J-S44007-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

TARYL AARON TAYLOR, 

 Appellant No. 1510 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 10, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-02-CR-0001053-2012 

CP-02-CR-0015350-2011 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2014 

Appellant, Taryl Aaron Taylor, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of an aggregate term of five to ten years’ incarceration, followed by ten 

years’ probation, imposed after he was convicted, following a non-jury trial, 

of two counts of robbery, carrying a firearm without a license, resisting 

arrest, escape, and possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, 

Appellant contends that the court’s verdict was contrary to the weight of the 

evidence. Additionally, his counsel, Victoria H. Vidt, Esq., seeks permission 

to withdraw her representation of Appellant pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), as elucidated by our Supreme Court in 

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981), and amended 

in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, 
J-S44007-14

- 2 - 

we agree with counsel that Appellant’s weight of the evidence claims are 

waived. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw.

On November 10, 2013, Appellant “robb[ed] Michael Sheets as he 

walked home to his apartment in the Bloomfield/Lawrenceville section of the 

City of Pittsburgh.” Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 2/12/14, at 2. On November 

12, 2013, Appellant “robb[ed] Marshall Farnan as he exited his parked car.” 

Id. Appellant was arrested and charged in two separate cases for the 

robberies of Sheets and Farnan, docketed at No. 2012-01053 and No. 2011-

15350, respectively. After a non-jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the 

above stated crimes on February 4, 2013. He was sentenced on April 10, 

2013. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion (PSM) raising the 

following claim: 

 6. The guilty verdict in this case was against the weight of the 

evidence. These cases involve claims that [Appellant] possessed 

a firearm. At 2012-01053 no firearm was ever recovered. 

Additionally, [Appellant] introduced evidence that he was 

at another location at the time of the alleged Robbery. 

The evidence boiled down to a ... case of one person’s word 

against another. The verdict should have shocked the 

conscience of the trial court, and the guilty verdict should have 

been overruled. 

Post-Sentence Motion, 4/19/13, at 3 (emphasis added). Because Appellant 

claimed in his PSM that he had not yet received the transcripts of trial, the 

court “allowed for a supplemental motion to be filed.” TCO at 2. However, 

no supplemental motion was received. Appellant’s PSM was denied by 

operation of law on August 21, 2013. 
J-S44007-14

- 3 - 

 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely courtordered concise statement of errors complained of on appeal in accordance 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In his concise statement, Appellant presented the 

following two issues: 

A. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the guilty 

verdict at No. [] 2012[-]01053 was not contrary to the weight of 

the evidence, specifically with regard to the identification 

of [Appellant] as one of the two perpetrators involved in the 

robbery on November 10, 2011. The victim, who was the only 

prosecution witness, testified that the robber was wearing a 

hooded sweatshirt and a hat which obscured his face from view, 

and which would have blocked any light shining on the shooter 

either from above or the side. The victim could not describe any 

particular characteristics of the robber immediately following the 

shooting. When the victim was shown a photo array, he looked 

at it for 5 to 7 minutes before selecting a picture. At trial, he 

said he was told to pick a photo that most closely resembled the 

person who robbed him. He was not told the perpetrator may or 

may not have been in the array. For these reasons, the 

element of identification was so unreliable and 

contradictory that it was incapable of supporting the 

verdicts of guilt, and therefore, the verdicts could have only 

been based on surmise and conjecture. 

B. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the guilty 

verdicts at No. [] 2011[-]15350 were not contrary to the weight 

of the evidence, specifically with regard to the identification 

of [Appellant] as one of the two perpetrators involved in the 

robbery on November 12, 2011. The victim testified that a gun 

was in his face during the ten-second encounter, and that the 

robber’s face was shadowed by his hoodie. The victim identified 

the robber entirely based on the fact that the hoodie worn by the 

robber was similar in appearance to one that [Appellant] was 

wearing at the time of his arrest. No evidence was presented 

that the gun found near [Appellant] at the time of his arrest was 

the same one used in the robbery. The victim could only say 

that the gun was similar in appearance and size, and could not 

give the make or model of the gun the robber used. 

Furthermore, a witness testified ... that they [and Appellant] 

were together at a party at the time of the shooting. Finally, 
J-S44007-14

- 4 - 

[Appellant] testified that the victim had a motive to fabricate the 

allegations. For these reasons, the element of identification 

was so unreliable and contradictory that it was incapable 

of supporting the verdicts of guilt, and therefore, the 

verdicts could only have been based on surmise and conjecture. 

Rule 1925(b) Statement, 11/4/13, at 2-4 (unnumbered pages; emphasis 

added). 

 On February 12, 2014, the trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion 

concluding that Appellant’s weight of the evidence claims were waived. 

While the court acknowledged that Appellant presented a weight of the 

evidence issue in both his PSM and Rule 1925(b) statement, the court 

concluded that the precise arguments proffered in those two documents 

were different. For instance, in regard to case No. 2012-01053 (victim 

Sheets), the court explained that in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant 

“assail[ed] the identification evidence supplied by Michael Sheets.” TCO at 

3. However, in his PSM, Appellant “referenced the lack of a weapon and the 

strength of his alibi evidence.” Id. In the case docketed at No. 2011-15350 

(victim Farnan), the court emphasized that contrary to the arguments 

asserted in Appellant’s PSM, his tactic in his Rule 1925(b) statement was “to 

challenge various components of the identification evidence with a particular 

emphasis upon defense generated evidence of alibi and motive to fabricate 

on behalf of the government’s key witness.” Id. at 4. 

In sum, the court concluded that because “the arguments advanced in 

support of the weight issue are different[,]” Appellant had not properly 

preserved this weight of the evidence claim for appellate review. Id. (citing 
J-S44007-14

- 5 - 

U.S. v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding “that for parties 

to preserve an argument for appeal, they must have raised the same 

argument in the District Court – merely raising an issue that encompasses 

the appellate argument is not enough”) (emphasis in original)). On May 7, 

2014, Attorney Vidt filed with this Court a petition to withdraw and an 

Anders brief, agreeing with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant waived

the weight of the evidence arguments he sought to raise on appeal. 

“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review 

the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Pa. 

Super. 1997)). In Santiago, our Supreme Court altered the requirements 

for counsel to withdraw under Anders. Thus, pursuant to 

Anders/Santiago, in order to withdraw from representing an appellant, 

counsel now must: 

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,

with citations to the record; 

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal; 

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and 

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. 
J-S44007-14

- 6 - 

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361). “Counsel also must provide a copy of the 

Anders brief to his client.” Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 880 

(Pa. Super. 2014). 

Attending the brief must be a letter that advises the client of his 

right to: “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) 

proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the 

appellant deems worthy of the court[']s attention in addition to 

the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.” 

Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 

(Pa.Super.2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 704, 936 A.2d 40 

(2007). 

Id. Once we are satisfied that counsel met these technical requirements, 

this Court must then conduct its own review of the record and independently 

determine whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous. See Daniels, 999 

A.2d at 594. 

 Instantly, in her Anders brief, Attorney Vidt provides a detailed 

summary of the procedural history and facts of Appellant’s case with 

citations to the record. She also includes a discussion of the two weight of 

the evidence arguments that Appellant seeks to raise on appeal. Attorney 

Vidt sets forth her conclusion that an appeal on Appellant’s behalf would be 

wholly frivolous and explains the reasons underlying that determination. 

She also supports her rationale with citations to the record, as well as 

relevant case law. Finally, Attorney Vidt includes a letter she sent to 

Appellant informing him of his right to raise any additional points that he 

deems worthy, and that he may do so pro se or retain new counsel to 
J-S44007-14

- 7 - 

pursue the appeal. Therefore, we conclude that Attorney Vidt has complied 

with the requirements of Anders/Santiago. Accordingly, we will now 

independently review the merits of Appellant’s assertions, and also 

determine whether there are any other issues he could arguably present on 

appeal. See Daniels, 999 A.2d at 594. 

Our review of Appellant’s PSM and Rule 1925(b) statement convinces 

us that the precise arguments he seeks to assert on appeal are waived. A 

weight of the evidence claim must be raised with specificity both in a postsentence motion and a Rule 1925(b) statement in order to preserve it for 

our review. See Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (“[T]he Rule 1925(b) statement must be specific enough for 

the trial court to identify and address the issue an appellant wishes to raise 

on appeal.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); 

Commonwealth v. Hitner, 910 A.2d 721, 733 n.17 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(finding a weight of evidence claim preserved where the appellant “raised his 

specific weight of the evidence claims in his post-sentence motion and courtordered [Rule] 1925(b) statement”) (citations omitted; emphasis added). 

Here, Appellant presented specific arguments in both his PSM and Rule 

1925(b) statement; however, his arguments in those two documents are 

inconsistent. Consequently, the claims presented in Appellant’s Rule 

1925(b) statement are waived because he failed to raise them in his PSM. 

See Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 610 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa. Super. 2008) 
J-S44007-14

- 8 - 

(stating “for any claim that was required to be preserved, this Court cannot 

review a legal theory in support of that claim unless that particular legal 

theory was presented to the trial court”)). Likewise, the claims Appellant 

presented in his PSM are waived because he did not raise them in his Rule 

1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in 

the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this 

paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).

 Because Appellant failed to preserve his weight of the evidence claims 

for our review, and because we ascertain no other issues of arguable merit 

that he could raise on appeal, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 

 Judge Lazarus concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/22/2014