THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Travis Hines, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002632

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal From York County

R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5877

Heard April 13, 2021 – Filed December 8, 2021

AFFIRMED

Clarence Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General Michael Jacob Neubauer, both of 

Columbia, for Respondent.

KONDUROS, J.: In this post-conviction relief (PCR) action, Travis Hines 

(Petitioner) appeals the denial of his PCR application as to his guilty plea for 

distribution of heroin, third offense. He contends he did not waive his right to 

counsel with a full understanding of his rights and the consequences of selfrepresentation. Petitioner also maintains the PCR court erroneously found the 
State "turned over all evidence as [it] received it" because the State did not allow 

Petitioner to view video evidence that allegedly depicted him involved in a 

controlled drug purchase. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A grand jury indicted Petitioner for distribution of heroin. At a December 15, 

2015 hearing, the State informed the circuit court Petitioner "was previously before 

the [c]ourt last term to enter . . . a [guilty] plea . . . . He informed the [c]ourt at that 

time that he was unhappy with [his attorney, Chris] Wellborn[,] as his counsel. So 

this hearing has been scheduled on . . . a motion to relieve counsel . . . ." Petitioner 

confirmed he wanted to relieve Wellborn and that he was "prepared to go forward 

without a lawyer." Petitioner clarified, however, that he intended to hire another 

attorney. The State indicated it planned to serve Petitioner with notice of its intent 

to seek a life without parole (LWOP) sentence immediately after the hearing, and it 

planned to call Petitioner's case for trial the following month. Petitioner stated he 

understood his case would be called for trial the following month and still wanted 

to relieve Wellborn. The circuit court relieved Wellborn as Petitioner's counsel. 

Petitioner acknowledged he originally had a court-appointed attorney before hiring 

Wellborn. The circuit court stated, "[Y]ou have been through two lawyers. The 

[c]ourt would not appoint you any more lawyers." The court then stated:

At some point if you don't have an attorney I will have to 

go through and warn you in detail about representing 

yourself because that will be . . . what you are left with. 

If you have not hired an attorney by [next month], . . . 

we'll go over and make sure [you] understand your right 

about representing yourself.

Petitioner responded, "Okay." The State served Petitioner with its intent to seek an 

LWOP sentence and stated a fifteen-year plea offer would expire "at the 

conclusion of this [c]ourt term." The State explained Petitioner was eligible for an 

LWOP sentence due to prior convictions for distribution of ecstasy within 

proximity of a school and distribution of cocaine within proximity of a park. 

A plea waiver form, signed by Petitioner on December 15, 2015, the same day as 

the hearing, informed Petitioner of his right to an attorney. It stated, "I understand 

an attorney would be of benefit to me, and since I am not an attorney, there is a 

danger in my representing myself." Petitioner initialed next to the warning. At a 

December 17, 2017 plea hearing, Petitioner appeared pro se. The State confirmed 
Petitioner was pleading guilty to distribution of heroin, third offense, "a statutory 

felony that carries with it no less than ten years [and] up to thirty years and a 

possibility of a fine up to [f]ifty thousand dollars." The State also noted 

Petitioner's charge was "a serious offense." The State indicated it was dismissing 

"an accompanying proximity charge" and Petitioner was pleading to a negotiated 

sentence of fourteen years' imprisonment. The State declared that after speaking 

with Petitioner following the December 15 hearing, it "ha[d] no doubt in 

[Petitioner's] intelligence or his understanding of the proceedings." The State 

informed the plea court Petitioner "indicated . . . he wishe[d] to proceed on his 

own." The plea court and Petitioner had the following exchange:

[The court]: [Petitioner], how old are you?

[Petitioner]: Twenty-nine.

[The court]: How far did you go in school?

[Petitioner]: I'm in college right now.

. . . .

[The court]: What do you do -- Do you have a job too?

[Petitioner]: Yes, sir.

[The court]: What do you do?

[Petitioner]: I'm an electrician's helper.

[The court]: You have a right to have an attorney 

represent you in regard to this charge[,] and 

if you cannot afford one[,] the State would 

be required to appoint an attorney to 

represent you within some limits. That is[,] 

you would be appointed an attorney to

represent you if you wish. If you could not 

afford one[,] the limitation being that you 

are assigned an attorney and that would be 

your attorney. It[']s dangerous for you to 

proceed without an attorney since you're not 
one and there is a benefit in having an 

attorney represent you. Do you understand 

that?

[Petitioner]: Yes, sir.

[The court]: Do you wish to have an attorney in regard to 

this charge or give up that right?

[Petitioner]: I give up that right.

[The court]: I find [Petitioner] has freely[,] voluntarily[,] 

knowingly[,] and intelligently[,] 

understanding the benefits of counsel and 

the danger of self[-]representation[,] 

exercise[d] his right to proceed pro s[]e.

The plea court informed Petitioner of the charge against him, its potential sentence, 

and the consequences of the charge being classified as "serious." Petitioner stated 

he understood and wished to plead guilty. Similarly, Petitioner stated he 

understood his trial-related rights and wished to waive them by pleading guilty. 

The plea court accepted Petitioner's plea and the negotiated sentence. Petitioner

pled guilty to distribution of heroin, third offense, and the plea court sentenced him 

to a negotiated sentence of fourteen years' imprisonment. 

Petitioner did not directly appeal; however, he filed an application for PCR. At his 

PCR hearing, Petitioner explained that at his first plea hearing, the court would not 

accept his plea because he stated he was not satisfied with Wellborn's 

representation. He added, "I never really wanted to fire him but when the [court] 

asked me that[,] that's what happened." Petitioner testified,

We never had a hearing after that to ask me why I didn't 

want him to be my lawyer or anything like that. The next 

time I was in court[,] all I knew is I was relieving Mr. 

Wellborn and I was going pro se. I never wanted to go 

pro se. I said I was going to get a lawyer. So obviously I 

didn't want to proceed pro se. I know nothing about the 

law.
Petitioner asserted he attempted to hire another attorney but was unable to do so 

because his trial date was approaching and the amount of time was insufficient for 

the attorney to prepare for trial. He stated he then decided to plead guilty because 

he could not prepare for trial himself and his plea offer would soon expire. 

Petitioner testified he had discussed with the State that he "didn't want to go to jail 

for a long time" and "had kids." He testified the State "scratched out the [fifteen] 

and put [fourteen] and said that's the best I can do for you." When asked what he 

understood about proceeding without an attorney, Petitioner answered, "Nothing 

really. I just knew if I didn't go ahead and take the plea they were going to give me 

[LWOP]." Petitioner alleged he was not made aware of the dangers of proceeding 

without counsel. Specifically, Petitioner stated the plea court did not make him 

aware of his right to a direct appeal and did not question him as to if he actually 

wanted to proceed pro se and why he did not have a lawyer. Petitioner asserted 

that if the PCR court granted his application, he "would definitely go to trial," 

despite his exposure to an LWOP sentence. 

Petitioner testified he did not review his discovery materials with Wellborn. He 

stated, "Really we were waiting on the video tape. That's all it was. We were 

waiting on the video tape. We couldn't take a plea." Petitioner testified he and 

Wellborn discussed waiting to view the video before deciding whether to plead 

guilty. He stated he hired Wellborn in April 2015, but the State did not allow 

Wellborn to view the video until November 2015. Petitioner stated he "learned 

[from Wellborn] that [he] was on the video but . . . there was basically no drug 

transaction." According to Petitioner, the video depicted him "doing something 

with a plastic bag." He added, "It looked like I probably was messing with drugs." 

Petitioner testified Wellborn informed him "[he] never gave anybody anything on 

the tape," but Wellborn nonetheless told him he "looked like [he] was guilty" and 

advised him to plead guilty.

Wellborn testified he told Petitioner that if the video did not depict a drug sale, that 

would be a potential defense. He stated he did not feel comfortable or believe it 

was appropriate to advise Petitioner to plead guilty without first viewing the video. 

Wellborn explained that when he began representing Petitioner in July 2015, the 

State's plea offer contemplated a ten-year sentence. However, the State increased 

the sentence to eighteen years the following month and informed Wellborn no 

information regarding the informant would be released until Petitioner rejected the 

plea offer. Wellborn testified the State did not provide "the drug report" to him 

until October 23, 2015. Similarly, the State only allowed Wellborn to view the 

video in November 2015, after he signed a protective order to conceal the identity 

of the confidential informant used in the controlled drug purchase. According to 
Wellborn, the video depicted an individual entering Petitioner's home, followed by 

the audio of a discussion between the individual and Petitioner. Wellborn stated:

I think there was a decent chance that jurors hearing the 

sound would believe that [the] discussion was related to 

drugs and transactions related to drugs[,] and [Petitioner] 

was at a table doing something that if the informant 

testified -- and we expected the informant to testify if 

[Petitioner] went to trial -- the informant would say he 

was packaging up drugs[.]

Wellborn testified Petitioner could be seen in a portion of the video "fiddling with 

a package." He further testified that because the video was of a controlled 

purchase, "it would not be an extraordinary circumstantial leap to connect the dots 

and suggest that [Petitioner] had given the informant the drugs."

Ryan Newkirk, the solicitor who prosecuted Petitioner's case, testified his office's 

policy was "generally not to release the video of a confidential informant in a drug 

case unless the defendant is then willing to not accept an offer from the State, 

especially in cases where the life of the confidential informant could be in danger." 

He stated protecting the informant in Petitioner's case "was incredib[ly] important" 

because previously Petitioner had been convicted of intimidating a witness and 

also charged with murder. Newkirk explained he sent Wellborn "still shots of the 

video" before ultimately allowing him to view the video.

In its order, the PCR court found Wellborn's testimony "credible and persuasive on 

all matters." It also found Petitioner failed to prove the State committed 

prosecutorial misconduct by refusing to disclose discovery materials.

The PCR court also found Petitioner was aware of his right to counsel. It stated:

[T]he plea [court] inquired [about Petitioner's] age and 

educational background where [Petitioner] stated he was 

twenty-nine years old, still in college, and worked as an 

electrician's helper. It is clear [Petitioner] was aware of 

the nature of the crimes and potential penalties as the

plea [court] informed him of this and he was previously 

served with the State's notice to seek [an LWOP

sentence] before negotiating a plea deal with [the State]. 

This [c]ourt finds that the plea court conducted a proper 
[Faretta1

] hearing, after which the plea court found 

[Petitioner] freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently understood the benefits of counsel and the 

dangers of self-representation and exercised his right to 

proceed pro se. 

Accordingly, the PCR court found Petitioner failed to prove "he was not properly 

advised of his right to counsel and self-representation." The PCR court denied the 

application for PCR. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this 

court granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In post-conviction proceedings, the burden of proof is on the applicant to prove 

the allegations in his application." Speaks v. State, 377 S.C. 396, 399, 660 S.E.2d 

512, 514 (2008). "Our standard of review in PCR cases depends on the specific 

issue before us." Mangal v. State, 421 S.C. 85, 91, 805 S.E.2d 568, 571 (2017). 

"We defer to a PCR court's findings of fact and will uphold them if there is any 

evidence in the record to support them." Id. However, "[w]e do not defer to a 

PCR court's rulings on questions of law." Id. "Questions of law are reviewed de 

novo, and we will reverse the PCR court's decision when it is controlled by an 

error of law." Id. (quoting Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 

(2016)). "On review of a PCR court's resolution of procedural questions arising 

under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act or the South Carolina Rules of Civil 

Procedure, we apply an abuse of discretion standard." Id. at 92, 805 S.E.2d at 571. 

"This court gives great deference to the PCR court's findings on matters of 

credibility." Putnam v. State, 417 S.C. 252, 260, 789 S.E.2d 594, 598 (Ct. App. 

2016).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner argues the PCR court erred in failing to find the State committed 

misconduct by refusing to show Petitioner the video unless he proceeded to trial. 

Petitioner asserts he was required to plead guilty before having the opportunity to 

review the video and he did not waive his right to review the video. He maintains

the PCR court erroneously found the State "turned over all evidence as [it] received 

 

1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
it" because the State did not allow Petitioner to view video evidence that allegedly 

depicted him involved in a controlled drug purchase. He avers the State forced 

him to either accept a plea offer without viewing the video or view it and face an 

LWOP sentence at trial, which he argues was improper and constituted 

prosecutorial misconduct. Petitioner contends he could not have made an informed 

decision about whether to plead guilty without viewing the video and as a result, 

his guilty plea was not freely and voluntarily given. We disagree.

"A defendant who pleads guilty usually may not later raise independent claims of 

constitutional violations." Gibson v. State, 334 S.C. 515, 523, 514 S.E.2d 320, 324 

(1999). "However, 'a defendant's decision whether or not to plead guilty is often 

heavily influenced by his appraisal of the prosecution's case.'" Id. (quoting 

Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995)). "When a defendant 

lacks knowledge of material evidence in the prosecution's possession, the waiver of 

constitutional rights cannot be deemed knowing and voluntary." Id. "Accordingly, 

[a PCR applicant] may challenge the voluntary nature of his guilty plea in a PCR 

action by asserting an alleged Brady[2] violation." Gibson, 334 S.C. at 524, 514 

S.E.2d at 324.

A Brady claim is based upon the requirement of due 

process. Such a claim is complete if the accused can 

demonstrate (1) the evidence was favorable to the 

accused, (2) it was in the possession of or known to the 

prosecution, (3) it was suppressed by the prosecution, 

and (4) it was material to guilt or punishment.

Id. (footnote omitted).

In Hyman v. State, the petitioner argued "because he was not provided the 

opportunity to view the videotape recording of the drug transaction forming the 

basis of his convictions, he did not enter his guilty plea freely, voluntarily, and 

knowingly, and as a result, his counsel was ineffective." 397 S.C. 35, 42, 723 

S.E.2d 375, 378 (2012), abrogated on other grounds by Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 

174, 181 n.2, 810 S.E.2d 836, 839 n.2 (2018). However, the supreme court 

disagreed "[t]o the extent Petitioner [was] argu[ing], pursuant to Brady . . . , that a 

criminal defendant may never enter a plea voluntarily without the State first 

disclosing all of the evidence in its possession." Id. at 45, 723 S.E.2d at 380. The 

court held no Brady violation had occurred in the case and explained:

 

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Petitioner cannot satisfy any of the factors delineated in 

Gibson to establish a Brady violation with respect to the 

videotape. Tantamount to any Brady claim is the 

withholding of evidence. Under the present facts, it is 

undisputed that the solicitor disclosed the videotape to 

defense counsel. Therefore, in order to find that this 

action amounts to impermissible suppression under 

Brady, we must first assume that the Constitution 

requires disclosure of Brady evidence to a criminal 

defendant personally. We are unwilling to make that 

sweeping assumption, and find that disclosure to defense 

counsel was satisfactory under the present circumstances. 

Further, because we deem the manner of disclosure 

appropriate, Petitioner cannot satisfy the materiality 

prong of Brady. See Porter v. State, 368 S.C. 378, 384, 

629 S.E.2d 353, 356 (2006) ("Materiality of evidence is 

determined based on the reasonable probability that the 

result of the proceeding would have been different had 

the evidence been disclosed to the defense." (emphasis 

added) . . . )[, abrogated on other grounds by Smalls, 422 

S.C. at 181 n.2, 810 S.E.2d at 839 n.2]. Finally, 

Petitioner has not proven that the videotape was 

favorable to him. By all accounts, including defense 

counsel's testimony, the videotape depicted Petitioner 

engaged in a drug transaction with a confidential 

informant. Because the evidence at issue is inculpatory, 

Brady is inapplicable.

Hyman, 397 S.C. at 45-47, 723 S.E.2d at 380-81.

Additionally, in Hyman, the supreme court disagreed with the petitioner's argument 

that "because he was not permitted to watch the videotape personally in violation 

of Rule 5 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure, counsel was 

ineffective." Id. at 47, 723 S.E.2d at 381. The court held:

Rule 5 permits inspection of evidence in the State's 

possession "which [is] material to the preparation of his 

defense or [is] intended for use by the prosecution as 

evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or 
belong to the defendant" upon request by the defendant. 

Rule 5(a)(1)(C), SCRCrP.

Compliance with Rule 5 is a fact-based inquiry. Under 

the present facts, the State not only disclosed the 

existence of the videotape, but also made the evidence 

available for inspection by defense counsel. The State 

even took the extra step of generating still photographs to 

assuage Petitioner's concerns about the contents of the 

videotape. Plea negotiations were ongoing until the day 

before jury selection, and there is no indication that the 

State would have withheld the videotape if a full trial on 

the merits followed. In fact, the identity of the informant 

had been disclosed to the defense by the time Petitioner 

pleaded guilty, removing any remaining impediment to 

Petitioner's access to the videotape in time for his trial. 

We note that, in cases involving a confidential informant, 

a criminal defendant's interest in access to certain 

evidence must be weighed against the State's interest in 

protecting the identity and safety of the informant. See 

State v. Humphries, 354 S.C. 87, 90, 579 S.E.2d 613, 

614-15 (2003) ("Although the State is generally 

privileged from revealing the name of a confidential 

informant, disclosure may be required when the 

informant's identity is relevant and helpful to the defense 

or is essential for a fair determination of the State's case 

against the accused. For instance, if the informant is an 

active participant in the criminal transaction and/or a 

material witness on the issue of guilt or innocence, 

disclosure of his identity may be required depending 

upon the facts and circumstances." (internal citations 

omitted)). Here, the State struck the appropriate balance 

by allowing defense counsel to view the videotape and 

providing Petitioner with stills during negotiations. 

Therefore, under these circumstances, the manner and 

extent of disclosure to defense counsel was satisfactory 

under Rule 5 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal 

Procedure.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that defense counsel acted 

unreasonably in failing to seek to compel disclosure of 

the videotape to defendant personally under the facts of 

this case.

Hyman, 397 S.C. at 47-48, 723 S.E.2d at 381 (alterations by court). 

The State argues the PCR court correctly denied Petitioner's claim that the State 

committed prosecutorial misconduct by making his plea contingent on Petitioner 

not viewing the video of the drug buy in order to protect the confidential informant 

because the State properly provided still photographs from the video to Petitioner 

and after Petitioner's counsel signed a protection order, allowed counsel to view the 

video and relay a summary of the video to Petitioner during plea negotiations.3

 

We affirm the PCR court's denial of relief on Petitioner's claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct because Petitioner failed to show the State violated Brady by 

 

3 Petitioner references a 2004 Memorandum from the then Chief Justice of the 

South Carolina Supreme Court, Jean Hoefer Toal, to support his argument that the 

State's practice here violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4, RPC, 

Rule 407, SCACR. See Rule 3.4, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR ("A lawyer shall not: 

(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, 

destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary 

value."). However, this memorandum was not included in the Appendix. 

Petitioner additionally cites a Utah criminal procedure rule. See Utah R. Crim. P. 

16(b) ("The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following 

the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor 

has a continuing duty to make disclosure."); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a) 

("Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 

request the following material or information of which the prosecutor has 

knowledge: . . . (4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt 

of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 

offense for reduced punishment; and (5) any other item of evidence which the 

court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant 

in order for the defendant to adequately prepare a defense."). In Petitioner's reply 

brief, he asserts he did not cite Brady in his Petitioner's brief because no attorney 

for Petitioner knows if a Brady violation has occurred due to the fact that no 

attorney for Petitioner has seen the complete video and Petitioner's argument here 

is that the State failed to comply with Rule 5, SCRCP.
prohibiting him from viewing the video. First, no evidence here supports an 

argument that the video was in any way exculpatory. See Gibson, 334 S.C. at 524, 

514 S.E.2d at 324 (providing "the evidence [must be] favorable to the accused" for 

its nondisclosure to constitute a Brady violation). Wellborn testified the video 

depicted an individual entering Petitioner's home, followed by the audio of a 

discussion between an individual and Petitioner that a jury would likely believe 

"was related to drugs and transactions related to drugs." He stated Petitioner could 

also be seen on the video "fiddling with a package." Wellborn believed the 

informant would have testified at Petitioner's trial that Petitioner was "packaging 

up drugs" in the video. Additionally, Petitioner admitted the video depicted him 

"doing something with a plastic bag," adding, "It looked like I probably was 

messing with drugs." Accordingly, the video was not favorable to Petitioner and 

did not implicate Brady. See Hyman, 397 S.C. at 47, 723 S.E.2d at 381 

("Petitioner has not proven that the videotape was favorable to him. By all 

accounts, including defense counsel's testimony, the videotape depicted Petitioner 

engaged in a drug transaction with a confidential informant. Because the evidence 

at issue is inculpatory, Brady is inapplicable.").

Moreover, the State allowed Wellborn to view the video.4

 As a result, the State did 

not refuse to disclose the evidence, another necessary element of a Brady claim. 

See Gibson, 334 S.C. at 524, 514 S.E.2d at 324 (providing evidence must be 

"suppressed by the prosecution" to support a Brady violation claim); Hyman, 397 

S.C. at 46, 723 S.E.2d at 381 ("[I]t is undisputed that the solicitor disclosed the 

videotape to defense counsel. Therefore, in order to find that this action amounts 

to impermissible suppression under Brady, we must first assume that the 

Constitution requires disclosure of Brady evidence to a criminal defendant 

 

4 Petitioner asserts Wellborn only saw the portion of the video the State deemed 

relevant. He points to Wellborn's testimony at the PCR hearing that the State told 

him it would "prepare relevant portions of the video for [him] to watch." The State 

contends Wellborn testified he viewed "the video." The PCR court's order quoted 

the State's email that it would "prepare the relevant portions of the video" and 

found Wellborn "testified he viewed the video." Petitioner did not argue to the 

PCR court that because Wellborn only saw a portion of the video, he could not 

know if the omitted portions of the video were exculpatory. A point not raised in a 

PCR application or at the PCR hearing is not proper for review on appeal. Hyman 

v. State, 278 S.C. 501, 502, 299 S.E.2d 330, 331 (1983). "In post-conviction 

proceedings, the burden of proof is on the applicant to prove the allegations in his 

application." Speaks v. State, 377 S.C. 396, 399, 660 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2008). The 

video was not admitted into evidence at the PCR court or submitted to this court.
personally. We are unwilling to make that sweeping assumption, and find that 

disclosure to defense counsel was satisfactory under the present circumstances.") 

Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

II. Waiver of Right to Counsel

Petitioner contends the PCR court erred in not finding the plea court failed to 

establish he was adequately informed of the dangers of self-representation and the 

advantages of having an attorney represent him at the time of the plea hearing 

when the record established such issues were only dealt with in a pro forma

fashion. Petitioner argues he did not waive his right to counsel with a full 

understanding of his rights and the consequences of self-representation. He asserts 

the plea court did not inquire about the circumstances under which his counsel was 

relieved or adequately warn him of the dangers of self-representation. Petitioner 

also asserts the State coerced his waiver of counsel by declaring its intent to seek 

an LWOP sentence at trial and refusing to allow him to review all the evidence 

against him. As a result, Petitioner argues he did not knowingly and voluntarily 

waive his right to counsel. We disagree.

"A defendant in a criminal case 'has the right to the assistance of counsel.'" Osbey 

v. State, 425 S.C. 615, 618, 825 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2019) (quoting State v. Justus, 392 

S.C. 416, 419, 709 S.E.2d 668, 670 (2011)). "In Faretta, the United States 

Supreme Court held that criminal defendants have a fundamental right to selfrepresentation under the Sixth Amendment." State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602, 

813 S.E.2d 487, 491 (2018). "In order to effectively invoke this right of selfrepresentation, the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert his desire to 

proceed pro se and such request must be made knowingly, intelligently[,] and 

voluntarily." Id.

Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and 

experience of a lawyer in order [to] competently and 

intelligently . . . choose self-representation, he should be 

made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that "he 

knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes 

open."

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 

269, 279 (1942)). "In a PCR action, if the record fails to demonstrate the petitioner 

made an informed choice to proceed pro se, with 'eyes open,' then the petitioner 
did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, and the case should be 

remanded for a new trial." Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407, 412, 570 S.E.2d 184, 

186 (2002).

In Iowa v. Tovar, the Supreme Court addressed "the extent to which a trial [court], 

before accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on 

the right to representation." 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004). The Court considered 

whether, as the Iowa supreme court found, a court must specifically (1) advise a 

defendant that waiving counsel risks overlooking potential defenses and (2) 

admonish the defendant that by waiving counsel he would lose an independent 

opinion about whether pleading guilty was wise. Id. It held the Sixth Amendment 

did not require either warning, reasoning "[t]he constitutional requirement is 

satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges 

against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of 

allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea." Id. at 81. The 

Court explained:

We have not . . . prescribed any formula or script to be 

read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed 

without counsel. The information a defendant must 

possess in order to make an intelligent election . . . will 

depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the 

defendant's education or sophistication, the complex or 

easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the 

proceeding.

Id. at 88.

Under South Carolina case law,

To establish a valid waiver of counsel, Faretta requires 

the accused be: (1) advised of his right to counsel; and 

(2) adequately warned of the dangers of selfrepresentation. In the absence of a specific inquiry by the 

trial [court] addressing the disadvantages of a pro se

defense as required by the second Faretta prong, this 

[c]ourt will look to the record to determine whether [the] 

petitioner had sufficient background or was apprised of 

his rights by some other source.
Prince v. State, 301 S.C. 422, 423-24, 392 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1990).

In State v. Bryant, the probation revocation court and Bryant had the following 

exchange regarding Bryant's right to counsel:

Q: Do you understand that you have a right to have a 

lawyer represent you in connection with these 

proceedings?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you wish for the court to inquire as to whether 

you would be entitled to a court appointed lawyer or 

do you wish to go forward today?

A: I want to go forward.

Q: Okay. Do you understand that an attorney may be 

of benefit to you, for example, there may be things I 

need to be told that you do not know to tell me, and 

that if you talk with a lawyer you and the lawyer 

would learn these things, do you understand that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Understanding that, do you still wish to waive your 

right to counsel and go forward?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Alright. At any[ ]time before I make a 

determination in this matter, if you desire to talk to a 

lawyer all you have to do is tell me and I'll stand 

aside and give you a chance to talk to a lawyer, do 

you understand?

A: Yes, sir.

383 S.C. 410, 416, 680 S.E.2d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 2009). This court found the above 

"colloquy adequately informed Bryant of her right to counsel and informed Bryant 
of the benefits of retaining counsel. Further, the probation court indicated Bryant 

could invoke her Sixth Amendment right at any point prior to a final ruling." Id. 

This court noted "the probation court did not expressly address the dangers and 

disadvantages of appearing pro se as required by Faretta." Id. Ultimately, 

however, this court found Bryant validly waived her right to counsel because she 

"had both a sufficient background and was apprised of her rights by some other 

source."5

 Id. at 417, 680 S.E.2d at 15. 

"The extent of inquiries made by the trial [court] . . . is not conclusive." Wroten v. 

State, 301 S.C. 293, 294, 391 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1990). "While a specific inquiry by 

the trial [court] expressly addressing the disadvantages of a pro se defense is 

preferred, the ultimate test is not the trial [court]'s advice but rather the defendant's 

understanding." Id. "If the record demonstrates the defendant's decision to 

represent himself was made with an understanding of the risks of selfrepresentation, the requirements of a voluntary waiver will be satisfied." Id.

When determining if an accused has a sufficient 

background to understand the dangers of selfrepresentation, the courts consider many factors 

including: (1) the accused's age, educational background, 

and physical and mental health; (2) whether the accused 

was previously involved in criminal trials; (3) whether 

the accused knew the nature of the charge(s) and of the 

possible penalties; (4) whether the accused was 

represented by counsel before trial and whether that 

attorney explained to him the dangers of selfrepresentation; (5) whether the accused was attempting to 

delay or manipulate the proceedings; (6) whether the 

court appointed stand-by counsel; (7) whether the 

accused knew he would be required to comply with the 

rules of procedure at trial; (8) whether the accused knew 

of legal challenges he could raise in defense to the 

charge(s) against him; (9) whether the exchange between 

the accused and the court consisted merely of pro forma

 

5 The court based that finding on "Bryant's previous experience in the criminal 

justice system, her previous representation by counsel, [a] signed Probation Notice

[informing her she could have an attorney represent her and that there are dangers 

and disadvantages to self-representation], and the probation court's colloquy with 

her." Bryant, 383 S.C. at 417, 680 S.E.2d at 14-15.
answers to pro forma questions; and (10) whether the 

accused's waiver resulted from either coercion or 

mistreatment.

Gardner, 351 S.C. at 412-13, 570 S.E.2d at 186-87.

In Wroten, the supreme court found "the [plea court] made no specific inquiry to 

determine whether [the] petitioner made his choice to proceed pro se 'with eyes 

open.'" 301 S.C. at 294, 391 S.E.2d at 576. The court noted the petitioner "was 

forty-five years old at the time of his plea and had a fifth-grade education." Id. at 

295, 391 S.E.2d at 576. The petitioner contacted a public defender after his bond 

hearing but never heard back from the attorney, and on the day of his plea, "the 

attorney did not have time to speak with him." Id. at 295, 391 S.E.2d at 576-77. 

When asked whether he wanted an attorney, the petitioner replied that he did not 

know what to do, and his prior experience with the court consisted of one other 

guilty plea. See id. at 295, 391 S.E.2d at 577. The supreme court found "the 

record . . . d[id] not demonstrate [the] petitioner was sufficiently aware of the 

dangers of self-representation to make an informed decision to proceed without 

counsel." Id. It reversed the PCR court's denial of relief and remanded for a new 

trial. Id.

In Prince, the supreme court similarly reversed the PCR court's denial of relief, 

finding "the record d[id] not demonstrate petitioner was sufficiently aware of the 

dangers of self-representation to make an informed decision to proceed pro se." 

301 S.C. at 424, 392 S.E.2d at 463. The court noted Prince "was twenty-two years 

old at the time of his plea," "was a high-school graduate [with] some college 

education," "had previously pleaded guilty to armed robbery," "was mentally 

disturbed at the time of his plea," and "exhibited little understanding of criminal 

proceedings" at his PCR hearing. Id.

In Gardner, the supreme court found "the plea [court] did not give [the p]etitioner 

any warning about the dangers of proceeding pro se. [It] did not inform him of the 

nature of the charges or of the possible penalties." 351 S.C. at 413, 570 S.E.2d at 

187. The court noted the petitioner had "a [twelfth-]grade education, and he had 

been represented by counsel on a previous charge to which he pled guilty. He also 

had a private attorney when he was first charged. However, the record [gave] no 

indication this attorney explained to him the dangers of self-representation." Id. 

The court further observed the plea court "did not advise [the p]etitioner of the 

crucial elements of the charged offenses, or of the possible penalties if the 

recommended sentence was not accepted by the [court]. In addition, the [court] 
did not ask questions to ensure [the p]etitioner's understanding of the consequences 

of his plea." Id. at 414, 570 S.E.2d at 187. The supreme court determined the 

petitioner did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, and it 

reversed the denial of PCR and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 410, 413-14, 570

S.E.2d at 185, 187.

Here, Petitioner's waiver of counsel was voluntary and not coerced by the State, as 

Petitioner argues. See Samuel, 422 S.C. at 602, 813 S.E.2d at 491 ("In order to 

effectively invoke this right of self-representation, the defendant must clearly and 

unequivocally assert his desire to proceed pro se and such request must be made 

knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily." (emphasis added)). Petitioner was 

represented at his first plea hearing, at which he informed the plea court he was 

dissatisfied with Wellborn. Several days later, Petitioner reappeared in court and 

although intending to hire another attorney, affirmed he was "prepared to go 

forward without a lawyer." Soon thereafter, Petitioner "g[a]ve up [his] right" to an 

attorney, pled guilty, and received a fourteen-year sentence. At his PCR hearing, 

Petitioner claimed he decided to plead guilty because his plea offer would soon 

expire and after being unable to hire another attorney, he could not prepare for trial 

himself. However, Petitioner voluntarily chose both to remove Wellborn as his 

counsel and to take advantage of the State's plea offer, which reduced his sentence 

exposure from LWOP to fourteen years' imprisonment. Consequently, the State's 

decision to seek an LWOP sentence at trial and its handling of Petitioner's 

discovery materials did not coerce him into waiving his right to counsel or 

pleading guilty.

Next, Petitioner's waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made. See

Samuel, 422 S.C. at 602, 813 S.E.2d at 491 (noting a defendant's request to 

proceed pro se must also be made knowingly and intelligently). In Gardner, a 

PCR action that followed a guilty plea, our supreme court stated, "According to the 

United States Supreme Court, in order to waive the right to counsel, the accused 

must be (1) advised of his right to counsel and (2) adequately warned of the 

dangers of self-representation." 351 S.C. at 411, 570 S.E.2d at 186. The supreme 

court recently reaffirmed this requirement in another PCR case following a guilty 

plea. See Osbey, 425 S.C. at 619, 825 S.E.2d at 50 ("For a knowing and intelligent 

waiver to occur, the defendant must be '(1) advised of his right to counsel; and (2) 

adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation.'" (quoting Prince, 301 

S.C. at 423-24, 392 S.E.2d at 463)).

In Tovar, which followed a guilty plea and was decided in 2004—after Gardner

but before Osbey—the Court held two specific warnings required by the Iowa 
Supreme Court were not "mandated by the Sixth Amendment," adding that "[t]he 

constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of 

the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his 

plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a 

guilty plea." 541 U.S. at 81. This information is more limited than Faretta's 

requirements of warning against proceeding pro se and that a defendant "be made 

aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." 422 U.S. at 835. 

However, the circumstances in this case demonstrate either standard was met.

Under Tovar, which limited the duty of a plea court when warning a defendant of 

the dangers of self-representation in a collateral attack of the guilty plea, 

Petitioner's waiver was valid. 541 U.S. at 81. Here, the plea court informed 

Petitioner of the charge against him, its potential sentence, and the consequences of 

the charge being classified as "serious." It also informed Petitioner he had the right 

"to have an attorney represent [him]." See id. ("The constitutional requirement is 

satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges 

against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of 

allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea."). The plea court 

further warned Petitioner, "It[']s dangerous for you to proceed without an attorney 

since you're not one and there is a benefit in having an attorney represent you."6

 

We find, under the circumstances of this case, the plea court's warning was 

sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, and Petitioner "made an informed 

choice to proceed pro se . . . with 'eyes open.'" Gardner, 351 S.C. at 412, 570 

S.E.2d at 186.

Moreover, Petitioner's background also weighs in favor of his understanding the 

dangers of self-representation. See Prince, 301 S.C. at 424, 392 S.E.2d at 463 ("In 

the absence of [sufficient warnings of the dangers of self-representation] . . . , this 

[c]ourt will look to the record to determine whether [the] petitioner had sufficient 

background or was apprised of his rights by some other source."). Here, Petitioner 

was twenty-nine years old, in college, and nothing indicates he suffered from any 

physical or mental health issues. See Gardner, 351 S.C. at 412, 570 S.E.2d at 186

(providing that some of the factors courts consider are "the accused's age,

educational background, and physical and mental health"). He was previously 

charged with murder and convicted of distribution of ecstasy within proximity of a 

school, distribution of cocaine within proximity of a park, and intimidating a 

 

6 Petitioner also signed a plea waiver form that warned, "I understand an attorney 

would be of benefit to me, and since I am not an attorney, there is a danger in my 

representing myself."
witness. See id. (stating courts also consider "whether the accused was previously 

involved in criminal trials"). Petitioner was aware of the nature of his charges and 

the possible penalty, and Wellborn represented him until two days prior to his

guilty plea. See id. at 412-13, 570 S.E.2d at 186-87 (noting courts can look at 

"whether the accused knew the nature of the charge(s) and of the possible 

penalties" and "whether the accused was represented by counsel before trial"). 

Petitioner testified at his PCR hearing he decided to plead guilty before the State's 

plea offer expired; thus, he was not "attempting to delay or manipulate the 

proceedings." Id. at 413, 570 S.E.2d at 187. Wellborn also testified at the PCR 

hearing he told Petitioner if the State's video evidence did not depict a drug sale, it

would be a potential defense. See id. (providing courts also examine "whether the 

accused knew of legal challenges he could raise in defense to the charge(s) against 

him"). 

Additionally, Petitioner's colloquy prior to his waiver of counsel did not entirely 

consist of pro forma questions; instead, the plea court inquired about Petitioner's 

age, education, and employment and explained "the State would be required to 

appoint an attorney to represent" him if he could not afford one. See id. (finding

courts consider "whether the exchange between the accused and the court consisted 

merely of pro forma answers to pro forma questions"); State v. Cash, 309 S.C. 40, 

46, 419 S.E.2d 811, 814-15 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating "the exchange between the 

[court] and Cash did not consist merely of pro forma answers to pro forma

questions" because the court "explained that a lawyer would be appointed for Cash 

if he could not afford one"; "inquired about Cash's age and educational 

background, about the teachers he had in prison, and about the amount of time he 

had spent in prison"; "stressed that Cash could be sentenced to thirty years" for the 

indicted offense; and asked Cash why he did not want an attorney to represent 

him). 

Finally, as stated above, Petitioner's plea was not coerced. See Cash, 309 S.C. at 

43, 419 S.E.2d at 813 (noting courts consider "whether the accused's waiver 

resulted from either coercion or mistreatment"). Although the appendix contains 

no evidence of a warning to Petitioner that "he would be required to comply with 

the rules of procedure at trial" or that Wellborn "explained to him the dangers of 

self-representation," and the plea court did not appoint stand-by counsel, the 

majority of the above factors weigh toward a finding that Petitioner's background 

was sufficient for him to be aware of the dangers of self-representation. See 

Gardner, 351 S.C. at 413, 570 S.E.2d at 187. Compare Osbey, 425 S.C. at 620-21, 

825 S.E.2d at 51 (finding two prior convictions and prior violations of probation 

and parole were "an insufficient basis on which to find Osbey actually understood 
the dangers of self-representation"), with Bryant, 383 S.C. at 417, 680 S.E.2d at 15 

("Based on Bryant's previous experience in the criminal justice system, her 

previous representation by counsel, the signed Probation Notice, and the probation 

court's colloquy with her, we believe Bryant had both a sufficient background and 

was apprised of her rights by some other source."), and Cash, 309 S.C. at 43-46, 

419 S.E.2d at 813-15 (finding Cash's background was sufficient because he was 

forty-six years old; spent thirty-four years in prison; completed the equivalent of 

six years in college; was not mentally or physically impaired; had previous 

experience with criminal proceedings, including a prior pro se appearance at a 

habeas corpus hearing; understood the nature of the charge and the possible 

penalty; had not been previously represented by counsel in the case but appreciated 

the difficulty of his case; was not attempting to delay or manipulate the 

proceedings; had stand-by counsel; knew he had to comply with procedural rules; 

was aware of potential defenses; did not engage in a merely pro forma colloquy 

with the court; and did not waive counsel due to coercion or mistreatment), and 

State v. McLauren, 349 S.C. 488, 495-96, 563 S.E.2d 346, 349-50 (Ct. App. 2002) 

(finding McLauren's background was sufficient when he was a mature man with 

both formal and informal education; the record contained no evidence of any 

physical or mental impairment; he had participated in his own previous criminal 

proceedings and was involved in the criminal proceedings of other individuals at 

the correctional facility where he was held; he knew the nature of the charge he 

faced; although he was not represented by an attorney before trial and appeared pro 

se at his arraignment, the court assigned an attorney to assist him during the trial if 

he needed, who sat at the defense table with him; nothing indicated he was 

attempting to delay or manipulate the proceedings as he made a motion for a 

speedy trial and trial began a few months after his arraignment; he knew to comply 

with procedural rules and had at least some familiarity with the rules—he made 

motions, called several witnesses, and objected to questions; he knew of legal 

challenges he could raise in defense to the charges against him—he argued a novel 

theory of law; and no evidence indicated his waiver resulted from coercion or 

mistreatment—he expressly stated he wanted to represent himself and would waive 

his right to an attorney).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm as to this issue.

CONCLUSION

The PCR court's denial of Petitioner's application for PCR is

AFFIRMED.
GEATHERS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.