U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

22–767 PDF 2017

S. Hrg. 114–622 

THE HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT’S 

BUDGET SUBMISSION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 8, 2016 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

DAVID S. LUCKEY, Director of Homeland Security 

WILLIAM H.W. MCKENNA, Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

BROOKE N. ERICSON, Deputy Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

GABRIEL S. SUDDUTH, Senior Professional Staff Member 

SHAD A. THOMAS, U.S. Coast Guard Detailee 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN R. VIN ̃ A, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

ABIGAIL A. SHENKLE, Minority Professional Staff Member 

MARIAN P. GIBSON, Minority U.S. Department of Homeland Security Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

BENJAMIN C. GRAZDA, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Portman .............................................................................................. 10 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 12 

Senator Baldwin ............................................................................................... 14 

Senator Heitkamp ............................................................................................ 16 

Senator Booker ................................................................................................. 17 

Senator Peters .................................................................................................. 20 

Senator Ayotte .................................................................................................. 21 

Senator Ernst .................................................................................................... 23 

Senator McCain ................................................................................................ 35 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 39 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 41 

WITNESS 

TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 2016 

Hon. Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

APPENDIX 

Charts submitted by Senator Johnson ................................................................... 60 

Response to post-hearing questions submitted by Secretary Johnson ................ 62 

(1) 

THE HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT’S 

BUDGET SUBMISSION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 2016 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman 

of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, McCain, Portman, Lankford, Ayotte, 

Ernst, Sasse, Carper, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp, Booker, and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. Good morning. This hearing is called to 

order. 

Let me first thank Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh Johnson for coming before the Committee. I know you 

have done this a few times, and I know you also did it a little bit 

earlier than you necessarily wanted to, so I truly appreciate that. 

I also want to just thank you for your service. I cannot imagine 

this is a real thank-filled position. It is a serious responsibility. I 

know you are a serious individual and you are trying to do everything you can to keep this Nation safe and secure, I really do appreciate your efforts working with a difficult agency—a difficult Department. It is never easy to consolidate 22 different agencies with 

different cultures. It has taken some time to do it. But, I think you 

have brought the right approach to the job here, so I truly appreciate your efforts. 

For our own part here, I want to thank all of the Members of 

the Committee for coming here. It is an important hearing. 

When I became Chairman, I sat down with the former Chairman, 

now my wingman, Senator Carper, and the first thing we did 

was—because of my business background, I thought it was very 

helpful to have a mission statement, and so, we quickly developed 

a mission statement for the Committee. It is pretty simple: To enhance the economic and national security of America. You cannot 

separate those two. They go hand in hand. 

And, then, based on that, on the homeland security side of the 

Committee, we established 5 priorities. I am not saying these are 

the order of the priorities. They are all top priorities, but border 

security—we have held 14 hearings on border security, alone. We 
2 

1The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

have taken trips down to the border, to Central America. The border is not secure. 

Cybersecurity—as General Keith Alexander said, it is the greatest transfer of wealth in human history—these cyber attacks. And, 

so, this Committee, working in a very bipartisan fashion, passed 

out of Committee the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 

2016 and married that up with the Senate intel bill. It is a first 

step. It is not a panacea, but it is a first step. 

The third priority is protecting our critical infrastructure, including our electrical grid. I understand that Ted Koppel has written 

a book, ‘‘Lights Out’’, talking about the vulnerabilities involved in 

that. That is something this Committee has to do more work on. 

And, the fourth priority concerns what we can do, as a Committee and as a Federal Government, to counter Islamic terrorists 

and other violent extremists. 

And, then, the fifth priority—and this is really kind of the purpose of this hearing, from my standpoint—is to commit this Committee—commit myself—to do everything we can to assist the Secretary, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey and the National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC) Director Nick Rasmussen, in succeeding in their missions 

of keeping this Nation safe. 

And, so, what this hearing is all about is the budget. This is providing the funds in what I would consider a top priority of government, the defense of this Nation—the defense of this Homeland. So, 

I want to really have this hearing focus on those threats and what 

we can do to keep this Nation safe and secure, so that America can 

be prosperous, because national security and economic security go 

hand in hand. 

So, I do ask consent that my written statement be entered in the 

record,1 but again, Secretary Johnson, thank you for coming here. 

Thank you for your service. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, I will turn it over to Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, great to see you, and I want to echo the Chairman’s comments thanking you for your leadership. Some of your 

leadership team is here and we have had a chance to spend time 

with them as of late and we are grateful for their service and the 

approximately 220,000 people that you collectively lead at the Department of Homeland Security. Thank you for joining us today to 

discuss the President’s budget proposal for fiscal year (FY) 2017. 

As you know, the President has requested a little over $40 billion—$40.6 billion to be exact—in discretionary funding for DHS. 

It is roughly a one percent decrease from the budget enacted this 

last year. And while I am pleased that the many vital Homeland 

Security missions are funded in this budget request, I do have 

some concerns about several of the proposals and the impact that 

they may have on the Department and on our ability to do our collective jobs. 
3 

I understand the need to do more with less as part of our efforts 

to continue to bring down our Nation’s deficit and debt. Making additional progress is critical for the well-being of our Nation and our 

economy. But, while doing so, we also need to make sure that the 

Department has the funds that it needs to keep the American people safe against the constantly evolving and growing threats that 

we face as a Nation. 

I am concerned, for example, by the proposal to cut funding for 

several Department of Homeland Security grants. In fact, some 

grants would be cut by as much as 35 percent. These funds are 

vital to helping our communities better prepare for major disasters 

and terrorist attacks. In Boston, for example, we all recall how the 

Department of Homeland Security grants were critical in training 

first responders and preparing the community to respond, as they 

did, to the Boston Marathon bombings. 

I also have questions about the fee increases proposed in the 

budget for aviation security. I know that raising these fees has not 

always been popular with some in the Congress, but I have always 

felt that if something is worth having, it is worth paying for, and 

that is why I supported reasonable fee increases that will help the 

Department of Homeland Security carry out its missions. However, 

if Congress does not raise these aviation fees, there will be roughly 

a $900 million hole in the budget for the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA)—a $900 million hole—and that is deeply concerning. I hope we can all come together and find a sensible solution to this challenge. 

Despite these areas of concern, there are a number of positive 

items included in this budget request. I will mention a few of them. 

For example, there is a sizable investment, over $1 billion, in 

cybersecurity. That is a 30-percent increase, I believe, over last 

year, for the budget. This new funding will help the Department 

to carry out several laws that this Committee has worked hard to 

pass over the past several years, and I thank my colleagues here 

for all of their work in doing that—really working with us over the 

last 3 years. 

For instance, the budget request includes needed increases for 

Einstein and for cybersecurity tools to better secure our Federal 

networks. There is also funding for additional cyber personnel as 

well as for the information sharing portal that Congress called for 

creating at DHS. 

The proposed budget also continues our recent investments in 

border security. I was particularly pleased to see increases in funding for valuable force multipliers, equipment such as aerostats, airplanes, helicopters, vehicles, boats, surveillance towers, drones, and 

fixed-wing aircrafts, that can help our men and women on the 

ground be more effective along our border with Mexico. 

I was also pleased to see that the budget request continues to 

make countering violent extremism (CVE) here at home a high priority by funding the Office of Community Partnerships. Last 

month, this Committee successfully marked up my legislation that 

would codify this office. I thank the Chairman and others for their 

support. I think we passed it out of the Committee unanimously. 

I look forward to working with you, Mr. Secretary, and the Director 
4 

1The prepared statement of Secretary Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 43. 

of the Office, George Selim, as well as our colleagues, to advance 

this important bill through the Senate. 

Finally, I have also been quite encouraged to see funding for the 

ongoing consolidation of the Department’s headquarters at St. Elizabeth’s. Completing this project will ultimately save taxpayers 

more than $700 million over the next 30 years by cutting down the 

number of costly leases we use to house DHS personnel. 

Mr. Secretary, let me close by recognizing your leadership, along 

with that of your Deputy, Ale Mayorkas, as well as the efforts of 

your senior staff—some of whom are here today—and of the over 

200,000 rank and file DHS employees in support of your ‘‘Unity of 

Effort Initiative.’’ Along with the Members of our Committee’s 

staffs, the Chairman and I are working diligently to move legislation that would codify a number of your proposed reforms, and we 

look forward to hearing more today about how we can work together to ensure the Department has the tools, the resources, and 

the authorities it needs to grow stronger and to work even more 

effectively. 

Again, thank you for joining us today. We look forward to your 

testimony and to our conversation. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in witnesses, so if 

you will please rise and raise your right hand. 

Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Committee 

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 

help you, God? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Please be seated. 

Secretary Jeh Johnson is the fourth Secretary of Homeland Security. Prior to joining DHS, Secretary Johnson served as General 

Counsel for the Department of Defense (DOD), where he was part 

of the senior management team and led more than 10,000 military 

and civilian lawyers across the Department. 

Secretary Johnson’s career has included extensive service in national security and law enforcement. He has also practiced as an 

attorney in private corporate law. Secretary Johnson. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JEH C. JOHNSON,1

SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary JOHNSON. Every time I hear that, I keep thinking, I 

have to rewrite that bio. People think it is more impressive that 

I ran an organization of 10,000 versus an organization of 200,000 

people. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, you have my 

written statement. 

This year’s budget submission, as I think Senator Carper has accurately outlined, reflects hard and difficult choices to fit within 

the budget caps. Because we had to make hard choices, there are 

some things that I wish we could have funded at higher levels that 

we do not in this budget request. 

Let me say that I appreciate very much the true partnership that 

I think we have had at DHS with the Members of this Committee 
5 

and what I believe to be a very effective bipartisan working relationship with Members of this Committee. Just since I have been 

Secretary, I think, together, we have accomplished a lot. 

Going back to even before I was confirmed and I began courtesy 

calls with members of this Committee, I took to heart the message 

I received from you about the importance of management reform— 

reforming the way in which our Department does business. 

Overall, my goal as Secretary, for the remaining 319 days I am 

in office, is to leave the Department of Homeland Security in a better place than I found it. What that means is improving the efficiency and the effectiveness by which we deliver homeland security 

to the American public. 

The centerpiece for that, as you know, has been our ‘‘Unity of Effort Initiative,’’ under which we have established joint task forces 

for border security on the Southwest and Southeast borders. We 

have established a Joint Requirements Council (JRC) to improve 

our acquisition practices and efficiency. We have beefed up our Office of Immigration Statistics. We are, as many of you know, developing better border metrics for evaluating and measuring border 

security as well as total attempts to cross the border under an initiative that we started called ‘‘BorderStat.’’ I appreciate the advice 

and input I have received from Members of this Committee in this 

regard. We have initiated something called the ‘‘Data Framework 

Initiative’’ to better integrate data that we collect within the Department, so that the data, itself, is not stovepiped and is effectively utilized against all of our databases. 

This Committee helped us through the authorization of a number 

of activities, so that they are cemented into law, institutionalized, 

and will go beyond my job as Secretary and the time I have as Secretary. 

I appreciate the effort, and I have reviewed the legislative language of this Committee to institutionalize our joint task forces, 

our Joint Requirements Council, and our joint duty, to elevate the 

Office of Policy within DHS to the Under Secretary level and to elevate the importance of that Office of Policy, which I think is indispensable to our ‘‘Unity of Effort Initiative.’’ 

Thank you, Senators, for passing out of this Committee legislation to specifically authorize our Office for Community Partnerships, which spearheads our CVE efforts. 

We also believe it is important to consolidate our Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and health affairs functions more effectively and efficiently around our Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (CBRNE) Office, which is in pending 

legislation right now. 

I also support the restructuring of the National Protection and 

Programs Directorate (NPPD) into a more streamlined, effective, 

and operational cybersecurity and infrastructure protection agency. 

I know that we have been working effectively with your staffs on 

authorizing a number of these things. I fully support this effort and 

hope that we can continue to work down this path in the future. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I want to go right to community partnerships, because you just 

mentioned that. In a briefing with the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
6 

tion officials, I was struck by one of the comments that, when officials go into communities—Muslim communities—and talk about 

youth that may be, potentially, radicalized, oftentimes, members of 

the community think we have perfect information, that we know 

exactly who might be prone to radicalization. Nothing could be further from the truth. 

Can you speak a little bit about it, in terms of what you are trying to do in terms of engagement that way. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. Thank you for that question. Given the 

nature of the problem and the nature of the current threat, which, 

in the homeland, includes terrorist-inspired attacks, law enforcement and the U.S. Government is not always in a position to know 

about someone who is self-radicalizing. It is the case, however, 

that, in almost every instance I can think of concerning a selfradicalized actor, somebody close to that person was in a position 

to know. 

So, since I have been Secretary, I have made our CVE efforts a 

top priority. I think these efforts are fundamental to the Department of Homeland Security’s missions. So, the first goal is to build 

bridges with communities, including Muslim communities. I have 

personally traveled to almost every major metropolitan area in this 

country that has a significant Muslim population, and when I go, 

I want to be sure that State and local law enforcement is with me. 

So, the goal is to simply build bridges with these communities to 

say, ‘‘help us help you,’’ and, ‘‘if you see something, say something.’’ 

Beyond that, the mandates that I have given our Office for Community Partnerships are to engage the technology sector, so that 

the technology sector helps communities amplify the counter-message to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and to engage philanthropies. How can philanthropies help and support a lot 

of community activities? 

I am pleased that, in this year’s budget, we have money for our 

CVE efforts, and, in this year’s budget submission for 2017, we 

have also requested some money for our CVE efforts. 

But, those are basically my three goals for our CVE efforts and 

I believe they are as important as any other Department of Homeland Security mission right now, given the nature of the threat we 

face. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. And again, I appreciate your efforts 

that way. I think that, probably, one of the most important things 

we can do is to engage those communities in a positive way. 

I do have to bring up unaccompanied children (UAC). I think we 

are still at, or possibly beyond, crisis proportions here, largely because—and, listen, we went down to the border. We were incredibly 

impressed with what your Department did addressing the crisis in 

2014. But, we have gotten more efficient at apprehending, at processing, and at dispersing, and Senator Portman held a great hearing in the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) on the 

depredations of some of these children who have been processed 

and dispersed, and we have kind of lost track of them. 

I want to just talk about the numbers. Through January of this 

year, we have had 16,438 unaccompanied children from Central 

America. That compares to 11,034 in fiscal year 2014. So, if we just 

did the math on that, just prorate that, in 2014, we had 51,705 un-
7 

1The chart referenced by Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 60. 

accompanied children come in. This was the crisis year. If we maintain this pace, we will have 77,000 in 2016. 

Now, we have not gotten the February 14 numbers. That would 

be my first question. How many unaccompanied children were apprehended, processed, and, probably, dispersed in February? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, I want to compare numbers with you. 

I am looking at my latest and best, in terms of UAC numbers. You 

are correct that in the fall of 2015, we saw an increase. Fiscal year 

2014—we saw the spike in the summer of 2014 that everybody 

knows about. Fiscal year 2015, after the things we put in place, we 

had a pretty good year. It was down significantly from fiscal year 

2014. In terms of total apprehensions on the Southwest border, it 

was the second lowest number since 1972, in terms of total apprehensions. 

In the fall—in October, November, and December—we saw an increase in UACs. The number was 6,775 in the month of December. 

In January, the number went down by more than half. 

Chairman JOHNSON. This is just the chart,1 in terms of the total, 

by fiscal year, through 2015. So, we had the spike in 2014: 51,000. 

Last year, it went down to 28,000. But, again, my point is, just in 

the first 4 months for which I had numbers, if you annualize those 

numbers, we would be up to 77,000 for fiscal year 2016. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, I was just getting to that. In January, 

we saw a significant dropoff, down to 3,111. In February 2016, 

there were 3,113 UACs. The March number so far—we are only 7 

or 8 days into March—is pretty much at the same pace as February—slightly higher. 

As I think everybody here knows, in early January, we began a 

series of public, concerted efforts in interior enforcement that focused on families, but we have also focused on just about every 

other population that has entered this country recently. Those apprehended at the border are a top priority. We focused more recently on those who came into the country as children or adults— 

and those people are in removal proceedings. 

The total number of those sent back to Central America this fiscal year is just over 28,000. The total number sent back to Mexico, 

either by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE), this fiscal year, is around 

128,000. So, those are pretty significant numbers. And, so, we are 

sending a very public message that, if you come here illegally, and 

if you do not have a valid claim for asylum and you have been ordered to be deported by an Immigration Court, we will send you 

back—and I have been very public about that. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, again, the point being—again, in 

February 2014—I did not have the numbers for 2016 to compare— 

there were about 3,400 unaccompanied children coming in from 

Central America. So, you are saying in February 2016, it was about 

3,100? 

Secretary JOHNSON. The February 2014 number was 4,840. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, again, one of the reasons I want border 

metrics is so we are talking about the same—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, I am happy to share this. 
8 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK, and we will take a look at that. But, 

the bottom line—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. The February numbers were lower. 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. We are pretty darn close, and 

if you annualize where we are in fiscal year 2016, we would be 

looking at 77,000 this year, versus 51,000 in the crisis year of 2015. 

I mean, we can massage the numbers a little bit, but it is pretty 

darn close. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I do not think that is accurate, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. What do you have year to date through February—unaccompanied children from—not by month, but year to 

date? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Year to date, UACs this fiscal year, we have 

23,553. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, in 4 months, we are up to 23,000 already. 

Secretary JOHNSON. 23,553—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. 23,000. So, that is just in 4 months. 

Secretary JOHNSON. 5 months. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. That is through 5 months. We are still 

at a pretty high pace. We will compare those figures. 

Secretary JOHNSON. The numbers are high. Definitely, the numbers are high. They are higher than I would like them to be. But, 

I have not done the math and I am not sure that they are at the 

same February 2014 pace. But, again, I am happy to share these 

with you, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. We will look at that. But, again, my point 

is that 2014 was a crisis. Right now, I think we are running ahead 

of 2014 levels from the numbers I am getting—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. I do not believe that is true. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Well, we will compare notes, because I am 

just talking about from Central America. 

I have run out of time. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. I just ran the numbers really quickly, and just 

from shorthand, back-of-the-envelope numbers, if we are at 24,000 

through the first 5 months, that would, I think, equate to an annual number—if it holds for the next 7 months—we would be looking at about 57,000. I think that is how it works out. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think the difference here may be, Senator, 

that you are looking at Central America numbers. I am looking at 

the total numbers. 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Secretary JOHNSON. That may be the difference. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Let us just stick with Central America for 

just a moment. I want to applaud the Administration for deciding 

to, not just to support force multipliers on the border—that is important. We need to invest not just in Border Patrol officers, but 

we need to invest in fixed-wing aircraft. We need unmanned aircraft. We need to invest in helicopters, boats, and motion detectors—all of the above. And, the Administration’s budget actually 

calls for a very small reduction—I think by maybe 300 out of 

maybe 21,000 or 22,000 Border Patrol officers—but a significant investment in technology that will enable the Border Patrol officers 

that we do have deployed to be more effective—and I applaud that. 
9 

My colleagues have heard me say more than a few times, with 

respect to Central America and the flow of unaccompanied children 

and families—they are not coming from Mexico. As we know now, 

there are more Mexicans going back into Mexico from the United 

States than coming from Mexico into the United States. And, for 

the most part—the flow of these numbers actually represent people, but most of them are coming from Honduras, Guatemala, and 

El Salvador. 

We spent, over the last decade, a quarter-of-a-trillion dollars to 

strengthen our border with Mexico. In the same 10 years, we spent 

less than 1 percent of that quarter-of-a-trillion dollars to address 

the root causes for why all of these folks are trying to get out of 

Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador to make it to our country. 

The Chairman and I have been down there. Others have been 

down there. They lack hope. They lack economic opportunity. There 

is rampant violence. And it is actually a situation that we are 

complicit in, because we buy drugs. We are addicted to the drugs. 

They flow through those countries. And, we send money and guns 

down to those countries and make life miserable for the people who 

live there. They want to leave and they want to come here. 

And, rather than just build our fences and walls and so forth, we 

need to also—while it is important, border security is hugely important, we also need to address the underlying root causes. 

They have come up with their own plan. It is like a ‘‘Plan Colombia’’ that was very successful in turning Colombia around. The plan 

in Central America, among the three countries of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, is called the ‘‘Alliance for Prosperity.’’ It focuses on governance—the ability to govern. Number 2 is security 

and rule of law. And, number 3 is economic development. 

And, the idea is not for us to literally turn over American tax 

dollars to those governments to focus on those three items. They 

have to raise their own money. And, what we do is we provide 

funding that goes through our own efforts, through a nonprofit organization. I think it is a very smart strategy. We need to be able 

to walk and chew gum, and I think with the Administration’s proposal, we will do that—and I applaud that. 

The Chairman has already touched on the unaccompanied minor 

surge with you. Let me just say, the numbers for the first 3 months 

of the fiscal year were very concerning. The numbers for the 

months of January and February are much better, and I think you 

sent a message. I think maybe that message has been received by 

the folks down there that would otherwise want to try to come up 

here. 

I want to focus, for the last minute or so that I have, on the impact of DHS fees, and their impact on the Department of Homeland 

Security and on the public. Mr. Secretary, could you just talk a little bit about why we need to increase some of the fees—I think 2 

of them that CBP and TSA collect. What will be the impact on the 

average American if those fees are increased slightly? What will be 

the impact on the Department of Homeland Security if we do not 

support the fee increases that the Administration has requested? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Let me begin by saying that the budget request, as I said before, does reflect hard choices to stay within the 

caps. Part of our request is a request for authorization of the fee 
10 

increase, with respect to air passengers, and the increased airline 

fee. The proposed increase would restore revenue fees from the airlines. I believe the amount is $470 million. 

Senator CARPER. Is that about a dollar a plane ticket? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, that is for the airlines. 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Secretary JOHNSON. The proposed passenger fee increase, I be- lieve, is $5.60 to $6.60. That is a dollar increase. 

The underlying rationale for the proposed fee increase is that it 

goes to pay for aviation security and border entry at airports and 

that those who use the system—as opposed to taxpayers, generally—should help a little more in paying for those things—in paying for those services for aviation security. 

My recollection is that these two proposals would generate about $900 million in revenue for the Department. If these are not increased, we are going to have a real problem finding how to pay 

for aviation security. Aviation security right now, given the world 

environment, in my judgment, is critical for the Congress to support. I was very pleased by this year’s budget and next year’s budget request. We have held the line on Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). We are not reducing them anymore. And Administrator Peter Neffenger and I are making a number of other investments in aviation security. We need help to pay for that. Right 

now, I believe aviation security is critical, given the world situation. 

Senator CARPER. And I agree. Thank you so much. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Portman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Johnson, 

it is good to have you before the Committee again. 

I have so many questions for you, I do not know where to begin, 

but I am going to, if I could, try to get some rapid responses to four 

issues. 

First is an issue, as you know, we are dealing with right now on 

the floor of the U.S. Senate, which is this epidemic of prescription 

drug and heroin addiction and overdoses. We will lose probably 25 

people in Ohio, this week, and 100 people in America, today, to 

overdoses. We understand that this heroin is primarily coming 

from Mexico, over the border. We recently had testimony in the 

House Judiciary Committee from the Texas Director of Public Safety saying this porous border with Mexico provides cartels reliable 

means to infiltrate this country—to smuggle and traffic drugs and 

people in the United States. He talked about some of the cartels 

and what they engage in. 

Can you give us a sense of what we could be doing better to 

interdict these drugs, to keep them from coming into the United 

States, and, specifically, tell us, if you could, what percent of the 

heroin coming in is apprehended and stopped at the border and 

what percent is coming into our communities. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, a couple of things. One, most of the 

heroin that is brought into the country is over land—not by sea. 

The Coast Guard is focused on this, but most of it is smuggled by 
11 

land. I do know that the percentage of heroin—interdicted by CBP 

that was smuggled—those numbers—that volume has gone up between last year and the year before. That has been going up because of our sustained, enhanced efforts. 

This is an effort that our Joint Task Forces (JTFs) have undertaken. It is an effort that CBP has undertaken. And, it is an effort 

that ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) has undertaken 

as well. 

I do not have, sitting here, an estimate of what percentage is 

interdicted versus what percentage gets through. If we have that 

number, I will see if I can provide it for you. 

Senator PORTMAN. That would be helpful. The number that you 

hear commonly is that 9 out of 10 of these packages of heroin, 

which are killing our constituents and the people we represent, are 

getting through, and—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. I do know that the volume of seizures by 

CBP and by HSI has been going up lately. 

Senator PORTMAN. I would love to follow up with you on that and 

figure out how we can do a better job. I mean, this legislation 

called the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 

(CARA), before the Senate today, focuses more on prevention, treatment, recovery, helping law enforcement, and so on. But one of the 

issues, obviously, that many of my colleagues and I are concerned 

about is how do you stem this flow and, therefore, increase the 

price, because one of the issues is prescription drugs are being replaced by heroin because the price is so low—and it is flooding our 

communities. 

On the unaccompanied children issue, as you know, we held a 

hearing at the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on this 

issue. This is where unaccompanied children come in, and we 

talked about the numbers. It looks like, as you said, the numbers 

are going to be high again this year—although you have made 

some progress in the last couple of months. The fact is that we 

have thousands of these kids in detention with the Department of 

Health and Human Services (HHS). You do not detain them, HHS 

does, and HHS releases these children to adults who are called 

sponsors. The idea is they go to these sponsors because they can 

come to an immigration hearing. 

Sadly, what we found out in our investigation was that some of 

these children were actually placed, not with sponsors who were 

family members or surrogates of family members, but with actual 

traffickers. And, in Ohio, we had kids from Guatemala who ended 

up at an egg farm being exploited, working 6 to 7 days a week, 12 

hours a day, and having their paychecks taken away from them by 

traffickers. These traffickers got the kids from the Department of 

Health and Human Services. 

My question to you is very simple this morning. Are you aware 

of this, first, and, second, are you working with HHS to come up 

with a way to actually implement legislation that is currently in 

place, which would prohibit these children from being placed with 

traffickers. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I am aware of these very unfortunate situations, including the one in Ohio, sir. I know that HHS Secretary 

Sylvia Burwell is very focused on the placement of the children. It 
12 

is her legal obligation. And, together, we have been working on ensuring adequate placement consistent with the law. 

Senator PORTMAN. You do have a role here. As you know, we 

have, in our report, indicated that HHS can work better with DHS 

to try to address this issue. 

Final question—I have more, but—is just this issue of social 

media and terrorism. We saw with regard to the San Bernadino attacks, that Tashfeen Malik, the female shooter, was on social 

media talking about her jihadi agenda. In fact, she went so far as 

to have an anti-American remark beside a photo of a plane crashing into the World Trade Center—and yet, she went through several screenings and none of that was picked up. 

Can you tell us briefly what you are doing to be sure that social 

media is something that is looked at as people are screened—not 

just for the K–1 visas for fiancees, but for all of our non-immigrant 

visas. 

Secretary JOHNSON. A couple of things. First, as the FBI Director 

has commented, Ms. Malik’s social media was not public prior to 

her entry into the United States. Notwithstanding that, we have, 

over the last 2 years, enhanced our use of social media in connection with immigration benefits. We have a number of pilot programs going on now. There was a ‘‘Social Media Task Force’’ that 

recently gave a report to me. I directed the Department to go even 

further in our use of social media. We use it now for something like 

30 different investigative intelligence purposes across the Department, but we are enhancing the use of social media in connection 

with immigration benefits—both refugee vetting and K–1 review. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Tester. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 

Member. 

Thank you, Jeh, for the job that you have done as Secretary. You 

and your team need to be commended on that. It is a tough job. 

Thank you. 

I want to just talk a little bit about the Port of Raymond. We visited it a little off schedule, outside of the door. There is a recommendation to reduce it from 24 hours to 18 hours. First of all, 

thank you for taking public input. I hope you continue to take public input on border crossing with the folks that live in that region, 

because it is important. 

I think, from a security and an economic standpoint—I know you 

are going to look at both—and I think it is really, really important. 

I think that, as we try to continue to grow our trade with Canada, 

I think it is just very important we take a look at Raymond and 

look at it from that perspective. That is all I am going to say on 

that point. We will follow up on that. 

Since TSA was brought up and fees were brought up, I want to 

talk just a little bit about full body scanners, because Administrator Peter Neffenger was in front of our Homeland Security Subcommittee on the Senate Appropriations Committee last week, and 

we have a number of them in Montana. He said there is a percent-
13 

age of TSA folks who do not have the full body scanners available. 

Is that because of lack of money? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I am not sure. I am not sure whether it is 

lack of money or whether we believe some other technology is better. 

Senator TESTER. OK. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I do know that we are doubling down on our 

use of technology at airports for aviation security in reaction to the 

Inspector General’s (IG’s) test results last summer. 

Senator TESTER. Yes. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I gave the Administrator a very aggressive 

10-point plan—— 

Senator TESTER. Right. 

Secretary JOHNSON [continuing]. To reevaluate our technology— 

and I know he is doing that. 

Senator TESTER. Yes. Well, I would just say that I agree with you 

when we talk about air travel. I can tell you that in a lot of these 

airports—they are big airports for Montana—but they are smaller 

airports when you compare them to Dulles, O’Hare, and places 

like that. I think it is critically important that they have the 

same—that we put forth the same effort of security, and if you 

could kind of look after that, I would sure appreciate it. 

I want to also talk about community partnerships. This adminis- tration is proposing a $560 million cut to the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) preparedness grants, which includes 

‘‘Operation Stonegarden’’ funding that impacts our Indian communities in a big way. It is pretty steep. Can you tell me why you are 

doing it this year? Last year, I think they were held pretty constant. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I support the President’s budget. The President’s budget request reflects hard choices to live within our caps. 

Having said that, I have seen, firsthand, the importance and the 

effectiveness of our FEMA grant money, which is delivered to State 

and local law enforcement and to communities for such things as 

active shooter training and overtime for police and fire. Grants are 

important—very important. 

Senator TESTER. Yes. I think they are critically important, and 

oftentimes, I wonder if the Administration does not cut programs 

that are really, really good programs, just figuring we are going to 

bump them up. And, I hope that is not the case here. I hope it is 

not the case anywhere in the budget, but we are going to have to 

do something about that, because, quite frankly, I feel the same as 

you. They are very important. 

I want to talk about border staffing really quickly. According to 

the 2017 budget request, DHS has a target of 300 fewer border 

agents than last year. Tell me—that is on the Northern border? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator TESTER. Tell me how that is going to work, because, 

quite frankly, I thought you were undermanned at this point now— 

that you were looking for more agents. If we are going to cut an 

additional 300, it looks to me like we are putting something at risk 

here—but maybe I am not seeing something you are. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, I believe that the allocation that you 

see reflects a judgment about where the risk is and where the 
14 

vulnerabilities are. As you know, Senator, we have a pretty active 

Southern Border right now. I also know that we are not doing as 

good a job as I would like to see us do, in terms of hiring—hiring 

up to the levels that Congress has authorized and appropriated. 

And the Commissioner of CBP has very aggressively taken steps to 

recruit and to get people through the vetting process. 

In terms of the allocation at the Northern Border, it is something 

that I insist that we look carefully at every year when we make 

these judgments, but I do believe it probably reflects a judgment 

about where the vulnerabilities and the needs are, Senator. 

Senator TESTER. OK. I will wrap it up really quickly, because my 

time is up. I just think that, when we are talking about drugs coming across the border, they do not all come across the Southern 

Border. And I think that if we have a Northern Border hiring problem, there are some things we can do. Places like where Heidi and 

I live are pretty rural. You are probably not going to get somebody 

from Chicago to move out to Plentywood, Montana, but you would 

get somebody from Scobey to do that. And, so, I think it is important that we start building bridges with our university systems in 

those States, because they can help you out a lot. 

With that, I will just leave you with these words: Do not forget 

about the Northern Border. It is damn important. I live 70 miles 

south of it. And, if we take our eye off of that, they will go to where 

the weakest link is. 

Thank you, Secretary Johnson. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Baldwin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BALDWIN 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking 

Member. 

I want to thank you, Secretary Johnson. The first question relates to a question that Senator Tester just asked with regard to 

State grant programs, FEMA preparedness grant programs. I am 

concerned about the proposed cuts as well as their impact and their 

potential for impact in the State of Wisconsin. 

The DHS grant program, which is, I think, budgeted at $267 million less than the Fiscal Year 2016 enacted level—this funding has 

been critical in my home State. Recently, these funds have provided equipment and training to our fusion center in Milwaukee, 

which, I might just add, is where a terrorist attack was thwarted 

just a couple of months back. 

Let me ask a question about that, and then before you answer, 

put forth an additional question related to the FEMA preparedness 

program. I would like to see or hear the justification for the proposed cuts to the State grant programs. And, are there other efforts 

that we should be aware of that may supplement the critical work 

of these programs? 

Switching to the cuts in the FEMA preparedness programs, particularly a 63-percent cut to the National Domestic Preparedness 

Consortium (NDPC), I also want to point out the impact there in 

the State of Wisconsin. The Transportation Technology Center 

(TTC) uses funding for its ‘‘Crude Oil by Rail Program.’’ Over the 

past five or so years, Wisconsin has seen a huge escalation in the 
15 

number of oil trains that are coming through from the Bakken to 

points west and south, and, because of this, it is so important that 

our first responders have the opportunity to receive training on the 

horrible possibility of a train derailment. We have had several, by 

the way, in the State. Fortunately, we have not seen any explosions. 

But, in your assessment, can you explain why the President’s request for the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium was 

more than $60 million less than Fiscal Year 2016? And, to what 

extent does DHS prioritize funding for proactive programs that prepare local first responders to respond to natural or human disasters? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, let me begin with the last part of your 

question first. We place top priority on programs that proactively 

get at preparedness and prevention, which is why, at various different levels, we are funding State and local law enforcement, first 

responders, emergency responders, and even paramedic equipment. 

Having said that, as I remarked before, this budget does reflect 

hard choices. The budget deal that was made by Congress and the 

President for 2016 and 2017 provides for greater levels in 2016 

than it does for 2017. So, regrettably, the proposal you received has 

the cut for the various different grants. 

Congress will ultimately do what you believe is necessary and 

appropriate by way of funding, but that is where we believe we 

needed to make some reductions. But, as I said before, I do believe 

these grants are very important. 

Senator BALDWIN. I am going to stop you there, because I want 

to fit in one quick, additional question—but we will certainly be following up on that. 

Last November, I wrote a letter to Commissioner Kerlikowske 

along with Congressman Reid Ribble, from my State, about an 

issue at the Austin Straubel International Airport in Green Bay. 

This airport, which is a port of entry (POE) serving Northeastern 

Wisconsin, has hosted the CBP’s Green Bay Port Office for over 20 

years. However, in July 2011, CBP informed the airport that the 

current port office did not meet its needs and that a general aviation facility would be necessary for CBP to remain at the airport. 

The airport subsequently worked with CBP to construct a general 

aviation facility and spent over $3 million to meet CBP’s specifications. 

Unfortunately, in July of last year, CBP reversed course and informed the airport that it would no longer occupy the facility. Let 

me emphasize that this was after the airport paid more than $3 

million on the construction of the facility. This was after the airport worked with CBP on the design of the general aviation facility 

and after CBP signed off on the facility. 

This is unacceptable, and as I made clear in my letter, there are 

no laws or rules that we can find that prevent CBP from occupying 

the general aviation facility, as it has claimed. So, it has been over 

4 months since we wrote that letter, and I raised the issue with 

the Commissioner. I have yet to receive a response to the letter. 

So, I want to ask you, today, and raise this to your attention. 

Will you commit to looking into this issue and responding to my 

constituents’ concerns? 
16 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, I am aware of the issue and I am already looking into it and I will ensure that you receive a prompt 

response—and I will be interested in the response. 

Senator BALDWIN. OK. And, when can I expect a response? 

Secretary JOHNSON. How about within the next week? 

Senator BALDWIN. That would be great. Thank you. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I do not know what the status of the response is, but I will ensure that you get a response within the next 

week. 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Heitkamp. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP 

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Secretary, for the great work that you do on behalf of the people 

of this country. 

I want to just reiterate what Senator Tester began saying, which 

is, those of us on the Northern Border believe that we are entitled 

to a level of protection and a level of border security that we do 

not always see. And, we measure the open positions, the ones that 

your folks have already said we need to protect the Northern Border, but yet we have huge vacancies. Recognizing the challenges 

that you have in recruitment in places like Portal, North Dakota, 

I want to just reiterate the absolutely critical importance of getting 

more attention to the Northern Border. 

With that said, a couple of things. First, one of the things I frequently hear from the folks down on the Southern Border is that 

there is not really a plan, that the last kind of organized plan, or 

strategic plan, for the Southern Border is a 1990s plan, and that 

there is not a sense of coordination. What is your response to that? 

Secretary JOHNSON. My response is that, 2 years ago, we created 

joint task forces for the Southern Border, where a Joint Task Force 

Director is responsible for coordinating all of the DHS assets and 

resources devoted toward border security in the Southwest and the 

Southeast. Part of that responsibility is that, every year, they have 

to submit to me a plan for border security—which includes not just 

people, but also prohibited items, like illegal narcotics, and so 

forth. So, we do have strategic plans for how we intend to secure 

the border in each place. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Why do you think that the other law enforcement agencies believe there is not an overall strategic plan? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I am not sure. Other law enforcement agencies are certainly aware of our joint task forces and help support 

them. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Yes. I say this not by way of criticism, but 

because that communication seems to be a gap here, in terms of 

what you say you have and what people on the border—whether 

it is people who are living on the border or people who are charged 

with the responsibility of protecting people on the Southern Border—believe there is. And, so, increased communication and understanding, especially making sure that the people who work for your 

agency actually understand what that plan is and that it is not just 

some document that is on a shelf in Washington, D.C. 
17 

The second thing, as we are talking about the movement of narcotics across the border—with the movement of marijuana, I think 

that we would all agree that marijuana is basically carried across. 

But, one of the concerns that I have with narcotics is that they are 

typically tunneled across. So, we have been talking to your staff 

about tunnel detection—about technologies. 

I guess my question to you is, do you believe you have a tunnel 

detection strategy on the Southern Border and are you deploying 

the best equipment? If you cannot answer that in kind of an open 

session, I think it would be good to do some kind of secured briefing on tunnel detection. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I would be happy to give you a secure briefing on that. We do have a tunnel detection capability and we have 

a very focused effort on this—but I could give greater detail in private. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Right. In this budget, do you believe there 

have been enough funds allocated to that kind of technology? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Within the confines of the caps we have to 

live with, yes. But, I could always use more in the absence of budget restraints. 

Senator HEITKAMP. Well, we had an opportunity to see some of 

this in Israel, as it relates to securing their border, and I am very 

interested in what kind of tunnel detection you have—whether we 

are deploying the number of resources that would reflect our concern about what it is that is moving through those tunnels. 

Finally, I would just like to talk about first responder grants. I 

think we have been very concerned about preparedness for first responders—whether they are responding to trains or whether they 

are, in fact, responding to terrorist activity—and yet we see a decrease in that kind of funding for first responders. I am going to 

run out of time, but I just want to impress upon you that those 

folks are on the front line. There are not enough Federal agents. 

There are not enough Federal personnel to protect this country. 

They are asking a very minimal amount of investment in helping 

secure that mission, and the last place we should be cutting, in my 

opinion, is grants for first responders—whether they are responding to a train or whether, in fact, they are responding to terrorism—and being prepared to respond. 

Just a note. When, in fact, we have had a very high-profile incident of a train exploding, the single thing that the fire chief told 

me is that the command and control incident training that he received at FEMA was absolutely critical. So, it is deployed every 

day. You do great training. Let us not lose sight of our partnerships with the local folks. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Booker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER 

Senator BOOKER. Thank you very much. 

Again, I just want to echo the words that were said and really 

compliment you on your work and your dedication—and I just appreciate your leadership, especially during these difficult times. 

I just want to jump right in with regards to CVE. I was happy 

that this Committee passed two bipartisan bills, and has made it 
18 

very much a priority. We passed authorization for the Office of 

Community Partnerships. I really am grateful for the leadership of 

Senator Carper and Senator Johnson in helping this Committee to 

come together around these issues. 

And, I am pleased to see the funding that was in the bill—in the 

DHS-led CVE work—really becoming a part of the President’s 

budget, which is something, again, I am very grateful for. $49 million dollars has been requested for DHS’s CVE efforts. If you look 

closely, unfortunately—at least I seem to see it that way—we see 

$10 million requested in grant funds for CVE-related activities at 

the local level and $39 million for activities targeted at preventing 

and preparing for—and this is how it reads—responding to complex, coordinated terrorist attacks. 

And, so, my concern with this language is that the majority of 

this money would be spent on preparing for a law enforcement response, while CVE is intended to create partnerships for community groups to do work to prevent radicalization really before law 

enforcement gets involved. So, it seems almost as if this funding is 

not really targeted towards the idea of CVE in the first place. 

And, so, how do you really envision this money being spent and 

how can we ensure that we are really bolstering some of the efforts, of which we are already starting to see some signs that they 

could be very fruitful, in general, as opposed to the law enforcement response that sort of ignores—to me—community organizations, universities, educators, tech folks, and others? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. The language you read is for 2016, 

right? 

Senator BOOKER. Yes. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. Right. To be candid, I had the same re- action you had. We learned we had $50 million for CVE, but then 

upon closer examination, $39 million of that is for terrorist attack 

preparedness, which is important, but it leaves just $10 million for 

our CVE efforts. 

As I explained earlier, CVE is a huge priority. One of the things 

I heard, repeatedly, when I would go to these communities in Minneapolis or elsewhere is the need for resources. We need help supporting our efforts at the local level. 

My recollection, Senator, from the language you read, is that 

there was some line in there that gave me some flexibility, in terms 

of how we allocate that—but I could be wrong. 

Senator BOOKER. And, I will just say, just to get to my next area 

of questioning, you and I both know budgets reflect priorities. We 

can say that this is a priority, but, really, the paucity of investment 

being made—what I found from being a local leader—and I know 

you know this better than I do—is that creating these partnerships—creating these relationships—is incredibly valuable—not 

just in CVE efforts, but also in helping to detect radicalization, in 

the first place. So, I would just really emphasize the importance of 

that. 

And, one thing I want to say is, I am curious if your folks can 

get back to me about whether there are a lot of concerns coming 

from the Muslim community over all this being focused just on the 

Muslim community, when we know there is radicalization in, say, 

neo-Nazi groups and others that have—and hate groups that have 
19 

perpetrated violence and terroristic activities within our communities. I am hoping that some of this CVE effort is focused there, 

as well. 

But, just real quickly, being that you and I have this kinship in 

the love of the State of New Jersey, I just want to bring to your 

attention—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. I love the taxes I pay there, too. 

Senator BOOKER. We appreciate the taxes you pay, sir, even 

though you spend so much of your time here. 

But, I really need you to comment on something that I hear so 

much anger and frustration over from people that live in our metropolitan area: the lines at Newark Airport, which are just outrageous. The holiday season—perhaps you do know that it was reported that we had such long lines that it led to delays exceeding 

an hour at some of these airlines that led, as one single airline reported, to about 200 passengers missing a flight. I believe that we 

have to do something to create more efficiencies. I get people coming and screaming at me on social media and the like, just so frustrated about this particular airport being worse than others in our 

country. 

And, so, my question is, with the increase in funding for TSA in 

the President’s budget, what flexibility do you have to focus on 

where the problem is? I fly into other airports in our region. I just 

do not see it as bad as what people are experiencing in Newark. 

We now have spring and summer travel seasons approaching. Can 

we not do something to alleviate this outrageous problem that, 

rightfully, is angering people at the Newark Airport? 

Secretary JOHNSON. A couple of things. First, part of the increase 

in wait times is due to the increased volume of air travel. That is 

a fact. Part of it is due to the increased volume of air travel. 

Part of it is also due to the re-emphasis that the Administrator 

and I have put on the airport screening of those in the longer lines. 

So, one of the things you could say to your constituents, Senator, 

is, ‘‘join ‘TSA PreCheck’ for the shorter line.’’ That is one way to 

get through faster. 

With respect to the budget, it is the case that, in 2016 and 2017, 

we have reversed a steady decrease in the number of TSOs for this 

reason. So, this budget submission reflects holding steady on it 

with an emphasis on technology, so that we are not focused, solely, 

on risk-based strategies that lead to a decrease in personnel. We 

have reversed that trend to deal with wait times and the like. But, 

increased volume is also contributing to this, without a doubt. 

Senator BOOKER. So, can somebody just get back to me 

with—I understand the PreCheck warning, but, I mean, we tell 

people to show up an hour before their flight and it seems like we 

should be telling them 2 hours before their flight. Can somebody 

get back to me with a plan to reduce wait times—if there is one 

for Newark Airport. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. Well, as you know, Senator, a lot of it 

depends on whether you are at Terminal A or Terminal C. 

Senator BOOKER. Understood. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Right. 

Senator BOOKER. All right. Thank you, sir. 

Secretary JOHNSON. OK. 
20 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

you, Secretary Johnson, for your testimony today. 

I also want to thank you for your recent visit to Michigan to 

meet with members of the Arab American Muslim community. As 

you know, they expressed a number of issues and concerns to you, 

and they appreciated your hands-on approach to come out and talk 

directly to and to listen to the community. And, I just want to say, 

I look forward to working with you and your staff as you work 

through the number of issues that you heard at that meeting—and 

appreciated. 

Secretary JOHNSON. That was a good visit to Dearborn. Thank 

you. 

Senator PETERS. It was. It was really wonderful, and folks are 

still talking about it, so, thank you for that. 

But, today, I would like to discuss the Blue Water Bridge in Port 

Huron, Michigan. As you know, Mr. Secretary, Canada is our largest trading partner, and the land ports connecting Detroit to Windsor and Port Huron to Sarnia are absolutely critical to our Nation’s 

trade and commerce. In fact, in terms of freight measured by the 

value of shipments—so that which goes through those ports of 

entry—Detroit and Port Huron rank numbers 2 and 3 in the country, respectively, moving over $200 billion worth of trade over those 

crossings. And, I know you know that, firsthand, as well, because 

I appreciated an earlier visit in 2014, when you came out and I accompanied you in Detroit and you went to Port Huron to see, firsthand, what was happening at those border crossings. 

Last year, at this Committee hearing on the Fiscal Year 2016 

budget, you testified that the case for expanding Customs capability at the Blue Water Bridge was clearly there and, in response 

to a letter that I sent, along with Senator Stabenow and Representative Miller, Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Gil 

Kerlikowske responded that the Blue Water Bridge remains, and 

I quote him, ‘‘a top priority.’’ But, delay in the modernization of the 

customs plaza at the Blue Water Bridge has become a real burden 

for the city of Port Huron, and St. Clair County, generally, which 

continues to lose out on potential revenue as the land that was required for the expansion actually sits vacant. 

As you are well aware, over 100 properties were demolished to 

prepare for this expansion. Folks believed that it was moving forward. There is a large area of just vacant land, which does not do 

much for the tax base of the city. It also has other issues that it 

has to deal with. And, new revenue from the construction and operation of that customs plaza would help offset that, not to mention, 

again, it is very critical for our Nation. Obviously, efficient border 

crossings are going to be critical for us economically, given that 

Canada is the top export destination for 35 States and that nearly 

9 million U.S. jobs depend on trade and investment with Canada. 

So, it is a strategic issue for the United States, which was identified, as well—and the Blue Water Bridge, specifically—as a priority 

in the 2011 ‘‘Beyond the Border Action Plan Agreement’’ with Canada. And that is why I am disappointed that the project has not 
21 

received funding so far—and you have heard those concerns before. 

There is a need. The local community is ready. The project is ready 

to go. So, I would just hope you could explain why the Department 

did not include funding for the Blue Water Bridge in the budget 

submission. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Senator, as you noted, I have been to the 

Blue Water Bridge. 

Senator PETERS. Yes. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I have seen the backup of tractor trailers on 

the bridge trying to get into the United States myself. 

Senator PETERS. Yes. 

Secretary JOHNSON. And, as I said last year, I think the case is 

there. I can report to you that, after projects currently underway 

or soon to be under construction, the expansion of the Customs capability at the Blue Water Bridge is the highest priority—after the 

projects currently underway or soon to be underway. As I said, I 

think the case is there. It is not just a top priority, it is the highest 

priority on the list of future projects. 

Senator PETERS. Yes. Any sort of timeline that you are willing 

to offer with that? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I do not have one sitting here, but I am sure 

that Customs and Border Protection can give you that, sir. 

Senator PETERS. Well, I appreciate that, and I know there are 

also some issues—or at least the potential to have a public-private 

partnership that could be formed, as well, perhaps, to accelerate 

that. It is my understanding Commissioner Kerlikowske said that 

some of these alternative financing projects may even speed that 

up. Do you concur that that might even be another way for us to 

accelerate the timeline? 

Secretary JOHNSON. In my experience over the last 2 years, great 

minds can think of some pretty creative ways to come together and 

solve these problems. 

Senator PETERS. Well, great. Well, I appreciate that. 

Secretary JOHNSON. The public-private partnerships and the 

like—— 

Senator PETERS. I appreciate that, Secretary, and I appreciate 

that it has gone from a high priority to the highest priority, so that 

is encouraging to hear that—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. That is what I have on this piece of paper 

right here. [Laughter.] 

Senator PETERS. Well, if it is on paper, it must be true, so thank 

you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate it. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. And, I personally also believe in 

the case, too, having seen it myself. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your leadership and service. You have a very important job. 

I wanted to follow up on what both Senator Heitkamp and Senator Tester talked about on the Northern Border. Actually, Senator 

Heitkamp and I introduced, and this Committee passed out, a bill 

called the Northern Border Security Review Act. Essentially, what 
22 

it would do is require an assessment of the current state of the border between Canada and the United States—and, to me, that 

makes sense as we look at resources. Is that something you think 

would be sensible? 

Secretary JOHNSON. It sounds right. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator AYOTTE. Great. Thank you. I hope we can get that to the 

floor and I appreciate the Chairman getting that out. Hopefully, we 

can get that passed and get that to you. 

I also wanted to follow up on the questions that Senator Portman 

asked you about, obviously, the heroin interdiction at the Southern 

Border. I think it would be really helpful for us to understand sort 

of what has been the trend, because, in other Committees that I 

serve on, the testimony that I have heard is that we have seen a 

significant increase in production of heroin. So, I think it would be 

helpful for us to understand, as we look at what is happening on 

the Southern Border, how much is being interdicted and how much 

is coming through. In New Hampshire, the price on our streets is 

so cheap right now, and anything we can do, obviously, to drive up 

that price and to stop its flow is going to help what our first responders are doing on our streets to keep it away, and, obviously, 

to protect people. 

So, I wanted to ask you about the issue of fentanyl. Are we seeing an increase in fentanyl, which, of course, could be as much as 

50 times more powerful than heroin—and it is a huge driver of 

what is killing people in New Hampshire and in the increase in our 

drug deaths. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I have the numbers here for heroin and heroin seizures, which have increased in 2015 over 2014. Statistics on 

fentanyl—I do not have offhand, but I can certainly get you that, 

ma’am. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, that would be excellent, because we have 

seen that combination—as someone I know who is in recovery—an 

amazing young man—described fentanyl as a serial killer because 

it is so much more powerful than heroin. So, I think it would be 

helpful for us to understand the fentanyl numbers, too, and whether those have increased along with heroin. 

I also wanted to follow up—I understand you just came back 

from a trip to Turkey—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator AYOTTE [continuing]. And the issue of, first of all, the 

foreign fighter flow—to get your perspective on where we stand 

with the foreign fighter flow with regard to the Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 

And, in addition to that, recently before the Senate Armed Services Committee we had General Philip Breedlove, who I am sure 

you know—who is the European Commander—come before our 

Committee. I asked him about the refugee issue, and he told me 

that he is concerned that, in fact, criminality, terrorists, and returning foreign fighters are, clearly, a daily part of the refugee flow 

now. 

So, could you give me an update on your trip to Turkey and what 

you see happening with the fighter flow issue? How much is this, 

from a homeland security perspective, something that you are focusing on? 
23 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. All good questions. I was in Turkey last 

week. I met with my counterpart, the Minister of Interior, there 

and we are making good progress, in terms of information sharing 

with the Turkish government. That is something that they are interested in doing with us and we are interested in doing with them. 

I signed several memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with that 

government to enhance information sharing—both with respect to 

cargo inspection and people. And, we agreed to further discussions, 

in further areas, that I would be happy to brief you on in private. 

Overall, I think it was a very, very productive visit. 

We know from prior experiences that members of ISIL have left 

that area posing as refugees. That is a fact. So, I agree with General Breedlove’s comments insofar as the worldwide refugee problem is something that poses a risk to us, in terms of what ISIL is 

trying to do. 

In terms of refugee resettlement in the United States, as I am 

sure you know, we have a very thorough multi-layered process. Before somebody is resettled, it takes something like 18 to 24 months 

to complete for each refugee—and we have recently added further 

enhancements to the security of that process—just in the last several months—which will most likely add to delays, but we are also 

adding resources and personnel to satisfy our undertaking. But, we 

do have a very thorough process right now and we are adding more 

on, and we are always looking at whether more is necessary, in 

terms of our own U.S. refugee vetting. 

Senator AYOTTE. Do you think that process can eliminate all 

risk? 

Secretary JOHNSON. The way I like to say it is that in a free, 

open, and democratic society that has a tradition of humanitarian 

goodwill, obligations when it comes to refugees, and an immigration heritage, we should welcome, with open arms, people who are 

in need and who are vulnerable—but we should do so carefully. 

And, I think the American people understand that in a free and 

open society, we cannot erase all risk. But, we should do our best 

at security—while maintaining our values. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Secretary Johnson. To me—I fully 

support ensuring that we are a vibrant country of immigrants, 

something that I have been supportive of—including productive immigration reform and border security. But, I respectfully disagree 

with you on the risk factor, as I hear what our intelligence officials 

have been saying, with the risks and a strategy from ISIS to actually try to purposely infiltrate the flow of refugees. 

I want to thank you for your work and thank all of those that 

serve underneath you. I mean, we all travel so much and are very 

appreciative of those who serve underneath you, because they do 

very important work for our Nation. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Ernst. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Secretary, for being with us today, and I just want 

to mention that I do certainly appreciate the work that you and 
24 

your employees have done, as well. I think you provide such a valuable service to all of us. 

I would like to take a minute just to discuss an issue that has 

arisen in Iowa, and it is affecting many of our levee districts across 

the Missouri River, as it relates to accreditation under the National 

Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). And, as you may know, the accreditation and certification of a river levee is very desirable for 

communities and property near the river, because it ultimately affects the affordability of their flood insurance rates. 

And, I understand that FEMA’s involvement in this process is to 

review and accept certification provided by a party that is seeking 

accreditation on a levee on a flood insurance rate map, providing 

100-year protection. But, the cost of the certification is really creating havoc for a number of these communities in my State. 

So, my questions on this are: first, in FEMA’s eyes, how is a 

rural community with almost no tax base—in my particular area 

of Southwest Iowa, we have just a handful of families that live and 

farm in these levee districts and they are supposed to pay for—at 

a minimum—a million-dollar evaluation by a professional engineer. 

This is not good news for a number of these families, and I do not 

know how they can reasonably accomplish accreditation when it is 

so costly for these families. So, I am not sure if you have ideas on 

how these rural communities can pay for those. 

And, second, why is it that FEMA has different levee certification 

standards than the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) when it 

comes to reviewing the effectiveness of a levee? And, I will stop 

right there and see if you have any thoughts on that, but there 

seems to be some inconsistency between FEMA and USACE. There 

is a memorandum from 2014 that lays out how they are supposed 

to work together, but, from what I understand from the exchanges 

of e-mails, this communication process is not happening or is not 

working. 

So, one, it is a big shock, the cost of levee certification, and your 

thoughts on that, please? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Senator, my overall view NFIP is that it 

should be solvent, but also affordable. I cannot comment specifically on the cost of certification and its affordability, particularly, 

with regard to the rural communities you spoke of in Iowa, but I 

am happy to look into that and get back to you, specifically, on 

your question. 

I do not have an explanation for you, in terms of the different 

methodology that may exist between FEMA and the Army Corps 

of Engineers, but I am happy to look into it. 

Senator ERNST. OK. I think that would be important, because it 

is not just in rural Iowa where this is happening. This is all across 

the United States. And flood mapping is a big deal. And, what we 

are running across in some of these areas, even, is what I have 

heard from some of my constituents—and I know this is true of 

other places, as well—that the cost of their flood insurance, their 

premiums—monthly premiums—are starting to edge up toward 

what their monthly home mortgage costs are. And, you have to remember that we have very economically challenged areas and it is 

all they can do to pay their mortgage—and then to double that 
25 

with flood insurance costs—some of them are simply walking away 

from their homes, and this is a very sad situation. 

So, if you could provide us information about that, it would be 

helpful, or if you could offer a way that we can do better and find 

alternatives for these families. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator ERNST. Next question. According to a recent article in 

Bloomberg, DHS suffered over 100 spills of classified information 

last year. While I understand that a spill is not quite the same 

thing as a leak, both forms of mishandling information in the Federal Government really do concern me. So, what are your feelings 

on this and what are we doing to address these types of situations? 

Secretary JOHNSON. My view is that DHS, given our 

cybersecurity mission, should be a model for other Federal agencies 

and departments. I am familiar with that article. I know that our 

cybersecurity experts and our Intelligence and Analysis Directorate 

are focused on addressing spills. My recollection is that the article 

was not accurate in all respects. 

Senator ERNST. OK. 

Secretary JOHNSON [continuing]. I would be happy to identify 

that for you. 

Senator ERNST. Yes. If you can clarify, that would be great. 

Secretary JOHNSON. OK. 

Senator ERNST. I appreciate it. No, I do appreciate it, and again, 

thank you for your very good work out there. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Senator ERNST. And to all of your employees, as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Ernst. 

I have been cranking through some numbers here. 

Secretary JOHNSON. OK. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I got your sheet on unaccompanied children. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. The big difference here is you are including 

all unaccompanied children, including from Mexico—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. And I was talking about unaccompanied children from Central America, which is the big problem. So, let us just kind of step through this, because it is important. This affects your budget. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. In your budget, you are basically budgeting 

for 75,000 unaccompanied children from all sources, correct? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. If you take a look at 2014, again, the crisis 

year, correct? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. We can put the chart back up there. That 

was, in total, about 68,631 unaccompanied children. This is only for 

Central America. It just kind of gives you a—year to date, we are 

10 percent above the 2014 numbers. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I am dealing with your numbers right now, 

which includes Mexicans. 
26 

Secretary JOHNSON. 68,541 is what I have. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Right. Exactly. 

Secretary JOHNSON. OK. 

Chairman JOHNSON. For the entire year. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Year to date, in 2016, we are at 23,553. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Year to date, in 2014, was 21,403. So, if you 

include all unaccompanied children, we are up 10 percent, which 

would imply that we are going to be 10 percent over 68,000. That 

is about 75,000. Now, that is including Mexican children, as well. 

Mexico is four times the population of Central America, and yet, 

Mexican unaccompanied children encompass somewhere between 

20 to 25 percent of the problem. So, that is why I isolate unaccompanied children from Central America—because we treat them differently. I am trying to figure out the best way to address this 

problem. What is the best way to reduce the flow? We have to take 

a look at the incentives, which, of course, you see Deferred Action 

on Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is one of them. The length of the adjudication process under the Feinstein Amendment is one of them. 

Another, is the fact that, when unaccompanied children from Central America get here, they are apprehended, they are processed, 

they are dispersed, and they basically stay, correct? 

So, again, the point I am trying to make is I think there ought 

to be alarm bells ringing right now, because, in the first 4 months, 

with just unaccompanied children from Central America, we are up 

49 percent over the first 4 months in 2014—when it was a crisis. 

We are up 49 percent, which would imply, again, when you run the 

numbers out, about 77,000 unaccompanied children from just Central America, if that will hold. 

Now, I see February’s numbers. I have backed out my assumption because it has been very consistent. We have had about a 

thousand unaccompanied children from Mexico the first 4 months. 

So, if I assume it’s 1,000 for February, I can come up with a number and we are still 28.5 percent ahead of 2014, which would imply 

66,000 unaccompanied children, from just Central America, compared to 51,000. 

So, again, my point being is, in the first 4 or 5 months of data, 

alarm bells ought to be ringing. The crisis has not been averted. 

It is not getting better. It is getting worse, even over 2014. Yes, it 

came down in 2015, but the early indications of the first 4 or 5 

months of 2016 is it is going to be worse than 2014—and that is 

my point. It is obviously going to affect your budget. 

And, I think the reason it is not a crisis—and here is what concerns me—is, again, because of the great efforts of CBP and your 

organization, we have gotten very good—very humane—at processing and dispersing. And, as I said earlier, in the hearing that 

Senator Portman had on the situation in Columbus, this is not a 

really humane situation when we disperse and we just kind of forget about them. 

So, again, are you acknowledging the fact that this is still an 

enormous problem and we are not—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, absolutely. 
27 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. From my standpoint, addressing the root cause—and our public policy ought to be: what can we 

do to stem the flow? Not to figure out how we can more efficiently 

process and disperse, but how do we address the incentives that 

are incentivizing people to come here? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes—a couple of things—and I hope you do 

not mind if I exceed the 36 seconds. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Sure. We are here by ourselves. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Correct. 

Chairman JOHNSON. There is no clock. 

Secretary JOHNSON. First of all, nobody in DHS, CBP, ICE, or 

HHS is feeling as if a crisis has been averted. Whether it is 75,000, 

68,000, or 39,000, that is a whole lot of kids and that creates a real 

problem for us. It overwhelms my resources, HHS’s resources, and 

taxes a lot of other resources. 

I do think that the comparison to 2014 is imperfect in that there 

is a certain trend that existed in 2014 that does not exist in 2016. 

The numbers in January and February of 2014 were considerably 

higher than the numbers in January and February of 2016. Now, 

having said that, much of this is seasonal, so I think we have to 

assume that March is going to be higher than February, and April 

is probably going to be higher than March. And May, June, and 

July will probably do what they typically do. So, we have to assume 

that we are not going to see numbers as low as 3,100 for the rest 

of this fiscal year, which is why our budget request assumes 75,000 

UACs in 2016. 

Now, I agree with you that you can put a lot of border security 

on this effort to deal with kids who are not seeking to avoid capture, and there is only so much you can do by way of border security and immigration enforcement. However, I do believe that it is 

important that people in Central America see that people are being 

repatriated back to Central America, which is why we have been 

very visible about our efforts in recent months. 

And I do agree with you, Chairman, that the underlying factors 

have to be addressed. I am pleased that Congress appropriated 

$750 million for Central America and I am impressed with the new 

President of Guatemala, Jimmy Morales. I hope you had a chance 

to meet him when he was here a couple of weeks ago. He is a dynamic leader in Guatemala and I am hoping, and I have some optimism for that country, given the new leadership there. 

But, we have to do more and we are seeking to do more to help 

those in Central America with their border security, through training programs and the like—through vetting programs. We have to 

do more in Central America, which is the heart of the problem. 

Just in my 26 months in office, I have learned that, as long as 

you have powerful underlying push factors—poverty, violence, 

drought, and the like—there is only so much border security that 

you can accomplish—whether it is more personnel or more walls— 

to deal with people who are motivated to leave their homes and 

travel thousands of miles to come here. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, we create an awful lot of pull factors 

here, and that is the whole purpose of that chart. DACA was a 

pretty tremendous pull factor. The fact that we grant lengthy adju-
28 

dication processes, and they learn the term, ‘‘credible fear,’’ and, all 

of a sudden, we are not sending them back. 

Secretary Chertoff, when we had a flow—what, in 2008?—in 

2006, from Brazil, started sending people back immediately. The 

flow stopped. 

We were in Guatemala and Honduras. We met with the President-elect, which he was at that point in time. I also met with the 

President when he just came here—what was it last week or 2 

weeks ago? We actually saw a repatriation of illegal immigrants 

from Guatemala when they returned to the airport. And, during 

the reorientation speech, and this is a paraphrase translated to me, 

the Guatemalans were told, quote, ‘‘It does not matter how poor, 

how rich, big, or small your country is. This is still your motherland. Remember that you have to love your country. Please consider that before attempting to leave for the United States.’’ 

The room of about 136 Guatemalans, who had just been repatriated, erupted into applause. The reprocessing center was very modern. We had non-governmental agencies (NGOs) ready to help 

them. There was a phone bank. There was one minor. He was separated from the group of adults and with their form of child protective services (CPS). 

So, we talk about these push factors. The President of Honduras 

asked us, ‘‘please, fix the ambiguity in your laws that are encouraging our citizens to leave our country.’’ Let us face it. This is the 

United States of America. I do not know how many people from 

around the world want to come here, but there are literally hundreds of millions—if not billions—of people who would like to be in 

America, but we cannot accept them all. It has to be a legal process, and we have to look at the incentives we create in our own 

laws that are the pull factors, because there are push factors all 

over the world and we really have to deal with what we can actually deal with here. 

Those countries are beautiful countries, but as long as we have 

this insatiable demand for drugs, the farmers in Central America 

will make 50 times what they can make on normal crops by selling 

poppies. And, they do not have to deliver it anywhere. They come 

pick it up. 

And, Senator Carper was saying the same thing. From our 14 

hearings on border security and our 100-page report, the conclusion 

I came to is that the root cause, among many, of our unsecured 

border is our insatiable demand for drugs. It is causing so many 

other problems, as well. 

So, that is my only point, let us look at this very clear-eyed. Let 

us acknowledge the reality. Let us take a look at policies that we 

have enacted, over multiple administrations, and just acknowledge 

the fact that these things are not working and we really have to 

look at what we can do ourselves. We have to state, from my standpoint, what should be the goal of our policies: what we can do to 

stem the flow, as opposed to what we are doing right now in your 

budget—and again, you have done a very good job with great humanity. What DHS did in the throes of that initial crisis in 2014 

was pretty extraordinary. But, that is not the solution, bottom line. 

You can comment. I have a couple of questions as long as—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, let me make something—— 
29 

Chairman JOHNSON. Sure. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Let me say a couple of things. First, I agree 

with what Secretary Chertoff told you, because he told me the 

same thing about the situation in 2006. And, I share his view that 

illegal migration is very market sensitive. It reacts to information 

in the marketplace about what is going on and what you can expect 

to happen after you pay a coyote $6,000 and you have migrated all 

the way up here. 

And, so, that is why, to the consternation and unhappiness of 

many, I have been very public about our enforcement efforts. Our 

enforcement efforts, just this fiscal year—the first 5 months of this 

fiscal year—with regard to Central America—after all of these people go through the ‘‘credible fear’’ process, having their claim heard 

in Immigration Court, and having the appeals run and so forth— 

just this fiscal year, we have sent back 28,000 people to Central 

America. Nobody is sitting on their hands. We have sent back 

28,000 people to Central America. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Let me ask, out of how many that—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. On average, 14 flights a week. So, people are 

being sent back routinely. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, out of how many that have come? 

Again, we are talking about unaccompanied children. You are talking about almost all adults—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Most of them are adults. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, what is the total that have come in? The 

28,000 is what percent of the total? 

Secretary JOHNSON. The total number who have come in just this 

fiscal year, sure, exceeds that 28,000 number, because a lot of them 

go through the litigation of their asylum claims. As you know, that 

takes months and months. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has 

a limited number of immigration judges to hear these claims. But, 

once we have gone through that process, I am sending people back 

as quickly as I can. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, listen, I understand the political heat. 

You have done that and I appreciate that fact. But, again, do you 

know the total number that have come in—what the estimate is? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Since when? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Just for the year. I mean, if you sent 

back—I mean, in the same period. If you are saying you have sent 

back 28,000, that is out of how many that came into this country 

illegally that we know of? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, so far this fiscal year, there have been 

152,000 apprehensions on our Southern Border—152,000 apprehensions. That is not—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, again, there is a dispute over 

how many get by without us knowing about it, so, I mean, it is 

still—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. That is one of the reasons why I think you 

and I are both interested in developing better border metrics. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Correct, and I appreciate that. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Right. So, it is a larger number, without a 

doubt. And, presumably, all of these people have—are in deportation proceedings at one stage of the process or another, but, as you 

know, it is a time consuming process. But, we are, in fact, routinely 
30 

sending hundreds and thousands of people back to Central America 

and I have kind of made a big deal about that. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Right. But, again, I think one of the reasons 

we only have a thousand Mexican unaccompanied children is because we can send them back right away, and so there is just—it 

is just easier to do it and so there is less incentive. But, let me turn 

it over to Senator Carper—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Mexico is a different—it is a different situation, too. It is not quite the same situation. 

Chairman JOHNSON. No, it is all complex. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Finish that sentence. Just follow up and just 

finish your sentence about how Mexico is a different situation—just 

briefly, please. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, the economy is better, as you know, 

Senator. The push factors are not the same. They are different. 

Mexico is a much different country from, say, 15 years ago, when 

the numbers of illegal migrants coming from there were far, far 

greater. And, so, I think it is notable that, though our economy is 

improving, the number of apprehensions on our Southern Border is 

a fraction of what it used to be—thanks to the investments we and 

the Congress have made in border security over the last 15 years. 

Could we do better? Absolutely. Are we concerned about another 

spike? We have to prepare for it and we are concerned about that, 

absolutely. Nobody is popping champagne corks. Just yesterday, I 

had a meeting with the Secretary of HHS on this problem, to try 

to anticipate what could be the worst again. 

But, as I said, I do not think 2014 is a perfect comparison. I 

think the trend lines are a little different. But, still, we can assume 

we are going to see seasonal migration trending up again. 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Secretary JOHNSON. That is absolutely the case. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. The other thing that is different 

with Mexico, they have a—I am tempted to call it a vibrant middle 

class. They have a middle class, today, that they did not have 20 

years ago, and part of that, I think, could be attributable to the 

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other things, 

as well. They are a strong trading partner with us. They still 

have—we have, God knows, we still have problems with rule of law 

in this country, and they certainly have their challenges, in Mexico, 

in that regard. 

But, the folks that are coming out of Guatemala, Honduras, and 

El Salvador—the Secretary has been down there and the Chairman 

and I have been down there—if we lived down in those countries 

and were trying to raise our families, we might want to try to get 

out, too—or at least get them to a safer place. 

OK. Cybersecurity. I know we talked a little bit about that. Over 

the last several years, we have talked about it a lot, and we have 

actually done very good work in an earlier Congress with Tom 

Coburn passing legislation that made real the Cyber Ops Center, 

well known as the National Cybersecurity Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), which provided greater hiring flexibility 

and enhanced your ability to hire the kind of cyber warriors that 

you need and to retain them. 
31 

And, the other piece is to try to reconcile the difference between 

the responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security and 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), with respect to protecting our ‘‘dot-gov’’ domain and doing that in a thoughtful way. 

Also, to move away from some kind of, like, paperwork drill system 

to actually a real-time system, where we actually are able to respond on a real-time basis—not, like, a year after an intrusion. 

But, we are happy with all of that. We have provided funding, 

as you know, for all of that. And you now have had an opportunity 

to begin hiring cyber warriors. How is it going? 

Secretary JOHNSON. First of all, thank you to both of you for taking on this complex subject and pushing out a really good bill last 

year. Thank you also for the cyber legislation we got in 2014 that 

gives us additional hiring authorities. 

We are competing in a tough marketplace against the private 

sector, which is in a position to offer a lot more money. Suzanne 

Spaulding and her people are making very aggressive efforts to, 

first, implement the 2014 legislation you passed, and, second, in 

the interim, to do a lot of things in terms of recruitment, expediting 

the hiring process, and so forth. We need more cyber talent, without a doubt, in DHS and in the Federal Government, and we are 

not where we should be right now. That is without a doubt. 

Senator CARPER. Let me just interrupt you. Phyllis Schneck, who 

is one of your top cyber people, she came out of the private sector, 

went to Georgia Tech—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator CARPER [continuing]. But came out of the private sector. 

I am sure she was very well compensated, and she gave it up in 

order to come to work at the Department of Homeland Security. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I am familiar with the phenomenon, yes. 

Senator CARPER. Yes. And the reason why, when I talked to her 

about it, was that she felt an obligation, or a desire, to give back 

to her country. And, it is all well and good that cyber warriors 

work for other companies or businesses and so forth, but, in this 

case, there is something to be said for appealing to people’s sense 

of patriotism—and I think that is one of the things that draws her. 

And, that is a calling card, if you will, that we can use—and I am 

sure that we do. 

Let me just follow up by saying, I think there is a 30 percent increase in the President’s proposed budget for next year for the Department’s cybersecurity programs. Some of these monies will be 

used to help expand Einstein so that, basically, all Federal agencies 

are using not just Einstein 1 and 2, but also Einstein 3, intrusion 

detection system, across the board—as well as to bring in the new 

personnel that we talked about for your cyber ops. 

How does the budget support implementation of the 

cybersecurity information sharing legislation that was enacted last 

year? We worked on it together, and got great support from the Administration, from the President. But, how does the budget support 

implementation of our information sharing bill that was enacted 

and signed into law last December? 

Secretary JOHNSON. The short answer is through further investments in maintaining our technology and building upon what we 

have. Further investments in the Einstein system. Further invest-
32 

ments in the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM). The 

legislation specifically authorizes DHS to go into other Federal departments and agencies to detect, to monitor, and to block intrusions. It is a good thing that Congress gave us the authority to do 

that, because we were finding considerable uncertainty to do that 

in departments and agencies. 

One of my top priorities for Federal civilian ‘‘dot-gov’’ 

cybersecurity while I am still in office is to have E3A in place to 

block intrusions across our entire Federal civilian system before 

the end of this year—and I think that is one of the legal mandates 

in the bill. But, as I have said, Einstein is also a platform for building additional capabilities, so that we are not just going after 

known intrusions, but also suspected intrusions. There are pilots 

out there now to do that, and I think we need to build on that for 

the future. 

So, the funding for additional technology implements the legislation that was passed last year. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Just a quick question to follow up on 

encryption, if I could. We hear a lot in the media about Apple and 

the disagreement that they have with the FBI. It is a serious matter. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. And, we have a mass killing in San Bernadino, 

as we know. I think 14 people were killed by a couple who were 

radicalized. And, there is a cell phone, an Apple cell phone, that 

is in question that I think was not owned by the killers, the perpetrators of the violence, but is owned by the county where the 

husband had actually worked. 

We have a role to play here. Some of our colleagues in the House 

and in the Senate are working on legislation. The Administration 

has spelled out their own views. I think there are actually some 

people who do not always speak in one mindset on this issue within the Administration. It is a tough issue. 

But, as we consider legislation on this matter, do you have any 

advice for us? 

Secretary JOHNSON. My advice is to ensure that you have the 

views of all of the stakeholders, from the tech sector, from the intelligence community (IC), and from the law enforcement community—Federal and State. One person who comes to mind, for example, is Cyrus Vance, who is the Manhattan District Attorney (DA). 

Cy, who is a friend of mine, has been very vocal about the 

encryption issue from the local law enforcement level and he reminds us that basically any crime that involves communications— 

not just Federal crimes—is harder to detect because of the 

encryption issue. 

I do believe that there needs to be a readjustment in the pendulum. I think that, in response to the plans of the marketplace, 

the tech sector has gone a long way toward encryption. But, it has, 

in fact, created a situation where crime and potential terrorist 

plottings are harder to detect. 

So, I and others do agree that there needs to be a recalibration. 

I, of course, support the government’s position in the case involving 

Apple in California. And, so, if we are to grapple with this problem—I think that smart people can solve the problem, but we have 
33 

to ensure that all of the stakeholders are represented in that discussion. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Well, we will continue to welcome 

your counsel on this. 

One last one, Mr. Chairman, if I could. The Chairman and I, as 

well as others on our Committee—our staffs—have worked a whole 

lot to try to put together legislative language authorizing some of 

the initiatives that comprise, in their entirety, your ‘‘Unity of Effort.’’ Why do you want to leave some of your reforms in place for 

the next Secretary? And will these reforms help, in some way, to 

get off of the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO’s) High-Risk 

List and be able to do the work more effectively? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, first of all, through our very able 

Under Secretary, who is sitting right there—— 

Senator CARPER. What is his name? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Russ Deyo. 

Senator CARPER. I have heard of him. 

Secretary JOHNSON. He is a former client of mine from my private practice days. And through his very able Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and our Deputy Secretary, we have gone a long way in 

working with GAO to get off of the High-Risk List. 

I believe very strongly that a lot of the things we are doing to 

remove the stovepipes in DHS and have a more strategic approach 

to budget making, acquisition, and so forth should be institutionalized. It is not just something that should exist while I am in office. 

I think it will make the Department a better, more effective place 

for homeland security if we move in the direction of more centralized, more strategic approaches to our homeland security mission. 

We have been stovepiped for far too long and we need to move toward a model more like the Department of Defense, where you 

have joint duty, joint task forces, and the like. 

There are provisions in the current law that create some limitations on our ability to do that, and I am sure our staffs have spoken to you about that in the current Homeland Security Act (HSA). 

And, so, the authorization of our ‘‘Unity of Effort Initiatives’’ is 

something I very, very much support, which includes reforming and 

restructuring NPPD. I have seen the legislative language that I 

know your Committee is working through now on a number of 

these things, and I support that, and I support the good work 

there. 

Senator CARPER. Good. And I think it is fair to say that we support what you are trying to do, as well. Thank you. Thank you so 

much for joining us today. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

I think Senator Sasse may be coming. I still have some questions, as well, so let us kind of step through them. 

By the way, I do appreciate you working with me on a border 

metrics bill and the fact that you recognize that, if we are going 

to ever secure the borders, we need to understand the situation. So, 

I hope you will continue to work with us. I would like to get that 

actually passed and certainly support efforts that you are trying to 

do within your Department. 

Let us talk a little about critical infrastructure. Earlier, I talked 

about Ted Koppel’s book, ‘‘Lights Out.’’ We held a hearing on this. 
34 

We had Dr. Richard Garwin here. We had James Woolsey. The 

Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP) Commission in 2008 tasked your 

Department with a number of, I guess, let us call them quick 

fixes—and GAO basically reported that you have not done a whole 

lot on that. 

We have witnessed the unsolved attack on an electrical substation at Metcalf. You read about the cyber attack on the power 

grid system in Ukraine. You take a look at the potential of solar 

storms with geomagnetic disturbances. You take a look at the potential, I mean, obviously, let us look at North Korea, with their 

ballistic missile technology and nuclear capabilities. I am concerned 

about Iran. There are reports that they have test fired Scud missiles off of ships—off of shore. These threats are real. 

And, I guess, can you just kind of talk about, across the board, 

critical infrastructure—I would say, particularly, the electrical grid, 

which is the number 1. When the electricity goes down, the lights 

go out, and we are in a world of hurt. And, we have these large 

power transformers that Dr. Richard Garwin, who, by the way, 

Secretary Moniz, when I was questioning him about this in the 

Foreign Relations Committee said—again, Dr. Richard Garwin, a 

real national treasure. Enrico Fermi referred to him as one of the 

truest geniuses he had ever met. 

So, can you just speak about what the Department has done, in 

terms of the charge you were given based on the 2008 EMP Commission on critical infrastructure, particularly, the electrical grid, 

but expand it beyond just EMP—Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD), cyber attacks, and physical terrorist attacks. Where are we 

at on these? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Better than we were, but there is more to 

do. I do not agree with everything in Ted Koppel’s book, but I think 

he was right to put a spotlight on the issue. 

Since the earthquake in Japan in 2012, there were a lot of lessons learned for the U.S. Government and the private sector critical infrastructure utilities here. And since that, which was sort of 

a seminal event, we have done a lot more partnering with the private sector—with critical infrastructure—to work with them, sharing best practices and sharing information about the potential for 

a cyber attack on power grids. And, we do exercises now with them. 

So, we are in a better place than we were. 

There was a DHS team, along with an interagency team, in the 

Ukraine recently. That was a cyber attack that led to a power failure. We are not, at this point, in a position to attribute it to any 

particular source, but that was a cyber attack. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And highly sophisticated, correct? 

Secretary JOHNSON. And, it would appear to have been fairly sophisticated, yes. And, that should be, and must be, a wake-up call 

for those who have not already been awakened by this problem and 

this risk. 

So, we are working with critical infrastructure all of the time. I 

have spoken to CEOs of utilities about this problem and they are 

seizing on this issue, as well. But, there is clearly more to do, 

Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. What is the lead group within your Department looking at this? 
35 

Secretary JOHNSON. We have an Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection who is part of this effort, but also our 

cybersecurity efforts, as well. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. I want to work very closely with you 

over the next few months to do whatever we can, legislatively, to 

work with your Department. This is incredibly important. 

I have more questions, but I will turn it over to Senator McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

Welcome back, Secretary Johnson. I want to bring up a couple 

of issues really quickly. 

We are terribly short on staffing at our ports of entry on our 

Southern Border. We passed legislation which would expedite veterans being hired. We have done a number of things. But, we are 

still—for example, at the Nogales-Mariposa port of entry, we are 20 

percent understaffed—well over 100 agents short. So, you see these 

lanes, these vacant lanes, and traffic stacked up behind it, simply 

because we do not have the personnel. 

It is my understanding it takes about 18 months—and we did 

pass legislation that would expedite veterans, former military. But, 

the fact is that we are still not making up for that shortfall, and 

I am of the view that we need to have some kind of incentive pay 

or hazardous-duty pay at the ports of entry that experience high 

traffic flows. I am very interested in your view on that. 

Secretary JOHNSON. First, Senator, we are not where we need to 

be. No argument from me, there. CBP needs to, and is, making aggressive efforts to hire, to bring on people faster, and to get them 

through the polygraph exams. I fully support the hiring of veterans 

and making it easier to hire veterans. I understand that you are 

interested in legislation that deals with pay in these areas and I 

am happy to look at that with you, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. It is a very tough environment along all of our 

Southern Border, but also, I would argue, in Arizona, it gets particularly warm, and I can understand how tough a duty it is. And, 

so, I think that, just as we in the military provide incentive pay 

for hardship positions, I hope that you would look at that. And, I 

will be introducing legislation on it, because it is just not sufficient, 

as you know, when we are 100—well over 100—Customs agents 

short. There is either something wrong with the level of staffing required or something is wrong with the level of personnel. 

I know that you know that there is an epidemic of manufactured 

heroin, and the deaths from manufactured heroin overdoses have 

been described by some Governors, including the Governor of New 

Hampshire, as a, quote, ‘‘epidemic.’’ The heroin that is being transported across the border in Arizona—seizures have increased 223 

percent as the drug cartels, obviously, transport and distribute the 

drug to the United States. 

I think it is particularly interesting, now, with the passing of 

Nancy Reagan—the ‘‘Just Say No’’ to drugs campaign was something that I think we ought to do a lot more of. 

But, one, do you agree that heroin drug overdose deaths are skyrocketing? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 
36 

Senator MCCAIN. That is just the facts that we get from the Governors. And, is not most of this manufactured heroin coming across 

through the ports of entry, rather than being smuggled across the 

border areas, for several reasons? And, what do you propose that 

we need to combat this problem, which some Governors have described as a, quote, ‘‘epidemic’’? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I agree that most of the heroin that is seized 

is seized at ports of entry on our Southern Border, as opposed to 

maritime, for example. That is what the facts and the statistics 

show. 

We have seen greater levels of seizures by Customs and Border 

Protection and by HSI. We have created a national task force with 

the Department of Justice to deal with the heroin epidemic, specifically. Part of the joint task force missions that I created 2 years 

ago—part of our JTF missions, which is modeled, by the way, after 

the structure we have in Arizona—is the illegal narcotics problem. 

It is not just migrants—illegal migrants. I want our JTFs to be focused on narcotics, as well. 

We are seeing an increase. It is alarming. And, I think this needs 

to be a National Government effort. Within DHS, we have ICE, 

HSI, and CBP focused on this problem. And, we are seeing seizures 

at higher levels, without a doubt. 

Senator MCCAIN. But it also seems that the problem is increasing—according to these Governors—rather than decreasing. And, I 

agree, fundamentally. I am in total agreement—it is supply and demand. But, it seems to me that, despite our increase in interdiction, the problem is growing worse. Would you agree with that? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Have you got any ideas? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think we need more resources at the Federal Government level, not just DHS, but DOJ and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and a coordinated, sustained effort to deal with this problem. 

Senator MCCAIN. I hope that this Committee and the Congress 

can get some recommendations from you, because, frankly, I have 

not seen anything quite like this, when I traveled to New Hampshire and heard the Governor of New Hampshire say it is an epidemic in her State—and throughout the Midwest, as well. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. And, maybe also some time we ought to talk 

about demand—but nobody seems to want to discuss that aspect of 

it, either, and I know that is disappointing to you. 

Finally, on the children showing up at the border, is one of the 

answers increasing our embassy and consulate capabilities in those 

three countries—El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala—so that 

they can go there, rather than showing up on our border? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir. I agree with that. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you for the good work that you do, Mr. 

Secretary. We have some spirited discussions from time to time, 

but I appreciate the work that you are doing. 

Maybe, finally, as Nancy Reagan inaugurated, maybe we ought 

to be talking a little bit more about trying to address the demand 

side of this problem, rather than blaming it all on the Mexican car-
37 

tels, who I am glad to blame it on—but there is a demand. Do you 

agree? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I agree, yes. You have to deal with the demand and the supply. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

By the way, we mentioned earlier that, I think, the evaluation 

I have come to in this Committee is that the root cause of our unsecured border literally is our insatiable demand for drugs—and so 

that is an important component. We are working. We are trying to 

work on a piece of legislation to address the consulates—to address 

that. 

But, here is an idea in terms of interdicting drugs at the border 

through ports of entry. We held a hearing—and I know you are 

busy with the Armed Services Committee—an incredibly interesting hearing. It was on canine units and it really spawned—the 

red teams and the failure rates, because it is difficult to detect 

these things. I went to the University of Pennsylvania, where they 

have a pretty groundbreaking canine training unit. Unbelievable 

capabilities. In the hearing, certainly, we saw we have not really 

increased the number of canine units—certainly not within DHS. 

I wanted your evaluation. In the layered approach to airport security—this is for bomb sniffing, this is for, potentially, drug sniffing, and all of those issues—do you think it is good to explore the 

efficacy and maybe the expansion of canine units throughout your 

different missions—whether it is drug interdiction or whether it is 

trying to, potentially, sniff out bombs in airports—that type of 

thing. I am very intrigued by it. 

Secretary JOHNSON. There is actually no better technology than 

a dog’s nose for detecting certain types of explosives and prohibited 

items. And, just in the last 2 years, I have seen us expand the use 

of canines at the last point of departure airports and domestic airports to look for prohibited items in airports and in and around airplanes. So, I do believe in canine use. It is very effective—in a 

number of our missions—not just aviation security. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, we have not really increased the numbers. I mean, is that something that you would want to look at increasing—I think it is about 2,500 units, in total, within DHS. I 

think it was 900 in TSA—or 1,000 in TSA. It has been pretty flat. 

Do you think it is so effective that we should be looking at expanding that? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think it is worth looking at. I understand 

you had a hearing exclusively devoted to this not too long ago. Canines are very effective, and one of the things that I was fascinated 

by when I was in Turkey last week, is that they are not as opposed 

to the use of canines, there, as one might expect them to be. So, 

they are embracing this, too. So, I think it is worth looking at, yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Yes. Well, we will work together on that. 

The final thing I will just talk about is what Senator Carper was 

talking about: personnel in cyber. Happy to work with you there, 

in terms of what we need to do. Is it, trying to attract people from 

the private sector to take a 2-year sabbatical and come here—whatever imaginative program we can use to attract those individuals. 

I have stated, repeatedly, that I am very impressed with the indi-
38 

viduals, like yourself, like Mr. Deyo, and really, like your entire 

team here—by the quality of the Federal workforce. These people 

are patriots. They take their mission of keeping this Nation safe seriously, but they also understand the constraints. I am a private 

sector guy. I know what the private sector will pay for talent and 

you are constrained there. 

So, we are going to have to put our heads together and figure 

out, what we need to do so that your Department is staffed with 

the best and the brightest. There are plenty of patriots in America 

that will do it and will do it at a really great financial sacrifice, 

so let us try and break down whatever barriers we create, bureaucratically, to resource you. 

Secretary JOHNSON. We have terrific career people, but I agree 

with what Tom said, which is that we ought to appeal to people’s 

sense of patriotism, to, ‘‘Hey, how about spending a couple of years 

serving your country and working for the government in 

cybersecurity, which will better enable you to get that terrific job 

later on in the financial sector, in the private sector, or with some 

terrific cybersecurity firm in Silicon Valley.’’ So, we ought to appeal 

to people’s sense of patriotism. 

Chairman JOHNSON. General Electric (GE) has a very imaginative marketing advertising campaign out right now trying to make 

it really attractive to not go into these apps, but actually to go in 

and figure out how to make an economy run properly with informational technology. And, we can, maybe, do something similar to 

that. 

But, again, we want to work with you, in terms of what Senator 

McCain was talking about, with consulates, so that refugees and 

asylum-seekers can do that within Central America, rather than 

make the dangerous journey. 

We want to work with you, in terms of reducing our insatiable 

demand for drugs. The passing of Nancy Reagan is an important 

reminder. That campaign actually worked. We have been very effective at reducing the demand for tobacco. We ought to try the 

same thing with drugs. 

But, again, I want to thank your entire management team. I 

want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for coming here, and for all of 

your efforts. This is not an easy job. This is an enormous challenge, 

and you are working hard to try and keep this Nation safe and secure. So, thank you for your efforts. 

With that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days, until 

March 23 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions 

for the record. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 
(39) 

A P P E N D I X 
40 

In this tight budget environment, the department has certainly had to make some tradcoffs. As 

we dive into the budget, I hope the secretary is able to speak to several arcasof potential concern 

for me and the committee. 

One issue is the department's decision to raise several fees, primarily at the Transportation 

Security Administration, by over almost $1 billion to offset shifts of appropriated funds 

elsewhere within the department. The TSA would have essentially no direct benefit from the 

increase. This decision comes at a time when Administrator Neffenger is trying to improve 

agency operations and security. 

The committee also wants to hear more about the department's proposal to reduce federal grants 

through the Federal Emergency Management Agency by $642.1 million- cuts that primarily 

would be made to mitigation and homeland security grants. 

Lastly, we want to hear what steps the department will be taking in the coming year to address 

ongoing management issues in acquisition, human capital and financial management. We would 

like to understand the department's next steps toward improvement. 

Again, I thank the secretary for joining us this morning, and I look forward to our discussion. 
41 

Statement of Ranking Member Tom Carper 

"The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2017" 

Tuesday, March 8, 2016 

As prepared for delivery: 

My thanks to Secretary Johnson for joining us today to discuss the President's Fiscal Year 2017 

budget request for the Department of Homeland Security. 

The President has requested $40.6 billion dollars in discretionary funding for DHS, which is 

roughly a one percent decrease from the budget enacted last year. 

While I am pleased that many vital homeland security missions are funded in this budget request, 

I do have concerns about several of the proposals and the impact they might have on the 

Department. 

I understand the need to do more with less as part of our efforts to continue to bring our nation's 

deficit and debt under control. Making additional progress is critical for the well-being of our 

nation and our economy. But while doing so, we also need to make sure that the Department has 

the funds it needs to keep the American people safe against the constantly evolving and growing 

threats we face as a nation. 

l am concerned, for example, by the proposal to cut funding for several homeland security 

grants. In fact, some grants would be cut by as much as 35 percent. These funds are vital to 

helping our communities better prepare for major disasters and terrorist attacks. In Boston, for 

example, homeland security grants were critical to training first responders and preparing the 

community to respond to the Boston Marathon bombings. 

I also have questions about the fee increases proposed in the budget for aviation security. I know 

that raising these fees has not been popular with some in Congress, but I've always felt that if 

something is worth having, it's worth paying for. That's why I've supported reasonable fee 

increases that will help DHS carry out its mission. 

However, if Congress doesn't raise these aviation fees, there will be roughly a $900 million 

dollar hole in the budget for TSA. That is deeply concerning. I hope we can all come together 

and find a sensible solution to this problem. 

Despite these areas of concern, there are a number of positive items included in this budget 

request. For example, there is a sizable investment--over $1.1 billion dollars-in cybersecurity. 

This is a 30 percent increase over last year. This new funding will help the Department carry out 

several laws that this Committee worked hard to pass over the past several years. 

For instance, the budget request includes needed increases for Einstein and other cybersecurity 

tools to better secure our federal networks. There is also funding for additional cyber personnel, 

as well as for the new information sharing portal that Congress called for creating at DIIS. 
42 

The proposed budget also continues our recent investments in border security. I was particularly 

pleased to sec increases in funding for valuable 'force multipliers'- equipment such as aerostats, 

airplanes, helicopters, vehicles, boats and surveillance towers- that help our men and women on 

the ground be more effective. 

I was also pleased to see that the budget request continues to make countering violent extremism 

here at home a high priority by funding the Office of Community Partnerships. Last month, this 

Committee successfully marked up my legislation that would codify this office. I look forward to 

working with you, Mr. Secretary, and the Director of the office, George Selim, as well as my 

colleagues, to advance this important bill through the Senate. 

Finally, I've also been quite encouraged to see funding for the ongoing consolidation of the 

Depmiment's Headquarters at St. Elizabeths. Completing this project will ultimately save the 

taxpayer more than $700 million over the next 30 years by cutting down the number of costly 

leases we use today to house DHS personnel. 

Mr. Secretary, I'd like to close by recognizing your leadership, along with that of your Deputy 

Secretary, Ali Majorkas, as well as the efforts of your senior staff and rank-and-file DHS 

employees, in support of your Unity of EfTort initiatives. 

Along with the members of our committee staff, the Chairman and I arc working diligently to 

move legislation that would codify a number of your proposed reforms. 

I look forward to hearing more today about how we can work together to ensure the Department 

has the tools, resources, and authorities it needs to grow stronger and work more effectively. 

Thank you again for joining us here today and for your extraordinary service to our country. 
43 

Prepared Testimony on 

"The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2017" 

Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Charles Johnson 

Senate Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee 

March 8, 2016 

Introduction 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and members of the committee. 

thank you for the opportunity to be here. 

The President's FY 2017 budget request for the Department of Homeland 

Security reflects hard choices to fit within the caps established by the bipartisan budget 

agreement of2015, but, at the end of the day, it funds all of our vital homeland security 

missions in these challenging times. 

The President's FY 2017 budget request calls for $40.6 billion in appropriated 

funds (compared to $41 billion currently in FY20 16) but an increase in total spending 

authority to $66.8 billion (compared to $64.8 billion currently in FY2016). Total 

workforce requested is 229,626, compared to 226,157 in FY2016, accompanied by an 

overall workforce pay raise of 1.6%. 

Like this year, the President's budget requests $6.7 billion to finance the cost of 

major disasters in FEMA's disaster relief fund, and the ability to collect fees of$19.5 

billion (compared to S 17.1 billion this year). 

As I said before, the President's budget request tunds our vital homeland security 

missions. Our request includes: 

• $5 .I billion for transportation screening operations, including increased screening 

personnel, to ensure the security of our airways, a $100 million increase; 

• $1.6 billion, an increase of over $200 million, to fund our vital cybersecurity 

mission, including increased investments in the Continuous Diagnostic Mitigation 

program; 

• $1.9 billion for the Secret Service, which is the same as enacted in FY 2016, to 

protect our national leaders, fight eyber-crime, and support increased hiring; 

• $319 million to cover costs associated with unaccompanied children and families; 

• $1.1 billion for recapitalization of the U.S. Coast Guard's assets, including a 

sizable investment in the Nation's future arctic capability; and 
44 

• $226 million for continued investment in the construction of a future DHS 

headquarters at St. Elizabeth's. 

Management Reform 

Like last year, reforming the way in which the Department of Homeland Security 

tunctions and conducts business, to more effectively and efficiently deliver our services 

to the American people, is my overarehing objective for 2016. We've done a lot in the 

last two years, but there is still much we will do. There are still too many stove pipes and 

inef1ieieneies in the Department. 

My goal as Secretary is to continue to protect the homeland, and leave the 

Department of Homeland Security a better place than I f(mnd it. 

The centerpiece of our management reform has been the Unity of Effort initiative I 

announced in April 2014, which focuses on getting away from the stove pipes, in favor of 

more centralized programming, budgeting, and acquisition processes. 

We have already transformed our approach to the budget. Today, we focus 

Department-wide on our mission needs, rather than through component stove-pipes. 

With the support of Congress, we arc moving to a simplified budget structure that will 

support better decision-making across the Department. 

We have transformed our approach to acquisition. Last year I established a DHSwidc Joint Requirements Council to evaluate, from the viewpoint of the Department as a 

whole. a component's needs on the front end of an acquisition. 

We have launched the '·Acquisition Innovations in Motion'' initiative. to consult 

with the contractor community about ways to improve the quality and timeliness of our 

contracting process, and the emerging skills required of our acquisition professionals. W c 

are putting faster contracting processes in place. 

We arc reforming our human resources process. We are making our hiring 

process faster and more efticient. We are using all the tools we have to recruit, retain and 

reward personnel. 

As part of the Unity of Effort initiative, in 2014 we created the Joint Task Forces 

dedicated to border security along the southern border. Once again, we are getting away 

trom the stove pipes. In 20!5, these Task Forces became fully operational. In 2016, we 

are asking Congress to officially authorize them in legislation. 

2 
45 

We are achieving more transparency in our operations. We have staffed up our 

Office of Immigration Statistics and gave it the mandate to integrate immigration data 

across the Department. Last year, and for the second year in a row, we reported our total 

number of repatriations, returns and removals on a consolidated, Department-wide basis. 

The long-awaited entry/exit overstay report was published in January. providing a 

clearer picture of the number of individuals in this country who overstay their visitor 

visas. It reflects that about I% of those who enter the country by air or sea on visitor 

visas or through the Visa Waiver Program overstay. 

We are working with outside, non-partisan experts on a project called 

BORDERST AT, to develop a clear and comprehensive set of outcome metrics for 

measuring border security, apprehension rates, and inflow rates. 

Since 2013 we've spearheaded something called the "DHS Data Framework" 

initiative. For the protection of the homeland, we are improving the collection and 

comparison of travel, immigration and other information against classified intelligence. 

We will do this consistent with laws and policies that protect privacy and civil liberties. 

We want to restructure the National Protection and Programs Directorate from a 

headquarters element to an operational component called the '·Cyber and Infrastructure 

Protection" agency. 

Finally, we will improve the levels of employee satisfaction across the 

Department. We've been on an aggressive campaign to improve morale over the last two 

years. It takes time to turn a 22-component workforce of240,000 people in a different 

direction. Though the overall results last year were still disappointing, we see signs of 

improvement. Employee satisfaction improved in a number of components, including at 

DHS headquarters. 

This year we will see an overall improvement in employee satisfaction across 

DHS. 

Counterterrorism 

In 2016, counterterrorism will remain the cornerstone of the Department of 

Homeland Security's mission. The events of2015 reinforce this. 

As I have said many times, we arc in a new phase in the global terrorist threat, 

requiring a whole new type of response. We have moved from a world of terroristdirected attacks to a world that includes the threat of terrorist-inspired attacks- in which 

the terrorist may have never come face to face with a single member of a terrorist 

3 
46 

organization, lives among us in the homeland, and self-radicalizes, inspired by something 

on the internet. 

By their nature, terrorist-inspired attacks are harder to detect by our intelligence 

and law enforcement communities, could occur with little or no notice, and in general 

makes for a more complex homeland security challenge. 

So, what are we doing about this? 

First, our government, along with our coalition partners, continues to take the fight 

militarily to terrorist organizations overseas. ISIL is the terrorist organization most 

prominent on the world stage. Since September 2014, air strikes and special operations 

have in fact led to the death of a number of ISIL's leaders and those focused on plotting 

external attacks in the West. At the same time, ISIL has lost about 40% of the populated 

areas it once controlled in Iraq, and thousands of square miles of territory it once 

controlled in Syria. 

On the law enforcement side, the FBI continues to do an excellent job of detecting, 

investigating, preventing, and prosecuting terrorist plots here in the homeland. 

As for the Department of Homeland Security, following the attacks in Ottawa, 

Canada in 2014, and in reaction to terrorist groups' public calls for attacks on 

government installations in the western world, I directed the Federal Protective Service to 

enhance its presence and security at various U. S. government buildings around the 

country. 

Given the prospect of the terrorist-inspired attack in the homeland, we have 

intensified our work with state and local law enforcement. Almost every day, DHS and 

the FBI share intelligence and information with Joint Terrorism Task Forces, tusion 

centers, local police chiefs and sheriffs. 

In FY 2015 we provided homeland security assistance to state and local 

governments around the country, for things such as active shooter training exercises, 

overtime for cops and firefighters, salaries for emergency managers, emergency vehicles, 

and communications and surveillance equipment. We helped to fund an active shooter 

training exercise that took place in the New York City subways last November and a 

series of these exercises earlier this month in Miami. Last month we announced another 

round of awards for FY 2016 that will fund similar activities over the next three years. 

As I said at a graduation ceremony for 1,200 new cops in New York City in 

December, given the current threat environment, it is the cop on the beat who may be the 

first to detect the next terrorist attack in the United States. 

4 
47 

We are also enhancing information sharing with organizations that represent 

businesses, college and professional sports, faith-based organizations, and critical 

infrastructure. 

We arc enhancing measures to detect and prevent travel to this country by foreign 

terrorist fighters. 

We are strengthening our Visa Waiver Program, which permits travelers from 38 

different countries to come here without a visa. In2014, we began to collect more 

personal information in the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, or "ESTA" 

system, that travelers from Visa Waiver countries are required to use. As a result of these 

enhancements, over 3,000 additional travelers were denied travel here in fY 2015. 

In August 2015, we introduced further security enhancements to the Visa Waiver 

Program. 

Through the passage in December of the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and 

Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of2015, Congress has codified into law several ofthcse 

security enhancements, and placed new restrictions on eligibility for travel to the U.S. 

without a visa. We began to enforce these restrictions on January 21. Waivers from 

these restrictions will only be granted on a case-by-case basis, when it is in the law 

enforcement or national security interests of the United States to do so. Those denied 

entry under the Visa Waiver Program as a result of the new law may still apply for a visa 

to travel to the U.S. 

Last month, under the authority given me by the new law, I also added three 

countries Libya, Yemen and Somalia to a list that prohibits anyone who has visited 

these nations in the past five years from traveling to the U.S. without a visa. 

We are expanding the Department's use of social media for various purposes. 

Today social media is used for over 30 different operational and investigative purposes 

within DHS. Beginning in 2014 we launched four pilot programs that involved 

consulting the social media of applicants for certain immigration benefits. USC IS now 

also reviews the social media of Syrian refugee applicants referred for enhanced vetting. 

Based upon the recent recommendation of a Social Media Task Force within DHS, I have 

determined, consistent with relevant privacy and other laws, that we must expand the use 

of social media even further. 

CBP is deploying personnel at various airports abroad, to pre-clear air travelers 

before they get on flights to the United States. At present, we have this pre-clearance 

capability at 15 airports overseas. And, last year, through pre-clearance, we denied 

boarding to over 10,700 travelers (or 29 per day) seeking to enter the United States. As I 
48 

said here last year, we want to build more of these. In May 2015, I announced 10 

additional airports in nine countries that we've prioritized for preclearance. 

For years Congress and others have urged us to develop a system for biometric 

exit- that is, to take the fingerprints or other biometric data of those who leave the 

country. CBP has begun testing technologies that can be deployed for this 

nationwide. With the passage of the omnibus bill, Congress authorized up to $1 billion in 

fcc increases over a period often years to pay for the implementation of biometric exit. I 

have directed that CBP begin implementing the system, starting at top airports, in 2018. 

In January, I announced the schedule for the final two phases of implementation of 

the REAL ID Act, which goes into effect two and then four years from now. At present 

23 states are compliant with the law, 27 have extensions, and 6 states or territories are out 

of compliance. Now that the final timetable for implementation of the law is in place, we 

urge all states, for the good of their residents, to start issuing REAL ID-complaint 

drivers' licenses as soon as possible. 

In the current threat environment, there is a role for the public too. "If You See 

Something, Say Something"TM must be more than a slogan. We continue to stress this. 

DfiS has now established partnerships with the NFL, Major League Baseball and 

NASCAR, to raise public awareness at sporting events. An informed and vigilant public 

contributes to national security. 

In December we reformed "NTAS," the National Terrorism Advisory System. In 

2011, we replaced the color-coded alerts with NTAS. But, the problem with NTAS was 

we never used it, it consisted of just two types of Alerts: ''Elevated" and "Imminent," and 

depended on the presence of a known specific and credible threat. This docs not work in 

the current environment, which includes the threat of homegrown. self-radicalized, 

terrorist-inspired attacks. So, in December we added a new form of advisory the NT AS 

"Bulletin"- to augment the existing Alerts. The Bulletin we issued in December advises 

the public of the current threat environment, and how the public can help. 

Finally, given the nature of the evolving terrorist threat, building bridges to diverse 

communities has become a homeland security imperative. Well inf<Jrmed families and 

communities are the best defense against terrorist ideologies. Al Qaeda and the Islamic 

State are targeting Muslim communities in this country. We must respond. In my view, 

this is as important as any of our other homeland security missions. 

In 2015 we took these efforts to new levels. We created the DHS Office for 

Community Partnerships, headed by George Selim. George and this office arc now the 

central hub for the Department's efforts to counter violent extremism in this country, and 

6 
49 

the lead for a new interagency CVE Task Force that includes DHS, DOJ, the FBI, NCTC 

and other agencies. 

Funding is included in the President's budget request to support these 

counterterrorism efforts in the following key areas: 

• $2 billion requested in total grants funding will prepare state and local 

governments to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from 

incidents of terrorism and other catastrophic events. These funds also include 

Firefighter and Emergency Management Performance Grants that support local 

first responders in achieving their missions and $50 million for Countering 

Violent Extremism grants for emergent threats from violent extremism and from 

complex, coordinated terrorist attacks. 

• $292 million sustains U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) targeting 

programs, which includes support for the National Targeting Centers (NTC) for 

passengers and cargo. The NTCs effectively target and interdict inadmissible 

high-risk passengers, cargo and agriculture/biotenorism threats before reaching 

U.S. ports of entry. And, the newly established Counter Network Program will 

expand CBP's partnerships to exchange information and coordinate actions to 

identify. disrupt, and dismantle illicit networks and associated organizations. 

• $197.5 million to sustain inspection and enforcement efforts abroad, which 

include the Immigration Advisory Program, created by CBP in 2004 to prevent 

terrorists and high-risk or improperly-documented travelers from boarding 

commercial aircraft destined for the United States. This investment also funds 

Preclearance operations. In addition to improving CBP's ability to protect the 

American homeland by extending our borders and preventing terrorists from 

gaining access to the United States, Preclearance relieves congestion at U.S. 

"gateway" airports and opens up new destinations for international flights. 

• $103.9 million to purchase radiological and nuclear detection equipment, an 

increase of $14 million over funding appropriated in 2016, enabling the proposed 

new CBRNE Office (a combination of Office of Health Affairs and Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office) and the U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, and TSA, to keep U.S. 

ports of entry safe and secure by detecting and interdicting illicit radioactive or 

nuclear materials. 

• $81.9 million sustains the BioWatch program to provide detection and early 

warning of the intentional release of select aerosolized biological agents in more 

than 30 jurisdictions nationwide. 

7 
50 

• $79.9 million sustains Infrastructure Security Compliance funding to secure 

America's high-risk chemical facilities through systematic regulation, inspection, 

and enforcement under the authority of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards. 

Aviation Security 

We are taking aggressive steps to improve aviation and airport security. 

Since 2014 we have enhanced security at overseas last-point-of-departure airports, 

and a number of foreign governments have replicated those enhancements. 

As many of you know, in May of last year a classified DHS Inspector General's 

test of certain TSA screening at eight airports, reflecting a dismal fail rate, was leaked to 

the press. I directed a 10-point plan to fix the problems identified by the IG. Under the 

new leadership of Admiral Pete NetTenger over the last six months, TSA has aggressively 

implemented this plan. This has included "back to basics" retraining for the entire TSO 

workforce, increased use of random explosive trace detectors, testing and re-evaluating 

the screening equipment that was the subject of the IG's test, a rewrite of the standard 

operating procedures manual, increased manual screening, and less randomized inclusion 

in Pre-Check lanes. These measures were implemented on or ahead of schedule. 

We arc also focused on airport security. In April of last year TSA issued 

guidelines to domestic airports to reduce access to secure areas, to require that all airport 

and airline personnel pass through TSA screening if they intend to board a flight, to 

conduct more frequent physical screening of airport and airline personnel, and to conduct 

more frequent criminal background checks of airport and airline personnel. Since then 

employee access points have been reduced, and random screening of personnel within 

secure areas has increased four-fold. We are continuing these efforts in 2016. In early 

February, TSA issued guidelines to further enhance the screening of aviation workers in 

the secure area of airports. 

I am particularly proud of the newly established TSA Academy housed by the 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers in Glynco, Georgia. Ali new TSOs are now 

receiving two-week training on how to screen for threats. DHS has built a full-scale 

representation of an airport screening station tor students to use as they are taught how to 

serve the traveling public, interpret x-ray machine images, and check bags lor dangerous 

materials or weapons. 

In the President's FY2017 budget request, funding is included tor aviation security 

in the following key areas: 
51 

• $3.0 billion to support 42,848 Transportation Security Officers, an increase of 

$26.9 million over FY 2016, to ensure effective screening operations while 

minimizing wait times. 

• $199.8 million for transportation screening technology, enabling TSA to continue 

improving the capabilities of its checkpoint screening equipment throughout 

almost 450 airports to better protect against passenger-borne threats, an increase 

of $5 million. 

• $116.6 million to provide training for TSA screeners. which supports an increase 

of $20 million for new basic training to be provided at the TSA Academy located 

at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. 

• $84.0 million for TSA 's intelligence operations, an increase of $2.0 million to 

expand the number of intelligences officers to 87 in frontline facilities that will 

enhance the effectiveness of checkpoint security screening. 

• $815.3 million to support the continued deployment of Federal Air Marshals 

(FAMs), $10 million above the FY 2016levels. The Federal Air Marshal Service 

has been subject to a hiring freeze since 2011, and recently completed a new 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS) detailing a new deployment strategy that 

achieves optimal F AMs staffing to ensure its operations mitigate the maximum 

risk as with other TSA aviation security activities. 

Cybersecurity 

While counterterrorism remains a cornerstone of our Department's mission, I have 

concluded that cybersecurity must be another. Making tangible improvements to our 

Nation's cybcrsecurity is a top priority for President Obama and for me to accomplish 

before the next President is inaugurated. 

On February 9'11 , the President announced his "Cybersecurity National Action 

Plan," which is the culmination of seven years of effort by the Administration. The Plan 

includes a call for the creation of a Commission on Enhancing National Cybcrsecurity, 

additional investments in technology, federal cybcrsecurity, cyber education, new eyber 

talent in the federal workforce, and improved cyber incident response. 

DHS has a role in almost every aspect of the President's plan. 

As reflected in the President's 2017 budget request, we want to expand our cyber 

response teams from 10 to 48. 

9 
52 

We are doubling the number of cybersccurity advisors to in effect make "house 

calls,'' to assist private sector organizations with in-person, customized cybersecurity 

assessments and best practices. 

Building on DHS's ''Stop. Think. Connect" campaign, we will help promote 

public awareness on multi-factor authentication. 

We will collaborate with Underwriters Laboratory and others to develop a 

Cybersccurity Assurance Program to test and certify networked devices within the 

"Internet of Things."-- such as your home alarm system, your refrigerator, or even your 

pacemaker. 

Last year we greatly expanded the capability ofDHS's National Cybcrsecurity 

Communications Integration Center, or "NCCIC." The NCCIC increased its distribution 

of information, the number of vulnerability assessments conducted, and the number of 

incident responses. 

At the NCCIC, last year we built a system to automate the receipt and distribution 

of cyber threat indicators in ncar real-time speed. We built this in a way that also 

includes privacy protections. 

I have issued an aggressive timetable for improving federal civilian cybersecurity, 

principally through two DHS programs: 

The first is called EINSTEIN. EINSTEIN 1 and 2 have the ability to detect and 

monitor eybersecurity threats in our federal systems, and are now in place across all 

federal civilian departments and agencies. 

EINSTEIN 3A is the newest iteration of the system, and has the ability to block 

potential cyber attacks on our federal systems. Thus far E3A has actually blocked 

700,000 cyber threats, and we are rapidly expanding this capability. About a year ago, 

E3A covered only about 20% of our federal civilian networks. In the wake of the OPM 

attack, in May of last year I directed our cybersecurity team to make at least some aspects 

of E3A available to all federal departments and agencies by the end of last year. They 

met that deadline. Now that the system is available to everyone, 50% are actually on 

line, including the Office of Personnel Management, and we are working to get all federal 

departments and agencies on board by the end of this year. 

The second program, called Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation, or CDM, 

helps agencies detect and prioritize vulnerabilities inside their networks. In 2015, we 

provided CDM sensors to 97% of the federal civilian government. This year, DIIS will 

provide the second phase ofCDM to 100% of the federal civilian government. 

10 
53 

We have worked with OMB and DNI to identify the government's high value 

systems, and we are working aggressively with the owners of those systems to increase 

their security. 

In September, DHS awarded a grant to the University of Texas San Antonio to 

work with industry to identify a common set of best practices for the development of 

Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations, or "ISAOs." 

Finally, I thank Congress for passing the Cybersecurity Act of2015. This new 

law is a huge assist to DHS and our cybersecurity mission. We arc in the process of 

implementing that new law now. Just last month, I announced that we issued guidelines 

and procedures, required by this law, providing federal agencies and the private sector 

with a clear understanding of how to share cyber threat indicators with the NCCIC, and 

how the NCCIC will share and usc that information. We issued these guidelines and 

procedures consistent with the deadline set by the new law. 

Funding is included for cybersecurity in the FY 2017 budget request in the 

following key areas: 

• $274.8 million for the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program which 

provides hardware, software, and services designed to support activities that 

strengthen the operational security oftederal ".gov" networks. an increase of 

more than $170 million over the FY 2016 enacted level. 

• $4 71.1 million sustains the EINSTEIN program, to continue to combat intrusions, 

enhance information sharing, and deploy analytical capabilities to secure the 

federal civilian information technology enterprise. 

• The FY 2017 budget request sustains ICE and USSS resources to combat cyhercrime and investigate cybcr-criminals. 

Immigration/Border Security 

Immigration policy must be two sides of the same coin. 

The resources we have to enforce immigration laws are finite, and we must usc 

them wisely. This is true of every aspect of law enforcement. 

With the immigration enforcement resources we have, ICE is focused more 

sharply on public safety and border security. Those who are convicted of serious 

crimes QI who have recently been apprehended at the border are top priorities lor 

removal. And we will enforce the law in accordance with these priorities. 

11 
54 

Accordingly, over the last several years deportations by ICE have gone down, but 

an increasing percentage of those deported are convicted criminals. And, an increased 

percentage of those in immigration detention, around 85%, are in the top priority for 

removal. We will continue to focus our resources on the most significant threats to public 

safety and border security. 

In furtherance of our public safety efforts, in 2014 we did away with the 

controversial Secure Communities program and replaced it with the new Priority 

Enforcement Program, or "PEP." PEP fixes the political and legal controversies 

associated with Secure Communities and enables us to take directly into custody from 

local law enforcement the most dangerous, removable criminals. Since PEP was created, 

cities and counties that previously refused to work with Secure Communities are coming 

back to the table. Of the 25 largest counties that refused to work with ICE before, 16 are 

now participating in PEP. In 2016, we will work to get more to participate. 

And, because we are asking ICE immigration enforcement officers to focus on 

convicted criminals and do a job that's more in the nature oflaw enforcement, last year 

we reformed their pay scale accordingly. Now, the pay scale f()r these immigration 

officers is the same as other federal law enforcement. 

We have also prioritized the removal of those apprehended at the border. We 

cannot allow our borders to be open to illegal immigration. 

Over the last 15 years, our Nation across multiple administrations has invested 

a lot in border security, and this investment has yielded positive results. Apprehensions 

by the Border Patrol which are an indicator of total attempts to cross the border illegally 

are a fraction of what they to use to be. 

In FY 2014, overall apprehensions by the Border patrol increased, as we saw a 

spike in the number of families and unaccompanied children from Central America 

during the spring and summer of 2014. That year the overall number of apprehensions 

was 479,000. Across the government, we responded aggressively to this surge and the 

numbers fell sharply within a short period of time. 

In FY 2015, the number of those apprehended by the Border Patrol on the 

southwest border was 331,000 with the exception of one year, the lowest since 1972. 

From July to December 2015 the numbers of migrants from Central America, 

especially families and unaccompanied children, began to climb again. 

In January I announced a series of focused enforcement actions to take into 

custody and remove those who had been apprehended at the border in 2014 or later and 

12 
55 

then ordered removed by an immigration court. I know this made a lot of people I 

respect very unhappy. But. we must enforce the law in accordance with our priorities. 

In January overall apprehensions by the Border Patrol on the southwest border 

dropped 36% from the month before. At the same time, the number of unaccompanied 

children apprehended dropped 54%, and the number of those in families dropped 65%. 

In February, the numbers of unaccompanied children and families have remained at this 

lower level. We are closely monitoring the situation on the southwest border and will not 

dial back our efforts, as illegal migration traditionally increases in the spring. We will do 

all we can to prevent another summer surge in illegal crossings. We will continue to 

enforce the law consistent with our priorities for enforcement, which includes those 

apprehended at the border in 2014 or later. 

Then there is the other side of the coin. The new enforcement policy the President 

and I announced in November 2014 makes clear that our limited enforcement resources 

will not be focused on the removal of those who have committed no serious crimes, have 

been in this country for years, and have families here. Under our new policy, these 

people are not priorities for removal. nor should they be. 

In fact, the President and I want to offer, to those who have lived here for at least 

five years, are parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanents residents, and who have 

committed no series crimes, the opportunity to request deferred action on a case-by-case 

basis, to come out of the shadows, get on the books, and be held accountable. We arc 

pleased that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case of Texas v. United States. 

which involves the new deferred action policies we announced in November 2014. 

Our overall policy is to focus our immigration enforcement resources more 

effectively on threats to public safety and border security, and, within our existing legal 

authority, do as much as we can to tix the broken immigration system. We're 

disappointed that Congress has not been our partner in this effort, by passing 

comprehensive immigration reform legislation. 

Finally. we recognize that more border security and deportations may deter illegal 

migration, but they do nothing to overcome the "push factors" that prompt desperate 

people to flee Central America in the first place. We are prepared to offer vulnerable 

individuals f1eeing the violence in Central America a safe and legal alternate path to a 

better life. We are expanding our Refugee Admissions Program to help vulnerable men, 

women and children in Central America who qualify as refugees. We are partnering with 

the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental organizations in the 

region to do this as soon as possible. This approach builds on our recently established 

Central American Minors program, which is now providing an in-country refugee 

processing option for certain children with lawfully present parents in the United States. 

13 
56 

The President's FY 2017 budget request includes the following key resources for 

immigration and border security: 

• $7.0 billion to fund the salaries and benefits of Border Patrol agents and CBP 

officers. In FY 2017, CBP plans to hire up to 21,070 Border Patrol agents, a 

decrease of300 from the 2016 enacted leveL and 23,821 CBP officers. 

• $1.4 billion to enable U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to maintain 

nearly 31,000 detention beds for individuals presenting a flight risk, a risk to 

public safety or national security, or who are subject to mandatory detention. 

• $2.0 billion sustains the Coast Guard counter-drug and alien migration 

interdiction operations. These intelligence-driven mission activities arc critical to 

disrupting Transnational Criminal Organizations and securing the southern 

border. 

• $1.6 billion sustains the Coast Guard's ports, waterways, and coastal security 

efforts. These include screening to ensure unauthorized and illicit individuals do 

not gain access to, or disrupt, key maritime transportation and commerce nodes. 

All crew, passengers, and cargo of vessels over 300 tons are screened prior to 

arrival in U.S. waters to mitigate potential risks to our nation. 

• $319 million, a decrease of more than $370 million, to cover the costs associated 

with the temporary care and transportation of up to 75,000 unaccompanied 

children, along with other resources for the custody of adults with children who 

cross our borders. 

• $126.0 million for the Alternatives to Detention Program, an increase of$12 

million, to monitor 53,000 average daily participants, including families, who 

may pose a flight risk but who are not considered a threat to our 

communities. The ATD program places low-risk individuals under various forms 

of non-detained. intensive supervision, which may include electronic monitoring. 

• $347.5 million for the Criminal Alien Program, an increase of$7 million, to 

support ICE in the apprehension and removal of both at-large and incarcerated 

convicted criminals. These resources include funding for an additional I 00 

officers to support the expanded implementation of PEP. 

• $268.4 million, an increase of$30 million that sustains the increase of 311 

attorneys in the FY 2016 appropriation, for ICE's Office of Principal Legal 

Advisor, which represents the U.S. Government in removal proceedings and 

litigated over 400,000 immigration related cases in FY 2015. 

14 
57 

• $355.7 million to maintain the necessary infrastructure and technology along the 

Nation's borders to ensure CBP law enforcement personnel are supported with 

effective surveillance technology to improve their ability to detect and interdict 

illegal activity in a safer environment. This represents a decrease of$91 million 

from the substantial increase provided in the FY 2016 appropriation. 

Refugees 

We are doing our part to address the Syrian refugee crisis. USCIS, in conjunction 

with the Department of State, is working hard to meet our commitment to admit at least 

10,000 Syrian refugees by the end of this fiscal year. We will do this by carefully 

screening refugees in a multi-layered and intense screening process involving multiple 

law enforcement, national security, and intelligence agencies across the Federal 

Government. 

Secret Service 

Over the last year, Director Joe Clancy of the Secret Service has done a 

tremendous job reforming the agency, including hiring a chief operating officer from 

outside the Secret Service, altering the structure and management of the agency, ramping 

up efforts to hire new members of its workforce, and expanding training opportunities. In 

2016 we will continue to work on areas that still need improvement. 

The President's FY2017 budget requests $108.2 million to enhance White House 

security, an increase of$42 million, which includes support tor the U.S. Secret Service's 

Operational Mission Support initiative to enhance protection at fixed and temporary sites 

and includes advanced protective countermeasures. 

The Coast Guard 

With the help of Congress, in 2016 we will continue to modernize the Coast Guard 

fleet, including all major air and surface asset lines. We propose continuing these 

investments in the 2017 Budget request. and we seek an additional $150 million for the 

design of a new Polar-class icebreaker. 

Our FY 2017 budget request includes S 1.1 billion to support the Coast Guard's air 

and surface fleet recapitalization, to include $240.0 million for production of four Fast 

Response Cutters; $130.0 million to convert Air National Guard C27J aircraft for Coast 

Guard use; $150.0 million for acquisition activities for a new polar icebreaker; and 

$100.0 million to complete evaluation of detailed design and long lead time material for 

the lead Offshore Patrol Cutter. 

15 
58 

Our FY 2017 budget includes $243 million to support FLETC's mission. Since 

2012, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has trained more than a quarter 

million federal, state and local officers and agents. At the same time, FLETC continually 

updates its curriculum to address the biggest challenges facing law enforcement, to 

include training for active shooter situations, cyber forensics. and human traft1cking. 

FEMA 

FEMA continues to carry out its extraordinary responsibility of supporting the 

American people and communities to prepare for. respond to, and recover from various 

disasters. FEMA will continue to focus on efforts to enhance resilience and mitigation 

measures before disaster strikes, to prevent loss and save lives. 

Our FY 2017 budget request supports the Disaster Relief Fund, grant programs, 

disaster preparedness plans, and training for our homeland security and law enforcement 

partners. This includes $6.7 billion to sustain relief fund levels that provide immediate 

and long-lasting assistance to individuals and communities stricken by emergencies and 

major disasters. Our 2017 Budget request also includes $365.0 million for the Predisaster Mitigation Fund and for flood hazard zone mapping. The Administration is 

committed to helping communities take steps to protect themselves from extreme weather 

and other climate impacts. These investments build on recent progress and pursue 

strategies to build a more climate-resilient America. 

Lawful Trade and Travel 

We continue to promote lawful trade and travel. We will continue to pursue the 

President's U.S.-Mcxico High Level Economic Dialogue and his Beyond the Border 

Initiative with Canada. We are implementing "Single Window" for international trade, 

which, by December 2016, will enable the private sector to use just one portal to transmit 

information to 47 government agencies about exports and imports, thereby eliminating 

over 200 different forms and streamlining the trade process. 

Conclusion 

As I stated before, developing this budget request within the top line constraints of 

the bipartisan budget agreement of 2015 required difficult choices. But I am confident 

that the Department of Homeland Security will build upon the progress we have made 

over the past year and continue to fulfill our vital mission of keeping the homeland safe. 

I again thank you for the opportunity to speak here today and for your continued 

support ofDHS. 

16 
59 

I look forward to your questions. 

l7 
55,000 

50,000 

45,000 

40,000 

35,000 

30,000 

25,000 

20,000 

15,000 

10,000 

5,000 

%removed 

to date: 

UAC APPREHENSIONS 

UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN: HONDURAS, GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR 

51,705 

DACA announced: • June2012 

29.7% 21.7% 24.1% 11.7% 6.2% 2.6% 3.6% 

U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 
APPREHENSIONS: FIRST QUARTER 

UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN: HONDURAS, GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR 

• 

16,000 • • 14,263 • 14,000 

12,000 

10,000 DACA announced: 

8,000 June2012-+ 

6,000 

4,000 • 

2,000 

1,000 

500 

0 

U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 
62 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable ,Jeh C . .Johnson 

From Senator Rob Portman 

"The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2017" 

March 6, 2016 

Question: What percent of the heroin and fentanyl trafficked is interdicted at the 

border(s)'? 

Methamphetamine') Cocaine? Marijuana? 

Response: Included below is information regarding drug seizures by U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection: 

US Border Patrol Nationwide Drug Seizures 

FY2015- FY2016TD through February 

Data source: Enforcement Integrated Database 

(Unotlicial) FY2015 as of End of Year Date; FYI6TD as of3/30116 

O!Ttce of Field Operations seizure data by land border and fiscal year are outlined below. 
63 

Cocaine 2.7'-10 2.7% 

I !eroin 0.7~10 0.5% 

Marijuana 9!.9% 9L2% 

Methamphetamine 4.7~·{} 5.6°/o 
64 

Cocaine 15.6% 18.7% 

Heroin 3.1% 3.0% 

Marijuana 77.2% 74.4% 

Methamphetamine 4. lo/o 3.8% 

Dntg Type: Sea; F¥ :ZfilS F¥2016to 

Feb 

Cocaine 46.3% 87.4% 

Heroin 0.1% 2.9°;~ 

Marijuana 53.6% 9.8% 

Methamphetamine 0.0% 0.0% 
65 

Question: What percent of the heroin and fentanyl trafficked gets through the border(s)? 

Methamphetamine? Cocainc'l Marijuana? 

Response: U.S. Customs and Border Protection is unable to gather detailed metrics for 

illicit substances that are not attributed to seizures. 
66 

Submission for Fiscal Year 1017 

Question: You testified at the hearing and in your written statement that apprehensions 

are have decreased. Moreover, you acknowledged the correlation between apprehensions 

and total attempts at crossing. Further, you specifically stated that apprehensions "are a 

fraction of what they to use to be." (sic) What are the most up-to-date statistics on total 

apprehensions in calendar year 20167 Fiscal Year 2016? 

Response: Below is information regarding U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions for this 

fiscal and calendar year through March, 2016. Detailed monthly and yearly data is 

publicly available on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Website: 

h.!1J1'iS_\\ '"::\"'~-c:_bp. U.O\ /newsroom/mcdia-reso urces.~stats'?t ill e "Border+ Patro I: 
67 

Question: Situational awareness on our northern border significantly differs from that of 

our southern border. Decreasing the number of available Border Patrol agents is 

troubling. !low are DHS and CBP maintaining situational awareness on our northern 

border given this proposed decrease in Border Patrol agents? 

Response: The U.S. Border Patrol defines situational awareness as knowledge of 

information that promotes timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of friendly, 

adversarial. and other activities within the operational environment to facilitate decision 

making. 

The U.S. Border Patrol's confidence in its level of situational awareness is not dependent 

solely on staffing levels. U.S. Border Patrol staffing levels at the northern and southern 

border arc decided after assessing information and intelligence, which differ for each 

border. When determining staftlng levels, U.S. Border Patrol also analyzes the 

differences in terrain. The influence of the weather and environment on operations, 

especially in the vast mountain ranges and waterways, arc geographic factors that affect 

both friendly and adversarial operations. As a result of these factors, which allow CBP to 

make risk-based decisions, staffing levels at the northern border have historically been 

lower than at the southern border. when comparing manpower-to-border-miles ratios. 

The methods U.S. Border Patrol leaders use to attain situational awareness along our 

Nation's border include: 

• Partnerships: The Border Patrol has and continues to develop a network of 

partnerships, with Canadian counterparts and other U.S. federal agencies, as well 

as state, local, territorial and tribal agencies along the northern border, to facilitate 

more integrated information sharing. Additionally, the Border Patrol carries out 

proactive engagement with the public through national and local level initiatives 

within communities along the northern border, such as our Border Community 

Liaison program, resulting in increased community engagement in law 

enforcement etlorts. 

• Information and Intelligence: The Border Patrol continues to develop analysis 

capabilities, capitalizing on intelligence gathered through Border Patrol sources, 

as well as the information gathered through the partnerships described above. 

Through such processes, the Border Patrol is able to employ a risk-based 

approach to decision making, and is able to direct operational resources to those 

areas determined to be of greater risk. 
68 

• Technology: The Border Patrol capitalizes on advances in technology whenever 

possible, including along the northern border. Technology initiatives provide 

force-multiplication, maximizing the efforts of manpower levels in those areas of 

coverage. 
69 

Question: As the number of Syrian refugees increase in our bordering nations, what 

precautions is the United States taking to make sure that our national security standards 

are maintained when determining admission into the US? 

Response Since its establishment in 2003 as the single, unified border agency of the 

United States, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has employed a strategy of 

extending the first line of defense in our border security outward to meet the dual goals of 

improving security while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. As these 

e!Torts evolved and capabilities grew to address an ever-changing threat environment, a 

comprehensive pre-departure strategy emerged, founded in the abilities ofCBP's 

National Targeting Center (NTC), enforced through our overseas pre-departure programs, 

and supported by our international partners. 

CBP's comprehensive pre-departure strategy focuses on pushing our first line of defense 

outward with the purpose of intercepting and addressing potential threats at the earliest 

possible opportunity overseas, prior to traveL and before such threats reach the United 

States. CBP's pre-departure strategy focuses on securing air travel as terrorist 

organizations continue to target commercial air transportation as a means to move 

operatives into the United States or to attack the homeland. CBP's pre-departure strategy 

also facilitates legitimate trade and travel, through the ei1icient review and identification 

of possible high-risk travelers. CBP separates that small segment from legitimate 

travelers, allowing all other travelers to move more quickly through the inspection 

process. 

Every stage along the international travel cycle-from when an individual applies for a 

visa or Visa Waiver Program travel authorization to when an individual arrives at a U.S. 

port of entry-provides an opportunity to assess risk and mitigate potential threats. In 

concert with our partners, CBP applies its capabilities throughout the travel cycle: 

• CBP's NTC increases security by receiving advance information, employing 

sophisticated targeting systems to detect risk. 

• CBP's overseas enforcement approaches-the Regional Carrier Liaison Group, 

Immigration Advisory Program/Joint Security Program, and Preclearance- act 

upon information provided by the NTC to address risks or prevent the movement 

of identified threats toward the United States at the earliest possible point in 

travel. 
70 

• CBP continually evaluates and adjusts its security measures to strengthen its 

ability to react quickly and effectively mitigate potential threats to the United 

States. 

These targeted security measures leverage both strategic intelligence to identify existing 

and emerging threat streams, and tactical intelligence to perform link analysis and 

targeted responses. 

All travelers who arrive in the United States (whether arriving by air, land, or sea), 

including U.S. citizens, arc subject to inspection. During primary inspection, CBP 

Officers further assess and segment traveler risk. They review entry documents, ask 

targeted questions, and run biometric and biographic queries against law enforcement 

databases. If travelers cannot be cleared during primary processing, they are referred to 

secondary processing where CBP Officers conduct an in-depth examination of the 

traveler. Examination results may yield immediate actions resulting in the arrest, seizure, 

or determination that an individual is inadmissible to the United States. Information 

derived from the secondary inspections of all counter-terrorism examinations provides 

invaluable intelligence and information that is shared with the intelligence community 

and law enforcement partners. 
71 

Question: You indicated in your testimony that the Department established a Social 

Media Task Force. When was this Task Force established? By whose direction? 

What were the Social Media Task Force's findings? Recommendations? 

Response: Social media can provide the Department with critical information related to 

the execution of our mission. The Depmiment uses social media in a number of ways, 

which have expanded during my time as Secretary. Today, social media is used for many 

different operational or investigative purposes by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 

Transportation Security Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. 

Coast Guard, U.S. Secret Service, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and other DHS 

components and offices. 

I have directed the further expansion of social media usc across the Department, 

consistent with the law and appropriately protecting civil rights, civil liberties, and 

privacy. To that end, on December 15, 2015, the Deputy Secretary and I asked the Under 

Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Francis X. Taylor, to lead a Task Force to review 

the Department's current use of social media and identify options to optimize its use 

across the Department. 

As recommended by the Task Force, a first priority, and an immediate operational 

imperative, is to expand U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USClS) ability to 

use social media to screen and vet applicants for immigration benefits, building upon the 

social media vetting capabilities USCIS has already piloted and deployed. 

Additionally, the Task Force recommended, and I approved, the stand-up of a DHS 

Social Media Center of Excellence (CoE) by August 1, 2016. 
72 

Question: The recent visa overstays report indicated thousands of visa overstays by 

visitors trom high-risk nations. These included 219 overstays from Afghanistan or 

10.25% of the visa population, I ,435 from Pakistan, 564 from Iran, 681 from Iraq, 930 

from Lebanon, and 440 from Syria, to name a few. 

Are you conducting additional background screening on all overstays? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) applies various levels of 

screening for suspected overstay violators. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses its arrival and departure information to 

identify potential overstays and create accompanying records. These records are 

subsequently screened against CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS). ATS is a 

decision support tool that compares traveler, cargo, and conveyance information against 

law enforcement, intelligence, and other enforcement data using risk-based targeting 

scenarios and assessments. These records are further screened through U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services' Computer Linked Application Information Management 

System that maintains all immigration applications and petitions, except for those 

involving naturalization, asylum, and refugee applications. 

Additionally, as part of overstay enforcement efforts, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) analyzes records of hundreds of thousands of potential status 

violators, and develops cases for investigation from the Student and Exchange Visitor 

Information System and CBP's Arrival and Departure Information System datasets. 

Overstay data is systematically vetted against numerous government databases, including 

law enforcement and security databases, to determine if individuals have departed the 

country or were granted an immigration benetlt, allowing the individual to remain in the 

country. ICE is also integrating publicly available information as part of its vetting 

etTorts. To better manage investigative resources, ICE relies on a prioritization 

framework for these leads and has established the Compliance Enforcement Advisory 

Panel (CEAP) with interagency partners within the national intelligence and federal law 

enforcement communities. Through CEAP, ICE's overstay enforcement criteria is better 

aligned with current threats to national security by prioritizing immigration violators who 

may pose the greatest risks to our national security. Those identitled as posing potential 

national security or public safety concerns, and who align with the Secretary's 

enforcement priorities, are referred to ICE field offices for investigation. 
73 

Question: Does this screening include social media? Are I 00% of those who overstayed 

screened on social media? 

Response: ICE does not screen 100 percent of the system-generated overstay records 

against social media. Records which meet ICE's national security parameters for further 

screening are manually reviewed against government database systems and classified 

reporting. During this phase, ICE also conducts open source/social media screening on 

overstay violators who may warrant additional investigation, targeting potential nationalsecurity or public safety concerns. 

Question: Do you feel that those who have overstayed their visas should be considered a 

higher risk than those who do not overstay their visas? 

Response: Interior enforcement actions are generally predicated on a violation having 

occurred, either by a nonimmigrant visitor having remained in the United States beyond 

the authorized period of admission or otherwise having violated the terms of their status. 

ICE coordinates closely within DHS and other federal partners in employing risk-based 

strategies to protect the United States, focusing on potential threats to national security or 

public safety. 
74 

Question: If someone eligible for admission under the Visa Waiver Program but is 

denied by the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, is this denial derogatory with 

regard to a subsequent visa application? 

Response: An EST A denial does send a record to the State Department Lookout system, 

on the reason for the denial of the ESTA. That information is available for the 

Department of State to use in its determination of whether a person is eligible for a visa. 

There are many times where a person may not be eligible for travel under the Visa 

Waiver Program, but may be eligible for travel with a visa. Please refer to the 

Department of State for further info1111ation on how an EST A denial am~cts a subsequent 

visa application. 
75 

Question: According to its June 2015 Report, DHS's Office ofinspector General (DHS 

OIG) found that TSA did not detect seventy-three (73) individuals employed by the 

aviation industry who were on Terror Watch Lists. The report further noted that this 

information gap stemmed from TSA lacking authority to receive terrorism-related 

information under current interagency watch listing policy. 

Since this report, what has DHS and TSA done to prevent individuals on the Watch List 

t!·om gaining access to our airports through the airline industry? 

Response: The June 2015 DI-IS OIG Report cited 73 examples where TSA issued 

credentials to individuals who matched records in the Terrorist Identities Datamarl 

Environment (TIDE), but for whom there were no records in the Terrorist Screening 

Database (TSDB) which contains the U.S. Government's consolidated watchlist of 

known and suspected terrorists. Following the findings of the OIG report, TSA 

subsequently reviewed each case and determined that none of the 73 records identified by 

the OIG posed a threat to transportation security. 

TSA. in coordination with interagency partners, received approval for automated access 

to additional, relevant TIDE information for usc in vetting credentialed populations. This 

information supplements TSA's current use of the TSDB, with TIDE information on 

individuals who have links to terrorists, terrorism, or terrorist activity, but have not met 

the reasonable suspicion standard necessary to be nominated to the TSDB (the 

"Watchlist"). Having automated access to this data makes it possible for TSA to make 

more informed security threat assessment decisions tor individuals seeking access to the 

critical and sensitive transportation infrastructure. 

TSA began automated receipt of non-U.S. citizen data at the end of February 2016, and in 

June 2016, manually received U.S. Citizen data from the National Counte1icrrorism 

Center (NCTC), using this information to inform Security Threat Assessments. A second 

phase will support the automated receipt and ingestion ofl.J.S. citizen data and is 

expected to begin in late 2016, after necessary changes across multiple agencies' 

information technology systems and thorough testing arc completed. 

Question: Currently, are there any individuals working in the aviation industry who are 

on terror Watch Lists') 

Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) vets aviation workers 

accessing varying aviation environments, such as workers with airport-issued credentials, 
76 

Federal Aviation Administration certificate holders, air cargo workers, general aviation 

pilots and crew, and pilots and crew flying into, out of, or over the United States. TSA 

vets these populations initially upon application for access and then recurrently against 

the Terrorist Screening Database and the additional Terrorist Identities Datamart 

Environment information noted above. When any matches to new information are 

confirmed in TSA's vetted populations, TSA coordinates with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation and/or associated nominating agencies and law enforcement to take 

appropriate action, ensuring individuals with access to critical and sensitive 

transportation infrastructure do not pose a threat to transportation. 
77 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Jeh C. Johnson 

From Senator Ron Johnson 

"The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2017" 

March 6, 2016 

Question: The Department has submitted its FY2017 budget request using the Common 

Appropriations Structure for all of its components except Coast Guard. 

Please describe what benctlts the Department will realize in terms of flexibility in how its 

appropriations are spent and tracked. 

Response: The Common Appropriations Structure (CAS) entails two primary changes 

beneficial to the Department, as follows: 

I) Since its creation in 2002, DHS has maintained nearly the same appropriations 

account strncture it inherited from the 22 agencies that joined together to become one 

department. The current structure reflects the budgeting practices of the multiple 

Cabinet-level departments and independent agencies from which today's DHS 

Components came. DHS has functioned for over a decade with significant budget 

disparities and inconsistences between its Components and their appropriations and 

programs. The lack ofunilormity has complicated spending decisions and other 

managerial decision making. Under the CAS, the Department's current total of 76 

different appropriations will be replaced using just four basic appropriations fund 

types (Research and Development; Procurement, Construction, and Improvements; 

Operations and Support; and Federal Assistance) and some limited exceptions. DHS 

leadership and stakeholders will have a greater ability to compare and contrast 

appropriations across DHS in meaningful ways and allow for better policy guidance 

and oversight. Adopting a common set of rules on how to prepare budgets across 

DHS, using the same basic appropriations types, will facilitate a greater 

understanding of Component performance and how appropriated funds are spent, and 

allow us to better track lifecycle costs for DHS acquisition programs. 
78 

2) The Department's array of over 600 Programs, Projects, and Activities (PPAs) will be 

realigned towards Mission Programs that are externally recognizable and 

operationally meaningful. DIIS leadership and stakeholders will be able to track 

budgeted amounts from the appropriations level directly to activities occurring on the 

front lines or in headquarters offices, consistently, and will have the benefit of 

knowing easily understandable program costs. As proposed by the CAS, the PP As 

funded within each Component's appropriations correspond to the Mission Programs 

found in the DHS Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) and as 

established in the Federal Program Inventory. This change synchronizes DHS 

programming and budgeting at both the appropriations and PP A levels, which will 

lead to efficiencies and greater transparency. Directly linking PPAs to Mission 

Programs provides direct connectivity between the Component's appropriations and 

its frontline operations and/or headquarters activities. Doing so consistently across 

DHS provides greater transparency and comparability on how resources are being 

spent and allows for fully informed programmatic trade-ofT decisions within limited 

resources. 

Question: How will the Department ensure that it has adequate oversight and 

transparency of its funds in the new structure? 

Response: The Depatirnent will maintain all internal controls and financial reporting it 

currently has in place. Oversight and transparency are largely achieved through regular 

financial reporting, and those processes will continue unfettered. 

To ensure an orderly and seamless transition to the CAS, the DHS Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer (OCFO) prepared an implementation and training plan in January 2016. 

Part of the efTort included a technical assessment of the Department's financial systems 

to identify any changes that may be needed to accommodate the new structure. That 

review resulted in a determination that Dl!S can and will continue to perform financial 

reporting after the CAS has been implemented. As an assurance and pursuant to Section 

563 of the Department's FY 2016 appropriations act (Division F ofP.L. 114-113), the 

DHS Deputy Under Secretary for Management and Chief Financial Officer certified to 

the Appropriations Committees on March 31 that DHS will continue financial reporting 

in the new structure. 

OCFO transmits a budget execution and staffing report for all ofDHS to the 

Appropriations Committees each month. Additionally, OCFO conducts quarterly 

reviews of Component budget execution along with a comprehensive midyear budget 

review. The monthly reporting and each of the oversight functions described above will 

continue in the new structure. 
79 

Question: The security and resiliency of our electric grid need to be among the top 

priorities of our nation in terms of ensuring the continued operation of critical 

infrastructure. 

How will the Department prioritize its critical infrastructure protection work with the 

energy sector in the coming fiscal year? 

Response: A robust, secure, and resilient energy infrastructure is essential to serving the 

needs oftoday's society, protecting public health and safety, economic security, and 

national security. It is for this reason that the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 

developed pursuant to Presidential Policy Directive- 21 (PPD-21) recognizes the Energy 

Sector as a key lifeline function. U.S. infrastructure-assets, systems, and networks that 

underpin American society-by its very nature supports communities with constantly 

evolving requirements. This is one reason for our close and ongoing coordination with 

the Department of Energy (DOE), the Energy Sector-Specific Agency. The Electricity 

Subsector in particular, is a priority. This is reflected by senior-level engagement with the 

Electricity Subscctor Coordinating Council (ESCC), which is comprised of Chief 

Executive Officers representing the breadth of the electric-power industry. 

Meetings with the ESCC throughout the year serve as a venue to discuss physical security 

and cybersecurity, grid resilience, and progress made on joint industry/government 

initiatives and national-level responses to major incidents. These meetings enable 

industry and government to share perspectives, identify joint priorities, and track progress 

on common objectives. 

Further highlighting the importance we place on this work, DHS will serve as the cochair in 2016 on developing a National Strategy for strengthening the security and 

resilience of the North American electric grid for all hazards (including adversarial, 

technological, and natural hazards). This work will include a strong international 

component, recognizing, for example, that there are over 30 major transmission 

interconnections linking Canada and the U.S., which traded approximately $3 billion 

worth of electricity in 2014. 

These activities complement the efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

and the DOE to produce a Power Outage Incident Annex (POIA). The POIA is cunently 

under development and will provide incident-specific supplemental information to the 

Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. The annex will also 

describe processes and organizational constructs that the government will use when 
80 

federal support is required to help facilitate response and recovery efforts resulting from a 

disruption in the power grid, whether it results from deliberate acts of terrorism or crime, 

accidents, or natural disasters. 

Question: Please describe any risk assessments and other major projects planned for 

FY2017 to analyze or strengthen protection of the electric grid. 

Response: In FY20 16, NPPD's Office of Infrastructure Protection, in collaboration with 

DOE, initiated the Regional Resiliency Assessment Program project for Region I 

(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) with 

a focus on electric power substations with large power transformers and their resilience to 

extreme weather events. This collaborative project is based on the results of the April 

2015 Quadrennial Energy Review. which identified the vulnerability of transmission, 

storage, and distribution infrastructure to natural phenomena and the criticality of highvoltage transformers to the grid's operation. The project also recommended that DHS 

and DOE collaborate on means of assessing the security and resilience of energy 

infrastructure assets. Project activities will continue through FY2017, transitioning from 

the ongoing data collection and analysis into the delivery of key tlndings and then 

moving into a period focusing on implementing measures to mitigate identified gaps. 

The objective of this project is to help the energy owners and state and local officials in 

the region understand the extreme weather risks to electric infrastructure, associated 

vulnerabilities and consequences, and offer mitigation strategies to enhance the resilience 

of the Energy Sector in Region I. In FY20 17, the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure 

Analysis (OClA) will continue to enhance the electric power modeling and simulation 

capabilities at the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) to 

analyze the electric grid from traditional and non-traditional hazards. 

Question: Geomagnetic disturbance resulting from solar activity and high-altitude 

electromagnetic pulse arc two issues facing the grid. Please list all activities the 

Department has undertaken in the last year, and those that it plans to take in the coming 

year, to study and improve the nation's readiness to face these threats. 

Response: DHS served as the co-chair of the Space Weather Operations Research and 

Mitigation Task Force established under the White House Oftlce of Science and 

Technology Policy. Out of the work of this task force, the National Space Weather 

Strategy was promulgated in October of20 15, along with its supporting action plan. The 

National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) will lead and support many of the 

actions outlined in this plan, focused on improving our ability to assess, characterize, 

protect, respond to, recover from and mitigate threats to the electric grid. 
81 

A joint DHS and DOE study is already underway regarding the impacts of 

Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP) and Geomagnetic Disturbance (GMD) events on the 

electric grid. This study consists offour phases, which will analyze the hazard 

environments, impacts, and consequences of different sources of EMP and GMD on the 

U.S. electric power infrastructures, and to use those methods to determine EMP and 

GMD events of concern and potential means of mitigation. 

Key EMP research and development capability gaps and needs identified by joint 

government and industry stakeholders will be fed into DHS's Integrated Product Team 

process for prioritization. NPPD and S&T/First Responders Group will work with DOE 

and the ESCC to develop a joint government and industry approach to address the threat 

ofEMP. 

Additionally, S&T is on a solar storm mitigation project with the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration's Goddard Space Flight Center that will enable forecasting of 

the localized quantitative efforts of severe geomagnetic storms. Electric utilities will be 

able to use this localized data to help prepare for and respond to geomagnetic 

disturbances. This project is planned for the transition at the end of2016. 
82 

Question: In the Department's written budget request for FY20 17, you acknowledge, 

"During the tlrst quarter ofFY 2016, [U.S. Border Patrol] apprehended over 17,000 UC 

crossing the Southwest border, compared to approximately 8,000 [unaccompanied 

children, UC] apprehensions during the same time period in FY 2015 and approximately 

13,000 in the first quarter ofFY 2014. In anticipation of these high numbers potentially 

continuing throughout FY 2016 and FY 2017, [Customs and Border Protection, CBP] 

requests resources to support a revised baseline of 75,000 UC apprehensions, as well as 

contingency fund should arrivals exceed prior year levels" (FY20 17 Budget Request, 

Volume I, Customs and Border Protection. Operations and Support, page 70). 

Rather than processing these children, what can the Department do to discourage UC 

from taking the horrific journey to the United States? 

Response: The United States has pursued a multi-pronged approach to discourage 

unaccompanied alien children from taking the dangerous journey to the United States. 

Together with the Department of Justice, DHS has increased activities to target, disrupt, 

and dismantle the human smuggling organizations that promote and facilitate the t1ow of 

migrants across our southern border. Networks are not just targeted in the United States; 

Homeland Security Investigations Special Agents and others in Mexico and Central 

America exchange intelligence and information to target smugglers south of the U.S.-

Mexico border. 

DHS currently promotes informational campaigns in the Northern Triangle countries of 

El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras focusing on the perils, risks, and tragic realities 

that migrants, especially children, encounter during illegal migration to the United States, 

as well as the consequences of attempting to enter the United States illegally. 

The Dangers of the Journey campaign ran from January through March 2016, including 

television and radio advertisements in Central America, and social media in Mexico. CBP 

is working with the Department of State on a new messaging campaign that will contain 

stronger messaging warning about the negative consequences of illegal entry into the 

United States. 

The Department has been in contact with senior government officials of Guatemala, El 

Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico to address our shared border security interests and how 

we can work together on safe repatriation and reintegration eiiorts. 
83 

In addition, we are offering a safe, legal, and orderly alternative to the dangerous journey 

to certain minors from El Salvador. Honduras, and Guatemala through the Central 

American Minors (CAM) Program, an in-country refugee and parole processing program, 

and we are working to expand refugee processing in the region. 

Finally, an important element of deterring illegal entry into the United States includes 

working to address the root causes of migration. To that end, the Administration is also 

pleased that Congress allocated $750 million in FY 2016 funding to support the U.S. 

Strategy for Engagement in Central America which will help promote a secure, and 

prosperous region. 

Question: You have testified multiple times that sending people home is one of the best 

ways to deter future unlawful migration to the United States. How can the Department 

eliminate incentives for unlawful migration to the United States? lfow does the 

Department plan to address the 2016 surge at our border? 

Response: Since the summer of2014 we have removed and repatriated migrants to 

Central America at an increased rate, averaging about 14 flights a week. Most of those 

returned have been single adults, but Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has 

more recently engaged in concerted, nationwide enforcement operations targeting both 

individuals who entered the country as unaccompanied children who have since turned 

18, as well as adults who were apprehended crossing the border with children after 

January 1, 2014, who are the subject of a final removal order, and who have exhausted 

their legal remedies and have no outstanding appeal or elaim for asylum or other 

humanitarian relief under our laws. Other aspects of our efforts to address illegal 

migration from Central America are described in the answer to the preceding question. 
84 

Question: Is there anything Congress can do to assist in actual refugee programs in 

Central America? 

Response: The Departments of State and Homeland Security are working to otTer 

expanded access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and other protection 

mechanisms in the region. The U.S. Government has been engaging other countries in 

the region, encouraging them to broaden access to protection for refugees from Central 

America. DHS appreciates Congress's interest in the protection of individuals in the 

Northern Triangle. An important part of US CIS officer preparation prior to conducting 

refugee interviews is country conditions training. Interviewing officers benefit from the 

research and resources identified by the USCIS Refugee, Asylum and International 

Operations Research Unit, but additional information on the applicant's country of origin 

from the Congressional Research Service is always of use. You may also wish to consult 

with the Department of State as to whether it has suggestions for ways in which Congress 

could assist with refugee programs in Central America. 

Question: Regarding the Central American Minors Refugee/Parole Program: please 

explain how this can be categorized as a "refugee" program if it takes up to six months to 

process applications. If children were actually refugees, wouldn't they need to be 

removed !rom their country immediately? 

Response: The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) is continuously looking for 

ways to cut down processing time within the Central American Minors (CAM) program, 

given possible safety concerns tor applicants, and consistent with security requirements. 

There are numerous required elements of the CAM processing protocol that prevent it 

from being a faster process. For example, the qualifying parent and qualifying child must 

submit DNA tor testing (which is often not done in a timely manner); the Resettlement 

Support Center must pre-screen the ease; DHS must conduct in-person interviews; and 

security checks and medical clearances must be completed for every approved case. 

US RAP continues to consider a range of options to expedite processing in the case of a 

child who is in imminent danger. 

The Administration has also been engaging other countries in the region to encourage 

them to join us in broadening access to protection for refugees from Central America. 

Question: How do you respond to claims made by the United Nations High 
85 

Commissioner for Refugees and the Department of State that most children in Central 

America would not quality as refugees? Do you agree with or dispute this claim? 

Response: USCIS is not aware of the specific reports or statements from UNHCR and 

Department of State that the question is referring to. 

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), refugee status can be granted to an 

individual on the basis of past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 

account of one of t!ve protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 

membership in a particular social group. Each element of the refugee definition must be 

established for an individual to be eligible for a discretionary grant ofrcfugce status. 

Each case is decided on a case-by-case basis, following an interview with a USCIS 

officer, and USCIS follows precedential legal decisions and utilizes country conditions 

information in determining whether an individual has been persecuted or has a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground, and otherwise meets the 

requirements. 
86 

Question: In your written testimony, you said the Department was working on a project 

called BORDERSTAT "to develop a clear and comprehensive set of outcome metrics for 

measuring border security, apprehension rates, and inf1ow rates." Specifically, what 

outcome-based metrics is the Department developing to measure and evaluate border 

security efforts? How do these metrics compare to those outlined in S.l864, the DHS 

Border Metrics Act? 

Response: Beginning in 2015, DHS has initiated a comprehensive border security 

metrics effort in order to establish an academically defensible methodology, using 

available data, to develop outcome-focused estimates of illegal border crossing activity. 

This effort, which DHS calls BorderStat, includes several outcome-based metrics in line 

with S.l864, the DHS Border Security Metrics Act of 2015. The BorderS tat analysis 

remains at an early stage of development, with preliminary results available only for a 

subset of these mctrics. 

The primary focus of the BorderS tat analysis to date has been to develop an estimate of 

the total number of unauthorized immigrants successfully crossing into the United States 

between ports of entry along the Southwest border. Once this estimate is finalized, DHS 

expects to be in a position to provide many of the metrics outlined in section 3 of S.l864. 

Future BorderStat research is expected to also focus on entorccment outcomes at ports of 

entry and in the maritime environment, and possibly to estimate illegal drug flows in 

addition to migration flows. DHS also has begun a related effort to use BorderS tat data to 

examine the impact of specific enforcement strategies on illegal migration flows. To the 

extent that these additional mctrics prove reliable, they will provide insight into many of 

the other metrics outlined in S.l864. 

By their nature, illicit flows are difficult to measure with accuracy. Historically, DHS and 

its predecessors have responded to this challenge primarily by examining migrant 

apprehensions as a proxy indicator of illegal migration attempts. An advantage to using 

apprehensions as a metric is that DHS knows exactly how many apprehensions it 

completes in a given period; but apprehensions are an imperfect indicator of unlawful 

entries or of entry attempts. The BorderS tat research addresses this ambiguity by 

estimating actual unlawful entries, meaning its results can be interpreted more directly 

than data on apprehensions. Yet, in order to describe unobserved entries, BorderS tat must 

rely on a model-based estimate, rather than on observation-based estimates. The reliance 

on a model of illegal migration and on additional data sources that infom1 the model 

mean the BorderS tat findings are characterized by some degree ofuncctiainty. For these 
87 

reasons, traditional measures of border security and the new BorderS tat research have 

complementary strengths and weaknesses; and using both BorderStat and traditional data 

sources provides some deeper insights on trends than does either type of metric in 

isolation. 

Question: Please provide a list of experts with whom the Department is consulting on 

this project. 

Response: DHS has contracted with the Institute for Defense Analyses (fDA), a 

Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), to provide technical 

support to the BorderS tat research. The lead IDA researcher is John E. Whitley, who 

manages a broader IDA team of empirical researchers. IDA has engaged with numerous 

outside experts to provide peer review, including Gordon Hanson University of 

California- San Diego, Joe Chang I !om eland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, 

Ted Alden Council on Foreign Relations, Roberto Sura University of Southern 

California, Pia Orren ius Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Madeline Zavodny (Agnes 

Scott College), Lindsay Lowell (Georgetown University), Jennifer Van Hook (Penn 

State), and Catalina Amucdo-Dorantes (San Diego State University). 

Question: What entity in the Department is responsible for this project? 

Response: The DHS Office of Policy has led the BorderS tat research since January 2015, 

working closely with IDA. Several other entities have contributed resources and/or data 

since its launch, including DHS MGMT (CFO), CBP, ICE, USCG, USCIS, and NPPD. 

Question: What is the timeline for accomplishing this project? How will these outcome 

metrics be used for future budgetary planning at Customs and Border Protection, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Citizenship and Immigration Services? 

Response: As noted efforts to date on this project have focused primarily on developing 

estimates for migrant flows between ports of entry on the Southwest Border. DI!S is 

actively working with IDA and other experts both inside and outside the department to 

continue refinement of these estimates. Like other major measures estimated by the 

Federal Government-such as the unemployment rate, the Gross Domestic Product, and 

Consumer Price Index-DHS will continue to reline BorderStat methodologies and results 

over time. DIIS is aiming to transfer the BorderStat capability (both data collection and 

analysis) from IDA to the government by 2017. 

Valid outcome metrics are useful for informing resource allocation decision-making. In 

developing resource strategies to strengthen the security of the border, DHS Headquarters 
88 

(PLCY and CFO) is responsible for setting strategic objectives and identifying strategies 

that cut across DHS Components (and the interagency). The policy decisions include. for 

example, the balance between investments at and between ports of entry. DHS 

Components (e.g., CBP, USCG, and ICE) are responsible for setting the componentspecific subordinate objectives and intra-component elements of the strategies (e.g., how 

CBP will prioritize and employ agents and fence). When validated and finalized, the 

BorderStat estimates should help inform decision-making at both of these levels. 

Question: Do you believe outcome-based metrics will lead to a better understanding of 

the border environment, ultimately allowing the Department to better allocate resources 

both strategically and operationally? 

Response: Yes, DHS is undertaking the BorderStat effort to inform both resource 

allocation and operational decision-making. The project includes research to better 

understand the impact of the Department's border enforcement and consequence 

programs on illegal migration flows-including both known flows and estimated 

unobserved illegal entries. Once this additional research is complete, it is expected to 

provide new insights that can inform how DHS allocates resources for its border security 

miSSIOn. 

Question: If the Department currently does not have a clear and comprehensive set of 

such outcome metrics, what metrics does the Department currently use to understand its 

border security, apprehension rates, and inflow rates? How are such metrics used to 

determine each relevant component's annual budget? 

Response: For many years, DHS and its predecessor have relied primarily on 

apprehensions as a proxy indicator of illegal crossing attempts, as noted above. DHS 

subject matter experts have used apprehensions data and ground-level operational 

observations to help shape strategic-level resource decisions. 

DHS also has been working for years, with support from Congress, to develop more 

refined indicators of border enforcement outputs (i.e., the degree to which border 

enforcement makes it more difficult for migrants to cross the border illegally and deters 

behavior) and border enforcement outcomes (i.e., the number of migrants that attempt 

and/or succeed in crossing the border illegally). The most relevant of these existing 

metrics, in use since 2014, is the Interdiction Effectiveness Rate (IER). The IER is an 

observation-based estimate of the share of illegal border crossers detected by the US 

Border Patrol that is either apprehended or compelled to retreat to Mexico. Thus, IER is 

calculated as the ratio of apprehensions and detected turn backs to all detected activity 

(apprehensions, detected turn backs, and detected got aways). The JER provides insight 
89 

into enforcement outputs, and CBP uses IER data to inform operational decisions across 

the Border Patrol sectors. 
90 

Question: Last year, I asked you what technology you have assessed to be the most 

promising in securing the border. At the time, you had only accepted, deployed, and 

tested the Mobile Surveillance System. 

Please provide an update on any other technology that you have found to be effective in 

securing the border. 

Response: The United States Border Patrol (USBP) employs a wide variety of 

technology assets that collectively contribute to the effectiveness of border security 

operations. These assets enhance USBP capabilities to detect, identify, classify, track, 

respond, and resolve illegal entries. Below are examples of current fixed and mobile 

capabilities. 

Fixed Technology 

• Integrated Fixed Towers (1FT) 

o 1FT systems provide long range persistent surveillance (camera and radar). 

They detect and track without operator intervention, and enable control 

room personnel to identify and classify activity using video feed. 

• Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) 

o RVSS provides short, medium, and long range persistent surveillance. 

They enable a control room operator to remotely detect, and to a limited 

extent track, identify, and classify functions using the video feed. 

Mobile Technology 

• Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) 

o MSC is the next generation mobile surveillance unit capable of providing 

long range surveillance through a suite of sensors (radar and camera) 

mounted on 4X4 vehicles. An agent deploys with the vehicle to operate 

the system. 

• Mobile Video Surveillance System (MVSS) 

o MVSS provides short and medium range mobile surveillance consisting of 

a suite of camera sensors mounted on 4X4 vehicles. MVSS enables an 
91 

operator deployed with the system to detect and to a limited extent, track, 

identify, and classify functions using the video feed. 

• Agent Portable Surveillance System (APSS) 

o APSS provides medium range mobile surveillance and consist of a suite of 

sensors mounted on a tri-pod. Three to five personnel transport the 

equipment on foot, by horse, or via A TV. 

Intrusion Detection Technology 

• Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) 

o UGS provide persistent and agent portable surveillance systems to 

enhance border security detection capabilities. These sensors support the 

need to dclect, and to a limited extent, track and identify tasks. Sensor 

capabilities include seismic, passive infrared, acoustic, contact closure, 

and magnetic. 

• Imaging UGS 

o l-UGS or Imaging Sensors (IS) are a specific type of unattended ground 

sensor with an integrated camera and the ability to transmit images or 

video back to the operations center. 

• Trip Wire (Buried Fiber Optic Cable/Sensor) 

• Handheld Thermal and Infrared Imagers 

o Handheld night imaging sensors provide a light weight device to enhance 

border security when mobile or fixed technology is not possible due to a 

variety of reasons. Handheld imagers have been utilized tor many years 

by agents and officers. They provide the ability to deploy a highly capable 

technology to numerous personnel needing night vision for coveti 

operations. 

Re-Utilization of Department of Defense Technology 

• Tactical Aerostats and Relocatable Towers 

o Tactical Aerostat Systems are ideal tor quick inflation and rapid 

deployment. Carrying useful, lightweight payloads, they offer a stable 

platfixm for communications and surveillance. 
92 

o Relocatable surveillance towers offer a surveillance capability (camera 

and radar) that provides f1cxibility to deploy rapidly to meet the mission 

needs of changing enforcement posturing. The towers are able to move 

with the changes seen in shifting threats. 

Technology assets such as integrated tlxed towers, remote video surveillance systems, 

mobile surveillance units, unattended ground sensors, and thermal imaging systems, 

among others, act as force multipliers increasing situational awareness, agent efficiency, 

and overall operational capability to respond to potential threats. 

Question: Where would additional fencing along the southwest border assist Border 

Patrol agents in securing the border? Please provide the type of fencing, the number of 

miles needed, whether the fencing should be single-layered or double-layered, and the 

specific locations. 

Response: Additional fencing would assist Border Patrol agents in securing the border at 

areas where there is a gap in impedance and denial. Border Patrol uses the Capability 

Gap Analysis Process (CGAP) to identify impedance and denial gaps and determine the 

requirements best suited to remedy those gaps. 

Current fence requirements consist of replacement of approximately 65 miles of legacy 

border fence across San Diego, El Centro, El Paso, Yuma, and Tucson Sectors. This 

fence was constructed prior to the 2007-2008 fence programs and consists mostly of 

landing mat, wire mesh, and chain link. This fence has no subsurface support structure 

and is maintenance intensive. At this time, there are no requirements for new double layer 

fence. 

CBP utilizes a standard fence design for pedestrian and vehicle fence. The type of 

fencing to be constructed depends on the specitlc operational needs and characteristics of 

the area. For each individual area, solutions are selected from the "Fence Toolbox'' to suit 

the type of environment (urban, ruraL or remote) and its geographic and climatic 

characteristics (hills, rivers, mountains, forest, desert, etc.). In the past, CBP has 

constructed two types of fence along the Southwest Border: pedestrian fence and vehicle 

fence. Their placement depends on the threat at the location and the operational needs of 

Border Patrol. 
93 

Question: During a February 4, 2016, House Judiciary Committee hearing, Texas 

Department of Public Safety Director, Steven C. McCraw, testified, "[The Department] 

requested a fifty percent reduction of persistent aerial detection, situational awareness, 

and monitoring support for Operation Phalanx from the Department of Defense [DOD]." 

Yet, at a February 24,2016, House Committee on Appropriations budget hearing, when 

Congressman Cuellar asked you about such reduction you responded that the reduction 

would actually only be five percent in part because of the addition of Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) capabilities. 

What specific capabilities has CBP added to justify the reduction of DOD flight hours? 

Response: US Customs and Border Protection, Air and Marine Operations (AMO) 

adjusts its aircraft and personnel deployment to best meet existing and emerging mission 

needs. Over the past several years, AMO has increased its UAS presence in the South 

Texas area of responsibility (AOR) as well as maintained a manned aircraft presence 

large enough to counter the threats in the area. In 2010 AMO identified the emerging 

threat in South Texas and began resourcing with assets, personnel, and aircraft night 

hours to address the change in operational environment. 

The following is a summary of increased operational capability in the 

south Texas area 

• 56% increases in personnel 

o In 20 I 0 43 AMO personnel were assigned to McAllen and 

laredo. 

o In 2015 67 AMO personnel are assigned to McAllen and 

laredo. 

• 53% Increase in Aircraft 

o In 2010 17 aircraft were permanently stationed in McAllen and 

Laredo. 

o In 20 I 5 23 aircraft permanently stationed in McAllen and 

Laredo. 

o In addition, there were no Unmanned Aircraft (Predator) in 

South Texas in2010 

o In2015 3 UAS Unmanned Aircraft (Predator) are pem1anently 

stationed in Corpus Christi flying in the South Texas area. 
94 

• 83% increase in Flight Hours 

o In 2010 6,961 hours were flown by AMO aircraft in McAllen 

and Laredo 

o In 2015 12,721 hours were 11own by AMO aircraft in McAllen 

and Laredo 

Question: Today, are there any 11ight hour shortages for aerial detection, persistent 

surveillance, or monitoring support that remain? If so, how many flight hours is CBP 

lacking to accomplish the mission tasks mentioned above? 

Response: AMO is in the process of collecting Flight Hour Requirements to inform the 

allocation of resources in the near term, and conducting an analysis of the capability gaps 

that exist for future planning. The result of these etiorts is a better idea of the needs of 

AMO and sister components-not just in terms of !light hours, but also in terms of 

additional assets and personnel. 

Question: Additionally, is the Department currently exploring any low cost technologies 

to address aerial detection, persistent surveillance, or monitoring support in FY 20 16? If 

so, provide a list ofthosc technologies. If not, does the Department plan on evaluating 

any technologies in FY 2017? 

Response: AMO plans to evaluate a radar-based Moving Target Indicator Sensor 

onboard the Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft in FY 2017. The radar is expected to usc 

its ability to identify changes in the earth's surface (foot prints/tire tracks) to locate 

vehicular and non-vehicular movement in remote border regions. This radar will 

complement the strategic capabilities of the VaDER system with a lighter and less 

capable system ideal for aircraft flying at lower altitudes with less payload capacity, such 

as the MEA. 
95 

Question: The Department has a new Ot1ice of Community Partnerships, which was 

announced in September 2015. This office will administer, through the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA ), $10 million of grants, appropriated in the 

FY2016 omnibus bill. FEMA has a history of awarding programs that do not pay clear 

dividends for strengthening United States national security and also of allowing funds to 

languish in unused accounts. 

How will the Office of Community Partnerships audit the funds it administers through 

FEMA to ensure they are used and used properly- to counter violent extremism? 

Response: The FY20 16 omnibus bill provided $10 million for a countering violent 

extremism initiative. The funding will be provided competitively directly to states, local 

governments, tribal governments, non-profit organizations, and institutions of higher 

education. The Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) leads the department's efforts 

to counter violent extremism by providing tools to stakeholders in local communities, 

coordinates other CVE activities of the Department, and hosts the Inter-Agency CVE 

Task Force charged with coordinating all Federal domestic CVE activities. In this role, 

OCP is providing CVE subject matter expertise on the CVE initiative funding and FEMA 

is providing expertise on the mechanics of grant award and financial accountability. OCP 

is defining the purpose, allowable activities, selection criteria, and other application 

guidelines for the initiative. OCP and other CVE experts will be involved in recipient 

selection and in evaluating the success of funded activities. This is a similar construct as 

DHS' Port Security Grants and Transit Security Grants, where the United States Coast 

Guard and the Transportation Security Administration, respectively, provide subject 

matter expertise. 

Question: What metrics will be used to determine whether the program is strengthening 

United States national security and countering vioknt extremism? 

Response: The grant funding is an integral part of the Department's overall CVE strategy 

which calls for several categories of metrics, including spurring CVE efforts outside of 

the Federal Government, measuring the reach ofCVE activities in person and online 

through sentiment analysis, and increased resiliency to the threat. The funding will be 

available to support a wide range of activities that benefit prevention of radicalization to 

violence and each funded project will be evaluated, in part on the metrics proposed in 

each application. 
96 

Question: How many individuals does the Department plan to have working on the 

mission of countering violent extremism full-time in FY20 17? Please identify the 

relevant component, position, and pay grade of each individual dedicated full-time to this 

mission. 

Response: The majority of the positions that are dedicated to CVE full-time are in the 

Office for Community Partnerships. The Office for Community Partnerships requests 16 

FTP and 16 FTE in FY 2017. DHS components have a number of individuals working on 

CVE in various capacities totaling an additional 8-10 FTE. 
97 

Question: Two examples of outreach that will be performed by the Countering Violent 

Extremism Task Force, housed at the Department and jointly managed with the 

Department of Justice, arc Community Resilience Exercises and Community Awareness 

Briefings. 

How will these exercises, briefings, and other activities be funded? 

Response: DHS is working with the other members of the Interagency CVE Task Force 

on scaling up these outreach activities by developing a train-the-presenter curriculum for 

the Community Awareness Briefing (CAB). which involves local law enforcement being 

trained to present the CAB to their colleagues and local communities. This effort is 

funded in part by the FY 2015 reprogramming to the Office of Partnerships and 

Engagement (OCP). The existing activities, which include Community Resilience 

Exercises, are funded out of requested budgets in OCP, the DHS Office for Civil Rights 

and Civil Liberties, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and potentially other 

resources from other members of the Task Force. 

Question: How much funding is required to maintain current levels of engagement 

regarding these activities? What is the funding level for the optimal level of 

engagement? 

Response: The funding to maintain the level of engagement that is planned for FY 2016 

at DHS is reflected in the FY 2017 request for the Office for Civil Rights and Civil 

Liberties, the Oflice for Community Partnerships, and FEMA State and Local Programs. 

The request for the Office for Community Partnerships also includes efforts that could 

exponentially increase engagement by supporting efforts by states, local government, 

tribal governments, and others through technical assistance, grant funding, peer-to-peer 

engagement, and online outreach. The FY 2017 budget request for FEMA State and 

Local Programs includes funding for CVE grants that will support, among other things, 

greater community engagement by state and local government, community non-profit 

organizations, and institutions of higher education. 

Question: What metrics will be gathered from such exercises to determine whether the 

program is strengthening United States national security and countering violent 

extremism? 

Response: The Office for Community Partnerships is exploring ways to standardize a 

feedback process when engaging with stakeholders that protects privacy. Information 
98 

such as number of participants, convening organization, stakeholder type, date, and 

location will give a sense of the geographic range of engagement efforts and the amount 

of people reached. Feedback surveys accompanying each activity will investigate the 

level of resiliency and information gained from the interactions, as well as if the activities 

are perceived as useful to the participants. 
99 

Question: The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) faces the challenge of 

allocating its tight fiscal resources across a wide range of project types and ideas. The 

FY2017 budget request for research and development is $436.9 million. 

How much of S&T's research and development portfolio for FY20 16 was allocated to 

projects that will largely benefit or by used by customers outside of the Department? 

How does S&T determine whether to fund projects that might otherwise be filled by the 

private sector or other R&D entities? 

Response: As the primary research and development (R&D) arm for the Department, 

S&T supports end users across the broad and diverse mission areas of the Department. 

All ofS&T's R&D projects target homeland security requirements. Most of the portfolio 

is tied to technological capability gaps and project requirements provided by DHS 

Components and operational end users within the Department. S&T recently completed 

the first cycle of the Department's Integrated Product Team process, part of which 

involved Component validation of ongoing R&D against Components' prioritized 

technological capability gaps. 

Although the majority of R&D is tied to DHS Components, in some cases, homeland 

security missions and stakeholders extend outside the Department. For example, one 

recent project, the Radio Internet-Protocol Communications Module (RIC-M), is a lowcost interoperability solution that allows analog systems to interface with digital systems. 

While this benefits DHS Components, it primarily enables first responder agencies to 

incrementally upgrade and affordably connect legacy systems with newer ones, averting a 

costly need to refresh entire systems at once and saving the first responder community 

millions of dollars. Although the primary beneficiaries are non-federal first responders, 

improved communications and better interoperability help safeguard our communities 

and fall squarely within the Department's and S&T's missions. In addition to first 

responders, biodefense (with numerous interagency stakeholders) and cybersecurity 

(where most critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated) are further examples 

of necessary homeland security R&D investments, even though the primary customer or 

end user may ultimately be outside DHS. 

Question: How does S&T determine whether to fund projects that might otherwise be 

filled by the private sector or other R&D entities? 
100 

Response: S&T's R&D projects are grounded in hundreds of technological capability 

gaps provided and prioritized by end users through mechanisms like the Integrated 

Product Team process or, for first responders, S&T's First Responder Resource Group. 

As these gaps are updated or re-prioritized and new potential investments emerge, S&T's 

first considerations for any new project are what is possible (i.e., within budgetary 

constraints and weighted priorities) and where a potential investment would be most 

beneficial. This requires a grasp of specific marketplaces and how those marketplaces 

may shape adoption of a new technology or method. If private sector markets and other 

R&D sources are meeting a specific homeland security need, then there is less need for 

S&T to invest its limited funds in that specific area. S&T project managers have 

numerous tools and support functions available-including technology scouting 

resources like patent searches, venture capital analyses, and market trend evaluationsthat ensure the government invests appropriately and incentivizes development only 

when private markets otherwise would not. 

Additionally, S&T is leading a departmental pilot initiative to develop a pipeline of nontraditional partners (e.g., start-ups) to accelerate research and innovation around 

homeland security priorities. S&T's first investment cycle in this initiative focuses on the 

Internet of Things. Even though private investment in the Internet of Things is high, 

S&T's subject matter experts recognized that current investments do not sufficiently 

address the security of resulting Internet of Things infrastructure and the need to protect 

potential users. S&T's first award to Pulzze Systems Inc., a start-up in Santa Clara, CA, 

supports a solution that detects devices as they connect or disconnect from network 

infrastructure. It also sees how devices communicate and what they are communicating 

with. This example demonstrates how an S&T investment inccntivized the development 

of solutions for homeland security needs (in this case, securing networks that will 

eventually include sensitive oil pipelines, border monitoring assets, or airport screening 

systems) in an area that private markets were not adequately addressing. 
101 

Question: The FY20 17 request for the Bio Watch program is approximately $82 million. 

As you know. Bio Watch was largely borne of out of a concern about state actors 

executing a widespread biological attack. It is my understanding that the Depmiment's 

own biological threat assessments now focus on several smaller, more likely attack routes 

rather than a single, unlikely catastrophic event. Additionally, the Government 

Accountability Office has raised important concerns about whether the BioWatch system 

can demonstrably complete its mission. 

What steps has the Department taken to assess the continued need for this program? 

Response: The BioWatch Program is the Nation's only biodetection capability that 

provides early warning and facilitates preparedness in 30+ jurisdictions that were selected 

based on their risk for a devastating biological attack. Early warning of a biological 

attack provides critical time before symptoms manifest in the public -a critical window 

of time in order to dispense lifesaving medical countermeasures. BioWatch was fielded 

in 2003 in response to concerns over potential attacks on densely populated American 

cities with aerosolized biological agents. There is no other program that provides this 

layer of biological defense for our most at-risk cities. 

Outward signs m1d symptoms of a biological attack may emerge slowly and, in some 

cases, too late for the most effective actions to save lives and reduce damage. The value 

of early warning was confirmed by The National Strategy for Biosurveillance: 

Biosurveillance- including early detection- is one of our tirst lines of defense 

against these threats. ( ... ) 'T'he sooner we can detect and understand a threat, the 

taster we can take action to protect the American people.( ... ) The effective 

dissemination of a lethal biological agent, for instance, could endanger the lives of 

hundreds of thousands of people and result in untold economic, societal, and 

political consequences. 1 

Through accurate early detection and rapid notification, BioWatch provides decision 

makers with the information at the earliest possible time to enable a coordinated and 

effective response. BioWatch is part of the Nation's broader biosurveillance framework, 

and is a critical link in a multi-layered defense that starts with early detection of an 

1 National Strategy for Biosurveillance, July 2012 
102 

organism, and includes surveillance that tracks the onset of disease and effectiveness of 

consequence response actions, such as distribution of medical countermeasures (MCM). 

Question: When was the last time the Department assessed whether BioWateh should 

continue to exist? What were the results of such analysis? 

Response: An April 2014, Acquisition Decision Memorandum confirmed that the current 

operational BioWatch program will continue to be the program of record for aerosol 

biological threat detection. The memo also called for continued improvements by DHS 

S&T and OHA in the technologies applied to BioWatch operations. BioWatch and S&T 

arc advancing plans that will bring near-term enhancements in FY 18, with mid- and 

long-term enhancements to follow. 

In addition, DHS sponsored an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the BioWatch 

program. The AoA was performed by The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), and 

completed in January 2014. In regards to the continued need for BioWatch, the AoA 

found that: 

[W]hile the overall risk of a biological attack is uncertain, that risk has not 

changed measurably since 2001. If a biological attack occurs, the risk of that 

attack being aerosolized is high.( ... ) Insofar as there is a requirement for earlier 

warning and detection, employment of a biosensor system according to planned 

CO;\OPS, with appropriate response by decision-making authorities and timely 

engagement by public health officials would yield fewer casualties and potentially 

non-quantifiable benefits including forensic samples, rapidly confirmable 

information, situational awareness and characterization, and improved planning 

and preparedness. 
103 

Question: The FY2017 request f(lr the National Biosurveillanee Integration Center is 

$7.7 million, a $2.6 million decrease from FY20J7. In November 2015, the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) released a report finding that the products of the National 

Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) were of little value to the key public health 

agencies in the federal government 

How does the Department assess the ongoing need for NBIC? 

Response: Congress authorized the National Biosurveillance Integration Center in 2007 

to integrate and analyze data relating to human health, animal, plant, food, and 

environmental monitoring systems. The Government Accountability Office (testimony 

from Chris Currie before the House Committee on Homeland Security on February 11, 

2016), the White House (National Strategyfiw Biosurveillance. 201 2), the Blue Ribbon 

Study Panel on Biodefense ?4 National BlueprintfiJr Biodej(mse, 201 5), Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 21, and others have also consistently recognized the need 

for and importance of achieving integrated biosurveillance. 

Similarly, DHS sees integrated biosurveillance activities as a crucial homeland security 

imperative. NB!C regularly collaborates and coordinates with federal partners in the 

interagency community, including key public health agencies, to provide situational 

awareness of key biological events on a daily basis. These reports provide a valuable 

cohesive picture, particularly for stakeholders without a biodefense mission but whose 

operations may be impacted by biological incidents. NB!C fields requests from federal 

partners tor information during ongoing biological incidents and delivers tailored reports 

for significant events requested by local partners that are evidence of ongoing demand for 

integrated information products that NBIC provides. NBIC leverages its governance 

boards (the Advisory Board and NBIC Interagency Working Group), interagency liaisons 

across Federal agencies, and regularly conducts surveys to federal partners to better 

assess its progress, improvements, and future capabilities. 

Question: When is the last time the Department assessed whether NBIC should continue 

to exist? What were the results of such analysis? 

Response: There is general consensus regarding the need for integrated biosurvcillance 

as evidenced within the 2015 GAO report, the White Ilouse National Strategyfor 

National Biosurveillance 2012, the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense A National 

Blueprintfor Biodefense. 2015, and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21. 

Further, NBIC carefully considers the recommendations within these reports and 
104 

implements improvements as acknowledged by GAO in its recent report on evaluating 

progress since earlier evaluations. 

NBIC regularly collaborates and coordinates with federal partners in the interagency 

community to provide situational awareness of key biological events on a daily basis. 

NBIC leverages its governance boards (the Advisory Board and NBIC Interagency 

Working Group), interagency liaisons across federal agencies, and regularly conducts 

surveys to Federal partners to better assess its progress. improvements, and future 

capabilities. In response to the last Federal Survey, NBIC instituted significant changes to 

its report fom1at and content that has been met with great favorability among the 

interagency as well as state, local, tribal and territorial partners. NBIC regularly assesses 

how to most effectively and efficiently meet its requirements. The Department recognizes 

the ongoing need for continued integrated biosurveillance across the interagency 

community. As with all of its programs, DHS regularly assesses its programs through 

resource allocation decisions in its annual budget cycle. 

Question: How is the FY20 17 budget request for NBIC responsive to the critique in 

GAO's review ofNBIC? 

Response: The FY20 17 budget includes funding for several initiatives which will 

address challenges identified by GAO. Addressing these challenges includes: working 

with the Department of Veteran's Affairs on a proof-of-concept to demonstrate 

interagency information sharing and integration; leveraging interagency efforts to utilize 

limited resources efficiently (such as the Department of Defense's Biosurveillance 

Ecosystem (BSVE) effort); and providing interagency access to advanced biosurveillance 

tools the Center develops, including Biofeeds. Biofeeds is an advanced integration 

system designed to streamline the collection of open source information. With its 

implementation, NBJC can more efficiently capture, track, analyze, and visualize 

biological event reporting, and disseminate key information to its partners more rapidly. 

As the Center develops the FY18 and future year requests we will work to incorporate 

additional efforts responsive to the report. 
105 

Question: The Department has chosen to deprioritize the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency preparedness grants by $642 million. These funds could be used by 

communities such as Garland, TX, Chattanooga, TN, and San Bernardino, CA, each of 

which has experienced a recent terror attack. 

Why has the Department decided to deprioritize grants to state and local governments? 

Response: In the context of government-wide spending limits imposed by the Budget 

Control Act, prior funding dedicated to preparedness grants in the 15 years since the 2001 

terrorist attacks, and the progress made in building preparedness across the nation during 

that timeframe, the Administration is proposing a combined $460,000,000 (35%) 

reduction to the preparedness grant programs (see table below). 

State and Local Programs 

Grants Programs 

Dollars in Thouwnds 

FY 2015 FY 2016 Activity/Office Revised Enacted Enacted 

State Homeland Security Grant $467,000 $467,000 Program 

Port Security Grant Program $100,000 $100,000 

Transit Security Grant Program $100,000 $100,000 

Urban Area Security Initiative $600,000 $600,000 

Countering Violent Extremism - $50,000 (CVE) 

Regional Competition Grant Program - - Total Budget $1,267,000 $1,317,000 

Positions - -

FY 2017 FY 2017 

Request +!- FY 

2016 

$200,000 ($267,000) 

$93.000 ($7.000) 

$85,000 ($15,000) 

$330,000 ($270,000) 

$49,000 ($1 ,000) 

$100,000 $100,000 

$857,000 ($460,000) 

- -

The President's Fiscal Year 2017 budget proposal re11ects difficult decisions among 

competing priorities across the DHS portfolio. As funding for grant programs began to 

decline in Fiscal2012, the Department emphasized that state and local governments 

should usc their grant funding to sustain the capabilities they built over the past 15 years 

with federal grant funding rather than invest in new capabilities that will be difficult to 

sustain in the tuture. 
106 

Question: According to information provided by FEMA to the Committee, over $3.7 

billion in prior year preparedness grant funding remained unspent as of January 31, 2016, 

a significant backlog. What are the primary reasons grantees give for not spending their 

allocations? How does FEMA consider this information as it determines its budget 

request each year? 

Response: The primary reasons for delay in expenditure of grant funds are because the 

funds are drawn down periodically on a reimbursable basis and many investments take 

from several months to over a year before they arc started. Such delays are inherent to 

the grants management process and arc not necessarily indicative of poor grants 

management or a reduced need for funding. Preparedness grants are awarded on an 

annual basis but grantees are allowed a three-year period of performance. The three-year 

period of performance promotes effective grants management, providing grantees the 

time necessary to complete the required planning, acquisition, and execution of projects. 

Additionally, because the funds are drawn down on a reimbursable basis, the unexpended 

balances remain high during the first year into the period of performance. As of April30, 

2016, of the reported $3.7 billion balance, $1.4 billion of that balance is from awards 

issued within the past year and $2.7 billion of the balance is from awards issued within 

the past two years. Unexpended balances are not an indicator of lack of need, and 

therefore not a consideration for detennining the budget request each year. We typically 

see significant draw down of awards in the year the period of performance ends, as large 

projects or equipment purchases come to a close and grant recipients expend funds and 

request reimbursement. For some projects, such as equipment, a grant recipient does not 

expend full funding until items are delivered satisfactorily, which is a sound approach to 

managing resources. 
107 

Question: In light of the upcoming Summer Olympics in Brazil: 

What efforts has the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), including through 

the Federal Air Marshals Service, made to secure agreements with South American 

countries to establish or enhance existing aviation security partnerships, particularly in 

airports that serve as a last points of departure for ±lights bound to the United States? 

Please list the partnerships TSA has in the region and whether the agency has a 

Memorandum ofCnderstanding or Memorandum of Agreement with the host country. 

Response: The Transportation Security Administration strives to secure Memoranda of 

Agreement (MOAs) regarding the deployment of In-Flight Security Officers (IFSOs) 

with all of its international partner countries. Currently there are 12 independent 

countries, and 3 dependent countries in South America that serve as last points of 

departure for flights bound to the United States. 

TSA's Oflice of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service, in coordination with the 

TSA Oftlce of Global Strategies (OGS), and the Department of State, are, as ofthe date 

of the hearing, nearing the final stages of securing an agreement regarding the 

deployment of IFSOs with Brazil, the host country for the 2016 Summer Olympics. 

In addition to a potential agreement with Brazil, TSA cunently has a Memorandum of 

Agreement (MOA), Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or Local Agreement 

regarding the deployment oflFSOs with eight other countries or tenitories in the region. 

Negotiations towards MOUs or MOAs are in process with several other countries. An 

MOA is binding and final, an MOl.J is non-binding and final (but leaves open the 

possibility of negotiating further to conclude an MOA if both countries choose to pursue 

one), and a Local Agreement is non-binding and informal (and leaves open a possibility 

of negotiating an MOU or an MOA if both countries so choose). 

A list of countries with an MOU, MOA, or Local Agreement regarding the deployment of 

IFSOs is Sensitive Security Information. TSA is able to provide these in a separate 

response, if requested. 
108 

Question: According to the Secret Service's Human Capital Plan, the Service plans to 

on board over 700 people per year from FY20 17 to FY20 19. 

!-low much of the FY20 17 budget is dedicated to hiring the contract human resource staff 

necessary to process this unprecedented number of hires? 

Response: $6,000,000 is allocated to support staffing contracts. 

Question: !-low does the Service plan to validate whether workforce staffing model 

projections are accurate in providing numbers that will right-size the Service'1 

Response: The Secret Service will contract with a third party to provide an independent 

validation of its staffing allocation model. This effort is being coordinated through DHS 

Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), with established timelines/milestones, and 

will be similar in scope and eflort to the validation of U.S. Custom and Border 

Protection's Workload Staffing Model conducted in 2010. A contract award is expected 

on or about June L 2016, and evaluation/validation (with final report) is expected to be 

completed prior to October I, 2016 

Question: If 12 Special Agent (SA) and 13 Uniformed Division (UD) classes will be 

needed in FY20 16 to on board only 406 new positions, how does the Service plan to 

onboard 700 people in FY2017 with only 7 SA and 8 UD classes? Does this mean that 

most of the hires in FY20 17 will be administrative, professional, or technical? 

Response: The 406 cited is projected position growth (target hiring minus projected 

attrition) in FY 2016 and does not reflect an on board total for the period. With current FY 

2016 attrition projections, the Secret Service will onboard over 800 positions to reach this 

projected growth in on board count. 

The Secret Service's Human Capital Plan (HCP) identified a growih of900 positions 

(300 positions per year) for the three-year period FY 2017 FY 2019. Thus, when 

accounting for projected attrition, the Service will need to on board about 700 positions 

per year during this period to reach growth targets. 

The IICP, while not a formal budget request, takes into account budgetary constraints in 

the FY 2016 President's Budget and identified a mission-based requirement of7,600 

positions by the end of FY 20 I 9. Reaching this target by FY 2019 was not constrained by 

budget considerations beyond FY 2016, and the onboarding of700 annually was 
109 

identified based on attrition and hiring projections. The FY 2017 budget request supports 

6,705 FTE and 6,772 positions (an increase of224 FTE and 58 administrative, 

professional, and technical (APT) positions) and includes 7 SA and 8 UD classes based 

on achieving FY 2016 enacted levels (6,481 FTE/6,714 positions). 

Any staffing target shortfall resulting from increased attrition and/or not reaching full 

hiring goals in FY 2016 will provide capacity to hire more SA/UD classes and APTs in 

FY 2017. 
110 

Question: The Coast Guard's FY20 17 budget requests an increase of $2 million and 28 

positions for military justice reorganization related mainly to sexual assault 

investigations. 

Why is there such a significant change in the projected number of attorneys required to 

prosecute sexual assault cases in 20 17? 

Response: The Coast Guard's budget request increases prosecution, defense, and 

judicial capacity to address an increasing military justice caseload and respond to 

Congressionally-mandated changes in military criminal law. Over the past three years, 

the Coast Guard has experienced a significant increase in the number of complex cases. 

At the same time, Congress has enacted changes in the law and procedures that apply to 

courts-martial. 

Question: Is the Coast Guard seeing an increasing trend of sexual assault incidents? 

Response: Over the past 3 years the Coast Guard has seen an increase in the number of 

sexual assault reports. The Coast Guard carefully analyzes these trends in sexual assault 

reporting as a part of our efforts to ensure comprehensive and effective sexual assault 

prevention and response. The Coast Guard assess that some of the increase in reports 

during this period is attributable to the actions undertaken to encourage victims to report 

incidents of sexual assault. 
111 

Question: The Government Accountability Office's recent report (GA0-16-148) 

concerning the National Security Cutter (NSC) indicates that NSC performance issues 

have resulted in the NSCs operating in a degraded condition and spending fewer days 

away from homeport than planned. The total of cost for retrofits and design changes to 

repair the NSCs amounts to $202.! million. However, the Coast Guard's budget only 

requests $!27 million for these activities. 

How much of the $!27 million will go towards implementing necessary design changes, 

and which hulls will be repaired in FY20 !7? 

Response: Of the $!27 million requested in FY 20 !7 for the National Security Cutter 

(NSC), approximately $!1 million is allocated to address a portion of the changes cited in 

Table 6 (page 28) of GAO report !6-!48 entitled "Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure 

Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Arc Addressed". 

This table is replicated below: 

Table 6: Retrofits and Design Changes on the National Security Cutter Class 

Costing over $1 Million as of June 2015 

Within the $11M, the following retrofits and upgrades will be completed: NSC 6 

ammunition hoists, NSC 6 and 7 gantry crane and side davit, NSC 7 and 8 

communications system, and NSC 7 cutter monitoring system. 
112 

Question: When will the remaining hulls be repaired'? 

Response: Svstems to be retrotltted or upgraded: 

• Structural Enhancement: NSC I will begin its Structural Enhancement Drydock 

Availability (SEDA) in Q4 FY 2016 and is scheduled to be completed Q4 FY 

2017. NSC 2 SEDA is anticipated to be complete by Q4 FY 2018. The structural 

changes were already incorporated into production starting with NSC 3. 

• Gantry Crane and Side Davit Replacements: 

o NSCs 3 and 4 are completed. 

o NSCs 1 and 2 will be completed during their respective SEDA periods. 

o NSCs 5-9 will be completed during their respective second Post 

Shakedown Availability (PSA) following delivery. The second PSA is 

completed within two years of delivery. 

• Ammunition Hoist (Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) and 57mm Gun) Upgrade: 

The upgraded CIWS and 57mm ammunition hoists were installed on NSCs 3 and 

4. Installation on NSC 5 is planned during its second PSA, which is scheduled to 

be complete by January 2017. A precise date for the installation on NSCs 6-9 has 

yet to be determined but if not incorporated into production wi 11 occur after 

delivery. Installation will occur on NSCs 1 and 2 during the next availability 

following their respective SEDA periods. 

System Upgrades: 

• C4ISR upgrade installation: 

o NSC 1: To be completed during SEDA. 

o NSC 2: Completed. 

o NSC 3: Planned FY 2017 maintenance period. 

o NSC 4: Currently undergoing installation, scheduled to be completed in 

May2016. 

o NSC 5-9: Incorporated into production. 

• Communications Upgrade: 

o NSC 1: To be completed during SEDA. 

o NSC 2: Completed. 

o NSC 3: Planned FY 20 I 7 maintenance period. 

o NSC 4: Currently undergoing installation, scheduled to be completed in 

May 2016. 

o NSC 5: Upgrade will occur during second PSA commencing May 2017 

and is scheduled to be completed in January 2018. 
113 

o NSCs 6-9: Upgrade will occur during PSA following delivery. 

• Cutter Monitoring System Upgrade (Machinery Control & Monitoring): 

o NSCs 1-5: Completed. 

o NSCs 6-9: Upgrade will occur during PSA following delivery. 

• Remove Aircraft Ship Integrated Secure and Traverse (ASIST) tracks in flight 

deck: 

o NSC 1: To be completed during SEDA. 

o NSC 2: To be completed during SED A. 

o NSC 3: Completed. 

o NSCs 4 through 9: Delivered from the shipbuilder without ASIST. 

• Breathing Apparatus replacement: 

o NSCs 1-5: Completed. 

o NSCs 6-9: Completed during production. 

Question: If changes for all hulls will not be planned at the same time, do you envision 

that the final cost will be more than $202.1 million? If so, what are the projected costs? 

Response: As indicated above in responses to Parts I and 2 of this response, these 

changes will not take place at the same time. 

No final costs are expected to exceed those in Table 6 except for SEDA, which was 

awarded after the GAO report in February 2016. The total value of the SEDA contract, 

including all options, is $70.6 million, $33 m more than reflected in the GAO table under 

Structural Enhancements. 

Question: Will the permanent increase in crew size for the NSC have any other 

budgetary impacts besides the $6.1 million line item increase for 125 positions') In other 

words, will there be any budgetary impact as far as changes to berthing, homeporting 

requirements, support personnel, etc. If so, please explain those impacts. 

Response: Increasing NSC crew size to 126 will not have any ancillary budgetary 

impacts (e.g., changes to berthing, homeporting etc). 
114 

Question: The FY20 17 request for Homeland Security Investigations (1-ISI) is $2.1 

billion. Information provided by Immigration and Customs Enforcement to the 

Committee shows that HSI agents spend a significant amount of time on criminal 

investigations that may be in the purview of other federal law enforcement agencies. 

How docs ICE HSI prioritize and allocate its resources~ 

Response: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security 

Investigations (1-ISI) conducts investigations to protect the United States through criminal 

enforcement against terrorist and other transnational criminal organizations that threaten 

public safety and national security, and brings to justice those seeking to exploit our 

customs and immigration laws worldwide. 

ICE HSI prioritizes and allocates its investigative resources by examining vulnerabilities 

in trade, immigration, and threat analysis. The threat analysis takes into consideration 

any imminent threat to national security and/or public safety; any imminent threat within 

a specific geographic area; and any operational priorities set by the White House, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of ICE, or Congress. 

Question: Describe how ICE HSI determines whether to allocate resources to 

investigations in categories such as drug smuggling, cyber-related crime, and gang 

activity, when such criminal activity can be investigated by other federal agencies? 

Response: Following passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, ICE was 

established as the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Charged with executing the interior enforcement mission of the former U.S. Customs 

Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, ICE is vested with all of the 

investigative authorities previously held by both of those former agencies. As a border 

enforcement agency, ICE HSI may utilize numerous federal statutes and regulations, and 

has the authority to investigate cross-border crimes related to illicit trade, travel, 

immigration, and finance. ICE HSI is also the principal criminal investigative agency for 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS), responsible for conducting criminal investigations in furtherance of 

deterring criminal conduct and promoting voluntary compliance of the programs under 

both CBP and USCIS purview. 

ICE HSI prioritizes the allocation of its resources with the goal of disrupting and 

dismantling transnational criminal organizations with a focus on the most significant 
115 

Homeland Security 

threats to the safety and security of the American people. While other federal agencies' 

investigative portfolios may overlap, no single entity can tackle global criminal 

enterprises alone. Rather, it requires a multi-agency, multi-national, and layered 

approach. To that end, ICE HSI forges strong and cooperative relationships and works 

closely with federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners toward the mission to 

uphold border security, public safety, and protect national security. 
116 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Jeh C. Johnson 

From Senator Kelly Ayotte 

"The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2017" 

March 6, 2016 

Question: New Hampshire, like many states in the nation, confronts a serious heroin and 

fentanyl epidemic. Heroin and fentanyl, which is a powerful analgesic estimated by the 

Drug Enforcement Administration to be 50 times more powerful than heroin, continue to 

be produced in and transit through Mexico, across the border, and into communities 

throughout the United States. In 2015, New Hampshire experienced over 420 fatal drug 

overdoses- I 57 of which could be attributed to fentanyl, 32 to heroin, and 43 to a 

combination of heroin and fentanyl. Local law enforcement can trace heroin seized in 

Manchester, New Hampshire to Lawrence, Massachusetts and then directly to Mexico. 

To protect our communities, we must do a better job of interdicting heroin and fentanyl 

before it enters the U.S. 

In October 2015. you and I discussed this epidemic at a homeland threats hearing. At 

that time, you stressed that "interdiction at the southern border is the key." 

Do you still believe that interdiction at the southern border is the key? 

Response: Yes. Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) pose the greatest 

criminal drug threat to the United States. The Southwest Border continues to be the 

dominant path along which these drugs are smuggled into the United States. 

Question: What specific steps has the department taken to increase interdiction? 

Response: CBP continues to conduct focused interdiction efforts, and to identify and 

implement new strategies, tools and technology that will assist frontline officers in the 

detection and interception of drugs and those involved in illicit smuggling activities. The 

Oflice of field Operations (OFO), Tactical Analytical Units, provide Ports of Entry realtime tactical intelligence through a diverse array of collection and analysis platforms, 

techniques and procedures to supply frontline ot1icers operationally relevant seizure 

trends, smuggling tactics, threat reporting and other value added enforcement 
117 

information. Additionally, OFO will be deploying 47 additional canine teams at 

Southwest Border ports of entry, distributed between four tield offices with the majority 

of the teams being deployed to ports within the San Diego and Tucson Field Oftices areas 

of responsibility. Canine teams will consist primarily of human/narcotics detection, but 

OFO will also be increasing the number of currency/firearms detection teams as well. 

Though there has been one promising study for the use of canines in the interdiction of 

fentanyl, the risk of canine death during detection is high due to the potency of fentanyl. 

Question: Please provide heroin interdiction data for 2015. 

Response: Heroin seizures by CBP totaled 2,745 kg in CY 2015, an increase of25 

percent over the 2,199 kg seized in CY 2014. The Southwest Border remains the primary 

entry point of heroin destined for the LJnited States accounting for 77 percent (2, 120 kg), 

with the majority occurring at the POEs. The majority (59 percent) of heroin seizures 

were hidden in personally owned vehicles and averaged 3.6 kg load size. 

Question: Please provide fentanyl interdiction data for 2015. 

Response: Fentanyl seizures by Cl3P totaled 55 kg in CY 2015, an increase of 150 

percent over the 22 kg seized in CY 2014. The SWB remains the primary entry point of 

fentanyl destined for the United States accounting for 47 percent (26 kg) of total fentanyl 

seizures. 
118 
119 

Question: In February 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Campbell returned to 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard after a 61-day counter narcotics patrol of the Caribbean Sea 

and Eastern Pacific Ocean. Campbell seized about 4,800 pounds of cocaine worth more 

than $80 million. These shipments from South America were bound for the United 

States. 

Please explain the U.S. Coast Guard's role in drug interdiction. 

Response: The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime law enforcement, 

including drug interdiction on the high seas, and shares the lead for drug interdiction in 

U.S. territorial seas with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The Coast Guard is 

able to leverage a broad array of authorities, capabilities, competencies, and partnerships 

which are vital to successful mission execution. 

Question: Please provide data related to the U.S. Coast Guard's interdiction ef1orts. 

Response: The Coast Guard interdicted 144 metric tons of cocaine and 78,000 pounds of 

marijuana from the maritime drug transit zone in FYIS, worth an estimated $4.3 billion 

dollars in wholesale value. 

Question: Where are they interdicting the most drugs? 

Response: The Coast Guard conducts most drug interdictions in the Western 

Hemisphere Transit Zone, that area between drug source countries in South America, and 

transshipment points in Central America. 

Question: What drugs'! 

Response: The Coast Guard interdicts more cocaine than any other drug. In FY 2015 

the Coast Guard removed 144 Metric Tons of cocaine from the transit zone, a 57% 

increase over FY 2014. 

Question: Where are they interdicting heroin'? 

Response: Heroin has been interdicted in the transit zone both within the Eastern Pacific 

Ocean and Caribbean Sea. These events typically originate in South America and arc split 

between commercial shipping vessels and noncommercial maritime conveyances; 

however. maritime interdiction oflarge quantities of heroin is rare. This is not surprising 
120 

since, according to our best intelligence, the vast majority of the heroin consumed in the 

U.S. is produced in Mexico and transported not by maritime means, but by land routes 

into the United States. 

Question: Does the Coast Guard operate with sufficient intelligence, and sufficient 

resources? 

Response: lntelligcncc on cocaine movements through the Transit Zone is adequate. 

Intelligence from multiple sources is fused by Joint Interagency Task Force-South and is 

used to make targeting decisions for action by Coast Guard, Allied and Partner Nation 

surface assets, supported by maritime patrol aircraft from the Coast Guard, Customs and 

Border Protection, the Department of Defense, plus Allied and Partner Nations. In fact, in 

fiscal year 2015 Joint Interagency Task Force-South had actionable intelligence with 

precise geo-coordinate information for the movement of more than 200 metric tons of 

cocaine that could not be targeted due to a lack of available interdiction forces. Over the 

last two fiscal years, more than 90 percent of our interdictions were cued by intelligence. 

However, operational capacity limits the Coast Guard to targeting significantly less than 

our available actionable intelligence. 

Question: How does the Coast Ciuard work with SOUTH COM and NORTH COM? 

Response: The Coast Guard works collaboratively with both NORTBCOM and 

SO UTI-I COM both as a force provider and partner for capacity building. The Coast 

Guard is the primary provider of smface interdiction forces to SOUTH COM through 

Joint Interagency Task Force-South, and is a key partner for capacity building efforts in 

NORTIICOM and SOUTHCOMs AORs. 

Question: How does the Coast Guard coordinate with the Drug Enforcement 

Administration? 

Response: The Coast Guard partners with DEA and other investigative agencies as part 

of its counter drug mission, including the FBI and ICE/HSI. A majority of collaboration 

takes place at, or is facilitated by, Joint Interagency Task Force-South. The importance 

of interdictions cued by information from investigative agencies leads to the direct 

removal of drugs taken off the high seas. When the U.S. Coast Guard apprehends 

suspects from drug smuggling cases, they divulge information during prosecution and 

sentencing that is used to help indict, extradite, and convict drug kingpins in the effort to 

dismantle transnational organized crime networks. Information divulged by smugglers 

also leads to actionable intelligence for future drug smuggling events, producing followon seizures and intelligence. 
121 

Question: Please provide an update on the Aviation Security Advisory Committee's 

recommendation that TSA implement recurrent vetting of airport workers. 

Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recognizes the value of 

conducting more frequent or recurrent criminal checks on airport workers to identify 

cases where there has been subsequent criminal activity since the employee was granted 

access. TSA requires that all aviation workers badged by an airport requiring a Criminal 

History Records Check must undergo a new check every two years. Further, TSA 

anticipates beginning its proof of concept with the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI) 

for FBI Rap Back, or recurrent criminal history vetting, this spring. The proof of concept 

will be with Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, Boston Logan International Airport, 

and Delta Air Lines. The FBI Rap Back will provide real-time recurrent information on 

criminal activity committed by credential-holding workers. The initial proof of concept 

will inform TSA's expanded implementation of this etiort to include information for 

aiq)ort statT planning, reporting, and operational updates required to expand Rap Back 

with more airports and air carriers after the initial phase is completed this summer. Full 

airport roll out is dependent on airport/air carrier ability to support resources, additional 

fees, and airport badging/human resource technology for recurrent criminal vetting. 

Additionally, all airport and airline employees flying as passengers must undergo the 

same checkpoint screening as the t1ying public. 
122 

Question: The Visa Waiver Program allows citizens from 38 countries to travel to the 

U.S. for business or tourism purposes for up to 90 days without first obtaining a visa. In 

December, Congress passed and the president signed into law additional restrictions for 

traveling under the program. Pursuant to that law, a citizen of a Visa Waiver Program 

country who has traveled to Iraq, Syria, Sudan, or Iran in the last five years cannot travel 

visa-free to the United States. That law also provided you with the authority to designate 

additional countries to that list. You recently announced that Somalia, Yemen, and Libya 

have been added to this list. 

What factors did you consider when deciding to add Libya, Somalia, and Yemen to the 

list'l 

To what extent was the Department of Defense consulted in these decisions'! 

To what extent was the intelligence community consulted in these decisions? 

Was AFRJCOM consulted? 

How about CF.NTCOM? 

We know that AI Qaeda continues to operate in large parts of Algeria, Mali, Tunisia, and 

Niger. Why weren't each of these countries also designated as a "country of concern" 

under this law'l 

Response: The Secretary considered the three criteria in the statute, specifically section 

217(a)(12)(D)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act: 

"(I) whether the presence of an alien in the country or area increases the 

likelihood that the alien is a credible threat to the national security of the United 

States; 

"(II) whether a foreign terrorist organization has a signifkant presence in the 

country or area; and 

''(Ill) whether the country or area is a safe haven for terrorists." 

The statute docs not exclude the Secretary considering other relevant criteria as well, so 

the Department of Homeland Security also considered, among other things, (a) available 

intelligence on the nature of the terrorist threat to the Homeland from the Islamic State of 

Traq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qa'ida, and other terrorist groups; (b) available intelligence 
123 

Question#: 32 

-: ----·-·----!-;-;-----------------------------1 Topic: Visa Waiver Program Changes 

Bearing: The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for fiscal Year 2017 

Primary: The Honorable Kelly Ayotte 

~--·Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) 

on the nature of the terrorist threat from ISIL, al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups to our 

allies and to U.S. interests overseas; (c) the extent and nature of legitimate trade, travel, 

commerce, and familial connections between the United States and the countries under 

consideration; (d) the extent of counterterrorism cooperation, and cooperation on 

aviation, border, and maritime security, between the United States and the countries 

under consideration; and (e) the counterterrorism capacity of the country under 

consideration. 

In accordance with section 217(a)(l2)(D)(i), the Secretary consulted with the Secretary of 

State and the Director of National Intelligence in making the determination to designate 

Libya, Somalia, and Yemen. The Department of Homeland Security also consults 

continually on both intelligence and policy matters with the interagency and specifically 

w·ith the intelligence and counterterrorism communities, including the Department of 

Defense. Weighing all the criteria in the statute and the other criteria listed above, the 

Secretary designated Libya, Somalia, and Yemen as countries of concern at this time. 

There is no time limit to the Secretary's authority to designate other countries or areas, 

and DHS will continuously evaluate intelligence and policy considerations to determine 

whether the further changes are necessary. 
124 

Question: As I understand it, DHS has brought back the Integrated Product Team 

concept to DHS Science & Technology. 

How is that process working? 

Specifically, how is the TSA interfacing with DHS S&T to provide TSA requirements for 

Research & Development investment? 

How would you assess TSA engagement with industry in the development of 

requirements needed to successfully implement Risk-Based Security processes and 

technology capabilities in the future0 

How is that process working? 

Response: The Integrated Product Team (IPT) process is working well. In response to 

the Secretary's memorandum in August 2015, the DHS Science and Technology 

Directorate (S&T) established a governance structure and operational process for the 

IPTs in FY 2016. This included standing up five chartered IPTs that identified priority 

technological capability gaps in their respective mission areas. The lPTs were led by 

senior executives from the operational Components and included members from across 

the Department. Based on inputs from the IPTs, the S&T Research Council (composed of 

the Component !PT leads) identified the high-priority gaps determined to be most 

important for R&D investment across DHS. These will be described in further depth in a 

report to be presented to Congress. 

The FY 2016 process also identified R&D activities being performed across the 

Department, providing a DHS-wide R&D profile to inform future decisions on R&D 

investments and acquisitions. 

Question: Specifically, how is TSA interfacing with S&T to provide TSA requirements 

for R&D investment? 

Response: TS/\ 's Of! icc of Security Capabilities conducts an annual prioritization of 

capability gaps related to physical security screening in airports. These prioritized gaps 

are shared with S&T to inform resource allocation decisions. 

Furthermore, the Aviation Security IPT was initiated in Q4 of2015 as a collaborative 

effort between the DHS S&T and the Transportation Security Administration, with 
125 

Fiscal Y ear20 17 

participation from other DHS component agencies to include the Secret Service, Coast 

Guard, and Customs and Border Protection. The IPT successfully completed the 

prioritization of DHS research and development activities in support of aviation security 

based on TSA 's prioritized capability gaps. 

In addition to chairing the Aviation Security !PT. TSA participated in the Biological 

Threat, Cyber Security, and Counterterrorism IPTs. As an active participant on these 

IPT' s, TSA provided considerable input regarding technological capability gaps across 

priority DHS missions. 

TSA and S&T are working together on several programs to fill the previously mentioned 

gaps. TSA and S&T signed the Innovation Task Force and Apex Screening at Speed 

Strategic Vision on April 7, 2016 and are initiating projects in support of these programs. 

Question: How would you assess TSA engagement with industry in the development of 

requirements needed to successfully implement Risk-Based Security processes and 

technology capabilities in the future? 

Response: TSA is deeply engaged with industry stakeholders through the development 

of requirements for fi.tturc security capabilities. TSA solicits industry responses on 

advanced security concepts through Requests for Information, Industry Days. stakeholder 

meetings, and technical presentations by TSA staff members at conferences. 
126 

Question: In December 2014, Congress passed the Transportation Security Acquisition 

Reform Act, which requires TSA "to implement best practices and improve transparency 

with regard to technology acquisition programs," including development of a five-year 

investment plan in consultation with industry. 

\Vhat progress has been made toward carrying out the directives in this legislation? 

Response: The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA's) policies and 

procedures address requirements of the Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act 

(Il.R. 2719). As required by the Act, TSA amended its Congressional notification 

policies for security-related technology acquisitions contract awards exceeding $30 

million. Per Section 1611 of the Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act, TSA 

submitted the Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan for Aviation Security 

2015 Report to Congress on August 12, 2015, which was developed in consultation with 

the DI-IS Undersecretary for Management, Under Secretary for Science and Technology, 

the DIIS Chieflnformation Officer, and with participation of the Aviation Security 

Advisory Committee (established by the Administrator ofTSA) and other aviation 

industry stakeholders. This plan aims to achieve a shared vision among Congressional, 

industry, DHS, and TSA stakeholders to address security technology needs, deploy 

cutting-edge security capabilities, and increase ct1iciency and security effectiveness in 

American aviation security. The plan provides transparency into TSA's capability gaps 

and planned investments to address them. TSA will continue to engage industry, as 

necessary, in the strategic technology initiatives identified in this plan and in advance of 

the revision planned for FY2017. 
127 

Question: Among the goals of First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet), the 

network aims to provide an interoperable communications platform that first responders 

at the local, state, tribal, and federal levels can use to coordinate during emergencies and 

for daily public safety communications. Yet, New Hampshire faces the challenge of 

being predominantly rural and mountainous, particularly in its northern and western 

regions. 

At this stage of the FirstNet rollout, what is the outlook on the ability to provide the 

necessary infrastructure in the most isolated parts of my state - given that rural areas will 

be the most costly to cover? 

Response: FirstNet is an independent authority within the Department of Commerce. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security is a permanent FirstNet Board member. A request 

for proposals (RFP) has been released and FirstNet has entered the evaluation stage of its 

procurement following final bids being due May 31,2016. Until a contract is awarded, 

FirstNet will not have its tina! solution, which will contain the specific information 

regarding impact on rural and mountainous coverage. Within the Middle Class Tax Relief 

and Job Creation Act of2012 (P.L. 112-96), however, FirstNet is required to meet 

'·substantial rural coverage milestones" during the deployment of its network. 

Additionally, within FirstNet's publicly available RFP, FirstNet has required bidders to 

propose network solutions to deploy FirstNet's Band 14 within the country's rural areas 

at the same time as the urban areas to ensure that rural areas receive coverage as required 

per the Act. 

As an independent authority within a separate agency, any additional requests for 

information or questions on this topic should be directed to FirstNet Director of 

Government Affairs, Edward Parkinson, at: Edward.Parkinson@FirstNet.gov. 
128 

Question: FirstNct was allocated $7 billion to establish a nationwide fully interoperable 

network. However, GAO estimates this could cost anywhere from $12-47 billion. 

Nearly one year after GAO's report was published, FirstNet has remained on track and 

met its planning deadlines, currently in the midst of the important RFP phase. 

Please provide an update on the assessment on plans to generate revenue through user 

fees and commercial partnerships to offset the additional expected costs. 

Does the use of commercial partnerships involve non-public safety services'> 

How will you utilize commercial revenue sources, yet also prioritize public safety 

concerns and feedback - especially when it comes to integration with existing regional 

communications services? 

Once up and running, what challenges and costs to you expect to be associated with 

maintenance of the network? 

How do we also ensure that FirstNet is not vulnerable to data breaches and cyberattacks, 

similar to what we witnessed with the Office of Personnel Management breaches 

recently? 

Response: While DHS is a permanent FirstNet Board member, FirstNet is an 

independent authority within a separate agency, the Department of Commerce, and 

therefore FirstNet is in the best position to answer questions regarding the specifics of the 

Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN). Please direct any questions on 

this topic to FirstNet Director of Government Affairs, Edward Parkinson, at: 

Edward.Parkinson@FirstNet.gov. 
129 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Jeh C. Johnson 

From Senator Claire McCaskill 

"The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2017" 

March 6, 2016 

Question: I want to acknowledge the important progress that DHS has made in 

improving their acquisition oversight. It is still far from perfect, but I know that you have 

made this a priority and I think we are at least starting to see the dividends of that work. 

I remain concerned about staffing levels for acquisition oversight positions. A few years 

ago DHS established a Cost Analysis Division (CAD) within the Office of the Chief 

Procurement Officer. The CAD is supposed to both validate the cost estimates of the 

most costly acquisitions and also conduct its own independent cost analyses. 

Yet the vast majority of major DHS acquisitions are still being delivered late and over 

budget. 1 am concerned that it simply does not have the capabilities to do its own 

independent analyses, though. 

Response: Today, all major DHS acquisitions have baselines that allow us to monitor the 

program's timeliness and cost, significantly improving the number ofDHS programs that 

are delivered on time and on budget. Baselines arc critical tools that program managers 

use to keep their programs on track. The Acquisition Review Board (ARB) also uses the 

baselines to oversee major programs. Since the beginning of October 2014, DHS has 

conducted 40 action-oriented Acquisition Review Boards of major acquisition programs. 

If program managers or the program's ARB tinct that the baseline is not being met, 

corrective action is taken early. Baselines are just one tool that DHS now has in place to 

aggressively limit cost overruns and schedule delays. 

As part of the Department's Unity of Effort Initiative, the Cost Analysis Division (CAD) 

was realigned from the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) 

to the Office of the Chief Financial Ot1icer (OCFO) in June 2014. 

CAD works across the Department to provide objective cost estimates and cost analyses 

to enable DHS acquisition and resource decision making. Specifically the CAD: 
130 

• Principally advises the Under Secretary for Management (USM), DHS Chief 

Financial Officer (CFO), and Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs) on cost 

estimating and analysis issues. 

• Leads the Department in cost estimating and analysis policy, policy implementation, 

and guidance. 

• As directed, develops Independent Cost Estimates (ICEs) and Independent Cost 

Assessments (ICAs) of Level I and Level 2 Acquisition Programs to inform the 

Acquisition Decision Authority. 

• Reviews, analyzes, and evaluates Life Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCE) and ensures the 

cost of DHS programs are presented to the Acquisition Decision Authority accurately 

and completely. 

• Advises the Homeland Security Acquisition Institute (HSAJ) on career field 

certification, training, and education for the cost estimating and analysis community. 

As of January 14,2016, the Department has successfully closed the Acquisition 

Documentation gap. All Major Acquisition programs between Acquisition Decision 

Event (ADE) 2A and 3 have CFO-approved LCCEs. 

Question: How many FTEs do you have in the Cost Analysis Division? 

Response: CAD has an authorized level of 14 positions, with nine full-time permanent 

employees currently on-board. CAD is working to fill its vacant positions and expects to 

be at full staffing in FY 2017. 

Question: How many independent cost analyses is the Cost Analysis Division able to 

complete per year'? 

Response: In Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, CAD is planning to develop five independent cost 

assessments. In FY 2016, CAD is completing three independent cost estimates: Customs 

and Border Protection's Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), the Chief Financial 

Officer Financial Systems Modernization (FSM), and the Chief Information Officer 

Human Resources Information Technology (HRIT). In FY 2015, CAD provided 

independent cost estimates covering two Master Acquisition Oversight List (MAOL) 

programs, United States Coast Guard OtT-Shore Patrol Cutter (OPC) and the Customs 

and Border Protection Strategic Air and Marine Program (StAMP), which included the 

Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA), UH-60 Black Hawk, and the StAMP Aircraft 

sustainment plan. 
131 

Question: How many times per year does the Cost Analysis Division have to rely on 

components' analyses rather than conducting its own? 

When the Cost Analysis Division cannot do its own analysis, docs it rely on whatever the 

components give it'7 

Response: CAD does not solely rely on the Components' analyses. When a MAOL 

Component Program Management Office (PMO) submits a LCCE for approval; CAD 

reviews, analyzes, and evaluates against CAD's LCCE Scorecard Evaluation Criterion 

which is based on GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide standards. In FY 2015, 

CAD developed and recommended 11 MAOL Program LCCEs for DHS CFO approval. 

Question: Docs the analysis done by the components ever come t1·om the contractor, or 

is it a 100% independent analysis that is conducted by the components themselves'7 

Response: The LCCEs developed by the Component PMOs use either government 

and/or contractor support staff. CAD has an assigned senior analyst to work directly with 

Components in the preparation of LCCEs prior to them being submitted for Department 

approval. As of January 14,2016, the Department has successfully closed the 

Acquisition Documentation gap. All Major Acquisition programs between Acquisition 

Decision Event (ADE) 2A and 3 have CFO-approved LCCEs. Contractors who would 

provide the goods or services being acquired are never involved in the development of 

LCCEs. All Department approved LCCEs are developed by the Component program 

offices. 
132 

Question: What steps does DHS need to take to ensure that programs have accurate, 

reliable, and timely cost estimates? 

Response: DI-IS CAD will continue to develop ICEs and !CAs on a limited and focused 

approach, and DHS will continue to review and approve LCCEs on all major acquisition 

programs for every ADE 2A, 28, 2C, and 3, CAD is leading cross-component initiatives 

that are aimed at enhancing the DHS cost estimating capability, such as establishing and 

promoting best practices; building better analytical tools and access to data; and 

standardizing training and certification of DHS cost analysts. In addition, DHS 

components will continue to certify resource availability for acquisition programs in 

advance of A.DEs, and maintain LCCEs. The annual Program and Budget Review 

process will continue to examine the affordability of major acquisition programs, DHS is 

committed to preparing credible, accurate, reliable, and comprehensive cost estimates 

that lead to improved acquisition oversight and resourcing decisions, 
133 

Question: GAO also found consistent staffing shortages across some ofDHS's most 

troubled acquisition programs. Overall, GAO found staffing shortfalls in 21 of the 22 

programs it recently reviewed; funding gaps of 10 percent or more in half of those 

programs; and requirements changes across all 22 programs. 

Customs and Border Protection, for example, had the equivalent of 11 full time 

employees working on its integrated fixed towers, or !FT, program, but needed 48. That 

is a 37 person shortfall on a program that is 7 already years behind schedule. 

DHS leadership told GAO that it could take years to resolve some of these issues. 

How long do you anticipate being short-staffed on some of these acquisition programs? 

Response: It is difficult to estimate how long it will take for some programs to be fully 

staffed. With the exception of Customs and Border Protection, most of the staffing gaps 

are vacant positions that are in various stages of the hiring process. Due to normal 

turnover, new vacancies and gaps occur that will have to be addressed. Staffing gaps that 

require additional funding may have to be addressed in the budget process and thus take 

longer to fill. There are mitigation strategies for addressing staffing gaps in place, 

including using temporary detailed or matrixed staff, as well as contractor support to 

obtain needed skills to execute programs until positions can be filled. 

Question: Has DHS ever considered delaying an acquisition program in order to ensure 

adequate staffing is available for program oversight? If so, please provide some 

examples. 

Response: Yes. DHS requires programs to document staffing plans in program 

documentation, which must be approved for Acquisition Decision Event (AD E)-I, for the 

program to proceed. DHS has considered delaying an ADE if adequate staffing is not 

identified or planned for and if mitigation strategies are not adequate to address staffing 

shortfalls. If a program is identified as having staffing risks prior to an ADE, DHS may 

perform a detailed assessment to help determine adequate program staffing. 

Question: What specific steps is DHS taking to remedy the staffing shortfalls? 

Response: DHS has required all major programs to conduct a staffing assessment and to 

identify their mitigation strategies for identified gaps. This has resulted in more emphasis 
134 

and prioritization in addressing gaps both in hiring to fill vacancies and training to 

address any skill gaps. The mitigation strategy may also include using temporary 

detailed staff as well as contractor support to obtain needed skills to execute programs 

and mitigate program staff shortages until positions can be filled. For programs that were 

identified with high risk staffing shortfalls, DHS performed a detailed assessment to help 

determine adequate program staffing and identify critical gaps to Component and 

headquarters leadership. 
135 

Question: On scores of cficctive leadership in from list of best places to work in the 

federal government, DHS is ranked last among all federal agencies, and 6 DHS 

subcomponents are among the lowest 9 sub-agencies government-wide. DHS is last in 

the survey in employee empowerment; last in employees' views of fair resolution of 

employee issues; last in the level of respect and satisfaction employees have for senior 

leaders; and last in employees' views of their immediate supervisors' job performance. 

These rankings demonstrate a lack of ef1ective direct management within the agency. 

How many SES positions do you have at DHS? 

Response: At the end of the FY 15 performance cycle, DHS had 696 allocated SES 

positions. 

Question: So what criteria are used to determine what positions within the DHS 

hierarchy should be filled by an SES employee? 

Response: DHS applies the criteria outlined in 5 U.S.C. 3132(a)(2) which states a 

position meets the SES functional criteria when it is classified above GS-15 and: 

directs the work of an organizational unit; 

is held accountable for the success of one or more specific programs or projects; 

monitors progress toward organizational goals and periodically evaluates and makes 

appropriate adjustments to such goals: 

supervises the work of employees (other than personal assistants); or 

otherwise exercises important policy-making, policy-determining, or other executive 

functions. Additionally, DHS applies the following leadership characteristics: 

o the scale of innovation as an outcome in and of itself which is new and 

unprecedented, or as the necessary means of accomplishing outcomes, 

requiring forward thinking and forecasting; 

o intense interest in program performance and the visibility the program 

would receive (public, political, public), the resource level, and/or issue 

controversy or sensitivity; 

o volatility from frequent and signii1cant changes in program requirements, 

regulatory guidance and/or policy, technology, and/or work methodologies; 

o conflicting requirements that evolve or respond to environmental 

volatilities: often require trade-offs and signiticant refocus of operational 
136 

plans, budgets, and/or work structures; 

o diversity across operational units and/or regions that require complex 

coordination and integration of distinctly unique functions, budget, issues, 

operational requirements, and oversight; 

o ltiglt level coordination and negotiation across components, other agencies, 

Congress, and/or other external entities (to include international interfaces); 

and 

o supervisory complexity that includes oversight of multiple senior- level 

positions, multiple work divisions, diverse professional series employees, 

regional dispersion, and/or large stafi numbers. 

Question: How many of them received bonuses last year? 

Response: 433 received a bonus last year. 
137 

Question: In the private sector, bonus pools are often tied to the profitability of a 

company in a given year. When the company has a great year, the bonus pool is bigger. 

When the company has a bad year, the bonus pool is smaller. Obviously that is hard to 

replicate at a federal agency, but there must be some metries that you can judge an 

agency or a subcomponent on. 

How much of an SES's performance plan is tied to the success of the agency itself or to 

that SES employee's subcomponent? 

Being a good manager also means etiectively managing and engaging your subordinates. 

Response: Sixty percent of an SES 's overall rating is tied to employee-specific 

performance objectives that measure the success of meeting goals issued by his or her 

supervisor. Goals and objectives are required to be tied to a strategic plan at the 

Department, Component, or operational level. The other 40 percent is tied to leadership 

competencies. 

Question: How much of an SES's performance measurement is tied to feedback from a 

manager's subordinates? 

Response: DHS's SES performance management and appraisal program follows the 

Government-wide SES Program and strongly encourages supervisors to engage with, and 

solicit feedback from an SES's subordinates. However, there is nothing provided in the 

Government-wide program or the DHS program that will measure how much the 

feedback from subordinates influences the supervisor's rating of the SES manager. 
138 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Jeh C. Johnson 

From Senator Tammy Baldwin 

"The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2017" 

March 6, 2016 

Question: As discussed at the hearing, the Fiscal Year 2017 Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) budget request includes significant proposed cuts to FEMA preparedness 

grants relative to the FY 2016 enacted levels. While I appreciate the hard choices DHS 

faces within current budgetary constraints, I remain concerned by the depth of these 

proposed cuts and the potential impact on local communities. Can you please explain 

why the FY 2017 request proposes such large cuts to preparedness grants. and 

specifically why DHS chose to propose funding reductions to each of the following? 

Response: The President's FY 2017 budget proposal reflects difficult decisions among 

competing priorities across the DHS portfolio. The proposed cuts to the preparedness 

grants programs give consideration to the $47.7 billion in funding appropriated to 

preparedness grants in the 15 years since the 2001 terrorist attacks and the significant 

progress made in building preparedness across the nation during that timcframe. As 

funding for grant programs began to decline in Fiscal Year 2012, the Department 

emphasized that state and local governments should use their grant funding to sustain the 

capabilities they built over the past I 5 years with federal grant funding rather than invest 

in new capabilities that will be difficult to sustain in the future. 

Question: The State Homeland Security Grant Program: 

Response: The President's FY 2017 budget proposes an allocation of $200 million for 

the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP). This represents a $267 million (57 

percent) reduction compared to the $467 million allocated for FY 2016. However, the 

Administration is proposing $100 million for a new Regional Competitive Grant Program 

which will target critical capability gaps at the regional level. As with SHSP, these funds 

would be awarded to states. In addition, $10 million is requested for Countering Violent 

Extremism (CVE) and $39 million is requested for state, local and tribal activities 

targeted at preventing, preparing for, and responding to complex, coordinated terrorist 
139 

attacks. In sum, a total of$349 million is being proposed to support state preparedness 

efforts; a reduction of $118 million (25 percent) compared to FY 2016. 

Question: Firefighter Grants: 

Response: The President's FY 2017 budget proposes $670 million for firefighter grants, 

which include Assistance to Firefighters Grants (AFG), Fire Prevention & Safety 

(FP&S), and Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER). This 

represents a $20 million (3 percent) reduction compared to the $690 million allocated for 

FY 2016. Given budgetary constraints for FY 2017, this relatively minor reduction in 

funding ret1ects the value and importance of the firefighter grants and demonstrates the 

Administration's commitment to sustain funding for these programs as close as possible 

to recent levels. 

Question: The National Domestic Preparedness Consortium: 

Response: The National Domestic Preparedness Consortium is a Congressionallymandated partnership of nationally recognized training organizations that address the 

preparedness training needs of the nation's emergency first responders within the context 

of all hazards, including chemical, biologicaL radiological, explosive, Weapons of Mass 

Destruction hazards, and surface transportation response programs. The members 

include: the U.S. Department of Energy's Nevada National Security Site, Counter 

Terrorism Operations Support (CTOS); Louisiana State University, National Center for 

Bio-Medical Research and Training (NCBRT); the New Mexico Institute of Mining and 

Technology, Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC): Texas A&M 

University, National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center (NERRTC); the 

University of Hawaii, National Disaster Preparedness Training Center (NDPTC); and the 

Pueblo, Colorado-based Transportation Technology Center, Inc., Security and 

Emergency Response Training Center (SERTC). 

The FY 2017 funding request for the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium is $36 

million because states are assuming increased responsibility for awareness level, 

refresher, and sustainment training that will allow our institutional partners to focus 

resources on more advanced, specialized training consistent with their respective 

expertise. In previous years, the $60 million request was for the Training Partnership 

Grants, which consolidated the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium ($42 

million) and Continuing Training Grants ($18 million). The difference in FY 2017 is that 

FEMA is requesting $36M for the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium and 

$18M for the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval Post Graduate 

School (which has historically been funded out of the Continuing Training Grants) as 
140 

separate appropnat1ons. FEMA would divide the $36 million requested funding evenly 

among the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium partners for FY 2017. 

Question: The Center for Domestic Preparedness: 

Response: Total FY 2017 funding requested for the Center for Domestic Preparedness 

(CDP) is $67,989,000 which includes $63,939,000 in program funding and $4,050,000 in 

the Procurement, Construction, and Improvements section of the budget request. These 

requests are an increase of $2,998,000 above the FY 2016 enacted funding of 

$64,991,000. 
141 

Question: Due to inadequate Coast Guard icebreaking capability, the Great Lakes 

economy lost an estimated $700 million and nearly 4,000 jobs during the winter of2013-

2014 and $355 million and nearly 2,000 jobs during the winter of2014-2015. As part of 

last year's omnibus, I authored a provision directing the Coast Guard to review its Great 

Lakes icebreaking needs. 

Will you please give me your commitment that this analysis is based on the Coast Guard 

meeting its target in the worst winters, such as the two I mentioned, not just during 

average winters? 

Response: The Coast Guard determined that the 2010 U.S. Coast Guard Domestic 

Icebreaking Mission Analysis Repori (MAR) remains relevant with respect to the Coast 

Guard's domestic icebreaking requirements on the Great Lakes and other regions. The 

report required by the omnibus will reference the 2010 MAR and summarize actions 

taken by the Coast Guard to address the issues raised therein, including the risks and 

impact of severe ice seasons like those experienced during the 2014 and 2015 winters. 

Question: The economic risks to our region are far too great for the Coast Guard to be 

prepared only for best-case scenarios. Along with your commitment, can you also 

provide a status update on the analysis, including how the Coast Guard is incorporating 

the economic costs of reduced Great Lakes shipping due to insufficient icebreaking 

capacity? 

Response: The Coast Guard does not incorporate commercial economic costs into Mission 

Analysis Reports. However, the report does include performance metrics that illustrate the 

overall ability of the Coast Guard to keep critical navigable waterways open during the 

winter season. 
142 

Question: I am concerned about existing capability gaps in the Department's predeployment workforce health protection mission. DIIS personnel are deployed overseas 

across a wide spectrum of environments and situations: supporting border security in 

allied nations, special mission activities for drug and weapon interdiction, sea-based 

coastal monitoring, site-surveying airports worldwide, as well as providing visas in 

hundreds of countries and all of the missions of the Secret Service. To date, the Oftice of 

Health Affairs, which provides policy and planning for these missions in support of DHS 

components, has had no personally validated, verified information on particular health 

risks or any information other than open source on the availability of health care 

facilities, whether in large cities or austere, contested environments. 

Providing more granular information, in advance of deployment, that identities existing 

and emerging threats to the health and safety of deploying workforces and which 

appraises the availability of basic preventive and responsive medical services to mitigate 

serious medical events, such as infectious disease outbreaks and injuries, will help 

minimize risk without compromising mission success. 

What tools are currently used by the Department and its components to identify and 

assess local medical infrastructure and health risks, including inpatient services, 

emergency care, emerging disease threats, as well as to track deployed DHS personnel in 

real-time? In your view, do those tools fully meet the Department's workforce health 

protection and traveler tracking requirements? 

Response: Upon Component request, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) provides DHS 

deploying personnel with Medical Travel Advisories that address many of these points. 

These advisories are the product of assessments conducted through web-based research 

and consultations with other federal departments, not a centralized automated tool. Ol-IA 

is exploring possible alternatives for a department-wide system for managing this sort of 

employee health information. 
143 

Question: Austin Straube! Airport in Green Bay, Wisconsin has infonned me that its 

current allocation of customs officers leaves the airport understaffed at a time of 

increasing volume. Because Austin Straube! is also a Port of Entry, it has been difficult 

for the airport to secure the additional customs services it needs, which threatens to stif1c 

trade and travel. This isn'tjust a problem in Green Bay. As I understand it, customs and 

border stations across the nation are facing shortfalls in staffing that threaten essential 

operations and force officers to work grueling shifts. 

I am particularly concerned that CBP has ended its last several fiscal years below the 

frontline slatTing levels authorized by Congress. I know that attrition and the lengthy 

hiring process have had an impact on these levels. I also know that the Department is 

shifting from a resource dependent model to an intelligence driven, risk based approach 

to border and port of entry security. However, at a time when increased security is more 

important than ever, can you discuss the Department's current efforts to improve 

recruitment and retention among CBP officers? 

Response: CBP has taken significant steps to address factors affecting frontline hiring. 

To ensure an effective approach to recruiting and hiring frontline personnel, CBP 

established a Frontline Hiring Program Management Office, which includes 

representatives and stakeholders from across the Agency. This team is working to 

integrate previously stove-piped elements of the hiring process and has already made 

some significant process improvements, such as developing a frontline hiring data model. 

This model provides a high degree of fidelity for the frontline hiring process timcline, 

identities areas of focus, and provides reliable estimates of hiring projections. The data 

provided by this model has led to a number of other process improvements, such as 

CBP's "hiring hub" concept, which integrates and consolidates many steps and several 

months of the hiring process into a two-day timeframe. The initial pilots of the hiring 

hubs resulted in over a 60 percent reduction in the overall time-to-hire for frontline 

personnel. 

CBP also established a National Frontline Recruitment Command to oversee and 

coordinate nationwide frontline recruitment efforts. Through data-driven, targeted 

outreach, CBP is able to convey information concerning its unique enforcement and 

national security missions, as well as information on its hiring process, to applicants. 

CBP is utilizing social media, email, newsletters, text messages, recruitment events, and 

strategic partnerships to connect with candidates and current applicants. CBP also 

enhanced its Careers webpage to include content and videos concerning frontline career 
144 

opportunities, qualifications, duty locations, the hiring process, and employee benefits. 

CBP employs a forward-leaning advertising and marketing approach and leverages field 

office resources across the country to provide information concerning CBP law 

enforcement careers and current job openings. CBP recruiters are now using technology 

to identify areas where there may be a high population of potential candidates in order to 

determine where to focus recruitment efforts. 

CBP's overall recruitment approach also includes strategies focused on recruiting 

veterans and individuals separating from military service. CBP is committed to 

recruiting and employing qualified veterans and initiated steps to reengineer how it 

recruits and hires transitioning military personnel. Over the past year, CBP has 

participated in recruitment events for Department of Defense (DoD) employees, attended 

nationwide veterans and military conferences, and partnered with organizations focused 

on assisting veterans' transition from military service. Finally, CBP is working with 

DoD to establish a shared services model for several ofCBP's pre-employment 

processes, which will significantly expedite the hiring process for veterans. 

Collectively, these efforts enable CBP to recruit and hire individuals who are interested in 

working for CBP, qualified to perform law enforcement functions, and suitable to 

manage the Department's national security mission. 
145 

Question: In your testimony, you mentioned that CBP has begun testing biometric exit 

technologies with a plan to begin implementing a biometric exit system in 2018. As CBP 

continues to test and prepare to implement biometric exit technologies, can you please 

explain to what extent CBP has considered each of the following: 

Testing technologies at international airports of different sizes, including small, medium, 

and large airports; and 

Response: Over the past year, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has tested 

biometric exit technology and processes at the ten largest international airports. and at 

pedestrian entry/exit lanes at one large land port (Otay Mesa). CBP concentrated on the 

larger airports, as they present the greatest challenges and will be the focus for the 

comprehensive solution set. Over the next 12 months, CBP plans to deploy the Biometric 

Exit Mobile (BE-Mobile) technology to several smaller airports to determine if the 

mobile technology could serve as the biometric exit solution for those smaller locations. 

The BE-Mobile project uses finger scanning technology in mobile hand-held devices to 

record the exit of departing foreign travelers. 

Question: Technologies that utilize multiple biometric capture and matching 

technologies, including finger, face and iris. 

Response: CBP is testing several ditTerent modalities of biometrics, in order to identify 

the best options for biometric exit recording: 

• The BE-Mobile project uses finger scanning technology in mobile hand-held 

devices that have been provided to CBP outbound enforcement teams; 

• The Pedestrian Field Test at Otay Mesa is testing both biometric facial and iris 

image matching. The Otay Mesa Field Test collects these biometric scans at a 

kiosk on entry, and then collects and matches biometric images during exit using 

two different technology platforms that allow the pedestrian to keep moving (or 

stop briefly) while the biometric is collected from a short distance; 

• The 1-to-1 Facial Comparison Test at Washington Dulles Airport held in the 

spring of 2015 tested biometric facial matching. Some inspection booths were 

equipped with a stand-alone camera that collected and matched the traveler's 

facial image to the image stored in the chip of their ePassport. The 1-to-1 Facial 
146 

Comparison capability is now installed on a permanent operational basis at 

Washington Dulles and John F. Kennedy Airports; and 

• CBP benefited from testing and evaluation of a wide variety of multi modal 

biometric testing for Entry and Exit operations in collaboration with DHS Science 

and Technology's Apex Air Entry/Exit Re-engineering (AEER) program. Apex 

AEER tested and evaluated face, finger, and iris recognition technologies at the 

Maryland Test Facility, with the objective of identifying a fast, accurate, and costetTective solution. CBP will be conducting The Biometric Air Exit Field Trial, 

which will test the viability of facial recognition in an airport environment. The 

Biometric Air Exit Field Trial aims to capture live photos of travelers and 

compare images against stored photos utilizing Hight departure manifest. 
147 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable Jeh C. Johnson 

From Senator Ben Sasse 

"The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2017" 

March 6, 2016 

Question: ICE OMAHA lNCIDE:\T: In late January, 21-year old Sarah Root was killed 

in Omaha by an illegal alien named Eswin Mejia, who was street racing while drunk. I 

sent a letter to ICE Director Sarah Saldana on February 29 asking about the agency's 

t~1ilure to detain Mr. Mejia (attached). 

Why did ICE officials to cite the 2014 immigration executive actions as the reason Mr. 

Mejia was not detained? 

Response: There are no satisfactory answers to the tragic case of Sarah Root. 

Plain and simple, Edwin Mejia should be detained right now. However, 1 will not cast 

Hmlt on decisions made by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel 

with respect to Mr. Mejia. At the time of his release by the county court, Mr. Mejia had 

not yet been convicted of a criminal offense. However, my November 20, 2014 

memorandum, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented 

Immigrants, makes clear that immigration officers may pursue the removal of any alien 

where to do so would serve an "important federal interest," regardless of whether the 

alien falls into the specific priority categories. Under the circumstances of this case, 

Jl.uiher immigration enforcement action against Mr. Mejia would have served such an 

interest. Director Saldaf\a has since made clear to the ICE field offices that similarly 

situated aliens should be subject to enforcement action even if such aliens do not fall 

within the delineated priority categories. 1 have also reiterated this to ICE leadership 

myself. 

Question: Is it DHS policy to decline requests to detain individuals, even if an individual 

has been accused of killing a U.S. citizen, so long as that individual does not have a prior 

conviction') 
148 

Response: No. My November 20, 2014 memorandum, Policies for the Apprehension, 

Detention and Removal of' Undocumented Immigrants, states that immigration officers 

may pursue removal of an alien not identified as one of the memorandum's enumerated 

priorities iL in the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director, removing such an alien 

would serve an important federal interest. 

Question: Is Mr. Mejia a threat to public safety') 

Response: ICE does believe pursuing further enforcement action in Mr. Mejia's case, 

including detention, would serve an important federal interest. Upon locating this alien, 

ICE will work with local law enforcement to facilitate the safe transfer of Mr. Mejia to 

ICE custody at the conclusion of his local law enforcement obligations. ICE will then 

render an appropriate custody determination, taking into account the facts of his case. 

Question: Did ICE make a mistake in failing to detain Mr. Mejia? 

Response: Please see responses above. 

Question: To date, ICE has not replied to my request for information- when will ICE 

provide a response? 

Response: The response to your February 29, 2016 letter regarding Mr. :vfejia was 

transmitted to your office on March 31, 2016. 
149 

Question: Last year, I asked you ifDHS had 100% situational awareness of the border. 

You said no and that DHS was not likely to have it by the end of the Obama 

administration. Then earlier this month, the acting chief of the Border Patrol, Ronald 

Vitiello, said DHS had "real time" situational awareness of only 56% of the border. 

Has DHS increased situational awareness since we talked at this time last year? How do 

you know? 

Response: When Acting Chief Vitiello referenced "real time" situational awareness of 56 

percent of the Southern border he was referencing border mileage classified as 

"deployment density." The United States Border Patrol has developed a risk-based 

strategy to determine where. when, and what resources to deploy. This risk-based 

approach is designed to "shrink the border'' through assessing activity levels and 

facilitating the deployment of resources that focus attention to the areas with the highest 

risk. This is articulated when the Department describes border mileage by one of two 

categories: "deployment density'' and Geospatiallntelligencc (GEOINT). Areas 

designated as "deployment density" (approximately 56 percent) are areas that are 

determined to be higher risk or higher activity. These areas have deployed technology, 

infi·astructurc, and personnel to detect, identify, classify, track, and resolve cross border 

incursions. A deployment density zone seeks to ensure the proper combination of 

manpower, infrastructure, and technology are deployed to ensure detection and 

apprehension. 

Areas deemed to be lower risk, based upon current intelligence, are monitored by 

GEOINT, which provides recurring surveillance to identify any changes in Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of cross border violators. GEOINT areas are those 

with low activity where U.S. Border Patrol believes an agent docs not need to be on the 

ground and the area can be reasonably monitored from the air. 

Based on USBP's current enforcement posture regarding the border mileage 

classitication of Deployment Density and Geospatial Intelligence maintained zones, there 

has been no significant change related to an increase in situational awareness along the 

Southern Border. 

Question: What does it mean to have "real time'' situational awareness of the border0 

Does it mean you know all of the traffic -legal and illegal coming across the border'7 
150 

Response: Real time situational awareness is having the technology, infrastructure, and 

personnel enabling DHS to provide persistent surveillance in an area classified as 

'"deployment density," facilitating detection, identification, classification, and tracking, 

which allows for the resolution of cross border incursions. 
151 

Question: I have now asked several DHS officials who is responsible for the 

department's long-term strategic planning for border security. Last year, during the 

HSGAC hearing on DHS's 2016 budget submission, I asked you and you said it was 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP). I then followed up several weeks after and asked 

CBP senior officials in a private meeting and they said it was the responsibility of a 

small unit within the DHS Secretary's office. Can you settle this for me'? 

Response: As a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) mission area (Secure 

our Borders), long-term strategic planning for border security is supported by multiple 

offices throughout the Department. Strategic planning and, in particular, bringing 

rigorous analysis to bear on the development of strategic plans, is an area that Dl-IS 

continues to work towards improving. 

In terms of responsibility for this function, the first division oflabor is between what is 

the primary responsibility ofDHS Headquarters and DHS Components. For example, in 

developing strategic plans to strengthen the security of the border, DHS Headquarters 

Ot1ice of Policy (PLCY) is responsible for setting strategic objectives and identifying 

strategies that cut across DHS Components (and across federal agencies). This would 

include the balance between applying appropriate consequences for individuals 

apprehended attempting to unlawfully enter the country (e.g., referrals for criminal 

prosecutions) and deploying the appropriate level of resources to secure the border itself 

(e.g., more agents and fence). 

In this context, PLCY coordinated the development for the Southern Borders and 

Approaches Campaign plan for the Department's unified approach to securing the 

southern border and approaches to the United States. DHS Components (e.g., CBP, 

USCG, and ICE) are responsible for setting component-specific subordinate objectives 

and intra-component elements of the strategies (e.g., how CBP will prioritize and employ 

agents and fencing). The new DHS Joint Task Forces work with the DHS Components to 

develop multi-component, synchronized operational approaches to meet intended 

outcomes for the Southern Border and Approaches Campaign. 
152 

Submission for Fiscal Y car 20 !7 

Question: Last year, it was revealed that TSA checkpoints failed to stop weapons 96% of 

the time during covert testing. Since then, security lines at TSA have become the "new 

normar· according to some. 

Arc the lines longer because TSA has changed its approach to security? 

Response: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) adapts security measures 

to an ever-changing threat environment. Enhanced security measures at the security 

checkpoint, coupled with passenger volume, resulted in increased wait times at a number 

of airports. As TSA heads into the busy summer travel period, the agency is taking a 

number of near-term steps, TSA is working with airline and airport stakeholders to 

address the increases in wait times while maintaining security. 

Question: Has TSA fixed all of the problems that led to a 96% failure rate last summer? 

Response: Last summer, I directed TSA to implement a series of steps constituting a 10-

point plan to address the issues raised by the covert testing. These included steps to 

ensure leadership accountability, improve alarm resolution, increase effectiveness and 

deterrence, increase threat testing to sharpen officer performance, strengthen operating 

procedures and technology, and enhance training. Under the leadership of TSA 

Administrator Neffcnger, TSA has aggressively implemented this plan. All of the actions 

directed in my 1 0-point plan arc substantially underway or have been completed. 

Question: [IF "YES''] How do you know- does TSA send you new mctrics to 

demonstrate their new success? Please provide a detailed response. 

Response: TSA realigned its organizational mctrics to new standards and expectations, 

with system and workforce measures focused on readiness and ctiectiveness. Much of 

this information is sensitive in nature, but specifics related to how TSA measures 

efTectiveness, however, can be provided in a closed session. 

Question: Given that security lines are now longer, does that mean security was weak 

when the lines moved faster? 

[IF "NO'' OR ''NOT YET"] Why is it taking so long to fix the problems, given that we've 

known about them for almost a year') 
153 

Response: The checkpoint detection failures identified by the Office of the Inspector 

General stem from multi-dimensional challenges that influenced the conduct of screening 

operations, creating a disproportionate tocus on efficiency and speed in screening 

operations over security effectiveness. TSA has renewed its focus on the fundamentals of 

security by requiring its officers and leaders to strike a new balance between security 

effectiveness and line efficiency, while also diligently performing appropriate resolution 

procedures. 
154 

Question: Is the American public stuck having to choose between long security lines and 

effective security measures'! 

Response: No. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working with 

airline and airport stakeholders to adapt procedures, processes, and resources to the 

reality of the evolving threat and increased passenger volumes. We will keep passengers 

moving. but we will also keep them safe. 
155 

Question: According to press reporting of a Dl-IS internal memo, the DHS Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis was responsible for at least I 19 "spills'' of classified 

information last year. 

DHS was recently given the chief place in protecting the federal government's civilian 

information networks~- what will DHS to ensure there is no spillage of private 

information flowing through DHS as a result of its new authorities? 

Response: The press reporting was tactually inaccurate. None of the incidents involved 

exposing classified information to individuals without an adequate security clearance. 

Almost all incidents were self-reported, remediated quickly, and did not result in any 

harm. The Department considers the handling and safeguarding of classified information 

a critical component in the execution of its daily missions. 

To further clarify, there is a distinction between "classified" and "private" information. 

"Classified" information contains sensitive information related to national security that is 

protected from unauthorized disclosure. "Private" information is a broad category of 

information. Private information can include statutorily protected categories like 

personally identifiable information, as well as other types of sensitive information about 

individuals and businesses. 

DHS is mindful that one of its missions is to ensure that privacy, confidentiality, and civil 

liberties are not diminished by the department's security initiatives. Accordingly, DHS 

implements strong privacy and civil liberties standards into all of its programs from the 

outset, including cybersecurity activities that protect the federal civilian government and 

private sector. The DHS Privacy Office institutes layered privacy responsibilities 

throughout the department and has embedded the Fair Information Practice Principles. 

Using these principles, DHS ensures privacy is an integral part of its cybersecurity 

programs. As part of this commitment to transparency, DHS conducts and publishes 

Privacy Impact Assessments and privacy compliance reviews for its cybersecurity 

programs. 
156 

Question: Why did DHS struggle to protect sensitive information, whether by employees 

making copies of classified material on unclassified copying machines or by discussing 

sensitive matters in unclassified phone calls? 

Response: There arc over 117,000 DHS employees with active security clearances and 

although any security incident could be potentially damaging, the rate of infractions or 

violations remains statistically low. Almost all incidents were self-reported, remediated 

quickly, and did not result in any harm. As noted, none of the incidents involved 

exposing classified information to individuals without an adequate security clearance. 

There are no current indicators to suggest widespread systemic problems with our 

workforce protecting classified information. That said, D!IS takes every incident very 

seriously and ensures timely and relevant mitigation protocols are employed to deter 

future instances. Some of these measures involve assertive. broad, and focused security 

awareness initiatives, while others target vulnerabilities associated with information 

technology. DHS is also enhancing its current program to include improved coordination 

with the Oftice of the Chief Information OJiiccr for managing and reducing data spills 

and performing Component-level outreach to improve coordination and collaboration. 
157 

Question: Since you last testified before the committee, Congress passed a new 

cybersecurity law and put DBS in charge of protecting the networks of civilian federal 

agencies. 

How much did the US Government spend on civilian cybersecurity last year? 

lias DHS compiled a list of"high-value assets"-IT systems containing valuable 

information that. if compromised, would risk our national security':' 

[IF "YES"] Will you share that list with us 0 

[IF ·•J DON'T KNOW"] Will you commit to finding out and then sharing it? 

[IF "NO"] Why not? 

Response: To clarify, departments and agencies remain responsible for securing their 

networks and systems. The recent legislation has expanded DHS's role in establishing a 

cybersecurity baseline for federal civilian executive branch agencies, and supporting 

efforts to improve their cybersecurity posture. As described in the Office of Management 

and Budget's March 18,2016, report to Congress on the Federal Information Security 

Modernization Act, the 23 civilian Chief Financial Of1iccr Act agencies reported 

spending $4.01 billion for information technology security in FY 2015. 

Per the Cybersecurity National Action Plan, the Administration required agencies to 

identify and prioritize their high value assets (HV As). DHS is now initiating a series of 

assessments to help each relevant agency improve the security of their HV As. The list of 

HV As across the federal civilian executive branch is maintained by the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB). 
158 

Question: Nearly a year after we discovered the OPM data breaches, does DHS know 

how to stop the next attack'? 

Response: Although federal government agencies are responsible for their own 

cybersccurity, DHS has the mission to provide a common baseline of security across the 

government and to help agencies manage their cyber risk. In providing this common 

baseline, DHS strives to reduce the prevalence of damaging cybersecurity incidents that 

result in the loss of sensitive information or the degradation of critical services. Our 

adversaries, many of whom are highly sophisticated and persistent. constantly attempt to 

compromise federal agencies. By deploying the EINSTEIN 3A system across the federal 

government, DHS can detect and block these threats before a successful compromise 

occurs. However, no eybersecurity tool or system is able to detect and block all threats. 

Individual agencies must therefore urgently patch critical vulnerabilities before they can 

be exploited. With our Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program, DHS is 

focusing first on helping agencies identify and prioritize vulnerabilities, measuring their 

progress in fixing the most critical vulnerabilities first, and motivating them by enabling 

standardized comparisons between agencies and across the government writ large. By 

fully deploying EINSTEIN 3A and CDM across the federal civilian government, we will 

reduce the likelihood of damaging incidents afTccting federal agencies. 

We have made significant progress over the past year. Over 50% of the federal civilian 

government is now protected by EINSTEIN 3A, and Congress has mandated that all 

civilian agencies join the program by the end of this calendar year. We have awarded 

CDM Phase 1 tools to 97% of the civilian government, which allows agencies to identify 

vulnerabilities in the hardware and software on their networks. The next year will see the 

completion ofCDM Phase 1 and new awards with CDM Phase 2, which helps agencies 

identify ''who is on their network'' and stop unauthorized activity before data can be 

stolen. 

More broadly, DHS continues to conduct vulnerability assessments and security 

architecture reviews of federal civilian agencies. These assessments are intended to 

identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries and provide agencies with 

clear steps for expedited remediation. A recent Binding Operational Directive issued by 

Secretary Johnson under authorities granted in the Federal Information Security 

Modernization Act requires agencies to address vulnerabilities identified in these 

assessments within 30 days, or provide DHS with a mitigation plan. While DHS cannot 

prevent all cybersecurity incidents, we continue to leverage the full breadth of our 
159 

capabilities to reduce the prevalence of compromises and the impacts of incidents that do 

occur. 
160 

February 29.2016 

lire Honorable Sarah Saldana 

Director oflnunigratinn and C.'ustoms I·:nron.:cmcnt 

U.S. Dl'partmcnt of I lomeland S~curity 

500 12'1

' St.. S.W. 

Washington. D.C. 20536 

Dear f)irectt)l' Saldana: 

I would appreciate your help in understanding a recent decision by Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (!CEl not to detain a man suspected both of living in the United States 

il!cgally and of killing n young woman. Sarah Root. in a drunk driving incident in Nebraska. 

On January 31, Eswin :vfejia, a I 9-ycar old man, was reportedly street racing in Omaha, 

Nebraska when he violently crashed his pickup truck into the back of Ms. Root's parked vehicle 

v. ith her inside. She was rushed to tlw hospital. where she died. 

For the past month. Nebraskans have grieved the Jcath of Ms. Root, who was killed just 

hours after graduating from college. It is unspcakahly sad that this innocent 

robbed of her life just as it was set to Adding to the grief. however, is anger 

over the ract that the nwn ;:JCcused her life has vanished without a trace alicr posting 

bail. Over the course of the last month. have searched in \'a in to find iv1r. :V1cji~l so he 

might be brought to justice. 

J would like to know \vhy i"v1r. was ev~r allowed to leave law cnrorccmcnt custody 

in the llrst place. In addition to being a or Honduras living in the lJ .S. illegally, I he nature 

of the charges against i'vir. A~1cjln are extremely· serious. Prior to killing this young woman. Mr. 

ivkjia was racing n:cklcssly down a husy street with a blood ulcohollevcl three times the legal 

limit. 1 This was not :-v1L !'v1cjia 's first encounter \"<ith the law enforcement either. Police 

suspt:ct~q him of drunk driving. but he skipped a court hearing and a wnrrant was 

arrest:· 
161 

For these reasons, Omaha's Deputy Police Chief Dave Baker said Iris department 

repeatedly asked ICE to detain him.1 Unfortm1ately, that request was repeatedly denied. 

The reason ICE gave to the news media said that detaining Mr. Mejia after he reportedly 

killed Ms. Root was not consistent with the Department of Homeland Security's immigration 

"enforcement priorities." The full statement from ICE is below. 

At the time of his Januaty 20! G arrest in Omaha on local criminal charges, Eswin 

Mejia, 19, of Honduras, did not meet ICE's enforcement priorities, as stated by 

the Nov. 20,2014 civil enforcement memo issued by Secretary Johnson, because 

he had no prior significant misdemeanor or felony conviction record. As such, 

ICE did not lodge a detainer. Mejia is scheduled to go before an immigration 

judge on March 23, 2017, and it will be up to the immigration courts under the 

Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOJR) to 

determine whether he has a legal basis to remain in the u.s.' 

As you know, the enforcement priorities mentioned above were created as part of the 

President's immigration executive actions. 5 The policy requires that ICE give its highest priority 

to removing illegal aliens who pose a threat ·'to national security, public safety, and border 

security." While this includes those who are convicted of serious crimes, DHS oftlcials arc given 

broad power to "exercise discretion" about whom to detain. 

DIIS has repeatedly said that the use of"prosecutorial discretion" is meant to ensure 

federal law enforcement officials judge the facts of each situation on a case-by-case basis, and 

determine threats to national security and public safety6 

lfthis man is not a threat to public safety, then who is? 

To summarize: Mr. Mejia was suspected of living in the country illegally, of driving 

recklessly down a busy public road, of driving while highly intoxicated on several occasions, of 

killing a young woman, and of skipping a prior court hearing. Nebraskans look at these facts and 

wonder how ICE did not consider this man a threat to public safety. 

Given Mr. Mejia's disappearance, fCE should explain clearly how it implemented its 

detention policy in this case. Please provide my office with answers to the following questions 

prior to Mr. Mejia's schedule immigration hearing on March 23. 

) Cooper, Todd and Rob Glissmann, "Systemic failures allowed man accused in mctor vehicle homicide to vanish,'' 

Omaha World Herald, February 22,20 !6, hitp;/iwww.nmaha.com/news crime/s\-stcmic~failurc:.AllloweJ-rnanacwsed-in-molor-vchid.~~homicidc-to/urtic !e 7bb2a68&-8bdb-5 541: L 795-43 8 1 b ,)c9c1464 .htm 1. 

:r Huston, Warner Todd, "Judge L~t~ Drunk !Uegallmmigrant Go After Killing Nebraska Woman: Hearing Lasted 

Just Minutes," Breitbart, february 23,2106, http:/im\\\ .brei!harl.cunl'h!<>-tWvNmnent/20 l6/02i2:\ 1

more-info-0n-

~o;g~rts-leH!runk- i l :egal-gc-a !lcr-k i/!i ng-nebrask<'Hvt'man•. 

Memorandum from DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, Released on November 20, 2DJ4, titled, "Policies for the 

Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants::' 

https:!/www.dhs.gov/silcs,.dcfault!fiies.-w.Jb!is;_gJ:ions, !4 112JL..!.:~.mo Qfl)Sl'Cutnri<ll di.s.::rctio.l.!.:QQI 0 Website of U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement, "Administration's Announcement Regarding a New 

Process to Further Focus Immigration Enforcement Rcsmm:es on High Priority Cases," accessed February 29,2016, 

ht1ps:r!www.ice.gov.·rcputriation-faq. 
162 

1. \Vho exactly atlCE was responsible for evaluating whether r-..1r .. Mejia was a threat to 

public safety? 

2. Why did ICE decline to detain Mr. Mejia, despite several requests to do so by the 

Douglas County Police Department? \Vcrc each of these requests denied on a case-bycase basis? 

3. fn its public statement, ICE referenced the November 20,2014 immigration executive 

actions. \Vhy docs ICE believe that new policy required the agency not to detain Mr. 

Mejia'? 

4. Did any nne within ICE consider Mr. Mejia a t1ight risk? What steps were taken to ensure 

he did not flee the country? 

5. What is ICE doing now to find :Vlr. Mejia? 

6. Do you consider Mr. Mejia to be a threat to public safety? 

It is deeply troubling that this was allowed to happen. Given the urgency of this situation. 

Nebraskans deserve answers. !look forward to a prompt reply. 

Sinc~rely, 

Rcn Sasse 

U.S. Senator 
163 

Æ 

The Honorable Ben Sasse 

United States Senate 

Washington. DC 20510 

Dear Senator Sasse: 

May 7. 2016 

t."i. Department of Hnmtland ~enrrlt" 

Vv:LfHn;.'!<ll\, J)C 2U\2S " 

Homeland 

Security 

J \Hitc in response to your April 5 letter to me. There are no satisfactory answers 

to the tragic case of Sarah Root. 

Plain and simple. Fswin Mejia should be detained right now. However. I will not 

cast Hmlt on decisions made by ICE personnel with respect to Mr. Mejia. At the time of 

his release by the county court, Mr. Mejia had not yet been convicted of a criminal 

offense. Jlowe\·er. my November 20. 2014 memorandum. Policies for the Apprehension. 

Detemion ami Removal of'Undocumemed lmmigrams. makes clear that immigration 

officers may pursue the r.:moval of any ali.:n vvhcre to do so would sene an "important 

federal interest:· regardless of whether the alien falls into the specific priority categories. 

Under the circumstan.:cs of this case. further immigration enforcement action against Mr. 

Mejia would have served such an interest. Director Saldana has since made dear to the 

ICE field offices that similarly situated aliens should be subject to enforcement action 

even if such aliens do not fall within the delineated priority categories. I have also 

reitcrat.:d this to ICE leadership myself. 

ICE is working to locate and apprehend Mr. Mejia. ICE added Mr. Mejia to its 

Most Wanted lbt. The Department and ICE will do all we can to ensure this fugitive 

faces justice. 

Sinccrelv. 

',if~· 

(tt~~lcs .loh~son 

www.dhs.gov