NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

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No. 21-1770

JIDEOFOR MICHAEL ONUEKWUSI

v.

DARNELL GRAHAM; *CHRISTOPHER BROWN; *MARIA MITTI; *JOSEPH 

COZENTINO; *DET. MIGUEL ARROYO; *CITY OF NEWARK

 DARNELL GRAHAM,

 Appellant

*(Dismissed pursuant to the Court Order dated 11/9/21)

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey 

(District Court No. 2:20-cv-02965)

District Judge: Honorable John M. Vazquez

__________

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on March 28, 2022

__________

Before: RESTREPO, ROTH, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 28, 2022) 

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OPINION*

1

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1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

Only the facts relevant to the narrow issue presented here will be set forth because

this opinion is not precedential, and the parties are well aware of the somewhat

complicated background. Defendant-Appellant Darnell Graham (Graham) seeks this 

Court’s review of the District Court’s order denying him qualified immunity under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and denying, in part, to dismiss Plaintiff-Appellee Jideofor Michael

Onuekwusi’s (Onuekwusi) complaint.

In 2018, Graham, a detective with the Newark Police Department, and his codefendants sought to apprehend an assailant who committed at least three robberies of

victims encountered through Offerup and Craigslist. Onuekwusi’s complaint alleges that

Graham used a 15-year-old picture of Onuekwusi in a photo lineup, falsely told witnesses

that Onuekwusi was connected to the number used to contact them, and did not disclose to

witnesses or the court that Onuekwusi spoke with a distinct Nigerian accent.

The grand jury indicted Onuekwusi on three counts of first-degree robbery, two 

counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, and three counts of seconddegree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose. Onuekwusi was subsequently 

arrested, placed on an immigration hold, and spent 11 months in jail. In 2020, Onuekwusi 

filed a complaint alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments stemming 

from defendants’ fabrication of evidence and false statements to a grand jury. Graham and 

his co-defendants moved to dismiss Onuekwusi’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In relevant part, the District Court determined that Graham was

not subject to qualified immunity. We affirm.
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I.

At issue is whether we possess jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order

denying Graham qualified immunity where issues of fact exist. Although Graham’s appeal 

is an interlocutory one, this Court has jurisdiction. It is well-established that, even though

28 U.S.C. § 1291 only provides jurisdiction over final orders, this Court has jurisdiction

under the collateral order doctrine over a petitioner’s § 1983 claim of qualified immunity,

but only to the extent that it “turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,

530, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 (1985); see also Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia et al., 

772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014) (same).

Under the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order is immediately appealable 

as a “final decision” within the meaning of § 1291 if it “[1] conclusively determine[s] the 

disputed question, [2] resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of 

the action, and [3] [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Johnson 

v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2152 (1995) (first, third, and fifth alterations 

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer 

Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S. Ct. 684, 688 (1993)). A district 

court’s order denying qualified immunity may be an appealable final decision under the 

collateral order doctrine if the order turns on an issue of law, not fact. L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of 

Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[A] district court’s denial of a claim 

of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final 

decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final 

judgment.”).
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To the extent that this Court has jurisdiction over Graham’s claims, we exercise de 

novo review over an appeal from a motion to dismiss. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 

F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). In considering a motion to dismiss, we “accept all factual 

allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 

determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be 

entitled to relief.” Id. at 233 (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 

(3d Cir. 2002)).

II.

We turn to the merits of Graham’s qualified immunity defense. We must determine 

whether the District Court properly denied Graham qualified immunity. Under § 1983, 

government officials are shielded from civil damages liability unless the official violated a 

complainant’s statutory or constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time of 

the conduct at issue. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012).

A court reviewing a qualified immunity claim must engage in a two-step analysis: “(1) 

whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) 

whether the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the official’s conduct.” L.R., 836 

F.3d at 241 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816 (2009)).

To satisfy the first step, we must decide whether the record was sufficient to 

establish a constitutional violation based on the set of facts before the district court. Graham 

argues that Onuekwusi failed to establish a constitutional violation of a clearly established 

right. Onuekwusi, on the other hand, points to his complaint which claims violations of his 
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Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. To determine whether Onuekwusi properly raised a 

Fourth Amendment violation, the District Court evaluated whether Graham had probable 

cause to arrest Onuekwusi. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Onuekwusi, the 

District Court noted that Onuekwusi alleged Graham falsely linked him to a cell phone 

number that was not his;

2 Graham used a significantly outdated photograph (15-years-old)

of Onuekwusi in a photo lineup; Onuekwusi did not have accounts on Craigslist or Offerup 

and Graham knew that; and Graham pursued Onuekwusi’s arrest despite the fact that the 

assailant was not described as having an accent whereas Onuekwusi spoke with a 

significant Nigerian accent. Based on these facts, the District Court determined that 

Graham did not have probable cause to arrest Onuekwusi and therefore violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights. 

The District Court used the same set of aforementioned facts to determine 

Onuekwusi’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, which alleges a Brady/Fabricated Evidence 

2 There is some dispute regarding the factual question of whether one of the perpetrator’s 

phone numbers was connected to Onuekwusi through a relative (Onuekwusi claims that he 

has no connection to the phone numbers though he may have mistakenly testified that one 

of the phone numbers used by the assailants was connected to a family member of 

Onuekwusi). The District Court must weigh the facts in the light most favorable to 

Onuekwusi as the non-moving party. Judge Vazquez considered Onuekwusi’s alleged facts 

as true, namely that he was not actually connected to the numbers, and that Graham 

knowingly falsified this information. 

Even if the question of Onuekwusi’s connection to the assailant’s phone numbers is a 

genuine issue of material fact, the District Court properly considered several other factors 

in denying Graham’s § 1983 protection claim, and we have jurisdiction to review that 

determination. 
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Claim under the Due Process Clause. Graham claimed that using an old photo was not 

fabricated evidence. However, as the District Court pointed out, the photograph shown to 

the robbery victims depicted Onuekwusi as 15 years younger and 70 pounds lighter than 

he was at the time of the robberies. Onuekwusi claimed that Graham framed him by 

inducing false witness identification using misleading and suggestive photo lineups. 

Graham also falsely testified to the grand jury regarding Onuekwusi’s alleged accounts on 

Offerup and Craigslist. 

The District Court found that Onuekwusi adequately pled facts giving rise to a 

reasonable inference that there was a reasonable likelihood that, absent Graham’s 

fabricated evidence, Onuekwusi would not have been criminally charged in violation of 

his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We agree. 

We now turn to whether Onuekwusi’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

were clearly established. The District Court found that “no reasonable police officer with 

the knowledge of the foregoing allegations would have believed that there was probable 

cause to arrest and prosecute Plaintiff.” App. 23. We agree. In his brief, Graham cites 

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) which provides 

officials with qualified immunity unless, inter alia, every “reasonable official” would have 

known that his actions were violative of the Constitution. Here, we agree with the District 

Court: any reasonable officer would have known that Graham’s alleged actions—

fabricating evidence and making false statements to a grand jury with the intent of arresting 

an individual—would be in violation of an individual’s constitutional protections. We 
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conclude, therefore, that Graham is not entitled to qualified immunity and the District Court 

did not err in denying his motion to dismiss. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying 

Graham’s motion to dismiss.