J-S65005-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

EDWARD SHEED,

Appellant No. 440 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 10, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004550-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2015

Appellant, Edward Sheed, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 

an aggregate term of 30 to 62 years’ incarceration, imposed after a jury 

convicted him of attempted murder, aggravated assault, possession of a 

firearm by a person prohibited, carrying a firearm without a license, and 

possessing an instrument of crime (PIC). We affirm.

The trial court summarized the evidence presented at Appellant’s trial, 

as follows:

Complainant[,] Marvin Brown, testified that on June 10, 

2011, at approximately 1:15 in the afternoon, he was playing 

dice on the 1400 block of Allison Street, when [Appellant] 

approached him and, pointing a gun at his head, reached into 

[Brown’s] pants pocket and took [Brown’s] cell phone. When 

[Appellant] left, [] Brown followed[,] asking [Appellant] to return 

his phone. After following [Appellant] a short distance, [] 

Brown, thinking better of his actions, stopped his pursuit, 

whereupon, [Appellant] pointed his gun at [] Brown and shot 

him multiple times, first in the stomach and then the back, 
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severing [Brown’s] spinal cord, leaving him paralyzed from the 

neck down. 

[] Brown testified that he had “hung out” with [Appellant] 

prior to the day of the shooting and had known him only by his 

nickname, “Doobie.” He also testified that he [had] learned 

[Appellant’s] name earlier [on the] day [of the shooting,] when 

he witnessed [Appellant] being stopped and questioned by 

police.2

__________________

2

Philadelphia Police Officer Chris Kopecki testified that on 

June 10, 2011, he was assigned to the Philadelphia Police 

Department’s 12th District Narcotics Division. At 

approximately 10:50 a.m., he was in plainclothes and an 

unmarked vehicle with his partner, when he stopped 

[Appellant], in the vicinity of 1400 South Allison Street, 

and verified his identity.

__________________

At trial, [] Brown unequivocally identified [Appellant] as 

[the] person who took his phone and shot him. [Brown] also 

testified that after waking up in the hospital he told his father 

that [Appellant] was the shooter. In addition, [Brown] testified 

that on June 21, 2011, eleven days after the shooting, he gave a 

statement to the investigating detective in which he identified 

[Appellant] as the shooter from a photo array shown to him. 

Philadelphia Police Detective Matthew Farley testified that 

on June 10, 2011, he was assigned to the Southwest Detectives 

Division of the Philadelphia Police Department located at 55th

and Pine Streets in the City of Philadelphia, when at 

approximately 1:15 p.m. he was assigned as the lead 

investigator to investigate the shooting of [] Brown. He further 

testified that within two hours of the shooting he had developed 

[Appellant] as a suspect by tracing back the 9-1-1 calls reporting 

the incident and talking to the callers himself.

Using this information, he prepared a photo array of eight 

pictures, including [Appellant’s], on a single sheet[,] as well as 

individual pictures of each of the individuals included in the

photo array. Detective Farley testified that he first interviewed 

[] Brown on June 21, 2011, at which time he took [Brown’s] 

statement and displayed a photo array containing [Appellant’s] 
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picture. [Detective Farley] further testified that, upon being 

shown the phot array, [] Brown immediately and without 

hesitation identified [Appellant] as the shooter.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 10/1/14, at 4-5 (citations to the record omitted).

Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Appellant of the abovestated offenses on July 10, 2013. On September 10, 2013, Appellant was 

sentenced to a term of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration for his attempted 

murder conviction, 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment for his offense of possession 

of a firearm by a person prohibited, 3 to 7 years’ imprisonment for carrying 

a firearm without a license, and 2 to 5 years’ incarceration for his PIC 

conviction. The court imposed each sentence to run consecutively, totaling 

an aggregate term of 30 to 62 years’ incarceration. Appellant filed a timely 

post-sentence motion, which was denied on February 7, 2014. Appellant 

filed a timely notice of appeal, and also timely complied with the trial court’s 

order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal. Herein, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

A. The guilty verdicts in this matter were against the weight of 

the evidence because:

[a]. the complaining witnesses [sic] trial testimony was 

grossly inconsistent with his prior testimony and 

statements; and, 

[b]. the 911 calls played at trial provided a description of 

the shooter that did not match [Appellant].

B. The trial court erred by allowing a detective to testify to 

impermissible hearsay regarding what the complainant said and 

why he ever said it.
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C. The trial court erred by instructing the jury that it’s [sic] 

assessment of the performance of the Philadelphia Police 

Department’s work in this matter was irrelevant.

D. The trial court erred by denying the jury’s request to review 

medical records which were previously admitted into evidence by 

way of stipulation.

E. The trial court erred by denying the jury’s request to review 

the notes of testimony from the preliminary hearing.

F. The trial court’s sentence of 2[] to 5 years[’] incarceration for 

the PIC conviction was an abuse of discretion and manifestly 

unreasonable as the trial court sentenced [Appellant] outside the 

guideline range without articulating sufficient reasons on the 

record[.]

G. The trial court’s aggregate sentence of 30 to 62 years[’] 

incarceration which included a determination that each individual 

sentence is to be served consecutively was an abuse of 

discretion and manifestly unreasonable because:

a. The trial court did not give adequate weight to 

[Appellant’s] current family support and past detrimental 

upbringing, and 

b. The trial court impermissibly double counted both the 

seriousness of the injury suffered by the complainant and 

[Appellant’s] prior criminal history.

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the jury’s verdict was against 

the weight of the evidence. 

A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 

Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial 

court's discretion; it does not answer for itself whether the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled 

that the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial 

based on a weight of the evidence claim is only warranted where 

the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks 

one's sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has 
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been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge's 

discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted 

where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable 

abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135-1136 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant contends that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight 

of the evidence because Brown made contradictory statements that called 

into question his credibility. Appellant specifically avers:

Brown testified at trial that he knew [Appellant] well before the 

shooting. In fact, he told his father that day in the hospital that 

“Edward Sheed” had shot him. Yet, Brown painted a much 

different picture when he testified at his preliminary hearing. At 

the preliminary hearing he told the judge that he did not know 

[Appellant’s] real name. Further, the stipulated medical records 

indicated that Brown had no independent medical recollection of 

the events pertaining to the shooting. This boldfaced 

contradiction – knowing [Appellant’s] name and the events 

[versus] not knowing his name or the events of the shooting –

are so juxtaposed that they clearly indicate a lack of truth. 

Thus, no verdict of guilt should have been based upon it.

Appellant’s Brief at 12.1

In rejecting Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence, the 

trial court emphasized that,“the question of a witness’s credibility is reserved 

exclusively for the jury.” TCO at 11 (citing Commonwealth v. Alicia, 92 

____________________________________________

1

In Appellant’s statement of the issues, he also challenges the weight of the 

evidence on the basis that “the 911 calls played at trial provided a 

description of the shooter that did not match [Appellant].” Appellant’s Brief 

at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). However, Appellant abandons this 

claim in the argument portion of his brief. Accordingly, we will not address it 

herein.
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A.3d 753, 761 (Pa. 2014) (“[T]he veracity of a particular witness is a 

question which must be answered in reliance on the ordinary experiences of 

life, common knowledge of the natural tendencies of human nature, and 

observations of the character and demeanor of the witness. As the 

phenomenon of lying is within the ordinary capacity of jurors to assess, the 

question of a witness’s credibility is reserved exclusively for the jury.”) 

(citation omitted)). The court also stressed that at trial, Brown identified 

Appellant as the person who shot him, and stated “that prior to the shooting 

he had known [Appellant] from the neighborhood by [Appellant’s] nickname, 

‘Doobie.’” TCO at 10. Brown also testified that he learned Appellant’s ‘real’ 

name shortly before the shooting, and that while in the hospital, he had told 

his father that Appellant had shot him. Id. at 10-11. The jury was also 

informed at trial that Brown had identified Appellant from a photo array 

“immediately and without hesitation....” Id. at 11. 

In regard to Brown’s purportedly inconsistent statements to medical 

personnel that he did not know who shot him, the trial court pointed out that 

Brown testified at trial that he did not tell medical staff that Appellant had 

shot him “[b]ecause it was not any of their concern.” Id. (citing N.T. Trial, 

7/9/13, at 34). Additionally, the record confirms that defense counsel crossexamined Brown with his preliminary hearing testimony in which he stated 

that he did not know Appellant’s ‘real’ name. N.T. Trial, 7/9/13, at 40-45. 

Therefore, the jury was aware of the inconsistency between Brown’s trial 

testimony and his preliminary hearing testimony. We agree with the trial 
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court that it was within the province of the jury to weigh these discrepancies 

and determine which, if any, portions of Brown’s testimony to believe. In 

light of the role of the jury in this regard, the trial court did not consider the 

verdict as shocking to “one’s sense of justice....” TCO at 12. Appellant’s 

argument on appeal has not convinced us that the trial court abused its 

discretion in reaching this decision. Accordingly, his challenge to the weight 

of the evidence is meritless.

In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the trial court erred by 

admitting hearsay testimony. We begin by noting that, “[q]uestions 

regarding the admissibility of evidence rest within the trial judge’s discretion, 

and an appellate court will reverse the judge’s decision only for an abuse of 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1179 (Pa. 

2009) (citations omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the 

exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, 

prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” 

Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 570 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Initially, Appellant’s vague argument inhibits our meaningful review of 

his claim. Specifically, Appellant does not identify what testimony was 

improperly admitted, or even name the witness that proffered the ostensibly 

inadmissible hearsay testimony. Instead, Appellant ambiguously refers only 

to “the statement” by Brown, testified to by “the Detective.” See 

Appellant’s Brief at 13 (emphasis added). At no point does Appellant quote 
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Brown’s statement, directly name the witness who testified to it, or cite to 

where in the record that testimony occurred. Thus, Appellant has waived 

this claim by not sufficiently developing it for our meaningful review. See 

In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“When briefing the various 

issues that have been preserved, it is an appellant's duty to present 

arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must 

support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record 

and with citations to legal authorities. ... [W]hen defects in a brief impede 

our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the 

appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.”).2

In any event, we would conclude that Appellant’s claim is meritless, 

even had he properly developed it for our review. Our examination of the 

trial court’s opinion and the Commonwealth’s brief indicates that Appellant is 

referring to testimony by Detective Farley, wherein the detective described 

comments Brown made when he was interviewed at the hospital by the 

prosecutor and Detective Farley. See TCO at 13; Commonwealth’s Brief at 

____________________________________________

2 We note that the trial court also found this issue waived based on the 

vague manner in which Appellant asserted it in his Rule 1925(b) statement. 

TCO at 12. The court emphasized that in his Rule 1925(b) statement, 

Appellant “not only failed to identify [to] which detective he is referring..., 

[but] he has also failed to specify to which testimony he is referring.” Id. at 

12. We agree with the trial court that Appellant waived his claim on this 

basis, as well. See Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. 

Super. 2001) (finding issue waived where the appellant’s concise statement 

“was too vague for the trial court to identify and address the issue to be 

raised on appeal.”).
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16. Specifically, the detective testified that during the interview, Brown 

asked the prosecutor “to keep [her] voice down” and said that “[h]e didn’t 

want anybody outside to hear what [they] were talking about.” N.T. trial, 

7/9/13, at 89. The trial court concluded that this testimony “was admissible 

as it clearly falls outside the hearsay exclusionary rule as a ‘verbal act.’” 

TCO at 13. For its part, the Commonwealth argues that Brown’s statements 

were not hearsay because they were “not offered for the truth of the matter 

asserted.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 14. Alternatively, both the trial court 

and the Commonwealth maintain that even if Brown’s statement was 

hearsay, the improper admission thereof was harmless error. For the 

following reasons, we agree with the court’s and the Commonwealth’s 

harmless error assessment; accordingly, we need not decide whether 

Brown’s two statements constituted hearsay. 

At trial, Appellant attempted to impeach Brown’s identification of him 

as the shooter by emphasizing that Brown had told medical personnel that 

he did not know who shot him. In response, the Commonwealth offered 

evidence demonstrating that Brown lied to medical personnel about not 

knowing the shooter’s identity because Brown did not believe the medical 

staff needed to know that information. For instance, Brown testified that he 

did not tell the medical staff what happened “[b]ecause it was not any of 

their concern.” N.T. Trial, 7/9/13, at 34. Brown also testified that when the 

prosecutor and Detective Farley came to interview him, he asked the nurses 

and doctors to “step out.” Id. at 35. Thus, through Brown’s own testimony, 
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the jury was informed that Brown did not want the medical staff to know the 

details of the shooting. Consequently, Brown’s hearsay statements asking 

the prosecutor to keep her voice down, and his comment that he did not 

want anyone outside the hospital room to hear his interview with the 

prosecutor and Detective Farley, were merely cumulative evidence 

demonstrating Brown’s desire to keep the details of the shooting private 

from the medical staff. Accordingly, even if the trial court improperly 

allowed Detective Farley to testify regarding Brown’s hearsay statements, 

we would conclude that that error was harmless. 

Next, Appellant challenges the trial court’s jury instruction. In 

Commonwealth v. Ragan, 743 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1999), our Supreme Court 

explained that, “[a] trial court has wide discretion in phrasing jury 

instructions.” Id. at 397.

When reviewing an allegation of an incorrect jury instruction, the 

appellate court must view the entire charge to determine 

whether the trial court clearly and accurately presented the 

concepts of the legal issue to the jury and should not reverse, as 

a result of the instruction, unless the trial court committed an 

abuse of its discretion. We will not examine a phrase or 

sentence of an instruction in a vacuum. Rather, when we 

evaluate a challenge to a charge, we must consider how each 

part fits together to convey a complete legal principle. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

Initially, we note that Appellant fails to cite to the portion of the record 

containing the at-issue jury charge. See Appellant’s Brief at 14. However, 

he does quote the challenged instruction, wherein the court instructed the 
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jury that, “a trial is not an evaluation of the Police Department.” Id. 

Appellant contends that this remark by the court 

was clearly prejudicial and likely influenced the jury to disregard 

any mistakes made by the police during the investigation of this 

case. If the statement had not been made, then the jury would 

have likely held the police to a much higher standard. The 

message to the jury was essentially telling them to give the 

police a free pass and not to factor into their verdict any 

mistakes that could have given way to reasonable doubt and a 

verdict of not guilty.

Id. 

Notably, Appellant does not discuss what purported ‘mistakes’ the 

police department made in this case that the jury disregarded because of the 

court’s contested instruction. That omission aside, Appellant’s challenge to 

the court’s instruction fails, as he essentially asks us to evaluate the court’s 

single comment in a vacuum, contrary to our Supreme Court’s mandate in 

Ragan. Namely, Appellant disregards the court’s instruction before and 

after the at-issue remark, which entailed the following:

[The Court:] [A trial] is not a competition between lawyers. It 

doesn’t matter which lawyer did the better job. That’s not the 

issue before you. ...

Likewise, a trial is not an evaluation of the Police 

Department. At the end of the trial when you go back to 

deliberate, if you conclude that the Police Department did an A 

plus job, could not have done a better job, as good as anything 

you’ve ever seen on TV, as good as anything any fiction writer 

ever imagined, but the Commonwealth has not proven the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, your verdict has to 

be not guilty. 

***
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Likewise, if at the end of your deliberations you’re thinking 

to yourself, geez, the Police Department could have done a lot 

better in this case, I wouldn’t even give them a passing grade, 

but you’re convinced by all the evidence, the testimony of the 

witnesses or whatever other evidence was introduced at trial, 

you’re convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

is guilty, then your verdict must be guilty, because that’s what a 

trial is about. A trial is about not the lawyers, not the police, not 

the opinions of the lawyers, not the opinions of the Judge. A 

trial is about whether the Commonwealth has proven the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

N.T. Trial, 7/10/13, at 9-10 (emphasis added).

Examining this instruction as a whole, rather than focusing solely on 

the emphasized comment (as does Appellant), we ascertain no abuse of 

discretion by the court. The court explained that the jury’s verdict should 

not be premised on any evaluation of how well, or poorly, the police had 

conducted their investigation. The court directed that, instead, the jury 

must focus on whether the Commonwealth’s evidence proved Appellant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s scant challenge to the court’s 

instruction (reproduced in its entirety, above) does not convince us that the 

court’s comments were legally incorrect and/or an abuse of the court’s 

discretion. Consequently, Appellant’s third issue does not warrant relief.

Appellant’s fourth and fifth issues are related and, thus, we will 

address them together. Appellant maintains that the trial court erred by 

denying the jury’s request to view, during their deliberations, Brown’s 

medical records and the transcript of his testimony from Appellant’s 

preliminary hearing. 
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“Whether an exhibit should be allowed to go out with the jury during 

its deliberation is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” 

Commonwealth v. Barnett, 50 A.3d 176, 194 (Pa. Super. 2012). Here, 

the court explained why it denied the jury’s request to see Brown’s medical 

records, and the transcripts of his testimony at the preliminary hearing, as 

follows:

The court denied these requests because [] Brown’s 

medical condition was not at issue. The records were 

voluminous and only one entry was introduced for the purpose of 

impeaching [] Brown’s testimony[,] and the requested notes [of 

testimony from the preliminary hearing] contained testimony not 

in evidence at trial. 

TCO at 16.

In asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in reaching this 

decision, Appellant provides the following argument, in its entirety:

The jury requested the medical records during their 

deliberation. It can be assumed that the records were important 

to some members of the jury as they attempted to reach their 

decision. Failure to provide these records to the jury resulted in 

an unfair prejudice to [Appellant]. The trial court assumes in its 

opinion that there was no prejudice because the medical 

condition of Brown was not in question and there was only a 

short submission in the report which contradicted the testimony 

previously provided by Brown. This was not for the trial court to 

assume and there is no justifiable reason why the medical 

records should not have been provided.

...

[Appellant’s] argument [regarding the jury’s request for 

Brown’s preliminary hearing testimony] is similar to the 

argument above concerning medical records. For the sake of 

judicial economy, [Appellant] would repeat the arguments made 

above. Specifically, that the jury deemed that the notes of 

testimony from the preliminary hearing were relevant and 
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therefore the notes of testimony should have been provided to 

the jury upon their request. The failure to do so by the trial 

court was unfairly prejudicial and did not provide [Appellant] a 

fair [trial].

Appellant’s Brief at 14-15.

Appellant seems to suggest that simply because the jury requested 

these documents, the court should have permitted the jury to have them. 

This argument is unconvincing, as it disregards the trial court’s discretion to 

decide whether to permit jurors to view exhibits during deliberations. 

Barnett, 50 A.3d at 194. Here, the court exercised that discretion, 

concluding that it was inappropriate to allow the jury to view Brown’s entire 

medical records, and the transcript of his preliminary hearing testimony, 

where those exhibits were voluminous and contained material that was not 

discussed at trial, and/or pertinent to Appellant’s guilt. Appellant has not 

convinced us that the court’s decision was “manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of 

record.” Gray, 867 A.2d at 570. Accordingly, Appellant’s fourth and fifth 

issues are meritless.

In Appellant’s final two issues, he challenges discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. We will address his arguments together. To begin, we note:

A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be 

considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to 

pursue such a claim is not absolute. When challenging the 

discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed, an appellant 

must present a substantial question as to the inappropriateness 

of the sentence. Two requirements must be met before we will 

review this challenge on its merits. First, an appellant must set 

forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon 
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for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects 

of a sentence. Second, the appellant must show that there is a 

substantial question that the sentence imposed is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code. That is, [that] the 

sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing 

scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular 

fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process. We 

examine an appellant’s [Pa.R.A.P.] 2119(f) statement to 

determine whether a substantial question exists. Our inquiry 

must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in 

contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary 

only to decide the appeal on the merits. 

Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886-887 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(emphasis in original; citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted).

Here, Appellant includes a Rule 2119(f) statement in which he, 

argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence where 

it gave no meaningful consideration to the Guidelines, but 

merely sentenced [] [A]ppellant to essentially the statutory 

maximum on each count. The sheer magnitude of the trial 

court’s deviation from the Sentencing Guidelines presents a 

substantial question of excessiveness that should warrant this 

Court’s review.

Appellant’s Brief at 16. 

Even if we accepted the claims set forth in Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) 

statement as presenting substantial questions for our review, he essentially 

abandons those assertions in his argument section, instead presenting 

substantially different claims. For instance, Appellant contends that the 

court erred by sentencing him to 2 to 5 years’ imprisonment for his PIC 

offense because the court failed to state reasons on the record for going 

“above and beyond the recommended guideline sentence.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 17. This specific assertion was not mentioned in Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) 
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statement. Likewise, Appellant’s argument that his “sentence was 

manifestly unreasonable because the trial court did not give weight to his 

current family structure and his past detrimental upbringing” was also not 

set forth, nor even suggested, in Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement. Id. 

Because Appellant failed to raise either of these challenges to the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence in his Rule 2119(f) statement, he has 

not demonstrated that either claim presents a substantial question 

warranting our review. Additionally, the claims set forth in Appellant’s Rule 

2119(f) statement are waived, based on his failure to meaningfully develop 

them for our review.

Nevertheless, even had Appellant satisfied the requirements for review 

of his discretionary aspects of sentencing claims, we would conclude that he 

is not entitled to relief. First, Appellant has not convinced us that the trial 

court’s deviation from the Sentencing Guidelines for his PIC conviction was 

unreasonable or an abuse of the court’s discretion. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9781(c)(3) (directing that the appellate court shall vacate a sentence if “the

sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the 

sentence is unreasonable”); Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 872 

(Pa. Super. 2006) (“Our standard of review when an appellant challenges 

the discretionary aspects of his ... sentence is very narrow; the Court will 

reverse only where [the] appellant has demonstrated a manifest abuse of 

discretion by the sentencing judge.”). We are cognizant that,
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[w]hen a sentencing court makes the decision to deviate from 

the sentencing guidelines, “it is especially important that the 

court consider all factors relevant to the determination of a 

proper sentence.” Commonwealth v. Ruffo, 360 Pa. Super. 

180, 520 A.2d 43, 47 (1987). This means that a sentencing 

court must give consideration not only to the nature of the 

crime, but also to the individual character and circumstances of 

the offender. See[] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

Commonwealth v. Eby, 784 A.2d 204, 207-208 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

Additionally, “[c]ourts must apply the guidelines unless the circumstances of 

the individual case require deviation, and in that situation where deviation is 

required the court must articulate sufficient reasons to justify this 

conclusion.” Id. at 209.

Here, the trial court was informed at the sentencing proceeding of the 

applicable guidelines ranges for each of Appellant’s offenses, including PIC. 

N.T. Sentencing, 9/10/13, at 16-18. In its opinion, the trial court also 

emphasizes that, 

[b]ecause of the violent nature of [Appellant’s] acts, the [c]ourt 

ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) be prepared 

prior to sentencing. The PSI, prepared on September 9, 2013, 

reveal[ed] that [Appellant was] 22 years old with a juvenile 

record of four arrests, including three in Texas. [Appellant] also 

[had] three arrests as an adult, resulting in two convictions, 

including the current matter. The report also note[d] that 

[Appellant] refused to cooperate and that “he does not appear to 

be a good candidate for community supervision.” 

TCO at 20 (citations to the record omitted). At the sentencing proceeding, 

the court stated that it considered the PSI, “listened to the arguments of 

counsel, the evidence that was presented, as well as [Appellant’s] 

presentation.” N.T. Sentencing, 9/10/13, at 33. Notably, the 
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Commonwealth stressed to the court that, in light of Appellant’s criminal 

record and the severity of his instant offenses, he posed a danger to the 

community. Id. at 18-23. The Commonwealth also emphasized that 

Appellant exhibited a complete lack of remorse for his present offenses. Id. 

at 19, 24. 

Prior to imposing its sentence, the court stated:

[The Court:] The offense gravity score in this case is high 

because the crime is serious, but even this offense gravity score 

understates the seriousness of this offense because of the 

horrible injuries suffered by the victim.

There are so many different ways to commit aggravated 

assault. And serious bodily injury is a definition that includes so 

many different kinds of injuries, but the injury that we saw in 

this courtroom was just horrific, and the jury found that it was 

caused by [Appellant]. 

So on count one, charge of attempted murder, I impose 

the maximum sentence, which is 20 to 40 years in a state 

correctional institution.

Count three is possession of a firearm by a prohibited 

person, and that law exists because the idea is that certain 

people by their conduct have demonstrated that they should not 

have a firearm. And based on what I heard, [Appellant’s] adult 

and juvenile record, there’s no question that he should never be 

anywhere near a firearm. And on that count, I impose the 

maximum sentence of five to ten years in a state correctional 

institution.

Count four is also a firearm violation, carrying a concealed 

weapon. I impose a sentence of three to seven years. And 

[PIC], a sentence of two to five years.

All of those sentences run consecutive for a total of 30 to 

60 years in a state correctional institution.

Id. at 33-34. 
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We concede that the court did not provide a lengthy statement of its 

reasons for fashioning Appellant’s sentence. However, “a lengthy discourse 

on the trial court’s sentencing philosophy is not required.” Commonwealth 

v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). 

“Rather, the record as a whole must reflect the court’s reasons and its 

meaningful consideration of the facts of the crime and the character of the 

offender.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, the record evinces that the court considered the PSI, as well as 

arguments and information presented by Appellant and the Commonwealth 

regarding Appellant’s prior criminal history, lack of remorse, the danger he 

poses to the community, the circumstances of his upbringing, and his 

individual characteristics. Moreover, the court’s opinion bolsters our 

interpretation of the record. There, the trial court stated: 

In fashioning [Appellant’s] sentence, the [c]ourt agreed 

with the Commonwealth’s assessment that [Appellant] 

demonstrated a “complete lack of remorse” and has failed “to 

take responsibility for anything that has happened in his life....” 

The [c]ourt also agreed with the PSI assessment that [Appellant] 

is not a good candidate for rehabilitation.

***

[Appellant’s] ... complaint that the [c]ourt failed to 

articulate “sufficient reasons” for imposing its sentence on the 

charge of [PIC] misstates the record. The nature of [Appellant’s] 

unprovoked shooting of [] Brown makes it abundantly clear that 

[Appellant] poses a real threat to the community, has a callous 

disregard for human life and should be forever barred from ever 

having a gun in his possession. 

***
J-S65005-15

- 20 -

Likewise, [Appellant] ... states that in sentencing [him], the 

[c]ourt failed to take into account current family support and his 

detrimental upbringing[, which] also misstates the record. Other 

than argument by counsel, [Appellant] presented no evidence 

relating to his current family support. His fiancé denied he was 

involved in the shooting. Furthermore, the salutary effect of any 

such evidence would have been negated by [Appellant’s] lack of 

remorse and failure to accept responsibility for his acts.

TCO at 21-22.

The record of the sentencing proceeding, the statements by the court 

prior to imposing Appellant’s sentence, and the rationale offered by the court 

in its opinion demonstrate that Appellant’s term of incarceration for each 

conviction, and his aggregate sentence, is not unreasonable or a manifest 

abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Accordingly, even had Appellant 

properly presented his discretionary aspects of sentencing claims in his Rule 

2119(f) statement, and convinced us that they present substantial questions 

for our review, we would deem them meritless.

In sum, all of Appellant’s issues are either waived and/or meritless. 

Accordingly, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/12/2015