infantry division, in effect weake ning the ex ploitation 

to the south by shirting units to ma ss more power against Coutances to the west 

and possible enemy co unt era ttacks from the cas!. This time, the First Army 

headquarters wou ld supply plenty of artillery, including 9 of its 21 heavy ba ttalions, 5 of its 19 medium battalions, and all 7 of its nond iv isiona l light battalions, as we ll as support from adjacent corps artillery. In all, Ihe V[[ Corps 

would have 258 arti ll ery pieces, compared to an average of 102 for the ot he r 

three corps. [t would also have 6 of the 18 army tank destroyer battal ions. Thanks 

to careful rationing by the Fi rst Army. the VII Cor ps could draw on re latively 

pl entifu l stocks of ammunition for these pieces. It a lso received severa l more 

quartermaster tru ck companies from the First Army motor pool. By 18 July the 

plan was compl ete, and Montgome ry, who in the interim had co nsented to a 

preliminary ofTcnsive by the Second Army, approved it. The next day, Bradley 

and Quesada went to England to fina li ze arran geme nts for the preattack aeria l 

bombardment. 76 

In th e meantime, the headquarte rs of the First Army and [X Ta ctical Air 

Command had arranged another form of air support. I f Bradley's memoirs arc 

to be believed, he and Quesada conceived the idea of placing an air support 

party with a radio in the lead tank of every armored column to communi ca te 

with a night of P--47 fighters overhead. Bradley arranged for the delivery of 

two tanks to the IX Tact ica l Air Command headquarters, a lt hough a Fi rst Army 

ordnance officer, sus pect ing a mistake, init ially se nt them to the 9th Infantry 

Division. Once the tanks finally arrived, the [X Tactical Ai r Command, in cooperat ion with the First Army armored and signal sections, tested the Army Air 

Forces' very hi gh frequency (V HF) radios in the tanks and found Ihem workabl e. It the n arranged wit h the First Army ordnance section and the IX Air 

Force Support COlllmand to equip the lead tank of each armored column with 

the VI-I F sct. 77 

The First Army staff made one other major contribution to solving the tac -

tical problems posed by the bocage . On 14 July Gerow invited Bradley, I-lodges, 

Kean, Mcdaris, and Hains to a demonstration at the command post of th e 2d 

Infantry Division. A sergeant in the 102d Cava lry Recon na issance Squad ron 
106 A COlllmand Posl al Wa/' 

had we lded fOlll' steel prongs from a destroyed e nemy obstac le to a Sherman 

tank, e nabling the lank to ram into and through a hedgerow without rocking 

ba ck on th e embankment and exposing its und erbe lly 10 enemy fire. Impressed 

with the demonstration, Bradley orde red Mcdaris and Hains, his ordnance and 

armored officers, to inslal11h e device on a few tanks in every lank company. 

Medaris directed his able ma inte nance and suppl y ch ie f, Col. Ne lson M. Lynd e, 

Jr., to rede sign the devi ce for ma ss production, and he put every ordnance company in th e beachhead to work on its installation. From beach obstac les, th e 

a rmor and ordnance sections obwincd the necessary stee l. Medaris also arranged for an ove rnight air shipme nt from England of acetylene cylinders for 

we lding. By 25 Jul y the First Army had produced a bout 500 hedge row cutte rs, 

and tank units we re ca ll ing for more . The ad vent of th e " rhino" device wa s one 

of the few instances in whi ch th e First Army headquarters took an ac ti ve role in 

adjusting equipment and tactics to th e bocage. Alth ough it distribut ed lessons 

learn ed through bull etin s, it lIsually left tactical innovations to the combat divisions, whi ch possessed the combat experience at the tacti cal level a nd could 

appl y it to thei r own unique problems with th e hedge rows.

18 

Thanks in part to th ese innovations, the First Army in mid-Jul y slowly adva nced to COBRA'S j umpoff line, th e SI. Lo- Peri ers road. Despite te na cious 

German resistan ce, on 14 Jul y the V III Corps reached the Ay and Seves Ri vers, 

just short of th e road, and the ncx t day th e First Army headquarte rs halted its 

dri ve west of the Tallte River. The foc us now shifted east of the Taute , whe re 

the XIX Corps wa s ad vanc in g southwest on SI. La. Bradley had appa rently 

decided that he want ed SI. La after a ll to guard COBRA'S easte rn fl a nk, although 

Corl ett would lat er sta te that the First Army commande r did not reall y ex pect 

the XIX Corps to take the city be fore Ihe big push. The XIX Corps commande r 

alread y showed some resentment of his supe rior's tcndeney to favor Coll ins in 

the all ocation of missions. troops, and resources. 1-1 is tcmpcr was not improved 

by the limited supply of ammunition that the First Army headqua rte rs, rati onin g for COBRA, was willing to a llot to his ad van ce, espec ia ll y aft er hav in g protested the ammunition estimates durin g the pre paration for OVERLORD. To provide some sub stitute for artill e ry, Corl ett obtained rrom the IX Tacti ca l Air 

Command two di ve bombe r squadrons fo r a rmed reconnaissan cc. With this ai r 

support, th e XIX Corps battled toward 51. La, finally brea king into the c it y on 

18 July. The Jul y offensive was over. [n sixtee n days of bitt er fighti ng, the First 

Army had gained onl y sevcn mil es west of the Vi re Ri ver and ba re ly over haIr 

th at to th e east. The cost was hi gh- 40,OOO casua lt ies since the start of July. 79 

Although the First Army headquart ers had origina lly planned to laun ch CoBR,\ on 18 Jul y, the slow ad vance to the desired starting line extcnded pre pa rati ons, and aftcr 19 July poor weather forced repca led postponements. Meanwhile, 

on 18 Jul y th e Second Arm y la un c hed GOODWOOD, the prelim ina ry 

ofTensive to COBRA. Aft er two days o r lilli e prog ress, 6,000 cas ualti es, and 400 

lost tank s and no sign of COBRA, Montgomery canceled the drive. Still , GOODWOOD 

had drawn Ge rma n attention bac k to the Cacn flank , magn ify ing the cha nces fo r 

COBRA'S success.

so Wa iting ror the c louds to disperse, Bradley hosted Eiscn howe r, 

Brereton, and Lt. Gen. Ca rt A. Spaatz, whosc U.S. Str ategic Air Forces (USSTA F) 
FirSl Tesl ill Normandy 107 

in Europe would carry out the pre·CollRA bomba rdment. I-Ie frequently visited 

his corps commanders, notably Corlett who wanted his XIX Corps to have a 

larger role in the aHack. He also conferred with Kean, Thorson, and Hodges, 

stay ing tip lat e with Hodges to finali ze arrangements for the impending transfer 

ofcolllmand. ~1 On 19 July Bradley had notifi ed Eisenhower that, once COBR A 

wa s finished, he planned to take command of the 1st Army Group, renamed th e 

12th Army Group to preserve the deception that the 1st Army Group was about to 

desecnd on the Pas de Calais. At that point, hc would activate Patton 's Third 

Army, leaving I-lodges in charge of th e First Army. Until then, Bradley would 

have Patton and Hodges coordinate the ir respective future corps, whil e th e First 

Army headquarters prepared to transfe r units to the Third Arm ~2 

After a week of poor weathe r, COBRA finally opened but to an inauspicious 

beginning. Despite pessimisti c weather reports, on th e evening of 23 July the 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force determined that the allack should begin th e 

nex t day. The following day dawned cloudy, but by the time the order for post· 

ponement reached the airfields in Britain, 1110St of th e 1,500 heavy and me· 

dium bombers had already departed. When they arri ved at the target area, fi ve 

miles by one mile, south of th e St. Lo- Pe ri e rs road, most found th e visibility 

too poor to bomb. Neverthe less, about 300 dropped the ir loads. In one assault 

division, 25 soldiers were killed and 13 1 wounded when a faulty rel ease mccha· 

nism causcd the lead bomber of one formation to re lease its bombs prema· 

ture1y. Appall ed, Bradley and Quesada, who had watc hed the attack from Collins' 

command post, call ed off the rest of the mission and attempted to institute 

more precautions for th e next day. Yet on th e morning 01' 25 Jul y bombs falling 

short of the ir mark, caused by an inability to verify targets through the clouds, 

smoke , and dust, kill ed III more soldie rs from the VII Corps. Shaken, infan· 

trymen moved to the attack, wh ere th ey encount ered fi erce resistance frol11 

dug·in Gel'lnansY 

What had happened? Bradley and Quesada lat er staled Ihat at th e 19 July 

conference th e Army Ai r Forces had agreed to an approach parall e l 10 the St. 

Lo- Peri ers road and th c Amcrican front. The Army Air Forces, on the othe r 

hand, c laimed that no such unde rstanding existed. The air forces generals, by 

the ir account, had warned Bradley that a parall e l approach al ong th e length of 

th e rectangular target area, rather than ac ross it, would create too much co n· 

gesti on ove r the area if th e strike were limit ed to an hour's length before the 

ground attack. Furthermore, they pointed out that th e bombs that fe ll outside 

th e target area lay within the norma l margin of e rror. Miscommuni cati on be· 

tween the two se rvices wa s obvious, but Bradley wa s probably as king th eA rmy 

Air Forces for more than it could safe ly de li ver, give n time and space co n· 

straints. Even Quesada lat er admitted that the St. L6- Pe ri c rs road did not pro· 

vide as c lear a line of demarcation from the a ir as it appeared on a ma p, and 

drifting smoke and dust furthe r obsc ured th e hig hway to aircraft. Whil e the 

First Army's antiaircraft section stepped up its efforts to find mat eri als, such as 

pane ls, searchlights, and balloons, whi ch would identify fri endl y troops and 

vehicl es from th e air, Bradl ey and Eise nhower debated wheth er th ey wo ul d 

ever aga in lise th e heavy bombers in a tacti ca l rol cY 
MAl' 5 
= 

COBRA: THE BREAKTHROUGH 

24- 29 JulV 1944 

front LiM, e ..... ning. 24 Jul 

1.:'.::.::.: ',::.:' l imi' of Sa,u,.tion Bombing Are. 

iii"""!,ii f'"", Line, E"'mlng. 27-:/l! .101 

Fron. Line. :!':l Jul 

ELEVATION IN METERS 

• 

• '00 
110 ;I COII/II/alld Post {II H't"II' 

Nevertheless, if the bombing had shocked and demoralized the VII Corps, 

it had done even morc damage to the Germans. Dickso n noted that the Germa n 

prisoners col lected by the VI J Corps nppeared deaf, tremulolls, or in deep shock 

as a result orlhe bombingY Still, on the evening of25 Jul y frOlllli ne officers 

co uld see few signs of a breakthrough. Gambling that a penetrat ion had occurred and that the Germans were not merely retreating to a second defensive 

line, Collins committed his ex ploitat ion force. By the evening of 27 Jul y the 

VII Corps had driven almost twelve mil es south into the German rear lind was 

threatening Couta nccs \0 the west. ULTRA intercepts showed the Germans' desperation over the gaping ho le in the line. Althollgh the V and XIX Corps had 

made littl e headway, the VIII Corps was <ldvancing toward COlltances. Exultation reigned in the app le orchard cast of Isigny as corps commanders reported 

Iheir progress, and Bradley wrote Eisenhower, "Things on our front really look 

good . . . . We believe we have the Ge rmans oul of the ditches and in complete 

demoralization and expect to take fu ll advantage of them." ~' (See Map 5.) 

The First Army headquarters moved quickly to turn the break through 

into a breakout. AI a con fe rence with his corps commande rs late on the 

afternoon o f 27 July, Bradley went ove r his plans and gave out new objectives and corps boundaries. Determined to press the attack and prevent the 

Germans from fo rming a new line along the rivers to the south, Bradley 

direcled Coll in s' VII Corps to widell the breakthrough and drive southwest 

tow<lrd the coast to cut off the enemy faci ng Middleton 's VIII Corps. Once 

the VII Corps' spearheads had conta c ted those of the VIII Corps ncar 

Coutances, the VII Corp s wou ld turn south and take the crossroads of 

Villedieu-Ies- Poeles, twe nty-two miles sOllth of the sit e of the breakthrough. 

The VII I Corps woul d keep up the pressure toward Cou tance s. At Co rlett 's 

suggesti on, Bradley transferred an infantry division and the XIX Corps front 

to Gerow's V Corps. The XIX Corps woul d take three infantry divisions 

and part of an armored division and attack south along the west bank of the 

Vire Ri ver. It would th e reby guard the V II Cor ps' flank and capture Vire, <l 

critical junction twenty mile s so uth of SI. L6 on the highe st ground in 

Normandy. The V Corps would continue its attack, bllt without any specific 

objectives as yel. P On a visit th e next day, Montgomery approved Bradley's 

design. He also arranged fo r the British Second Army to attack near Caumont 

on 30 July to guard the First U.S. Army's east nank and contain German 

armored re se rves on the British (ronl. 88 

As American troops raced south during the lasl days of July, the First Army 

headquarte rs unavo idably missed some opportunities in th e fast-developing 

situation. (Map 6) Bradley, preparing to take over the 12th Army Group, left 

more of th e direction of the First Army 10 Hodges, who devoted most of his 

timc to touring corp s command posts. La c kin g a PIIANTm.I system like 

Montgomery's, il was nearly impossibl e for anyone at the First Army headquarters to keep pace with events. Despite Bradley's instructions to Collins at 

the 27 Ju ly conference, th e First Army field order for 28 Jul y directed the VII 

Corps to purSlie both its drive southwest toward COlltances and its attack so uth 

at the same time, moving its boundary with the VIII Corps east from the coast 
FirSI TeSI ill Normandy 

FIRST U.S. ARMY 

30 July-6 August 19.4 

_r.-Uno.E--.30.,... 

" " " " " , 

_r.-Uno.E--.".IuI 

_r.-Uno.E_ ...... 

ElEVATION iN "H£~S 

,OlD :!OIl 300 ...... _ 

'co --~---~--~\~ .. , ... 

t t t 

MAl' 6 

only when it had linked up with the VII I Corps and when the VIII Corps was 

prepared to contin ue its attack south rrom Cout ances. The resultin g conrusion 

and lack orcoordination between the VII and VIII Corps probably permitted iI 

good share orthe Germans raci ng th e VIII Corps to escape, although they len 

behind considerable equipment and ve hicl es.~ 
112 A COII/mal/d Post at Wi'll' 

The American hi gh command mig ht we ll have been morc co ncerned abollt 

the situation to the cast. By the morn ing of28 July Di ckso n had noted a Ger· 

man panzer di vision apparentl y movin g west from the British front to strike the 

flank oCthe penetrat ion. Despite Hodges' disapp roval of Corlett 's desire to Ou lflank th e German thrust, the XIX Corps managed to hall the coun teratta ck and 

dri ve the Ge rmans back across the Vire Ri ve r, cl ea ri ng th e way for a U.S . advance farther south. By 3 I Jul y the VI II Corps had se ized Avranchcs, th e coasta l 

10WI1 where No rmandy and the Brittany Peninsula mee t, breaking th e li ne thaI 

th e Germans were attempting to organize beyo nd the town and open ing the 

way into Brittany,"I(I 

In its bapt ism of fire , a period in which it enj oyed great power and autonomy as the primary American headq ua rte rs on the Continent, the First Army 

headquarters displ ayed competence, though no specia l brilliance , as well as a 

wi ll ingn ess to assert its prerogatives. It performed its rol e in an assured manner, laying out c lear and simpl e missions that rarely interfered in corps business, establishing insta ll ations and procedures, a nd keeping close track of operations, thanks to th e ge nerall y excellent communi cation s in th e sma ll , slowly 

expa nding lodgment. One could argue that the headquarte rs needed to learn 

some lessons about concentrating fo rces, mishandl ed some aspects of the 

buildup, took too hard a line with its di vision com manders and th e Navy, lacked 

coordinat ion with highe r air eche lons, and did not allow ADSEC and COMZ to 

install th emse lves on the Con tinent. Yet many of the fa ctors with wh ich the 

Fi rst Army had to co nt end- rugged terrain , poor weather, lack of sh ipping, 

and an immensely compl ex bui ldup o rgan izati on with inadequate channels of 

communica tion- were beyond its control. With the 2 1 Army Group, the corps, 

and parti c ularly th e IX Tacti cal Air Command headquarte rs, th e First Army 

headquarte rs enj oyed good relations, due large ly to Bradl ey's interpersonal skills 

and easy rapport with the principa ls, and, even with the Navy, the First Army 

headqua rt ers was able to work o ut its diffe rences. COI3RA showed that the Fi rst 

Army co uld co ncentrate combat power when cond itions were right. Nevertheless, probl ems in command and communi cations in COBRA foreshadowed the 

diffi cu ltie s that the First Army would face in the pursuit across France. 
Notes 

I H:lnscn Dinry, 6 JUIl 44. USAM I-I [: Bradley, A Soldier:~ Story, pp. 268- 74: Wiltinrn C. 

Sylvan Diary, 6 Jun 44, OCMH Collection, I)crsonal Papers. Sylvan box, USAMH1; LIT, 

Blanchard to author, Jan 97. DWH; Jn ls, First Army 0 - 3 Jnls for AligliSIa and Acherl/(fr, 6 J UII 

44. All G- 3 Journal entries ci ted in this chal)lcr arc ill 10 1- 3.20- 3 Journal , boxes 1959- 1963. 

WWIl Dps Reports, RG 407, WNRC. MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbc.IlP. 118- 20; MS. Cafler. 

Carter's War, eh. 9, pp. 6- 10; Morison, TlIe 11II'(lsiOIl of France (l1It1 Gel'lI1lIll),. pp. 142- 52; Rpls. 

First U.S. Army, Report of Opcrations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944, 5: 121. and Dran, First 

U.S. Army Report of Opcr:.tions, 20 Oct 4]- 1 Aug 44, sec. 4, pI. OJ no. 2, p. 5. For general 

backgrolmd, sec discussion in BibJiogn11)hical Note. 

) Sylvan Diary, 7 J un 44; Rpl. Provisiona l Engineer Speci,11 Brigade Group, Operillion 

Rej)ort: NI;PTUNE, 30 Sep 44, pp. 313- 15. 

J Grant A. Williams. "First Army'S ETO Signal Operations," Sigl/ols 2 (March- April 1948): 

7- 8; Rpt. First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 Octobcr 1943- 1 August 1944. 5: 174-75. 

6: 14- 16; Jnls. First Army G- 2 and 0 - 3 Jnls for Auguslo and Acllenlflr, 6 J un 44. All G- 2 

Journal entries citcd in this study arc in 101 - 2.2 G- 2 Journal. bO)lcs 1837- 1879, WW II Ops 

Reports, RG 407, WNRC. MS, Robert H. George, Ninlh Air Forcc, April 10 November 1944. 

Army Air Forces Historical Studies 36,1945, pp. 80- 81, CM U Library: Bradley, II Sohlier:t 

SIoI)', Pl'. 280- 81. Acco unts differ on Ihe effectiveness of Ihe naval shore fire control parties 

and air support part ies. [n nddition to sources cited above, sec Rpt. Provisionn ] Engineer Special 

Brigade Group. Operation Report: Nt:PTUNE, p. 93: Morison. Th e /lw{/.yiQII of Fmllce (11111 Gemll/llY, 

p. 143. 

• O' Este, Decisiol/ ill Nomll/JI(ll'. p. 160; I-Iarrison. Cl'Oss-Cltmll/e/ Altack, p. 336; 1·lansen 

Diary, 7 Jun 44; Montgomery, NOrlll(//uly to Ille B(lIIic. Pl' . 72- 74: Brndley, A Soliliel's SIOl'Y, 

pp. 278- 81: Jnls, First Army 0 - 2 and G- 3 Jnls for AlIgllslII ,lnd Achenlllr, 7- 10 Jun 44 . 

J Hansen Oinry, 7- 10 Jun 44 ; Bradley, A So/tliers SlOty, Jlp. 282- 83; Msg, Bradley to 

Co lli ns, 9 Jun 44. and U r. Bradley 10 Eisen hower. 8 Jun 44. both in 101 - 3.3 G- 3 Journals, 

WW IJ Ops ~e rt s, RG 407. WNRC: Jn ls. First Army G- 2 nnd G- 3 Jnls for AllglI.WII and 

Achei'll{//". 7-10 Jun44. 

• Ruppenthal. Logislical Supporl ofillc Armies. Volume I, pp. 39 1- 93, 398-400. Rpts, First 

U.S . Army. Report of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944.2:26-35,5:1 42. 14 7; 

I'rovisional Engineer Speeia ll3rigade Group, Operation RC1)Ort: NEl'TUNF., 30 Sep 44. Pl'. 174-

77,18 1, 188. 28 1; and U.S. Army, ETO, Gc ncralBoard. Mounting the OperJtio n OVI:RI.QRl), 

Study 129. pp. 19- 21. Iinnsen Diary, 7- 10 J un 44 ; Jnls. First Army G- 2 and 0 - 3 Jnls for Ihe 

Allgusta. 6- 7 Jun 44: McNllnll1ra, QII{/"'(,I·I//(/ ~/e/" IIClivilie.l" pp. 129- 30; [nlerv. Robertson with 

Il oge, sec. 2, 14- 15 Jan 74, 1'1'. 50- 55: Wenver, Youkee Doodle Dlllld)" Pl'. 344. 350- 5 1: Bykofsky 

nnd Larson. Opera/jOlls OI·CJ"$ClU. p. 273; Morison, The bll'llSiQII of Pmllcc (UI(I Ge,./l/llII)', pp. 

162- 64. 

J Ruppenlhal.l.ogisliclIl SIiPPOI"/ oflheArlllies. Volllllle I.pp. 392- 93 , 399- 400: l-Irulsen 

])inry. 8- 10 Jun 44. USAM I·II: [ntervs, Forrcst C. Pogue with Alan O. Kirk. 4 Apr 47, Pogue 

interviews, USA MI-II, nnd Robcrtson with lIoge, 14- 15 Jan 74. sec. 2. pp. 50-55; Morison, Tile 

1I,I1(1S;O/l of Pmllce mul Gerlll(lIlY. pp. 164 65. 

' [nlcrv. Pogue with Kirk, 4 AIH 47; Moriso n, Th e hll'(lS;OIl of FHlllce (IIld Ge,./l/ony, pp. 

164- 66; Weaver. Yank ee /Jomlle J)(llItiy, pp. 35 0- 51; Bradley, A Soldie,.:~ SIOI)" pp. 304- 06; 

Jnls, First Army G-4 Jnls, 11 - 13 Jun 44. Al l G- 4 Journal cntries c ited in this study arc in 101 -

4.20- 4 Journal , bo)les 1993- 1996. WW II Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. 

• Rpl. U.S. Army. ETO, General Board. Mo unting thc Operation OVERl.OkO. Study 129. pp. 

13- 14: MS, Carte r. Can e r's War. eh. 9. Pl'. 20- 22; Memo, Col Walter W. Wendt. G-4 Section, 

for Quartermaster, Ordnnnee, Signal. Engineer, Medical. and Chemical Warfare Sections, 19 

Jun 44.101-4.2 G- 4 Journal rile. bO)l 1994, WW[] Ops Rcports. itO 407, WNRC; Bykofsky 

and La rson, Ope"{//iol/.~ Olle,.seas, p. 273. 

10 [{ pts. First U.S. Army, Report of Ope rations, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 3: 19, 

5: 12 1- 25, 13 [. 1111<1 First Army, COO, 18 Nov 46, ])p. 160. 163; Jnls, First Army G- 2 and G- 3 
114 A COII/lIIlInd Posl a/ 1Vt'U' 

Jnls for Augllstll and Acllerllllr. 6- 10 Jun 44, and Firsl Army G 2 Jilts, 6- 10 JU1l44: Roscng:lrlcn, 

"With ULTRA From OMAIIA Beach to Weimar. Germany," I), 128; Rill. Rosengarten to Taylor. 

21 May 45, sub: Report on UITIlII Intelligence at First U.S. Army: Lir. Ricsman to author. 4 Feb 

97; MS. Dickson. Algiers to lhe EII)C, pp. 121 - 22. 

II MS. Dickson. Algiers to the Elbc. p. 136; Iinnson W. Ihldwin. Baffles /.osl mill !Jim: 

Gte{/{ Cmlll)(ligllN vi ll ar/II fI'rll" 1/ (Nell' York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 363, 497- 98. Sec also 

lhe rcpofl of Specia l Forces Dcwc hmCIlI 10 in Rpl . "[odges to Uradlcy. 101 - 3.22 Mise 

Memoranda and PUI)CrS, 0 - 3. 1 SI Army. Oct 44. box 1992, WWII OI)S Reports. RG 407. WNRC. 

For more on the ass in the European theater, sec Dnvid W. I-logan, Jr .. U.S. Arm)' Spedll/ 

Operaliolls ill World 11'(1/' /I (W"shington, D.C.: U.S. A rmy Center of Military History. 1992). 

II Jnls, First Army G- 2 and G- 3 Jllis for AllglI.\·w and lIe/w/"Iwl'. 6- 10 Jun 44. and First 

Army G- 2 Jnls. 6- 10 Jun 44: MS. Dickson. Algiers to the Elbe, pp. 12 1- 22; MS, Bradley. 

Revised Transcription of Bradley Interviews, reel I. p. 95 ; Montgomery. NOl'lIIclIIdy 10 the Btl/tic. 

pp. 79- 81. 85. 

IJ Jnts, First Army G- 2 :md G- 3 Jnls for Allgllsta and Achenltlr. 9- 11 Jun 44; 1I:lllscll 

Di:try. 8- 9 Jun 44; Bradley. A Soldier's SIOI"),. p. 282; Sylvan Diary, 9, II Jun 44: Rpt, First U.S. 

Army, Report ofOl'erations, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944.2; 108. 5: 122, 6: 16- 19; Williams, 

" Firsl Army's ETO Signal Operations." PI'. 8- 10: IllIerv, llevan wilh Hewitt, I Oe181, p. 149; 

MS , Bradley, Revised Tr:lnSerilltion of Bradley Interviews, reel I, pp . 94, 141-42; MS, Carter, 

Carters War, eh. 9, I). 17; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, I). 126: McNmnara, Qllarlenlll/.I·lel· 

AClil'ilies.I'.134. 

I. Bradley, A Soldier s Slory, Ill). 3 19- 20. Inlervs, Pogue \\'ilh Bradley. 14 Oct 46. pp . 2- 3: 

Pogue and Harrison with Bonesteel, 18 Jun 47, p. 3; Pogue with Smi th , 8 May47. p. I; 1111d with 

Williams. 30- 31 May 47, p. 8. O·Este. Decisioll ill NQr/l/fwdy, pp. 306- 07, 352. 

I) Kpt. U.S. Army, 12th Army Group. Report of Operations. 5:54-55; Hamilton. Masler of 

Ille fltllliefield, pp. 762- 63; Tcleeon, author with Dannemiller, 6 No\' 92, pp. 18- 27,59- 61. 

'· Teleeon, author with Dannemiller, 6 No\' 92. PI). 5- 13; Cir, I-IQ. First U.S. Army. 10Jun 

44, OITieer Roster by Section ; Rpt . First Army. CO D. 18 Nov 46. PI). 177- 78: Cir, HQ. First 

U.S . Army, 21 Apr 44. Functional Chart, Chief of Starr Section; T:lpe, Dannemiller to author, 

Jan 97. DWH. 

17 Jnl. First Army G- 2 Jnl. 13 Jun 44; llennell, ULTRA ililhe U'bl, Pll. 70- 72. 

Il llradley. II SO/dir!I'$ S/(II)'. PI). 292- 93: Llrs, Gerow to Gordon A. I-I:mison, 16 Oct 47, 

Hlld Lt Gen Clarence R. Huebner to Harrison. 17 Del 47, both in box 164. B:lekground Notes to 

ClT)s.f-Chllllllei Allack by Gordon A. Ilarrison, RG 319. NAI{A; War Department, Historienl 

Division. Oll/allll Be(lchhe(l(l (6.1111/1.'- /3 .lillie 1944). American Forces in Action Series 

(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division. War Depa rtment. 1945). p. 158: Jnls. First Army G- 3 

Jnls. 12- 13 Jun 44: Msg, Bradley to Gerow, 12 Jun 44. Bradley World War 11 Correspondence. 

1942- 1945, box 5, Bradley I'npers. USAMIII ; Llr. Col Robert S. Nourse. Adj Gen , First Army. 

to Bradley, 2 Apr45, II Cys G- 3 Leiters and Indorsements. Apri l 1945 re historical illfo. box I. 

U.S. Army. I-IQ, First Army, Assistant Chief of SlafT G- 3, Reports and Messages, RG 338. 

WNRC. 

I. Hnmilton, Mcmer ofllll' nmllefield. p. 650. 

lO Bradley, A So/clier $ Slory, PI). 293- 95, 298- 99: Hamilton, khmer oflhe Bfllf/e/ield, pp. 

658- 60,671; 1·larrison. Cm.I·. -C"lIIl1!eI Allad. pp. 376- 77: Sylvan Diary, 13 Jun 44; Juls. First 

Army G- 2 Jnls, 13- 18 JUIl 44; Cir, First Army 0 - 2 Estil1l<lte 4.14 Jun 44. All G- 2 Estim<ltes 

cited in this study arc in 10 1- 2.150- 2 Estimates, box 1956. WWII Ops Reports. RG 407 . 

WNRC. Jnls. First Army G- 4 Juls. 13- 14 Jun 44: 011/(/1/(/ l1eacillwad, p. 163. 

II Ruppentha l, Logislictl/ SIIPPOI'f of IIII.' Ilm/ies. 1'01111111.' /, pp. 397, 401: Rpt. First U.S. 

Army, Report of Openuiolls, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 1:56, 5: 144, 216, 6: 132- 33: 

Jnls, First Arlily G- 4 Jllls, 12. 14 JUll 44; McNamara. QII(II'I('/'III(U{crAclil'ilies, pp. 130, 133: 

MS. Carter, Carter's War. eh. 9, p. 18; MS. Carter, Employment and Staff Procedures, p. 44; 

Ross alld Ronmnus, OpelYl/iOl/s ;/1 Ihe ~Ir Agaillsl C('I·lIIml)'. pp. 443-44: Rpt, Provisional 

Engineer Speei<ll Brigade GroUI), Operation Report: N[l'lUNI:. 30 Sep 44, pp. 233, 239; Memo, 

I lodges ror CG. Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, 14 JUII 44, 101 - 4.2 G- 4 Journal 

file, box 1994. WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. 
First Test ill Normandy 115 

11 Ruppcnthal, Logislical S'II'IWrl 0/ 11t(~ Armies, l'oll/IIIC I. pp. 434. 493; Rpt. First U.S. 

Army. RCI)ort ofOIlCr;ltio!ls. 20 Or;:wbcr 1943 I August 1944.5:144.216; Jnls. First Army G 

4 Jnls. 18 19 Jun 44: MS. Carter. Cotrter's War. ch. 9, p. 18: MS. eMter. Employment anu Staff 

Procedures. p. 44: Memo. Eisenhower for Smith. 16 Jun 44. in Chandler. cd .. Ei~ eIl/1fJ1I'el' P(lpcr~, 

3: 1929 30: Intef". author with Welltit, 29 Apr 91. pp. 45- 46. 

1I Rill. First U.S. Army. Report OfOI)cratiuns. 20 October 1943 I August 1944. 1:56.80. 

6:61. 133 40; r.,·layo. all lJelichheai/ al/(llJllllle/l'Olll. pp. 244- 45. 249. 

l ' Kleber and 13irdsell. Cllelllica/~' ill Combal. p. 70; MS. Carter. Carter's War. eh. 9. I). 27: 

MS. Bnldley. Revised Transcription of Bradley Interviell's. reel I, p. 17 1. 

21 Rpts. First U.S. Army. Rcport of Ope fat ions. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 1:56.80-

81. 7:69. and U.S. Army, ETO. GencrallJoard. Mounting the Operation OV[III.OIIO. Study 129, 

PI'. 7 8; Coslllas and Cowdrey. M('(/icfli SC/'I'ice ill Ihe Eumpelll' Thealer 0/ Opcraliol/s. pp. 

222 ·24. 231: Rpl. PrO\'isional Engineer Special Brigade Group. Operation Report: NLrTuNF. 

30 Sep 44. pp. 115.335: Hansen Di:try. 8 Jun 44: Jnl , First Army G- 4 Jill. 28 JUI! 44. 

:.. Rpts. First U.S. Army. Report of Opera lions. 20 October 1943 I August 1944. 1:74.80 

81. 5:220. :lIld First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. p. 19. 

II Rpt. First U.s. Army, Report ofOI>Cl11tions. 20 October 1943 I August 1944.6:137. 

140: MS. Carter. Employmcnt and Staff Procedures. pp. 39. 42. 44. 58. 100. 104: Jnls. First 

Army 0-4 Juls. 11 - 12. 15- 17 Jun 44. 

I. Memo, First Army Daily Supply Siluntion, 15- 19 Jun 44,101 4.20- 4 Journal fil e. box 

1994. WWII OI)S Reports. [{ G 407, WNRC; Weigley. Eisel/howcr :\. Uell/I'II(IHI.\·, p. 107; Elbridge 

Colby. The Fint AI'm)' ill Europe. 1943 1945. 2d cd. (Naslwillc. Tenn .: U<t1l ery Press. 1993). p. 

36. 

~ Rpl. Provisional Engineer SI>ccial Brigade Group. Opefltlion Report: NLrTUN[. 30 Sep 

44. pp. 76- 77. 151 - 54; Bradley. A SoltJicr s Siory. I)P. 302 03; InteTI'. Murray with P:l1terson. 

23 Aug 73. p. 14 7: MS. Carter. Cartcr's W:tr. eh. 9.p. 32: Jnls. First Army 0 - 4 Jnls. 20- 22 JUIl 

44: Colby. The Fit'si At'III)' ;/1 EUl'Ol'e. p. 36. 

M RUPllCnthal.l.ogi.\·licul Suppo,., o/Ihe ' /l"IlIies. l'olullle I. pp. 407.446; Bradley. A Soldier:v 

SI(JI)" PI). 303- 07: Rpt , First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 

1:80.94 95. 125.5: 183- 86, 6:6 1- 62: Intef\'. Forrest C. Pogue with Maj Gen Robert \V. Crawford. 

5 May 4S. p. 2. ['ogue interviews. USAMIII; Rpt. Provision:t l Engineer Specia l Brigade Group. 

Opcration Report: Nt:rl"UNt:. 30 Sep 44. pp. IS9, 236: Intcrv, Pogue with Kirk. 4 Apr 47; Rpt . 

First Army. CO D. 18 Nov 46. p. 349: Jnls. First Army G-4 Juls. 12. 14- 15,2 1- 25 Jun. alld 3, 

16, 18.25 JIll 44; Weigley. fi.\'elllw1l"er~· Lieutel/ants, Ill'. 107- 0S: Ltr. IJris GCII Miller O. 

Perry, USA (Ret.). to aUlhor. 28 Jan 97. DWII; Ilansen Dinry. 16. 18.23 Ju144: Colby, rile Firsl 

Army ill Eu/"ope. p. 36. 

}I Jnl. First Army G-4 Jnl. 19 Jun 44: Bradley, A Soldier's SIOI)'. ll. 305: Lirs, Bradley to 

Eisenhower. 25 Jun 44. and Eisenhower to Bradley. 27 Jun 44. both in Bradley Correspondence 

with Eisenhower. v. I. 1943- 1945. box 5, Brndicy Pal)Crs. USAMIII. 

II Rpt. Draft. First U.S. Anny Report of Opera Ii OilS. 20 Oct 43- 1 Aug 44. sec. 4. pI. A. p. 

9: Msg. Bradley to Smith. 17 Jun 44. Bradley World War II Correspondence. 1942- 1945. box 5. 

Brndley I'apers. USAM HI; Ltrs. Bradley to Eisenhower. 16 Jun 44. Bradley Correspondence 

wi 1h Eisenhower. v. I. 1943- 1945. box 5. Brndley Pal>crs. USAMIII. and BuHto Bradley. 17 

JUII 44. Misccllancous Military Lellcrs. I June 1944- 20 Dcccmbcr 1944. box I. Ha rold R. 13u ll 

I'npers. Eisenhowcr Lib r~ry; IntCrl'. 51. LOllis with Boncsteel. 9 Nov 72. p. 177: Rpts. U.S. 

Army. ETO, Generall3oard, Mounting the Operation OVI,RI.ORO, Study 129. pp. 10- 12, 17- 19. 

24 26. and U.S. Army, ETO. General Ooard. Control of Troops Build-up in Cross-Ch,lI1nel 

Amphibious OI)CT:lt ion. Study 22. I). I I. 

)J 1·larrison. C/"O$S-ClllllllleJ AI/ack. p. 416: IJradley. II Sahli/!/' s SIOI)'. pp. 300- 30 I: Cir. 

First Army G- 2 Estimate 5. 18 Jun 44; Jnls. First Army G- 2 Jnls. 18 19 Jun 44: War Departmcnt. 

lI istorieal Division, Uwlt IJettclt to Chc/"bollrg. 6-17 Jlllle 1944, American Forces in Action 

Series (Washington. D.C.: Ilistorical lJivision. War Department. 1947). p. 150 . 

.).I Harrison. Cross-Challlle! Allf/ck. p. 443: Bradley. II Soldier's Siory. pp. 30 1. 303: Cir. 

First Army G- 2 Estimate 5. 18 Jun 44: Jnls, First Army G- 2 Jnls. IS 19 Jun 44. and First Army 

G 4 Jnl. 21 JlIn 44: Field Order (FO). Capt S. A. Mar;:Kenzie. Asst Adj Gcn. First Army. to 
116 A COII/molld Post al H/c/l' 

Collins, Middleton, 19 J UI1 44. 101 - 3.9 Field Orders. W\\'[I Ops Reports. RG 407. WNRC: 

H3111i hon. A-fasle,. ojl/l(' IlO/l/ejiefd, pr. 680- 81: Montgomery, NOl"lIIwu/y 10 fhe lJallie, pp. 92-

94. 

l~ Morison, Tfle Illvasioll of Frallce IIml GermallY. pp. 196- 212; Robert H. George. 

"NOfl11iUldy:' in 71w Arm)' Air Forces ill lVodd fJ't,r II, vol. 3, £lIl"ope: ARGUMENT /() VE Day . 

./tl/ll/(//")' 1944 10 Mol' 1945, cd. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Calc (Chicago: University of 

Chicago, 1951), pp. 199- 201: Ilarrison. Cros.\'-C/U/lllle!I/(/(/{:k, IlP. 428- 29; Jill. First Army 0 -

3 Jnl. 24 JUll 44: Bradley, A Soldier's SIOI),. p]l- 307- 08; Hughes, OVERLORD. pp. 159- 66. 

J.o Olu111cnsoll, /Jreakolll (tnd PUI".I'II;I, pp. [86- 87: Eisenhower. Grus(lde ill Europe, pp. 

264.268; Memo. LUCKI' STlUKI; plan. in 101 - 3.5 I'lanning Papers. box 3. U.S. Army. First U.S. 

Anny. Assistant Chief ofStaITG- 3, 1'l:1ns and Operations. RG 338, WNRC; Interv. Pogue with 

Dickson, 22 Dec 47, p. I: Weigley, Eisellhou'er:~ Lieu/emlilis. pp. 114- 15: D'Este, /Jedsioll ill 

Norll/andy. p. 345. 

'1 Colby. The Fil'~ 1 Army ill Europe. p. 43. 

1. First Army FO 1. 26 lUll 44. 101 - 3.9 Field Orders, WWJl Ops Reports. RG 407, WNRC; 

Ilradley. A Soldier~' SIU/)'. pp. 317- 19: Blulllenson, Brcnkoul (/lid Pursuil. p. 37: War Dep:1rtlllent, 

Historical Division, SI-I.o (7 .//l1y-19 ./ul)' 1944). American Forces in Action Series (Washington. 

D.C.: Historical Di vision. War Departillent. 1946). p. 2; Jnl, First Army G- 2 Jnl. 27 Jun 44: 

Sylvan Diary. 26- 28 Jun 44: Weigley. EisenflOwer s Lh'lIlell(IIIIS, ]lp. 121 - 23. 

l' Cirs, First Army G- 2 Speei:11 Estill1i1te 4. 29 Jun 44. and G- 2 Estimate 7, 29 Jun 44. 

Quote from Ur. Bradley to Eisenhower. 29 Jun 44. Omar N. Ilradley, Bradley Correspondence 

with Eisenhower, v. I, 1943- 1945. box 5.l3rad ley I'apers. USAM HI. 

.~ Montgomery. Nor/l/andy /0 Ihe Baltic. pp. 106- 09: l-I:u11i11on, 1J{(ISler of/he IJrm/efield. 

pp. 696- 702: Eisenhower, Cmsade ill £lIrOIJe, Pl'. 267- 68; Interl', SI. Louis with Bonesteel. 9 

Nov 72. PI). 149- 5 1: First Army FO I. 1 Ju144, 101 - 3.9 Field Orders. WWll Ops Reports. RG 

407. WNRC: Hansen Diary. 2 Ju144: I3rad1cy, A Soldiers 5/(11),. pp. 327- 28; SI-Lo, p. 2 . 

• , Hansen Diary. 3- 4 1111 44 ; Sylvan DiMy, 3- 7 lui 44 ; Bl umenson, Brenkolll allfl P/II·~·lIil. 

pp. 101 - 03 . 

• , Sylvan Di:lry, 8 Jul 44; Corlett. Cowboy Pele, pp. 92- 93: Blumenson, Breakou/ (/lui 

Pllr.wil. p. 134: Msg, Bradley 10 Commanding Officers. V. VII . VI II . XIX Corps lind Provi~ional 

Ranger Group, 8 Jul 44. 101 - 3.9 Fidd Orders. WWII Ops Reports, RG 407. WNRC . 

• l P:llton quote from BIl/lI1ellson. cd., The PallOll Paper~·. 2:482. 

"' Ltrs. Brildley to Eisenhower. 6 luI 44. Bradley Correspondence wilh Eisenhower. v. I, 

1943- 1945, box 5, Bradley l'apeTs. USAM H J, and Eisenhower to Marsh,!!), 5 Jul 44 , in Chandler, 

cd .. Eisenflower Papers, 3: 197 I; MS, Dickson. Algiers to the Elbe, p. 137: RPIS, Firsl Army G2 Periodic RillS for 4- 8 Ju144 . All G- 2 Periodic RcporlS cited in this study arc in 101 - 2.2 G- 2 

Journal. boxes 1837- 1879. WWII Ops Reports. RG 407. WNRC.l3ennelt. UL TRA illthc West, 

pp. 98- 100: Cir. First Anny G- 2 Estimate 9. 10 Jul 44 . 

• ~ Hamilton. Masler of the Balllejidr/, p. 717; Montgomery, N(wII/alldy 10 Ih e Baltic, pp. 

11 3. 11 8- 21; D'cste, Decision ill Norll/nllt/y, pp. 300- 302. 306 . 

•• First Army FO I, 1 Jul 44, with an. !. I Jul 44; Weigley. Eisenhower s Ueulelltlllls, pp. 

123, 137; Martin Blumenson. The liallie oflhe Gel/erals: 711e UIlJOld SIOI), oJI/W Ftlltlise Pockel. 

Ihe Campaign Thai SJWIlIrI Nave WOII World War 1/ (New York: William Morrow, 1993), p. 118: 

D·Este. Decisioll ill Norm(wdy, PI'. 340- 41 . 

• 1 Rpt, First U.s. Army. Repon of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944, 1: 122- 23; 

Doubler. BIISlillg the Bocage, pp. 14- 16,22- 29; O"'(lha /Je(lchhead, p. 19; Blumenson, BreakOll1 

alld Pl/rSIl;I, pp. 11 - 13. 178; Weigley, £isen{wl\'er:\' LienlellalllS, pp. 123, 127- 28. 

" Interv, author with Hains. 29 May 91, Pl'. ! I. 23. 36. 45; Ltr, Co l Peter C. llai ns, USA 

(Rct.), to author. 10 Dec 96. DWH: Donald E. HoustOIl , Hell 011 Wheels: rhe 2dAr",ored Dil'isioll 

(San Rafael. Calif.: Presidio Press. 1977). pp. 200- 207. Sec also Rpt. First Army. COD, 18 No\' 

46, pp. 50- 51,011 tank employment 

... Hansen Diary, 2 Ju144 ; Bradl ey. II Soldier y SIOI}'. pp. 322- 23: Interv. author with Hain ~, 

29 May 91. pp. I 7- 18; Jnl , First Army G-4 Jnl. 4 Jul 44: Ur. Eisenhower \0 Marshall. 5 lui 44, 

Pogue files- Eisenhower Ltrs. lu144, Pogue interviews. USAMH I: Blumenson, Breakollt alld 

Pllrsllit, p. 205. 
FirSI Tesl ill Normal/dy [ [7 

~ Interv. aUlhor with Hai ns. 29 May 9 1. pp. II. 14- 17.25.36- 39; Thompson and ll arris, 

Tlte Oil/collie. pp. 118- 19; Williams. " First Army's ETO Signal Operations," p. 10. 

JI Cir. First U.S. Army Artillery Information Service. Sep 44. 101 - 16.0 Special Any Reports. 

Rcporl Memo 116. lSI Army. Sept. 44. bO)t 2000. WWJI Ops Rcports. RG 407. WNRC. 

S2 Cirs, First U.S. Army Art illcry Informatio n Servicc. Telephone Numbers. Office of the 

Art illery Officcr. First Army. lui 44. 101 - 16.0 Special Arty Rel)Orts. Staff Section RepuTls. 

Memo 115. 1st Army, July 44. and First U.S. Army, Office orthe Artillery Officer, Opcraliona l 

Procedure: Organiz,lIion and Functioning of thc Army Artillcry Scetion. Firsl Army Artillcry 

In formation Se rvice, Sep 44 , pp. 6- 7. 101 - 16.0 Special Arty Reports, Sta ff Section Reports, 

Memo #6. 1st Army. Sept. 44 . bOl h in box 2000. WWll Ops Reports. RG 407, WNRC; Llf. 

Perry to ant hor. 28 Jan 97. 

JJ Rpt. First U.S. Army. Report ofOpcrations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944,5: 177- 78; 

II. W. Blake ley. "Artillery in Normandy." Fie/dAnillel)'Jollnwl 39 (March- April 1949): 52-

54: Inter\'. Murray with Hart. 1973. p. 50; Ltr. I'efry to anthor. 28 Jan 97. 

~ Rpt. First U.S. Army. Repon of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944.5: 126- 27. 

171- 81: "First U.S. ATllIY Air OP Opcrations." Fidd Ani/leryJotll'lwl 36 (October 1946): 586: 

Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46. pp. 11 , 164; MS, The First Army G- 2 (Air) Section, Battle of 

the Bulge. box 4. Dickson Papers. USMA Library; Rpt . SynOI)sis of Activiti es of Army Photo 

Interpretation Detachment. and Llr, Brig Gen H. 13. Lewis. Adj Gen. I st Army GrOUj). to Bradley. 

10 Jun 44. both in 320.3. T/O. vo l. II . box 126. 12th Army Group. Adjutant General Section. 

Administration Branch, Decimal fil e. RG 33 1. NARA; Into.::rv. Poglle wi th Dickson. 22 Dec 47. 

Il. 2; Cir. First Army, an. ! to Standard Operating !'rocedure. FirSI Unitcd States ATlny, for Field 

Arlillcry and Tank Destroyers. 15 M:ly 44. pp. 2- 3. 101 - 1.15, G- I SOl'. Anncx No. I, G- I 15t 

Army. 15 M"y 45, box 1829. WWII Ops Rellorts. RG 407, WN ~C; Ltr. Blanchard to amhor. 

Jan 97; George. "Normandy," in EIII"Ope: /1 RGUMt:NT 10 VE Du),. J(II/II(11), 1944 to May 1945. 

cd. Craven ami Cate. p. 202. 

U MS, Georgc. Ninth Air Force.Apri l lO Novembcr 1944. pp. 97- 98: George. "Normandy." 

in Eli/v'l,e: ARGUMENT to VE Da),. J(II/I/(II), 1944 to Mu)' 1945. cd. Craven and Cate. p. 202: 

Rjlt, First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. p. 10: lIughes, OVERLORD. pp. 144. 148-49. 

J<o Cir. SOP- First U.S. Army. I May 44. p. 22. 101 - 1.I5- S0P. G- I 1st Army. 1 May 

1944. box 1829, WWII Ops Rcports. RG 407, WNRC; MS. George, Ninth Air Force. April to 

Novembcr 1944. pp. 136- 37; George. "Normandy:' in Europe: ARGUMENT 10 1/£ Day. JOlIl/ar)' 

1944 til /\>/(1), 1945, ed. Cr,wen and Cn te. p. 203; Rpt, ETO. Army Air Forces Evalll1Hion Board. 

Tncti cs and Techniques Deve lopcd by the U.S. Tlleti cal Air Command in the ETO, pp. I S- 20; 

Memo. Liaison With Air Slipport Command. 16 Jan 44. 3 10. 1. box 64. U.S. Army. First U.S. 

Army. Adj utant General Section. Genert.1 Com.:spondencc. 1940- 1947. RG 338. WNRC: Hughcs. 

OVERLOR/). p. 156. 

S1 Rpts, First U.S. Army, Rcpor! ofOJlerations. 20 October 1943- 1 Augnst 1944. 1:69.91. 

11 9 20. nnd First Army. COD. 18 No\' 46, PJl. 10. 12; George. "Normandy." in Europe: 

ARGUMENT /Q V£ Da),. J(III//(II), 1944 IQ M(J), 1945, ed. Craven and Cate. pp. 203- 07; Interv. 

LI Col Stcve Long and Lt Col Ralph Stephenson with LI Gell Elwood R. Qucsada, sec. 4. 22 

May 75, JlJl. 5- 20. Scnior Offieers Oral History Program, USAM III : MS, Bradley. Revised 

TrJlIlscrilltion of Bradley Interviews. rcel I. pp . 74- 80; I3 cc hthold. "Close Air Support in 

Normandy," pp . 109- 40. 

SI RjltS. First U.S. Artny. Report orOperations. 20 October 1943 I August 1944,5:73- 76. 

and First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46. pp. 153- 54; Cir, SOP- First U.S. Anny, I M:.y 44. 

~ Rpts. First U.s. Army, Repor1 ofOpcralions, 20 October 1943- 1 Augllst 1944.5:65- 67. 

and First Army. CO D, 1 S Nov 46. IlP. ISO, 193; Ruppcnt hal. Logislical Support of lite Arllliel·. 

Volume I. pp. 303- 05. and Volume II, p. 337; Blumenson , Br('(lkO/l1 (/11(/ Pllrsuil. p. 179 . 

.. Rpts, First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944.5:67- 70. 

and First ATllIY. CO D, 18 Nov 46. pp. 154.318- 19; Hansen Diary. 4 Jul 44 . 

• , Quote from I3lumellson. cd .. Tile "a/ltlll Pllpers, 2:479. Rpt, First U.S. Army. Rcport of 

Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944,5:69; Llr, Eisenhowcr to Marshall. 5 Jul 44. in 

Chand ler. cd., Eisen/lOwer Paper.f. 3: 1972; Brndl ey, A Soldier:r SIOI)'. pp. 296- 98; MS, Bradley, 

Revised Transcription of Brad ley Interviews. recl I. pp. 153- 56; Bolger. "Zero Defects:' pp. 
I 18 A COII/malld POSI Of IIill' 

61 - 73: rerrel. Thel'e's a Wal' To lJe II'Im. pp. 26. 72. 118; O·Este. Decisioll ill Nornl{/I/{~l" [J[J. 

288- 89. 

01 John Colby. H{lr From Ihe GrOl/lld Up: 7'i,e 9th" Dil'isioll ill World WW'/I (Austin. Tex.: 

Norte;\: l)ress. 1991). pp. 16- 17.29.148-49.475- 76: Romie L. Brownlee nnd William J. Mullen 

I r I. intcrview..:rs. Challgillg lIIl Al'lIIy: All Oral History o/Ce.lleml WiIIi(lll/ £. DePII),. USA I?elil'ed 

(W:lshington, D.C .. U.S. Army Military History [nslitute and U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1988). jlp. 16- [7,31 - 32: Sylvnn Diary. 3 lu[44; 1[,1I1sen Diary. 13 Ju144. 

OJ Rpts. First U.S. Army, r~ eport of Operations, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 1 :96. 

5:70- 73: U.S. Army, ETO. General Board. Special Services Organization, Study 113. pp. 3- 5, 

CM1-1 Library: and First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. pp. 432- 33 . 

... Rpt. First U.S. Army. Report ofOperntions, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944,7:209-

12; MS, Br<1d ley, Revised Transcription of Bradley Interviews. reel 1. pp. 81 - 84,112; Rpl. 

First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 382- 84: I-Innsen Diary. 3,13 Jul 44: I3rndlcy, II S(}ldiel'~' 

SIOI:t'. p. 335: MS. Dickson , Algiers 10 the Elbe.I). 139; MS. Cnrter. Carter's Wnr, ch. 9. pp. 

33- 34. 

oS Rpts. il·~t U.S. ArIllY. Report ofOperntions. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944,7:205-

09, :lIld First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 383- 84: I-lnnsen Di:lry, IS lui 44; Brad ley. A Soldier :\. 

510/)'. pp. 308- 09. 

"" Rpt. First U.S. Army, Report of Operat ions. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. 5: 155- 62: 

Coles and Weinberg. Soldiers lJecollle COI'emor.\", pp. 721 - 26; F. S. V. Donnison. Ch'il Ajjilil's 

allli Mililaty Cm'emllwlIl ill NOl'l/llI'e~'1 Europe. 1944- 1946. History of the Second World War 

(London: Her Majesty's Stationery OITiee, 1961), PI'. 73- 78; Rpl. First Army, COD. 18 Nov 46. 

pp. 226- 37. 242; Interv, author with Sen. J. Strom ThurmOlld.pI. 2, 24Aug 93. pp. 4- 5,10- 12, 

DWll; Jnl, First Army G- 4 Jnl , 8 Ju144. 

07 Rpt. First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. I: 15; 

[-I nilsen Diary, 2 Jun 44; Msgs. Bradley to Smith. 2 Jul 44, nnd Smi th to Bmdley. 51ul 44. both 

in 014.1 Vol. I: Civi l Affnirs in Northwest Europe, box 6. SHAEF, Office of the ChiefofStnff, 

Secretary of the General Staff, Decimal file. May 1943- August 1945. RG 33 1. NA RA : lnterv. 

author WilhThurmond.l)1. 1, 11 Aug 93. pp. 16- 18 . 

., I~pts. First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 20 October 1943- 1 Augu~t 1944. [:95. 

5:80- 81. 128- 31. 7: 11 - 12. 15- 19, 20- 25. 227- 29. and First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. PI). 318-

19.323; Cir. First Army G- 2 Estimate 8, 3 lui 44 . 

09 Rpl. First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944. I .81; 

Illterv. author with Wendt, 29 Apr 91. pp. 40- 41; RuppcllthnL Logi.\·liclI! SIIPpO,"1 o/Ihellrmies. 

Voll/me I. pp. 430- 33; Blumenson. IJre(lkolll lIlId Pursllit, p. 179. 

1(1 Rpts. First U.S. Army, Rcport ofOper:ll ions, 20 October 1943- 1 August 1944,5:143-

44. 7: 11 - 15.nnd First Army, COD. 18 Nov46.pp. 19!. 205. 

11 Ruppenthnl , Logislical SIIPPOI'I o/Ille Armies. Volllllle I, p. 45 7; J3!ulllcnSOIl. Breakollt 

ami PIII'SIl;I, pp. 208- 09. 

11 Ruppcntlwl. Logisliwl Supporl oftlteArmies. Volllllle I. pp. 416- 18. 489; Rpt . First U.s. 

Army. Report ofOpcmtions. 20 OCTober 1943- 1 August 1944, 1:93- 95, 5: 142- 44 . 

7) Brndley. A Soldier~' SlOry. pp. 329- 30, 338- 39; MS. Bradley, Revised Tmnseription of 

Bmdley Interviews, reel l. pp. 1- 7. 117- 18: Interv. Pogue with Bradley. 14 Oct 46. pp. 1- 2; 

Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimnte 9, 10 lu144: Hnnsen Diary, 271u144; I3lumenson, /Jreakoll/ (IIld 

PUI'.wil. pp. 187- 88,213- 14: Weigley. Eisellho ... er:~ Lieiliel/ailis. p. 137. Note Quesada's Inter 

clnim that he h<1d suggested the grenter eOlleentmtion of force. Scc Inten'. Burg with Qucsadn. 

25 Aug 76, pp. 177- 79. 

N I3mdley, ;I Soldier~' Story. pp. 330- 32; [hnsen Diary. 12 Jul 44; MS, I3r<ldley, Revised 

Transcription of Bradley Intervi ews, reel 1. pp. 7. 118- 20; lntcrvs, Pogue with Bradley. 14 Oct 

46, p. 2, nnd Forrest C. Pogue with Ambnssador Wnlter B. Smith. 9 May 47. pp. 3-4. r ogue 

interviews. USAM 1-1l; J. Lawton Co llins, Ughtllillg Joe: All AlltoiJiogmphy (Baton Rouge: 

Louisinna Slate University Press, 1979), pp. 232- 33; Conference. NOles on 12 July Corps 

Commanders Conference. 101 - 0.5. box 1826. WW II Ops Reports. RG 407. WN RC; Blumenson. 

Breakoll/ "'1(1 Pllr.l'lIil. pp. 187- 88.213- 14; D'Este, Decisiol/ ill Norm(ll/dy. pp. 332- 33. 347-

51; Hamilton, M(lslel' o/Ihe fJ(lfllefleid. pp. 723. 728 . 
Firsr Tesr ill Normol/dy 119 

l' Bradley. A Sofdierl' Slm)". pp. 332. 338: Ilansen Diary. 14 16,18 Ju144: Syl\'an Diary, 

17. 19 Ju144: "',15. Bradley, Revised Tr;lI1seril)tion of Bradley Inlerviews, rcel I, I)P, liS 21: 

Coli ins. UghlllillS Joc, pp. 233- 36: Blumenson. 8,.e(l/;01l1 (11111 PIII'.nlil. pp. 2 13- 17: RI)I. FirSI 

U.S. Arllly, Rel)Orl or Operations. 20 October 1943- 1 Augusl 1944, 1:97 98: Cir. First Army 

Ci- 2 ESlimate 10. 18 Ju144; RPIS, FirSI Army G 2 Periodic Rpls fo r 13- 16 Ju144: Jnls. First 

Army G- 4 Jnls. 16. 18 Jul 44: Cir. I-IQ. FirSI U.S. Army. Outline Plan: Ope ration COIIM ,\. , and 

atlllehmel1ts.IOI 3.5 G- 3 Operation I'lan COllR,\.. G 31st Army, July44. box 1974. WWII Ops 

'{e,}(lrts. RG 407, WN RC. 

~ Bradley. A Soh/it'l" S SIOI)'. pp. 332, 339-4 1: MS. Bradley. Revised Transcripl ioll of Brndley 

Imerviews. reel I. pp. 10 12: Collins. Lighfllillg Joe. pp. 233- 36: lIansen Diary. 18 19 Jul 44: 

OIUl11eIlSOI1, fJrca/;oU/ ami P/lI'slIil. pp. 2 16 20: Rpt. First U.S. Army, Rcport of Operations. 20 

October 1943 I August 1944. 1:98- 99: MS. Kcnllcth WI-lech ler, VII Corps in Operation COliMA. 

8 3.1 AK. pI. 2. p. 27, CM II Archivcs: lI ughes. OVERLORD. PI). 191; -200. 

71 Bradley. A Soldie,.:\, SIOIY. pp. 337 38: IllIerv. Burg with Quesada. 25 Aug 76. pp. 179 

85: Conference. Notes on 12 July Corps Conllllllnders Conference; Rober! H. George. "The 

llal1lc of Frallcc," in Europe: ARGUMENT 10 VI:: D(I),. J(IIII/(II)' 1944 I(J '\/a.11 1945, cd . Craven 

and Cate. pp. 239 40: Williams. "First Army's ETO Signal Operations." p. 10: [nterv. author 

with lIains. 29 May 91. pp. 19- 2 1: lIughes. OVERLORD. pp. 183 84. The British. at Ihe time. 

were lIsing a similar systenl. known as Rovt R, in the Med iterranean . For 1110re on RO\' I ~. sec C. 

J. C. Molony, 111(' Medi/(' IT{/I/CIIII 111/(1 Middle fllsl, vol. 6. Vic IOIy ill Ihc Mcdilcrrt/llellll. 1)1. I. 

hI "pri/lo 41h JI/II(' 1944 (London: lI er MajeslY's Stationery OlTice. 1(84), pp. 67. 157.205. 

If Rpl. First Army. CO D. 18 Nov 46. I)P. 348- 49: lI ansen Di ary. 14 Jul 44: Bradley, II 

S(JItIi('I':~ SIOJ)'. p. 342; Sy lvlll1 Diary. 14 Ju144; Intcrv, author with Il llins, 29 May 9 1. pp. 26-

27: Dc Guingand. Opcmlio/l VICTORY. p. 395: Mayo. 011 IJcacM/e{/(1 wltl B(Jflle/nmt. l)p. 253 

54: Blumenson. HIWlkrml Will PllrSllit. PI). 206- 07: Doubler. HIISlilig Ille Hoc(/gc. PJl. 30 38, 

62 63. 

7'0 Coriell. Cowboy PCIC, pp. 93- 95: Ilhllllel1S0n. 81'CII/;01l1 all(/ PIII' lliI. pp. 165. 175. 

~ [{ pt. First Army G- 2 I'criodic Rpl for 2 1 Jul 44: D' Este. Occisioll ill N(J I'III(l/llly. PI). 

386- 88. 

I I I-jansen Diary. 20 23 Ju144: Sy lvan Diary. 20- 23 Ju144 : Jnl. First ArlllY G 3 Jil l, 20 Jul 

44: Coriell. Cowbo)' PNC, p. 95. 

I! Ur, Eisenhower to Bradley. 14 Jul 44 , in Chandler. cd .. Ei~'ell"Oll'er Paper.l. 3:2004 05; 

l l:tnsen Diary. 20- 2 1 Ju144; Inle rv. Murray wi th Myers. 15 Apr 74. p. 15: Ill umenson. 81'1'(llwlI/ 

(//ull'Il/'J'IIil. pp. 209- 10. 288; Rpt. U.S. Army. 12th Army Group, RCI)Ort ofOper,lt ions, 1:6. 

II H:1I15en D;:lry, 24 25 Ju144; Syh'an Di:lry, 24- 25 Jul 44 : Bradley." Soldicl'~' Slory, pp. 

346 49: MS. Bradley, Revised Transcription of Bradley Interviews, ree l I, I)P. 14- 17: Collins. 

Ughillillg Joe, pp. 238-40: Interl's. l3urg lI'ilh Qucsada. 25 Aug 76. pp. 188- 90. and Long an(1 

Stephenson with Quesada. sec. 5, 13 May 75, p. 6: George, "Battle of Frmlce," in flllvpe: 

ARGUMENT 10 VE Do),. J(IIUI(IIY 1944 10 Mfl)' 1945, cd. Cmven and Cate. PI). 228 34: John J. 

Sullivan, "The Botched Air SIIPI}(Ift of Operation CO IlR A." P(//rlll/C/ cl:~ 18 (March 1(88): 102 

06: Hughes. OVERLORD. p. 2 15. 

U Bradley. II Sohlicr s SIOI')'. pp. 347- 49: George, "l3allle of Fr:lIlee," in EUl'ope: 

ARGU MENTIO VE 00),. J(IIII/(/I')' 1944 10 M(l), 1945. cd. Cr:wen nnd CIte. pp. 23 1- 38: I)·Estc. 

O('(;isioll ill N O/'lll(lIId)" I). 403: Memo. IIQ, First U.S. Army. Combined Air and Ground 

OI)C rations West ofSI. Lo on Tuesday. 25 July 1944. 25 Ju144. in nll ,~c n Di:uy. Ju144 : Sull iv:ln. 

"Ol)eration C013 RA." Pl'. 101 - 08 ; Inter\', Long and Slephenson with QlIeslldll, sec. 5, 13 Ia y 

75, Ill'. 6- 7: Blumellsoll, BrC(l/;tJllI (lIId PIII:fUil . pp. 22 1. 23 1- 33: RlltS. First US. Army. Report 

of Operations, 20 Octobe r 1943- 1 Augllst 1944. I: 120- 21. and First Army. COD. 18 No\' 46, p. 

269: GeolTrey I'erret. WiIlSe(l l/ic/o,.y: Tlte ;/I'/II)I.iI;1' rorc:e~' i/l World mil' II (New York: Random 

1I0use. 1(93). p. 3 11. 

., Rpts. First Army G 2 Periodic Rilts ror 25 26 Jill 44 : MS, I)ickson. Algiers to the Elbe. 

PI). 139- 40. Sec a lso fnter vs. Long and Stephenson wit h Quesada. sec. 5, 13 May 75, Il. 8, and 

Burg with Quesada. 25 Aug 76. p. 19 5. 

s. Llr. Bradl ey to Eisenhowcr. 28 Jul 44. Bradley COfi'espondenee wilh Eisenholl'er, v. I. 

1943- 1945. box 5, I3ri1dlcy Papers, USAM IIL Sec also Bennell. UL TRA illlhe 1I'<.>.f/, PI'. 102-
120 A COII/II/olld POSI al I-/ill' 

03; I3lumcnson, Bl"eakulI/ alld PI/I·~ ui/. p. 246; Hansen Diary, 26- 27 Jul 44; Sylvan Diary. 27 

Jul 44. 

01 Llf, Brndlcy to Eiscnhower. 28 Jul 44; l-!nnscn Diary. 27 Ju144; Coriell, Cowboy Pe/e . p. 

96; Biulllcnson, Breakolll and 1)/lI'slI;/. pp. 286- 88. 

' 3 Blulllenson. lJreakulI/ al/ll PI/J~\"IIi/. pp. 289- 90; Monlgomery, Normandy 10 /he Bal/ie, 

pp. 139- 40; Hamilton, M(/!;/el'o!rlte Bmllt'field. p. 768. 

I . First Army FO 2, 28 Jul44 , 101 - 3.9 Field Orders, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407. WNRC; 

Llr. Ilrndl ey 10 Eisen hower. 28 Jn144; Co llins. Lig/llnillg Joe, p. 245; Blulllenson. Orcakolll (lIId 

Pursllil. pp. 282, 287- 88; Wciglcy, Eisellhower $ Lieu/emlll/s, 1). 159 . 

... Hanse ll Diary, 28- 30 Jl1144; Sylvnn Dinry. 28- 31 Ju144; LIT, Brndley 10 Eisenhower. 28 

Ju144; Cir. First Army G- 2 Estimat e 12.28 Ju144. RPI S, Firsl Army G- 2 I'criodic Rpts for 28-

30 Ju144 ; 1111 , Firs! Army G- 4 Jill , 28 1u144. 
5 

Hodges Steps Up the Pace 

For such a momento us day in the anna ls of the First Army. I August 1944 passed with remarkably lillIe fanfare. At 0900 Brad ley bid farewe ll to the 

staff, a nd shortly afterward he and his two aides left fo r th e 121h Army Group 

headquart ers. I-lodges waited until 1025 to sign General Orders 4, by which he 

took command or the First Army. The new com mander spe llt the rcsl or the day 

and much o rlhe evening in his war 1'00111 tent, confe rring with Kcan, Thorson, 

and his corps commanders and watching the First Army continue its ad vance to 

the so uth. I 

Scholars ove r Ihe years, ,l1ld eve n many contemporaries, have found it hard 

to c haracte ri ze Courtn ey Hodges. Thei r evaluations ra nged from "one of the 

most skill ed craftsmen army e ntire command" and " the Robert E. Lce of World 

War II " to " less than mediocre" and " n moro n."2 While Hodges did not invite 

familiarit y, he possessed many qualities Ihat inspired res pect. Every inc h a 

ge ntl e ma n, the soft·spok e n , modest, 57·year·old Geo rg ian co unt ed 

Eisenhower, Patlon, Bradley, and Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson of the Ninth 

Army among his good fri end s. A man of undoubted te na city, diligence, and 

physica l courage, he ea rn ed an officer's commission throug h 11 competitive 

examination aner academic failure at West Point and won the Distinguished 

Service Cross as a batta li on commander in Wo rl d Wa r I. He later earned a 

reputat ion as a superb trainer a nd ex pert o n small· un it infantry tactics in th e 

in te rwa r Army.] Yet he lacked the presence of Bradley or PaHo n. Extremely 

shy, he seemed dist ant and struc k some as unasserti ve. 4 While a man of c harac· 

te r, he cannot be regarded as an original thinker. In his tactics, he preferred 

simpl e, direct solutio ns to complex maneuvers, argui ng that "too many of these 

batta lions and regiments of ours have tri ed to nan k and skirt and neve r meet 

the e nemy straighl o n."5 

His command sty le likewise prese nts a study of contra sts. On the one hand, 

he de legated considerabl e authority to su bordinates and 5lafT. He possessed 

great confidence in Kea n, whom he had known in the c hi ef of infantry's offi ce 

be fo re the wa r, and, in the absence of a de puty commander, he allowed his 

ehiefofstafT so much latitude tha t many beli eved that it was Kean, not Hodges, 

who ra il the First Army.6 On the other hand, he kept close watch over opera· 

tions. A ba lla lion·leve l tactician by in c lination and experience, he spent hours 

at th e situation m<lp in his eomm<l nd post with his inner ci rcl e. This group 
122 

consisted of his chief of staff, Kean; 

th e G- 3, Thorson ; and the artillery 

olTicer, Hart. Usually, but not always, 

it also included the G-4, Wilson; the 

commander of the IX Tactic'll Air 

Command, Quesada; the deputy chief 

of staff foro per at ions, Myers; and the 

G- 2, Dickson. With these officers, he 

worked out tac ti cal problems with 

great care , methodically reading situation reports, examining roadn ets, 

and ske tching prospective boundaries. 7 Unlike Bradley, the shy 

I-lodges did not like to call large staff 

conferences to explain his intentions, 

preferring instead to rely on Kean and 

Thorson as middlemen. 8 He also 

lacked Bradley's personal touch with 

his co rps commanders. At fi rst , he 

made daily trips to corps, division, 

and, occasionally, lowe r-level headquarters, but such visits declined over 

time. Nevertheless, the corps comA Commalld PO:"I al I-Var 

General "Iodges (1/ his field (ldqll(/rf :~ 

ill Belgilllll 

manders knew he was watching them closely, and Corlell in particular believed 

that he lacked the confidence of his chier. Indeed, I-lodges' reservations about 

his subordinates with the except ion of Collins may well have led him to follow 

thei r moves more closely than would otherwise have bee n the case.9 

As for the First Army headqua rt ers, it experienced more a change in tone 

than in substance. Other than aides, only O' Hare accompanied Bradley to the 

12th Army Group headquarters. Bradley later stated thai he left behind his old 

Tunisia comrades because he did nol believe an army group headquarlers, with 

its focus on strategic planning and minima l logistical rcsponsibilities, wou ld 

allow enough scope for their functional ski lls. 'O More likely, he did not want to 

make the task mo re difficul t fo r his old friend by taking all ofthc expcrieneed 

personnel with him. Thus, I-lodges inherited a veteran staff, set in its proec· 

dures and so meticulous and attentive to details thai one corps G- 3 remarked, 

only half jokingly, "When you did a situation report forThircl Army you showed 

thc positions or the regimcnts. When you did onc for First Army, you had to 

show pla toons."" 

I-lodges' se lf-effacing nature was largely responsible for the few changes 

that were madc, such as thc more limited access to the commander and the 

enhanced role of Kean , who effectively assumed the role or deputy commander 

despite the position 's disappearance from the headquarters organization. The 

stern First Army chief of staff easeo some of the coordination problems caused 

by the narrowness of I-lodges' inne r circle by summoning Carter, McNamara, 

Medaris, or others among the staff chicfs at the close of I-lodges' 1110rning meet· 
Hodges Steps Up tfle Pace 123 

Ge/leml WilSOII, left, (lml Ge/lel'(ll ,'vlet/(/ris al senior officers men' 

ing, informing them of the proceedings, and having them pa ss a long key decisions. In Di ckso n's view, Kean's new status made him more domineering than 

ever, leadi ng the 0 - 2 to mutter thM Mil/illY 011 the /JOllllfY was certai nly the 

wrong mov ie for the little Kean boy to wat ch at an impressionable age. l

} Under 

Kean's forbidding gaze and without Bradley's moderating innuence, the First 

Army headqua rters became a more tense workp lace, and some of the pe rsonal 

frict ion tha t had been cont ained to that point erupted into the open, especia lly 

the te nsion betwee n Thorson and Di ckson. The 0 - 2 felt es pecially aggri eved 

because the 0 - 3 and 0-4 received promotions to brigadier gene ral, wh il c he 

rema ined a colone l. Thc strained atmosphere spilled into re lations with ot her 

eche lons, earn ing the First Army headquarters a reputa tion as a touchy group, 

dcm<nld in g of subordinates and jea lous of its prerogatives with su pcriors. I J 

The combative ness of th e Fi rst Army headq uarters rc nccted, at least in part, 

ilS transition from th e se ni or America n headquarte rs on th e Cont inent to one of 

many arm ies, eac h Wilh its own Illission and logist ica l demands. The First Army 

headquarte rs never forgot its former sta tus, and it viewed the new arrivals of 

the 12th Army Group staff as untested in terlopers. Dickso n, for onc, had hoped 

to become the army group G- 2, only to sec th c position go to an old rival, Brig. 

Gen. Edwi n L. Sibert. Not surprising ly, relations between the two staffs were 

oft en cool, and Lt. Ge n. Wa lt er B. Smit h, SHAEF's ch ief of staff, later recalled 

with amusemcnt tha t the First Army staff office rs would frequen tly bypass their 

counterparts at the 12th Anny Grou p headquarters to co ntact the ir former chief. 

Bradley perha ps inadverten tly encouraged the practicc by ing his senior army 
124 A COIIIII/alld POSI al Wa,. 

grou p stafT"probably less than any olher important ge nera l in Europe," dealing 

directly with army commande rs through personal visits by liaison plane .'~ He 

and I-lodges kepi up their close re lationship, often exc han ging ideas 011 ope rations before Bradley issued his final orders. 

The c ircumsta nces of the campaign gave to the 12th Army Grollp a grea ter 

role in administrative and logistica l matters than the Army had pla nned. During August Ihe 12th Army Group headquarters se rved as the leadi ng American 

ground eche lon with supervisory responsibilities over American suppo rt agenc ies on the Continent. Even after August the 12th Army Group headquarters, 

alt hough operating increasingly as a predomi nant ly strategic bod y, wou ld carry 

out mo re admi nistrative functions than Army doctrine envisioned. Still, the 

First Army headquarters worked directly with ADSEC and COMZ on most dayto-day administrative and sllppl y isslles except for alloca tions, an increasin gly 

important role by auturn n.

15 

Once the Fi rst Army headquarters drew a rear boundary on 2 August, COMZ 

assumed con trol of logisti ca l agencies, fa ci li ties, and operations behind Ihal 

line, in c ludi ng ADSEC, whi ch se rved as Ihe direct su pplier to Ihe armies. To 

process the First Army's requisit ions and arrange for Ihe stead y now of suppli es, ADSEC placed the 25 th Reg ulating Stal ion in close proximi ty to the First 

Army hcadquarters, with the regu lating ofTicer himself ope rating from wit hin 

the First Army 0-4 section. On tcchnical matters, the chain of command ra n 

directly from the theater technical service chiefs, who doubled as th e special 

starr chiefs for COMZ, to the field armies and their subordinate ordnance, qua rte rmaster, medical, and other se rvice units, in the process bypassing SHAEF 

and the 12th Army Group headquarters. In practice, the Fi rst Army quartermaster and othe r special staff chiefs who focllsed on suppl y had muc h more 

con tacl wit h their ETOUSA-COMZ chiefs and less with their army group superiors than othe rs, such as thc enginee r, whose responsibilities were divided 

more even ly between logistics and opera tions. II> 

The di vision of units between the First and Third Armies had al ready been 

decided. Under a 27 July First Army memorandum, the First Army would retail1 3 corps, 7 infant ry divisions, and 3 a rmored divisions. Army comba t units, 

in addition to several headquarters units, included 3 cava lry groups, 8 tank 

balla li ons, 13 tank destroyer battalions, 3 field artillery observation battalions, 

39 othe r field art ille ry ba tla li ons, 25 antiairc raft battalions, 3 chemica l baltalions, 2 Ranger battalions, I separate in fantry batta li on, and 3 military poli ce 

battal ions. For se rvice units, th e First Army eOllld calion 12 engineer combat 

gro ups, including 36 engineer ballalions and 39 separate engi neer compani es; 

II evacuation and 5 fi eld hospitals; I convalescent hospital; 37 medi cal eOIllpanies; 2 chemica l compani es; 3 signal battalions and 8 signa l companies; a 

signa l ai r liaiso n squadron; 109 quartermaster compani es, includi ng 34 truck 

compani es; 82 ordnan ce compani es; and an army band, again in addition to 

numerous headquarte rs units. Among th e units a ttac hed to th e First Army 

were 24 quarterma ster companies, 4 mach ine reco rds units, 27 army postal 

units, 6 military poliee escort guard companies, and 12 finance a nd disburseIlle nt seclions.'7 
Hodges Steps Up the Pace 125 

To supervise th is organization, the First Army st aff followed a strenuous 

schedule. The threc officers in the G- 3 operations group, fo r exampl e, each 

worked an ght~hour tour in the opera tions tent, with the officers on the 0800 

to 1600 and th e 2400 10 0800 shifts prepa ring the 1200 and 2400 situation 

reports, respectively, before going off-duty. Durin g th e night, the ge neral staff 

sections coll ated periodi c reports, which arrived about 2400 from subordi nate 

G- 2s and G- 3s, and the daily est imated battle loss reports, which came into 

th e command post about 0600. Hodges and his inner circle awoke about 0630 

and, a ft er breakfast, held a mccti ng during which thcy hea rd bricfings on the 

si tuation and discussed future plans. After the meetin g disbanded about 0900, 

1·lodges might confer with individual staff ch iefs before givi ng his orders for 

th e day to Kean. He then depart ed by jeep or plane to visit subordi nate eo ~ 

mands, or he spent the day in his war room, o ft en meeting with Kean, Di ckson, 

Thorson, and other leading staff officers. He scldom composed orders himsel f, 

leavi ng that to the di fferen t sections, which wou ld submit a draft for approval. 

If visiting other echelons, he usually returned about 1500 and rcceivcd a summary from Kean of th e day's events. Frcquent ly, he also discussed the prcss 

briefi ng wit h his publi city offi ce r. The staff ate dinne r about 1830 and then 

continued its work, o ft en until 2400, with Hodges and his in ner circle often 

holding mcet ings. l'lodgcs himself usua lly retired about 2200.11 

The sta ff's routine changed somewhat with th e reorganization of th e staff 

echelons for mobi le warfare. As th e First Army's uni ts ra pidly ;:l(lva nced in th e 

afterma th of COBRA, it soon became clear tha t th e cx isting starf organ ization 

could not mai ntain the pacc. Eve n the command cchelon had grown so large 

and burdencd wit h asse ts that it needed rive days' notice for a change o f oca~ 

tion, and it could not move ovcr a hundred mi les at a time. On 5 August Hodges 

ordered th e format ion of a sma ll ta cti cal echclon to fol1 ow th e fa st-movin g 

rront and maintain control ove r corps and divisions. (Chart 7) The concept of a 

tactical echclon, operating in advance o r the rest of the headquarte rs, was not a 

new idea, but Hodges' directive represented its debut with the First Army.'" In 

the First Army, th e tactica l echelon consisted of Hodges, Keilll, and key personnel from the G- 2, G- 3, arti l1 ery, enginee r, and signal sec tions. Later, 

det achments from the G- 4 sect ion and the IX Tacti cal A if Command headquar~ 

ters joi ned th is group.2° The tactica l echclon's organ ic tran spo rtation ten~ton , 

small aflllS repair V,IIlS in which the ordnance eq uipment had been removed 

and desks. maps, and signa l eq uipmc nt instal1 ed- fu nctioncd as rolling command posts when thc echelon could not satisfy "Iodges' preference for indoor 

quarters. 1·lodges and the command g roup wit h th e tactical eche lon used two 

sturdicr Army Air Forces trailers prov ided by the IX Tacti cal Air Comma nd.

21 

The rest of the First Army headquart ers divi ded into main and base ecJl~ 

elons. Under Mye rs, as deputy chier of staff fo r ope rations, the main cchelon, 

o ft en split into cOlllmand and supply eche lons, ma nagcd lcss crit ical opcrati ona l tasks as wel1 liS administrative function s ofenollgh importance that th ey 

could not be handl ed by the base cchelon. It in cluded thosc sections that reported to Myers. as we ll as a smal1 group from the adju tant general's secti on 

and a modest G- l contingent under the new G- I, Col. Geo rgc A. Miller. The 
Sec/io/l OjJicer.f EII/is/e(1 M ell 

Commanding 

Gcncml J J 

Chief of 

Staff ... . . . ..... 3 2 

G 2 ... ........ 

Engineer. 

Arlillery 

G ] ... ........ 

Liaison (G ]) ... ........ 

Armored .................. . 

Signal 

0-4 ...................... . 

Medical 

Detachment 

Anti:lircmfi 

Artillcry ..... 

J 

2 

4 

4 

8 

5 

5 

4 

6 

6 

8 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

Ilcadquartcrs 

Commandanl .... ........ 2 2 

Ile:ldqu<trlcrs 

Comp:1I1Y . . 

Signal DClachmcnl . 

Car Company ............. . 

o 16 

As determined 

by Signal Officer 

J8 

EqllipJllelll 

2 1/2 ton housc Ir:lil cr; 

map van: 2- 1/4 ton Ueel}); 

l- slll:111 ,Hms repair (SAR) 

tfuck; 2 2 1/2 1011 (truck) 

2 1/4 ton (jeep): I SAR; 

3/4 ton weapons c:lrrier 

(w/c): I 2 1/2 Ion (truck); I 

2 1/2 ton house tmiler 

SAR; 2- 1/4 ton (jl'Cp) 

1/4 tOil (jeep); I- SAR 

wilh trnilcr 

2 1/4 ton (jeep); SAI~: 

I 1/2 10n (Iruck) 

I- SAR; 1- 1/4 ton (jccp) 

8 1/4 ton (jcep) 

SAR: 1- 114 Ion (jeep) 

SAR; 3- 1/4 ton (jecp); 

omce trailer 

I- COllllllalld and reconnaissance 

lruck lI'ilh Imilcr (1 /2 Ion) 

ambulancc 

I- SAR; 1- 114 ton (jeep) 

1- 3/4 Ion w/c: 1- 1/4 ton 

(jeep) 

9- 2 1/2 1011 (truck) 

Sol/ITt': Rllt. u.s. Army. First U.S. Army. Combm Operations Data. " irSI Army. Europe. 1944 19",5. I IS 

No, 46. CMII Libr .. ry. 
Hodges S,eps Up 'he Pace 127 

Ordl/once 1'(11/ 

G- 2 (Air) and G- 3 (Air) subsecti ons worked ncarby with the main IX Tac tical 

Air Command headquarte rs.!! Under Charles Williams, th e base echelon, often 

as far as a hundred mil es to the rear, handl ed routine administratio n. The new 

system wa s an improvement, but ove r time it fa ced its own probl ems, notably 

inadequate communications, inerficicncies resulting from a separation of sec· 

lions, a tendency to shift personnel forward, and a need for support troops in 

the tacti ca l echelon disproportionate to the size of thaI group.lJ 

The First Army headquarters would soon necd any improvemcnt th e new 

system could provide, for Ihe whole front was begi nning to move. While Gerow's 

V Corps in the northeast seclor ofthe First Army front and Corlett's XIX Corps 

in the cente r eonverged on Vire, Coll ins' VII Corps to the so uthwest had by 3 

August rcaehed Morwin, a key c rossroads in the hill y country about thirt y miles 

south of 51. La and eighteen miles cast of coastal Avranches. Farther west, the 

VII I and XV Corps of the Third Army were passin g through Av ranehes and 

encountering little opposition in Brittany. To the cast, on 30 July the British 

Second Army had launched BcuEcot\T, a powerful attack southwest toward Vire, 

wh il e the Canadian First Army was deploying into the Orne bridgehead pre· 

liminary 10 an offensive toward Falaise, twent y mil es southeast of Caen and 

almost fort y miles northeast of Mol'tain. Unde r orders from Montgomery, who 

exercised operational control over the 12th Army GrollI' pcndin g SHAEF 's 

movemcnt 10 France, Brad ley altered his plans, ord ering Patton to seize Brit ~ 

tany with a minimum force wh il e turnin g the rest of his Third Army cast for the 

dri ve to the Seine. To prepare for the dri ve 10 th e east, I-lodges would pi vot 
128 A COII/lllolld Post lit War 

counterclockwise toward a line from Domfront, fi fteen mi les cast of Mortai n, 

to Maycnnc, th irty mil es to the southeast of orlai ~ (Map 7) 

For th e nex t three days, I-lodges and his staff raced to keep up with eve nts 

(I S thei r three corps pivoted eastwa rd. In five days the First Army headquarters 

issued three fi eld orders after requ iri ng only two during the previous two months. 

The nu id si tuation raised numerous questions ofbollndari es, as the First Army 

stafTworkcd with mi xed success to preve nt confusion among troops from the V 

Corps, XIX Corps, a nd British Second Army in the east and between the VII 

Corps and the Third Army in the west. Indeed, when the bounda ry between the 

two armies wa s established 0 11 I August, IwO ofCoJlins' di visions were placed 

in th e position of having to fight their way cast ward to rcgai n th c First Army 

side of thc ncw boundary line. At thc samc time, thc Fi rst Army headquartcrs 

pushed thc army artillery forward to support the VII and XIX Corps, coordinated corps artillery, and shined troops to strengthe n the drive in the sOllthwes!. It sent two divisions to the VII Corps and, under orders from Bradley, two 

other di visions to the Third Army. By 6 August the numbe r of troops n owin g 

through the narrow bott lenec k between Avranches and Mortain was causing 

traffi c jams, and an exasperated I-lodges int crvcncd to clear some of the confusion. The genera l's mood was not improved by thc XIX Corps' slow advance on 

Vi re, to th e poinltha t he was rCildy to a ll ow Colli ns to c ross Corlett's frOlll. H 

Part of the reason for thc XIX Corps' delay became clear Ihat ni ght, as fo ur 

German panzer di visions launched a massive counterattack at Monain, the fi rst 

rea l lest for the First Army under I-lodges. The attack did not come as II compl ete surprise. For almost a week , Bradley, I-lodges, and Collins had been wary 

o f a possible enemy attempt to ellt the narrow co rridor between Avra nches and 

Mortain, and the First Army G- 2 section had traced the movement o f German 

di visions west fro m the British sector to its front. Still, Di ckson had not loca ted the poi nt of the Ge rman thrust, a nd ULTRA a lerted the Allies only about 

an hou r before the attack beganY' 

After somc mislcad ing initi a l reports, the First Army headquarte rs, which 

was st ill in the process o f forming a tacticll l echelon, knew by dawn that the 

Ge rmans were mak ing a maj or e tTort. I-lodges rema ined un co ncerned. I-Ie was 

rece iving reassuring reports from Coll ins, and both the army and army group 

headquarters had several di visions avai labl e in the threatened area. During the 

day, Hodges re inforced the VII Corps to seve n divisions and inc reased the a ll ocation of artillery ammunition to that sector, despite the conce rn s of his statT 

that such a move would ex haust the First Army's low supply of arti ll ery she lls. 

Meanwhil e, 1-1 ,11"1 coordinated corps a rt ill cry in support of the VII Corps and 

position ed the 32d Fi e ld Artillcry Brigade to bring to bear the we ight of the 

a rmy 's heavy artill ery.27 Elsewhe re, the G- 3 (A ir) subsection and the G-4 section a rranged with the IX Tactical Air Command headq uarte rs for c lose a ir 

support and an air drop primari ly of food, ammunit ion, and medica l suppli es to 

an isolated batt alion on the outsk irts of Mortain. Under SHAE F policy, the two 

sections had to consult with the IX Tactica l Ai r Command and coo rdinate with 

the 12th and 2 1 Army Group and Ninth Air Force headquarte rs be fore bidding 

for avai labl e transport space from AEAF's Combined AirTransporl Operations 
CLOSING THE FALAISE·ARGENTAN POCKET 

8- 17 August 1944 

• 

III -'" 1111 , 

AlI ........ "oI""ldI: 

F,_U'O".8""" 

F'Gnl llne. 17 """ 

ELEVATION IN ETf~S 

• JOO.nd_ 

Mi .... 

M Al> 7 
130 A COII/mand Po!>' at War 

Room, which coordinated drops. An initial mission by twelve C-47 cargo planes 

on 10 August dropped about a day's supply of food a nd ammunition to the 

bel eague red uni t, but anothe r drop on 11 August was less successful. As an 

alternative 10 the air drop, th e medica l section arranged with the ammunition 

officer to send bad ly needed syrcttcs into the position by artillery shc ll. 28 

As Ihe First Army batt led to contai n Ihe German thrust, a major opportunity loomed for the All ied commanders. While Ihe British Second Army had 

continued ils dri ve soulh, the C<lIladian Firsl Army on 7 August had launched 

ils ofTe nsive south towa rd Fa laisc. The Canadian drive presented Bradley with 

the prospect oftll1'ning the enemy's front with the Third Army's XV Corps and 

of dri ving across the German rear to link up with the British and Canadians 

near Falaise. On the morning of 8 August he checked with Hodges 10 confirm 

that the First Army cou ld hold for the forty-eight hours needed to close the 

trap. Int elligence from the First Army G- 2 section indicated that the Germans 

intended to press thei r attack, but Hodges knew that the enemy had suffered 

heavily. Bolstered by assurances from Colli ns, he ex pressed confidence that 

his troops cou ld stand firl11. 2

<) With the approval of the visi ti ng Eisenhower and, 

by phone, of Montgomery, Bradley ordered the Third Army to turn its advance 

from the area of Le Ma ns, about seventy miles southeast of Mortain, toward 

Argentan, fifty-five miles due north of Le Mans a nd fourteen mil es southeast 

of Fa laise. Meanwhile, the First Army would reduce the German sa lient. advance east to cover the Third Army's nank, and prepare to move against the 

e nemy na nk and rea r.J

() 

Although Bradley's nanking movement would make possible a crushin g 

victory, it caused the First Army headquarters some te nse moments. The First 

Army fie ld order of 9 August ca lled for rc ncwed attacks by the V and XIX 

Corps, supported by the army art ille ry, aga inst the northern face of the enemy 

sa lie nt near Mortain. As the VII Corps was pinched out by the XIX Corps' 

advance, it would shi ft south of Domfro11t for a drive north east alongside the 

XV Corps' nank. Fa r from reCOiling in the face of the First Army's counterattacks and the prospect of th e Third Army's spearheads in the ir rear, the Germans held firm and, indeed, mainta ined enough pressure to kee p Hodges rrom 

reinforcing Patton, as Bradley desi red. Nor cou ld Hodges readily assembl e the 

Vll Coq)S south of Domfront, where only a thin scree n from the 1st and 4th 

Infantry Divisions cove red the gilp to the Third Army boundary.]' 

Thus, some days wou ld pass before the First Army could begin its attac k. 

By the evening o f 9 August I-lodges bel ieved that his troops had decisively 

blunt ed the Ge rman drive, but he was uncertain whether the enemy would now 

withdraw or regroup to resume the attack . Through the nex t day, Dickson and 

Thorso n deba ted the connict ing intelligence data- Thorson arguing that the 

Germa ns would soon try to escape and Di ckson pointi ng to identifications of 

e nemy rei nforcements, including some from Pas de Cala is, to argue th at the 

e nemy was mere ly regroup ing. Finally, on 11 August, the day the XV Corps 

captured Alc lu;on, only twe nty-four mi les south of Argcn tan, th e First Army 

saw signs of withdrawal along its front. On 12 August the VII Corps began 

movin g 10 its attack positions, but anot her day wou ld pass before it cou ld sta rt 
"Iodges Sreps Up rite Pace I ] I 

its adva nce. Mea nwh il e, concerned abollt the XV Corps' long, exposed weste rn flank , Bradley hldt ed the Third Army just short of Argen tan on the ni ght o f 

12- 13 August. 1\ve1l1Y miles lay between Patton's fo rces and th e Canad ians, 

whose advance toward Fala ise had stalled.J2 

Over the next three days, as Allied ge nerals debat ed whether to close the 

exit from the " Fa laise pocket" or try for a deepe r cnvclopmcnlto th e Seinc, the 

First Army attackcd all along its front against the shrinking salient.JJ To the 

north, the British Second Army was maintaining the pressure agai nst the nort hern shou lder of Ihe German sa li ent, wh il e the Canadi ans by 16 August werc 

encircl ing F,daise. Meanwhile, most of the Third Army drove cast to a northsouth line from Dreux, whi ch lay only forty miles west of Paris, to Orl eans in 

th e Loi re Vall cy. 

In th is fluid situa tion, the First Army headquarte rs sought to close the trap 

without becomi ng entangl ed with troops from other armi cs. Give n thc pace of 

events, U LTRA intercepts o ftcn were obsolete by the time they rcachcd the First 

Army headquarters, compounding the G- 2 section's probl ems in discerni ng 

the chaotic situation in the pocket. Although Dickson pcrceived the star! of an 

enemy wit hdrawal by 15 August, he stil l saw a considerable body of enemy 

troops, including parts of ni ne panze r divisions, in the pocket.J 4 As the VII 

Corps bega n its ilttack agai nst the southern fa ce o f the sa li ent on 13 August, 

"Iodges, at Collins' instigation, asked Bradley to 'Ilter the a rmy bou ndary to 

enable the VII Corps to drive north east on Arge ntan and Fala ise. Si nce the 

change would have causcd th e VII Corps 10 cut across the XV Corps' front, 

Bradley dcmurred, but at a conference later in the day Montgomery approvcd 

the changc. Subsequently, the VII Corps advanced so quick ly that by 14 August most of its units had reached the east-west boundary between the 12th and 

21 Army Groups and were in position to cover the XV Corps' flank . Stil l, on 15 

August IheA lli es had not yet closed the gap. By ordering part of th e XV Corps 

to head east whil e the rest joined the VII Corps in closing the gap, Bradley 

showed that he was still undec ided between compl eting the short hook and 

launching a long envelopment to th e Se inc. Fa eed with the prospect of a headon collision with the 21 Army Group, the First Army headq uarters halt ed the 

VII Corps on 16 August, just beyond th e a rmy group boundary and twcl ve 

mi les short of Falaise.

J5 

Confusion reigned in Allied ci rcl es that 16 August, the same day the Germans finally dec ided to withdraw from the pocket. As the Anglo-A me ri cans 

tried to rea lign their force for the drive to the Seine, Bradley decided to se nd 

all of the Th ird Army to the east and turn ove r the ta sk o f closing th e gill' to the 

Fi rst Army. Res pondi ng to Montgome ry's transfer of the junetion point between his fo rces and the Canadians to Tru n and Cham bois, eaeh about eight miles 

northeast of Argcntan, Bradley visited the First Army tactical echelon that afternoon. In the absence of l'lodges, who was tou ri ng division command posts, he, 

Kean, and Brig. Gen. Truman C. Thorson decided to take Gerow's V Corps headquarters, whose drive had been pinched out by the British advil nce at the tip of 

the salient, and shift it to the Argentan sector to take over th e three divisions left 

behind by the XV Corps. Anx ious to ma intain the pressure unlil Ge row arri ved, 
132 A Commalld Posl al IIil/' 

Brad ley orde red Pallon to form a provisiona l corps headq uarters to direct a 

drive on Trun. :k> 

The 121h Army Group commander had overcstima tcd the time necessary 

fo r Gerow to take command. Th nt eve nin g, the First Army he"dquarters ca ll ed 

Gerow and a sillall group frolll the V Corps' staff to th e First Army tactical 

eche lon ncar Domfron!. Due to poor communications and lia ison wit h the Third 

Army, "I odges and Kean could provide littl e on th e situation near Argentan, 

but, "fter a few hectic hours of working out the details of transfe rring the V 

Corps to that front , Gerow le ft for Alem;:on. He arri ved early in th e morning of 

17 August to find Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, Patton 's ch ief of staff and COIllmander of the provisional corps, completing his preparations to attac k. Gerow 

could not confirm his authority with the 12th Army Group headquarters until 

midday, at whi ch point he postpon ed the attack until the nex t day to prep"re his 

own plan and to bring up corps artille ry. Mcanwhil c, th e British Second Army 

con tinued to reduce the pockct from the north, while th e Canadian First Army, 

aft er capturing Falaise on 17 August, continued its dri ve toward a j un ction with 

the Ameri cans. By the time the V Corps linked up with the Polish I st Armored 

Division of the Canadian First Army at Chambois on 19 Au gust, mu ch of the 

Sevellih Army had escaped, al though il left behind large qua nt iti es of vehi c les 

and equipmenl.l1 

Even be fore the junction at Falaise, th e Allies had alread y shifted most o f 

th eir attention to th e dcep enve lopment to the Se ine. On 16 Au gust the British 

I Corps of th e Canadian Fi rst Army had begun a ge nc ral ad va nce cast IOwaI'd 

the Seine. As the rest of th e Canadia n Fi rst and th e British Second Armies 

fi nished mopping up the pocket, th ey also turned to the east. To th e south, the 

Third Army raced to the Se ine , establishing a bridgehead at Mantes-Gassicourt, 

thirt y mi les northwest o f Pa ris, on 20 August and at Me lun, twe nt y-five miles 

southeast of Paris, on 24 August. (Map 8) 

Whil e Ihe Third Army drove toward the Se ine, the First Army conducted 

one of its most impressivc mane uvers of th e campaign. On 17 August I-lodges 

received orders to assume the 64-mile front from Argentan cast to Dreux, preliminary to a possibl e ad vance nort heast to Mant es- Ga ss icourt. l~ To man thaI 

front, the First Army stafflllade the complex arrangements necessary to move 

Coriell 's X IX Corps from th e DomfrOllt area, where it had been pinched out by 

the con ve rging al\acks on the pocket, on a nin ety-mi le march cast, leapfrogging ac ross the rea r areas o f the VII and V Corps to its new sec tor. To prepare 

for the XIX Corps shift, th e First Army stafToffice rs hagglcd with th e ir Thi rd 

Army coll eagues over boundaries, provided six truck compani es frOIll th e VII 

Corps, and arranged fo r the V Corps 10 usc ils trucks 10 move the 2d Armored 

Division east of Argen t an, whe re th e di vision would transfer from th e V to th e 

XIX Corps. On 19 Au gust. whi le the X IX Corps was still moving into position, 

Hodges co nferred with Montgome ry, Bradley, and Dempsey and won approval 

of his plan to se nd the XIX Corps north, al ongside the Third Army's XV Corps, 

on a dri ve to the Seine, c uttin g off th e Germa ns n ee ing eastward in fro nt of th e 

British advance. As Kcan and Wi lson compl et ed supply arrangeme nts with th e 

12th Army Group staffon 20 Au gust, the XIX Corps began its allack. Fivc days 
/-lodges Steps Up the P(/ce 133 

late r, Corlett 's troops se ized Elbeuf, a lown on the Se ine rt y~on e miles north 

of Dreux, and contacted the British Second Army.)' 

The First Army headquarters now faced th e cha ll enge of disentang li ng the 

two forccs. I-lodges had alread y conferred with Dempsey and a representa tive 

of the British 30 Corps and arranged fo r the two armies to al terna te for two 

hours each on the usc of criti c'lt roads unt il the redeployment was compl ete. 

This compl ex operation, whi ch ended on 27 August, and the earli er y~ 

mi le shift o f th e XIX Corps rece ived litt le ofthc popul a r attention given to the 

Third Army's rapid drive to the sOllth, but it demanded more coord ination .40 

Fo r the First Army headq uart ers. August 1944 must indeed have seemed 

the best of times. Followi ng the advl.lllee, the tactical ec he lon drove east throu gh 

the French countryside, stopping for two or three nights at parks and chatea us. 

At one point, the headquart ers occup ied a th rty~ room mansion with red 

brocades and French art nea r COllterne.

41 

For ntt the good times, the frequellt moves prese nted a cha ll enge to th e 

signalmen. So criti ca l was the role oflhe signal offi ce r in these re locations th at 

I-lodges remarked, " I neve r move anywhere until [Grant) Willi ams tells me I 

ea n."42 Whenever the headq ua rters commandant wen t ahead to find a new locatio n for th e command post, he took a long a signal officer, oft en Wi lli ams ~ 

se lf, to ad vise him. When establishing a new command post, crews of the 17th 

Signa l Opera tion Battalion, whi ch furnished e ighty-e ight pe rsonnel to the ta e~ 

tical eche lon, initially laid wire to each of the First Army's th ree corps, five 

wire lines to the rea r, and a wire line directly to the 12th Army Group headquarte rs. Eventua ll y, the time, ma te riel, and personnel needed to ma intai n wire 

commun ications caused the First Army headquarters to re ly more on radio. At 

each new command post, signal c rcws woul d install two radio phone lin ks and 

one radio te letype link to caeh corps and 10 the command eche lon, as well as a 

radi o command net to the corps, II rad io station on th e 121h Army Gro up's 

command net, and a point-to- point radio circuit to the command ec he lon_ To 

enabl e rapid movement, they placed the ma ste r switchboard in the ordnance 

vans, from which they ran lines to vans housing the different staff sections. In 

add ition, the signal section provided fOllr dismou nt ed couriers, six motor messe nge rs, a ir courier plan es, and a locator service.4J 

Once the signalmen had established communi cations, Ihe eche lon woul d move 

forward by phases to the new command POSI. In the case of the move to Ma illebois 

on 22 August, the headquarters commandant and his section depart ed firsl. They 

were foll owed at inte rvals by th e hendquarters reconnaissance plmoon of the 125 th 

Cavalry, the signa l contingent, the c hi e f of staff secti on, the cOlllma nder's group, 

G- 3 personnel, G- 2 personne l, the arti llery continge nt, and the enginee rs. The 

last contingent to leave closed down the fo rmer site. 44 

Despite the best efforts of Will iams and his signal crews, it proved imp os~ 

sible to ma intain consistent commu nications duri ng the pursuit ac ross France_ 

Inevitably, lack of wire, and of pcrsonnc l to lay wire, forced the headq uarte rs to 

turn to radio. Alt hough the SCR- 399 radios lIsed by the command net could in 

theory reach 100 mil es- more than the dista nce to corps headq uarte rs for nearly 

th e who le campa ign- ava il abl e frequencies cou ld not ha ndl e all of the traffi c 
134 A Command POSI al lIi ll' 

M AP 8 

gene rated by an army sta ff. In the end, the headquarte rs had to rely heavi ly on 

rc lays to ens ure good cOl11lllunications. The IX Tacti ca l Air Command det achment in parti c ular ra n in to probl ems as the adva nce carried it farlher frolll its 

ba ses; it coped by emp loying a variety of communi ca tions li nks and keeping 

its wings fully briefed in Ihe event of loss of contact. For particularly important 

messages, the First Army headquart ers used spec ial nights of air couri ers in 

addition to the five schedul ed nights. Employing wi re. radio- includin g Ihe 

independent ne ts of the specia l stafT- liaison planes, and the innovat ion of a 

special commun ications control ce nter to diagnose problems in the circuits 
!-lodges Sfeps Up fhe Pace 

DR IVE TO THE SE I NE RI VE R 

16-25 August 19U 

F'On1 lOne. 16Aug 

F, onl U ..... 25 Aug 

elEVATION i N METERS 

135 

quic kl y, the tactical eche lon almost neve r lost contact with major subordinat e 

units for exte nded peri ods of time. Neve rth e less, brief delays and even major 

disruptions did OCCU I'. For eX llmpl e, the headquarters had no commun ications 

with the XIX Corps for three days during the corps' ad vance to Elbeuf, causin g 

a fru strated Hodges to direct the use of liaison officers in continuous shifts 

unt il his st afT had rece ived enough information on the corps' situat ion:'! 

Mobil e warfa re ca used the First Army headq ua rte rs to make adjustme nts in 

its process of issuing orders as wel l. Normally, Hodges rcceived verbal orde rs 

from Brad ley a few days before the writt en lettcr of instruction arrived. This 
136 

advance noti ce allowed Ake rs' G- 3 

operations subsection, with written or 

oral gu idance from Hodges, \0 begin 

the process of preparing its own orders; 10 furnish advance information 

011 boundaries, missions, and available units to the olhe r staff sec tions; 

to obtain Sllpporti ng data from them ; 

and to coordinate with th e IX Tactica l Ai r Command headquarters via 

G- 3 (Air). Within a day or two of th e 

army group 's instructions, the First 

Army headquarters would publish its 

own order. During June and July Ihis 

took the form o fa field orde r, laying 

out th e e nemy and Allied situations, 

the boundaries and avai labl e units, 

the missio ns, administ rati ve arrangements, and the location o f the army 

com mand post and ax is of signal 

commun ication. As the pace quickened in ea rly August the First Army 

headquarte rs dropped the more deA Commalld Pus/ at "YinGeneraf Rugers 

tailed field order in favor of letters of instructions, which, stated the sta lT of· 

fice rs field manual o f 1940, "deal wit h the strategic'll phases of large unils and 

regulate operations ove r a large area for a conside rable length of time."46 This 

form had already been used by the Fifth Army staff in It aly. The First Army 

st aff turned to eve n briefer direct ives for cha nges in mission and dispositions 

of the corps. After 9 August it never aga in issucd a field order during the European campaign. Over timc, howcve r, its lcttcrs of instructions resembled fie ld 

orders in organiza tion and scope.47 

Akers' operations planners were not the only ones who had 10 adjust to the 

rapid pace . Although the mcdical section found its task cased by lowcr casua lties in the pursuit, it sti ll had to deal wilh the long lines of evacuation and the 

problems associated with frequent repositioning. In response, Rogers reorganized the army evacuation system, posit ion ing his three mcdical groups on an 

axis pcrpendicular 10 the front to provide more dcpth than breadth of coverage. 

Oncc the First Army passed the Seine, Rogers ordered the use of field hospitals, more mobile than the evacuation hospitals, as improvised evacuation units, 

lea pfrogging them forward as thc divisions that they supported advanced. He 

assembled his evac ua tion hospita ls and other less mobile un its near Senonches, 

fifty mi les southwest of Paris, ready 10 move where most needed. To keep up 

wit h the advance, the First Army medical sect ion soon moved ils evacuation 

hospitals to La Cape lle on the Franco-Be lgian borde r, but by then even that 

area lay too fa r behind the lines fo r conveni ent lise. The rapid adva nce put 

great strains on the section 's transportation reso urces, causing Rogers to pool 
/-lodges Sfeps Up fhe Pace 137 

200 vchicles of his units into a provisional truck company to carry hospital 

supplies and the depot. This measure, along with airlift, the comparative ly light 

weight of medi cal items, and captured German supplies, enabled the First Army 

med ics to maintain their slOcks.4g 

The ordnance sect ion also adopt ed some highly sllccessful mca sures to meet 

the demands of mobile warfare. Anticipating the pursuit, Medaris had integrated supply and maintenance as far forward as possible, stationing behind 

each corps two ordnance battalions, one to perform maintenance and operate a 

coll ecting point, and the other for repair and major tank maintenance and the 

operation of a forward depot. These battalions came under an ordnance grou p 

reporting to Medaris, who also had ordnancc groups to supervisc ordnance 

operations in the army area , run the main army shop, and control the ammtmition battalions. The First Army ordnance officer also developed a radio net 

reaching down to the ordnance battalions, a systel11 that saved hours, even days, 

in forward ing requisitions and delivering essential supplies to combat units. 

Using five truck companies from the army pool , the section created a rolling 

ammunition supply point, which fottowcd closc behind the VII Corps in its 

attack on the Falaise pocket.49 

Still, Mcdaris and his section encountered several problems, many of which 

could be traced to the low rank of ordnance suppli es, except ammunit ion, on 

the G-4 section's list of priorities. Through August and September the ordnance depot received perhaps 2 percent of its tine items and almost no replacement vehicles. This deficiency created an espec ia lly grave situation given the 

wear on tanks and other vehicles and the First Army 's depletion of the in itial 

complement of230 replaccment tanks that it had brought ashore at Normandy. 

Of the 1,079 tanks- including 75- and 76-mm. gun and 105-mm. howitzer 

tanks- authorized for the First Army's three armored divisions, nine separate 

tank battalions, and three cava lry groups, the 12th Army Group's September 

figures showed 941 serviceable and 114 repairable tanks for the First Army. To 

repair or replace these vehicles, the ordnance sect ion resorted to ca ptured 

vehicles, local procurement, salvage, and cann ibali zation .

so 

The pursuit crea ted similar problems of control and supply for Carter's engineer section. The engineers possessed their own radio net, enabling Carter at 

the tactical echelon to maintain contact with his executive officer, Col. Carlton 

P. Roberts, at the supply echelon, and with the army enginee r grou ps supervising the army engineer units. Communi cations, however, were often so poor 

that Carter mercly gave the groups broad assignments to close up and support 

the advance. Given the neeing enemy's inability to carry out systematic demolition, road repai rs did not pose a major problem, nor did bridge constr uction, 

despite the numerous river barriers and destruction of many spans by Allied 

aircraft during the pre- D-Day period. Thanks largcly to a mobile depot assembled by Roberts to foltow the advance, the First Army engineer section 

ensured that corps and division engineers had enough resources to bridge rivers and meet other cont in gencies. A more pressing problem, along with the low 

level of engineer supplies in the First Army depots, was the difficulty in maintaining a proper stock of maps. The rapid advance rendered nearly use less the 
138 A COlIIlI/tIIJ{/ Posl (II I#u" 

deta iled I :25 ,000 maps that ETOUSA had drawn up for the campaign in France. 

In the end, the First Army engi neer section left the task of tactical photomapping to corps topog raphic units and focllsed on producing a [a rge-scale series 

covering the Rhine from Cologne to Koblenz.sl 

As much as the First Army headquarters wanted to continue its drive to the 

Rhine once it had reached the Seine, it could not avoid entanglement in the 

politics surrounding the liberation of Paris. The Al lied high command had hoped 

to avoid the burden of occupying and, therefore, supplying Paris for as long as 

possible, but General Cha rl es de Gaulle , head of the French provisional government, wanted to liberate the city fo r symbolic and political purposes. On 20 

August Maj. Gen. Jacques P. Leclerc, commander of the French 2d Armored 

Di vision, whi ch had just been shifted from the XV to the V Corps, wenl directly to Hodges to ask for perm ission to drive on Paris. Short, intense , and 

often stu bborn, but a charisma tic veteran o f independent operations in North 

Africa, LeClerc could be condescending toward Americans. He had already 

clashed with Patlon during the XV Corps' drive to Argen tan, and he made no 

more headway with Hodges. Unaccustomed to deal ing with Frenc h sensit ivities and absorbed in the XIX Co rps' drive on Elbeuf, Hodges brushed off his 

proposal. Undeterred, the French general sent a reconna issance in force toward 

the capit al, and, when his corps commander, Gerow, protested, LeClerc took 

his case to Bradley.s2 

By the time LeClerc reached the 12th Army Group command post on 22 

August, Eiscnhower and Bradley, acting on reports of an uprising in Paris, had 

dccided to send a liberating force to the French capital. Bradley personally 

delivered the order to Hodges, who passed the word through Kean to Gerow 

and his V Corps staff. Lacking pol itical guidance from above or information 

on Paris' defenses, the two staffs hastily prepared a pla n, whi ch thc French 2d 

Armored and 4th U.S. Infantry Div isions executed the next morning. After an 

advance slowed by both vigorous resistance and rejoicing c ivilians, the combi ned force fin ally occupied Paris on 25 AugustY 

The First Army headquarters had never been comfortable with civil affairs, 

and its co nd uct of the occupation of Paris reOected that fact. An tic ipating near 

chaot ic conditions, the First Army planners unde r Col. Elbridge Colby of the 

G- 5 section an ticipated airlifting three million ration s to feed the city for ten 

days, after which th e America ns hoped that Paris would steadily increase its 

reliance on the countryside. 54 When the First Army civil affairs detachments 

arrived in Paris on 26 August, howeve r, they found relatively stable condit ions. 

The enemy had not carried out Hitler's order to destroy the city, and many key 

fac iliti es and se rvices stil l opera ted. The Resistance had acted quickly to restore administration, and the popu lace seemed orderly and healthy, albeit low 

on food Y Thc big problem lay in resolving questions of command, a problem 

aggravated not just by the too recent conclusion of a civil affai rs agreement 

with de Gaulle but also by poor staff relations between Kean and Gunn, the 

conscientious but overly methodical First Army G- 5. [n keepi ng with Army 

civil affairs doctrine, Gunn believed in recognizing Gaullist General Pierre J. 

Koen ig as the military governor of Paris and ordering civil affairs detachments 
Hodge.\' Sfeps Up lite Pace 139 

to assist and not interfere with his government. Kean, however, regarded Gerow 

as the milita ry governor of the city until the tactical situat ion permitted the 

transfer of command to Koen ig, a view he communica ted to Gerow. For days, 

the two sides c lashed over jurisdict ions with the First Army headquarters, intent on the military task at hand, often finding it hard to understand French 

cmotions at the momcnt of liberation,S6 

By the time the First Army headquarters transferred its authority in Paris to 

the French and COMZ on 28 August, its lead uni ts had a lready advanced well 

beyond th e capital. (Map 9) Under the original OVERLORD plan, the Alli es were 

supposed to halt at the Seine and build lip their logistics for the drive into 

Germany. Anxiolls not to give the enemy a respite, Eisen hower directed on 19 

August that the drive continue beyond the Se ine.s7 Even be fore this decision, 

the debate had already started on the next step in the campa ign. Montgomery 

wanted to combi ne the 21 and 12th Army Groups in a massive advance northeast into the Low Countries and thence eastward to the Ruhr, Germany's enormous industrial center on the Rhine. Bradley, on the other hand, favored a secondary drive by the 21 Army Group and a main effort by the 12th Army GroLlp, 

except for one corps, directed east on Metz, the old fortress city near the German border, and the Saar industrial region. Most of the now-famous debate 

took place at a level above the First Army headq ua rters, a lt hough Hodges did 

back Bradley's strategy in a meeting with Montgomery, Bradley, and Dempsey 

on 19 August and in a discussion with Brad ley and Kean on 2 1 August.~8 In the 

meantime , Eisenhower's apparent vac illation ove r the amount of strength to 

give to the northern thrust caused problems for the First Army planners. The 

engineer section, for one, had to place a hurried cal l to London for more maps 

when Eisenhower on 23 August te ntatively decided to turn the First Army northeast alongsi de the 21 Army Group.s') 

Wh il e Montgomery and Bradley debated strat egy with the supreme eOIllmander, the First Army headquarters prepared for the next step. During the few 

days afte r the fa ll of Paris the First Army staff compl eted the withdrawal of the 

XIX and XV Corps, wh ich Bradley had temporarily assigned to the First Army 

on 23 August , from the British zone northwest of Ma ntes-Gassicourt. In the 

process, it transferred the Seine bridgehead and divisions in the MantesGassicourt sector from the XV to the XIX Corps, returned thc XV Corps headquarters to the Third Army, and sh ifted the 5th Armored and 28th Infantry Divisions from the XIX to the V Corps. It also coordinated arrangements for 

ammunition supply points and comlllunicati ons and allocated two eight-inch 

howitzer ballalions and a 240-tll11l. howit ze r battal ion to support the Mantes 

bridgehead, placing the rest of Ihe army artillcry in army reserve, Allocations 

of artille ry otherwise remained fairly even alllong the corps.60 

By 29 August, the day the XV Corps returned to the Third Army, the First 

Army was we ll on the way to Soissons, 60 miles northeast of Paris, and the 

Belgian capital of Brusse ls, 110 miles farther to the northeast. The offensive 

picked up speed espec ially on th e flanks, where armored spearheads of the 

XIX Corps' 2d Armored Division to the northwest and the VII Corps' 3d Armored Division to the southeast led the drive. To the south, Ihe Third Army was 
PURSUIT TO THE GERMAN BORDER 

26 August- l0 September 1944 

Altie<! F'onlline. Dale 

Ge,man F,onlline. 25 Sep 

We.1Walt 

ElEVATION IN METERS 

I I I 

• '00 ~ 10«1 0<><1 A_ 

• ~ 

Mil ... 

MAP 9 

142 II COII/mand Post al IH'II' 

c rossing old World War I batt lefie lds on its way to the German border, whi le 

Devers' 61h Army Group, wh ic h had landed in so uthern France on 15 August, 

was rap idly driving nort heast toward a linkup with the 12th Army Group. ~ 

while, by 3 1 August the 21 Army Group had lIsed one corps to clear the Pa s de 

Ca lais while thrusting the others northeast to the Somme , seventy mile s north 

o f Paris. The First Army's advance protected the 21 Army Group's sout heastern 

na nk but, at Bradley's insistence, remai ned under the command of the 12th 

Army Group. On ly the remnan ts of German units withdrawing to the West Wall 

obstructed the path orlhe Fi rst Army, which fo und its adva nce slowed morc by 

gasoline shortages than rea l resistance. Indeed, lac k of contact with Gcrman 

troops and the speed of the drive frustrated th e IX Tactical Air Command, wh ic h 

switchcd most of its missions from close air support to interdiction . By phone 

and visits to command posts, I-lodges urged on his corps commandcrs but len 

them with more than th c usual discretion to res pond to the fluid situat ion. In 

part, I-lodges' de fe rence can be traced to poor communi cations, parti c ularly 

with the XIX Corps to the northwest. 61 

Communi cations wi th the 21 Army Group headquarters also posed a problem, but only part o f th e diffi c ult y was techn ica l. Relations be tween the First 

Army and 21 Army Group headquarters had so ured since their assoc iation in 

Normandy. Like ma ny othc r Americans, the First Army staff officers blamed 

what they saw as British slowness and fastidiousness over boundaries for the 

failu re to tra p the Germans west of the Se ine, and the 2 1 Army Group headquarters natu rally took umbrage at the critieism.62 As th e two forces raced northeast from th e Sei ne , the First Army headquarters suspeet cd that Montgomcry 

had used his au thority as temporary ground commander to a ll ocate the sectors 

wit h the best roads to thc British, forci ng Hodges \0 go, hat in hand, to the 2 1 

Army Group command post for re lief. Given the less dcve loped state of roads 

in th e 2 1 Army Group zone, these compla ints seem uncha ri tab le, but rc lat ions 

between Montgomcry 's headqua rt ers and its Arneri c<l n ne ighbors we re poor 

enough that from 22 August to 3 September Montgomery made no effort to sec 

Brad lcy, evcn though for most of tha t period he was still the ground forccs 

commande r and, during the ent irc period, had the ri ght to "cffec t the necessa ry 

operational coordi na tion" between his army group and Brad ley's nort he rn 

wi ng.6J Mea nwhi lc, the Fi rst Army headquarters fai led to keep Cori ell fu lly 

info rmed as he drove into Be lgium, leavi ng him to coordinate most boundary 

issues directly with Lt. Gen. Sir Brian Horrocks of the Second Army 's 30 Corps. 

Aga in, poor cOllllllun ications undoubtedl y caused much of the problem. In any 

case, since Hodges' units stayed ahead o f the Bri tish, the advancing Americans 

we re often able to usc the roadnet in the Brit ish zone for a day or two before 

the ir a ll ies arrived on th e scene. 64 

As August turned into September, the First Army was finding it increasingly difficult to avoid straying onto British territory. On 3 1 August Bradley, 

who had received reports of large bodies of enemy troops moving cast across 

the First Army's front, ordercd Hodges to turn due nort h and cut the ir escape 

routes. l'lodges the n sent his G- 3, Thorso n, in pcrson to di rect Corlett and the 

X IX Corps to dri ve north to Tournai, a critical crossroad s fo rty-five miles west 
!-lodges Sfeps Up 'he Pace 143 

of Brussels. By 2 September the XIX Corps had reached Tournai , wh ich lay 

inside the British zone. When Field Ma rshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery protested th e nex t morning that the XIX Corps had crossed the army group boundary and was blocking the road to Brusse ls, an amused Bradley ca ll ed the G- 3 

duty officer at the First Army command post and told him to withdraw the XIX 

Corps from the c ity. Montgome ry then drew a new army group boundary (hat 

fenced off the major road hub o f Brusse ls from the First Army.65 

Bradley and Hodges cou ld afford to be amused, for the First Army had just 

pulled off, almost by acc ident, one of the finest coups of the campaign. When 

Bradley ordered the First Army to swing north on 31 August, Hodges, perhaps 

because of the poor weather for aeria l reconnaissance and the lac k of contact 

with the retreating enemy formations, knew lillie of German movemen ts. Indeed, he seems to have thought that Bradley had turned his army north large ly 

to link up with a planned parachute drop near Tournai. Nevertheless, he directed Coll ins by phone to turn the VII Corps, the army's easte rnmost corps, 

north to Mons, twenty-seven miles so uth east of Tourna i. When Coll ins asked 

who wo uld fill the res ultin g gap between him and the Third Army, I-lodges 

brusquely replied, " Joe, that 's you r probl em."b6 Detaching a reinforced cavalry 

group to cover its flan k, the VII Corps drove north to Mons, arriving on the 

evening of2 September. That night, a wild me lee along the VII Corps' western 

flank indi cated the presence of several units of the German Sel'en,1I Arlll)" 

trapped within the pocket formed by the First Army's three corps. In the Mons 

pocket , th e First Army captured 25,000 Gcrmans, c leari ng its 1',1111 to the 

German border. 61 

The windfallll1ight neve r ha ve occurred with better communi cations. On 2 

September Eisen hower, who had taken field command of tile Allied forces th e 

day before, had returned to more of a dual-thrust strategy that turned the First 

Army to the east. Passin g the V Corps behind the VII Corps to take the sout hcrnmost flank , tile First Army drove for the West Wall. A jubilant Hodges told 

his staff on 6 September that with ten more days of good weat her, the war 

would be over. 6~ 

Ever since its units had crossed the Seinc, however, the First Army headquarte rs had become more acquainted with the tyranny of logisti cs. The da ily 

suppl y, maintenan ce , and evacuation reports at 0830, and the daily stock status 

reports at 1800 presented an increasingly alarming picture. Stores of rations, 

espec ially fi eld rat ions, had reached such a low level- almost no B and 10-in* 

I rations and less than two days of C and K rations by 2 September- that 

McNama ra occasionally turned to capt ured German foodstuffs. Clothin g, engineer and signal equipment, and medical sto res were in short supply, and 

Mcdaris reportcd shortages of rcplacement tanks and vehicle spare parts, which 

were sore ly needed for maintenance at thc end of August. Ammunition remaincd 

a concern, although not as pressing thanks to the lower demands of pursuit 

wa rfare . Lack of gasoline was the most criti cal problem. Betwee n 5 and 19 

August the Fi rst Army's stocks of gasoline had dropped from 10. 5 to 3.9 days, 

and by 2 September the First Army staff was report ing less than a half day's 

suppl y of gasoli ne on hand . (Table /) As stocks fell , the First Army inc reas-
Dale 

19 Aug . . 

20 Aug. 

21 Aug. 

22 Aug 

23 Aug. 

24 Aug. 

25 Aug. 

26Aug 

27 Aug. 

28 Aug 

29Aug . 

30AlIg 

31 Aug 

1 Scp 

2 Scp 

3 Scp 

4 SCI) 

5 Scp 

6 Sc p 

7 SCI) 

8 Scp 

9 Scp 

10 Scp 

11 Scp 

12 Scp 

[3 Sep 

14 Scp 

15 Scp 

16 Scp 

17 Scp 

18 Scp 

19 Sep 

T ABLE I - F'R ST ARMY SUPPLY AND CONSUMI'TlON L EVELS 

19 A UGUST- 19 S EPTEr-m ER 1944 

Rmiolls PO/. AlI/lI/l/lIiliOIl Raliolls Gus 

Oil HOlld all l-/(III(I all 11(111({ COI/sllliled COllsllmed 

(do)'s oj supply)" (da)'s qrsllpplyr (lOllS) rIO) (g(lls.) 

5.3 6.9 24.001 399.253 542,765 

4.4 6.6 24,74 1 449.092 344,405 

4.9b 2.2b 25,259 389,64 3 295,305 

4.7h 1.0b 31.63 1' 427.145 5 14,970 

4.0h .7' 34,368' 478.199 482,2 15 

7.6b 1.9b 35,1 15" 443.927 782,200 

37,976' 395,461 58 1.535 

7,4b LOb 41,916' 393,283 509,805 7,4h I.Ob 41.616' 310,670 451,575 6.1 ~ .9 41.479' 313,48 1 567.260 

6.5 .4 12. 100 393,555 49 1,860 

6.3 .47 12,831 405,538 327.750 

5.5 .5 11,602 324,496 577, 130 

4.4 .14 11,468 432,821 55 1,325 

3.7 .4 11,447 327,946 429,420 

3.6 .6 13,025 356,118 370,3 15 

2.9 .34 14,627 389.836 558,625 

2. 1 .54 17,839 451,579 420,740 

18,378' 370,400 567,110 

1.4 .77 18,183 343,792 630,880 

.7 18,042 330,324 498,495 

.7 18,581 f 359,035 665,360 

0 0 294,9 17 593,255 

1.0 1.0 ! 8,469 264,327 569,180 

1.5 .6 19,956 453,82 1 571.790 

1.4 .67 19,473 412, 155 652.240 

2.0 .76 16,43 1' 380,7 11 504,650 

2.3 .56 15,856< 374,261 510,825 

1.5 0 18,88Y 397,454 403 ,930 

2.0 .2 17,315' 401,092 319,930 

1.8 .151 15,234' ~ 348, 188 415,615 

2.0 .7)" 14,49Y · 379,30 I 408 ,985 

ROII/ltls 

CUI/sullledl 

(110.) 

144,42 ~ 

107,429' 

'According to the 1944 Dic/iollm), of Ullil('d Sw/e.,· AI"lIIy '!i.·I·W"'. the d:,y of supply is the "unit used in 

estimating the average expenditure ofl'arious items of supply per day in the field ." Thus for mtions, one day of 

supply represents thequantilyofr;,tions needed to feed every sohJicr in the First Army for 24 hours. For petroleum. 

oil, and lubricants (POL). it represents the nlnOllnl of POL required to mOl'e el'ery vehicle in the Army 50 miles 

per day. For gasoline ,lione, the day of Slip ply for Augusl and Septembe r ",as probably about 500.000 gallons I>cr 

dlly. In October the b"sis for Ihe day of supply of gasoline changed from 500.000 10 550,000 gallons I>cr day. -Infornmtion from La Loupe area unavailable 

'Including La Loupe llrca 

"All Irllekheads forward of La LOllpe: rear army depot not reporting ' Rceompuled tonn;lge 

()'er physical illl'entory 

IDocs nOI include I.;'on ;IIHl l.;, Loupe <ln~as 

' In long Ions 

'Gasoline only ' For I05·IlUll. howilzcrs. 155~mlll. howitzers. and 155" IHlt guns only For 18 August- 3 September 

'For 4 Se)llember- 16 September 

SOl/rcc : First Army Supply, Maintenance, and Evacuation Daily Summary Rpts, 101-4.9. WWII Ops RCPOMS, 

RG 407, WNRC: Rpt, U.S. Army. Firsl U.S. Army, Report ofOper;ltions. I August 1944- 22 February 1<)45, 

3:26.4:81. 86- l!7. 93. 911. C~III Library. 
Hodges Steps Up file Pace 

ingly met its dail y requirements on a 

hand-to-mouth ba sis. McNamara's 

quart erma sters rece ived continuous 

ca lls on wh e re fu el co uld be procured, trucks waited in line at cmpty 

truck heads for ncw shipments, and 

vchi c les trave led fa r to th e rear in 

sea rch of gasoline.

69 

As Bradley latc r rema rked, th e 

growing logisti cal crisis " had come 

not as the result of a breakdown in 

suppl y but as thc inevitable consequence of an unexpectedly specdy 

ad vancc."7o Between [August and 16 

Sept ember the First Army's quartermaste r depot moved six times, preventing the buildup of amp le stocks 

at any point and stretching quartcrmaster personne l and resources to the 

limit. By earl y September the First 

Army depots and dumps lay in eastern France and Belgium, 200 to 300 

145 

--

-

Colollel McNamara 

mil es from the beaches with few intermediate depots in betwec n.

7 1 Un fortunately, Alli ed transportation was provin g sadly inadequate for th e tas k of bringing up supplies from th e beaches to the armi es. We st of th e Se ine, thc French 

ra ilroad system had been virtuall y destroyed by air raids and the Rcsistan ce, 

and reconstru ction o f th e railroads was progressin g slowly du e to th e lack of 

civilian labor and ro lling stock. Then on I Septembe r the COMZ headquart ers 

bega n its move forward to Paris, a journey that took seve ra l weeks to complete. 

The COMZ commander, LI. Gen. John C. H. Lee, later protested that Pa ris, as 

the administrati ve and transportation hub of France, was the natural location 

fo r COMZ, but c riti cs complained o f th e impact of the di ve rsion of prec ious 

motor and rail transport at a c riti cal time in the pursuit. Meanwh ile, as of 31 

August th c pipeline, criti cal to th e delivery of gasoline and oil, had only reached 

Ale t1(,(on, over 140 mi les behind the XIX Corps' spearheads, and lhe Alli es 

could de liver only negli gibl e tonnage by air. They would have to re ly heavily 

on tru cks, of whi ch they never had enough and whi ch required la rge amounts 

of fuel to ope rat e. 72 

Thus, the Fi rst Army's su pply crisis was only part of a la rger probl em over 

whi ch its headquarters, as one of many cla imants for the few ava ilabl e resources, 

had littl e control. To pl an, Hodges and his staff at least needed to know what 

suppli es to expect and when to expect th em. At most, in early September COMZ 

estimated that it could ship on ly 7,000 tons pe r day to th e 12th Army Group. 

Bradlcy's staff accordingly adopt ed a system unde r which the First Army received ini tially 5,000 and late r 3,500 tons o f th e ava ilable dai ly lift. Based on 

bids from special staff sections, Wilson 's G-4 supply subsecti on allocated th is 
146 A Commalld Pos/ lII War 

portion and forwarded the approved req uisi tions to the 25t h Regul ati ng $ Ia · 

lio l1 . The 25th shipped items ava ilable in ADSEC de pots to the First Army and 

sent orders for oUI-or-slock items to COMZ, whose 0-4 sec tion would then 

allot its actual tra nspo rtatio n o n hand 10 ship Ihe items. Unfo rtunately, the First 

Army 0-4 secti o n often did not chec k th e tonnage of req uisitioned items, wilh 

the result that COMZ wo uld nol shi p many goods due to weig ht overages. Nor 

did COMZ always notify th e First Army headquart ers aboul the status of ship -

ments. Through reports to th e command echelon and to I-lodges and Kca n via 

the small G-4 contin ge nt that Wilso n established at the tacti ca l ec he lon , the 

Fi rst Army headquarters managed to keep track of its own stocks, but until 

staff officers could physica lly locate suppli es en route, the army supply planne rs could make only the most hazy logist ica l forecasts. Desperate, McNama ra 

eve n borrowed a plane rrom Hart to locate convoys and tra ins that mi g ht be 

ca rryi ng fuel. 7l 

As COMZ ru shed construc ti o n on pipeli nes and railroads and est ablished 

Ihe Red Ball Ex press to tru ck supp lies direc tly to th e rronl, the First Army 

moved to supplement its tran sportatio n in thc army area and beyond. On 27 

August the 12th Army Group told its armi es that, until the rail system co uld 

maintain the now of suppl ies with ease, each arlllY mu st stretch its communications to the maximum a nd usc all avai lable tran spo rtation to bring su pplies 

forward. Hodges ca ll ed in his staff, informed them that supp li es took precedence ove r combat forces, and asked that, if necessary, they convert combat 

formations to logistica l units. Patterson, the a ntill ircraft office r, offered 300 

truc ks, and Brig. Gen. Cha rl es E. Hart immobilized much of his heavy a rtill cry 

and reorganized e ighteen fie ld artillcry battalions into provisionallruck battalions. Under the overall supcrvision of Wilson and the G-4 tran sporta tion subsection, Hodges' staffultirnate ly found enough vehicles from assorted antiaircraft, artillery, o rdnance, quarte rmaster, signa l, and c hemical warfare units to 

move the First Army 's depots closer to the front and even return to the beaches 

to obtain gasoline. Nonetheless, transportation remain ed in such short suppl y 

tha t beginning 3 September Wilson requircd bids for available transport on a 

daily ba sis. For the trucks <Ivailable, the First Army paid a price, not on ly in lost 

ca pabilities among combat and service uni ts tha t had to donate vehicl es, but 

also in deferred mainte nance, the drain on an a lready dwi ndling supply of gasoline, and dri ve r fati g uc as supply hauls oftcn approac hcd three hundred miles. N 

Incrcased traffic combined with th e jumbl e of installations, priso ners, a nd 

stragglers to crca te eongcstion in rear areas. Thc First Army had establis hed a 

road network for troop movements and supply, including bypasscs, onc-way 

strcets, and temporary bridges at chokepoints sllch <I S St. L6, Mortain, Domfront, 

and the Belgian industrial cente r of Li ege, fift y-five mi les so utheast or Brussels. This approac h worked well over timc. Still. Col. Wi lliam H. S. Wri gh t's 

provost marsha l offi ce faced problems of coordination with ADSEC and COMZ 

over traffic regulation. By mid-A ug ust the section also faced the task of processi ng the torrent of prisoncrs nooding into its arca , incl uding 35,000 from 

the Fa laise pocket. Barely had it ac hi evcd somc control over that situatio n when 

the Fi rst Army reccived ovc r 20,000 prisoncrs from the Mons poc kct. To avo id 
Hodges Steps Up the Pace 147 

using precious manpower, gasol ine, and supply vehicles to sh ip prisone rs back 

to the army lllaintai ed enc losu res, or cages, units keptthelll at temporary eol~ 

lecting points in the vic inity of Mons until the First Army provost marshal 

office could tra nsport them back to the army facilities. They remained in army 

cages until they procceded on to ADSEC and COMZ facil ities. " Wright 's sec~ 

lion a lso carried oul a crackdown on rampant black markelee ring and strag~ 

g ling, which, wi th th c ra pid pursuit, had become a major problem. Fort un ate ly, 

the expec ted threat from saboteurs and subversive organizations never did materialize, thanks to cooperative local populations and the disruption to enemy 

plans causcd by the speed of the adva nce.1(, 

Although the First Army headq uarte rs in the early days of September would 

not yet admit that th e pursuit was nea rly over, supply shortages were becomi ng 

an insuperable drag on operations. The British Sccond Army captured Antwe rp 

on 4 Septembc r, but months would pass befo rc the Allies could c lear the banks 

of the estuary leading to that essential port and render it usable. By 10 Sep el11~ 

ber the 2 1 Army Grou p was encountering stiff opposition along Dclgium's Albert 

Canal, whi le in the sout h the Third Army's advance towa rd Met z and Nancy 

had stalled. 

Still, the First Army headquarters hoped to improvise enough supplies for 

its forward units to penetrate the German frontier in force before the enemy 

could organize a defense. With Eisc nhower's dec ision to return to the ~ 

thrust stratcgy, Bradley had cut thc First Army's tonnage share to 3,500 tons, 

1,000 tons below the min imum the First Army staff saw as necessa ry to ma intai n a fu ll nedged drive. 1·lodges gave most of the available fuel to the VII and 

V Corps, hoping to seize the Meuse crossings, which we re closcr to those two 

corps than to the XIX Corps, before the Germans cou ld form a line a long the 

river. Bcyond the Mcuse, the Germans wcre preparing to make a stand along 

the frontic r at the Siegfricd Line, or Wcst Wall. The First Army headquarte rs 

wanted to break through the barri cr before the defendcrs could make the ong~ 

neglected works truly formidable. 71 By 6 Septcmbcr, howeve r, the First Army 

was receiving only 1,500 tons o f supplics per day, and the next day thc V Corps 

immobilizcd an armored division for lack o f fuc l. On 10 September a g loomy 

Wilson informed his commander that the First Army no lo ngcr possessed any 

substantial reserves, that he possessed no information on suppli es arriving at 

th ej ll st~es tabli d rai lhead at Soissons, and that the G-4 sec tion could barely 

scrape togcthcr enough stocks fo r daily issues. On the basis of Wilson's report, 

Hodges delayed th c V Corps' drive to the West Wall unt ilthc First Army could 

gathcr cnough artill cry ammunit ion to support it. 7g 

Infl ucnced by his favorite corps commandcr, howeve r, Hodgcs changed his 

mind. On thc afternoon of II Scptcmber the buoya nt Coll ins visitcd the ncw 

a rmy command post at l-iuy, Belgium, fift ee n mi lcs southwcst along the Mcuse 

from Li ege. Eager to grant no respitc to the enemy, he recommended a rcco ~ 

naiSS(l nce in forcc the flex I day to penetrate German border defe nses. He was 

aided in his case by Dic kson's estimate tha t the Ge rmans wcre desperately rushing in service units tilld worn~out combat formations to fill the gaps in their 

defenses ercated by the COliP ncar Mo ns. EncollnJged by the report, Hodges 
148 A COlIJmal/d Post (1/ 1fT//' 

Surveying 'he IIWI) ;/1 the IIUlI) IVOlIIlll ,he First ArlllY f(/ cfica! COIIII//(///(( post (Ire. left 

to right, Gel/emf Keall, Genemf Hodges. Cololle! /Jicksol/, Gel/emf 1'1101',\'011, (lml 

Gel/em/l-lan, 15 Septelllber 1944. 

approved Colli ns' request and directed Gerow 's V Corps to carry out the same 

mission, but he instructed both corps commanders to halt their attacks if Ihey 

ran into solid resistancc,'N Unfort unate ly, Hodges had spread his troops ove r 

such a wide front that he could not concentrate enough forces in the X IX Corps 

zone faci ng the Aachen corridor, the best rout e into Ge rmany. He did so partly 

because he wanted to move quickly and lise his troops whe re Ihey we re situated 

and partly because he was trying 10 comply with Bradley's orders to protect 

simultaneously the flanks of Montgomery and Patlon on either side of him 

whil e maintaining his own advance to the Rh ine Valley citi es of Cologne, Bonn, 

and Koblenz. The First Army could yet craek the West Wall , but only if the 

opposit ion was mi nimal.8G 

In the end, German resistance, wh ile fe eble, proved enough, combined with 

foul weather, harsh terrain, and Allied logist ical problems, to haltlhe First Army. 

South of the old medieval c it y of Aachen, just over the Ge rman border aboul 

twenty-five miles from Liege, Colli ns' VII Corps penetrated the outer works of 

the West Wal l. Farther south, Gerow's V Corps found the defenses weak and 

undermanned. In the heavily wooded Arde nnes on the southern sector of the V 

Corps front, one armored division made a clean break in the German line. The 

First Army headquarters, however, did not press ils corps commanders to exploit their adv;mtage and, indecd, ca utioncd them to consolidat e any gains made 

aga inst counterattacks. Poor wc,lIher and a sevcrc cold kepI I-lodges al his head -
/-lodges Steps Up 'he Pace 149 

quarters, except fo r occasional trips to the 121h Army Group hc,Hlquartcrs where 

he and Wilso n were warned by Bradley about the growing crisis in supply. The 

First Army commander devoted much of his time to phone ca lls 10 ha sten 

ADSEC's pace of resupply and arrange for an cmcrgency shipmcnt of 3,000 

tons of ammunition by a ir. In this situation, his instinct toward caution was 

abettcd by a growing gap on his northcrn flank creatcd by the 2 1 Army Grou p's 

drivc north into Holland and pc rhaps also by Dickson 's cstimate on 15 September that the Germans, fa r from fight ing a mere de laying action prior to a withdrawalto the Rhine, we re throwi ng eve rything into a stand at the West Wall .

s, 

On 17 September l'lodges halted the V Corps' attack, which had been only 

a secondary effort, and fi ve days later, after conferrin g with the three corps 

chiefs, he ordered an indefinite postponement of the entire offensive . Also on 

17 September Montgomery launched MARKET-GAR DEN, a risky airborne operation which sought to j ump his 21 Army Group ove r the Rhine. For the field 

marshal , the abrupt end of the First Army offe nsivc, which could have di verted 

enemy rcsc rvcs away fro m his attack, mllst have becn a kee n disappoinlment.u 

The racc across Francc was ovcr. For most of the First Army, the drive 

began much latcr than for thc Third Army, the First Army's bumpt ious ne ighbor 

to thc south. Ncve rtheless, ove r the last two weeks of August into the first week 

of Septembe r, l'lodges and his staff had gained ex perience in mobi le operations. Wi th its unique challenges o f command, co ntrol, and communica tions, 

mobile warfa re must have proved a bit diseoncc rtin g for a headquarters that 

had grown accustomed to close sur vci ll ancc of its un its, and the First Army 

headqua rtc rs only adjustcd to a dcgrce . It allowed the corps more lecway than 

ever, adopted the tactical echelon, and madc extc nsive usc of liaison aircraft, 

but it did not develop the kind of liaison systems lhat Montgome ry and Patton 

employcd so well. In mobil e as in static warfa re, the First Army headquarte rs 

ca rried out its tec hni ca l tasks quit e well , perform ing superbl y in shifting the V 

and XIX Corps across two corps rear areas to new sectors, and it improvised 

with ski ll to sustain at least a trick le of supp lies to forward un its. Yel, while 

these weeks were an exhi larating period fo r the First Army headquarte rs, August and September werc a lso a difTicult time. The First Army wa s no longer 

the leading American ground hcadqua rt ers 011 th e Continent, and the altitude 

of its vetcrans toward th e relatively gree n 12th Army Group and Third Army 

staffs can well be imagined. Although l'lodges performed compe tently enough 

in his firsl weeks as commander, he lack ed the presence of his predecessor, nor 

could he ofTer Bradley's moderatin g influence both inside and outside the headquarters. A Iready assertive personal iti es both within and, in the case of Col I ins, 

outside the headquarte rs we re moving into the vacuum. For the moment, however, in the glow of victory, nearl y eve ryone was plcased with thc pc rforma nce 

of the First Army headqua rt ers under its new comma nder. 
Notes 

I Sylvan Diary. 1 Aug 44: Bradley. A SOlllie,.'s 5101')" pp, 358- 60. 

l First quote is by Bradley from Bradley. A Sold;c,,.;f S/lJry, p. 226. Second quote is by 

PaUcrson from lnlerv, Murray with Patterson. 23 Aug 7), p. 2. Third quote is by GCIlCTlll Bruce 

C. Clarke from [nlen'. Kish with CI<lrkc. 23 Feb 82. p. 293. Fourth quole is by Pallon from 

ll1ul11cnson. cd., The 1',,11011 (Jape/'s, 2:517. 

J MS. Bradley, Revised Tfllilscriplion of I3rl1dley Interviews. reel 1. pp. 42- 47: Bradl ey. II 

So/dh~I' s SIOI)'. pp. 225- 26, 358- 59: MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbc. p. J 45; IllIcrvs, Murray 

with Di ckson, 22 Sep 72. pp. 2- 3. lind with Patterson. 23 Aug 73, p. 2: UT. Eisenhower to 

Hodges. 1 May 40. 1940- 1, Prom01ions. CongralUlatory Leiters, box ), and Cir, Lieutenant 

Gencral Courlney H. 1·lodges, Biography file, box I. bolh in Hodges I'apers. Eisenhower Library; 

Inter", G. Patrick Murray wit h Mrs. Mildred Lee 1·lodges. 20A ug 73, pp. 38- 39. SeniorOffieers 

Orai llislory I'rogram. Rencclions on General Couftney Hodges. USAM HI: G. Patrick Murray. 

"Courlney 1·lodges: Modest Star or World War II:' Ame,,;cl/ll HiSIOIJ' /JII/Slm/ell 7 (January 

1973): 13- 16.25; Richard C. HoUciel. "The Victor or Aachen:' Co/liel"~' (4 November 1944): 

17,49; Charles 0. MaeDomLld, The Siegfried Lille Cllllliul igll, U.S. Army in World War [[ 

(Washington, D.C.: U.s. Army Center or Military History. 1963). pp. 20- 2[: I3lulllenson, 

IJrcakout al/(I Pllrsuit. p. 441 . 

• Teleeon. author wi th Dannemiller. 6 Nov 92. pp. 6- 7, 39- 40: Hansen Diary. 11 - 12 Feb 

45: Interv, Col Paul Fischer ,\lId Lt Col David H. Harris with (icn John L. Throckmorton, 14 

Apr 78. sec. 3, p. 16. Senior Officers Debriefing Program, USA M 111 ; M S, Carter. Carter's War. 

ch. 10. p. II; Intervs. Murray with Rosengarten. 3 Mar 75. p. 3. and with Myers. 15 Apr 74. p. 

19; Weig1ey, £isellhow( r:~ LiI'wt.'lIall/s. 1'. 85. 

Quotc rrom Sylvan I)iary. 30 Ju144. and sec also 19 Jun 44. Ilarmon with MacKaye and 

MacKaye. Combat COlI/llulI/der. p. 208: Interv. Murray with Myers. 15 Apr 14, pp. 1. 22. For an 

alternative view. sec Intery. Murray with Hart. 1913. p. 64 . 

• Inlervs, Murray wilh Paucrson, 23 Aug 13, pp. 4- 6: with liar!, 1913. p. 42: and with 

Myefs, 15 Apr 74, PI'. 19,21 . Weigley. £isCll/lt)wcrs Li('llIell(/lIl.f, pp. 84- 85. 

7 Several entries in the Sylvan Diary show 1·lodges· command style. Sec also MS. Carter. 

Carter's War, eh. 10. pp. 11 - 12; Hottclet. "The Victor of Aachcn." p. 49: Intervs, Murray with 

lI art, 1913, p. 68, and with Myers, 15 Apr 74, p. 36; Br,ldlcy, A Soldiel's S/Ory, p. 358: Ilodges 

notes under Order of Discussion, in CM II 314.7 Brcnkout nnd Pursuit, Author- Mnrtin Blumenson 

16- 2, box 174, Background Notes to Breakout alld PIII'.~uit, by Martin Blulllenson, RG 3 19, 

NARA. 

, MS, Carter, Carter'S War, ch, 10, pp. 11 - 12; Inter", Murray with Har1, 1973, p. 68. 

t See several entries in Sylvan Di nry, on Hodges' command style. See also Interv, Murray 

with Mycrs. 15 Apr 74, ]1]1. 21,35- 36: Corlett, Cowboy Pew, p. 91: Bolger. "Zero Defects," pp. 

69- 7 1. 

I. Bradley, A Soldicr:rSIOIJ" pp. 359- 60; MS, Carter, C,trter's War, ch. 10, p. 10: Intervs. 

Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74,]1. 15: wi th Patterson, 23 Aug 73, p. 2: and with Lynde, 1'. 45. 

II llrig. Gen. John G. Hill, rormer G- 3, V Corps. quote rrom MacDonald, The Siegfried 

Lille Campaign. Jl. 22. 

I l MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbc, p. ISO-A. 

Il Ibid.; 13radlcy, A Suldier ~ SIOI)', p. 180; Inter"s, Murray wit h Myers, 15 Apr 14, [J]l. 8. 

32- 33, nnd Pogue with Rosengarten, 22 Dec 47, p. I; Tcieeon, author with Hansen, 5 M,lr 93, 

DWH; Interv, Murray with Di ckson. 22 SCI) 72, pp. 7- 8: Hansen Di;lry, 2 Jun 44, 11 - 12 Feb 45: 

JllIncs M. Gavin Diary, 24 Jan 45. copy in author's pcrsonnl riles, OWI·I; Ingersol l, Top Secrel, 

]1 . 309: Baldwin, B{/I/Ies Losl lllld Jl(m. pp, 36 1- 62; D'Este. Ililler VicIOl'Y. p. 272r . 

.. Quote rrom Ingersoll, Top St.'CI'f!I. p. 3 I I, and see also p. 169. Intcf\'s. rogue with Williams, 

30 3 1 May 41. p. 5: with Rosengarten. 22 Dec 47, p, I; and with Smith, 8 May 47 , pp. 2- 3. 

Teleeon, author with Garson, 14 Oct 92, pp, 16- 11: Interv, author with Hains. 29 Ml1Y 91. p. 43; 

Telecon, ,lUthor with 1·lansen, 10 Feb 91. For more on Bradley's reasons for Ica\·ing Dickson at 

the First Army headquarter's. sec I)'Este. Biller Vic/Ory . PI), 27 1 12f. 
Hodges Sfeps Up lite Pace 15 1 

I l Il11 ervs. Murray wi th Di ckson. 22 Sep 72. p. 7. and author wit h Wendt. 29 Apr 91. p. 61: 

Rpt. U.S. Army. ETO. Ocnera lllo:lrd. Swdy of the Administrative Fllllctions of thc Army Group 

Headquarters. Study 29. pp. 4-5. 

,. Rpt . U.S. Army, First U.S. Army. Reporl of Oper'lI ions. I August 1944-22 February 

1945.4 vo ls., 2:99, CM H Librnry; Ru ppellth nl. Logislicul Supporl oflhe Armies. Volllllle II. pp. 

26- 27: Rpt, First Army, COD. 18 Nov 46. pp. 295 1)6,335.368: Kleber :lnd Birdsell, Chemicals 

ill COlllb(l/. pp. 76, 179: MS. Carter, Employment and StaO" Procedures. p. 39; Ross and ROI1l:lIlUS, 

Opel"(/fiol1s ill file Ifhr AgtlillSI GerllltlllY, pp. 393- 95.446- 49.733; Cosllias 1md Cowdrey. Mef/ical 

SelTice illllle ErllTIIJel1l1 Tlleater o/O"el1llioll.\·, ])I'. 66- 67 . 

17 Memo. Kenn for General and Speci:.1 StaO"Section Chiefs. First Army. 27 Jul 44. 101 -

3.3 0 - 3 Journal file, WWll Ops Reports, RO 407. WN RC . 

.. Inlervs, MUrrllY with Myers. 15 Apr 74. PI). 38-41. and with !-Iart, 1973. pp. 32- 34. 42-

44; HOllelel. "Victor o f Aachen." p. 491: Cir. Organizations and Functioning of 0 - 3 Plans and 

Oper.llions. 

I. Rpt. First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46. p. 478; Sylvan Diary,S Aug 44; Rpl. Scventh U.S. 

Army. Report of the Sicilian Campaign. 10 July- 17 August 1943. p. A-I; Koch and H1IyS. G- l 

IlIIelligellcefO/' PaIlOI'. p. 26. 

:. Rpt, First Army, COD. 18 Nov 46. pp. 429. 479. Memo. Akers for Thorson. 4 Aug 44. 

and Cirs. Kcan to All Staff Sections, 22 Aug 44, and Lt Co l S. E. Senior. Ass! Adj Gen, First 

Army. to Corps, Division, and Sepn rate Unit Commanders. I I Sep 44, "II in 101 - 3.22 0 - 3 

Memor:mdums and Miscellaneous Papers- First Army. box 1992. WWII OI)S Reports. RO 407. 

WN RC, Interv, Murray with Myers. 15 Apr 74. I'P. 4-5; George, "The B:.llie of Frallce," in 

Europe: ARGUMENT fo /IE D(I),. j(IIIII(IIJ' 1944- Mo)' 1945, cd. Craven and Cate. pp. 268- 69. 

I I Rpts. First Army, COD. 18 Nov 46, pp. 479- 80, and First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. 

1 August 1944-22 Februnry 1945,3: 172: MS. Carter. Carter's War. eh. 10. pp. 5- 7: Thompson 

1md Harris. The Oil/Wille. p. 117: Williams, " First Army's ETO Sign:.1 Operations:· pp. 10- 11: 

Ltr, WOJG Dcmpsey Allphin. AUS (ReI.), to author. 8 Ja n 97. DWI·1. 

11 RI'I. Firsl Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 146- 47. 164,249.303,389- 90.430,478; Inlerv, 

BeVlln with Hewilt. I Oct 81. pp. 158- 59; Cir, Myers to ChicfsofAll Gcneml and Special Slllff 

Sections, Command lind Supply Echelons. 25 Aug 44. 10 1- 3.22 G 3 Memorandums and 

Misccll:.ncOIlS Papers- First Army, box 1992, WWII Ops Reports. RO 407. WNRC; MS, Cartcr, 

C:.rter's War. eh. 10, p. 3: Interv. MurrJY with Myers. 15 Apr 74. pp. 4- 5. 

lJ Rpt. First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46, pp. 249. 389- 90. 433. 480- 81. 

:' Cir, Leller of Instruction (L01) I. 12t h Army Grou p. 29 Ju144 : Llr, Bradley to Hodges 

and l'aUon, 2 Aug 44 ; and Cirs, LOI 2. 12th Army GroUI), 3 Aug 44, and LO I 3, 12th Army 

Group, 6 Aug 44. All in RPI, U.S. Army. 12th Army Group. Report of Operations. 5:64- 75. 

Bradley. A Solfliel' 's SIOI')'. p. 352; Llr. Eisenhower to Marsha ll. 24 Aug 44. in Chandler, cd .. 

Eise"hol1·el· p(I"er~. 4:2093; Hamilton, MOSie!" oflhe Bml/ejield. p. 773: D·Este. Ded ~ioll ill 

NO!"II/fllldy, I'. 410: I3lul1Icl1soll. IJl"e(l1((1111 (lild 1~/II"Sllil, pp . 431 - 32. 

lJ Sy lvan Diary, 1- 6 Aug 44. First Army FO 3. I Aug 44; First Army FO 4. 4 Aug 44. wilh 

annex; and First Army FO 5. 5 Aug 44. All in 10 1- 3.9. WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. 

Biulllenson, ed., Tile Pfl/f011 Papers, 2:498; Coll ins. Lighmillg j(Je, pp. 250. 253; Rpt, U.S. ATillY, 

V U.S. Corps. V Corps Operations in the ETO, pp. 158, 163- 64. CMII Library; BlulIlcnson. 

Breakmll lIIlll P,w,fllil, p. 450. 

1. Sylva n Di:.ry, 4 Aug 44; Cir. First Army G- 2 Est imate 13, 1 Aug 44. All 0 - 2 Estimates 

cited ill this study arc in 101 - 2. 15 G- 2 Estim,Ltcs, box 1956. WWI[ Ops Reports, RG 407, 

WNRC. Rpts, First Army 0 - 2 Periodic Rpts for 2- 7 Aug 44. All G- 2 Periodic Reporls cilcd in 

this study arc in 101 - 2.2 G- 2 Journ:.1 and file . boxcs 1837- 1879. WWII Ops Reports. RG 407, 

WN RC, Bennell, ULTRA illllle fl esl. pp. 11 1- 15. 11 9; Martin Blulllenson, "Will ULTRA Rewrite 

History'!" Il nllY 28 (A ugust 1978): 48; Collins. Ughillillg joe, p. 25 1: Bl umensoll. ed. , 1'lIe 

1>(111011 I~flpers, 2:494, 497, 503. 

n Sylvan Diary. 7 Aug 44; IL1I erv. Forrest C. I'aguc with GeLl Courtney 1·1. 1·lodges. I Apr 52, 

Pogue interviews. notes in G. Patrick Murmy Papers. DWH; Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of 

Operations. I August 1944- 22 February 1945.3:5; Collills, Ughlllil/g J(/('. Jl. 253; Rpt. V Corps 

Oper<JIions in the ETO. p. 164; I) lulIlenson, Ikc(lk(JrlI (//1(/ PI/nllil. p. 470: an.~el1 Diary. 7 Aug 44. 
152 A Command POSf at War 

n Blu1l1c llson. Breakollt (/1/(/ Pm'SIt;I, p. 489; ItpIS. U.S. Army. ETO. Gcncrlll Board. 

Mounting the Operation OVERI.OIm. Study 129, p. 14. nnd U.S. Army, ETO, Gener'IIBoard. 

Study ofSUPI)iy and EVlI cunli on by Air, Study 26, I'p. 3 10, 29. CM H Li brary: Tclccon, author 

Wilh Co l John I{<lY. USA (Rel.), 25 Nov 96. DWH. 

~9 Sy lvan Diary, 8 Aug 44: Rpls. First Army 0 - 2 r criodic Rpl S for 7- 8 Aug 44 ; Cir. Firsl 

Army 0 - 2 ESlil11l1lc 14.8 Aug 44 . 

](I I3 radlcy. II SQhlier:~ SID/y. PIl. 372- 74: Cir. LOI 4. 121 h Army Group, 8 Aug 44. 12th 

Army Group, RepoTt o fOpernlions, 5:77- 78: l3Iul11cllson. nrc(/kol/l alld Pursuit, pp. 492- 94 : 

Montgomery. Normulldy 10 the fluflie. PI'. 158- 59. 

J t First Artily 1'0 6. 9Aug 44. 10 1- 3.9 Field Orders. WWIJ Ops Reports, RO 407. WNRC; 

Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimate 14,8 Aug 44 ; ll1umenson. cd .• The Palfoll I'apc,.s. 2:505- 06. 

12 Sy lvan Diary. 9- 12 Aug 44 ; Blumenson. Break()/II Cllld PIII"SII;t. p. 5 10; Jnls. First Army 

G- 2 Jnls. 9- 12 Aug 44. All G- 2 Journal entries cited in this study arc in 101 - 2.2 G 2 Journal. 

boxes 1837- 1879, WWll 01)S RC1)Orts. RG 407, WNRC. Co llins. Lig/llllillg Joe. p. 256. 

l) ll1u11lenson. Breakout and Pur~ lIil, p. 506. 

U Cirs. First Army G- 2 Estimate 15. 13 Aug 44, and Estimate 16. 15 Aug 44: Rpts. First 

Army G- 2 Pe riodic Rpts for 12- 16 Aug 44; Bennett . ULTRA illihe IIb/. pp. 120- 24. 

)) Sylva n Diary. 12- 15 Aug 44 : Llr. I3radley to Army Commanders, 15 Aug 44. in 12th 

Army Group Directi ves. DWH; Hansen Diary, 14 Aug 44; Collins. U gh/JIillg Joe. p. 256. 

J. SyIV1H1 Diary. 16 Aug 44. 

l' Rpt , V COqlS Operation s in the ETa, pp. 18 1- 84: Sylva n Diary. 16 Aug 44 ; L1r. 1·lodges 

to Gerow, 17 Aug 44, 101 - 3.9 Field Orders, WWII Ops Reports. RG 407. WNRC: I3l umenson. 

cd .. rhe Palloll Pallcrs. 2:514- 16; Blumenson. The H(II/Ie of tlw Gem'mls, pp. 2 1. 234- 38; 

l31umenson. 8,.ellkolll (///(/ Purl·llil. PI'. 529- 30, 558; Weigley. Eisenlwwer :f Uell/ell(lII/.~, pp. 

21 1- 12. On the debate over the number of Germans who escaped, sec D'Estc. DecisiOIl ill 

Normandy. pp. 430- 3 1, 438. 

JI Cir. LOI 5. 12th Army Grollp. 17 Aug 44. in Rllt, U.S . Army, 12th Army Group. Report 

of Operations. 5:79- 8 1. 

,. Sy lvan Diary. 17- 20.23 Aug 44 : Corlett, Cowbo)' Pc/e. p. 99; Ltr. Hodges to Corlett, 18 

Aug 44. 10 1- 3.9 Fi eld Orders. WWlI OI)S Reports. RG 407. WNRC; liansell Dia ry. 20 Aug 44; 

Rpt . V Corps Ope rat ions in the ETO. p. 186; I3lumenson. /Jre(lkOIlI (/lid Pur.wil. I). 577: Bradley. 

A Soldier's SIOI) '. pp. 380- 83. For intelligence during this movement. sec Rpts. First Army G2 Periodic Rpts for 17- 26 Aug 44 ; Cirs, Firsl Army 0 - 2 Estimate 17. 18 Aug 44; Estimate 18. 

19 Aug 44: Estimate 19.20 Aug 44: and Estimate 2 1. 25 Aug 44 . 

..0 Sylvlln Diary, 23- 27 Aug 44: Llr. l'lodges to Coriell lind Gerow. 24 Aug 44. 101- 3.9 

Field Orde rs. WWII Ops Re llorts. RG 407, WNRC: l3Iumenson. BreakOllt alld Pllrsllil, p. 579: 

Bradl ey. II Soldiers Stm)'. pp . 38 1- 83; Ltr. Bradl ey to Eisenhower. 10 Scp 44, Bra dley 

Correspondcnce with Eisenhower. v. I. 1943- 1945. box 5, Bradley Pape rs, USA MIII: Intervs. 

I>ogue with Dcmpsey. 12- 13 Mar 47. pp. 1- 2. and wi th Dicksoll. 22 Dec 47, I). 2. 

~I Rosengarten. " Wi th ULTRA From O MAHA Ileach to Weimar. Germany." p. 129; Syh'an 

Diary. 2 1 Aug 44 ; MS. Carter. Carter's War. eh. 10. pp. 17- 18. 

Ol 1·lodges quote from Thompson lind Harris. TII(' O/Ilcollle. p. 117. 

~J Ibid .. pp. 116- 17, 124: Int en '. Murray with Hart. 1973, pp. 30- 3 1: Rpts. First U.S. Army. 

Report of 0l)erations. I August 1944- 22 February 1945. 3: 172- 74 . and First Army. COD, 18 

Nov 46. pp. 479- 80; Williams. "Firsl Army's ETO Signal Ope rations," pp. !O- I I. 

U Memo. Kean for All Staff Sections. 22 Aug 44. and Cir. Myers to Chiefs of All Genera l 

and Special StafT Sections. Command lind Supply Echelons. 25 Aug 44. both in 101 - 3.22 G- 3 

Memorllndullls and Miscellaneous Papers- First Army. box 1992. WWII Ops Reports. RG 407. 

WNRC . 

• s Rpts. First U.S. Army. Report ofOperlltions. I August 1944- 22 February 1945. 1: 164. 

3: 172- 74. 1ll1d First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. p. 480: Thompson and Harris. The Oil/COllie. pp. 

123- 24.640; MS. Carter, Carter's War, eh. I U. p. 7; George. "The Bailie of Fmncc," in Europe: 

IIRG UA'fENT /0 JlE Day. Jmlllmy 1944 to May / 945. cd. Craven and C;ue, PJ) . 268- 69: Sylvan 

Diary, 18.20.28 Aug 44, I Sep 44 . 

... FM 101 5. SlttffOjJicer.\· Field M(lII//(i/, 1940. p. 48. 
Hodge:> S/eps Up the Pace 153 

1bid .: Rpt , First Army, COD, 18 Noy 46, p. 176: First U.S. ArlllY FOs nnd LOIs. in 10 I 

3. 9 Field Orders. and 101 - 3. 11 Lellers of Instructions 0 3 1st Army. box 1989. respective ly. 

both in WWJ[ Ops Reports. itO 407. WNltC: Cir. First U.S. Army LOis in 300.6 LCllers of 

Instructions, bo,", 62. First Army, Adj Gen Section. General Correspondence. 1940- 1947. RG 

338. WNRC. 

'1 Rpt. First U.S. Army, Rel>Ort of Opcr .. tiolls, 1 August 1944- 22 Febru<lfY 1945.4: 131 -

34. 149. 152: Cosmas and Cowdrcy. Medic(" Sen'ice ill Ihe E/I/'Opeoll 71/eoler o/Opermiolls. 

pp. 278- 84. 293, 298- 302: Jill. First Army G--4 Supply lnL 1 Aug 44. All 0 - 4 10urn .. 1 ent ries 

cited in th is st udy arc in 101 - 4.20- 4 10urn11I , boxes 1993- 1996, WWll OI)S Reports. ItG 407. 

WN RC . 

... Mayo. 011 Bel/chhemf (///(1 Bailie/rolli, pp. 269-7 1. 274: Rpt . First U.S. Army, Reporl of 

Operatiolls, 1 August 1944 22 February 1945,2:100.4:2--4. 13- 15.53. 

so I ntery, Murray with Lynde, pp. 28- 29, 34: Ruppenthal. Logi.~lic(// Slipport o/I"eAr/lli('.~. 

Volllllle I, Pl' . 524- 27. 

!I MS. Carter. Employment and Staff Procedures. Pl' . 93 - 94: Rpt. First U.S. Army. Report 

of Operations, I August 1944-22 February 1945,3:105- 12,117- 18, 125,14 1--44, 149: MS, 

Carter, Carter's War, ch. 10, p. 4. ch. II , pp. 2- 4. 

!l Sylvan Di ary. 20 Aug 44: Ilradley, A Sol(liel's SIO/)" pp. 384-87: MS. Dickson, Algiers 

to the Elbe, p. 146: Hanscn Diary, 2 1 Aug 44: Interv, Forrest C. Pogue with Gen Courtney 11. 

Hodges, 12 J i1l1 50, notes in Murray Pal)crs, [)WH; l31ulllenson, The /Jall/e o/lhe Genera/s, PI'. 

193- 96: Oll/menson , cd .. 711l! Pal/on 1~(lper.~. 2:5 11,516. 

Jj Sy lvan Diary. 22- 25 Aug44: Rpt. V Corps OpeTat ions in the ETa. pp. 197- 98,201 - 02; 

Bradley. A Sohliel's Story, PI>, 387- 93 ; MS. Dickson. Algiers to the Elbc. pp, 146-47; I-I ansen 

Diary, 22 Aug 44; 01umenson, Hre(lkQI/f al/d PI/I's"il. p. 606: Jnl, First Army G- 3 l nl. 25 Aug 

44 . All G- 310urnal entries ci ted in this chapter arc in 101 - 3.2 3 Journal, boxes 1959- 1963, 

WWII a I's Reports. RG 407, WN RC. Ltr, Gerow to Maj Gen A. C. Smith. Chief of Milit ary 

lIistory. U.S. Army, 22 SCI> 54, CMH 31 4.7 Breakout and Pursuit , Author Martin Blumenson 

16- 2, box 174, Background Notes 10 Bre(lkolllllll(l PI/I'slli/. RG 3 19, NA RA. 

W Rpl. First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46, 1>. 246: Coles and Weinberg, Soltliel's Become 

Go\·erllol's. PI'. 722, 738- 41: Bradley. A So/(liers SIOI}'. p. 387: Llr. LI Col George W. Crawford. 

USA R (Ret.). to aut hor. 16 Apr 97, OWl-I. 

SJ Rllt, First U.S. Army, Rel)01't of Operations, 1 August 1944- 22 Fcbruary 1945 ,2: 173-

74; Coles (lnd Weinberg, Soldicl'S Becolll e! G01'(!/,/IOD·. pp . 722, 742--45; Rpt , First Army, COD. 

18 Nov 46, p. 246; Rpt. V Corps Operation s in the ETO. p. 206; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the 

Elbe. p, 149; Jnls, First ATIlly G- 3 Tac Jnl. 21 Aug 44 . alld First Army G- 4 Jnl. 25 Aug 44: 

BlumCllson, lll'('akou/ (IIul Pur.mil. pp . 626-27. 

so. Syl":ln Diary. 26 Aug 44: Intervs. author with Thurmond, II Aug 9), pp. 13- 14. and 24 

Aug 93. Pl'. 24- 25: Rpt , Fi .~ t U.S. Army. Report ofOpcralions. I August 1944-22 February 

1945, 1:26 27; Co les and Weinberg, Soldiers Ilet'ollle GOl'el'lwI's, PI). 699, 74 1- 44 ; Rpt. V COfj)S 

Operations in the ETO. p. 209: II:lIlsen DiMY, 26 Aug 44: Blumenson, BI'c(lkolil allli P"r.mil, 

pp. 625- 26. 

j' For the atmosphere at First Army headquarters, see Tclccon. author with Ilrig Gen Wi lliam 

B. Kunzig, USA (Ret.). 12 Apr 92, OWl-I; Inter\', autho1' with Wendt, 29 Apr 91. p. 58. 

n Sylvan Diary, 21. 24- 25 Aug 44: Ilrad ley, A Soldier:f SIOI}', pp. 398- 401; Ltr. Eisen hower 

10 Mont gomery. 24 Aug 44. in Chandler, cd., Eisel/hower PlIl,ers, 4:2090- 91; Msg. Eisellhower 

to Adm Sir Bertr .. m H. Ramsay, Montgomery, Bmdley, Leigh-Mallory. Ilreretoll, LI Gen CMI 

Spalltz, Air Manhal Art hur T. Harris. and Smith, 29 Aug 44, in Chandler, cd., EisenllOwer 

plI/JC/'S, 4:2 100- 21 01 : Cir, LO] 6, 12th Army Group. 25 Aug 44. in Rpt, U.S. Army. 12th Army 

Group. Report of Operations, 5:85- 87. 

S<> MS. Ca rter, Carter's Wllr, ch. II. pp . 2- 3. 

0<) Sylvan Diary, 26- 29 Aug 44. Msgs, I-lodges to Gerow, 25 Aug 44; Hodges to Collins, 25 

Aug 44; and Hodges to Cori ell and Haislip, 25 Aug 44. All in 101 - 3.9 Field Orders. WWII Ops 

Reports. ItG 407. WNRC. Uiumenson, nreakQlI1 lIl/d II/'~ lIil, p. 672. Msgs. Akers to Coriell , 

26 Aug 44: Akers to Maj Gcn Wade B. Haisl ip. XV Corps, 26 Aug 44; Akers to Gerow, 26 Aug 

44; and lIodges to Corps Commanders and Commander, 32d Field Arty Ilde, 27 Aug 44. All in 
154 A COII/mand Post (If War 

101 - 3.9 Field Orders. WWI1 Ops Reports, RG 407. WNRC. Jill. First Army 0 - 4 Jill. 25 Aug 

44: Rpt. V Corps Operations illlhc ETO. p\>. 208- 10: Coriell. Cowboy Pele, p. 100: Colby. Tlte 

Firs, AI"III)' ill Europe. p. 88. 

61 Sy \'~m Diary, 26- 3 1 Aug 44: RpIS, Fi rst Army G- 2 r'o.:riodic Rpls for 26- 30 Aug 44; Cir, 

First Army 0 - 2 Estimate 22. 27 Aug 44: Jnl. First Army 0 - 3 Tac Jnl, 29 Aug 44; Rpl, V Corps 

Operations in Ihe ETO. p. 210: Coriell. Cowboy Pete. pp. 100- 101: InleT\', Burg wilh Quesada. 

25 Aug 76. pp. 206- 07: MS. George. Ninth Air Force, p. 164. 

6.! I-]ansen Diary, 7. 13- 14 Aug 44: MS, Dickson.Algiers to the Elbc, p. 145: ]nlen'. Murray 

wilh Myers. 15 Apr 74. p. 2]: Dc Guingaml. OpelYl/ioll IIICTOH)', pp. 407- 08: Colby. The First 

Army ill £III"OPI', pp. 79- 80. 

6J Quote rrom Llr. Eisenhower \0 Mont!;omery, 24 Au!; 44. in Chandler. ed .. Eisenhower 

Papers, 4:2091. 

" Ibid.; Notes orlmcrv. l'o!;uc with l1od!;cs. 12 Jan 50, in Murray 1'<!I)erS, DWII; Sylvan 

Diary, 2 Sep 44; lI amil:on. Musle,. o/Ihl' Balllefleld, PI). 820. 829; Hamilton. MOIII)" p. 43: 

Corlctt, Cowboy Pele. pp. 100- 101; Msg, Lt Col John L. Throckmorton, G- 3 Scction. First 

Army. to Sccond Army. 30 Aug 44. 10 1-4.2 G-4 Journa l :Ind rile. Tactical Echelon. First Army, 

box 1994. WWll Ops Rcports. RG 407. WN RC. 

) Sylvan Diary. 2 Scp 44; H:lllsen Di:lry. 3 Sep 44; Coriell. Cowboy Pele. p. 100; Br..ldley. 

A Soldier"s SlfJlJ'. pp. 402- 03: BlumenSOIl, nrcakolll (lilt! I'II/;ntil. pp. 679- 80 . 

.. I·lodgcs quotc rrom Collins, Ughll'illl; Joe, p. 261. 

.7 nl umcnson. 11/"eakml/ (lilt! I)",·.wil. pp. 676. 679- 82; Sylvan Diary. 31 Aug- 5 Sep 44; 

Collins, Ligll/llillg Joe, p. 26 1; Interv, l'O!;ue wi th Dickson, 22 Dec 47. p. 2; Rosen!;artcn. '"With 

ULTRA From OMA HA Beach to Weimar. Germany." p. ] 29; Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimate 23. 

31 Aug 44: RI)tS. First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpts ror 31 Aug, 1- 3 Sep 44: McNamara, 

Qlltll"ler/l/{/Slel" AClil'ilies. p. 144; Brad ley. A Softliel""s SIOI)'. pp. 407- 08. 

" Sylvan Diary. 1- 6 Sep 44: Rpts, First Army 0 - 2 Periodic Rpts ror 1- 6 Scp 44; Coriell. 

Con'boy Pele. 1)1).100- ]01: Rpt, V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 224; nrildley. A Soldiel-:I' 

Siory, PI). 407- 08: Hansen Diary, 1- 2 Sep 44 . 

•• See Jnls, First Army 0 -4 Tac Jnls, especia lly for 26- 27 Aug. 5 Sep 44; Memo, Daily 

Mai nten:lllce Requircment or First U.s. Army, 27 Aug 44 to 5 Sep 44, in 101 - 4.20-4 Journlll 

llnd rile. Tlletical Echelon- First Army. 25 Augusl- 8 October 1944. box 1994, WWII Ops RCI>OrtS. 

RG 407. WNRC; lnls. First Army G-4 lnls ror August and Septcmber. cspecially the weekly 

rcports, and First Army 0 - 4 Transport Jnls. 30- 31 Aug 44. Sec also Rpt. First U.S. Army. 

Report orOpcTlltions, I August 1944- 22 FcbrU:lry 1945, 1:46, 2:108- 09,4: 10, 47- 51; Sylvan 

Diary, 28 Aug 44; RUI)penthal, Logi.flical SIIPIJOrl 0/ Ihe A,.mies, Volllme I. pp. 503- 07, 5 18; 

MeNamarn, QllfII'ler/ll(Jsler AClillilies. pp. 142- 44. 

70 Bradl ey. II Soldiers SIOI),. p. 403. 

71 RIlt, First U.S. Army, Rel)Ort orOper'ltions. I August 1944-22 Febru,lry 1945, 1:28- 29, 

37,2: I 0 I - 09, 4:45- 52: Jill, First Army G-4 Jn l, 21 Aug 44; Mayo, 011 Beachhetul fIIld /1(/lIlc/I"OIlI. 

p. 27 1; Ross and Romanus, Opemliolls ill Ille JJ~II" Agaillsl Ger/lltlll)'. pp. 452- 55; Ruppcnthal. 

Logisliclll SUflpon 0/ tlte AI"/Ilil's. Valilme I, p. 494. 

11 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report or Operations. I August 1944- 22 Fcbruary 1945, 1:29. 

2: 10 1- 09. 4:52; Sylvan Diary. 28 Aug 44: Ross and Rom,mus. OperM;OI/S ii' lite r~1I" Agaillsl 

GC/"II/(/IIY, p. 455: Ruppelltlw l, Logistictll SllplJOn o/fhl' Ar/llies, VollI/lll' I, p. 5 I O. and Voll/Ille II. 

p. 3[; Bradley, II Soidierl' SIOI)'. p. 404; Jnls, First Army 0 -4 Supply Jl1 ls, 12, 2 I Aug 44; 

Poguc, 71/C S"pn:me COIIIIII(lIld, pp. 322- 23; lIr, All phin 10 aut hor, 8 Jan 97. 

11 Ruppenlhu l, Logislical SIIPPOl"1 o/the AI"mies. r~,llIme I, Pl'. 491 - 92. 496- 97, 508; Ross 

and Romanus. Opemfiolls ill the lI'm' /lgainsf Ger/l/any. Jlp. 389- 90: Telecon, :luthor wi th Col 

Walter W. Wcndt, USA (Ret.), 24 Apr 97. OWl-! . Jnls, First Army 0-4 Tac Jilts, 27. 30 Aug, 2, 

5- 6.8- 10 SCI> 44; First Army G-4 lnls, 1,4.7- 8 Sep44: First Army 0-4 Supply lnl. 5 Scp 44; 

and First Army 0 - 4 Trnnsporl Jnl. 2 Sep 44. Rpt. First U.S. Army, Report or Opcrutions. I 

August 1944 22 February 1945. I :45-46. 

H Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report OrOpeTlltions, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1:35- 37, 

2: 1 03, 4:53; RUPI)enlhal , Logislical Support o/t/w Anl/ie.I·, l'ulllllle I, pp. 492, 570; I Illerv. Murray 

with Patterson. 23 Aug 73. pp. 7- 9; Ross and ROIHunus. Opem/iolls ill lite Wi"lrllgaiJl.fl Ger/lltlllY, 
Hodges Steps Up fhe Pace 155 

pp. 454-55, 654: Hart, "Artillcry With nn AmeriC(lIl Army in [urope:' p. 26: Mayo, 01/ iJeflchhe(1(1 

alld iJallfefl"OlI/, p. 271: MS, Carter, Carter's War, eh. II , I). 9. Juls. First Army G-4 Tae 1111. 26 

Aug 44; First Army G- 4 Transport 1nl. 3 Sep 44: and First Army G- 4 Supply 1'ransportlnl. 31 

Aug 44. ]]Iumenson, Rr(!a/.:oul alld Pursuit, p. 691. 

75 Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945,2;101. 

107- 08,4:224- 25,234- 35, and First Army, COD. 18 Nov 46, pp. 375- 76. 

76 Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. I August 1944- 22 February 1945,4:239, 

246, and First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46. p. 327; Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimate 19. 20 Aug 44: MS. 

Carter, Carter's War, eh. 10, I). 21; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe. pp. 155- 56. 

11 Sylvan Diary. 2- 5 Sep 44; Msg, Eisenhower to Ramsay, Montgomery. Bradley. LeighMallory, Orereton, Spaatz, and Hnrris, 4 Sep 44. in Chandler, cd .. Eisellhower (>ape,'s, 4:2115-

18; Rpts, First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpls for 3- 9 Scp 44: Cil". First Army G- 2 [stimate 24, 3 SCI) 

44: MS, Dickson. Algicrs 10 the Elbe, pp. 156- 57; I3lumenson, cd .. The Pm/all Papers, 2:537; 

Rpt , V Corps Opemtions in the ETO. pp. 226, 230. 

71 Sylvan Diary, 6- 10 Sep 44: Jnls. First Army G- 4 Tac Jnls. 6.10 Sep 44, and First Army 

G-4 1nl file. 7 SCI) 44; [nterv, G. Patrick Murnly with Ge111. Lawton Collins, USA (Re!.). 15 

Aug 73. p. 43, Senior Officers Oral History l'rogmm, Renections on General Courtney 1·lodges. 

USAMH[; Ltr. Gcrow to Maj Gcn 10hn H. Stokes, lr.. Chicf of Military History. 16 Apr 56, 

CMH 314.7 I3reakout and Pursuit, Author- Martin 13lulllenson, 16- 2, box 174, l3ackground Notes 

for H,'ellkout alld f)/Irslli/. RG 319, NARA. 

7'1 Sylvan Diary. 11 Sep 44; Collins. Lightlling Joe, p. 267; Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimate 

26. 11 Sep 44: Jnl. First Army G- 3 Jnl. 11 Sel' 44; MacDonald. Th e Siegfried Lille Campaign, 

pp.37- 38. 

1(1 Collins, Lighlnil/g Joe, p. 267; Cir. LOI 8, 12th Army Group. 10 Sep 44. in Rpt , U.s. 

Army. 12th Army Group. Report of Operations. 5:91 - 92; Bradley. A Soidier:~ SIOI)" pp. 41 1-

12; MncDonald, The Siegfried Lill(" Cmll/mign. pp. 39- 41. 56; Charles B. MacDonald, The Ballfe 

of the Hller/gell Poresl (Philadelphia: 1. 13. Lippincott, 1963), p. 200; Weigley, Eisenhowers 

LielltenGnls, pp. 298-99. 321; Wilmot. The S/l"IIggfejor Europe, I). 495 . 

$I Sylvan Dinry, 12- 22 ScI' 44; Rpts, First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpts for 16- 17 Sep 44; lnls. 

First Army G- 4 Tac 1nls, 13- 14, 19,21 Scp 44; Llr, Bradley to Eiscnhowcr, 14 Sep 44. I3radJey 

Correspondence with Eisenhower, v. I, 1943- 1945, box 5, I3radlcy Pnpers, USAMH I; Notes or 

lnterv, I'ogue with 1·lodges, 12 lan 50: Msg. Akers to Corlell, 15 Sep 44 , G- 3 Memorandums 

and Miscellaneous Papcrs- First Army, 1- 30 Sep144, box 1992, WWII Ops Rel)Orts, RG 407, 

WNRC; Corlett. Cowbo)1 Pete, p. 102: Hanscn Diary, 14 Sep 44; Llr, Corlett to Maj Gell A. C. 

Smith, Chief of Military History, 2 Sep 53, Replies from Participants-Siegfried Line Caml)aign, 

box 184, Background Materials from Charles B. MacDonald, 1"hcSieg{ried Linc, U.S. Army in 

World War II, RG 319, NARA: MacDonald. Tile Siegfried Lille Campaign, I'p. 62, 112- 15; 

Wcigley, Eisel/flOwer s Lielll(~lwnls, p. 325; MacDolln Id. Rallle of the f'lIler/gen Forest, PI'. 47, 

58-59. 

31 Sylvan Diary, 17,22 Sep 44: Bradley. A Sofdier~' StOlJ' , pp. 414- 18; Ruppenthal, 

Logistic(11 SIIPPOI"I of !lie Armies. Volllme ff, p. 12. 

6 

Frustration at the West Wall 

As the First Army crossed th e German frontier in the early days of the autumn of 1944, Courtney Hodges and his staff were flush wilh exh ila ration. 

Contrasting Ihe Hodges of mid-September with the Hodges of Bristol days, 

Major 1·lanse n noted that the First Army's commander appeared "more positive 

now [that] he has found himse lf with a command .... [He} asserts himself 

morc readi ly in a morc positive manner .... YOLL can fee l Ihe ginger in everything he doe s.'" Although th e First Army's initial attack o n the enemy fortifications a long the frontier had stall ed, Hodges a nd his exulta nt sta ff remained 

certain that the Germans were beaten a nd that the end of the war lay within 

meas urable distance. They were anxiou s to resume the dri ve to th e Rhinc as 

soo n as logistics permiltcd.2 

While it assembled enough supplies to resume the offensive, the First Army 

headquarters cou ld examin e the terrain on its front. (Map 10) The best avenue 

of advance lay to the no rth. Once Co rl ett's X IX Co rps c rossed th e WOrm Ri ve r, 

it would enter an open plain, broken o nl y by a few villages and the Roer and 

Errt Ri vers, which flowed north paralle l to the First Anny front. The XIX Corps' 

long, exposed northern flank, however, gave pause to planners. Opposite th e 

First Army cente r, just so uth of the boundary between the XIX Cor ps and 

Collins' VII Corps, lay Aachen, a metropolis with a prewar population of 165,000 

and, as th e scat of Charlemagne's First Reich, a point of speci al significance to 

the Nazis. South and east of Aachen lay the Stolberg corrido r, about fifteen 

miles long but less than six miles wide at one point and obstructed by urban 

areas, ridges, patches of timber, and three rivers. Beyo nd th e co rridor lay the 

g rim, foreboding mass of the Hlirtgen Forest, crossed by on ly an occasional 

road or path. A fifteen-m il e corridor running nort heast from the village of 

Monschau, fifteen mil es sou th of Aachen, provided a narrow, village-st udded 

passage along the so uth east side of tile forcst. To the south, Ge row's V Corps in 

the fo rested Ardennes of Belgium and Luxembourg faced the German Ei fel, a 

densely wooded regio n with a limitcd road net, which provided few avenues for 

exploitati on.) 

Along with the rugged tcrra in, thc First Army would have to contend wit h 

the Siegfried Li ne, o r West Wa ll. The pillboxes and "dragon's teeth " of the West 

Wall, including a double band of forti fi cations south of Aachen, covered a lmost 

the entire fron\.4 Although these works presented an obvious barrier, initi a l est i-
GERM AN BORDER BATTLES 

25 Septcmber- 22 October 1944 

""'''''' 

• .000 100 __ 

• L-__ ~ __ ~~~ ____ __ • 

MAr 10 
Fl'lIslmliOIl (II lite West Wall 159 

Firsl Army comll/and pO~'1 (II Verviers 

mates indicated that thc line was not insurmountabl e. Reports of long-neglected 

works, inundated with seepage and lacking gun s and barbed wire , showed that 

the Germans had not had enough time to prepare them fo r an assault.s 

Any advance of thc First Army front would have to take into account the 

threat that the darns near the headwaters of the Roer River posed to crossings 

downstream, a threat that the First Anny headquarters was slow to perceive. While 

five of Ihe seven dams lacked the capacity to affect Ihe river's flow vcry much, 

the Urft and Schwammcnauel Darns, when opened, could have produced one to 

two weeks of flooding a long Ihe lower reaches oflhe Roer. The result would have 

becn a near-impassable barrier that might have isolated All icd bridgeheads. The 

concrctc, 170-foot-high Urft Darn nea r Gemiind could store 42,000 acre-feet of 

water, and the earthen, l80-foot-high Schwammcnauel Dam, two miles downhi ll 

from the town of Schmid I, could hold another 81,000 acre-feet ofwater.6 Unfortunately for the Allies, inte lligence officers at virtua lly every level from SI-I AEF 

on down eithe r minimi zed the size of the floods that could be produced by the 

dams and their value to th e enemy or assumed tha t the dams could be knocked 

out by air or captured in the natural cou rse of the adva nce. Through September, 

terrain analyses, inte lligence estimates, and field orders from SHAEF, the First 

Army, and VII Corps headquarters all fa iled to mention the threatJ 

Instcad of the dams, Dickson's G- 2 section foclLsed on the Aache n sector. 

At the new Fi rst Army command post ncar Verviers, Bc lgium, about fiftecn 

miles so uthwest of Aac hcn and twelve miles east of Licge, he and his intelli-
160 A COll/malld Post af War 

gence officers assembled and eva luated data from Ihe usual sources and a few 

new ones, sLlch as the well-organized Belgian Resistan ce and a Dutch undergrollnd telephone network that reached behind enemy lines. Drawing on these 

sources, Di ckson perceived a go lden opportunity for the First Army to destroy 

what remained of the enemy's forces prior to reaching the Rhine. In the same 

estimate that forecast a German stand at the West Wall, the First Army G- 2 

pointed oul that, although Ihe enemy was rushing new troops inlo the line as 

soon as they became available, reports indicated that the fortifications were 

mostly manned by service units and fragments of fo rmations thai lacked arlilte ry and tank s.

8 As the days passed and Dickson watched the enemy buildup in 

th e Aachen area , he moderated his optimism to a degree, noting in particular 

the arrival oflhe 183d " 1/(11111)1 Divisioll in the XIX Corps' sector." 

By 26 September, the day Di ckso n submi tt ed his reviscd estimate, the First 

Army had received its new mission. Operation MARKET-GARDEN, Montgomery 's 

attempt lojump the Rhinc, had fallen short, while Patton 's Third Army had nUl 

into bitte r fighting around the old fortress city of Metz. Farther south, patrols 

of Dcvers' 6th Army Group had contacted the Third Army near Dijon. At a 

SHAE F conference on 22 September, Eisen hower gave the main effort in the 

October offensive to Montgomery's 2 1 Army Group. It would clear the water 

approaches to Antwe rp and thcn advance on the Ruh!", while thc First Army 

protect cd its southern nank. lo After a meeting with l·lodges and Montgomcry, 

Bradl cy dirccted I-lodges on 25 Scptember to c lea r a pocket of cnemy troops 

west of the Meuse River bctween his army <lnd the 2 1 Army Group and then 

drive to the west bank of the Rhin e between Dlisse ldorfand Bonn. To help. he 

tran sferred the 7th Armored and 29t h Infantry Di visio ns to th e First Army and 

ordered Simpson's Ninth Army, fresh from its campa ign in Brittany. to take 

over the inact ive Ardennes sector from the V Corps. At the same time , however, 

he sh ifted the First Army boundary with the 21 Army Group forty mi les north 

to encompass the enemy's Meuse pockct in the boggy lowlands of the Peel 

Marshes. Thus, Hodges' delight over rcceiving the ncw di visions was tempcred 

by the wider front he would have to cover. Reca ll ing the probl ems from an 

overly dispersed front in mid-September, he sought and obtained Montgomery's 

agreement to the old boundary for that part of the First Army east of the Meuse. 11 

Relieved, Hodges conferred with his st aff and corps commanders during 

the four days after Bradley's 25 September directive to plan the First Army's 

role in the offensivc. His arran gemen ts, however, belied the supposed status of 

thc XIX Corps as the main effort. Unde r the new boundari es distributed by 

Thorson's G- 3 section on 26 September, the V Co rps, once relieved by the 

Ninth Army's VII I Corps in the Ardennes, would sidestep north to assume 15 

mi les orthe VI! Co rps' line ncar Monschau, thereby reduc ing the VII's front 

from 35 to 20 miles. The XIX Corps' 25-mile front remained unchanged except for the addition of the Peel Marshes, which formed a thumb-like , 40-mil e 

appendage to its northern flank 011 the west bank of the Mcuse. 12 From these 

prov isio ns, one could easily guess that the VII Co rps, not the XIX Corps, had 

the main effort , a feature that did not escape the notice of Corlett. The XIX 

Corp s commander already fclt confirmed in his inferior stat us among the First 
Fruslraliol/ at the Wesl Wall 161 

Army corps commanders as a result of an episode in mid-Septembe r. At a time 

when he was struggling to find enou gh troops to cover his front , guard his 

ex posed northern nank, and sti ll maintain a semblance of his advance, Hodges 

had come to his command post and asked, "Can 't yo u help Joe Collins?"1J 

Corl ett would later complain that the First Army orders laid Ollt tactica l 

detilils normally left to the subordina te commande r. The di rective isslled by the 

First Army headquarters 011 29 September seems innoeuolls enough in this respect. 11 directed the V Corps to prepare for an advance on Bonn, while th e Vll 

Corps drove around the south and east side of Aachen to conta ct the XIX Corps, 

isolating the city. Meanwhil e, the XIX Corps wo uld take steps to protect the 2 1 

Army Group's sout hern nank prior to a coordinatcd attack through th c Wcst 

Wa ll to its rendezvous with the VII Corps. Thereafte r, the Vll Corps, assisted 

by the XIX Corps on its nank, would seize a foothold on the Roer and then 

drive to the Rh ine near Cologne. Corle tt later stated that he wanted to dri ve to 

the Rh ine at Cologne and allow a bypassed Aachen to fa ll of its own weight. As 

he recalled, however, his orders, perhaps additiona l verbal directives from army 

headquarters, ex pli cit ly stipulated that the XIX Corps' 30th Infantry Division, 

upon cracking thc West Wal l, turn south to Wiirse lcn, about two miles northeast of Aac hen, to meet the Vll Corps, while the 2d U.S. Armored Division 

fo ll owed and protected the 30th's nank and rear. Only after the linkup wou ld 

the two corps dri ve to the east. If Corlett 's account is true , the First Army was 

not only misusing an armored division for a defensive mission, but also in terferin g with tacti cal decisions that were properly the responsi bility of the XIX 

Corps commander and his staff, thereby violating Army doctrine and its own 

usual practi ec '~ 

Even the all ocation of army units for the offcnsive was equivocal in its 

concentration behind the main effort. The XIX Corps received two infa ntry 

divisions and two armored divisions, in contrast to the two infantry and one 

armored di visions of each of the othe r two corps, but the XIX would need to 

employ two of its divisions to reduce the Peel Marshes. Army artille ry of thc 

32d Field Artill cry Brigade, with th e exception ora group headquarters and an 

eight-i nch gun batt,dioll attached to the VII Corps, would contin uc to reinfo rce 

the fires of both the XIX and VIl Corps arti ll ery from positions along the corps 

bounda ry. The First Army wou ld also retain a cava lry troop and th irteen antiai rc raft battalions undcr its direct control. Each corps recei ved a cavalry group 

and three ta nk battalions. To the XIX Corps, the First Army also allotted 13 

field art ill ery battalions, 5 tank destroyer battalions, and 6 antiaircraft battalions. The VII Corps rece ived 13 field artillery battal ions, 4 tank destroye r 

batta lions, and 6 antiaircra ft battalions. The V Corps, with an ostensi bl y scconda ry effort, retai ned 11 fie ld artillcry batta li ons, 5 tank dcstroye r battalions, 

and 5 antiaircraft batwlionsY 

In a separate directive, the First Army headquarters ordered thc VII Corps to 

drive through the l-l iirtgcll Forcst and securc high ground ncar the Monschau 

corridor. Military historians have long questioned the First Army headq uarters' 

decision to drive through, rather than bypass, the Hiirtgen Forest. It is hard to 

imagine worse terrain for offensive action, or more idea l ground for a dcfen-
162 A Commalld Post af War 

sive fo rce, than these dense woods, cut by numerous, abr upt ridges and occasional paths or roads, with only a few villages at isolated c\curings. 16 Given the 

lack of evidence due to the collegial style o f the First Army headquarters' planning process, the original source of the idea of clearing the forest canllot be 

determined, but Hodges, Kean, and Collins, reca lling the threat thai the Argonne 

Forest prese nted 10 the AEF's nank in World War I, were concerned about the 

da nger that a Germa n force , comi ng ou t of the woods, would pose to the sOLlthern nank of the VII Corps advance up the narrow Stolberg corridor. Kean later 

argued thai the First Army lacked the strength to cordon and bypass such a 

maj or potentia l enemy strongpoint. He conte nded that the First Army had often 

bypassed other strongpo in ts in open coun try whe re large e nemy formations 

could not hide. 17 In truth, the First Army headquarters had a lmost no reserves 

on which to draw and did not know for sure , although it suspected, that the 

forest contained only a few German troops, in no position to mount an offensive. Still, Hodges and his planners failed 10 app rec iate the advantage that the 

forest gave even these few defenders, nor did they fu ll y investigate the possibil ities of a converging a!lack to pinch out the Hiirtgen. ' 8 

As September turned to October, the First Army headquarters was less concerned about the Hiirtgen Forest than abo ut a supply crisis that had arrived in 

full force. At the sta rt o f October the First Army logistic ians counted barely 

two days of rations in their stocks, and they were fo rwarding gasoline on a dayto-day basis. In the rush to forward these priority items, logisticians neglected 

other categories, leaving the First Army with severe shortages of everyth ing 

from trucks, tanks, lank engines, and ta nk tracks to tires, signa l equipment, 

and winter clothing. So serious was the shortage of operat io na l tanks that in 

late September the First Army headq uarters reduced the aut horized number of 

medium tanks in its armored divisions and tank ba!la li ons to fifty per ba tta lion, regardl ess of levels in the Army's table of equi pment. In October, at a time 

when its vehicles badly needed scheduled mai ntenance, the First Army headqua rt ers reported its lowest level of spare parts for the campa ign. The First 

Army also sha red in the ammu nition crisis that all but silenced American guns 

in October. Although a problem in al most all catego ries, the shortage especiallyaffected I 05-nun. and 1 55-mnl. howitzers, and 155-mm. guns, the workhorses of American artillery. Wh il e lack o r transportat ion rema ined the main 

cul prit in suppl y shortages, the ammun ition crisis resulted from a general shortage in the theater. This shortage , in turn, stemmed rrom inadequate port capacity and storage facilities in Normandy, as well as production short ralls in the 

United States. More than any other factor, ammunit ion shortages wou ld affect 

operations. '9 (Table 2) 

At least, the slowi ng adva nce had give n Fi rst Army supply personnel a 

chance to bring forwa rd insta llations that had fal1en far to the rear. In early 

September the First Army was trucking suppl ies as far as 300 mi les to Liege 

from the army depots in the La Loupe army service area , abou t sixty miles 

southwest of Paris. After consulting with Kean and the G- 3 section, Wilson's G-4 

sectio n sel'ected a new army service area east of the Meuse , exte nd ing from 

Li ege, where ADSEC established its headquarte rs, about twenty mi les east to 
T ABLE 2- FIRST ARMY SUPPLY AN D CONSUM PTION L EVELS 

20 SEPTEMllER- 19 O CTOBER 1944 

/laliolls Gas Ammullitioll RatiollS Gus ROl/llds 

Date 011 !-Ialld 011 /-Ialld ol/I1(1l1d CO/lsumed COI/slllllc(1 COlls/lllle(I' 

(days ojslIlJplyl' (gals.) (1011.1') (110.) (guls.) (110.) 

20 Sep 2.1 O· 12.128 '~ 342.567 391.425 

21 Sep 2.2 O· 12.74 1d 354,134 328,830 

22 Sep 1.8 O· 10.121 d 396.498 224.960 

23 Sep 1.9 O· 11.626 357.163 271,915 

24 Sep 2.1 O· 14.809 392.045 271,525 

25 Sep 2.7 O· 16,825 299.997 355.415 

26 Sep 2.7 O· 17 ,50 1 384.459 255,050 

27 Sep 2.1 O· 19.407 399,350 530.920 

28 Sep 1.5 O· 20.855 379,138 322.960 

29 Sep I.l O· 19.850 398.478 299.315 

30 Sep 2. 1 O· 19,734 401.317 396,745 

1 Del IA O· 20,094 402,239 420.540 314,056' 

2 0cI 1.5 O· 21.6 II 391,502 348,165 

30cI 2.9 O· 21,752 403,143 275,110 

4 Del 3.5 O· 21,455 392,813 329.340 

5 Del 3.0 O· 21,641 425.819 325.370 

60el 2.97 2.212,775 23,265 413,374 369,105 

70cl 3.0 2,533,895 25,864 413,661 358,745 

8 Oct 3.0 2.163.630 26,556 354.164 306,990 

90cI 2.6 2,532,275 26,765 456,633 3 14.435 

100cI 2.7 2,608,105 24.714 381,733 248,155 

11 Oct 3.2 2,855,670 25,084 394,918 233,985 

120cl 3A 3.263,135 23,870 393,329 227,620 

130cI 3.2 3,490,340 22,653 398.227 220,525 

140cI 3.7 3,938,070 22.541 392.566 273,045 366,140' 

15 Oct 3.6 4,095.470 22,715 415,669 258,735 

160ct 3.1 4,235,700 22,710 414,669 213.420 

170cl 3.4 4,403,060 22,858 411.721 275,650 

180cl 3.' 4.475,490 23,367 417.886 222,895 

190cI 4A 4,623.505 24,388 437.462 269,485 

'Aceordillg to the 1944 Dielioltlll)' of Ulliled Sillies ,lnllY TalliS. a day of supply is the "unit used in 

esti1l1ating the average expenditure of various items of SUIJply pCT day in the field." Thus for rations. one 

day of supply repreSe/l15 the quantity of rmions needed to feed every soldier in the FiTst Army for 24 hours. 

"A ll qu:u)\i1ies received arc issued immediately. Units do not have prescribed loads and cannot therefore 

aecumulatc a reservc. 

' In long Ions 

"Including La Loupe ;lre" 

' For lOS-111m. howirzers, 155-mm. howitzers, 'Illd ISS-111m. gUlls only 

'For 17 Scptember- l October 

"For 2 October- 14 October 

Source: Firs1 Army Supply, Maintenance. and Evacuation Daily SU1l11lmry Rpts. 10 1--4.9, WWII Op5 

Reports. RG 407, WNRC; Rpt, U.S. Army. Fir.;l U.S. Army. Report ofOpera ion~, 1 AlIglist 1944- 22 February 

1945.3:26.4:93.98- 99. CMH Library. 
164 A Command Posl a/ War 

Eupen and l-I e rbcstha1. I-laving obta ined data on ra il lines a nd sidings in the 

Eupcn area from the 0 - 4 transportation subsection, the 0 - 4 ope rati ons ll b~ 

section, in coordination wit h the 0 - 3, G- 5, and provost marshal sections, chose 

sit es for faci liti es and scI priorities fo r ra ilrO'ld reconstruction, The G- 4 traffic 

headq uarters then worked with the 0 - 3 section, provost marshal persollnel, 

and the engin eers to draw up a traffic plan.

20 

Once the rai lroad rcached Li ege on 18 September, the First Army opened 

railheads for di fferent classes of supply in the new se rvice area, and the spec ial 

staff chiefs moved into the ir depots. McNamara had a lready c losed the quartermaster depot at La Cape lle, just over the French border about e ighty miles 

southwest of Liege, and had established a depot for all classes of SLIp ply in the 

Ellpcn~I rb est al area. Meanwh ile, Rogers was shifting most of his med ical 

fac ilities into Herbesthal and was assigning each of his three medical gro ups to 

suppor! a corps. From th e new service a rea, the First Army could ship suppli es 

by truck and rail to forward distribution po ints in the corps zones, where they 

transferred them to the di visions. By October most facilities were in pl ace, if 

not yet stocked.

21 

In the race to build up sup pli es for the ten divisions now under its CO Ill -

mand, the First Army suppl y chiefs usually worked direct ly with their cou nterparts at ETOUSA, COM Z, and ADSEC within the framework set by the 12th 

Army Group's allocations. McNamara, for one, kept in close touc h with the 

dynamic chief quart ermaste r for ETOU SA and COMZ, Maj . Gen. Robe rt M. 

Littl ejohn, who often visited his subordinates and established a system ofjccp 

courie rs to maintain co ntact with his far-nung empire. In addition to the actual 

requisit ions he submitt ed to COMZ vi a the G-4 scct ion, McNamara was a lso 

supposed to provide periodic estimates- every ten days for rations and every 

fifteen for clothing- of future needs to ETOUSA , set the tonnages fo r each 

item, and indica tc the desired priority. Littlejohn 's office then lL sed these forecasts to asscmble loads for shipment to the front , although the actua l allocation 

of transporta tion for these supplies, as with norma l requ isitions, was made by 

the G- 4 secti on ofCOMZ. Fortunately, ,IS COMZ's transportation capac ity rose, 

th e First Army's sha re of it, as allocated by the 12th Army Group, grew from 

3,500 tons per day in September to 6,500 tons per day in early October.22 

The First Army suppl y buildup was not hcl ped by the irritation fel t by many 

at the Fi rst Army headquarters, espec ially in the G- 4 section, toward COMZ. 

Part of this antagonism could be traced to the common resentment o f combat 

ec he lons toward rea r a rea personnel a nd a tend ency to take the rear area 

personnel's work for gra nted. 21 Still , the First Army he<ldquarters' hostil ity went 

beyond the usua l complai nts large ly because of its G- 4. Although Wilson got 

along we ll enough with Brig. Gen. Raymond G. Moses, the 12th Army Grollp 

G-4, and Brig. Gcn. Ewart G. Plank of ADSEC, he disliked and distrusted 

COMZ. His suspic ions o f autonomous su pply organizations stemmed from his 

ex perience with the SOS in North Africa an d Sicily. This attitude influenced 

those aroun d him, including Hodges and Bradl ey, who had a high regard for 

Wilson as the dean of the army su ppl y chiefs.24 For Hodges, who, eve n more 

than Bradley, preferred to foclls on tactics, the need to hand le supp ly problems 
FrWilrafioll {If Ihe Wesl Wall 165 

he could normally delcgate to his staff presented an especially unwe lcome distraction. After meeting Hodges during a trouble-shooting tour in Deeembc r, 

one War Depa rtment observer wrote that " Hodges is a man intolcrant of supply 

shortcomings who ha s not studi ed supply and docs not intend to."1:1 The innat e 

suspicion of Hodges a nd his staff toward COMZ was furthe r fed by rumors of 

black marketeering and by COMZ's move to Paris. The move es pecially caused 

many First Army staffofTicers to wonde r how much gasoline and ammunition 

could have been brought forward by the transportation used to shift Lce's COMZ 

headquartcrs.16 

Thus, when the supply crunc h of October arri ved, the First Army headquarters showed little sympathy for COMZ's difficult plight. First Army logistic ians complained when th e tonnage that they actu all y rece ived from COMZ 

did not match that a ll ocated to them by the army group. As might be expected, 

COMZ's frequent practi ce, when requisitioned items were not ava ilabl e, of fi lling out loads with nonesse ntial but easil y accessible artic les angered First Army 

supply ofTieersY To speed the de live ry of critica l items, Roge rs sent trucks 

directly to Paris, and Mcdaris even adopted the practice of sending ordnance 

officers to run down spec ific requisitions. Rumors of" I 00 bloodhounds" from 

the First Army ordnance section, roaming COMZ rear areas in " free-for-all 

attempts to sec ure suppli es from unauthorized sources" drew an inquiry from 

Maj . Gen . Henry B. Sayler, ETOUSA's ordnance chief. 28 A pious Medaris reassured his chief that he beli eved in orderl y procedures and that his men were on ly 

stll tioned in COMZ in an "official liaison eapacity."19 Whatever the real rol e of 

thcse " liaiso n" officers, COMZ and Bradley, with good reason, suspected the 

First Army of stea ling suppli es on thei r way to other armi es. Meanwhile, COMZ 

also protested the Fi rst Army's overrequisilioni ng and thc tendency of First Army 

special stafTchiefs, notably Carter, 10 requisition supp lies through technical rather 

than command channels, in vio lation of established proced ures.lO 

Matte rs came to a head in early October. On 29 September the XIX Corps 

launched its attack into the Pee l Marshes. Three days later, the First Army headquarters, fortified by assurances from the 12th Army Group sta ff of large r ammunition stocks in the ncar future, had the XIX Corps start its drive aga inst 

Aachen. The next day, 3 Octobe r, an angry Colonel Ray, the First Army ammunition officer, phoned the 12th Army Group headquarters with word tha t COMZ 

had placed zeroes next to his req uisitions for almost a ll ammun ition. In short, 

the supp lies that the 12th Army Group logisti cia ns had promised for the ofTensive did not exist eithe r in the First Army's depots or in COMZ, and Ray beli eved that the 12th Army Group headquarters had 11 0 idea what suppl ies were 

avai labl e. [n fact, Bradley's G-4, Moses, had suspec ted all along that COMZ's 

estimates were overoptimistic and was trying to ca ll its bluff. To ascertain the 

true situation, Ray went to Paris 10 confer with Sayler's ammunition office r, 

who insisted that no ammun ition shortage existed in the theat cr. In Cherbourg, 

howcve r, the First Army ammun ition officer found offshore numerous shi ps 

futt of ammunition, waiting to bc unloaded. As Ray discovercd, COMZ had 

included in its figures stocks that remain ed on ships offshore a t the ports and 

invasion bea ches. Largcly due to higher priorities for troop debarkations and 
166 A COII/II/al/d Post al War 

She/hi stacked by type /0 j(lci/ilafe isslle 

the impact of autumn storms on the invasion beaches, COMZ had been unab le 

to unload th ese suppl ies.)' 

SHAEF now ente red the picture to arbitrate the c lash between the armies 

and COMZ. On 9 October Kca n, Wilson, and Mcdaris atte nded a conference 

with representatives from SHA EF, the 12th Army Group, COMZ, and the ot her 

armies. After three days the 12th Army Grollp sent a de legation to Paris to ask 

Lee to speed lip the unloading o f vessels. The 12th Army Grollp headquarters, 

which had re instituted ammunition ration in g on 2 October, also dec la red II 

moratorium a ll the further su pply of ammunition to the armies ulltil COMZ 

built up stocks at its depots in Liege, Verdun, and Soissons, a process that the 

pla nners determ ined would not be complete until 7 November. Finally, the 12th 

Army Group headquarte rs, acti ng on the armies' recommenda tion, arranged 

for COMZ to fi ll requisitions as submilled and, where items we re unava ila ble, 

substitut e food or gasoli ne. Under the new system, COMZ wou ld a lso set up 

c redits at forward depots and the armies wo uld draw ammunition against these 

c redits. Although a major improvement, the new system sti ll did not meet the 

request of the arm ies fo r a mec han ism tha t wou ld give reliable estimates o f 

future supplies as a basis for plann ing. Tha t would come on ly in November, 

when 121 h Army Group logisticians installed a system of thirty-day ammu nition fo recasts, each div ided into three ten-day periods. Estimates for the first 

pe riod of the forecast consisted o f firm figures, which the 12th Army Group 

stafT div ided among the three arm ies, while th e figures for the nex t twe nty days 

provided estimates for planning purposes onl y.J2 
Frwi/l"(ff;OI/ Of fhe Wesf Wall 167 

As the [2th Army Group headq uart ers labored to speed up the su pply now 

from COMZ, the First Army sta ff improvised with what it had. Lacking artillery ammunition, the First Army used tanks, tank destroyers, and antiaircraft 

guns as artillery. In rear areas, army sa lvage companies gathc red enemy materiel and throwaway items that the First Army could refurbish and use. With 

COMZ st ill lacking the facilit ies and base shops to overhaul engi nes, Mcdaris 

expanded his own mai ntenance system, rebuilding 783 major assemblies, including 304 engi nes in October alone despite the chronic shortage of spa re 

parts. To expedite the arri val of replacement tanks and parts, Colonel Lynde, 

Mcdaris' maintena nce and supply chi ef, arranged for tank ba ttali ons en route 

to the front from Normandy to bring extra tanks with spare treads and extra 

ammunition and travel at twelve miles per hour to reduce wear. The trip took a 

week but the reward in new vehicles with minimum wear, the first to reach the 

First Army in months, was worth the delay. 33 The First Army also continued to 

use airlift and provisiona l truck companies drawn largely from antiairc raft and 

arti ll ery un its. Trucks mostly forwa rded suppli es within the army area , but they 

occasionally went farther, as on 21 Septembe r when the G- 4 secti on arranged 

for each corps to release two truck companies to return to the beachcs for 105-

mm. ammunition. loI The First Army also did well at less legitimate means of 

obtaining suppli es, indeed becoming so adept at hoarding that Patton, seei ng 

Wilson and Mcdaris, warned his chief of sta ff, " Look out for that pair. I know 

them both. They once worked for me."H 

Along with other problems, the First Army logistic ians had to worry about 

wi nterization. During October the engi neer section completed its plans for winter shelter, providing for maximum use of billeting and construction of frame 

buildings for kitchens and mess halls. Although the forests of the region provided an ample supply of lumber, the First Army had to turn to local sawmills, in 

addition to its own, to provide the over nineteen million board feet that it required.,J(, McNamara's quartermasters, meanwhile, could not begin to meet the 

demand for an tifreeze, which ranked [ow on the Allied list of supply priorities. 

Wintcr clothing, with its Illultiple sizes and complicated handling procedures, 

also presented a specia l chall enge. COMZ had canceled McNamara's initial requisitions in August due to the higher priority of other items. Using the fifteenday estimates, in early September Littlejohn arranged fo r shipments of winter 

clothing, but he tHld McNamara had to improvise transportation 10 de liver these 

items to the First Army. Amphibious vehicles en route to the front took along 

woolen overcoats and underwear, and some items came by air. By early October 

the First Army had obtained much of its win ter clothing but sti[llacked sleeping 

bags, popular sizes of field jackets and wool sweaters, and arctic overshoes. '7 

Lack of overshoes and shoepacs, th e new lined winter boot, contributed 

to the trenc h foot crisis that strllck First Army units in the autumn of 1944. 

This cold-weather injury, whi ch cost some th ei r feet and kept most of its 

vict ims from ever retur ning to combat, had plagued the Fifth Army in Italy 

th e previous winte r, but, despite admonitions from th e War Department, few 

in ETOUSA grasped its se riousness or th e need to take early preventive steps. 

Incredibly, after consultin g with Thorson in the spring, McNamara had noti-
168 A COII/malld Posl (If War 

fied the ETOUSA quart ermaste r o ffi ce that the Fi rst Army did not expect to 

opera te in a "cold cl imate zone" whe re it woul d require spec ial wi nter clot hing, although he did as k ETOUSA to have overshoes rcady in case the need 

arose. McNa mara lat er admitt ed that his sec tion. busy with th e myri ad othe r 

details involved in NEf'TUNI:, neve r a rra nged to alt er peaceti me equ ipment 

tables, wh ich aut horized overshoes onl y for work pa rti cs. Apparently, the First 

Army headquarters also associated trenc h foot wi th snow, rather than longterm immersion in cold, we i cond itions. Whateve r the explana tion, the need 

for wi nt er foolgc ar did not become ap parent until the First Army's initia l 

winte ri zation program was we ll und er way, leavi ng many soldie rs withollt 

adequate protection for colder conditions. Si nce th e poor quality of the Army's 

winte r foo tgear o ft en contri buted to disease and inju ry, greater forcsight on 

the part o f McNama ra might not have made a di ffe rence, but the First Army 

headq ua rte rs as well as olher eche lons could have shown much mo re awareness of Ihe problcm. 18 

In Octobe r, as the weather cooled for thousands of Gis immobili zed in damp 

foxholcs and unabl e to rot ate out of the line du e to lack of rese rves, cases of 

trench fOOl bcgan to appear, and they ra pidly multipli ed in November. Medi cs 

evacuated the wo rst cases to ge neral hospitals and sent others to a gas treatment batta lion, which experimented with ways to control the inj ury. As cases 

mult iplied, the Fi rst Army headquarters issued warnings, stressing such preventive measures as rotation of troops in line, dry socks, and overshoes. Seve ral Army Air Forces un its in Britain scnt th eir overshoes to th e Fi rst Army, and 

quart ermaste rs at cvery echelon improvised substitutes. Preventi ve measurcs 

evcntually reduced the rate, but trench foot had al read y scve rely Cllt the strength 

of many li ne units.J9 

The October supply crisis, which contri buted to the tre nch foot problem, also 

caused the First Army headqua rters to expand its use o f capt ured supplies and 

equi pmen t. Unti l COBRA, the First Army had captured only a negligi ble amou nt 

of materiel. During the pursuit across France, however, the number of depots and 

warehouses that fell into its hands overwhelmcd its sa lvage units, whi ch received 

lilli e guidance from ETOUSA on handling these stocks. On 8 Septcmber the 

12th Army Group headquarters authori zed the Fi rst Army to lise captured up ~ 

plies in its area, and enemy ra ti ons hel pcd the First Army overcome its shortage 

of food in September. To organize the wea lth of enemy stores that had fal len into 

its hands, on I Oc tober the First Army qua rtermaster section fo rmed a spec ial 

subsection in its supply div ision, a step th at the other techn ical secti ons soon 

copied. Under army procedure, corps and di visions would collect and guard ca ptured materiel in dumps in their areas and report the loca tion thro ugh technical 

chan nels to the First Army staff. In the case of the qua rtermaster section, sa lvage 

compa nies sent teams to evaluatc and inve ntory these stocks, which the subsecli on thcn distributed 10 other subsections that could use them. Any un used items 

went to COMZ or to civil ians th rough the G- S section. By December the First 

Army was using enemy artill ery, ammun ition, and cven a few tan ks in action 

with good res ults. Such equ ipment, however, represented too great a maint enance problem fo r widesp read, sustai ncd use. 40 
Fruslmrioll (II Ihe We~ 1 l-1'all 169 

As part of its program of improvised supply, the First Army capitali zed on 

its proximity to one of Europe's major ind ustria l areas. Local procurement normally came under Gunn's G- S section, but it also involvcd the technical services, espec ially ordnance. While trying to find an automotive dump in Paris, 

Lynde and Col. Floyd Hanse n, Medaris' executive officer, visited the GnomeRhone factory, which had built aircraft engines for the Germans. Reasoning 

that th e plant could do just as fine ajob of produci ng ta nk engines for the First 

Army, Lynde and Hansen contracted with Gnome-Rhone to overhaul 200 tank 

engi nes at $SOO per engine. The financi ng of the deal caused some disputes 

between Lynde and the G- S section, but it paid off lUlndsome ly for the Fi rst 

Army, which rece ived its first order with in two weeks. Encouraged, Medaris 

formed a much larger procurement network in Belgium, negotiating a contract 

for small arms with Fabrique Nationalc des Armes de Guerre and arranging for 

Englebert and Company to repair and manufacture tires. Local sources also 

produced such badly needed items as ba tteries, wire, shells, automotive parts, 

and snow capes. In their efforts to meet First Army orders, firms were o ft en 

plagued by poli ti cal instabi lity and lack of raw mat erials, shortages of electrical power, and the wa nt of sk ill ed labor. Still, by November the program was 

providing valuable items wh il e also helping the G- S section revive industries 

damaged by the war. 41 

Loca l procurement often expedited research and development by the First 

Army ordnance section. When troops compla ined about the accuracy of their 

60-rnm. and 81-ml11 . mortars, a lieutenant on detail from COMZ investigated 

the problem, developed new prototypes, and tested them in the field, where 

they received a positive response. Lynde then contracted with Belgian mortar 

manufacturers in Li ege and Charlero i to rehabilitate the First Army's mortars, 

a project they complcted by December. Meanwhile, First Army ordnance teams, 

exami ning Ge rman ISS-111I11. guns on thc Maginot Line, found that syntheti c 

rubber pads on the guns lasted much longer than asbestos pads on correspondin g American mode ls. The manager o f Englebert and Company be li eved that 

he could dup licate the composi ti on, and Lynde made arrangements fo r the firm 

10 produce the pads.42 The ordnance section also replaced 7S-mm. gu ns on M4 

Shennan tanks wit h 76-mm. tubes and experimented with rockets as an inexpensive, easily manufactured alt ernative to the ammunition-poor artillery. With 

the approva l of Thorson and Hart, army ordna nce personnel equipped a 10Smm. howitzer battalion with 4.S-i neh rocket launchers, but the projec t received 

less than rave reviews. Artill erymen crit icized the weapon's inaccuracy and 

vulnerability to eountcrbattery fire, and adjacent units complained when the 

unit drew enemy she ll ing on their positions. The First Army also eq uipped several artillery units with the new proximity fuze, although it delayed the new 

weapon's employment due to securit y cOllstraints. 4J 

For all the First Army headquarters' efforts to improvise, lack of resources 

emasculated its October offensive. Focllsed on the main drive, the First Army 

and XIX Corps headquarters had grea tly underestimated the opposition that 

they would encountcr in the Pee l Marshes. As of 6 October the 7th Armored 

Division was still bogged down in the region. To the south, the rest of the XIX 
170 A COII/fllalld Post at War 

Corps was maki ng slow, ifslcady, headway in its allack on the Wesl Wall north 

of Aachen. The First Army's inabilit y to clea r its flank , as we ll as a nega ti ve 

reporl from Dempsey, the commander of the British Second Anny, on the First 

Army 's supp ly of ammunition, infl uenced Montgome ry's decision on 7 October to postpone the 2 1 Army Grou p's Ruhr drive to conce ntrate on clearing the 

approaches to An twc rp .44 

AI Eisenhower's direction, Bradley orde red the First Army to turn over the 

Meuse sa lie nt, along wit h the 7th Armored Di vision and Ihe Be lgian 151 Brigade, to the Second Army, and he assigned I-lodges a morc limited mission to 

ex ploit his penetration o f the West Wa ll and take Aachen as a foothold for a 

furthe r ce ~5 I-lodges, not wan tin g to divert scarce units to surround a 

bypassed Aachen, had already ordered the capture of the c it y over th e protests 

of Corl ett and Coll ins, who wished to avo id prolonged street figh ting and push 

on to the Roer River. Perhaps his caution was abetted by Dickson 's estimate 

tha t, "although four of the pz or pz Gr Divs of first qua lit y have appea red on 

our front, it is be li eved he has ava ilable at least five more," including the 9,h, 

9,11 SS, 101h SS, 2d SS, a nd J 2111 SS Panzer Divisiolls.46 These units act uall y 

were not in the Aachen area at the time , although the 9,h and 10,h SS Panzer 

Divisiolls appeared later in the month on the 2 1 Army Group's fro nt. Whil e the 

G- 2 watched for a counte rattac k, the XIX and VII Corps, agai nst stitT resista nce, closed the ring around the doomed ci ty in two weeks of fierce fi ghti ng. 

In the Hiirtgen, the 9th Infantry Di vision wa s maki ng slow progress in its attempts to clear the forest and protect the VII Corps' so uth ern flank , whil e, to 

the south, the Third Army, low on artill ery ammunition, had bro ken otT its 

advance north and west of Metz.·' 

The slow pace of the XIX Corps' advance did not help the pe rennially cool 

re latio ns betwee n its headquarte rs and th e First Army commander and staff. 

After al most da ily visits 10 corps and di vision command posts ea rly in the offensive, Hodges spent most of his time at his chatea u near Verviers. 48 The re, in 

mid-October hc rcached a final impasse with Corlett. By his own admission, 

the XIX Corps commander, who had bee n battli ng an infection si nce July, was 

tired and irritable. He had never had th e rapport with Hodges that he had ell* 

joyed with Bradley, and his awareness of playin g second riddle to Colli ns was 

onl y exacerbated by Hodges' shift of the ma in e ffort for the Rhin e drive from 

the XIX to the VII Corps once the First Army reached the Roer, as we ll as the 

continuing priority or the VII Corps over the XIX Corps in the a ll oca tion of 

artil le ry ammun ition. When Hodges, in Bradl ey's presence, dressed down Corl ett 

for exceeding his quota of a rtill ery ammun ition for the preassault bombardment on 2 October, Corlett unwisely replied in kin d. Re lations bctween the two 

only grcw worse ovcr the next two weeks, as the First Army headqua rters pressed 

the XIX Corps to accelerate its advance. Alone poi nt, Corl ett offered to ta ke 

Kea n and Thorso n to the front and show them the situation. Corl ett 's staff like* 

wise regarded the First Army headquarte rs us overbearing, whil e th e First Army 

commande r and sta ff saw Corlett as a tired old man, overanxiOliS about his 

nank and a lways ca lling for more troops and ammunition when none were avai lablc.~9 On 18 October, th ree days before Aachen fell, Bradley, at Hodges' insti-
Fmsfmfiu!I (jf fhe Wesf Wall 171 

gation, relieved CorletL While ill health was the reported reason, Hodges clearly 

was ha ppy to see Coriell depa t. ~ 

Withi n days ofCorl eu 's re li ef and replacement by Maj. Gcn. Raymond S. 

Mc La in, the 12th Army Grou p headqu<l rle rs tra nsferred the XIX Corps from 

the First Army to the Ni nth Army. Almost as soon as the Ni nt h Army had taken 

ove r the Ardenn es front in ea rl y October, Bradley had decided to sh ift it north 

to a sec tor between the First Army and 2 1 Army Gro llp. He late r stated tha t he 

wa nt ed to preve nt his most ex perienced and temperamental army staff from 

falli ng unde r British control in the eve nt Montgomery pers uaded SHAEF to 

give the 2 1 Army Group an America n army. While the move made sense poli tica lly, it lim ited the Fi rst Army's opl ions by, in effect, shifti ng its fronl to the 

rllgged te rra in 10 the sout h. To avoid a complex physica llransfer of troops and 

supplies, Bradley di rected the IWO army headquarte rs simply to exchange corps, 

wit h the First Army rece ivi ng the VIII Corps and the Ni nth Army obtaining th e 

XIX Corps.sl 

Given th e gene ra l shortage of suppl ies, the transfer took some negoti at ion 

betwee n th e two a rmi es. Aft er a co nfe rence of G- 3s and G-4s fro m the two 

anui es and two co rps on 10 Octobe r, the Ninth Army traded the VIII Corps, its 

supporting se rvice units, and any th ing left in the dumps supplying its units fo r 

the XIX Corps, the service un its supporting it, and credits for the su ppl ies thai 

it had given to the First Army. Al thollgh the pape r transfe r took place on 22 

Octobe r, the actua l sh ift took some time , during which the First Army continued to supp ly the XIX Co rps un til COMZ built lip enough supp lies in the Ninth 

Army's depots. At one poi nt, a dispute arose when the First Army headq uarters 

ordered the X I X Corps to transfer to the VIII Corps 1110st of the equipment lhat 

the First Army had obtai ned prior to the invasion for speci,,1 projects, such as 

construction, ove r and above 111<11 authorized by tables. In the end, the 12th 

Army Grou p headqua rters arranged for the tra nsferred divisions to keep thei r 

equipme nt while the Ninth Army compensated the First Army, but the case did 

littl e to diminish the First Army's reputation for pira cy.52 

The exchange of corps also contributed to the decision to relocate the First 

Army headquarters. l'lodges' stafThad long si nce earned a reputation for choosing the most uncomfortabl e sites for its command posts, and Verviers, with its 

drab chateau, officers mess in a sta bl e, tents in lTluddy fie lds. and dirl roads 

had done litt le to dispe l the image. As the days grew shorl er and the rains 

colder, the stafT chi efs had urged I-lodges and Kean to move th e command post, 

but they refused to make any move that might impl y that the Fi rst Army headquarte rs had given up its hopes for a breakout and gone into winte r quart ers. 

Fina lly. with the close of the October ofTensive and the Ninth Army's shift to 

the north, they re lented. On 25 October the First Army headquarters began its 

move to Spa, an old resort ci ty, about seventeen miles southeast of Li ege in the 

hilly southeastern corner of Bclgium ncar the Ardennes. In addition to a more 

centra l location behind the front, Spa offered the most elegant quarters yet 

occupied by the staff. Hodges, Kean, Quesada, and the general staff install ed 

their offices in the sta te ly Hotel Britannique, with I-lodges laking a room once 

occupied by Field Mars hal Paul von I-lindenburg in World War I. Meanwhile, 
172 A Comlllalld POS! (t/ Wi.,,· 

View of Spa, Belgil/Ill. December 1918 

the special staff found quarters in other hotels, casinos, and nigh tc lubs around 

the lawn. At Spa 100, the entire headquarters, except for th e rear echelon, reassembled fo r the first time since early AugustY 

With the move to Spa, located in the midd le of th e Belgian communications 

network, the First Army headquarters would benefit from improved commu nications, which, unfortu nate ly, also brought with them Ihe illusion of complete control. The pursuit now over, Williams' signalmen could rely less on radio and more 

on wire, whi le also making extensive use of Be lgian commercia l facilities. Arter 

the First Army moved its command post to Spa, signal construction companies 

rehabilitated the communications network, incl uding an exchange that the Germans had demolished. Next to this exchange, the First Army headquarters install ed 

its switchboard. Wire links, including a direct line from Quesada to the IX Tactica l 

Air Command 's command post at Verviers, radiated out to lower-level headquarters and adjacent eche lons. They also connected into the Continenta l Wire System, 

the uniri ed main-line wire system that Williams, in conjunction with representati ves from the 12th Army Group headquarters, COMZ, and the other army sta ff.<;, 

had helped design. The First Army signal crews also installed several radio nets, 

llsing relay stations to bypass terrain features obstructing transmission and reception. As the First Army drove into Germany, army signal battalions, rebuilding 

communi cations systems in Aachen and the surrounding area , took precautions 

against sabot age and the usc of commercial cables by agents behind Allied lines. 

By the start of the Battle of the Bulge in December, the First Army headqwJrters al 

Spa stood at the center of a major communications network .54 
Frustration (If the West Wall 173 

/-Iofel Bri/(IIlI1ique, Firs/ Arm)' COII/Il/{l/U/ pas/ ill Spa (December 1918 view) 

With in Spa, perhaps the livel iest places in town were the fOllr hotels used 

by the journa lists and the First Army's press re lations personnel. In general, 

media re lations were as warm under I-lodges as they had been unde r Bradley. 

despite the occasiona l disputes over censorsh ip policy and Hodges' lack of the 

common touch that Bradley brought 10 press conferences. Such reporters as 

Hanson Baldwi n, !-Ial Denny, Drew Middleton, and Jack Thompson had become fixtures arou nd the headquarters, and they gene rally gave the First Army 

favorab le coverage.ss Although I-lodges did not go OUI of his way to court the 

press, neithe r did he shun them. He held sporadic press con ferences :1Il(~ for a 

time during the ea rly autumn, hosted at dinner numerous correspondents, many 

sent by SHAEF to divert to !-lodges some of the publicity lavished on his namboyanl cohort at the Third Army. 56 During the pursu it, the press camp had used 

ca ptured vehiel es and lia ison pl<l nes provided by other sections to mee t the 

need of reporte rs for tra nsportat ion and communication, but now it could rcturn to a more orderly routi ne in Spa. There, First Army staff personne l briefed 

the press every morning at 0900, allowed them fairly free re in to travel along 

the fron t during the day, and the n briefed them agai n at 1700. By October the 

section had a lso corrected most of the communications difTiculties that had 

plagued it in Norma ndy, arranging for each page of copy 10 be c<lrried by a 

courier to a censor for c learance and then to the press wi reless for dispatch. S1 

In the competition fo r resources within the pu blicity <lnd psychological warfare section, the psychological warriors came olTsecond best. By Octobe r ma ny 

ofthcir fUllc tions had been assumcd by the ir counterparts at thc 12th Army Group 
174 A Commolld Posl lIf War 

headquarters and I-l AEI-'~ leaving the First Army wilh the tasks of tacti cal propa· 

gallda and "consolidation" propaganda in Ihe liberated and occupied areas within 

the army rear area. In the case o f consol idation propaganda , the section assisted 

the 0 - 5 starr with public address equipment, ncwsp'lpers, and other means of 

disseminati ng infonnation among civil ians. In the case ofillctic<l] propaganda, il 

<I .. ra nged for loudspea ker broadcasts and distribu tion of lea fl ets to weaken 1110· 

!'ale and induce surrenders among front line enemy troops. Responding to requests 

from div ision 0 - 2 sections through section liaison officers, section pe rsonne l 

prepa red leaflets and coord inated with the artill ery section to fire them into encmy lines by she ll, thc norma l mode of delivery. As was so often the case with a 

program dealing with intangibles, it proved diffi cult to determi ne the effectiveness of psychological warfare, although the First Army propagandists could cite 

some suggestive cases, such as the impact of c ivilia n panic on the defense of 

Aachen when leaflets threatened the city's destruction.58 

While weari ng down the esp rit of enemy sold iers, th e First Army also had 

to mai ntain the spirits of its own. Even though moral e clearly caused conce rn 

in the A Ilied high command that autumn, the First Army headqua rters was slow 

to res pond wi th a program. One of the rea so ns lay in the ongoing changes in 

orga ni zation for moral e support in Army staffs afi er a War Department directive in late August to remove information and educa tion, which wenl to the 

G- 3 section, from the list of specia l service functions. Partly in response to 

thai orde r, at the end of September the First Army spec ial se rvice section reorganized into fOllr subsecti ons: one for ente rtainment, another for rest areas, a 

th ird for suppl y, and a fourth for leaves, furloughs, and passes. Supply problems also contributed to the delay in estab lis hing a comprehensive morale program. Given its low priority for COMZ transport and the problem o f theft en 

route, May's spec ial servi ce section almost invariably had to bri ng forward its 

own suppli es using army transporta tion thm the G-4 secti on was wi lling to 

<11101 for the purpose. 59 Fllrthermore, it appears that some First Army sla ff o fficers, 1110st notably Kean, shared the old Army view that moral e was a function of leaders hip, training, and disciplinc; that specia l activities were superfluous; and that spec ial suppli es we re an unneeded luxury. The apa thy in the 

First Army headquarters toward spec ial services in the early autumn of 1944 

probably also reflected a li ngeri ng hope tha t a breakout was imminent as we ll 

as the wish of sec urity-mi nded counte rinte ll ige nce office rs to segregate the 

troops from eivil ia ns.1tO 

With colder weather and" more stabl e fronl, however, Ihe First Army headqU<lr\ers look several steps to improve moral e. Unde r May's specia l service 

sect ion, a spec ial servicc company with eac h eorps and a separate company for 

army un ils provided concerts, li ve shows, and mov ies. The last proved espec iall y popu lar despite the poor en tertai nmen t value of most available fi lms and 

the shortage of projectors and spare parts. In mid-October the First Army headquarters re laxed its off-limits policy on towns to open three corps rest ce nte rs 

and. later, separate army ce nte rs. At Verviers, Eupen, and Arlon, sixty-five miles 

soulh of Liege, corps and division pe rsonne l on 48- or 72-hour passes from the 

combat zone could enj oy ba rs. dances, recreational halls, exc hanges, swim-
Frustratioll (It the West Wall 175 

ming pools, showers, movies, and live shows. The latter included USO shows, 

feClturing such luminari es as Dinah Shore , Fred Astaire, lind Marlene Dietrich, 

allhough some soldi ers complained that the Slars did not stay long enough to 

justify their advance pUblicity.M lnlhei r efforts, First Army spec ial se rvi ce units 

received Cl big Clssist from theA merican Red Cross. Under a new scction within 

the First Army headquarters, the Red Cross opened "donut dugouts" in corps 

rest arcas, sponsored Christmas programs, distributcd gum, cigarettes, stationery, and other desirabl e itcms, and di vided its clubmobil c groups inlo sections 

of four trucks eac h for greater covcmge of the frotH Y 

Nor did the First Army headquarters neglect other means of maintaining 

morale. On 22 Octobe r the First Army heCldquart ers Cluthori zed 48-hour passes 

to Paris for pe rsonnel from combat divisions, and in December it instituted a 

program of furloughs to the United States. Prioriti es for the latter favored those 

with the most wound s or decorations rather than the most time overseas. First 

Army un its a lso made li beral use of awards and decorations; indeed, in November the 12t h Army Groll p headquarters restricted thc numbcr of combat awards 

that the First Army and its subordinClte units could distribute in a given week. 

In practice, however, the First Army was often able to exceed the quotas. The 

First Army G- l sec ti on would later argue in favor of percentages as a guide to 

awards, rather than mandatory limits.63 

Training was a lso critical to the mai ntenance of morale. Although the shortage of div isions precluded lengthy breaks from the front fo r reo rga ni zing and 

retraining most combat units, the G-3 training subsection supervised and coordinated such training and retraini ng programs as existcd. The subsection pre~ 

pared tra ining mcmorandums, inspected un it training programs, supervised army 

schools, allocated spClees in those schools, and a llott ed training facilities and 

ammunition in conformity with policy set by Hodges and higher headquarters. 

The special st aff sections likewise su pervised training in their specialties. The 

armored section, for exampl e, published combat experiences, collected tra ining films, and improvised ranges ncar Spa where new tank units cou ld test-fire 

their wea pons be fore they went into combat. Hav ing initiated training for the 

proposed crossing of the Rh inc Rive r, the e ngineer secti on delegated act ua l 

supervision of the tra ining to its groups but conducted frequent inspect ions 

and coordinated demonstrations by units. 6-I 

While the specia l service and G- 3 secti ons attempted to maintain morale 

and training levels, the provost marshal section, in cooperation with the judge 

advocate genera l and inspector general sections, worked to maintain disci pline 

withi n the First Army. During the pursuit across France, the numbe r of cases 

involving insubordinat ion and sexua l offenses had dropped, Cllld by early September cases o f se lf-inflicted wounds had declincd so I'm· that Col. Rosser L. 

Hunter, the First Army inspector gcne ra l, recommended they be turned over to 

the corps and division heCldq uarte rs for hand li ng. On the other hand, Wright 's 

provost marsh al sect ion noted a sha rp rise in Ihe number of absences without 

o fficiClI leave (AWOLs) and smaller increases in larceny and pillaging. The 

First Army headquarte rs was also concerned about the amount of black 

marketee ri ng in i IS rear areas. Al t hOllgh t he headquarters issued st i ff direct ivcs 
176 A COII/II/al/d Posl ((I Wa/' 

against the practice, the provost marshal noted that the mosl efTective deterrent 

was probably civi lian awareness thai they wOli ld be prosecuted for possession 

of Army property.M 

Of even more concern than the blClCk market was the rise in AWOLs, many 

of whom took vehicles al a time when the sho rtage of transportation was a 

major problem. The First Army headquarters allowed the corps and divisions to 

adopt their own policies, but, in a 6 October order to separate army units, il la id 

Ollt severe count ermeasures, including the provisio n that il would charge those 

absent over th irty days with desertion. The First Army headquarters divided the 

army rear area between two military police battalions, each of whom would 

opera te straggler posts and se nd patrols through its area. To rei ieve subo rdinate 

units of responsibility for pick ing up apprehended stragglers, the two battalions, starting in Septembe r, returned them through prisoner channels to their 

outfits in the case of army un its, or to corps coll ecting points if the offender's 

un it was assigned or attached to a corps.66 

Under the First Army command systcm, the provost marshal had the responsibility for rear area security. a source of inc rcasing conce rn to the First 

Army headquarters in genera l and the G- 2 section in particular. As the First 

Army ent ered Germany, the G- 2 sec tion was greatly concerned about the threat 

of guerrilla wa rfare and espio nage by fanati ca l Nazis. In li ne with SHAEF 

directives, Hodges adopted a tough policy against fratern ization- a policy that 

proved difficult to enforce- and authorized "the most stringent measures" 

against guerriliasY To gather intelligence 011 German organi zations, the G- 2 

section formed a special " 0 " su bsection. At the same time, the counterintelligence subsecti on, in cooperation with the provost marshal and inspector genera l sect ions, supervised the First Army interrogatio n center, next to thc army 

prisoner e nclosure. There, military intell igence teams and personne l from the 

other two sections questioned suspicious civilians and possible war cri minals. 

After a 12t h Army Grollp directive in late August formed a st anding cOllrt of 

inqu iry for vi olations of the Geneva Convent ion and laws of war, Hunter, having consulted with thc G- [ and G- 2, obta ined Kean's approval in [·Iodges' name 

of a sta ndard operating procedure for handling Stic h cases.6S 

In November the First Army headqua rtcrs a lso adopted a system to defend 

key rear area installat ions and communications against small-scale attacks, 

guerrill a operations, and sabotage and to hold back large-sca le attacks until 

combat troops could be moved to the threa tened localities. Th is plan divided 

the zo ne between the army and co rps rear boundaries into areas, each under a 

commande r who, advised by a company grade officer with combat experience, 

would prepare plans and otherwise take responsibi lity for the defen se of his 

area. Each of these commanders rcpo rted directly to the provost marshal , who 

served as army sec urity cOlllmander with responsibility for coordi natin g and 

oversecing the defense of the who le. Because the provost marsha l lacked the 

organization to ca rry out this mission in addition to his other duties, coordina -

tion of defense arrangements would actually be handled by the commander of 

the 23d Tank Destroyer Group, an army unit that possessed the necessary staff 

and communi cations. Under the provost marsha l as security com mander, the 
FI'USf/"{lIiOIl altlie Wesl Wall 177 

First Army G- 2 (A ;1) subsection plots reports oj aerial ecol/I/(fi~'s(lIIce. 

23d Tank Destroyer Group headquarters became the Security Command Headquarte rs, First U.S. Artny.M 

The First Army headquarte rs also needed to take in to account the threats 10 

its rear areas from unconventiona l German wea pons. Of these, th e threat from 

chemical weapons d id not overly concern the chem ical warfare section. During 

the pursuit, intelligcnee teams that eva luat ed captured German stocks did not 

find the stores o f chemical munitions that they had expected, and G- 2 reports 

indicated that the Germans we re not equipp ing new units with gas masks or 

instructing them in preventive measllrcs.

70 

On the other hand, the threat to the First Army rear from V-weapons had 

suddenly become real. Through October and November, V-I s, or "buzz bombs," 

and V- 2s rained on All ied rea r areas, mostly 011 Antwerp, but also on Liege , 

Eupen, and Ve rvicrs, damaging railroads and other facilities. 71 In response, 

Patterson's antia ircraft section formed a special subsection for V-weapons and 

deployed detection devices to track missiles and collect data on their operation. At the same time, Meda ris assigned an ordnance officer to gather information from trajecto ries, night paths, and wreckage at the impact sites. Intelligence from these two sources, as well as from prisoner interrogation and from 

aerial reconnaissance reports by the IX Tact ical Air Command, went to th e 

G- 2 sect ion, where Capt. Roger Ray soon assembled a fairly complete picturc 

of V-weapon deployment, capabilities, and supportin g logistics. Using this intelligence, Patterson stationcd a belt of 90-mm. gun and automati c weapon 

battalions about fi ftecn miles southeast of Spa ncar Camp Elscnborn to shoot 
178 II Commalld POSf al 1I'flr 

down the V- Is as Ih ey new overhead, and he a lso morc c lose ly int egrated his 

air warning system with th e IX Ta ctical Air C0111mand 's organi zation. Under 

th e new arrangeme nt , the 1491h Antiaircraft Ope rati ons Detac hment reported 

directly to Patterson rathe r than the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade, the headqua rt ers 

to whi ch Patte rson allached 111os1 antiaircraft units assigned to th e First Army. 

From 24 November to th e end of February 1945, 70 of th e 350 V- I s enterin g 

th e First Army's a ir space we re destroyed by an tiaircraft ballc ri es. Whil e th e v -

weapons explodin g in the vic init y occasionall y ca used staff personne l 10 di ve 

for cover, Ihey never had a signifi cant impact on opc ralion s.

n 

The rain orY-weapon s on populations in rear areas made the ta sk of the civil 

affairs section more difficult. In September, for the first time, the First Army 

stood on German soil , exercising military governme nt over occ upi ed territory. 

Unfortuna tely, Allied leaders once aga in had not given timely guidance, except 

for Some genera l st atements on the need fo r a stern approach, eliminating Nazism and limiting rel ief to those measures that wo uld preve nt disease and chaos. 

At the time , the First Army headquarters still had not received the SHAEF handbook or the 12th Army GrollI' directive for mi litary governmen t in occupied 

Germany. Furthermore, the G- 5 section was dissatisfied with the quality of its 

mi litary government detachments and assembled those not already in the field at 

its military government center in Verv iers for a training program. [n dealing with 

these detachmen ts, Gunn jealously guarded his authority, ordering them to rou te 

all communi cations outside the center through his G- 5 section, even though the 

detllchments came under ETOUSA's European Civil A ffa irs Division for administration. Fortunately, the First Army st aff had done some plan ning for the OCCLlpation as part of R ANKIN and R ANKIN'S later version, T ALISt-.'IAN. 7J As the First Army 

drove into Germany, military governmen t detachments posted proclamations; 

appoin ted officia ls; gath ered weapons, explosives, and rad ios from the populace; and restricted the movements of the population. After a ll the concern , the 

inhabitants proved genera lly docile toward the invaders. It helped that the First 

Army occupied only a small slice of Germa ny and could foclls its efforts on 

Be lgi um, the Netherla nd s, and Luxembourg.N 

In the Low Coun tries, whose ex iled govern ments had reached preliminary 

ag reements with the Allies, the First Army had an easier task than in Germany, 

but c ivil affairs in these countri es could hardly be described as s111ooth . [n itia lly, 

liaison with thc Belgian government and military missioll in Brussels was lacking, and even after it was instituted, the First Army headquarters complai ned that 

the Belgian governmen t too often acted slowly in response to the First Army's 

needs. Among other problems, the First Army headquarters faccd the complicated task of collect ing old Be lgian and Luxembourg notes and substituting new 

cu rrency, a task supervised by the finance section . It also confrollted the ticklish 

job of disarmi ng factions of the Belgian Resistance, a situation it resolved by 

taking the stern line of arming the police and warning faction leaders that it 

would not tolerate unrest in its rear areas. Meanwhile , civil affairs olTicers used 

ca ptured rations to meet food shortages, helped the Red Cross combat outbreaks 

of typhoid and diphtheria, made arrangements to guard art treasures, and established camps to house the large numbers ofrcfugees. 15 
FI'I /S(I'(lfiOIl at lite Uhl ,"Va/l 179 

While the First Army G- 5 sect ion struggled Ihrough October and early 

November to bring order 10 rear areas, the supply crisis was finall y starting to 

e(lse. (Table 3) Between I October and mid-November, Class I reserves, including rations, had increascd from 1.4 to 13.4 days, and McNamara 's quartermasters cou ld even serve Thanksgiving dinn er to the troops. Class III stocks, 

including gasoline, had increased from .8 days on I October to 8.8 days by 20 

October. The First Army still needed ammunition, but COMZ, by rushing forward ammunition stocks to ADSEC and the arlllY depots without segregating 

them by type, had accumulated enough in forward areas for a rea so nabl e expenditure in the nex t offensive. During October the First Army increased stocks 

of ammunition in its depots from 20,094 tons to 32,443 tons.76 Despi te th e 

good news, conside rable tension remained between the First Army headquarters and COMZ. J usti nably skeptical ofCOMZ's abi lity 10 deliver on its prolllises and dete rmined to build up their stocks against any renewed supply c risis, 

the First Army logisticians naturally cont inued to requisition more than they 

needed. The practi ce infuriated COMZ, which wanted to develop its own int ermediate and rear depots. For all the efforts ofCOMZ, ADSEC, and the arm ies, 

the supply situation would be a co ncern until February 1945.77 

Although far from ideal , the supp ly situation had improved to the point that 

the First Army headquarters could se riously co nsider a major November offensive. As October came to a close, Dickson's G- 2 section prepared the necessary esti mates and terrain anal yses for a drive to th e Rhine . Poo r weather and 

fewer daylight hours, however, reduced acrial reconnaissance, causing the G- 2 

planners problems in acqui ring data. German radio silence, cutting off the ma in 

source of U LTRA, also affected information gathering. 7g The data that the G- 2 

section did possess showed Ihe enemy's astonishing powers o f rec uperation 

sin ce September. The Germans had taken advantage of the Allies' supp ly crisis 

10 construct new field wo rks, to bring new infantry divisions into the line, and 

to withdraw panzer di visions to rest and refi t with the fruits of Germany's cxpanded tank production. When the next Allied o ffensive began, it woul d 

encounter a much stronger defensive line, as Dickson nOled. 79 By the end of 

October he had backed off his estimate of nine panze r divisions available for 

commitmcnt on the First Army front , but he still foresaw a stron g possibility of 

a spoiling attack toward the Maas River by at least four panze r divisions. His 

conce rn was not sha red by the VII Corps' G- 2 section, wh ich estimated that it 

enjoyed a five-to-one edge over the Germans in its sector.so 

Du ring October the First Army headqua rters was also fina ll y becoming aware 

of the danger Ihat the RoeI' dams posed to the Allied advance. The 9th Infantry 

Division's G-2 had first warned of the threat on 2 October, but Di ckson was 

initial ly inclined to minimize it. He estimated that opening the dams would, at 

most, cause on ly five 10 six days of local floods, alt hou gh Carter, whose engineer 

section was conducting its own studies, believed that the flooding could be morc 

widespread.s, [n latc October, after SHAEF and Ihe corps engineers expressed 

their concern, Dickson and Carter took another look, consulting a civi lian hydrographic e ngi neer from Aachen, arranging for aerial reco nnaissa nce of the dams, 

and otherwise making th e area a priority for intell igence collection by th eir two 
T ABLE 3- F mST ARMY SUPPLY AN D CONSUMPTION LEVELS 

2 0 O CTOIJER- 19 NOV EMBER 1944 

Rmiolls Gas 1IIII/JlllililiOn Roliolls Gas ROlilld.\" 

Dm(' 01/ H(Jlld ol/Hol/d 011 !l(Jlld COJl~ IJJlled COIISllllled COIISllllled~ 

(da)'s oj.I·II(Jply)" (gals.) (lOllS) (110.) (gals.) (I/o.) 

200cI 5. 1 4.835.000 24.284 441 ,276 2 18.525 

2 10cI 5.5 4,785,325 24 .459 390,94 5 327.540 

220cI 6.3 4,665,055 25,050 397,404 338,590 

23 0cI 7.3 4,582,800 25,254 414,006 348,765 

240cI 9.5 4,232 ,038 27,678 37 1.956 389,640 

25 0 cI 0.2 3,926.320 29,83 1 334, 166 373.220 

26 0 cI L2 3,757,980 3 1, I 13 390, 11 8 332,465 

27 0cI 1.0 3,779,595 32,575 385,238 369.190 

28 0cI 14 3,836,660 33,865 385,009 334,625 212,162' 

29 0cI 1.7 33,3 05 367.650 305.840 

30 0cI 1.8 3,734,740 32,443 379,833 290.835 

3 1 Oct 2.0 3,545.460 3 1,698 364,072 347. 165 

1 Nov 2.9 3,672,785 3 1,698 389,864 300,975 

2 Nov 3.3 3,827.458 3 1,698 375,609 26 1,630 

3 Nov 3.8 3,789,720 30,420 372,225 297. 175 

4 Nov 4. 1 3.692,806 28,347 37 1.602 355,980 

5 Nov 44 3,709,095 28, 114 375,478 292 .675 

6 Nov 4.3 3,735,225 28, 1]6 ]89,476 273,820 

7 Nov 14.1 3,639,900 27,996 402.375 287,985 

8 Nov 1].8 ],542, 160 27,689 388, 147 290,885 

9 Nov 1].8 3,412,125 27.501 489,393 289 .500 

)0 Nov 13.4 3.483,940 27.5 15 435,3 11 275,915 

) I Nov 13.3 3,233,465 26.5 12 428.970 311,675 235,7 10" 

12 Nov. 13.7 2,968, 190 25,925 4]7,882 328,660 

13 Nov 13.5 2,78 1, 11 5 25,827 414,770 324.700 

14 Nov. 14.0 2.553,270 25,675 423,024 264.450 

15 Nov. 13.8 2,313, 185 25,422 428,390 377,875 

16 Nov. 13.7 2,556, 125 26, 167 419.606 323.445 

17 Nov. 13.7 2.547,695 25.720 395.524 282 ,130 

18 Nov. 13.5 2.564,445 25.648 405,972 323,905 

19 Nov. 13.5 2.670,915 25,0 17 418,254 326,945 

' According to the 19441Jictiolllll), o[Ulliwd SIIIU:s Artily Tertii". Ihe day or supply is the "unit used in 

estim~tin g the ,wen.gc c.,pcndil urc of \'ariollS items of supply per day in the field." Thus for r;ltions. one d"y of sup pi)' represents the qunntity of rmions needed to fee d el'ery soldier in the First Army for 24 hOllrs. 

For lOS-111m. howitze rs. ISS-mill, howitzers. :1I1d 155-mm. Suns ou ly 

' For 15 Octobcr- 211 October 

"For 29 October- I! NOI'ember 

SOIII'Cj': First Anny Supply. Mninlcnnnec. and Evncumion Dnily SUlllnwry Ri,ls: Hpl . U.S . Army. First 

U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 1 August 1944 22 Fcbru;ory 1945.3:26.4:93- 94.99- 100. 
Frustratioll at the West Wall lS I 

Schll'ammel/(I/Icl 00111 01/ fhe RoeI' Ril'er 

sections.82 Still, the First Army leadership was slow to see the darns as a rea l 

menace. As late as 29 October I-lodges told Bradley that storage reservoirs on the 

Roer were down to 30 to 50 percent ca pacity and that ';present plans oflhis Army 

do not contemplate immediate captu re of these dams."8J Not unli l 7 November, 

aner the preliminary attack against Schmidt had already begun and at the same 

time that a First Army intell ige nce report noted Ge rman preparations to flood the 

Roer did I-lodges finally order the V Corps headqua rters to draw lip a plan specifica lly to seize the darns.s4 Even then, somc ti me would pass be fore the First 

Army focused its attention on that objective. 

Pan of the reason for the First Army headq uarters' slowness to perceive the 

importance o f the dams lay in its foc lis on the Stolbe rg corridor, its best rema in ing avenue of advan ce ane r the Ninth Army's move to the north. On 18 

October Eise nhower had dec ided to proceed with a Novembe r o ffensive, and 

he direc ted Bradley to makc the main effort toward the Rh ine south of Cologne, while also prepari ng to ex tend his northern nank to link up with 

Mon tgome ry's drive frOI11 the MARKET-GARDEN sali ent. Mon tgomery would first 

open the approaches to Antwerp and then adva nce southeast from the MARK ETGARDEN sali ent to elear the area fro m the Meuse to the Rhine and li nk up wi th 

the northe rn flank of Brad ley's th rust. Deve rs' 61 h Army Group wou ld resume 

its drivc to the Rhine at Sirasbourg. After meeting wilh his a rmy commande rs, 

on 21 October Bradley ordered the First Army to attack ellst on 5 November 

and, if possible, seize a bridge head over the Rhinc in the Colognc-Bonn area, 

on the southern edge of the Ruh r. tfthe First Army co uld not ca pture a bridge-
182 A COII/llll/lld POSI (I( War 

head, it would clear the west ban k of the Rhi ne south to the Mose ll e. Meanwhile , the Ninth Army wou ld protect the Fi rst ArlllY's nort hern nank to the 

Rhine and then advance north to link up with the 2 1 Army Grou p. The Third 

Army wou ld protec t the o ther nank of the First Army, advancing from the Mclz 

arca to the Rhine nca r Mai nz,s, 

The First Army headqua rte rs moved with alacrity 10 pl an the aUCld . Even 

be fore I-lodges rece ived Bradl ey's order, he had confe rred wit h Collins, whose 

VII Corps would again ha ve Ihe Tlwin rol e. To he lp Colli ns, he moved the VII 

Corps- V Corps boundary nort1nv<lrd, provided a n ex tra reg iment o f infant ry 

and a combat command of arlllor to joi n the VII Corps' three infantry and o nc 

armo red divisions, and arranged for y~ wo battalions of fi eld an ill ery and 

300 tan ks and ta nk destroye rs to suppo n the VII Corps attack . Collins was to 

dra ft two attack pl ans, one fo r three di visions o n 5 November a nd anot her fo r 

fo ur div isio ns at some po int between 10 and 15 Novembe r. Accompa ni ed by 

T ho rson, Hodges met with his o the r corps commande rs and corps G- 3s to lay 

out plans, rea li gn forces, and sct bOllndaries.86 

Whil e I-lod ge s met with the prin cipals, his staff handled the details of th e 

pla n. I-I art 's artillery sec tion asked th e 12th Army Group artill ery section what 

units and ammunition the 12th Army Group would allocat e for the attack. It 

also coo rd inated wit h th e G- 3 section to get th e ge neral plan of attack , with the 

G- 2 secti on to find the locati ons of enemy arti ll ery, and with corps artill ery 

o ffi cers to det ermine what they needed to achieve th ei r missions. Based on this 

information, it drew up .. Ill artill ery ann ex, a ll ocatin g artill ery to the co rps, 

respec ti ve zones of fire for eac h corps, and the missions of the 32d Fie ld rtil ~ 

lc ry Brigade, whi c h would o perate as army arti ll ery in general support, re in~ 

forc in g the fires of the V and VII Corps artill ery. The sec tion then issued drafts 

to interested pa rti es, and, at a conference , received their comments prior 10 

issuing th e fin;."! 1 annex as pan of the overall plan . Simultaneo usly, Cane r's 

engineers brought up bridging equipment, negotiat ed throug h ETOUSA for a 

landing craft detac hme nt from the Navy, 10clHed c rossin g sites, and otherwise 

laid plans for the Roe I' and Rh ine crossings. On 26 Octo ber th e First Army 

headquarters issued a fi eld o rder for the drive. 1I7 (Map /1) 

The First Army fi eld o rde r for the November offe nsive a nd the successive 

versions o f that order le ft muc h to be desired. Aside from the te ndency to 

mi cromanage that crept into some First Army o rde rs that autumn, the main 

probl em lay in the role assig ned by th e First Army headquart ers to th e V Corps. 

By capturing Schmidt- a key crossroad s occupying hi gh g ro und above the Rocr 

hcadwat ers on the southeastern fringe s of the Hiirtge n Forest- in a pr lirni ~ 

nary atta ck, the First Army headquarte rs hoped th at th e V Co rp s would gain 

man euver room for th e VII Corps and protect the VII 's southern fl ank while 

di ve rtin g encmy reserves from the main dri ve . To gain that objecti ve, however, 

the First Army a nd V Corps headquartcrs esc hewed a n advance no rtheast to 

Schmi dt up th e na rrow but o pe n Mo nschall co rridor, ou tflank ing the Hi.irtge n 

Fo rest from the so uth, in fa vo r of an othe r att ac k thro ug h the woods, eve n after 

earli er probes had shown the g reat ad va ntages the tcrra in gave a de fe nder. Fur~ 

the rmorc, the First Army directi ve gave the V Co rps too few troops fo r all of its 
• , 

GERMAN BORDER BAnLES 

26 OClobor- 15 Decembllr 1944 

""""" 

W_WIII 

H'VAlIO N IN (TE S 

I I 

--- - " 

MM' I I 
184 A COII/mand Post af 'Far 

ta sks. To carry out the preli minary attack, cover a 27-mil c front , and prepare 

for an advance 10w,lrd Bonn in support of the VI r Corps, Gerow had foul" divisions, one of which was supposed to go to the VII Corps for the main attac k. In 

th e end, the V Corps could only Spenc the 28th Infantry Division for the Schmidt 

mission, and th e attack plan, drawll up by the V Corps headquart ers, reli ed on 

faulty reconnaissan ce, underestima ted German opposition, <lnd sent the di vision in several directions. Still , I-lodges, wh en he saw the plan, pronoun ced it 

exce ll enLgg 

Then came the postponeme nt of the main attack. Facing an e nemy buildu p 

o n the VII Corps front , the Fi rst Army headquart ers wa s banking heavil y on the 

arrival of th e 99th Infantry Di vision from Great Britain and th e 104th Infantry 

Division from Antwerp, wh ere it had bee n help ing the British and Ca nadians 

c lear th e approachcs to th e port. The anticipated de lay in the arri val of these 

units, alon g with th e postpon ement of the 2 1 Army Group 's offensi ve to 14 

November, caused Bradley on 1 Novembe r to set ba ck the target date for the 

Fi rst Army 's offensive to 10 Novernbe r. 89 Anxious not to postpone the main 

offe nsive any longer than necessary, th e First Army headqua rte rs took every 

step to haste n the arrival of the 99th and I 04th . Whil e liaison officers from the 

G- 3 and G-4 sections went to Great Britain to supervise the equ ipping and 

movement of th e 99th Di vision, others accompani ed six truck compani es to the 

French pori of Le Havre to speed the 99th 's trip to the front. The G- 3 and G-4 

sections also coordinated with COMZ and the British regarding th e movement 

of the di vision through their zones, and with the provost marshal 's traffi c subsection for the First Army zone. By 10 November the last troops of th e two 

di visions were moving into line , the 104th on the VII Corps' north ern flank in 

th e Stolberg co rridor and the 99th on the V Corps' front ne<lr Monsch<lll.'Ki 

The orde r of battl e for the November offensive conta ined some anomali es. 

As of 10 November the VII Corps in cluded two infantry divisions, an attached 

infantry regiment, and one armored division in line and an infantry di vision, 

armored combat command, and cavalry group in reserve. The V Corps had two 

in fantry di visions and a cavalry group; nomina lly, it also had atta ched to it 

Illost of an infantry division and an armored di vision, although these would be 

available <I S the army rese rve . The VII I Corps h<ld three infantry di visions, one 

armored division, and two cavalry g roups. This list clearly indi cated the VII 

Corps' ro le as th e main e ffort in th e attack. Even with provisions for artill ery 

Slipport from surrounding units, howeve r, th e Vll Corps, accord ing to the 27 

Octobe r order of battl e, contained j ust sixt ee n field artill e ry batta lions, four 

tank destroye r ba llal ions, two tank battalions, a chemi ca l mortar battali on, and 

six antiairc raft b<l ttal ions. The V Corps could actually ca ll on more tank destroyer and tan k battali ons- six and three- than th e Vll Corps, but only thirtee n field artill e ry battalions and six antiaircraft b<lttalions. The VII I Corps 

wa s le ft with thi rtee n fie ld artill e ry battalions, fom' tank destroyer batta li ons, 

three tank battalions, five antiaircraft batlalions, and a chemi cal mortar battal -

ion. Army headquarte rs retained direct control of th e fi e ld artill e ry brigade 

with seven batta lions, a se parate infantry batta li on, and thirtee n anti a ircra ft 

battalions. After having yie lded priority on arti Il c ry ammunition to th e V Corps 
Frustration al Ihe West Wall 185 

for the attack on Schmidt. th e VII Corps regained a preponde rant sha re for its 

own dr ve. ~! 

Despit e the postponement. th e Fi rst Army headquarters did not halt the 

28th's :Ittack, thereby a ll owing the Germans to co ncentrate against it. On 2 

November the 28th attacked and, for the fi rst two days, seemed to make good 

progress, one battal ion even forcing its way into Schmidt. The Germans, 

however, ru shed in rese rves and cou nte rattacked on 4 Novembe r, dri vi ng the 

Americans from the town. Wh il c two batta lions clung to a precarious position 

in ne ighboring Komme rsche idt, engi neers struggled to keep ope n a narrow, 

mudd y trai l through a gorge, the only line of rei nforcement and supply. Despite 

at least five calls per day be tween the Fi rst Army G- 3 sect ion and the V Corps 

headqua rters, the First Army headquart ers could learn little about the true situat ion, and on 5 Novcmber Hodges visited the division's command post, where 

he apparently vented his displeasure.91 As the 28t h Division contin ued to struggle 

over the next few days wit h poor weather, rugged terrain, lac k of reserves. and 

overwhe lmi ng Germa n opposition, Hodges demonstrated his de tachmen t from 

the situation. First, he c ritic ized Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota , commander of th e 

division, for not deploying his troops properly to withstand artill e ry fire, and 

then he gave the batte red 28th an unrcalisti c list of new tasks. When he visited 

the division again on 8 Novembc r, he dressed down Cota fo r not keeping track 

o f his units and told Gerow to recommend any necessa ry reliefs. Although Cot a 

had indeed lost tou ch with his un its, he could hard ly be blamed entire ly for th e 

predicament into which the V Corps and First Army headquarters had thrust 

his commandY 

Whil e the 28th Division fought for its survival, the First Army headquarters, 

rememberi ng COBRA, was working wit h its Army Air Forces colleagues to refine 

a plan fo r a massive air strike that would clear th e way for the ground troops. 

Joint plmllling for the operation began at the IX Tactica l Air COlllmand headquarte rs on 30 October. It c ulminated in a meeting on 7 November of Hodges, 

his G- 3, his artill ery office r, and his antiaircraft officer with representati ves of 

SHAEF, th e 12th Army Group, the Nin th Air Force, and the Ninth Army and th e 

IX and XX IX Tactical Air COlllma1l( s.9~ To all ow for uncertai nties o f weather, 

the planners prepared three continge ncy plans. The preferred pla n, set for ally 

day from II to 16 Novembe r, ca lled for 1,200 heavy bombers of the Eigh th Air 

Force to blast enemy troops and installations in the Esehwe il er and Langerwehc 

areas, directl y behi nd the German front facing the VII Corps. An eq ua l number 

of British heavy bombers would bomb the Roer valley cities of DUren, Jlilich, 

and I-I e insberg, creating enough destruction to block roads lead in g through those 

c ities. Meanwhile, med ium bombers of the IX Bombardment Di vision wou ld 

attack other tTOOpS and fac ilities in the Ge rman rea r, while fighter-bombers of 

the IX Tactical Air Command would respond on ca ll aga inst ta rgets of opportu -

nity, cover the VII Corps' columns, and conduct armed reconnaissance. 95 

Rememberi ng COBRA, planners took e labo rate precaut ions. They set a safety 

zone three times the size of that used for COBRA, and Patterson worked out an 

elaborat e plan with the IX Tactical Air Command and Eighth Air Force fo r 

e lectronic signals, colored panels, barrage ba ll oons, red an tia ircraft bursts, and 
186 A Command Pos/ (1/ 11'//1' 

scarchligilis to mark th e First Army front. Accordin g to the plan,the Eighth Ai r 

Fo rce, with Hodges' approval , wo uld determine the liming of the a ttac k for the 

first three days of the ta rget pe ri od, and Hodges wou ld dec ide ove r the la st 

three. The plan thus le ft the dec ision for the first three days to the echel on that 

best grasped the weathe r requirements of the hea vy bombe rs, whil e reservin g 

the dec ision over the last th ree days to th e g round cOlllmande r, wh o l1<1d th e 

111051 a t st akc. ?6 

In the e nd, poor weather did indeed push back th e offensive fro m I 0 to 16 

Novembe r. While wait ing for the weather to clea r, Hodges and his statT made 

fina l preparations, listened with frustrat ion to COMZ's generaliti es on future 

suppli es, and wa tchcd an xiollsly as th e Germans built up th eir de fe nses. In th is 

ne rvous atmosphere , Di ckson warned of:l highl y probable Germa n spoil ing 

attack in thc Nillth Army's sec tor, mak ing l'lodges and his staff a ll the morc 

eager to start the offensive. Thc Ge rman atta ck did not mate ria li ze, and late on 

the night of 15- 16 November Hodges deci ded that thc weather would cl ear 

enough to launch th e offensive the next day.<17 

Arter a ll th e painstakin g preparation, th e disappointingly slow start o f the 

o ffe nsive again caused Hodges to ma ke unrealisti c j udgments o f his di visions. 

Thanks to the e laborate precauti ons, th e air bombardme nt proved safer th an 

COHItI' 's but not as e ffe cti ve, as the bombers, hi nde red by clouds and haze, did 

minimal dama ge to the Ge rman front lines.'1s At Spa , Hodges initially showed 

litt le concern over th e lack of headway. Within a day, however, he criticized the 

I 04th 's tactics a nd, on the VII Corps' southern flank , the 4th Infantry Di vision's 

ten dency to dri ve its spearheads up the roads in the I-Iiirtgen Forest. He wanted 

th e 4th Di vision to adva nce in a line, an unrealisti c sta nce give n the unit 's excessive ly broad fron tage in th e woods. In fo ur days th e VII Corps ad v~'n ced 

only two miles, a lthough Di ckson, relie ved over the abse nce o f a spoiling atta ck a nd the ga ins whi ch the All ied atta ck had registered, beli eved tha t the 

increasin g pressu re wou ld fo rce the enemy to commit the Sixth Pa/lzer Army 

piecemea l. Nevert he less, when Hodges and Quesada dined on the even ing of 

23 November, the First Army commander seemed to his colleague to be ag ita ted, blaming the weather for precluding muc h of the fighte r-bomber support 

he had an ticipated . "!-Ie went on and on about how we might lose the war," 

Quesada later remembered.9\! 

Responding to the situation, I-lodges seemed to have learned lillie from his 

ex periences with the 28th In fan try Division. Searchi ng fo r ma neuver room lind 

anx ioLls to reli eve pressu re on the VII Corps, on 19 Novembe r I-lodges orde red 

Gerow's V Corps to proceed wit h its attack in the I llirtgen Forest. The drive irllO 

the woods by the VII Corps' 4th Division had gone nowhere, and I-lodges shortened the 4th 's front by movi ng northwa rd the VII Corps' bou ndary with the V 

Corps. He then gave the job of tak ing the key crossroads of iliirtgen, j ust inside 

the eastern edge of the forest. to the V Corps' fresh 8th Infan try Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Donald A. Stroh and supported by the attached Corubat 

Command R of the 5th Armored Division. Rat her than adjust the boundary to 

grant the V Corps a clear pat h to the Roer, however, I lodges lei the boundnry cut 

across the highway north of I-Ii.irtgen, an odd arrangement Ihat indicated his 
Frustration at tlte West Wall 187 

Conferel/ce 011 {he lVe.~/ern Frol//: left 10 right. Gel/eml M eLaill. Genemf Kellll. 

Gel/emf Bmtffey poinlil/g. Gelleml Hodges. lIl/d Gel/emf Silllpsollllllllap. 

22 Nm'ember 1944 

desire to allow the VII Corps to exploit any opening, as we ll as, in a roundabollt 

fas hi on, his growi ng awareness of the significance of the RoeI' dams. Unfortunately, as was the case with the 28th, th e 8th had so many tasks that it could 

devote only one regiment to the drive on I-ILirlgen. Neverthe less, I-lodges pronounced himself pleased with Stroh's plan. Ind ee(~ he was so optimisti c that he 

told Combat Command R to bc ready to ex ploit on the second day. 1011 

Aga in, I-lodges would bc disillusioned. Oncc morc, thc troops made slow 

headway th rough the dense woods, pillboxes, booby traps, and cold, damp 

wea thc r. As in the Argonne twenty-six years before, command press ure grew 

on subordi nate office rs, who responded with overl y opti mistic re po rts of 

progress. Alt hough I-lodges, from visits to corps and division command posts, 

was somewhat aware of th e condit ions, he kept up the press ure on Stroh, un -

just ly perce ivi ng th e probl cmto be more a lack of will on th e part ofthc 8th's 

commande r. HUrt ge n fell on 28 November but too late to save the ex hausted 

Stroh, relieved at his own request the day before. IOI 

As the offensive cont inucd and casua lties mounted, the First Army's replacement situa tion deteriorated. With the help of more personnel,the adjutant 

genera l's casualt y division cleared most baltic casua lty reports for ETOUSA's 

Casualty Branch wi th in ten days of the occurrence. In the inte rim, the daily 

estimated loss reports provided Hodges with a close enough accounting oflosscs 

and replacement req uiremcnts for planning purposes. As casualti es mounted, 
188 A Command Post a/ 1#11' 

however, ETOUSA's abilit y to find enough replacements to fill the gaps in the 

ranks came into question. By December ETOU SA wa s experienc ing such a 

th eater-wid e shortage of infantry and armor fi ll ers, es pec ially infantry riflemen, that Bradley, during a visII to Spa, raised the specter of American divisions fighting at half-strength, just like their adversaries. 102 So short were units 

ofrifl cmcn, medi cs, and automati c ri fl e bearers that some reso rted to hijacking 

replacement convoys and removing the ir fill ers. even though th e replacements 

they obtai ned did not p.a ssess th e correct spec ialties. In res ponse, th e headquarte rs had to detail personnel to patrol the roads and stop the piracy. 103 

By December th e First Army G- I section had al ready evol ved a heart y 

dislike for the new replacement system that had gone into effect on 13 August. 

The new system placed th e 3d Replacement Depot and its three battalions, 

each supporting a corps, und er ETOUSA's Ground Force Repla cement System, 

although the depot and battalions operated in the army area. Requisitions went 

from th e combat ullits to th e First Army headquarters, which me rely audited 

and set prio rities before sending them to the 3d Replacement Depot for action . 

In its monthly repo rts, the First Army G- l replacement subsection complai ned 

that the system c reat ed an unn ecessary lag between the submission ofrequisitions and deli ve ry of fill ers to units. The subsection also stat ed that the system 

did not a ll ow th e First Army to provide surplus pe rsonne l to units ente ring 

combat, and it creat ed a drain on First Army fa ciliti es and transportation due to 

th e inadequate reso urces of the depot and the oversupply of soldi e rs with unneeded spec ialti es. To speed the flow of fillers, th e subsection adopted the expedient of having ullits submit advance requ isitions forty-e ight hours be fo re 

they went into action. [t also subm itt ed requisitions ba sed on th e daily loss 

estimates to the replacement depot eve n before the offi cial requisitions arri ved 

at the First Army headquart ers from the combat units. II).! 

Othe r att empts by th e First Army staff to address defects in the replacement system were lost in th e snowballi ng repla cement crisis. As a partial remedy to the demorali zing process by whi ch indi vidual fillers shuffied throu gh 

successive depots on their way to th e front , the 0 - 1 section he lped th e 3d 

Replacement Depot institute combat orientation courses. !Os In Novembe r th e 

sec tion also proposed tha t, in the future , ETO USA furnish replacements already organized into battalions or compani es, a ll owing regimen ts to usc th em 

intact and sh i n thei r rema in i ng veterans to othe r units, but noth i ng came of the 

eonee pt .

106 As th e November otfensive continued and replacemcnts grew scarce, 

th e G- l section kept close watch ove r th e manpower situ ation on th e front lines 

and allocated available replacements accordin g to the ta cti cal situat ion. With 

losses mounting, it cance led its poli cy of ret urnin g casualti es to th e ir original 

units. The First Army headqua rt ers took this step to increase the fl exibil ity and, 

thus, the responsiveness of the system, but th e new poli cy backfired on morale, 

as many vetcrans went AWOL in an attempt to return to th eir former outfits. 

Reve rting to its establ ished practice, the G- I section was still looki ng for othe r 

solutions in mid _Deeember.

107 

As during the Normand y campai gn, the shortage of re pl acement officers 

posed a spec ial probl em. Ba ttl efi e ld appointme nts of noncommissioned offie-
Frustratioll lit the West Wall 189 

ers (NCOs) to officer rank offered one possible alternative source. The G- I 

secti on found that many candidates could not meet the Army Genera l Classifi· 

cat ion Test (AGCT) score req uired for Army officers, but, beli eving that these 

soldiers had already demonstrated their fi tness, it waived tha t standard. Even 

with lowered st andards and a permissive theater policy, it soon became appar· 

ent tha t battlefield appointments wou ld not meet all the needs for replacement 

of ricers. This probl em had become clear especia ll y during the autumn when 

the War Department announced that it was curtailing officer candidate pro· 

grams in the United States and, later, that it could provide no infantry officer 

replacements for November and Decembe r. The Wa r Dcpartment expected to 

deliver on ly 600 infan try and armor officers per month beginning in March. 

Although ETOUSA removed almost all limits on battlefield appointments, they 

could replace only a sma ll percentage of officer casualti es. 

Even with the shortage of officer replacemen ts, the First Army headquar· 

ters still sought to ma intai n the standards in its officer corps. When many units 

began to trea t battlefield appoin tments as routine, the 0- 1 section issued a 

new policy that restricted th em to th ose ineligible for a routine promotion, ex· 

cept for candidates who showed unusual leadershi p and courage whi le per· 

forming the dut ies of a higher rank. Reclassi ri ca tion o r unsuitable officers 

remained a headache for the staff. [n September the 0 - 1 section reca ll ed the 

reclassifica tion recorders at the corps headquarters and authorized corps and 

separate unit commanders to send those they recommended for reclassifica tion 

to the First Army command post bearing their complete fi le. I f that headqua r· 

ters approved the proceedings, the officer would continue on to the Reelassifi· 

ca tion Center, whi le his file wen t to the 12th Army Group headquarters. This 

procedure was modified by the G- I sect ion in November to provide that any 

commander seek in g reclassifica tion or an office r sho uld report the case to his 

immedi ate superior, who would interview the officer in question and then pre~ 

pare a brief report for the officer's fi le. This change, the 0 - 1 section beli eved, 

would ensure that the officer under conside ration would be made aware of the 

rea sons for the action. If any evidence of misconduct ex isted, the judge advo· 

ea te genera l would be involved at an early stage. Still, the process did not con· 

fer the au thority to relieve the officer before disposition of his case at higher 

levels, maki ng it impossibl e to replace him in the interim. lOa 

Ncuropsyehiatric cases presented another complication . In December the 

First Army headqua rters' reclassification of two officers evacua ted with neu· 

ropsych iatri e symptoms was rejected by ETOUSA on grounds that the two mcn 

had displ ayed no mental indirfe renee, inaptitude, or incompetence. ETOUSA 

lat er up held the First Army's appea l, but the two cases pointed to a rea l prob· 

lem, since psyehoneuroties, once sa fe in a rear area, often reacted so normally 

that medica l officers returned them to combat through replaceme nt channels. 

With the re newal of hard combat in November, the number or neuropsychiatric 

casua lties aga in increased, as it h'ld ill July. In November, howeve r, the First 

Army psychiatrists found that their patients were less likely to return to duty, 

due to a fe eling of dislocation resulting from th e rising number of rep lace· 

mellts, the breakdown ofsol11c who had been previously wounded, and the high 
190 A COlllllland Posl (1/ !-fin' 

degree of burnout alllong veterans. To treat morc serious cases in an environment separate from other wounded soldiers, the First Army operated two exhaustion centers, where psychiatrists observed, treat ed, rehabilitat ed, and, if 

possib le, returned pati ents to their units, usua lly via division clearing st ations 

to avoid the dc lays of replacement channe ls. 11)9 

Fortunately, by latc November the First Army medical organ ization was bettcr prepared to meet more orthodox medica l challenges. Truck runs direct from 

COMZ depots, loca l procurement, and Ihe airlift ofslIch criti ca lly needed it ems 

as penic illi n had built lip the First Army's slocks of medical suppli es, and more 

medica l units had arrived from the beaches. Brig. Gen. John A. Rogers stati oned 

his llondivisional units, exccpt for the hospita ls, under his th ree groups, each of 

which support ed a corps, and he established a new medica l base area at Eupen. 

He also created a system of liaison officers with the 12th Arrny Group headquarters and ADSEC, while keep ing in touch with his own units by phone and courier. During the fall the medical section continued its ro le of policy maker and 

quality inspector, as its medi ca l and surgica l cons ultants supervised patient care 

and enforced the principles of the ETO Mal/llol o/Therapy. As the First Army 

la unched its November offensive, losses increased but at a fairly steady and predi ctable rate , enabling the army surgeons to forecast supply and evacuation requirements at each st age. Beca use ambulances could not maneuver in the rugged 

terrain, the First Army had to rely morc heavily on litter bearers, pressing even 

artillerymen and ADSEC personnel into se rvice. The shee r volume of casualt ies 

ca used the First Army medica l Slaff to disregard its ten-day evacuation poli cy 

and evacuate more wounded directly to ADSEC and COMZ fac ilities, particularl y the holding units and general hospitals at Liege. As the weather worsened, 

the railroad replaced airl ifi as the preferred method of evacuation. 110 (Char' 8) 

The poo r weathe r, as well as rugged terrain and lack of ammunition, also 

presented challenges for the arti ll ery section. Afi cr finding lillie opportunity 

to lise massed artillery in the pursuit, th e First Army headquarters employed 

army artillery in support of th e attac ks on the West Wall and Aachcn. Usually, 

l'lodges and Hart, who worked closcly, retained the 32d Fie ld Artillery Brigade, which was composed o r an observation batta lion, four battalions of240-

mill. howitzers, and two battalions of eight-inch guns. From a position roughly 

eq uidista nt between the two corps bearing the main burden of the assa ult, the 

heavy guns of the brigade cou ld give gene ral support to either of the two corps 

upon rece iving, first, broad, often verbal orders from Hart regardi ng their mission and, second, specifi c guidance from th e su pported corps via liaison officers. lll By November, however, poor weathe r hindered aerial reconnaissance, 

on which the artill ery relied so heavily, an d, in the Hiirtgen, dense woods impeded th e usc ofarlillery in close support of advancing infantry. To destroy the 

enemy morta r nests that were causing so much grief to American uni ts, Hodges 

and Hart worked out a plan for the arti ll ery to start in the enemy's rear area and 

work toward his front lines. Fo r most close support, howevcr, thc infantry had 

to turn to sel f-propelled guns, tanks, and tank destroyers.l!2 

As ever in the campai gn, air support offered an alternative, but poor weather, 

rugged terrain , and the enemy's fixed fortifications kept tactical air from 
C"ART 8 - FIElD ARt-'II ES ANI) C O MZ EVACUATION R ES I'ONSlillliTY 

Clcaring+X X 

Sta 

,- -

Clearing XX 

Sta + Clearing X X 

Sw + Clearing+X X 

Sia 

, 

, ....... XXXX': -" ...... '... + Evac Hosp 

~ XXXX I ' ~ 

~ EV:lC Hosp /", 0000 

-'" 0000 " _ + o!dll1~ . ' .... __ - Unlt-A lr 

XXXX /---00-00---''\ + Ho!ding + Evac Hosp / ~ /1 Ulllt 

\ Regulating /~ 

'" Stu ,/ -----' 000 + Ho!dillg 

000 Ulllt 

, ---" , Holding Unit-Rail " } 

"---" 

----+--XXXX-------

-------

------L-- xX xx-------- 000 

0<:) 

Advance Section 

----- 000 ------

Intermcdiutc Base Sections 

0000-------

Port B:tse Sections 

--- h,'!'alty r",td nrmy rcsl"M,slbitlly 

- - - Field """y rcstlOnsibilily 

-- COM:!. rcslXlnsibil,ly 

0:0 A;rl,fI oW 

+ Gen Hosp 

+ Gen Hosp 

--~--- OOO ------

--------0000-------

S""l're: Graham A. Cos mos 3nd Al bert E. Cowd rey, Tile Mellie,,1 OCII(Ir/"""II. Medicill 

Sen·ice ill ,II,· "-·"""pe,,,, Til,·",,·,. "/O"emli,,, ..... U.S. """ y in Wo rld Wor (I (Wash i nglon . 

D.C .: U.S Army Ce nler of Mililary HiSlory, 1992 ). I'. 376. 
192 A Comlllalld Posl a( War 

having th e same impa ct it had achieved ea rlier in the year. By November the IX 

Tacti cal Ai r Command wa s maste ring Ihe supply problems that had plagued it 

as we ll as the ground troops earlier in the autumn. The move of its a irfie lds to 

the Li ege area, closer to the front , in latc October also helped close ai r support, 

enabling planes to stay over th e mission area for longer pe riods. Yet, du e to 

inc lemen t weath er, the IX Tacti cal Air Command performed only two-th irds as 

many missio ns in October as in the previous month, an d in November it carried 

Qut no sorti es on nine days and fewer than two hundred on six others. By December, howeve r, th e number of fi ghter-bomber missions was rising aga in, 

large ly due to th e IX Tactica l Air Command's use of P- 6 1 ni ght fi ght ers a nd 

ex perimenta ti on with radi o and rada r to direct pl anes to their targets. II) 

The First Army and IX Tacti ca l Ai r Command were we ll accustomed to 

work ing with each othe r by the autumn of 1944. Although Quesada did not 

enjoy the rapport with Hodges that he had with Bradl ey, th e mechanisms for 

close cooperation were a lready in place. The two headquarte rs continu ed the ir 

collocation of stafTs in Spa, inc luding a j oint operatio ns cent er established by 

Quesada and Patte rson to co ntrol air de fense. During the au tumn the IX Tactical Air Command con tinued its program of increasing the number of ai r support parti es. It kept th e a ir support parti es with th e ir di visions even when those 

di visions transfe rred to anoth er eorps or army, and it gave them a more acti ve 

rol e in directing close air suppo rt. Quesad a also arranged for his pilots and 

staff offi cers to spend more time with ground uni ts. Sueh measures, as we lt as 

the IX Tacti cal Air Command commander's boa sts that his planes would go 

wherever and whe never the infan trymen went, contribu ted to the confidence 

that ground troops fe lt in a ir support, at least on th e days whe n the aircraft 

could get off the groul1d. 114 

By Decembe r the Al lies' offensive had nearl y sta lled. A ft e r capturin g Metz 

in a bitt er fifteen-day struggle, th e Third Army had to fi ght hard to reach th e 

Saa r region on th e German fronti e r. The 6th Army Grou p to th e so uth enj oyed 

bett er fortun e, brea king through to the Rhine and taking Strasbourg. To th e 

north, th e 2 1 Army Group opened th e port of Antwerp but made littl e progress 

towa rd the Rhine, a nd th e Ninth Army reac hed the Roer onl y a ft e r a bill er 

struggle. 

The First Army headquart ers no longer had any doubt abou t the importan ce to the Alli ed offensive of taking th e Roe!" dams. As the ra ins of ea rly 

November fill ed th e Roer rese rvoirs, am id furthe r indi cati ons of German pl ans 

to blow up the dams, the First Army headquarte rs' concern about them had 

grown ex pone ntially. A Fi rst Army dispatch, dated I I November, wa rn ed the 

corps not to go beyond th e Roe I' except on army order. Later in th e month, an 

increased numbe r of photograp hic recon na issa nce ni ghts sea rched for evidence 

of demoli tions and changes in wa te r leve ls. Still, Hodges and his sta ff hesita ted 

to swit ch th e foca l poi nt of th e ir drive from the Stolbe rg corridor to the dams, 

and Hodges expressed his hope that the ir destru ction by a ir could spare the 

ground forces the trouble of taking the dams. The norma lly enthusiastic Quesada 

was skepti ca l. He noted th e concentration ofanti a ireraft guns a rou nd the dams 

and j ud ged th at his tiny bombs could do littl e aga inst suc h soli d struct ures. 
Frusfralioll (II fhe WeSI Waif 193 

Afier considerable badge ring from l'lodges through Bradley and SHAEF, the 

Royal Air Force's Bomber Command, which specialized in the low-level, prccision bombing that the mission dcmanded, reluctantly agreed to try. A fier severa l canccllations due 10 poor wcathe r, British bombcrs managed to conduct 

three strikes on the dams in the first half of December. None caused more than 

minimal damage. 11S 

Anticipating a possible failure by the Royal Air Force, the First Army headquarters was already preparing an attack on the dams. To strengthen the prospect ive drive by the V Corps, Bradley arranged for the First Army to receive 

two more infantry divisions. One would go to the V Corps, and one wou ld 

relieve an expcrienced di vision on the inactive VI II Corps sector, enabli ng the 

division 's transfer to thc V Corps. Mcanwhile, Hodgcs rotated IWO exhausted 

veteran infantry divisions out of the VII Corps sector and replaced them with 

two rcsted divisions from quiet sectors of the First Army front. Given the lack 

of reserves, rotation of divisions between active and quiet sectors of the front 

was onc of the few ways the First Army headquartcrs could rest divisions Ihal 

had been in combat for somc lime. The plan thai l'lodges worked out with his 

corps commande rs called for the VII Corps to conti nuc to the Roer, where it 

would wait until the V Corps se ized the Schwammenauel and Urn Dams. For 

this drive, the V Corps regained the major sha re of the alloca ti on of artillery 

ammunition. The 32d Field Arti ll ery Brigade, wh ich was positioned to provide 

general support for the V and VII Corps, would conservc its ammunition for 

missions to hit critical long-range targets, such as bridges, factories, and Vweapon sites. A cautious scheme , the First Army plan renected not onl y the 

headquarters' concern about the dams, but also Dickson's dirc forecasts of a 

massive cnemy countcrattack that would hit the First Army as it lay astride the 

Rocr.116 

The VI [ Corps attack on 10 December made good initial progress, but when 

the V Corps joined th e offensive three days later, it encountered the rugged 

terrain of the Ge rman Eifc l and a hailstorm of opposi tio n. An irritated Hodges 

notcd the V Corps headquart ers' ignorance of the location of its units, a cardinal sin in his eyes, and told Gerow in plain language to straighten out the situation. Neither Hodges' nor Gerow's curiosity was aroused by the identit y of the 

hidde n masses that had stopped the V Corps. 1I7 

l'lodges' irritation reneeted to some degree the fatigue pcrvading mueh of 

the First Army headquarte rs by mid-December. Many sect ions had long been 

overworked because the headquarters had based its organization on TO 200- 1, 

the lean table issued in 1942 by Army Ground Forces for a field army staff. 

Since Jul y ETOUSA had periodically authorized in creases in personne l for the 

changes the First Army headquart ers had made in its organiza tion, notably for 

the G- 5 section and a photographi c interpretation specia l staff scction. These 

in creases, however, were only temporary augmentations. As th e Army prepared 

to revise 200- 1, it cal led on the armics for recommendations. Not surprisingly, 

the First Army sections almost invariably ca lled for more people. The adjutant 

general 's section recollllllended a visitor's bureau, the G- 2 and G- 3 sections 

wan ted to add air subsect ions, the G- 3 section suggested a passive air defense 
194 A COJIIII/al/d Post {jf War 

subsection, and the 0-4 section want ed to institutionali ze its traffic control 

headquarte rs. But requ ests for more personn e l rece ived a cold shoulder from 

Army Ground Forces, which was trying to find ways to c ut, not in crease, support e lements. The new tabl e for a fi e ld army headqua rte rs th at appea red in 

lale October authori zed new armored, provost marshal, and press and psychological warfare secti ons, but only a net additi on of 14 offi ce rs, 3 warra nt ofTi cers, and 15 enlisted men. IIS 

More personne l would have he lped, but for the commanding general and 

many staff offi cers the stress orlhe almost dail y fi ghtin g since Jun e was beginning to show. Eve n th e slower pace of ope rations and the move to more comfortabl e quart ers in October co uld not remove the strain. Thorso n, th e First 

Army G- 3, later recall ed that I-lodges at th e time "was prett y slow mak ing the 

big decisions. He would stud y them for a long time, and I would o ften have to 

press him be fore I got a decision." Hodges' fati gue result ed partly from a cold 

that plagued him peri odi ca lly during the autumn, but mai nly from his killing 

schedul e. During the November offensive, he had worked two strai ght wee ks 

of sixtee n-hour days, and, during the RoeI' dri ve, he obta ined onl y an hour of 

sleep per nighl. "9 Dri ven by Kean , the staff was workin g long hours, and many, 

espec iall y th e Medit erranean veterans, were on the brink of ex haustion. As 

early as October Major Hansen noted tha t Di ckson looked tired, and th e G- 2's 

bchav ior in th e lat e autumn, when he admitt edly had mu ch to concern him, 

indi cat ed an acute case of nerves. As for Thorson, the visiting Bradley told 

Hodges that the exhausted G- 3 should go on leave once the First Army reached 

the Rhine. Thorson not ed Kean 's disapproving look and joked, "General, maybe 

you 'd bett er put that orde r in writin g." !20 Under thc 12th Army Group 's new 

leave poli cy for senior ofTi ee rs and First Army policy, First Army staffpc rsonnel could lise l'lodges' plane to go to London for seventy-two hours of rest, and 

many on th e staff were ava ili ng themse lves of th e opportunityY ! 

For th e Fi rst Army headquart ers, it had been a fru strating autumn. At every 

step, the headquarte rs fa ced fa ctors outside its control , including poor weath er, 

diffi cult terrain, and shorta ges of divisions, replacements, arti ll ery ammunition, and key supplies. In some ways, Hodges and his staffpe rfonned th eir role 

as an army headquarte rs with skill, particularly in th eir improvisati on of suppli es and unit rotati on. Yet th ey creat ed many problems for th emse lves, largely 

due to th e fasc ination with dctail whi ch had served th em so well in N ErTuNE 

pl annin g. Wh eth er because of Hodges' interest in lowe r-leve l ta ctics or lack of 

confidcnce in the corps commanders- or, more li ke ly, bot h- th e headquarters 

during the fall showed an occasional tende ncy towa rd mic romanagemcnt and a 

near obsessive need fo r information from the front. Ironi cally, the headq ua rte rs might have perfo rmed bell er in the pursuit than would otherwise have becn 

the case because it could not indulge its penchant for detail ed co ntro l. Even 

when Hodges a nd his staff stayed within th e ir proper rol e, however, the ir conduct of th e a utumn offe nsives was oft en characte rized by uninspired pla nning, 

questi onabl e boundary placeme nt, inadequate concentration of fo rces and oth er 

resources, an oft abnorma l concern for flanks, and a tendency to press some 

attacks past the point of a reasonabl e goa l. Finally, in its relations with other 
Fl'IlSfrafioll af flte West Wall 195 

echelons, the First Army headquarters frequen tly displayed a lack of patiencc. 

In the casc ofCOMZ, such impatience and even hoarding was unde rsta ndable 

but did little to help the overall task of building a thea tc r-wide logistical structure. Ma ny of these problems could be traced, 10 some extent, to the fat igue 

tha t gripped much of the First Army headquarters by mid-December. Fatigue 

eame at :l bad time, for that headquarters was about to embark on its greatest 

test. 
Notes 

, Hansen Diary, 14 SCI' 44. 

1 Ibid.; [Illerv, author with Wendl, 29 Apr 91, p. 58; Bradley, A Sofdie/'ii SIOI}', p. 410. 

J MacDonald. The Siegfried Line Campaigll . PI'. 28-30, 66, 281; MllcDollald, Bailie oflhe 

NuengclI Forest, pp. 27- 28; Weiglcy, Eisenhower~' LiCIIICl/lIII/S, p. 357; RPI, V Corps Operations 

in the ETO, p. 270 . 

• itrl, First U.S. Army, Report of Opera lions. 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1:53. 

) Ibid .. 1:51 - 53; MacDonald, The Siegfried Lille Campaign, pp. 30- 35; Rpt , V Corps 

OpcHll ions in the ETQ, I'p. 250. 270; Beck c \ aI., rhe IVaI' Agoills( Germany. pp. 414- 15: MS, 

Dickson, Algiers to the Elbc, p. 156; Cir, First Army 0 - 2 Est imate 28,15 Scp 44. All 0 - 2 

Estimates cited in this study arc in 10[- 2, 15,0- 2 Estimates, box 1956, WW[[ Ops Reports, 

RG 407, WNRC, Rpt , First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpt for 12 Scp 44. All G- 2 Periodic Reports 

cited in this study arc in 101 - 2.2 G- 210urnal and filc, boxcs 1837- 1879, WWll Ops Rcports, 

RG 407. WNRC. 

6 MacDonald, Th e Siegfried Ulle COIIII}(ligll, 1'1). 324-26; Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of 

Opcrat io ns, I August 1944- 22 Fcbruary 1945, t :95; MacDonald, Bailie of/he Hller/gell Fores/, 

1).64; MS, Cartcr. Carter's War. ch. 11. Pl'. 30- 33; Bradley, A Soldier!; S/Ol)'. p. 442; Wciglcy, 

£isellhol!'e/"~' Lielitell{JlI/s, p. 434. 

7 Sce First Army G- 2 estimates for September 1944. and periodic rcports for Scptember 

1944. See also MacDonald. The Siegfried Lille Campaigll . pp. 326- 27; Collins, Ligh/llillg Joe, 

p. 273; Convcrsations With Gcncml1. Lawton Collins, Maj Gary Wade, USA, tran~eriber, CombHt 

Studies Instit ute Rcport 5 [Fort Le'lVcnworth, Kans., 1983], p. 10, CMH Library: MacDonald. 

BailIe 0/ the Hiler/gel! Fores/, pp. 65- 66, 199. Rcgarding Ralph Ingersoll"s claim Ihat 12th 

Army Group's G- 2 section foresaw the threat from the dmlls. sce Ingersoll. Top Secret. pp. 

306- 07; Rpt, U.S. Army. 12th Army Group. Report of Operations, 3:49- 103. 

I MS, Dickson, Algicrs 10 the Elbe, ])p. 155- 56; Rpts. First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpts for 

13- 14 Sep 44; Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimate 28, 15 Sep 44. 

4 RpIS, First Army G- 2 Pcriodie Rpts for 28. 30 Scp 44. I Oct 44; Cir, First Army 0 - 2 

Estimatc 30, 26 Sep 44; RPI, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. I Augusl 1944- 22 February 

1945, 1: 57. 

,e Ltr, Eisenhower to Bradley, 23 Sep 44. Bradley Correspondence with Eisenhower. box 

5, Br:ldtcy Papcrs, USAM HI; Bradley. A Soldier~' SIOI)" p. 423. 

II MacDonald, The Siegfried UI/e C(//I/p(lign, PI). 23 1- 33. 251: Ltr, Bradl ey to Eiscnhowcr, 

25 Sep 44 , Orildley Correspondencc Wilh Eiscnhower, box 5, Bradlcy Papcrs. USAMH1; Sylvan 

Di;lry, 24, 26 Scp 44; Bmdlcy, II Soldiers S/OIJ', p. 423; Wcig1ey, Eisel/howers Lielliellanl~', PI}. 

352.357; Cir, LOI 9. 12th Army Group, 25 Sep 44, in Rpl , U.S. Army, 12th Army Group, 

Report of Opera lions, 5:93- 95; Rpl , First U.s. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 

Fcbruary 1945, 1:54. 

11 Sy lvan Dia ry, 25- 29 Scp 44; MncDonnld, The Siegfried Lillc C(IIup(ligll, PI'. 251 - 52; 

Rpt, V Corps Operations in thc ETO, p. 260; lnl, First Army 0 - 3 Jnl , 24 Scp 44. All 0 - 3 

Journal cntrics cited in this chilpter arc in 101 - 3.2 G- 3 10urnal. boxcs 1959- 1963. WWl l a I's 

Reports, RG 407, WNRC. 

Il l'lodges quote from CorIell, Cowboy Pde, p. 102. 

I. Cir, LO I. First U.S. Army, 29 SCI) 44.101 - 3.110- 3 Lclters of In structions. G- 3 1st 

Army, box 1989, WWll OIlS Rcports, RG 407. WNRC; CorIell , COll"b{)y I~c/ e, p. 102; MacDonald, 

TlreSieg{i-ied Line Campaign, p. 233: Rpt. V Corps Operations in the ETa, pp. 260. 262, 268: 

Weig1ey, EisenflOwers Lielllel/III//s, p. 358; Rpt , First U.S. Army. Report ofOI}Crilliolls. I August 

1944- 22 Febnwry 1945, 1: 54- 55, 3:6- 7. 

I) Cirs, First U.S. Army. Ordcr of Baltic: Comba! Units. 27 September 1944. 101 - 3. 14 Ordcr 

of Balllc, SCPI 44- Feb 45, WWIl Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC, and LOI, First Army. 29 Sep 44; 

Rpt. First U.S. Army, Rcport ofOllcralions, I August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1:54- 55,3:6- 7. 

I. MacDona ld. The Sieg{i'ied Line C(IIuJ)(lign, p. 323; MacDonald, Bal/le o/Ihe Hllcr/gclI 

Forest. pp. 6 1. 91; Ceci l B. Currey, Fol/ow Me {lmf Die: The Des/rlle/ioll 0/(111 American Dil'isilJII 
Frustration at rhe Wesr ~V{jll 197 

ill World IIhrll (New York : Stein and Day, 1984), p. 51; Weigley. EiselllWlI'e/'S Lielllellal//s, pp. 

365. 432- 33. 

I I Mac Donald, Ballte a/tile Huengell Forest, pp. 61 - 63: Coll ins. Liglullillg Joe, pp. 269, 

279: Conversations With General J. Lawton Collins. Combat Stud ies Institute Report 5. p. 9: 

Interv, G. Patrick Murray with II Gen Will iam B. Kean, USA (Ret.). 25 Aug 73. Murray Papers. 

DWI-1 ; Weigley. EisellllOll'er's Liell/(:II{llIt.l', p. 365. 

,. MacDonald, Batlle a/the Ih, e/·tgell Forest. pp. 62- 63. 200- 203; Harmon with MaeKaye 

and MaeKaye, Comb", COII/malldel'. p. 225; Interv. Murray with Hart. 1973, p. 59, General 

Courtney H. Hodges Oral l-l istory I>rojcet. Seni or Officers Orall-1istory Program. USA MHI. 

I. After Action Reports (AARs), First U.S. Army, for Sept ember MId October 1944. 10 1-

0.3 Aft er Action Reports, boxes 1823- 1824. WWlI Ops Reports. RG 407. WNRC; Ruppenthal. 

Logistica/ SUppOI"l 0/ the Armies. Volullle II. pp. 188, 194. 215. 247. 260; Rpt, First Army. 

COO. 18 Nov 46. p. 403; Ross and Romanus. Opera/iOIlS ill the War Against GerllltlllY. pp. 

461. 494 ; Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945. 

3:45; lnterv. I'ogue with !·Iodges. 12 Jan 50: Mayo, 011 Beaelllr ead tIIltl Bt/flle/rollt, pp. 295. 

302; Cir, Allotments in 1st Army G- 3 Section Ammunition #2 July 1944-September 1944 

Ammo Reports, box I, U.S. Army, Headquarters, First U.S. Army. Asst Chief o f Staff G- 3. 

Rel>orts and Messages: Ammun ition #2 Through Correspondence. RG 338. WNRC; MS. 

Remarks of Lynde on First U.S. Army Operations. PI'. 5- 6. Murray !'apers. OW l-! : MacDonald, 

The Siegfried Lill e Campaigll. p. 386; Jnls, First Army G-4 Tae Jnls. 14- 15, 19,30 Sep 44 . 

All G- 4 Journal entri es cited in th is study arc in 101 - 4. 2 G- 4 Journal. boxes 1993- 1996. 

WWII Ops Reports, RG 407. WN RC. 

1O Rpts. First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. PI'. 224- 25. and First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 

I August 1944- 22 February 1945.2: 139. 

11 AARs. First U.S. Army, for September and October 1944: Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report 

ofOperntions, I August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1:62. 2: 139. 4:56. 60- 61: Ross and Romanus. 

OpclYlfiollS ill the mlr Agaillsi GC/"II/(III),. p. 456; Mayo, 011 Be(lchlwlI(l (111(1 Battle/rom, p. 294: 

MeNallltu·a. Ql/arfCrll/aste/' Actil'ifie.f, p. 145: Coslllas and Cowdrey, Me(lical SelTice ill Ihe 

European Theater o/Opemtioll.f, PI'. 282- 83. 

II Ross and Romanus. Opemtimrs ill the "'itr Ag(linst Genltall)'. pp. 389- 90. 733: Cosmas 

and Cowdrey. Me(/iml Service ill the ErllYJpCall Theater o/OpemfiOils. pp. 358- 59; Interv. author 

with Wendt. 29 Apr 9 1, p. 61; Rpt . U.S. Army. ETO, General Board, Study of the Administrative 

Funct ions of the Army Group Headqu.1TIers. Study 29 . p. 5; AA R. First U.S. A rmy. for October 

1944; Jnls. First ArmyG- 4 Jnls. 24 Sep. 12 Oct 44; Rpt. First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 

1 August 1944- 22 February 1945.2: 111. 

lJ Interv. Forrest C. Pogue with Lt Gen Walter 13. Smith, USA (Rel.). 13 May 47. pp . 1- 2, 

!'ogue interviews. USAM H I: Ruppentha l. Logisliclll SIIPP()/"I ()/ Ihe Al'lII ie ~. Volume II. p. 349: 

Teleeon. author with Col Walter W. Wendt. USA (ReL), 24 Apr 97. OWU. 

H Hansen Diary, 12, 15 Sep 44: Tcleeon, author with Wendt , 24 Apr 97. 

IJ LI. Gen. Leroy Lutes quote from Domin ick Gmham and Shelford Bidwel l, CoalitiOiIS. 

Polilieialls. a/l(l Gellemls: Some Aspe .~ 0/ Commmul ill tko ~"'d rr'itrs (London: Ilrassey·s. 

1993). p. 26 1. Sec also Ruppentha l. Logistica/ Support 0/ Ihe Al'llrie.f. IV/II/lle II. p. 349. 

l~ Pogue, The Supremc Commalld. pp . 322- 23; lIr. Allph in to aut hor, 8 Jan 97. OWH: 

!nterv. Murr:1Y with Myers, 15 AI" 74, p. 59: Mayo. 011 8eachflead alld /Jattie/mlll, p. 296. 

11 Rpt. First U.S. Army. Report ofOI)C rations. I August 1944-22 February 1945. 1:62- 63. 

2: III ; Ruppenthal , Logistical Support of/he Armies. Vo/ulll e II. p. 172. 

II Ltr. Mcdaris to Sayler. 15 Feb 45. fi le 9, ETO, January- August 1945. bo)[ 4, Sayler 

Papers. Eisenhower Library. Sec also Ruppenthal. Logistic,,' Support 0/ the Armie.f, Volllllle II. 

pp. 360 6 1; Mayo. 011 Beachhead alld B(I/tle/rolll, pp. 296. 304 . 

H lIr. Mcdaris to Sayler. 15 Feb 45. 

JO Ruppenthal. I.ogistic(ll Support 0/ the Arlllies. ,",ohm/c II, pp. 359- 6 1; Mayo. 01/ 

Beachhead mId Bt/ttlc/rolll. p. 296: MacDonald, The Siegfried UIIC Climpaigll. p. 385: I nterv, 

Murray with Myers. 15 Apr 74. 1111 . 59- 60: Graham and Bidwell. Cot/liliolls. I)olilidalls. allll 

Gel/cm/s. ]Jp. 26 1. 269; MS, Carter. Carter's War. eh. 13. p. 15; Interv. Murray with Pallerson. 

23 Aug 73. pp. 18- 25. 
198 A COl/lmand POSI al H11r 

JI Mnyo, 011 Beachhe{ullllld Ball/efrolll, pp. 301 - 02: Tclecon. author with Ray. 25 No\' 96, 

OWH. 

12 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Ol)erations. 1 August 1944-22 February 1945. 2: III , 

4:3- 4; Ruppenthal. Logisticol SUppOl"t oftheAl'lI/ies. Volllllle II, pp. 248- 54: Mnyo, 011 Beachhcad 

(111(/ Balliefrollt. pp. 302- 03; Bmdley, II Soldier's SIOI"),. pp. 431 - 32; Hansen Diary, 9.11,15 

Oct 44: Weigley. Eisell/lOu'cr's Lielltell(lllls.I). 376. 

J1 Mayo, 011 Beachhead (111(/ Ill/II/efronl. pp. 299- 30 1,303; Rpt , First U.S. Army, Report of 

Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945.4:55,58; Ross ,md Romanus, OpemtiUlrs ill the 

""111' Agllimil Gerlll(lIlY, p. 462: Interv, Murnly with Lynde, pp . 29- 31, Genera l Courtney H. 

1·lodges Oral History Project. Senior Officers Oral History Program. USAMH I; MS, Remarks 

of Lynde on First U.s. Army Operations, p. 5. 

H Rpt , First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. I August 1944- 22 February 1945,2:113, 

4:6, 55- 56; Ross and Romanus, Opelmiolls ill the lVI/I" Agaillst Gerlllall),. p. 462: AARs. First 

U.S. Army, for September and October 1944; MacDonald, Th e Siegjriell Lille Call1IJ(ligll, p. 

383; Jnls, First Army 0-4 Tac Jnls, 12- 13, 16.21 - 22 Sep44, and First Army 0-4 Jnls, 12- 13 

Sep 44; Intcrv, amhor with Wendt, 29 Apr 91 , p. 59. 

J! Patton quote from Bradley. A Soldier:5 SIOI)', p. 431. Sec also Ruppenthal, Logislical 

SIIPPOrt of the Al"mies, Volllllle II, p. 179 . 

.... Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945. 1:94, 

2; 117,3: 108; AAR. First U.S. Army, for October 1944: MS, Carter. Carter's War. eh. II. pp. 

35- 37; MacDona ld, The Siegfried Lille C(IIl/p(ligll, p. 386. 

J7 Rpt , First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1 :94, 

2: 11 7. 4:58; AAN , First U.S. Army, for October 1944; 1nls, First Army 0 -4 Tac Jnls, 19.26- 27 

Sep, 2- 3 OCI 44. and First Army 0 -4 Jnls, 26 Sep. 9 OCI 44; Noss and Romanus, Operaliolls ill 

Ihe 11'<'/1' Agaillst GermllllY. pp. 389, 462, 567- 71, 577; McNamara, QlIlIJ"ferlllllsrer Aclillilies. I'· 

147: MacDonald, The Siegfried Lille Campaigll. pp. 386- 87. 

JI Nuppenthal, Logistical SlIpporl of 11111 Al"mies. Vo/ullle II, pp. 229- 32: COSlllas and 

Cowdrey, Mediclil Service ill Ihe EUl"opellll Theatel" of OpemtiollS. Pl'. 488- 89, 490- 92, 

McNamara. Qllartermllstel" lielil'ities, p. 148; Telecon interv, author w;th Lt Gen Andrew T. 

McNamara, USA (Re1.), 8 Sep 94, DWH; Ross and Romanus, Opemtiolls ill Ihe rr'tll' Against 

Gerlllall)" pp. 571,599- 607. 

J9 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Rcport of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945,2: 117, 

4: 138- 39. 158- 59; Coslllas ,HId Cowdrey. Medical Service ill tlte EIII'OIJe(1II Theater of 

OIJel"(Jfiolls. pp . 490- 96 ; Ross and Rom3nus, Operatiolls ill the 11'<'11" Agaillst Gel'mall)', PI'. 

607- 10; Tclecon interv, author with McNaIlHJnl. 8 Sep 94; InteT\'. Murray wit h Collins, 15 

Aug 73, p. 44; MS. Carter, Carter's War, eh. ! I. p. 34; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, Pl'. 444- 45. 

010 RI". First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. 1 August 1944-22 February 1945, 4:64- 65: 

McNalllar,l, Ql/al"termastCl' Activities. p. 146; Ross and ROnlll IlUS. Operatiom' ill Ihe 11'<'11' Agaillsl 

Gerlll{/JI)'. pp. 728- 30: Cir, SOP. First United States Army, I Dee 44, p. 12, 101 - 1.15 SOP 0 - 1 

1st Army, 1 Dec 44, box 1829, WWI I Ops Reports. RO 407, WNRC; 1nl, First Army 0-4 Jnl , 

16 SCI' 44: Rpt , First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 246; Ruppcnthal, Logisticul Support of the 

Armies, Ifilullle II, p. 256: Mayo. 011 Bellch/lelld lIlId BlIlllefrollt, p. 303. 

" Np1. First U.S. Army. Report of Operations, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1:93, 

2:116- 17,4:11-- 12; AAR, First U.S. Army, for October 1944; Interv, Murray with Lynde, 

pp. 2- 7; Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46. p. 246; M:1YO, 011 Beachhe{l{llIlId Balliefrollt, 

pp. 297- 98; Mac Donald, rhe Siegfried Lille Clllllplligil. pp. 385- 86; Ross and Romanus. 

Opel"lltiolls ill the JIIar Agaill.l"t Germllll)" p. 641: MS. Carter. Employment and Staff 

Proccdurcs. p. 69. COE; Ruppenthal, LogisliclIl SIII'POI"/ of the Armfo·. Voll/Ille II, Pl'. 474. 

488 , 492- 93 . 

• 1 Mayo. 011 Beachhead and Balllefi"Ol/l, pp. 298- 99; Interv, Murray with Lynde. p. 3: MS, 

Remarks of Lynde on First U.S. Army Operations, pp. 2- 7. 

<J Mayo, 011 Ilelic/rhelllllllld Ball/efrolll. pp. 333- 34; Rpl , Fir5t Army. COD. 18 Nov 

46. pp. 349- 50: Hart, "Artillery With an Amcriean A rilly in Europe," p. 26: Rpt, First U.S. 

Army, Report of Ope ratio liS, 1 August 1944- 22 FebnHlry 1945.3:29; Ltc Perry to author. 

28 Jan 97. 
Fr/lstratiol/ at tile West Wall 199 

.. Hamilton. MOIII)I. p. 107; Msg. Eisenhower to Montgomery. 15 Oct 44. in Chand lcr. cd .. 

Ei.~elll/OU'er Papers. 4:2228r: MacDonald. Tile Siegfried Lille CUlllf)lligll. pp. 213, 241. 

' $ Msg, Eisenhower to Bradley. 8 Oct 44. ill Chandler. cd .. EiseJlfloU'er/'lIpers. 4:2212- 13 . 

.. Cir. First Army 0 - 2 Estimate 33. 17 Oct 44. Sec also Cirs. LO I. First U.S. Army. 6 Oct 

44. and 8 Oct 44. both in 101 - 3.1 1 0 - 3 Letters orlnstruet ions. 0 - 3 1st Army. Oct 44. box 

1989. WWII Ops Reports, RO 407. WNRC; MacDonald. Tile Siegfrie(1 l.ille OWIIUligll . p. 278. 

<l M;lcDonald. 8allie of III{! /lIl{'rrg(ll1 Foresl. I). 86. 

" Sylvan Diary, 2- 20 Oc\ 44 . For ,I visit by King George VI to the First Army command 

poSI in Oc tobcr. sec I-Ianse n Diary. 14 Oct 44 : Inte rv. Mllrray with l'allersOIl, 23 Aug 73 . PI'. 

75- 78 . 

• 9 Corlett. Cowboy Pete. pp. 102- 06; Memos, artillery alloclHions, 10 1- 3.3 G- 3 Journal 

files. WWII OI)S Reports. RG 407. WNRC: LIT. Corlett to Smith. 2 Sep 53, Replics from 

Pa rt ic ipants- Sieg rried Line Campaign. box 184. Background Materials from Charlcs B. 

MacDonald TIll' SiI'g/'rie(1 Lille. U.S. Army in World War II. RO 319. NA RA: Inlerv. Lt Col Frank 

L. !lenry, USA. wi th LI Gcn George I. Forsythe. USA (ReL). 19 Feb 74. pp. 210- 13. Senior 

Officers Oral UislOry Program, USAM HI; Sylvan Diary. 14 Oct 44: Hanscn Diary. 2 Nov 44: 

Inlervs. Murray with Dickson. 22 Sep 72. p. 18. and I'ague wilh Hodges. 12 Jan SO: MacDonald 

The Sh'8fried Lille COII/!'tligll. p. 303; Weisley. Eisel/hower:~ Liel/lel/mlls. PI). 358- 62. 

)II I-Iansen Diary, 19 Oct 44: Coriell. Cowboy Pele. pp. 104- 06: MacDonald. The Siegfried 

Lille Call1paigll . p. 3 19; Weisley. EisellhOIl'el' s Lieulellalll.I·, p. 363: Ltrs, Bradley to Eisenhower. 

19 Oct 44. Bradley Correspondcnce with Eise nhowc r. box S. Bradlcy I'npcrs, USAM HI. nnd 

Eisenhower!o Marshall . 20 Oct 44. in Chn nd ler. cd .• Eisellhou'cr Papers. 4:2233- 34. 'I Bradley. A Soldiel'sS/o/,y, I)P. 436- 37; Inter\,. Pogue with Di ckson, 22 Dcc47, I). 2; MS. 

Carter. Carter's War. eh. II. PI). 23- 24; MlleDonald The Sie1!il'if!l/ U"e CUIII/wigl/, pp. 378- 79. 

,: Jnls, Firs! Army 0-4 Jnls, 10. IS Oct 44; Rpt. First U.S. Army. Report orOperations. I 

August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1:92.2: 114: AARs. First U.S. ArIllY. ror October and November 

1944. 10 1- 0.3 After Action Reports. boxes 1823- 1824, WWII Ops Rel)orts, RO 407. WNRC; 

Sylvan Diary, 10 Oct 44: Hansen Diary. 28- 29 Oct. 3-4 Nov 44: Mac Donald, The Sie1!iried 

/.ill(' Call1ptligi/, p. 379. 

JJ Rosengarten. ··With ULTRA From OMA I-IA Beach to Weimar. Germany," p. 129; Hanscn 

Diary. 14 Oct. 14 Nov 44: MS. Cnrter. Carter's War. c h. II, PI' . 14- 16.24-26: Bradley, A Soldiers 

SIOIJ', PI). 432. 439-40; McNamara. QlltII'/c/'/I/(Wf!r AClil'iliel·. p. 149: MS. Dickson. From Algiers 

to the £Ibc, p. 164: Intcrv. author wit h Wcndt , 29 Apr 91, p. 72; Sylva n Dinry. 10. 26 Oct 44; 

Cir. Bochicchio to Chiers or Sect ions 1[nd Attached Units. 22 Oct 44 , 101 - 1.15 SOl's. bo:< 

1829. WWll Ops ReJlorts. RG 407, WNRC; Jill. First Army 0 - 3 Jnl. 25 Oct 44 . 

,. Rpl. First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 1 August 1944 22 February 1945,3:174-

78: Cir. Bochicch io to Chiers or Sect ions and Attached Units. 22 Oct 44; Thompson and I-I arris. 

The Olllcollle. p. 133. 

IJ Interv, Murray with Patterson. 23 Aug 73. p. IS: Uansel1 Diary. 14 Aug. 14.22 Oct 44; 

MS. Cartcr, Carter's War. eh. II. p. 45 . 

.. Sylvan Di ary, 12 Aug. 16. 18,21- 22.26. 30 Sep. 1,4. 6 Oct 44; MS, Robert St. John, 

NBC. Courtney I-lodges. 15 Dec 44. 1944- 1945 I'ersonal Correspondence. box 7. 1·IOOges Papers. 

Eisenhower Library: HOllclet. "The Victor or Aachen:' p. 17. 

" Rpts. First U.S. Army, Report or Operations. I August 1944- 22 Februllry 1945.4:273-

8 1, and First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46, PI). 383- 85. 

JI Rpts. First U.S. Army. RCI)ort ofOper:nions, I August 1944- 22 February 1945,4:282-

87. 290- 94: U.S. Army, ETa. OcneT111 Board. Psycholosien l Warfnrc inlhe European Theater of 

OpwLtions. Study 131. PI'. 6- 7. I I. CMI I Library: nnd First Army, cal). 18 Nov 46, pp. 385-

86. MS. Organization and Operation of an Army Headqullrters in Combat. pp. 32- 33. Dclbert 

L. Bristoll'apers, Mrs. Vivian Bristol. Florissant. Mo.; Rpts. First Army 0 - 2 I'eriod ie Rpts for 

18 Oct. 6 Nov. I Dec 44. 

j9 Cir. Maj Oen J. A. Ulio. Adj Gen. to Distribution List. 24 Aug 44. 10 1- 3.22 0 - 3 

Memorandums and Miscellaneous Pnl)Crs First Army, box 1992. WWII OI)S Reports, RO 407. 

WNRC; Rpt. First Army. CO D. 18 Nov 46. pp. 431 - 32; Memo. Eisenhower ror Senior 

Commanders, 6 Nov 44. in Chandler. cd., Eisenhower P(/!,er.~, 4:2290 92. 
200 A COII/malld Posl al Wt/l' 

..0 Hansen Diary, II OCI, 3- 4, 17 Nov 44; FM 100- 5, Field Se,.vice R(;'gll/tlliol!~: Operatiolls, 

1941, pp. 18- 21; Rpl, U.S. Army, ETO, General Board, Special Scnliccs Organization, Study 

113, pp. 3-4, 7- 8, CMH Library; Graham and Bidwell, Coafiliollll. Politicians. (///(1 Gel/ends, 

pp.2 11 - 12. 

01 Rpl. First U.S. Army, Report orOpcrations, I August 1944-22 February 1945,2:23- 26; 

Cirs, Col R. S. Nourse, Adj Gen, First Army, 10 Corps. Division, and Separate Unit Commanders, 

15 Ocl 44, box 63. U.S. Army, Headquarters, First U.S. Army, Adj Gcn Section, General 

Correspondence, 1940- 1947, RG 407. WNRC, and Nourse 10 Corps, Division, and ScpanLlc 

Unit Commanders, 15 Nov 44, 101 - 3.22 0 - 3 Miscellaneous Memos, HQ 1 st Army, Oct 44-Feb 

4S, box 1992, WWll Ops Reports, RG 407, WN RC; Sylvan Diary, 21 Oct 44: AARs, First U.S. 

Army, for September through December 1944, 101 - 0.3 A ncr Action Reports, boxes 1823- 1824, 

WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. 

02 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945, 2:29- 30: 

AARs, First U.S. Army, for September through December 1944. 

0) Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 FChrunry 1945,2:27- 28, 

45- SI: AARs. First U.s. Army, for September through December 1944; Rp1. U.S. Army, 121h 

Army Group, Rcport of Operations, 2:18- 19. 

~ Rpts, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 178- 79, and First U.S. Army, Report ofOpcrations, 

1 August 1944- 22 February 1945, 3:40-43,121- 22. 

<>5 Rpl , First U.S. Army, Reporl ofOper;ltions, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945,2:48- 51, 

237- 48: AARs, First U.S. Army, for September through December 1944. 

M Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945, 2:49, 

4:229-30,242; AARs, First U.S. Army, for September through December 1944. 

61 Quote from Sylvan Diary, 17 Sep 44, and sec also 23 Sep44. Cirs, First Army G- 2 

Estimate 25, II Sep 44; Estim;lte 27, 12 Sep 44; and Estimatc 3 L lOcI 44. Hansen Diary, 13 , 

20 Scp 44. 

'" Rpts. First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945, 2:41, 

4:228- 29, and First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 161, I 64- 6S. 

W Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944-22 February 1945, 1:94, 

and First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46. pp. 360- 61,443 , 448-49, 4S3 , 466- 70; Memos, documents 

in [0 I- I. IS SOP for Security Headquarters, G- I, I st Army, Nov, Dec, 1944, WWI[ OilS Reports, 

box 1829. RG 407, WNRC; AAR, First U.S. Army, for November 1944: Memo, Senior for 

Corps, Division, and Separatc Unit Commanders, 7 Dec 44, 101 - 3.22 G- 3 Misccllancous 

Mcmos, HQ, 1 5t Army, Oct 44- Feb 4S, box 1992, WWII Ops Rcports, RG 407, WNRC. 

70 Rpts, First U.s. Army, Report ofOpcrations, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945, 4:260, 

and First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpts for 20 Sep, 7 Oct 44: Kleber and Birdsell, Chemicals ill 

COli/bat, pp. 78- 80. 

7, Sylvan Diary, 23 Oct 44. 

71 Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report ofOpcralions, 1 August 1944-22 Fcbruary 1945, 1:94, 165, 

2: I [8, 3:73- 74, 77 , 80, 83, 4: 16, and First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpt for 20 Sep 44 ; MS, Dickson, 

Algiers 10 the Elbc, p. 158; Bull. First Army AA Bulletin 18, 27 Sep 44, ;lI1d Mcmo, Bochicchio 

for Bradlcy, 22 Oct 44. both in [01 - 3.22 G- 3 Miscellancous Mcmorandums and Papers- Radar 

Equipmcnt, First Army, 22 October 1944, box 1992, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407. WNRC; Mcmos, 

First Army G- 2, Analysi~ of V- I Activity Prceeding and During Ihe Bombardmcnt of Liegc, Mise 

Prior to 0 Day, box 5, Dickson Papers, USMA. and Maj Christopher H. Ilobbc, Passive Air Defcnse 

Officer, G- 3. for Hcwitt, 25 Sep 44, 101 - 3.22 G- 3 McmOfilndllms and Misecllaneous Pill)crsFirst Army, box 1992, WW]I Ops Rcports, RG 407, WNRC; Rpt, First Army, COD. 18 Nov 46, p. 

261; MacDonald, TheSiegrriell Lille CllIllpaigll, p. 230: Telccoll, author with Col Roger Ray, USA 

(Rct.), 30 Jan 95, DWH: Ltr, Col Roger Ray, USA (Re!.), to au1hor, II J;m 97, DW II; Sylvan 

Diary, 1,2 1- 24,27- 29 Oct, 21 - 24, 27- 29 Nov, 3, 6, 12 Dcc 44. 

lJ Earl F. Ziemke, The u.s. Army in the Occuplltion ojGerwallY. f944- 1946, Army Historical 

Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Ccntcr of Military History, 1975), PI'. 84, 104, 136- 37, 

146, 158, 161 - 62; MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, I). 162; Cir, Scnior to Corps, Division, and 

Scparate Unit Commanders, 15 Sep44. 101 - 3.22 G- 3 Mcmorandums and Misccllancous [>;!pcrsFirst Army, box 1992, WWll O])S Rcports, RG 407, WN RC. 
FrtlSlr(lliOJl (lI l lie Wesl Wall 20 1 

U Ziemke, The U.S. Arll/y ill the Occupatioll ofGe/"lmwy, pp. 133- 39, 146- 47; Rpt, First 

Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 242--44; MS, Dickson, Algiers 10 the Elbc, pp. 161- 62 ; Rpts, First 

Army G- 2 Periodic Rpts for 12- 14 Sep 44, and First U.S. Army, Report of Opera lions, I August 

1944- 22 February 1945, 1 :56; Sylvan Diary, 16 Sep 44. 

n Coles and Weinberg, Soldiers BecQllle GOI'e/"llors, pp. 802- 04. 808- 09, 823; Rpt. First 

U.S. Army, Rcport of Operations, I August 1944-22 February 1945, 2:39. 162- 71; AARs, First 

U.S. Army, for Septcmber through Dccembcr 1944; Memo, Brig Gcn II. 0. Lewis, Adj Gen, 

12th Army Group. for 1·lodges. II Sep44, and Cir, Senior to Corps, Division, und Separate Unit 

Commanders, II Sep 44, both in 101 - 3.220- 3 Memorandums and Miseell;meous I'apersFirst Army, box 1992, WWII Ops RCI)Orts, RG 407, WNRC. Cirs, Nourse to Corps, Division, 

und Separate Unit Commanders, 3 Dee 44, 101 - 3.22 0 - 3 Miscellaneous Mcmos. HQ, I st Army, 

Oct 44- Feb 45. box 1992, WWII Ops Repon s, RO 407. WNRC; First Army G- 2 Estimate 27, 

12 Sep 44; and First Army 0 - 2 Estimate 28. 15 Sep 44. Jnl. First Army 0 --4 Jnl , 16 Sep 44. 

T. Ruppenthal, Log islic(11 Support of 'he Ar/llies, I'o/I//lle II, pp. 178--80. 189; MacDonald. 

The Siegfried Lille CamJNIigll, p. 389; AARs, First US. Army, for October and November 1944: 

McNamara. QuarferllUls/el' AC/iI'ities. p. 151; Rpt, First U.S. Army, Repon of Operations. I 

August 1944- 22 February 1945.2:116. 

17 Ruppenlhal, Logistical SlIpporl althe Arlllie.~, 10/lIlIIe II, pp. 179, 349; Ross and Romanus, 

Opemliolls illlhe "'cIrAguill.~1 GermallY, pp. 39 1- 92; Hansen Dinry, 27 Noy 44. 

T, Rosengarten, "With ULTRA From OMA HA Bcach to Weimar. Germany," p. 129, 

~ Cirs, First Artily G- 2 Es!imate 32, 9 Oct 44, and Estima!e 33. !7 Del 44; Rpts, First 

ArmyG- 2 I'criodic Rpts for 10- 18 Oct 44 ; Bcnnctt, ULTRA i •• lhe IIb'/, PJl. 17 1, 183. 

to Cir, First Army G- 2 Escimale 34, 31 Oct 44; Rpts. First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpts for 18 

OCI- 8 Nov 44 ; MS, Dickson. Algiers to the Elbe. p. 165: Rpt . Rosc ngnrlcn to Taylor. 21 May 

45, sub: Report on ULTItA Intelligence at First US. Army. SRII- 023 Pt , I. box 9. Records orthe 

National Security Agency, RG 457, NA RA; Weigley, £isellholl'er~' Lieu/emlll/S, p. 433; 

MaeJ)Qnald. Th" Siegfriet/ Lille Cmllpaigll. pp. 409- 10. 

II Cir. First Army G- 2 Estimate 32. 9 Oct 44; MacDonald The Sif-gfried /.il/e Comptligll, 

PJl. 326- 28; MacDonald. BailIe oflhe I-/uel"lgell FOn'sl, pp, 65- 66; Colli ns, Ughilling Joe, p, 

274: Currey, Follow Me alld Die, p. 62. 

I I RpI S, First Army 0 - 2 Period ic Rpls for 10- 29 Oct 44, and First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46, 

jJl'. 169- 70; MS, Dickson, Algiers to Ihe Elbc, p. 163; MS. Cnrter. Cllfler's Wnr, ch. II, pp. 30-

33: Interv, Murray with Dickson , 22 Sep 72, I'll. 21 - 22; MS, Org;,niznlion nnd Operntion ofnn 

Army Headquarters in Combat, pp. 21- 24. 

aJ Msg, Bochicchio to Bradley. 29 Oct 44 , 101 - 3.22 G- 3 Memorandums and Miscellaneous 

I'llpers- First Army, Oct 44, box 1992. WWlI Ops RejJorts, RG 407. WNRC . 

... Rpts, First Army G- 2 I'eriodic Rpts fo r 30 Oet- 8 Nov 44; Msg, Kean 10 Gerow. 7 Nov 

44. 101 - 3.22 Mise Memoranda nnd I'llpers, 0 - 5 1st Army. Nov 44. box 1992. WWI I Ops Reports, 

RG 407, WNRC; MacDonald. The Siegfried Lille Campaigll, pp, 342. 374; Currey, Follow Me 

(III(/ Die, p. 62. 

I S Cirs, Eise nhower to Commanders, 28 Oct 44. in Chand ler. cd .. Eisellhower Papers. 

4:2257- 59, and LOI 10. 12th Army Group, 21 Oct 44. in RPI, U.S. Army, 12th Army Oroup, 

Report of Operations. 5 :97- 99 . 

.. Sylv:,n Diary, 18- 31 Ocl 44; MacDonald, The Sieg(rie(1 Lille Cmllpaigll, pp. 340-4 1. 

399- 400,409; Collins, Uglllllillg Jo e, pp . 274- 75; Rpl. V Corps Operations in the ETO. p. 282, 

11 MS. Organizlltion and Opernlion of an Army Headqunrlers in Combat. pp. 24- 30: MS, 

Cnrter. CMler's WlIT, ch . II, pp, 42- 44 ; Cir, LOI, First U,S. A!'IllY. 26 Oct 44, 300.6 Letters of 

Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj Gen Seclion, General Correspondence, 1940- 1947, RG 

338. WNRC . 

.. Syh'an Diary, I Nov 44: Rpl. V Corps Operations in the ETO. pp, 28 1- 88; Charles B. 

MllcDonald and Sydney 1'. Mathews. Three B(lII/es: Amm·ille. 11111/;:;0, tllld SChlllit/I, U.S. Army 

in World War II (Washington , D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Mili tary lIistory. 1952). pp. 25 1- 55; 

MacDonald. The Sit'gfried /.ille Cmlll)aigll. pp. 340--48: MacDonald. BailIe of tile Hllerlgell 

Fon-sl. pp. 88- 90: Currey, FoliaII' Me alld Die. pp. 50, 59- 60. 64 66; Inlerv, Murray wilh 

Di ckson, 22 Sep 72, pp. 18- 19. 
202 A ComlJlal/d Post af War 

" Rpt, First U.S. Army. Report of Opera lions. I August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1:7 1: CiT. 

Amendment 3 10 LO I 10, 12th Army Group, 4 Nov 44. in Itl)!. U.S. Army. 121h Army Group. 

Report of Opcr a lions. 5: 102: Wilmot. The Struggle/Of' Europe. p. 563: Memo, First Army G- 3. 

Reason fo r De lay o f Annc k, First Army 10 11 Nov. 101 - 3. 11 G 3 Letters of Instructions G 3 

15\ Army Ocl 44, b O)l; 1989. WW[I Ops Rerom, RG 407. WNRC: MacDon:lId. Th e SieJifrie(1 

Lille C(lIIIj)(ligll. p. 392. -

'10 RPI, First U.S. Army. Report of Operations, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1:7 1. 

2: 11 5; Sylv3n Diary, 28.)0 OC1, 7 Nov 44: Memo. Thorso n for Hodges. 7 Nov 44. 101 - 3.22 G 

3 Misce llaneous Memoranduills and I'llilcrs, 15\ Army. Nov 44, box 1992, WWJ l Ops Reports. 

RG 407. WNRC; 1nls, First Army G- 3 Jnls, 1- 2,5- 6 Nov 44 , and First Army G-4 J nls. 3 1 Oct, 

1- 5,7- 9 Nov 44: Rpts, U.S. Army. COD. IS Nov 46, I>P . 367- 68, and V Corps Operations in the 

ETO. p. 303: MacDonald, Till' Sieglriet/ Li,w CWllpaigll. pp. 227.400. 

91 Rpt . First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. I August 1944 22 February 1945, 1:71: Cir. 

First U.S. Army. Order o rll:llllc: Combat Uuits. 27 Oct 44. 101 - 3. 14 Order of Bailie. Sept 44 

Feb 45. WW II Ops Re porls. ItG 407. WNRC: Memos. arlillery a llocations: MacDonald. The 

Sieg/"rict/ Lille C(//Ilpaigll, pp. 397, 400. 

01 Sylva n Diary. 2- 5 Nov 44: ll1ls. Firsl Army G- 3 luis, 2 8 Nov 44: Currey, Fol/ow Me 

mit/ Die, p. 143. 

OJ Syh'an Dinry. 6- 8 Nov44: Msg, Kean to Gerow. 7 Nov 44 , 101 - 3.22 G- 3 Misce llaneous 

Melllorandums and Pflpers. 1st Artily, No" 44, box 1992, W\VII Ops rl . RG 407, WNRC; 

Rpl . V Corps Operat ions inth e ETO, p. 298: MacDonald ntHI Mathews. rllrce B(II//es. PI}. 362 

63; MacDonald. Th e Sie8r,.ied Linc Camptlig" , p. 369: MacDonald, /J{III/e oflhe fll/eJ"fgcl/ Forl'sl. 

p. 107 . Intervs, Murrny wi th Dickson. 22 Sep 72, pp. 16- 17,24; wilh Collins. 15Aug 73, p. 42; 

and Spernw with Collins, p. 224. \Veigley, Eiscnhower:~ Uelllelwills. pp. 368- 69; Currey, Follow 

Meum/ Die. pp. 22 1- 25, 260- 64: Gavin. 0" 10 Berli", pp. 265- 66 . 

... MS. USAF Historical Division. Air UniversilY, Tactical Opeflltion s of the Eighth Air 

Fo rce, 6 June 1944- S May 1945, USAF Historical Study 70, p. 7 1. CM U Library; Memos, 

I' lanning Papers in Operalion "'Q" and Offensive by First and Ni nth Arm ies. Narrative Re port 

(Nov 16-30). box 7, 1·lodges I'apers, Eisenhower Libmry. 

~! MS. Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force. USAF lI iSlorical St udy 70, pp. 7 1- 72; 

Memos. Planning Papers in 01}Cnllion "Q"' and Offcnsive by First and Ni nth Armies: David G. 

Rempel, "'Check at the Rhine," in Hurope: ARGUMENT (0 VI-: 0(1)", )(/1/1/(/1)' 194410 Moy /945. 

cd. Crnvcll and Cate, p. 63 1: MacDo nald The Siegfried Lille Calli/wig", PI). 403- 05: MacDonald, 

111111/(' of the I-IlI erlg('II Forl'st, p. 124; We igley, Eisell/lOwer s Liell(ellmlts, p. 38 1: Hug hes, 

OVeRLORD, p. 266 . 

... MS, Tactical Operat ions of the Eighth Air Force. USAF IliSlorical Study 70, I}P. 7 1 72; 

Memos. Plnllning I'npcrs in OllCration "Q"' and Offensive by First and NinthAnnies; Cir. I lodges 

to Collins, Commanding General, 49th AAA Brigade , 10 Nov 44, 101 - 3.11 G- 3 Lellers of 

Instructions, G- 3 1st Army, box 19S9. WWll Ops Reports, RG 407. WNRC; Bmd1cy. A Soldie/"'s 

SIOI)', p. 440; MncDonald, TlleSiegfriell Lille ClI/llplligll. pp. 405 06: MacDonald Ball/e oflhe 

lIul!ngell Forest, p. 124; Weigley. Eisellhower's Lielt/eIl/III/S, I>. 38 1; Rpt, U.S. Army, COD, 18 

Nov 46, pp. 268- 69: H;lnsen Di ary, 16 Nov 44 ; Hughes. OVERLORD, p. 267 . 

• 1 Sylva n Diary, 9 15 Nov 44; Cir. FirSI Army G- 2 Estimate 35. 12 No" 44; Rpts. First 

Army G- 2 Periodic Rpls for I 15 Nov 44; Jnls, First Army 0 - 3 l nl5. 10- 11 , 13- 16 No\' 44 ; 

Ilansen Di ary, 10. 14- 15 Nov 44 : Bradley, A Soh/ier:~ StOl')', pp. 439- 40 . 

.. MS. ~1ctical Operatio ns of the Eighth Air Force, USAF Il iSlorical Study 70, pp. 72- 73; 

Sylva n Diary, 16 Nov44; Rempel, "Check allhe Rhine," in Ellmpc: ARGUM£NTlo V£ Da)" J(/IIIIIII)I 

/944 10 May 1945. cd. Craven and Cate, p. 632; MS, George, Ninth Air Force, April to November 

1944. p. 3 1S; Memo. Quesada, 23 Feb 45. 1944 O[>emtion "Q" and Offensive by First and Ninth 

Armies. Narmli\'e RellOrt (Nov 16- 30), box 7. l'lodges P,'pers, Eisenhower Library; MacDonald 

The SiL'8friet/ Line CtllllfHligl', pp. 41 2- 13. 43 I; Weigley, Eisen/wwer s Lielllel/(lIIts, p. 382 . 

., Sylvan Diary, 16- IS No" 44; Cir, First Army G 2 Estimate 36, 20 No\! 44: Rpts. First 

Army G- 2 Pe riodic Rpls for 17- 18 Nov 44; Hansen Diary. 16- 20 Nov 44 ; Bradley, A So/dier:1 

SIOI)', pp. 440-4 1; Macl)onnl d, The Siegfried Li'le ClIIII/Hlig" . p. 431. Quesada quote rrom 

Hug hes, OVERLORD, p. 252, and sec also p. 251. 
204 A COII/mond Post (1/ Wi'll' 

Papcr~, 0 - 3 lSi Army, Dec 44, box 1992, WWI I Ops Reports, itO 407, WNRC: R[)\s, First 

Army 0 - 2 Periodic RplS for 29- 30 Nov, 1- 9 Dec 44; Cir. First Army 0 - 2 Estimate 37.10 DCI: 

44: Memos, artillery allocations: Jilis. First Army 0 - 3 1n1s, 4- 6, 9 Dec 44. and First Army G4 Jill, 6 Dcc 44: Mac Dol1(lld, The Sicg(ric(/ Lille Campaigll. pp. 598. 600: MllcOonald Barile of 

'he HllcrlgCII Fon:SI, PI). 188- 89; Rpl. V Corps Operations in the ETO, Jlp. 330- 34; Hansen 

Diary, 9 Dec 44. 

117 Sylvan Diary, 10- 15 Dec 44; RpIS. First Army 0 - 2 Periodic Rpts for 10- 15 Dec 44: 

1111, First Army 0 - 3 Jill. 14 Occ 44. 

,,' Rpl , U.S. Army, ETQ, General Board, Report on Ihe Organiz:uioll of lhe Army 

Headquarters nnd Hcadqunrlcrs Company, Study 24, pp. 1- 2, CMH Library; Msgs, Dickson to 

Asst Chicf of Staff, 12th Army Group, 19 Aug 44,320.3 T /O Vol. I, box 126, and MOlj E. H. 

Korcl11cl11, ASSI Adj Gen, 12th Army Group, to l'lodgcs, 31 OCI 44, 320.3 T/O Vol. IV, box 12 7, 

bOlh in U.s. Army, HQ, 12th Army Group, Spccial StOlfT, Adj Gen Scction, Administrmive Uraneh, 

Decimal file, RG 331, NARA; RPI, U.S. Army, ETO, GcneralBoard. Organizlltion and Functions 

of 0 - 1 Sections in Army Groups and Armies. Study 9, I'. II, CM H Library; Mcmos, for Army 

COl11l11,lIlder ,!11d aides, HQ, FUSA, 4 Sep 44, and Dickson for G- I. 9 Sep 44. bOlh in 320.3/415 

l3inder #2 SepOlrale Folder. box 96. U.S. Army, I-IQ, First U.S. Army, Adj Gen Section, General 

Correspondcnee. 1940- 1947, RG 338, WNRC; TOE 200- 1, Nea(/qll(lI"Iers. Army, War 

DepMtmcnL 26 October 1944, OrglH1izalional Hislory BrOlnch. CMH. 

119 Thorson quote from MacDonald, TIle Siegfried Lille CWIlf}oigll, p. 619; Int erv, Pogue 

wilh Hodges. 12 Jan 50; Sylvan Diary, 14 Scp, 20 Nov 44. 

IJU 1·lansen Diary, 9, 23 Oct, 7. 14- 15 Nov 44 ; MS, Carler, Carter's W"r, ch, II , p. 44. 

Thorson quote from Bradley, A Soldier:~ Slm}', p. 440. 

I I I lnlerv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73. Pl'. 95- 96; MS, Carter, Carter's War. eh. II, 

p. 45; AA R. First U.S. A rmy, for Novcmber 1944: Rpt, U.S. Army. 12th Army Group, Report of 

Operations, 2:18- 19; Ltr, Perry to author, 28 Jan 97. 
Fmslra tioll at the West Wall 203 

100 Cir, LOI, First U.S. Army, 19 Nov 44,101 - 3.11 G- 3 LCIICTS oflnstTuctions, G- 3 1st 

Army, Nov 44, box 1989, WWI I Ops Reports, RG 407, WN RC: Sylvnn Diary, 19- 20 Nov 44: 

Rpt, V Corps OI}Crlltions in thc ETO, PI}. 310. 315- 16: MncDonnld 7l!e Siegfried Lille Cfllllpaigll. 

pp. 438- 41; MneDonnld. 81111/e of the Hllertgell FOI·est. Jlll. 148- 50. For more on the bnllie of 

the H(irtgen Forest, sec Edw:1rd G. /I.'Ii1ler. A Dark IIlId Bloody Groulld: Hie Hllertg(m Forest 

alld the RoeI' Ri"er Dams. 1944- /945 (Col1cge Station: Texns A&M University Press. 1995). 

101 Syl"nn Diary. 21 - 24, 27 Nov 44 ; Interv. Murray wi th Kean, 25 Aug 73: Rpt, V Corps 

Opera tions in the ETO, pp . 318- 20; MacDonald, The Siegfried Line ClIlllpaigll, p. 451; 

Mac Donald. BlIllle of the Hue/"lgell Forest. pp. 154. 173, 203- 04: Weiglcy, Eisellfl(Jwers 

LieUlellallt~·, pp. 4 1 7- 19; Llr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 27 Nov 44 , in Chandler, cd., Eisellhower 

Paper.\", 4:2321 , 

101 AARs. First U.S. Army, for September through December 1944; Sylvan Di,lry, 10 Dec 

44; RPI, Activi ties of the Adjutant General Section, 0 Day through 7 Mny 1945,300.6 AGO 

Memos. 10/43- 12/45, box 62. Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence. 1940- 1947, RG 338, 

WN RC; MS, Carter, Cnrter's War, eh. II . p. 34; Bradley, A Soldier:~ StOt}', Pl'. 444-47 . 

10J Llr. Lt Col Eugene R. Wood, USA R (Rel.), 10 amhor, 30 Jan 97, DWH. 

I~ Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945,2:12-

14, nnd First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46, PI', 149- 50, 15 7; AARs, First U.S . Army, for September 

through December 1944. 

10j Rpts, First U.S. ArI11Y, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945,2: 14, 

and First Anny, COO, 18 Nov 46, p. 157. 

100 Elbridge Colby, "Replacements for:1 Field Army in Combat," Illfill/tl)' lOll/"lUtl60 (March 

1947): 12- 18. 

!0 1 Rpt , First U.S. Army, Rcport of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945,2: 14-1 5: 

AAR, First U.S. Army, for November 1944. 

1\l8 Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report ofOperntions, I August 1944- 22 February 1945,2: 16- 20: 

AARs, First U.S. Army, for Septcmber through December 1944. 

) (to Alber! J. Glass, cd., NCIII"ops)'cfli(ltl)' ill World 11'</1" II, "01. 2, Orerscm' 7'ltcatcl"s 

(Wnshington . D.C.: Office of the Surgeon Genera l. 1973), pp. 28 1- 93: Cosmns and Cowdrey, 

Medical Sen1ice ill the Ellropean Theatel" o/Operatioll.r, pp. 385- 86. 

110 Cosmas ,111d Cowdrcy, Medical Sen 1ice ill tlte Ellropeal/ Theater oj Ope/"{/tioll~·. Pl'. 

359- 60,366,372- 77,382- 90; Cir, First U.S. Army, SOl', I Dec 44, p. 48; RPI, First U.S. Army, 

Report of Opera lions. 1 August 1944- 22 Februnry 1945,4:134- 39,150.153- 55. 

III Rpt , First U.S. Army, Report ofOpcrntions, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945,3:2-4. 

6- 7; 1·lart , "Artillery With an American Army in Europe," p. 26; Cir, LO I, First Army, 29 Nov 

44, 300.6 Letters of Instructions, box 62, First Army. Adj Gen Section, GencTul Correspondence. 

1940- 1947, RG 338, WN RC; AA Rs, First U.S. Army, for September and October 1944. 

III Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945,3:7,15, 

25; Sylvan Diary, 21 Nov 44; AA Rs, First U.S. Army, for September and October 1944. 

IIJ Rempel. "Check nt the Rhine," in Eumpe: ARGUMENT to /IE D(I)" l(lIlI/(II)' 194410 

May 1945, cd. Crnven and CalC, pp. 611. 614- 16: MS . George, Ninth Air Force, April to 

November 1944, pp. 289, 292, 302- 05; Inlerv, Long nnd Stephenson with Quesada, 13 May 75, 

sec. 6. p. 3: MacDonald, The Siegfried Lille C(lIIII)(ligll, pp. 381 - 82; RPI, First U.S. Army, Report 

ofOperntions, I August 1944- 22 Februnry 1945, I: 169- 70; Hughes, OVER/..OIW, PI). 251 - 70. 

II. Cir, First U.S. Army, SOP, I Dec 44, pp. 32- 33; MncDonnld, Tile Siegfl"ied /..ille 

Call1paign, p. 24: Jacobs, "Uatlle for Fnlllce," in C(lse SII/dies ill tfle f)( e1opl/lellt oj Clo,I'e A if 

Support, cd. Cooling, p. 266: Intcrv, Murrny with l'allerson, 23 Aug 73, I'P. 28- 29; George. 

"Bnltle of France,"' in EIII"Ope: AUGUMENT to VE Day. lalll/w)' 1944 to Ma)' 1945. cd. Craven 

and Cutc, pp. 245-46; Hansen Diary, 15 Nov, 7 Dec 44; Hughes, OVERLORD, p. 231. 

liS Sylvnn Diary, 22, 30 Nov, 2- 5, 7- 9,11 - 14 Dcc 44 ; Rpts, First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpts 

for 29- 30 Nov, 1- 15 Dcc 44: Jnls, First Artily 0 - 3 1nls, 30 NOli, 1,3 Dcc 44; MS, CMtcr, 

Cnrter's War, ch. II, p. 33; MacDonnld, rile Siegjriell Lille Campaigll. pp. 596. 598. 

II. Sylvan Diary, 4- 9 Dec 44: Cir, LOI. First US. Army, 6 Dec nnd 8 Dec 44, 300.6 Letters 

of Instructions, box 62 , First Army, Adj Gen Scction, Gencr,d Correspondcnce, 1940- 1947, RG 

338. WN RC; Memo, 12th Army Group. 8 Dec 44, 10 1- 3.22 Miscellaneous Memorandums and 
7 

"The Rock of Gibraltar" 

The First Army Headquarters at the Bulge 

A s dawn approached on 16 December [944, the Fi rst Army headqua rters 

showed little awareness or tile storm that was about to break. To the north, 

Coll ins' VII Corps was waili ng for Gerow's V Corps in the First Army center 10 

ca pture the Rocl" dams. In the so uth, all lay qu iet on the sector held by 

Middl eton's VII I Corps. Its 75-mi lc lengt h rep rese nted almost two-thirds of 

the First Army front and about three times the length of a normal corps front. 

To strengthen ils adva nce along the Aachen-Cologne axis and to be ready to 

exploit allY breakthrough to the Rhin e, the First Army headquarters had concentrated mosl of its units in the V and VII Corps sectors and most of its service installations forward in the triangle between Spa, Verviers to the north, 

and Li ege to the northwest. They thus lay directly beh ind the V Corps front. 

The quiet V[[ [ Corps sector se rved as a place to acclimate green div isions and 

rest and refit worn-out veteran di visions in the absence of enough reserves to 

rotate units out of the li ne. [n the rear areas behind and on the fringes of this 

thinly he ld front, the Fi rst Army sta ffhad placed onl y a few major insta ll ations. 

Seven mi[es south of Spa lay the map depot at St ave lot. A truckhcad was stationed near Butgcnbach, fifteen miles east of the First Army command post. 

Just north of Butgenbach, ncar Elsenborn, was <In enginee r dump. One ammunition supply point was located near Waimes, twe lve mi les southeast of Spa, 

and another lay north of the VIII Co rps headq uart ers at Bastogne, which was 

thirty-five miles soulh of the resort. Two dumps with a total of three million 

gal lons of gasoline wcre sta tioned e ight miles sou theast of Spa, near Malmedy.' 

(Map 12) 

At Spa itsclf, many of the slaff section chiefs were taking advantage of the 

relative lull for a leave from the headq uarte rs. The First Army G- 3, G- 4, and 

artillery, ordnance, and antiaircraft officers had all returned to England, whi le 

the G- 2 took a few days of furlough in Paris. For a headquarters whose forces 

were actually in the process of an offensive, the number of staff chiefs absent 

at one time is striking. Undoubtedly, many of the staff heads wanted a rcst prior 

to the offensive that they anticipated would follow the ca pture of the Roer dallls. 2 

Of the First Army G- 2 officers who would later claim to have predicted the 

Ardennes offensive, Di ckso n was the 1110st visible, protesting to the end of his 
• 

THE ARDENNES 

15 December 1944 

(,"'" line 

W GOIWBII 

ELEVATlO", 1'1 METERS 

= '00 

, , 

\, 

" .. 0 r--.) RlANOS 

=. 

a LUXEMBOUR 

z 

< 
"The Rock of Gibraltar ": The First Arm)' Headquarters at the Bulge 207 

life tha t he had foreseen the German attack and sounded the a larm .

J By his 

account, he began to have rese rvat ions about his optimisti c 20 November 

est imat e in early December. Prisoner interrogations at the time revea led the 

presence of four SS panzer divisions along the Rhine so uth of Diisseldorf; reconnaissance planes spotted intensified rail and vehicle traffic opposite the 

First Army front ; and a capt urcd cnemy order disclosed that the Germans were 

forming Englis h-speaking units to conduct raids and sa botage on American 

command posts. A request from the G- l larget subsec tion for bombing raids 

against enemy assembly areas wa s approved by I-lodges and Quesada , but, 

Di ckson stated, the Eighth Air Force tu rned down the mission as "unremun era · 

tive."4 Nonethe less, on 10 December the First Army G- 2 iss lied his contro -

versial Est imat e 37, in which he raised as a probabl e enemy strategy th e exhaustion of the First Army 's Roer drive followed by an all-out countera ttack as 

the First Army crossed the plain between the RoeI' and Erft Rivers. Over the 

next few days, Dickson later contended, he became certain that the focal point 

would be the Ardenn es, and finally, on the evening of 14 December, he slapped 

th e 111ap and proclaimed his suspi c ions, a prediction that, he c laimed, caused 

Hodges to request two divisions from Bradley for the VII I Corps sector. Di ckson 

then left for Paris, st aling lalCr that he needed th e rest and was confident that 

he had done all that he co uld.s 

The written record supports Dickso n's case to II point- but only to a point. 

His daily periodic reports for early December and Estimate 37 leave no doubt 

of his anxiet y over th e prese nce of a large , uncotllmilled enemy rese rve. When 

Estimate 37 ventures to predict th e time and place of the otTensive, however, it 

repeatedly returns to a counterattack beyond th e Roer in response to an All ied 

crossing of that rive r and refers to th e VII I Corps front only as a "compa rative ly qui et sec tor" for seasoning new formations. For a document that Dickson 

would lat er na un t as evidence of his foresight , Estimate 37 provides a rathe r 

shaky fOllndation on which to build a case. 6 

While more clairvoyant , the pe riodi c reports for II to 15 December also 

fall short ofpredicling the time, place, and scal e of th e offensive. Reports for 

12 to 13 Decembcr show enemy di visions arri ving in the rear area op posite the 

VIII Corps but also state th at two d ivisions on that front should soon move 

north, indicating only a nor111 a l rotation of units. On th e othe r hand, the 14 

December report- composed by Dickson 's deputy, Col. William Silvey, after 

the G- 2 had left for Paris-cites as "vcry interestin g" reports from the inte l'l'ov 

g<lIion by VI11 Corps intelligence officers of a German woman who saw ri ve rcrossing eq ui pment ncar l3 itburg. Silvey noted th at this ind icated an offensive 

intent. Hours before the attack. the re port for 15 December points to reinforcements in the V and VI II Corps sectors and quotes many prisoners speaki ng of 

an allack between 17 and 25 December alld of the recapture of Aachen as a 

Christmas gift for Hitler. But it hedges, stating that "al though the enemy is 

resorting to his attac k propaganda to bolster the morale of the troops, it is posv 

sibl e Ihat a limited sca le offensive will be launched for the purpose of achieving a Ch ristmas morale victory for civilian consumption." None of the periodic 

reports fro m the issuance of Estimate 37 to the sta rt of the battle change that 
208 A Command Pasl {If ~filr 

estimate's prognosis of German capabilities. Di ckson and his assistmlls clearly 

se nsed that the enemy W<lS lip to somet hing, but the number of qualifications in 

the record undercuts the G- 2's cl aim of pred icting a major Ardennes CQuntcr* 

offensive Oil 16 Dccember. 1 

Dickson, of course, could have presented specific verbal warn ings to his 

commander in a way that a written estimate's listing o f all e nemy capabilities 

did not allow, but, ifhe did so, he clearly did not convin ce his superiors. I-lodges 

did talk private ly wil h his G- 2 on 10 December ancr the release of Estima te 

37. When Brad ley visited Spa the next day, however, he saw no indication that 

the First Army ex pected an attack, and Hodges lat cr heatedly denied his 0 - 2's 

c laim that the Fi rst Army commande r had requested reinforcements fo r the 

Ardennes. I-lodges' concl usion at the time seems to have been tha t any enemy 

attack would come a ner the First Army c rossed the Roe r and that the Oermans 

were usi ng the Ardennes front to rest old divisions, not an unreasonable view 

given the reports he was receiv ing from his 0 - 2.8 I-lis 0 - 3, Thorson, ridicul ed 

Estimate 37 and later denied Ihal Dickson ever bri efed Hodges on the threat to 

the Ardennes. 9 The 0 - 2's case for having foreseen the offe nsive is not a ided by 

inconsistenc ies and errors of fa ct in his account, such as his recollections of 

the timing of his depa rture for Paris a nd his later sta tement that Estimate 37 

predicted an attac k in the Ardennes. Rosengarten, the First Army ULTRA officcr 

and a Dickson intimat e, la ter remembered that his chief believed that an enemy 

counterattac k was com ing, but not e nough to "stick his neck OUt."IO When 

Dickson departed for Paris, Rosengarten reca ll ed, he was worried enough to 

give Rosengarten specific instructions but not enough to stay home. 1I 

Whateve r Dickson's warnings, they were not wcll received by his superiors, perhaps because they were reminded of his dire prognostications before 

the Novembe r offensive. Sibert, the 12th Army Oroup 0 - 2, followed Estimate 

37 with his own optimisti c estimate on 12 December.12 Although SJ-IAEF's 

0 - 2, Maj. Oen. Kenneth W. D. Strong, had, at other times, warned his c hi ef of 

staff, Smith, and Bradley of the buildup opposite the Ardennes and Strasbourg, 

he now informed Sibe rt that Di ckson was falling into his old hab it of listing 

div isions known to be on other frOllts. He told the 12th Army Group G- 2 to set 

the First Army G- 2 straight, but Sibert could nol contact Di ckson before th e 

attac k. With some of these officers, Dickson's reputation as an a larmist, however exaggerated, came back to haunt him. Indeed, the G- 2's hedging of his 

conclusions may have reflected a painful awa reness of his image. ll 

Why was the First Army headquarters unabl e to predict the Ardennes counteroffe nsive? The argument that the more luxuri ous li festyle in Spa made the 

sta lT less a lert is debalabte. 14 Among the various echelons, one finds poor coordination among the 0 - 2 sec li ons, at least partly due to lhe animus between 

Dickson and Si be rt. Di ckson later complained bitterly that highe r echelons did 

nol share their data with his section, but the First Army G- 2 periodic reports 

were not of much immediate help to lower echelons, not reaching di vision 

G- 2s until two or three days after issue. For security reasons, the First Army 

headq uarters was also reluctant to give Ollt specific warnings based on ULTRA, 

si nce corps G- 2s would demand the source of the information. ls 
"Tile Rock a/Gibraltar ": The FirSI Army Headql/arlers alille Bulge 209 

Along with deficient organization, unenlightening so urces and faulty analysis contributed to the lack of prescience. Of the data , summaries, and estimates 

from subordinate commands, neighboring armi es, and highe r echelons, few 

sounded ,my note of concern, and the signs that they noted were orten qualified, 

as in the case of observations ora rise in traffic being dismissed as normal un it 

rotation. On German soi l, Allied intelligence could not depend on civilian reports as much as in France, and poor weat her curtailed uir rcconna issance, especia ll y in the low-priority VIII Corps area. Thus, the First Army G- 2 secti on relied more thu n ever on prisoner interrogation reports, captured documents, and 

signa ls intelligence. 16 Viewed wilh hindsight, ULTRA gave somc clues of the COin -

ing attack, despite Hiller's orders for rad io silence, but the indicators that it provided did not stand out enough from the other data to draw the atten ti on of Al lied 

inte lligence, including the First Army G- 2 section.

17 Much has been made of the 

lack of OSS representation at the First Army headquarters, but the ass could 

operate in the First Army sector under 12th Army Grou p auspi ces. The ass operatives who did infiltrate German lines in the area se ldom returned, and those 

who did often did not provide reliable da til. I~ Like other A lli ed in telligence agencies, Dickson's section beli evcd th e conservati ve Generalfcldmarsehall Gerd vo n 

Rundslcdt, rather than the risk-taki ng Hitler, was in cha rge. In addition, First 

Army intelligence officers occasiona lly saw what they wa nted to sec, an incl ination that the enemy, using a skillful deception plan, did much to confirm. '9 

Thus the First Army headquarters was surprised when Gcrman infantry 

eme rgcd out of the mists early on the morning of 16 December. (Map 13) The 

fi rst hint of anyt hing unusuul came at 0615, when the 491h Antiairc raft Brigade 

reported seve ral explosions in its area. Then, as the morning progressed, 

reports of attacks, cspecially on the Vlll Corps' front , began to reach Spa. 20 

Initiall y, the exact seopc of the offensive remained obscurc. A disrupti on of 

com muni cations, es pec ially between the VIII Corps at Bastognc and its forward units, kept Middl eton from providing a clear picture 10 gcs. ~1 Consequen tly, I-lodges' ea rly responses to the situation were tentative. Following his 

frequent practi ce of splitt ing armored di visions among different tasks, he approvcd Middleton 's request for the re turn of Combat Command B o f the 9th 

Armored Division. He also pla ced on aleI'I two of the Vll Corps' di visions, the 

1st Infantry Di vision and part of the 3d Armored Di vision. But when Gerow 

ca lled about 11 00 and asked for permission to halt the V Corps' drive for the 

Roer dams, the First Army eomlllundcr, still sllspecting a Ge rman di versionary 

att ack in thc Ardennes, refuscd. 22 

With in the First Army staff, dcbatc ragcd all day and into the evening betwecn the G- 2 and G- 3 sections ove r the scope of the offensive. Silvey, still 

acting as th e G- 2 in Dickson's absence, pointed to the alarming number ofncw 

di visions on the fronts of the V and VI II Corps and argued that von Rundstedl 's 

order of the day, a copy of whi ch had been captured ea rl y in the afternoon byV 

Corps units, confirmed that an all-out offensive was unde r way. ThaI order had 

informed the German troops that "Your great hour has urri ved .... We gamble 

evelJ'lltillgfYou carry with you the holy obl igation 10 give everything to achieve 

things bcyond human possibi lities for Our Fathcr[landJ and Our Fuhrer!,'2J 
WACHT AM RHEIN 

16-2!> De 

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) 

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F 

c(!mb(!r 1944 

F,,,,,,Lf ... 16Doc: 

FrOM U .... 20 Doc: 

F,""tllno.2SDoc: 

.... _Movemen .. 

,!t !~1 

Vo,dun 

R A N 

NETHERLAND/) ( i ~ , 

SM;()NU. " / 

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C E Yo 

M Al' 13 
"The Rock 0/ Gibralfw' ": The First Army Headquarters (If 'he Bulge 2 1 I 

Neverthe less, th e la ck of initial 

progress by the Germans and ncour~ 

ag ing reports from lia ison offi cers 

returning to Spa late that aft ernoon 

indicated that the activit y might have 

been no more than a spoi li ng att<Jek.N 

For most of the headquarters, any 

li ngering doubts vanished the nex t 

day, 17 December. During the morning the First Army headquarters re ~ 

ce ived repo rts that German armor, 

in c luding th e oon o~ ~notoriou s 

Kamp/gruppe Peiper, had broken 

through the Los he im Gap, nine miles 

south east of Bu tgenbach and just 

south of the boundary betwee n the V 

and V [II Corps. Then, about 0930, 

word reached the G- 2 section that the 

enemy had surrounded two regiments 

of th e VIII Corps' 106th Infantry Di ~ 

v isio n on th e Sc hn ee Ei fe l. th e 

wooded ridge run ning south from th e 

Gel/em/ Middlefol/ 

Loshe im Gap. As the day wore on, the G- 2 situa tion Illap showed enemy ar~ 

heads nea ring the critica l road junction ofSt. Vith , twelve mil es southwest of 

Losheim, and major penetrati ons in the southern half o f th e VII I Corps sector. 

Rumors abou nded of German tan ks and saboteu rs in rea r a rea s, although nx ~ 

e ty over frantic repo rts of enemy paratroope rs in the V Corps rear area cased 

during the day as the limited exte nt of the drop became clea r.2S Abou t 1730, 

howeve r, a distraught milita ry pol iceman a rrived to report a massacre of American prisone rs by LI. Col. Joachi m Pei per's SS unit nea r Ma lmedy. Ove r time, 

th e investi ga ti on of the massacre wo uld in vo lve eve ry inspector on the Fi rst 

Army stafT, coll ec ting evidence at the si te and interrogatin g 125 Ame rica n so ~ 

diers. c ivilians, and enemy prisone rs, some as far away as Pa ris and Normandy. 

Indeed, word of the massacre sp read so qu ick ly that Dickson wryly remarked 

tha t his interrogators could not find any Ge rman SS prisoners to question.!6 

For the moment, the Fi rst Army headquarters had enough with wh ich to 

concern itself other than the Ma lmedy massacre. By midmorning, l'lodges had 

sensed that his army was in dee p troub le. Whi le the :lvailabi lity ofnlternat ivc 

radio ne ts in the specia l staff sections compensated to a degree for the isr p~ 

tions to his communications, he still needed to se nd starfofTicers to the front to 

discern the situation. 21 Early in the morning, he confe rred with Quesilda, Maj. 

Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg of the Ninth Ai r Force, and Brig. Gen. Richard E. 

Nugent of the XXIX Tac tical Air Command, which support ed the Ninth Army, 

to arrange for "il' suppor!. He had already attached a regiment of the I st Infa ~ 

try Division to the V Cor ps at mklnight of 16- 17 December, and at 0700 he 

gave Gerow a free hand to halt his drive and organize a defense of the Else nborn 
2 12 A COII//J/oild PO.'!I (1/ WOI' 

Ridge, northwest of the Loshc im Ga p.2S Beyond a few enginee r units, the First 

Army had a lmost no rese rves, but during the previous day Bradley, ot 

Eisen hower's urging. had ordered the 7th a nd 10th Armored Di visions to the 

First Army. After re peated ca lls to the 12th Army Group command post in Lmt· 

cmbollrg City, six ty miles due so uth of Spa , the First Army headqua rt ers also 

received word, early in the eve ning of 17 December, that it would rece ive th e 

SI-I AEF reserve, the XVIII Ai rborne Corps.2Q 

Despit e th e encouraging news Ihal th e XV II I Airborne Corps was on the 

way, the First Army headquart ers' inner c ircle had to dea l with another chilling 

deve lopment. Even before the batt le, I-lodges had shown signs of fatigue. On 

the night of 15- 16 Decembe r, he had retired early with a cold, but the nex t day 

he seemed ca lm, his aide describing him as " ne ither optimisti c nor pessi mistic." On 17 December, however, something was wrong with Hodges. His aide 

wOlild on ly say that he spent a lmost the e ntire morning in the G- 3 section.30 

Mye rs later sa id tha t "Iodges wa s su tTe ring from influenza a nd " fee li ng very 

bad ly because of what had happened" but wa s sti ll providing "general ove ra ll 

guidan ce" and had his pre se nce of mind, " except ror very, very brief inte rludes."31 Kean, 011 th e other hand, later told an intervicwer that Hodges was 

co nfi ned 10 his bed, barely consc ious with viral pnculllonia. J2 

Espec ially arresting is the account ofWOJG Dempsey Allphin, Kean 's military secreta ry and a ide. On th c morn ing of 17 Dccember All ph in recalled, 

Gcncrall-l odges and Gencral Kean eame to the otTi ce at approximately the same timc 

as usual- about 0830. General l'lodges went through our otTice (General Kean's and 

mine) and into his olTi ce . The only entrance to his otTice was through this one. He len 

the door opcn. A little latcr Gcncral Kcan told mc to chcck and scc if General l'lodges 

was okay. He said that l'lodgcs wa s not feeling good when thcy camc in. [ wcnt to the 

door nnd into his olTi ce. General 1·lodges was sitt ing wit h his arms folded 011 his desk 

and his head in his arms. I wcnt bllck Ollt and told Kca ll . Kean then went into l'lodges' 

olTice. When he came ou t just a few minutes later, he pull ed the door closed and told 

me to give him all of Hodges' ca lls, and to let no one into his office. General Hodges 

spcnt thc entire day there at his desk see ing no one and taking no ca lls .... For two 

days, Generall'lodgcs stayed in his otTiec alone. not IlIking ca lls nor see ing visitors or 

statT." 

Allphin 's account obviously con fli c ts wit h those of Kea n, Myers, and Sylvan, 

as well as that of Maj . Gen. James M. Gavin, who remcmbcred meeting Hodges, 

Kean, and Thorson on the morning of 18 December, but in many key respects, 

it hu s th e rin g of truth. Ge nera l Hodges himself later reca ll ed his lu sting impression of the ba ili e as being tired, needi ng sleep, and yet having to be acti ve 

almost consta ntly. Wh atever happened that 17 Decembe r, overwhe lming evide nce ex ists that the First Army commander was incapacitated for at lea st Iwo 

days and that Kean , in etTect, operated as the commande r of the First Army. 

During that time, the chie f of st atT and Thorson, who had just retur ned from 

London, managed to wa ll off Hodgcs and minimize his co ntacts with visitors, 

not an overly di tTicu lt task given his long-estab lished habit of work ing th rough 

a small group of intirnatcs . .l4 
"The Rock of Gibraltar ": The First Army Headqu(II'tel'iI' al the Bulge 2 13 

Under Kean 's direction, the 0 - 3 an d 0-4 sectio ns arra nged to rush reinforceme nts to th e threa tened secto r. In th ese fi rst two days, la rge r units oft en 

moved to the scene in piecemea l fa shion , pe rhaps du e to II lac k of truck companies or a lingerin g suspi cion wit hin the Fi rst Army G- 3 section ofa spoi ling att ack , Using six truck companies, the First Army headquarte rs moved 

the 1 st Infantry Di visio n's 26th Infantry to Elsenborn du ri ng th e ni ght of 16-

17 December, about the same time as the 7th Armored Division bega n its 

ma rch to St.-Vi th ,H In the confusion, the 7th arrived wilh li ttle food, fu c l, or 

ammuni tion and too late to conduc t the count erattac k planned by the VI II 

Corps headquarters, The division commander sllbseq uently complained 

bitte rly Ihat the First Army headq uarte rs provided no he lp or eve n info rmalion 10 his d ivisio n abo ut the attack undc r way in the VI [I Corps area . At leasl 

one critic has charged that thc First Army headquart e rs' delay in arrangi ng 

road clea ran ces was responsible for th e 7th's late arrival in the battle area , 

but the responsibi li ty for the di vision 's problems is ha rd to pinpoint from the 

existing recordsY' 

Th roug h 17 Decembe r the Fi rst Army staff moved add itiona l uni ts to th e 

threatened area. The rest of the 1st Infantry Di vision and the 47th Regiment 

of the 9th Infantry Division went to th e V Corps, and the First Army also 

obta ined the 30th Infantry Di vision from the Ninth Army. Without orders 

from Brad ley, Simpson, the Ninth Army commander, had gene rously offered 

to his old friend l'lodges thc 30th Di vision and 2d Armored Di vision, and 

Thorson sent his deputy, Hewill, to guide th e 30th Di visio n into posit ion. To 

help with the move, the Nint h Army headquart e rs loa ned four truck companies, which stayed wi th the First Army 10 the end of December, 37 Meanwhile, 

Pa llon, while continuing the lim ited attacks on his frol1t, made arrangements 

to transfer th e 10th Armored Di vision to th e VIII Cor ps. In addition to the 

XV III Airborne Corps, the First Army staff had arranged fo r the movement 

of 60,000 Iroops and 10,000 vehi c le s- includ in g two infantry di visions, two 

a rmored divisions, an infan try regiment, and one each of th e separate infa ntry. fie ld art il lery, tank destroye r, an d ta nk ba tt alions- by midnight, 17- 18 

Decembe r.J8 

The Fi rst Army needed a ll the vehicles tha t it could obtain from the 

Ninth Army because of the demllilds placed on its own transportatio n by the 

evacuation of su ppl y facilities, Most of the First Army supply chie fs had 

bee n at Kasscrine Pass in North A fri ca, and they sensed early thaI the German offensive was no spoiling attack. Whi le staying in close touch wilh th e 

0 - 2 and 0 - 3 sectio ns during the fi rst day of th e German attack, th ey preparcd to evacuat e their insta ll ations. McNama ra, the quarte rmaster, can -

ce led fu rth er s hipments of gasoline and rations to the Butge nbach trllckh ead. 

Mcda ris placed his o rdnan ce depots on a six- hour alert for movement, wh ile 

his ope ratio ns su bsection prepared plans and his am mun iti on office rs arranged for demolitions in the ir forward ammunition su ppl y points, At 2200 

Rogers, actin g o n th e late st reports of enemy ad va nces from th c G- 3 section , ordered the wit hdrawal of two cvaeuation hosp itals ncar the front li ne 

of the VIII Corps' southern sector. 39 
2 14 

By Ihe next day. 17 December. the 

scale orlhe German offensive became 

morc cl ear, and th e supply and admin· 

iSlrativc chiefs acted. The G- l section 

made arrangements to canc e l all 

leaves. passes, and furl oughs, cut short 

mosl of jts en tertainment program, and 

recalled Ihe Red Cross c lubrnobiles. 

AI th e same time, th e G- 4 section 

called o n the 12t h Army GrollI' and 

ADSEC fo r serv ice troops, truck 

compa ni es, ammunition, and major 

ordnance ilems.40 

Simultaneously, the supply chiefs 

put their evacuation pl<lns into operation. From Ihe G- 2 section, wh ich had 

Ihe captured Germa n special opcration s plan by the end orlhe fi rst day, 

McNamara knew Ihal th e Germans 

were relying on captured gasoline to 

maintain their offensive, and he acted 

accordingly. After directing the evacuation of the truckhead ,It Butgellbach, 

he o rdered 600 trucks to the huge fuel 

A COII/malld POSI (1/ lI'tIl' 

Fir.~1 Arlit)' gasolille. oil. (Il1d /ubricalll 

resen>es Slore(/ (I/ollg Ihe rom/side lIe(lr 

SI)(I. 7 December 1944. 

dumps sOllt h of Ma lmedy .md asked ADSEC to send r<lilroad cars to th ree nearby 

rai lroad depots to remove fuel aftcr thc trucks had shu ttled it there. Over three 

days, the First Army cvacuatcd all but 124,000 ga ll ons, whic h were ignited ncar 

Stavelot as a roadblock against German tank s. After movi ng th ese dumps, the 

Fi rst Army logisticians, using two semi-trai ler companies from ADSEC, shined 

4,000 long tOilS of Class II and 1 V supplies from the army depot at Eupen and 

moved the rations depot from nea rby We kenraedt.~1 As for Mcdaris' ordnance 

section, it was tryi ng to keep its ordnance depots open as long as possible. Two 

ammunition supply points were overrun by the enemy, but ordnance troops evacuated a third under the noses of the German advance. From ADSEC, Mcdaris 

borrowed enough truck tractors to shift most of his main depot behind the Meuse 

by 22 Deeember.~2 Meanwhile, the medical section moved its evacuation hospitals from Malrncdy to Vervicrs, while Ca rter's engineers evacuated bridging equipment from the engineer dump ncar Elsenborll but lost the map depot at Stavelot. 

[n the end, the First Army headquarters saved the bulk- about 45,000 tons- of 

its su pplies in the threatened area.H 

By 18 Deeembcr the First Army headquarters was considering evacuation 

of its command post at Spa. A ftcr his return from Paris via the 12th Army 

Group command post the previous evening. Dickson had recommended moving the headquarters. It proved hard, howevc r, to shift quickly a command post 

as established as the First Army's was in Spa, cspec iall y onc that did not fully 

g rasp the situa tion. Nevcrthelcss, Kcan took th e precaution of ordering the head-
"The Rock of Gibml/oJ' ": Tlte First Army I-Ieadql/al"lers at the Bulge 215 

quarte rs commandant to reconnoiter for a new si te at Chaud fontaine, almost 

cleven mil es northwest of Spa and roughly the same dist ance southeast of Li ege, 

and the supply echelon prepared for a move 4~ 

The move came sudden ly. When Kean, Thorson, and a "weary" Hodges 

met on the morning of 18 December with Gavin, ac ting commander of the 

XV III Airbornc Corps, they knew little of what was happening to the south and 

southwest. They did have enough indications of German armor ncar Stllvelot 

that Kcan told Gavin to position th e 82d Airborne Di vision at Wcrbomont, cleven 

mil es sout hwest o f Spa, and the IO lst Airborne Di vision at Bastogne. 45 About 

1500, after the command group finished meeting wi th the commander of the 

30th Infantry Di vision, word reached Spa of enemy tanks onl y six mil es down 

the road, and most of the staff turn ed out to man the roadblocks. The report 

turned out to be fal se, but the command group decided that the time for evacuation had come. While most of the staff hurriedly loaded into trucks, I-lodges, 

Kean, Thorson, and Hart waited in the Hotel Britann ique for Gavin to return. 

When Gavin failed to appear, "Iodges' party dcparted at 2200.46 In the rush to 

evacuate, at least SOme of the staff left behind working phones, secre t papers, 

and even situation maps. Both Montgome ry and the commander of the 7th Armored Division would later claim that the First Army headquarters left Spa 

without informing other echelons of the trans(er.47 

As the First Army commander and staff completed their move during the 

evening of 18 December, their gloomy mood was deepened by the loss en route 

of most of the G- 4trafTie headquarters to a V- I missile. By midnight the su pply echelon had withdrawn to Micheroux, six miles east of Li ege, and the command echelon to Chaudfontainc. Set in a cleft in the hills on the main road to 

Liege , Chaudfontai ne, formerly the site of the First Army base ec he lon, had 

been selected because of its location on the existing commun ications net, and 

by the next morning personnel of the 17th Signal Operation Battalion had augmented the exist ing installations and used its mobile facilities to est abl ish both 

telephone and teletype service to all major units. As the staff was quick to note, 

howeve r, the new command post's position also exposed it to V- I s that fell 

short on their way to Liege.48 

When the staff sett led into its new offices in the Hotel des Bains the next 

morning, it faced disorder in its rear area and lack o f re liabl e informati on about 

the sit uat ion at the front. So many troops separated from their units were wandering in the First Army rear area that the provost marshal's section, lacking enough 

tra nsportation, arranged for the replacement depot and battalions to accept all 

stragglers except suspects of serious crimes and soldiers AWOL for long periods 

oftime.49 Largely because the German offensive had cut off so many units from 

hi gher headquarters, the daily estimated loss reports co rn ing in to the casualty 

division grossly underestimated the First Army's casualties for the first th ree 

days of the battle. The casualty division was already struggling to catch up with 

its work load after numerous unit reassignments, two moves, and emergency duty 

manning defensive positions within the previolls two days.so 

Clouding all else, the First Army headquarte rs had little idea of the status 

of the battle. The staff knew that the VIII Corps held St.-Vith, Wiltz, and 
216 A Command Pasl al War 

Echternach, the laller Iwa respectively thirteen mi les cast and thirty-four miles 

sou theast of Bastognc, and it cou ld locate the points of the enemy spearheads. 

The positions of American uni ts between those spearheads, however, remained 

vague . Rumors circulated that the Germans had cut the Baslognc- Li egc highway and captured Bastogne. In the G- 2 section, officers were worried ovcr the 

location orthe 1/ SS Pallzer Corps, not having received an ULTRA inte rcept that 

located the corps Ileal' Wilt z, and a nervous Di ckson figured that the Germans 

still had fOllr SS panzer di visions and five other divisions in reserve. SI Yel the 

G- 3 section con tinued to believe thatlhc Germans had not penetrated the First 

Army's lines in force, even as the section broke up divisions to plug gaps and 

extend the northern shoulder of the evolvi ng Bu lge to the west. In its orders 

that day, the First Army headquarters exhorted its units to block and sea l off the 

e nemy forces and stabi li ze the line preparatory to resumin g the ofTensive. ~l 

Help was on the way. At Verdun that day, Eisenhower halted all Allied offensives 

and orde red Devers' 6th Army Gro llp to extend its front northward to enable 

Bradley to launch a cou nterattack with Patton 's Third Army again st the southern shoulder of the enemy salient . Meanwhile, Montgomery's 21 Army Group 

would pay particu lar attent ion to securing the line of the MeuseY 

In response to the numerous, deep enemy penetrations oflhe First Army frollt, 

many specia l staff chiefs took mailers in to their own hands. Usi ng the operational control delegated by Bradl ey in March, th ey formed ad hoc task forces to 

hold key junctions and depots and delay, if not stop, the German onslaught. On 

the eve of the offensive, the First Army headquarters had approved the use of 

antiaircraft batteries for artillery and an titank roles as long as such use did not 

jeopardize the ir prima ry mission, and Patterson now took advantage of that permission. When the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade lost contact wit h its groups and 

batteries, Patterson assllmed direct control of those units he cou ld reach and posit ioned them to defend the approaches to Spa, Liege, and I-Iuy pending the 

arrival of the 30th Infantry Di vision.~4 Meanwhile, army engineer groups and 

battal ions under Carter's su pervision were prepa ring roadblocks, laying mines, 

and razing bridges to construct barrier zones a long the northern shoulder,55 Hains 

had his armored officers and some headquarters troops patrol between the Germans and the gas dumps. At one point, he sen t a separate tank battalion, which 

had arrived without tanks, to the ordnance depot to take whatever weapons were 

available and stop the threat to the depol.S6 While Lynde distributed tanks among 

volunteer crews of replacements and helped position antiaircraft units, Medaris 

new missions as an air spotter. The staff chiefs were proud of their private war, 

but the Security Command was less impressed, complaining that they were commandeering too many of its units for their task forces. 51 

For all its rea l accomplishments, the rear area security system encoun tered 

problems beyo nd the commandeering of many of its uni ts by the spec ial staff 

chiefs. With the start of the offensive, the Security Command had brought its 

area and subarea securi ty pla ns into operat ion. 11 provided a means of coordinating rear area defense against infiltrators and deep enemy penetrations, and 

its 99th Infantry Ba ttalion and "T Force ," consisting of an armored infantry 

ballalion and a tank destroyer company, covered the Malmed y-St ave lot de Po! 
"The Rock of Gibralrar ",' The FirSI Army Headql/ar/ers a/llie Bulge 2 17 

area un ti l the arrival of the 30th Infantry Div ision.

58 Not sur prisingly for sueh 

a young orga nization, however, it encountered problems. Its rad io nets ca rried 

far too much conversatio n in the clear, much to the enemy's de light, and its 

overzealous counte rmeasures agaillst enemy infil trators red uccd the effic iency 

of the command system. Among other things, it fo rbade liaison officers to carry 

informa tion betwee n headquarters.

59 

The Security Command 's direc ti ves represented th e least of the liaison 

system's problems. Prewa r Army doctri ne for li aison operations had sketched 

in vague terms the li aison offi cer's dut y to " furthe r harmonious cooperation" 

betwee n his own headquarters and the one he was visiting, and it emphasized 

his responsibility to ensure that the viewpoint and orders of his commander 

were unde rstood by his host. It did not, howeve r, suffic iently siress his dUl y to 

kee p his commander informed in a time ly mallner about the situat ion of the 

unit and headquarters to wh ich he was accred ited. In pract ice, American liaison officcrs o ncn were littl e more tha n messengers, "carrying scaled envelopes at leastlwe nty- four hours old."60 Although Ake rs, who supervised li aison 

work as the G- 3 operatio ns officer, had expanded liaison coverage to th e di visions o f the VII Corps du ring the November o ffensive, most First Army li aison 

o ffi cers still were assigned to corps, adjacent armies, the 12th Army Group 

heildq uarters, and the Army Air Forces. In addition, the First Army liaison offi cers apparently sl ill operated under an arc haic system by which they re ported 

to Akers once in the afiernoon, with no interven ing reports. In contrast to th e 

pract ice in other headq uarters, l'lodges attended on ly about half of these briefings. This system could not sat isfy the thirst for information of an army COIll -

mand group grasp ing at any ava ilable source, incl udi ng, by some accounts, 

truck drivers and 7th Armored Division enlisted men returni ng to Chaudfontai ne 

for Christmas packages."! 

The order forb idding li aison offi cers to carry information be twee n headqua rters was just one demonstration of the impact o f Lt. Col. 0110 Skorzeny's 

English-speaking inriltrators. From orders captured before the offensive and 

during the fi rst day. the Fi rst Army G- 2 section had constructed a good idea of 

Skorze ny's mission when, on 18 December, an ordnance unit found three Germans in a truck beari ng the mark ings of the 5th Armored Division. The three 

men claimed to be part ofa ISO-man group assigned to cut American communi catio ns, ra id command posts, and watch the Meuse bridges. Interrogators 

re layed the word to the Fi rst Army headqua rters, which ordered corps and divisions to establish checkpoints, and the headquarters even drew up quest ions on 

America na with whi ch to grill suspects. The Security Command now uscd its 

units and radio net to aid the Fi rst Army's counte rinte ll igence corps in the search 

for infiltrators. Search parti es soon rounded up the few enemy jeep parties tha t 

had reached the First Army's rear, as well as some Americans who had been 

AWOL for some time, but the German infiltrators had al ready caused much 

confusion, even terror, in rea r areas. Indeed, information from one captured 

g roup of a plot to assassinate Eisenhower, dut ifu lly forwarded to SHAEF by 

the First Army G-2 section, served to imprison the supreme commander in his 

own headq uarte rs for several days.62 
2 18 A CO/llmand Pas/ a/ IVor 

The confusion of the battle's fi rst fOllf days contri buted to the failure to 

airdrop suppli es \0 the two surrounded regiments of the 1061h Infantry Di vision. Allhough the di vision headquarters at St.-Vith had asked the VIII Corps 

headqua rters for an airdrop almost as soon as il rece ived news of the encirclement on the morning o f 17 December, the req uest di d not reach th e IX Troop 

Carrier Command in Britain until ea rly the nex t morn ing. The air liaison officer at th e VIII Corps headquarters lat cr stated thaI someo ne in the Fi rst Army 

G- 4 section delayed the request for twenty-fo ur hours, ostensibly because it 

had not followed prope r channe ls, bu t no evide nce has been found to support 

or refu te his account. When twent y*t hree transports with ammunition and medi* 

cal supplies did arrive later on 18 December over the airfi e ld in Belgium where 

they were supposed to receive their bri e fing, they found no ready information, 

fighter escort, or eve n permission to land, and had to fl y to a base in Fmnce, 

where they wai ted un til the ca nce lla tion of th e mission on 22 December.6l 

Obvi ously, the process for arranging an a irdrop had broken down at some 

point. In its report, the First Army headquart ers claimed that it had responded 

promptly to the I 06th 's request, and th e division's pl ight WllS clea rl y upper* 

IllOSt in the minds of I·lodges and Kea n on th e mornin g o f 18 December. Gi ven 

lack of evidence, it is ha rd to fix responsibilit y for the mishap at the airfield, 

which seems to have resulted from poor coordi nation at several leve ls. Whether 

proper coordination wou ld have e nsured a sllccessful drop is another matter. 

The weather co nditions <lnd termin in the drop area on 18 December prese nted 

major obstacles, and good com muni cations and information on the region were 

lac king. Still, the Firsl Army headquarters might have decided to push for a 

drop if it had known the situation was desperate. Thi nking that the two regi* 

ments co uld ho ld Ollt, that headquarters apparentl y dec ided to postpone the 

drop unti l prospects improved. Before thai happened, the two units surrendered 

on 19 Decembe rY 

Although by the evening of 19 December some <It the First Army headquar* 

ters may have believed that they had the situation unde r con trol, SI-I AEF clearly 

thought otherwise. At the suggesti on o f SJ-IAEF's G- 2 and its acting G- 3, Sm ith 

recommended and General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhowe r approved the 

transfer of the First and Ninth Armies to the operational control of Montgomery's 

2 1 Army Group and o f the VIII Corps 10 Patton's Third Army. The First and 

Ninth Armies remained under th e 12th Army Group headquarters fo r logisti ca l 

support <lnd administration. Simu lta neously, the IX and XX IX Tact ical Air Com* 

mands came under the ope rat ional co ntrol of th e British 2d Tactical Air Force, 

whose commander gave Quesada control over avia ti on in the batt le area. 6S 

The change in command drew a protest from Brad ley, but th e 12th Army 

Group commander did not h<lvc much of a case. While his st<lfftechni ca ll y had 

never lost cont act with its northe rn armies, the communi cations network that 

ca rri ed the thousands of messages involved in command and control of the 

arm ies was tenuous at best. It would soo n break down irrepa rably with the fa ll 

of l emell e, the key mdio relay a nd wire*c<lble st<ltion th irty* ri ve mil es so uthwest 

of Chaudfontain e. Even if liaison officers and a lengthy wire ci rcuit around the 

Bulge had been able to bear th e traffic, Bradley, in Luxembourg, was in a poor 
"rlte Rock of Gibralwr ": rite First Army /-Ieadquarters at tlte Bulge 2 19 

position to provide the personal presence necessary in the crisis. Whi le Bradley had often talked with Hodges and Kean by phone, he had not visit ed Hodges 

sin ce the start of the batt le and, aside from arranging for the First Army to 

obtain the XVIII Airborne Corps, had done little to make his old headquarters' 

task easie r. Bradley probably had such confidence in Hodges and Kean and 

was so slow to grasp th e true dimensions of the German offensive that he beli eved th ey could handl e the situation on thei r own, but to some on Hodges' 

beleaguered staff, the 12th Army Group headquarters appea red remote, even 

unca ring. 66 

Alt hough th e First Army commander and statT did not relish the spectacle 

o r their rormer commander's humiliation and rese nted the notion th at they 

needed specia l assistan ce rrom the British, many could see the benefits of the 

change. Aside from the disrupti on of signal communica tions, the First Army 

headquarters had encountered so many probl ems in supplying th e VII I Corps 

that it had already directed th at corps to turn to the Third Army ror support.67 

Then too, Montgomery quickl y gave the First Army headquarte rs a degree or 

di rection and support that it had not rece ived rrom Luxembourg. Even berore 

the Verdun conre rence, th e fi eld marshal , concerned about the threat to his 

southern flank , abandoned his plans to lise the British 30 Corps in the MARKETGARDEN sa li en! to the north and instead directed the corps to assembl e on the 

northern bank of the Meuse near Liege. He had also sent reconnaissance parties along the Meuse southwest o f Liege to watch the bridges, the immediate 

objecti ve of the German offensive.'s 

More was yet to come. At 1330 on 20 December, about an hour aft er the 

offic ial change, Montgomery arrived at Chaudront ai ne, calm and confident 

wi th th e air, according to one of his staff offi cers, o f "Christ come to cleanse 

the temple." Aft er l'lodges outlined th e situation, Montgomery laid out his response, cal1ing for the reorga ni za ti on of the front and the formation o r a 

rcse rve corps for a counte rattac k. In the ensuing discussion, a cl ea r di ffe rence 

in ph ilosophy arose. The British wa nt ed to rea lign the front and thus acc umulate reserves in prepa ration for a sing le, massive countcrblow once the enemy 

offensive had run its course. On the other hand, the Americans resisted surrendering ground and sought to regai n the initiative at the ea rliest opportun ity. For 

the moment, Montgomery agreed to the majority of the First Army's dispositions as we l1 as a planned dri ve to regain contact with the be leaguered 7th 

Armored Divisio n at St.-Vith. Meanwh ile , he requested that Collins assemble 

three divisions northwest of th e key crossroads of Marc he, thirt y mi les southwest of Chaudfontaine and eighteen mil es east of the Mellse crossin gs. They 

would avoid involvement in the batt le ror th e nort hern shoulder of the Bulge 

until th e counterattack . To rrce Collins ror this duty, he had the Ninth Army 

assume responsibility for the VII Corps sector nort h of the Bulge. 69 

British accounts of the atmosphere at the First Army command post varied. 

De Guingand, Mon tgomery's chief of staff and a popular fi gure alllong Americans, later remarked that while the First Army staff appea red tired they 

remai ned chee rful and seemed to have the sit ua tion in hand by the time of 

Montgomery's visit.70 I n contrast, Mon tgomery and others of his entourage late r 
220 A COIIIIII(//id POM ar War 

Left to right: Generaf COf/iIlS. Field Mars/1lI1 MOIl/gomeIY. and General Ridgl1'a)' 

after a conference a/lhe VII Corp~·llelldq/(al"/ers 

professed shock at what they saw on the ir visit to the First Army headquart ers. 

Williams, the intelli gence chief, rema rked that Hodges looked as jfhe h"d been 

poleaxed, and Belehem, Montgomery's operations chief, sta ted that Hodges 

"nd his seni or sta ff " looked as if they had all seen a ghost. ... [They were] so 

tired and dispirited that it requ ired the utmost tact and diplomacy to establish a 

friendly rapport."71 Montgomery perceived an atmosphere of great pessimism 

and lack of grip, and he later re rn"rked that '-lodges had seemed ti red and "het 

Up." 72 The field ma rshal had never possessed muc h confi dence in the First Army 

commander, and he soo n informed Smith at SHA EF that he might need to re~ 

move Hodges. Eisenhowe r replied on 22 December th aI Montgomery should 

keep him informed of any requ ired chan ges, but he added, " Hodges is the quiet, 

reticen t type and does not appear as aggressive as he reall y is. Un less he becomes ex hausted, he will always wage a good fight."7l Even without this endorsement, Montgome ry apparently had decided "gainst a relief. That evening, 

he told Eisenhower that, while I-lodges had been a bit shaken, tired, and in need 

of moral support, he seemed to be improving and wou ld rema in in comrnand. 74 

Although Montgomery did not reli eve '-lodges, he exercised much closer 

supervision over the First Army headquarters than he had in the past. Both 

Collins of the VII Corps and Maj. Gen . Matthew B. Ridgway of the XVIII 

Airborne Corps found the field marshal's liaiso n organization to be an intrusion and thought his liaison officers to be prejudiced agai nst American troops. 

Nevertheless, Pllfl NTOt.·\ and Montgomery's personal liaison corps did keep him 
"Tile Rock of Gibralw,. ": Tlte Fi,.st Army Headqllarters (If lite Bulge 22 1 

aware of events at lower echelons in a way that the America n system had not 

fo r Hodges. It a lso informed American corps commanders of the fie ld marshal's 

intentions hours before written orders could pass down the chain of eomtnHrHI. 7S 

The commander of the 21 Army Group suppl emented PHANTOM reports with 

visits to divisions and corps, especially Colli ns' VII Corps. For all practica l 

purposes, Montgomery superseded Hodges, directing the VII Corps as his per· 

sonal counterattack force and forbidding its commi tment without his perm is· 

sian. Each day about 1300 he visited the First Army command post to talk over 

the situation and provide any necessary Sllpporl. 76 The command cha nge not· 

wi thstanding, Bradley maintained frequent contact with l'lodgcs for the duration of thc battle and on at least onc occasion, advoca ted a course of ac tion 

contrary to Montgomery's announced strategy. 77 

In the mean time, the 2 1 Army Group and First Army staffs resumed old 

tics. Treading ca refully to avoid stirring America n resentment, Montgomery's 

staff chiefs, follow ing British staff prac ti ce, called on thc First Army staff to 

renew acq uaintances and reest ablish the work in g relat ionsh ips of Normandy. 

Dannemiller, who had becn scrving as the First Army liaison officer with the 

Nint h Army, moved to thc 21 Army Group command post, where he reported to 

de Guingand. To help the establishment of communications, signa l personnel 

of the 21 Army Group suppl ied tel etypewrit er and radio eq uipment and troops 

and provided a messenger service direct to the First Army headquarte rs. In 

seven days First Army signalmen laid ove r 2,000 miles of new c ircuits to service the command change and installed three radio nets to the 21 Army Group 

and one to the Bri tish Second Army.7H 

Mea nwhi le, the First Army G- 3 troop movements subsection was having 

its finest hour. During 17- 26 December it arranged for the shift across the 

army area of about 238,000 troops and 40,500 vehicles. (See Appelldix H) These 

figures included seven infantry di visions, two airborne di visions, five armored 

div isio ns, e leven fiel d artillery baualions, five engi neer combat battalions, numerous corps troops, and other support units. The subsect ion coordinated that 

movement wit h the n ow ofsuppl ics to the front and the evacuation of essential 

installations to the rear. For much of that time, it operated withou t much help 

from the G-4 traffic headquarters after the dcadly V- I attack during the move 

from Spa to Chaudfontaine. To transfer the VII Corps quick ly from the AaehenHiirtgen sector to the area southwest of Li ege, the su bsection gave the corps 

almost unlimited usc of three north-south roules for seve ral days. During that 

time, the corps had to report every move so that the First Army staffcould plan 

others along and across the three roads when th ey were not in lise. At th e same 

time, the area elearance section of the G- 3 troop movements subsection located and reserved bi vouac and assembly areas for VII Cor ps lInits as they 

arrived southwest of Liege. Give n the scale of the operation, it is not surprisi ng 

that traffiejallls and disruptions to the supply now occurred. but the First Army 

staff managed to keep these probl ems \0 a minimum. 79 

While the VII Corps moved Ileal' Marche, thirty mil es south of Li ege, the 

First Army headquarters spent an anxious three days. A SHAE F visitor to chaotic Chaudfontaine later recalled that the staff barely knew thei r own location, 
222 A Command Post (If Wa/' 

lei alone that of the ir units or those of tile Germans. When the commander o f 

one of the div isions gat hering near Marche asked for information on fri endly 

and enemy dispositions in the area, the First Army slatT could tell him little.so 

Actua lly, the e nemy had pene trated farther west than the First Army headquarte rs th ought, to the point that, when the divisio n arrived in the Marche area, it 

had to commit one of its regiments to defend th e assembly area. Wh en th e 

Germans cut of r an armored ta sk force, the staff, lllldoub tedly with the 1061h 

Division in mind, spared no effort to arrange a pai r of airdrops, neither of whi ch 

was successful.' 1 

Yet, as concerned as '-lodges and his sta fTwcrc about the threat to the Marche 

area, they were more worri ed about other sectors. Thcy watchcd for an a!lack 

ncar Malmedy, or at thc VII Corps- XV III Airborne Corps boundary, toward 

Li ege. At the First Army command post, Dickson, still concerned about the 

whereabouts of the /I SS Panzer Corps, warned o f a secondary attack toward 

Aachen a nd a roused a larm with his estimate of twe nty uncommitted enemy 

di visio ns on the front orthe 12th and 21 Army Groups. He did, howeve r, a llow 

that th e Germans would run out of fuel if thcy did not capture a major depot 

over the nex t few days. The gc neral conec rn was cased to a degree when Montgomcry deployed a British brigadc to defe nd the Meuse bridges west ofNamur. 

Hodges and his sta ff were also cheered by the news on 22 December of the 

start of the Third Army's countera ttack to relieve besieged Bastogne and th e 

a rri val of clear skies for Allied a ircraft afte r three days of nasty weather.

l 2 

Hampered by the lack o f information and s<lddl cd with a commander only 

beginning to rega in his vigor, thc First Army headq uart ers stru gg led to maintain some contro l over the ba ttl e. It con tinucd to move units into position on 

the north ern shoulder and to se t corps boundaries. Thc artille ry section had 

alread y obtained permissio n to lise the new proximity fuze, and th e section 

also rece ived a large enough allocation from the 12th Army Grou p staff to lin 

restrictions on artillery ammunition ex penditures for all the corps.83 On 2 1 Dccember the First Army headquarters issued new orders. The V Corps, ho lding 

the critica l Elsenborn Ridge on the eastern end of the shoulder, rece ived three 

infantry divisions, most of anothe r infa ntry di vision, and an a rmored comba t 

command. Thc XVI II Airborne Corps on the V Corps' western nank would 

have a n airborne divisio n, an in fan try division, and most of an a rmored di vision, as we ll as the remnants of the I06th Infantry and 7th Armored Di visions. 

The VII Corps, assemblin g near Marche, could ca ll on two infantry divisions 

and an armored division. As of 25 December the V Corps could calion 14 

a rtill ery batta lions, a chemical morta r battalion, 3 tank ba ttal ions, 5 tank destroyer battal ions, and 12 a ntiaircra ft battalions. The VII Corps had 13 artil lery 

battalions, a chemi ca l mortar battalion, 4 tank battalions, 7 tank destroyer at~ 

tal ions, and 8 antiaircraft battalions, whil e the li ghter XV III Ai rborne Corps 

had 7 artille ry batta lions, 2 tank ba tta li ons, 4 tank destroyer batta lions, and 6 

ant ia irc raft battalions. The army retai ned 6 artillery batta li ons, a tank ba tta lion, a battalion of Be lgian Fusilie rs, and 19 anti aircraft batta lions. S-! 

Its imperfect knowledge of the situation notwithstandin g, the First Army 

headquart ers argued for th e ea rli est possible co unt erattack. In its 2 1 December 
"The Rock o[Cibralta/" ": The First Army Headquarters at the Bulge 223 

orders the G- 3 sect ion claimed that the First Army had blunted the allaek, that 

large enemy groups had been encircled and destroyed, and that the time had 

come to take the offensive. 85 Ake rs wrote these orders without consult ing 

Dickson, who remarked caustically that the only large grou ps encircled belonged to the First Army, but the G- 2's influence with I-lodges and Kean had 

reached a new low. Hodges' health and spirits were improving, especially after 

the command post moved on 22 December be hind the Meuse to the fo rmer 

Belgian Army barracks at Tongres, about eleven miles north of Liege. He and 

Kean continued to resist Montgomery's desire to wait and a llow the German 

offensive to expend itself against the Ame rican defenses.

86 Atthe fie ld marshal's 

insistence, they withdrew the 7th Armored Division from St.-Vith on 22 December. The division's commanders returned fu ll of gratitude for Montgomery, 

but with li llIe complimentary to say abou t the distance they had felt from Hodges 

and the First Army headquarte rs during the ir ordeal. As the 7th withdrew, the 

First Army commander and staff were having a hard time keeping the VII Corps 

in reserve and above the fray as German tanks drove within fOllr miles of the 

MeuseY 

The crisis of the battle was at hand. On the morning of24 December the /l 

SS Panzer COIpS finally attacked, capitaliz ing on the First Army headq uarters' 

fau lty handling of the bou ndary between the VII and XV III Airborne Corps to 

capture the important crossroads of Manhay, about twenty-five miles south of 

Li ege. 88 This action, as well as the 2d Panzer Division's advance farthe r west 

near the Meuse, posed a grave threat to the First Army's entire front , and, while 

ma king contingency plans for a retreat by the V Corps in the east, Hodges 

requested mo re troops from the 2 1 Army Group to backslop his li ne. Montgomery provided the 51st Highland Division, but the field marsha l also directed the 82d Airborne Division, on the western flank of the XV III Airbo rn e 

Corps near Manhay, to ret real 10 a shan er, more defensible front. To guard against 

the 2d Panzer Division's drive to the Meuse, he ordered that the VII Corps, "if 

forced," swi ng back its western fl ank " to the Andenne- Hotton line," Andenne 

and Hotton being, respectively, twenty-four miles sou thwest and twenty-six mi les 

sou th of Liege. This line, he stated, "had to be held at all COSt."89 

The series of events that followed highlighted, once again, not only the 

differences in doctrine between the British and the Americans but also the First 

Army headquarters' deference to the dynamic commande r of the VII Corps. 

During a visit to Coll ins on 23 December, his fi rst visit to a subordinate headquarte rs since the beginning of the battle, Hodges had discussed an allack by 

the 2d Armored Division against the 2d Panzer Division's spearheads near the 

Meuse. Now, a day later, he was reluctant to rein in Coll ins, even though the 

orders that Montgomery had just given him indicated a defensive intent. Hodges, 

Kean, and Thorson decided to send Akers to the VII Corps command post to 

ex plain the fiel d mars hal's wishes. In the mean time, Kcan called the VII Corps 

headquarters. Since Collins was visi ting his divisions, Kcan, speaki ng in 

"guarded double talk" in case of a compromise of the line, told Collins' artillery chief that Akers was on his way. He emphasized that the VII Co rps headquarters had "unrestricted" lise of all of its troops and au thorized the VII Corps 
22 4 

10 c hange ils de fensive front 10 a li ne 

between the two villages beginning 

with "A" a nd " 1-1 ." Aft er Kenn hun g 

up the pho ne, he remembered th e ex* 

ulla nl tone at the othe r end orlhe line 

and thought thai th e offi cer had misund erstood him . He ca ll ed back, repeated his in str uc tion s, a nd said, 

"Now get this. [' m o nl y going to say 

it oncc. Roll with the pUIlCh."90 

Keall had judged co rrectly. The 

VII Corps arti ll ery offi cer, who had 

rece ived repea ted pl eas fro m th e 2d 

Armored Di visio n fo r a uth ori zation 

to atttl ck, had ass umed tlwt "A" and 

" 1-1 " stood for the villa ges of Asscsse 

and J-I ognc . A linc between them 

would be pa rall e l \0, but abo ut e ig ht 

mil es southwest o f, the one Kca n had 

in mind. From th e viewpoi nt of the 

2d Armored Division and th e VII 

Corp s headqu a rt e rs, th is wa s a n 

e nco uraging inte rpretati o n, a nd the 

A COlllmalld Po.~( (If Wa r 

Colollel Akers 

(Photogra ph taken in 1947.) 

a rtill e ry o ffi ce r had sent a dispatch 10 reach Collins o nce the latte r a rrived at 

the di vision 's command post. A ne r Kean 's second ca ll, th e o ffi cer reali zed his 

c rror, sent a co rrection to th e 2d Armo red Di visio n, and ad vised Coll ins to 

"come home ."91 By the time Akers rcached the VlI Corps comma nd post ane r a 

long tre k, Collins and his sta ff had discllssed the ta cti ca l situati on and th e im· 

pli eations of Kean 's messages. T he red-ha ired 0 - 3 o perations offi ce r described 

th e sit uati o n as seen from th e Fi rst Army headqua rt e rs a nd int e rpreted 

Montgome ry's directi ve as re leasing Coll ins from all offensive missions and 

g rantin g the VlI Corps commander co nside rabl e disc retio n to accomplish the 

o bj ective of stab ili z ing the First Army's western fl ank . Collins read th ese o rde rs as g ra nt ing a uthori zati o n to attack, a nd he took th e res po nsibility o f di -

recting the 2d Armo red Di vision to do so. On Christma s Day, the 2d attac ked 

a nd inflictcd heavy losscs o n thc 2d Pal/zer DivisiOiI nca r Cell es, j ust four miles 

cast o f th e Meuse crossings at Dinant. 92 

Altho ugh Mo ntgomery and Di ckson still thoug ht the Ge rmans had a not her 

attack in th em, I-lodges a nd 111 0S\ of his staff be li eved ane r 25 December that 

the c risis had passed and th ey could transition to th e offe nsive. As early as 19 

Decembe r the First Army commander and sta ff had wanted a counterattack, 

but Mo ntgomery re fu sed to be ru shed. He cont ended tha t the All ies must wai l 

fo r th e e nemy main effo rt to ex pend itse lf be fo re 1<lUn ching a full -sea le 

eOllnterstrok e . On this poin t, th e fi e ld ma rshal was backed by ULTRA inte rcepts 

o f e nemy intent ions and Di ckso n's estima te of seve ntee n un committed enemy 

di visions, e leve n nea r Aache n and six facing the north ern shoulde r. Tho rson, 
"The Rock a/Gibraltar"; The First Army Headquarters at the Bulge 225 

however, dismissed the G- 2's prognosis, arguing that the Germans we re so badly 

beaten that they must soon retreat, and his argument gained ground as the days 

passed without a major Germa n allaek. At a higher level, Mon tgomery wa s 

unde r pressure from Eisenhower and Bradley for a First Army attac k that they 

could coordinate with the Third Army advance in the south. Already, on 26 

December, Patton had re li eved Bastogne, and 0 11 30 December, he turned his 

a!lae k toward Houffali ze, in th e middle of the German sali ent abou t eig ht een 

miles so utheast of Hotton and about te n l11i les nort h of Bastogne. Under these 

circumstances, Montgomery allowed the First Army and corps staffs to inte nsify pla nning for a counlera!laek .

9J (Map 14) 

One of the main reasons for the field marshal's reluctance to take the ofTensive was a serious lac k of infan try, especia lly riflemen, in the First Army's di visions. During 16-3 1 December, the First Army obtained only 15,295 fillers to 

cover total losses of 4 1,166. On 23 December Mont gomery warned that the V 

Corps' four di visions wcre shol'l 7,000 men, most ly infantrymen, and Ihat the 5th 

Armored Division was operatin g al 60 percent stre ngth. SHAEF responded by 

promising 17,474 emergeney replacements, mostly noninfan trymen retrained by 

ETOUSA, 10 the 2 [ Army Group. Wh en SHAEF transferred the Fi rst and Ninth 

Armi es to the operational control of the 21 Army Group, it had given the latter 

authorit y to allot fi llers betwcen the IwO armi es, an au thority that headquarters 

now de legated to Mill er, the First Army ~ Otherwise, the First Army headquarters had littl e control over its replacement supply. During this time, ETOUSA 

was combing able-bodicd men from COMZ, instituting conversion programs, 

and even breaking up existing units to obtain fillers. The First Army G- I section, 

by con trast, could on ly tighten its proeedures, provide vete ran instructors to its 

combat orientation program, and use dai ly estimated loss reports, phone ca lls, 

and visits to determi ne proper allocations of the available fill ers. ndee(~ du ring 

the Ardennes battle, the daily estimated loss reports, which improved in accuracy 

aftcr the first few days, provided Hodges with his only source of data on unit 

stre ngths. Unlike the Third <1I1d Seventh Armies, however, thc First Army did not 

crea te its own conversion program.95 

Be fore the First Army could attack, it would have to replace heavy losses in 

eq uipme nt as we ll. Begi nning 24 December, the First Army's serv ice units refitted formations, such as the 7th Armored Division, that had borne the brunt 

of the battle so far, but they soon exhausted their stoc ks. The G-4 section submitt ed a survey of its needs to the COMZ and 12th Army Group staffs; it would 

take time, however, fo r those two agencies to respond. [n th e interim, the First 

Army stafT turned to other so urces. To meet the shortage of medium tank s, 

Medaris and Lynde , as e<lrly <IS 19 December, had turned to their counterparts 

at th e 2 1 Army Group headquarters, many of whom th ey had known in North 

Africa. The British initiall y turned down th e requests, c iting th eir own needs. 

Afte r the command switch, they c hanged the ir Illinds and provided 250 medium tanks. In a erash prog ram during 3 1 Decembe r 1944- 2 January 1945, 

Medaris' tank maintenance companies worked with Williams' signa l radio teams, 

Be lgian labo rers, a nd vo lunteers from th e Irish Guards to load the tanks with 

rations and ammun ition and install new radios. The British also suppli ed enough 
260 ERASING THE BULGE 

ecember 1944- 25 J, nuary 1945 

~ F,,,,,, l"', zt; Do< 

r"""l .... gJ •• 

, 

BELGIUM 

"'R~lY SJ;HVICE ,\HEA 

R 

\ 

A N c E 

MAl' 14 
"The Rock ojCibral(o,.": The Firsr Army HeadquarTers {[Ilhe Bulge 227 

25-pounder guns and ammun ition to equi p fou r arti ll ery battalions, as well as 

about thirty 6-pounde r guns to replace American 57-mm. antitank guns tost in 

combat. The Fi rst Army logisticians also turned to the Ni nth Army for trllcks, 

signa l items, and antitank mines, to COMZ for signal cquipment, and to rear 

area units like the 29th Infan try for mac hine guns and bazookas.% 

While the First Army specia l staff sections su pervised the replacement of 

unit eq uipment, the evacuation process continued. On 20 December the First 

Army headqua rters had ordered the evacuation of all but the most essential 

insta llations to the region behind the Meuse. The ordnance section established 

a se rvice area in the square between Liege , Tongres, St.- rond wenty-two 

miles northwest of iege and Namur, whieh lay on the Meuse thirty-rive miles 

southwest of Liege. Meanwhi le, the quartermasters reinstalled most of their 

depots near Gemblollx, about thirty-eight mi les west of Li ege. The transfer of 

the First Army priso ner enclosure to Hu y, seventeen miles southwest of Li ege, 

on 28 Decembe r permitted the evacuation of prisoners rrom the corps by rail as 

well as truck. As for the First Army hospitals, they moved 10 a concentration 

area near the quartermaster depots, but the lack of shelter was so acute that 

most evacuation hospitals rema ined inactive. As a rcsult, Rogers had to send 

all but those men requ iring immed iate emergency surge ry in thc division field 

hospitals to COMZ facilities. This poli cy aggravated the First Army's replacement problem, for COMZ, eager to keep its own forward hospitals clear, sent 

many less serious cases too far to the rear for conveni ent return to du ty. Elsewhere, the First Army G- 5 section was coordinating the evacuation of thousands of civilians from threatened areas to the rear and making arrangements 

to feed, clothe, and house them. 97 

Although the evacuation of suppl y installat ions created major problcms of 

congestion and she lte r in rear areas, the proximity of the major depots to the 

front eased logistical prepa rations for the counterattack. Forward of the Meuse, 

the First Army logisticians positioned insta ll ations to be ready for a quick 

ad vance once the counterattack began. They stat ioned a rolling ammunition 

supply point of500-ton ca pac ity with the VII Corps and an ammunition supply 

point of 750-ton capacity to support thc XV III Airborne Corps. Rather than 

accumulate large stocks in forward depots, the First Army headquarters Sli Pplied its fo rward distribution points directly from COMZ depots. Amlllunition 

reserves remained low, large ly because the 12th Army Group headquarters had 

removed restrictions at the start of the battle, but most other supplies rcached 

accep tablc levels by the start of the ofTensive.98 

Noting the progress of resupply and replacement in the First Army and 

eager to show himself the good subord ina te after a command c risis with 

Eisenhower, Montgomery finally agreed to an offcnsivc. Although he had ostensibly left the planning for a cou nterattack to the First Army and corps hcadquarters, he had kept a close watch on the process and, th rough daily visits, 

ensured that his views were known. 99 Amo ng the planners, genera l agreement 

existed that the roadnet at the base of the salient was too poor to permit an 

attack in that area. On 27 December Collins proposed a drive to SI.-Vith, but 

Hodges, tired of two wceks of opcn nanks, chose a Icss risky and compl ex 
228 II COlllmalld Post af H¥/I' 

thrust 10 Houffali ze along the west bmlk of the Ourthc, wh ich flowed southeast 

through the VII Corps front at Hotlon. When Montgomery made availabl e the 

30 Corps to lake over the VII Corps' zone west of Ihe Ourtilc, I-lodges shift ed 

Collins' altack east of the river. 100 

A ftcr Montgomery set 3 January as the date for the counterattack, Hodges, 

Kean, Thorson, Collins, and Ridgway met on 31 December to draw up a plan 

for an offensive. The VII Corps, with two armored and two infantry di visions, 

would drive to a linkll]J with the Third Army at Houffa lizc , while the XVI II 

Airborne Co rps- with one infantry, one airborne, and two armored divisions 

and part of anothe r infantry divisio n- supported the VII Corps' eastern flank 

with an advancc on St.-Vith. By 2 January th e First Army had positioned 15 

field artill ery ballalions, a chemical mortar ballalion, 4 tank battalions, 6 tank 

destroyer battalions, and 8 antiaircraft battalions to support the VI I Corps dri ve. 

In add ition, the VII Corps rece ived the lion 's sllare of the allocation of avail -

able art ill ery ammunition. The First Army headquart ers also gave th e 32d Fi eld 

Artillery Brigade to the XV III Airborne Corps, which now boasted 14 artill ery 

ballalions, 2 tank battnlions, 5 tank destroycr battalions, and 6 antiaircraft battalions. The V Corps was left with 14 artill ery ba tta lions, a chemica l mortar 

ballalion , a Range r batta lion, 3tank ballalions, 5 tank deslroyer battalions, and 

10 a nti aircraft battalio ns. Eightee n antiaircraft battalion s, a tank 

battalion, and a battalion of Belgian Fusiliers remained in army reserve . Meanwhi le, I'lodges me t with the Army Air Forces generals 10 finali ze air sllpport. 

Some of the concern over uncommitted German reserves dissolved that New 

Year's Day when Ihe Germa ns launched Operation NORDWIND against th e 6th 

Army Group in Alsace. IO ' 

When th e VII Corps finally began ils counterattack on the morning of3 January, it made slow progress. even after the British 30 Corps to the west joined the 

attaek the next day. The marshy plateau cast of the Ourthe was crossed by numerous gorges and only a few major roads. Already miserable, the weather worsened 

over the next few days as snow flurries, interspersed with light rain, crcat ed threefoot drifts and covered roads with sheets of ice, causing vehicles to skid OLLt of 

control. On only three days over th e nex t two weeks could the IX Tactical Air 

Command provide evcn nominal air sllpport. The enemy, identified by the G- 2 

sect ion as portions of I SS panzer, I panzer, and 3 vO lksgrenadier divisions, was 

well fortified with tanks and antitan k guns and preparcd to fight for the few 

bui ldings that alTered shelter rrom the arctic blasts. Hoping for a quick breakthrough to trap the Germans at the tip or the Bulge, Collins led with his two 

armored divisions, but the tankers had a hard time maneuveri ng off the roads, 

which were covered by antitank weapons. The First Army headquarters' cautious 

lISC of phase lines to pace the advance of the 82d Airborne Division on the Vll 

Co rps' eastern flank preve nted the paratroopers from dri ving across the Salm 

Ri ver, which ran across their front , and cutting a key east-west highway. Plagued 

by a cold, Hodges remained at Tongres, received few visitors, and exercised littl e 

personal influence over the battle, which soon became a slugging match. 102 

Hodges played a larger role once the full XVI II Airborne Corps joined the 

attack. By 9 January his health had imp roved enough for him to visit Ridgway's 
"The I?ack a/Gibraltar": Tile Firsl Army Headquarlers (j/ Ihe Bulge 229 

headquartc rs and plan thc dri ve on SI.-Vi th. As issued by the First Army hcadquart ers after the fi e ld marshal 's approval the next day, the plan ca ll ed for the 

XVIII Airborne Corps to adva nce southeast on 13 Ja nuary to an initial phase 

line. On orders from th e First Army headquarters and with the support of the V 

and VII Corps on its l1anks, it would then tak e SI.-Vith and sec ure the line from 

HoutTali zc northeast to SI.-Vith. Shortl y aftcr the attack started on 13 January, 

howcver, 1·lodges, checking the situat ion repo rts coming into his headquarters, 

became dissatisfi ed wit h the progress of the XV[I [ Airbo rn e Corps' 30th and 

75th Infantry Divisions. Hc refused th e appeal of Ridgway's G- 3 to launch the 

attack of the V Corps' [st In fantry Di vision on th c XV[ II 's eastern nank unti[ 

the 30th Division had reac hed its initia l phase line. Aftc r Ridgway, during two 

visits by I·[odges to th e XV III 's command post, told his supc rior thaI the 75th 

req uired new leadership, 1·lodges relieved the commander of that di vision on 

20 January. [n the meantime, he had received bettc r news from the VII Corps 

headquart e rs, whi ch had linked up with the Third Army at HoutTalize on 16 

January.IUl 

With the linkup at Houffali ze, the First Army returned at midnight on 17 

January to the operational control of the 12th Army Group. Earlier, on the 

aftc rnoon of 16 Ja nuary, Montgomc ry had stoppcd by the First Army headquarte rs for a farewell. For allthc animosity that was alrcady bui lding betwec n 

the field marshal and Bradley and would later color postwar memories among 

participants, Montgomery 's fina l visi t to the First Army command post seems 

to ha ve bee n a mutually and genuinely amiabl e parting. Many on the First Army 

statT, of course, found Montgomery's mannerisms amusing and his actions and 

views irritating. Yet they respected his thorough profcssion;l lism and were grateful for his usua l noninte rfe rence in th e ir tact ical decisio ns, as we ll as his 

cncouragcmcnt and support for them during the Ardcnnes battl e. No doubt th ey 

also appreciated the li be ral number of British decorations that hc had authori zed for personnel of the First Army. In co ntrast, the First Army officers cxpressed much more rese ntment toward what th ey saw as se lf-glorifi ca tion by 

the Third Army headquarters of its ro le in the bailie. Nevert hel ess, 1·lodges and 

his st .. tTel early re lished their retu rn to Bradley's command . Reunited with the 

12th Army Group, the First Army continued its ad van ce to the east, erasing the 

Gc rman sa lient with the c'lpture ofSt.-Vith on 23 January.I(I.I 

Thc First Army headquarters had survived the greatest test of its campaign 

in Europe, but not without highlighti ng some of the defic iencies and strains 

that had plagued the staff for Some time. These included thc defects of the First 

Army information-gathcri ng system, the ant agonism be tween the G- 2 and 

G- 3, and the lack of vigorous leade rs hip from the command ing general. Because of these factors, the First Army headquarte rs was not only surprised by 

the otTcnsive but slow to react once it came . For much of the battlc, the headqua rtc rs scemed out of touch with events at the front, givin g unrea listi c missions and providing littl e moral su pport to units dcsperlll e ly in need of it. 

Dcspitc these probl ems as well as lack of support from onc superior eche lon 

and diffcrences of philosophy and nationa lity with anoth er, thc First Army headquarters managed to get thc job donc. After a slow start, it rushed reinforce-
230 A COII/mand Pos/ {II War 

meills to those positions on the northern shoulder where they cou ld best blunt 

the German dri ve. It saved the great bulk of its endangered supplies from caplure and, with the he lp of the British, found enough replacement equipment to 

make an early counterattack possible. For these achievements, much credit 

sho uld go to the chief of staff, who held the headquarters togethe r and provided such direction as ex isted after the incapacitation o f his commander. As 

Bradley 's aide remarked, Kean had truly been 11 "Rock ofGibrallar" in the crisis. HIS Thanks largely to his leade rsh ip, the First Army headquarters overcame 

an occasional case of bad nerves to find the necessary resilience to turn back 

the tide of Hitle r's last great offensive. 
Notes 

I Bradley. I I Soldier s Slor)'. pp. 4S I- 53: Hugh M. Cole, TfteAlT/clllles: /JollIe oflhe Bulge. 

U.S. Army in World War II (Washington. D.C.: U.s. Army Cenler of Military Hislory. 1965), 

pp. 259- 60; AA R, First U.S. Army. for December 1944; Rpls. First U.S. Army. Report of 

Operations. I Augnst 1944- 22 February 1945,2: 139, and First Artn)', COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 404 . 

I Inl crvs, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, p. 95 , and Bevan with Hew itt , I Oct 81. p. 

172: MS , Dickson, Algiers to the Elbc, pp. 170- 71. 

I Weigle)" £i~'clI"ml'e l's Lielll el1{/1I1.~. p. 460; Llr, Dickson to Kcan, lJ Jan 45. 20 1 file , 

Dickson Papers, USMA Library: Inlcrvs, Murray with Dickson, 22 Sep 72. pp. 32- 37. and 

Pogue with Rosenga rten, 22 Dec 47, pp. 1- 3. Pogue interviews. USA MI·II; Rpl. Rosenga rtcn to 

Taylor, 2 1 May 45, sub: Report on UI.TR" Intelligence a t First U.S. Army: Interv. G. Patrick 

Murrny with Col William R. Si lvey, Murrny Papers, DWI'I; John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bille,. 

"'lxx/s (New York : G. I'. Putnam's Sons, 1969), p. 28: Ltrs, Fred Wa llach to Joseph H. Ewing, J 

Aug 65, DWII, and Blanchard to author, Jan 97: I3radley. A Soldiers Slo/")', pp. 462- 63 . 

• MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 170. See a lso AA R, First U.S. Army. for December 

1944: Rpl . First U.S. Arrny, Report of Operations, I August 1944-22 February 1945, 1:99- 100: 

MS, Benjamin A. Dick son, The G- 2 Battle of the l3ulge, pp. 3- 5, 8, Il<lttle of the Bulge-Research 

MMerials, John Toland Papers, LibrllTy of Congress (LOC). Washingto n, D.C.: MS, Benjamin 

A. Dickson and Ivan H. "Cy" I'ete rman, We Wouldn 't Be Warned in the Bulge, Battle of the 

Bulge- Research Materials. Toland Pa pers, LOC: Interv, Pogue with Dickson, 6 Feb 52, p. I, 

I'ogue interviews. USAM H1; Ba[dwin.IJlIlllel· Lost alld !YOI/. p. 358. 

' AA R, First U.S. Army, for Decembcr 1944: Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operat ions. I 

August 1944- 22 February [945, I: 100- 103: MS. Dickson, The G- 2 Bailie of the Bulge, pp. 

17- 19; MS. Dickson and I'eterman, We Wouldn't Be Warned in the l3ulgc: MS, Dickson, Algiers 

to the Elbc, pp. 170- 74, 186- 87: [nterv. Pogue wilh Dickson. 6 Feb 52. pp. \- 2; Baldwin, 

Ballles Losl alld 11'0/1. pp. 358- 59. 

' Quote from Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimate 37,1 0 Dec 44 . All G- 2 Esti\lIll1es c ited ill this 

study arc in 101 - 2. 15, G- 2 ESlim<ltes, box 1956. WWIl Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. RpIS, 

First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpls for 16- 17 Sep. 1- 9 Dcc 44. All G- 2 Periodic Reports ci ted in 

Ihis study arc in 101 - 2.2 G- 2 Journa l and file. boxes 1837- 1879, WWII OilS Re ports, RG 407, 

WN ~C . Sec a lso MS. Royce L. Tho mpso n, Ameri ca n [nt c lli ge nce o n th c German 

Counteroff eusive. I November- IS December 1944, 2 vals., 1949,2:349,354. CMH : Pogue, 

The SIII'rclllc CQIIIIII(III(I, pp. 366- 69. 

1 Rpts. First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpts for 12- 13 Dec 44 . Silvey quote from Ibid., for 14 

Dec 44. and second quote from Ibid., for 15 Dee 44. Ibid., for 11 - 16 Dec 44. See a lso MS. 

Thompson, Amcrican Intelligence on the German Counte roffensive. 2:233- 34: Pogue, The 

SIII"Y.!IIIC COlllllllllld, p. 370. 

' Inlerv, Pogue with Hodges, 12 Ja n 50 and I Apr 52: Sylv<ln Diary, 10 Dec 44; Bradley, 

A Sohlier~' Story, pp. 462- 64; Imervs. Jo hn Toland with Gen Courtney II. Hodges, Ba il ie of 

the Bulge- Research Ma te rial. 1st Army. Tola nd Pape rs, LOC, and Murray with Myers, 15 

Apr 74, pp. 4 1-42. Regardi ng AmeriC<l n system ofestimales, see Intcrv, Pogue with Wi ll iams. 

30- 3 1 May 47, p. 5; Baldwin , Hallles 1.O.f1 ami IYOII, p. 367; Pogue, The SIIIJremC COII/I//(ll/d, 

Il. 36 2. 

9 Inter\', John Toland wilh Brig Gel1 Trumau C. Thorson. Baili e of the Bulge- Research 

Materi:,I, lSI Army. Toland Papers, LOC. For the views of other First Army staff officers on 

Diekson'sclaims, sec Intervs, Murray with Myers, 15Apr 74, p. 33; with Pllllerson, 23 Aug 73, 

pp.94-97, 112- 13; Tol<lnd wi th Maj Gen I'elcr C. Hains [II, B<lttle of the Bulge- Research 

Material, lSI Army, Toland Papers, LOC: Murray with Hart, 1973. pp. 46- 55; author wilh Wendt. 

29 Apr 91. p. 66; Murray with Silvey; and Bevan wilh Hewitt , I Oct 81, pp. 173, 179. Llr. 

Allphi n to author, 8 Jan 97. 

,l lntcrv, Pogue wilh Rosengarten, 22 Dec 47, p. 2. See a lso Jn1. First Army G- 2 Jnl for 14 

Dec 44. All G- 2 Journal entries cited in this study are in 101 - 2.2 G 2 Journal, boxes 1837-

1879, WW II Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. 
232 A CO/llmand POSI a/ War 

II InteTl', Pogue with l~oscngartcn. 22 Dec 47, P)J. 2- ], Sec also Mac Donald, A Tilllc[ol" 

7hllllpel.~, pp. 76- 77; Pogue, Tile Slipreme COII/IIII/I/d. I), 370; Weigicy, £iSCI/II01rer S LiCllleJl(lIIiS, 

p.460. 

Il Cir. 12th Army Group 0 - 2 Weekly IllIeliigcncc Summary 18, 12 Dec 44. Balik of the 

Bul ge folder, box 4, Dickson I)apers, USMA Library_ 

I) InteT\" FOTrcst C. Pogue with Brig Gen Edwin L. Sibert. II Mny 51, and LIT, Sibert to 

John Toland, I Feb 58, both in Gen, Sibert. FUSA [nlell, box 6. Charles 13. MacDonald Papers, 

USAMHI. Intervs, Forrest C. I'ogue wilh Maj Gen Kenneth W. D. Strong. 12 Dec 46, pp. 2- 3, 

Pogue interviews. USAMJ-11 ; with Col J. O. CUTtis, 16 May 50, p. 2, Pogue interviews, USAMI-I I; 

wilh Smith, 8 May 47, pp. 2- 3; wilh Williams, 30-3 1 May 47, p. 5; with Rosengarten. 22 Dee 

47. p. 2: and Murray with Silvey. John Toland. BailIe: The SIOI)' oflfle Bulge (New York: Random 

House. 1959). p. II: Bradley. A Soldier~' SIOI)'. p. 464; Eisenhower, Biller Woo(ls. p. 172; Pogue, 

Til e Supn'me Commal/d. pp. 364- 65; Wilmot, TI", Slmgglefor Europe, pp. 574- 75. 

" Baldwin, Bm{/es Losl (/I/d WOII, I). 361. 

u Inten'. Pogue with Rosengarten , 22 Dec 47. I)P. 1- 2; MS. Thompson. American 

Intelligence on the German Counteroffensivc. 2:243-46; Interv, Murray wi th Dickson, 22 Sep 

72, pp. 33- 34; Interv, Pogue wi th Sibert. II M,W 51, and Llr, Sibert to Baldwin, 2 Jan 47, both 

in Gen. Sihert, FUSA Intel I. box 6, MacDonald Papers, USAMH I; IllIen'. Pogue with Dickson, 

6 Feb 52. p. 2; Baldwin. Ballles Losl (lml UVII, Pl'. 362- 63. 

I. MS. Thompson. Amcrican Inlcl1 igcnce on the German Counteroffensive, 2:227- 36, 243-

46,346, 377; Int erv~, Murray with Dickson, 22 Sep 72, p. 38, and Pogue with Dickson. 6 Feb 

52. p. 2; Bradley, II Soldier s SI(lI)" p. 460: David G. Rempel , "Oallle of the Olllge."' in Europe: 

AI?GUMENT 10 VE Day. j(IIIII(II), 1944 10 May 1945, cd. Cravcn and Catc, pp. 673- 82; 

Eiscnhower, IJiller Woods, p. 169: MacDonald, II Timefor Tl"I!lIIpel.\·, p. 56; Baldwin , B(llIles 

Losl anrl U0/1, pp. 364- 65; Pogue. The Slipreme COlIIlIIll/ld. pp. 361 - 62; Robert E. Merriam. 

Dark December (New York: Ziff Davis. 1947), PI). 100- 102; l1 r. Allphin to author, 8 Jan 97. 

17 lnterv. Murray with Rosengarten, 3 Mar 75, pp. 24- 25; 13cnnett, ULTRA illihe Wesl, pp. 

188- 204; MacDonald. II rimefor Tl"llmpels, 1)1). 40, 78. I, Intel'v, Pogue with Dickson, 6 Fcb 52. p. I; MacDonald. A rime for TrUll/pels, p. 56; 

Int eTvs, Poguc with Uradlcy, 6 Nov 46. p. 2. and with Curtis, 16 May 50, p. 2. 

I" Interv, MUrrllY wi th Roscngarten, 3 MtII" 75, p. 49; MS, Carter, Carter's WM, eh. 12, p. 2; 

13rlldley, A Soldiers SIOI)" PI" 460- 61; Baldwin. 8(1111es Losl (J1Il11J't)JJ, pp. 360- 61. 365: Pogue. 

The Supreme COlllllllmd, p. 361; Merrinm. Dark December. pp. 98- 99; Cole, The ArdclllleS, pp. 

56- 63. 

20 Sylvnn Diary. 16 Dec 44; Jul. ir~t Army G- 3 Jnl for 16 Dec 44. All G- 3 Journal entries 

citcd in this chal)ter are in 101 - 3.2 G- 3 Journnl, boxes 1959- 1963. WWII Ops Reports. RG 

407, WNRC. First Army G- 3 Jnl Correspondence for 16 Dec 44, in 10 1- 3.3 G- 3 Journal file, 

G- 3, 1st Army. 1- 20 Dec 44. box 1971, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407 , WNRC. MS, Carter, 

Cartcr's War. eh. 12. p. I; MS. Thompson. American Int elligence on the German 

Counteroffensive, 2:374; Llr, Jacks to author, II Dec 96. DWI·I. 

11 Inler\', 1'olllnd with 1·lodges; Cole. The IlrdelllleS, I'. 331: MS, Thompson, Amcrican 

I nlelligence on the Germlln Countcroffensi\'c, 2 :240; Wilmot, Tile Sll"I!ggle for Elllvpe , p. 583; 

Gregory A. Fontenot. "The Lucky Scvcnth in the Uulge: A Case Study for the AirLand Bailie" 

(M.A.S. [Master of Military Art nnd Scicncejthesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

Co llege, 1985), p. 37. 

II Sylvan Diary. 16 Dcc 44; Interv, Toland with l'lodges: Cole, The AnlelllleS. p. 331; 

MacDonald, A rime for Tl"I!lIIpcls. I)P. 188- 89; Tol:1I1d. BailIe, p. 30; Wilmot. The Slrllggle for 

Europe, p. 583; Eisenhower, CI"II.\"ade ill Ellrope. p. 347. 

1J Quote from MS, Thompson. Americnn Intclligencc on Ihc Gcrnl(LIl Counteroffensive. 2:532. 

Sec nlso Jnl. First Army G- 2 Jnl for 16 Dec 44; Rpt, First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpt for 16 Dec 44; 

MS, Thomp~on, Americll11 Intelligence on the German COllilleroffcnsive. 2:241. 374- 77. 

2-1 Sylvan Diary. 16 Dec 44; MS. Dickson. Algiers 10 the Elbe, p. 176; MS, Dickson. The 

G- 2 l3atlle oflhe Bulge. p. 21; Cosmas and Cowdrey, Medical Serl'icc illihe £UroPC(l1l Thealer 

OfOIJemliolls, p. 404. 

:l Sylvan Diary, 17 Dec 44: Jnl, First Army G- 2 Jill , 17 Dec 44. 
"The Rock ojGibmllar": The Finl Army Headquarters (1IIhe Bulge 233 

!II Ibid.; AARs. First U.S. Army. for December 1944 and January 1945; MS. Dickson, 

Algiers to the Elbe. p. 177. On the killing of American prisoners, see John Bauserman. The 

Maimed), Mas$(lCrc (Shippensburg. I'a.: White Mane. 1995). 

17 Syl I'an Diary, 17 Dec 44; Mayo. 011 tJeachhead al/d /Jallh1IYJllt. p. 31 I : Toland. !Jail/e. 

1).54; Hamilton, MOII/Y, p. [87: Wilmot. Tilt' Struggle/or Ellmp!', p. 587. 

11 Sy lv,LI\ Diary, 17 Dec 44: Interl', Pogue with Cu rtis, 16 M,ly 50, I). 2: Co le, TheAr(/elll/e.\·. 

1).104: MacDonald, II Time/Of' Tn/mIJets, p. 26 1: Weigley, Eisenhower's Licuten(IIII ~, p. 481; 

lIughes. Ol'ERLORD. p. 274. 

:<I Sylvan Diary, 17 Dec 44. Ilitervs, Toland with Thorson; Murray with Kean. 25 Aug 73; 

and wi lh Myers, 15 Apr 74. pp. 43- 44. Cole, The ArdClIl/es, I). 305: Toland, 8((/llc, PI). 55, 86-

87: MacDonald. A Timc/or TmmpclS. I)P . 262 63: Wei gley, Eisel/hower s Lieulemlllls, p. 481 . 

.;0 Quote from Sylvan Diary. 16 Dec 44. and sec also 17 Dec 44. 

j , Inter\" Murray with Myers, 15 Apr 74, pp. 11- 12, 45 46. 

J1 lnlerv, Murray with Kean, 25 Aug 73. 

JJ Ltr. Allphin 10 author. 8 Jan 97. 

H Intervs. Murray with Kean. 25 Aug 73: Toland with Ilodges; and with Hains. Llr. Allphin 

to author, 8 Jan 97; Ilansen Diary, 11 - 12 Feb 45. 

U Msg, Akers to Gerow, Collins, 16 Dec 44.101 - 3.3 0 - 3 Journal file, G- 3 1st Army, 1-

20 Dec 44 , box 1971 , WWII Ops ~e[lor s, I~O 407. WNRC; I~pt. First U.S. Army. Report of 

Operations, I August 1944-22 February 1945, 2: 119. 

,. Co le, The Ar(/eIIllCS, PI). 274, 333; Jnls, 7th Armored Division HQ Jnls for 16- 17 Dec 

44,607- 3.2 G- 3 Journal with Supponing l'apers- 71h Armored Di vision, Dec 44. box 15568, 

U.S. Army. Adj Gen's Office. World War JJ Operations Reports. 1940- 1948: 7t h Armored 

Division, 607- 3.2 11 - 1- 44 to 12- 3 1-44, RG 407, WNRC; Rpt, Battle ofSc.-Vith (17 23 Dec) 

607- 3 0 - 3 Operlllions Overlays, G- 3, 71h Armored Division , Dec 44. box 15555, U.S. Army 

Adj Gens Ofl'iee. World War II Operations Reports. 1940- 1948: 7th Armored Division, 607-

2.6 10607- 3, RG 407, WN RC; Inlervs, Kish wilh Clarke, 23 Feb 82, p. 66. lind Robcrt E. 

Merriam with I3rig Gen Robert W. Ilasbrouek , C 1- 287 7th AD Ardennes Bre'lkthrough 16 Dec 

44- 8 Jan 45, box 24097, U.S. ArmY,Adj Gen's Ofl'iee. World War II Ol)erations Reports, 1940-

1948: ComblH [nterv iews. RG 407, WNRC; Teleeon, author with Col Gregory Fontenot, 8 Mllr 

95, OWl[; J. D. Morelock, Gel/ero/s o/lheAJ"(/elllle ~; I lmeric(1/I Le(l(/crship ill Ihe /J(II/Ie o/Ihe 

!Julgc (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), pp. 172,222 23. 

) 7 Msgs. Lt Col E. 13. Locke, First Army G- 3 Section, 10 CGs, V and VII Corps. 9th 

Infantry Division . 17 Dec 44, and ColO. C. Mood. Chief o f Staff, V Corps. 10 Di vision 

Comm<lnders. Corps Artillery, 17 Dec 44, bOlh in 101 - 3.3 G- 3 Journa l file, G- 3 1st Army, 

1- 20 Dec 44, box 1971, WWlI Ops Reports, RG 407, WN RC; Interv, Bevan with Hewitt, I 

Oct 81, p. 174: Teleeon. author with Dannemiller. 6 Nov 92, PIl . 102- 03; AAIt. Firsl U.S. 

Army, for December 1944: ItHen's, Maclyn 1'. Burg wilh Gen William H. Sittll)SOt], USA 

(Ret.), 15 Mar 72 lInd 5 Nov 72, PI' . 69, 86, 92, Eisenhower Library: Moreloc k, Gellem/s 0/ 

the An/clilies. I). 175: U.S. Army, Ninth U.S. Army. COl/quer; The Slor)' a/Nillth Arllly. 1944-

J945 (Washington. D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), Pl'. [ 17. 120- 2 1: Weigley. Eisenhower's 

Uell/('JI(IIIIS, p. 494. 

J. Incl, Ori g Gen William B. Kunzig, USA (Ret.), to author, 10 Jun 95, DWll : Mettlo. 

Kunzig for Thorson. 3 Jan 45, DWI-!: Rpt. First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. I August 

1944- 22 February 1945, 1 :[05; Cole. Thellrdellllcs, pp. 333- 34. 

" Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945,2; 119, 

4: 140, and First Army, COD. 18 Nov 46, p. 350: McNamara, QlIlII·lerll/aSler ,' c/i\'i/ies. PI). 151-

52; Cosmas and Cowdrey, ,\Iedical Sen'ice i/l Ihe Elllvl'cal/ Theme/" o/Ol'emtiOlu. Pl'. 402- 04 . 

.. Rpl, First US. Army, Report of O])eratiotls, I August 1944 22 Febru<lry 1945,2:27; 

AAR, First U.S. Artily, for December 1944. 

~I Rpt. First U.S. Army, Reporl of Operations, I August 1944 22 February 1945, 4:66 73; 

AAR. First U.S. Army, for December 1944: Rpt. First Army, COD. 18 Nov 46. PI'. 170. 404 ; 

MS, Dickson, The 0 - 2 Balik of the Bulge, p. 23; MeNatllaf<t, QII(lI"ICrm(/.I'ler ;Iclil'ilies, pp. 

152- 55; AAR, First Army Quartermaster, ror December 1944, 101 - 30.0 QM After Aelion 

Rel)orts, WWII Ops Rel)OrlS, RG 407. WNRC: Ross and Romanus. Opemliolls ililhe fI'!lI"lIg(/i/lst 
234 A COllllllalld Post (If War 

Germany, p. 426; Inter\', Murray Wilh I'allcrsoll. 23 Aug 73, p. 137: RPI 21, First Army 0-4, 

101-4.2 G- 41ournal file, WWJI Ops Reports, Ita 407, WNRC. 

'Z RPI, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945,4:4- 5; 

AAR, First U.S. Army, for December 1944; RPI, FirSl Army, COD, 18 NOli 46, pp. 350- 51 ; MS, 

Dickson, The G- 2 Battle orthe Bulge, p. 23; InteTI!, Murray with Lynde, pp. 17- 21; Mayo, 011 

Beachhead (ll/d Balllejrolll. pp. 304- 12. 

>l RPI, First U.S. Army, Report of 01)Cralions, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1: 128-

29,2: J 19- 23, 126,3: 149- 51,4: 140- 41. 156; AAR, First U.S. Army, for December 1944: Rpts, 

Supply Reports, Rhine Crossing, FUSA, ML 870, box 24185, WWII Ops Reports. ML Series, 

RG 407, WNRC; MS, Dickson, Thc G- 2 Batt[e of the Bu[ge , p. 23; Cosmas and Cowdrcy, 

Medica! Service ill the Ellrope(lll 71water oj Operatiolls, pp. 404- 09, 428; MS, Royce L. 

Thompson, Overrunning of Installations: The Ardennes Campaign, [953 , CMH; Ruppcntha[, 

Logistical Support of the Armies. flolullle II, pp. lS I- S3, 209 . 

•• MS, Dickson, Algicrs to the Elbe, p. 176; [ntCTv, lluthor with Hains, 29 May 91. p. 27; 

Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, Pl'. 43S- 39. 

U Quotc from Gavin, Oil to Berlil/, p. 205, and sec also p. 206. Rpt, V Corps Oper<llions in 

the ETO, p. 350; Wcig[ey, Eiscl/llOwer:'· Licutcl/allls, pp. 4S I- 82; Cole, TheArdClllles, p. 307; 

Wilmot, Th e Strl/gg!efor Ellrope, p. 5S5; Merriam, Dm'k Decembcl', pp. [60- 61. 

'6 Sylvan Diary, IS Dec 44; Colc, Tile Ardell/leS, p. 336; Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, 

1,.439; Inlerv. Murrny with Rosengarten, 3 Mar 75, p. 35; Jnls, First Army G- 2 Jill, 18 Dec 44, 

and First Army G- 3 Jnl, IS Dec 44; Baldwin, Ballies Lost alld WOII , pp. 332- 33; To[and, 1J1II1/e, 

I)P. 105, 111. 

. 1 Hamilton, MOII/)" pp. [90, [95- 96,246; Eiscnhowcr, Biller Woods, I). 245; Morelock, 

Gellem/s of the Ardelllles, pp. [32, [50, 180; MS , Carter, Carter's Wnr, eh, 12 , p. 14 ; [nterv, 

Kish with Clarke, 23 Feb 82, p. 293; Mcrriam, Dark December, p. 132. As a combat historian 

with the Ninth Army, Mcrri'lm visitcd Spa not long after the First Army headquarters' departure. 

For contrary views, see Llrs, Jacks to author, 11 Dec 96, and Perry to author, 28 Jan 97; 

MacDona[d, A Tilllcfor T/"IIlIIpels, p. 419 . 

.. Sylvan Diary, 18 Dec 44 ; JI1[, First Army 0 - 4 In[, 18 Dec 44. All 0 - 4 Journal cntries 

citcd in this study are in [0 1- 4.20- 4 Journa[, boxes [993- 1996, WW[[ Ops Reports, RO 

407, WNRC. Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945, 

3: I SO; MS, Dickson, The 0 - 2 Batt[e of the Bu[ge, pp. 24- 25; [nterv, To[and interview notes, 

Battle of the Bu[ge- Research Material, 1st Army, To[and Papers, LOC; MS, Carter, Carter's 

War, cll. 12, PI'. 14- [5; MacDona[d, A Timefor Trumpels, p. 419; Interv, Pogue with [·Iodges, 

12 Jan 50. 

'9 Sylvan Dillry, 19 Dec 44: Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, [ August 1944-22 

FebruMy 1945,4:230- 31. 

}II AAR, First U.S. Army, for Decembcr 1944. 

II Llf, Jacks 10 author, I I Dcc 96; Rpl, First Army 0 - 2 Periodic Rpt for 18 Dec 44; Mins, 

First Army Roundup, 19 Dec 44,101 - 3.30- 3 Journal file, 0 - 3 [st Army, [- 20 Dcc44, box 

1971, WWI1 Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC; Cole, TIle Ardelllles, pp. 344-45; Bennett, UIJRA 

illillc Wcst, p. 2[0. 

'z Cir, LOI, First Army, 19 Dec 44, 300.6 Lctters of Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj 

Gen Section, Genera[ Correspondence, 1940- 1947, itO 338, WNRC; Mcrriam, Dark Dccember, 

p. 120. 

II Pogue, Tile Supreme Command, pp, 376- 77. 

~ Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, [ August 1944- 22 February 1945, 3:73, 

80- 8 t, and First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 261; Interv, Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 

55- 57, 131 , 148; Ltr, lacks 10 author, 11 Dec 96. 

II Rpt, FiTst U.S. Anny, Report of Operations, I August 1944- 22 February 1945, 3: I 05, 

[26- 27; AAR, First U,S. Army, for December 1944; [nterv, Murray wi th Patterson, 23 Aug 73, 

pp. 130- 3 [; MS, Carter, Carter's War, ch. 12, pp. 3- 4, 7- 10, 18- 19; Bcek el aI., The W(lrAgllillsl 

Germany, p. 483. 

!6 lntcrvs, Murray with Palterson, 23 Allg 73, p. 13[; alllhor with Hains, 29 May 9[ , pp, 

29- 31; lilld Toland with Hains. 
'The Rock of Gibraltar ",' The First Army Headqllarfers (illite Bulge 235 

,J Rpt, First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. p. 476: McNamara. QUlII'ICI'/l/l/Slel' AC/il'ilies, p. 157: 

Intcrvs. Murray with Lynde, pp. 17- 19, and with Patterson. 23 Aug n, ll. 131: Memos. First 

Army, StafT Mcmo 1,2 Jan 45, and First Army, Opcrations Mcmo 7. 27 Mar 45. bolh in 101-

1.1 5 SOP. G- I I st Army, 1 May 44. box 1829, WWII Ops Reports. RG 401, WN RC. 

" Rpts, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 415, and First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. I 

August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1:105- 06 . 

.1'1 RI)ts. First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46. pp. 415- 71, and Firsl U.S. Army, Report of Operations. 

I Angust 1944- 22 February 1945. I : 110; Merriam, Dal'k Decembel', p. 192: Hamilton, MOllly, 

p. 307. 

00 First quote from StajJOffice/,s Field M(llIl/al, 1940. p. 33, and scc :llso pp. 3 1- 32, 34. LL 

Col. T. S. Bigland. liaison ofTicer from lhe 21 Anny Group to the 12th Anny Group. quole from 

Hamilton, "'JOIII)'. p. 307 . 

• ' Memo. Akers for Thorson. 5 Nov 44, 101 - 3.22 Mise Memoranda & Papers. 0 - 3 lSI 

Army. Dec 44, box 1992. WW[I Ops Reports, RG 407. WNRC; Sylvan Diary. 16 Dec 44; Teleeon. 

author with Daunemi ller. 6 Nov 92. p. 45; Cir. First U.S. Army. SOP. I Dec 44. p. 26, 10 1- 1.15 

SOl'. G- I 1st Army. I Dec 44, box 1829, WWII Ops Reports. RO 407. WNRC; Tape, Dannemiller 

10 author. Jan 91, DWI'I; Cole. 71/CAI~/cl/llcs, p. 345; Merriam. Da/'k Oec('mln~I", p. 133; Hamilton, 

MOIII),. pp. 246. 301. 

01 RillS. First U.s. Arrny, Report of Operations. I August 1944- 22 February 1945. I: I 04, 

11 0, 128: First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46, pp. 110- 72. 195,476; First Army G- 2 Periodic Rpts for 

16,2 1 Dec 44: and Lt K'1I111 . PWE. to Dickson, 19 Dec 44.101 - 3.30- 3 Journal file, G- 3 1st 

Anny, 1- 20 Dec 44 . box 197 1. WWII OilS Reports. RO 401. WNRC. MS. Dickson, Algiers to 

the El bc. pp. 183- 84; AAR. First U.S. Army, for December 1944: Cole. Tllell/'del/llcs, p. 559; 

Wil1110t, The Siruggle jo/' Europe, p. 588; Mayo, 011 Deacllllei/(/ (///(/ 8111fh1rolll. IlP. 309- 10. 

oJ MS. Royce L. Thompson. Air SU1,ply to Isolated Units. ArdcnnesCampaign. 16 Decembcr 

1944---27 January 1945, 1951. pp. 8- 21. CM U; Rpt, First U.S. Anny. Rcport of Operations. 1 

August 1944- 22 February 1945. 2: 120- 21: AAR, First U.S. Army. for December 1944: Cole. 

TheAnlellllCI>, pp. 171 - 72; Tolnnd.lhlli/c. pp. 58, 107 . 

... MS. Thompson, Air SUJlply to Isolated Units, Ardennes Campaign, pp. 2- 6, 22- 32; Rpt . 

First U.S. Army, Report of Opera tions. I August 1944- 22 February 1945.2: 120- 21; AAR, First 

U.S. Anny. for December 1944 ; Gavin. 011 10 Ber/ill, p. 205; Cole. TIll' Ardellllcl·. p. 112; 

M'lcDonald. A Tilllejol" Tn/lIIl,els , j', 341; [ntcrv. Pogue with 1·lodges. I AllT 52; Telecon, ,Iuthor 

with Col Walter W. Wendt, USA (I(el.). 9 Mar 95, DWH; Ltr. Allphin to author, 8 Jan 97 . 

• 1 Intcrv, Poguc with Smith. 8 May 47, PI1. 2- 3: Colc, The rde/llle.~, pp. 423- 24; HamilTon. 

MOllly, PI1. 194- 95.201 - 06; Wilmot. TheSll"IIgg/ejiJr £UI"(JPC. IJIJ. 589- 9 1: Ilughes, OVERLORD. 

p.281. 

" 1·lansen Diary, 18- 20.23 Dec 44; Bradley. A Sohfierl' SlIll,),. pp. 476- 18; inten', Pogue 

with Bnldley, 6 Nov 46, pp. 2- 3; MS. Courtney H. Ilodges, The Ardcnnes Campa ign, 1946 

Ardennes Campaign (article), box 9, l'lodges Papers. Eisenhower Library: lntervs. Poguc with 

Smith.8 May 47. pp. 2- 3. and Murray with Collins. 15 Aug 73. p. 48: Sylvan Diary. 16- 19 Dec 

44; Thompson and Harris, The Oil/COllie, PI'. 156- 58; Colc, The AI¥/ellllel', Pil. 424- 25; Hamilton. 

MOIII)'. IJP. 192. 195.206- 01,246: Mcrriam, Dltrk Decembel', pp. 123- 24: Mac Donald, A Tilllc 

/01' TI"ullltlCIS, PI'. 423-24; Wilmot. Tlrc SI,."gglc /O/' t:1I/"{lfJe. pp. 59 1- 92: David Eisenhower. 

Eisel/hower (1/ 11'1.,,: /943- /945 (New York: Random House, 1986). Pl' . 510- 71; Morelock, 

G,meml.\· ojllre AI~/elll/e.\·, pp. 128- 29. 

01 [ntervs. I'ogue with l'lodges, 12 Jan 50. and Murray with Oickson, 22 Sep 72. p. 40; MS. 

Dickson. Algiers to the Elbe. JlJl. 180- 81. [ntervs, Murray with Myers. 15 Apr 74, pp. 47-49; 

Bevan with 1·lewill. I Oet8!, p. 176; author with Wendt, 29 Apr 91. pp. 69- 70; Murray wilh 

Hart , 1973. p. 57; author wi th Hains, 29 May 91. p. 49: and Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73. 

pp. 124- 26. 138. Te[econ, nuthor with Dannemiller. 6 Nov 92. pp. 113- 14 . 

.. Sylvan Diary. 20 Dec 44; Ltr. Montgomery to Hodges, 19 Dec 44. 1945, Appreciation and 

Congrntullllory Leiters, WWII. VII's. bo" 8, 1·lodges Papers. Eisenhower Library; Montgomery. 

NOl"I/I(lIId)' fO Ihe Bailie, pp. 280- 81: David Ilelchem, All ill Ihe 0(/)1 $ March (London; Collins. 

1978). p. 247; Hamilton, MOIII)I, pp. 196 97; Wilmot, Tile Sll"IIgglejol' EIlI'OPC. ll. 592 . 

.. Quote from Wilmot. Tlte SII""gg/(' /or EIII"O/IC, p. 592. and see also p. 593. Sylvan Diary. 
236 A Commolld Pos/ (1/ /Vtu' 

20 Dec 44: Inlcrvs, Pogue with I-lodges. 12 Jan 50, and wilh IJcichcl11, 20 Feb 47. p. 4: Halnilton. 

MOIIIY. pp. 211 - 14, 308- 11: Dc Guingand, Operatioll VICTORY, pp. 429- 30: Ilcichclll. AI/ ill 

Ihe Days M(II"ch, pp. 248- 50: Gavin. 011/0 Berlill, pp. 247-48. 259; Interv, John S. D. Eisenhower 

with Field Marshal Lord Montgomery ofA1[tl11cin. I Oct 66. pp. 6- 8. OWI·I: Cole, TheArt/cllllcs, 

pp. 393- 95.426- 27: Mcrri.uII. Dark Decembe,.. p. 156: EisenhOll'er, J1iller Wood$, pp. 287- 89; 

Tol:l11d. BailIe. pp. 158- 60: Fontenot, "The Lucky Seventh inlhc Bulge," p. 61: MacDon;lld, II 

Time/or Tl"lIlIIpels.l)(J. 424- 25, 468: Wciglcy, Ei.I'euflowed' Uelllell(flHS, pp. 487, 50S: Intcrvs, 

Burg with Simpson, IS Mar 72 and 5 Nov 72. PI'. 69, 94 , 99. Eisenhower Libr<lry: AAR, First 

U.S. Army, for Deccmber 1944. 

10 Dc Guingand. Oper(l/iOIl VICTORY. p. 429. See also IllIervs.Burg with Simpson. 15 Mar 

72 and 5 Nov 72. pp. 69, 100. 

11 Be1chem. All ill the Days M(II"cfl. p. 24S. See also Intervs, I'oglle with Willi<lms. 30- 3 1 

M<lY 47. p. 7. mId with Beleheill. 20 Feb 47. p. 4. 

)l lnterv, Eisenhower with Montgomery, I Oct 66. p. 6. Sec <llso Hamilton. MOllty, pp. ISO. 

199.213; Ambrose. The Supreme Commwlf/er, pp. 564- 65. 

lJ Msg, Eisenhower to MOl1tgomcry, 22 Dec 44, in Clwndler, ed .. Ei.\·CIlItOll"CI· Papers, 

4:2369. 

N Hamilton, MOllt)', p. 251; Intervl!. Pogue with Rosengarten, 22 Dec 47 , p. 2, (llid with 

Hodges. 12 Jan 50; Pogtle, The Slipreme Commalld, p. 3S1; MacDonald, A TimejiJr1h/mpets, p. 

426. 

)~ Hamilton, I\IOIII)', Pl'. 245- 46; Inlerv, Murray with Collins. 15 Aug 73, p. 54; Collins, 

Ughtllillg Joe, p. 296; Eisenhower. Biller Woods. p. 288. For more on Ihe I' II"NTO~I system. see 

R. J. T. Hills. I)NANTOM Was There (London: Edward Arnold, 1951). 

'. Hamilton. MOIII)I, pp. 244- 45; Interv, Murray with Collins, 15 Aug 73 . Pl'. 45, 53- 54; 

Collins, UghlllillgJoe, I). 291. 

17 H<lnsen Diary, 22, 25- 26 Dec 44. 

'. MS, Dickson, Algiers 10 the Elbe. 1'.181; MS. Carter, Carter's War. e h. 12, pp. 14- 16; 

Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I Allgust 1944-22 February 1945. 3:ISO; AAR, 

First U.S. Army, for December 1944: Thompson and Harris. The Olltcome, p. 157; Teleeon. 

author with Dannemiller. 6 Nov 92. pp. 102. 108- 10. 

1'1 Memo. KUllZig forThorson, 3 Jnn 45; Incl. Kunzig to author. 10 Jun 95: Rpl. First Army, 

COD, 18 Nov 46, pp . 194- 95, 206- 08: Msg, Thorson to Collins, 22 Dec 44.101 - 3.22 Mise 

Memoranda & Papers, G-3 1st Army, Dec 44. box 1992. WWIJ Ops Rcporls. RG 407, WNRC; 

I·Jarmon with Mac Kaye and MacKayc. Combal COII/m(/mlcr. pp. 229- 3 I; Bradley. A Salt/ier~' 

SIOI)'. p. 478. 

511 Sylvan Diary, 21 - 23 Dcc 44 ; Collins, Liglitlling Joe, pp. 282- 85; Intcrvs, Ourg with 

Brig Gen Thomas J. BellS. Oct 73- Aug 76. PI'. 263- 68. Eiscnhower Library; Cole. TheArdelllles. 

p.427. 

~I Sylvan Diary, 21 Dcc 44; Cole, The Ardell/lCs, JlJl. 431 - 33: MS. Thompson, Air Supply 

10 Isolaled Units. P)J. 33- 63; MacDonald, A Tilllc/or T/'IImpets, PI'. 562- 63. 

11 Sylvan Di<lTY, 21 - 22 Dec 44 ; Jnls, First Army G- 2 Jills for 21 - 23 Dec 44; Rpt, First 

Army G- 2 Periodic Rpt for 23 Dcc 44; Cirs, Firsl Army G- 2 Estimates 39-4) for 21 - 23 Dce 

44: MS , Dickson, Thc G- 2 Bal1le of the Bulge, I)]). 25- 26; Cole, TIle Ardelmes, pp. 363 , 433-

34; Merriam. Dark December, pp. 134. 168, 172: Bradley. A Soldiers S/OlY, p. 479: Eisenhower. 

Biller Wouds, p. 356; Hughes, OVERLORD, p. 282. 

IJ Rpl. First U.S. Army, Report ofOper<llions, 1 August 1944- 22 Febnl<lTY 1945,3:25,29: 

Cole, Tile IIn/('IIIIes. pp . 376, 431. Sec also MS, Royce L. Thoml}Son. Employment of Fuzes in 

thc Ardennes Campaign, European Theatcr of Operations. 16 Decembcr 1944- JanU<lTy 1945. 

1950, CM H. 

8' CiT, LOI, First Army, 21 Dcc 44, 300.6 Lellers of Instructions, box 62. First Army, Adj 

Gen Section, Genera l Correspondence, 1940- 1947, RG 338, WNRC; Memo, First U.S. Army 

Order of Bailie, Comb<l\ Units, 25 December 1944, 101 - 3.14 Ordcr of l3allle, Scpt 44- Feb 45, 

WW II Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC. 

'~ Cir. LOI. First Army. 21 Dcc 44. 

s. Sylvan Di<lTy, 22- 23 Dec 44; MS, Dickson. Algiers to the Elbe. pp. 182, 184; Cole, Th e 
"rite Rock of Gibl'(lII(l1' ": rite FirSI Arlll)' Headquorters (1/ ,lte Bulge 237 

Ardennes. p. 434: Collins. Ligh/nillg JO£'. PI'. 284- 85: Hamilton. MOnl)', pp. 220- 22. 227- 29, 

236: Rpt. First U.S. Army. Rq~ rt or Operations. I August 1944 22 Febru,lry 1945,3: 180; 

Intervs. Murray with Collins, 15 Aug 73. p. 51. and Pogue wil h Bradley. 6 No\' 46. p. 3; Wilmot. 

rhe Sll"IIgglefor EII/upe. PI'. 595- 97: r-,·IS. Carter, Carter's War, ch . 12. p. 17: Interv. Murray 

with Rosengarten. 3 Mar 75. p. 37. 

11 Sylvan Diary. 22 Dce 44: Ilamiitoll. MOIII)I, p. 228: Cole. TheAIY/enlle ~. pp. 411 - 13, 431 -

34: Interl'. Eisen hower with Morllgomery. I Oct 66, p. I I: Fon tenot. "The Lucky Seventh in the 

Bulge," PI>. 85- 87: MacDonald, II Timeftw 7hnupets, p. 478; Eisenhower, lJiller Hbods. p. 295: 

Interv, Kish wi th Clarke. 23 Feb 82. pp. 29 1- 94: Morelock, Genemls oflhe Ardenlle.~. p. 180. 

I I SyllllHl Diary, 24 Dec 44: MacDonald, A rime /01" Tl"lllIIpels. pp. 548. 557: Cole. The 

An/elllleS. p. 590; Hami lton, fI-/on/)', PI'. 243- 44; Merriam. f)(/rk December. p. 173; Weigley, 

Eisenhower s Lieulenanls. p. 530 . 

... Quote rrom Hanson W. Oaldwin. "Great Decision:' 1/I/alllly Jourua/ 60 (May 1947): 16. 

Sec also Sylvan Di ary. 24 Dec 44: Cole. The Ardel/I/es. PI'. 443. 586- 87: Hami lton. Monl)" p. 

234: MacDonald, A Time/or Trumpel.f. p. 579: Toland. BailIe. p. 242: Weigley. Eisell//Ower's 

Uelllell(lll/j', p. 535: Baldwin. /Jaules Losl am/ rl~lII, p. 347. 

'" Kean quote rrom Baldwin. "Grea t Decision:' p. 17. and sec also p. 16. Sylv:ln Diary, 

23- 24 Dec 44: Inter\" Lt Col H. L. HUnt cr, Jr .. USA, with Gen Williston Birk himcr Palmer, 

USA (Rel.), 12 Feb 72. PI'. 73- 74, Senior Officers Debriefing I'rogram. USAM H[: Co le. 

T/II' Ardelllles. pp. 565- 66; Wilmo!. The SlrllgS/e /01' Ellrope. p. 598: Toland, Ball/e, pp. 

242- 43. 

i l Quote from Baldwin , "Grell! Decision:' p. 18, :'lI1d sec also p. 17. Co llins. Lighlnillg Joe. 

pp. 287- 89: IllIerv. HUllIer with Palmer, 12 Feb 72. pp. 74-75: Co le, 1111! Ardelllles, p. 566: 

MacDonald, II Time/or Tl"llmpels. pp. 579- 81: Weigley. Eisenhower s UelllClwnfS, PI'. 535- 36: 

Eisenhower, HiOer Woods, pp. 367 70 . 

• 1 Baldwin. "Grcat Dceision:' PI'. 19- 21: Collins, Ughfllillg Joe. PI'. 289- 90: InterllS. 

SperaI\' wi th Collins. pp. 134- 36, and I-I ullter with Palmer. 12 Feb 72, PI'. 75- 76: Memo. Akers 

for Coll ins, 24 Dcc 44. 10 1- 3. 11 Leiters of Instruct ions. G- 3 I st Army, 29 September 1944- 28 

April 1945. box 1989, WWII Ops Reports. RG 407. WNRC; Cole, The Ardennes. p. 566: 

fl amilton, MOIII)" pp. 234- 36: MacDonald, A Time for Tmmpels, p. 581; Toland. BailIe, pp. 

243-45: Weigley, Eisenhower s LieHle/wIlIS, pp. 535- 36; Eisenhower, IJiller Woods, pp. 370-

72: I3n ld\\'ill, fJall/es Los/ a/ld flbn. p. 348: Harmon with MacKnye nnd MacKnye. Comhal 

Commander, pp . 236- 37. 

J Sy lll;1I1 Diary. 26- 30 Dec 44: Cirs, LO is. First Army, 19. 2 1 Dec 44, 300.6 Lellers of 

Instruct ions, box 62. First Army, Adj Gen Section. General Correspondence, 1940- 1947, RO 

338. WNRC, and First Army 0 - 2 Estimates 44-49, 26- 31 Dec 44: Rpts, First Army 0 - 2 Periodic 

Rpts for 27- 28 Dcc 44; MS, Dickson, Algicrs to the Elbe. PI'. 184- 85; Ilamiiton. MOIII)" pp. 

255- 58: Ltr. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 29 Dec 44, in Chaudler, cd .. Eisel/llOwer Pupas. 

4:2384; Cole. Tile An/ellnes. pp. 6 10- 12: Toland. BlIlI/e. p. 302: Merriam, D{/rk December, PI'. 

199- 201: Weigley. Eisenhowe,.'s Liell/emlllis. PI'. 541, 546 . 

.. AAR, First U.S. Army, for December 1944; limni llon. MO/ll)". Pl'. 232- 33: Weigley, 

Eisell/wlrel's Lieulemlll/S, p. 570. 

t J AAR, First U.S. Army, for January 1945. 10 1- 0. 3 Afier Action Reports, boxes 1823-

1824, WWII Ops Reports, RG 407. WNRC; Rpts. First U.S. Army, ReJlort of Ol)erations. I 

August 1944- 22 February 1945,2:1 1- 14, and First Army, COD, 18 Nov46. p. 157; Ruppenthal, 

Logislicil/ Slipporl 0/ Ih e Armies. Voillme II, PI'. 3 17, 322- 23, 326. 345- 47; Cir. Nourse to 

Corps. Oill isions. and Separate Units, 31 Jan 45, 10 1- 3.22 G- 3 Miscell;lIleous Memos, HQ 1st 

Army, Dee 44, box 1992. WWII Qps Reports, RG 407. WNRC . 

.. Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944- 22 F\!bruary 1945. 2: 122-

25: AAR. First U.S. Army. for December 1944; Int\!rv, Murray with Lynde. pp. 25- 27; Rpt, 

First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46. p. 350: Mnyo, Oll/Jeachhelltl mil/ BUllle/rolll. p. 312: Jnls, First 

Army G- 4 Jnls. 17- 18,27- 30 Ikc 44; MS, General Considerations (hereafler cited as MS. 

General Consideration s), OCM I·I 91) (Cole) The Ardennes: Baili e or the Oulge. box 194. 

Ollekllround Notes to The AI"tlelllleS {JI1f/ Ihe BlIllle o/Ihe HII/ge by Ilugh L. Cole, RG 3 I 9. 

NARA: Thompson and Harris, The Oil/come, p. 154: CO/lquel', p. 122. 
238 A COll/malld POSI 01 11.1(11' 

91 Rpl, First U.S. Army. Report of Opera lions, I August 1944- 22 February 1945,2: 121, 

4:67- 74; AAR, First U.S. Army, for December 1944: MS, Gcncl'1ll COllsiderations; Casillas and 

Cowdrey. Mediml Service ill 'lte/:.'/II"Oj)em/ Thellier o/Opemliolls, pp. 4 10- 13. 

'OJ !tpl. First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I August 1944-22 February 1945,2: 121. 

126,4:5.66- 74: AAR, First U,S. Army. for December 1944: Ross :l11d Rornanus, Ope,.ations ill 

Ihe Hilr Agllills/ Genl/{IIIY, p. 428: Cosrn,tS and Cowdrey, Medic(" Sen·ice il/ the t:/II"(11)('(/// H,calcl' 

oIOf/em/iolls. pp. 413- 14, 498. 

Wlnterv, Eisenhower with Mont gomery. I Oct 66, p. 7: Memo. Collins for Hodges. 30 Dec 

44, 20 I Personal LeIter fil c- 1944( 1), 1. Llwton Coll ins Papers. Eisenhower Library; Ham ilton . 

.110111),. pp . 275- 79, 288- 90. 309. 

100 Sylva n Diary. 27- 30 Dee 44 . Memos. Collins ror 1·lodges. 27. 29, and 30 Dee 44, all in 

20 I Personal Leiter rile- 1944( I). J. Lawlon Coil ins Pal}Cl'S. Eisenhower Library. Inlervs. Pogue 

with Hodges. 12 Jan 50. and Toland with Hodges; Coll ins. Ughll/;/lg Joe. pp. 291 - 92; Inlerv. 

Murray wilh Collins. 15 Aug 73, p. 49. Cirs. LOis. First Army, 19.2 1,27.29 Dec 44. all in 

300.6 Leiters or Instructions. box 62, First Army. Adj Gen Seelion, General Correspondencc. 

1940- 1947, RG 338, WNRC: Colc. The Art/cllllcs. p. 611 : MacDonald. A Timefor Trumpcls. pp. 

599- 600: Weigley. Eise/lhowcr:f U elllcl/(/lIls. pp. 546, 557- 58. 

IGI Sylvan Diary. 31 Dec 44- 2 Jan 45; Intervs. Pogue with I-lodges, 12 Jan 50. I Apr 52; 

Coll ins. Lighll/i/lg Joe, pp. 292- 93: Cir. LOI, First Army. I Jan 45. 300.6 Leiters or Instructions. 

box 62, First Army, Adj GCll Section. Gcneral Correspondence. 1940- 194 7. RG 338. WNRC: 

Cole. Th e Ardcllllcs, I) . 6 12: We igley, EisCllhowcrs UClllcIHIl/I.r, pp . 546- 47 : Hughcs, 

OVERLORD, p. 290; Cir. First U.S. Army Order or Banle. Combat Uni lS. 2 January 1945. 101 -

3.1 4 Order or Battle. Sept 44- Feb 45, WW IJ Ops Reports. I~G 407. WNRC; Memo, arlillery 

allocation s, 101 - 3.2 G- 3 Journal ri les. WWII Ops Reports, RG 407. WN RC. 

tGl Sylvan Diary. 3- 12 Jan 45: Colli ns, Lighillillg Joe, PI). 293- 94: Cole, The Artlelllles. p. 

650; Charles B. MacDonald Thc /.(ISI Offellsil·c. U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Anuy Center or M ililary II istory. 1973), pp. 29- 30; MacDonald. " Time for Trllmpcls, p. 

610: Hamilton, MOIII),. p. 290: Rempel, "Bailie or the Bulge:' in Europe: ARGW.4£NT /Q V£ 

Da),. JmllllllY 194410 May 1945, cd. Craven and Cate, pp. 70 1- 02 : Gavin, Qllio Berlin. p. 249. 

IGJ Sy lvan Diary, 9- 10, 13- 17,20 Jan 45: Cir. LOI, First Army, 10 hn 45, 300.6 Letters o f 

Inslruct ions, box 62, Firsl Army, Adj Gen SCClion, Geucml Correspondence. 1940- 1947. RG 

338, WN RC; Hamilton, M OIII)" IIp . 3 19- 22. 

10' Jn l, First Army 0 - 3 Jnl. 16 Jan 45; Ltr. MOlHgomery to I-lodges, 17 hn 45, 1945 

Appreciation and Congratu latory Leuers. WWI I, IP ~. box 8. Hodges I'apers, Eise nhower 

Library: Sylvan Diary. 15- 17 JlUl 45; Gavin, Qllio !Je"'ill , pp. 243-44. Intervs, Murray wi lh 

Harl. 19 73. p. 58: wi th Myers, 15 Apr 74. pp. 48-49; and Pogue with Hodgcs. 12 Jan 50, 1 Apr 

52. AAR. First U.S. Army, ror January 1945. 

itS Hansen Diary, 19 Dec 44 . 
"First To Reach the Rhine ... 

First To Meet the Russians" 

8 

As se rvice personnel labored to restore insta llations and activities disrupted 

by the Battle of the Bulge, the First Army headquarters returned 10 Spa on 

18 January 1945. Williams' signa l crews had already installed a new central 

st ation and radio li nkups in the town, and within the next few weeks they would 

usc underground cable systems and ovcr 1, I 00 tni les of wire to lay Ollt a communi cations network even more extensive than had ex isted before th e Bulge . 

The G- I section had just reinstated passes to Paris and the United Kingdom 

and was preparing leave programs for Brussels and the French Rivi era, while 

the special service sect ion was reopening corps rest centers and preparing new 

retreats for aeria l reconna issa nce and separa te army unit perso nn e l. For some 

of the st aff officers who retu rned to the old resort, however, Spa would never 

again be the same. At the Hotel Brilanniqlle, Carter, the Fi rst Army enginee r, 

found the former officers mess in a state of disa rray- furniture ove rturned and 

a Christma s tree, without ornaments, tilting "drunken ly" in one corn er. Two 

inches of wate r flooded the former quart ers of the G- 3 operations subsection. 

When I-lodges and his aide arrived ea rly in the afternoon , they found his old 

offi ce to be a shambles: no cha irs, dust on the floor, wate r sta ndin g on the 

desk, and signs that the map board had been used for kindl ing. St ill, the staff 

ma naged to restore some order by the time Bradley arrived, in the middle of the 

aftern oo n, to discuss future plans with I-lodges. I 

Bradley was a man in a hurry. SI-I AEF wanted Ihe 21 Army Group to have 

the main effort in the comin g drive to the Rhine, bu t Bradley had prevailed on 

Eisenhower to allow him to fo ll ow the Germans retreatin g from the Bulge into 

the Eife l, a n advance that he hoped would break through the rugged Eifel and 

the West Wall to the Rhi ne near Bonn, roughly fo rty miles to the east of 

Monschau. Although agreeable, Eisenhower was prepared to abort Bradley's 

offensive ifno breakthrough was forthcomi ng. 2 

After his superio r's departure, Hodges c loseted himself wi th his chief of 

sta ff, Kean, and G- 3, Thorson, 10 prepare a plan. The three men did not know 

how many divisions wou ld be avai labl e, and many of those they did have were 

tired and in desperate need of infantry replacements. Also, the Fi rst Army's 

transportation organization had bee n disrup ted by freque nt troop movements 
240 

and depot shifts. On the other hand, 

in the coming offensive, th e Fi rst 

Army would have the unique opportunity 10 co ncentrate two corps on a 

25-mile front with one corps in rese rve. If it achieved a breakthrough 

agai nst what Dickson, the 0 - 2, saw 

as a defense stripped of resources to 

reinforce the Eastern Front , the Gerlllans would have few reserves available to Slap the American onslaught 

short of the Rhi ne.l 

In his orders for the Eifel offe nsive, I-lodges once again failed to 

concentrate his resources behind 

either of the two corps conducti ng th e 

attack, although given the na rrow 

army front this lack of co ncentrati Oil 

probably did not matt er. Havi ng met 

w ith his corps com mand e rs and 

coordinated a rmy boundaries with 

Bradley and the commanders of the 

two adjacent armies, Hodges issued 

A Command Post (If JIIar 

Genera/Hllebner 

(Photograph taken after the waLl 

an order on 25 January. The First Army plan call ed for successive attacks beginning 28 January by Ridgway's XVI II Airborne Corps in the south and the V 

Corps, now under Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, in the north. The two corps 

wo uld drive cast through the rugged border country to Euskirchen, on the Erft 

some twenty-five miles cast of Monschau. The XV II I Airborne Corps would 

employ an ai rborne and three infantry di visio ns, while the V Corps lIsed one 

armored and three infantry divisions. Each corps coul d callan 14 artill ery battalions, 5 tank destroyer battalions, a c hemical mo rtar battalion, and 2 cavalry 

squadrons for the attack. Also allotted 10 the V Corps were three tank battalions and seven an tiaircraft battalions, while the XVII1 included four tank battalions and six antiaircraft battalions. The seve n battalions of the 32d Field 

Arti ll ery Brigade would provide sup port to both corps. A cava lry troop, tank 

destroyer battalion, tank battalion, chemical mortar battalion , Belgian Fusilier 

battalion, and fourteen antiaircraft battalions also remained under army control. Once again, Hodges had distributed divisions, army arti ll ery, and other 

resources almost equally between the two eor ~ 

After a fine start, the Eifel offensive bogged down, due more 10 winter 

weat her and the mountainous, forested terrain than to anything the few remaining Ge rmans in the area coul d do. Heavy snows left drifts over two fee t high in 

places, and the few roads were j ammed with artillery, armor, and service vehicles, creating numerous problems in pushing forward food and ammunition. 

To meet the ongoing shortage of specia l wintcr Clothing, McNamara and his 

quartermasters rus hed to the front such key items as mittens, ponchos, and 
"Fi,.st To Reach Ihe Rhine . .. Finl To Meellhe Russial/s" 241 

shoepacs and placed orders for scarce white camouOagc capes from loca l manu· 

facture rs despite complaints from troops abou t the design. Meanwhile, to record 

casualties more effic iently, army machi ne records units replaced the old manual 

systcm wi th a new procedure o f mechanically proccssing hospital admission 

and disposition reports onto locator cards bcfore submitting them to the casualty division. At the Hotel Brita nn ique, Hodgcs and Kean scanllcd the G- 2 

secti on's reports of crack ing Germa n morale and sensed a breakthrough. Within 

a few days, however, ant ici pation turned to distlppointmcnt as the V Corps' 

converging attack toward the crit ica l Wahlersche id crossroads, fi ve mi les beyon d the jumpoff line , slowed to a crawl, and Ridgway's XVII I Airborne Corps 

failed to craek the West Wall defe nses in its sector. [n four days, the XV II I 

Airborne Corps had driven eight to twelve mil es, a res pectab le advance under 

thc conditions but not the decisive breakthrough SHA EF wa nted.s (Map /5) 

On I February Thorson returned from the 12th Army Group headquarters 

with orders to halt the advance and to regroup. To the north, Montgome ry's 21 

Army Group, hav ing mopped up a sa li ent between the Meuse and the Roer, 

prepared to clear thc area between the Maas and th e Rh ine, while Simpson's 

Ninth Army, wh ich had remained under the 2 1 Army Group, fought along the 

old Fi rst Army fron t to reach the Roer near Monschau. Patton's Third Army, to 

the south of the First Army, tried to penetrate the West Wall, wh il e simultaneously it covered Hodges' nank. Farther south, Devers' 6th Army Group, having turned back NORDWIND, was clearing the Colmar Pocket from its front. 

Accord ing to Thorson, the First Army was supposed to extend its own front to 

the north and provide the Ni nth Army with at least one, and probably five, 

di visions ror its role in Montgomery's offensive.6 

For the First Army command group. cancellation orthe Eifel offensive was 

a great blow. Although the First Army had not yet ac hieved a breakthrough, on 

2 February Di ckson estimated that on ly eight weak divisions held the West 

Wall and tha t the First Army must maintain the pressure and not allow the 

Germans a respite to build up their defenses. Indeed, Hodges had already alerted 

his staff sect ions to plan ror an ex ploita ti on by the VII Corps to th e Rhin e. With 

the conc lusion oflhc Eifel dri ve, however, Hodges' staff officers were worried 

that the First Army would become a mere supplier of divisions to Montgomery 

and that, when the 21 Army Group attacked, the enemy wou ld si mply re lease 

the Ooodwat ers of the Roer from the dams. Having ignored the problem posed 

by the dams during much of the autumn, the First Army headquarters now lIsed 

the threat they posed to bolste r ils argument fo r a continued offensive in its 

sec tor. 7 

Brad[ey eased the First Army headqua rte rs' conce rn to some deg ree when, 

at a conference on 2 February with Hodges and Patton, he app roved a conlin· 

ued advance by the First and Third Armies. The two armies cou ld proceed as 

long as their losses and ammun ition expenditures were not excessive and as 

long as they employed onl y forma tions ava ilabl e after they transferred to the 

2 1 Army Group the un its required for its offensive. Unde r Brad ley's design, the 

First Army would give two armo red and three infantry di visions to the Ni nth 

Army in exchange for one armored and two in fantry di visio ns and most or the 
MAP 15 
ADVANCETOTHE RHINE RIVER 

21 JlloUllfY-7 March '945 

llillilililli Froniline, 27 Jan 

From Une, 9 Feb 

f,omline, 1 Ma r 

F,onl Line, 7 Mar 

• __ .__ Allie<! MO\I."'on ~ 

ElEVATIOfII~ METERS 

, 

MilM 

" , 
244 A COII/lllalld Post a/ War 

sector north of MOll schau. The Ninth Army had assumed th is sector in reli cfof 

the First Army during the Battle of the Bulge.s 

Despite Brad ley's plan, the First Army would still, for the mome nt, play 

only a secondary rolc. Its rev ised mission called for th e capture of th e Roe I' 

dams and a drive to a line from the RoeI' headwaters to the small crossroads 

vi ll age of Frau e nkron, about five miles east of its forward positions near 

Los heim. This ad vance, in turn , would be followed by an attack about [0 Fcb~ 

I' uary across the RoeI' to protect the southern Oank of the Ninth Army's ofTensive. For the main effort, the Ninth Army would employ ten divisions over a 

front of about thirty-five miles, while the First Army, in a supporting rol e, 

would dcploy cleven divisions over" front of about forty-five miles. Perhaps to 

ensure that his two most expe rienced corps commanders would carry thc main 

burden of support for the Ninth Army and a lso to allow Huebne r's V Corps to 

focus on its ongoi ng drive to the Roer- Fr<luenkron line, Hodges decided to move 

the Vll and XV II I Airborne Corps into position north of the V Corps on th e 

Ninth Army's flank. As the V Corps continued its advance, the First Army began its largest troop shift sincc the Ardennes crisis to assume the sec tor from 

Monschau north to the Aachen-Cologne highway.9 

In the midst of this massive troop shift, the First Army had to capture the 

Roe r dams before the start of the main etTort, which was supposed to begin 

within a few days. The dams should have been in Allied hands long ago, but 

Al lied commanders from Eisenhower on down had displayed a remarkable complacency toward them, probably believing they would fall as a byprod uct of the 

Eifel offensive . Al though Eiscnhower had told Bradley to use two or three divisions for the capture of the dams, Bradley, Hodges, and Huebne r, balanc ing 

many tasks, apparen tly deci ded that they could spare onl y the reinforced 78th 

Infantry Div isio n, which had just transferred from the Ninth Army. A relat ively 

g reen formation, the 78th had started through the Monsc hau corridor toward 

the dams as part of its mission of g uard ing the First Army's northern nank 

during the Eifel drive. Transferred to the First Army on 2 Februa ry, the division, under Maj . Gen. Edwin P. Parker, Jr., prepared a plan for a two-phase 

advance up the narrow corridor toward the famil iar objective of Sclunidt. The 

First Army headquarters arranged to support the drive wi th fo rty batta lions of 

arti llery, incl uding artil lery from the 32d Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, and 

7th Armored Divisio n, and it a ll ocated the reserve combat command of the 7th 

Armored Division and an extra engi nee r eomb,lI ba ttalion to the division. Nevert heless, the 78th eou ld ex pect only limited help from the XV III Airborne 

Corps, which was still movi ng into position to the north , and the rest of V 

Corps, which was simult aneollsly trying to drive east to the Roer-Fra uenkron 

line and assume the XVII I Airborne Corps' old sector. 10 

In the end, the First Army accompl ished its mission of capturing the darn s 

but only afte r considerable unnecessa ry strain for all conce rned . The o peration began auspiciously enough when patrols seized the Urft Dam against 

negligible opposition on 4 Februa ry. Ovc r the next twenty-four hours, the 

78th Division's aHack penetratcd within two miles of Schmidt. The V Co rps 

and 78th Division headqua rters, however, mishandl ed the seco nd pha se of 
"First To Reach the Rhine . .. First To Meet the Russialls" 

the ad vance, an d, when I-lodges visited Pa rker and Hueb ne r on 6 Februar y, he foun d the dri ve bogged 

down in the woods short of Schmidt. 

The First Army COlllmande r faced a 

deadli ne, and an a ili ng ba ck did not 

improve his dis position. Over the 

nex t two days, he told Huebne r to 

take pe rsonal charge of the battle 

and lat er, in the presence of aides, 

pondered aloud why the V Corps and 

the 78th Di visio n did not just blast 

a road to the dams with all of th e 

ma ssed a rti ll e ry a t their d isposa l. 

Even with su pport frOIll two regiments of the 82d Airbo rne Di vision 

to the north an d IwO more from th e 

9th Inf.mtry Division to the south, 

it W,IS not unt il la te in th e eve nin g 

of 9 February tha t the 78th fi nally 

brok e throu g h to t he Sc hwammcnaue l Dam. They found that th e 

Genend Millikin 

245 

Ge rmans had blown the d isc harge va lves and re leased enough wate r to flood 

the Roer for days. II 

Before they could join the 21 Army Group's offensive, wh ich had already started 

with an attack in the far north by the Canadian First Army on 8 February, the First 

and Ni nth Armies could only wait impatiently for the Roer Ooodwaters to subside. 

For "Iodges and his staff, the delay was espec ial ly maddening, as Di ckson's estimates stated that the enemy was regrouping reserves and strengthening his defenses in the Cologne plain to the cast. At first, c.lrter and his engineer colleagues 

calculated that it would take fOllr days for the Roer to return to normal levels. but 

heavy ra ins fo rced repeated postponements. At a commanders conference on 17 

February, Carter informed I-lodges that he could ex pect the water to begin to recede on 23 February, provided no further ra in fell in the interim. Accordingly, the 

assembled commanders sct 23 February as the target datc. In the mean time, the 

First and Ninth Armies watched the Canadians reach the Rhine at Emmerich on 13 

February. To the south, the Third Army forc ed its way through the West Wall toward Prlim and clea red th e triangle between the Saar and Mose lle Rivers, whil e, 

fart her south, the 6th Army Grollp mopped up the Colmar Pocket. ~ 

As it waited, the First Army completed prepa rat ions for its supporting ro le 

in GK ENADE, th e Nin th Army's drive northeast to the Rhine. At Eise nh ower's 

instigati on, Bradley shift ed Maj. Gen. John Millikin 's III Corps from the Third 

Army to the First Army to lake over the sector o f the XVIII Airborne Corps, 

which returned to SI·IAEF reserve. Along the First Army front, the VII Corps 

now he ld the north ernmost sector, with th e II I Corps in the center, and the V 

Corps to the sOllth. 
246 A COII/mand Pos/ fII Wa/' 

Meanwhil e, the First Army headquarters co ntinued to adjust boundaries 

and move di visions and other formati ons into posi l ion. All three corps COIlta ined three infantry di visio ns, an armored division, two cavalry squadrons, 

and a chemical mortar ba tta li on. Patterson re la ined four antiairc ra ft battalions 

at army leve l and a ll otted seve n anti aircraft batta li ons to the III and VII Corps 

and eight to th e V Corps. He acted ostensibly so that the corps cou ld plan the 

early reli ef of division anti a ircraft units bUI perhaps also to remove the units 

from the control o f his nemesis. Timberlake. or th e artill ery bU llalions, the 

First Army reta ined seven, wh ile attaching twe lve each to the II I and V Corps 

a nd fourteen to the VII Corps. The 111 Corps a lso conta ined five tank destroyer 

batta lions and three tank batta lions, while the V Corps included four tank destroyer batta li ons, one lank ba tta lion, a nd a Ra nger ballalion, and the VII Corps 

had ri ve tan k destroyer ballalions, four tank battalions, and a battalion of Belgia n Fusiliers. The '\fIny reta ined two tank batta li ons, two Belgia n Fusili er 

ba ttali ons, and a ta nk destroyer batta li on. Bradley, Si mpson, and Hodges had 

already adjusted boundaries, granting both armi es access to the transportation 

hub of Aachen by splitting the city between them and widening the Ninth Army's 

front to include all of th e RoeI' Va lley city of Hili ch. With GRENADE set, Bradley, l'lodges, and their staffs a lso laid plans for GRENA[)E'S successor operation, 

L Ut.HlERJACK , durin g which Ihe First Army wou ld th ru st southeast to ta ke Cologne and cl ea r the Rh ine's west bank once the Ni nth Army had reac hed the 

river.1l 

As usua l, the a rtill ery-minded l'lodges drew heavily in the pla nn ing process on the ad vice of Hart. In alloca ting his guns, the Fi rst Army artill ery officer faced a dilemma . Colli ns' VII Corps wou ld have the army's main e ffort 

and should thus rece ive as muc h support as possibl e. Yet I-I art believed th at 

Huebner's V Corps, with its extended fron tage and de fcnsive mission, could 

not give up muc h of its artillery. In addition, Hart co uld locate on ly a few 

appropriate positions for arti lle ry in the VI[ and I [I Corps areas. Thus, whil e he 

Sli ghtly favored th e VII and [II Corps in allocatin g artillery units, he avo ided 

any major shin o f arti ll ery from the V Corps. From th e a rmy a rtillery, I-I arl 

attached a 240-mm . howitzer ballalion and an eig ht nc h gun batta li on to the 

VII Corps and one of eac h to the III Corps, but he allotted two-thirds of the 

240-mm. howit ze r ammunition to the VII Corps a nd a th ird to the III Corps. 

These units were 10 attack long-range targets on order from the army headquarters. While Hart believed in decentral ized control for mobile operations and 

liked to push his gun s as far to th e fron t as possibl e, he preferred to keep Ill ore 

co ntrol ove r missio ns for army artille ry in static warfare . As for ammunition, 

the Firsl Army headqua rters had return ed to rationing with the Janu ary offe ~ 

sive, bUI it too k ad vmllilge o f sli ght increases in stoc ks to permit more liberal 

all ocations. '4 

For the First Army logistic ians, the pace had hard ly slac kened since the 

repulse of the Ardennes eounteroffensive. At the star! of Fe bruary th e First 

Army staff began 10 move its supply facilit ies bac k ac ross the Meuse to posi· 

tions from which they could support a brea kout to the Rh ine. By lat e February 

the a rmy supply c hiefs had returned their depots 10 Ihe Eupen-I-I erbesl ha l area, 
"First To Reach the Rhille . .. Finn To Meeilite Russial/s" 247 

established a forward fue l decanting point at Stolbcrg, and moved truck heads, 

rai lheads, and ammunition suppl y points forward to su pport the corps. The 

move placed heavy demands on the scarce supply of labor and transport. To 

maximize flex ibili ty, the First Army headquarters allocated more service units 

on the basis of operational control ra ther than attac hment, the reby relieving 

subordinate echelons of administrative responsibilities, and it kept other service un its directly under the army servi ce chiefs. The First Army, however, 

never seemed to have enough of these units, and civilian labor, while helpful, 

was hard to find . Fortunately, the rai lroad net had progressed to the point tlHlt 

ADSEC could often de li ver supplies directly by rail to divisions and army rear 

area troops. Th is arrangcment cased the strain 011 a rmy motor tra nsport, wh ich 

was also in great demand for troop movements and road maintenance, and enabled a sizable bui ldup in army depots. By 2 1 February the First Army had 

increased supply levels to 4.5 days of rations, 6 days of fuel , and 45,549 tons of 

ammu nitio n. Its depots of Class II and IV stores we re well stocked, except for 

small stoves, woo l gloves, spare engi ne parts, and some signa l and enginee r 

equ ipment. 's 

Thc First Army headquarters' re lations with COMZ, while hardly warm, 

were improvi ng. During January General Lee, the COMZ commander and 

deputy commander of ETOUSA, had made two visits to Hodges' command 

POSIIO discuss items in crilically short supply, and he impressed Hodge s' a ide 

with his willingness to listen. At the end of the mont h the First Army headquarters received a full prog ress report from Lee, after wh ich COMZ's G- 4 and 

chief of tra nsportation visited Spa 10 rev iew the situa tion. Through its "A BC 

Haul" truck network and "Toot Sweet" rail express, COMZ made a speci al 

effort to ru sh key items to the froll!. l/) The COMZ headquarters also finally 

abandoned its da ily a llocation of tra nsportation in favor of a monthly a ll otment 

of its available transport, to be coordina ted by its chie f of transporta tion. At a 

conference of the thea ter's top ord nance officers in late February. the COMZ 

representatives agreed to help case the general shortage of ordna nce service 

troops by loaning some ofCOMZ's own service units to the armies. Army logisticians still viewed with skeptic ism some of COMZ's rosier rorecClsts, and 

COMZ officers sti ll sllspected tha t the armies were not accura tc ly repo rting 

the ir stocks and were stori ng too many supp lies for easy movemcnt. When 

Littlejohn, chief quartermaster of ETQUSA and COMZ, tri ed to reorgani ze his 

depot system and limit slocks in advance depots, however, army protests caused 

him to raise storage levels in those depots to seven days of rat ions, fuel , and 

lubri cants and fificen days of c lothing and equipmen t. 17 

Whi le thc logistic ians moved up supplies, the engi neers completed thei r 

pl ans for a Rhine c rossi ng. For months, the First Army enginee rs had been 

preparing for the mission of an opposed crossing of the Rhine. In Septembe r, 

when a Rhine crossing seemed immi nent, army group and army engineers la id 

plans for bridge construction at severa l difTerent points. Begi nning in October, 

the First Army engineer section partici pated in planning sessions with their 

colleagues from ETOUSA, SHAE ~ the Navy, the army grou ps, and the oth er 

armies. Drawing on guide lines preparcd at these mcetings, on data collected by 
248 

the S- 2 subsection, <Ind on consultations with the G- 3 section about slIch 

factors as probable sites and dates, 

Carter'S operat ions officers prepared 

plans for simultan eous crossings by 

two cor ps, using treadway, heavy 

ponton, and Bailey bridges. The logistics subsection then bega n to assembl e the necessary materials at 

depots, and the operations subsection 

obtained more bridge units and init iated training programs. l~ In the past, 

the First Army had been re lu ctant to 

use smoke, bu t for th is task, the engineers obtained smoke ge nerator 

units through the chemical warfare 

seclion,I9 When SHAEF decided in 

favor of the north ern th rust, however, 

it took severa l bridge units from the 

First Army. In theory, SHAEF's ac· 

tion left o nly enough equipment for 

three bridges, a lthough Carter would 

late r claim that he had worked out an 

A Command Pasl (I( War 

General CarleI' 

(Photograph laken aner the war.) 

arrangement with a captain in a regulating stat ion to divert all bridging equi p· 

me nt to the First Army no matter wha t its assigned destination.2o 

Busy as they we re with Rhine planning, the First Army engineers in early 

February had to deal with another crisis. After a January of deep snow and ice, 

which caused units to turn to sleds and spec ial tracked vehicles to move sup· 

plies, a sudden thaw and heavy rains caused even hardened macadam roads in 

the First Army area to disin tegrate. Poor road condition s were the last straw for 

many of the First Army's aging vehicles. They freque ntly broke down under the 

stra in, des pite cannibaliza tion and other efforts by forward ordnance mainle· 

nance battalions to keep as many as possible on the road. Notwithstanding 

strenuous efforts by the engi nee rs, the road system had deteriorated to such a 

degree that on 14 February the First Army st aff divided its roads into three 

groups: those open to unlimited usc, those open only to esse nti a l traffic , and 

those, mostly in the V Corps sector, that the engineers deemed impassable and 

closed . Aided by troops of the 7th Armored and 99th Infantry Divisions and by 

local labor, the First Army engineers devoted all of their resources to keeping 

roads in the first two categories open, and the enginee r section worked closely 

with 0 - 4 traffic headquarters to direct convoys to open rou tes. Due to the dif· 

ficulty of moving supplies forward, the First Army headquarters look the almost unprecedented step of authorizing the VII Co rps' two assault div isions to 

accumu latc five days ofamll1unit ioll for the attack. 21 

Aftcr a 45-minute barrage by 2,000 artillery pieces fi ring in support of the 

Ninth Army and the VII Corps, Collins' troops began their attack across the 
"Firs! To Reach Ihe Rllil1e . .. Firs! To J\tJeelllie Russians" 249 

Roer ,It 0330 on 23 February. Strong river currents and preregistered encmy 

artillery fire caused probl ems for the first waves, but by the nex t day Hodges 

was satisfi ed enough with the VII Corps' progress to order Mill iki n's III Corps 

across the Roer. To avoid successive assa ult crossings, the First Army headquarters cleverly directed each division to cross into the existing bridgehead of 

the division on its left and the n slip 10 the right and uncover its own bridgehead 

si tes. It thus cleared the way for the next division to repeat the process. While 

the II I Corps crossed the Roer, the VII Corps' armored spearheads plunged 

ahead on 27 February to the Erft ncar Elsdorf, about eight miles cast of the 

RoeI'. At Spa, the First Army hcadquarters fo llowed with great satisfaction the 

progress of the adva nce. Hains' armored section in particular noted with pleasure the exce ll ent performance at Elsdorf of one of the twenty new Pershing 

tanks that the 12th Army Group headquarters had assigned to the 3d Armored 

Division.n 

As the Nin th Army raced northeast to the Rhine, the First Army prepared to 

launch LUMBERJACK. Once Bradley el:lsed Hodges' anxiety abollt his southern 

nank by di recting a converging attack by Patton's Third Army, the First Army 

headqua rters issued orde rs to its three corps on 28 Februa ry. In the first stage 

of L Uf-IIlERJACK, the VII Corps would continue to protect the Ninth Army's southern flank , crossing the Erft and occupying the high ground northwest of Cologne, wh il e the II I Corps adva nced nine miles east to the Erft and se ized 

Euskirchen. In th e second stage, the VII Corps would invest Cologne, while the 

III Corps turned to the southeast and linked up wi th the Third Army along the 

Ahr River, which flowed cast into the Rhine fifteen mi les southeast of Bonn 

and twice that distance southeast of Cologne. The two corps would then close 

to the west bank of the Rhine. During these stages, the V Corps would covcr 

the III Corps' nank and be ready to advance farther eastY 

LUMLlI;RJACK procecded almost without a hi tch. By 4 March, the same day 

that the First Army headquarte rs reactivated the tactica l echelon, the [II Corps 

had captured Euskirchen, and the VII Corps' adva nce had reached the Rhine 

cight mi les north of Cologne. Two days later, the VII Corps occupi ed Cologne, 

while the II I Corps raced towa rd the Ahr. For the First Army headquarters, the 

speed and clockl ike prec ision of the drive were ex hilarating. The pace, as we ll 

as the warme r wea ther, especia lly seemed to be a tonic for Hodges, who was 

devoting more time to visiting subordinate command posts than he had in 

months. At Coll ins' request, he shiOed the boundary be tween the VJI and [11 

Corps to allow the VII Corps to drive to the Rhine south of Cologne and cut the 

last Germa n escape route , and he also adj usted the boundary between the 1[ 1 

and V Corps to give the former more frontage on the Ahr. 24 

In kceping with his orders from Bradley, Hodges was more intent on the 

approaching junction with the Third Army on the Ahr tha n se izing a Rhine 

bridge. Allied commanders expected that Ge rman engineers, as a matte r of 

course, wOldd demolish every threa tened span. Moreover, SHAEF had shown 

little enthusiasm for a Rhine crossing 011 the First Army fronl. Steep riverbanks 

presented a major obstacle. The rough, wooded terrain and poor, easily blocked 

roads 011 the cast bank of the Rhine between Bonn and the mouth of the Ahr 
250 A COII/mand Post (If ~/" 

View of Remogel/ (ll1d 'he LI/(Ien(/Qrff Bridge from 'he west b,,"k looking east. 

March 1945 

offe red few openings for ex ploita ti o n, and the limited rO<ldnct on the west bank 

wo uld ma ke support of a ny c rossing di fficul t. Consequently, S HAE F had 

p],lIlllcd primaril y for a Rh ine crossi ng to the nort h in the sector orthe 2 1 Army 

Group, with possibl e secondary crossings to the south by the Third Army and 

the 6th Army Group, Icavi ng the Fi rst Army nearly last in priority for bridg ing 

un its and materia ls. Although the First Army headq uarters and subordinate cehclons more or less shared an unde rstanding orlhe desirability of la ki ng a bridge, 

Hodges a nd his sta ff tended to steer the II I Co rps toward the Ahr and away 

from the Rhine. Indeed, he and his stafTactually wanted the Allied air forces to 

bomb bridges in its zone of advilllee a nd cu t ofT the Germa n retrea t, although 

foggy, rainy weather in the first days of March had forced ca nce ll ation o f most 

of those missions. Not until the evening of 6 Marc h did the First Army com· 

mander, responding to the request o f the II I Co rps G- J th rough the First Army 

G- 3 (Air), ask for the suspen sion of th e strikes. H 

Abollt 1700 o n 7 Ma rch, wh il e Hodges was visiting the newly occupied 

c ity of Cologne, his tact ica l ec he lon at thc Primm estate in Stolbe rg received 

sta rtli ng news: Combat Command B (CeB) of the 9 th Armored Divisio n hlld 

captured intact the LudendorfTBridge, the rai lroad span at Remagen, two miles 

no rth of the mouth of the Ahr and fifty miles cast of Stolberg. In his c hief's 

absence, Kean approved the 9th Armored Di vision's change ofeCB's mission 

from driving to the Ahr to rei nforci ng and exploiting the Remagen crossi ng. 

Whe n l'lodges returned at 1800, he co nfirmed these o rders a nd to ld Kean that, 
"Firs! To Reach lite Rltine . .. Firsl To ""'ee! Ihe Russians" 

POll/Oil bOal~' ami flaal.l· 011 'he u'a), '0 lite Nhill e ill 'he Rellltlgell area. 

/0 Marclt 1945 

251 

with due regard for responsibi li ties on the rest of thc front, hc wan ted to scnd 

to thc Rcmagcn arCH cvcry unit that it could hold as soon as possible. 26 

For seve ral hours, the First Army headquarters hummed wi th activi ty. 

Thorson made two ca lls to the II I Corps headquarte rs, directing Mi lli kin to 

secllre the Ahr crossings but be prepared to turn them ove r to the V Corps so 

that the 111 Corps headquarters could concentrate on Ihe bridge head. He also 

informed the III Corps headqua rters that it wou ld rece ive the 7th Armored Division, whi ch wou ld enable the 9th Infantry Division to move to Remagen. 

Later, the First Army headq uarters told its III Corps subord inates to transfer 

the I st Infantry Division and the Bonn sector to the VII Corps, again to enable 

the III Corps to foclls on the task at hand. Hodges, Kean, and Thorson discussed transportation and road priorities with Wendt, the G- 4 executive officer 

who was acting for the ailing Brig. Gen. Robert W. Wi lson. Si multaneously, 

Hart, Williams, Patterson, and Carte r arranged fo r the immedia te shi fi of their 

artillery, signal, antia irc rafi, and engineer units to Re rnagen. In li ne with prior 

plans for a Rhine crossing, Thorson also askcd thc Navy to scnd landing c raft. 

As the staff raccd to realign the First Army, l'lodges callcd Bradlcy and obta ined his approval for the buildup of the bridgehead. 17 

The First Army headquart ers had reacted with commendable dispatch, but, 

in its haste, it gene rated an overkill of resources. Eager to consolidate their 

coup and awa re from ULTRA int ercepts that the Germans were frantically assembling forces to destroy the bridge and bridgehead, the stllff chiefs ill the 
252 A Commalld POSI at lVi',,. 

tactical echelon rushed forward bils and pieces ofunits. 28 Since the 0 - 3 troop 

movements subsection and 0-4 traffic headqua rte rs had rema ined at Spa with 

the command ec he lon, the Si"rrat Stolberg re lied on minimal , informal coordination . By th e night o f 7- 8 Ma rch the two inadeq uate roads leading into 

Remagcn from the west and so uth were alrcady jammed with traffic, and the 

next day '-lodges' a ide saw a nearly continuolls line of amphibious tru cks, bridging eq ui pment, suppl y vehicl es, antiaircraft batteries, and trailers with landi ng 

craft headed southeast from Euskirchcn to Rcmagen, over twenty miles away. 

There, the convoys ran in to the granddaddy of a ll bottlenecks. Alt hough twentyfOllr hours pa ssed bcfore the Germans could offer mu ch resistance, rugged terrain and la ck of infantry slowed ex pansion of the bridgehead and enabled th e 

Germans to bring observed a rtill ery fire on the bridge and its approac hes. To 

add to the First Army headquarters' agg ravat ion, SHA EF. despit e proddi ng from 

the 12th Army Group headquarters, gave lilli e indication wha t it wanted to do 

with the bridgehead. On 9 March Bradley rinally told Hodges to hold the bridgehead but limi t it to an a rea five di visions could defend. To disrupt enemy defenscs, units on the perimeter could ad va nce but were limit ed to 1,000 yards 

per day.29 

While S HAEF reconside red its plans, the First Army engineer sect ion did 

its best to ex pedite construction of more bridges in the Remagen area. Fortunately for the First Army, the II I Corps engineer had shown enough foresight to 

incl ude a treadway bridge compa ny in the column behind the 9th Armored Division. He immediately put into effect the First Army contingency plan for 

co nstructing a tread way and a ponton bridge whil e ferrie s moved men, suppli es, and ve hicl es to the far bank . To perform these missions, howcver, the III 

Corps had to go beyond its ava ilable resources. The Fi rst Army headquarters 

rcsponded with a heavy ponton battalion to opera Ie the ferries, ,md it later se nt 

2 engi neer combat batta lions, 2 treadway compnn ies, and 2 henvy ponton batta lions to build th e treadway Hnd ponton id ges ~ 

The First Army engineer section soon became more intimately involved in 

the bridg ing operation. When Carter went to Remage n on the morning of 8 

March, he fo und preparations for more bridges under way, although traffic jams 

and road priorities wou ld de lay arrival of th e bridgi ng units and the start of 

constr uct ion until the morning of 10 Ma rch. The First Army engi neer checked 

the st atus of the captured bridge and called in a COMZ const ruc tion battalion 

to take over the repai r of a blown girderY Meanwhile, his scction at Stolbe rg 

raced to ga the r units and Illateria ls, coo rd ina ting with th e G-4 scction ror transport and trarfi c cl earances, with the provost mars hal for traffi c control , and 

with th e ant iaircraft sec tion for bridge defcnscs. The scction also obt ai ned fOllr 

truck compa ni es from ADSEC to haul bridging equipment to the Remagen area. 

AI Kean's orders, Carter return ed to the bridgehead several times over the next 

two weeks to ensure tha t work proceeded satisfa ctori ly. By the time the captu red rai lroad bridge coll apsed on the afte rnoon of 17 Ma rch, engineers had 

constructed three temporary spa ns in the area illld insta ll ed a vast fc rryi ng opcrati on of DUK Ws, pontons, and twent y· rour naval landin g craft, vehicle and 

personne l (LCV P), under the overa ll supervision of Carter's engineer secti onY 
'Pirs' To Reaclt ,lte Rltille ... Firs' To Mee' 'lte RlIssiallS" 253 

Like Carter, Patte rson took seriously Hodges' instructions to push forward 

every unit that th e bridgehead a rea could hold. Within a few days of the capture 

of the railroad bridge, the First Army headquarte rs had rei nforced the anti a ircraft defenses of the span to in clude nine automati c weapons battalions and 

four gun battalions, whi ch look positions on both banks of th e Rhine. An offi cer in Patte rson's an tiaircraft section later recall ed that hc had never seen so 

many antiaircra ft units in one place. They we re so numerous, he st ated, that 

th eir rounds were landing on fri endl y troops and ca usin g casualti es.H 

Until the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade assumed from th e corps th e res ponsibility for Ih e defense of the bridges on 25 March, the task demanded parti cularl y close coord ination amo ng e ng ineer, chemi ca l wa rfa re, anti a irc raft , 

artille ry, and armored perso nne l at ldlleve ls and the IX Tactical Air Comma nd. 

To prevent friendl y fire in c idents, Patterson and Qucsada , cOlllmandc r of th e 

IX Tac ti cal Air Command, worked out a " no-pene tra ti on zone" over the 

LudendorfT Bridge for Allied a ircraft, givin g the gunners a cl ea r fi eld offire.H 

Drawin g on First Army ex pe riments with protecti ve ri ver booms during th e 

previolls win ter, engineers placed a log boom, an impact boom, and a large net 

upstream to stop noal in g obj ects and saboteurs. They also ca ll ed on Ihe First 

Army chemica l wa rfa re secti on for smoke generator compani es. Not until 10 

Ma rch, however, was the First Army headquarte rs abl e to release two such units 

from th e ir othe r dutie s for Ihe ta sk, and not until 16 March could one leave fo r 

Remagen, too late 10 be of mu ch he lp. The bridge defenses we re furth er augmented by barrage ba ll oo ns, sea rchlights, 155-mm. howitzers positioned along 

the banks, and depth charges dropped into the river at five-minute int erva ls to 

discourage swimme rs. Despite the ad hoc nature of the defenses, th ey did their 

job. The Germans tri ed artill ery, air strikes, floating mines, frogme n, and eve n 

V- 2 missil es, but only the a rtill ery did much damage to th e bridges.n 

In the midst o f the battle fo r the bridgchead, on 17 March Hodges reli eved 

the 111 Corps commander, Millikin. For some time, it had become inc reasin gly 

obvious that the First Army commander lacked confidence in Millikin, a ta[1 

cava lryman with abu ndant nervous ene rgy. Whet her th is lack of confidence 

stemmed from the 111 Corps' past association with Pallon's Third Army, old infantry-cav<llry riva lries, or even the interwa r animus betwee n Pershin g, th e hero 

of AEF veterans like Hodges, and General Peyton C. March, the former chiefof 

stafT and Millikin 's fathe r-in-law, can only be left to conj ecture. It is interesting 

to note, however, that Patton, anOlher AEF veteran and a Pershing intimate, had 

come c lose to reli evi ng Millikin, whom he regarded as amateurish compared 10 

his other corps eommanders.J6 Although Hodges docs not appear to have bee n 

aware o f Patton 's eva luation, he clea rly was unhappy ove r Milli kin 's performance 

in L Ut.tOERJACK. I-Ie later complained that the III Corps commander repea tedly 

disregarded his orders, resting the 78th In fantry Di vision instead of pushing a ll 

of his units forward, sending the 9th Infantry Di vision to take Bonn rather than 

bypass it, and not auaching enough infa ntry support to the 9th Armored Division, which was commanded by an old fri end of HodgesY 

As the battlc for the Rcma ge n bridgehead deve loped, Hodges' anxiety and 

irritat ion with Millikin had mounted. Aware of his G- 2's 8 March estimate, 
254 

which showed a sizable German force 

massing to wipe QUI the bridgehead, 

Hodges voiced concern over the slow 

buildup, the corps hcadqu<lrtcrs' appa rent lack of control over the situation, and- always a sure way to draw 

his ire- th e absence of timely. reliabl e reports from the corps. A trip to 

the [II Corps command post and Ihe 

Rcmagen bridgehead on 10 and I I 

March, during wh ich he encountered 

the traffic jams clogging the roads to 

Rcmagcn, did littl e to improve his 

fi rst impressions. He became especia lly vexed by what he perce ived to 

be disobedi ence or his orders to dri ve 

north along the Rhine's cast bank and 

open a crossing for th e VII Corps.J8 

On th eir parI, Millikin and his statT 

co uld blame misunderstand in gs with 

th eir superior headquarters. inadequat e communi ca tions wi th the 

A Command Posl at IIhl' 

Gel/eNd Vall Fleel 

units on the east bank, and the lack of roads, bridges, and service troops to 

accommodate the nood of units that the First Army headquarters was pushin g 

forward to them . Millikin 's biggest problem, howevc r, was that he was not J. 

Lawton Collins, the milTl the First Army hcadquarters opcnly wished had received the winMali. On 15 March I-lodges informed General Omar N. Bradley 

o f his intent to make a chan ge, and Bradley took the opportuni ty to name" 

favorite, Maj. Gen. James A. Van Fl eet, to fill th e vacancy.3<J 

The case of Mill ikin 's reli ef does not renect well on the First Army headqua rters, whatever thej uslifi ca tion . Mi lli kin's leadership may we ll have been 

inadequa te. William C. Westmore land, then a colone l and the chief of staff of 

the 9th Infa ntry Di visio n, late r reca lled that Milliki n never visited the east bank 

and thai Westmore land had warned Hodge s' aide of the corps commander's 

lack ofresolulion. I fhis communi cations with the bridgehead were inadeq uate, 

he could have improved them simpl y by moving his command post to the other 

side of the ri ver. Yet the [[ I Corps commander apparently beli eved that his presence on the west bank of the Rhin e was necessa ry to dea l with the confusion 

there. With rega rd to this confusion, th e First Army headq uarters co uld have 

been more helpful, ass umi ng more of the responsibility for the rear a reas so 

tha t the corps could concentrate on the bailie. Millikin could c laim with some 

justi ce that the Fi rst Army headquarters made lillie effort to unde rsta nd his 

problems or to he lp him stra ighten out the chaos. I ndeed, it might have actua lly 

hindered him by burdening his corps with more resources than it could handle. 4U 

By the time of Millikin 's relief, lilli e doubt rema ined as to the securit y of 

the bridgehead, but the First Army commander and staff were still anx ious about 
"Fil'sl To Reach Ihe Rhine . .. Fil'st To Meel ,lie Russial/s" 255 

the ir role in the com ing offe nsive. The Allied armies had almost ac hieved 

Eise nhower's morc immediate goal of clearing the west bank of the Rhine. To 

the north, the Ninth Army, after reac hing the Rhinc on 2 March, had driven 

nort h to link up with the Ca nndian First Army the next day. While the 2 1 Army 

Group mopped up the region between the Maas and the Rhine, the Third Army 

reac hed th e Rh ine on 7 March and, afte r contact ing the First Army nca r the 

Ahr, cleared its sector of the west bnnk. To the south, th e 6th Army Group's 

Seventh U.S. Army launched Operation UNDERTONE on 15 March to break through 

the West Wall in its area and elim inate cnemy resistance from th e region 

betwecn the Rhine, Mose ll e, and Laut erwSarre Rivers. 

In th is con tex t, th e First Army continued to build up ils bridgehead. On 15 

March the VII Corps began to cross the Rh ine to assume its position on the 

north ern sector of the perimeter, white the 32d Fi eld Arti ll ery Brigade under 

the control of the First Army took up positions along the west bank to provide 

ge neral support of the bridge head. Gradually, the perimeter expa nded to reach 

by 17 March over fOllr mil es north along the Rhine, six mil es to the south, a nd 

about seven mile s inland to th e autobahn. Despite th e progress, th e First Army 

headqua rt ers remained in the dark about its future rol e and feared that it mi ght 

have to send sevcm l divisions to th e 2 1 Anny Gro up. Hodges and his slaff had 

good rea son to be co ncerned. The seizure of the Remagen bridgehead had intensified th e debate over strategy, and at one point , Eisenhowe r directed Bradw 

ley to be prepa red to empl oy at least tcn divisions from the First Army to exw 

ploit the bridgehead that th e 2 1 Army Group plan ned to establish north of the 

Ruhr industrial regio n. 41 

Finally, on 19 Ma rch the uncertaint y ended. On that day Bradley told I-lodges 

to bu ild lip his forces in the bridge head to nin e di visions and prepare for a 

breakou t on 23 March. The next day Hodges assembl ed his corps commanders 

at his new comma nd post in Eus kirchen and we nt over plans for a twowp ha se 

offensive. At this point, th e First Army could go almost anywhere it wanted, 

give n th e sta tus of encmy reserves, fue l, ammunition, and mora le. Since the 

Gcrmans had ma ssed most o r thei r remaining strcngth north o f the bridgehead, 

I-lodges planned for thc III Corps, which wou ld be in thc ce nter once th e V 

Corps entered the bridge head, to ad va nce sotltheastto Limburg, a road center 

on th e Lahn Ri ve r about forty mil es so utheast o r Remagell . The VII Corps in 

the no rth wou ld drive about the same distance cast to the Di ll Ri ve r. Arte r linking lip with the Third Army at the Lahn Rive r, the First Army would drive to 

Giessell , 30 mi les northeast of Limburg, and then advance to Ka sse l, anothe r 

64 mil es northeast of Gi esscn and I 10 miles ca st o f Cologne, thereby e ne irw 

cling the Ruhr from the sOllt l1. ~2 

Although the plan did not specify a ma in e ffort, Colli ns again rcce ived the 

largest share of the resources. I-lis VI1 Corps wou ld have one armored and five 

infantry di visions and priority for support frOIll th e army artill e ry. Van Fl eet's 

til Corps cou ld ca ll on one armored and two infantry di visions, and Huebner's 

V Corps woul d contain one armored and three infa ntry divisions. The VII Corps, 

howeve r, received a much IlIrger sector than the other two corps. Under the 

initi(ll plan, th e V Corps, which began to c ross into the so uth ern sector of th e 
256 A Command POSf (II War 

bridge head on 2 1 Marc h. was supposed to play on ly a minor rol e, but when 

probes showed the enemy's weakness on the V Corps front , Hodges adjusted 

his plans to pe rtuit the III and V Corps 10 drive abreasllo the Lahn.4l 

The First Army logistic ians knew that the inevitable breakout would result 

in a mobil e campai gn simil ar in pace to the pursuit of the previous summer, but 

they were in a much be tte r position to meet th e challenge. Thea te r orga nization 

for logisti cs had come a long way, to the point thai the 12th Army Group headqu arters could provi de the First Army with four add itiona l quarterma ster service compan ies, and COMZ could muslcr 75 perce nt of its truck transport in 

direct support of the dri ve beyond the Rlli ne. Under a plan worked out by COMZ, 

ADSEC, the 25th Regulating Sta tion, and the First Army staff, COM Z pl edged 

to make available up to thirteen te n-ton truck compa nies to SUppOri a First 

Army ad vance o f up to 125 mil es from a se rvice area west of the Rhi ne. The 

Fi rst Army would a lso benefit from imp roved a rrangements for ail' supply, unde r which eac h a rmy submitt ed designated airfields and bids for suppli es directly to the AEAF's Combi ned AirTranspori Opera tions Room. Since the First 

Army rece ived most of its suppli es from COMZ by rail, it was li mited in its 

ability to move de pots fo rward, du e to the heavy damage to rail insta llat ions in 

th e Rhi neland. Still , it pushed its distribution poi nts as far forward as possible, 

pl acing an ammun ition dump at Rh einbach, e ight mil es southeast of Euskirchen, 

and a deca nting point for fuel at St adt Mecke nhe im, three mi les farthcr sou theast 0 11 the road to RCIlMgen. Whil e e ngi neers hurriedly improved road and rail 

connect ions to these points, logist ic ians rushed to stock fuel and other supplies 

in preparation for a brcakout. 44 

They did not have long to wait. On 22 Ma rc h troops of the Third Army 

crossed the Rhine j ust south of Ma inz ncar Oppe nhe im. (Map /6) The ncx t day 

Montgomery launc hed his careful ly prepared assault across the Rh ine north of 

th e Ruhr. After a de lay of two days to allow the offensives by th e 2 1 Army 

Group and Third Army to develop, the First Army stru ck all alon g the line on 

25 Marcil. The front soo n gave way, opening the door to ex ploitation by armor. 

On 26 March, th e same day that the Seventh Army in the south made its c rossing o f the Rhi ne, the V Corps adva nce rcached Limburg, and, at Bradl cy's instigation, Hodges direc ted a combat comma nd fro m thc V Co rps' 9th Armorcd 

Division in to the rea r of th e Germans opposi ng the Th ird Army:l! 

Once again, the pace of the advancc fo rced Hodges to trust in the discretion 

of his corps commrlllders. Aft er the V Corps linkcd up with the Th ird Army on 28 

March, Bradley dcc ided to try for a sha ll owcr envc lopmc nt of the Ruhr, ordering 

the First Army to turn north and dri ve sixty mil es to Paderborn, where it would 

Illectthc Nint h Army. As the First Army turned to the nort h, inadeq uate communications and frequent shifts of a tactica l eche lon enlarged to incl ude personnel 

from the medical, annorc(~ and an tiaircra ft sections limited the abi lity of its headquarters to fo llow and, whcn necessary, innllence the battle. Aside from the G-4 

section 's need to ma inta in the now of Slip pli es, Hodges and his staff could allow 

the corps to run thc show. For all his confide nce in Collins, however, l'lodges still 

worried, this time with good reason, l:lbotlt the Vll Corps' long western na nk. 

When reports on 30 Ma rch indica ted an immincnt enemy attempt to break out 
"Fir:"1 To Reach Ihe Rhille ... FirSI To ""eel Ihe Russialls" 257 

from the Ruhr ncar Winterberg, about seventy mil es cast of Cologne, the First 

Army commander, without a req uest from Collins, shined the 9th In fantry Division from the III Corps to reinforce the VII Corps' nank, and the division arrived 

in time to help repe l the German foray. 46 

The action at Winterberg hardl y slowed Collins, who had grown so accustomed to the discre tion Hodges habitua lly granted him that he hardl y blinked 

at bypassi ng the First Army commander to deal with a tactical contin gency. 

When the VII Corps met unexpectedly fierce resistance at Paderborn, Collins 

went outside th e normal command channels to co ntact Simpson of the Ninth 

Army directly lmd arrange a linkup eighteen mil es west of Paderborn on I 

April. Given the situation, "Iodges could hardly complain. Thc encirclcment of 

thc Ruhr brought considerable satisfa ct ion to his headquarters, but a lso sadness at the news that Maj. Ge n. Maurice Rose ofthc 3d Armored Division, one 

of the First Army headq uarte rs' favorite tank commande rs, had been kil1 ed in 

the fighting at PaderbornY 

"Iavin g received acclaim from the supreme commander himse lf for its performance in th c enc irclement of the Ruhr, the First Army would now have a 

major role in the final dri ve into the helut of Germany. On 29 Ma rch Eisen hower 

announced that the 121h Army Grollp wou ld make the main effort, driving 150 

miles cast along the Erfu rt-Lei pzig axis to the Elbe River and also clearing the 

Ruhr Pocket. As was onen the casc, Bradley wa it ed to issue offi cial orders 

unti l 4 April. In the interim, he notified I-lodges of the First Army's mission to 

cl ea r the Ruhr and a lso to prepare for an offensive that would contact the Soviets, exploit any open ing for an Elbe bridgehead, and set the stage fo r an 

advance farther to the cast. For hel p in reducing the Ruhr, the First Army would 

regain the XV III Airbo rn e Corps.48 

Although the Gcrman opposition to the final drive promised to be negligible, Hodges and his staff in the closing weeks of the war would have to 

contend with the most widely separated fron t they had faced in the entire campaign. Delighted to have Ridgway under his command once again, Hodges called 

his corps commande rs to his new command post in a barracks at Mllrburg, 

seventy miles east of Bonn, on 2 April. The re, he ordered the XVII I Airborne 

and III Corps, with support from the army artillery, 10 mop up the Ruhr, whilc 

the VII and V Corps regrouped for the drive to the Elbe. On the same day 

conferees from the First Army and the Ninth Army, which was returning to the 

121h Army GrOllI', set their boundary for the Ruhr operation along the Ruhr 

Ri ver, the westward nowing stream that bisected the Ruhr. When the Fi rst Army 

headquarters received the tentative bound'lries fo r the Elbe drive the nex t day, 

however, I-lodges and his stafT groa ned at the provisions that gave them not 

only the Ha rz Mountains and no autobahns in the ir area but also additional 

terra in north of the Ruhr River. Meet in g with Bradlcy and Simpson on 4 April, 

I-lodges recove red his forme r northern boundary with the Nint h Army at the 

Ruhr Ri ver and also received orders to se ize a bridgehead over the Weser, ten 

to fineen miles 10 thc easl, preparatory to a drive to the Elbe. 4

'J 

While th e generals conferred, the XVI II Ai rborne Corps in the so uth and 

the 11 1 Corps to the east, in collaboration wit h the Ninth Army in th e north, 
258 

DRIVE INTO GERMANY 

24 March .... April 1945 

"'''' """ F'<lnIUne. Midnight. 2~ Mar 

-

, , 

Front linlt. Midnight. 28 Mar 

From Line, Midnigtu. 1 Apr 

From liM. Mid"igt'l. ~ Apr 

ElEVAllON IN Mel{RS 

8OO.nd _ 

» 

M Al' 16 

A Commalld Pasl (1/ lfIar 

had already begun to rnop up th e Ruhr Pocket. (Map J 7) On the basis of 

Dickso n's estimat es that th e Germans had on ly 125,000 men in the Ru hr, and 

those mostly service troops, Bradley and I-lodges c lea rl y hoped fo r a quick 

redu ct ion o f the pocket so they cou ld turn th eir full attention to th e drive 

cast. Ac tuall y, well ovcr twice that number occupi ed th e Ruhr, and, alt hough 

surrounded, Illany were prepa red for ha rd fighting. The hilly, fore sted terra in 

o rthe Sauerla nd on th e sout h edge of tile Ruhl' an d the inexperience of three 

green divisions in the XV III Ai rborne Corps further slowed ope rations. AI-

~­• 
"First To Rellch the Rhille . . . First To Meet the Russians" 259 

though somewhat aware of th e rugged ground fa cing his troops, an impati ent 

Hodges kept up the press ure on his commanders. At 11 gathering of Alli ed 

generals, Hansen not ed that I-lodges " has lost th e calmness or his days in 

England and seems to reel th e urgency of th ese days of swi ft ad vances," When 

the III Corps achi eved only moderat e progress, Hodges berated Van Fl eet 

ove r th e phone, and he and Rid gway wo uld have reli eved th e assistant commander o f the 86th Infantry Division if Bradley had not int ervened. Despite 

the press ure from Hodges, the First Army did n01 link lip wit h th e Ninth Army 
260 A Commolld Posl al Iii'll' 

THE DRIVE INTO GERMANY 

4-18April l945 

- AJllod ""-'"."" 

H EV"'''ON ON METERS 

I I o ;!OO 000 000 800 ..... ... _ 

" , 

MAP 17 

inside th e Ruh r until 14 April, and not until 18 April did the 317,000 remaining Ge rman troops eap itulate .

so 

As the battl e for the Ruhr took place, th e Fi rst Army's other two corps 

advanced to the Elbe and its tributary, the Mulde, which flowed parall e l to, and 

about twenty miles west of, th e Elbe. As the staff had noted, the army zone 

from th e Wese r to the Elbe contained few roads and the Harz Mountains, which 

ex tended ac ross most of tile VII Corps zo ne about ha lfway to th e Elbe. Yet th e 

rest of the zo ne consisted of open, rolling country for mobi le warfare, and 

Dickson rated the de fenders, the ha stily constituted Elevell/It Army, as mere 
"Firsl To Reach Ille Rhille. , . First To ""Ieellhe Russialls" 26 1 

"confused rabbl e,"si At fi rst, Bradley limited the First Army's advallce to a 

bridgehead over th e Le in c Ri ve r, two to four mil es to th e cast. Under pressure 

from Hodge s and Huebne r, howeve r, he removed restri ctions on [0 Ap ri [ and 

set as the obj ecti ve the Mulde-Elbe line, th e farthest adva nce hc thought that 

he could support without railroads. 

With the ir armored di visions in th e lead, th e VII and V Corps raced east 

agai nst sporadic resistance, ignoring flank s and tak ing risks unthinkable a rew 

weeks bcfore. The First Army headqu<lrle rs' majo r chall enge, aside from logisti cs and administration, was staying e[em' of the ad vanc ing armies on e ither 
262 A COII/malld Post at lVar 

flank , as units from all three armies often wande red into each other's zones. 

Despite several suc h entanglements, by I G Ap ril both corps had reached the 

Mulde-Elbe line, and on 19 April Leipzig surrendered to the V Corps. To the 

north, LI. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, nervous about the threat to his northern flank 

from the Harz Mounta ins, pursued the Eleven/h Arm)' into its dense woods and 

caves in spite of General Courtney H. Hodges' orders to bypa ss the region. His 

commander's impatience notwithsta ndi ng, Collins look his lime cl earing the 

area to avoid imposin g heavy losses on his troops so near th e e nd of the war. 

Not until 20 April did the last enemy troops in th e Harz region surrender. 52 

Collins' indepe ndence was large ly due to the respect I-lodges had for him, 

but uncertain communi ca tions over lon g distances in a fast-paced campaign 

undoubtedly con tributed. Antici pati ng the probl em, Grant Williams' signal section had devoted most of March to stocking wire and forming a mobil e supply 

depot to follow th e advance. When the III Corps proved unable to maintain 

contact with its di visions in the Rcmagcn bridgehead, Williams detailed the 

32d and 35th Signal Construction Baltalions to lay two cabl es to the east bank. 

Even these mea sures proved inadequate as th e First Army advanced beyond th e 

Rh ine land. Th rough late Marc h, the First Army headquarters stru gg led with its 

communications. The low poin t came on 30 Ma rch, whe n the tactica l ec helon 

moved across the Rhi ne to a forest near Frei lingen, twen ty-five miles cast of 

Remage n, only to find itse lfwithout comllluni cations until ea rly the next morning because the signal vans were delayed by traffic. Whe n th e command post 

moved to Marburg two day s latc r, signal crews laid over a hundred mil es of 

cabl e and established numcrous repca te r stations to keep the First Army headquarters in touch with its far-flung units. Oncc again, tha t headquart ers had to 

rely heavily on radio, notwithstanding the securit y risks and the resulting time 

lag invo lved in coding and decoding me ssages. Communications problems, as 

well as confusion in th e command struct ure, may well have causcd the delay in 

re sponding to the 9th Armored Division's urge nt request for information on 

" Flak Alley," a belt of German antiaircraft balt eries that was wreaking havoc 

on American tanks on the approach to LeipzigY 

During the last 1110nths of the war, the Fi rst Army headquarte rs took somc 

long ove rdue steps to improve access to timely tactical information from the 

front. Thanks to Bradley's great inte rest in the British PIIANT01\."1 system, th e 

12th Army Grou p headq uarters had obtained the services of a PIIA NTOM detachme nt during its earli est days on the Cont inent. The First Army headquarte rs 

received PII ANTOM data through a detachmen t that was stationcd at its command post. This unit rece ived reports frOI11 its counterpart at the 12th Army 

Group headquarters and, via the Ninth Army's det achment, from the regimenta l headquarters at the 2 1 Army Group coml1HlIld post. Still, the time necessa ry 

ror these repo rts to follow suc h a le ngthy path minimi zed PHANTOM'S valuc for 

thc Fi rst Army, except where it cou ld intercept rcports of patrols in the field, 

and the attempts of Akers, the G- 3 operations officer, to establish direct contact with the 2 1 Army Group headquarters mad e little hcadwuy.54 Meanwhil e, 

ETOUSA, with the War Department's bl essin g, orga ni zed and trained Signal 

Information and Monitorin g (SIAM) companies to pe rform PHANTOM-like mis-
"Firsl To Reach Ihe Rhine . .. Firsl To Meellhe Russians" 263 

sions for Ame rican rie ld armies, as we ll as monitor rad io networks for security. 

(Chal'l 9) The 3323d SIAM Company, whic h joined the First Army headquar· 

ters at MlIrburg in ea rly April, attached its liaison platoons down to corps and 

divisions, where, in addit ion to thei r prima ry a rmy missions, each would re· 

ceive lasks from its host echelon's signal officer, under the supervision oflhat 

eche lon's G_3.5S 

As was perhaps to be ex pected, the 3323d ran into problems 100 nume rous 

and fundamenta l to work out in Ihe few wee ks left be fore V- E Day. The unit 's 

trai ning and equi pment left much to be desired. As 1st LI. John S. D. Eisenhower, 

the ge nera l's son and an officer in the 3323d, remembered, division and corps 

G- 3s were less than enthra lled over receiving S IAM perso nn el, whom they 

suspected of be ing the spies of higher eche lons. This distr ust was allayed to a 

deg ree once they understood that the platoons were under strict orde rs to send 

no messages without the approva l of the subordina te echelon's G- 3 or a membe r of that section, but the platoons still were bare ly tol erated by thei r hosts. 

Finally, they lacked the capabilities to perform properly both the tactical informa tion and signal monitoring missions. Too many officers believed they could 

ha ndl e both funct ions si mply by monitoring frequencies, but dat a from this 

sou rce often proved un re liable and incomplete. Faced with a choice be tween 

the two missions, the corps and div ision signal officers, lack ing any ge nu ine 

in te rest in the PHANTOl'." concept, tended to concentrate on th e security mission, 

and SIAM eommande rs,also signa l officers, did li ttle to diss uade them. In any 

case, the war ended too early for a rea l test of the conccpt.S<> 

Despite an un precedented dema nd for food and gasoli ne, the First Army 

main tained sufficient stocks of supp lies for most of April. By the time of the 

Rhi ne crossings, the First Army had accumulated more gasoline in its dumps 

tha n eve r be fore, and the fina l drive never had to fa lt er fo r lack of fue l even 

when issues reached the Icve l of onc mill ion ga ll ons in a day. Unti l late Ap ril 

the First Army also had plenty of all types of rat ions for its troops, although thc 

quarte rmaste r. McNama ra, complained to the G-4 section. and later to the inspec tor general, that too ma ny d ivisions were overrequisitioning rat ions. Toward the end of April reported ration stocks fell to sllch a low leve l tha t the 

12th Army GrollI' headquarters deemed the situation critica l, but no Ame rican 

units suffered from lack of ra tio ns. Except for shortages of engines, salvaged 

jerri eans, and some spa re pa rts, such as tank bogie wheels and treads, Ihe First 

Army logistic ians also managed to keep up with the demand for Class II and 

IV supplies. Although reduction of the Ruhr Pocket requircd fai rly high expendit ures of arti ll ery ammun ition, mobil e warfa re elsewhere pl aced few demands 

on the First Army's ammu nition stocks. Lack o f ammunition was no longer a 

problem, and the 12th Army Group headquarters suspended al loca tions as of I 

April. After past shortages, howeve r, the armies were always eager to get more 

ammun ition, wha tever the real stat us of their supplyY 

The few problems of supply could be blamed not so much on actual stocks 

as on the hectic depot situiltion and the perenn ial lack of transport. Given the 

nuid na ture of mobile warfare, the supply sections often found it difficult to 

position installat ions where they would be usefu l. When the main army axis 
CiI,\ RT 9- FIR ST AR MY SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AND M ONITORING (S IAM) R,\ DIO N ET 

xxx 

xx 

Army SIAM 

Nell 

Army SIAM 

Net 2 

Army SIAM 

Net 3 

xxxx O xxxx Oxxxx 

SCR 1885 

xx 

SCR 1935 

Mobile rndio stations 

Army and division SIAM 

Nets 2 and 3 arc the 

S:II11 e as Nets I. 

Div SIAM 

Net I 

Div SIAM 

Net 2 

Div SIAM 

Net 3 

I. The army SIAM platoon station will be the Net Control Station (NCS) in each of the 

army SIAM nets. 

2. The se nior stati on ill each of th e di visioll SIAM nets will be the NCS, 

3. Code signs and frequenc ies fOf the above nets will be furnished by the Army signal 

offi cer in extract form for periods of one wee k. In the inte rest o f security these code 

signs and frequencies wil l not appear in th e Army Signal Ope rati on Instructions. 

4. The solid lincs within the diagram show only th e difTere nt stati ons invol ved in the 

radio net. They are not mcant 10 de pict exc lu sive communi cat ions c hanne ls between 

th e vari ous headquat'te rs. Tra nsmissio ns between headquarters within the net arc 

monitored by othe r headquarte rs within the ne!. 

SOI/fce: Cir. Col S. E. Senior, Asst Adj Oen, Firsl AfIll Y, to COs of Corps and Divisions; 

CO, 3223 d SIAM Co: 0 - 2, Fi rst Army; a nd 0 - 3, First Army. 13 Apr 45. sub: Sig nullnfofm31 ion 

and Mon ito ri ng Directive. Opera tions rlans, 1945, box 3, U.S. Army, l-IQ, Fir~1 U.S. Ar my, Asst 

Chief o f Sta ff, 0 - 3, OpCfutio ns I'hIllS, RO 338. WN RC, 
"Pirst To Reach the Rhil/e . .. Pirst To Meet the RlIssiaw;" 265 

shifted to the north, the ordnance sec tion changed the status of its ammun ition 

depot at Marburg to an ammunition supply point and redesigna ted as a depot 

the supp ly point at Warburg, fift y miles to the north, on ly to have the axis shift 

back to the south. Such a rapidl y changing sit uation a lso led to misunderstandings. Alone point, McNamara moved the rations depot to the west bank of the 

Rhin e at Andernach, twel ve mil es upstream from Remagcn, on the assurance 

that a ponton bridgc wou ld be laid ac ross th e river there, only to fi nd that the 

ne'1l'c st ponton bridge lay wcllto the north.s8 

Whi le moving its depots constantly, the First Army support serv ices were 

sllstaini ng four corps on a front that by 5 May stretched 247 mil es from the Ruhr 

to the Elbe. Although the First Army had received additional service units from 

the 12th Anny Group and could cal i on c ivilian labor and cvcn prisoners, such a 

fron t was far too broad fo r the manpower ava ilable. Despite the best efforts of the 

enginee rs, the First Army began its breakout in late March with a main army 

service area , ncar Euskirchen, that had no intact rail connections to th e cast. 

With help from ADSEC trucks, the supply chi efs shi ft ed th eir depots across the 

Rhine to the Marburg area in early April, but within a few days, the rapid adva nce compelled a further move to Warburg and, later in the month, to the GiesscnKasse l area. The rations depot moved to Andernach and later Hersfeld, the fue l 

decanting poi nt across the Rhin e to Gicssen, and th e ammunition depot to 

Marburg, Warburg, and back to Marburg, with a faci lity at Rheinbach to support 

the two corps in the Ruhr. West of the Rhine, the First Army progressive ly turned 

over sectors of its former area to LI. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow's new Fiftee nth 

Army, which assumed occupation duties for other armies as they ad va nced. ~9 

As in August lack of transport presented the major probl em. Even with the 

First Army's tempora ry bridges, the Rhine remai ned a formidable barri e r. Once 

the Ludendorn' Bridge collapsed into the river, it would tak e almost another 

month for COMZ to construc t rai lroad bridges north of th e Ruhr at Wesel and 

well to the south at Mainz in the Third Army zone. In the inte rim, through the 

ingenuity of some of its quartermaste rs and engineers, the First Army installed 

a pipeline across the Rhine, seven miles northwest of Remagen, on an infantry 

footbridge, enabling trllcks and, lat er, rai l tank cars to pump the ir cargoes across 

the Rhin e to storage tanks.t.O East ofthc Rhine , motor transport still carried the 

bulk of the load. Once aga in, suppl y officers fa ced th e daunting probl ems ofa 

poor roadnet, wo rn -out ve hicl es, and vast distances, but, with the drop in the 

usc of artill ery, they could ca ll on ant iairc raft and artillery trucks, replacement 

vehi cles on their way to the front, 100 new tru cks from COMZ, and 20 ten-ton 

truck companies from ADSEC.(}l Thanks to the high priority that SI-IAEF had 

pla ced on air supply, they co uld re ly on airlift much more than eve r before. 

Divisions and corps reported to the First Army staff the locations of ove rr un 

airfields, wh ich were examined by th e IX Engineer Command. Once the engineers declared the fi elds ready, the First Army G- 4 section took bids from the 

suppl y ch iefs, set priorities, and co ntacted the Combined AirTransport Opera -

tions Room. During April planes de livered 15,000 tons of suppli es, mostl y gasoline lmd rations, directly to the front. In some cases, un its bli the ly asked for 

delivery miles beyond their positions since the enemy opposit ion was so weak.

61 
266 

Aircraft also proved to be a godsend for medical evacuation given the 

absence of railroads cast oCthe Rhine 

and scarcity of 111otor transport, including ambulances. After adopting 

a liberal evacuatio n policy during the 

Ge rman Ardennes counteroffensive, 

the First Army headquarters, faccd 

wi th a lack of replacements, tried to 

keep mo re of its short-term patients 

through a policy of retaining all patients requiring tcn days or less of 

treatment as long as the fighti ng contin ued. For those soldiers who had \0 

be evacuated from the army area, 

Rogers, the army surgeon, relied 

heavily on air transportation. Small 

liaison planes and even gliders helped 

ambulances convey patien ts to airfields, where hol ding units processed 

the evacuees for shipment by C--47 

back to COMZ, Great Britain , and, 

A COIIIII/alld Post (j/ War 

C%llel GIIIIII 

in somc cases, the Un ited States. Rogers' medical section coordinated evacuation with the G--4 section, which arranged with th c IX Troop Carrier Command 

staff for the use of planes. In the end, the aircraft g reatly a ll evi ated the evacuation problem, carrying 14,000 pati ents from ni ne fields during April. 

Yet air evacuation was not a panacea. The problem in an increasingly fastpaced campaign, as in the pursuit across France, lay in the lack of mobility of 

the evacuation hospital, which, employing its own vehicles, could not even 

move itself in two stages. Once again, the First Army use of field hosp itals as 

evacuation hospitals alleviated the problem. Ofcollrse, lower losses due to the 

transition to pursui t warfare greatly cased matters.b) 

While the First Army's medica l section grappled wi th problems ofevacllation, the G- 5 sec tion laid the groundwork for the military government of a 

de feated nation. In one form or another, the First Army headquarters had been 

planning for the occupation since its activation. Originally code-named RAN KI N 

and later T AUSMAN, the Allies' ECUPSE pl an for military gove rnment concentrated more than its predecessors on the increasing likelihood ofa long, drawnoul end ing without a formal surrender, rather than a qui ck collapse. The 

overall design included a "ca rpet plan" for the deployment of military government units as Allied forces overran GernHlllY and a "static plan" for realigning 

these detachments acco rdi ng to the occupation zones.t>I At that time, th e 6th 

Army Grou p, and proba bly the 12th Army Group, would dissolve. The American zo ne would then reorganize into mi litary districts, eac h under an army headq uarters that would establish control over its area, complete disarmament of 

enemy forces, guard captured materiel , arrange repatriation of All ied prisoners 
"FirSI To Reach Ihe Rhine . .. Firs' To Meellhe Russialls" 267 

and displaced persons, and initiate military government. One problem with th is 

approach lay in th e transition from tactica l boundaries to areas based on the old 

German regiona l borders.

6S The First Army also needed more manpower to carry 

out its plans. Hodges and Kea n shifted personne l from the , supply, and 

adjutant ge neral sec tions to th e 5 section, whi ch through its military 

government center drew on replacement depots to form fift y provisional deta chments. Still short, the First Army eve n used spare fi e ld artillery units for 

military govcrnment.6(', 

Even with the extensive planning and additional detachments, the 5 section fa ced an enormous task as the First Army advanced into Germany. Fortunately, the army arca cast of the Rhin e, mainly agri cultural except for the Ruhr 

and the Le ipzig region, could produce its own food with he lp from outside 

labor, and most ind ustries, banks, roads, and utiliti es could resume operations 

fairly qui ck ly. Even in the desolate Rhineland, thc First Army found enough 

food to support the remaini ng population. With the inl1ux of displ aced pcrsons, however, food became enough of a problem that the 5 section turn ed 

to McNamara for supplies. A typhus epidemi c in Cologne hi gh li gh ted th e limited medi cal asse ts ofGunn's G- 5 section, and under S I-I AEF orde rs, Rogers 

ass umed re sponsibilit y for publi c hea lth in the army area. 67 

No r was this the end of the section's troubles. As early as mid-March, a 

SHAEF G- 5 survey found that its theory of military govc rnment, based on 

tact ica l command responsibility rath er than sc parat e military governmcnt , was 

brea king down. The field armies cou ld not gove rn such large areas within their 

arbitrary unit bounda ries. Despite the efforts to form provisional un its, the advance spread the ca rpet of dct'lchments too thin, especia lly as it conti nued into 

the future Soviet zone.

68 

Then there was the probl em or denazification. Even in April 1945 it was 

cl ea r that ex isting Alli ed policy, ca lling for a conqueror's peace and e limination of Nazism, would be hard to carry out, especially as it fa ced the shortage 

of qualified non-Naz i offic ials, th e military need to maintain order in rcar 

areas, and th e lack of comprehension of the non frate rni zation policy amon g 

G is who int erac ted dail y with the populace. As events turned out, the First 

Army headqua rte rs would not have mu ch time to tackle these problc llls before 

it departed ETOUSA in lllid_May.69 

The rapid pace, vast spaces, and lack o f manpowe r threatened to overwhelm 

personnel charged to oversec capturcd materiel. S I-I AEF had intcnded that 

COMZ handl e the bulk of these stocks, but, si nce COMZ was not supposed to 

ha ve an area in Ge rmany, the armi es received th e mission by defa ult. On 20 

March the First Army headquarters ca ll ed on its corps and divisions for information on the locations, general nature, and security of enemy supply dumps in 

their areas. To ai d corps with the enormous quantities of enemy materie l failin g into their hands, it expanded its subsections for ca ptured materi el and arranged for Be lgian troops, surplus artill ery battalions, and infantry regiments 

not needed on thc front line to augment gua rd details of the serv ices and the 

Security COlllmand.

70 The First Army co uld also ca ll on "T Forces"- specia l 

in te lligence teams from ETOUSA's techn ica l services and special groups- to 
268 A COII/malld O~' lIf War 

sea rch for materia ls used for rockets and Germany's nuc lctlr program, alt hough 

these teams, with th eir se parate chai n of command back to ETOUSA, could be 

an irritant. 11 Despite these steps, th e numbe r of overrun depots soon grew be· 

yond even the First Army's resou rces. During April its subordinat e commands 

reponed 1,246 enemy inslallations, and army lea rn s could only tou r these 

faci lities o n a prio rity basis.72 

Like other observers, the Fi rst Army headquart ers was stunned when it overran th e concentration camps. At Nordhausc n, Buchenwald, and olher siles, Ihe 

First Army staffpersonllc] saw firsthand the decaying co rpses, pestil enti a l conditions, and other features of what Di ckson te rmed the "shockin g depravity" of 

the concentration camps. The G- 5 personne l from the First Army and lower 

eche lons tried to all eviat e the misery. locati ng or bring in g up suppl ies, work -

ing wi th medics to treat the sick, and compe lling German c ivili ans to clean the 

compounds and bury the dead.71 

Compounds for All ied priso ners o f war were characterized by only Slightly 

bette r conditions. Nca r Limburg, th e First Army found a camp of ove r 3,000 

prisoners, mostl y Ru ssian, suffering from poo r sanitation, disease, and ma lnourishment. The First Army headquart ers had esta blished procedures callin g 

on di visions to notify the ir corps and a rmy headqua rte rs as soon as possibl e on 

th e location and size of overrun prisoner camps. The corps headqua rt ers would 

then dispatch a team prov ided by S HAEF to coo rd inate administration of the 

camps and supervise evacuation accordin g to procedures la id out by the First 

Army headquarte rs. In pmctice, the task provcd far too la rge for these sma ll 

teams to handl e, and the First Army headquarte rs had to di vert spa re combat 

units to help. In the case of prisone r compounds as we ll as concentration camps, 

the undermanned inspector ge ne ral sec tion gathe red evidence of atroc iti es, 

sort ed throu gh cac hes o f va luabl es stol en from inmates by th e Nazis, and prepared lists of suspected war c riminals with th e hc lp of an investi gati ve tcam 

from the 12th Army Group. Under an ETOUSA d irecti ve, the j udge ad voca te 

genera l assumed the responsibilit y in mid-April for war crimes vest galio s. ~ 

Amo ng the legac ies that the fa ll en Re ich left to the Fi rst Army, the pl ight 

of displaced pe rsons, or " OPs," was especia lly heart-rend ing. SHAEF di rectives fo r milita ry government orde red fie ld commands to take res ponsibil ity 

for the we lfare of these unfortu nates, most ly impressed labore rs liberated by 

the All ied ad vance but lack ing food or mea ns o f relurn 10 thei r homes. The 

dimcnsions of the DP crisis did not come as a total surprise. In SI-I AEF-sPOllsorcd disClissions of th e ECLIPSE plan on 19 Marc h, it was noted that the care 

un d feed in g of DPs and Alli ed prisoners "may assumc co nsidera ble proportions" and the First Anny staff recommended that eme rgency sliPpli es of food 

and clothing be made ava ilab le from "imported" suppli es fo r the DPs. n The 

planners, however, underest imated the problem. Alt hough the First Army dealt 

to a degree with Drs in the Rhi ne land, cari ng for them al a center near Aachen, 

the dam rea lly broke in the second week of April, when the retreating Germans 

ran ou t of space to move thei r slave labor. Despile All ied "standfasl" orders, 

the Drs wa ndered through the cou ntryside, clogging important routes. The Firsl 

Army coped by cstablishing barriers at the Rhine to restrict traffic , directing 
"FirSI To Re(lch 'he Rhil/e . .. First To Meet/he Rllssi(llls" 269 

corps and di visions to assemble Drs at coll ection points, and installing checkpoints in the army area to round up DPs and send them to the nearest town, or 

a DP camp if one existed nearby. From these assembly points. they moved to 

transit areas for registra tion, sc reen ing. medical exams, and disinfecti on and 

th en proceeded Oil to the main camps.'6 

By May the First Army camps contained 281,000 Drs and refugees. Those 

from Western Europe usuall y wa nted to go home, and th e First Army faci lit<ltcd 

thai as much as possible, using captured trucks, while holding East EUrOpe<lllS 

until repatri ation was arranged. The East Europea ns provided a good source of 

labor. but they drew so heavily on the local resources and captured supplies that 

were supposed to be their only subsistence that McNamara estimated that he 

would not be able to fe ed them after 20 May. The Russians in particular presented a problem, since inter-Allied agreements, stri ctly interpreted, stipulated 

that Russian DPs wou ld receive Ihe same rations as Ameri can Iroops.77 

Along with the DPs, the First Army had to handle the hordes of Gerl1lan 

prisone rs inundating its lines in the war's last weeks. Wri ght 's provosllllarshal 

secti on had anticipated the problem of mass surrenders in th e February edition 

of the staff admi nistra ti ve instructions, but even with advance planning, the 

system was overwhelmed by sheer numbers. During April alone, the First Army 

took ove r 435,000 prisoners into its enclosures, which it stat ioned nex t to the 

army depot 10 enable the employment of ration trucks for evacua tion. By the 

second week of April the nood reached such proportions thai the First Army 

headquarters assigned antiaircraft batta lions and fillers to guard duty and delega ted responsibility for operating overrun German mil itary hospita ls to th e 

Ge rman medica l staff caplured in the Ruhr. It also conve rted some corps cages 

into enclosures where prisone rs could wai t unt il their evacuat ion to ADSEC. 

Rations proved to be a major headache. Under SI-I AEF orde rs, ralion issues to 

prisoners and Drs were supposed to be limit ed to local supplies and captured 

stocks, and SI-I AEF, aware of thc relative ly low Icvel of troop rations toward 

the end of April, kept close wa tch on rations issued to prisoners. Thus German 

prisoners often went withou t food for days, causing severe hardship to those 

whose hea lth was already poor. As with so many other problems assoc iated 

with th e chaos ofa defeated Germa ny, the First Army headqua rt ers only began 

to grapp le with the problem of carin g for German prisoners before its ea rl y 

departure from the theater. 78 

Whil e seve ral First Army sections struggled with th e problem of carin g for 

prisoners, the publi city and psychological warfare sec tion had recovered from 

a bombing raid that kill ed its chief and a few reportcrs and guests during th c 

Battle o f the Bulge. Aided by an information control office r from the 12th 

Army Group staff, psychological warfa re personnel sought, with mi xed success, to help the denazifi cation program and fill th e void o finforlll<ltion in the 

First Army rear by issu in g news papers in Aachen, Cologne. and other newly 

occupied areas; distributing posters: and using loudspeakers to announce occupation poli cies. 19 While busy with psychologica l warfa re. th e section, during 

the drive to the Mulde-Elbe, divided media acti viti es into a forward grou p with 

one o f the eorps and a rear conti ngc nt with the army command cchelon. 
270 A COII/llland Post (f( War 

Almost all reporters traveled with the corps, sending their copy by plane to the 

comma nd eche lon, from which the section forwarded il by teletype to London. 

The First Army press section di d suffer an embarrassment when afmy censors 

blocked mention of the locat ion of units at Rcmagen, only to see its Ninth 

Army counterpart release the story and penali ze the First Army's press corps. 

The episode must have been especially morti fying to the Fi rst Army stafr, which 

had just hosted White House press secretary Stephen Ea rly as part of his efforts to find ways oflooscnin g censorship and improving publicity or the Army's 

achievements. Still, the First Army reporters remained loyal e nough that Bradley felt compe ll ed to form his own press camp to counte r what he viewed as a 

parochia l out look of Ihe army-based media.so 

By mid-April speculation in the First Army press corps cenlered on when 

and whcre th e First Army would contact the Soviets. On 21 April, while his Iroops 

mopped up the west bank of the Mulde and Elbe, Hodges contacted the 12th 

Army Grou p headquarters about the procedures for meeting Ihe Soviet Red Army 

and, according to his a ide, received only meek adv ice 10 "treat them nicely."81 

Actually, SHAEF had been working on the problem for some ti me but had made 

lilli e progress with the secretive Soviet high command. On the day after I-lodges 

called the 12th Army Group headquarters, Bradley passed on SI-I AEF's agreement with the Soviets on recogn ition signa ls and a halt by the two forces at the 

point of contact, after which senior local commanders would work oulthe boundaries between their forees. 82 At the First Army command pOSI, the anticipation 

heightened as aircraft reported sigh tings of Soviet troops east of the Elbe, but 

Hodges remained nervous aboul a possibl e acci den tal clash with the Red Army. 

Unknown to Hodges, the Soviets had decided to stop at Ihc Elbe. A Red Army 

request 011 24 April that the First Army withdraw its bridgeheads over the Mulde 

left the intervening area as a no-man's land. In this area the next day, two patrols 

from the 69th Infantry Division contacted Soviet troops. Representatives of the 

two armies set up a meeting on 30 April at a nearby chateau, where Hodges 

presented his Soviet coun terpart with a First Army fl ag and a jeep.~) 

For I-lodges and his staff, the rest of the war could onl y be ant icli mactic. 

Pleased with Hodges' performance, Bradley briefly conside red moving the First 

Army across the Third Army's rear for an offensive so uth east into Czec hoslova kia, cutting off the Alpine redoubt where Illany Allied in tell igence orficers, 

including Dickson, thought thc Nazis wou ld try to make thei r last stand . Inlhe 

end, however, he decidcd that such a transfe r would involve an overly extensive 

redeployment of supply facilities, and he gave the mission to Palloll. He left to 

Hodgcs the task o f ho lding the Mulde-Elbe line and taking over P(I]'t of the 

Third Army's frOllt to the south. On 16 April Hodges and Thorson went to the 

12th Army Group headquarters 10 discllss the major troop movements involved. 

Under the resulting arra ngements, the Third Army would receive the III Corps 

and most of the div isions from the Ruhr, the VIII Corps would return to the 

First Army,lhe XV III Airborne Corps would return to SHAEF reserve, and the 

Fifteenth Army would take over mllch of the First Army's rear area east of the 

Rhine. With the transition from combat 10 occu pation, the new army boundaries followed province lin es.H~ 
"Firs' To Reach 'he Rhille . .. Firs' To Mee' 'he RlIs:" ialls" 271 

SOI,je/-Alllericol/ bal/qlle/llfter meelillg III TO/gall. Gel/emf t/o(fges. just to the left of 

the mirror. sils willi. left to right. Gel/eraf Jortlol'. COlllllltlll(/er oJ Ihe 51h Russiall 

Army; Gel/emf Ket/l/: Gel/eml Backel/ol'. commtlmler oJlhe 341h R,f.\·sitll/ C0I1JS; 

II Russial/ sla./JofJicer; (Illd Gellem/Harl. 30Aprilf945. 

For the next two wee ks, th e Fi rst Army hc,Hlqua rtcrs shined units, supervised suppression of remaining resistance , had its subordi nates turn back refu -

gees from the Soviet zone in accord with Alli ed po li cy. and specul ated on its 

next mission. ECLIPSE plans ca ll ed for the headquarters, upon contact with the 

Red Army, to be prepared to withdraw from the prospective Soviet zone and 

then occupy and govcrn Hcsse and two other German provinces ulltil rel ieved 

by other America n armies. The headquarters would then, under this design, 

proeced to France and awai t orders fo r its redeployment. Elsewhere, the war 

moved to a concl usion. As April turn ed to May, the Third Army drove into 

Czechoslovak ia and Austria , while the 6th Army Group advanced in to the Bavaria n Alps, searching for signs of the Na tional Redoubt. To the north, the 

Nin th Army had also completcd olTcnsive operations, whi le Montgomery's 2 1 

Army Group was dri vin g toward the Baltic coast at Lilbeck.

8$ 

At the resort of Bad Wild ungen, ha lfway between Ma rburg and Kassel, and 

then at the university city of Weima r, ninety-six miles cast of Bad Wildungen 

and fiOy miles southwest of Leipzig, the First Army headqua rters reun ited to 

focus on unfi nished business. For Miller's G- I section, these last wecks before 

V- E Day were especia lly busy. With its planning and supe rvision in such arcas 

as war c rimes, dete ntion of enemy civilians. nonfrllterniza tion, and disbandment of enemy forces. the G- I section was involved in many areas not in-
272 A COII/mand Post a/ m'l" 

Colollel Millel; ri ghI, gels the Legion of Merit from General l-/o(lges. 

eluded in the prewar staff manua l, and the li ne between G- l and G- 5 functions 

in these areas was 11 0t always clear. Wit h the la rge number of div ision transfers, 

the G- l section also faced a major challe nge in keeping records in order.86 

Fort unately, th e repl acement crisis that had bedeviled the sec tion during the 

winter and ea rly spring had passed, as converted special ists from COMZ and 

the Army Air Forces, including th irty-three provisional ri ne platoons of black 

enl isted men assigned by ETOUSA to the First Army's divisions, fi ll ed th e 

gaps. Hodges and his staff kept close watch on the performan ce of the black 

platoons and were gratified at the exce ll ent reports from the divisions. Perhaps 

beca use of the rise in available replacements, the G- l section adopted a tougher 

poli cy on battlefield appointments, restrict ing them to combat units, except 

where a noncombat formation had lost officers to mil ita ry govern me nt duties, 

or where an individ ual had clearly shown his capabilities under fireY 

The G- l sec tion also modifi ed its poli cy on office r recl assifi cation. Until 

April the First Army had held to a poli cy that no officer who had shown a lack 

of leadership and effic iency be permitted a less hazardous assignment, but rather 

that he should be return ed to th e United States and dism issed from the service. 

By Ap ril , however, the G- I section co ncluded that too many officers were rc~ 

turn ing to the United States for reasons other than rec lassification, thercby 

reduc ing th e stigma , and it advised that no office r be recommend ed for di ~ 

missal while he could still perform another useful se rvicc. Wit h combat declinin g in frcqucncy, the First Army headquarte rs be li eved that it could adopt th e 

new pol icy without too much harm to lll0ra le. 88 
"Fil'st To Reach the Rhine . . . Fi,.sl To Meellhe Russians" 273 

Nevertheless, morale remai ned a major concern, as the end of the war in 

Europe left severa l combat units with time on thei r ha nds. As the First Army 

swept across Germany in th e final drive, the G- I section noted a sharp increase in black marketee ring, looting, larceny, AWOLs, murder, and rape. To 

cut down on black ma rketeering, the finance section carried out SHAEF policy 

by supervising the coll ection and conve rsion of Belgian and French francs in to 

Allied mi litary marks, the official exchange fo r all Allied troops. Such measures and stricter discipline, however, represented only part of the answer to 

maintaining moral e. The new 12th Army Group awa rds policy, which removed 

limi ts on awards in favor of issuing pe rcentages as a weekly gu ide, met with 

the approval of the G- I miscellaneous subsect ion. As combat decreased, the 

demand from units for movies and li ve shows in creased, and the spec ial se rvice 

section a lso continued its program of rest centers and furloughs, subst itu ting 

Belgian shows for the all too infreq uen t USO performances. It also instit uted 

train service for troops with 72-hour passes to Paris. " Jeep shows," three-toeight-manll1obile teams ofcntertainers who visited the front lines, had provcd 

popu la r since their introduction in nuar y.8~ 

In March the First Army 1110rale officers began real planning for post-V- E 

Day activiti es. The new First Army ath letic offi cer deve loped a design for an 

athletics school and program, but those plans became obsolete with the First 

Army's rapid departure from the theate r. To he lp dea l wit h the non fratern ization 

poli cy, the Fi rst Army headquarters even requested that the Red Cross bring 

more women into the army area. As it became obvious that the First Army 

would need an extensive postwar mo rale program, the specia l service section 

finally began to obtain somc of the add itional personllcl that it had needed for 

some time. 90 

The increase in spec ial service personnel was only pa ri of the reorgan ization 

of the First Army staffin the spring of 1945. On 14 March the 12th Army Group 

had directed its armies to reorganize their staffs according to the new table of 

organization issued by the Wa r Departmen t in October 1944 and modified in 

January 1945. The new table authorized 50 more officers, 2 additional wa rrant 

officers, and 100 more enlisted men than the 1942 version. It e liminated the 

anti aircraft section and formed an air-ground coordination center to replace the 

old G- 2 (A ir) and G- 3 (A ir) subsections. Pendi ng authorit y from the War Department to activate a new headquarters battery 10 command the army antiaircraft units, the 12th Army Group permitted the armies to retain tempora rily the ir 

antiaircraft sections, and it also authorized additional spaces for c ivil affairs, wa r 

crimes investigati ons, and th e photo in terpretation section. By this means, th e 

First Army headquarters managed to retain its antiaircraft section to the end of 

the wa r. The changes left army headquarters in the 12th Army Group with an 

authorized strengt h of330 officers, 28 warran t officers, and 712 en listed men, 

inCluding the authorized augmentat ions, as the war came to a close. Even with 

the new tables, noted a postwar study, army headquarters in Europe always seemed 

to req uire more people, due to their multiple eche lons and "the volume and variety of duties performed during combat and occupa tional operations ... [being] 

greater than had been anticipated initial ly."?! 
274 A COII/II/and Post (I( Win 

As April came to a close, the un certainl y over the next mission for the First 

Army headq uarters finally lifted. On 26 April l-1 odgcs lea rn ed thaI General of 

the Army Douglas MacArth ur had accepted Marshall's ofTer of the First Army 

headqua rt ers for the invasion of Japan. Exhilarated over the First Army's spring 

triulll phs and the linkup with the Soviets the day before, ]'lodges was pleased 

with the idea of goi ng to the Pac ific. His staff, when they heard Ihe news a few 

days lat er, was more ambivalent. While many officers wcre proud of the chance 

to partic ipate in the closing act in both theaters, most were ex hausted after 

el even months of nearly co nstant campai gn ing. Enthusiasm rose, however, when 

I-lodges obt ained a promise of leave in the United Sta tes prior to the staff's 

departure for the PaciCic.n On 3 May thc First Army headquartcrs canccled a ll 

furloughs, and, ancr receiving offic ial orders the following day, the staff began 

to prepare for redep loyment. Under the 12th Army Group headquarte rs' orders, 

the V Corps joined the Third Army's drive into Czechoslovak ia, while most of 

the rest of the Fi rst Army went to the Nin th Army, which a lso inherited the 

problem of ca ring for the prisoners and DPs. Meanwhile, staff chi efs labored 

to pe rsuade kcy personne l with eno ugh overseas time for a disc harge to st ay 

with the First Army staff for one more campaign. On 7 May, eight days before 

the schedu led departure for the United St ates, 1·lodges received a pre~dawn call 

from Bradley, informing him of Germany's surrender. 93 

Hodges and his staff would remember with pride their final offensive, in 

which they were the " first to reach the Rhin e Ri ver and cross it [and] the first 

to meet the Ru ssia ns."').! They liked to thi nk the campa ign showed they could 

handle mobil e warfare as wel l as the more publicized Third Army, and they had 

some reason fo r this view, although the lack of rea l opposit ion after late March 

made the issue somewhat academic. Aided by the maturity of the theater logistical structure, th e suppl y sect ions ha ndl ed the c ru cia l transportation problem 

with sk ill, improvising a pipeline across the Rhine and mak ing maximum use 

of supp ly by air. On the whole, the co nduct by the Fi rst Army headquarters of 

GRENADE and L UMBERJACK was masterly, and its met hod of river crossings, particularl y the techn ique of crossing one corps over another's bridges, most effec ti ve in outnank ing opposition. Yet the First Army headquarters' ma stery of 

mobil e warra re fell short in some areas, mainly due to the limitations of technology. The tactical ec helon could maintain only a tenuous control through 

radio, and Hodges and Kean were slow to take measures to improve lia ison and 

coml1l uni cat ions. Despite the best efforts o f the suppl y secti ons, the First Army 

was running low o f certa in stocks by the end of April. The commander and 

staff had reacted quickly when fortune knocked at Remagen, but the ad hoc, 

inadequately coordi nated response of a split First Army headquarters tha t had 

not planned sufficient ly for such a windfall was mostly responsib le for the 

chaos that cost Millikin his command. Despite the Fi rst Army headqua rt ers' 

many abilities and insistence that it could crack the whi p just as effectively as 

Patton, Hodges and his staff clea rl y felt more comfortable with methodically 

prepared and controll ed offensives than th e fast-moving, largely instinctive 

nature of mobilc warfare. 
Notes 

'The strllcoflhe officers mess is described in MS. Career. eMICr'S W:.r. eh. 12. p. 27, and 

sec also eh. 13. p. I. SylV311 Diary. 18 Jan 45; RPIS, First U.S. Army, Report of Opera lions. I 

August 1944- 22 February 1945.2:27 28.3:181, and U.S. Army. First U.s. ArIllY. Repon of 

Operations, 23 Fchruary- 8 Ml1Y 1945,3 I'ols .. 2:24, CMI-I Library ; "A It , First U.s. Army, for 

Jnnu;\ry 1945: MS, Dickson, Algiers 10 lhe Elbc. p. 198. 

l I3rlldlcy. A Soldier~' S/IJIY, PI). 495- 96; Cir. LQI. 121h Army Group. 24 Jan 45. in RPI, 

U.S. Army. 121h Army Group. Report ofOpcfations, 5: 115- 17: RIH, U.S. Army, ETO, General 

Board. Strutcgr orlhe Campaign in Western Europe, [944- 1945, Study I, pp. 73- 76. eMI-1 

Library: MacDona ld, rtle Lasl Offellsil'e, p. 56: I'ogue, The Supreme Command, p. 4 17. 

J Sylvan Diary. 19.22 Jan 45: AAR. First U.S. Army, for January 1945; Cir. First Army G2 EstimlllC 64, 21 Jail 45. All G- 2 Estimates cited in this study are in 101 - 2. 15, G- 2 Estimates, 

box 1956, WWII Dps Rcports, RG 407, WNRC. Bennell. ULTRA ill Ihe lI't!sl. pp. 222- 23: 

MacDonald. The Losl Offellsire. PI'. 60. 63. 

• Cir. LOI. First Army. 25 Jan 45 with amcndmcnt. 300.6 Letters of Instructions. box 62. 

First Arllly, Adj Gcn Section, General Correspondence, 1940- 1947. ItG 338, WN RC: Sylvan 

lJillry. 22. 24- 27 Jan 45, USAM HI : Olumenson, cd .. The 1'1111011 !>ap(!/'s, 2:628- 29; Mac Donald, 

The La.,·1 Offell.l"iI'e. pp. 60- 62; Rpt. V Corps Operations in the ETO. p. 370: Cir, First U.s. 

Army Order of I3ntlle. Combat Units, 27 Jall\mry 1945, 101 - 3.1 4 Order of Battle, Sept 44- Feb 

45, WW[ I Ops Reports, ItG 407, WNRC. 

j Sylvan Diary. 28- 31 Jan. I 2 Feb 45; Clay Olair. Hidg\l"{/Y~' Pli/"{/iroopers: The 

Alllt'rican Airborne ill Worlt/ II'{"' I/ (Garden City. N.Y.: DoubJcdllY. 1985). p. 428: AARs. 

First U.S. Army. for January 1945. and First U.S. Army Quartermaster. for January 1945; 

Rpts. SUI)ply Reports. Rhi ne Crossing. First Army. pp. 33- 35: Interv. author with Wendt. 

29 Apr 91. p. 74: Cir. First Army G- 2 Estimate 65. 29 Jan 45: Rpt , V Corps Operations in 

the ETO. p. 372. 

• Sylvan Diary. I Feb 45. 

1 Sylvan Diary, 1- 2 Feb 45: lI ansen Diary. 16 Feb 45; Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimate 66. 2 

Feb 45; Rpl. Rosengarten to Taylor. 21 May 45. sub: Report on ULTRA Intell igence at First U.S. 

A rmy; Memo. Hodges for First Army Chiefs of Sections. 31 Jnn 45, AG 381 ['reparations and 

I'repnredncss for War, box 182. First A nny, Adj Gcn Secl ion. Gener;!1 Correspondence, 1940-

1947. ItG 338, WNRC: (31(11r. Ridgway:,· I~(//"(/Iroopel·s. p. 429: I3lumcnson. cd .• Tlte Palloll 

1~(lIJ(J,.S. 2:633. 

• Sylvan Diary. 2 Feb 45 ; Brudlcy, II So/(Ii('1":~ SIOIT. p. 499; MacDon:l ld. The LlI.~1 Off(,lIsit'c. 

pp. 67- 68: Dnvid Eisenhower, £isellhOll"el"tl/ mil: 194J /94j (New York: Random [·[ouse. 1986), 

p.668. 

4 Sylvan Diary. 2- 5 Feb 45; Cir, 1.01 IS, 12th Army Group. 7 Feb 45. in Rpl , U.S. Army. 

12th Army Group. Report of Opera lions. 5: 119- 21: Rpts. Supply Reporls. Rhine Crossings. 

First Army. p. 35: MncDona ld. The LllSI Offl'l/Sil·e. pp. 136- 37. 

10 ['ogue, The Supreme COli/lilli/ill. p. 420; [nterv, Pogue with I lodges. I APT 52; Cir, LOI. 

First Army. 4 Feb45. 300.6 Letters of Instruct ions, box 62. First Army. Adj Gen Section. General 

Correspondence, 1940- 1947, RG 338. WNRC; MacD0I1l1ld. The L/I.~I Offell~·il·e. pp. 71- 75; 

Weigley. /1,·isellllOwe,. :,. LieulemllllS. pp. 600- 60 1. Sec also R. W. Thompson. Tile /Jallie jiJI' IIIe 

Rllillelllllli (London: Hutchinson. 1958). pp . 7- 9. 29- 30. 39, 89. 148. 

1/ Syillan Diary, 4- 9 Feb45; Rpt. V Corps Opcrntions in the ETO, PI). 374- 80: MacDonnld, 

The /.(1.1'1 Offens;l·e. pp. 78. 80- 81: Weigley. £i.,·ellhOll'el':v LiCIiI/JlltWIS. pp. 601 - 03; Blair. 

RitlgwlIYs r'tII·lI/roopers. p. 431. 

I l Sylvan Diary. 10- 23 Feb 45; Cirs. First Army 0 - 2 Estimate 67.10 Feb 45. and Estimate 

68. 16 Feb 45; Bennett, ULTR,I ;lIlhe IIb/, pp. 236- 37: Cir, Akers 10 Corps Commanders. 10 

Feb 45, in 101- 3.3 G- 3 Journal file. G 3 151 Army. Feb 45. WWII Ops Reports, RG 407. 

WNRC: Memos. Carter for Kean. 15 Feb 45. and Carter for Kean . 22 Feb 45. both ill 101 - 3.3 

0 - 3 Journal. First Army, 12- 23 Feb 45. WWII Ops Reporls. RG 407. WNRC; MS , Carter, 

Carter's War. ch. 13. pp. 3- 5; Ingersoll. TOIISeerel. p. 308; Hansen Diary. 11 - 13, 16- 17.23 Feb 
276 A Comlllalld Pos/ (1/ 1Vt'lr 

45; Br'ldlcy. II Soldiers Story, pp. 501 - 04: MacDonald. The L(/~ I ffel/si\'( , p. 143; Weigley, 

Eisenhower S Uelliellalll~', p. 605. 

I) Sylvan Diary. 12- 13, 17.20- 22 Feb 45; Memo, Col John G. Hill. 0 - 3, V Corps, for 

Thorson, 7 Feb 45, First Army Mise Plans, 1944- 1945- Y Corps, box 3, U.S. Army. I-IQ, First 

U.S. Army, Assl Chief of Starr, 0 - 3. Operations Plans. RG 338, WNRC; RI)!. First U.S. Army, 

Report of Operations. I August 1944- 22 February 1945. 3:85; Uf. J<lcks \0 author, 1 J Dec 96. 

DWH; Cir, LO ], First Army, J 1 Feb 45, 300.6 Lcucrs of Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj 

Gen Section, Gcncnll Correspondence, 1940- 1947, RG 338. WNRC; Ninth Army. Conquer, p. 

146; M(lc Oonald. The LlIsl OffCIlSil'c, pp. 97. 185; Eisenhower, Eisel/hower (If lIilr, Ill'. 673- 74, 

6S9; Blair. RidgH'{/)'~' Pam/IYJopers. p. 436; Rpt. V Corps Openltions in the ETO, pp. 385- 8S . 

.. Rpt. First US. Army, Report of Operations, 23 Fcbruary- 8 May 1945, 1:5,2: 106; Cirs, 

LO I, First Army, 4 Feb 45,300,6 Lc!lers of Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj Gen Section, 

General Correspondence, 1940- 1947. RG 338. WNRC, and LO!. First Army. II Feb 45; Hart, 

"Artillery WiTh an American Army in Europc," p. 26; Rpt , Field Artillery and Tank Destroyer 

Operations Summary. 28 Fcb45, 2 Ammunition 1st Army G- 3 Section March- Apri11945, box 

I, U.S. Army HQ, First U,S. Army, Asst Chiefo fStafT, G- 3. Reports and Messages. Ammunition 

#2 through Correspondence, RG 33S. WNRC; MacDonald, TI/C Lasl OjJellsil'e, PI). 185- 86; 

Rpl. First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 AugUST 1944- 22 FebnHlry 1945,3:26. 

1) AARs. First U.S. Army, fo r JnnuMY nnd February 1945 , 101 - 0. 3 Arter Action Reports, 

boxcs 1823- 1824, WWIl Ops Rel)orts, RG 407, WNRC, and First U.S. Army Quartermaster, 

for Janu,lry and February 1945. RPI S, Supply Rcports, Rhine Crossing, First Army, I'])' 35- 39; 

First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 1 August 1944- 22 February 1945, 1:163, 2: 129, 132, 

4:66- 70 ; nnd First U.S . Army, Report of Operations. 23 February- S May 1945. 1:6. 3:39- 40. 

McNamara , Quarterll/(tster Actil,;tie.\·. pp. 157- 59; MacDonald. Th e Las/ OjJel/sil'e, p. 186. 

16 The "ABC Haul" truck network is mentioned in Ruppcnthal , Logistical Support of Ihe 

A/'IlIie~ . Volllille II. p. 141. The "Toot Sweet" rail ex press is mentioned in Ibid., p. 352. 

11 Sylvan Diary, 29 Jnn 45; AA R, Firs! US. Army, for January 1945; Ingerso ll. Top SetTeI. 

jJ. 289; Mayo. 011 Beachhead alld Halllefrolll, jJp. 339- 41 ; Ross ~nd Romanus. OperOliolls ill 

the War Agaillsi Germal/)" pp. 392- 93 , 430- 33. 

I I Rpt, First Army, CO D. 18 Nov 46, pp . 308- 09; MS. Carter, Employme nT and Staff 

Procedures, pp. SO, 80; Beck et nl.. Th e H'w' AgaillSI Gel'llwlIY. I>P. 489, 504, 506, 535; Rpt , U.S. 

Army. 12th Army GroUI), Report of Operations, 12:27.30; Mcmos, Bridge 1'11111 for Rhine River 

Crossing in Vicinity of Kohl, and Lt Co l John T. O'Ne ill, Comdr, II 10lh Engr Combat Gp, for 

C~rtcr, 20 Sep 44, both in Folder I Rhine Rive rCrossings, box 20, First Army Enginecr. l'lnnning 

files, RG 338. WN RC: Interl'. Bevan wilh Hewill. I Oct 81 . pp. ISO. 208; Morison. The 11II,(ISioll 

of fhlllce alltl Germall)', 1). 317. 

19 Kleber and Birdse ll. Chel/li~'als ill COlllb(l/, pp. 74, 360. 

:i.I Rpt. First Army, CO D, 18 Nov 46, p. 309: Memo, Lyman, Signal Ofcr, Third Army. for 

Guest, Ch, Army Communicat ions Service Div. 11 Jan 50, 1950- 1965. I'ersonn l Correspolldcnce, 

G- R. box 21. Hodges Papers, Eisenhower Library; Ruppenthal, Logis/icli/ Support oflheAl'mies. 

VO/lll11e If, PI). 372- 73; MS. Carter, Cn n er's War,eh. 13, I). IS. 

I ' AAR, First U.S. Army, for February [945, Hansen Diary. [0, 16,23 Feb 45: Ingcrsoll , 

Top Secm!. p. 293. Rpts, Firs! U.S. Army. Report of Opera tions, I August 1944- 22 Febru<lfY 

1945, 1:163.2: 129.1 32.4:8- 11. 14; First U.S. Army, Rel)ort of Operations, 23 February- B 

May 1945.2:60, 3:2; and Supply Reports. Rhine Crossing, First Army, pp. 35- 37. MS, Carter. 

Carter's War, eh. 13, pp. 1- 2; Ruppentha[, Logi.~lical Suppo!'t ofl he Arlllies, Volllille If. p. 423; 

Rpt , V COTj)S Operations in the ETO. p. 386. 

12 Sylvan Diary, 23- 28 Feb 45; MS. Carter, Carler's War, eh. 13, pp. 5- 6; Bradley, II Solflier:r 

S/OI)I, PI'. 504- 06; RI)t, First U,S, Army, Report o f Ope Tat ions, 23 February- 8 May [945 , 1:88-

89; M~l Donald, The La.l·t OjJellsil'e. PI'. 137, 191 - 92; Weig[ey. £isellflo\l'e!'~' Liel/iel/(/IIIS, Pl'· 

612,617- 19. 

IJ Memo, 12th Army Group, Outlille Operntion 1'[;111 ,23 Feb 45, Outline Operat ions Plan 

1945, box I. U.S. Army, I-I Q. Firs! U.S. Army, Asst Chie f of StnfT, G- 3. Operations Plans, RG 

338, WNRC; Cirs, LO!. First Army. 28 Feb 45, 300.6 Lellers or Instructions. box 62 , Firs! 

Army. Adj Gen Section, General Correspondence. 1940- 1947, RO 338, WNRC, and LO I 16, 
"First To Reach Ihe Rhil/ e . .. Fi/'Sf To Meel the Russial/s" 277 

12th Army Groull, 3 Mar45. in Rilt. U.S. Army, 12th Army Group. Rellort ofO,)eratiolls. 5: 122-

24; MS. Carler, Carter's War. eh. 1), PI'. 6- 7: Bradley, A Solflier's 5'/01)', pp. 506- 08; Hansen 

Di ary, 27 Feb. 1- 2 M(lr 45; MacDonald. The Lasl OjJellsil'e. pp. 191 - 92. 

!.< Sylvan Diary. 1- 6 Mar 45; MS. CMter. C(lrter's War, eh. 13, pp. 7 8; Bradley. A Soldier 's 

SIOI)'. p. 508; Rpl. Firsl U.S. Army. Rel)Ort of Operations. 23 February- 8 May 1945, 1:24: 

MacDonald The Llisl OjJellsil·e. pp. 194. 196; Rpt. V Corps Operations in Ihe ETO. p. 394: MS. 

Courtney 1-1 . Hodges. Rcmagcn : Thc Bridge ThaI Changed the War. pp . 15- 17. 1949 Remagen: 

The Bridge ThaI Changed the War (Article). box 21, l'lodgcs I'al)ers. Eisenhower Library. 

l! MacDonald, rile LIISI OjJellsil'e, pp. 196.211- 12: MS, U.S. Army, Armored School. 

RcseMeh lind Eva luation Division. The Remagcn Bridgehead. 7- 17 March 1945, pp. 1-3, 6, 

CM II Librnry: Ken Hec hler. The Brit/ge al HCII/agc/I (New York : Ba llantine Books. 1957). pp. 

4. 17- 23: Bradley, A Soldier:r SlOr),. p. 510: Intervs, Murray with Kean, 25 Aug 73, and Madyn 

1'. Burg with John W. Leonard, 15 Mar 72 and 5 Nov 72. p. 79. Eisenhower Library; Sylv3l1 

Dillry,5 Mllr 45; MS. Cllrler. Cllrter'S War. eh. 13, p. 16; Weigley. Eiscn/lOwe,'s Lieuleml//ls. 

pp. 623- 27: Beck et 111.. Tile mil' Ag(l;".~ 1 Ge/'II/(l/I)'. p. 500. 

:. Jill, First Army G- 3 Jnl for 7 Mar 45 . All G- 3 Jou rnal entries ciled in this Ch(lpler lire in 

Journ(l l N29 1945, box I, U.s. Army. First U.S. Army. G-3 D(lily Journals, 2 February- 9 May 

1945, RG 338, WNRC. Sylvlln Diary. 7 Mar 45; MS. Hodges. Remagen. pp. 19- 20: MS. Carter. 

Carter's War, ch. 13, pp, 9- 11; MS, Armore(] School , Renmgen ridgehc(l{~ pp. 7- 8; MlleDonald. 

The l, lISI Offen!)'i!'e, p. 2 19: Heehl er, /J/'idgl~ til Relllllgell. I'. 156: Weigle)" Eisel//I011'c/':~ 

LiellleIUlIIIJ', pp. 626- 28. 

17 Sylvan Diary, 7 Mar 45: MS. I-lodges. Remllgen. pp. 20- 24; Inlerv, author with Wendt, 

29 Apr91, pp. 38- 39: Tc!eeoll. author wilh Col Walter W. Wendt. USA (Rel.), 14 Apr 95, OWl-I; 

[nterys, Murray with Patterson. 23 Aug 73. pp. 9- 10. and wi th Hart. 1973, pp. 61 - 62: MS. 

Armored School. Remagell Bridgehead. p. 8: Bradley. II Soldier s SIOI)'. pp. 510- 12; Weigley, 

/:;;scIIJlOwer s Uelilellllllls, I'p. 628- 29: Rilt. First u.s. Army, Rel>ort of Operations. 23 February8 May 1945, 2:58- 59. 

H Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimate 71. 8 Mar 45: Benne\!. ULTRA ill Ihe 1Il-'.l/. pp. 240-41: 

Rilt. Rosengarten 10 Taylor, 21 May 45. sub: Report on ULTRA Intelligence at First U.s. Army. 

n Sylvan Diary. 8- 9 Mar 45: MS. Carter, Carter's W:u. eh. 13. p. II: MS. Di ckson , Algiers 

to the Elbe, p. 205: MS, Armored Schoo l, Rernagen Bri dgehead. Ilil . 3- 6, 9- 11. 21: MacDonald. 

Tile l.a.I·1 OjJell.l·fI·e, pp. 220, 223, 227; Henry G. I' hillips. Relllllgel/ : Sprillgbollrd 10 l' icIOI}' 

(I'en n Valley, Calif.: Henry G. ['hillips, 1995), p. 78; Telecons, author with Wendt. 14 Apr 95, 

and with Maj Gen William A. Carter, USA (ReL), 17 Apr 95. DWI-I ; LIT, Jacks to llulhor, II Dee 

96: Tclecon. ,nllhor with I3rig Gel! Wi ll iam 13. Kunzig. USA (!te1.), 24 Apr 95. OWl·!. Kum:ig 

headed thc Iroop movements subsection as a liell\enant colonel. 

Jf itl,t. Report of the Rhi ne River Crossings. May 45, 101 - 20.0 OfTiee of the Engincer 

Stllff Section Reports. Report of the Rhine River Crossi ngs. First Army. May 45. box 2002. 

WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WNRC: MS. Carter. Carter's W(lr. ch. 13. p. 1 I: InterY, I3CVllll 

with lIewitl. I Oel 81. p. 207; l3eck el aI., The /1'1'/1' Agl/i/lsl Ge/,lIIflll)'. p. 504. 

JI MS. Carter. Carter's War. eh. 13. PI'. 11 - 12. 

) 1 Rl't, Report of the Rhine Ri ver Crossings. May 45; MS. Carter, Carter's War, ch. 13. Pl'. 

13- 14. 17- 23,26- 28: Memo, Lyman fo r Guest. II Jan 50: [ntery, UevllIl with I-I ewill, I Oct 81. 

pp. 208- 09: RPI, Firsl U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 23 February- 8 May 1945, 1:42,2: 174-

75. 178; MS, Armored School. Remagcn Bridgehead, pp. 11 - 12: MacDonald. Tile I.lIsl OjJel/sil·e. 

p. 227: Beck el aI., The fI'I'lI'i1g(IiIiSI Gerll/al/)', 1)1'. 504- 09, 5 13- 14; Morison, The (m'asiol/ of 

Fmllee /lilt! Ge/,lIIlIIIY. p. 3 19: WeiSley. £isel/hmrer :1' LieIlICII(III/J', p. 631. 

J) IllIerv. Murray with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 33- 35; Rpl. Firsl U.S. Army. Report of 

Operations. 23 February- 8 May 1945. 1:30- 31, 123- 25: MS, Armored SchOOl, Remagen 

Bridgehead.llll. 8.10, 12.21 - 22: MacDonald. rile L(lSI OjJells;l·e. Pl'. 227- 28: Ltr. Jack s to 

author. II Dec 96. 

J,I InterY, Murray with I'allerson. 23 Aug 73, p. 34. 

)j Rl'ts, First U.S. ATluy, RC]>ort ofOl'erations, 23 February 8 May 1945, 1:30- 31. 2: 123-

25. and First Army, COD. 18 Nov 46, I)]l. 266, 269; MS. Armored School. Remagen Bridgehead. 

I'p. 8, 10, 12, 21-22; MS, Carter, Cnrter's War. eh. 13, pp. 23- 24, 31: Beck et al.. The Uhf 
278 II COII/ mond Pas! at H1w 

Against GermallY, pp. 504- 05,509; Rpl, Report of Rhine River Crossings, May 45, p. 28; Memo. 

Lyrn:lIl for Guest, I I Jan 50; Kleber und Birdsell. Chemicals ill Combal, pp. 38l- 82: MacDonald, 

The Lasl O./Jellsil'/!, pp. 227- 29. For more on the security precautions for the bridges :tncr the 

491h Anliuircr;lti Brigade assumed commamt, sec Rpl, Report of the Rhine River Crossings. 

First United States Army, May 45. ML 887, box 24[87, WW II Qps Reports. ML Series, RG 

407. WNRC . 

.II> Hechler, Bridge (If Rell/agclI, p. 16: ['hillil}S. Rellltlgcl!. p. 15; BlllIllcnson. cd. , The Pal/oil 

Papers. 2:637- 38: Sylvan Diary. 15 Mar 45. 

J7 MS, Hodges, Rcmagcn. PI). 14- 15; Inlen's, Burg lVilh Leonard, 15 Mar 72 and 5 Nov 

72, p. 45, and Pogue with [·lodges. 12 Jan 50. 

JI Sylvan Diary, 8- 13 Mar 45; Phi llips, Rel/wgell, pp. 77- 79: Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimate 

71,8 Mar45; InteH'S, Murray with Hart. 1973, pp. 60- 61 , and with Myers. 15Apr 74. pp. 50-

54: Hansen Diary. 9 Mar 45: M;lcDonald. The Last OffeIlSil'e. pp. 223- 27, 229. 

J9 Sylvan Diary, 12, 15- 17 Mar 45; Phillips. Nelllagell , PI). 78- 79; Intcrvs, Burg with 

Leonard. 15 Mar 72 and 5 Nov 72. pp. 80, 82. 85 , 87, and MUfnly with Patterson, 23 Aug 73. Pl'. 

151 - 52: Memo, Comments by MG John Millikin, and Mins, Bradley's comments in Transcript 

of Noles Taken During Panel of OCM I-! 21 P, The Last Offcnsive, 30 June 1967. both in 

Comments, box 219, Background Notes for Charles B. Mac Donald. Tile LtlSl OffellSille. RG 

319. NARA; Rpt, First U.S. Army. Report of Operations, 23 Fcbru;lry- 8 M,lY 1945,2:214: Llr, 

Bradley to CG. ETO. 26 Jun 45, Bnld1cy World War II Correspondence. 1942- 1945. box 5. 

13rildley Papers, USAMHI; MacDonald, The L(ISI Offellsil'e, I)P. 224- 27. 229 . 

.j(I Phi Hips. Ilelllagell, p. 156: MS. Hodges. Remagen, pp. 28- 30. 11ltervs, I'ogue with I·lodges, 

12 Jan SO: Murray with Kean, 25 Aug 73: Poguc with Dickson. 22 Dec 47. p. 2; Murray with 

Dickson, 22 Sep 72, pp. 13- 14: wi lh Hart. 1973. pp. 60- 63; with Patterson, 23 Aug 73, pp. 

lS I- 53; and with Myers. IS Apr 74. pp. 50- 54. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports 

(Garden City, N.V.: Doubleday. 1976), p. 22: Tcleeon, author with Gell William C. Westmoreland, 

USA (Rel.), 5 Jul 95, DWH: MacDonald, The Lasl OffeJlsi!'!!, pp. 223- 27. 229: Weigley, 

£i.w:lI{wH"cr"s Lielllenallls, pp. 630- 32: Bolger, "Zero Defects," r. 72; MS. Armored School, 

Remngen Bridgehead, p. 21; John W. Brawley, AII)'lI"ay. II'/! Wun: 0111 oflhe O::(II"ks (ll/d II/to the 

AI"III)' ill World lIill·/I (Marceline, Mo.: Walsworth PublishinJ;, 1988). p. 273 . 

• , Sylvan Diary, 10- 18 Mar45; Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, 23 Fcbruary8 May 1945, 1:43; MS, Armored School, Remagen Bridgehead, pp. 12- 20; Cir, Artillery Annex 

to LOI. First Army, 15 Mar 45. 300.6 Leiters of In structions, box 62, First Army. Adj Gen 

Section, General Correspondenec. 1940- 1947, RO 338, WNRC: Rpt. V Corps Operations in 

the ETO, pp. 398, 404, 406; MS, C;lrtcr. Carter's War. eh. 13, Pl'. 25- 26. 30, 33- 34 ; Llr, 

Eisenhower to Bmdley, 13 Mar 45, in Chandler, cd., Eisenhower P(/pcr~, 4:2527; Bradley, A 

Soldier :\. StOJJ', pp. 517- 18: MacDonald. The Lasl Offellsil'e, pp. 231 - 34: Ambrose, The Supreme 

CUII/II/allder, r. 620: Eisenhower, Eisenhower (II flill". p. 671. 

~l Sylvan Diary, 19- 24 Mar 45; Cirs, Eisenhower to Devers. Bradley, Brereton, 21 Mar 45, 

and Ei5enhower to Bradley, Montgomery. Del'cr5. 25 Mar 45, both ill Chandler, cd., Eisel/hower 

P{/per.~, 4:2537, 2542; Cir, LOI 18, 12th Artny Grol1p, 25 Mar4 5, in Rpt , U.S. Army, 12th Army 

Group. Report of Operations. 5: 127- 29; Bradley. II Soldier :\. SIOIJ'. PI'. 524- 26: Rpt. First U.S. 

Army, Report ofOpcrations, 23 February- 8 May 1945. I: II, 37, 43: Cir, First Army 0 - 2 Estimatc 

76.22 Mar 45; Benncll, ULTRA illille IIbl, pp. 240- 44: MS, First Army G- 3 Opns (Draft) Mar 

45, p. 80, ML 1017. box 2420 3. WWII Ops Reports, ML Series, RG 407. WNRC: Cir, LO I, 

First Army. 20 Mar 45,300.6 Le\1ers of Instructions, box 62, First Army, Adj Cen Section, 

General Corrcspondence. 1940- 1947. RG 338. WNRC; Rpl. V Corps Opcrations inthe ETa. p. 

408: Coli ins, Lightning Joe. I'p. 309- 11 : WeiJ;lcy, £iscnhmr(w"s Lieli/eMIIIS, pp. 641-42, 67 1-

72: MacDonald, The L(lSI Offcllsil'c, Pl'. 234. 344-45. 

> j Rpl. First U.S. Army. Report of Ope Tat ions. 23 February- 8 May 1945, 1:37,43; Cir, 

LOI, First Army, 20 Mar 45; Rpt, V Corps Operations in the ETa, p. 408 . 

•• Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Opcrations, 23 February- 8 MllY 1945. 2:59- 62. 3:5, 

42- 45, and Supply Reports. Rhine Cro5sing, FUSA, sec. 4, pp. 1- 8: AAR, Pirst u.s. Army, for 

March 1945, 101 - 0.3 After Action Reports. boxes 1823- 1824, WWll Ops Rcports, RG 407, 

WNRC: Inter\'. author with Wendt. 29 Arr 91, p. 74: Raymond G. Moscs Di(lry. 10 M;lr 45 , and 
'"Firs' To Reach (he Rhine . .. Firs, To Mee, 'he Russialls" 279 

Memorandulll for the Record (MFR). 10 Mar 45, 12th Army Group Operat ions rile, both in 

Raymond G. Moses Collection, USAMHI: Rllt , U.S. Army, ETO, Gcnerai lloard, Study of SUI' ply 

and Evacuation by Air. Study 26, pp. 22 23: Coslllas and Cowdrey, Medica( SelT/ce ill the 

Emvpeall TllCmet of Op mti(}u , p. 5 1 I : Ruppenthal. LogistiC'f/{ Support oft/Ie Al'llIi c.~. Volume 

II. p. 429. 

~, Sylvan Di:uy. 25- 26 Mar 45; Weigley. Eil'cllhoU'er's Liellle/wl/l.\', p. 672. 

" Sylvan Diary, 27 Mar- J Apr45; lnterys. Bevan with Ilewitt . I Oct 81. p. 184, and I'oguc 

with Hodges, 12 Jan 50: Rosengarten. "With ULTRA From OMA HA Beach to Weimar. 

Germany," p. 131: Cir, Capt T. M. Conway, Asst HQ Cmdt, to Chiefs of Sections, II Mar 45. 

Journa l #29, 00" l. First Army G- 3 Da ily Journals, 2 February- 9 May 1945, RG 338, WNRC; 

MacDona ld. 71le L(/.I· / Offell .~iI·e, pp . 355- 56; Weigley. £iselll/O\I'/'I'~' Lietlteluwl.\', Il. 676: Rllt, V 

Corps Operations in the ETO. pp. 408- 16; Collins. LightllillgJQ{:, Il. 315; Interv. Sper:!w wit h 

Co llins, p. 255 . 

• 1 Sylvan Di:try, 3 1 Mar 45; Han se n Diary. 26- 28 Mar 45: MacDonald, The Lrm 0 ffellsh'e, 

p. 359: Weigley. Ei.~cnhO ll'cr's Lieutell(/III.~, p. 676; Collins. LighmingJoe, pp. 315- 16: [ntery, 

Spentl\' with Collins. [l. [64; I-Iarmon with MacKaye and MacKaye, Comma COllllllfllu{er. p. 

252 . 

•• Msg, Eisenhower to Montgomery. 28 Mar 45; Cir. Eisenhower to Montgomery, Brad ley, 

Devers. 2 Apr 45; :utd Ur. Eisenhower to M<trshall. I I Apr 45. All in Chand ler, cd .. Eisenhowcr 

f~(/pers. 4:255 2- 53, 2576- 77 .2598. rcspeetive ly. Lt r. Eisenhowcr to Marsha ll. 30 Mar 45, Monty 

lind Eisenhower rite, Forrest C. Poguc I)ap r~ , USAM HI : Cir, LOI 20, 12th Army Group. 4 Apr 

45. in Rpl. U.S. Army, 12th Army Group, Rcport of Operations, 5:133- 36: Mac Dona ld. The 

/.(I.\'I Offen.~i\'(', pp. 379- 80: Pogue, The Supreme COIl/II/(llul. p. 439 . 

•• Rpl, First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46, p. 5; Sylvan Diary, 31 MltT- 4 Apr 45; MS. Dickson, 

Algiers to the Elbe. pp. 209, 2 15: Cir, First Army G- 2 Estimate 78. 5 Apr 45; Ninth Army. 

Conquer. p. 270; Cir, LO I. First Army. 5 Apr 45.300.6 Leiters of Instructions, box 62, First 

Army. Adj Cen Section, General Correspondence, 1940- 194 7. RG 338, WNRC; MaeDon:tld, 

The Las/ Offi'llsil'lf, p. 362. 

$0 Quote from II:tttsen Diary, 6 Apr 45. Sylva n Diary. 5- 18 Apr 45: Cir, First Army (1- 2 

Estimatc 78, 5 Apr 45; MS, Di ckson. Algiers to the Elbe, p. 209; itpt, Rosengarten to Taylor. 21 

May 45, sub: Report on ULTRA [ntell igenee at First U.S. Army; Ninth Army, COl/queI', p. 28 1; 

Blair, R;tlgll'aj' s P(I!'(III'Oopel·s. pp. 478, 481 - 84: Matthew B. Ridgway, Soltlier: Tile Memoirs of 

,H(/ullell' B. Ridgll'(/)' (New Yo rk : Harper. 1956), p. 139: Macl)onald, Tile 1.(1.\'1 Offe/lsil·e. pp. 

359.367: Weigley, Eisenhower's UCllle/I(IIII.~. pp. 678- 80. 

JI Cir, First Army G 2 Estimate 78, 5 AI)f 45. 

J.I Ibid.: Sylvan Diary, 5- 12, [4- 20 Apr45: Cir. LO ], First Army, 9 Apr 45, 300.6 Lctters 

of I nstfllctions. box 62. First ArtilY. Adj Gcu Section, Genera! Correspondence, 1940- J 94 7, ItG 

338, WNRC; MS, C:trler. Ca rter's War, ch. 13. pp. 40- 41: Pogue. Th/I SlI(JI'eme COIllIllt/lld, pp. 

448, 452: MacDonald. rile /.1151 O.Dellsil'e, pp. 380, 402- 03; RIlt, V Corps Openllions in the 

ETO, pp. 422- 36: Weigley. £i.~·enlloll'er s Uelllcmlll/s. I). 724: Collins, Ugh/ni/lg Joe. p. 322. 

JJ " Flak Alley" is mentioned in MacDona ld. TIl(' L(m Offellsil·e. p. 393. Sec " Iso R])t. First 

U.S. Army_ Report of Operations, 23 February- 8 May 1945,2:2 14 19; Thompson and Ilarris, 

Tlu: OIllCOIIII!, p. 171: Williams. "First Army's ETO Signal Operations." pp. 6- 7; Sylva n Di ary. 

27,29- 30 Mar 45; Pogue. The SIIf'I'Cmc COllllllfllul. p. 450: Rpt , V Corps Operations in the ETO, 

p. 412: McNamarn , QU(lI'le/'ll/t/stel'llclil'ilies.ll. 161. 

~ John S. D. Eisenhower. Strictly Per.Hmo/ (G arden Cit y, N.Y.: Doubleday. 1974), p. 8 J; 

Rpl. U.S. Army, 12t h Army Group, Report of Operations, 5:8. 16, 19.55: G-3 Memo and Inds, 

17 Feb 45 , 101 - 3.22 Misc Memoranda ~nd Papcrs, G- 3 First Army, Fcb 45 . box 1992, WWII 

Ops Reports, RG 407, WN RC. 

" John S. D. Eisenhower, "The Army Tactica l Information Services." MifiulIJ' Red/,ll' 29 

(August 1949): 34 35: Eisenhower, Slriclly I~t!r.\·oI1I/I, p. 83: Cir, Sen ior to Distribution. 13 Apr 

45, Operations ~ns, 1945, box 3. Firs1 Army G- 3, Operations rl:ms, ItG 338, WNRC. 

SI> Eisenhower, "Thc Army T"cticn l In forma tion Services," PJ). 35- 36; L1r. Eisenhower to 

mlthor, 4 May 95, DWII: Hansen Di ary. 14 Feb 45; Gary B. GriITi n, The Dil'ectell Teles(:ope:11 

Traditi(JI/(/{ t::lelllelll of Effec/il'e Command (Fort Leavenworth. Klttts.: Combat Studics [nst itute. 
280 A COII/malld Post (If War 

198 1), pp. 25- 28. See also R])I. U.S. Army, ETO. Gcncrall3oard, The Army Taclical lnformation 

Service, Study 18. eMf.! Library: Walter B. Potter, "SIAM: Signal Information and Monitoring:' 

,Hili/lilY Rel'jell' (May 1945): 28- 30. 

JI AA R, First U.S. Arruy, fo r April 1945, 101 - 0.3 A ftef Action Reports, boxes 1823- 1824. 

WWII Ops Reports, RG 407, WN RC. RPIS, 12th Army Group 0 - 4, for April 1945, 101 -4. 1 G4 Periodi c Reports to SOS ETQUSA, WW[I Dps Reports, RG 407. WNRC: First U.S. Army, 

Repon ofOpcratiolls, 23 Fchru:uy- 8 May 1945,2:62.66,3:9,1 11 - 12: and Supply RC]}OrlS, 

Rhine Cross ings, FUSA, I), 5. Ross and Rortl(trlus, O"emlioll.\' ill tile Wl//' Agaillsi Genllllll)" pp. 

434. 495: lntcrv, Murray wi th l'at1crson, 23 Aug 73, p. 22; McNamara. QII(/rlerllla~ e/' AClivilies. 

PI'. 165- 67; Cir. Hodges 10 COs. VII Corps, 32d Field Arty Ode , III Corps, V Corps. 30 Mar 45, 

2 Ammun ition 1st Army G- 3 Scction MarCh- April 1945. ball: 1. First Army. Reports and 

Messagcs: Ammun ition 112 Through Correspondence. RO 338. WN RC: Ruppenthal . Logisfic(l/ 

SlIppor l O/Ihe Al"llIies, l-o/IIIIIC 11. PI'. 431 - 35. 438. 447--48. 450: MacDonald, The Lasl 0ffellsil'e, 

pp. 325, 328. 

,.. RPI, First U.S. Army. Report orOperations, 23 Febnmry- 8 May 1945.3:5- 6; McNamara, 

Ql/urlerll/aSler Aelll'ilie,f. p. 160. 

'" Rpts. First Army. COD. 18 Noy 46. p. 5: First U.S. Army. RefKlrt ofOI>CTations. 23 Febru<lry8 May 1945. 1:5 7,2:63- 65,3:5- 6,46- 49. 5 1- 54,112; and Supply Reports. Rhine Crossing, 

FUSA, pp. 5- 6. Ross <lnd Ronmnus. Ol'el"o/iOils ill Ihe War Agaillsi Germol/)', PI). 436- 37; 

RUI)pentlwl. Logi.Hit:(l1 SIIf1JJOI"I of Ihe Armies, 1'0/lIlIIe II, I). 430: SylYan Dinry. 29 Mar 45. 

&0 Rpt . First U.S. Army. Report of Ol)ern tions, 23 February- S May 1945. 2:65; AA Rs, First 

U.S. Army. for March and Apri l 1945: Rpt, First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46. p. 404: MeNnlllnra. 

Qlltme/"lIU/SlerAel ivilies. pp . 160- 63; MS. Carter. Carter's War. ch. 13. PI'. 35- 37: Rpts, 12t h 

Army Group G--4. for Apri l 1945. MFR. 10 M<lr 45: Msgs, Moses to Cr.lIyford, 14 M<IT 45 ; 

Moses to Plank. 30 Mar45: TWXs (teletypewri ter messages) to army G- 4s. 20- 30 Mar45; and 

MFR. 5 Apr45. All in 12th Army Group Opcl1ltions ri le, Raymond G. Moses Papers, USAMIII. 

Mayo. 01/ Be(/chhead (fIuIIJmlle/rolll. p. 344; Ruppcnth _I , Logislicul SUPPol"1 o/Ihe Armies, 

]'-O/lIml! II. PI'. 410. 412: Bykofsky and Larson, O,}emliOIl.~ OI·/:l"sellS. pp. 303. 336- 39. 347, 

350. 

61 Rpt. First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 23 February- 8 May 1945,2:65.3:45, 49. 

54: AARs, First U.S. Army. for March and April 1945: McNamnra. QuorleI"llWSICl"liclil'ilies, 

IlP. 160- 63; Rpts, 12th Army Group 0 - 4. fo r April 1945: MFR, 10 Mar 45. Msgs. Moses to 

Craw ford. 14 Mar 45: Moses to j'lank, 30 Mar 45; and TWXs 10 army 0 --4s, 20- 30 Mar 45. 

MFR, 5 Apr 45: Ross and Romanus, Op emliQII.~ ill the ]](11' Agaim'l Gerllltwy. l'. 435: MilYO. 011 

8e(lchhe(l(I (IIu/ 8(1/lle/mlll. p. 344. 

12 Rllt, First U.S. Army. Report of Ope Tat ions. 23 February- S May 1945,2:66: AARs. First 

U.S. Army. for March and April 1945: Rpts. 12th Army Group G- 4, for April 1945; MFR. 10 

Mar 45 . Msgs. Moses to Cl1lwford, 14 Mar 45; Moses to Plank. 30 Mar 45 ; and TWXs to nrOlY 

G--4s. 20- 30 Mnr 45. MFR. 5 Apr 45; Rpt, U.S. Army. ETO. General 130ilfd Study of Supply 

and Evacuation by Air. Study 26. pp. 35- 36: SylYan Diary. 12 Apr4 5. USAM HI: Hansen Diary. 

7 Apr 45; Pogue. The S"f1I'C/l1(! Commaud. PI'. 448. 452. 

6 ) Rpt, First U.S. Army. Report of Operations, 23 February- 8 May 1945,3: 109- 10; COSlllas 

and Cowdrcy, Mediell/ Serl'l'ce ill Ihe /;'lIIvl'e(ll/ Tfu?(lier o/OPC/"{IIiOIl .~, Pil. 5 I 1- 15; AA R, First 

U.S. Army. for April 1945 . 

.... Ziemke, Tile U.S. 111'111)' illille OCCI/Pillioll o/Genmwy. p. 164 . 

• ~ Ibi d .. pp. 3 1- 32.100, 104, lOS, 15S, 163- 66; COSIllIlS and Cuwdrey, M edico! Sen'ia III 

tflC' Eurol'C(l1l Themer o/Op('mliolls. PI'. 546. 549- 5 1: Memo. MacKenzie for Bradley. 23 Mar 

45. sub: Second Draft. Operations Plan. Operation EcursE, and Mins. Notes from the Ecl.trslC 

Conference lIeld at 12th Army GrouJl (TAC) on 19 March 1945. both in Plans- 12th Army 

Group 1945, bOll: l. U.S. Army, IIQ, First u.S. Army. Asst Chief of Staff. G- 3. Operatiol's 

Plans. RG 338, WNRC; MacDonald. TIle /.(lS1 0ffellsil·e. p. 334. 

M Ziemke, Tltc U.S. Army illlltc OCCllptlfiml o/Germtw)', PI'. 32. 194: Rpl. First U.S. Army. 

Report ofOpel1ltions. 23 February- 8 May 1945,2:75: Ms!:\. Col li. II. Newman, Ass! Adj Gen. 

SIIAEI'. to Bradley. 23 Feb 45, 320.3 T/O. Vol. IV, bOll: 126. U.S. Army. IIQ, 121h Army Group. 

Speci,il Starr.Adj Gcn Section. Administrat iye I3 rllllch. Decimal rile. 1943 1945. RG 331 , NARA. 
"First To Reach fhe Rhine . .. First To Meet the RussiaI/:)' " 281 

., Ziemke. Th e US. AI'II/)' illilie OCCIII'll/iOIl o/Genl/(IIIY. PI'. 194- 97.243- 46; Rpts. First 

Army G- 5 Historical Rpts for March and April 1945, 17. 11 Historical Report First US Army 

M<lrch 1945 and 17. 11 Ilistorical Report First US Army April 1945. box 151. SI-IA EF General 

StalT, G- 5 Division. Information Ilranch, IliSlorical Section, Numeric Subject Operations file, 

1943- July 1945. 17.1 1 Historical ReporlS, First US Army, RG 33 1. NA RA; AARs, First U.S. 

Army, for February, March. and April 1945; Rpts, First U.S. Army, Repor! of Oper,IIion s, 23 

Febrllary- 8 May 1945,2:79,82, and First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46. PI'. 335,341; Sylvan Diary, 

6 Mnr 45; RPI, V Corps Operntions in the ETO, pp . 434, 436. 

6' Ziemke, The U.S. Army illihe OC~'IIP(/Ii(jll o/Germany, 1']1. 194,206- 07,236. 

"" Ibid .. pp . 160- 61 ; Rpt. First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46. p. 243: MS. Dickson, Algiers to the 

Elbe, I'll. 195- 96; Mac Domlld, rite I.ru·1 Offellsil'e, p. 330. 

1(1 Rpt, Supply Reports, Rhine Crossings, FUSA. sec. 4, pp. 9- 10; AA R, First U.S. Army, 

fo r March 1945; Mayo, 011 BellchlrclU/mll/ BlIllle/rolll, 1'1'. 341 . 346-49; Mins, Notes from the 

EcuPSp. Conferenec Held at 12th Army Group (TAC) on 19 March 1945. 

lI"T Forces" arc Illentioned in MacDonald, The LU.fl Offellsil'e, p. 332. Sce also Mayo, 011 

Belldrhem/mltl BalllefiulIl. p. 348: Rpt, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. 23 February- 8 

May 1945.2:222; Kleber and Birdsell , ChemjclIls ill COlI/bul, PI'. 79- 80, 84; Thompson and 

Harris. 71lc OIl/COllle. p. 165; MS. Carter. Ca rter's War, eh. 13, p. 46; MS, Di ckson, Algiers to 

the Elbe. p. 2 16. 

11 AA R, First U.S. Army. fo r April 1945; Rpts, First U.S. Army. Report of Operations. 23 

Febfuar y- 8 May 1945,3 :45.50. and First Army G- 4 Quarterly Rpts, 101 - 4. 1 G- 4 Periodic 

Reports to SOS ETOUSA. WWII Ops Re])orts, RG 407. WNRC. 

7J Dickson quote from MS. Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe, p. 2 14, lind sec 1Iiso p. 21 5. Rpts. 

First Army G- 5 Historica l Report for AIHii 1945; Lt Col Davi d W. PlIulette to G- 5. VII Corps. 

15 Apr 45; and Egon \V. Fleck and 1st Lt Edward A. Tencnbllum. Buchenwald: A Preliminary 

Report . 24 Apr 45. All in 17. 11 I-listorieal Report , First U.S. Army, April 1945, box 151, SI-IAEF, 

G- 5 Division, Numeric Subject Operations rile. 1943- July 1945, RG 33 1, NARA. Sylvan Diary, 

11 ,24 Apr 45 ; Intervs. author with Thurmond, II Aug 93 , PI'. 6- 8, and Murray wilh Myers. 15 

Apr 74, p. 55; MS, ClIrter. Carter's \VlIr. ch. 13. PI'. 43-46: Rpt, V Corps Operations in the ETO, 

1,.434; Ziemke, Tir e Us. Arm)' illihe OUII/HI/ioll o/Germllll)" PI'. 234 39,244-45: MacDonald 

Tire LuSI Offcllsil'e, pp. 391 - 92 . 

~"t , First u.s. Army. Report ofO])erations, 23 February- 8 May 1945,2:28-29. 47,50, 

3: 105; AAlts, First U.S. Army, for March, April. and May 1945, 101 - 0.3 After Action Reports. 

hoxes 1823- 1824, W\V II Ops Rel)Orts, RG 407, WN RC; MS, Dickson, Algiers 10 the Elbe, p. 

194. Memos for Colonel Viln WllY, 12th Army Group. OITice of thc JAG. 21 AI)f 45. 320.3 Vol. 

III, Strength. box 126, and Koremem fo r I lodges, 31 Oct 44. and Senior for Ilradley, 9 Nov 44. 

last two in 320.3 TIO, Vol. IV. box 127. All in 12th Army Group, Adj Gen Section, Decimal file. 

1943- 1945. RG 33 1. NARA. Rpt, U.S. Army. ETO, General Board, Organization and Functions 

of G- 1 Sections in Army Groups and Armies, Study 9, p. 6. CMII Libr;lry: Cosmas and Cowdrey, 

Medic(l/ SelTice ill Ihe Emvpcml TllclIlel' o/Opem/jolls, PI'. 557- 61. 57 1- 76. 

" "Dl's" quote from AAIt. First U.S. Army. for April 1945. Sec also Ziemke, n,e u.s. 

Arll/)' ill lire OCCllpUlioll 0/ Germllll),. PI' . 52- 53. 167- 69; Mins. Notes frorn the ECl.lrst 

Con ference Held at 12th Army Group (TAC) on 19 March 1945; Memo, MacKenzie fo r Bradley, 

23 Ma r 45, sub: Second Draft. Operations Plan . Operation Ecursll. in Plans - 12th A rmy Group 

1945, box I, U.S. Army. I-I Q, First U.S. Army, Asst Chi efof StaIT. G 3. Operations Plans, RG 

338, WNRC. 

1. "Standfas!" is ment ioned in AA R. First U.S. Army, for April 1945. Sec also AA Rs, First 

U.S. Army, for Fcbruilry, March, and May 1945. Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, J 

August 1944 22 February 1945. 2: 162 64: First U.S. Army, Report of Opera lions, 23 Fcbruary8 May 1945.2:80; Supply Reports, Rhine Crossings, FUSA, PI). 10 II ; lInd First Army. COD. 

18 Nov 46, pp. 243- 46. 360. Cirs. Col George P. SenelT, Exec Ofcr, First Army G- 5. to Comdg 

Ofcrs, MG and DP Detachments, Army Service Area, 19 Apr45: SenelTto Mi litary Government 

Detachments. Army Service Arell. 18 Apr 45: and Lt Col Wi ll iam A. Lord, Asst Exec Ofcr, G 

5. to Comdg Of en, Mililnry Government Detachments, and Comdg Of cr. Regulating St<ttion. 

14 Apr45. All in 17.11 Il istorical Report, First U.S. Arrny, April 1945. box 15 1, SI-IAEF G -5 
282 A COII/II/alld POSf fI( War 

Division, Numeric- Subject O])cnlliolls file, 1943- July 1945. 17.11 1-1 istorica l Reports- First 

U.S. Army. RG 331, NARA. Msg, Moses 10 Plank. 30 Mar 45. 121h Army Group Operations. 

Moses Co llection. USAMHl; Inlerv, Forrest C. Pogue with Maj Cell Alben W Kenner, J Jun 

45, Pogue interviews. USAMHI: MacDonald. The L(lSI OgClIyi!'C, p. 33 1: Ziemke, rhe U.S. 

Al'm), ill Ihe Occllpmioll of GC/"III(//!)'. ])p. 200- 206, 238- 41: Cosmas and Cowdrey, MCllico/ 

Service il/ the Ellmpetlll1'hC(/fCrojOperatiolls. pp. 553- 57. 569- 71: Hansen Diary, 29 Mar 45. 

" AARs. First U.S. Army, for Fcbrullry, Marcil. April, and May 1945; RpIS. Fim U.s. 

Army, Report of Operations. 23 Fcbruary- 8 Mily 1945, 2:80, and Supply Reports. Rhine 

Crossill!;s. FUSA, pp. 10- 11; McNnnwra, QllarlerllllislerAclil'ilies. pp. 163- 64: MS. Carter, 

Carter's War, eh. 13, pp. 37- 38. 

1~ AA lts. First U.S. Army, for March. April, and Mny 1945; Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report 

of Operations. I August 1944- 22 February 1945,4'226. and First U.S. Army, Report of 

Operations, 23 February- 8 May 1945.3:104-06,159- 63: Memo for Colonel Van Way, 21 AIH 

45: McNamara, QllarlerllllulerAC/;\'il;es. pp. 163, 165; MS, Carter, Carter's WilT, ch. 13, pp. 

38- 39; Ziemke. The u.s. Arm)' ill Ihe OCCIII)(llioll ojGel'lllflll)" p, 241: Cosmas and Cowdrey, 

M ediwl Sen'i<:e illihe £lIrOIJe(l1/ Themer o/Opemliolls. I)P. 561 - 69. 

19 MS, Dickson, Algiers to the Elbe. p. 184: Rpts, First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. 

23 February- 8 May 1945.3:208, and First Army, COD, 18 Nov 46. p, 387; Ziemke, The U.S, 

Arm)' ;/I Ille Occl/patiol/ o/Germal/Y, pp. 174- 75. 

811 Rpts, First U.S, Army, Rel)ort of Operations, 23 February- 8 May 1945.3:199- 203 , and 

First Army. COD. 18 Nov 46, pp. 386- 87; 1-Iansen Diary, 22 Feb. 8 Mar, 5 Apr 45: Sylvan Diary, 

I Mar 45; Ambrose, rile Slipreme COIIIIII(//u/er, PI'. 621 - 22: Bradley, A Soldier:\' SI/}/)" PI'. 498-

99: MS, Carter, Carler's War, ch, 13, ])I), 29- 31; MS, Dickson. Algiers to the Elbe. p. 197. 

1\ Sylv,ln Di,lry, 2 1 AIH 45. 

11 Correspondence documents in Chandler, cd .• Eisenholl'er Ptlpers, 4:255 8, 2583- 84. 2590-

92, 2632- 36; Ambrose. Tile Sf/prell/e COlI!lIIt1l1der, pp. 642- 43; Cir, Brig Gen T. J. Davis, Adj 

Gen. SHAEF, to CGs, 6th, 12th. 21 Army Groups. 20 Apr 45. II Cys G- 3 Letters and 

Indorsemen ts, box I. First Army, Reports and Messllges: Ammunition #2 Throug h 

Correspondence. RG 338. WNRC; Bradley, A So{(/ier s SIOI'Y. PI'. 531, 544-46. 

OJ Sylvan Diary. 21 - 27. 29- 30 Apr 45 ; Interv, Pogue with 1·lodges. 12 Jan 50: Rpt, First 

U.S. Army, Repor! of Operations, 23 February- 8 May 1945. I :83- 84; MacDonald, The 1.(151 

OjJen.l'il'C, I). 452; MS. Carler. Carter's War. eh. 13, PI'. 47- 48: MS, Dickson. Algier~ to the 

Elbe, I'll. 217- 18: Rll!, V Corps Operations in the ETO, I}P , 424, 438. 

i.4 Sylvan Diary, 10. 16 Apr45: Bnldlcy, A Soldiel'~' SIOI)', p. 543; Hansen Diary, 13- 14, 16 

Apr 45; Memo, Notes on Chief of Staff's Conference with G- 3, 12th Army Group, G- 3 Third 

Army,0- 3 First Army. 16 Apr 45, #9 Conferences. April 1945, box I, U,S. Army. HQ, First 

Army. Asst Chief of Staff, G- 3, Reports and Messages, RG 338, WNRC. Cirs, LOI 2 1, 12th 

Army Group, 17 Apr 45 , in Rpt. U.S. Army. 12th Army Group, Report ofOpera!ions, 5: 13 7- 42 ; 

First Army G- 2 Estimate 80. 18 Apr 45; LOIs. First Army, 20 Apr 45. nnd 28 Apr 45. All in 

300.6 Lel1ers of Instructions, box 62 , Firs! Army. Adj Gen Section. General Correspondence, 

1940- 1947, RG 338. WNRC. Weigley. £isellho\\'el':~ Lielilemwls, p. 709. 

~j Sylvan Dillry. 17. 19, 21 - 22, 24- 25, 27- 30 Allf 45; Memo, Operation ECLII'St, 27 Apr 

45, 101 - 3, 11 LCl\crs of Instructions, G- 3 1st Army, 29 Sept 44-28 Apr 45. box 1989. W\V[I 

Ops Reports. RG 407, WNRC; Rpts. First U.s. Army, Report of Operations, 23 February- 8 

May 1945. 1 :85, and V Corps Opera1ions in the ETO. pp. 436, 445- 50: Nimh Army, Conquer, 

p. 309, 

'" Sylvan Diary, 15,24 Apr 45; AARs, First U.s. Army. for March, April, and May 1945; 

Cir, Senior \0 Separate Un it Comm:tnders, 16 Mar45. box I, Fir~t Army, RellOfts and Messages: 

Ammunition #2 Through Correspondence, RG 338, WNRC; Rpt , U.s. Army, ETO, General 

Board, Organization and Functions of 0 - 1 Sections in Army Groups and Armies, Study 9. pp. 

12- 13,19- 20. 

n AA Rs, First U.S. Army. for March, April, and M"y 1945: RpL US. Army. 12th Army 

Group, Report of Open It ions. 2:38; Ulysses Lee. The Eillpfoymeill 0/ Negro 7i'ovps, U.S , Army 

in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.s. Army Center of Military History, 19(6), p. 696; Weigley, 

Eisenholl'e/'~' Liel/le/wIIIY, pp. 660- 62. 
"First To Reach fhe Rhille . .. First To Meettfte Rllssians" 283 

U AA Rs. First U.S. Army. for March. April. and May 1945: Rpt . First U.s. Army, Report of 

Operations, 23 February- 8 May 1945.2:1 7- 18 . 

.. "Jeep shows" are mentioned in Rpt . First US. Army. Report of Operations, I August 

1944- 22 Fcbru<lfy 1945,2:23. and sec also 2:24- 30. 4:238: Rpt , First U.S. Army. Report o f 

Operations. 23 February- 8 May 1945. 2:23- 26. 40-41. 46, 3: 167- 68; AA Rs. First U.S. Army, 

for January through May 1945; MacDonal d. The LlIs/ 0ffellsi\·e. PI'. 3J 1- 33. 

90 Rpts, First U.S. Army. Report ofOI)Cnltions. I August 1944 22 February 1945,2:23-

30. and First U.S. Army, Report of Operations. 23 Februllry- 8 May 1945.2:23- 26, 40- 4 1.46. 

3: 167- 68; AARs, First U.S. Army. for Jl1\Hmry through May 1945; Rpl. U.S. Army. ETO. General 

Board. Special Serv ices Organization. Study 113. pp. 4. 7. 

'I Quote from Rpt. US. Army. ETO. General Board. Report on the Organization of the 

Army Headquarters and Headquarters Company. Study 24. p. 5. lI nd see also PI'. 2- 3, 5. Rpt . 

First Army. COD, 18 Nov 46, p. \46; AA R. First U.S. Army. for March 1945 . 

• Z Sylvan Di ary. 1 May 45; Llrs. Eisenhower 10 Marshall, 26 Apr 45. and Eisenhower to 

Marshall. 2 May 45, both in Chandler. cd .• Eisel/tlOwer Pt/pel's, 4:2647--48, 2667: Hansen Diary. 

8 May 45 ; MS. Carler, Carter's War, ch. 13. p. 49; MS. Dickson. Algiers 10 the Elbe. p. 2 19; 

Interv, author with WClldt , 29 Apr 91. pp . 75- 76. 

'J Sylvan Diary. 3-7 May 45: Cir. LO! 22. 12th Army Group. 4 May 45, in Rpt. U.S. Army, 

12th Army Group. Report o f Operat ions. 5: 143--46: MS, Carter. Ca rter's War, eh. 13, pp. 49-

SO. e h. 14. pp. \- 4; AA R, First U.S. Army. for May 1945: McNall111n1. Qllartermaster Activities, 

I). 168; Ninth Army, Co /utileI'. pp. 332- 34; MacDonald. The (/.~I OjJellsil'e, I). 466; Bradley. A 

So/tliel' 5 SUN),. p. 554; Mayo, 011 lJe(lchhuul alit! BafllejrQllf, 1). 350. 

9' 11l1crv. Murray with Myers. 15 Apr 74, p. 18. 

9 

Conclusion 

According to contemporary Army doctrine, the America n fie ld army of World 

War II was not only the "fulldamcntalunit of slr,lIegic maneuve r, ... the 

un it wh ich the theate r commander or commander of the fi eld forces uses as a 

basis for planning and executing stf<licgic and tactical operations," but also 

"the largest se lf-contained uni t" and "a ncx ible combat force capable of independent operations.'" Under the overall design of the thea ter or army group, 

the army engaged in long-term planning and provided general objectives to its 

corps, established boundaries, and allocated units, artillery. and other resources. 

It then supervised the corps as they fought the battles. shifting formations and 

reserves where necessary. The army also hand led administration and provided 

the logistica l li nk between the communications zone and the distribution points 

within the div isions. Finall y, th e army staff was respo nsible fo r coordination 

with the Army Ai r Forces and, when necessary, the Navy. [n Slim, the field 

army of World War II was expected to serve as a logistical, admi nistrative, and, 

in modern terms, operationa l headquarters. 

Any eval uation of a n American army headquart ers in World War II must 

co nsider the legacy of World Wa r [ a nd inte rwar doctri ne. Aside from the toodistant Civil War, World War I provided the Army's only rea l ex perience with 

army-level command, and th e foul" mo nt hs of comba t prior to the armistice 

fur nis hed little ti me in which to learn. Vete rans of the Ame rican Expeditionary Forces woul d long recall the controve rsy over staff office rs arbitrarily 

iss uing commands, th e chaotic communications, overly detailed and confusing orders, Pe rshin g's tough re lief poli cy. and th e dispute over boundaries 

near Sedan. Consequently. Army doctrine and the sc hools tha t future First 

Army commanders and staff officers attended during the 1920s and 1930s 

empha sized well-drawn boundaries, clear orders, and the sole a uthority of 

the commander. Yet the sc hools a lso blurred the concepts of command and 

contro l and taught command in such a way as to dilute the pri nc ipl e of the 

a ll-powerfu l commander. Army doctri ne and schools a lso provided mixed 

messages on the role of the army headquarters. They st ressed open warfare 

with an a rmy ec helon that approa ched operations from a broade r pe rspec tive. 

At the same ti me, the emphasis on me thodical pla nning, continuo us fronts, 

simplicity, firepowe r an d the centra l role of the artillery officer, a comp lex 

supply structure based on railroads, the principle of pushing fo rwa rd sup-
286 A COII/II/oud Pos' at Wa/' 

plies, and, on occasion, centra lized control was remi niscent of th e slow pace 

of 191 8. 

Not surprising ly. the legacy of World War I in prewar doctrine , as well as 

the Army's inexperience wi th higher-level command, hampered the First Army 

headquarters' 1.ldjusIlllcni to a new war. The First Army commanders were only 

a few years removed from fiel d grade rank, and the st aff officers, if they could 

boast any background in staff work, drew the ir expertise e ither from the morc 

tactica lly oriented corps headquart ers or from rush courses at staff colleges. 

Thus, they often tended towa rd centrali za tion and an ovcrcollccntrati on on tactics, sometimes micromanagi ng in orders and, in general , focusing too closely 

on details more properly thc province oflower-leve l commanders. On the whole, 

the principle of the commander as sole authority proved sound, but the headquarters still faced the rea lit y that the commandcr cou ld not do everything. 

Even before the campa ign proper began, Bradley found it necessary to delegate muc h of his authority ove r army un its to special staff ch iefs. Although 

the practice usually worked well for the First Army, it resu lted in some anomalous situations, as in the case of the an tia ircraft office r and the 49th Antiaircraft Brigade's commander, and it occ asiona ll y created confusion in the 

command structure, notably during the BailI e of lhe Bulge. One major faul t of 

prewar doctrine lay in the inadequate info rmation-gathering capabilities it gave 

the army commander. In particu lar, the First Army headquarters neve r devised 

an efficient liaison system similar to Montgomery's PIMNTOM system and 

Pallon 's 6th Cava lry Group.2 

Ce rtainly the limitations of military communi cations in the 1940s complicated the ta sk of information ga thering. Although the signa l section and 

constru ction units of the army headquarters did a fi nc job under difficult 

circumstances, the commander and staff, both on D- Day and during the pursuit, we re oftcn unabl e to prov ide proper supe rvisio n to th e corps simply 

because they did not possess adeq uat e commll niciltions with them. During 

th e pursuit, wire construction units lacked the manpower, equipment, and 

tra nsportation to keep up wi th the pace, forcing th e First Army headqua rters 

to rcly mostly on radio. Yct radio- susceptible to interference, overloading, 

de lays in coding and dccoding, and jamming and interception by enemy signals intelligence- hard ly furnished a panacea. The situation improved only 

when the advance slowed and signal crews could lay wirc to othe r eche lons 

and take advantage of ex isting communica ti ons systems in urba n areas. 

In general though, the First Army's organization and proccdures func tioned 

we ll, nol surprising for an outfit led by veterans accustomed to working with 

cileh oth er in a re inforced corps in the Mediterranean theate r. The army orga nizat ion did not fully ant icipate the need for truck compan ies, signal units, and 

civil affairs detachments or the popula rity of the chemical mortar battal ions, 

but it usually met the demands placed on it. With some relative ly minor changes, 

the general and specia l sta ff organizations proved adaptable enough to the different chall enges they encountered in northwest Europe. Admittedly. the First 

Army staff would probably have found useful a plans subsection with in the 

G- 3 section. The presence of such an agency might have cnabled the First Army 
COllell/sion 287 

commander and staff to focus less on the daY-Io-day details of operations and 

more on the army headquarte rs' lo ng-ra nge planning funct ion, perhaps anticipat ing the problems posed by the bocage and the Roer dams. Bradley and Kean 

also decided not 10 include a separate transportat ion section with in their specia l staff at a time when transportation was playing an increasingly critical ro le 

in opcrations. Neverthe less, the lack ofa transportation section seemed 10 ma lter little, especially give n the coordination within and between the gene ral and 

spec ial staffs. 

Despite LI. Gen. Lesley J. McNair's earnest effo rts to keep the Army's various field headquarters as lean as possible, the First Army staff shared the usual 

tendency of organizations to grow beyond au thorized strengths. To some degree, the headquarters' penchant for deta il created an unnecessarily great work 

load and demand for additional personnel, but almost all of the new sections 

responded to real requirements stemming from Ihe inc reasing specialization 

and complexity of warfare, especially the need fo r closer air-ground cOOl'dinatio n. Still, the cUlTlulative effect of the expansion was a need for more men than 

the tables of organization for an army provided. ETOUSA only met the need in 

part, wi th the result that, desp ite exchanges of manpower withi n and between 

sections, the First Army staff agencies were often undermanned and their personnel overworked. In the end, some existing requirements. such as the need 

for a plans subsection or more liaison pe rsonnel, went unfulfilled. 

Nor did the organizational strains from these changes stem on ly from manpower constraints. As agencies came into existence or reorganized, doctrinal 

confusion often followed, as occurred in the separation of specia l service functions from those of informat ion and ed ucation. In the case of the public ity and 

psychological warfare section, the First Army headquarters combined two largely 

incompatible tas ks at a time when other staffs in the theater were separating thc 

IwO. Jurisdictional clashes also created turbu lencc within the sta ff. Whe n the 

new armored officer encountered sllspicion from the ordnance officer over 

whether the armored office r intended to encroach on the other's domain, the 

potential dispute was settled qu ickly and amiably, largely because of the status 

of the armored officer as a distingu ished tanker well known to the II Corps 

vete rans on the stafP The place of the civil affairs section proved more difficult to resolve. Fo rmed at the instiga tion of higher headquarters, the G- 5 section, like the publicity and psychological warfare section and the spec ial service section, was often viewed with condescension by more conventional perSOllnel. It always seemed to lack enough personne l, sometimes drcw heavily on 

the resources of the other sections, and also found itself in jurisdict ional fights 

with the G- l and ordnance sect ions at vario lls times. 

Most of the tensions that existed on the staff, however, resulted less from 

organization tha n from personality conflicts. Too mllch can be made o f th is 

friction , as the overall mutual confidence among most of the staff chiefs, bonds 

forged in the Mediterranean campaigns, cannot be overemphasized. The First 

Army stafTwou ld never have achieved half of what it did wit hout the close ties 

among Dickson, Wilson, Ake rs, Carter, McNamara, Mcdaris, Patterson, Grant 

Williams, and other staff chiefs. Nevert heless, tensions did ex ist and if, as Myers 
288 A COII/mond Posl al ~fflr 

latc r remarked, persona lit ies had a "tremendous effect" on the functioning of 

the First Army staff, the n these tensio ns must have len a major impact. 4 Be· 

tween the ha rd-driving Tunisia veterans and those officers newly arrived from 

the United States existed a coolness, as exemplified by the strain between 

Thorson and several North African veterans, who resented his displacement of 

Hewitt as the G- 3. Such feelings inevitably dissipated over time as the staff 

became morc integra ted and some of its morc conten tiOlLS members, nota bly 

O' Hare, moved on to other duties. In contrast, friction between the G- 2 and 

G- 3 sectio ns intensiFied. Mostly a personal ity clash between the flamboyant 

Dickson and the dour Thorson, it contributed to an inc reasing lack of dia logue 

between the two sections and was largely responsible for the G- 2's declini ng 

stature within the army cabinet The lack of dialogue between the G- 2 and 

G- 3 was espec ially damag ing during the Bailie of the Bulge. 

As long as Omar Bradley cOlllmanded the First Army, these quarrels di d 

not reach major proportions. Bradley's stature with the I I Corps veterans who 

had served with hi m in North Africa and Sicily and his ca lm but commanding 

presence, communicati ng assurance, served him well in keeping in line the 

numerous egos withi n the First Army headquarters. Modest and grega rious in 

manner, he communicated we ll with people. As the First Army commander, he 

liked to maintain personal contact with su bordinate commanders through phone 

calls and frequent personal visits, and with his staff through la rge meetings 

wherc he could hear severa l different poi nts of view and explain his intentions 

to a broad audience. His orders, beyond selling general objectives, almost in~ 

variably left his subordinates with considerable freedom of action. Yet, although 

generally a good delegator, he liked involving himself in the detai ls of G- 3 

work, incl udi ng some aspects that properly belonged to the corps. Behind the 

genial ex terior lay a calm, tough professional. Ca reful , balanced, and organized, he demanded and rece ived good work from his First Army staff. Whatever his alleged lack of origina lity as a balliefie id commander, his frequent 

inability to concentrate his forces, and his interest in tactica l det a ils at the 

occasiona l expense of the larger picture, he knew how to run a headqua rters. 

Although Courtney Hodges was likewise a calm, diligent man of character, 

he lacked Bradley's ability to impress his persona on his staff or his army. The 

retiring Hodges preferred to work through a small inner circle; to those outside 

that c ircle , he was a remote figure. Lac king much imagi nation, having little 

co nfidence in most of his corps commanders, and inclined by in terest and background towa rd sma ll er-u nit tactics, the methodical Hodges often encountered 

problems in maintai ning the broader perspective of an army commander. When 

healthy, however, he could make a decision. He was at his best in the first 

month alld a half of his command, when the First Army raced across France to 

the German border, conducting the large-sca le flanking movemen ts that trapped 

thousands of Germans at the Seine and in the Mons Pocket. His performance 

declined during the fall and wi nter, largely due to fat igue and illness. Increasingly tied to his command post, uninspired in his tactics, alternately distant 

and impatient with subordinates, he mishand led successive attacks on the West 

Wall and reacted slowly to the German counteroffensive. If not for consider-
COl/clusiol/ 289 

ations of coa lition politics and conce rn s fo r the impact his dismissal might 

have at a crit ica l moment of the ba ttl e, he probably wou ld have- and should 

have-been re lieved during the Battle of the Bulge. By the time of the spring 

campaign, Hodges had recovered much of his energy, but, during what should 

have been his fi nest hour, he seemed irritable and tendentious, hardly the type 

of manne r to inspire confidence in those around him. 

Under such an unasserti ve commander, Kean became the dominant personalit y in the Fi rst Army headqua rters. In many ways, the stocky infantry man 

typified the American ch id of staff of World War II. Like Eisenhower's Lt. 

Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and MacArthur's Lt. Gen. Richa rd K. Sutherland, 

Kea n played the hatche t man, allowi ng his supe rior to remain serenely above 

the fray. Within his command post, offi cers either admired him, feared him, or 

hated him with a passion. Able, perce ptive, and clea r th inking, he was also a 

hard ta skmaster, efficient, but with li ttle of the human touch. Once Hodges 

assumed the command of the First Army, Kean often pe rformed, in effect, as 

deputy commander but withoLlt the doctrin al authority a true deputy would 

have enjoyed. For a time during the Arden nes bailie, when Hodge s was practically in ca pacitated, Kean held the staff together, issu in g in I-lodges' name the 

orders necessary to construct the cri tical north shoulder of the Bulge. He could 

do lilli e, howeve r, to ease the jillers that appear to have in fected much of the 

headquarters in the midst of the German onslaught. In many ways, Kean was 

an idea l chief of stafT, espec ially for a Bradley, but he lacked the calming innucnec that on ly a true commander cou ld provide. 

As custodians of one of the central functions of an army headquarters, the 

support sections of the First Army headquarters dese rve much c redit for their 

performance. Like othe r Americ'lIl logisti cians in the thea ter, First Army supply personnel had to meet th e dema nds ofa hi ghly complex mechanized force 

manned by troops accustomed to the American standard of li ving. Whil e they 

could not claim immunity from blu nders, they often demonstrated their resou rcefulness in ove rcoming scarcities, whethe r through pooling tra nsportation, 

improvising pipelines, lIsi ng captured food and equipment, call ing on airdrops 

of Sli P plies, or capita lizing on local procurement. Although they could be pri ckly 

in their relations with other support echelons, they frequently showed perceptiveness and n exi bility in their response to operational needs, notably in their 

timely response to the Ardennes counteroffensive. Under the ca pable, ex perienced Wi lson, the First Army G- 4 section qu ietl y, but e ffi ciently, coordinated 

a suppl y effort that reached gigant ic proportions by V- E Day. 

Unfortunately, th e staff's ope rat ions officers did not show the same imagination. They often pe rformed well such compl ica ted tec hni cal tasks as th e 

massive troop shifts during the Battle of the Bu lge and could be innovative, as 

in their rive r-crossing techniques during GRENADE. AU too freq uentl y, however, 

the planning and ope rations of the First Army headquarters tended towa rd conse rvatism, an excessive conce rn for nanks, piecemeal employment of armor, 

and an inability to concentra te avai lable forces. Admittedly, doctrine, terrai n, 

and the shortage of fresh di visions lIntil ea rly 1945 must be take n into account 

in any evaluation of th e First Army's ope rations. Such episodes as the bungled 
290 A COlllmand POSI a/ War 

attack on Schm idt and the ongoing effort \0 plow strai g ht through the HUrtgen 

Forest, howeve r, are hard to justi fy. At times, the First Army staff's long-range 

planning was deficient, and corps boundaries, especia lly in the fall campaign 

and th e Battle of the Bulge, were often uninspi red and refl ected a dismaying 

lack afknowledge or the ground. Although the staff's careful attention to detail se rved it well on several occasions, it also crea ted problems when it 

mi cromanaged or became too engrossed in lowe r-leve l tact ics. The gulf between Thorson and much of the rest of his G- 3 section, whose abilities he did 

not regard highly, ce rtainly did not improve th e situation. 

Any evaluation of the 0 - 2 sect ion mllst bcgin with its controve rsial head. 

In many ways, Dickson was a fine intelligence officer, a dedi cated, careful 

cransman in an Army that valu ed his field all too lightly. A cautious man, hc 

tended toward pessimism in his estimat es of enemy capabiliti es and would occasionally list absent di visions and predict counterattacks that never took place, 

but his reputation as an alarmist seems exaggerated. That perception, however, 

stuck aner his false wa rnings of a November ofTensive by the Germans, and 

this image, as well as a volatile pe rsonality and rcputa tion in some quarters as 

a drinker, contribut ed to his low stature with Hodges. His strong prej udi cesagainst th e OSS, th e 12th Army Group G- 2, Thorso n, and Kea n, to namc a 

few- further li mited his value. Re lying on intuition and his fee l fo r the Ge rman mind, he co uld be quite pe rcept ive of cnemy int entions, though not as 

clairvoyant as he lat er claimed. Whi lc he fail ed to see the movc of the 352d 

Illfanll)' Division to O MAHA Beach and the importance of the Roer dams, ove rsights he shared with several others, he spotted thc German buildup during the 

latc autumn of 1944, and he generally did well on th e enemy order o f bait Ie, 

admittedl y aided by U LTRA. In Normandy, ULTRA proved invaluabl e to the First 

Army headquarters, but aner the breakout, its importance declincd to th e status of one of the many sources consulted by Di ckson and his hi ghly competent 

section. Among th ese other sou rces, Dickson was qui ck to see thc val uc of 

ae rial reconna issance, and he worked c lose ly with Hart's artillery section and 

the IX T"cti cal Air Command to exploit th is capabilit y. 

Dickson 's cooperation with thc IX Tactical Air Command was only one of 

the many benefic ia l re lationships that the First Army headquarters established 

with the other scrvices durin g the campaign. Many of the difficulties that the 

headquarte rs encountered, suc h as misundersta nd ings, poor communi ca tions, 

ignorancc of anothe r servicc's techni callimitatiolls, and thc low priority placed 

on joint opcrations by the different services at different times would sound 

familiar to practitioners of joint operations from Nic ia s to Schwarzk opf. In its 

demands on th e Navy and the Army Ai r Forces, t"ctica l and strategic, thc First 

Army headquarters could be unrealisti c, as in its insistcncc on priority unloading of tra nsports following D-Day and in its concept for the pa rallel approach 

by the Army Ai r Forces bombers preceding COIlRA . The main factor that made 

the situa tion wo rk was Bradley's rclationships with Kirk and Quesada, both of 

whom showed an abil ity to accommodate th e Army's needs. Although the Army 

Air Fo rces in pa rti cular preferred ce ntrali zed control and ca rcful allocation of 

support for ground ope rations, it came to accept a system under whi ch lower 
COI/elusioll 291 

levels could bypass echelons to request immediate ai r support. Over time , the 

air and ground eche lons also improved their procedures for supply by air and 

emergency airdrops, contributing immensely to the final drive across Germany. 

As in othe r wars, the services, for all thei r differences, madejoint operations 

work- fortunately for the First Army, for without naval and air support, its 

ach ievements would have been impossible. (See Appendix I.) 

Likewise, relations with all ies proved manageable , despite the potential for 

crippling disagreeme nts and tensions. Seeing themselves as strai ghtforward 

fi eld soldiers, the First Army staff offi cers looked down on politics, but they 

could not easily avoid the subject in a coa lition war. During the effort to close 

the Falaise Pocket, the First Army headquarters faced outright insubordi nation 

from a French armored division eager to advance on Paris. Its irrita tion was 

only exacerbated by disputes with French authorities after the liberation of Paris. 

With the British, the First Army headqua rt ers nourished a curious love-hate 

rela tionship, dating back among many veterans to the campaign in Tunisia when 

several British officers adopted a condescendi ng attitude toward the inexperienced Americans. Cu lt ural and philosophical diffe rences an d American 

anglophobia did not help ease relations. Throughout the campa ign, one could 

hea r grumbling at the First Army command post over its boundaries with the 

2 1 Army Group and the apparent British inability to keep up with the American 

drive. Yet, when the First Army headquarters had to serve under the 2 1 Army 

Group headquarters, the arrangement worked well. In part, the good re lations 

wc re due to Montgomery's tact and forbearance , and, in part, because the Fi rst 

Army commander and staff, for all of their compl ai nts about the field marshal's 

caution, gen uin ely respected his professiona lism. 

In many ways, the FirstArmy headquarters' relations with the 2 1 Army Group 

commander and staff were better than those with the 12th Army Group headquarte rs. The First Army's staff officers, especia lly the Tunisia campaign veterans, showed more respect for the 21 Army Group sta ff, which included many 

rami liar faces from North Africa. In addition, Montgome ry and his stafTallowed 

the Fi rst Army headqua rters considcrable frcedom to plan and carry out operations, although Montgomery, who possessed less confidence in Hodges than in 

Bradley, regularly bypassed Hodges and dealt directly with corps commanders 

during the Battle of the Bulge. In contrast, the First Army veterans saw the 12th 

Army Grollp staff as interl opers in assuming their role as the main American 

fi eld headquarters on the Continent. According to Bedell Smith, some of the 

First Army sta ff officers did not hesitate to bypass their army group counterparts 

to deal directly with Bradley. If the U.S. Army had little experience with armylevel headquarters, it had even less with army grou ps, and, in many areas, qucstions existed over the responsibilities of the 12th Army Group headquarters. Since 

that echelon's maj or role lay in operations, the First Army su pply ch iefs had relatively littl c contact with the ir army grou p counterparts, exccpt for the role of the 

army gro up supply chi efs in allocating tonnage. Still, for all its apparent disdain 

for the 12th Army Group staff and the lack of support rrom that echelon during 

the Battlc of the Bulge, the First Army headquarters leO no doubt of its wish to 

return to the jurisdiction or its fo rmer cOlllmande r. 
292 A COII/mand Post (If War 

The First Army headquarters' relations with the thea ter support echelons 

were even more ambivalent. The staff enjoyed a smooth working partnership 

wit h ADSEC and the 25th Regu lating Station. With the theater chie fs, re lations 

were often warm and characterized by mutual respect. Fo r COMZ as a whole, 

however, the First Army headquarters, especially Hodges, Kean , Wilson, and 

the ordnance officer, Medaris, voiced much disdain. Some of the animus rcpv 

resented the usual rancor of combat zone soldiers for rear echelons, but it was 

aggrava ted by a theater organization that tcll COMZ and the fie ld forces as 

separate entities, each responsible only to the theater commander. COMZ 's inability to give figures for available supplies, delive r supplies as asked, or 

give realistic estimates on when they would be available seriollsly hampered 

the First Army headquarters in its planning. The First Army headquarters' irritation was on ly intensified when it heard rumorS of rampant black marketeering 

and COMZ's use of scarce transport to move to Paris. In fairness, the First 

Army headquarte rs allowed COMZ little time to establish a depot system in 

Normandy befo re the breakout. Then too, the First Army won few friends at 

COMZ or other ec helons for hoarding and even outright thievery to build up its 

stocks. Such practices may have been understandable , given scarcities and the 

widespread occurrence of stich chicanery, but they only confirmed the First 

Army headq uarters image as a prima donna organization and did little to help 

the development of an efficient theater logistical structure. 

With adjacen t armies, the First Army headquarters exchanged lia ison office rs but naturally left most of the coordination of movements to the army 

group headq uarte rs. Re lations with Dempsey 's British Second Army headquarters, especially after Normandy, were cordial but distant, as the two forces, for 

the most part, moved independently of each other, conferring only periodically 

to sort out their boundary problems. Relations with the Ninth Army headquarters after its arrival on the First Army's northern Oank in October were much 

warmer. The friendship between Simpson and Hodges ensured a close cooperation that paid major dividends in the Battle of the Bulge, when the two headQuarters worked out troop movemen ts with an inc redible degree of informali ty. 

With Patton's Third Army headquarters, the relationship was more tempestuous if somewhat removed. Many on the First Army staff had served with Patton 

in Tunisia and, by and large, dismissed him as a glory-hunting adolescent, an 

impression that his exploits and the publicity surrounding them during the summer of 1944 only seemed to confirm. Then came the Bulge, when the First 

Army appeared to have been rescued by Patton. Not surprisingly, Hodges and 

his staff felt that they had a point to prove in the spring campaign. 

In its supervision of the corps, the First Army headquarters evolved one type 

of reI ali on ship with the VII and XVII I Airborne Corps and another with its brother 

corps. Under the aggressive, magnetic Collins, the VII Corps became the favored son, receiving the finest div isions and the best terrain avenues. Through 

his enormous innuence with both Bradley and Hodges, Collins revised COBRA to 

his own design, induced Hodges to continue the September offensive and drive 

into the I-Hirtgen Forest, and bypassed the First Army headq uarte rs to arrange the 

link up near Paderborn with the Ninth Army. Given his success, the First Army 
Conclusion 293 

commander and statTpretty much let the VII Corps headquarters do as it wished, 

seldom asking questions. I-lodges kept closer watch over Ridgway's XVIII Ai ~ 

borne Corps, but his hi gh regard for Ridgway, a fe llow infantryma n and Ma rshall 

protege, was such that he tended to blame any problems on Ihe division com~ 

manders. The commanders of the 1I1 , V, and X IX Corps were not as fortunate. 

Hodges possessed littl e confidence in Millikin, Gerow, or Corlett, an attitude 

expressed in repeated requests for detailed reports, occasional micromanagement, 

and pressure to speed up their advances, despite the First Army commander's 

nea rly complete absence from the front during the crucia l months from Septem~ 

ber through February. When pressure did not produce the desired progress, dark 

hints of impending relief soon followed. 

Perhaps no part of the First Army headquarte rs' story has been more co ~ 

troversial than its policy on reliefs. Bradley and Hodges have come under heavy 

fire from historians Russell Weigley, Dani el Bolge r, and others who argue that 

the First Army commander and sta ff acted too quickly 10 fire corps and div ~ 

sion commanders, thereby instilling overcaution in the remainder. The First 

Army commanders do appear to have been quicker than most to relieve subor~ 

dinates who were not making desired progress, and the reliefs do seem to have 

had a chilling effect on at lea st some lower~level eche lons in the conduct of 

operations. Neverthe less, many of the reliefs seem just ified. General William 

E. DePu y and other veterans o f the 90th Infantry Division later admitted that 

their unit, vicli m of two ea rly reliefs, badly needed a shakell p. As for the reliefs 

ofeorlett and Millikin, a good case can be made for either side, but most il i~ 

tary analysts would agree tha i a commander should have subordinates in whom 

he has confidence, a qualit y absent in Hodges' relations with both gene rals. 

Quick re li efs were by no means uncommon in an Army that believed in the 

supreme importance of the commander's will and took as a model Pershing's 

wholesale reliefs in the Mellse~Argonne ofTensive during World War I. Whether 

the reliefs rea lly improved uni t performance is an issue that can be resolved 

only on a case~ y~case basis. ~ 

In the course of the campaign in France and Germany, the difficul ty and 

variety o f the operationa l conditions and challenges faced by the Fi rst Army 

headquarters compare with those of any other American army echelon in the 

war. For the massive amphibious operation on D~Day, the headquarters' me~ 

thodiea l planning style was admirably suited, even if lhe staff placed too much 

faith in a llp er~comp ex priority system and neglected plans for the pOSt~NEI'~ 

TUN E phase. Positional warfa re in Normandy and along the German frontier 

rendered relatively easy the problem of control and communications, but the 

supply crisis also demanded improvisation. Mobile warfare did not come as 

natura lly to the First Army headquarters. In the pursuit, it had to overcome the 

need to know and control every deta il, allow subordinate echelons mo re discretion, and become used to making quick, instinctive decisions on the basis of 

incomplete information. The use of radio and liaison planes and the innovation 

of a tact ical eche lon helped, but the First Army headquarters faced a constant 

struggle to maintain the proper balance in the tactical echelon between the 

need for more people and the need for a small, mobile command post. The 
294 A Comlllolld Post (1/ H'iu· 

Ardennes counteroffensive highl ighted the headquarters' strengths and weaknesses. It showed the siaff's resilience , its technical skills in mov ing troops, 

and the resourcefulness of its logistica l organization, but it also showcased the 

inadequac ies of the informat ion-gatheri ng system, the tensions within the genera l staff, and the lack of vigorous leadership from the commander. 

Whatever problems the First Army and other army headquarters encountered, the Army, by and large, regarded experience as having confirmed its 

doctrine for a rmy echelons. The First Army headqua rters left Europe before 

the theate r's Genera l Board began its analysis of lessons learned, but the board 

still drew heavily on the First Army's extensive aft er action reports. 6 In the 

years aner the war, First Army staff chiefs publ ished extensively on the work of 

their sections- Carter and Patterson writing lengthy reports, McNamara publishing his memoirs through the Quartermaster School, and Hart, Medaris, and 

Grant Williams producing articles in branch journals. 7 When the Army's new 

doctrinal manua ls on army echelons and staff work appeared in the late I 940s, 

they e laborated on the oft sketchy form of the prewar large-unit ma nua ls, stressing the need for an army commander to engage in long-range planning but 

alte ring little the basic role of the field army. The principle of the sole authority of the commander again received heavy emphasis. The use of tec hnica l cha nne ls by staff officers was limited 10 routine technical repo rts and "technical 

instr uctions not involving variation from command policies and directives." 

Doctrine for suc h functions as forwa rd and rea r echelons and the ro le of a 

lia ison officer showed litt le change.

R Despite the recommendations of the General Board, the tab le of organ ization tha i appeared in March 1947 provided 

only a bare bo nes headquarters struc ture , cutti ng civil affa irs, th e armored section, and photo interp retation but adding a transportation sectio n and a ligh t 

av iation seclion.

9 

By 1947, of course, mosl of the First Army headquarters of World War II had 

moved on to other duties. One who did not, General Hodges, would remain the 

First Army commander until his retirement in 1949. His old friend and predecessor, General Bradley, served as Army ch ief of staff and cha irman o f the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff during the turbulent years of defense unification and the Korean 

War. In Korea, Kean, the good staff officer, became a division commander, and 

he later commanded the Fifth Army prior to his retirement as a lieutenant general 

in 1954. Myers likewise reached three-star rank, serving as depu ty chief of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group in South Vietnam in the late 1950s. Dickson, 

still a colonel, retired in 1945 on physical disab ility. He devoted the rest of his 

life to his warehouse business and his argument that he had so unded the alarm in 

the Ardennes. His old nemesis, Thorson, stayed in the Army and became the 

inspector general of Europea n Command. For many of Ihe young special slafT 

heads, the ir service with the First Army headquarters launched them to distinguished careers. Hart rose to lieutenant genera l and commander of the Second 

Army. McNamara served as Army quartermaster general and the first director of 

the Defense Supply Agency. Medaris enjoyed a high profile as director of the 

Army Ballistic Missile Agency in the post ~S ptll'ni k years, while Carter was governor o f the Panama Canal Zone. From the G- 3 section, John L. Throckmorton 
COllclusion 295 

served as Genera l Westmoreland's deputy in Vietnam and led troops sent to quell 

the Detroit riots. And a lawyer in the G- 5 secti on, J. Strom Thurmond, became a 

governor, senator, and presidential ctll1didate. 1O 

On ba lance, the First Army emerges as a solid, competent- if not especially 

brill iant- headquart ers. At the First Army command post, the U.S. Army's European theater had its most seasoncd hi gh-level stafT, much of wh ich had served in 

thc Army's ea rlicst actions in the thcater. Proud of th eir status, the veterans of the 

First Army staff could be sensiti ve of their prerogatives, and echelons above, 

adjacent, and below often fo und the staff aloof and a bit tOllchy. The strength of 

the First Army headquarters lay in the technical expe rtise of th e special stafT, 

which, time and again, demonstrated flexibility and ingenuity in getting resources 

to the battlefield. The commande rs and operators on the general staff seldom 

displayed the same originality in planning and in allocati ng those resources, although critiques of the First Army headquarters often unde restimate the doctrina l conSl'raints and the missions, terrain, and mea ns given it by other echelons. 

Notwithstanding its quirks and occasional blunders, however, few staffs could 

match the First Army's for diligence and conscientiolLs att ention to detail. That 

work paid dividends, in the success of D-Day, in the breakout from Normandy, in 

the enve lopment to the Seine, in the repulse of the last great Germa n counteroffensive on the Western Front, and in the se izure of th e Remagen bridge and the 

final race across the German pl ain. Of all the American army headquarte rs in 

Europe, only the First Army's served continuously from OMAIIA Beach to the 

Elbe in the final campaign to overthrow Hitler's Germany. 
Notes 

I FM 100- 15, Field Service Regulations: Large,. Ullits. [942. p. 5 1; War Department FM 

10 I- I O. SflIffOfficers Field MUll/wi: OrgtJlli:.:alioll. TeclllliC(l1 ali(I Logistical D(II(1 (Washinglon. 

D.C.: War Department, 10 October 1943), p. 108. 

I Griffin. The Direcled TelesCOIJc. p. 27. 

J IllIcrv, author wilh lIains, 29 Mny 91, pp. 25- 26. 

' 11l1crv, Murray with Myers. 15 Apr 74, p. 7. For 111 0rc on Ihe coope ration of the " Forty 

Thieves:' as Bradley dubbed the First Army special starr chiefs. sec Imerl'. Murray with Pal!crson. 

23 Aug 73, p. 18. 

, Sec Weigley. Eisel/hower's Lielllcll(IlI/s, p. 602; Bolger. "Zero Defects," pp. 61 - 73; 

Brownlee and Mullen. Cllul/gill}; (III Arm)'. pp. 16- 17.3 1- 32.35 . 

• Rpl. U.S. Army, ETO, General Board Report on the Organization of the Army Ueadquarters 

aud Headquarters Company, Study 24, pp. 2- 12. 

1 MS, Carter, Employment and StafTProcedures: Ltr, Jacks to author, II Dec 96; MeNamarn, 

Quarter/lwster Activities: Han, "Arti llery With an American Army in Europe": Charles E. /-I art, 

"Artillery Representation on a High Level Before and During Combat," Field AI·tilleIJ,Juunwl 

38 (September- October 1948): 208- 13: John 13. Mcdaris, " Fi eld Service in the First Army: 

Ordnance Mai ntenance Mee ts the Test of Velocity Warfare," Ar/lly Onillallce 28 (JanuaryFebruary 1945): 66; Williams, "First Army's ETO Signal Opemtions." 

I Department of lhe Army FM 100- IS. Fic'" Sen'ice Reg ula/iul/.r: Larger Ulli/s 

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 19S0), pp. IS, SS- 60. Quote from Department 

of the Army FM I Ol- S, SllIff Officers Field MOllual: SWff Ol-gmli:atioll lll1d Procedllre 

(Wash ington, D.C.: Department orthe Army, July 1950), p. 17, and see also pp. 1- 31,38.48. 

55- 57. Depa rtment or the Army FM 100- 10. Field Sen,jce Regulatiolls: Admillistratioll 

(Washington. D.C.: Department of the Army. September 1949). pp. 150- 5 I, 180-81. 191 - 94: 

Department of the Army FM 100- 5, Fieltl Sen 'ice Regll imiol/s: Opemflolls (Washington. D.C.: 

Department orthe Army, August 1949). pp. 23- 24 . 

• Rpt, U.S. Army, ETO. General Board, Report on the Organization orthe Army Headquarters 

and Headquarters Company, Study 24, pp. 2- 12; TOE 200- 1 T. Heill/quartcrs. Army (FieM. ZI). 

War Departmcnt, I March 1947, Organizational History Branch, CMH. 

10 Roger J. Spiller, cd .. Dic/iollory af AlI/criC(1II IJiograplly (Wcstport, Conn.: Greenwood 

I'ress, 1984), p. III ; Murray, "Courtney 1·lodges," p. 25; Obitu,lry, "William Benjamin KCllll." 

ASl'emb/y (March 1982): 119: Obituary. "Samuel Leslie Myers," Assembly (March 1991 ): 136: 

Obituary. "Bcnjami n A. Dickson," Assembly (Septembe r 1978): 128: HRC 201. Truman C. 

Thorson, Histori cal Records Branch, CM Hi HRC 20 1. Charles E. Hart. Historical Records 

Branch. CMH; HRC 20 1. Andrew T. McNamara, Historical Records Brauch, CMH: I·IRC 20 1, 

John B. Mcdaris, Historica l Records Branch, CM H; !-IRC 201. William A. Carter. Historical 

Records Brnnch, CM I'I; IIRC 201. John L. Throckmorton . Historical Records Branch, CMII. 
Appendixes 
" " " 

" " " " 

Tobie ofOrgonilotion 

No. 200-1 

Uml 

4 

Appendix A 

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY WAR DEPARTMENT. 

Designation: Headquarters, ' ___ Army WASHINGTON. July I. 1942 

9 [ IO[ II 1I2[ 13 1I4[ 15 [1 

""":ani c<b<1on R<Mc<hdOl'l ."""', 
" Supply(S2l) _____ _____ _____ ... _ .... '" .... II) . "J .-.... ...... ..... 1'1 (6) (7) I ,k'; •• 1. jod~, ><I,,,,, ... ', 

" Supply (82~) ........ ...... (2) _ (2) (2) """"'" I "'I'IIly. mod",,!: I " Tr:I1Isporu'",<I (8Il) .•.• ........ (2) (2) (2) ""ppIj' and cJotic;d. ordr.lt!c<; I 

" s",rr ",,'Sc.nt ;n<ludin~ ••.•.••.••.•.• , , " • , - • 20 35 ;uppIy. gen=!. ~ " C~;fioation >POCi,),,, (275) nJ (I) (I) Olhets <~. w .. " .. 1'>l. " Clorl«OSS) ._ ((11)5) (21 nJ -- '" I'J 11 III I" In (8) (16) 'Cb«ir",,,,,,,, and ""ii"" 

" Clork ... ni<>I)"(I%) •.• (1). (I) (l) ~~~ 

" Clerk. v<1.rin1fY (250). _. _ •..•.• _ .•..• .... I" (I) (I) 'I for clasoirlC;"''''' ''''''''''', " Oporalio .. (814) ...•.•.••.•.••.•.••..•.• I'J (2) -- l'l .... (I) (I) (7) 'From lnfon,'Y. oJl """'" " Supply (821 ) .•..•.•..•.•.•..•.••.•.••.••. I" ((' 1'1 1'1 l'l from ~i ... :ann or .<en'k\:. 

" Tr:ln>pon""", (81 J) •.•.••.•.••..•.• ............ ....... '" IJ) I'J 'Vctmll3l')' Corps. 

" S<:rge,nl. including _ •..•.•.••.•..•.••.• " , , " , , , , , " " Trans;.orwi<>n f...-...h<d by 

" Ckrk (405) •.••.•.• (('!lS) I" (2) (II) I" (2) (2) (2) (I) (8) (19) :umy ho:>dqU.1nol'> oomp>ny 

" Hy~kni"(120) (I) . '" '" .00 :umy qltln,mw«, ie" ~ Op<rnli<>n'(81~1 .•.•..•.•..•.•..•..•.•. I" ((l '" (I) . (S) . (2) •..•.•• '" (10) .~ 

" Supply (821) ,. ,' ".,. " . , .. ' . ' ...•..•.••. ...... .............. .......... .... ((J ..... . ...... . ...... ('l (2) (2) Thi> I>bI< in<lOOo pmoM<l oM T.",hnid.n. ~r.ldo 3 } r (!: j.l for I>:odqu>nm of. ~"" """l' H T.:oh"i<~Sr.l<k~ . " " 106 roru.'SI'''l:<>f'''''Y""",,",>nOl 48 T~dm'<i,n.sr.,,!o:S ",c:lII<l,"S •.••.•. M " " " " " , " " 25 18 " , " 109 'IJlO 'OI)IS. c,<~ «>rfI' to!'>-

49 1'''''''0. iiI'>' cI.ss " " 8--1 ;i"m~ of C<I<p$ trOOpi ODd 3 ,. Classilic."CHI .peei,li" (215) . .. (" "l i I) di''' ..... in Kti,,, op<rnicw. 

" Ckrk (OSS) ••.•.••. 3 . " 1)( In I'J ((J 10, 114) (J) .... ,,- (Il (I) '" .•.••.. (9) (23) IkJlOOOi.s .. ;i,<. """'I">" 

" Ckrk (405) •..•.•..•.• , (OJ (2) (2) '" (2) ,OJ (21) (10) (I) (I) 2) (I) ((' (2) (2) ,., (I) (lS) 6) ",1011. >nO mi«ion o( tho """l' 

" Cic-rk (055) •.•..•.•.••.•.••.• • '" IJ) '" IJ) IJ) (19) 10, III 3) (2) ((' (3) (3) (J, · (27) (46) ond .. tho ,h<;o", of opm. ~ Ckrk (OSS) •.•..•...••.•.•..•.••.•..•.•.. ..... (OJ IJ) l'l IOj 10, (2S) IJ) '" " (4) (4) (6) · (26) (SI) Iicw.~ondorgon.ation 

" Drnftsm.n (010) .•..•...•..•.•..•.•..•.. .. '" (2) (2) I" (11) •.•..•• (II) <>f1hc ~ ond <>fit> 

" Drnf''''''''" (070) .••...•.•..•.•.••.••.•.. , - IJ) '" '" l'l (IS) •.••.•. (lSI ""'.",.".,)' be ",o,lint<!. 

" Drnft..",n. IO"'f'h<>no .nd Tho ... ",1 number .)mboi 

10lesrnph (07S) •.• '" (!) . ,.". ' ...... --- (II $ boooll ,n """"",I.,, .. , " .. " Droit"",,". «kp"""" ,nd IA"P"f>~' pon .1 '"k~",ph (075) •••.•.••.•••• .. ..... ......... •• '" (I) . ............ ... .. " . , . , . " . , (I) <p<cio1i<1 Il«ipolion. A .....,. 

" Pcrsonnell""hn,oi .. (290) •.• , (2) IJ) (2) bet bel<M' SOO rtf", to .. ",. M $IO,i,,;,i"1112) .••.•.• .. ('1) ..... ........... , I'J I'J 0",,"110.,1 sp«1>li't ,"'110<.: 

" SIO,i"ki.n (212) •.• I" '" ., ((' """lif""'llQII "'~'" .. f"""" S'clIOJ;"'plIcr (21 J) ....... .............. '" I" I" I" (2) (10) ((' (I) , I) (!) I" (I) (!) (1) (I) (9) (19) m IIR 615·26.".umber ,""'~ 

" S,ooogrJphor(21l) ..•.••.•.••.•.••.•..• ( ' 1)01) (2) (l) IJ) '" (1 4 ) ('2) OJ I) (1) (2) (2) ", ..•.•.. (11) OS) SOC) ",fe.. to • mili"")" ~ StollOllrJph<r(2IJ) •.•..•.••.•.••.•....• ", '" '" I" IOj (12) '" '" (I) (1) (3) (2) '" •.•.••. (13) (lS) """"",lion>! >j>«w;>1 I;>lcd in ~ Typi" (24;) ••.••••.••.•.••.•.••.•.••.•.• '- '" I" In I" (0' (2) ((, I) (!) (I) (I) IJ) (I) (10) (16) Cifl:l1i:1r 1'0. 14. W". Ikp;>rt. 

" Typi>1 (247) ••.•.•.••••.•.••.•..•.•.. • (('1)5) (2) (2) I'J (10) I" '" I) (I) (3) (I) I" (I) (16) (6) rno:tII. 19-11. 

" T)'pl" (247) .• ((l l)l) IJ) '" I" (1 4) I'J ((J " (S) (ll (OJ ...... · (19) (33) 

os T.,.,I.nli,l«I •.••.•.••.• . , " " '" • " .. 271 ." " " 20 '10 •• JS 26 " '1 231 "" " """,,-,,,t< .............. , ". " " , " " '" " , " " " , 61 38 • 12 146 '" 

IA. G. 320.2 (6-2942).] OfflCV.L O. C. ~\'\RSIIALL. 

By ORDER OFTIlE SKRIITAln'OF W AR ; l.A.ULlo. ChhfofSw$ M"1t' (;r",,,,,I. 

"A(/juranl (;"""",1. 
Appendix B 

FIRST U.S. A RMY 

STAFF MEMORANDUM 24 

18 MA RCt·1 1944 

COMMANf) AND OPERA TIONAL CONTROL 

I. [ n orde r to clarify th e subject of "Command" insofar as it re lates to th e 

relationship betwee n spec ial staff section chie fs of this headquarters and the 

troops of th e ir branch, th e policy of th e Commandin g Ge neral is herewith set 

fo rt h. 

2. "Comma nd" insofar as it pertains 10 th e First Army ca n be defin ed in two 

categori es: 

a. Compl ete command, whi ch entai ls a ll the prerogati ves of a Commander 

as described by Army Regulati on 600- 20. This may well be exemplifi ed as Ih at 

rel ationship wh ich normally exists betwee n a reg imental or sepa rate battalion 

commander and his subordi nates. 

b. Ope rati onal control, wh ich entails those pre rogati ves of a Commande r 

de legat ed to an indi vidual to enabl e him to direct, control , and coordinate the 

activitie s of a la rge number of units, and at the same time reli eving him from 

the maximum of administrative responsibilities. 

3. This ope rational control , as indicated in 2b above , is that authorit y which th e 

Commanding Genera l desires to de legate to the spec ial sta ff section chi efs o f 

this headqu arters. Some of the more impo rt an t responsibili ti es and limitations 

arc as foll ows: 

a. Those fun ctions whi ch a re de legated to spec ial staff scction chi efs to 

exe rc ise over th e troops of th e ir braneh are as follows: 

( I) Transfe r of personn e l between subordin ate Army units to the ext ent that 

recommend ations wi ll be made to the Adjutant General for transfe rs fO fTic~ 

ers of company grade and enlisted personne l, and to th e G- \ for fi eld grade 

Offi ce rs. These recommendations will be concurred in and orde rs iss ued uto ~ 

mati ca lly, exce pt in unusual cases, when th e maile r of tra nsfer may be placed 

before th e Chief of Staff for dec ision. 

(2) Iss uance direct to subordina te Anny units in th e name of th e Army Com~ 

mander of normal operating orders and instructions necessary to the cco ~ 

pl ishmcnt of th e mission. 
Appendixes 301 

(3) Prcparat ion, publ ieat iOll, and supervision of execu ti on of techllica I train· 

ing directives, mcmoranda, orders, and other similar publications of a lechni· 

cal nature which pertain 10 subordinate Army units, in the namc of thc Army 

Commander. 

(4) The reallocation of supplies within subordinate Army units wherever 

necessary to accomplish thc most satisfactory results. 

(5) Remark or recommendation on efficiency reports and on recommenda· 

tions for the prol11 otion, decoration, and reclassification of personnel of sub or· 

di nate Army units. For this purpose, all documents of this nature will be rOLlted 

10 G- I, who wi ll note them and immediately circulate them to the spccial staff 

section conce rned prior to ge neral staff or CO l11mand action. 

(6) The issuance of necessary orders in combat to move Army service troops 

within the Army zone of operation whe rever such moves are indicatcd to best 

accomplish the mission. All such moves will be coordinated with other intercstcd sections of the headquarters. 

4. All othcr elements of command will be retained by the Army Commander. 

Source: Rpt, u.s. Army, First U.S. A rmy, Report or Operlltions, 20 October 1943- 1 August 

1944,7 vols., 1:1 7- 18, CMH Library. 
Append ix C 

LOCATIONS OF FIRST ARMY COMM AND POSTS 

Locations of the Tactical Ec helon 

Place F/'O II/ 7'0 

Sept Fre rcs . Aug 4 Aug 14 

Lc Till eul ......... . Aug 14 Aug 15 

Domfront ......... . Aug 15 Aug 21 

COulcrn e........... . .... . .... . Aug 2 1 Aug 23 

Mailteboi s (ncar Blcvy) ........... . ....... . Aug 23 Aug 27 

AufTorgis (near Rambouill cl) . ...... . . All g 27 Scp 1 

Scnlis .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. ... .. .. . . Scp I Scp 4 

Vill qlli Aum l1l (ncar Chauny). Scp 4 Sep 8 

l-I am-sur· Hcure . . .. ... .. ... .. .... Scp 8 Scp II 

Lcs Communes (near HlI y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . Scp II Scp 17 

Fays (ncar Vcrvicrs) . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . . . . Scp 17 Oct 26 

Spa .... .. ... . . . . . . . .............. . . . Ocl 26 Dec 18 

ChaudrOlltaine (with Command Eche lon ) ..... .. . Dec 18 Dec 22 

Tongrcs (with COlllmand Echelon) ....... . . Dec 22 Ja n 18 

Spa (with COlll lllllnd Eche lon) ... .. .. . . Jan 18 Mar 3 

Stolberg . . . . . . . . . . . . Mar 3 Mar 9 

Duren (with Command Eche lon) . . Mar 9 Mlir 16 

Euskirehen (with Command Ec he lon) .. . ... . Mar 16 Mar 30 

Fre linge ll .. .. .. . .. .. . . . Mar 30 Apr I 

Marburg (joined by Command Echelon) . ..... . . Apr I Apr 15 

--~--------~------ --

Location s of the Command Echelon 

Place 

Grandcarnp les Bains .......•. 

Haute Che rnin (ncar Voui lly) . . 

C<Ul isy . . .. . . _ ...... _ 

Coul ouvray Boisbenstre 

Hal ein e . . . . ....... _ 

Bl evy . . . ....... _ 

Versaill es ............. _ 

Vi llNlui cr-Aulllont ....... . . . . . .. .• . . . . .. . . ..... 

Ham-sur-I-Ie ure ...... .. .. . . . . . . .... ... . . 

Les Communes (ncar Huy) . . . • . .. . .. . . ..... 

Fays (ncar Vcrviers) ...... . .. .... . . . ..... . 

~ .... _ . . ...... _...... . . ... ... . . . . . . . 

Chaudfontaine .. . ......... . .... . ... ... . .. . •. . 

Tongrcs (absorbed Supp ly Echelon ) . . ... .. . . ... . 

~...... . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . ...... . 

From 

Jun 9 

Jul 2 

Aug 2 

Aug 12 

Aug 23 

Aug 27 

Sep 2 

SCI' 6 

Scp 10 

Sep 14 

Sep 19 

OCI 25 

Dec 18 

Dec 22 

Jail 18 

", 

JuJ 2 

Aug 2 

Aug 12 

Aug 23 

Aug 27 

Sep 2 

Scp 6 

SCI' 10 

SCI' 14 

SCI' 19 

Oct 25 

Dec 18 

Dec 22 

Jan 18 

Ma r 9 
Appendixes 

Place 

Duren .......... . 

Eusk irchen ........... . . 

Bad Godesberg .. . ....... . 

Marburg ...... . 

Bad Wi ldungen ...... . 

Weimar (absorbed Rear Eche lon) 

*Thereafter en route to the United States 

Frum 

Mar 9 

Mar 16 

Mar 30 

Apr 5 

Apr 15 

Apr 24* 

Locations of the Supp ly Echelon 

Place From 

Grandcamp les Bains Jul I 

Vouilly .. ..... . ...... . . . Jul 4 

Canisy ........ . .. . Aug 3 

SI. Pois ...... . .... . Aug 13 

Coulcrn e .......... . . . .. . . . Aug 24 

Blevy ........ . . ... . Aug 27 

Versailles ....... . . . Sep 2 

Villequier-Aumont . . .... ... . Sep 6 

Ham-sur-I'le ure ..... . Sep 10 

Les COlllmunes (near !-I uy) .......... . Sep 14 

Fays (ncar Verviers) . ........... . Sep 19 

Spa ..... .............. . ... . Oc t 2S 

Micheroux ......... . Dec 18 

Tong res. . . . . . . ............. . .. ... .. . . . . . Dec 23· 

*Supply Ec helon merger wilh Command Echelo n 

Locntion s of Ihe Rear Ec he lon 

Pltlce 

Valognes .......... . ...... . 

SI. Lo .. . . ..... . 

Fourgeroulles du Pl essis (SW ofTeilleul) 

La Perray (ncar Rambouill el) . . 

Charl ero i ...... . 

Soumagne . .... . 

Chaudfontaine .. 

SI. Trond ....... .... . . . • . 

Chaudfontaine ... .. . . . . 

Dure n ... . 

Weimar .... . . . . . 

*Rejoi ned Command Echelon 

Fro/ll 

Jul 6 

Aug 6 

Aug 2 1 

Se p I 

Sep 12 

Sep 22 

Nov 30 

Dec 2 1 

Feb 6 

Mar 20 

May 2* 

303 

To 

Mar 16 

Mar 30 

Apr 5 

Apr 15 

Apr 24 

May 14 

10 

l uI 4 

Aug 3 

Aug 13 

Aug 24 

Aug 27 

Sep 2 

Se p 6 

Sep 10 

Sep 14 

Sep 19 

Oel25 

Dec 18 

Dec 23 

Ja n I 

Tn 

Aug 6 

Aug 21 

Sep 1 

Sep 12 

Sep 22 

Nov 30 

Dee 21 

Feb 6 

Mar 20 

May 2 

SOlIl'ce: U.S. Congrc~s. Sen~ e. Till< "'I"SI AI"III)' ill i:."umpe. by Elbridge Colby. 91st Cong .. 1st ~ess .. 

19M, S. R[lL 9 1- 25. p. 189. 
Appendix D 

TROOP BUILDUP OVER TI-IE NORMANDY BEACI-IES. 6- 30 JUNE 1944 

Dafe Tow! 0 .1/,111,' Ur.ll/ 

D Om's J/ille PIal/lied tlell/ol P/(/}/Ilcd "clI/a/ P{(ll/lIcd Actual 

o Day. 6 61.626 ' 57,500 29.714 34,250 3[,9[2 23,250 

D&D+ 1 6&7 26,492" 26.492 0 

0 + 1. 7 21.238 < 31,569 13,428 20,834 7,810 1 D, 735 

0 +2. , 31.220" 33,349 17,668 21,761 13,552 11.588 

0 +3. 9 23,986 20,291 13,781 15.881 10,205 4.410 

0 +4. 10 23,232 22.571 8,899 12,397 14,333 10,174 

0 +5. " 19,477 18,839 11,932 12.428 7,545 6,411 

0 +6. 12 22,869 17.270 13.483 8.777 9,386 8,493 

0 +7. 13 27,275 17.901 18,708 13.779 8.567 4,122 

D+8. 14 19,713 19,460 8.309 11,481 11,404 7,979 

0 +9, . 15 17,151 22,841 9,280 10,798 7,871 12,043 

0 + 10. 16 20,527 16,696 9,165 11,538 11,362 5,158 

0+11. 17 27,919 17.905 22,036 10.791 5,883 7,114 

D+ 12. 18 15,414 18,312 9.200 12,729 6.214 5,583 

D+I] . 19 18,359 ' 11,165 10,992 8,318 3.186 9,441 

D+ 14 20 24,493 r 3.299 9,403 3.299 9.806 0 

D+15. 21 11,051 1,498 • 1,498 • • D+ 16. 22 11,118 898 333 • 565 

D+ 11. 23 19,592 30,916 • 24,425 • 6,491 

D+ 18. 24 12,425 11,345 15,525 • 1,820 

D+ 19. 25 23,023 9.]51 1,624 1.721 

D+20. 26 21,651 13 ,590 10.141 • 2,843 

D+21. 27 14.634 14,34 1 6.816 • 1.525 

D+22. 28 19,264 9,430 4.540 • 4,890 

D+23. 29 19,138 12, 168 • 1,395 10,113 

D+24 ... . 3. 14,018 1,355 • 3.651 3,698 

"Forces 0 ~nd U 

'Force B or followup 

<Prcloaded buildup 

[nclude~ 2 [,734 troops in prcloadcd buildup 

<Includes 3.581 planned ;.rri\';lls ;.t Cherbourg 

'Includes 5.284 planned arrivals at Chcrbourg 

' Data not readily ('''nibble 

SOIlIT'e: Roland G. Ruppenthal. I.ogislicm 5111'1'01'/ of Ihe A/'f/li" l'. Voillme I: Hoy 1941 Se{Jle",ber 

1944. U.s. Army in World War II (Wa~hington. D.C.: US. Army Center of Milit;try lI istory, 1953). p. 420. 
Appendix E 

SUPPLY BU ILDUI' OVER TH E NORMANDY IlEAC/-IES. 6- 30 JUNE 1944 

[In long Ions} 

Dille To/(/( OM.fI/.f Ur:m 

D Ofl.rs JIII/e Pl(lIlIIcd ACllw/ P/mllled l ief/wI PIt/III/e(1 AC/lw/ 

o Day . . . 6 4.650 2.400 2.250 

D+ I .. ... . 7 9,900 5,100 4.800 

0 +2 . . 8 10,300 5,807 7,000 1,429 3,300 4,378 

0+3 . . ..... • 11,000 5,705 6,600 2,542 4,400 3.163 

0 +4 .. I. 11.700 6.340 7.000 ].942 4.700 2.398 

0 +5 . . 11 12.700 9.452 7.000 7,187 5.700 2.265 

0 +6 .. 12 12,700 9,896 7,000 5.752 5,700 4.144 

0 +7 . . 13 13,700 9,300 8.000 5,46 1 5,700 3,839 

0+8. 14 13,700 12,335 8,000 7,377 5.700 4,958 

0+9. 15 13.700 14.744 8,000 9.008 5.700 5,736 

0 + 10 .. 16 14,700 14,466 9,000 8,535 5.700 5,93 1 

0 + 11 ...... 17 14,700 13,660 9,000 8.876 5.700 4.784 

1)+ 12 .. 18 15,900 14,360 10.200 8,690 5.700 5,670 

0 +13 . . 

" 

15,900 8,339 10,200 5,764 5,700 2,575 

D+ 14 .. 2. 16,000 99. 10.300 676 5.700 323 

D+ 15 . . 21 16, 100 1,558 10,400 1.077 5,700 481 

0 + 16 . . . ... 22 16, 100 1,359 10.400 494 5.700 865 

D+ 17 . . . . 2J 16,300 16.395 10.600 9.996 5.700 6,399 

D+ 18 . ..... 24 16,300 17,521 10,600 11.562 5,700 5,959 

D+ 19 . . 25 16,400 20. 136 10.700 12.994 5.700 7. 142 

D+20 . . . . 26 17,500 2 1,347 11 ,800 14.449 5,700 6,898 

0 +21. ... . 27 17.500 19,699 11 ,800 12,808 5,700 6,891 

D+22 . . .... 28 17.500 22.512 11.800 13.842 5,700 8.670 

D+23 . ..... 2' 17,500 23,040 11,800 14,869 5,700 8, 171 

D+24 . .. .. . 3. 17.500 20.857 11.800 14.361 5.700 6,496 

' No record 

S(!!lI"cc: RUllpcnlh:tI, I.vgi.'·linl/ SUPfiorl of 11,(, ,4,.,,,ies. 10/11111(' I. p. 416. 
Appendi x F 

VEHICLE BUILDUP OVER THE NORMANDY BEACHES, 6- 30 JUNE 1944 

Dale Tota/ a .I/AII,' UrAIl 

o D(/y.~' lillie Plmmed Ae/lla/ P/mmed AC/I((I/ Plallned A ClIllIf 

o Day . 6 6,8 10' 2,870 3,241 2.870 3,569 0 

0&0+ 1 6&7 4,431 D 4,431 0 

0 +1 7 2,82 [< 2,676 1.656 [ .207 1.165 1,469 

D+2 .... 8 4. 85 ~ 4,7 13 2.6 16 3,555 2.238 1, 158 

0 +3 . 9 4.108 4.035 2,879 2.148 1.229 1.887 

0 +4, .. 10 ),920 2,667 2. 11 7 !.579 1,803 1,088 

0 +5 . . II 4.480 3,694 3.001 2, 183 1,479 1,5 11 

0 +6 . 12 4.086 2.645 2,480 1.610 1.606 1.035 

0 +7. Il 4,33 4 3,134 2.685 2.268 1,649 866 

0 +8. 14 4.278 2.388 1,38 J 1.506 2,897 882 

0+9. 15 4,07 1 2,8 19 2,457 1.584 1,614 1,235 

0 + 10. 16 4.41 ] 2,908 2,533 2,228 1,880 680 

0 + 11 . 17 S,OOl 3.58 1 4,359 2.5 [5 642 1,066 

0 + 12. 18 3,760 2.4 11 2.225 2,087 1,535 324 

0 + 13. 19 4.103 3.045 2.781 1.902 776 1.143 

D+ 14 .. 20 4.792 738 2,004 533 2.077 205 

0 + 15. 21 4,220 243 243 0 

0 + 16. 22 4.222 179 146 33 

0 + 17 .... 23 4,118 4.053 3.430 623 

0 + 18. 24 4,03 1 3,866 3,32 1 545 

0 +19. 25 4, 193 2.5 19 1.971 548 

0 +20. 26 4, 124 3,428 2,984 444 

0 +21. 27 4.136 4.160 2,713 1.447 

0 +22 ... 28 3,523 2,080 1.425 655 

0 +23. 29 3,543 3.230 552 2,678 

0 +24 . 30 3.549 2,828 1.466 1,362 

' Forces 0 and U 

"Force 13 or followup 

'!'reloaded buildup 

dlnchl(lcs 3.242 "chicles in prcloadcd bui ldup 

' Data 1101 readily a\'ai1.,ble 

Source: Ruppelllhal. Logislical SUPPO'" of Ihe A"lIIi(! ~. VolulIl(' I. p. 418. 
Appendix G 

DIVISION BU ILDUP. 6 JUNE- 25 JULY 1944 

D;I';.I";oll Plwmell A rl'il'lI/ Actual Arri\'a/ 

1st Infantry Division , ......... o Day 6 June o D,IY " June 

4th Infantry Division D Day 6 June D Day 6 June 

29th Infantry Division D Day 6 June D Day 6 June 

10 I 5\ Airborne DivisiOil" o Dny 6 June o O,IY 6 June 

82d Airborne Division' . . o O,IY 6 June D Day 6 lune 

2<1 Infantry Division D+2 8 June 0 +2 8 June 

90lh Infantry Division 0 +2 8 June 0 +2 8 JUl1e 

2d Armored Division D+4 10 June 0 +4 10 June 

9th Infantry Division D+7 13 June D+6 " }ul1e 

30th Infantry Division ......... . , . 0 +7 13 June 1)+ 10 16 June 

79th Infantry Division 0 +8 14 June D+8 14 June 

3d Armored Division 1)+ 11 17 June 0+ 16 22 JUlIe 

83d Infantry Division. ......... .. . 1)+24 30 JUl1e 0+15 21 June 

8th [nfnnlry Division ......... 0 +29 5 July 0+27 3 July 

35th Infalllry Di vision ...... .. D+32 8 J uly D+32 8 July 

4th Armored Division. ........ D+34 10 J uly D+36 12 July 

5th In fantry Division D+36 12 J uly D+35 " July 

61h Armored Division. ......... . . D+60 5 August D+46 22 July 

281h Infantry Division D+71 16 August D+47 23 July 

71h Armored Division. D+80 25 August D+68 13 August 

80lh In fant ry Division D+88 2 September D+58 3 August 

5th Armored Division. D+96 10 September D+49 25 July 

' Uoth airborne tlivisions hatl been wilhdrawn 10 the United K;n!:dom for refitting by 2S July. 

SOI/I"(:I:: Huppcnllwl. Logislicill SlIflPOri of Ihe Armi ...... lu/"",e f. p. 457. 
Appendix H 

TACTICAL TROOP MOVEMENTS, FIRST U.S, A1Uv[Y 

17- 26 DECEM BER 1944 

From Memo, Lt Col Willilll11 13. KUllZig. Assistant 0 - 3, First Army, for Brig Gell Truman C. 

Thorson, 0 - 3, First Army, 3 Jan 45, OWl-I. These figures do not include the movement of 

vchicles c;lrrying supplies or the shi fiing of ~crvicc units and installations. 

17 Decell/ber 1944 

1st Inf Oil,' 

581h Armored FA I3n (l05 How) 

30lh Inf Di v 

I-IQ & Blry 0. 28SIh FA Obsn 

823d "" TD Bn (SP) 

743d Tank Bn 

531s1 AAA AW 13 11 (M) 

7th Armored Oil,' 

2851h FA Obsn nn (- Otrics A and B) 

101h Armored Div 

471h Re T 

T Force, 121h Army Gp 

99th In!' I3n 

Total: 59,620 troops 

9,868 vehicles 

18 Decemher 1944 

58th Armored FA Bn (105 How) 

Blry C, 563d AAA AW 1311 (M) 

143d AAA Gun I3n (M) 

2901h FA Obsn I3n (- Blry A) 

755 1h FA Bn (155 I-low) 

254th FA Bn (155 How) 

82<1 Airborne Div 

10 I st Airborne Di v 

705 th TO fin (SP) 

Total: 28, 107 troops 

2.859 vehicles 

19 December 1944 

9th Inf Oiv (- 60th & 4 7th RCTs) 

776th FA [3n (155 11 0w) 

CC 13. 3d Armore<1 Oiv 

3d Armored Oi v (- CCs A & B) 

991st FA Bn, Il3try(155 Glin S P) 

2 Btries, 991s1 FA I3n (155 Glin SP) 

Total: 17,24 1 Iroops 

3.829 vehicles 

20 December 1944 

141slAAA Glin 13n (M) 

788th AAA AW On (S P) 

789th AAA AW Bn (S P) 

Rcn Pial & Co 13, 703<1 TO 1311 (SIl) 

507th Engr L Pon Co 

Onc RCT. 841h Inf Oil' 

552<1 AAA AW Bn (M) 

1st Un, 55 I s\ Para [nf Regl 

TOlal: 8,489 troops 

1, 135 vehicles 

21 De(:cmber 1944 

84th InfOi v (- I ReT) 

1871h FA 13n ( ISS How) 

CC A. 3<1 Armorc<1 Oiv 

5 171h I'ara lnfRcgl 

CC R, 5th Armorcd Oil' 

289th ReT, 75 1h In f Oiv 

2d Armored Oiv 

290lh RCT, 75 th Inf Div 

TOlal: 47,026 troops 

8.50 I vchicles 

22 December 1944 

509th Para Inf 13n 

643d TO I3n 

VII Corps 1-1 0 & Corps Troops 

2071h Engr C 13n 

1I061h Engr C Gp 

2371h Engr C On 

2381h Engr C Bn 

994th Eng r TI3 Co 

291s1 ReT. 751h InfDiv 

148th EngrC Un 

1641h Engr C On 

60th RCT, 91h InC Djv 

Total: 23,220 Iroops 

3,839 vehicles 
Appendixes 

23 December 1944 

V[ I Corps Troops 

60th RCT 

738 th Tank Bn (M)(S I')(Minc 

Exploder) 

Co 13. 644th TD Bn (51') 

[[ [Olh EngrCGp 

871h CIlI[ 1311 (M lz) 

2[ [th Gp. HQ 

Tot .. l: 11.852 troops 

2.102 ve hi cles 

24 December 1944 

V II Corps T rOOI)S 

240lh FA I3n (ISS Gun) 

6281h TO 1111 (51)) (- Co C) 

5th Armored Di v (- CC R) 

Co C. 6281h TD Bn (51') 

76th FA 1111 (105 lI uw) 

508th Engr L I'on Co 

5051h Engr L Pon Co 

181h FA Bn(105 Ilow) 

Tot .. l: 13,669 troops 

2,854 vehicles 

AM Anliaircrafl Artillery 

AIV AUlOmatie Weapons ", Ihllalion ", British 

1J1ry Ihl1ery 

C Combat 

CC Combal COllunillld 

e ml Chcmic1Ll 

Co Comp:my 

Dil' Division 

I:ngr Engineer 

A Field Artillery 

Gr Group 

11 011' Ilowil zer 

II Q IlcadqulITlcrs 

25 December 1944 

ntry A, 290lh FA Obsn 1311 

CC Il 3d Armored Diy 

703d TO [311 (- Cos Band C) 

5 [s\ Highl .. nd Diy (Br) 

179th FA Gp 

Co 13, 86th Cml I1n 

CO A, 86th Cmll1n 

To ... I: 22.493 troops 

4.350 vehicles 

26 Dec:ell/her f944 

2591h FA I3n (4.5 Gun) 

83d Inf Oiv 

551s1 FA I3n (240 [l ow) 

[41st AAA Gun 1311 (M) 

Total: 18. 193 !roops 

2,672 vehic les 

Legelld 

" r tnf1111.ry 

l Ughl 

M Mobile 

MIZ Motorizeu 

Obsn ObseT\'atioll 

t'aTa Pa rachute 

Pial I'lmoon 

l'on I'onlon 

Ren Keeonnaissanec 

RCT Regimcntal COl11oot Tc:ull 

Kegl Regimen. 

SO' Self " ropelled 

T" Treadway llridgc 

TO Tank I)estroyer 

309 
Appendix I 

IX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND'S SUPPORT o rnlE FI RST ARMY 

61UNE 1944- 8 MAY 1945 

Targe{ 

Aircraft (in air) .............. .. . 

Aircraft (on ground). 

Locomotives 

Armored vehicles .. 

Motor transport. 

Horse-drawn vehicles. 

GUliS. 

Dumps 

Troop concentrations 

B:lrgcs .......•. 

Railroad cars ............ . 

Bridges ................................. . 

Railroad cuts. 

DeslIYJ)'cd 

941 

556 

1,779 

2,641 

19.716 

2.576 

1,053 

161 

164 

276 

15.298 

225 

3.291 

DOlllflged 

429 

450 

691 

1,722 

10.872 

311 

83 

335 

15,497 

323 

SOl/rcl': Rpl. US. Army, First U.S. Army, Combat Operations DaIJ. First Anny. Europe. 1944- 1945. 

18 Nov 46, eMH LibrMY. 
Bibliographical Note 

Undoubtedly, one of the primary reasons for the small number of se rious 

historical studies on the organization and operation of military field headquarters is the lack of docume ntation on the ir activities. This sta tement might 

elic it an incred ulous respo nse from those familiar with the enormous amounts 

of papcrwork generated by modern st atTs. Nevert heless, whi le ex isting records 

may contain reports, int elligence, and othe r information en tering the command 

post and the orders and policy memorandums emanat ing from it, the intera ctions within the command post- the arguments in mee tings, Ihe conversations 

over telepho nes, the disc ussions ac ross desks- a llloD onen arc lost to the historian. As Ru sse ll We igley has pointed out, developmcnts in tra nsportation and 

communication have made it mu ch easier for princ ipals to talk over the telcphonc or travel by ca r or plane for a face-to-face confere nce, often without 

Icaving any reco rd of the ir convc rsa tion. The problem of documenting the dec ision-making process is a ll the more critica l for historians, sin ce command in 

World Wa r II was much le ss personal and innuences on decisions much more 

dilTuse than had been the case in ea rlier wa rs. 

Fortunate ly, even though it was usua lly difficu lt many yea rs afte r the fact 

to pinpoint the spec ific steps and considerati ons leading to an action with in the 

First Army headquarters, the record containcd much to illumine the way in 

wh ich that organiza tion conducted its business. The headquarters reports and 

di aries were essential. Alt hough they contained siz<l ble gaps, headquarters 

rccords provided some pieces to the puzzle. Personal papers o f partic ipants 

often included memorandums, letters, and other revealing materia ls. Despite 

the biases of the authors and the elTect on memory of the passage of time, 

mcmoirs were among the most fruitful sources. Oral histories lacked reliability 

on specifics but supplied an overall picture and mood absent from the documents. Official Army publicat ions provided the doctrine on which the headquarte rs based its organization and procedures. Finall y, unpublished manusc ripts, official histori es, disscrtations, and olher secondary sources furn ished 

esse ntial backgro und for the sto ry. 

Bibliographies 

The most helpful of tile specia lized bibliographies consulted for this work 

was Gary L. Bounds, La/'ge/' Vllil ... : Thealel' AI'II/y- A/'II/y G/'oup- Field A/'II/y, 

Combat Stud ies Institute Historiograph ica l Bibliography 4 (Fort Leavenworth, 
3 12 A Command Pos/ a/ ~Vt"lr 

Kans.: Combat Studies Institute [CSI], U.S . Army Command and General Stall 

Coll ege, 1984). Also esse ntial were U.S. Air Force, Air Un ive rsity Librar y, The 

Air Ullivel'sily Libral)' flu/ex to Milital)' Periodicals, va ls. 1- (Maxwe ll Air 

Force Base , Ala.: Air University Li brary, 1949- ), and Myron J. Smith, World 

~Vt:II'II , The Ellropean (llId Medifermneall Theaters: All Aili/olaled Bib/iogmphy 

(New Yo rk: Garland, 1984). Other bibliographies consulted included those ci ted 

below. 

Arnold, Louise A. The £1'(1 a/World War II: Mediferl"OlIetlll (lild lVeslern EII/,o ~ 

peal! Theaters a/Opera/ioll, Spec ial Bibliogra phy 16, vo l. 4 . Ca rlisle Barracks, I'a .: U.S. Army Military History In st itute (M I-II), [979. 

Barnard, Roy S. The £/'0 a/World War II: Gelleral Referellce ,.yorks. Biography. 

Special Bibli ography 16, vo l. I. Carlisle Barrack s, Pa .: MI-II , 1977. 

Bayliss, Gwy n M. Bibliographic Gllide 10 Ihe Two World Wars: All Allllolaled 

Survey of English Language Reference Maleria/s. Londo n: Bowker, 1977 . 

Hi gham, Robi n. A Guide to the SOllrces of u.s. Mililary Histol)'. Suppl. 1981 , 

1986, 1993. Hamden, Co nn.: Archon Books, 1975. 

Jessu p, John E., and Coa kley, Robert W. A Guide to the SfI{(ly alld Use ofMilital)' HislOI)'. Washin gton, D. C. : U.S. Army Ce nt er of Military History 

(eM H), 1979. 

Ziegler, Janet. World Wa r II: Books ill English. 1945- 1965. Palo Alt o, Calif.: 

Hoover Insti tution Press, 1971. 

Also examined we re indexes of Military Affairs, Natiollal Guardsmall, Ordnance, and QuarterJllaster Review from 1945 to the prese nt. 

Mililm)l Records 

Natiollal Archi ves alld Records Adminislmtioll 

Since research for this vo lume wa s condu cted, almost all of the World War 

[[ records at the Nationa l Archives and Records Administration have bee n moved 

from the National Arch ives' main branch in Wa shington, D.C., and th e Wa shington National Records Ce nter in Suit land, Maryla nd, \0 the new Arc hi ves II 

branch in Coll ege Park, Mary la nd. When the author resea rc hed this study, the 

records were in Record Groups (RG) 407 (Records of the Adj utant Gene ra l's 

OlTice, 1917- ) and 338 (Records of Unit ed States Army Commands, 1942- ). 

An index was avai lable to guide the researcher through the documents in both 

reco rd groups. RG 407 contained the monthly after action reports and drafts of 

final reports in 101 - 0.3, some plan ning doc umen ts for N EPTUNE in 101 - 0.8, 

and a handful of eonfe renee minutes ill 10 1- 0.5. The G- I records in RG 407 

conta ined plans for NEI'TuNE and OVERLORD, including arra ngements for air 

support, in 101 - 1.5 ; staff roste rs in 101 - 1.8; adm inistra ti ve SOPs, including 

headq uarters security, in 101 - 1.1 5; casualt y figllres in 10 1- 1. 16; and bu ildup 

tabl es in 101 - 1.1 7. The G- 2 records in cl uded the journals and fil es in 101 - 2.2 
Bibliographical Note 313 

and 101 - 2.3 and th e G- 2 estimates in 101 - 2. 15. In the 0 - 3 records wercjournals and files in 10 1- 3.2 and 10 1- 3.3; some plans, particularl y for th e ea rli cr 

period, in 101 - 3.5; fi eld orde rs in 101 - 3.9 and lett ers of instructions in 101 -

3. 11 ; and a valuablc memo randum fil e in 101 - 3.22. The 0 -4 files contai ned 

periodic re ports in 10 1-4. 1 and journals and supporting mat erial in 101-4.2 

and 101 - 4.3. Among the spec ia l staff section reports in RG 407, reports of lhe 

art illery sec tion appea red in 101 - 16.0; reports and notes of the engineer seclion. including a report of the Rhine River crossing, in 101 - 20.0; quarterma ster reports in 101 - 30.0; medical reports in 101 - 26.0; ordnance reports in 101 -

27.0; and signal reports in 101 - 3 1.0. 

[n RG 338 were several files not incorporated into RG 407. The enormOll S First Army adjutant general dec imal fil e can be searc hed lIsing the War 

Department dec imal system. Of spec ial interest we re the 300.6 file, cOlllaining leiters of instructions not in RG 407; the 3 10 records of SOPs; the 320.31 

41 5 fo lder regarding headquart ers reo rgani zation ; th e 353 training fi le; and 

th e 38 1 fil e, containi ng more plans documents. In th e G- 3 fil es were journal 

file s fo r the wint cr and spring of 1945, as we ll as memorandums on ammun iti on allocation, planning papers for NEPTUNE and ECLlI'SI:, minut es of conferences in Ap ril 1945, and a lengthy report of observations of the Fifth Army 

headquarters. The two boxes of signal sccti on fil es contained that secti on's 

correspondence and a host of oth er matcrial, whil e the nine boxes of quartermaster correspondencc included rccords on cverything from graves rcgistration to local procurement. 

This wo rk drew on several other collections at th e National Arc hives. In 

th e 12th Army Group records in RG 33 1 (Records of Allied Operational and 

Occupation Headquarters, World War I I), now located at Archives II , th e 320.2 

and 320. 3 dec imal files of the administrati ve branch, adjutan t gencral section, provided va luabl e data on headquart crs organi zation. In th e records of 

th e SHAEF G- 5, Information Branch, Histori ca l Section (RG 33 1), the 17.1 1 

Histo rical Reports in the numeric subject opera tions fil e cOlHribuled sevc ral 

valuable First Army rcports on G- 5 acti vities during the campa ign. Within 

RG 332 (Records of U.S. Theatcrs of War, World War II), the admi nistrati ve 

fi le of ETOU SA's Historical Division had background mat erial on the origins of the First Army headquarters, while the misce llancous list se ri es held 

several interesting items on First Army operations and logistics in th e spring 

of 1945. For th e story of the First Army headqua rters du ri ng the Baltle of the 

Bulge, the records of th e 71h Armored Division, 607- 3 and 607- 3.2, as well 

as the comba t interviews in fol ders 286- 287, both in RG 407, were helpful. 

Also moved to Archi ves [I , the fil e, SRH- 023, pI. I, in RG 45 7 (Records of 

the Nationa l Securit y Agency), in which th e First Army ULTRA rcport was 

locat ed. provided Colonel Rosenga rt en's important reporl. AI the main branch 

of the National Arc hi ves in downtown Wa shington, the aulhor vi ewed the 

comments on the Fi rst Army versus IV Corps manellvers in November 1941 , 

located in GHQ General Correspondence, 1940- 42,354.2 (First Army), RG 

33 7 (Records of Headquarters, Army Ground Fo rces), and the Di ckman Board 

rcports in box 2 199 ofRG 120 (Records of the Amcriean Expeditionary Forces. 
3 14 A COII/lIIlInd POSf ar War 

World Wa r I). These records, presuma bl y, remai n at th e main bra nch. 

u.s. Army Ceillel' olMiIi/my Nisrory 

In the archi ves a nd library of th e U.S. Army Cent er of Military History 

(CMH) in Wa shin gton, D.C., unpublished uni t reports and histories were the 

most important so urces of informat ion on the story of th e First Army headqlwrtcrs. Espec iall y indispensa bl e was the First U.S. Army report of opera -

tions, fiftee n large, blue-bound vo lumes prepared by the Fi rst Army staff in 

three insta llments over the course oCthe campaign. Each insta llment incl udes 

the main body oCthe report, emphasizi ng operations and lessons learned, and 

annexes fo r most of the genera l and spec ial staff secti ons. The first, in seven 

volumes, covers the pe riod from 20 October 1943 to I August 1944 and incl udes th e First Army's NEt'TUNE pl an. The second, in four vo lumes, co ntinues 

the story from I August 1944 to 22 February 1945; the thi rd, in three vo lumes, 

goes on to V- E Day. These reports are ofte n avail ab le at military install ation 

librari es as well as at e M I-I. 

One of the most vahmbl e feat ures of this report is the ex tensive graphics 

coverage of the campaign. The NEI'TUNE plan an nex contains troop lists, buildup 

sc hed ul es, allocation of ships and craft, and a headquarters planning sched ul e 

for the invasion. The staff section annexes also provide a plethora of pertinent 

gra phs and charts, inCluding those on casualties, replacemen t specia lti es, battlefield appoi ntments, and awards and decorations in the G- I annexes; figures on 

transportation, losses of equi pment at the Battle o f the Bulge, and displaced persons in the G-4 annexes; tables on the c fTcctivencss of First Army allliaircraft 

fire in the antiaircraft anncxcS; charts on the numbcr o f operative tanks and tank 

losscs for thc various di visions in the armored annexes; slatistics on road COIlstruction and a list of bridgcs across the Rh ine in the engincer annexes; rad io net 

dia grams, including one that shows the communications nets among headquarters ships on D-Day, in the signa l annexes; figures on th e flow of prisoners of war 

in the provost marsha l annexes; and in the medi ca l an nexes a vast array of cha rts, 

covering admission to army hospitals by week, type of wou nd, or disease, and the 

incidence of neuropsychiatri c and venereal disease casua lties. 

The final volume o f the report is the essential First Army Combat Operations 

Data . It provides a compendium of information on thc First Army's operations 

an d on thc orga ni zation and activities of the headquarters. Most of its statistical 

tablcs- dea ling with such subj ects as corps frontages, artil lery expenditures, and 

air support- cover the entire campaign rather than th e individual phases. The 

vo lume also ha s several charts showing the organization of the different First 

Army staO' sections at the end of the war, and it suppli es othe r charts showi ng 

coord ination and other standard operating procedures withi n the headqua rters. 

The CM H libra ry and arch ives contai n othcr informat ion of int erest 10 the 

researcher and instructor. This in c ludes th e fou rteen-vol ume 12th Army Group 

re port of operations, thc administrati ve history of the 2 1 Army Group, the provisional engi neer specia l brigade group's report of NEI'TuNE, the V Corps report of operations in ETOUSA, the nine-volume repo rt of the Fifth Army's 
Bibliographical Note 315 

ope rat ions in North A friea and !laly, the Seventh Army's report of operations in 

the invasion of Sicily. and the Third Army's two-vol ume afte r acti on report of 

the campaign in northwest Europc. Thc rcport ofthc provisiona l engi neer special brigade group, in particular, contains plentiful graphic mate rial on NEPTUNE. including a hclpful cha rt showing funct ions and communications li nks of 

agcncies handling thc arriva l, allocation, and berthing of ships. 

Of specia l importance among CMH's collections were the reports of 

ETOUSA's Genera l Board, which met after the war to cva luate thc stratcgy. 

tactics, and admi nistration employed by American forces in the theater. These 

studies contain considerable background data as well as organizational and other 

charts collected as part of the board's wo rk. Essential for th is project was Study 

24, Report on the Organization of the Army Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company. Other significant studies for this work included those cited be low. 

I, Stra tegy of the Campa ign in Western Europe, 1944- 1945 

9, Organization and Functions ofG- 1 Sections in Army Groups and Armies 

18, The Army Tact ica l Information Sc rvice 

22, Control of Troops Bui ld-up in Cross-Channe l Amphibious Ope ration 

25, Organizat ion, Functions, and Operations of G- 3 Sections in Thcate r 

Headquarters, Army Groups, Armies, Corps, and Divisions 

26, Study of Supply and Evacuation by Air 

29, Stud y of Administrati ve Fu nctions of the Army Group Headquarters 

58, Ammun ition Supply for Field Arti ll ery 

11 3, Spec ial Services Organi zation 

129, Mountin g the Operation OVERLORD 

13 1, Psychologicl.l1 Warfare in the Europca n Theate r of Operations 

The CM H a rchi ves and library conta ined severa l other unpublished manusc ripts and documents perta ining to the First Army and its operations. Of these, 

the un publ ished manuscripts, prepared by the CM H stafTto support the ofTic ial 

histori es of World War II , were especially revealing. Thc archives conta ined 

seve ra l by Royce L. Thompson, including those sources cited be low. 

Air Supply to Isolated Units, Arde nnes Campa ign, 16 December 1944- 27 

January 1945. 195 1. 

American Inte ll igence on the Germa n CounterofTensive, I November- 15 

December 1944. 2 vols. 1949. 

Ardennes Campaign Statistics, 16 December 1944- 19 January 1945. 1952. 

Armies Class II and IV Suppl y Shortages, 17 December 1944- 3 Feb ruary 

1945. 1952. 

Employment of Fuzes in the Ardennes Campaign, European Theater of 

Operations, 16 December I 944- Janua ry 1945. 1950. 

Overrunni ng of Installations, the Ardennes Campaign. 1953. 

In the CMH library, research rcvea led an unpublished manuscript on the history of the U.S. Army Command and General StafTCollege, Fort Leavenworth, 
3 16 A COII/mand Post at '''hI' 

Kansas, [88 1- 1963; a study by the U.S. Army Armored School , Research and 

Eva luation Division, on the Rcmagen bridgehead, 7- 17 March 1945; and scv. 

era l unpublished Air Force manuscripts, including those cited below. 

Ackerman, Robert W. The Employment of Strategic Bombers in a Tactical Role, 

1941 - 195 1. U.S. Air Force (USAF) Historica l Study 88. 1954. 

George , Robert 1-1 . Nin th Air Force, April to November 1944. Army Air Forces 

(AAF) Historica l Study 36. 1945 . 

Hennessy, Juli ette. Tactical Opera tions or lhe Eighth Ai r Force, 6 June 1944- 8 

May 1945. USAF Historica l Study 70. 1952. 

Ramsey, John. Nin th Air Force in the ETO: 16 Octobe r 1943 to 16 April 1944. 

AAF Historical Study 32. 1945. 

In Ihe author's files was Timot hy K. Nenninger's unpublished manusc ript on 

John J. Pershi ng and command in the American Expeditionary Forces, 191 7-

1918. Also va luable for the World War I period was Joseph W. A. Whitehorne 's 

unpublished man uscri pt on the inspectors genera l of the U.S. Army, 1900- 1939 

(\993); and two contemporary accoun ts of staff function s by AEF staff officers: 

Avery D. Andrews, A Brief Summary of the Organization and Opera tion of First 

Section (0- 1), General Staff; and George Van Horn Moseley, A Brief Summary 

of the Organization and Opcration of Fou rth Section (G-4), Genera l Staff. Among 

thc documcntation for Edga r F. Raines, Jr.'s forthcoming work on Army aviation 

wc re a roster and a lecture on First Army organization from the papers of Col. 

De lbert L. Bristol, the artillery air ofTieer on the Fi rst Army staff. 

Given the numerous gaps in the rccord, ora l histories oncn proved the most 

enlightening sources on the inne r worki ngs of the First Army headquarters. 

The author conduc ted severa l interviews, corresponded with First Army veter~ 

ans as part of the manuscri pt review process, an d obtained access to interview 

tapes and transcrip ts. All hough time constrai nts did not permit a comprehen~ 

sive su rvey of First Army vetera ns, the author did inte rview, by phone or in 

person, Dempsey E. All phin, Wil liam A. Ca rt er, Edward M. Da nnemiller, Arthur 

Ga rson, Peter C. Hai ns Il l, Chester B. Hansen, William B. Kunzig, John Ray, 

Roger Ray, J. Strom Thu rmond, and Walter W. Wendt. He also inte rviewed William C. Westmore land rega rdi ng Mi lli kin's re li ef at Remagen. As a resu lt of 

the rev iew process, the author obtained val uable comments, by leller or cas~ 

se lic tape, from Dempsey E. Allphin; Robcrt M. Blanchard, Jr.; George W. 

Craw ford; Edward M. Dannemi ll er; Peter C. Ha ins; Frcd W. Jacks; William B. 

Kunzig; Mill er O. Perry; Rogcr Ray; and Robe rt A. Ricsma n. In addit ion, O. 

Patrick Murray ge nerously furnished untranscribed tapes and notes from his 

interviews with assoc iates of Hodges not incl uded in th e Courtney I-lodges Oral 

History Project at MHJ. These included taped inte rviews with Benjamin A. 

Dickson, Samuel L. Myers, and Adolph G. Rosengarten, Jr. , which CM H later 

transc ribed, and notes of conversations wit h Wil liam B. Kean, Nelson M. Lynde, 

Jr., and William R. Silvey. Also significant was an Octobe r 1966 in terview of 

Fie ld Marsha l Montgome ry by John S. D. Eisenhower as part of the laller's 

research for The Bifter Woods. This proved a va luablc source for the discllssion 
Bibliographical Note 3 17 

of the First Army headquarters in th e Battle of th e Bulge. Pend ing determina· 

tion of a final repository, these materials were in the author's fil es at CMH . 

From the CMH library, the autho r obtained Conversations With General J. 

Lawton Colli ns, transc ribcd by Gary Wade, Combat Studi es Institute Report 5 

[Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1983). Another int ervicw, Rom ie L. Brownl ee and 

Will iam J. Mullen III, intcrvicwers, Changing all Army: An Ond I-/;SfOl)l of 

General William £. DePuy. USA Refired (Washi ngton, D.C.: U. S. Army Mili· 

tary History Institut e and U. S. Army Center o f Milita ry History, 1988), was 

avai lablc thro ugh thc Government Prin ting Offi ce. 

u.s. Army Militw)1 I-/;SIOI)I IlIsli l llfe 

The archi ves orthe U.S. Army Military History Institute at th e U.S. Army 

Wa r Coll ege at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, cOlltained seve ral coll ections 

of personal papers essential for this project. Foremost amon g thcse pape rs were 

the headquarters di a ri es prepared by th e aides to th e two commandi ng ge ner· 

als, Lt. Col. Chester B. Hansen and Maj . William C. Sylvan. Most of the World 

War II papers of Gencnll o fthcArmy Omar N. Bradley wcre loca ted at MH I. A 

thorough index helped the author through the Bradlcy Papers. In the archivcs 

too, the author fo und backg round fil es to Forrcst C. Pogue's The Supreme Com· 

mand. Olhc r coll ections pertaini ng to the First Army headquartc rs included th e 

Clay Blair and Charl cs B. Ma cDonald coll ec tions of research materials. Pogue 's 

int crvi ew with Edwin L. Sibert was located in the MacDonald Papers. The di· 

ary and pcrsonal papers of Raymond G. Moses and the interwar files of th e 

Army Wa r Collcge. whi ch contained extensive lec ture notes and course materials, also appeared in thc MHI archives. 

The M HI archives also held one of the largcst col lections o f oral historics Oil 

America n military history in the cou ntry. The Pogue interviews conducted as 

part of Pogue's research for The Supreme Commalld have long provided a critical 

source of information for World War II rcscarchc rs. Especially lIseful for this 

study wcre Pogue's intcrviews with David Be1chem; Charles H. Bonestcel III; 

Omar N. Bradley; Robert W. Crawford; J. O. Curtis; Mi les Dempsey; Benjamin 

A. Di ckson; Courtney H. Hodges; Al bert W. Kenner; Alan G. Kirk; Adolph G. 

Roseng<l rten, Jr.; Walter Bcdell Smith; Kenneth W. D. Strong; and E. T. Will iams. 

The coll ections at MI-II also includcd the Courtney H. Hodgcs Oral History 

Proj ect, consisting of intervicws conducted as part of G. Patrick Murray's re· 

search for a biography of Hodges. Although Murray never finished his biogra · 

phy, the project, with intcrviews of J. Lawton Coll ins, Cha rles E. Hart, Hodges 

family members, Nelson M. Lynde, and Charles G. P<lttcrson, is cssential for any 

serious research on Hodges and thc First Army. Also indispensabl e was the Se· 

nior Offi cers Debriefing Program (latcr known as th e Senior Offi cers Oral History Program), which are interviews of leading Army fi gures by students at the 

Army War College. For the First Army project, Ihe intervi ews consulted wcre 

those with Clwrl es H. Bonesteel III , Brucc C. CI<lrke, J. Lawton Collins, George 

I. Forsythe, Barksdale Haml ett, RobertA. Hewitt, William M. Hoge, Williston B. 

Palme r, Elwood R. Quesada , and John L. Throckmorton. In add ition, the George 
3 18 A Comlll(lnd Pos, {If IVa,. 

H. Decker and Clyde D. Eddleman in terv iews provided a basis for comparison 

with another American army headq uarters staff. 

Dwight D. Eisenhowe/, Presidelltial LibnllY 

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library ill Abil ene, Kansas, contained nume rous collections of persona l papers of great va lu e to the Wo rld War 

II sc holar. While not as extensive as the Bradley Papers, th e Courtney 1-1. Hodges 

Papers provided reveali ng informatio n on Hodges' background and tenure as 

commander o f the First Army. Also va luabl e for th is study we re the papers of 

Ray W. Barker, Harold R. Bu ll, 1. Lawton Colli ns, Elwood R. Quesada, and 

Henry B. Sayler. The library a lso incl uded a collection ofpapcrs from the First 

Army headquarters, many of whi ch were also at the National Archives. 

During the 1970s, the Eisenhower Li brary amassed its own coll ection of 

oral histories pertaining to World War II. Conducted by Maclyn P. Burg, the se 

included several of signi ricance to the sc holar of First Army ope rati ons, most 

notably those o f John W. Leonard, Elwood R. Quesada, Will iam H. Simpso n, 

and Roscoe B. Woodru ff. Thomas F. Soapes interviewed Henry J. Matche tt . A 

se parate in tervi ew with Quesada by John L. Luter, part of Columbia Universit y'S 

oral history coll ection, was also among the Eisen hower Library's interviews. 

Othel' Document Repositories 

Several othe r repositories contained materials that proved inva luable for 

this project. The Spec ia l Coll ections Branch of the U.S. Military Academy Library he ld a substant ial number of Bradley's Wo rl d War [I pape rs that were not 

at Carlisle, and it also had the Benjamin A. Dickson Pape rs, which incl uded an 

often idiosy ncratic but va luabl e memoir by Ihe First Army G- 2 officer. The 

history office of th e U.S. Army Corps of Eng inee rs in Alexandria , Virginia, 

had the memoirs of William A. Ca rt er, Jr., Ihe First Army enginee r, as we ll :IS 

Employment and Stall' Procedures o f Engineers with Division, Corps, and Army, 

a doctrinal sta tement produced by Carter's enginee r secti on after the war. At 

the Library of Congress, Ihe John Toland Papers contained intervi ew notes for 

his book on the Bailie of the Bu[ge. The arc hi ves of the u.s. Army Command 

and Ge ne ra l Sta fT Coll ege at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he ld mate rials on fie ld 

army doctrine fro m inte rwa r courses. 

Published Document Collections 

The published document coll ections examined we re few but significant. 

Most impo rtant, pa rti cu la rly regarding th e strategic co ntext, was Alfred D. 

Chandl er, Jr. , cd., The Papers oj Dwight David E;:"ellhower, vo ls. 3-4 (Ba ltimore, Md.: Joh ns Hopki ns Uni versity Press, 1970). Martin B1umenson, cd., 

rhe Paftol/ Papers, 2 vo ls. (Boston: Houghton Mim in, 1974), a lso provided 

some useful material fro m the viewpoint of the First Army's colorfu l rival. 
Bibliographical Note 3 19 

Memoirs alld Firsthand Accollnts 

Given the shortage of thorough stud ies of the development of field headqua rters in the U.S. Army, the background research for th is analysis rested more 

tha n usual on memoirs. The most important for the pre- World War II pe riod 

are cited be low. 

Bullard, Robert L. Persollalities alld Reminiscences of lite War. Garden City, 

N.Y.: Doubleday, 1925. (See pages 283- 303 for information on the Second 

U.S. Army.) 

Dickman, Joseph T. The Great Crusade: A Narrative of Ihe World W(I/'. New 

York: Appleton, 1927. 

Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs ofU. S. Gmlll. 2 vols. New York: Charles 

Webster, 1885- 1886. (See espec ially 1:254- 56.) 

Humphreys, Andrcw A. The Virgillia Campaigll of '64 and '65. New York: 

Charles Sc ribner's SOilS, 1883. 

Liggctt, !-I utHcr. AEF: Tell Years Ago ill Frallce. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1928. 

Lyman, Theodore. Meade:~' Headquarrel's. 1863- 1865: Lelfers of Colonel 

Theodore Lymall From Ihe Wildenress 10 Appomalfox. Edited by George R. 

Agassiz. Boston: Atlant ic Mon th ly, 1922. 

Ma rsha ll , Geo rge C. Memoirs 0/ My Services ill the World War. Boston: 

Houghton Miffl in, 1976. 

Pershing, John J. My Experiences inlhe World War. 2 vols. New York: Frederick 

A. Stokes Company, 1931. 

Porter, Horace. Campaigning Wilh Gra"t. New Yo rk: Century, 1897. 

Sherman, Wil1iam T. Memoirs of Gel/eml William T. Sherma". 2 vols. Ncw 

York: D. Appl eton, 1875. (Scc espcc ially 2:22- 23, 402- 03.) 

For ann ies in othe r thea tcrs du ri ng Worl d War [I, see Edmund F. Ball, Sltifj 

Officer Wilh Ihe Fifth Army (Ncw York: Ex position Press, 1958); Ma rk W. Clark, 

Calclilaled Risk (New York: Harper, 1950); and Walter Krucger, From DOlI'n 

UI/del' fO Nippon: The SIOI}' of Six,II Army ill World War /I (Washington, D.C.: 

Combat Forces Press, [953). The author also looked at profcssional articlcs by 

stafT officers and observers, such as Cha rles S. D'Orsa, "The Tria ls and Tribulations o f an Army G-4," Military Review 25 (July 1945): 23- 33; Conrad H. 

La nza, "Thc First Army Mane uvers," Field Artillery JO///'JIa/ 35 (NovemberDccember 1935): 540- 65; Thomas M. Spaulding, "Thc Lcssons of thc World 

War as Applied to Our Detailed StafTSystcm," fI({allllyJol/l'lla/ 19 (J uly 192 I): 

57- 64; and Robert J. Wood, "The Fifth Army Lcarncd!" Mililory Review 24 

(October 1944): 45- 52. 

Of thc published memoirs for World Wa r II , Oma r N. Brad ley, A Solt/ied' 

SIOIY (New Yo rk: Holt, 1951), was by far the most helpful for the First Army. 

The manuscript was ghostwritte n by Brad ley's aide , Coloncl Hanse n, and was 

[argely based on the Hansen dia ries, wh ich the aut hor found al MHI. By contrasl, Oma r N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (Ncw York: Simon and 
320 A COII/molld Post af Hi'll' 

Schuster, 1983), cannot be viewed as reliable, since Bradley died before he had 

the chance to review the entire ma nu script. Although Hodges apparent ly made 

some effort to record his reminiscences, he never published his memoirs. On 

the other hand, three of his corps comma nders did, including J. Lawton Collins, 

Lightning Joe: All Autobiography (Baton Rou ge: Louisia na Stat e Universi ty 

Press, 1979); Charles H. Corlett, Cowboy Pete (Santa Fe , N.M .: Sleeping Fox 

Ent er prises, 1974); and Matt hew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper, 1956). For the perspective of a key figure 

within the II Co rps and First Army headquarters, see Andrew T. McNamara , 

Qllar/eJ'lI/aster Activities of II Corps TIIru A Igaia, TUllisia. alld Sicily alld fj'rSf 

Army Thl'll Europe (Fort Lee, Va.: Army Quartermaster School, 1955). For th e 

strategi c context, th e author eX<llll ined Dwight D. Eisen hower, Cr/lsade ill Ell· 

rope (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubl eday, 1948), and Bernard L. Montgomery, 

Normandy fO the Baific (Boston: Houghton Mifn in, 1948). Othe r significant 

memoirs for this proj ect incl ud ed those cited below. 

Bclchcm, David. All ill fhe Day's Marcil. London: Collins, \978 . 

Brawley, John W. Anyway. We WOII: aUf of fhe Ozarks and IlIfO fhe Army ill 

World War II. Marcc line , Mo.: Walsworth Publishi ng, \988. 

Brereton, Lewis H. TIle Brereton Diaries: The mil" ill the Air ill fh e Pac{fic. 

Middle East. (Ind Europe, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945. New York : William 

Morrow, 1946. 

Butcher, Ha rry C. My Three Years With Eisenhower, New York : Simon and 

Schuster, 1946. 

De Guingand, Francis. Operatioll VICTORY. London: I-Iodde r and Stought6n, 

1947. 

Eisenhower, John S. D. Strictly Persollal. Garden Cit y, N. Y: Doubleday, 1974. 

Gavin, James M. 01110 Berlill: Ballies of all A irbo/"lle COII/II/tll/del: 1943- 1946. 

New York : Viking, 1978. 

1·larmon, Ernest N. , wi th MacKaye, Milton, and MacKaye, Wi ll iam Ross. Com· 

bat COII/mander: Alltobiogmplty of a Sofdier. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 

Prentice· Hall , 1970. 

Ingersoll, Ralph. Top Secret. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946. 

Koch, Osca r w., and Hays, Robert G. G- 2 IlIlelligellcefo/, Palfoll. Philadel· 

phia: Wh itmore, 1971. 

Morgan, Frederick E. Overwre to OVERLORD. Ga rden City, N.V. : Doubleday, 

1950. 

Smith, Walter B. Eisel/howed' Six Great Decisions: Europe. 1944- 1945. New 

York: Longman's Green, 1956. 

Truscott, Lucian K. , Jr. Commalld Missiolls: A Persunal StOl),. New York: E. P. 

Dutton, 1954. 

Weaver, William C. Ya nkee Doodle Dalldy. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Bros., 

1958. 

Westmoreland, William C. A Soldie,. Reports. Garden Ci ty, N. Y.: Doubleday, 

1976. 
Bibliogmphical NOfe 321 

Two valuable unit histories by veterans were John Colby, War From lite 

GrOlllld Up: Tlte 90fh Divisioll ill World War /I (Austin, Tex.: Nortex Press, 

1991), and Donald E. Houston, Hell 011 Wheels: The 2d Armored Division (San 

Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1977). 

Several First Army vetera ns wrote accounts in professional journals of their 

ex peri ences with the First Army headquarters and First Army ope rations. These 

included those cited below. 

Bla ke ley, H. W. "A rtillery in Normandy." Field AJ'fillel), JOll/'llal 39 (MarehApril 1949): 52- 54. 

Colby, Elbridge. " Replacements for a Field Army in Combat." III/ollfry Jol//'i/(/1 

60 (March 1947): 12- 18. 

Eise nhower, John S. D. "The Army Tactical Information Services." MilifClIY 

Review 29 (August 1949): 33- 36. 

Hart, Charl es E. "Artill ery With an American Army in Europe." Field Artillery 

JOllrnal37 (January- February 1947): 25-26, 53- 58. 

---. "Arti ll ery Representation on a High Level Before and During Combat." Field ArtillelJ' JOIIl'llal 38 (September- October 1948): 208- 13. 

Medaris, John B. "Field Service in the First Army: Ordnance Maintenance Meets the 

Test ofVeJocity Warfare." Arl/ly Ordllallce 28 (January- February 1945): 66- 67. 

Reeves, Joseph R. "Artillery in the Ardennes." Field Arfillel),Jollmal36 (March 

1946): 138-42. 

Rosengarten, Adolph G., Jr. "Wi th ULTRA From OMAHA Beach to Weimar, 

Germany- A Personal View." Milit{//y AjJairs 42 (Oc tober 1978): 127- 32. 

Will iams, Grant A. " First Army's ETO Signal Operations." Signals 2 (M archApril 1948): 5- I l. 

The most helpful of the journalistic accounts was Ri chard C. Hottel et, "The 

Victor of Aac hen," Collier's (4 November 1944): 17, 49. On the SIAM companies, see also an art icle by a Seventh Army veteran, Walte r B. Potter, "SIAM: 

Signal Information and Monitoring," Mifil(//)' Review (May 1945): 28- 30. 

Official Publications 

The development of American doctrine on field armies has been traced in the 

first chapter. The re levant manuals can genera lly be obtained th rough either the 

CMH or MI-li libraries. Many of these manuals provide charts showing doctrinal 

organization and procedures, such as the diagram of command and statTprocedure 

in War Department Field Manual (FM) 101- 5, SrajJOjJicers Field Manual: Tlte 

Staff al/d COli/hal Orders (Washington, D.C.: Government Printi ng Office, 1940). 

Some of the most significant manuals on this subject include those cited below. 

U.S. Army. Command and General Staff School. Malllla/ /01' COil/mandel'S 0/ 

L(//ge Ullils (Tel/tative), vol. 2, Orgallizaliol/ and AdministratiOIl. Fort 

Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General Staff School Press, 1935. 
322 A Commolld Post al ~Vt-II' 

U.S. Army. Offi ce of the Chief of Staff. Field Service Regulatiolls. Ullifed Slates 

ArIllY. Washington, D.C. : Government Printin g Office, 191 7. 

War Depart ment. FM 100- 5. Field Service Regula/ions: Opem/iolls. Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1941. 

---, FM 100- 5. Tenlalflle Field Service Reglllatiolls: Operations. Washi ngton, D.C.: Government Printing OrTice, 1939. 

---. FM 100- 10. Field Service Regula/iolls: Adm/llis/rafion. Washington, 

D.C.: War Department, 1943. 

---.. FM 100- 15. Field Service Regulatiolls: Larger UllifS. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1942. 

---.. FM 101 - 5. Staff Officers Field Mallual, UI/ifed Stales Arll/Y, eh. I, "Staff 

Principles and Functions." Wash ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1928. 

---. FM 101 - 5. Staff Off/eel's Field Mallua!: The St({U' alld Combat Orders. Washington, D.C.: Governme nt Printing Office, 1940. 

---. FM \ 0 \- 1 O. StaffOffieel's Field Manllal: Olgalliz{t/ion, Technical alld 

Logistical Data. Wash ington, D.C.: War Department, 1943. 

---. Field Service Regula/ions. Ullited Stales Army. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1905. 

---. A Malllwl for Commallders of Lmge Ullits (Provisional). Washingto n, 

D.C.: Government Printi ng Office, 1930. 

---. S/{{U'Off/eers fIeld Mallual. Washington, D.C.: Government Printi ng 

Office, 1932. 

---. Troops ill Campaign: Regula/iolls for Ihe Army of rfte Un ired Srares. 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1892. 

War Department. Ch ief of Staff. Field Service Regulatiol/s. Ulli/ed Slates Arll/y. 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1924. 

War Department . Office of the Chief of Staff. Field Service Regulations. Ulli/ed 

States Army. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910. 

---. Field Service Regulatiolls: Ul1ired States Army. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1914. 

---. Field Service Regula/ions. United S/(Iles Army. 1914. 2d ed. Washington, D.C.: Military Pu blishing Company, 1916. 

Technical manuals provided background ma terial on relevant specialties. 

The most sign ificant manuals used for this study are those cited below. 

War Department. FM [- 25. A I'lI/yAir Forces Field Mallual: Ail' Defellse. Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1943. 

---. FM 3- 5. Chemica! W(lrj(II'e Service Field Manllal: Ta ctics of Chemical 

~¥(lrfal'e. Washingto n, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942. 

--- FM 4- 100. Olganiztllion and Tac/ics of AlIliaircmjt Ar/illel)'. Washington , D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943. 

---. FM 5-5. Ellgineer Field Malll/ol: Engineer Tmops. Wash ington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1943. 

---. FM 5- 6. Ellgilleer Field Mal/ual: Operatiolls of Engineer Field Units. 

Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1943. 
Bibliographical Note 323 

---. FM 6- 20. FieldAl'tillelY: Tactical Employment. Washington, D.C.: War 

Department, 1944. 

--- FM 6- 100. Field Al'tillel'Y: Tactics and Techniques of Division AI'/iIlelY and Higher AI'/illeIJ' Echelons. Washi ngton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944. 

---. FM 8- 10. Medical Field Manual: Medical Sel'vice of Field Uni/s. 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942. 

---.. FM 9- 5. Ordllance Field Manual: Ordnance Sel'vice in/lie Field. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing OlTice, 1942. 

---. FM 10- 5. Quar/ermaster Field Mwwal: Quar/ermaster Operatiolls. 

Washington, D.C.: Govcrnment Printing OlTice, 1941. 

---. FM 10- 10. Qual'termaster Field Mallllal: Quartermaster Sel'vice in 

the Theater of Operations. Washington, D.C.: Government Print ing OlTice, 

1942. 

--- . FM 11 - 20. Signal Corps Field Mallual: Orgalliulliol1s alld Opera-

/ions ill the Corps, Army, Theater of Opemtiolls, and GHQ. Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940. 

---. FM 27-5. Un ited SIMes Army and Navy Mallllal of MilitcllY Govel'llment (Illd Civil Affairs. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943. 

---. FM 28- 105. The Special Service CompallY. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944. 

---. FM 30- 5. Basic Field Mallual: Milit{IIY Ill/elligence. Combat Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: Government Print ing Office, 1940. 

---. FM 30- 25. Mililwy Illtelligence: Coullterintelligence . Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printi ng Office, 1940. 

---. FM 100- 20. COII/II/and alld Employment of Air Power. Washington, 

D.C.: War Department, 1943. 

In a study of an Army organization, tables o f organ ization (TOs) are central. At the Center of Military History, TO 200- 1, Headquarters, Army, War 

Department, I July 1942; TO 202- W, Army Headquarters, Field Army, War 

Department, I July 1929; and TO 202- I- W, Army Headqua rters, Field Army 

(Init ial Organization), Wa r Depanment, I October 1929, were located in the 

Organ iza tiona l History Branch. TO 200-1, Headqua rters, Field Army, War 

Department, I January 1941, was located in the archives of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine COlllmand at Fort Monroe, Virginia. 

Several othe r offic ial publications contributed to this study. In the CM H 

libra ry, War Department, Gel/eral O,.ders alld Bulletins. 1920 (Washi ngton, 

D.C.: War Department, 1921), had mate rial on the Na tional DcfcnseAc t. Also 

there were U.S. Army, Army War College, NOles 011 Liaisoll ill Model'lI Warfal'e (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917); U.S. Army, First 

U.S . Army, Repol't of/he Fil'st Al'my, American Expeditiol/(fI)1 Forces: Organization alld Opemtiol1s (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: General Service Schools 

Press, 1923), an inva luable source on the First Army headquarte rs in World 

War I; U.S. Army, General Service Schools, School of lhe Line , Gel/eral Tactical FUI/ctiol/s of LtIIgel' Ullits (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: General Service 
324 A COlllmalld Pas! al War 

Schools, 1922); and Arthur L. Wagner, OI'gollizatiOiI (llId Taclics, 7th ed. (Kansas City, Mo.: Franklin Hudson, \906). For data on the orga nization of American army headquarters during World War I, U.S. Army, Vlli/ed Slales ArlJlY ill 

'he World WC/J; 1917- 1919, vol. I, OlgallizOfioll o/Ihe Americal/ Expeditioll-

(lIY Forces, 2d ed. (Wash ington, D.C.: U.S. Army Ce nter of Mi litary History, 

1988), was essential. The U.S. Army. Com mand and General Staff School, 

Commal/dallts. Slaj! Facully. alld GradHales. 1881- 1939 (Fort Leavenworth, 

Kans. : Command and General Staff School Press, 1939), and U.S. Army. 

Command and Gene ral Staff School. Graduales a/the General S(ajJalld Service Classes. /941- / 944 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Com mand and Genera l 

Staff School Press, 1944), availab le at the U.S . Army Command and Genera l 

Staff Coll ege a rchives, provided valuable information on graduates of thai 

institution . At the CM H library, u.s. Military Academy (USMA), Associ ation of Graduat es, Register of Gradl/(lres (llId Former Cadets of lhe Uniled 

Stales Milir(/ly Academ)': Eisenhower Cenlenllia/ Edition (West Poi nt, N. Y.: 

Association of Graduates, USMA, [990); War Department, Adjut ant Gene ral's 

Office, Official Arm)' Register. / Jalll/al}' 1944 (WaShington, D.C.: Gove rnment Print in g Offi ce, 1944); and War De partment Technical Man ual (TM) 

20- 205, Dictiol/(IIY of UI/ited Stales Arm)' Terms (Washin gton, D.C.: War 

Department, 1944), also proved to be lIseful refere nces. 

During the years following World War II, the U.S. Army and oth er services 

published officia l histo ri es of the ir role in that conflict. Prepared by professional historians, these studies have been an essential starting point for scholars of that confli ct. The U.S. Army in World War I] series, the so-ca ll ed Green 

Books, conta ins a considerable amoun t of mat eri al on American army headquarters in combat, both in the ope rati onal and th e technical vo lumes. Much of 

the information co ntained in this work but not c ited in the notes came from 

these volumes. For the discussion of operations in Nort h Africa and Sicily, see 

the volumes from the subse ri es on the Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

cited be low. 

Ga rland, Albert N. , and Smyth, Howard M. Sicily ([lid the Surrender of Italy. 

u.s. Army ill World War II. Was hington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Mi litary History, 1965. 

Howe, George F. Northwest Africa: Seizing rile Inilialive ill the West. U.S. Army 

in Wo rl d War II. Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

1957. 

In the su bseries on the European Theater of Operations and the Special 

Studi es subseries, the volumes lIsed for this study included those cited be low. 

Blurne nson, Martin. Breakoul alld PurSllil. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Ce nter of Mi litary History, 196 1. 

Cole, Hugh M. The Ardel1l1es: Baffle ofllle Bulge. U.S. Army in World War 11. 

Washington, D.C.; U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1965. 

Coles, Harry L., and Weinberg, Albert K. Cilli/ Affairs: Soldiers Become Gov-
Bibliographical NOle 325 

emors. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Army Center of 

Mi litary History, 1964. 

Harrison, Gordon A. Cross-Channel Allack. U.S. Army in World War II. Washin gton, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1951. 

MacDonald, Cha rles B. The Last Offensive. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center o f Military History, 1973. 

- --. The Siegji'ied Line Campaign. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1963. 

---.. , and Mathews, Sydney T. Three Baffles: Amaville. Altuzzo. alld Schmidt. 

U.S. Army in Worl d War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1952. 

Pogue , Forrest C. The Supreme Command. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1954. 

Ruppenthal, Roland G. Logistical Support a/the Armies. Volllllle I: May 1941-

September 1944. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D. C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Mi li ta ry History, 1953. 

---. Logistical Support o/the Armies, Voillme II: September 1944- May 1945. 

U.S. Army in Worl d Wa r II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Cente r of Mil ita ry History, 1959. 

Williams, Mary 1-1 ., compo Chronology: 1941- 1945. U.S. Army in World War 

II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1960. 

Among the Technical Services volumes of the Army series, the most helpful are c ited below. 

Beck, AI fred M., et al. The Corps 0/ Engineers: The War Against Germany. U.S. 

Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1985 . 

Bykofsky, Joseph, and Larson, Harold. The Transportatioll Corps: Operations 

Overseas. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Ce nter 

of Military History, 1957. 

Cosma s, Graham A., and Cowdrey, Albert E. The Medical Department: Medical Service ill the European Th eater 0/ Operations. U.S. Army in World 

War II . Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Cente r of Military History, 1992. 

Kleber, Brooks E., and Birdsell, Da le. The Chemical Warfare Service: Chell/i· 

cals in Combat. U.S. Army in World War II. Wash ington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1965. 

Mayo, Li cla . The Ordnance Department: 011 Beachhead and Balllefroll/. U. S. 

Army in Worl d War II. Wash ington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

1-1 istory, 1968. 

Ross, William F , and Romanus, Charles F. The Quartermaster Corps: Operations ill the War Against Germany. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Cente r of Military History, 1965. 

Thompson , Geo rge R., and Harris, Dixie R. The Signal Corps: The Outcome 

(Mid-1943 Through 1945). U.S. Army in World War 11. Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1966. 
Bibliograpltical Note 327 

Sc .... eral oth er official histories contributed to this project in varying deg rees. Alt hough written by a .... etenlll, Elbridge Colby, Tlte First Army ill EIII·ope, 1943- 1945, 2d ed. (Nashvill e, Tenn.: Battery Press, 1993), is not a memo ir, but a history of the First Army. focusing on operations. Its he lpful append ix includes a list of the units assigned or attached to th e Fi rst Army du ring 

the course of the campaign. For headquarte rs orga ni zation and procedures 

durin g the Re volutionary War, sec Robert K. Wright , Jr. , The Contillental 

Army, Army Lineage Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1983). On the First Army headquart ers in World Wa r I, U.S . Army, 

Army War Coll ege, Historical Sec ti on, The Gelle~is of tlte Americall First 

Army (Washi ngton, D.C.: Gove rnment Pri nting Office, 1938), contai ns much 

hel pfu l data, particularly in th e appendix. The secti ons of this study on armies 

and large-scale maneuve rs du rin g the interwar period drew on Marvin A. 

Krcidberg and Merton G. Henry, f-liStOIJI of M iUtlllJ' Mobilizatioll in 'he VI/ired 

Sfale~ Army, 1775- 1945 (Washi ngto n, D.C. : Depa rtme nt o f th e Army, 1955); 

Jean R. Moenk, A l-fistolY of Com/l/aud and Confrol of Army Forces ill th e 

Conlillel/wl Vlli/ed SIMes, /919- / 972 (Fort Mo nroe, Va.: Cont inent al Army 

Command, (972); and Jean R. Moen k, A His/olY of Large-Scale Maneuvers 

illlhe Vllited SUites. /935- /964 (Fort Monroe, Va.: Continenta l Army Command, (969). For th e armi es in the conti nenta l United States during the ea rl y 

years of American involvement in World War II , the Army Ground Forces 

studi es, published shortl y after World War II , were helpful. Thcse we re Bell 

I. Wi lcy and Willi am P. Gova n, flislO/JI of rile SecoJl(/ Army, Study 16 (Washington , D.C.: Historica l Section, Army Ground Fo rces, 1946); Franc is G. 

Smith, I-listOIJ' of the Third Army, Stu dy 17 (WaShingto n, D.C.: Historica l 

Secti on, Army Ground Forces, 1946); and Jack B. Beardwood, /-lis/ory of 'he 

FOllrlhAnllY, Study 18 (Wa shington, D.C. : Historica l Secti on, Army Grou nd 

Forces, 1946). On the Ninth Army, see U.S. Army, Ninth U. S. Army, COI/-

qller: The S f 0/)' of Nil/lh Army, 1944- 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Infan try Journal Press, 1947). The Ame rican Forces in Action seri es, published by the War 

Department as readi ng materia l fo r the troops, conta ins three .... o lumes wit h 

data hclpfu l to this project: Omaha Beachhead (6 Jlllle- l 3 JUlie 1944) ( 1945); 

St-Lo (7 Jllly- 19 July 1944) ( 1946); and Vtah Beach 10 Cherbolflg (6- 27 

Jlllle 1944) (1947). The sec tion on civil affa irs in Normandy benefited greatly 

from mat eri al in the British official history, F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs 

and Milit(//)' Gove,."mell/ ill Northwest Europe. 1944- 1946, History of the 

Second World Wa r (London: !-I er Majesty's Stationery Offi ce, 1961). For 

mil itary gove rnment in Ge rman y, see Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army ill the 

Occupation of Germal/Y, 1944- 1946, Army Historical Se ries (Wash ington, 

D.C.: U.S . Army Center o f Military History, 1975). For data on neuropsychiatri c practice in the First Army, sec Albert J. Glass, cd., Neuropsychiatry in 

World l'a r 11, vol. 2, Overseas Theaters (Washington, D.C.: Offi ce of the 

Surgeo n General, 1973). For a study of different eche lons during th e Battle 

of th e Bu lge, see also J. D. Morelock, Generals of Ille Ardenlles: Americall 

Leadership iI/ the Baffle of the Bulge (Was hington, D.C.: Na tional Defense 

Uni verSi ty Press, 1994). 
326 A COII/lllond Post at 11'01' 

The backg round files oCthe U.S. Army in World War II series varied. Some 

authors retired a large body of records to the National Archives, while the retired documentation from others amounted to little beyond old manuscript drafts. 

Unfortunately, I110S1 of the volumes in the subserics on the European theater 

fell into the latt er category, but these files slill conta ined valuable items. They 

can be found in RG 319 at Archives [I in College Park, Maryland. 

Other volumes of the U.S. Army in World War II series also contained information helpful 10 the First Army project. The Army Ground Forces vo lume 

by Kenl R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell L Wiley, The Orgailiullioll 

o/Ground COII/ bal Troops, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 1947), was invaluable fo r the background of 

field army doctrine. On strategy, see the Wa r Department volumes, Maurice 

Matloff, Stmtegic Planning/or Coalition Wm/are. /943- 1944, U.S. Army in 

World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1959); 

and Mauri ce Matloff and Edwin M. Sne ll , Strategic Plan ning for COo/ilion 

Well/are. /941- /942, U.S. Army in World War I [(Wash ington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1953). 

The First Army headquarters operated at a level that brought it into frequent 

contact with the other services. Among the vo lumes of the official Navy history, 

au thored by Samuel Eliot Morison, the most relevant was The /lIl'asioll 0/ Fmllce 

and Germal/Y. 1944- /945, History of United States Naval Operations in World 

War [I (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962). In contrast to the Navy and Army, the Army 

Air Forces' official history consists of vol umes of essays by individual authors. 

The most relevant essays for the campaign in northwest Europe were Robert H. 

Gcorge's "The Battle of France," and "Normandy," and David G. Rempel's "Battle 

of the Bulge," and "Check at the Rh ine," in The Us. ArlllyAir Forces ill World War 

II, vol. 3, Europe: A RGUMENT to VE Day. Jalll/my 1944 to May 1945, cd. Wesley 

F. Craven and James L. Cate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 195 1). On the 

Army Air Forces, the author also examincd W. A. Jacobs, "The Battle For France," 

in Case Sflldies ill the Development o/CloseAir Suppor', ed. Benjamin F. Cooling, 

Special Studies (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), and Daniel 

R. Mortensen, A Palfel'll /01' Joint Opem/iol/s: Worfd Hill' II Close Ail' Supporl. 

North Africa, Historical Analysis Series (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force 

History and U.S. Arrny Center of Military History, 1987). 

Some of the most helpful official histories for this project came from the 

Combat Studies Institute at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenwo rth, Kansas. Published as part o f CSI's ongoing mission to 

conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the 

Army and to integrate historical materials into the Army's educational system, 

CSJ publications examine a va ri ety or su bj ects. For th is st udy, Robert 1-1. Berlin, U.S. Army World ~l'or 1/ Corps Commanders: A Composile Biography (Fori 

Leavenworth, Kan s.: CS1, 1989); Michacl D. Doubl er, Bustillg tlte Socage: 

American Combined Arms OperatioJ/s ill Fl'ance. 6 JlIlle- 31 July 1944 (Fort 

Leavenworth, Kans.: CSl, 1988); and Gary B. Griffin, Tlte Dil'ecled Telescope: 

A Traditional Elemellt 0/ Efjeclive COII/mond (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: CSJ, 

1981), were especially valuable. 
328 A Commalld Post at Wa/' 

Dissertations and Theses 

Although army· level headquarte rs orga ni zation and doctrine has not generally been a fruitful field for dissertations any morc than for published sou rces, 

some dissertations and theses did shed light on the subject. For the development of doctrine prior to Pea rl Harbor, see those cited below. 

Brereton, Todd R. "An Impractical Sort of OlTicer: The Army Career of Arthur 

L. Wagner, 1875- 1905." Ph.D. diss. , Texas A&M Unive rsity, 1994. 

Cockrell, Philip C. "Brown Shoes and Mortar Boards: U.S. Army Professional 

Education at th e Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, 19 19- 1940." Ph.D. diss., Universit y of South Caroli na, 1991. 

Gabel, Christopher R. "The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941." Ph.D. diss., 

Ohio State University, 1981. 

Matheny, Michael R. "The Development of the Theory and Doctrine of Operational Art in the American Army, 1920- 1940." M.A. thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988. 

Odom, William O. "The Rise and Fall of U.S. Army Doctrine , 1918- 1939." 

Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1995. 

Raines, Edgar E, Jr. "Maj or General J. Franklin Bell and Military Reform: The 

Chief of Staff Years." 2 vols. Ph.D. diss., Universi ty of Wisconsin, 1976. 

Shiman, Phi lip L. " Engineering Sherman 's March: Army Engineers and the 

Management of Modern War." Ph.D. diss., Duke Uni versity, 1991. 

For the World War 11 period, see Michael Bechthold, "Close Air Support in 

No rmandy: The Case of First U.S. Army and IX Tactical Air Command: A Question of Doctrine, Training, and Experience" (M .A. thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1993); Gregory A. Fontenot, "The Lucky Seventh in the Bulge: A Case 

Study for the AirLa nd Bait Ie" (M.A .S. [Master of Military Art and Science1 

thesis, U.S. Army Command and Ge neral Slaff Coll ege, 1985); and Steve Robe rt Waddell, "The Communi cations Zone (COMZ): Ame rican Logistics in 

France, 1944" (Ph.D. diss., TexasA&M University, 1992). 

Other Secondmy Sources 

When the author began his research , the secondary literature on the 

development of an ny-level doctrine in the U.S. Army was rathe r sparse. Listed 

below are the main secondary works consulted on Ihis su bj ect for the period 

prior to World Wa r II. 

Ball , Harry P. Of Responsible Command: A His/olY of the u.s. Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Alumni Association, U.S. Army War College 

(USAWC),1983. 

Bauer, K. Jack. The Mexican War. New York: Macmi ll an, 1974. 

Coakley, Robert W. , and Conn, Stetson. Th e ~~//, of the American Revolution. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975. 
Bibliographical Note 329 

Coffman, Edward M. "The American Mi litary Ge neration Gap in World War I: 

The Leavenworth Cliquc in the AEF." In COllllllalld alld Commanders ill 

Modem MifilWJI HisrOlY: Proceedings oflhe Second MiliulIY HistOlY S)'m· 

POSillll/, U.S. Air Force Academy. 2- 3 May 1968, edited by Will iam Geffen. 

Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History and U.S. Air Force Acad· 

emy, 1971. 

---. The War To Elld All tYars: The Americal/ MiliulIY Experiellce ill World 

War I. New York: Oxford Un ive rsity Press, 1968. 

Conge r, Arthur L. The Rise of U. S. Grallt. New York: Century, 1931. 

Cos mas, Graham A. All Army for Empire: The Vlli/ed Stmes Army ill tile Span· 

isll·Americall War. 2d ed. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane, 1994. 

---. "San Juan Hill and E1 CH ney, 1- 2 July 1898:' In America s First Ballles, 

edited by Charles E. Hell er and William A. Stom. Lawrence: University 

Press of Kansas, 1986. 

Freeman. Douglas Southall. R. E. Lee: A Biography. 4 vo1s. New York: Charles 

Scribner's, 1934- 35. 

Hagerman, Edward. Tlte Americall Civil /lilr and Ihe Origins of Modern War· 

fare: Ideas, Organizatioll. alld Field COII/malld. Bloomington: Indiana Un i· 

versity Press, 1988. 

l'littl e, J. D. The Milit(llY Staff: lis History alld Developmelll. Harrisburg, Pa.: 

Mililary Service PubliShing, 1949. 

Holley, I. B., Jr. Gel/eral John M. Pa/mel; Citizel/ Soldiers. and Ille Army of a 

Democracy. Contributions in Military History 28. Westport, Conn.: Green· 

wood Press, 1982. 

Lu vaas. Jay. The MiliulI)1 Legacy oflhe Civil Will'. 2d cd. Lawrence: University 

Press of Kansas, 1988. 

MilleH, Allan R. The General: Roberl L. Billiard and Officership ill/he Vnited 

Stales Arm)" 1881- 1925. Contributions in Military History 10. Westport, 

Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975. 

Mi ll is, Wa lter. Arms alld Mell: A Study ill American Mili/{IIY HisIOlY. New York: 

G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1956. 

Nenninger, Timothy K. "American Military EfTectiveness in the First World 

War." In Milit(llY Effectiveness, vol. I, The First World Wcll", edited by Allan 

R. MilieH and Williamson Murray. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988. 

---. "Creating OfTicers: The Leave nworth Experience. 1920- 1940." Mili-

/(fry Review 69 (November 1989): 58- 68. 

---. "Leavenwort h and Its Criti cs: The U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff School, 1920- 1940." ./Ollrnal a! MiliulIY HistOlY 58 (April 1994): 

199- 231. 

---. The Leavellll'orlh Schools alld rite Old Army: Edllcation. Profession· 

a!ism. alld the Officer Corps of Ihe Vlliled SIllies Army. 1881- 1918. 

Westport. Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1978. 

Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: The Edllcation of a General. New York: 

Viking, 1963. 

Sea rs, Stephen W. George 8. McClellan: The YOllng Napoleoll. New York: 

Ticknor and Fie lds, 1988. 
330 A COII/malld Post (If War 

Smi th , Justin H. The War Witll Mexico. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1919. 

Smythe, Donald. Pershing: Gel/emf of the Armies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. 

Trask, David F. The War Wirh Spain ill 1898. New York: Macmillan, 198!. 

Upton, Emory. Th e Military Policy of fhe Ulliled SIMes . 3d ed. Washington, 

D.C.: Gove rnment Prin ting Office, 1912. 

Van Horne, Thomas B. /-liSfOIJ' of (he Arm)' of fhe Cllmberlalld: lis Organizatiol/, Campaigns, and Bat/les. Cincinnati, Ohio: Robert Clarke, 1875. 

Weigley, Ru ssell F. f!iSfOI), of the Vll ired Stares Army. 2d ed. Bloomington: 

India na Unive rsity Press, 1984. 

Wert, Jeffry D. '''The Tycoon': Lee and His Staff." Ci\lil War Times J1/lIsrl'ared 

(July 1972): 10- 19. 

Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and His Generals. New York: Kn opf, 1952. 

Wilson, John B. "Army Readiness Plann ing, 1899- 1917." MiliulIY Review 64 

(Jul y 1984): 61 - 65. 

For the discussion on the II Corps headquarters in No rth Africa and Sicily, consu lt the secondary works cited below for mate ri al not mentioned in 

the notes. 

Blurnenson, Martin. Kasserille Pass. Boston: Houghton Miffii n, 1967. 

---. "Kasscrine Pass." In America S FirSI Ballles, edited by Charles E. Heller 

and William A. Stoff!. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986. 

D'Este, Carl o. Biller ViCIDlY: The Balfle/o/' Sicily, 1943. New York: E. P. Dutton, 

1988 . 

For the campai gn in northwest Europe, sources of material not mentioned 

in the notes include those cited below. 

Blumenson, Martin. The Baltle o/Ihe Generals: The Vllioid SIOIY o/Ihe Falaise 

Pockel, Ihe Call/paigll Thm Should Have Won World War II. New York: Willimn Morrow, 1993. 

---.. The Duel/or Frallce . Boston: Houghton Mimin, 1963. 

0 ' Este, Carlo. Decision ill Normandy. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1983. 

Eise nhower, David. Eisenhower al mil; /943- /945. New York: Random House, 

1986. 

Hamilton, Nigel. Master o/the BallleJiefd: MOl/ty :~. 1#11' Years, 1942- / 944. New 

York: McGraw Hi ll, [983. 

--- Manly: Filial Years 0/ the Field Marshal, 1944- 1976. New York: 

McGraw Hi ll , 1987. 

MacDonald, Charles B. The Hemle a/the HlIerlgell Forest. Philade lphia: J. B. 

Lippincott, 1963. 

Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower s Lieutenants: The Campaigns 0/ France (lnd 

Gerll/(/IIY, 1944- 1945. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. 

Wilmot, Chester. Tile Slrugglejor Europe. New York: Harper, 1952. 
Bibliogrtlphical Note 331 

Othe r sources for this study included those cited below. 

Ambrose, Stephen E. The Supreme COII/mander: The War Years 0/ Geneml 

Dwight D. Eisenhower. Garden City, N.V.: Doubleday, 1970. 

Baldwi n, Hanson W. Baffles Lost alld WOII: Gre(o Campaiglls o/World War II. 

New Vork: Harper & Row, 1966. 

---. "G reat Decision." 11I/(/J/fI:)' }oumaI60 (May 1947): 14- 2 1. 

Bause rman, John. Tlte Malmedy Ma.~.mcre. Shippensburg, Pa .: White Mane, 

1995. 

Bennett, Ralph. ULTRA ill fhe West: The Normandy Campaigll, 1944-1945. 

New Vork: Charles Scribner's, 1979. 

Blair, Clay. RitlglI'aY:5 Paratroopers: The Americal/ Airbol'/le ill World War II. 

Garden City, N.Y.: Doubl eday, 1985. 

Bl umcnson, Martin. "Will ULTRA Rewrite History?" Army 28 (August 1978): 

42-48. 

Bolger, Dani el P. "Zero Defect: Command Climate in First U.S. Army, 1944-

1945." Milifal)' Review 7 1 (May 1991): 61 - 73. 

Boyes, Jon L. "C3 1 and 0 Day." Sigl/al38 (June 1984): 13- 14. 

Currey, Cecil B. FollolI' Me and Die: The Destrl/ction 0/011 Americall Divisioll 

ill World War II. New York: Stei n and Day, 1984. 

Deutsch, Haro ld C. "The Influence of ULTRA on Worl d War II ." Parameters 8 

(Decembe r 1978): 2- 15. 

Doughty, Robert A. The Seeds of Disaster: The Developmellf 0/ French Army 

Doclrille. 1919- 1939. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1985. 

Eisenhower, John S. D. Tlte Hilfel' Woods. New Vork: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1969. 

" First U.S. Army Ai r OP Operations." Field ArtillelJ' }ollnlal36 (October [946): 

586. 

Garland, Albert N. "A Study in Leade rship: One of th e Greatest." Military Re~ 

view 49 (December 1969): 18- 27. 

Graham, Dominick, and Bidwell, Shelford. Coaliliolls. Polilicialls. and Geller~ 

als: SOllie Aspects o/ColI/lI/alld ill 7il'o World U't'll'l·. London: Brassey's, 1993. 

Hastings, Max. OVERLORD. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 

Hec hler, Kcn. The Bridge al Rell/agell. New York : Ballantine Books, 1957. 

Hills, R. J. T. PHANTOM Was Tllere. London: Edward Arnold, 195 1. 

Hughes, Thomas A. OVERLORD: GClleral Pcle Quesada alld the Triumph 0/ 

Tactical Air Power ill World War II. New York : Free Press, 1995. 

Jamcs, D. Clayton. The Years o/MacArl/lIIl'. 3 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 

1970. 

Keegan, John. Tile Mask o/Comlllalld. New Vork : Viking, 1987. 

MacDona ld, Charles B. A Tilllc/or Trumpets: Tile UnfOld StOlY o/lhe Baffle 0/ 

lite Bulge. New Vork: William Morrow, 1985. 

Me rriam, Robert E. Dark December. New York: ZifTDavis, 1947. 

Miller, Edward G. A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Huerlgell Forest al/d Ihe 

RoeI' River Dallls. 1944- 1945. College Stat ion: Texa s A&M University 

Prcss, 1995. 
332 A COII/malld Post (f( War 

Murray, G, Patrick. "Collrtney Hodges: Modest Star of World War II." American HistOlY IIll1s(mled 7 (January 1973): 12- 25. 

North, John. Nor/hwest Europe. 1944- 1945: The Achiel'emelll of 2 1s! ArlJl)' 

GI'OI/p. London: Her Maj esty's Stationery Office, \953 . 

Perret, Geoffrey. There s a War To Be WOII: Tlte Us. Army ill World War II. New 

York: Random I-louse, 1991. 

Phillips, Henry G. Remagell: Springboard fO Victory. Penn Valley, Calif.: Henry 

G. Phillips, 1995 . 

Price, Frank J. Troy N. Middleton: A Biography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 

University Press, 1974. 

Reynolds, David. Rich RelaliOIlS: The Americol/ Occupatio/l o/Britaill, 1942-

1945. New York: Random HOllse, [995. 

"A Salute to the Numbered U.S . Armies." Arm)' IlIjol"malioll Digesl 17 (October 1962): 32- 39. 

Spiller, Roge r 1. "Assessing ULTRA." Military Review 59 (August 1979): 13-

23. 

Sullivan, John J. "The Botched Air Support of Operation COBRA." Pal'amelel's 18 (March 1988): 97- 110. 

Thompson, R. W. The Baltlejol' Ihe Rhine/alld. London: Hutchinso n, 1958. 

Toland, John. BailIe: The SIOIJI of Ihe Bulge. New York: Random HOllse, 1959. 

Van Creveld, Martin. COII/malld ill War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

1985. 

Wadde ll, Steve R. Ullited SImes Army Logistics: Th e Norl/lalldy Campaign, 

J 944. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994. Has severa l pertinent charts, 

including he lpful tables on First Army stocks and ex penditures fo r ammunitio n and gasoline. 

Whiting, Charles. '44: In Combat From Normandy 10 Ihe Ardennes. New York: 

Stein and Day, 1984. 

---. The Belllle of Ihe Hllerlgell Foresl: The Vlllold SIOI), of a Dhastrous 

Campaign. New York: Orion Books, 1989. 
Military Map Symbols 

Military Units- Identification 

Airborne Infantry 

Armor. 

Infantry . . 

Size Symbols 

Division .... . 

Co rps 

A fm y 

Army Grollp ...... .... . 

Communica tion s Zone ..... , .... 

Examples 

Boundary between 2 [ and J 21h Army Grollps . 

Command Post, First Army ... 

II Part/chI/Ie COI]JS .. ..... .......... . 

Canadian 3d Infantry Di vision. 

xx 

xxx 

xxxx 

xxxxx 

0000 

-xxxxx- " 

" IF~~'~ I ,.Ml<-, 

~I'rcht 

~3Cdll 

Index 

Aachen: 148, 157, 159- 60, 161 , 165- 66, 169-

70, 172, 174, 190,207- 08,222,224-25, 

246.268,269- 70 

"ABC Haul" truck network: 247 

Achenl(lr (cargo ship): 67- 68, 77- 78, 83 

Advance Section (ADSEC), COMZ: 56, 83, 

86- 87,124,146- 47, 162,164- 65,214, 

247,256,265,292 

Aerial observers: 48, 96- 97 

Aerial photography: 96- 97, 192- 93 

Aerial reconnaissance: 48, 51,83,96- 97, 106, 

177- 78,179,181,185,190,192- 93,207, 

209,290 

African Amcrican soldicrs: 272 

Ahr River: 249- 50, 251, 255 

Air-ground coordination: 14,5 1,59, 90,98, 

105.192,287,290- 91 

Air liaison personnel: 59. 85 , 218 

Air supcriority: 14, 51, 65, 98 

Air support 

for attack on Germany: 185- 86, 190, 192, 

207 

for the Battle of the Bulge: 211 - 12, 218, 

228- 29 

close: 45, 78, 97- 98 , 128, 130, 192 

for COBIt,\: 105, 106- 07, 110. 185- 86,290 

and identification of friendly troops: 107 

at Monain: 128, 130 

in Normandy campaign: 90, 91, 94, 97- 98 

for Novcmber 1944 ofTensive: 185- 86 

planning for invasion: 46- 47, 51, 52- 53, 59 

saturation bombing: 90 

Air support officers in G- 2 and G- 3: 14, 

97- 98 

Air support parties: 5 1,59, 113113 

in armored columns: 105 

for attack on Germany: 192 

and COBRA: 105 

Air transport 

of ammunition: 88- 89,149 

of critical supplies: 167,256,265 

Air transport- Continucd 

of maps: 83 

of signal equipment: 83 

Air warning system: 177- 78 

Airborne Corps, XV III : 2 I 1- 12, 213, 215, 219. 

220- 21,222,223.227,228- 29,240-41, 

244,245,257- 60,270,292- 93 . See (lIsa 

Ridgway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B. 

Airborne Divisions: 90, 103- 04,222,240 

82d: 52, 94- 95, 215, 223, 228, 245 

101st: 52, 85, 215 

Aircraft 

army liaison: 97, 133- 35, 149 

British bombers: 185 

C- 47: 83, 130 

fighter-bombers: 51, 59, 185- 86, 192 

fighters: 105, 192 

radios for: 192 

used for medical evacuation: 266 

Airdrops to surrounded troops: 128, 130,218, 

222,290- 91 

Akers, Col. Russell F. " Red," Jr.: 32- 33, 85, 

136.217, 222- 24,262 

Albert Canal: 147 

Aleu~on; 91 , 130- 31. 132, 145 

Allen, Maj. Gen, Lcven c.: 44- 45 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force (A EAF): 59, 

90,107,128,130.256 

Combined Air Transport Operations Room: 

128, 130,256,265 

Allphin. WOJG Dempsey: 29, 212 

American Expeditionary Forces: 4- 8, 9, 285-

86. See also Pershing, Generallohn J. 

American Red Cross: 101 - 02. 175, 178,214, 

273 

Ammunition 

air transport of: 88- 89, 149 

airdrops of: 128. 130 

allocation of, by Hodges: 128, 130, 170- 7 1, 

184- 85, 193,246 

artillery: 88- 89, 96, 97, 128, 147, 162, 167, 
336 

Ammunition- Continued 

184-85, 193,222, 228, 246, 263 

for the Battle of the Bulge: 214, 222 

captured German: 168 

estimates: 40-41, 69n6, 88-89, 106, 166 

planning for supply buildup after D-Day: 49 

restrictions on use of: 88-90, 106, 166,222, 

227, 246,263 

shipping of: 51, 82- 83 

shortages of: 96-97, 104, 128, 143, 145, 

147, 149, 162, 165- 66,167,170,179,227 

small arms: 88 

stocks for attack on Germany: 165-66, 179, 

247,248,263 

stocks for COBRA: 105 

truck transport of: 167 

units: 40, 137 

Ammunition supply points: 88-89, 139.256, 

263, 265 

arrangements for demol ition of: 213 

for attack on Germany: 246- 47, 265 

in Belgium: 205, 213, 214 

evacuated: 214 

in Normandy: 87 

rolling: 137, 227 

Amphibious Force, lIth: 64 

Amphibious operations, planning for: 39, 52 

Amphibious training center, Siapton Sands: 

66-67 

Andenne: 223 

Andernach: 265 

Andrew, Lt. Col. Flynn L.: 102 

Andrews, Lt. Gen. Frank M : 21 

Antiaircraft Brigades 

47th: 60 

49th: 60,178,209,216,253,286 

Antiaircraft Operations Detachment, 149th: 

177- 78 

Antiaircraft units: 40, 87, 94- 95, 124, 161 , 

167, 178, 184, 190,216,222, 228,240, 

246, 253, 269 

Antifreeze: 167 

}\nnverp: 147, 160, 170, 177-78, 181-82, 184, 192 

Ardennes: 148- 49, 157, 160, 193,205- 30, 

288-89 

Argentan: 130- 32, 138 

Arion: 174-75 

Armies. See also Army, Third; Bradley, 

General Omar N.; Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark 

W.; Drum, Lt. Gen. Hugh A.; First Army 

A Command Post at War 

Armies- Continued 

headquarters; Gerow, Lt. Gen. Leonard T.; 

Hodges, General Courtney H.; Krueger, 

Lt. Gen. Walter; Patton, Lt. Gen. George 

S., Jr.; Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H. 

Second: 8 

Fifth: 14, 16, 136 

Sixth: 14, 16 

Seventh: 14, 16, 255, 256 

Ninth: 160, 171,181- 82,185,186,192,213, 

218, 219, 225, 227, 241, 244, 245, 246, 

248- 49,255,256- 60,262 ,2 71,274,292 

Fifteenth: 265, 270 

Armored combat commands. See Combat 

Commands. 

Armored divisions: 40, 105 

air support parties supplied to: 105 

allocation to armies: 124, 241, 244 

allocation to corps: 94-95, 139, 161, 182, 

184- 85, 222, 228, 240, 245, 246, 251, 

255-56 

equipment for: 137 

tanks authorized for: 162 

Armored Divisions (units) 

2d: 40, 85- 86,132- 33,139,142,161,213, 

223-24 

3d: 91 , 94- 95 , 139, 142,209,249,257 

5th: 139, 186-87,217,225 

7th: 160, 169- 70,211 - 12,2 13,215,2 17, 

219,222,223,225,227,244,248,251 

9th: 209, 250- 51, 252, 253, 256, 262 

10th: 211-12, 213 

Armored infantry battalions: 86,216- 17 

Army, Third: 8, 94, 271. See also Patton, Lt. 

Gen. George S., Jr. 

activated: 107 

and attack on Germany: 170, 182, 192,225, 

228-29,241,244,245,249-50,255 ,256 

and the Battle of the Bulge: 216,222 

boundary with First Army: 128, 130- 31, 

132- 33,292 

and drive to the Rhine: 139, 142 

and drive to the Seine: 131 - 33 

and Falaise pocket: 130-31 

First Army units transferred to: 107 

nank protection for: 130-31, 142-43, 148 

and Little BUCO: 67 

and Normandy campaign: 61 

problems of communications with First 

Army headquarters: 132 
Index 

Army, Third-Continued 

units allocated to: 124, 128, 139, 142,218, 

270,274 

Army Air Forces: 14 

and massive air strikes against Germany: 

185 

overshoes sent to infantry: 168 

and planning for invasion: 45, 51, 59 

Army Air Forces (units). See also Tactical Air 

Command, IX; Tactical Air Command, 

XXIX. 

Eighth Air Force: 185- 86, 207 

Ninth Air Force: 45, 5 1,64-65,78,87,90, 

128,130,185,211- 12 

Twelfth Air Force: 65 

IX Air Forces Support Command: 105 

IX Bomber Command: 90 

IX Engineer Command: 265 

IX Bombardment Division: 185 

IX Reconnaissance and Photographic 

Squadron: 48 

Army bands: 124 

Army Ground Forces: 13, 14,26, 193- 94 

Army Group, 12th: 266- 67. See also Bradley, 

General Omar N. 

administrative role: 124 

and airdrops: 128, 130 

and allocation of supplies: 145-46, 182 

and the attack on Germany: 241, 257 

awards policy: 175. 273 

and the Battle of the Bu lge: 208, 211 - 12, 

214,218- 19, 222 

and command of First Army during drive to 

the West Wall: 142 

and denazification program: 269-70 

and Dickson's Estimate 37: 208 

failure to provide guidance on military 

government: 178 

G-4: 164 

and investigation of war crimes: 268 

leave policy: 194 

and logistical support: 124, 132-33, 146, 

148-49,164-66,171,214,218,222,225, 

227, 256, 263, 265 

under operational control of Montgomery: 

127-28 ' 

PHANTOM detachment: 262-63 

and planning the attack on Germany: 182, 

185-86 

and procedures for contacting the Soviet Red 

Army Group, 12th-Continued 

Army: 270 

and psychological warfare: 173-74 

reassumes control of First Army: 229 

337 

and reclassification of officers: 189 

relations with First Army headquarters: 123-

24, 182, 218-19,291 

and Remagen bridgehead: 252 

and reorganization of army staffs: 273 

and transfer of corps among armies: 171 

and use of captured German supp lies: 168 

Army Groups. See a/so Bradley, General Omar 

N.; British 12 Army Group; Devers, Lt. 

Gen. Jacob L. 

1st: 41,44- 45, 56, 67 

6th: 142, 181- 82, 192,216,228,241,245, 

255,266-67,271 

Army postal units: 124 

Army War College: 4, 9,10,11 - 12,13,26 

Arti ll ery. See a/so Field artillery battalions. 

allocation of: 139, 142, 182 

captured German: 168 

problems posed by hedgerows: 96 

shortages of ammunition for: 96, 97, 128, 

162, 167, 184- 85, 193,222,228,246,263 

units: 94-95, 96-97, 128, 130, 167, 169, 

182, 190,222,225,227,228,240,244-

45,246,253,267- 68 

used to deliver medical supplies to iso lated 

troops: 130 

used to de li ver propaganda leaflets to 

enemy forces: 174 

Assesse: 224 

Augusta (heavy cruiser): 67-68, 77-78, 84 

Avranches: 112, 127- 28 

Awards and decorations: 29, 32, 60, 175,229, 

273 

Bad Wildungen: 271 

Baker, Col. Chauncey B.: 5 

Baldwin, Hanson: 173 

Balleroy: 90 

Bastogne: 205, 209, 215- 16, 222, 225 

Bayeux: 46, 52, 78 

Beach ma intenance area: 79, 86 

Beach obstacles 

underwater: 53, 64 

used to reinforce tanks: 106 

Belchem, Maj. Gen. David: 46, 220 

Belgian forces: 267- 68 
338 

Belgian forces-Continued 

I st Brigade: 170 

Fusiliers: 222, 228, 240, 246 

Belgian Resistance: 159- 60, 178 

Belgium: 142-43, 147, 157, 169, 171-73, 178 

Bigland, Lt. Col. T. S.: 235n60 

BIGOT : 48 

Bitburg: 207-08 

Black marketeering: 147, 165, 175-76,273, 

292 

BLUECOAT: 127 

Bocage region. See Hedgerows. 

Bold, Maj. Frederick C., Jr.: 34 

Bolger, Daniel: 293 

Bomb disposal squadrons: 40 

Bonn: 148, 160, 161 , 181-82, 183-84,239, 

251,253 

Boundaries 

between American and British units: 85, 91, 

110, 142-43,160 

between American and Russian forces: 270, 

291 

between armies: 46, 85,128,130- 31,132-

33,160- 61 ,240,246,257,26 1-62,292 

beach sector: 52 

between corps: 94, 160- 61, 182, 186-87, 

211,222,223,246,249 

doctrine concerning: 285- 86 

problems with: 52, 128, 136, 194- 95 , 223 

rear: 124 

set by Bradley: 104-05 

Bradley, General Omar N.: 22, 67- 68, 294, 

296,,4 

and allocation of divisions to armies: 128 , 

171,193,211-12 

and allocation of divisions to corps: 128, 

131-32 

and allocation o[supplies: 145-46, 147-49 

and ammunition: 40-41, 89 

and the Battle of the Bulge: 216, 218- 19, 

221,225 

command group: 28- 29 

command style: 22-23, 24, 288 

as commander of 1st Army Group: 44-45, 

107 

as commander of 12th Army Group: 107, 

121 , 123-24, 127-28, 130-33, 135- 36, 

138, 139, 142- 43 , 145,147-49, 160,165, 

170- 71, 181-82, 184, 187-88, 192- 93, 

208,211-12,215- 16,2 18- 19,239, 240, 

A Command Post at War 

Bradley, General Omar N.- Continued 

241,244,245,246,249,251-52,253- 54, 

255,256- 61,262,270,274 

as commander of" Corps: 22-23,24, 288 

as commander of First Army: 26-35, 39, 40-

41,44,45-47,49,52-53,59,60-61,67-

68,77- 79,82- 84,85- 86,88- 91 ,94-95, 

100-103,104-07,110-11,286,287,288 

and corps boundaries: 91, 94, 110- 1 I 

corps dispositions in Normandy: 94-95 

discretion allowed subordinates: 23, 91,94, 

104- 05,286,288 

and division commanders: 53, 170- 71 

and end of the war in Germany: 270 

failure to concentrate forces: 288 

and Falaise pocket: 130-32 

field orders issued by: 94- 95, 110- 11 

and First Army s upplies acquisition 

tactics: 165 

and joint operations: 90,290-91 

and lack of replacements: 188 

and liberation of Paris: 138-39 

and military intelligence: 262- 63 

and Normandy campaign: 77, 78-79, 84-85, 

86,89- 90,91,94 

and Office of Strategic Services: 83- 84 

and operational control delegated to special 

staffs: 216 

orders to Hodges: 135-36, 142-43, 148, 

170, 181- 82,249- 50,252,255,256,257, 

261 

orders to Middleton: 91 

and Patton: 24, 94 

personal staff: 29 

and planning for COBRA: 104- 05, 106, 110 

and planning for invasion: 49 

and planning for post-D-Day operations: 61 

and redeployment of XIX Corps: 132- 33 

relations with correspondents: 102,270 

relations with First Army headquarters as 

commander of 12th Army Group: 123-24, 

170-71,288 

relationship with Eisenhower: 90, 91,110 

relationship with Hodges: 123- 24,218-19, 

221,239- 40,25 1-52,259-60 

relationship with Kean: 218- 19 

relationship with Montgomery: 45- 46, 86, 

104, 110, 142,225,291 

and relief of commanders: 100-101, 170-

71,293 
Index 

Bradley, General Omar N.- Continued 

and Remagen bridgehead: 250- 51, 252 

and Roef dams: 244 

satisfaction with commanders: 100- \ 0] 

and staffing of First Army headquarters: 22-

23, 288 

and strategy for attack on Germany: 139, 

160,170,181 - 82,239-40, 241 , 244, 246, 

249- 50, 255, 256-62 

and unloading of ships: 82- 83 , 89 

and use of armored divisions: 95 

visits to corps commanders: 106-07 

visits to First Army headquarters: 123- 24, 

194,208,218- 19, 244,288 

visits to lower echelons: 91 

BRASS HAT: 66 

Brereton, Lt. Gen. Lewis H.: 45, 65 , 106- 07 

Bridge units: 248 

Bridges 

Allied bombing of: 51, 250 

construction of: 182,247-48,250,251 - 53 

Meuse River: 219, 222 

Rcmagen: 250- 54, 262, 274 

Bristol: 26, 64, 66, 67-68 

British 21 Army Group. See also Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. 

and airdrops: 128, 130 

Americans on staff: 46 

and Antwerp: 169- 70 

and attack on Germany: 160, 182, 184, 192, 

239, 241 , 244,245, 255,256 

and the Battle of the Bulge: 216, 218, 219-

21,223 

boundaries: 291 

and breakout into Brittany: 90 

combined planning with First Army 

headquarters: 44, 45-47 

communications problems with First Army 

headquarters: 142 

and dri ve to the West Wall: 142 

and Falaise pocket: 131 

nank protection for: 142-43, 148, 160, 161 

and German opposition in Belgium: 147 

and invasion: 46, 56, 78 

liaison group: 85 . 

and logistical support for First Army: 225, 

227 

and MARKET-GARDEN: 149 

and NEPTUNE: 52- 53 

PHANTOM detachments: 262- 63 

339 

British 21 Army Group Continued 

and planning for beachhead expansion: 61 

and planning for cross-Channel attack: 

43-44 

relations with First Army headquarters: 84-

85,218,219-21,223,291 

and replacements: 225 

and shortage of tanks: 225 , 227 

staff from British Eighth Army: 46 

transfer of armies to the operational control 

of: 218, 225, 229 

British Second Army. See also Dempsey, Lt. 

Gen. Sir Miles. 

and BLUECOAT: 127 

boundaries: 85,91,110,142-43,292 

and COBRA: 106- 07 

and drive to the Seine: 132-33 

and Falaise pocket: 130- 31, 132 

liaison with First Army headquarters: 85 

and the Meuse salient: 170 

PHANTOM detachments: 84-85 

and planning for cross-Channel attack: 45 

and relief of commanders: 101 

role in Normandy campaign: 47, 61, 78-79, 

91,94 

British units. See also Royal Air Force. 

First Army: 5 

Eighth Army: 24, 46 

I Corps: 132 

30 Corps: 133, 142,219,228 

79th Armoured Division: 40 

51 st Highland Division: 223 

Brittany Peninsula: 61, 112, 127- 28 

Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan: 64 

Brussels: 178 

Bryanston Court: 47 

Buchenwald: 268 

Buildup Control (BUCO) (West): 67, 89 

Bulge, Battle of the: 172, 193 , 205-30, 

288- 89 

Butgenbach: 205, 211, 213 , 214 

Caen: 46, 78, 84, 85 , 91, 94, 106 

Caen-Falaise plain: 61 

Camp Elsenborn: 177- 78 

Canadian First Army: 127, 130-32, 245 , 255 

CANDLE: 65-66 

Captured materiel: 168, 267-68 

CAR EFREE: 65- 66 

Carentan: 46, 51 , 78, 84, 85-86, 104 
340 

Carrier pigeons: 84 

Carter. Col. William A., Jr.: 34, 40, 5 1. 83. 87. 

88, 137. 165, 179. 18 1. 18 2.2 14.216. 

239,245,247-48,251.252,294 

Casualties: 106, 107. 187- 88, 190,2 15 

estimated losses rcports: 98. 125, 187- 88. 

215,225.24 1 

friendly firc: 90. 107,253 

German : 130 

reporting [HOCess: 98, 125, 187- 88,241 

li nd training exercises: 66- 67 

Caumont: 85, 110 

Cavalry. 125 th : 133 

Cavalry Recon naissa nce Squadron. 102d: 

105- 06 

Cavalry units: 40, 124, 13 7, 14), 16\, 184. 

240, 246 

Cellcs: 224 

Censorship: 173. 270 

Chambois: 132 

Chaplains: 12 

Charleroi: 169 

Chaudfontainc: 2 14- 15. 2 18- 19, 221 - 22 

Chemical units: 40, 87. 94-95.124,184.222, 

228, 240, 246. 253, 286 

Chcmicll! weapons: 177 

Chcrbourg: 39, 46, 47, 61, 78- 79, 86, 89- 90. 

102, 104, [65- 66 

Ch ief o f Staff to the Supreme Allied 

Commander (COSSAC): 2 1- 22. 39. 41. 

43-44,46,48,64 

Chiefs of MalT (army), role of, in World War I: 

3- 4,6- 7, 10 

Churchil l, Winston S.: 21, 94 

Civil affairs detachments: 102- 03, 138- 39. 286 

Civil affairs doctrine: 138- 39 

Civi l affairs olTicers: 12. 102- 03, 178 

Civilians: 248 

evacuation of: 227 

lack of. for labor: 145,225,227,247 

questioned abOlll illegal activities: 176 

in rea r areas: 102- 03,227 

supplies for the support of: 5 1. 102- 03. 138-

39.227 

Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.: 16,23 

Clifton College: 26 

Clothing 

dU11l1)s: 87 

estimates of needs: 164 

shortages of wimer: 162. 167- 68, 240-41 

A COIIIIII(III(/ Post til War 

Clothing- Conti nued 

stocks of: 247 

COURA: 104- 07. 168,290,292- 93 

Colby, Col. El bridge: 138 

Col d-weather injuries: 167- 68 

Collins. U. Gen. J. Lawton: 53 

and anack on Germany: 147- 49. 182.227-

28.248- 49.255- 57 

and the Battle of the Bulge: 219. 223- 24. 

227- 29 

Bradley opinion of: 100.292- 93 

and COURA: 104- 07, 110. 292- 93 

and the Cotcntin Peninsula: 89- 90 

(lI1d drive through Hiirt gen Forest: 162. 

292- 93 

and Falaise pocket: 130. 13 1 

and HarL Moumains: 261 - 62 

and Mons pocket: 143 

orders from Bradley in NOrl1Hlndy: 78- 79 

relationship with Hodges: 122. 128. [47-48. 

223- 24. 254. 255- 57.26 1- 62.292- 93 

relationship with Montgomery: 220- 21 

and VII Corps boundaries: 94 

Colmar Pocket: 24 1, 245 

Cologne: 246, 249, 250. 267. 269- 70 

Combat Commands: 182. 184,222 

13: 209. 250- 5 [ 

R: 186- 87 

Combat orientation courses: 188,225 

Combi ned Chiefs of Staff: 2 1 

Combined Control Center. 2 1 Army Group : 

59. 78 

Command. See also Doctrine. 

dece nlrnli zation of and the demands of 

mobil e warfare: 14, 16 

problems within First Army headquarters: 

229- 30 

and role of army slaffin World War I: 6-7. 10 

ships: 67- 68. 77- 79 

Com111:lnd errors 

caused by fu tigue: 193- 95 

at Eifcl: 193 

failure to concentrate forces: 94- 95. 288. 

289- 90 

failure to perceive threa t posed by Roer 

River dams: 159. 179, 18 1- 82 

fa sein,ltion with delait: 161. 194-95. 286 

HUrtgen Forest: 16 1- 62 

indec ision by Bradley at Futaise: 130- 32 

misuse of armored division: 16 1 

\ 

( 

I

f 

\ 

\ 

\ 
Illdex 

ComnHlnd and General StafTSehool. 9. 10, 13, 

25- 26,34-35 

Comm,lI1d post 

exercises: 61, 64- 66 

location of: 26, 66, 84, 9 1, 125, 133, 14 7-

48. 159- 60. 171 - 72,214- 15 ,223.239, 

255.256- 57,262,271 

rolling: 125, 133,293 

Commanders 

doctrinc related to authority of army: 6- 7, 

9- 1 L 12, 13,285- 86 

extra regimental and battalion, assigned to 

divisions: 100 

freedom of action of: 104-05 

rcliefof: 100- 101, 170-71,229,293 

satisfaction with: 100- 101 

selection of: 53 

Commun ica t ions 

between 21 Army Group and First Army 

headquarters: 221 

between armies: 132 

on the beaches: 51,84 

breakdown of: 77- 78, 143,209.2 11 - 12, 

213,215,217.218- 19,274 

between British Second Army and First 

Army headquarters: 221 

cable: 84 

at Chaudfontaine: 215, 217 

within First Army headquarters: 61 

betwecn First Army headquarters and corps 

interrupted: 209, 211 - 12, 213 

integnltion of U.S. and British systems: 66 

limitation of available systems: 286 

network in Belgium: 172 

problems among engineer echelons: 13 7- 38 

problems with, during mobi le warfare: 132. 

133- 35, 142- 43 ,262 

problems with, in World War I: 4, 7- 8 

testing of systems: 65- 66 

Communications Zone (COMZ) 

and allocation of transportation for supplies: 

164.247 

and ammunition requisitions: 165- 66 

lind ammunition stocks: 179 

construction battalions: 252- 53 

and control of logistical opcrations on the 

Continent: 124 

development of, on the Continent: 56. 85- 86 

and estimates of supply shipments: 145-46, 

166,292 

341 

Communications Zone (COMZ)- Continued 

forward he<ldqllarters echelon: 56 

G- 4 section: 164 

in:lbility to quantify available $IIPI)lies: 292 

I:lck of f<lcilities to overhaul engines: 167 

and Little BUCO: 67 

medical facilities in: 50 

movement of headquarters to raris: 145, 

165.292 

and prepar<ltion for attllck on Germany: 227, 

247.256 

and POW facilities: 146- 47 

and railroad bridges ovcr thc Rhine: 265 

relations with First Army G- 4 section: 164-

66.179,186,247,292 

and Rcmagcn: 252- 53 

research and devclol)menl by: 169 

role of: 13- 14 

special staITehiefs: 124 

and wintcr clothing: 167 

Concentration camps: 268 

Concentration of forces 

in attack on Germany: 239-40 

failure 10 achieve: 94-95, 288, 289- 90 

Connor, Brig. Gen. William D.: 9, 10 

Construction 

battalions: 40, 252- 53 

of bridges: 247- 48. 252- 53 

matcrials: 87 

of pipelines: 145- 46 

of railroads: 145, 146 

Continenlal Wire Systcm: 172 

Corlett, Maj. Gen. Charles H.: 53, 56, 91,94, 

106- 07,110, 142-43 

relationship with Hodges: 112, 122, 128, 

160- 61,170- 71,293 

Corps 

allocated to armies: [24. 139, 142, 171 ,245 

freedom in pursuing missions: 13, 86, 

104-05 

lack ofeoordinatioll betwecn: 110- 11 

and planning for invasion: 40, 51, 52- 53 

responsibility for support functions during 

invasion: 52- 53 

truckhcads allocated to: 87 

Coq)S, 1: 5- 6. See (l1~'Q Drum. LI. Gen . 

Hugh A. 

Corps. II: 22- 25, 28- 29, 33, 34- 35, 39, 287-

88. See (llso Bradley, General Omar N.; 

Frcdendall. Maj. Gcn. Lloyd R. ; Patton, 
342 

Corps, II- Continued 

LI. Gen. George S .. Jr. 

Corps. Ill ; 245, 246, 249- 51. 252, 253- 54. 

255- 60,262,270. See (liso Millikin. Maj. 

Oell.10hn: Van Fleet. Maj. Gen. James A. 

Corps. V: 53. See also Gerow, Lt. Gen. Leonard 

T.: Huebner, Maj. Gen. Clnrence R. 

and altack on Germany: 160- 61, 182, 184-

85, 228- 29. 240- 41, 244- 45, 249, 25 J, 

255- 56,257,261- 62 

and the Bailie orthe Bulge: 205, 209, 211 -

12,223,225,228 

boundaries: 85, 186- 87 

and close air support for invasion: 78 

:lI1d COUR ,I: 110 

concerns nbolll nank protection: 85- 86 

and D-Day: 48- 49 

and drive to the West Wall: 147- 49 

First Army headquarters cable cOllll11unications with: 84 

and ]'!iirtgcn Forest: 182. 184. 186- 87 

lack offuel: 147 

and liberation of Pllris: 138- 39 

and O~l.\ltA Beach: 52, 77- 19, 85 

radio net: 77- 18 

and Roer River dams: 181, 193,209 

training excrcises: 66- 61 

units allocated to: 94, 13 1- 32, 139, 161, 

182, 184, 193,211 - 12,213,222,228, 

240. 246,255- 56 

Corps, VII: 52, 53. Seea/soCollins, Lt . Gen. J. 

Lawton; Woodruff, Maj. Gcn. Roscoe B. 

allocation of (Imnlll11i tlon to: 128 

artillery support for: 105, 128, 130, 161 

and attack on Germany: 228- 29. 241, 244. 

245,248-49, 251,254,255- 51,260- 62 

and the Battle of the Bulge: 205 , 209, 219, 

220- 21,223- 24.228- 29 

boundaries: 94, 110- 1 I, 128, 130- 31, 186--81 

casualties due to friendly fire: 101. 110 

and COIJRA: 104- 01. 110- 11 

and Cotentin Pcninsula: 85. 86. 89- 91 

under direct control of Montgomery: 221 

divisions allocated to: 128, 161 

and drive to the Rhine: 119 

and drive to the West Wall: 139, 142, 141-

49,110,193 

fililure to perceivc threat posed by Rocr 

River darns: 159 

and Falaisc pocket: 130- 31, 131 

A COII/malld Post at f11'11' 

COTj)S, VII- Continued 

flank prote(.:tion for: 110. 182. 184. 228, 

256- 57 

and Hurtgen Forest: 161 - 62, 186- 81 

and Mons poekct: 143 

training exercises: 66- 67 

units allocated to: 94. 161, 182. 184- 85, 

222.228.246,255- 56,292- 93 

and UrAIl Beach: 77- 79 

Corps, VIII. See a/so Middleton, Maj. Gen. 

Troy H. 

and the Battle of the Bulge: 205 , 201, 209. 

211. 213. 215- 16, 218 

and COBRA: 104- 05. 106. 110- 12 

and Cotentin Peninsula: 89- 90, 91 

missions: 91 

and Normandy c;unpaign: 94- 95 

traded to First Army: 171 

transfer to Third Army: 218, 219. 210 

units allocated to: 94- 95, 184,193, 213 

Coq}s. XV: 130- 31, 139, 142 

COT)S, XVIII Airborne. Sec Airborne Corps. 

XVIII. 

Corps, XIX: 53, 56, 85- 86. See (/I~(J CorleH, 

Maj . Gen. Charles H.; Crillenberger. Maj. 

Gen. Willis D.; McLain. Maj. Gen. 

Raymond S. 

attack into the Peel Marshes: 165- 66, 

169- 70 

boundaries with British Second Army: 

142- 43 

boundary with VI I Corps; 94 

and COIJRA: 106- 01, 110 

and drive to the Rhine: 139, 142 

and drive to the Seine: 132- 33 

drive on Tournai: 142-43 

failure of communications links with First 

Army headquarters: 135, 142 

j'lodges' dissatisfaction with performance 

of: 128. 110- 71 

and Normandy campaign: 91. 94- 95 

redeployment of: 132- 33 

traded to Ninth Army: 111 

lInitsallocated 10: 94, 161 

COla, Maj. Gen. Normnn D.: 185 

Cotentin Peninsula: 39,46,53.61,78, 85.86, 

89- 91 

Coughlan, Col. Joseph D.: 87 

Countcrintelligenee opcrations: 48, 84 

Couriers: 97,133,164 
Index 

Coul;lnccs: 86, 89- 90. 91,105. lID- II 

COll!erne: 133 

Crillenberger, Maj. Gen. Willis D.: 53 

Cross-Channel invasion. See OV ERLORD; 

NEI'TUNE. 

Dams (Roer River) 

bombing of: 192- 93 

First Army slow to pcreeive the threat posed 

by: 159. 179, 181 - 82. 192- 93 

seizure of: 181 - 82.205 

Dannemiller, Maj. Edward M.: 85,221 

De Gaulle, Gcneral Charles: 138 

De Guingand, Maj Gen. Sir Francis: 46. 219-

20, 221 

Deception pi;II1S for invasion: 49. 84 

Dempsey, LL Gen. Sir Miles: 61, 78- 79, 84. 

104,132- 33,1 70 

Denazification: 267. 269- 70 

Dcnny. Hal 173 

DePuy, Gcncnll William E.: 293 

Desertion: 176 

D'Este. Carlo: 101 

Devers, Lt. Gen.laeob L.: 21 - 22. 142.216 

Di ckson. Col. Dcnjamin A. "Monk": 23- 24. 

25,32,67,102, 110,194,268.270,290. 

29' 

all itude toward Office of Strategic Services: 

83- 84, 290 

and the Dattlc of the Bulge: 205, 207- 08, 

214- 15, 216,222- 23.224- 25 

and concerns about German movement: 85-

86,89- 90,91,94,112,128,130- 3 1,186. 

193,207- 08,216,222.224- 25,245 

and cvallwtion of German strcngth: 147-48, 

149. 170.179. 186, 240.257- 59.260- 61 

and German defcnses (l\ the Wcst Wall: 159-

60,179,186,193 

and Malrncdy massacre: 211 

and planning for the invasion: 48, 49 

relationship with Hodges: 122, 125, 14 7- 48. 

223, 290 

relationship with Kean: 123.223 

relationship with Sibert: 208 

relationship with Thorson: 123. 130- 3 1. 

208. 288, 290 

reputation as an alarmist: 208, 290 

and threat posed by dams: 159- 60, 179, 181. 

290 

Dijon: 160 

343 

Di!! Rivcr: 255 

Disciplinary ilctiotls: 29, 32. 103, 175- 76 

Displaced persons: 267. 268- 69 

Divisions 

nllociltcd to armies: 128.211- 12,241 

li llocntcd to corps: 128, 13 I - 32. 182.222,228 

naval officers nuached to artillcry 

headquarters: 56 

rotation of: 193,205, 207 

Doctrinc. See of so Staff doctrine. 

nmphibious opcrntiol1s: 52 

arlllY hcadquarters: )-4, 5, 6- 7, 294 

civil aff;lirs: 138- 39 

command: 3- 16, 27. 44-45, 60- 61,88, 10 I, 

104- 05, 124- 25, 127,285- 86.287, 294 

ll11d liaison opcnltions: 85. 217 

Domfrotlt: 131. 132. 146-47 

Drcllx: 131. 132- 33 

Drum, Lt. Gen. Hugh A.: 4, 5- 7, 13,25 

DUren: 185 

DUsseldorf: 160, 205.207 

Dutch underground telephonc nctwork: 

159- 60 

Early, Stephen: 270 

Echtcrnach: 215- 16 

ECLIPSE: 266- 67, 268 , 271 

Eifel: 157, 193,239, 240- 41,244 

Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D.: 

22 , 41. 68. 85- 86. 90. 100- 10 I. 106- 07 

ilild allocation ofarmics to army groups: 218 

and thc l3attle of the l3ulge: 211 - 12. 216, 

2 17.2J8,220,225 

and the invasion: 78 

and liberation of I'Mis: 138 

opinion of l'lodges: 220 

relationship with I3r<ldlcy: I 10 

relationship with Montgomery: 46, 94. 

227- 28 

and the Roer d<llllS: 244 

and selection of corps commanders: 53 

and ship manifcsts problcm: 89 

and strategy for attack on Germany: 139, 

143.147. 160, 170, 181 - 82, 225 , 227- 28, 

239. 255, 257 

Eisenhower, 1st Ll. John S. D,: 263 

Elbe River: 257. 260- 62, 270 

Elbcuf: 133, 138 

Elsenborn: 205 , 211 - 12, 213 , 214. 222 

Emmcrich: 245 
344 

Engineer Special Brigades 

lSI: 52. 86 

Sth: 52 

61h: 52 

Engineer units: 137- 38. 175.216 

combat bnllaliOI1S: 40. 64, 124.244.252 

special brigades and groups: 43, 51. 52. 56, 

59.64,79, 82 , 84, 86,87,90 

Engineers 

corps: 179, 181 

and demol ilion of undcrw(I\cr obstacles: 53 

and mobile warfare: 137- 38.256 

and pipeline across the Rhine: 265 

and plan fo r crossing the Rhine: 247- 48 

relations between echelons: 88, 137- 38 

and RCIlHlgcn: 251 - 54 

and road rcpuirs: 248 

supplies for: 51 , 83,182 

Engineers, Army Corps of: 25 

Englcbcrl and Comp,LllY: 169 

EnlcrlainmcllI for troops: 29. 32, 101 - 02, 174-

75 , 214, 273 

Equipment 

alioc(l!iOlls for invasion forces: 50- 5 1 

captured German: 132. 167, 168 

innovations: 40. 106, 169 

losses 0(: 225. 227 

shortages of: 225, 227, 247 

Ern River: 249 

Eschweilcr: 185 

ETO Mali/wi ojThempy: 190 

Eupen: 162, 164.174-75.177.190.214,246..-47 

Europclln Theater of Operations. U.S. Army 

(ETOUSA): 21 - 22. See also Devers. LI. 

Gen. Jacob L. 

and ammunition estimates: 40- 41, 69116. 

88- 89 

and buildup of supplies after D.Day: 82- 83 

Casualty Branch: 187- 88 

chief surgeon: 41 

and engineers: 182 

European Civil Affairs Division: 102- 03, 

17' 

failure to take steps to prevent cold-weather 

injuries: 167- 68 

Ground Force Replacement System: 100, 

188 

and installations in Britain: 41. 43 

and logistical support: 164, 167- 68 

and military intelligence: 262- 63 

A Commalld Pasl a/ War 

[uropcnn Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 

(ETOUSA)- Continucd 

ordnance officer: 40--41 

and organization of army headquarters: 193-

94.287 

and planning for crossing the Rhine : 

247--48 

planning reSI)Onsibi I ities: 4 J. 45 

quartermaster office: 167- 68 

Reclassification Board: 100 

relationShip of technical chiefs with First 

Army headquarters special staff heads: 41 

.tnd replacement personnel: 43, 100, 187-

88,225 

T Forces: 267- 68 

technical service chiefs: 124 

and lInlollding of ships: 89 

Euskirehcn: 249, 252, 255, 265 

Exhaustion centers: 189- 90 

FMII US, Excrcise: 66- 67 

Fabriqllc Nationa1c des Armes de Guerre: 169 

Falaise: 127, 130- 32, 137. 146--47,291 

Field Army. First: 3--4 

Field artillery b<11talions: 40. 56. 124. 146. 161. 

182, 184. 190.213.228,267 

Field Artillery I3rignde, 32d: 94- 95.96, 128, 

130. 161. 182, 184, 190, 193, 228 , 240, 

244 . 255 

Field service regulations: 6- 7 

1914: 3--4 

1923: 9 

1939: 9, II 

Fighter.bombers 

missions: 185- 86, 192 

squlldrons of. on call during invasion: 

5 1, 59 

Finance and disbursement sections: 124 

Finance officers: 12 

Finley, Col. Charles R.: 60 

Fife direction centers: 96 

First Army adjutant genera l section: 43, 

193, 267 

casualty division. 59. 98,187- 88 , 215, 

241 

el11ssification subsection: 98,100 

early movement to France: 98 

and main echelon: [25, 127 

responsibilities: 60 

First Army artillery section: 182, 222. Seeolso 
Index 

First Army artillery section- Continued 

I-brt, I3 rig. Gen. Charles E. "Eddie the 

Cannon." 

aerial observntion subsection: 59,95- 96,290 

antitank subsection; 59, 95- 96 

liaison officer to 0 - 2: 96- 97 

organization of: 95- 96 

and planning for attack on Germany: 

182, 190 

and tactical echelon: 125 

and training: 64 

First Army G- I (personnel) section: 6, 28-29, 

32.60- 61. 287. See also Miller, Col. 

George A.; O'Hnre, Col. Joseph J. "Red." 

and the B,lttle of the Bulge: 214 

and combat awnrds: 175 

duties during occupation of Gcrmany: 

271 - 73 

carly movement to Francc: 98 

and leave policy: 239 

and main echelon: 125, 127 

miscellaneous subsection: 273 

and officers: 188- 90 

I)CrSonnel shifted to G- 5: 267 

and personnel shortages during buildup for 

O ... " RLORD: 43 

and planning for the invasion: 50 

and relief of commanders: 43 

and replacements: 188, 225 

rcsponsibilitics of: 29- 30, 60 

First Army G- 2 (intelligence) section; 6, 

22- 23,29,32,193- 94,286,288,290.Sec 

also Dickson, Col. Benjamin A. "Monk": 

Military intelligence. 

(Air) subsection: 83, 125, 127 

Mtillcry liaison officer to: 96 

and the llattle of the Bulge: 205, 207, 209, 

211,214,216, 223,224- 25 

cOllntcrintell igcncc subsection: 103, 176 

"0" subsection: 176 

Estimate 37: 207- 08 

and estimates for drive to the Rhin e: 179 

failure to pcrceive threat poscd by dams: 

159- 60 

fai lure to predict Ardennes offensive: 205, 

207- 09 

and German counterattack at Monain: 128 

and German defenses at the West Wall: 

159- 60 

and Normandy campaign: 83- 84, 104- 05 

345 

First Army G- 2 (intelligence) scclionContinued 

order of ballie subsection: 83 

organization of: 32 

and plnnning for invasion: 47, 48-49 

planning subsection: 83 

poor coordination lV ith 0 - 2s at other 

echelons: 208 

and problcms discerning situation: 131, 

293- 94 

and propaganda: 174 

and rear area security: 176 

reports to: 83 

reports issued by: 83, 177, 241 

sources of information: 83, 179 

and Inctical echelon 125 

target subsection: 83,207 

and ULTRA: 49 , 131 

and V-weapons: 177- 78 

First Army G- 3 (operations) section: 6, 7- 8, 

22- 23,29,32- 33,193- 94,286- 87.288, 

290. See also Thorson, Bri g. Gen. 

Truman C. 

(Air) subsection: 59, 97- 98,125,127,128, 

130, 136 

and attack on Schmidt: 185 

and the Battlc of thc l3ulge: 209,2 1 I. 213, 

216.222- 23 

liaison subsection: 59 

Little BUCO: 67 

and location of supply facilities: 162. 164 

operations group: 125 

operations subsection: 33, 85, 135- 36, 

213 , 217 

organization of: 33 

passive air defense subsection; 59 

and plan for crossing the Rhinc: 247- 48 

and planning for invasion: 40, 47, 49 

and preparations for attack on Germany: 184 

and replacement personnel: 100 

and tactical echelon: 125 

and tactical information: 262-63 

1raining subsection: 64, 175 

1roop movements subsection: 103,22 1,252, 

2771129 

First Army G- 4 (supply) section: 7.22- 23.29, 

33- 34, 193- 94, 289. See also Wilson, 

I3rig. Gen. Robert W. 

and allocation of 1ransportation 

resources: J 74 
346 

First Army G- 4 (supply) section- Continued 

and ammunition supplies: 89- 90, 96 

and Ihe DulI1c or the I3ul!;c: 213- 14 

and buildup on O~IMIA: 79 . 82 

and close air support: 128, 130 

and logistical Slipport for attack on 

Germany: 184, 256- 57 

and medical C\"ICualion: 266 

mission: 33- 34 

operations subsection: 162, 164 

and planning for the invasion: 40, 49 

regulating officer assigned 10: [24 

rclalionswilhCOMZ: 164- 66, 194- 95,247 

and special sl<lff sections: 87- 88 

and supply crisis: 162, 164 

supply subsection: 34, 145-46 

and tnelienl echelon: 125 

traffic hClldqunrtcrs: [03. 162, [64,215, 

221, 248, 252 

lfansponation subsection: 33- 34. 146, 162, 164 

and usc of airfields: 265 

water IrnllSpOr1alion subsection: 34 

First Army 0 - 5 (civil affairs) section: 103, 

164, 193- 94,287. See also Gunn, Col. 

Damon M. 

and capwred enemy supplies: 168 

and civilians in rear areas: 227 

and local procurement: 169 

military government center: 178,266- 67 

and military government for Germany: 

266- 67 

and occupation of Paris: 138- 39 

and propaganda: 174 

and relief for concentration camp victims: 

268 

and sup plie s for civilians in occupied 

areas: 267 

First Army headquarters. See alst) Bradley, 

General Qmar N.; Drum, LI. Gen. Hugh 

A.: Hodges, General Courtney H. 

and 28th Division's attack on Schmidt: 185 

accommodations officer: 26 

adjutant general: 6, 26, 28- 29, 34, 60- 61 

administrative responsibili ties: 26, 27 

air representative: 97- 98 

and allocation of artillery: 246 

ammunition officer: 96, 165- 66 

amphibious section: 59, 83 

antiaircraft section: 26 , 34, 60, 107, 

177- 78, 252- 53,256- 57,273 

A Command Post {(( War 

First Army headquarters- Continued 

armored section: 59,175 , 194, 249,256_57, 

287 

artillery officer: 26, 34, 40 

athletic officer: 273 

attitude toward British Second Army: 94 

base echelon: 98,125,127 

cable communications with lower 

echelons: 84 

and Carolinn maneuvers: 13 

chaplain: 26, 28- 29, 34, 60- 61 

chemica l warfare section: 26,3 4, 87,177, 

248, 253 

chief, air service: 6 

chief. chemical warfnre service: 6 

chief, motor transport corps: 6 

chief, tank corps: 6 

chie f of artillery: 6 

chief engineer: 6. 34, 40, 60- 61. 87 

chief of stnff: 6, 25- 26. 27- 28, 60- 61 

civil affairs ~tion: 26, 51 , 59, 102- 03, 178,287 

combi ned planning with 21 Army Group: 

44,46-47 

command echelon: 125.215,252.269- 70 

command group: 28- 29, 217 

command post, location of: 26, 66, 84, 91. 

125, \33.1 47- 48 , 159- 60, 171 - 72.214-

15,223,239,255,256- 57.262,271 

commnnd problems during the Banle of the 

Bulge: 229- 30 

communications control ccnter: 133- 35 

com!l1unicationsproblcms: 77- 78, 127, 142, 

256- 57, 262, 286 

composition of: 6. 25, 26 

and control of buildup: 86- 87 

and coordination of nrtil1cry: 128 

corps assigned to: 139, 142, 171 

delegation of duties to staff: 27, 286 

deputy chief for operations: 29 

deputy chief of staff for administration: 

28- 29 

deputy commander: 27- 28 

difTerences with the British ovcr the conduct 

of the Baul e of the Bul ge: 218- 21 , 

223- 24 

and dri\,c through Hiirtgen Forcst: 16!- 62 

engineerscction: 88,103,125 , 137- 38, 139, 

104,167,175,179,181,182, 247-48, 252 

eval uation of pcrformance of: 34- 35, 

61 - 64,68, 87, 94- 95, 112, 149, 194- 95 , 
Illdex 

First Army headquarters- Continued 

207- 09.217.229- 30,251,254.274. 

287- 95 

failure to notify other echelons of transfer 

from Spa: 215 

and fatigue: 193- 95.274.288- 89 

finnncc section: 26, 28- 29, 34, J 78, 273 

formation of: 6, 22 

G- 5 (training) section: 6 

and General Drum: 25 

general staff section chiefs: 26. 27. 29- 30, 

60- 61 

and handling of possible war criminals: 176 

headquarters commandant: 26. 34. 59, 133, 

214- 15 

and importance of Roer River dams: 159. 

179,181 - 82 

inability to keep pace with e\'en!s: 110- 11 

inspector genenl1 section: 6, 26. 28- 29. 34, 

60- 61,100,103.175- 76,268 

interrogation center: 176 

and joint relationships with Navy: 56 

judge advocate genera l: 6. 26. 28- 29, 34, 

60- 61 , 103,175- 76.189.268 

Kean as effectivc COlmmmderof: 212- 13. 289 

lack of guidance to , on governance of 

occupied territory: 178 

lack of rescrves: 212 

li(lison systcm: 85, 286. 292 

Little I3UCO: 67 

main echelon: 125, 127 

medical section: 50. 60- Ci1, 130, 136- 37, 

190,2 14,256- 57,266 

mission during invasion: 47 

need for support trOOI)s: 127 

no transportation officer: 59 

and occupation of Paris: 138- 39 

officcrs from II Corps assigned to: 22- 23. 

25, 28- 29. 33, 34- 35, 39, 46, 287- 88 

and operational control ofscrvice units: 247 

opinions on condi tion of, during the Baltic 

of the Bulge: 219- 21 

ordcrs issucd by: 128, 130, 182. 184.222. 

240,289 

ordnance section: 6, 26, 34, 51, 60- 61, 87, 

105,106, 137, 165. 169,214,227,263, 

265,287 

organic transportation: 105. 125 

organization: 6, 7, 26- 27. 60- 61, 286- 87 

personnel management: 29, 32 

347 

First Army headqlHlfters- Continucd 

l'IIhNToM detachment: 262- 63 

photographic interpretation section: 193- 94 

and planning for the attack on Germany: 182 

Planning Group: 44, 45, 64 

planning for the invasion: 21 - 22. 47- 68, 

293- 94 

planning for the movement of, to the 

COlllincnt: 56 

and planning for the occupation of Germany: 

266- 67 

policy of 01)emtional conlrol by the special 

staff: 60 

press corps: 102. 173, 269- 70 

press and psychological warfare section: 194 

and priority lists for buildup for D-Day: 52-

53.293 

provostlllnTstwl: 6, 26, 34, 59. 175- 77 

publ icity and jlsychological warfare section: 

59,102,125,173- 74,269- 70,287 

quartermastcr scction: 6. 26, 34, 40. 50-

5[.60- 6 1.87- 88, 101 - 02 , 124, 145, 

168 

and rear area security: 216- 17 

[~ ed Cross olTicial assigned to: 101 - 02 

relations IVi lh 121h Army Group: 123.218-

19,229,29 1- 92 

relations with 21 Army Group: 84- 85, 142, 

218,219,291 

relalions with allies: 291 

rclation~hip with ADSEC: 56 

relationship with COMZ: 179,256,292 

relationship between special staff hCllds lInd 

technical chiefs at ETOUSA: 41 

rcorganization of: 125, 127.273 

rcplacclllcnt dCJlot: 50 

and reputation for gett ing supplies by any 

means necessary: 165, 167. 171 , 179. 292, 

296114 

rcsponsibilities during invasion: 56 

responsibility for (l{[ministration of troops 

in Britain: 26. 43 

responsibility for training tr001)S in 

Britain: 26 

rolling command posts: 125 

secretary of the gcncral stalT: 26, 28 

Security COl11l11and: 216- 17, 267- 68 

signal section: 6, 26, 34. 40, 51,60- 61. 125. 

133- 34,262 

spccial sections: 29- 30 
348 

Fir~1 Army hClldquurtcrs- Continucd 

special service section: 26, 28- 29. 34.10 1-

02. 174- 75,239,273 

special Slaff: 6, 26. 34, 41, 49, 50- 5 I. 59, 

60,87- 88,103,124,164,165.1 75,193-

94 ,2 11 - 12,216,227 

spccia llroops: 28- 29 

strength: 12. 13.25,26.59,193- 94.273,287 

and supervision of training: 64-66 

and supply crises: 162. 179. 194- 95, 

293- 94 

supply eche lon : 137- 38, 214-15 , 289 

surgeon: 6, 26, 34, 40, 41,60- 61, 87 

laclical echelon: 125, 127. 128, 131- 32, 

133- 35.137- 38,146.149,249.250- 52, 

256- 57, 262,274,293- 94 

tensions Mllong stnff: 25 , 123.287- 88, 

293- 94 

training of SIU If officers: 25- 26 

transferred \0 operational control of 21 

Army Group: 218- 21 

underestimation of opposition: 169- 70 

units allocated to: 103- 04, 124, 139, 142, 

239- 40 

use of phase lincs: 228- 29 

lind World War I: 4- 8 

First Army provost tllarshlll's scction: 164, 

175- 76,194,215 

disciplinary subsection: 103 

lind i111crrogation cc ntcr: 176 

lind POWs: 146- 47,269 

responsibility for rear lIrea security: 176 

tT:lffic subsec tion; 103, 146- 47, 184 , 

252- 53 

"Flllk Allcy": 262 

Flank protection 

for 21 Army Group: 142- 43, 148, 160, 

161 

abnOfmlll concern with: 194- 95,289- 90 

for British Sccond Afmy in Norrnllndy: 

78- 79 

for First Army in lldvanec 10 thc Rhine: 182, 

241 , 244, 249 

lack of, fOf First Army: 149 

for Ninth Army: 244 

for Third Army: 130- 31, 148 

for V Corps: 85- 86 

for VII Corps: 110, 170, 182, 184,228, 

256- 57 

for XIX Corps: 94 

A Commalld Pasl 01 lVi'll' 

Flooding, thre~lt posed by: 159, 179, 181 

Foch. M,lrshlll Fcrdinand: 6. 7 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 4, 6- 7, 9,10 

Forward Echelon, COMZ: 56 

Fougcres: 91 

Fralerniz,l\ion , See Nonfratcrnization policy. 

Fraucnkron: 244 

Frcdcndall, Maj. Gen. Lloyd R.: 23- 24 

Frcilingen: 262 

French Army 

doctrine: II 

org;lllization: 5 

French forces 

Sceond Army: 5 

11 Colonial Corps: 7 

2d Armored Division: 138,291 

Frcnch general staff organ ization: 5 

French Rcsistancc: 83, 138- 39 

Friendly firc accidcnts 

involving fightcr-bombcrs: 90 

involving hcavy bombers: 107 

prevention of: 18 5- 86, 253 

at Rcmagcn: 253 

Fuel: 90 

allocation of: 147 

for attack on Germany: 162,247,263, 265 

availablc stocks of: 88, 104, 179.205,263 

and the Ballic ofthc Bulge: 205, 214, 216 

decanting points: 246- 47. 256, 265 

dumps: 205, 214, 216, 263 

evaeulllcd from areas threlllened by German 

offensive: 214 

cxtra fuel carricd ashorc by vehicles: 51 

planning for buildup of, after D-Day: 49, 

50- 51 

shortages: 142, 143, 145- 46, 147, 162 

transportation to the fronl from be<lches: 146 

truck heads for: 87 

Furlough.~: 175,205- 06,239 

Gaffey. Maj. Gen. Hugh J.: 132 

Gavin, Maj. Gen. James M : 23. 2 12- 13, 215 

Gembloux: 227 

Gem(ind : 159 

General Headquarters (GI-IQ): 12- 13 

General Servicc and SlllffCollcge: 4, 6- 7 

General slaffs, organization of: 11 - 12 

GellCVll Convention, violations of: 29- 30, 176, 

268,271 - 72 

German forces: 128. 185 
Illdex 

German forces- Continued 

eOllstal defenses in France: 48- 49 

equipment cllplured from: 112, 167 

fuel shortages: 222, 255 

morale: 48- 49, 94, 110, 174,207- 08, 

241,255 

in Norm;mdy: 84, 106, 107, 112, 128, 131 

in lhe Peel Marshes: 169- 70 

radio silence: 179, 209 

:1I Rcmagcn: 252- 54 

stand allhc Wesl Wall: 149 

underestimation of: 169- 70, 182, 184, 

257- 60 

withdrawal to the West Wall: 142 

Germlln units: 86,94,170,207,216 

SeI'eIllIlAI'IIIY: 132, 143 

ElcI'clllh Al'lIIy: 260- 62 

Sixth Pal/zer Ar/ll)': 186 

II SS P(llIzer CQrfJ~ : 91 , 216, 222, 223 

91s1ln/tlI/1ry Divisiol/: 52 

183d III/IIIIII}' Dil'is ioll: 160 

352d Ill/alliry Dil'isioll: 48- 49, 68, 77, 290 

2d Pallzer Divisioll: 223, 224 

91h I~(II/zer Divisioll: 170 

lsi SS P(II/zer Divisiol/: 86 

2d SS PllllZ( r Dil'is ioll: 86,94, 170 

9111 SS Pal/zer Dil'isioll: 170 

10lh SS Pallzer DiL'isioll: 170 

121h SS Pall zel' Dil'i~'i oll: 170 

I 71h SS POll zel' Grel/(/(lier Dil'i$ioll: 86 

PllI/zer Lehr/JiI'i.l'ioll: 94 

Kalllp/gl"lll'pe Peiper: 211 

German infiltrators: 207, 2 1 I, 216- 1 7 

German organizations in rear areas: 176 

German reinforcements 

and the ,LHack on Germany: 228- 29, 245, 

255. 260- 62 

and the Oallie of the Bulge: 207.209.21 1, 

216,222,224- 25 

information on: 83- 84, 85- 86, 130- 31, 147-

48,160, 170, 179 

in Normandy: 83- 84, 91. 94,104-05.110, 

112 

at the West Wall: 147-48, 160.170, 179, 184 

Germany: 147- 49,209 

military government for occupied territory 

of: 178, 266- 67 

occupation of: 265, 266- 67, 269- 74 

Gerow, Lt. Gen. Leonard T.: 53, 85, 131 - 32, 

193 

Gerow. LI. Gen. Leon:lru T.- Continued 

and allack on Schmidt: 185 

and the Oallic of the Bulge: 211 - 12 

concern for flank : 85- 86 

and Fifleenth Army: 265 

and liberation of Paris: 138- 39 

349 

and planning for allack on GerrnfLny: 182, 

18' 

relationship with 1·lodges: 293 

and tanks equipped for hedgerows: 105- 06 

Giessen: 255, 265 

Gnome-Rhone factory: 169 

Gooo\\'ooo: 106 

Governor's Island, NelV York: 25, 30 

Grandeamp-Ies-Ilains: 84, J04 

Graves registration: 29, 32 

Gre~" Britain 

nwrshalinJ; areas for assault: 46-47 

responsibility for units in : 41 , 43 

"Grcenlight" shipments: 83 

GR ENADE: 245, 246, 274, 289- 90 

Ground liaison personnel 64- 65,97- 98 

Guerrill" activity. defense agfLinst: 176- 77 

Gunn, Col. Damon M.: 103, 138- 39, !69, 

178,267 

Guns 

6-poLLnder: 225, 227 

8-inch: 96, 190 

57,nlln.: 225, 227 

76,rnm : 95 

88-mm.: 95 

90'mm.: 177- 78 

I 55-111m.: 169 

l!ntiaircrafl: 167 

replacement: 225, 227 

Hains, Col. Peter C.: 95, 105- 06.216,249 

HllllSen, Maj. Chester 13.: 29, 67, 102, 104, J 57. 

194,259- 60 

Hansen, Col. Floyd: 169 

Hart , Orig. Gen. Charles E. "Eddie the 

Cannon"; 23- 24, 34, 40, 64, 105, 146, 

215,294 

and aerial observers: 48 

and control of army artillery: 96 

and coordination of corps artillery: 128 

and organization offLrtillery section: 95- 96 

and planninJ; the attack on Germany: 182, 

190,246 

relationship with I lodges: 121 - 22 
350 

linr( , Brig. Gen. Charles E. "Eddie the 

Cannoll" - Colllinucd 

and Rcmagcll bridgehead: 251 

and testing of antitank weapons: 95 

visits 10 lower echelons: 95- 96 

Harz Mountains: 257, 260- 62 

I-lawley, Maj. Gell.Paul R.: 41 

Hedgerows: 61,64,68,91,94,95,96,98, 103, 

104, 105- 06 

I-Icillsbcrg: 185 

Hcrbcsthal: 162, 164,246- 47 

Hcrsfcld: 265 

Hesse: 271 

Hewitt, Col. Robert A.: 32- 33, 68, 2 13. 288 

I-lodges, General Courtney H : 27- 28, 29. 44, 

67- 68. 91, 105- 06, 294 

nnd ndyicc from Di ckson: 14 7- 48,205, 

207- 08 

and air support for a1tack on Germany: 

185- 86 

and alloc;lIion of resou rces: 255- 56 

and Mlack on Germany: 245 

and attack on Schmidt: 185 

and the Battle of the Bulge: 193,207- 09, 

2 12,215.216,218,219- 21,222- 23,225, 

227- 30, 288- 89 

command style: 121 - 22, 125,288- 89 

communications with corps commanders: 

209, 213 

and concern about nanks: 249, 256- 57 

disapproval ofCor1ctt'~ plans: 11 2 

and distrust of COMZ: 164- 65 ,247 ,292 

,lIld division commanders: 223, 228 

and drive through I-I l"Ingen Forest: 161 - 62, 

186- 87 

and drive to the West Wall: 143, 157 

and failure to conccntr,llC fo rces: 14 7- 49, 

240,288,289- 90 

and Falaise pocket: 130- 32 

fatigued: 193- 95,212,219- 20,222 

and German counterattack at Mor1;lin: 

128, 130 

he:Lith problems during campaigns: 148-49, 

228- 29,245,288- 89 

instructions to Collins: 147- 49,261 - 62 

instructions 10 Gerow: 147- 49, 186- 87 

lack of cOllfidcnce in corps coml11,mders: 

194- 95,253- 54,288- 89,293 

and liberation of Paris: 138- 39 

and location ofcommund post: 171 - 72 

A COII/mand Post at War 

I-lodges, General Courtncy H.- Continued 

:md mobile campaign in Germany: 257-62, 274 

orders from I3r,Ldlcy: 135- 36, 142- 43, 148, 

170, 181 - 82,249- 50,252,255,257, 

261 - 62 

and orders during mobile warfare: 13 5- 36 

and planning for thc all,Lck on Germany: 

145-49,157,160- 61 , 170, 182, 184, 185-

86, 190,192- 93,207,219, 239-40,241 , 

246, 255- 56 

and policy on fraterniza tion: 176 

possible misuse of armored division: 161 

and preparations fo r the occup<lIion of 

Germany: 267 

press con ferences by: 173 

and procedures for contacting the Sovie t Red 

Army: 270 

and redeployment of XIX Corps: 132- 33 

relationship with Bradley: 123- 24 ,218- 19, 

221,239--40 

relationship wilh Collins: 122, 128, 147-48, 

220- 21,223- 24 ,254, 255- 57,261- 62, 

292- 93 

relationship with Coriell: 122, 128, 160- 61 , 

170- 71 

relationship with Dickson: 12 1- 22, 125, 

223,290 

relationship with Eisenhower: 121 

relationshil) with Gerow: 185 

relationshil) with ~I art: 12 1- 22 

relationship with Kean: 12 1- 23, 125 

relationship with Montgomery: 91 ,94,2 19-

21. 223, 229, 291 

relationship with Patton: 12 1 

relationship with Quesad,l: 122, 186, 192 

relationship with Simpson: 292 

relationship with Thorson: 121 - 22, 125 

relationship with Wilson: 122 

and relief of Millikin: 253- 54, 293 

and Rcmagen bridgehcad: 250- 54 

and Roer River dams: 181, 186- 87, 192- 93, 

209 , 241,244-45 

and tactical problems: 12 1- 22 

tcndeney to microm;uHlgc : 293 

and training: 175 

transfer of command 10: 107, 110- 11 , 121 

and unrealistic judgments of subordinate 

commands: 185, 186,259- 60 

and uLlrealistic mission assignments: 185, 

186- 87,293 
Illdex 

Hodges. General Courtney H.- Continued 

and use of armored divisions: 209 

visi ts to corps commanders: 11 0 11. 122. 

125. 142.223- 24,228- 29.240.249 

visits to divisions: 244- 45 , 249 

11 0gne: 224 

Horrocks. Lt. Gen. Sir Brian: 142 

Hospitals 

ndmissions to: 241 

convalescent: 40, 87,124 

evacuation: 40. 87. 124. 136- 37, 190. 213, 

227.266 

field: 87. 124. 136- 37.227.266 

gencral: 168. 190 

ncuropsychiatric; 100. 189- 90 

1I0tei Britlulni<lue: 171- 72,2 15,239.241 

Hotton: 223. 224- 25, 227- 28 

Houffalize: 227- 28, 229 

11 0wi tzcrbattalion s: 139,169.190,246 

Howitzers 

8-i nch: 139.246 

105-mm.: 162, 169 

155-mm.: 162 

240-nll11.: 96, 139. 190,246 

shortages of ammunition for: 162 

Huebner, Maj. Gcn. Clarence R.: 240. 244- 45. 

255- 56,26 1 

Hun ter, Col. Rosser L.: 175- 76 

Huntsberry, LI. Col. Walter A.: 33- 34 

Hiirtgcn Forest: 157, 161 - 62, 170, 182, 184. 

186- 87, 190. 289- 90, 292- 93 

Huy: 147,216,227 

Infall1ry Battalion. 99th: 216- 17 

Infall1ry Branch: 25. 34-35 

Infantry di visions 

allocated to ,mnics: 103- 04, 124. 160,24 1. 

244 

:1 ll ocated 10 corps: 94- 95, 105, 161. 182, 

184- 85. 193. 222. 240, 246. 255- 56 

number of. nceded for OVI!MI.ORll: 40 

lnfiHltry Division s (units) 

1st: 51- 52, 130,209,21 1- 12.213.229,251 

2d: 105- 06 

41h : 52. 77- 78,130,138- 39, 186 87 

8th : 100- 101. 186- 87 

91h : 94,170. 179.18 1. 2 13. 245, 251. 253, 

254,256- 57 

28th: 139, 184. 185. 186- 87 

29th: 51- 52,86,1 60,227 

351 

Infantry Divisions (nn its)- Corninued 

30th : 91 , 94 , 161. 213. 215, 216- 17, 229 

451h: 45 

69th: 270 

75th: 229 

78th: 244- 45.253 

79th : 89- 90 

86th: 259- 60 

90th: 100- 101 ,293 

99th: 184.248 

104th: 184. 186 

106th: 2 11. 218. 222 

In f:1l1try regiments: 182.184.267- 68 

261h: 213 

471h : 213 

Infanlry rinernen, short:1ges of: 100. 187- 88,225 

Infall1ry School: 22 

Intelligcncc. See Mi litMy intelligence. 

Inter-Allied Joint Army Committee: 43 

lsigny : 46, 52, 9 1.104,110 

H:11y: 14, 16 

Jemellc: 218- 19 

Joint agreement of 10 February 1944: 56 

Joint assauh signal compan ies: 51 

Joint Chiefs orSlaf1': 85- 86 

Joint operations, inadequacy of doctrine for: 14 

Joint pla nning ror attack on Germany: 185- 86 

Hilich: 246 

Kassel: 255, 265 

Kean, Maj. Gen. William B.: 24. 28. 29, 49, 

67.91.105- 06. 132- 33,194. 294 

acting ror Hodges: 176 

and alllick on Cierlllllny: 24 1 

altitude loward morale: 174 

and the Uattle of the Bulge: 212 - 13, 

214- 15,218,223- 24.230, 289 

and COMZ: 292 

,md dri ve through Hiirtgcn Forest: 162 

and Fal:lise pockct: 13 1- 32 

and libcration of Pilris: 138- 39 

and location of command post: 171 - 72 

and planning the in\'asion orOcrm,my: 228. 

239- 40.267 

and planning for invasion: 49 

relationship with Bradley: 218- 19 

relationship with Dickson: 123, 223 

relat;onshill wich Hodges: 121 - 23, 125. 212 

and Rcmagcn bridgehead: 250- 51. 252 
352 

Kcan. Maj. Gen. William B.- Cominucd 

and tactical echelon : 125 

and un loading of ships: 82- 83 

Kea rney, Maj. Charles R.: 34 

Kirk , Rear Adm. Ala n G.: 45, 52. 64, 68, 

85- 86,290 

Koblenz: 8, 137- 38, 14 7- 48 

Koenig. General Pierre J. : 138- 39 

KOI11I11Crschcidl: 185 

Krueger. Lt. Gen. Waller: 14, 16 

Kunzig. LI. Col. William B.: 2771129 

La Capdle: 136- 37, 164 

La Loupe: 162, 164 

Lahn River: 255- 56 

Landing craft detachments: 182,251,252 

Landing ships. tank (L5Ts): 66- 67. 87 

Landrulll , Maj . Gen. Eugene M. : 101 

Lnllgcrwchc: 185 

L:tI1 grcs: 5 

Lauler-Sarre Ri ver: 254- 55 

Le lIavre: 184 

Le Mans: 9[,130 

Lcanel drops: 102 

Leave 

policy: 194- 95,239,273 

responsibility for policy on: 29. 32 

staff officers: 205- 06. 239 

Leclerc, Maj. Gen. Jacques r'.: 138 

Lee, LI. Gen. John C. Ii.: 14 5, 166,247 

Lei ne River: 260- 6 1 

Leipzig: 262 

Lessay: 89- 91 

Lessons 1cMned: 106 

Letlers of instructions: 136 

Liaison officers: 11 ,85, I)) 35, 165, 184, 190, 

211. 217, 218- 19, 220- 21. 286, 292, 294 

Liege: 146- 47, 162, 164, 166, 169, 177. 190, 

192,205,2 15,2 16,219,222,227 

Limburg: 255, 256, 268 

Litllcjohn, Maj. Gen. I{obert M.: 1M, 167.247 

Log istical support 

121h Army Group role in: 124 

2 1 Army Group control of: 56 

for VIII Corps in Ihe Bailie of the Dulge: 219 

for XIX Corps: 171 

allocalions priorities: 52- 53, 124 

fo rallack on Germany: 164, 166.225.227, 

246-47 

breakdown of: 143, 145, 14 7. 162, 179 

A Commalld Posf (If lVor 

Logistica l supporl- Continued 

causes ofshorlages in: 162 

and COMZ: 124, 145- 46, 164, 167, 179. 

186.247.292 

distribution system: 164, 165, 166 

for mobile campaign inlO Germany: 256 57. 

263- 65,274 

planning for. for openllions: 39, 46- 47, 49, 

50- 53, 164. 166.225,227,292 

procedures for: 145-46.292 

and winter: 167- 68 

Loire River: 21. 5 1. 61. 131 

Losheirn Gap: 2 11 - 12. 244 

Lt1bcck: 27 1 

Luow STRIKE;: 90 

LudendorfT Bridge (Remagen): 250- 5 1, 253. 

265 

LIJMIU:MJACK: 246,249, 253, 274 

Luxcmbourg: 157, 178 ,211 - 12,218- 19 

Lynde, Col. Ne lson M .. Jr. : 106, 167, 169. 216, 

225.227 

Maas Rivcr: 179 

MacArthur, Genera l Douglas: 8- 9. 12, 14 

Machi lle records units: 124.24 1 

McLain, Maj. Gen. Raymond S,: 171 

McNair, LI. Gcn. Lcsley J : 12,287 

McNamara, Col. Andrew T.: 23- 24. 34. 40, 

14 5.146.213,2 14 ,263,265,294 

and displ;lced persons and rcfugces: 267. 

269 

failu re to anticip:nc nccd for wint er 

clothing and foo l wear: 167- 68,240 41 

and opcrat ions ill Normandy: 87- 88 

aud plannillg for invasion: 50- 5 1.59 

and qUMtermastcr del)OI: 164 

MaiHebois: 133 

Mainlcnance for tanks: 167 

Mainz: 181 82, 256, 265 

Malmcdy: 205, 21 I, 214, 2 16- 17. 222 

Manhay : 223 

Mantes-Gassicourt: 132, 139 

,Hamw! jill' COII/II/III/ders oj Lflrge Ull i/~ : 9 

Map depots: 87, 137- 38,205.2 14 

Maps. shortagcs of: 137- 38, 139 

Marburg: 257. 262 63,265 

March, Gener-II I'eyton C.: 253 

Marchc: 2 19, 22 1- 22 

Marigny: 104 

MAIIKIT-G"MUIN: 149. 160, 181 - 82,219 
Illdex 

MarslHlII, General Gcorge C.: 4, 6- 7, 53, 56 

May,Col. William: 102, 174- 75 

Mayenne: 127- 28 

Mcdaris, Col. John B.: 34,90, 105- 06, 143, 

294 

~nd the ~HIe of tile Bulge: 213, 214. 216 

and COMZ: 292 

and 10e~1 procurement: 169 

and ordnnnce supplies: 43 , 165, 167 

and pl~nning for inv~sion: 40-4 1. 51 

~nd problems of mobile w~rfarc: 137 

and tank innov~tions: 40- 41 

and tanks for aHack on GernHlny: 225. 227 

and V.wcapon llllacks: 177- 78 

Medical base area: 190 

Medical evacuation 

by air: 50, 87, 190,266 

to COMZ facilities: 50 

during mobile warfare: 136- 37,266 

plllnning for: 50 

policy: 190,227,266 

by rail: 190 

by sea: 50, 87 

for trench foot: 168 

Mcdieal supplies: 128,130.136- 37,143,145, 

190 

Medical units: 40 , 124,136- 37.164,190 

Mellin : 132 

Merriam, Robert E.: 23 41/4 7 

Metz: 139. 147, 160, 170, 181 - 82, 192 

Meuse-Argonne ofTensive: 7 

Meuse pocket· 160, 170 

Meuse River: 147,219,222 

Micheroux: 2 15 

Middle WlIllop: 48, 77- 78, 96- 97 

Middleton, Drcw: 173,209 

Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.: 89- 90,91 

Milit;try governmcnt for occupied territory: 

178,266- 67 

Military government units: 178,266- 67 

Mi litary intelligence: 130- 31 

accuracy of: 48- 49 

on the B,IHIe of the Bulge: 207- 09,216- 17 

British contributions to: 48 

during campaign in Germany: 262- 63 

on cnemy order of blllllc: 83,290 

failures of: 48-49, 286, 293- 94 

II \Nl"O~l: 84- 85, 220- 21 ,262- 63,286 

and Roer Riverdanw 179, 181 

sources: 159- 60, 207, 209 

Military intelligence- Continued 

on V-wellpons: 177- 78 

Military intclligence teams: 176 

353 

Military police units: 40, 48,103,124.176 

Miller, Col. George A.: 125, 127,225, 27 1- 72 

Millikin. Maj. Gen.lohn: 245, 251, 253- 54, 

274,293 

Mons: 143, 146- 47 

Monschau; 157, 160- 61, 182, 184,239,24 1. 

244 

Montgomery. Fie ld Marshal Sir Bernard L. 

and Antwerp: 170 

assault across the Rhine: 256 

and the Bailie of the Bulge: 216, 218- 20, 

223- 25,291 

lind COUR,\: 104, 105, 106- 07, 110 

command sty le : 45-46. 29 I 

diplomacy e~crcised by: 84-85 

lind Falaise pockct: 130, 131 - 32 

and invasion: 78 

and MARKH-GARI)EN: 149, 18 1- 82 

and Illanning for beachhead expansion: 61 

and plnnning for NEPTUNE: 46 

lIld problem po~ed by hcdgerows: 64 

and redeploymcnt of XIX Corps: 132- 33 

relations with 12th Army GroUI): 127- 28 

relations with First Army headquarters: 84-

85,86,89- 90,91.218,219- 20,229 

rciationship wi th Brlldley: 45- 46, 78- 79, 

84- 85,91 ,1 42-43 ,29 1 

relationship with Eisenhower: 227- 28 

relationship with Hodges: 219- 21. 223- 24, 

227- 28,229,291 

and strategy for attack on Germany: 139, 

160,2 19,227- 28,241,244 

visi ts to corps and divisions: 220- 21, 

227- 28 

Morale 

effects of repillecment system on: 188 

erforts to enh~ln ce: 10 1- 02. 174- 75, 272, 

m 

German forces: 94, 110, 174,207- 08,241, 

255 

and specia l service officers: 14. tOl- 02, 

174- 75 

nnd training: 175 

Morgan. Lt. Gen. Frederick E.: 21 

Morrison, Brig. Gen. John F.: 4 

Mortain : 127- 28, 130, 146- 47 

Moselle River: 245. 255 
354 A Commalld Posl {II fYar 

Moses, Orig. Gen. Raymond G.: 164. 165- 66 Ofiicers- Continued 

Motor pool: 90, 105 reclllssificlltion of: 189- 90.272 

MUUII:RRY: 88 

Mulde River: 260- 62, 270 

Mullen. Lt. Col. Jamcs R. : 33- 34 

Myers, Col. S(lIllUel L.: 29. 32, 68.125,127, 

212,287- 88,294 

Namur: 222. 227 

N(lIlcy: 147 

National Dc fense Act of 1916: 8- 9 

National Guard as source of First Army helld 

quarters Slaff: 25, 29, 32 

Naval beach battalions: 56. 59, 64 

Naval bombardmcnt group: 5 1.90 

Naval eomb"t dcmolition units: 53, 64 

Naval dispatch bOll I servicc: 77 

Naval gunfire liaison ofTieers: 56, 90 

Naval gunfire support: 43, 51. 90 

Naval shore fire control parties: 5 I , 56, 64, 

113113 

Navy, U.S. 

and availability of lift: 49 

coordination of eross·Chmmcl movemcnt: 34 

disputcs wi th First Army hea<lqu<Hters ovcr 

unlonding of ships: 82- 83 

(wd landing cra ft detachments: 182 

and Lillie BUCO: 67 

llnd plan for crossing the Rh ine: 247- 48 , 

251,252 

und planrling for eross-Channcl atlnck: 44, 

46- 47.51,52- 53.64 

Western Task Force: 45, 56. 64 

NEI'TUNE: 46, 50- 53, 56. 58, 59, 62, 83- 84,100 

Netherlands: 178 

Neufch[Heau: 7 

NCUrll]lsyehialrie casual tics: 189- 90 

NonfratcrnizllIion policy: 176.267,27 1- 72,273 

Nordhausen: 268 

Normllndy campaign: 46, 61. 77- 112. 293- 94 

North Africa: 40, 164- 65,213 

Nugcnt. Brig. Gcn. Richard E.: 21 1- 12 

OtTiee ofStralegie Services (OSS): 83- 84, 209 

OtTice!" candidate programs: 189 

Officcrs 

assignmcnt of cxtras prior to D-Day: 50 

battlefield IHomot ions: 188- 89 

casualties: 189 

lowercd standards for: 188- 89 

rclieved: [OO- lOl, 189- 90. 253- 55 

rcplacement of: 43.100,188- 89 

O'Hare. Col. Joseph 1. "Red": 29, 32, 45 , 66, 

[22,288 

O~!'\lI \ Beach: 49 

and brcakdown of eOlllmunications: 77- 78 

c<lble communications on: 84 

dcstruction ofartificilll port at: 88- 89 

forces assigned to assault: 51 - 52, 77 

naval support at: 51 

problems with buildup at : 79, 82 

Oppenheim: 256 

Orders 

for al!aek on Germany: 182, 184 

doctrine conccrning: 13,285- 86 

cITccts of mobile warfare on the issuing of: 

135- 36 

instruction in the prelMration of: 4 

issued by Bradley: 23,135- 36,142-43,148, 

170, 181 - 82,249- 50,252,255,257,261 

issued by First Army hC(ldqu;lrters: 128. 130, 

182, 184,222,240,289 

issued by 1·lodges: 135- 36, 161. 222, 240, 

255,261 - 62 

issued by Montgomcry: 84 

prcparcd by 21 Army Group: 53 

and tendency 10 micromanage: 182, 184, 

286,289- 90 

Ordnance depots: 137,213.216 

Ordnaneeunits: 40,87, 106, 124, 137,247,248 

equipmcnt for: 40, 43 

to support cnginecr Sl)ecial brigades: 51 

Organized Reserves as source of First Army 

headquarters staff: 25, 29, 32 

Orleans: 131 

Orne Rivcr: 46 

Ourthe River: 227- 28 

OVERLORO 

eomn1l1nd of: 2 1- 22, 39, 52, 56 

controversial ordnance planning deci~ions : 

40- 41 

cstimates of equipment nceded for: 39 

estimates of unilS needed for: 39,40,46 

planning for: 21 - 22, 39- 68, 86- 87, 90 

SHAEF role in planning for: 61 

I'aderborn: 256- 57, 292- 93 

Page, Col. David 1' .. Jr.: 102 
II/dex 

I'aget. General Sir IJcrnnrd: 4<1 

P(lIlzer divisions. Se(~ German forces; German 

uniTs. 

Paris: 61. 138- 39, 175.291 

Parker, Mnj. Gen. Edwin P .. Jr.: 244- 45 

P(IS de (n1ais: 49. 84. 107. 142 

PaTterson. Col. Charles G.: 48, 60. 87, 146, 177-

78,185- 86,192. 216.246.251. 253. 294 

PillIon. LI. Gen. George S .. Jr.: 16,23- 24 . 10 7, 

167, 253, 292 

nllitude toward Oradley: 94 

,11Iilnde toward odge~: 94 

and the l3aule of the !lulge: 216 

llradley's orders 10: 131 - 32 

commnnd sly Ie: 16 

ordered 10 seize I3rillany: 127- 28 

Peel ;lr~hes: 160- 61 , 165- 66. 169- 70 

I'egrnm. Maj. Earl F.: 85 

Peiper. LI. Col. Jonehim: 211 

Pericrs: 94. 104- 05. 106. 107 

Pcrshing, Genernl John J.: 4-8.101. 285. 293 

Petain, Genernl Henri: 6 

l'n,\NTml dctaehments: 84- 85 , 220- 21, 262-

63.286 

Photo company detachments: 40 

I'h olographic interpretation delnehment. 

]1rOVi5ionn1: 48. 96- 97 

Photomapping: 138 

Pil)e!ines: 90, 145.146,265 

I'Jank , Brig. Gen. Ewart G.: 164 

Pointe dll Hoc: 84 

Poli ~h 1 ~t Armored Division: 132 

Politics, role of. in selection of commanders: 53 

l'ort-en-l3essin: 90 

POSTal service: 29.32. 50 

Press, reltllions with: 102, I 73. 269- 70 

Prisoners of W(lr (POWs) 

during the I3tl1t1c of lhe Bulge: 217 

during COIIR,\: 110 

facilities for: 227 

food for: 269 

in Germtlny: 269 

interrog'ltions of: 207,209,211,217 

massacre of American: 2 11 

at Mons: 143 

problems posed by: 146- 47 

responsibility for: 29. 32.103 

Promotions 

ball\efield: 100. 188- 89, 272 

officers: 29, 32 

I'romotions- Conlinned 

responsibilily fo r: 60 

Prol)agandtl: 32.102,174 

I'roximity fuze: 169, 222 

Prlim: 245 

l'sychologieaJ warfare: 102. 173- 74 

Public he"lth. responsibility for: 267 

Qutlrtermaster Corps: 25 

Quartermaster depots: 145, 164.227 

Qunrtermtlster units: 40, 124,256,265 

Quebec conferences: 21- 22. 39 

355 

Quesadn. Maj. Gen. Elwood R. "Pete": 45. 48. 

97- 98.290 

and air ,lltacks on Germany: 207 

and air support for the Haule of the Ulilge: 

218 

,md COIIR I\: 104, 105. 107. 1181173 

and communiC;ltions f;leilities: 172 

and destruction of Roer River dams by ,lir: 

192- 93 

rcltltionship wilh Bradley: 45, 97. 105. 

290- 91 

relationship with l'lodges: 122. 186. 192 

and Remagen bridgehctld: 253 

Radio eommnnications: 14 

with 21 Army Group: 84 

with corps: 84, 133 

decoding of: 78 

interecption of Gcrmtln: 49. 83. 85- 86, 

110.209 

during ilwasion: 77- 78 

and mobile warf,lre: 133,286 

in Normandy: !l4 

tcsting of: 66 

Radio nets: 51 

for tlir-ground coordination: 77- 78 

command: 77- 78, 133- 34, 172.209,211- 12, 

216- 17.218- 19.221.239.262- 63.286 

engineers: 137- 38 

monitored during invasion: 77- 78 

ordnance lin its: 137 

Radio relays: 133- 35. 172.218- 19 

Radios 

SCR- 399: 133- 34 

in ttlnks: 105.225.227 

VHF: 105 

Railroads 

damaged by V-weapons: 177 
356 

Railroads- Continued 

lack of: 103, 145, 146,265 

reconstruction of; 164,247,256,265 

used to transport supplies: 214, 256 

Ranger baualions: 51 - 52.124. 228,246 

RANKI N: 39, 178,266 

Rations 

airdrops of: 128, 130 

for tlllack on Germany : 263, 265 

captured German: 168, 178 

estimates ofnccds: 164 

planning for. for QVEIILOlI.ll: 49, 50- 51 

reserves: 88, 162. 179.247.263 

shortages of: 162. 168 

stocks of: 50- 51. 104, 143, 145,269 

truck heads for: 87 

Ray, Lt. Col. John: 40- 41 , 51, 88- 89, 165- 66, 

177- 78 

Rear areas 

security: 175- 78 

lruckhcads: 87 

and V-weapons: 177- 78 

Reclassification: 29. 32,43,98, 100, 189-

90 

Reclassification Center: J 89 

Red Army. See Soviet Red Army. drive for 

conIne! with. 

Red Ball Express: 83, 146 

Red Cross. See AmeriCll!l Red Cross. 

r~ efugees: 178,268,269 

Regulating Station, 25th: 124, 145-46.256.292 

I{emagen: 250- 54, 262, 274 

I{enncs: 61 

Replacement dcpot~: 50, 2 r 5 

3d: 188 

14th: 100 

Replacement personnel: 29, 32. 43 

assauilunits: 50 

hijacking of convoys of: 188 

infantry riflemen: 100. 187- 88.225 

lack of: 168, 187- 88.225.239-40.266 

ofTieers: 43. 100, 188- 89 

prior \0 D-Day: 43 

priorities for: 100, 188 

responsibility for: 43. 187- 88 

sources of: 225. 272 

volunteer crews of: 2 16 

I~eplncemcnl ~ystem: 98.100.188- 89 

Rest arcas: 101 , 174- 75,239,273 

Rheinbnch : 256, 265 

A COII/malld Post (f( 'Yar 

Rhinc River 

bridgehellds over\he: 181 - 82,249- 54,255,265 

drive 10 the: 138, 149, 157. 179. 181 - 82. 

239- 40,241,245,246- 50 

Montgomery's crossing of the: 256 

pinus for crossing: 247- 48 

"Rhino" device: 106 

Ridgway, M"j. Gen Matthew B.: 220- 21, 

228- 29,240,257,259- 60.293 

Ronds 

bombing of: 51 

coordination of the lise of: 133, 142-43.221. 

251,252 

improvement of: 146- 47,248,256 

inadequney of: 248, 252, 254 

priorities: 252- 53 

Robcrts, Col. Cnrhon r. : 137- 38 

Rockel launchers: 169 

Roer River 

crossing of: 182.248- 49 

dams: 159- 60, 179. 181 - 82. 192- 93.205, 

241,244,286- 87,290 

flooding of: 241,245 

Rogers, 13rig. Gen. 10hn A.: 40. 41. 50, 87, 

136- 37.164- 65.190,213,227.266. 

267 

Roosevclt , Franklin D.: 21 

Rooscvclt, Bri g. Gen. Theodorc, Jr.: 102 

Rosc, Maj. Gen. Mauricc: 257 

Roscngancn. LI. Col. Adolph G. , 11'.: 49, 208 

ROVER: 1191177 

Royal Air Force: 45, 65 

Domber COI1l11l,l1ld: 193 

2d Tactical A ir Force: 48, 90, 218 

Ruhr I'ocket, operation s against: 255- 60 

Russian refugces: 269 

Russian forces. See Soviet Red Army, drive for 

contact with. 

Sllbotage 

defense llgainst: 176. 253 

by Germnns: 207.211. 253 

SI. Lo; 39, 47, 48, 85- 86, 90- 91,94, 104- 05, 

106, 107, 110, 146- 47 

St.-Trond: 227 

St.-Vith: 2 11. 213. 2 15- 16, 218, 219, 223. 

227- 29 

Ste. MCre-Eglisc: 46 

Salm Rivcr: 228 

Salvagc companies: 167. 168 
Illdex 

Sayler. Maj. Gen. Henry D.: 40 ...... 1, 165 

Schmidt: 181. 182, 184-85,244- 45,289 90 

Schncc Eifcl: 211 

Schwaml11enaucl Dam: 159. 193, 245 

357 

S,)ecial scrv ice compan ies: 10 1- 02. 174- 75 

Specia l service officers: 14 

Special stalTs, org:mization o f: 11 - 12 

SS Panze r division s. See German force s: 

Security Command Headquarters, First U.S. Germ,lIl units. 

Army: 176- 77 Stadt Meckenheim: 256 

Sei ne. drive to the: 127-28. 13 1- 32, 139 Stafl"doctrine 

Scnonehes: 136 

Service troops; 214. 247. 254, 265 

Services of Supply: 41 , 43.44- 45,89 

Seulles River: 85 

Scves River: 106 

Ships. comllland: 67- 68, 77- 79 

Ships. un loading of 

backlog at OMAHA: 79, 82- 83, 88- 89. 104 

policy and procedures fo r: 56, 59, 82- 83, 86 

priorities for: 56. 79, 82- 83. 89, 165- 66 

Shocpacs: 50, 167- 68,240- 41 

Si bcrt, Brig. Gcn. Edwin L.: 123- 24. 208 

Sicily: 16.22.24-25.45,86, 164- 65 

Sic!;fricd Line: 147, 157 

Si!;na l Construction Bau"lions 

32d:262 

35th: 84. 262 

Signa l equipmcnt 

shortages of: 104, 143, 145. 162 

for tank s: 95 

Signal In fOfrlwt ion and Moni toring (S IAM) 

Comp'IIlY. 3323d: 262- 63 

Sigtwl intelligence: 83 

Signa l Ol)erations Battalion, 17th: 133.2 15 

Signa l uni ts: 40, 51, 124. 172,225.227,286 

Silvey. Col. William R.: 32, 207, 209 

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William 1-1.: 121. 213. 246. 

257.292 

Skorl.eny. Lt. Col. OUo: 217 

Small arms. shortages of: 104 

Smith, Lt. Gcn. Walter 13.: 123- 24,208,218, 

220.289,291 

Smoke generator units: 87, 248, 253 

Soissons: 147, 166 

Somlllc Ri ver: 142 

Soviet Red Army, drive for contact with: 257. 

270- 71 

SI)a: 171 - 73.177- 78.186. 188,192,205,207. 

208,211 - 12.214- 15.2 16.239,249.252 

Spaatz. Lt. Gen. Carl A.: 106- 07 

SI)anish-Americ:ln War: 3- 4 

SIMre PMts, shortages of: 143, 145. 162. 167, 

247,263 

British: 5 

dcvclopnlent of: 4, 5. 6- 7,1 1- 13.26,136. 

285- 86 

French : 5 

Staff officers, shortages of: 13 

Staff officers field nlRlluals: 9, 13.26. 136 

St:lff operations, officer training in: 4- 5, 

9- 13. 16 

SWrs (lnd Siripe ~: [0 [- 02 

Stavc lot: 205, 21 4. 215. 2 16- 17 

Stolberg: 246- 47. 250- 5 1, 252 

Stolberg corridor: 157, 162, 181- 82. 184, 192- 93 

Stragglers: 103. 14 6- 47. 176.21 5 

Strasbourg; 208 

Slroh, Maj. Gen . Donald A.; 186- 87 

Strong. Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. D.: 208 

Superior Board on Organization and Tactics: 9 

Suppl ies. See (liso p(lr/icllfar iICIIIS. 

airlift of: 256, 265 

and Ihe Battle oflhe Bu lge: 219 

buildup before :ltt:lek on Germany: 246 ...... 7. 

256,263 

bui ldup on beaches: 67. 77. 79. 82. 89 

captured German : 137, 143, 145, 167, 168 

C,Hlses of shortages: 162 

charges of theft of. by First Army: 165 

Class I (mlions): 87 

Class II (construction matcria ls): 50- 51. 87 

CI:lsS III (I>c troleum and lubricants); 87 

Class IV (clothing): 50- 51. 87 

Class V (ammun it ion): 87 

effect o f June storm on buildup: 88- 89 

effects of congestion on bui ldup: 104 

effects of11lobile w:lrfare on: 143, 14 5, 162 

cngineer: 137- 38, 143, 145,2 14 

cst imates of needs: 164, 1M. 292 

hoarding of: 165. 167,292 

improvisation: 169 

in:lbililY to deliver: 292 

local procuremcnt of: 169.240- 41 

ordnance: 137. 143. 145. 162 

I)riorit ies for bui ldup of: 49, 67.79.89, 13 7. 

162, 164.167- 68.174 
358 

Supplies- Continued 

requisition procedures: 165 

reserves: 88 

shipping priorities for: 49 

transportation plan for: 162. 164.256,265 

Supply dumps 

011 the beaches: 79, 86 

captured enemy slipplies: 168 

clothing: 87 

construction malerials: 87 

cllJ;inccr: 205 

evacuation of: 214 

location of: 145,205, 246- 47 

Supply installalions: 213, 221, 227, 246- 47 

ADSEe: 146 

lucation of: J45, 162, 164, 227,263,265 

mobile: 14, 137- 38,227,262 

storage levels for: 247 

Supreme l-Icadquartcrs, Allied Expeditionary 

Force (SHAEF): 41. 47. See also Eisel1-

hower, General of" the Army Dwight D. 

and attack on Germany: 239, 241 

and the l3:llllc of [he Bulge: 217, 218 

and breakout il1lo I3rillany: 90 

and contact Wilh the Soviet Red Army: 270 

~lI1d control of cnptured materiel: 267- 68 

and crossing of the Rhine: 249- 50 

nnd Dickson's Estimllle 37: 208 

nnd emergency replncements: 225 

fnilure to perceive threat posed by Roer 

Rivcr dnms: 159, 179, 181 

fnilurc to providc guidance on militnry 

government: 178 

(md fmtcrnizntion: 176 

nnd Germnn row enmps: 268 

and Hodges: 173 

nnd loss estinllltes: 50 

movement to the Contincnt: 56, 68 

and occupied Gcrmnny: 267, 268 

operntionnl memornndums: 56 

nnd plnn for crossing the Rhine: 247-48 

and pllHming the nttnck on Germnny: 185 

policy rcgarding airdrops: 128, 130 

and priority of ilir supply: 265 

and psychological warfare: 173- 74 

and Remagcn bridgchead: 252 

and resolution of supply problems: 166 

and supervision of OVERLOIW planning: 61 

Swift. Capt. Eben: 4 

Sylvan. M:lj. William C.: 29, 212 

A COIIIIII(lIl(/ POSI af War 

Tables of equipment, pe;lectime: 168 

Tables of Organization for army headquarters: 

12 , 14.26, 27,59, 193- 94.273, 287. 

294 

Tactical Air Command, IX: 45, 48 

and aeTinl photographic observ;Hion: 96- 97 

aerinl rcconnnissance missions: 96- 97, 177-

78,290 

and air warning systcm: 177- 78 

airdrops: 128. 130 

and close air support at Mortain: 128, 130 

and CO!ll~A: 105. 106 

and control of elose nir support: 97- 98 

coordiniltion with First Army G- 3 (Air): 136 

nnd First Army headquartcrs taclienl 

echelon: 125, [27 

intelligence reports from First Army 0 - 2. 

83,177- 78 

and intcrdiction of withd rnwing Gcrmnn 

troops: 142 

and invnsion: 77- 78 

linison to First Army headquarters: 96- 97 

and plnnning for ntt:lck on Germnny: 

185- 86. 192 

problems with conlinuniC;ltions: 134-35 

relations with First Army hcadquMters: 45, 

51, 59. 96- 98. 105. 112, 134, 185- 86, 

190,192,211.218.290- 91 

and Rem;lgen bridgehcnd: 253 

staff collocatcd with First Army lIir 

rcpresentativc: 97- 98 

transferred 10 operational control of British 

2<1 Tnc\ ical A ir Force: 218 

T;lcticnl Air C0111nml1(~ XXIX: 185.211- 12.218 

TAUSMAN: 178, 266 

Tank battalions: 86, 94- 95, 124, 137, 161, 162, 

167.175.184,213.216,222.228,240,246 

Tank Dcstroyer Group. 23<1: 176- 77 

Tank destroyer units: 40.105, 124,161. 184, 

213.216- 17.222,228, 240, 246 

Tank destroyers: 96,167.182 

Tank-infnntry coordination, fnilurcs of: 95- 96 

Tnnk mnintcnancc companies: 225, 227 

Tank truck eompllnies: 90 

Tanb 

assigned 10 support corps: 182 

cnptured German: 168 

communicmions e(lllipment for: 95 

developed by British: 40 

engines for: 167, 169 
Index 

Tllnks-Conti nued 

equipped to deslroy hedgerows: 105- 06 

German: 95 

nwimenancc and s;dvagc of: 95. 137. 167 

Pershing: 249 

replacements for: 137, 143, 145. 162, 167, 

225.227 

Shennan: 95, 105- 06, 169 

shonages of: 162,225,227 

uscd as artillery: 167 

wcaponry for: 95, 169 

Thompson. Jack: 173 

Thorson . Brig. Gen, Truman C.: 32- 33, 49, 

67,86,91 , 102. 142- 43. 167- 68, 194. 

270,287- 88.290, 294 

and allaek on Germany: 241 

lll1d the Bailie of the Bulge: 208. 212- 13, 

215,223- 25 

and Falaisc pocket: 13 1- 32 

and planning thc aHnek on Germany: 182. 

228.239- 40 

rc1ationship with Dickson: 123, 130- 31 

rela tionship wi th I-lodges: 12 1- 22. 125, 

212- 13 

and Remagcn bridgehead: 251 

Throckmorton. Lt. Col. John L.: 33, 294- 95 

Tt! N()E~C M, Exercise: 6 I 

Thurmond, J. Strom: 295 

Tlm,R, Exercise: 66- 67 

Timberlake, Brig. Gen. Edward W.: 60. 246 

Tongres: 223. 227. 228 

"Toot Sweet" ra il express: 247 

TOllogrnphic obst<l cles: 6 1, M 

TOl)Ognlphical battalions: 40, 138 

To~ ll: 23- 24 

Tournai: 142- 43 

Traffieeongcst ioll: 103 04.128.146- 47. 184. 

221. 240-41, 252- 54 

Training 

air-ground: 64- 65 

of Americanlroops in Brit:tin: 26. M 

for assault tanding: 64 

in bridge construction: 248 

of British forces: 65- 66 

of Canadian force s: 65- 66 

combat orientation program: 188, 225 

command post exercises: 61,64- 66 

exere iscs in Britain: 65- 67 

First Army headqunrtcrs rcsponsibility 

for: 26 

Training Continucd 

GHQ responsibi lity for: 12 

joint: 64- 65 

1<Ick offaei1ities for: M 

t<lck of instructional rnaterillis for: 64 

maneuvers: 12- 13 

359 

of military government detachments: 178 

with the Navy : 64 

of olTicen: 4. 9- 12. I]. 16.25- 26.285-

86 

of pilots: 45 

of replaecments: 225 

for SIAM compan ies: 263 

in stllIT operations: 4- 5. 9. 12- 13 

supervision of. by First Army: 64 

unit: 12- 13, 175 

Transportation 

allocation of, by COMZ: 1M, 247 

coordination of: 246 

ina(tcquacy of: 145, 146, 162. 247, 263 , 

265 

ror medical supplies: 136- 37 

need to revise shipping schedules: 66- 67 

problems in allaek on Germany: 2]9- 41 , 

265 

Tr:lI1sportation Corps: 79, 82 

Trench foot: 167- 68 

Troop Carrier Command. U.S. IX: 218, 266 

Troop movements: 289 

for attack on Germany: 240- 41. 244. 247 

during the Illlulc of the l3ulge: 221, 239-

40.292.293- 94 

to the Continent: 67- 68 

priori ties for: 67 

responsibi lity for: 67 

Truck b,l\lalions. provisiona l: 136- 37, 146, 

167 

Truck companies: 40, 90, 105, 124. 132- 3]. 

137,184,213,214,252.256,265, 286 

Truekheads: 87. 205. 246- 47 

Trucks 

priority of usc for tr;lIIspoTlinS supplies: 

146- 47 

shortages of: 162. 176. 247, 265 

Truseoll, Maj. Gen. Lucian K., Jr.: 53 

Tunisia: 23. 24. 291. 292 

U LTRA: 49. 83, 85- 86, I 10. 128. 131 , 179.208, 

209.216,225- 26.251 - 52,290 

U ND£RTONE: 255 
360 

Underwater obstacles: 53, 64 

Unit awards: 98 

Unit exchanges: 50 

United Serllice Organizntioll shows: 102, 115, 

213 

Urf! Dam: 159, 193,244- 45 

U.S. Strategic Air Forces: 106- 07 

UTAH Belich: 51 , 52. 77- 78 

V-weapons: 177- 78 

V- Is: 177- 78,215 

V- 2s: 177- 78 

A COII/mand POSI (II War 

War Department- Continued 

and fepl,lcemen! officers: 189 

and supremacy of COllllllillldcr: 6- 7. 9, 10, 

13,285- 86 

War Department General SlatT: 4 

Warburg: 265 

Water Tr<tllspoTlulion Control: 83 

Weather 

and COBRA: 106. 107 

effects on aerial reconnaissance: 209 

effects on attack on Gcnml1lY: 148-49. 186, 

190, 192, 194- 95.228,240-41,245,248 

Vnn Fleet, Maj. Gen. James A : 254, 255- 56, winter: 167- 68 

259- 60 Wciglcy, Russell: 293 

Vandenberg, Maj. Gen. Hoyt S.: 211 - 12 

Vehicles 

captured German: 132. 137, 173 

shortagcs of: 213 

taken by AWOLs: 176 

Verdun: 166,216 

Vcrviers: 159- 60. 170, 171 - 72, 174- 75. 177, 

178, 205.214 

Vil1cdieu-1cs-roc1cs: 110 

Villers-Hocage: 86, 90 

Virc River: 91. 94,110.112 

Von R1Uldstedl. Generalfeldmarschall Gerd: 209 

Wagner. Maj. Arthur L.: 4 

Waimes: 205 

Wainwright. CapL Stuyvcsllnl: 84 

War Departmcnt 

authorizations for army headquartcrs: 12 

and command doetrinc: 6- 7. 9.10, 12- 13, 

285- 86 

decision to form Amcriean army slaff in 

Britain: 22 

and doctrine for headquarters echelons 

above divisions: 3-4. 5, 6- 7. 9, 12- 13, 16. 

285 

and estimates of needs for OVI:RLORO: 39. 

40- 41 

and org11l1ization of army headquarters: 8-

9,11 - 12,174 

Weimar: 271 

Welkenracdt: 214 

Wendt, Col. Waltcr \V.: 33. 251 

Werbomont: 215 

Wescr River: 257. 260- 61 

Wesel: 265 

West Wall 

First Army attack on : 147-49, 169- 70, 190. 

241 , 288- 89 

German defense of: 157, 159,241 

German retreat to: 142- 43, 149 

Westmoreland, Col. William C.: 254, 294- 95 

Williams. Col. Charles F.: 28- 29. 127 

Williams. Brig'ldier EdgarT.: 46, 220 

Williams. Col. Grant A.: 34.40, 51.67- 68, 

133- 34. 172,225,227,239, 251.262.294 

Wi [son, Brig. Gen. Robert \V.: 23- 24. 33- 34, 

49,77,82- 83,132- 33,146,148- 49,164-

65,167 , 251,289,292 

Wihz: 215- 16 

Wing. LL Col. Morg'1I1. Jr.: 88- 89 

Winterberg: 256- 57 

Wire communications: 51, 66. 77- 78 , 133, 

172,2[8- 19,239,262,286 

Woodruff, Maj. Gcn. Roseoc B.: 53 

World War 1: 4- 8,13- 14.285- 86,293 

Wright. Col. William H. S.: 146-47, 175- 76.269 

Wlinll Rivcr: 157 

Wlirsclcn: 161