Accessible Version

MILITARY 

RECRUITING

Army National Guard 

Needs to Continue 

Monitoring, Collect 

Better Data, and 

Assess Incentives 

Programs

Report to Congressional Committees

November 2015

GAO-16-36

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-16-36, a report to 

congressional committees

November 2015

MILITARY RECRUITING

Army National Guard Needs to Continue Monitoring, 

Collect Better Data, and Assess Incentives Programs

Why GAO Did This Study

Recruiters are often referred to as the 

“face” of the ARNG. In the past, there 

have been allegations of recruiter 

misconduct and misuse of financial 

incentives, making it important for 

recruiters to ensure procedures are 

followed when working with applicants 

and that incentives to join the ARNG 

are awarded properly and effectively.

House Report 113-446 included a 

provision for GAO to review the 

ARNG’s recruiting practices. This 

report evaluates the extent to which (1) 

ARNG has provided oversight of its

recruiting process; (2) ARNG met its 

goals for recruiting, completion of initial 

military training, and initial term of 

service; and (3) OSD, Department of 

the Army, and ARNG have conducted 

oversight of ARNG’s enlistment 

financial incentives programs. For this 

work, GAO reviewed DOD and ARNG 

recruiting policy and procedures and 

interviewed cognizant officials. GAO

analyzed data on recruiting from 

FY2010 through FY2014, training from 

FY2011 through FY2014, and initial 

term of service for FY2015. GAO 

visited four states representing a range 

of size and locations.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other 

things, that ARNG take actions to 

collect consistent, complete, and valid

data on soldiers who do not complete 

training and initial term of service, and 

evaluate and document its incentives 

programs. DOD concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations but stated that it did 

not concur with the report due to 

GAO’s depiction of waivers. GAO 

disagrees with DOD’s characterization

as discussed in the report.

What GAO Found

The Army National Guard (ARNG) has taken steps to increase oversight of its 

recruiting process primarily conducted by recruiters dispersed at the state-level 

but has not established a permanent program to monitor state-level recruiting 

activities. In June 2014, the ARNG created a Recruiting Standards Branch that

has started to conduct inspections of state offices. The Recruiting Standards 

branch completed inspections in 16 states from October 2014 through July 2015 

and found that 2 states did not achieve full compliance in their inspections.

However, this is not a permanent program, and ARNG officials stated that they 

are using positions to staff it intended for use in other areas. The ARNG is

seeking approval for permanent staff by early 2017 to continue its oversight. 

Continued monitoring of state-level recruiting activities, such as through a 

permanent recruiting standards branch, will be important to ARNG’s oversight

functions.

The ARNG had mixed results in meeting its overall recruiting goals and nearly 

met its goals for initial military training; however, the ARNG does not track 

whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service or military obligation. 

The ARNG met its recruiting goals in 2 of the 5 years from fiscal years (FY) 2010 

through 2014. While the ARNG nearly met its goals for training completion from 

FY 2011 through 2014, GAO found that the ARNG does not have complete, 

consistent, and valid data on why soldiers do not complete training and when 

they separate during training. Without consistent, complete, and valid data, 

decision makers do not have information to determine why a higher number of 

soldiers are not completing training. The ARNG also does not track whether 

soldiers are completing their initial term of service. GAO’s analysis shows that 

about 40 percent of enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from FY 2001 through 

2007 did not complete their initial term of service. Without tracking completion of

initial term of service, ARNG officials cannot assess whether their programs are 

effective in meeting personnel requirements and do not have visibility to ensure 

the ARNG is maximizing its investment in its soldiers.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department of the Army (Army), 

and ARNG have not fully conducted their oversight responsibilities of ARNG

enlistment financial-incentives programs. OSD has not enforced a requirement 

that ARNG report incentives obligated through the ARNG incentives programs.

Further, although Army and National Guard regulations require evaluations of the 

effectiveness of the ARNG financial incentives programs, the Army and ARNG

have not evaluated and documented the effectiveness of the programs. Without

evaluating and documenting the effectiveness of ARNG incentives programs, 

officials may not know whether changes are needed for effective use of 

incentives or they may determine that certain financial incentives are not needed. 

Moreover, the ARNG has not ensured that recruiters have an understanding of 

available financial incentives. Financial incentives are a tool available to 

recruiters and agency policy states that incentives are available to assist in 

meeting and sustaining readiness requirements and to assist in filling critical 

shortages. ARNG has not provided recruiters with training on using financial 

incentives. With additional training, recruiters could better understand when and 

how to offer financial incentives to fill critical positions.

View GAO-16-36. For more information, 

contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or 

farrellb@gao.gov.
Letter 1

Page i GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Background 6

The ARNG Has Recently Taken Steps to Increase Oversight of 

the Recruiting Process but Has Not Permanently Established a 

Program to Monitor State-Level Activities 10

The ARNG Has Had Mixed Results in Meeting Goals for 

Recruiting and Nearly Met Goals for Completing Training, but 

Does Not Track Completion of Initial Term of Service 16

ARNG Has Not Ensured That Recruiters Understand Financial 

Incentives, and OSD, Army and ARNG Have Not Conducted 

Oversight of ARNG’s Financial Incentives Programs 33

Conclusions 41

Recommendations for Executive Action 42

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 43

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology 47

Appendix II: Completion of Initial Military Training by Non-Prior Service Enlisted Soldiers 52

Appendix III: Average Length of Time for Enlisted Soldiers to Qualify for Their Military Occupations 54

Appendix IV: Length of Time Enlisted Soldiers Who Left Before Their Initial Term Served in the Army National 

Guard 56

Appendix V: Reasons Why Enlisted Soldiers Did Not Complete Their Initial Term 57

Appendix VI: Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the Army, and Army National Guard (ARNG) 

Policies and Procedures Related to Recruiting and Retention 59

Appendix VII: Recommendations from Selected Prior GAO Work on Military Recruiting and the Status of Their 

Implementation 60

Appendix VIII: Comments from Department of Defense 62

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 66

Appendix X: Accessible Data 67

Agency Comment Letter 67

Data Tables 71

Related GAO Products 73

Contents
Tables

Page ii GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Table 1: Extent to Which the Army National Guard (ARNG) Met 

Recruiting Goals and Its National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) End-Strength Ceiling (Fiscal Years 2010 

through 2014) 17

Table 2: Army National Guard (ARNG) Reenlistment Goals and 

Number of Reenlistments for Fiscal Years 2010 through 

201419

Table 3: Army National Guard (ARNG) Goals for Soldiers to 

Complete Initial Military Training, and ARNG-Reported 

Completion Rates (Fiscal Years 2011 through 2014) 21

Table 4: Comparison of How Two States Selected Categories for 

Why Soldiers Who Joined in Fiscal Year 2014 Left the 

Army National Guard (ARNG) before or during Initial 

Military Training 23

Table 5: Completion of Initial Term of Service for Enlisted Soldiers 

Who Joined the Army National Guard (ARNG) from Fiscal 

Years 2001 through 2007 30

Table 6: Completion of Initial Military Training for Non-PriorService Enlisted Soldiers Who Joined the Army National 

Guard (ARNG) (Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013) 53

Table 7: Average Length of Time It Took Non-Prior-Service 

Enlisted Soldiers Who Joined the Army National Guard 

(ARNG) from Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013 to 

Complete Training and Qualify for Their Military 

Occupation for the Top 15 Occupations 54

Data Table for Figure 1: Length of Time Enlisted Soldiers Who 

Left before the End of Their Initial Term Served in the 

Army National Guard (ARNG), for Those Joining from 

Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007 71

Data Table for Figure 2: Primary Reasons Enlisted Soldiers Did 

Not Complete their Initial Term of Service for Those who 

Served in the Army National Guard (ARNG) from Fiscal 

Years 2001 through 2007 71

Figures

Figure 1: Length of Time Enlisted Soldiers Who Left before the 

End of Their Initial Term Served in the Army National 

Guard (ARNG), for Those Joining from Fiscal Years 2001 

through 2007 56
Figure 2: Primary Reasons Enlisted Soldiers Did Not Complete 

their Initial Term of Service for Those who Served in the 

Army National Guard (ARNG) from Fiscal Years 2001 

through 2007 57

Page iii GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

NGB National Guard Bureau

ARNG Army National Guard

ARNG-HRM Army National Guard-Personnel Programs, Resources, 

 and Manpower Division

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

SIDPERS Standard Installation/Division Personnel System

GIMS Guard Incentive Management System

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

SRIP Selected Reserve Incentives Programs

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Page 1 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 17, 2015

Congressional Committees

The nearly 15 years of deployment of U.S. troops in a wartime 

environment has proved challenging for recruiting servicemembers for the 

Department of Defense (DOD). At the height of Operations Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Department of the Army and the 

National Guard Bureau (NGB) allowed applicants with lower aptitude 

scores or prior felony convictions to enlist in order to ensure that the Army 

National Guard (ARNG) and Active Army could meet their respective 

missions. However, since the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and a 

significant drawdown from Afghanistan, the Department of the Army and 

NGB have issued guidance prohibiting approval of waivers for applicants 

with prior criminal offenses, such as certain types of sexual offenses1, as 

well as increasing the applicant aptitude score standards. These changes 

and other factors such as a less physically fit youth population have 

reduced the pool of qualified applicants for the ARNG and make it more 

difficult for recruiters to meet defined recruiting goals.

The ARNG primarily relies upon recruiters dispersed at the state-level to 

conduct its recruiting process. Recruiters are often referred to as the 

“face” of their respective military component. and any type of recruiter 

misconduct could have significant implications for DOD. In the past, there 

have been allegations of recruiter misconduct with applicants resulting in 

negative perceptions about military service. This makes it important for 

recruiters to ensure that proper procedures are followed when interacting 

with applicants and that recruiters correctly assess applicant eligibility. 

Further, the ARNG has had trouble in the past meeting its recruiting 

 

1 See e.g. Director of Military Personnel Management Memorandum, Suspension of 

Enlistment Waivers (Apr. 09, 2012). Additionally, Congress enacted two provisions related 

to this issue in 2013, the latter of which provides that persons convicted of certain felony 

sex offenses under Federal or State law may not be processed for commissioning or 

permitted to enlist in the Armed Forces. See 10 U.S.C. § 657 and the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239 § 523 (2013, repealed). On 

June 2008 OSD issued Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-018 – Enlistment Waivers 

which established policy and provided guidance regarding enlistment waivers for 

applicants for the Military Services and provided standardized terminology for the tracking 

and reporting of waiver data to be implemented in fiscal year 2009. According to OSD 

officials, waiver data prior to fiscal year 2009 is inconsistent and unreliable.

Letter
goals, which inherently applies more pressure for recruiters to enlist 

applicants. With the Army’s downsizing and the current fiscal 

environment, including the Budget Control Act of 2011,

Page 2 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

2 DOD faces an 

uncertain future where personnel decisions may prove even more 

important and where there is particular need for effective measures such 

as financial incentives to help the ARNG meet its recruiting mission and 

readiness requirements.

House Report 113-446 accompanying a bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20153included a provision for us to 

review the ARNG’s recruiting practices and report to the defense 

committees. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) the ARNG has 

provided oversight of its recruiting process; (2) the ARNG met its goals for 

recruiting, completion of initial military training,4 and completion of initial 

term of service5in recent years;6 and (3) the Office of the Secretary of 

 

2The Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25 (2011), established, among other 

things, a congressional Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction to propose legislation 

that would reduce federal deficits by $1.5 trillion over 10 years (fiscal years 2012–2021), 

and two sequestration procedures: a sequestration procedure originally to be ordered by 

the President on January 1, 2013 to ensure that the level of deficit reduction would be 

achieved in the event that the Joint Committee failed to reach agreement to reduce the 

deficit by at least $1.2 trillion, and an additional sequestration procedure triggered if 

appropriations exceed established discretionary spending caps in a given fiscal year 

between fiscal years 2012 and 2021. The sequestration in fiscal year 2013 used the 

former procedure, triggered because the Joint Committee did not reach agreement.

3H.R. Rep. 113-446 (May 13, 2014).

4

Initial military training refers to basic and advanced training to qualify for a soldier’s 

military occupational specialty. Basic training is the first introduction to the military for each 

of the services and includes instruction for new recruits on order and discipline, practices 

and procedures in their specific military services, combat preparedness, as well as 

instruction to enable new recruits to meet service-specific fitness requirements. Advanced 

training is career-specific training that prepares soldiers for their military occupations.

5By DOD Instruction, each person who becomes a member of an armed force, subject to 

certain exceptions, will initially serve in the armed forces for a total of 8 years in some 

combination of active and reserve status. See DOD Instruction 1304.25, Fulfilling the 

Military Service Obligation (MSO) (Oct. 31, 2013) implementing 10 U.S.C. § 651. 

According to the ARNG Accession Options Criteria, non-prior-service soldiers will be 

enlisted for 8 years and can commit to active participation in the ARNG for the entire 

duration or for a portion of the time (minimum of at least 3 years), serving the remainder of 

the 8 years in the Individual Ready Reserve. The amount of time prior-service soldiers 

commit to active participation in the ARNG varies depending on the length of time the 

soldier previously served in the Active, Reserve, or National Guard components. For the 

purposes of this report, we define initial term of service as the length of the soldier’s initial 

commitment in active participation in the ARNG.
Defense (OSD), Department of the Army, and ARNG have conducted 

their oversight responsibilities of the ARNG’s financial incentives 

programs. Also, the House report included two additional provisions: (1) a 

provision for us to assess the extent to which contracting vehicles used to 

support ARNG recruiting were in compliance with DOD and Department 

of the Army policies and regulations, and (2) a provision for us to assess 

the numbers of individuals who complete basic and advanced individual 

training and the average length of time between when a person enlists in 

the ARNG and when the person completes initial military training. To 

address the first of these two additional provisions, we reviewed findings 

from and the status of recommendations by the U.S. Army Audit Agency 

and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Procurement to improve contracting processes at NGB. A Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement official determined that 

this information is sensitive but unclassified so we provided a briefing in 

October of 2015 separately to the committees. To address the second 

provision, we have included results of our analyses in appendixes II, III, 

IV, and V.

For our first objective, we obtained and reviewed DOD guidance 

regarding ARNG oversight of its recruiting process and interviewed 

officials from ARNG. To describe how states conduct oversight over the 

recruiting process, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of four states 

based on varying factors such as state ARNG assigned end-strength,

Page 3 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

7

the 

total number of enlistments, and geographic locations. We selected 

Texas and Pennsylvania as two states with a large-size ARNG endstrength, Virginia as a state with a medium-size end-strength, and Idaho 

as a state with a small-size end-strength. We obtained and reviewed 

applicable state and local recruiting and retention guidance and 

interviewed recruiting officials at each of these four selected states. The 

observations from these four selected states are not generalizable to all 

states and territories but provide important insight into ARNG oversight of 

its recruiting process.

 

6We evaluated the extent to which the ARNG met its goals for recruiting from fiscal years 

2010 through 2014, completion of initial military training from fiscal years 2011 through 

2014, and completion of initial term of service as of May 2015 for fiscal year 2015. 

Appendix I provides additional details on the fiscal years included in our review.

7End-strength represents the actual number of personnel on board at the end of a fiscal 

year.
For the second objective, we obtained aggregate recruiting data and 

associated goals from the ARNG. We compared data on the ARNG’s 

annual recruiting goals for enlistments with the number of enlistments in 

the ARNG for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, respectively. We chose 

fiscal year 2010 as the start date because our prior work discussed the 

extent to which the ARNG met its recruiting goals from fiscal years 2000 

through 2009.

Page 4 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

8 We chose fiscal year 2014 as the end date because it was 

the most recently available data at the time of our review. To determine 

the extent to which the ARNG met goals for completion of initial military 

training, we compared the ARNG’s goals for completion of initial military 

training with ARNG-reported completion rates for fiscal years 2011 

through 2014. We were not able to assess the extent to which the ARNG 

met its goals for completion of initial military training prior to fiscal year 

2011 either because the goals were not available or the goals in place 

were not comparable to the completion rates provided for fiscal years 

2004 through 2014. We chose fiscal year 2014 as the end date because it 

was the most recently available data at the time of our review. Lastly, to 

determine the extent to which the ARNG met goals for completion of 

initial term of service, we compared the ARNG’s fiscal year 2015 attrition 

goal for completion of initial term of service with the ARNG’s completion 

rate as of May 2015, which was the most recently available data. We 

could not assess the extent to which the ARNG met goals prior to fiscal 

year 2015 because ARNG officials stated that the goals have changed 

over time and could not provide goals for previous fiscal years.

For our third objective, we obtained and analyzed relevant policy and 

guidance documents to identify oversight responsibilities for ARNG 

incentives programs. We interviewed officials from the ARNG to gain an 

understanding of how incentives policies and guidance are being applied. 

We interviewed officials from OSD, the Department of the Army, and the 

ARNG about how they conduct oversight of ARNG incentives programs. 

To gain an understanding of how incentives are being implemented 

during recruiting and retention activities, we obtained and analyzed 

 

8GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel 

Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005); 

Military Personnel: Army Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of Financial Incentives 

and Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth, GAO-09-256 (Washington, D.C.: May 

4, 2009); Military Recruiting: Clarified Reporting Requirements and Increased 

Transparency Could Strengthen Oversight over Recruiter Irregularities, GAO-10-254

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2010).
applicable state and local incentive policies and interviewed recruiting and 

retention officials from the four selected states.

Further, to assess the number of individuals who complete basic and 

advanced individual training and the average length of time between

when a person enlists in the ARNG and when the person completes initial 

military training, we obtained and analyzed record-level data on enlisted 

soldiers.

Page 5 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

9 Appendix I provides additional information on our scope and 

methodology. We elaborate on the results from our analysis in 

appendixes II and III and provide additional analysis related to the length 

of time soldiers who did not meet their initial term of service stayed in the 

ARNG in appendix IV, and provide the reasons why soldiers left the 

ARNG prior to completing their initial term of service in appendix V.

To assess the reliability of the data used in this report, we analyzed the 

data for inconsistencies, incomplete data fields, and outliers. We also 

reviewed relevant documentation about the data systems and guidance 

provided to the states and territories on how to report recruiting and 

retention data. We followed up with the ARNG to discuss limitations we 

identified and requested revised data or made adjustments to our 

analysis, when possible, to mitigate these limitations. We noted any 

limitations in the report, where appropriate. We determined that the data 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing the extent to which 

enlisted soldiers completed their initial military training; the length of time 

it took for these soldiers to complete their initial military training and 

become qualified for their military occupational specialty; the extent to 

which enlisted soldiers completed their initial term of service; the length of 

time enlisted soldiers who did not complete their initial term of service 

served in the ARNG; and the reasons why enlisted soldiers who 

graduated from their training but did not complete their initial term of 

service left the ARNG. We identified some data limitations, which we 

discuss in this report.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to November

2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

 

9We analyzed information from a soldier’s first enlistment in the ARNG. If a soldier joined 

more than once, we only analyzed information from the first enlistment.
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The ARNG performs both federal and state missions

Page 6 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

10 and is one of two 

reserve components of the Department of the Army, the Army Reserve 

being the other reserve component. The ARNG provides trained and 

equipped units ready to (1) defend property and life to the 54 states and 

territories and (2) respond to overseas combat missions, counterdrug 

efforts, reconstruction missions, and more, as needed. The Secretary of 

the Army11 is responsible for creating overarching policy and guidance for 

all of components of the Army, including the ARNG. The Chief of NGB is, 

among other responsibilities, the official channel of communication 

between the Department of the Army and the 54 states and territories in 

which the ARNG has personnel assigned, and is responsible for ensuring 

that ARNG personnel are accessible, capable, and trained to protect the 

homeland and to provide combat resources to the Army.12

NGB has issued guidance to ARNG personnel within the states and 

territories for recruiting and retention, and the adjutants general of each 

state are generally responsible for developing and implementing 

programs or policies that are consistent with NGB guidance.13 The Chief 

of NGB issued the National Guard regulation that is intended to integrate 

all of the recruiting and retention programs, policies, and procedures 

necessary for developing, implementing, and monitoring the ARNG 

 

10When guardsmen serve on active duty (including service in certain DOD headquarters 

functions) or are otherwise called to active service of the federal government, they 

typically serve in federal status and are under the command and control of DOD. 

However, under most other circumstances, guardsmen serve in state status and are under 

the command and control of the governor of their respective states or territories through 

their respective adjutants general.

11The Department of the Army consists of the Active, Reserve, and National Guard 

components. 

12Title 10 U.S.C §10501 provides that the NGB shall, among other things, be the channel 

of communication between the Department of the Army and the states and territories.

13See, for example, National Guard Regulation 601-1, Army National Guard Strength 

Maintenance Program, § 1-4 (Apr. 28, 2006). 

Background

Roles and Responsibilities
strength maintenance program in the states and territories.

Page 7 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

14 Appendix VI 

shows selected instructions, regulations, and other criteria related to 

recruiting and retention. Although the Director, ARNG, has overall 

responsibility for maintaining policy and programs for the ARNG recruiting 

programs, OSD requires certain recruiting-related reports to be submitted. 

These include reports on the numbers of enlistment waivers, recruiting 

resources, recruiting production data, and recruiter irregularities.

Each year, Congress, through the National Defense Authorization Act, 

provides the ARNG with an overall authorized end-strength.15

Subsequently, the Director, ARNG, develops a recruiting mission with a 

goal of fully utilizing that overall authorized end-strength. The Director, 

ARNG, provides individual end-strength goals and recruiting missions to 

the adjutants general of the 54 states and territories. In order to help the 

states and territories achieve state-level end-strength goals, the Chief of 

NGB, through the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division, provides the 

state-level ARNG in each of the 54 states and territories with funding, 

personnel, guidance, and training. Further, financial incentives16 are 

available in order to help personnel in the states and territories in meeting 

and sustaining ARNG end-strength goals. Within the Department of the 

Army, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is responsible 

for reviewing, monitoring, and evaluating the effectiveness of ARNG 

incentives programs. The Director, ARNG, is responsible for exercising 

staff supervision and management of financial incentives programs 

pertaining to ARNG soldiers. Within the ARNG, the ARNG-Personnel 

Programs, Resources, and Manpower Division (ARNG-HRM) is 

responsible for developing budget requests for financial incentives, 

 

14National Guard Regulation 601-1, Army National Guard Strength Maintenance Program

(Apr. 28, 2006).

15End-strength is the maximum number of personnel each component of the military 

services is authorized to have on the last day of a given fiscal year. See, for example, The 

Carl Levin and Howard “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2015, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 411 (2015). In addition to end-strength limitations for Active, 

Reserve, and Guard components, Congress also generally assigns an end-strength 

minimum for the Active components. 

16According to National Guard Regulation 600-7, Selected Reserve Incentive Programs 

(Aug. 12, 2014), financial incentives within the Selected Reserve incentive program 

include enlistment bonuses, reenlistment bonuses, military occupational specialty 

conversion bonuses, the student loan repayment program, officer accession and affiliation 

bonuses, and critical skill retention bonus, among others. For the purposes of this report, 

we use the term incentive to refer to financial incentives that fall within this description. 
developing and implementing policy, and conducting oversight. Within 

each state and territory, the adjutant general

Page 8 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

17 is responsible for 

development and implementation of the state strength maintenance 

program and has a recruiting and retention battalion that manages 

recruiting and retention personnel18 and day-to-day operations. ARNG 

recruiters are assigned to a recruiting and retention battalion in the 54 

states and territories, and each battalion commander issues an annual 

mission for enlistment based on various factors with a goal of achieving 

the state annual end-strength goal. Military Entrance Processing Stations 

are responsible for testing and conducting physical examinations on 

applicants prior to their joining a military component. At each Military 

Entrance Processing Station, an ARNG Guidance Counselor is 

responsible for processing ARNG applicants and ensuring that all 

paperwork is complete and that the applicant meets eligibility standards.

In contrast to how active-Army recruiters are only responsible for 

recruiting, ARNG recruiters are responsible for recruiting, retention, and 

attrition for their assigned area of operations in their assigned state or 

territory.19 To achieve the goal of fully utilizing the ARNG’s overall 

authorized end-strength ceiling, the ARNG-HRM works with state-level 

military personnel officers and recruiting and retention battalions in the 54 

states and territories and adjusts annual recruiting and reenlistment 

missions as necessary. Further, ARNG applicants generally are placed in 

unit vacancies within a 50-mile radius of an applicant’s home. This 

approach generally limits the pool of applicants to positions in close 

proximity to the applicants’ homes, while active-Army applicants are not 

limited to a specific geographic region and are recruited for positions 

where available worldwide.

 

17The ARNG Strength Maintenance Division does not have direct chain-of-command 

authority over the adjutants general of each of the respective 54 states and territories.

18The recruiting and retention personnel include recruiters, guidance counselors, 

educational service office personnel, and retention noncommissioned officers. 

19According to National Guard Regulation 601-1, Army National Guard Strength 

Maintenance Program (Apr. 28, 2006), recruiting is defined as the act of replenishing and 

reinforcing our armed commands with prior service and non-prior service personnel; 

retention is defined as maintaining ARNG membership through extension of their 

expiration of term of service or immediate reenlistment; and attrition is defined as 

separation of ARNG soldiers prior to achieving their expiration of term of service.
Our prior work has reviewed military recruiting practices and made a 

number of recommendations to address recruiting-related issues, such as 

improving the use of financial incentives and oversight of recruiter 

activities:

· In November 2005,

Page 9 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

20 we reported that DOD lacked information on 

financial incentives provided for certain occupational specialties, 

making it difficult for the department to determine whether financial 

incentives were being targeted effectively. We recommended that the 

DOD components, including the ARNG, report all of their over- and 

underfilled occupational specialties, including the reasons why the 

occupational specialties are over- and underfilled, and to justify their 

use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses provided to 

servicemembers in occupational specialties that have more personnel 

than authorized. In addition, we recommended that DOD develop a 

management plan to address recruiting and retention challenges. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendations but did not 

implement them.

· We reported in May 200921 that the Army had substantially increased 

its recruiters and funding for incentives, although it had not used 

existing research to identify and set bonuses at dollar amounts that 

are the most effective. We recommended that the Department of the 

Army take a number of steps to ensure cost-effective measures are 

taken, and DOD concurred with three recommendations and partially 

concurred with the fourth. DOD implemented one of our 

recommendations regarding building on currently available analysis to 

help set bonus amounts.

· We reported in January 201022 that the military components were not 

consistently reporting cases of recruiter irregularities and that greater 

oversight by OSD was needed. We made four recommendations 

regarding increasing visibility and tracking of recruiter irregularities, 

and DOD concurred with all of the recommendations. DOD 

implemented three of our recommendations regarding clarifying, 

sharing, and tracking of recruiter irregularity data but did not 

 

20GAO-06-134.

21GAO-09-256.

22GAO-10-254

Prior GAO Work on DOD 

Recruiting Practices
implement our recommendation to include appropriate disclosures 

concerning data limitations in recruiter irregularity reports.

· We reported in July 2015

Page 10 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

23 that Army reserve components did not 

have complete, accurate, and timely information to report soldiers’

nonavailability rates and that multiple systems did not interface in a 

way to allow for timely updates between all systems. We made four 

recommendations regarding data reliability, and DOD concurred with 

all of the recommendations.

Appendix VII identifies our recommendations from selected prior reports 

and the status of DOD’s implementation.

The ARNG Strength Maintenance Division has recently taken steps to 

increase oversight of how states and territories adhere to recruiting 

policies and procedures; however, the ARNG Strength Maintenance 

Division has not permanently established the Recruiting Standards 

Branch to ensure ongoing monitoring of state-level recruiting activities. 

The ARNG Strength Maintenance Division and the selected states we 

visited conduct reviews of a portion of packets from recruits. Additionally, 

in June 2014, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division began a pilot 

effort through its Recruiting Standards Branch to conduct inspections to 

help provide oversight of state-level recruiting activities, but the branch 

has not been permanently established to ensure ongoing monitoring.

 

23GAO, Army Reserve Components: Improvements Needed to Data Quality and 

Management Procedures to Better Report Soldier Availability, GAO-15-626 (Washington, 

D.C: July 31, 2015).

The ARNG Has 

Recently Taken Steps 

to Increase Oversight 

of the Recruiting 

Process but Has Not 

Permanently 

Established a 

Program to Monitor 

State-Level Activities
ARNG Strength Maintenance Division and selected state officials stated 

that steps have recently been taken to provide oversight over enlistment 

packets

Page 11 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

24 at the national and state levels. ARNG Strength Maintenance 

Division officials stated that a portion of their oversight of the recruiting 

process includes a review of selected enlistment packages at the national 

level to help identify any errors in paperwork and any irregularities 

involving recruiters. Officials stated that, since fiscal year 2010, the ARNG 

Strength Maintenance Division has conducted reviews of 10 percent of 

packets from enlistees and soldiers starting military training.25 ARNG 

Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that they review every 

document within the selected packets and maintain electronic records of 

the results. In addition, officials stated that if there are deficiencies 

identified in the review, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division sends a 

training team to help correct them and to provide retraining for staff as 

necessary.

According to National Guard regulation,26 state-level recruiting officials 

are to conduct quality checks over enlistments. At the four selected states 

we visited, there were multiple reviews of packets for enlistments, and 

officials stated that these reviews are intended to help minimize errors 

and recruiter irregularities.27 According to National Guard regulation,28

recruiters are responsible for initial prescreening of the applicant, which 

involves a background review, an initial determination of physical 

eligibility, and a review of prior education, among other things. In the four 

selected states that we visited, recruiters use checklists to screen 

applicants and submit applicant packets to their respective supervisors for 

review prior to the packets going to Military Entrance Processing Stations 

 

24Enlistment packets include source documents that substantiate basic eligibility criteria 

such as evidence of education, proof of citizenship, and proof of age, among other 

documents.

25The reviewing entities include the Military Entrance Processing Station regional 

managers.

26National Guard Regulation 601-1, Army National Guard Strength Maintenance Program

(Apr. 28, 2006).

27During our selected state visits, we met with officials to discuss their quality-control 

processes. However, we did not independently verify that these officials conducted 

quality-control reviews over all enlistment packages. 

28National Guard Regulation 601-1, Army National Guard Strength Maintenance Program.

(Apr. 28, 2006).

The ARNG and Selected 

States Have Recently 

Taken Steps to Provide 

Oversight by Reviewing 

Selected Enlistment 

Packages to Address 

Errors or Recruiting 

Irregularities
where an applicant is tested, examined, and processed for enlistment into 

the ARNG. In the four selected states we visited, recruiting personnel had 

to electronically submit enlistment packets to the Military Entrance 

Processing Station a minimum of 48 to 72 hours before each applicant 

arrived at the Military Entrance Processing Station for processing.

According to National Guard regulation and the ARNG’s Military Entrance 

Processing Station Operations Guide, each Military Entrance Processing 

Station is to be assigned guidance counselors who are responsible for 

quality-control checks designed to help prevent entry of anyone not 

qualified for the ARNG.

Page 12 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

29 The regulation and guide state that the Military 

Entrance Processing Station guidance counselors are responsible for 

reviewing all applicants’ enlistment packets submitted by recruiters for the 

ARNG. The Military Entrance Processing Station guidance counselor’s 

primary role, according to National Guard regulation, is to ensure that all 

qualified persons applying for ARNG enlistment complete the process, 

that applicants obtain a reservation for training, if necessary,30 and that 

incentive agreements are valid, among other things.31 ARNG Strength 

Maintenance Division officials noted that three regional managers 

oversee the guidance counselors at the Military Entrance Processing 

Stations and help ensure that the guidance counselors at each station are 

following applicable policy and guidance. Also, applicants must complete 

a test, called the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery, to determine 

the applicant’s qualification for enlistment, and a Military Entrance 

Processing Station physician conducts a medical examination to 

determine whether the applicant meets physical health standards. When 

the applicant has met the qualifications for military enlistment, the 

guidance counselor conducts another check of the paperwork, and the 

applicant signs an enlistment contract and is sworn into the ARNG.

 

29National Guard Regulation 601-1, Army National Guard Strength Maintenance Program

(Apr. 28. 2006), and National Guard Bureau Strength Maintenance Division, National 

Guard Bureau Military Entrance Processing Station Operations Guide (July 1, 2012).

30 An applicant with prior service might not need a training seat and may be exempted 

from attending all or part of the initial military training.

31 National Guard Regulation 600-7, Selected Reserve Incentive Programs (Aug. 12, 

2014).
In June 2014, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division began a pilot 

effort through its Recruiting Standards Branch to help provide oversight 

over state-level recruiting activities, but the branch has not been 

permanently established to ensure ongoing monitoring. Officials from the 

ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch stated that the branch was 

established in response to GAO’s findings in a prior report

Page 13 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

32 and a 

Department of the Army Inspector General’s report.33 Specifically, in 

January 2010, we found that the ARNG’s data on recruiter irregularities—

or, wrongdoings on the part of recruiters—were incomplete and 

recommended that DOD take actions to increase visibility and track 

recruiter-irregularities.34 DOD concurred with our recommendations and 

took steps to clarify, share, and track recruiter irregularity data. Later, in 

February 2012, the Department of the Army Inspector General found 

errors in processing enlistment packages and recommended that the 

ARNG create an entity to provide oversight of recruiting standards.

In response, the ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch was established as 

a pilot program and completed its first official inspection in October 2014. 

As of July 16, 2015 this office had completed inspections in 16 states. An 

ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch official stated that the goal is to 

complete at least 12 state inspections each year. The ARNG Recruiting 

Standards Branch uses a four-tiered standard scale for compliance and 

reporting. Each inspection results in one of four ratings: Non-Compliant, 

Pending Compliance, Full Compliance, or a Program of Excellence 

Award; the excellence award is the highest rating. The state inspections 

include a review of state-level recruiting procedures and programs to 

determine compliance with overarching guidance and a review of 

accession packages to determine compliance with eligibility standards 

and policy. Following each inspection, the ARNG Recruiting Standards 

Branch requires states and territories to submit corrective-action plans to 

address any identified deficiencies, which an official stated are used in 

subsequent re-inspections to demonstrate state efforts to resolve the 

deficiencies. Nine of the 16 states inspected as of July 16, 2015 had 

submitted their respective corrective-action plans to address any 

deficiencies identified during their inspection, regardless of the inspection 

 

32 GAO-10-254. 

33 Special Inspection of Accessions Policies, Processes, Procedures and Reporting 

Related to the Army National Guard (ARNG) Accessions Reporting (Feb. 14, 2012). 

34GAO-10-254.

The ARNG Has a Pilot 

Effort to Help Provide 

Oversight of States’

Recruiting Activities but 

Has Not Permanently 

Established a Program to 

Ensure Ongoing 

Monitoring
rating.

Page 14 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

35 The Recruiting Standards Branch plans to conduct a reinspection of each state or territory that does not meet at least the Full 

Compliance standard. The ARNG Strength Maintenance Division Chief is 

informed of the inspection results, and results are included in a newsletter 

sent to all states and territories.

According to an ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch official, the 

inspections program can be effective even though ARNG does not have 

direct chain-of-command authority over the states and territories.36 The 

official stated that the state inspections and any associated correctiveaction plans can help ARNG recruiters to comply with policy. This official 

cited the Army Inspector General inspection, which recommended the 

creation of a recruiting standards entity, as a sign of leadership’s support. 

The official noted that although there is no direct chain-of-command 

authority, state officials to date have participated in the inspections. An 

ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch official stated that if a state is 

unwilling to participate in the inspections process, the ARNG’s Chief of 

Staff will work with the respective state’s or territory’s Chief of Staff.

ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that the inspections 

to date have been helpful in determining whether states and territories are 

in compliance with guidance and current policy. Of the 16 states 

inspected as of July 2015, 2 received a rating of Program of Excellence, 

12 received a rating of Full Compliance, and 2 received a rating of 

Pending Compliance on their inspections.37 ARNG Strength Maintenance 

Division officials stated that the findings from the inspections conducted to 

 

35Seven states that had been inspected had not yet reached the deadline for submission 

of their respective corrective-action plan. 

36When guardsmen serve on active duty (including service in certain DOD headquarters 

functions) or are otherwise called to active service of the federal government, they 

typically serve in federal status and are under the command and control of DOD. 

However, under most other circumstances, guardsmen serve in state status and are under 

the command and control of the governor of their respective states or territories through 

their respective adjutants general.

37ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch inspections evaluate whether the state or territory is 

in compliance with 113 critical tasks and provides the state or territory with a rating based 

on how many of the 113 the ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch determines to meet 

compliance. When the state or territory is in compliance with (1) 100-113 critical tasks, it is 

rated a Program of Excellence; (2) 80-99 critical tasks, it is rated Full Compliance; (3) 70-

79 critical tasks, it is rated Pending Compliance, and 4) 69 or fewer critical tasks, it is rated 

Non-Compliant. 
date, along with the issues identified in our January 2010 report and the 

February 2012 Department of the Army Inspector General report noted 

above, highlight the continued need for the ARNG Recruiting Standards 

Branch to conduct inspections. However, the ARNG Recruiting Standards 

Branch remains in a pilot phase and is working to seek approval for 

permanent staff by the Director, ARNG, and subsequently the 

Department of the Army. The approval for permanent staff may not take 

place until early 2017. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials 

stated that they believe that continued oversight of state recruiting 

activities is important and that currently they are using positions for the 

ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch that are intended for use in other 

areas. Officials stated that the ability to permanently assign individuals to 

the ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch is very important in the ARNG’s 

ability to continue to exercise its oversight role. The Director, ARNG, has 

overall responsibility for maintaining policy and programs for the ARNG 

recruiting programs, and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government states that agencies should have control activities in place 

for ensuring that management’s directives are carried out.

Page 15 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

38 Without 

permanently establishing an entity, such as the ARNG Recruiting 

Standards Branch or other entity, to conduct inspections of state-level 

recruiting activities, the Director, ARNG may be limited in its ability to 

ensure that ARNG policies and procedures are being properly 

implemented by the states.

 

38Control activities are the policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms that enforce 

management’s directives. They help ensure that actions are taken to address risks, and 

control activities are an integral part of an entity’s planning, implementing, reviewing, and 

accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving effective results. 

See GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
The ARNG had mixed results in meeting its overall recruiting goals and 

nearly met its goals for initial military training; however, the ARNG does 

not track whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service or 

military obligation. The ARNG met its recruiting goals in two of the five 

years from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Further, from fiscal years 

2011 through 2014, the ARNG nearly met its goals for completion of initial 

military training, but we found that the ARNG does not have consistent, 

complete, and valid data on why soldiers do not complete training and 

when soldiers separate during the training process. We also found that 

while the ARNG sets and tracks goals to keep the loss of soldiers in their 

initial term below a maximum percentage, the ARNG does not track 

whether ARNG soldiers who join in a given fiscal year complete their 

initial term of service. Finally, ARNG Strength Maintenance Division has 

not periodically estimated the full cost of recruiting and training soldiers 

who do not complete their initial term of service.

ARNG data show that from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 the ARNG met 

its annual overall recruiting goals in 2 of the 5 years but stated that the 

purpose of the recruiting goals is to fully utilize the authorized endstrength in the National Defense Authorization Act, which data show the 

ARNG nearly met or slightly exceeded over this time period. ARNG 

Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that, in addition to 

recruiting goals, managing losses and setting goals for reenlistments play 

key roles in the ARNG’s ability to meet its goal of fully utilizing its 

authorized end-strength.

ARNG manages its end-strength, in part, by setting goals for each state 

and territory to recruit a certain number of individuals to enlist in the 

ARNG.

Page 16 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

39 GAO’s leading practices in strategic human-capital 

management40 and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government states that agencies should establish goals and monitor the 

extent to which they are met.41 Prior GAO work has shown that historically 

the ARNG has had mixed results in meeting its recruiting goals. 

 

39The ARNG generally establishes these goals near the beginning of the fiscal year, but 

the ARNG can make adjustments to the goals throughout the year, when necessary.

40GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management GAO-02-373SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).

41GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

The ARNG Has Had 

Mixed Results in 

Meeting Goals for 

Recruiting and Nearly 

Met Goals for

Completing Training, 

but Does Not Track 

Completion of Initial 

Term of Service

From Fiscal Years 2010 

through 2014, ARNG Met 

Overall Recruiting Goals in 

Only 2 Years but Generally 

Fully Utilized End-Strength 

Authorizations
Specifically, in November 2005, we reported that the ARNG exceeded its 

annual recruiting goals from fiscal years 2000 through 2002 but fell short 

of its goals in fiscal years 2003 through 2005, achieving only 80 percent 

of its goal in 2005.

Page 17 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

42 In May 2009, we reported that the ARNG made 

progress in meeting its annual recruiting goals since fiscal year 2005, 

meeting more than 95 percent of its goal in both fiscal years 2006 and 

2007 and exceeding its goal in fiscal year 2008.43 We then noted in a 

January 2010 report that the ARNG met its recruiting goal in fiscal year 

2009.44 Our analysis for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 is consistent with 

this historical trend as ARNG only met its recruiting goals in 2 of the 5 

years. Officials stated that the purpose of the state and territory goals for 

recruiting is to fully utilize the ARNG’s authorized end-strength. Table 1 

shows the extent to which the ARNG met annual recruiting goals as 

compared to the end-strength authorized by the National Defense 

Authorization Acts from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, as reported by 

ARNG.45

Table 1: Extent to Which the Army National Guard (ARNG) Met Recruiting Goals and Its National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) End-Strength Ceiling (Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014)

Fiscal 

year

Total ARNG 

recruiting

goal for ARNG

(in thousands)

Total number

of ARNG 

enlistments

(in thousands)

Percentage

of ARNG

recruiting goal

met (percent)a

NDAA authorized 

end-strength

for ARNG

(in thousands)

ARNG actual

end-strength

(in thousands)

Percentage of 

NDAA authorized 

end-strength 

(percent)

2010 60.0 56.3 93.8% 358.2 362.0 101.1%a

2011 53.0 48.6 91.7 358.2 361.6 100.9a

2012 46.0 48.0 104.3 358.2 358.1 100.0

2013 49.0 49.3 100.6 358.2 357.7 99.9

2014 47.9 47.1 98.3 354.2 354.1 100.0

Source: The ARNG-reported data. I GAO-16-36

a

The President is permitted by section 123a of Title 10 of the United States Code to waive the NDAA 

end-strength limitations under certain circumstances. Pursuant to a delegation of that authority, the 

Army granted the ARNG a waiver to exceed the NDAA authorized end-strength in fiscal years 2010 

and 2011.

 

42GAO-06-134.

43GAO-09-256.

44GAO-10-254.

45 We analyzed data from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 because we reported in January 

2010 the extent to which the ARNG met its recruiting goals in fiscal year 2009.
ARNG-Personnel Programs, Resources, and Manpower Division (ARNGHRM) officials stated that ARNG’s recruiting goals have generally 

decreased from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, in part because the 

ARNG’s authorized end-strength also decreased over this time period.

The President is permitted by section 123a of Title 10 of the United States 

Code to waive the NDAA end-strength limitations under certain 

circumstances. Pursuant to a delegation of that authority, the Army 

granted the ARNG a waiver to exceed the NDAA authorized end-strength 

in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. However, the officials stated that the 

waiver was no longer granted in fiscal years 2012 through 2014, thus 

requiring the ARNG to stay below the authorized end-strength and to 

reduce its annual recruiting goals.

While the ARNG met its recruiting goals in only 2 of the 5 years from 

fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the ARNG achieved or nearly achieved 

its goal of fully utilizing its authorized end-strength in all of the years as 

shown in table 1. When setting goals for the states and territories, the 

ARNG emphasizes that attrition management has a significant effect on 

the ARNG’s ability to utilize its authorized end-strength and that, in 

addition to setting recruiting goals, the ARNG meets its end-strength by 

setting goals for managing losses and retaining existing personnel. Since 

fiscal year 2009, the ARNG has established annual goals for the states 

and territories to reenlist a certain number of individuals nearing the end 

of their term of service. ARNG data showed that it either exceeded or 

nearly exceeded its reenlistment goal in 4 of the 5 years from fiscal years 

2010 through 2014.

Page 18 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

46 Table 2 shows the extent to which the ARNG met 

reenlistment goals from fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

 

46We previously reported in May 2009 that the ARNG used attrition rates—the number of 

losses from a component during a given time period compared to the component’s 

average end-strength during that period—as a measure of retention, striving to keep 

attrition below an established maximum rate, or ceiling. We found that the ARNG’s attrition 

rates were either below the ceiling or were within the margin of variance allowed by DOD 

from fiscal years 2005 through 2008, staying around 19 or 20 percent in each of those 

years. The ARNG continues to use attrition rates as a measure of retention and reported 

that ARNG attrition rates have ranged between about 13 and 15 percent from fiscal years 

2010 through 2014. ARNG officials attributed the lower attrition rates, in part, to better 

preparation of soldiers to attend initial military training, reducing the number of soldiers 

who separated during training.
Table 2: Army National Guard (ARNG) Reenlistment Goals and Number of 

Page 19 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Reenlistments for Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014

Fiscal 

year

Total reenlistment

goal for the ARNG

(in thousands)

Total number of

ARNG reenlistments

(in thousands)

Percentage of 

reenlistment goal met 

(percent)a

2010 30.5 31.7 104.0%

2011 39.8 39.8 100.0

2012 48.4 49.3 101.7

2013 59.2 51.1 86.3

2014 43.8 43.3 98.8

Source: The ARNG-reported data. I GAO-16-36

aPercentage may not equal comparison of two previous columns in table due to rounding.

ARNG-HRM officials stated that the ARNG has increased its reenlistment 

goal over time because the number of individuals who joined the ARNG 

greatly increased from fiscal years 2006 through 2009, in part, due to the 

Grow the Force initiative.47 The officials stated that the increased number 

of soldiers who joined during this time period became eligible to reenlist 

from fiscal years 2012 through 2014, thus increasing the population of

soldiers eligible for reenlistment. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division 

officials noted that the ARNG achieved a lower percentage of its 

reenlistment goal in fiscal year 2013 because ARNG wanted to 

emphasize reenlistments in this year and set a more aggressive goal in 

comparison to other years. For example, in fiscal year 2012, the ARNG 

set a goal to reenlist 48,446 soldiers out of an eligible population of 

125,785 soldiers, while in fiscal year 2013 set a goal to reenlist 59,233 

soldiers out of an eligible population of 121,624 soldiers.

 

47In January 2007, the President announced the Grow the Force initiative which was 

intended to expand the size of the Army in order to meet strategic demands and help 

reduce stress on the force. 
The ARNG nearly met its goals for completion of initial military training 

from fiscal years 2011 to 2014; however, we identified inconsistencies in 

how states recorded reasons that soldiers did not complete their training 

and found that available Army training data does not provide the ARNG 

with complete data on the timing of when soldiers leave during the 

training process. Further, while the ARNG uses an internal database to 

collect information on why soldiers do not complete training and when 

they separate during the training process, ARNG officials stated that they 

could not determine whether the data were valid.

The ARNG nearly met its goals for completion of initial military training, 

which includes basic and advanced individual training,

Page 20 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

48 from fiscal years 

2011 through 2014. From fiscal years 2011 through 2014, the ARNG set 

a goal of at least 84 percent and achieved a completion rate of 

approximately 81 to 82 percent in each of those years. The ARNG sets 

and tracks several goals that focus on states’ and territories’ ability to 

prepare their recruits to attend initial military training. One such goal is 

based on the percentage of soldiers who completed initial military training 

(both basic and advanced) compared to the number of soldiers who 

began training and did or did not complete training for a rolling time period 

covering the past 12 months. By law members of the ARNG that have not 

completed the minimum training required to deploy within 24 months must 

be discharged.49 ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated 

that they have not separately set a goal for the extent to which soldiers 

complete basic training because the ARNG is primarily concerned with 

soldiers completing both basic and advanced training to become qualified 

for their military occupation. Table 3 shows the ARNG’s goal for 

completion of initial military training, when available, and ARNG 

completion rates from fiscal years 2011 through 2014.

 

48Basic training is the first introduction to the military for each of the services and includes 

instruction for new recruits on order and discipline, practices and procedures in their 

specific military services, combat preparedness, as well as instruction to enable new 

recruits to meet service-specific fitness requirements. Advanced training is career-specific 

training that prepares soldiers for their military occupations. ARNG officials stated that the 

ARNG assigns soldiers to his or her unit during enlistment, while the Army Active 

Component assigns its soldiers to a training account until completion of advanced training 

and subsequently assigns soldiers to his or her unit. 

49Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 

1115 (1992 as amended) (appended as a note below 10 U.S.C. § 10105). 

The ARNG Nearly Met 

Goals for Completing 

Initial Military Training but 

Does Not Have 

Consistent, Complete, and 

Valid Data on Why and 

When Soldiers Do Not 

Complete Training

Goals for Completing Training 

Nearly Met
Table 3: Army National Guard (ARNG) Goals for Soldiers to Complete Initial Military 

Page 21 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Training, and ARNG-Reported Completion Rates (Fiscal Years 2011 through 2014)

Fiscal 

year

The ARNG’s

percentage goal for soldiers to

complete initial military training

Percentage of

ARNG soldiers completing

initial military training (percent)

2011 ≥84% 81.8

2012 ≥84 82.2

2013 ≥84 81.5

2014 ≥84 80.8

Source: ARNG-reported data. I GAO-16-36

Note: The ARNG calculates the completion goal and rate by the percentage of soldiers who 

completed initial military training compared to the total number of soldiers who began training and did 

or did not complete training for a rolling time period covering the past 12 months.

The percentage of ARNG soldiers who completed their initial military 

training has generally increased annually from about 70 percent in fiscal 

year 2004 to about 81 percent in fiscal year 2014.50 ARNG Strength 

Maintenance Division officials attributed the improvements in completion 

of training largely to the ARNG Recruit Sustainment Program, which 

began in fiscal year 2005. The purpose of the ARNG Recruit Sustainment 

Program is to increase the likelihood that ARNG soldiers will complete 

initial military training by ensuring that recruits are mentally prepared and 

physically fit prior to attending training. The program aims to provide 

recruits with realistic training that is similar to the first 3 weeks of basic 

training. In addition, recruiters stated that the ARNG Recruit Sustainment 

Program allows the ARNG to maintain contact with recruits while they 

wait to attend training and to monitor their conduct and educational 

progress to help ensure they stay eligible to join. For states or territories 

that struggle to meet ARNG’s goal for training completion, ARNG 

Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that they share best 

practices from states that are meeting or exceeding ARNG’s goal or send 

out ARNG mobile training teams to the states or territories to help 

address challenges.

 

50We also obtained and analyzed record-level data on non-prior-service, enlisted soldiers 

who joined the ARNG from fiscal years 2004 through 2013 and analyzed the extent to 

which they completed their initial military training. Our analysis similarly showed that 

completion rates for initial military training generally improved over this period. See app. II 

for the results of our analysis.
We identified inconsistencies in how the four selected states we visited 

recorded reasons that soldiers did not complete their initial military 

training.

Page 22 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

51 ARNG regulation and guidance require states and territories to 

report the reasons why soldiers leave the ARNG in the ARNG personnel 

database of record known as the Standard Installation/Division Personnel 

System (SIDPERS).52 Although not generalizable to all states and 

territories, we found that states we reviewed varied in whether they 

selected only a general category in the system about the timing of a 

soldier leaving initial training versus selecting a category noting the 

specific reason each soldier left training prior to completion. When 

soldiers leave training prior to completion, officials from states and 

territories are to select the reason why the soldier left the ARNG from a 

list of over 100 pre-predetermined categories, such as alcohol or other 

drug abuse or medically unfit at the time of appointment. In interviews 

with officials from the four selected states that we visited, officials 

provided different responses about how they select a category regarding 

why soldiers left the ARNG before basic or during basic or advanced 

training. For example, one official stated that he selected general 

categories about timing, such as if a soldier left before attending basic 

training or left during basic or advanced training; however, that state’s 

officials did not select a category that specified the reason why the soldier 

left the ARNG.53 In contrast, officials in another state stated they have 

selected 13 categories about specific reasons and use the general 

categories about timing for soldiers that left before basic training or during 

basic or advanced training from April 2014 through March 2015. Table 4 

below shows the contrasts in how these two state officials chose general 

or specific categories regarding soldiers leaving training.

 

51Consistency is a key characteristic of reliable data and refers to the need to obtain and 

use data that are clear and well defined enough to yield similar results in similar analyses. 

For example, if data are entered at multiple sites, inconsistent interpretation of data-entry 

rules can lead to data that, taken as a whole, are unreliable. GAO, Assessing the 

Reliability of Computer-Processed Data, GAO-09-680G (Washington, D.C.: July 2009).

52Army National Guard Pamphlet (AR) 25-10, Standard Installation/Division Personnel 

System Army National Guard Data Element Dictionary (Jun. 30, 2014), and PPOM 14-

008, Synchronization of Assignment/Loss Reason Codes with Enlisted Personnel 

Separation Authority Reasons (Feb. 18, 2014).

53The general category used to describe soldiers who left before training is “Pre-Initial 

Active Duty for Training Discharge Program,” and the general category used to describe 

soldiers who left during training is “Trainee Discharge Program Release from Initial Active 

Duty for Training.” 

Inconsistent Reporting by 

Selected States and 

Incomplete and Invalid Data on 

Soldiers Who Do Not Complete 

Training
Table 4: Comparison of How Two States Selected Categories for Why Soldiers Who Joined in Fiscal Year 2014 Left the Army 

Page 23 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

National Guard (ARNG) before or during Initial Military Training

Category selected to describe why 

soldiers left the ARNG

State 1 Number leaving ARNG before 

or during initial military training 

State 2 Number leaving ARNG before or 

during initial militarya

General category about soldiers leaving 

before basic training 179 6

General category about soldiers leaving 

during basic or advanced training 134 99

Other general or specific categories 9 119

Total 322 229

Source: GAO analysis of ARNG data. I GAO-16-36

Note: Our analysis includes non-prior service, enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG in fiscal year 

2014 but separated from the ARNG before or during initial military training as of April 15, 2015. The 

analysis excludes enlisted soldiers who later became officers. State 1 officials stated that they only 

select one general category for soldiers who leave before attending training and one general category 

for soldiers leave during training. State 2 officials stated that they select a number of different 

categories—both general and specific—for those who leave before or during training.

aNumbers do not add to 229 because five soldiers did not have a category reported in the database.

Further, we found that available Army training data do not provide the 

ARNG with complete data on the timing of when soldiers leave during the 

training process.54 According to GAO’s leading practices on strategic 

human-capital management, reliable data help enable an agency’s 

decision makers to evaluate the success of their human-capital 

approaches and to identify opportunities for enhancing agency results.55

The Army’s training system of record known as the Army Training 

Requirements and Resources System contains soldiers’ training records, 

including the dates soldiers completed basic training and advanced 

training. However, we found that this system was missing completion 

dates from basic training for a significant number of soldiers who should 

have had dates listed. Specifically, we found that of the 134,293 nonprior-service enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal years 

2010 through 2014 and completed their initial military training as of April 

15, 2015, 36,644—or 27 percent—were missing basic training completion 

dates. ARNG-HRM officials attributed this missing information, in part, to 

data on the soldiers who attended basic and advanced training at the 

 

54 Completeness is a key characteristic of reliable data and refers to data elements being 

populated appropriately. GAO-09-680G.

55 GAO-02-373SP.
same training site—referred to as One Station Unit Training,

Page 24 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

56 leading the 

school to only record one date for completion of both basic and advanced 

training. ARNG-HRM officials stated that they use the information on 

basic training completion in the Army system to track whether recruits are 

completing basic training but that they understood there were data 

limitations due to the missing information in the system. The level of 

incompleteness in the data for basic training completion, however, raises 

concerns about whether ARNG can use this system to determine the 

timing of when soldiers left during their initial military training. Further, we 

found that when the One Station Unit Training sites report discharges 

from training, the reports do not indicate whether the soldiers were 

discharged during basic training or advanced training. According to a 

fiscal year 2014 discharge report for the Army training schools, of the 

3,352 soldiers who were discharged from training sites, 1,037 soldiers—

or 31 percent—were discharged from a One Station Unit Training site. As 

a result, the ARNG would not have visibility into whether these soldiers 

were discharged during basic training or advanced training.

ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials acknowledged that the 

databases of record for ARNG personnel and Army training data do not 

offer the level of detail they need to determine the reasons why soldiers 

left before or during initial military training or when soldiers separated 

during the training process. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division and 

ARNG-HRM officials stated that they were aware that there could be 

inconsistencies in how states and territories select the category to 

describe the reason why soldiers left the ARNG before or during training. 

The officials attributed the inconsistency in part to the availability of the 

general categories in SIDPERS for soldiers who leave before beginning 

basic training or prior to completion of advanced training. ARNG-HRM 

officials noted that the 54 states and territories each enter the information 

into SIDPERS, which likely result in inconsistencies in data entry across 

the states. Further, as noted above, the system of record for data on 

soldiers’ training records is the Army Training Requirements and 

Resources System, and the system of record for data on why soldiers 

leave the ARNG is SIDPERS, rather than one centralized data source. In 

July 2015, we reported that multiple data systems used to track soldier 

availability data did not interface in a way to allow for timely updates 

 

56 One Station Unit Training combines basic training and advanced training into one 

location, and soldiers stay with the same class throughout initial military training. 
between all systems to ensure the relevance and value of the data that 

management uses to make soldier availability-related decisions.

Page 25 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

57 We 

recommended that the Secretary of the Army develop and implement 

ways that the Army reserve components can facilitate timely updates of 

availability data between all data systems through the current system 

interfaces to improve the relevance and value of the data that 

management is using to make soldier availability-related decisions, and 

DOD concurred with our recommendation.

Recognizing the gap in information on why soldiers did not complete 

training and the timing of when they separated during the training 

process, ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that they 

started to collect this information in fiscal year 2010 by modifying a 

management tool—known as the Vulcan Recruit Sustainment Program 

Database—used to track recruits while they are in the training process. 

ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials emphasized that the 

database is an internal management tool and not a database of record 

and is therefore generally not used to report information outside of ARNG. 

According to the officials, the ARNG modified the tool to capture when a 

soldier separated during the training process, such as before basic 

training, during basic training, or during advanced training, as well as the 

reason for the loss. The officials stated that while the categories for 

reasons are similar to those in SIDPERS, ARNG removed the two 

general categories for separating before or during initial military training to 

require the states and territories to select the specific reason why the 

soldier left the ARNG. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials 

stated that they did not modify SIDPERS to capture this information 

because the Army is in the process of transitioning to an Army-wide 

personnel database, the Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army. 

The officials stated that they have not been allowed to make changes to 

SIDPERS since at least 2007 in anticipation of the new system. In 

February 2015,58 we reported that the full deployment of the Integrated 

Personnel and Pay System-Army is not expected until April 2020, and 

that the Army had not developed any portion of the system as of 

November 2014.

 

57GAO-15-626.

58GAO, Defense Major Automated Systems: Cost and Schedule Commitments Need to 

Be Established Earlier, GAO-15-282 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2015).
As part of a broader review of the ARNG Recruit Sustainment Program, in 

September 2008 the U.S. Army Audit Agency reported that the Vulcan 

database sometimes did not provide accurate and timely data for Recruit 

Sustainment Program managers.

Page 26 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

59 The U.S. Army Audit Agency found 

that the Vulcan database provided useful information, but its effectiveness 

was limited because program managers at the state level sometimes did 

not update or use the system as the preferred management tool. 

According to the report, the program managers did not use the Vulcan 

database because it did not provide information that the states needed to 

monitor recruit status, the database was not user-friendly, and the ARNG 

did not routinely provide formal training to users. The U.S. Army Audit 

Agency concluded that the data in the Vulcan system were not reliable for 

making sound management decisions and made four recommendations 

to address the issues identified, including developing and providing 

routine formal training to Vulcan users and ensuring that state ARNG 

organizations use the Vulcan database to manage the Recruit 

Sustainment Program and not locally developed systems. The ARNG 

agreed with the report’s recommendations and, according to ARNG 

Strength Maintenance Division officials, the ARNG has taken steps that 

are intended to address the report’s recommendations. For example, 

ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that states’ use of 

the Vulcan database is continuously managed by means of daily reviews 

and validated during the branch leadership’s accreditation process. 

Further, ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated that, since 

the U.S. Army Audit Agency audit, the ARNG instituted the role of training 

liaison officers who act as liaisons to the Active component training 

facilities in order to manage ARNG recruits at training as well as 

contracted administrative support for the Recruiting Sustainment 

Program. According to ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials, 

both the training liaison officers and Recruit Sustainment Program 

contract support staff now play a role in maintaining information in the 

Vulcan database. In July 2015, the U.S. Army Audit Agency started a 

follow-on review of the ARNG Recruit Sustainment Program, which 

includes reexamining the Vulcan database and evaluating the measures 

that the ARNG has taken to address the deficiencies described in the 

September 2008 report.

 

59U.S. Army Audit Agency, Army National Guard Recruit Sustainment Program, A-2008-

0250-FFF (Alexandria, VA: Sept. 10, 2008).
The ARNG’s personnel database of record, SIDPERS, and the Army’s 

database of record on training, the Army Training Requirements and 

Resources System, do not provide ARNG with full visibility into why 

soldiers do not complete initial military training and when they separate 

during the training process. Further, while ARNG has modified its internal 

Vulcan database to capture this information, ARNG-HRM officials stated 

that they could not determine the information to be valid because 

inputting the information is voluntary, and the Vulcan database is not the 

database of record on losses from the ARNG. According to GAO’s 

leading practices on strategic human-capital management, a critical 

success factor is using consistent, complete, and valid data to determine 

key performance objectives and goals.

Page 27 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

60 The Director, ARNG, has overall 

responsibility for maintaining policy and programs for the ARNG recruiting 

programs, and ARNG-HRM officials stated that they use the data on 

reasons why individuals left the ARNG to develop policies to help retain 

soldiers. Without consistent data about specific reasons soldiers left the 

ARNG before or during training in the ARNG database of record, officials 

will continue to be limited in their ability to identify actual reasons for 

separation. Further, without complete information on when soldiers 

separate during the training process, ARNG cannot know the extent to 

which soldiers are leaving during basic or advanced training. Such 

limitations hinder the Director, ARNG’s ability to develop policies and 

programs intended to help create an environment in which a higher 

number of soldiers complete training.

ARNG Strength Maintenance Division does not track whether ARNG 

soldiers complete their initial term of service. When individuals join the 

 

60GAO-02-373SP.

ARNG Does Not Track 

Whether Soldiers 

Complete Their Initial Term 

of Service and Has Not 

Periodically Estimated the 

Costs to Recruit and Train 

a Soldier

Completion of Initial Term of 

Service Is Not Tracked
ARNG, they sign a contract to actively serve in the ARNG for a specified 

amount of time, which varies by soldier.

Page 28 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

61 For example, while a non-priorservice enlisted soldier must enlist in the ARNG for a total military service 

obligation of 8 years, a portion of the 8 years can be active service in the 

ARNG with the balance being in the Individual Ready Reserve.62 On an 

ongoing basis, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division tracks initialterm attrition rates—the number of soldiers in their initial term who leave 

the ARNG during a given period compared to the average number of 

soldiers who were serving in their initial term over that same period—with 

the goal of keeping attrition below an established maximum rate. For the 

purposes of tracking initial-term attrition rates, the ARNG does not track 

all enlisted soldiers who join, but defines soldiers in their initial term as 

enlisted soldiers who have completed initial military training63 and have 

less than 6 years in service. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division 

officials stated that they establish the goal based on the ARNG’s historical 

performance and that the metric is adjusted over time to encourage 

incremental improvement. ARNG officials have established an attrition 

goal of a percentage of less than or equal to 12 percent for soldiers 

leaving during their initial term of service, and as of May 2015 the ARNG 

had an attrition rate of 8.1 percent.64 According to the ARNG, managing 

 

61By DOD Instruction, each person who becomes a member of an armed force, subject to 

certain exceptions, will serve in the armed forces for a total of 8 years in some 

combination of active and reserve status. See DOD Instruction 1304.25, Fulfilling the 

Military Service Obligation (MSO) (Oct. 31, 2013) implementing 10 U.S.C. § 651. 

According to the ARNG Accession Options Criteria, non-prior-service soldiers will be 

enlisted for 8 years and can commit to active participation in the ARNG for the entire 

duration or for a portion of the time (minimum of at least 3 years), serving the remainder of 

the 8 years in the Individual Ready Reserve. The amount of time prior-service soldiers 

commit to active participation in the ARNG varies depending on the length of time the 

soldier previously served in the Active, Reserve, or National Guard components. For the 

purposes of this report, we define initial term of service as the length of the soldier’s initial 

commitment to active participation in the ARNG.

62The Individual Ready Reserve is a subcategory of the Ready Reserve of the Army 

Reserve. Members of the Individual Ready Reserve include individuals who were 

previously trained during periods of active service, but have not completed their service 

obligations; individuals who have completed their service obligation and voluntarily retain 

their reserve status; and personnel who have not completed basic training. Most of these 

members are not assigned to organized units, do not attend weekend or annual training, 

and do not receive pay unless they are called to active duty.

63As noted above, the ARNG separately tracks the extent to which soldiers complete initial 

military training.

64The ARNG refers to these percentages as first-term attrition loss rates.
attrition has a significant effect on the ARNG’s ability to achieve its endstrength goal, and ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated 

that they track initial-term losses in this way because it helps states and 

territories manage their respective end-strengths by better anticipating 

future losses and the ARNG can include the most recent enlistments in its 

analysis for initial-term losses.

While the ARNG’s calculation of the initial-term attrition rate provides 

ARNG Strength Maintenance Division with some information that helps 

officials manage end-strength, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division 

does not regularly track whether all soldiers who join in a given fiscal year 

ultimately complete their initial term of service. We obtained data on 

enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal years 2001 through 

2007, and analyzed whether they ultimately completed their initial term of 

service; we found that about 40 percent of these soldiers did not complete 

their initial term of service (see table 5).

Page 29 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

65

 

65We analyzed enlisted soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001 through 2007 because 

non-prior-service, enlisted soldiers typically joined the ARNG with a 6-year initial term of 

service based on our analysis of the data. As a result, after fiscal year 2007, a significant 

number of soldiers were still in the process of completing their initial term of service. We 

also analyzed the length of time enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal years 

2001 through 2007 and did not complete their initial term of service stayed in the ARNG 

and report our analysis in appendix IV. In addition, we analyzed the reasons these 

soldiers separated from the ARNG, when possible, and report our analysis in app. V. 
Table 5: Completion of Initial Term of Service for Enlisted Soldiers Who Joined the Army National Guard (ARNG) from Fiscal 

Page 30 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Years 2001 through 2007

Fiscal 

year

Number who completed

initial term of service (in thousands)

Number who did not complete their

initial term of service (in thousands)

Percent of soldiers

who did not complete their

initial term of service (percent)a

2001 33.3 20.9 38.6%

2002 34.1 20.9 38.0

2003 27.6 18.4 40.0

2004 24.0 16.8 41.2

2005 25.3 16.2 38.9

2006 34.6 23.9 40.8

2007 32.9 23.8 42.0

Source: GAO analysis of ARNG data. I GAO-16-36

Note: We analyzed information from the first enlistment of soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001 

through 2007 and whose initial term end dates occurred before September 30, 2014. The length of a 

soldier’s initial term of service varies by soldier, but we found that over half of non-prior-service, 

enlisted soldiers joined with an initial term of service of about 6 years. We counted soldiers who had 

an attrition date within 30 days of their initial term end date as completing their initial term of service. 

In addition, we excluded (1) soldiers who were missing a date for the end of their initial term of 

service; (2) soldiers who enlisted into the ARNG but later became officers; and (3) soldiers who left 

the ARNG to join the Active component, another Reserve component, or the Inactive Guard, among 

other things, because these soldiers may have later completed their initial term of service in those 

capacities, but we did not have visibility into whether they did so.

aPercentage may not equal comparison of two previous columns in table due to rounding.

According to GAO’s leading practices on strategic human-capital 

management, valid data help enable an agency’s decision makers to 

evaluate the success of their human-capital approaches and to identify 

opportunities for enhancing agency results.66 ARNG Strength 

Maintenance Division officials stated that there could be some 

advantages to tracking the extent to which soldiers complete their initial 

term of service by those who join in a given fiscal year, but it may be 

viewed as redundant reporting given that the ARNG already tracks 

attrition rates for initial-term soldiers. Further, ARNG Strength 

Maintenance Division officials stated that tracking soldiers from the date 

of their enlistment to their final completion is a complex task. However, 

regularly tracking the extent to which soldiers who join the ARNG in a 

fiscal year and complete their initial term of service can help the ARNG 

understand what human-capital decisions may have led to certain trends 

in data. For example, ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials 

 

66GAO-02-373SP.
stated that multiple factors may have contributed to 40 percent of soldiers 

we identified as not completing their initial term of service from fiscal 

years 2001 through 2007. The officials noted that this time period was at 

the height of the troop surge in Iraq, where many of the quality metrics 

were loosened across the Army in order to meet expanded end-strengths. 

As noted above, the officials stated that the Recruit Sustainment 

Program, the program to which they attribute higher completion rates for 

initial military training since fiscal year 2005, was not in full force until the 

latter part of this time period. Further, tracking completion by soldiers who 

join in a given fiscal year can help the ARNG identify the points in time 

during soldiers’ enlistments when they are more likely to separate from 

the ARNG. Without the ARNG regularly tracking the extent to which 

soldiers complete their initial term of service and understanding trends in 

the data, officials do not have full visibility into the effect the ARNG’s 

programs and initiatives have in helping states meet their strength and 

readiness requirements.

In addition to not tracking the extent to which soldiers are not completing 

their initial term of service, the ARNG had not estimated the total costs to 

recruit and train an ARNG soldier.

Page 31 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

67 In response to our review, ARNG 

Strength Maintenance Division officials estimated that in fiscal year 2014, 

it cost the ARNG approximately $62,000 to recruit and train an ARNG 

soldier for those soldiers who attended basic training and advanced 

training at separate training sites or approximately $51,000 for soldiers 

who attended basic training and advanced training at the same training 

site.68 According to officials, a portion of these estimates includes the 

salary paid to the soldier while in training but also includes enlistment 

incentives and the administrative costs to process the soldiers, among 

other things. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials stated, 

 

67In September 2013, we reported that DOD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

office had not established business rules for estimating the cost of part of DOD’s total 

workforce—Reserve and Guard Personnel—and recommended that DOD develop 

business rules for estimating the full cost of these personnel. DOD partially concurred with 

our recommendation, stating that it was assessing the potential need for reserve 

manpower costing models and would develop reserve costing models, if appropriate, after 

it gained a more thorough understanding of the questions to be addressed by reserve cost 

estimates. GAO, Human Capital: Opportunities Exist to Further Improve DOD’s 

Methodology for Estimating the Costs of Its Workforces, GAO-13-792 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 25, 2013).

68We did not independently assess the reliability of the ARNG’s cost estimate to recruit 

and train a soldier.

Costs to Recruit and Train a 

Soldier Are Not Estimated
however, that the estimate includes costs other than those that support 

recruiting, such as resources used to manage attrition and retain 

personnel and that additional analysis is needed to further refine this 

estimate. For active-duty soldiers in the Army Active Component, the 

Army has estimated that recruiting and training cost about $72,000 per 

soldier who attended basic training and advanced training at separate 

training sites or about $54,000 for soldiers who attended basic training 

and advanced training at the same training site in fiscal year 2014.

Page 32 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

69

As mentioned above, the ARNG has recruited about 190,000 soldiers 

from fiscal years 2011 through 2014, and not all of these individuals 

completed initial military training. However, ARNG Strength Maintenance 

Division had not estimated the ARNG’s costs for recruiting and training 

soldiers, and officials stated they would have to frequently update the 

calculation because the associated costs change over time. While we 

recognize costs for recruiting and training a soldier can change over time, 

it is important for the ARNG to periodically estimate these costs, such as 

during an annual budget cycle or other time period as appropriate, 

because it would better enable the ARNG to know how it is spending its 

resources. According to GAO’s leading practices on strategic humancapital management, agencies should have valid data for determining 

whether they are maximizing their human-capital investments and that 

data gathered are kept current.70 Without periodically estimating the cost 

to recruit and train an ARNG soldier, ARNG Strength Maintenance 

Division does not know the extent of its investment in soldiers and the 

potential loss of investment when soldiers do not complete training or 

their initial term of service. Having this information could be particularly 

important in light of our analysis above showing that about 40 percent of 

soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001 through 2007 did not complete 

their initial term of service.

 

69We did not independently assess the reliability of the Army Active Component’s cost 

estimate to recruit and train a soldier. ARNG officials noted that the Active Army estimate 

would not be comparable to the ARNG estimate because the ARNG estimate also 

includes some resources that support attrition management and retention.

70GAO-02-373SP.
The ARNG has some internal controls for processing its financial 

incentives

Page 33 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

71 but has not ensured that recruiting officials understand 

available financial incentives to fill critical military positions, and OSD, the 

Department of the Army, and ARNG-HRM have not exercised all of their 

oversight responsibilities for ARNG financial incentives programs. OSD 

has not monitored the costs associated with ARNG incentives programs, 

which the services are required to report by DOD instruction. In addition, 

the Department of the Army and ARNG-HRM have not evaluated and 

documented an evaluation of the effectiveness of the financial incentives. 

Department of the Army and National Guard regulations require the 

Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 

and ARNG-HRM to evaluate the effectiveness of the financial incentives 

programs.

The ARNG has a system of internal controls to help monitor compliance 

with financial incentives contracts.72 Beginning in fiscal year 2012, ARNGHRM implemented the Guard Incentive Management System (GIMS) to 

help establish internal controls when awarding financial incentives and 

processing incentives payments. The management system was 

implemented in response to a 2010 study73 that a contractor conducted 

for the ARNG, which found deficiencies in quality controls for its previous 

incentives processing system. For example, the study found that it was 

not clear how many people had access to or how frequently they used the 

incentives system. Further, the 2010 study found that the previous system 

did not capture all requests for payments, creating the inability to 

accurately manage the funding for the programs, and found that the 

 

71According to National Guard Regulation 600-7, Selected Reserve Incentive Programs 

(Aug. 12, 2014), financial incentives within the selected reserve incentive program include 

enlistment bonuses, reenlistment bonuses, military occupational specialty conversion 

bonuses, the student loan repayment program, officer accession and affiliation bonuses, 

and critical skill retention bonus, among others. For the purposes of this report, we use the 

term incentive to refer to financial incentives that fall within this description. 

72Soldiers who are awarded an incentive enter into a contractual agreement with the 

ARNG that contains specific requirements for the soldier to complete in order to remain 

eligible for the incentive.

73iMARC Feasibility Study: Bonus and Incentives Program (Oct. 29, 2010).

ARNG Has Not 

Ensured That 

Recruiters 

Understand Financial 

Incentives, and OSD, 

Army and ARNG 

Have Not Conducted 

Oversight of ARNG’s 

Financial Incentives 

Programs

The ARNG Has 

Implemented Some 

Internal Controls for 

Processing Its Financial 

Incentives
system did not monitor and validate that a soldier remained qualified to 

receive an incentive.

Financial incentives are to be awarded and monitored within GIMS, which 

(1) establishes control by setting user levels and limitations on 

transactions that users are able to complete regarding incentives; (2) 

monitors a soldier’s compliance with his or her incentives contract, and 

can change the incentive payments to an on-hold status and withhold 

payments until violations can be addressed (if at all); and (3) processes 

and releases payment notifications per the contract schedule, assuming 

the soldier’s incentive payment is not flagged as in on-hold status. Some 

controls within GIMS

Page 34 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

74 are similar to control activities suggested by the 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,

75 which states 

that attributes to internal control activities include dividing key duties and 

responsibilities among different people in order to reduce the risk of error, 

waste, or fraud.

ARNG officials at all four selected states we visited said that GIMS 

reduces the possibility that soldiers are awarded incentives that are not in 

accordance with regulation. For example, the state-level incentives 

manager has the responsibility to monitor incentives awarded within his or 

her respective state and only officials within the incentives managers’

office have the authority to review and approve incentives actions, while 

the Military Entrance Processing Station guidance counselor is 

responsible for issuing incentives to a soldier. Officials stated that GIMS 

does not allow for individuals to perform duties outside of their 

responsibility, which greatly reduces the risk of fraud and improper 

incentives activities. Further, officials at all four selected states we visited 

said that GIMS greatly reduces the possibility that soldiers are awarded 

incentives or receive incentives payments if they do not meet the 

requirements for the respective incentive. For example, officials stated 

that soldiers cannot receive additional incentive payments until the soldier 

passes his or her physical training test. Officials stated that in order to 

receive a payment, GIMS requires the soldier’s commander to verify that 

the soldier has passed the most recent test. If the soldier has not passed 

 

74Assessing the effectiveness of internal controls within GIMS was outside of the scope of 

this review. 

75GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
the most recent physical training test, GIMS will flag the soldier as 

ineligible for receiving payment.

GIMS utilizes an algorithm that considers factors such as unit fill rate and 

time until deployment that determines which positions, when filled, 

provide the applicant with incentives. The algorithm also determines the 

amount of the financial incentive that the applicant will receive if the 

applicant meets the eligibility requirements for that position. Recruiters 

access the information in GIMS to determine whether an available 

position has an incentive attached. According to the ARNG’s financial 

incentives policy,

Page 35 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

76 positions are assigned an incentive tier level 

corresponding to how critical the position is.77 For example, a position 

scored as a tier level 1 is considered most critical and has the greatest 

amount of incentives, while a position scored as a tier level 7 is 

considered not critical and does not have any incentives. Further, 

according to the policy, recruiting and retention financial incentives are 

intended to assist in filling critical shortages. The policy also states that 

ARNG-HRM is to develop and implement policy for ARNG incentives 

programs and that the Chief of NGB, through the ARNG Strength 

Maintenance Division, is responsible for developing strength maintenance 

guidance, programs, and training.

ARNG officials from all of the four selected states that we visited stated 

that they did not understand which vacant ARNG positions were 

considered critical and had incentives attached. These state recruiting 

officials stated that because they did not understand which positions were 

considered critical and had a financial incentive attached, it was difficult to 

utilize financial incentives as a recruiting tool. For example, during our 

review the algorithm within GIMS was initially being updated on a daily 

basis and officials stated that the constant change was a contributing 

factor in making it very difficult to understand which positions have a 

financial incentive. ARNG-HRM officials stated that, based on feedback, 

the algorithm was changed in January 2015 and was now being updated 

on a monthly basis instead of a daily basis. However, ARNG-HRM 

 

76Acting Director, Army National Guard Memorandum, FY14 Selected Reserve Incentive 

Policy (SRIP) Endorsement (May 22, 2014).

77On February 9, 2015, the ARNG issued guidance that identified certain military 

occupational specialties as “critical” for the purposes of affiliation bonuses. 

The ARNG Has Not 

Ensured That Recruiters 

Have an Understanding of 

Available Financial 

Incentives
officials stated that the algorithm change to being updated on a monthly 

basis confused state-level recruiting personnel as to how positions that 

become vacant within the month are considered for criticality and 

incentives between the monthly updates. ARNG-HRM officials stated that 

there are tools, such as a search function, within GIMS for state recruiting 

personnel that would assist in understanding which positions are 

considered critical and have an incentive. However, officials stated that 

the tools are not being fully utilized, which is another contributing factor in 

not understanding which positions have a financial incentive.

Part of the reason for confusion is that the ARNG Strength Maintenance 

Division and ARNG-HRM has not provided recruiters with training to help 

enable them to effectively use financial incentives to fill critical positions. 

The ARNG’s training curriculum instructs recruiters to identify the 

motivator for each applicant and to use that motivator as leverage to gain 

the applicant’s commitment to join the ARNG. For example, some 

applicants may be motivated to join the ARNG in order to gain certain job 

skills or family tradition of service in the ARNG. Recruiters we interviewed 

stated that they are trained to persuade applicants to join the ARNG 

based on areas other than financial incentives, such as service to country 

and skills training, but the training did not teach recruiters how to use 

financial incentives to fill critical positions. While officials maintain that 

recruiters should primarily utilize motivators to gain the applicant’s 

commitment to join the ARNG, ARNG Strength Maintenance Division and 

ARNG-HRM officials stated that additional training for recruiters on how to 

utilize tools to understand which positions have incentives may help in 

more effective use of financial incentives. Financial incentives are a tool 

available to recruiters, and ARNG incentives policy states that the 

incentives assist leadership in meeting and sustaining ARNG readiness 

requirements and provides incentives to assist in filling critical shortages. 

Incentives are to be implemented in those situations where other less 

costly methods have proven inadequate or ineffective in supporting unit 

and skill staffing requirements. Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government

Page 36 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

78 states that it is necessary to provide personnel 

with the right training and tools, among other items, to ensure operational 

success. Without providing recruiters with training on how to utilize 

available tools, such as use of financial incentives to fill positions, 

recruiters may not have an understanding of which military positions are 

 

78GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
considered critical and are not best positioned to utilize available financial 

incentives to fill these positions.

OSD has not monitored the amounts of incentives obligated through the 

ARNG incentives programs. A DOD instruction requires the tracking and 

reporting of recruiting resources throughout DOD, including the obligation 

of incentives to, among other things, help ensure that DOD is using the 

most efficient and cost-effective processes in the recruitment of new 

personnel.

Page 37 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

79 For example, these reports must contain information on the 

amount of obligations on college-fund contributions, enlistment bonuses, 

and student loan repayments, among other recruiting costs. According to 

the instruction, the information collected through the required reports is 

intended to help formulate policy guidance and oversight and ensure 

mission success. OSD has collected information on recruiting resources 

for the Active components through these reports, but OSD officials stated 

that the information does not include the amounts obligated through the 

incentives programs in the National Guard and Reserve components. The 

requirement for the National Guard and Reserve components to report 

this information to OSD has been in effect since at least 1991, but officials 

stated that turnover in staff and office reorganizations that began 

sometime after 2004 resulted in OSD no longer collecting and reviewing 

the information. In response to our review, in July 2015 the officials stated 

that OSD has plans to include information on the amounts of incentives 

obligated from the National Guard and Reserve components in the next 

reporting cycle of October 2015 and in future reports. Without information 

on the amounts obligated through National Guard- and Reservecomponent incentives programs, OSD cannot effectively develop policies 

and guidance to help ensure that recruiting resources are used efficiently 

and in a cost-effective manner throughout DOD.

 

79According to the instruction, the military services are required to submit, at a minimum, 

two reports annually. The first report is due within 45 days of when the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer receives the OSD budget 

estimate submission from the Office of Management and Budget. The second report is 

due within 45 days of when the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer receives the OSD President’s Budget from the Office 

of Management and Budget. Department of Defense Instruction 1304.32, Military Services 

Recruiting Related Reports (Mar. 26, 2013).

OSD Has Not Monitored 

the Amounts of Financial 

Incentives Obligated 

through ARNG Incentives 

Programs
The Department of the Army has reviewed and approved the ARNG’s 

financial incentives policy and has recently issued a directive that 

expands its oversight; however, the Department of the Army and ARNGHRM have not evaluated and documented the effectiveness of the 

financial incentives programs in achieving overall objectives. The ARNG 

obligated about $836 million in financial incentives from fiscal years 2012 

through 2014, which includes enlistment bonuses, student loan 

repayment, and reenlistment bonuses, among other incentives. The 

amount obligated for ARNG incentives programs decreased over this time 

period, from $348 million in fiscal year 2012 to $206 million in fiscal year 

2014. ARNG officials noted that obligations related to ARNG financial 

incentives programs decreased over this time period because of 

budgetary constraints. According to Department of the a Army 

regulation,

Page 38 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

80 the Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Personnel has responsibility for conducting a semiannual review 

of the financial incentives program. Further, in September 2015 the 

Secretary of the Army issued a directive81 that requires all new accession 

incentives created by Department of the Army components, including the 

ARNG, to be reviewed and approved by the Department of the Army. In 

addition, the directive requires all Department of the Army components to 

submit all current incentives programs for Department of the Army review 

and approval. A Department of the Army official stated that it meets its 

review requirement by ensuring that ARNG financial incentives policy 

complies with applicable laws and Army regulations. The official stated 

that if the ARNG determines that no midyear updates are necessary, then 

the Department of the Army does not conduct an additional review of 

ARNG incentives policy.

As previously noted, the ARNG Strength Maintenance Division and 

ARNG-HRM have not ensured that recruiting officials receive training and 

understand available financial incentives to fill critical military positions, 

and ARNG-HRM officials stated that they are aware that there is some 

confusion at the state level over which positions are considered critical. In 

November 2005, we reported that of the 1,500 enlisted occupational 

specialties across DOD, 19 percent were consistently overfilled and 41 

 

80Army Regulation 135-7, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Incentives Programs 

(Apr. 15, 1996).

81Army Directive 2015-36, Review and Approval Authority for Army Accession Incentives 

and Programs (Sep. 15, 2015).

The Department of the 

Army and the ARNG Have 

Not Evaluated and 

Documented the 

Effectiveness of the 

ARNG’s Financial 

Incentives Programs
percent were consistently underfilled from fiscal years 2000 through 

2005.

Page 39 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

82 Moreover, we found that active-duty components provided 

bonuses to servicemembers in consistently overfilled occupational 

specialties.83 We recommended that DOD require its 10 components to 

report annually on all (not just critical) over- and underfilled occupational 

specialties; provide an analysis of why occupational specialties are overand underfilled; and report annually on and justify their use of enlistment 

and reenlistment bonuses provided to servicemembers in occupational 

specialties that exceed their authorized personnel levels. DOD partially 

concurred with our recommendation, stating that it has visibility over skills 

deemed most critical for retention and that our definition for over- and 

underfilled specialties was unreasonably strict. Our recommendation was 

not implemented.

Our current review found that in the ARNG, incentives are not always 

being used to fill military occupational specialties that are consistently 

below authorized levels and that incentives are being sometimes used for 

military occupational specialties that are consistently above approved 

levels. Specifically, we found that there were several military occupational 

specialties that were consistently below 80 percent of approved rates 

from fiscal year 2012 though fiscal year 2014. These military occupational 

specialties were in areas including electronic warfare, explosives 

ordnance disposal, and special forces, which have all been identified as 

important to DOD. For example, data provided by ARNG showed that 

while one special forces military occupational specialty was only at 70, 

66, and 69 percent filled from fiscal years 2012 through 2014, 

respectively, only 14 contracts84 containing incentives were approved for 

individuals in these occupational specialties during that time frame. 

ARNG officials stated that, depending on the demographics of a given 

area in close proximity to a unit and the requirements to fill positions 

within a particular unit, it may be difficult to find applicants who meet the 

qualifications of an available position. Further, data provided by the 

ARNG also showed that some military occupational specialties were 

consistently filled over approved levels yet hundreds of contracts 

 

82GAO-06-134.

83Our 2005 report only analyzed bonus data for active duty components in this report 

since bonuses for reserve and National Guard components depend on geographic 

locations due to their geographic recruiting limitations and state missions, respectively.

84These contracts represent approximately 2 percent of approved levels.
containing incentives were approved for individuals in these positions 

from fiscal years 2012 through 2014.

Page 40 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

85 For example, one supply military 

occupational specialty was at 118, 116, and 113 percent of authorized 

levels from fiscal year 2012 through 2014, respectively, and yet over 880 

contracts86 containing incentives for these positions were awarded during 

that time frame. Officials stated that incentives can be awarded to 

positions even when the national authorized level is above 100 percent if, 

for example, the unit or state-level fill rates are low.

Furthermore, the Department of the Army and ARNG-HRM have not 

exercised their oversight responsibilities to evaluate and document the 

effectiveness of the ARNG’s financial incentives program in achieving 

overall objectives. A Department of the Army official stated that he 

believed that it was not the role of Department of the Army to monitor and 

evaluate the effectiveness of the ARNG’s financial incentives program, 

and that he believed that it was the ARNG-HRM’s responsibility to do so. 

According to ARNG-HRM officials, the effectiveness of the incentive 

programs is evaluated on a regular basis. However, ARNG-HRM officials 

have not documented results of any evaluations or documented that their 

current financial incentives programs are meeting overall objectives. 

Department of the Army and National Guard regulations87 state that the 

Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 

and ARNG-HRM, respectively, will monitor and evaluate the effectiveness 

of the ARNG financial incentives program in achieving overall objectives. 

A National Guard regulation88 states that ARNG incentives serve as 

extraordinary measures to assist the ARNG in meeting and sustaining 

personnel requirements, help meet quality and skill-match objectives, 

 

85Information related to incentives contracts approved include all types of incentives as 

defined by Army Regulation 135-7, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Incentives 

Programs (Apr. 15, 1996). The Regulation allows for incentives to be approved in certain 

situations where national fill rates are at approved levels and unit fill rates are below 

approved levels. Officials stated that the algorithm within GIMS can determine that a 

position will have an incentive in cases where national fill rates are at or above approved 

levels and when state or unit-level fill rates are below approved levels. 

86These contracts represent approximately 3 percent of approved levels.

87Army Regulation 135-7, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Incentives Programs

(Apr. 15, 1996), and National Guard Regulation 600-7, Selected Reserve Incentive 

Programs (Aug. 12, 2014).

88National Guard Regulation 600-7, Selected Reserve Incentive Programs (Aug. 12, 

2014).
stabilize the ARNG through longer service commitments, assist in filling 

critical skill shortages, and support deploying and high-priority units. 

However, Department of the Army and ARNG-HRM officials have not 

documented that the ARNG incentives programs are meeting the goals 

listed in the National Guard regulation.

Moreover, recruiting officials at all of the four selected states we visited 

stated that there are cases where applicants enlist in the ARNG for 

nonfinancial reasons, such as service to country, and have still been 

awarded financial incentives. Without the Department of the Army and 

ARNG-HRM evaluating and documenting the effectiveness of ARNG 

incentives programs in meeting its goals and documenting the results, 

they may not know whether incentives are being used effectively to meet 

and sustain program goals and whether incentives are being awarded to 

fill critical occupational specialties.

In light of the Department of the Army’s downsizing and ongoing fiscal 

uncertainty, and given the importance of the ARNG to help meet Army 

missions, it is critical for the ARNG to oversee its recruiting process and 

to maximize its return on investment it incurs with recruits. In response to 

findings from our prior work as well as others, the ARNG has taken steps 

to increase its oversight of the recruiting process. However, the Recruiting 

Standards Branch, which has played a key role in ARNG oversight of 

state-level recruiting activities, is in a pilot phase awaiting approval and is 

not permanently established. In addition to continued attention on 

oversight, the ARNG must have relevant, timely information that provides 

visibility over a soldier’s career, including the recruiting process and 

training for his or her military occupation, through the soldier’s completion 

of his or her initial term of service. While the ARNG has increased its 

percentage of soldiers who complete initial military training, available data 

do not provide the ARNG with full visibility into when or why a soldier 

does not complete initial military training or may not be reliable. Further, 

the ARNG’s approach to tracking soldiers does not include whether 

soldiers who join in a given fiscal year complete their initial term of 

service. Moreover, the ARNG has not periodically estimated the total cost 

to recruit and train a soldier. Such information could be useful to decision 

makers to help understand the return on investment in recruiting and 

training a soldier. Although the ARNG implemented a new financial 

incentives system in fiscal year 2012, the ARNG has not provided training 

to help ensure that recruiters understand what financial incentives are 

available to help fill critical positions. Moreover, OSD, the Department of 

the Army, and the ARNG have not fully conducted their oversight 

Page 41 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Conclusions
responsibilities of ARNG incentives programs. Though the National Guard 

and Reserve components are required to provide information on their 

incentives programs, OSD has not enforced the requirement since around 

2004, and while the Department of the Army and ARNG are required to 

assess the effectiveness of the ARNG financial incentives programs, they 

have not evaluated or documented their assessments of the programs. 

Given the number of occupations that are not at full strength and given 

the current constrained fiscal environment, it is critically important for 

DOD to know that incentives are being obligated effectively and that they 

are achieving the goal of helping to fill critical positions.

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following six 

actions:

· To aid ARNG officials in conducting their oversight of the states and 

territories, direct the Director, ARNG, to establish a permanent 

program for monitoring state-level recruiting activities either by 

extending the Recruiting Standards Branch or establishing some other 

similar program.

· To aid ARNG officials in understanding the effectiveness of efforts to 

meet force requirements, direct the Director, ARNG, to do the 

following:

· Take steps to help ensure that the ARNG collects consistent, 

complete, and valid data on the specific reasons why soldiers do 

not complete initial military training and when these soldiers 

separate from the ARNG during the training process. Such steps 

could include modifying SIDPERS to capture this information or if 

unable to modify SIDPERS, taking actions to ensure that 

information collected in the Vulcan Recruit Sustainment Program 

database is valid.

· Regularly track whether ARNG soldiers who join in a given fiscal 

year complete their initial term of service.

· Periodically estimate, such as on an annual basis or other time 

period as appropriate, the total cost of recruiting and initial training 

for a soldier who joins the ARNG.

· To help ARNG officials in using financial incentives to fill critical 

positions as required by Army and National Guard regulation, direct 

the Director, ARNG, to provide recruiters with training to better enable 

the use of available financial incentives.

Page 42 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
· To help determine whether ARNG officials are effectively using 

financial incentives, in conjunction with the Director, ARNG, exercise 

their oversight responsibilities by evaluating and documenting the 

effectiveness of ARNG’s incentives program in meeting its goals. The 

evaluation should also determine whether incentives are being 

effectively awarded in military occupational specialties that have been 

under or over authorized levels, and whether changes are needed to 

effectively use existing incentives.

Given that the reporting of information related to the amounts of 

incentives obligated has been a requirement but not carried out in recent 

years, we recommend that the Office of the Secretary of Defense take the 

following action in order to ensure continued reporting in the future:

· Enforce its requirement for the National Guard and Reserve 

Component to submit information on the amounts of incentives 

obligated and incorporate the required information in the recruiting 

resources reports.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its 

written comments, DOD concurred with all seven of our 

recommendations, but stated that it did not concur with our report due to 

our description of recruiting policies that were in place during the last 

nearly 15 years of war. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix VIII. 

DOD also provided technical comments that we considered and 

incorporated as appropriate. 

Regarding its statement that the department does not concur with our 

report, DOD stated that we portray both Army and ARNG recruiting efforts 

as being targeted at sexual offenders and that we assert that during 

hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan that both the Army and ARNG made 

standard practice of issuing enlistment waivers for convicted sexual 

offenders. We disagree with that assertion. In our report, we describe the 

recruiting policies that were in place during a difficult time for military 

recruiting and have since changed. Further, in the technical comments 

provided to us, DOD stated that “At the height of Operations Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Department of the Army and the 

National Guard Bureau (NGB) accepted lower quality applicants (lower 

aptitude scores and moral waivers) and offered significantly higher 

incentives in order to ensure that the Army National Guard (ARNG) and 

Active Army could meet their respective missions, achieve end strength 

goals and provide ready units to combatant commanders.” DOD also 

provided additional context regarding factors that have made the 

Page 43 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
recruiting environment increasingly more challenging. Based on DOD’s 

technical comments, we have added context to our final report regarding 

our description of the Army and ARNG’s past recruiting efforts. 

Specifically, our report now states that, “since the end of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and a significant drawdown from Afghanistan, the Department 

of the Army and NGB have issued guidance prohibiting approval of 

waivers for applicants with prior criminal offenses such as certain types of 

sexual offenses, as well as increasing the applicant aptitude score 

standards. These changes and other factors such as a less physically fit 

youth population have reduced the pool of qualified applicants for the 

ARNG and make it more difficult for recruiters to meet defined recruiting 

goals.” In April 2012, the Director of Military Personnel Management 

issued a memorandum entitled Suspension of Enlistment Waivers, which 

stated that in an effort to reinforce and ensure compliance with Office of 

the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) policy issued 

in 2009, the “enlistment or commissioning of any individual with a 

conviction or adverse adjudication for a felony or misdemeanor sexual 

offense is prohibited and no waivers are authorized.” The memorandum 

also suspends enlistment waivers in areas of major misconduct, positive 

drug/alcohol tests at military entrance processing stations, and 

misconduct or juvenile major misconduct for drug use, possession, or 

drug paraphernalia, to include marijuana. 

DOD agreed in its comments that not enlisting individuals with felony 

issues does shrink the pool of eligible recruits but stated that the 

accession mission for the ARNG has not been in jeopardy. However, as 

we note in this report, while ARNG met end-strength goals from fiscal 

years 2010 through 2014, the ARNG met overall recruiting goals in only 2 

of the 5 years. We noted in our report that several factors have reduced 

the pool of qualified recruits, all while end-strength goals have remained 

constant. This in itself makes it inherently more difficult for recruiters to 

meet defined recruiting goals. Further, officials we interviewed during this 

engagement stated that their reduced ability to process waivers for 

certain law violations has made meeting the recruiting mission more 

difficult. We also note in our report that in June 2008 OSD issued a 

Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-018 – Enlistment Waivers, which 

established policy and provided guidance regarding enlistment waivers 

for applicants for the Military Services and provided standardized 

terminology for the tracking and reporting of waiver data to be 

implemented in fiscal year 2009. According to OSD officials, waiver data 

prior to fiscal year 2009 is inconsistent and unreliable.

Page 44 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
With regard to our seven recommendations, DOD concurred with all of 

them and described actions it plans to take to implement them.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army, the 

Chief, NGB; and the Director, ARNG. In addition, this report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3604 or at farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IX.

Brenda S. Farrell

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Page 45 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 46 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

The objectives of our review were to evaluate the extent to which (1) the 

Army National Guard (ARNG) has provided oversight of its recruiting 

process; (2) the ARNG met its goals for recruiting, completion of initial 

military training,

Page 47 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

1 and completion of initial term of service2

in recent 

years;3 and (3) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department 

of the Army, and ARNG have conducted their oversight responsibilities of 

the ARNG’s financial incentives programs. Also, House Report 113-446 

accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 20154included two additional provisions: 1) a provision for us to 

assess the extent to which contracting vehicles used to support ARNG 

recruiting were in compliance with Department of Defense (DOD) and 

Department of the Army policies and regulations, and 2) a provision for us 

to assess the numbers of individuals who complete basic and advanced 

individual training and the average length of time between when a person 

enlists in the ARNG and when the person completes initial military 

training. To address the first of the two additional provisions, we reviewed 

findings from and the status of recommendations by the U.S. Army Audit 

Agency and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Procurement to improve contracting processes at the National Guard 

Bureau (NGB). A Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

 

1

Initial military training refers to basic and advanced training to qualify for a soldier’s 

military occupational specialty. Basic training is the first introduction to the military for each 

of the services and includes instruction for new recruits on order and discipline, practices 

and procedures in their specific military services, combat preparedness, as well as 

instruction to enable new recruits to meet service-specific fitness requirements. Advanced 

training is career-specific training that prepares soldiers for their military occupations.

2By DOD instruction, each person who becomes a member of an armed force, subject to 

certain exceptions, will initially serve in the armed forces for a total of 8 years in some 

combination of active and reserve status. See DOD Instruction 1304.25, Fulfilling the 

Military Service Obligation (MSO) (Oct. 31, 2013) implementing 10 U.S.C. § 651. 

According to the ARNG Accession Options Criteria, non-prior-service soldiers will be 

enlisted for 8 years and can commit to active participation in the ARNG for the entire 

duration or for a portion of the time (minimum of at least 3 years), serving the remainder of 

the 8 years serving in the Individual Ready Reserve. The amount of time prior-service 

soldiers commit to active participation in the ARNG varies depending on the length of time 

the soldier previously served in the Active, Reserve, or National Guard components. For 

the purposes of this report, we define initial term of service as the length of the soldier’s 

initial commitment to active participation in the ARNG.

3We evaluated the extent to which the ARNG met its goals for recruiting from fiscal years 

2010 through 2014, completion of initial military training from fiscal years 2011 through 

2014, and completion of initial term of service as of May 2015 for fiscal year 2015.

4H.R. Rep. 113-446 (May 13, 2014).

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

Procurement official determined that this information is sensitive but 

unclassified so we provided this information separately to the committees. 

To address the second provision, we included results of our analyses in 

appendixes II, III, IV, and V.

To describe the steps the ARNG has taken to provide oversight of the 

ARNG recruiting process, we obtained and reviewed guidance and policy 

documents regarding oversight of recruiter activities and interviewed 

officials from the ARNG. Although not generalizable to all states and 

territories, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of four states based on 

factors such as size, the total number of accessions, and geographic 

locations to understand and describe how states conduct oversight. We 

selected Texas and Pennsylvania as two states with a large-size ARNG 

end-strength, Virginia as a state with a medium-size end-strength, and 

Idaho as a state with a small-size end-strength. We obtained and 

reviewed applicable state and local recruiting and retention policy 

documents and interviewed recruiting and retention officials at each of 

these four selected states. The observations from these four selected 

states are not generalizable to all states and territories but provide 

important insight into ARNG oversight of its recruiting process.

To determine the extent to which the ARNG met goals for recruiting, 

completion of initial military training, and completion of initial term of 

service, we obtained aggregate recruiting data and associated goals from 

the ARNG. We compared data on the ARNG’s annual recruiting goals for 

enlistments to the number of enlistments in the ARNG for fiscal years 

2010 through 2014, respectively. We chose fiscal year 2010 as the start 

date because our prior work discussed the extent to which the ARNG met 

its recruiting goals from fiscal years 2000 through 2009. We chose fiscal 

year 2014 as the end date because it was the most recently available 

data at the time of our review. In addition, we compared ARNG’s goals for 

completion of initial military training to ARNG-reported completion rates in 

fiscal years 2011 through 2014. We could not assess the extent to which 

ARNG met its goal for completion of initial military training in fiscal years 

prior to 2011 because the goals in place for those years were not 

available or not comparable to the completion rates provided by the 

ARNG. We tried to analyze data on the reasons why soldiers did not 

complete their initial military training and when these soldiers separated 

during the training process; however, we found that states inconsistently 

recorded the reasons why soldiers left before beginning or prior to 

completion of training and that training data did not provide full visibility 

into when soldiers separated during the training process, as we discuss in 

greater detail in the report. Lastly, we compared ARNG’s fiscal year 2015 

Page 48 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

attrition goal for soldiers nearing the end of their initial term to the ARNG’s 

initial term attrition rate as of May 2015, which was the most recently 

available data at the time of our review. We could not assess the extent to 

which the ARNG met goals prior to fiscal year 2015 because ARNG 

officials stated that the goals have changed over time and could not 

provide goals for previous fiscal years. In addition to analyzing available 

data, we interviewed ARNG officials and officials from the four states we 

visited for their perspectives on trends and issues we identified in 

analyzing the data.

To determine the extent to which OSD, the Department of the Army, and 

the ARNG have conducted oversight of the ARNG’s incentives programs, 

we obtained and analyzed relevant policy and guidance documents to 

identify oversight responsibilities for ARNG incentives programs. We 

interviewed officials from the ARNG to gain an understanding of how 

incentives policies and guidance are being applied. We interviewed 

officials from OSD, Department of the Army, and the ARNG to gain an 

understanding of how OSD, the Department of the Army, and the ARNG 

conduct oversight of ARNG incentives programs. To gain an 

understanding of how incentives are being implemented during recruiting 

and retention activities, we obtained and analyzed applicable state and 

local incentives policies and interviewed recruiting and retention officials 

from our four selected states. Although not generalizable to all states and 

territories, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of four states based on 

factors such as size, the total number of accessions, and geographic 

locations to understand and describe how states are implementing and 

utilizing incentives programs in the recruiting process.

Further, to assess the number of individuals who complete basic and 

advanced individual training and the average length of time between 

when a person enlists in the ARNG and when the person completes initial 

military training, we obtained and analyzed data on enlisted soldiers to 

determine the extent to which they completed their initial military training.

Page 49 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

5

We elaborate on the results from our analysis in appendixes II and III and 

we provide additional analysis related to the length of time soldiers who 

did not meet their initial term of service stayed in the ARNG in appendix 

IV and the reasons why soldiers left the ARNG prior to completing their 

 

5We analyzed information from a soldier’s first enlistment in the ARNG. If a soldier joined 

more than once, we did not analyze information from subsequent enlistments due to 

limitations in the data.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

initial term of service in appendix V. We analyzed data from 365,431 nonprior-service enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal years 

2004 through 2013 to determine the extent to which they completed their 

initial military training. We also calculated the length of time it took nonprior-service, non-split-option

Page 50 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

6 soldiers who enlisted during this time 

period to complete their initial military training and become qualified for 

their military occupational specialty. In addition, we analyzed data from 

380,736 enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal years 2001 

through 2007 to determine whether they completed their initial term of 

service. For those soldiers who joined during this time period but did not 

complete their initial term of service, we analyzed the length of time they 

stayed in the ARNG and the reasons for their separation. Because states 

inconsistently recorded the reason for soldiers who left the ARNG before 

completing training, we could only analyze the reasons for soldiers who 

completed training but left before the end of their initial term of service.

To assess the reliability of the data used in this report, we analyzed the 

data for inconsistencies, incomplete data fields, and outliers. We also 

reviewed relevant documentation about the data systems and guidance 

provided to the states and territories on how to report recruiting and 

retention data. We followed up with the ARNG to discuss limitations we 

identified and requested revised data or made adjustments to our 

analysis, when possible, to mitigate these limitations. We noted any 

limitations in the report, where appropriate. Except in the case of reasons 

why soldiers left the ARNG before completing their military training and 

data on when soldiers separated during the training process, we found 

that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining (1) 

the extent to which enlisted soldiers completed their initial military 

training; (2) the length of time it took these soldiers to complete their initial 

military training and become qualified for their military occupational 

specialty; (3) the extent to which enlisted soldiers completed their initial 

term of service; (4) the length of time enlisted soldiers who did not 

complete their initial term of service served in the ARNG; and (5) the 

reasons why enlisted soldiers who graduated from their training but did 

not complete their initial term of service left the ARNG.

 

6The split-training option is an enlistment option for those who cannot complete basic 

training and advanced training in one continuous cycle because of school or seasonal 

employment.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and 

Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to November

2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Page 51 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
Appendix II: Completion of Initial Military 

Training by Non-Prior Service Enlisted 

Soldiers

For individuals who joined the Army National Guard (ARNG) within a 

given fiscal year, we analyzed whether they completed their initial military 

training and found that the percentage of ARNG soldiers who completed 

their training generally increased annually from 63.7 percent in fiscal year 

2004 to 80.5 percent in fiscal year 2013.

Page 52 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

1 ARNG Strength Maintenance 

Division officials attributed the improvements in completion of training 

largely to the Recruit Sustainment Program, which began in fiscal year 

2005. The purpose of the Recruit Sustainment Program is to increase the 

likelihood that ARNG soldiers will graduate initial military training by 

ensuring that recruits are mentally prepared and physically fit prior to 

attending training. The program aims to provide recruits with realistic 

training that is similar to the first 3 weeks of basic training. In addition, 

recruiters stated that the Recruit Sustainment Program allows the ARNG 

to maintain contact with recruits while they wait to attend training and to 

monitor their conduct and educational progress to help ensure they stay 

eligible to join. Table 6 shows our analysis of the extent to which nonprior-service enlisted individuals who joined the ARNG from fiscal years 

2004 through 2013 completed their initial military training.

 

1We chose fiscal year 2004 as the start date because the Recruit Sustainment Program 

started in fiscal year 2005. We chose fiscal year 2013 as an end date because 36 

percent—or 13,716 soldiers—who joined in fiscal year 2014 were still in the process of 

completing their initial military training as of April 15, 2015. 

Appendix II: Completion of Initial Military 

Training by Non-Prior Service Enlisted 

Soldiers
Appendix II: Completion of Initial Military 

Training by Non-Prior Service Enlisted 

Soldiers

Table 6: Completion of Initial Military Training for Non-Prior-Service Enlisted Soldiers Who Joined the Army National Guard 

Page 53 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

(ARNG) (Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013)

Fiscal 

year

Number of ARNG

soldiers who completed initial

military training (in thousands)

Number of ARNG soldiers

who did not complete initial

military training (in thousands)

Percentage of ARNG soldiers

who completed their initial

military training (percent)a

2004 16.7 9.5 63.7%

2005 18.7 7.8 70.5

2006 30.1 10.9 73.5

2007 29.9 10.8 73.4

2008 31.7 10.7 74.7

2009 29.2 8.4 77.6

2010 30.2 8.6 77.8

2011 26.4 7.0 79.1

2012 28.5 7.4 79.4

2013 30.1 7.3 80.5

Source: GAO analysis of ARNG data. I GAO-16-36

Note: Our analysis includes non-prior service, enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal 

years 2004 through 2013 and did or did not complete training as of April 15, 2015. Our analysis 

excludes enlisted soldiers who later became officers and 5,405 soldiers who were still in the process 

of completing their initial military training at the time of our analysis. Due to limitations in soldiers’

training records, we could not separately determine the extent to which soldiers completed basic 

training.

aPercentage may not equal comparison of two previous columns in table due to rounding.
Appendix III: Average Length of Time for 

Enlisted Soldiers to Qualify for Their Military 

Occupations

The average length of time for non-prior-service enlisted soldiers who 

joined the Army National Guard (ARNG) from fiscal years 2004 through 

2013 to complete initial military training and become qualified for their 

military occupation for the top 15 military occupational specialties varied 

from 254 to 357 days. See table 7.

Table 7: Average Length of Time It Took Non-Prior-Service Enlisted Soldiers Who Joined the Army National Guard (ARNG) 

Page 54 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

from Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013 to Complete Training and Qualify for Their Military Occupation for the Top 15 

Occupations 

Military occupational specialty

Number who completed initial

military training and became

qualified for their military

occupational specialty

Average time to complete

initial military training and

become qualified for military 

occupational specialty (days)

Approximate length of 

basic and advanced 

training for soldiers’

military occupation (days)a

Infantryman 27,648 270 98

Motor Transport Operator 16,115 263 119

Military Police 15,103 313 140

Health Care Specialist 10,616 357 182

Automated Logistical Specialist 8,045 297 154

Combat Engineer 7,962 262 112

Light-Wheel Vehicle Mechanic 6,812 318 140

Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic 6,748 297 161

Unit Supply Specialist 6,589 287 126

Food Service Specialist 6,029 284 133

Cannon Crewmember 5,632 254 119

Human Resources Specialist 5,293 291 133

Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear 

Specialist 5,066 309 140

Signal Support Systems 

Specialist 4,991 357 196

Cavalry Scout 4,827 269 112

Overall total and average for 

non-prior-service, non-splitoption enlistments 211,085 303

Source: GAO analysis of ARNG data. I GAO-16-36

Note: We determined the top 15 military occupations based on the total number of non-prior service, 

enlisted soldiers who completed training and became qualified for their military occupation. These 15 

occupations sum to 137,476. The total shown includes all occupations.

Our analysis includes non-prior-service enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from fiscal years 2004 

through 2013 and had completed their initial military training as of April 15, 2015. This table excludes 

30,406 non-prior-service, enlisted soldiers who joined under the ARNG’s split-training option, which is 

an enlistment option for those who cannot complete basic training and advanced training in one 

continuous cycle because of school or seasonal employment. The amount of time it took to complete 

training is calculated from the date of the soldiers’ enlistment in the ARNG to the date the soldiers’

pay status indicated that the soldier had been trained. We could not use soldiers’ training records to 

Appendix III: Average Length of Time for 

Enlisted Soldiers to Qualify for Their Military 

Occupations
Appendix III: Average Length of Time for 

Enlisted Soldiers to Qualify for Their Military 

Occupations

identify the date they completed their initial military training due to limitations in the availability of the 

data. ARNG officials stated that there could be a time lag of up to a few weeks from the date a soldier 

graduated from initial military training to the date that a soldier’s pay status indicated that he or she 

was trained

aNon-prior service, enlisted soldiers attend both basic training and advanced training for their military 

occupational specialty. Prior to attending advanced training—which varies based on a soldier’s 

military occupation, the soldiers generally attend basic training for 10 weeks or approximately 70 

days.

.

Page 55 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
Appendix IV: Length of Time Enlisted Soldiers 

Who Left Before Their Initial Term Served in 

the Army National Guard

Enlisted soldiers who joined the Army National Guard (ARNG) from fiscal 

years 2001 through 2007 and did not complete their initial term of service 

typically left within the first 2 years of joining the ARNG. Figure 1 shows 

the length of time enlisted soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001 

through 2007 and did not complete their initial term of service stayed in 

the ARNG.

Figure 1: Length of Time Enlisted Soldiers Who Left before the End of Their Initial 

Page 56 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Term Served in the Army National Guard (ARNG), for Those Joining from Fiscal 

Years 2001 through 2007

Note: We analyzed information from the first enlistment of soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001 

through 2007 and whose initial-term end dates occurred before September 30, 2014. We counted 

soldiers who had an attrition date within 30 days of their initial-term end date as completing their initial 

term of service. In addition, we excluded (1) soldiers who were missing a date for the end of their 

initial term of service; (2) soldiers who enlisted into the ARNG but later became officers; and (3) 

soldiers who left the ARNG to join the Active component, another Reserve component, or the Inactive 

Guard, among other things, because these soldiers may have later completed their initial term of 

service in those capacities, but we did not have visibility into whether they did so.

Appendix IV: Length of Time Enlisted 

Soldiers Who Left Before Their Initial Term 

Served in the Army National Guard
Appendix V: Reasons Why Enlisted Soldiers 

Did Not Complete Their Initial Term

We also analyzed the reasons why soldiers did not complete their initial 

term of service and found that soldiers left for a variety of reasons.

Page 57 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

1

Figure 2 shows the reasons why soldiers did not complete their initial 

term of service for those who joined from fiscal years 2001 through 2007.

Figure 2: Primary Reasons Enlisted Soldiers Did Not Complete their Initial Term of 

Service for Those who Served in the Army National Guard (ARNG) from Fiscal 

Years 2001 through 2007

Note: Percentages in the figure do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. We analyzed information 

from the first enlistment of soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001 through 2007 and whose initial 

term end dates occurred before September 30, 2014. We counted soldiers who had an attrition date 

within 30 days of their initial term end date as completing their initial term of service. In addition, we 

excluded (1) soldiers who were missing a date for the end of their initial term of service; (2) soldiers 

who enlisted into the ARNG but later became officers; and (3) soldiers who left the Army National 

Guard to join the Active Component, another Reserve Component, or the Inactive Guard, among 

 

1Army regulation states that depending on the nature of the soldier’s service while in the 

ARNG and the reason for the separation, a soldier can receive an honorable, general, 

dishonorable, or uncharacterized discharge, and may be required to repay unearned 

incentives. Further, Army regulation states that the ARNG should generally determine the 

characterization of a soldier’s discharge based on pattern of behavior rather than an 

isolated incident. The way in which a soldier’s discharge is characterized affects certain 

benefits, such as future reenlistment into military service, obtaining civilian employment, 

and receipt of veteran’s benefits. In addition, the ARNG may recoup incentives from 

soldiers who received unearned portions of monetary payments, such as enlistment 

bonuses, that were paid in advance.

Appendix V: Reasons Why Enlisted Soldiers 

Did Not Complete Their Initial Term
Appendix V: Reasons Why Enlisted Soldiers 

Did Not Complete Their Initial Term

other things, because these soldiers may have later completed their initial term of service in those 

capacities, but we did not have visibility into whether they did so.

aWe found that states were not consistently selecting the category in the Standard 

Installation/Division Personnel System for why soldiers left either before or during initial military 

training, and, as a result, we were not able to analyze the reasons these soldiers left. In addition, due 

to limitations in soldiers’ training records in the Army Training Requirements and Resources System, 

we could not identify whether a soldier left during basic or advanced training. For the purposes of our 

analysis, we consolidated the data for soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001 through 2007 and 

left before or during training into the “Left before or during training” category. Those soldiers who 

completed their training but left before the end of their initial term are categorized by their respective 

reason in the chart.

b

The “Other” category includes reasons such as felony conviction, death, and maximum allowable 

age.

c

The “Personal reasons for the soldier” category includes soldiers who left for a reason such as 

commuting distance, hardship or religious reasons, and inability to perform duties due to parenthood.

Page 58 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
Appendix VI: Department of Defense (DOD), 

Department of the Army, and Army National 

Guard (ARNG) Policies and Procedures 

Related to Recruiting and Retention

Page 59 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Reference Source Description Publication date

DOD Instruction 1304.32, Military 

Services Recruiting Related Reports

DOD Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides 

procedures regarding the tracking and reporting of various 

recruiting-related data (including the tracking and 

reporting of enlistment waivers and tracking and reporting 

of recruiter irregularities).

March 26, 2013

DOD Instruction 1145.01, Qualitative 

Distribution of Military Manpower

DOD Establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for 

qualitative distribution of manpower accessions, and 

defines certain DOD quality measures for accessions.

December 12, 

2013, incorporating 

change September 

22, 2014

Army Regulation 601-210, Active 

and Reserve Components 

Enlistment Program

Department of 

the Army

Governs eligibility criteria, policies, and procedures for 

enlistment and processing of persons into the Regular 

Army, the Army Reserve, and the ARNG, among other 

things.

March 12, 2013

Army National Guard Accession 

Options Criteria

ARNG Dictates the different types of enlistment or accession 

programs for enlisted, officers, and warrant officers.

June 1, 2014

Army Regulation 40–501, Medical 

Services, Standards of Medical 

Fitness

Department of 

the Army

Provides information on medical fitness standards for 

induction, enlistment, appointment, retention, and related 

policies and procedures.

August 4, 2011

Army Regulation 135-7, Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve 

Incentive Programs

Department of 

the Army

Establishes a single reference for incentives authorized 

within the ARNG and Army Reserve and establishes 

responsibilities for Department of the Army regarding 

incentives within the ARNG and Army Reserve.

April 15, 1996

National Guard Regulation 601-1, 

Army National Guard Strength 

Maintenance Program

ARNG Integrates all of the recruiting and retention programs, 

policies, and procedures necessary for developing, 

implementing, and monitoring a successful strength 

maintenance program at the state or territory level.

April 28, 2006

National Guard Regulation 600-7, 

Selected Reserve Incentives 

Programs (SRIP)

ARNG Governs policies and procedures for the administration of 

the ARNG SRIP Programs.

August 12, 2014

Source: DOD, Department of the Army, and ARNG. I GAO-16-36

Appendix VI: Department of Defense (DOD), 

Department of the Army, and Army National 

Guard (ARNG) Policies and Procedures 

Related to Recruiting and Retention
Appendix VII: Recommendations from 

Selected Prior GAO Work on Military 

Recruiting and the Status of Their 

Implementation

Page 60 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Report title

Report

issuance date Recommendation

Status of Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) 

implementation

Military Personnel: DOD 

Needs Action Plan to 

Address Enlisted Personnel 

Recruitment and Retention 

Challenges

November 17, 2005 To provide greater understanding of the recruiting and 

retention issues and improve the department’s 

oversight for these issues, the Secretary of Defense 

should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to 

require the 10 components to report annually on all 

(not just critical) over- and underfilled occupational 

specialties, provide an analysis of why occupational 

specialties are over- and underfilled, and report 

annually on and justify their use of enlistment and 

reenlistment bonuses provided to servicemembers in 

occupational specialties that exceed their authorized 

personnel levels.

Not implemented

To provide greater understanding of the recruiting and 

retention issues and improve the department’s 

oversight for these issues, the Secretary of Defense 

should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to 

develop a management action plan that will help the 

components to identify and address the root causes of 

their recruiting and retention challenges.

Not implemented

Military Personnel: Army 

Needs to Focus on CostEffective Use of Financial 

Incentives and Quality 

Standards in Managing 

Force Growth

May 4, 2009 Should the Army decide to offer incentives to officers 

in the future, the Secretary of Defense should direct 

the Secretary of the Army to build on currently 

available analyses that will enable the Army, with the 

direction and assistance of the Secretary of Defense, 

to set cost-effective bonus amounts and other 

incentives.

Not implemented

To enable the most efficient use of recruiting 

resources, the Secretary of Defense should direct the 

Secretary of the Army to collect data on the costeffectiveness of the Army’s conduct waiver polices—

including costs associated with the waiver review and 

approval process and with future separations of 

soldiers with conduct waivers for adverse reasons—

and use these data to inform the Army’s waiver 

policies.

Not implemented

To enhance its existing processes to recruit and retain 

sufficient numbers of enlisted personnel and to avoid 

making excessive payments to achieve desired 

results, the Secretary of Defense should direct the 

Secretary of the Army to build on currently available 

analyses that will enable the Army to set cost-effective 

enlistment and reenlistment bonuses.

Implemented

Appendix VII: Recommendations from 

Selected Prior GAO Work on Military 

Recruiting and the Status of Their 

Implementation
Appendix VII: Recommendations from 

Selected Prior GAO Work on Military 

Recruiting and the Status of Their 

Implementation

Page 61 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Report title

Report

issuance date Recommendation

Status of Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) 

implementation

To enable the Army to make informed decisions 

regarding the management of its officer corps over 

time, the Secretary of Defense should direct the 

Secretary of the Army to track—and if necessary 

correct—any effects that its actions to alleviate 

shortages may have on the officer corps, particularly in 

cases in which the Army has deviated from 

benchmarks established in the Defense Officer 

Personnel Management Act.

Not implemented

Military Recruiting: Clarified 

Reporting Requirements and 

Increased Transparency 

Could Strengthen Oversight 

over Recruiter Irregularities

January 28, 2010 The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries 

of the Army and Navy to identify mechanisms for the 

regular sharing of the recruiter irregularity data 

throughout all levels of command.

Implemented

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

complete and issue the instruction on tracking and 

reporting data on recruiter irregularities to clarify the 

requirements for the types of recruiter irregularities to 

be reported and the placement of recruiter irregularity 

cases and actions taken into reporting categories.

Implemented

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

direct the relevant offices within the National Guard 

Bureau to adjust their reporting procedures in ways 

that will provide transparency in the data reported to 

OSD and any limitations on the data.

Implemented

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

include the appropriate disclosures concerning data 

limitations in the recruiter irregularity reports that OSD 

produces on the basis of the National Guard data for 

the Congress and others.

Not implemented

Source: GAO. I GAO-16-36
Appendix VIII: Comments from Department of 

Defense

Page 62 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Appendix VIII: Comments from Department 

of Defense
Appendix VIII: Comments from Department of 

Defense

Page 63 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
Appendix VIII: Comments from Department of 

Defense

Page 64 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
Appendix VIII: Comments from Department of 

Defense

Page 65 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Brenda S. Farrell, (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Vincent Balloon, Assistant 

Director; Amie Lesser; Richard Powelson; Terry Richardson; Christine 

San; Jared Sippel; Norris “Traye” Smith; Sabrina Streagle; Elizabeth Van 

Velzen, and Michael Willems made key contributions to this report.

Page 66 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Appendix X: Accessible Data

Page 67 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Ms. Brenda S. Farrell

Director, Defense Capabilities Management

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street, NW

Washington DC 20548 Dear Ms. Farrell,

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO Draft Report

GA0-16-36, "MILITARY RECRUITING: Army National Guard Needs to 

Continue Monitoring, Collect Better Data and Assess Incentives 

Programs," dated September 24, 2015 (GAO Code 351957).

The Department is providing official written comments for inclusion in the 

report.

Whereas the Army concurs with the recommendations made by the GAO, 

the Army does not concur with this report. The GAO's portrayal of both 

Army and Army National Guard (ARNG) recruiting efforts as being 

targeted at sexual offenders is inflammatory, not supportable, and 

unnecessarily out of context for this report. Your report indicates that 

during hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, both the Army and ARNG made 

standard practice of issuing enlistment waivers for convicted sexual 

offenders. That with the Army's decreasing combat role, both the Army 

and ARNG, "have determined that they would no longer approve waivers 

for applicants with prior criminal offenses such as certain types of sexual 

offenses." It is Army policy that convicted sex offenders are not eligible for 

enlistment and may not enter or reenter the Army. Whereas not enlisting 

individuals with adult major misconduct (felony) issues does in fact shrink 

the pool of eligible recruits, the Accession mission for both the Army and 

the Army National Guard has not been in jeopardy . We formally request 

to see the data used by GAO that led to the issuance of the statement on 

page 1 of your report.

Appendix X: Accessible Data

Agency Comment 

Letter

Text of Appendix VIII: 

Comments from 

Department of Defense

Page 1
Appendix X: Accessible Data

Sincerely,

Anthony J . Stamilio

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Military Personnel and Quality of 

Life)

Enclosures

1) Army Comments

2) Technical Comments

GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 GAO-16-36 

(GAO CODE 351957)

“MILITARY RECRUITING: ARMY NATIONAL GUARD NEEDS TO 

CONTINUE MONITORING, COLLECT BETTER DATA AND ASSESS 

INCENTIVES PROGRAMS”

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO 

RECOMMENDATION

RECOMMENDATION: 

To aid ARNG officials in conducting their oversight of the states and 

territories, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army direct the 

Director, ARNG, to establish a permanent program for monitoring statelevel recruiting activities either by extending the Recruiting Standards 

Branch or establishing some other similar program.

ARMY RESPONSE:

Concur. In addition to continuing to provide Title 10 oversight of State 

recruiting through the Military Entrance Processing Station Guidance 

Counselors, the ARNG will continue the pilot program in the interim and 

complete the process to document and resource the Recruiting Standards 

Branch at the earliest possible date.

Page 68 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Page 2
Appendix X: Accessible Data

RECOMMENDATION:

To aid ARNG officials in understanding the effectiveness of efforts to 

meet force requirements, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of the 

Army direct the Director, ARNG, to:

· Take steps to help ensure that the ARNG collects consistent, 

complete, and valid data on the specific reasons why soldiers do not 

complete initial military training and when these soldiers separate 

from the ARNG during the training process. Such steps could include 

modifying SIDPERS to capture this information or if unable to modify 

SIDPERS, take actions to ensure that information collected in the 

Vulcan Recruit Sustainment Program database is valid.

· Regularly track whether ARNG soldiers who join in a given fiscal year 

complete their initial term of service.

· Periodically estimate, such as on an annual basis or other time period 

as appropriate, the total cost of recruiting and initial training for a 

soldier who joins the ARNG.

ARMY RESPONSE: 

Concur. ARNG will develop the functionality in personnel and/or training 

management systems to collect consistent, complete, and valid data on 

the specific reasons why Soldiers do not complete initial military training 

and when these Soldiers separate from the ARNG during the training 

process. Additionally, the ARNG will begin tracking on an annual basis 

the percentage of ARNG Soldiers from a given years enlistments that 

complete their initial term of service. Finally, the ARNG will, for each fiscal

year, refine the current estimate of the total cost of recruiting and training 

an ARNG.

RECOMMENDATION: 

To help ARNG officials in using financial incentives to fill critical positions 

as required by Army and National Guard regulation, the GAO 

recommends that the Secretary of the Army direct the Director, ARNG, to 

provide recruiters training to better enable the use of available financial 

incentives.

ARMY RESPONSE:

Concur. In addition to the current training on selling the features and 

benefits of service, the ARNG will add a training module into the basic 

recruiter course, the 79T Conversion Course and the NCOIC course 

Page 69 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Page 3
Appendix X: Accessible Data

(currently under development) on efficient and effective use of available 

financial incentives to fill critical vacancies starting FY17. The delayed 

implementation accounts for the requirement to develop training material, 

approve through Army Training and Doctrine Command, and revise the 

course to include the material.

RECOMMENDATION: 

To help determine whether ARNG officials are effectively using financial 

incentives, in conjunction with the Director, ARNG, the GAO recommends 

that the Secretary of the Army exercise its oversight responsibilities by 

evaluating and documenting the effectiveness of ARNG’s incentives 

program in meeting its goal. The evaluation should also determine 

whether incentives are being effectively awarded in military occupational 

specialties that have been under or over authorized levels, and whether 

changes are needed to effectively use existing incentives.

ARMY RESPONSE: 

Concur. As of August 2015, the ARNG has initiated a robust plan to 

evaluate and document the effectiveness of the ARNG’s incentive 

programs. The annual review will ensure incentive policy aligns with 

strategic goals and are only implemented in specific situations where 

other, less costly, methods have proven inadequate or ineffective in 

accordance with DoDD 1205.20. The ARNG’s measures of effectiveness 

are based on the DARNG’s strategic lines of effort. The evaluation plan 

includes recommending quarterly changes to incentive policy. 

Effectiveness of the quarterly analysis and evaluation cycle will be 

reviewed annually. The first annual incentives evaluation (FY16) will be 

completed December 2016 and will identify if additional changes are 

needed to meet the DARNG’s strength maintenance goals. Additionally, 

per Army Directive 2015-36 (Review and Approval Authority for Army 

Accession Incentives and Programs), to ensure oversight of accessions 

programs expending federal funds, all components must submit all 

accessions incentives and programs to the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) for review of return on investment 

and validation of management controls.

RECOMMENDATION: 

Given that the reporting of information related to the amounts of

incentives obligated has been a requirement but not carried out in recent 

years, the GAO recommend that the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Page 70 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting
Appendix X: Accessible Data

take the following action in order to ensure continued reporting in the 

future:

· Enforce its requirement for the National Guard and Reserve 

Component to submit information on the amounts of incentives 

obligated and incorporate the required information in the recruiting 

resources reports.

DoD RESPONSE: 

Concur. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), as cited in the 

report, has already collected the data from the National Guard and 

Reserve Components for the next report. Those data will be included in 

future reports. However, incentive obligation information is presented 

through DoD to congress biannually and published in the Department of 

the Army Budget Estimates: Justification Book. The Justification Book 

summarizes end strength goals through management of recruiting, 

retention and attrition. Incentive obligations are reported as actuals for the 

previous year, as estimates for the current year and as requests for the 

upcoming year. The same data and analysis submitted during staffing the 

Justification Book will be shared with the recruiting resource reports 

required by DoDI 1304.32.

Data Table for Figure 1: Length of Time Enlisted Soldiers Who Left before the End 

Page 71 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

of Their Initial Term Served in the Army National Guard (ARNG), for Those Joining 

from Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007

Length of time served in Army National Guard Percentage

0-1 years 32%

1-2 years 28%

2-3 years 17%

3-4 years 10%

4-5 years 8%

5 or more years 5%

Data Table for Figure 2: Primary Reasons Enlisted Soldiers Did Not Complete their 

Initial Term of Service for Those who Served in the Army National Guard (ARNG) 

from Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007

Reason Percentage

Left before or during training 47%

Absent without leave 18%

Other 9%

Page 4

Data Tables
Appendix X: Accessible Data

Page 72 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Reason Percentage

Medically unfit 8%

Drug separation, misconduct, other disqualifying conduct 8%

Personal reasons for the soldier 4%

Reason not reported 4%

Erroneous enlistment, fraudulent entry 1%
Related GAO Products

Military Recruiting: Clarified Reporting Requirements and Increased 

Transparency Could Strengthen Oversight over Recruiter Irregularities. 

GAO-10-254. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2010.

Military Personnel: Army Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of 

Financial Incentives and Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth. 

GAO-09-256. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2009.

Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted 

Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges. GAO-06-134. 

Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005.

Military Attrition: DOD Needs to Better Analyze Reasons for Separation 

and Improve Recruiting Systems. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-117. Washington, 

D.C.: March 12, 1998.

Military Recruiting: DOD Could Improve Its Recruiter Selection and 

Incentive Systems. GAO/NSIAD-98-58. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 

1998.

Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted 

Personnel. GAO/NSIAD-97-39. Washington, D.C.: January 6, 1997.

Page 73 GAO-16-36 Army National Guard Recruiting

Related GAO Products

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