Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping:

Drivers, Challenges, and Implications

by Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders

CHINA STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 10

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Cover photo: President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping and 

Chinese General Fang Fenghui, Chief of the General Staff, before meeting 

General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Beijing, 

April 23, 2013 (DOD/D. Myles Cullen)

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

The mission of the China Center is to serve as a national focal 

point and resource center for multidisciplinary research and analytic 

exchanges on the national goals and strategic posture of the People’s 

Republic of China and the ability of that nation to develop, field, and 

deploy an effective military instrument in support of its national strategic objectives. The Center keeps officials in the Department of 

Defense (DOD), other government agencies, and Congress apprised of 

the results of these efforts. The Center also engages the faculty and 

students of the National Defense University and other components of 

the DOD professional military education system in aspects of its work 

and thereby assists their respective programs of teaching, training, and 

research. The Center has an active outreach program designed to promote exchanges among American and international analysts of 

Chinese military affairs.
Chinese Military Reform in the

Age of Xi Jinping 

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs

Institute for National Strategic Studies

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Series Editor: Phillip C. Saunders 

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

March 2017

by Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders

Chinese Military Reform in the

Age of Xi Jinping:

Drivers, Challenges, and Implications
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please visit the NDU Press Web site at:

ndupress.ndu.edu.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

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Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

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First printing, March 2017
Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

Introduction........................................................................................................ 4

A New PLA Organization ................................................................................. 6

Drivers of Reform.............................................................................................23

Political Strategy to Implement the Reforms................................................37

Implications.......................................................................................................42

Next Steps and Areas for Further Research ..................................................49

Conclusion ........................................................................................................54

Appendix 1. Leadership...................................................................................55

Appendix 2. Central Military Committee Departments.............................61

Acknowledgments............................................................................................66

Notes ..................................................................................................................67

About the Authors............................................................................................87

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Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Executive Summary

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on its most wide-ranging and ambitious restructuring since 1949, including major changes to most of its key organizations.

■ The general departments were disbanded, new Central Military Commission (CMC) 

departments created, and a new ground force headquarters established.

■ Seven military regions were restructured into five theater commands aligned against 

regional threats. Commanders will be able to develop joint force packages from army, 

navy, air force, and conventional missile units within their theaters.

■ PLA service headquarters are transitioning to an exclusive focus on “organize, train, 

and equip” missions and will no longer have a primary role in conducting operations. 

However, the PLA is still figuring out how the new relationships among the CMC, services, and theaters will work in practice.

■ The restructuring will also reduce the size of the PLA by 300,000 soldiers, cutting the 

ground forces and increasing the size of the navy and air force.

The restructuring reflects the desire to strengthen PLA joint operations capabilities—on 

land, at sea, in the air, and in the space and cyber domains.

■ The centerpiece of the reforms is a new joint command and control structure with 

nodes at the CMC and theater levels that will coordinate China’s responses to regional 

crises and conduct preparations for wartime operations.

■ A Strategic Support Force has been established to provide command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to commanders and will oversee space, cyber, and electronic warfare activities. A Joint Logistics 

Support Force will provide logistics support to units within the theaters.

■ The creation of a joint command system complements other recent changes supporting 

joint operations—including joint training, logistics, and doctrinal development.
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

The reforms could result in a more adept joint warfighting force, though the PLA will continue to face a number of key hurdles to effective joint operations.

■ If the reforms are successful, the PLA could field a joint force more capable of undertaking operations along the contingency spectrum, including high-end operations against 

the U.S. military, allied forces in the Western Pacific, and Taiwan.

■ Key obstacles include continued ground force dominance, interservice rivalry at a time 

of slowing budget growth, and lack of combat experience for most PLA personnel.

■ Several years of joint exercises and training will be needed for PLA officers and units to 

gain experience in operating under the new system. This could impede China’s ability to 

conduct major combat operations during this period.

Several potential actions would indicate that the PLA is overcoming obstacles to a stronger 

joint operations capability.

■ Useful indicators of progress would include more joint assignments going to non–

ground force officers, expansion and deepening of joint training, and evidence that the 

theater commands are exercising operational control over air, naval, and conventional 

rocket forces.

■ Additional reforms to the officer assignment and military education systems will be announced in 2017, and will play a critical role in cultivating the military leaders necessary 

to conduct effective joint operations in a restructured PLA.

The reforms are also intended to increase Chairman Xi Jinping’s control over the PLA and 

to reinvigorate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organs within the military.

■ The reforms emphasize Xi’s role in making all major decisions, reversing the delegation 

of authority to the two vice chairmen under Hu Jintao. However, Xi will still have to rely 

on trusted agents within the PLA to supply military advice and execute decisions.
3

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

■ The restructuring strengthens supervision of the military by giving auditing, discipline 

inspection, and military legal mechanisms more independence and having them report 

directly to the CMC.

■ Xi is also trying to increase ideological control by emphasizing the importance of political work and the military’s “absolute obedience” to the Party.

Xi Jinping’s ability to push through the reforms indicates that he has more authority over 

the PLA than his recent predecessors.

■ Xi has been able to wield sticks and carrots to break the logjam of institutional and 

personal interests that stymied previous reform efforts.

■ The ultimate effectiveness of efforts to strengthen CCP control will depend on Xi’s ability to devote sufficient attention to supervising the military and on the loyalty of the officers who will implement the control mechanisms.

■ If Xi’s leadership falters or if a slowing Chinese economy can no longer provide resources for military modernization, PLA leaders may grow dissatisfied with Xi’s efforts to 

strengthen CCP control over military affairs and to emphasize political ideology.

The restructuring could create new opportunities for U.S.-China military contacts.

■ The PLA now has closer counterpart positions for some senior U.S. billets, such as Chief 

of Staff of the Army. This could provide an opportunity for more productive exchanges.

■ The creation of a new joint command system and the role of the theater commanders 

in directing operations will require adjustments to existing confidence-building and communications measures to ensure that U.S. and Chinese forces can communicate effectively 

during a crisis.
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Introduction

Chinese military modernization has made impressive strides in the past decade.1 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has achieved progress in key technological areas, ranging from 

precision-guided missiles to advanced surface ships and combat aircraft; PLA personnel are 

more highly trained and skilled, capable of carrying out increasingly complex operations near 

to and farther away from China’s shores; and Chinese military doctrine and strategy have been 

updated to emphasize modern, joint maneuver warfare on a high-tech battlefield.2

 This progress 

has been supported by significant increases in Chinese defense spending every year since 1990.3

Taken together, these changes better enable the PLA to fight what the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) describes as “short-duration, high-intensity regional conflicts.”4

Yet, as the title of a 2015 RAND report suggests, PLA modernization has been “incomplete.”5

 Among the major weaknesses outlined in that report was the PLA’s antiquated organizational structure, which had experienced few major changes since the 1950s. Key problems 

included the lack of a permanent joint command and control (C2) structure, inadequate central supervision—which bred corruption, lowered morale, and inhibited the development of a 

professional force—and institutional barriers in the defense research and development (R&D) 

process.6

 Prior military reforms made only limited and incremental adjustments to the PLA’s 

structure; more comprehensive reform efforts stalled in the face of bureaucratic resistance.

In late 2015 and early 2016, the PLA sought to correct these problems by enacting a series 

of major structural reforms. These changes, part of a broader set of national defense reforms being pursued under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, represent the most ambitious, widereaching, and important restructuring of the PLA since 1949. Key changes include:

■ The four semi-autonomous general departments (responsible for operations, political 

work, logistics, and armaments/equipment) were disbanded and replaced by 15 functional 

departments, commissions, and offices within the Central Military Commission (CMC).

■ Separate national- and theater-level ground force headquarters were established for the 

first time. Previously, the general departments served primarily as PLA army headquarters and only secondarily as a joint headquarters, while the seven military regions (MRs) 

were overwhelmingly focused on ground force affairs.
5

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

■ The MRs themselves were replaced by five theater commands (TCs), which are responsible for leading joint operations in their respective regions.

■ Both a Strategic Support Force (SSF)—responsible for consolidating operations in the 

information domain, including space, cyber, and electronic warfare—and a Joint Logistics 

Support Force (JLSF) were created.

■ The responsibilities of key PLA components were adjusted so that TCs would concentrate on combat preparations and the service headquarters, which had previously led 

peacetime operations, would focus on what in the U.S. military are called “organize, train, 

and equip” missions.

These reforms raise a number of key questions. What has changed in substance, what has 

changed only superficially, and what has remained the same? How have the functions of different organizations, and the relationships between them, evolved? Why did the PLA choose to 

adopt these reforms, and why now? What do the reforms mean for China’s neighbors and for 

the United States? How might the changes affect the PLA’s operational effectiveness, and what 

obstacles stand in the way?

This study assesses the contents, drivers, and implications of the PLA’s restructuring. It 

draws on a large volume of Chinese open sources—both authoritative, such as speeches by 

senior leaders and reports in centrally controlled state media outlets—and non-authoritative, 

including op-eds and essays by leading PLA analysts. The study also benefits from conversations with senior Chinese military and civilian interlocutors between 2013 and 2016, and from 

several initial studies on the reforms by researchers outside China.7

 Although some aspects of 

the new structure remain unclear, the available data allow for a relatively detailed examination 

of the reforms and an initial assessment of what they could mean for China, its neighbors, and 

the United States.

The study is divided into five main sections. The first section reviews the scope of the 

changes, discussing how the PLA’s organizational chart has changed in the wake of the reforms. 

The second analyzes the drivers of reform, highlighting three factors: improving the ability of 

the Chinese military to conduct joint operations, increasing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

supervision of the PLA, and spurring technological innovation and civil-military cooperation. 

The third section assesses Xi’s political strategy for overcoming resistance to the reforms within 

the PLA. The fourth section considers the implications of the reforms. The main finding is 
6 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

that the PLA could be better positioned to conduct a range of operations in multiple domains, 

though several obstacles will likely continue to pose problems. The fifth discusses the next stages of the reforms and identifies avenues for additional research. The appendices provide further 

details on leadership changes associated with the reforms, and offer sketches of each of the 15 

new CMC departments.

A New PLA Organization

The PLA restructuring resulted in a new organizational chart and redefined authority relations between major components. In some cases, the changes were relatively superficial. For instance, the shift from the Second Artillery Force (SAF) to the Rocket Force appears to have been 

primarily a change in name only.8

 In other cases, the reforms were more substantial, as in the 

balkanization of the former General Staff Department (GSD, also known as the General Staff 

Headquarters) and the creation of the Strategic Support Force. This section describes the PLA’s 

preexisting organizational structure, reviews the major changes, and concludes with thoughts 

on how closely the PLA now resembles the U.S. military system.

Background

The PLA’s pre-reform structure (depicted in figure 1) was a legacy of the Chinese military’s pre- and early post-revolutionary history. Politically, the PLA possessed Leninist features 

designed to preserve CCP control over military decisionmaking and operations. This system 

stretched back to the PLA’s earliest days and was solidified at the Gutian Party conference in December 1929, which enshrined the principle that the “Party controls the gun.” The CMC was established as an arm of the CCP Central Committee and is typically chaired by the Party generalsecretary.9

 Other Leninist features included a dual command system in which unit commanders 

shared responsibility with political commissars (PCs); Party committees or branches down to 

the company level that decided matters as diverse as operations, officer selection, expenditures, 

and personnel management; and discipline inspection commissions that ensured compliance 

with Party rules and regulations.10 Most PLA officers (and some enlisted personnel) joined the 

Party, and loyalty to the CCP and participation in its affairs were a key basis for advancement.

Operationally, the PLA’s organization coalesced around a Soviet model in the late 1940s 

and early 1950s.11 Reflecting the Chinese armed forces’ involvement in the Korean conflict from 

1950 to 1953 and the influence of Soviet advisors, the structure was geared toward low-tech 

ground force combat missions. The general departments—which included the GSD, General 

Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Armament 
7

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Department (GAD)—were led by army officers and collectively supervised the ground forces. 

The MRs were likewise ground force–centric organizations that trained and equipped army 

units and managed provincial-level military districts. The navy and air force were only nominally integrated into the MR structure and were in practice controlled by service headquarters 

in Beijing. The SAF, established in 1966 to manage the country’s nuclear and conventional missiles, was thought by outside analysts to have reported directly to the CMC.12 This structure 

suited the PLA in Cold War–era operations, such as the 1962 border conflict with India and the 

1979 Sino-Vietnam war, which primarily involved the ground forces.

Since the early 1990s, PLA reformers argued for comprehensive changes to the military’s 

structure. There were two basic reasons. First was the trend of modern warfare toward joint 

operations, most notably in the maritime and aerospace domains. This required the PLA to 

rebalance itself from the army to the navy and air force and to institute a joint C2 structure that 

could integrate the capabilities of all the services as well as command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets. The need to conduct 

effective joint operations in multiple domains only increased as China faced growing security 

Figure 1. PLA Structure Prior to Reforms

Ministry of 

National Defense

Central Military Commission

(Chairman, Vice Chairmen, Members)

CMC Subsidiary Organs

General Oce

Discipline Inspection Commission

Audit Bureau

General Sta

Department

CCP Politburo State Council

General Political

Department

General Logistics

Department

General Armaments

Department

PLA Navy

Headquarters

PLA Air Force

Headquarters

PLA Second Artillery

Headquarters

Military Regions

Shenyang

Beijing

Lanzhou

Jinan

Nanjing

Guangzhou

Chengdu

Ground Forces Fleets Air Forces Missile Forces
8 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

challenges along its periphery, especially those posed by the Taiwan independence movement; 

land and maritime territorial disputes with countries such as India, Vietnam, and the Philippines; and potential instability in North Korea. The specter of U.S. military intervention in a 

regional conflict also required the PLA to adapt to be able to fight wars against a high-end adversary.13 Second, the general departments and MRs had amassed too much power and were too 

poorly supervised, leading to growing financial waste and corruption throughout the force.14

This, in turn, raised serious concerns about PLA morale, combat readiness, and proficiency. 

These core problems were accompanied by other structural weaknesses, including a defense 

R&D system that did not adequately utilize advances in civilian science and technology (S&T).15

To address these problems, the PLA embarked on a series of institutional reforms during 

the CMC chairmanships of Jiang Zemin (1989–2004) and Hu Jintao (2004–2012). Important 

changes included:

■ reducing the PLA’s size by 500,000 (in 1997) and 200,000 (in 2003)

■ establishing a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps (in 1998)

■ increasing resources to the navy, air force, and SAF

■ making force structure changes at the tactical and operational levels

■ restructuring the research, development, and acquisition process

■ reducing the number of PLA academic institutions

■ establishing a reserve officer training program in civilian universities.16

However, more fundamental changes to the PLA’s C2 and administrative structure eluded reformers. As then–Chief of the General Staff Fu Quanyou observed in 1998, such changes would 

“inevitably involve the immediate interests of numerous units and individual officers.” He also 

noted that reformers would have to address “selfish departmentalism” across the PLA.17 Resistance to change was likely strongest among the potential losers of reform, including the ground 

forces and general departments. The relative weakness of Jiang and Hu within the military made 

bureaucratic opposition even harder to overcome.18
9

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

In this context, Xi Jinping launched a renewed effort to revamp the PLA’s structure shortly 

after becoming CMC chairman in November 2012 (after having served for 2 years as a CMC 

vice chairman under Hu). The outlines of a reform program took shape at the Third Plenum 

of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013. At this session, the Central Committee decided 

to pursue a variety of reforms to the PLA’s institutions, processes, and systems, including “optimizing” the PLA’s leadership system and making progress toward a joint C2 structure.19 The 

Third Plenum not only identified key areas of military reform but also sent a powerful message 

that fundamental organizational changes to the PLA were an important part of China’s overall 

national reforms, and were widely supported by the top CCP leadership. In January 2014, the 

CMC established a leading small group dedicated to military reform, with Xi as its chairman.20

This group led the process of identifying key weaknesses and developing a blueprint for a new 

organizational structure.

Meanwhile, Xi and his supporters carried out an effort within the PLA to create favorable 

political conditions for the pending reforms. This included an anti-corruption campaign focused on both junior and senior officers.21 Most prominent were the investigations into former 

CMC vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, who were both expelled from the Party and 

detained, as well as the highly publicized investigation into former GLD deputy director Gu 

Junshan, whose alleged malfeasance resulted in a suspended death sentence.22 This effort put 

the military on notice that bureaucratic intransigence would not be tolerated as the reforms got 

under way. The PLA also carried out a propaganda campaign aimed at generating support for 

the reforms among rank-and-file personnel. For instance, an August 2014 circular encouraged 

all servicemembers to “resolutely support reform, actively reinforce reforms, and consciously 

dedicate themselves to reforms.”23

The first specific announcement tied to the reforms was made at a military parade in Beijing in September 2015, when Xi stated that the PLA’s size would be reduced by 300,000 by the 

end of 2017, bringing total personnel down from 2.3 to 2 million.24 This was followed by the 

CMC’s adoption of a detailed reform plan at a meeting held in November 2015.25 This decision was formalized in a document approved by the CMC and issued on January 1, 2016, titled 

Opinions on Deepening Reforms on National Defense and Armed Forces. This document provided a comprehensive and authoritative blueprint of the overall military reform program.26 It 

clarified that the major structural reforms (discussed below) would be only the first stage in a 

5-year process of reform. Later reforms would address deficiencies in force structure and force 

composition, the professional military education (PME) system, the military legal system, and 

other areas. The official completion date for the current reforms is 2020. This coincides with the 
10 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

end of the 13th 5-year armed forces development plan, which calls for the PLA to emerge as a 

“first-rate” military power by the end of 2020.27

Major Structural Changes

In contrast to previous reforms, this restructuring involves more comprehensive changes 

that affect all three major PLA organizational pillars—general departments, MRs, and services. 

The reforms not only resulted in a significantly revised organizational chart (shown in figure 

2) but also redefined the authority relationships between major components. These changes are 

detailed in the following sections.

Central Military Commission Reforms. While the CMC itself was left intact, the reforms 

produced a new bureaucratic structure under the CMC’s direct supervision (depicted in figure 

3). In particular, on January 11, 2016, Xi announced that the general departments had been disbanded and replaced by 15 functional departments, commissions, and offices under the auspices of the CMC.28 The distinction between these three types of organization is not entirely clear, 

but it appears that departments carry out operational and supervisory functions for the whole 

Figure 2. PLA Structure after Reforms

Ministry of 

National Defense

Central Military Commission

(Chairman, Vice Chairmen, Members)

General Oce

Joint Sta Dept.

Political Work Dept.

Logistics Support Dept.

Equipment Development Dept.

Training Management Dept.

Nat’l Def. Mobilization Dept.

Discipline Inspection Commission

CCP Politburo State Council

Strategic Support

Force

PLA Navy

Headquarters

PLA Air Force

Headquarters

PLA Rocket Force

Headquarters

Theater 

Commands Eastern

Southern

Western

Northern

Central

Ground Forces Fleets Air Forces Missile Forces

PLA Army

Headquarters

CMC Subsidiary Organs

Political & Legal A. Commission

Science & Tech. Commission

Strategic Planning Oce

Reform & Organization Oce

Int. Military Cooperation Oce

Audit Bureau

Organ Aairs Gen. Management

 Bureau Support to

Theater Commands

Nuclear forces still

report directly to CMC;

conventional forces

unclear

Service Headquarters:

Administrative but not

Operational Control

Joint Logistics

Support Force
11

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

PLA, similar to the former general departments; commissions provide high-level oversight on 

select issues; and offices perform planning, managerial, and other specialized tasks. The grades 

of these organizations also vary, with departments and commissions generally higher than offices. Appendix 2 contains more detailed sketches of all 15 organizations.

Surveying the impact of the reforms on the former general departments, it is clear that 

the most significant changes were made to the former GSD. Its sub-departments responsible 

for operations and, likely, intelligence analysis (2PLA) were assigned to a new CMC Joint Staff 

Department (JSD) led by former GSD director Fang Fenghui. However, other GSD sub-departments did not migrate to the JSD and instead became full-fledged departments under the CMC. 

In particular, the GSD training, mobilization, and strategic planning departments became the 

Training Management Department, National Defense Mobilization Department, and Strategic 

Planning Office, respectively.29 Still other functions previously performed by the GSD were assigned to the services: army aviation and other army-related functions (such as the Army Command College) were placed in the new army headquarters, while signals intelligence (3PLA) 

and electronic warfare (4PLA) likely moved to the new SSF and possibly merged into a single 

entity.30 Table 1 identifies the confirmed or likely destinations of the former GSD sub-departments.

The organizational impact on the other former general departments was less significant, 

with the core components of the GPD, GLD, and GAD moving into the formal CMC organization as the Political Work, Logistics Support, and Equipment Development departments, respectively. The directors and PCs of these departments remained the same, and there is no indication that their bureaucratic grades were reduced. However, several notable changes did occur:

Figure 3. New CMC Organizations

Logistics Support

Department

Political Work

Department

General Oce Central Military Commission

(Chairman, Vice Chairman, Members)

Joint Sta

Department

Equipment

Development Dept.

Training

Management Dept.

National Defense

Mobilization Dept.

Discipline Inspection

Commission

Political and Legal

Aairs Commission

Science and Technology

Commission

Reform and

Organization Oce

Strategic Planning

Oce

International Military

Cooperation Oce Audit Bureau Organ Aairs General

Management Bureau

Departments( 部 )

Commissions( 委员会 )

Oces( 办公室/署/局 )
12 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

■ The GPD’s oversight of military justice moved to a new CMC Political and Legal Affairs 

Commission, which will handle military courts and criminal investigations. It also appears to have assumed the GPD’s responsibilities for military counterintelligence.31

■ The GPD’s role in enforcing discipline among Party members in the PLA transitioned 

to an expanded CMC Discipline Inspection Commission. This commission will play a 

key role in the PLA’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign, much as the Central Discipline 

Inspection Commission (led by Wang Qishan) has helped execute the anti-corruption 

campaign on the civilian side.

Table 1. Destination of Former GSD Sub-Departments

GSD Sub-department Function Destination 

Operations Command and control CMC Joint Staff Department

Intelligence (2PLA) Intelligence collection, 

analysis 

CMC Joint Staff Department 

(likely)

Technical (3PLA) Signals intelligence, cyber 

operations

SSF (likely) 

Informatization (5PLA) C4ISR systems SSF (likely) 

Strategic Planning Long-range analysis CMC Strategic Planning 

Office 

Army Aviation Army aviation Army HQ

Military Training Training, professional 

military education 

CMC Training Management 

Department

ECM & Radar (4PLA) Electronic warfare SSF (likely)

Mobilization Reserve force, militia, ground 

force enlisted recruitment 

CMC National Defense 

Mobilization Department; 

Ground Force recruitment 

likely moved to Army HQ 

Military Affairs Organizational planning, 

welfare, enlisted personnel 

management 

CMC Reform and 

Organization Office, CMC 

Political Work Department 

(possible) 

Management Support Logistics support CMC Organ Affairs General 

Management Bureau (likely)

Sources: Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department: Evolving Organizations and Missions,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, ed. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen 

(Vienna, VA: Defense Group, Inc., 2015), 135–160; “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle,” 

China Military Online, January 12, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm>.
13

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

■ A number of military academies, such as the GLD’s Logistics College and the GAD’s Armament College, were transferred to the new CMC Training Management Department.32

■ Some elements of the GLD, such as the former Wuhan Rear Base, were transferred to 

the JLSF while others (such as the GLD’s Finance, Capital Construction, and Hygiene 

Departments) were moved to the new Logistics Support Department.

■ The GAD’s Science and Technology Commission was placed under direct CMC oversight.33 The commission will promote civil-military cooperation in defense R&D and 

strengthen high-level guidance for the research, development, test, and evaluation system 

(RDT&E).

■ The GAD’s responsibilities for repair and maintenance appear not to have been assumed 

by the Equipment Development Department but instead transferred to the services.34

■ A new CMC Organ Affairs General Management Bureau consolidated management 

support functions of the four general departments (for example, facilities).35

■ Some staff from the general departments moved to the new army headquarters to manage ground force political, logistics, and equipment matters.36

Of the 15 CMC departments, the CMC General Office occupies a position of unique importance. This office is listed first in protocol order, ahead of even the successors of the former 

general departments.37 In the past, the General Office mainly supervised the flow of information to and from CMC members and performed other duties, such as policy research.38 PLA 

interviewees contend that the General Office will not only continue to carry out these functions 

on behalf of the CMC but also take on added responsibility for overseeing the implementation 

of the reforms and ensuring that Xi’s (and the CMC’s) directives are followed across the expanded CMC bureaucracy.39 Critical to this effort will be the General Office director (currently 

Lieutenant General Qin Shengxiang), a key confidante and advisor of Xi and the other CMC 

members.40

Service Reforms. Key service-level reforms included establishing national- and theaterlevel ground force headquarters, renaming the SAF as the PLA Rocket Force and elevating it to 

full service status, and creating the SSF and the JLSF. These are discussed in turn.41
14 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Establishing Separate Headquarters for the Army. At the national level, the PLA established an “army leading organ” (陆军领导机关) or headquarters in Beijing. As a result, the 

ground forces now have their own headquarters on par with the other services, while the JSD 

and other general department successors were divested of their ground force responsibilities. 

This meant that some personnel previously assigned to the general departments (such as the 

Armored Bureau of the former GSD Military Training Department) likely moved to the new 

army headquarters. Lieutenant General Li Zuocheng, a veteran of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese 

War who most recently served as Chengdu MR commander, was selected as army commander.42 Lieutenant General Liu Lei, who was previously the Lanzhou MR PC, became the army PC.

Regionally, the PLA also established separate army headquarters within each of the TCs.43

Like the CMC departments, the TCs will also become “joint” organizations staffed, in principle, 

by personnel drawn from all the services (roughly analogous to what are called “purple-hatted 

officers” in the U.S. military). Like its navy, air force, and rocket force counterparts, the theater 

ground force headquarters will conduct training, maintain combat readiness, and make units 

available to joint commanders as needed. Theater ground force commanders (identified in table 

2) are generally senior officers from the preceding MR.

Renaming and Elevating the Second Artillery Force into a Full Military Service. The 

SAF was renamed as the PLA Rocket Force (解放军火箭军) and its status was formally elevated from an independent branch of the army (兵种) to a full-fledged service (军种) alongside the army, navy, and air force. SAF commander General Wei Fenghe and PC Lieutenant 

General Wang Jiasheng retained their positions in the Rocket Force, as did most other senior 

SAF leaders.44

Renaming the SAF and issuing new uniforms and patches was one of the more superficial aspects of the reform. Moving from a branch to a service did not affect the Rocket Force’s 

grade, which remains at the same level as the other services, and the Rocket Force commander 

continues to be an ex officio CMC member. Moreover, Xi used the same three-part formula to 

describe the Rocket Force’s duties as he did when addressing the SAF in 2012, stating that the 

force is the “core strength of China’s strategic deterrence, the strategic support for the country’s 

status as a major power, and an important cornerstone safeguarding national security.”45 This 

implied that the Rocket Force would serve essentially the same function as the SAF. Similarly, 

a PLA spokesman emphasized that the country’s no-first-use nuclear pledge remained intact.46

However, a key change is that Rocket Force conventional units will have closer relations with the 

theater commands; this is discussed in the next section.
15

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Creating the Strategic Support Force. The PLA also established a new SSF (解放军战略支

援部队). Authoritative Chinese sources are consistently vague about the purpose of this organization. Xi stated only that this is a “new type of operational force,” which is a “major growth 

point of our military’s new-quality combat capability.”47 Whether the SSF should be described 

as a “service” or as some other type of entity is the subject of debate in foreign analysis and 

Chinese media.48 The SSF’s first commander is Lieutenant General Gao Jin, a career SAF officer 

who most recently served as president of the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), where 

he oversaw the development of joint doctrine, including the publication of the 2013 Science of 

Strategy (战略学), which considers the implications of technological change on the operational 

arts.49 The PC is General Liu Fulian, former PC of the Beijing MR.

Non-authoritative Chinese media reports suggest that the focus of the SSF will be on supporting information operations and providing C4ISR support.50 A People’s Daily report noted 

that the force would provide an “information umbrella” for joint forces.51 Senior Colonel Shao 

Yongling of the PLA Rocket Force Command College portrayed the SSF as a valuable “force multiplier.”52 Retired Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo similarly argued that the SSF will not be a “standalone 

Table 2. Army Leadership in Theater Commands

Theater Command Army Commander Previous Position 

Eastern LTG Qin Weijiang Deputy Commander, 

Nanjing MR

Southern MG Liu Xiaowu Chief of Staff, Guangzhou 

MR

Western MG He Weidong Shanghai Garrison 

Commander

Northern MG Li Qiaoming Commander, 41st Group 

Army (Guangzhou MR)

Central MG Shi Luze Chief of Staff, Beijing MR

Sources: “Army Adjustment and Establishment Completed in Five Theater Commands,” China Military Online, February 4, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-02/04/content_6890499.htm>; “Southern Theater Command Army Commander, PC Announced, Two Major Generals with 

Masters Degrees Take the Lead” [南部战区陆军军政主官揭晓 两硕士少将领衔], Caixin [财新], February 5, 2016, 

available at <http://china.caixin.com/2016-02-05/100907605.html>; Zhao Lei, “Beijing Garrison Gets a New Commander,” China Daily, August 18, 2016, available at <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-08/18/content_26522904.

htm>; “MG Li Qiaoming Becomes Northern Theater Command Ground Force Commander” [李桥铭少将任北部战

区陆军司令员], Caixin [财新], February 10, 2016, available at <http://china.caixin.com/2016-02-10/100908458.html>; 

“Shi Luze and Wu Shezhou Become Commander, PC of Central Theater Command” [史鲁泽吴社洲任中部战区陆军

军政主官], Caixin [财新], February 4, 2016, available at <http://china.caixin.com/2016-02-04/100907394.html>.
16 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

force,” but will instead operate in conjunction with the other services.53 He added that the SSF 

will carry out such tasks as early warning, managing space satellites (including the Beidou navigation satellites), and provide defense in the electromagnetic and cyber domains.54 These claims 

were echoed by PLA interlocutors during discussions in 2016, who also noted that the SSF would 

play a key role in communications.55 Nevertheless, much will remain in the realm of speculation 

until details on this organization are provided in authoritative sources.

Creating the Joint Logistics Support Force. In September 2016, the PLA announced the 

creation of another quasi-service called the Joint Logistics Support Force. The origins of this 

organization lie in the 1990s era reforms to the PLA’s logistics system, which aimed to reduce 

redundancies by consolidating logistics from the services into joint organizations. This effort 

included experimentation, notably in the Jinan MR, with theater-based joint logistics departments. Other changes included budgetary and procurement reforms and professionalization 

of logistics personnel. Nevertheless, the PLA continued to face a number of weaknesses in the 

logistics sector, including rampant corruption, standardization challenges, lack of sufficient information systems to promote rapid and efficient logistics support, and inadequate synergies 

between the military logistics system and the civilian economy.56

To overcome these challenges, Xi Jinping stated that the JLSF should serve as the “main 

force” in “strategic battle support missions” and urged it to better integrate logistics support 

into joint operations.57 It will do this by overseeing provision of general purpose supplies to 

joint commanders at the theater level, although service-specific logistics supplies will continue 

to be handled within the services. Organizationally, the JLSF is headquartered at the former 

GLD Wuhan Logistics Base and has subordinate Joint Logistics Support Centers in each of the 

five new theater commands. These organizations appear to have replaced the previous MR joint 

logistics departments. Nevertheless, a number of key uncertainties about this organization remain. Key questions include the relationship between the JLSF and CMC Logistics Support Department, and the relationship between the JLSF, theater commands, and service components.

Theater Reforms

At the theater level, the seven MRs (depicted in figure 4) were replaced by five TCs (战

区).58 Listed in protocol order, these are the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central 

TCs. This change reflected the culmination of a longstanding goal of PLA reformers to gradually transition from an MR system, which was primarily focused on administering the ground 

forces, to a TC system that would emphasize joint operations.59 Indeed, at least as early as 1998, 

Chinese military strategists had discussed plans to consolidate the MRs into more regionally 
17

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

focused theater commands (sometimes referred to as “war zones.”).60 Chinese sources describe 

the TCs as the highest joint headquarters within their respective regions, with a primary responsibility for “maintaining peace, deterring wars, and winning battles.”61 Senior Colonel 

Wang Xiaohui of the PLA National Defense University (NDU) explains that the TCs will be 

mainly concerned with conducting joint training during peacetime and will exercise command 

of theater-based combat forces during wartime.62

According to Chinese sources, the TCs are aligned against specific threats within their 

respective region or “strategic direction” (战略方向). The Eastern TC, which replaced the Nanjing MR, is focused on the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea. The Southern TC, which succeeded the Guangzhou MR with the apparent additions of the southwestern Yunnan and Guizhou 

provinces, will take responsibility for the South China Sea. Southern TC commander General 

Wang Jiaocheng states that his command will “resolutely” defend China’s maritime rights and 

interests in the region.63 The Northern TC replaced the Shenyang MR with the addition of parts 

of Inner Mongolia, and is focused on the Korean Peninsula. The Western TC, largely a merger 

of the Lanzhou and Chengdu MRs, will handle challenges emanating from Central Asia, such as 

Figure 4. MR System Boundaries

Source: Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 2.
18 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

cross-border terrorism, and safeguard the Sino-Indian border. The Central TC will defend the 

capital and might provide support to other TCs as needed.64

Nevertheless, the geographic boundaries of the new TC system remain somewhat ambiguous. The most authoritative map released as of mid-2016 appeared on the official Web site of 

PLA Daily, but has been disputed by other Chinese media reports.65 For instance, there was 

initially some uncertainty about whether units on the Shandong Peninsula (including the North 

Sea Fleet) would be allocated to the Central or Northern TC, but it was later clarified to be the 

latter.66 The map also incorrectly showed Yunnan Province as belonging to the Western TC 

when it in fact belongs to the Southern TC. One important development is that the PLA will 

no longer maintain regional headquarters in Lanzhou and Jinan, although these two cities will 

serve as the headquarters for the Western and Northern TC ground forces, respectively. Figure 

5, drawn from DOD’s 2016 annual report on China, depicts the approximate TC boundaries.

Within the theaters, army, air force, and (where applicable) naval service component commands report through two chains of command. Operationally, they are under the direction of 

the TC commanders. Administratively, they report to their respective service headquarters in 

Beijing. The service components in turn exercise operational and administrative control over 

operational units (group armies, squadrons, naval detachments, and so forth). As with the previous MR system, service component commanders are dual-hatted as TC deputy commanders. 

The Rocket Force maintains missile bases in each of the TCs, but these have not been identified 

as having a subordinate relationship with the TC headquarters, and missile base commanders 

have not been dual-hatted as TC deputy commanders. Geographically, only air force headquarters are located in the same cities as the TC headquarters, while army and naval headquarters 

are located elsewhere. Those locations are provided in table 3.

Despite these changes, the leadership of the TCs remains largely dominated by ground 

force officers. All five current TC commanders (identified in table 4) are army officers—four 

of them were previous MR commanders who have rotated to new theaters, while a fifth previously served as Beijing MR deputy commander. However, the appointment of North Sea Fleet 

commander Yuan Yubai as the new Southern TC commander in January 2017 constitutes an 

important breakthrough for jointness.67 Four of the five TC PCs are army officers, while one 

(Lieutenant General Zhu Fuxi of the Western TC) is currently an air force officer who spent 

most of his career in the army. Four of the five PCs served as PC of the preceding MR, adding 

a level of consistency in the context of the rotation of TC commanders. Nevertheless, it is also 

notable that the TCs are becoming more joint at the deputy commander level. In the pre-reform 

system, air force and navy officers held only 10 of the 32 MR deputy commander positions, the 
19

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

minimum possible given air force and navy responsibility for commanding seven MR air forces 

and three fleets.68 Officers from those services currently occupy 16 of 31 deputy commander positions in the five theaters.69 TCs remain MR leader-grade organizations, on par with the service 

headquarters and several CMC departments.70

Reforming Lines of Authority

In addition to adjusting the PLA’s organizational composition, the restructuring altered 

the authority relationships between the military’s main components. The key development 

was a formula adopted at the November 2015 CMC reform work meeting that the CMC would 

provide “general management,” the theater commands would focus on operations, and the 

services would manage force building (军委管总、战区主战、军种主建).71 This implied a 

division of authority into two separate chains of command (depicted in figure 6)—an administrative chain, in which authority flows from the CMC to the services to the troops, and an operational chain flowing from the CMC to the TCs to the troops.72 In short, service chiefs would 

focus on organizing, training, and equipping personnel, while the TCs would concentrate on 

joint training and operations.73

Figure 5. Approximate TC Boundaries

Source: Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 2.
20 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

In practice, however, there are questions about how exactly this system will function. 

One issue is whether the service headquarters will retain some degree of operational authority through their operations departments (作战部门). For instance, PLA interviewees contend 

that routine, single-service operations would continue to be managed by the services rather 

than by TC commanders.74 For instance, it was reported in April 2016 that navy commander 

Wu Shengli had directed the evacuation of sick Chinese workers from Fiery Cross Reef in the 

South China Sea, suggesting that the navy headquarters retained at least a limited operational 

role.75 When, and even if, that role will fully transition to the new joint headquarters is unclear. 

Another issue concerns authority over out-of-area operations, given that TCs only cover terriTable 3. Service Components Within the TCs

Eastern TC Southern TC Western TC Northern TC Central TC

TC 

HQ

Nanjing Guangzhou Chengdu Shenyang Beijing

Army 

HQ

Fuzhou Nanning Lanzhou Jinan Shijiazhuang

Group 

Armies

1st, 12th, 31st 14th, 41st, 42nd 13th, 21st, 47th 16th, 26th, 39th, 

40th

20th, 27th, 38th, 

54th, 65th

Navy 

HQ

Ningbo Zhanjiang None Qingdao None

Navy 

Fleets

East Sea Fleet South Sea Fleet None North Sea Fleet None

Air 

Force 

HQ

Nanjing Guangzhou Chengdu Shenyang Beijing

Air 

Forces

Eastern TC 

AF (formerly 

Nanjing 

Military 

Region 

Air Force, 

MRAF)

Southern TC 

AF (formerly 

Guangzhou 

MRAF)

Western TC 

AF (merged 

from Chengdu 

and Lanzhou 

MRAFs)

Northern TC 

AF (formerly 

Shenyang 

MRAFs)

Central TC 

AF (merged 

from Beijing 

and Jinan 

MRAFs) 

Sources: “Xi Jinping Presents Flags to Five Theater Commands” [习近平向五大战区授予军旗], Jinghua Shibao [京

华时报], February 2, 2016, available at <http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2016-02/02/content_278482.htm>; “Deployment of 18 Group Armies Completed, What Will the Five Theater Commands Do?” [18个集团军部署完成, 五大

战区都在做什么?], Nanfang Zhoumo [南方周末], April 17, 2016, available at <http://military.china.com/important/11132797/20160419/22465989_all.html>; Web sites of the five TCs are located at the following addresses: 1) 

<http://db.81.cn>; 2) <http://nb.81.cn>; 3) <http://xb.81.cn>; 4) <http://bb.81.cn>; and 5) <http://zb.81.cn>.
21

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

tory within China. As discussed in the next section, the JSD, rather than TCs, will likely take the 

lead on operations far from China’s borders, such as in the Middle East or the Arctic.

A related development concerns the management of the provincial-level military districts, 

which in turn supervise reserve, militia, and some active duty forces. Supervision of the military districts was previously handled by the MRs, but under the reforms has shifted to the new 

CMC National Defense Mobilization Department. An exception concerns the Tibet and Xinjiang military districts, as well as the Beijing Garrison, which will be managed instead by the PLA 

army headquarters. The deputy director of the Tibet military district political work department 

described this change as an “elevation of authority” for his command that symbolized the operational focus of PLA forces in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.76 This arrangement was also 

needed because those three organizations have a higher bureaucratic grade than the National 

Defense Mobilization Department, and thus could not report to it.77

Toward an American-Style Structure?

Overall, the reforms suggest that the PLA is moving toward a command structure more 

closely resembling the U.S. military. In particular, PLA restructuring has drawn comparisons 

to the U.S. military’s reforms as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.78 This act resulted in a joint C2 structure for the U.S. military in which 

authority flows from the President and Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the regional 

unified combatant commands (CCMDs), who lead forces within their respective theaters.79

Service chiefs were given an advisory role, with responsibilities to “organize, train, and equip” 

Table 4. TC Leadership

TC Commander Previous 

Position

PC Previous Position

Eastern LTG Liu Yuejun CDR, Lanzhou 

MR

LTG Zheng 

Weiping

PC, Nanjing MR

Southern GEN Wang 

Jiaocheng

CDR, Shenyang 

MR

GEN Wei Liang PC, Guangzhou MR

Western LTG Zhao 

Zongqi

CDR, Jinan MR LTG Zhu Fuxi PC, Chengdu MR

Northern LTG Song 

Puxuan

CDR, Beijing 

MR

GEN Chu Yimin PC, Shenyang MR

Central LTG Han 

Weiguo

DCDR, Beijing 

MR

GEN Yin 

Fanglong

Deputy Director, GPD
22 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

troops. This bifurcation of authority appears similar to the evolving PLA distinction between 

operational and administrative chains of command. Indeed, Chinese analysts have explicitly 

cited the U.S. C2 system as a useful example worth considering.80

Yet PLA reformers drew inspiration from not only the U.S. system but also the examples 

of several advanced foreign militaries. Former PLA Academy of Military Sciences president Liu 

Chengjun observed that the services had been removed from the operational chain of command and joint command systems established in both the U.S. and Russian systems.81 Indeed, 

a volume published by AMS highlights the structural reforms of the U.S., Russian, Japanese, 

Indian, British, French, and German armed forces. The book makes clear that joint C2 systems, 

greater use of C4ISR assets, joint logistics systems, and other developments have been pursued 

by all of these states, suggesting that it is the changing nature of modern warfighting in general, 

and not the specific experience of any single country, that informed some of the key themes of 

the PLA reform.82 Senior Colonel Wang Xiaohui of the PLA NDU argues that any model that 

results in quick C2 and effective force management can be one for China to emulate.83

Given this wide-reaching examination of foreign militaries, it is not surprising that certain 

aspects of the PLA restructuring more closely resemble non-U.S. systems than they do the U.S. 

structure post–Goldwater-Nichols. For instance, the TC system is less similar to the U.S. CCMDs, which span the globe, than to the Russian military district system as it evolved after 2008, 

which is focused mainly on responding to challenges in Russia’s near abroad.84 As discussed in 

the next section, the TCs are likewise aligned against regional threats just beyond China’s borders. The new JSD, which will supervise out-of-area operations from Beijing, also lacks a clear 

cognate in the American system. Instead, this organization more clearly resembles the British 

Figure 6. Bifurcation of Authority

CMC and Subsidiary

Departments

Operational Units

Theater Commands Service HQs

Administrative 

Chain of Command

Operational

Chain of Command
23

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Permanent Joint Headquarters, responsible for directing overseas operations among the army, 

navy, and air force.85

In addition, it is important to note that the PLA has not fundamentally changed in some 

respects. The PLA remains an essentially Leninist organization whose purpose is to carry out 

the Party’s decisions. This means that the CMC continues to serve as the military’s highest 

decisionmaking organ, along with the infrastructure of Party control throughout the PLA, including the PC system and party committees. PLA interviewees generally agreed that the “dual 

command system” in which both unit commanders and PCs exercise authority will not be affected by the reforms, though it is likely that training for all officers (including commanders and 

PCs) will be more oriented toward joint operations.86 In addition, Chinese military leadership 

remains heavily ground force–centric, especially within the new CMC departments and in the 

TCs. Thus, the restructuring can be seen as a merging of new elements drawn from foreign examples with a traditional structure that has persisted over the last 90 years.

Drivers of Reform

There are arguably three key reasons for the PLA’s restructuring. First is improving the 

ability to conduct joint operations across multiple domains. Second is the desire to improve 

supervision over a force seen as increasingly corrupt and undisciplined. Third is advancing 

“civil-military integration,” especially in the defense R&D system. These factors are discussed in 

the following sections.

Strengthening Joint Operations

First, restructuring seeks to enhance the PLA’s ability to conduct joint (that is, cross-service) operations in multiple domains.87 The PLA’s focus on joint operations stretches back to the 

late Cold War period. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese observers noted that advanced 

militaries increasingly utilized joint campaigns in a number of regional conflicts. The most notable example was the first Gulf War, in which U.S. forces employed a combination of joint force 

and advanced systems (such as conventional precision-strike missiles and advanced C4ISR platforms) to defeat the Iraqi armed forces.88 Another driver was growing concerns about Taiwan 

independence, symbolized in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which led to added emphasis 

on joint amphibious, blockade, and firepower operations. The lesson was that China would 

have to improve its own joint capability in order to compete on the modern battlefield against 

high-tech adversaries. This led the PLA to develop joint doctrine, create a joint logistics system 

within the MRs, and carry out cross-service exercises.89
24 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

The restructuring seeks to strengthen joint operations in several ways: establishing a permanent joint C2 structure, integrating C4ISR support, reducing the dominance of the ground 

forces, and promoting joint training and logistics. These are discussed in turn.

Establishing a Two-Level Joint C2 Structure

A key challenge inhibiting PLA joint operations was the lack of a permanent joint C2 

structure. As noted, prior to the reforms the naval and air force headquarters had a peacetime 

C2 role, while the SAF was thought to have reported directly to the CMC. Divided command 

authority meant that non–ground force units were poorly integrated into the MR structure. The 

commander of a PLA service academy explained that the pre-reform relationship between the 

services and MRs was essentially, “You don’t listen to me, and I don’t listen to you.”90 Doctrinally, joint headquarters would have been established on an ad hoc basis during wartime. These 

headquarters, likely staffed by officers seconded from the general departments, would then attempt to integrate the activities of all forces in their area of responsibility.91 PLA analysts noted 

that this would have delayed the transition from peacetime to wartime operations, and would 

not have met the criteria of modern warfare to act quickly and decisively.92

Modifying the C2 structure is a centerpiece of the restructuring. The Third Plenum decision called on the PLA to “complete CMC joint operations command organs and theater joint 

operations command systems.”93 In December 2013, Xi Jinping noted that the PLA “has given 

much consideration to joint C2, but fundamental problems remain. . . . [E]stablishing a CMC 

and theater command joint C2 system requires urgency and should not be delayed.”94 Xi reiterated this objective in a meeting of senior PLA officers in September 2014, in which he called for 

the construction of a “new type of command headquarters.”95 In November 2015, Xi announced 

at a CMC meeting on military reform that a “two-level joint operational command system” (两

级联合作战指挥体制) would be established, with key decisionmaking nodes at the CMC and 

theater levels.96

The January 2016 CMC Opinions on Deepening Reforms on National Defense and Armed 

Forces further explained that:

By adapting to the requirement of integrated joint operation and command, we 

will establish a sound two-level joint operation and command system between the 

CMC and the theaters, and build a strategic and operational command system 

that integrates peace time and war time, that operates in a normal state, that 

specializes in main operations, and that is lean and highly efficient.97
25

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

The decision to establish a permanent joint C2 structure was immediately hailed in Chinese media commentary as resolving a fundamental problem inhibiting joint operations. Senior 

Captain Zhang Junshe, vice president of the PLA Naval Research Institute, stated that the shift 

from MRs to TCs would allow a quicker transition to a “war footing.”98 A PLA Daily report 

likewise noted that the new C2 mechanism (sketched in figure 7) would allow forces to “quickly 

shift” to wartime operations without the need to set up a temporary command structure.99

At the national level, the CMC will continue to hold the highest command authority.100

CMC decisions will likely be passed down to the theaters through the JSD, which may perform 

functions similar to the U.S. Joint Staff J3 (Operations) directorate.101 The CMC (through the 

JSD) will also likely approve transfers of combat units from one TC to the next in the case of 

cross-theater training or operations. The JSD will be responsible for other duties associated with 

joint operations, including developing campaign plans, formulating military strategy, performing combat capability assessments, and ensuring combat readiness (战备建设).102 The JSD’s 

Operations Bureau (作战局) will directly supervise out-of-area operations through its Overseas 

Operations Office (海外行动处).103 One PLA interviewee explained that this office would not 

only oversee peacetime security missions, such as noncombatant evacuations and disaster relief 

missions, but would also have an unspecified “combat” role.104 Nevertheless, in practice it is 

Figure 7. Notional PLA Joint C2 Structure

JSD Operations

Bureau

Theater Commands

Theater Service

Component HQs

Major Combat

Units

CMC JOCC

Xi Jinping - CinC

TC JOCC

Led by TC CDRs

CMC

Supervises 

out-of-area operations

Supervises 

regional operations
26 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

possible that some routine, single-service operations will continue to be carried out by the individual services. One PLA interlocutor suggested that in cases such as anti-piracy operations, the 

JSD Overseas Operations Office would only play a “planning and coordinating” role.105

Within the theaters, TC commanders have been assigned operational authority over most 

combat forces in their areas of responsibility. This is reflected in the new TC emblems, which 

combine the symbols of the ground, air force, naval, and rocket forces (depicted in figure 8). 

Peacetime control of naval fleets and theater air forces has been formally transferred from service headquarters to the TCs, though as discussed previously, there is some evidence that services retain at least a limited degree of control over routine operations. Theater commanders 

also have operational control over active-duty ground forces within their respective regions.106 

Most reserve and militia units will report through military districts to the National Defense 

Mobilization Department in Beijing, though during a contingency they would likely be allocated to TC commanders. During peacetime, theaters will likely focus on joint training, including 

testing and improving the joint C2 system at both levels.107

Given that all Rocket Force units were previously directly controlled by the CMC, it is 

notable that the TC commanders appear to have some ability to control or at least pass orders 

to conventional Rocket Force units within their theaters, although the exact nature of this relationship is unclear. Eastern Theater commander Liu Yuejun stated in an interview that his 

authority extends to Rocket Force units within his area of responsibility.108 One hundred Rocket 

Force personnel have also been assigned to TC headquarters as staff officers, where they likely 

assist in the development of joint operational plans and may play a liaison role.109 There is also 

increasing evidence of Rocket Force participation in theater-based joint exercises, a trend that 

is likely to continue.110

However, evidence suggests weaker integration of Rocket Force units into TC C2 structures. Unlike the army, air force, and navy, no Rocket Force senior officers have been appointed 

as theater deputy commanders, nor have new theater-level command structures been established for Rocket Force units.111 Moreover, the CMC is certain to retain tight control over Rocket Force units with nuclear weapons. At most, TC commanders will have conventional missiles 

at their disposal. Since most missile bases currently command both conventional and nuclear 

units, the C2 structure would have to be bifurcated to allow TC commanders access only to 

conventional units or TC orders to conventional Rocket Force units would have to flow through 

the CMC. How this would work in practice (and the exact nature of TC commanders’ authority 

over conventional missile units) is not clear.
27

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

At the heart of the joint C2 system are joint operations command centers (JOCCs; 联合

作战指挥中心) that develop operational plans, analyze intelligence, coordinate combat forces, and link higher and lower echelons.112 Prior to the reforms the PLA possessed at least two 

JOCCs. One was the national command center located in the Western Hills of Beijing.113 This 

was reportedly established in August 2014 and operated by the GSD Operations Department 

(predecessor of the JSD).114 Second was an East China Sea JOCC that helped to coordinate 

enforcement of China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, which was announced 

in November 2013.115 Although details are limited, these centers probably provided the PLA an 

opportunity to test the infrastructure and systems needed to build a more comprehensive joint 

C2 structure.

Following the reforms, the PLA quickly unveiled JOCCs at both the CMC and theater level. 

The national command center was renamed the CMC JOCC (军委联合作战指挥中心). This 

organization entered the media spotlight when Xi inspected it in April 2016 and was named its 

“commander-in-chief ” (总指挥). This led some observers to conclude that Xi (who was dressed 

in combat fatigues during the visit) would personally take charge of operations during a crisis.116

Figure 8. Theater Command Emblems

Source: “PLA Establishes Five Theater Commands” [解放军建立东南西北中五大战区], Beijing News [新京报], February 2, 2016, available at <www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2016/02/02/393483.html>.

Note: Southern TC emblems depicted.
28 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

However, one PLA interlocutor stated that this was merely a symbolic visit and that, in an actual 

crisis, Xi would delegate most authority to professional officers, since leading combat is a “general’s job.”117 JOCCs have also been established within all five TCs. Chinese media note that these 

are staffed by personnel drawn from all the services, including the Rocket Force, who perform 

24/7 watch functions, collaborate on developing operational plans, and ensure that all service 

perspectives are represented.118 Chinese sources also note that the TC JOCCs are equipped to 

facilitate communications with both theater service component headquarters (such as fleet headquarters) and with the CMC JOCC.119 These communications links are critical because most 

theater service component headquarters are geographically separated from the theater JOCC.

Integrating C4ISR Forces

Another emphasis of the reforms is integrating C4ISR capabilities into joint operations. At 

a broad level, PLA interest in competing in the “information domain” has increased since the 

1990s.120 This includes both ways to harness information to conduct effective operations and 

ways to counter adversary information systems in the context of joint campaigns. China’s 2015 

defense white paper notes that the military should be able to fight and win “informationized 

local wars” (信息化局部战争), in which “integrated combat forces will be employed to prevail 

in system-vs-system operations featuring information dominance, precision strikes, and joint 

operations.”121 The 2013 edition of the Science of Strategy argues that the PLA should integrate 

space, cyber, and electronic warfare operations to “paralyze enemy operational systems.”122

A key obstacle has been bureaucratic stovepiping within the PLA that has led to different 

services relying on different information systems, MRs developing C4ISR capabilities that were 

incompatible with other MRs, and operations in the information domain being managed by 

different organizations.123 For instance, the PLA’s cyber network attack, espionage, and defense 

forces were treated as “separate disciplines” conducted by different former GSD sub-departments, while space operations were carried out by both the GSD and GAD.124 A 2015 RAND 

report suggested that the compartmentalization of the C4ISR system, along with technological 

weaknesses, could “hamper the speed, reduce the reliability, or otherwise diminish the effectiveness of the PLA’s over-the-horizon targeting capabilities.”125

The restructuring seeks to reduce these problems by establishing the SSF. As noted, this 

organization probably manages space, cyber, and electronic warfare forces, and provides C4ISR 

support. Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo explains that the SSF will provide “battlefield support” to combat forces in areas ranging from reconnaissance, to navigation, to communications.126 A People’s 

Daily report asserts that the SSF could help the PLA conduct operations as complex as the May 
29

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

2011 U.S. raid on Osama Bin Laden, in which satellites and other advanced systems supported 

operators.127 The SSF might support TC commanders by making centrally managed assets, such 

as satellites, available during exercises or operations.128 However, how the SSF will be integrated 

into the TC structure is unclear. One way would be to provide guidance and support to the theater-based Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (技术侦察部) that are responsible for electronic 

Figure 9. Relative Size of the PLA Services (2013)

Sources: “Full Text: The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” Xinhua, April 16, 2013, available at 

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681_2.htm (army, navy, and air force); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2012 (London: IISS, 2012).

Army: 1,600,000

69%

SAF: 100,000

4%

Air Force: 398,000

17%

Navy: 235,000

10%
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

warfare, cyber, and other technical missions, though the exact nature of the SSF’s organizational 

relationship with the TCs is unclear.129

Reducing Ground Force Dominance

The reforms also seek to improve joint operations by reducing the dominance of the 

ground forces within the PLA. Historically, the army has been by far the largest of China’s services (depicted in figure 9). As a result, most commanders and key staff of the general departments and MRs were army officers. The 2013 edition of the Science of Strategy noted that this 

was not conducive to establishing a joint C2 system, since the perspectives of the other services 

were not well represented.130 Another problem was that the general departments and MRs were 

preoccupied with managing the ground forces, while supervision of the other services was performed by service headquarters. This reduced the ability of the GSD and MR leadership to focus 

on joint operations. Li Zuocheng, the PLA’s new army commander, argued that in the absence 

of a separate army headquarters, joint organizations would find it difficult to “shake off ” the 

influence of the ground forces.131

The reforms attempt to reduce these problems in two ways. First is that the planned downsizing will disproportionately target the ground forces.132 While the army will remain the largest 

service—even if it absorbs the entire 300,000-person cut—the share of personnel from the other 

services will rise.133 This means that there should be more navy, air force, and Rocket Force officers moving into command and staff roles. One PLA interviewee argued in 2016 that naval 

officers might even eventually lead maritime-focused TCs (citing the example of the U.S. Pacific 

Command, which is typically led by a naval officer).134 This is the case with Vice Admiral Yuan 

Yubai’s appointment to the Southern TC commander billet. Other key billets, such as TC chief 

of staff, might also be filled by non–ground force officers. (Notably, the Southern TC chief of 

staff, Rear Admiral Wei Gang, is already a naval officer.) Second is the creation of national and 

theater army headquarters, which will free CMC departments and TCs to focus exclusively on 

joint operations with no need to manage ground force affairs. Nevertheless, a case can be made 

that army influence will persist and may even increase in some ways despite (or as a result of) 

the reforms. This is discussed in the next section.

Improving Joint Training and Logistics

The reforms also strengthened two key enablers of joint operations—training and logistics. In recent years, the PLA has increasingly focused on exercises involving multiple branches, 

services, and MRs in a variety of complex scenarios. Mark Cozad explains that while the PLA 
31

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

has “gone to great lengths to improve realism and build real capability” in its exercises, there 

have also been continuing weaknesses, such as cases “in which PLA commanders were not wellversed in the wide range of capabilities at their disposal, failed to coordinate . . . and demonstrated weak command and organization skill.”135 For instance, the Stride-2015 exercise, based 

on a Taiwan scenario, exhibited “poor coordination” between air and land forces.136 Another 

problem was that the PME system offered only limited instruction on joint operations, exposing 

officers to the subject late in their careers, if at all.137

Accordingly, improving the quality of joint training is a theme of the reforms. The Third 

Plenum decision stated that the PLA would implement reforms of the “joint operations training 

and support system.”138 During a military training conference in December 2013, PLA Chief of 

the General Staff Fang Fenghui noted the need for an improved joint training system, reforms 

to training assessments, and a deepening of military academy reforms.139 The CMC Opinions on 

Deepening Reforms on National Defense and Armed Forces similarly stated that the PLA would 

improve its joint training system and enhance joint education within military academies.140

Moreover, in April 2016, Xi stated that the PLA must address the shortage of officers with a 

“deep knowledge” of joint operations.141

The reforms aim to improve joint training in two ways. First is by establishing the CMC 

Training Management Department. This replaced the former GSD Military Training Department, which itself had been created in 2011 in part to enhance joint training.142 Elevating this 

organization to a CMC department underscored Xi’s emphasis on training and gave it a stronger mandate to supervise training departments within the TCs and services.143 One way that it 

will do this is by sending inspections teams from its Training Supervision Bureau (训练检查

局) to units across the PLA to provide critical assessments of exercises and unit training.144 This 

department will also directly supervise a number of PLA academies formerly under the general 

departments.145 Second, while not part of the restructuring itself, the broader military reforms 

include changes to the PME system that include greater emphasis on joint operations. For instance, the PLA NDU has established a course for joint commanders and is exploring ways to 

partner with theaters and services to improve joint training.146 Service command colleges will 

also emphasize joint training for both command and staff officers.147

Regarding logistics, the reforms build on earlier efforts to establish a joint logistics system 

in the MRs. Begun in 1999, this system attempted to reduce redundancy by integrating the existing “fragmented” logistics systems of the ground forces, navy, and air force.148 Despite progress in the 2000s, a number of problems persisted, including limited funding for logistics, lack 

of standardization, a small corps of professional logisticians, and excessive decentralization.149
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

The logistics system was also afflicted with corruption in the purchase and delivery of military 

supplies, as well as in the sale of PLA-owned land and facilities, illustrated by the investigation 

and conviction of former GLD deputy director Gu Junshan for malfeasance.150 To assess these 

problems, the PLA established a special group for logistics reform in March 2014 under the 

leadership of GLD director Zhao Keshi.151 In January 2016, the CMC called for an improved 

logistics system that would be better “adapted to the joint C2 structure.”152

The restructuring addressed joint logistics by replacing the GLD with a Logistics Support 

Department (LSD). As with its predecessor, this department will coordinate with the theaters 

and services to support joint logistics requirements, similar to the U.S. Joint Staff J4 (Logistics) 

directorate.153 The key change is that the LSD (along with the other successors to the general departments) has been placed within the formal CMC bureaucracy, where it will likely be subject 

to a greater degree of external supervision. For instance, the PLA Audit Bureau, which had been 

moved from the GLD to the CMC in November 2014, will have the ability to review accounts 

and investigate financial irregularities in the supply chain.154 The new CMC Discipline Inspection Commission will also likely continue to investigate corruption in the logistics system.155

This could result in a more professional and efficient logistics apparatus supporting joint operations. The reforms also created the JLSF, which will consolidate and strengthen the provision of 

supplies to operational units within theater commands.

Tightening Political Control

The main political driver of the reform was the desire to tighten political control and supervision of the PLA. On one level, this goal reflects Xi’s general tendency toward centralizing 

authority throughout the Party-state and his use of the anti-corruption campaign as both a 

means of rebuilding the Party’s image and as a weapon against opponents. (Xi’s political strategy for the reforms is discussed in the following section.) However, there were also a number of 

specific political and institutional problems within the PLA that previous administrations failed 

to correct. This section explains those problems and describes the ways in which the reforms 

sought to address them.

Xi Jinping and his fellow reformers confronted a variety of political problems within the 

PLA. One was inadequate supervision of the PLA by top Party leaders. Chinese sources blame 

Jiang Zemin for elevating corrupt officers such as former CMC vice chairmen Xu Caihou and 

Guo Boxiong to high-level positions and Hu Jintao for his inability to exercise control over 

them when serving as CMC chairman.156 A second concern was that PLA political work was 

inadequate and Party organs within the PLA were ineffective in exercising control. This con-
33

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

tributed to concerns about ideological laxity among PLA members, manifested in the waning 

attractiveness of Marxism and concerns that some might have advocated for the PLA to become 

a “national” army rather than a Party-army. Xi’s concerns were reportedly piqued by an assessment that the Soviet Communist Party’s loss of power was partly caused by the loss of military 

support.157 Third, senior PLA officers in the general departments and the military regions had 

too much power and were not always responsive to orders from the center. Fourth were weak 

supervisory mechanisms that were either corrupted (in the case of the promotion system and 

auditors) or ineffective (Party committees and military courts). Fifth was the weak influence 

of rules and regulations, which frustrated the PLA’s ability to transform into an “army ruled by 

law” (依法治军).158

The reforms include several changes designed to correct these problems. First is enhancing 

Xi’s personal authority over the PLA. As in other aspects of governance, he has emphasized the 

need for centralizing authority over the military. The first “basic principle” in the CMC Opinions 

on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms is:

to consolidate and perfect the basic principles and system of the Party’s 

absolute leadership over the military . . . comprehensively implement the CMC 

chairmanship responsibility system [军委主席责任制], and ensure that the 

supreme leadership right and command right of the military are concentrated in 

the [Communist Party of China] Central Committee and in the CMC.159

Observers distinguish the “CMC chairmanship responsibility system” from the so-called 

CMC vice chairman responsibility system allegedly practiced under Jiang and Hu, where many 

routine duties were handled by CMC vice chairmen.160 In contrast, under Xi “all significant issues in national defense and army building [are] planned and decided by the CMC chairman,” 

and “once the decision has been made, the chairman conducts ‘concentrated unified leadership’ 

and ‘efficient command’ of the entire military.”161 Although Xi will have to continue to rely on 

professional military officers for advice and support across a range of issues, the clear emphasis 

is on strengthening his ability to make the important decisions. This effort to reinforce Party 

control over the military (and to strengthen Xi’s personal authority) was reinforced by the Sixth 

Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, held in October 2016, which described Xi for the first time 

as the “core” of CCP leadership and called upon Party members to “adhere to the centralized 

and unified leadership of the CCP Central Committee.”162 Press reports subsequently described 

senior PLA officers meeting to study the spirit of the Sixth Plenum.163
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Second is eliminating the general departments and moving most of their functions to the 

CMC. One PLA Daily article argued that the general departments had too much power, served 

as an independent leadership level, and substituted for the CMC in ways that “undermine the 

centralized and unified leadership of the CMC.”164 Changing the general departments into CMC 

departments reduces the autonomy of their leaders and makes them directly accountable to the 

CMC chairman. This should increase supervision and improve the flow of information to the 

top (since the CMC General Office, run by Xi’s trusted aides, will be able to directly task the new 

CMC departments to provide information).

Third is moving a number of supervision mechanisms such as auditing and discipline inspection to the CMC level, where they can be more independent of potential “command influence” and thus more effective. Until November 2014, the Audit Bureau was under the GLD, 

which was responsible for most PLA expenditure (and was one of the most corrupt parts of 

the system).165 The Discipline Inspection Commission, which had been subordinate to the GPD 

since 1990, also became a direct report to the CMC, where it will have greater independence and 

authority. This organization will enforce Party discipline by sending investigation teams to Party 

units throughout the PLA. In a speech introducing the reforms, Xi stressed the importance of 

regulating power within the military, stating that “decision-making, enforcement, and supervision powers should be separate and distributed in a manner that ensures they serve as checks and 

balances on each other but also run in parallel.”166 A PLA expert argued that the new arrangement would “better safeguard the authority of discipline inspection and auditing departments 

and ensure that they can independently and fairly exercise their supervision duties.”167

Fourth is increasing the PLA’s reliance on formal laws and regulations that specify how 

military leaders should carry out their work. This is described as a shift toward more standardized and systematic work methods that reduce a commander’s autonomy (and the resulting 

potential for arbitrary or corrupt decisions) and produce “administration according to the law.” 

This effort is supported by the elevation of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission from the 

former GPD to the CMC. This commission will promulgate regulations and oversee the military court system.168 These efforts were formalized in June 2016 with the issuance of the CMC 

Opinion on Strengthening the Construction of a Military Law and Regulation System During the 

Period of Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms.

169 These changes deepen the process 

of “regularization” (正规化) of the PLA that has been ongoing since the 1980s but which has 

been hampered by weaknesses such as the lack of professionalization of military prosecutors, 

gaps in military legislation, and commanders who think that “their word is law.” 170
35

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Fifth is an increased emphasis on political work to reinforce proper ideological values 

among the senior officer corps. As early as the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, the CMC 

reiterated that the PLA must “unswervingly uphold the absolute leadership of the party over 

the army,” “guarantee absolute loyalty and reliability,” and support the new generation of Party 

officials under Xi.171 Although this theme can be found in PLA political work stretching back 

to the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, in which some PLA units refused to obey commands, Xi has emphasized it in a way that his immediate predecessors did not. For instance, loyalty to the Party 

was a major theme at the October 2014 PLA Political Work Conference at Gutian.172 The CMC 

also highlighted the need for reliable Party cadres in the army, defined in one document as those 

who have “resolute” political views, carry out military and political orders “without hesitation,” 

and are able to resist “incorrect ideological trends.”173 Senior PLA officers were required to biaotai, or publicly pledge their dedication to the Party and its leadership.174 The Sixth Plenum in 

October 2016 stressed the importance of socialist norms such as austerity, intra-Party democracy, service to the people, criticism and self-criticism, and upright actions and reinforced the 

need for all Party members to obey the center. The plenum themes promptly became the basis 

for political study within the PLA.175

Enhancing Civil-Military Integration

Another driver of the restructuring is improving “civil-military integration” (CMI; 军民

融合), especially in the area of defense R&D.176 Since the early 2000s, Chinese reformers have 

sought to achieve synergies by integrating the defense and commercial industrial bases more 

tightly. This would benefit the PLA, which would have greater access to civilian S&T advances, 

as well as the civilian economy, which would be able to incorporate dual-use technology initially developed for military purposes.177 These efforts have been frustrated by several obstacles, 

including limited information-sharing and poor coordination between the military and civilian 

research communities, barriers limiting the access of private enterprises into the defense market, and poorly developed CMI policies.178 A related problem was corruption within the defense 

R&D and acquisition systems, although its extent has been hard to evaluate.179

Consequently, improving CMI is a central theme of the Xi Jinping–era reforms. The Third 

Plenum decision called for promoting joint military and civilian development, perfecting defense innovation systems, and promoting entrance of private civilian firms into the defense sector.180 Xi reiterated these goals in a CMC reform meeting in November 2015, stating that the focus of reforms should be on “resolving systemic and mechanical issues constraining integrated 

civil-military development.”181 The CMC Opinions on Deepening Reforms on National Defense 
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

and Armed Forces likewise noted the need for a development system “led by the state, driven by 

demand, and unified by market operations.”182 In March 2016, Xi again called for “coordinated, 

balanced, and compatible” development of civilian and military resources, noting that this had 

previously been hindered by a lack of high-level coordination.183

The reforms aim to accomplish these goals in several ways. First is moving the Science and 

Technology Commission (STC) from the GAD to direct CMC supervision. The STC guides 

weapons R&D and consists of a range of sub-committees that incorporate civilian expertise 

into the management of technological progress in areas ranging from sensors to explosives to 

IT systems.184 Placing the STC under the CMC symbolizes the emphasis being placed on CMI 

in the reforms and could result in an expansion of its responsibilities. For instance, the STC has 

reportedly developed an office that will be responsible for promoting defense innovation.185 This 

office is apparently modeled on the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, whose 

research focus and structure Chinese analysts have closely studied.186

Second is by creating the SSF, which will likewise draw from civilian S&T strengths to 

develop and employ advanced technology. According to a People’s Daily report, the SSF is 

already sponsoring “multiple strategic projects” involving the joint efforts of industry, civilian 

research institutes, and military academies. This will make the SSF a “cloud think tank” that 

serves both military and civilian development.187 The article further notes that “certain departments” of the SSF are seeking to achieve breakthroughs in “disruptive technologies,” which 

have a “destructive capability on par with the most advanced international arms.” Yin Zhuo 

observes that some technologies incorporated into the SSF mission, such as satellite navigation 

equipment, have dual-use applications and their development will play an “important role” in 

China’s economic progress.188

Third is replacing the GAD, which was largely preoccupied with ground force modernization, with a CMC Equipment Development Department (EDD) that will oversee weapons 

development for the entire PLA and institute reforms to the R&D and procurement systems.189

The EDD will coordinate with services and theaters to determine priorities and reduce duplicative development. Moreover, since the EDD will be part of the formal CMC bureaucracy, it will 

likely be subject to more stringent oversight from organizations such as the Audit Bureau, Discipline Inspection Commission, and Politics and Law Commission. This could help to reduce 

corruption and inefficiency in the defense R&D system. Notably, in January 2014, CMC vice 

chairman Xu Qiliang observed that weapons research, production, and procurement was one of 

two major areas (along with the logistics system) requiring “better oversight.”190
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Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Another aspect of the reforms relevant to CMI is adjusting the national defense mobilization system, including mobilization plans, conscription, and the reserve and militia forces.191 

Prior weaknesses in the mobilization system included lax training standards and performance, 

low levels of IT integration, and inadequate support.192 In discussing CMI, the Third Plenum 

decision stated that mobilization structures should be completed and mobilization laws and 

regulations perfected.193 The reforms took a step in this direction by replacing the former GSD 

Mobilization Department with a new CMC National Defense Mobilization Department, and by 

placing oversight of the reserves and the provincial-level military districts in this new department. This might enhance supervision of China’s mobilization work and result in better and 

more systematic management of reserve and militia forces.

Political Strategy to Implement the Reforms

PLA reformers have advocated structural reforms since the early 1990s, but previous reform efforts (including some backed by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) were stymied by bureaucratic opposition within the PLA. How has Xi Jinping succeeded where his predecessors failed? 

Xi has employed a number of tools and tactics to pursue the reform goals of building a PLA 

that can “fight and win informationized wars” by improving its joint operations capability and 

strengthening CCP control over the PLA. This section describes the elements of Xi’s political 

strategy and the political tools available to pursue his military reform agenda.

Embed Military Reforms in a Broader Reform Agenda. Key elements of the military reforms were unveiled in the Third Plenum decision document approved by the Central Committee in November 2013. By embedding the PLA reforms in a broader reform agenda, and 

elevating the decision mechanism to the Central Committee level (where the power of PLA 

senior leaders was diffused), Xi made it harder for potential opponents to resist the reforms. As 

one PLA officer noted, incorporating military reforms into the national reform agenda elevated 

military reform “to the will of the Party and act of state.”194 The plenum decision document outlined key aspects of the reforms, sometimes in vague terms that indicated the desired direction 

of change without providing specific details. This is an effective device for building consensus 

on the overall reform agenda while deferring divisive internal debates (for example, over which 

services would gain or lose personnel in the PLA restructuring).

Xi’s Personal Involvement in Military Reforms. Xi has used direct involvement in the reform process to demonstrate his personal commitment to making the reforms succeed. Widely 

considered the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, Xi has devoted time and 

attention to military matters in ways that his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao did 
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

not.195 For example, in his first 3 years as CMC chairman (November 2012–December 2015), 

Xi made 53 publicized appearances at military events. During the equivalent period of time 

from 2004 to 2007, Hu Jintao made only 36 appearances.196 One nonauthoritative Chinese media report even claims that Xi spends a half day every week at his CMC office, in contrast to Hu 

Jintao who rarely used his office.197 Moreover, as Nan Li argues, Xi’s more assertive leadership 

style has allowed him to exert greater influence within the PLA than either Jiang or Hu.198 As 

noted, Xi has also highlighted the “CMC chairmanship responsibility system” that emphasizes 

that he bears ultimate responsibility over all military matters.

Xi has also used his positions as chairman of the CMC and chairman of the CMC leading 

small group on military reform established in January 2014 to lead efforts to flesh out details 

of the military restructuring, including chairing meetings to study the feasibility of various 

options.199 More than 20 working groups were established under the CMC to research and consider various aspects of the reforms, including extensive consultations with military and civilian 

units at various levels and more than 150 revisions of the reform plan.200 In November 2015, he 

chaired the CMC meeting that adopted the detailed reform plan.201

Since the reforms were announced, Xi has been personally involved in pushing them forward. One means was making formal speeches to military audiences to launch key elements of 

the reforms, including a December 27, 2015, speech at the PLA newspaper Jiefangjun Bao and a 

major address on the reforms to CMC and senior PLA leaders at a December 31, 2015, ceremony to establish the army as a separate service, rename the SAF as the Rocket Force and elevate 

it to full service status, and stand up the SSF.202 Xi met with leaders of the new services and personally awarded them banners to serve as symbols of their services.203 Xi made a similar appearance and speech at a January 11, 2016, ceremony to establish the reorganized CMC with its new 

departments, commissions, and offices.204 Xi used these appearances and his photo opportunity 

at the CMC joint operations command center to highlight the missions and importance of the 

new services and the reorganized CMC and to reinforce his authority as CMC chairman and 

his personal commitment to the reforms. Xi also led a 2-day conference on military reform in 

December 2016 that reaffirmed the need for a smaller, more agile military.205

Since Xi himself cannot be personally involved at all times and in all aspects of the reforms, 

he has installed trusted agents within the PLA who can ensure that his instructions are followed. 

One such individual is Lieutenant General Qin Shengxiang, director of the CMC General Office, who was also dual-hatted as director of the new CMC Reform and Organization Office, 

which has a leading role in formulating reform plans and ensuring implementation.206 Another 

key figure is Major General Zhong Shaojun, who has been a senior civilian aide to Xi since Xi’s 
39

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

time as Zhejiang Province Party Secretary. When Xi became CMC chairman, Zhong was given 

a military rank of senior colonel and designated as CMC General Office deputy director and director of Xi Jinping’s personal office within the CMC (and was later promoted to major general). 

His close association to Xi and responsibilities in the General Office likely give him significant 

influence despite his relatively low formal rank and grade.207

Protect Senior Officers. The PLA organizational restructuring is a major transformation 

that saw the end of the general departments, transition from seven military regions to five theater commands, and establishment or change in status of three services. Some senior PLA officers stayed in essentially the same jobs under a new organizational structure; others changed 

to new positions, sometimes in different geographic areas. However, one tacit principle is clear: 

all senior (MR Leader grade and above) PLA officers were given jobs at their current grades 

and kept their current ranks. This may be a transitional arrangement that only lasts through the 

19th Party Congress in late 2017, but protecting the personal career interests of senior PLA officers (as opposed to forcing officers whose organizations were disestablished to retire early) was 

an important means of defusing opposition to the reforms from leaders whose organizations 

would lose personnel, authority, or budget in the reorganization. Refer to appendix 1 for more 

details on PLA leadership under the reforms.

Compensate Reform Losers. Despite its traditional dominance in numbers and the PLA 

leadership ranks, the army has lost status, budget share, and end strength relative to the other 

services in recent years. Since 2004, Chinese defense white papers have emphasized the need 

for increased funding for the navy, air force, and Second Artillery. “Optimizing the composition of the services and arms of the PLA” has meant reductions in “technologically backward” 

army units and personnel increases for the other services.208 Most of the 300,000 troops that 

will be cut from the PLA will come from army ranks, and the army is widely perceived as the 

likely loser in current PLA organizational reforms.209 Elimination of the general departments 

and establishment of a new army commander and headquarters reduced the army to bureaucratic equality with the other services. The army also lost direct control of space and cyber units, 

which were transferred to the new Strategic Support Force.

Nevertheless, the reforms provide compensation that may actually increase the army’s 

power, at least in the short term.210 The new joint C2 structure gives theater commanders both 

wartime and peacetime operational control over army, navy, air force, and potentially conventional Rocket Force units within their areas of responsibility. This significantly expands the 

authority of theater commanders relative to commanders of the former military regions. All 

five of the theater commanders and four of the five theater political commissars were ground 
40 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

force officers, though this balance began to shift with the announcement of a navy admiral as 

Southern TC commander a year after the reforms. If the army can retain control of most of the 

theater commander positions (perhaps by arguing that navy and air force officers lack the experience necessary to run large-scale joint operations), army officers will continue to dominate the 

senior levels of the PLA leadership. Territorially based theaters are not the only possible joint C2 

structure; placing a ground force officer in the chain of command of maritime operations in the 

South China Sea may not have been the most effective operational solution.

Another effort to defuse potential opposition involves ensuring that those officers and 

NCOs who will lose their positions as part of the 300,000-person downsizing of the PLA will receive the pensions, civilian jobs, and compensation that they are entitled to. Two PLA NDU researchers published an article in Jiefangjun Bao warning that salary and pension issues needed 

to be addressed properly to ensure that military downsizing did not destabilize the military and 

society.211 The PLA has learned important lessons from previous force reductions and has codified the benefits that conscripts, NCOs, and officers should receive, which vary based on status, 

years of service, and how they separate from the PLA.212 Challenges include allocating sufficient 

resources to pay earned benefits, ensuring that local officials fulfill their responsibilities to provide benefits to PLA veterans, and pressuring state-owned enterprises and local government 

offices to fulfill their responsibility to provide civilian jobs to PLA veterans who are entitled to 

them. One aspect of the reforms gives responsibility for veterans affairs to the new CMC Organ 

Affairs General Management Bureau.213 Senior leaders, including Xi, have stressed the importance of local officials fulfilling their obligations to veterans.214 While the ultimate effectiveness 

of these measures remains to be seen, they indicate a desire to take better care of downsized 

soldiers than in the past.215 Protests by disgruntled PLA veterans in front of the Ba Yi building in 

October 2016 and January 2017 serve as a vivid reminder of the potential for veterans to engage 

in embarrassing and politically sensitive protests.216

Enlist Support from Reform Winners. The navy, air force, and Rocket Force are likely to 

be the organizational winners of PLA reforms. They have already benefited from an increased 

share of the PLA budget since 2004, and are likely to be protected from significant force cuts in 

the 300,000-person downsizing and may even increase their size. Although the army continues 

to dominate the initial theater command senior leadership and senior CMC staff, the emphasis 

on jointness in the reforms is likely to create opportunities for the other services. The number 

of air force and navy officers assigned to theater deputy commander positions may be an early 

indicator that the other services will increase their policy influence and share of senior officer 

positions.
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Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Use Threat of Corruption Investigations to Intimidate and Punish Opponents. Investigations into former CMC vice chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou not only revealed 

their complicity in corruption on a massive scale, but also confirmed the widespread practice of PLA officers paying large bribes for promotion to senior positions. This suggests that 

most senior PLA officers are vulnerable to corruption investigations that would reveal their 

complicity in the pay-to-play promotion system. However, so far anti-corruption investigations have focused primarily on the logistics and political systems (which, along with military 

district commands, offered the most opportunities for corruption). To date, all current CMC 

members and senior PLA operational commanders have been spared (with the potential exception of some officers with close ties to Guo, Xu, and the network run by Bo Xilai and Zhou 

Yongkang). The threat of investigation is a potent tool to intimidate or remove any officers 

who might obstruct reform efforts or show insufficient loyalty to Xi Jinping.217 In December 

2016, the PLA confirmed that Deputy Chief of Staff Wang Jianping had been placed under 

investigation. Wang is the highest ranking active-duty officer to be investigated for corruption.218 This sent a further signal that even very senior officers could be subject to punishment 

for malfeasance.

Use Control over Promotions to Reward Allies and Supporters of Reforms. Guo and Xu 

were evidently able to extract such large bribes for positions because Hu Jintao was not actively 

involved in the promotion and selection process, essentially rubber-stamping decisions made 

by the CMC vice chairmen. Conversely, Xi Jinping appears to be significantly more engaged in 

the promotion and assignment process, beginning back when he was a civilian vice chairman of 

the CMC.219 Xi’s personal involvement in the selection process provides opportunities to place 

supporters of reforms in key positions and to reward officers with whom he has close ties or 

who display personal loyalty to his leadership.220 This approach would be consistent with his 

broader approach to civilian personnel appointments within the Party and government. The 

expected reshuffle of senior PLA officers in the run-up to the 19th Party Congress in late 2017 

will provide more opportunities to reward allies and supporters of reforms (and to sideline or 

retire officers less enthusiastic about reform efforts).

This review suggests that Xi has a range of tools at his disposal and appears to be employing them in a reasonably strategic fashion to promote the military reforms. However, 

some of these tools require his continued personal involvement in order to be effective. 

This could become a problem if Xi’s attention gets drawn away to deal with other pressing 

challenges.
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Implications

Although the military restructuring is still in its early implementation phase, it is not too 

soon to consider the opportunities and challenges that the restructuring might have for the 

PLA, the United States, and regional countries. This section assesses the implications of the reforms for PLA operations, for Party control and supervision of the military, and for U.S.-China 

military relations.

A Stronger Warfighting and Deterrent Force

In the near term, the PLA will likely be preoccupied with putting its new structure into 

practice and managing related institutional challenges. New organizations such as the SSF and 

the army headquarters will need time to become fully operational, the new joint C2 structure 

will have to be tested, and personnel will have to understand and gain experience with their new 

roles and responsibilities. Other factors adding to organizational flux within the PLA will include the process of downsizing the force by 300,000 personnel by the end of 2017, the unveiling 

of new policies and regulations as part of the larger reform program, and the rotation of senior 

leaders at the 19th Party Congress in late 2017.221 Taken together, these changes could prove sufficiently disruptive to reduce the PLA’s ability to launch and sustain major combat operations.

However, over the longer term, the PLA reforms could result in a leaner, more effective 

warfighting organization. The establishment of a permanent joint C2 structure, enhanced joint 

training within the TCs, a dedicated SSF responsible for operations in the information domain, 

a JLSF that strengthens the PLA’s joint logistics system, and greater resources for the naval and 

air forces could all give the PLA more confidence and capacity to conduct joint operations in 

multiple domains. Moreover, if the reforms are successful, the PLA might be able to transition 

more quickly from peacetime to wartime operations, reducing warning time of an attack. This 

is particularly relevant to TCs, which are focused on responding quickly to emerging threats 

around China’s periphery.

As a result, the restructuring could lead to new or increasing operational challenges for 

both U.S. and regional forces. For the United States, the PLA might be able to utilize its new 

joint C2 structure to conduct more effective operations targeting U.S. forward-deployed forces. 

The ability to integrate advanced conventional missiles, C4ISR support, and traditional platforms such as submarines and fighter aircraft, could pose particularly serious challenges for U.S. 

intervening forces, such as carrier strike groups. PLA joint forces could also be used to target 

U.S. regional bases that may be needed to support operations in the Taiwan Strait, the South or 
43

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

East China seas, or elsewhere. PLA joint training will likely focus on enhancing the ability of 

forces from multiple services to carry out these types of “counter-intervention” operations.222

Regional forces could also face a more proficient and determined adversary. Maritime 

states such as Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam might have to contend with a PLA that is 

better organized, trained, and equipped to conduct joint operations in the maritime and air 

domains. India could likewise face a more capable opponent both along the Sino-Indian border 

and in the Indian Ocean region.223 Regarding Taiwan, the PLA will likely continue to deploy 

some of its most advanced capabilities and talented personnel opposite the Taiwan Strait (in 

what is now the Eastern TC). PLA joint training in this area will likely be focused on operational 

subjects related to a Taiwan contingency, such amphibious operations, blockades, and joint firepower strikes.224

Nevertheless, several factors could impede the PLA’s ability to strengthen its joint warfighting capabilities. First is the continued dominance of the ground forces. Most major PLA 

organizations remain under the leadership of army officers. This was evident in a group photograph taken of leaders of the new CMC departments in January 2016, in which only 11 of 69 

officers were from the navy or air force. According to one foreign analysis, this did not mark 

an “auspicious start for greater jointness at the most senior levels of the PLA command structure.”225 Paradoxically, the reforms might even have increased ground force influence by placing 

naval and air force units under the command of army officers within the TCs, though this was 

mitigated by the appointment of a naval admiral, Yuan Yubai, as the new Southern TC commander in January 2017.226

A second problem concerns interservice rivalry. As with any modern joint force, competition for resources and influence might constrain effective cooperation between the different 

services.227 For instance, there is evidence of competition between the air force, Rocket Force, 

and the former GAD related to control of counterspace systems.228 These tensions could increase 

as the growth of China’s military spending continues to slow, placing a premium on preserving 

and demonstrating unique capabilities. Indeed, the reforms might have inadvertently increased 

the chances for interservice rivalry by instituting an army headquarters. The army commander 

will be designated with the responsibility for ensuring that army interests will be protected even 

as the PLA shifts toward a greater emphasis on naval and air force operations.229 The army commander will likely gain an ex officio seat on the CMC after the next Party congress.230

Third is the PLA’s lack of major combat experience. All but a few current PLA officers are 

too young to have experienced China’s last major war with Vietnam in 1979.231 Moreover, some 

of the key operational lessons from that war, which was primarily a large-scale ground cam-
44 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

paign, are unlikely to be applicable to modern joint operations, especially those in the air and 

sea domains. A PLA spokesman notes that the lack of combat experience is mitigated by the 

participation of many personnel in UN peacekeeping operations and other peacetime missions, 

as well as by “realistic” combat training.232 Nevertheless, the lack of recent combat experience 

poses several problems, including depriving the PLA of battle-hardened veterans and inhibiting 

its ability to understand how its structure, leadership, doctrine, and hardware performs under 

complex real-world conditions, or what is often called the “fog of war.”

Given these uncertainties, it is important to identify possible indicators that these barriers are being overcome and the PLA is achieving progress in joint operations. Those indicators 

might include any of the following:

■ Increased joint training. In the next few years, the PLA will likely attempt to enhance 

joint operations through increased multiservice training events. This would not only continue the trend toward greater joint training that has been evident for the past several 

years, but also provide an opportunity to identify and correct problems associated with 

the new joint C2 structure. Advances could be indicated by air force or naval officers 

exercising authority over joint task forces during exercises, and by a greater role for joint 

staff officers in exercise planning and execution. Also worth following is the role of the 

new CMC Training Management Department, which will play a role in developing joint 

training standards and monitoring progress.

■ A stronger “joint” curriculum. The PLA’s commitment to jointness might also be reflected in the nature of reforms to the PME system. A greater emphasis on joint command 

could be reflected in a higher level of exposure to mid-career officers, such as those attending the Air Force Command College and Naval Command College, to joint campaign 

history and doctrine. This might be similar to the U.S. Joint PME Phase 1 requirements, 

which provides joint training qualifications for mid-level officers. The publication of new 

PLA training materials focused on joint operations, such as a new edition of the Science of 

Campaigns (战役学) could also suggest an increasing focus on joint education.

■ More opportunities for non–ground force officers. As discussed, one of the challenges 

to greater jointness in the PLA is the continued dominance of ground force officers in key 

command and staff positions. In the long term, evidence of a shift would include a higher 

share of non–ground force officers in senior positions, such as TC commanders and CMC 
45

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

department directors. The leadership reshuffle set to take place at the 19th Party Congress 

in late 2017 will provide an initial chance to observe such a shift. One might also expect to 

see greater participation of naval, air force, and Rocket Force officers in key joint training 

programs, such as the PLA NDU senior-level strategy (“Dragons”) course, and in lower 

level joint command and staff billets (including TC deputy commanders and chiefs of 

staff) that might be stepping stones to higher level positions. If the PLA establishes a joint 

assignment system that designates some positions as joint billets and provides promotion 

incentives for officers to fill these positions, this would be a significant step toward more 

jointness.

■ Greater authority delegated to the TCs. The reforms sought to promote jointness by 

creating a new joint C2 system in which TC commanders (and in some cases, the JSD) 

exercise operational authority over joint forces, and in which the services are assigned an 

administrative “organize, train, and equip” role. An indicator that this system is becoming more fully operational would be the transfer of routine operational functions, such as 

oversight of anti-piracy task forces and noncombatant evacuation operations, from the 

service headquarters to the TCs and JSD. Conversely, the continued exercise of operational command by service chiefs could suggest a delay in the transition to joint command.

■ Changing CMC membership. The reforms did not lead to any immediate changes in the 

CMC’s composition (depicted in table 5). However, changes are likely to be announced at 

the 19th Party Congress in late 2017. Chinese interlocutors expect that the new PLA army 

commander will be appointed to the CMC, placing that position on par with the other 

service chiefs who are ex officio CMC members. It is less clear whether other new positions, such as TC commanders, SSF commander, or leaders of new CMC departments, 

will be afforded CMC status. Also unclear is whether the former general department directors will retain CMC membership, or whether the new key CMC department leaders 

(such as the director of the Training Management Department) will be included. A key 

question will be who within the new CMC will be advocates for interservice collaboration.

A Changing Civil-Military Bargain

The military reforms reveal new information about the current state of civil-military relations in China and highlight areas where civil-military tensions may arise in the future. First, Xi 

Jinping’s ability to push through a major military restructuring indicates that he exerts greater 
46 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

authority over the PLA than his predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and that he is willing 

to intrude into the military’s domain when necessary to achieve his objectives. As the discussion of the political strategy indicates, Xi has been able to use a mixture of sticks and carrots 

to break through the logjam of institutional and personal interests that had stymied previous 

reform efforts.

A second implication is Xi’s determination to increase CCP control over the PLA and his 

own personal authority over the military. In Huntingtonian terms, the reforms strengthen the 

Party’s “objective control” over the PLA by reinvigorating auditing, discipline inspection, legal, 

and regulatory mechanisms and ensuring that PLA organizations with these responsibilities 

have independent channels to report to the CMC. These changes are coupled with efforts to 

strengthen “subjective control” by emphasizing ideology and the importance of obedience to 

the CCP and by strengthening the role of the CCP within the military. Xi’s personal involvement in decisionmaking and promotions and his installation of trusted allies in the CMC General Office are important means of exerting control. However, these control mechanisms are all 

being implemented by military officers (rather than by truly independent outside monitors) 

and their long-term effectiveness will depend on both the loyalty of the officers involved and 

Name CMC Role Other Positions Service 

Xi Jinping Chairman CCP General Secretary, President

GEN Fan Changlong Vice Chairman CCP Politburo Member Army

GEN Xu Qiliang Vice Chairman CCP Politburo Member Air Force

GEN Chang 

Wanquan

Member Minister of National Defense Army

GEN Fang Fenghui Member Director, Joint Staff Department Army

GEN Zhang Yang Member Director, Political Work 

Department

Army

GEN Zhao Keshi Member Director, Logistics Support 

Department

Army

GEN Zhang Youxia Member Director, Equipment Development 

Department

Army

ADM Wu Shengli Member Former Navy Commander Navy

GEN Ma Xiaotian Member Air Force Commander Air Force

GEN Wei Fenghe Member Rocket Force Commander Rocket Force

Table 5. Current CMC Membership
47

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

on Xi’s ability to devote sufficient attention to the task of managing and controlling the military. 

The PLA remains a self-policing organization, which may limit the effectiveness of objective 

and subjective control mechanisms on some issues, such as corruption.

A third consideration is the extent to which the reforms and Xi’s efforts to strengthen Party 

control over the military rewrite the bargain governing civil-military relations in China. The 

“conditional compliance” model developed by Ellis Joffe and refined by James Mulvenon posits 

that the CCP provides the PLA with resources, status, and a degree of autonomy in exchange 

for its loyalty to the Party.233 In strengthening CCP control and the authority of the CMC chairman, the reforms reduce PLA autonomy and demand ideological loyalty and obedience to the 

Party’s orders. Xi’s repeated emphasis on the military’s role in the “China Dream” and on the 

importance of building a military that can fight and win wars articulates goals that command 

significant support within the PLA leadership. The emphasis on obedience and ideological loyalty is likely less popular, especially given the Party’s hypocrisy in pursuing an aggressive anticorruption campaign while the families of many top CCP leaders have traded on their political 

connections to build massive fortunes.

Moreover, there is a potential contradiction between the goals of building PLA combat 

capabilities and emphasizing political education in order to maintain loyalty to the CCP. Every 

hour spent in political education is an hour taken from training and military tasks. If anticorruption efforts reduce the ability of less capable military officers to buy senior positions, that 

is a positive thing for the PLA. But if political reliability outweighs military leadership capabilities as a criterion for promotion, this will have a negative impact on China’s ability to create a 

military capable of fighting and winning informationized wars.

For now, Xi Jinping appears to have been successful in imposing his will on the PLA and 

in forcing needed reforms through. However, the PLA’s satisfaction with the revised terms of 

the civil-military bargain could decline if Xi’s leadership falters or if a slowing Chinese economy 

can no longer provided the resources needed to fuel military modernization. Because top military leaders ritualistically declare their loyalty to Xi and the CCP in their public speeches and 

writings, it will be easier for outsiders to gauge the PLA’s progress in improving its joint operations capability than to assess the actual state of civil military relations.

A New Opportunity for U.S.-China Military Relations

Another implication of the reforms concerns the development of U.S.-China military relations. According to DOD, engaging the PLA provides “opportunities to explore and expand 

cooperation in areas of mutual interest and to manage competition constructively.”234 Key areas 
48 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

include senior leader dialogues; practical cooperation, including combined exercises and working-level discussions; and risk-reduction efforts such as confidence-building measures (CBMs) 

related to maritime and air-to-air encounters. Past exchanges have included contacts with organizations throughout the PLA, including the general departments, services, MRs, and academic 

institutions, as well as the Ministry of National Defense and CMC.

The PLA reorganization has implications for all aspects of the bilateral military relationship. First, the establishment of new organizations and positions could require adjustments in 

senior-level engagements. This is most relevant to cases in which the reforms created positions 

roughly equivalent to those in the U.S. system (see table 6). For instance, the new PLA army 

commander is a natural counterpart for the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, since both are responsible 

for training and equipping ground forces. That relationship has already begun to develop with 

a meeting of the U.S. and Chinese army chiefs in August 2016.235 The reformed CMC has also 

created positions similar to directors of several U.S. Joint Staff directorates. In other cases, there 

might be opportunities for additional dialogue on regional or functional issues. For instance, 

U.S. CCMD commanders might consider exploring dialogue opportunities with TC commanders, who are responsible for operations around China’s periphery, or with the JSD, responsible 

for overseas operations.

Second, the restructuring is relevant to practical exchanges and exercises. Those involved 

in such engagements might encounter representatives of new PLA organizations, such as the 

Table 6. Possible Counterparts

Topic U.S. Leader PLA Counterpart

Army issues U.S. Army Chief of Staff PLA Army Commander

Space, cyber issues Commander, U.S. Strategic Command SSF Commander

North Korea Commander, U.S. Forces Korea Northern TC Commander

East China Sea Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Eastern TC Commander

South China Sea Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Southern TC Commander

MENA region Commander, U.S. Central Command Director, Joint Staff 

Department

Training, PME Director, Joint Force Development (J7) Director, Training 

Management Department

Logistics Director, Logistics (J4) Director, Logistics Support 

Department

Strategic Plans Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) Director, Joint Staff 

Department
49

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

army headquarters or the JSD Overseas Operations Office, and will need to understand the 

roles and authority of their new interlocutors. PME exchanges, including those between the 

PLA and U.S. national defense universities, will also be affected to the extent that Chinese delegations are more focused on exchanging ideas on topics emphasized by the reforms, including 

joint operations. There will also likely be further implications for working-level exchanges in 

the coming years as the PLA adjusts its force structure as part of the larger reform program. 

These changes could create opportunities for combined exercises and interactions, though what 

those might be remains to be seen.

Third, the reforms require a reassessment of CBMs and crisis management procedures. 

This is particularly relevant in light of recent agreements, such as the establishment of a Defense 

Telephone Link that could be used to share information during a crisis.236 The creation of a joint 

C2 structure means that new organizations and individuals will play a role in crisis response. 

Overseas crises will likely be coordinated through the JSD, while TCs will likely play a key role 

in overseeing responses to crises around China’s periphery, including in the South and East 

China seas. Thus, there is a need to decide whether the reforms require any changes to existing 

CBMs (such as hotlines), or whether new agreements are needed to ensure timely and accurate 

communication during a crisis.

Next Steps and Areas for Further Research

The structural changes announced in late 2015 and 2016 represent only the initial phase 

of a 5-year reform agenda. The CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military 

Reforms contains a specific timetable for additional reform areas through 2020, which is summarized in table 7. This section previews key changes that are anticipated in the next stages of 

reform, and then identifies several areas for continued research.237

Force Structure and Composition. One area of further reform concerns changes to the 

PLA’s force structure and force composition. A key focus will likely be reducing and streamlining the organization of the PLA ground forces. Speculation in Hong Kong media suggested that 

the PLA’s 18 group armies could be converted into a number of smaller, more agile divisions. 

Although the details remain uncertain, this type of shift would be consistent with a long-term 

trend toward a more deployable, combat-focused ground force that would be better suited for 

modern combined arms and joint operations.238 Moreover, the ground forces are expected to 

bear the large majority of the planned 300,000-person downsizing, set for completion by the 

end of 2017. Those cuts will focus on “troops equipped with outdated armaments, administra-
50 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Reform Area 

(English)

Reform Area 

(Chinese)

Topics Target 

Completion

Leadership 

Management System

领导管理体制 Reforms to CMC 

departments, military 

services, logistics system, 

equipment development 

system

2015

Joint C2 System 联合作战指挥体制 Establish two-level joint 

command system, reform 

joint training, establish 

theater commands

2015

Military Scale 

Structure

军队规模结构 Reduce force size by 

300,000, reduce noncombat 

personnel, reduce officer 

billets, phase out old 

equipment

2016

Force Composition 部队编成 Adjust force structure, 

optimize reserve force, 

reduce militias

2016

Cultivating NewType Military Talent

新型军事人才培养 Enhance PME 2016

People’s Armed 

Police (PA) 

Command and 

Control System 

(C2) and Force 

Composition

武装警察部队指挥

管理体制和力量结

构

Adjust PAP C2 and force 

structure

2016

Policy System 政策制度 Reform personnel system, 

budget management, 

procurement system, salary 

and welfare system

2017–2020

Developing CivilMilitary Integration

军民融合发展 Enhance management of 

civilian-military integration

2017–2020

Military Legal System 军事法治体系 Reform military regulations 

and the military justice 

system

No date 

provided

Table 7. PLA Reform Agenda Through 2020

Source: CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的

意见], Xinhua, January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.
51

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

tive staff, and non-combatant personnel.”239 By contrast, the navy, air force, and Rocket Force 

are likely to grow in size relative to the army and could add additional end strength.

Professional Military Education. Another area of reform concerns changes to the PME 

system. Weaknesses in officer education and training have long been highlighted in official PLA 

media. One recent formula describing these shortcomings is the “the five cannots” (五个不能, 

referring to commanders who cannot judge the situation, understand the intention of higher 

echelons, make operational decisions, deploy troops, and deal with unexpected situations).240 In 

particular, the PLA recognizes that it has a paucity of highly qualified joint commanders—who 

are needed to provide the human capital for effective joint operations. At an inspection tour 

of the PLA NDU in March 2016, Xi Jinping indicated that changes to the PME teaching and 

research agenda would be made to emphasize joint operations.241 Specific changes were not 

immediately revealed, but could include earlier exposure to joint operations concepts and curriculum changes that put added emphasis on joint command.242

Personnel Policies. The PLA is also likely to overhaul its human resource system. Under 

the current system, officers simultaneously hold 1 of 10 ranks and 1 of 15 grades (meaning that 

there are multiple grades for each rank). Grades are the more important determinant of seniority, benefits, and career progression. In December 2016, China announced that it would implement a “rank-centered military officer system,” in which rank would play a more important 

career development role.243 Specifically, Chinese sources expected that there would be only one 

rank available for each position.244 The PLA could also be wrestling with changes that would 

complement the new joint operations system. Interviewees discuss a forthcoming “rotational” 

assignment system in which officers will rotate among different TCs, service headquarters, and 

CMC departments (as opposed to spending the majority of their career in one region). However, it is unclear whether the PLA will adopt a formal joint billet system or make joint experience a requirement for promotion.245

Military Laws and Regulations. Since the 1980s, the PLA has undertaken efforts to institute laws and rules governing military activities. The emphasis was on “regularizing” behavior 

in order to prevent abuses of power and promote better management. Hence, the Party restored 

military ranks (which had been eliminated during the Cultural Revolution) in the late 1980s, 

and issued guidelines in areas such as recruitment, promotions, retirement, procurement, and 

auditing. 246 However, this process was frustrated by problems such as lack of professionalization of military courts and prosecutors, gaps in military legislation, and, perhaps more seriously, commanders who think that “their word is law.” 247 As part of the Xi-era reforms, the PLA 

has already begun to strengthen relevant laws and regulations. In December 2016, for instance, 
52 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

the military announced new auditing regulations and strengthened the power of auditors to 

investigate and penalize infractions.248

The reforms also raise a number of intriguing questions about the nature of authority in 

the PLA and the roles and functions of particular organizations. Further research will be needed 

to fully address these questions, which include the following:

■ Division of authority within the joint C2 system. Chinese sources have not clearly defined the division of authority between the national and theater levels of the new joint C2 

structure. The formula that the TCs are “mainly responsible for operations” leaves the impression that they will have broad discretion to develop and implement operational plans, 

similar to U.S. CCMDs. However, this leaves unanswered several key questions, such as 

how TC commanders will coordinate with the CMC, who will make key decisions at the 

strategic and operational levels, and what role the JSD (and its director) will play in the 

new system. Over the next few years, joint training and exercises will probably attempt to 

resolve these types of questions.

■ Service component–TC coordination. Theater-level ground force and naval headquarters, as well as Rocket Force bases, are not collocated with TC headquarters (not unlike 

the situation in most of the U.S. regional CCMDs).249 This raises the question of how the 

TCs and services will coordinate both in a “steady-state” environment and during a contingency. Authoritative PRC media reporting suggests that one function of the new TC 

JOCCs is maintaining communications links with the service component headquarters, 

and that the centers will have personnel assigned to them from all the services.250 But 

more information on this relationship would be helpful in gauging how TCs will exercise 

operational control over units.

■ Rocket Force C2 and scope of authority. Although authoritative Chinese sources emphasize consistency in the transition from SAF to the Rocket Force, it remains to be seen 

whether and how the migration of operational authority from service chiefs to theater 

commanders will affect the Rocket Force. Will Rocket Force commanders eventually have 

a formal role in the TC structure (for example, serving as dual-hatted theater deputy commanders alongside counterparts from other services)? How will theater commanders exercise operational authority over land-based conventional missile forces?251 Any changes 
53

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

could significantly alter the previous arrangement in which command and control over 

the SAF was highly centralized in the hands of the CMC.252

■ Role of the SSF. TC commanders have been granted operational authority over army, 

navy, air force, and potentially conventional missile units within their area of responsibility. Less clear is the role of the SSF in the theaters. One indicator suggesting that the SSF 

is less well integrated in the theater commands is a PLA Daily report on the Eastern TC 

JOCC, which notes that personnel from all the services except the SSF were involved in 

the center’s operations.253 Will the SSF headquarters in Beijing assign personnel and assets to the TCs on an ad hoc basis, or will the SSF maintain permanent units within the 

theaters? Answers would help clarify the nature, purpose, and organization of the SSF.

■ Role of the JLSF. The Joint Logistics Support Force was announced in September 2016, 

after most of the other elements of the organizational restructuring were put into place. 

It is unclear which elements of the former GLD have moved into the CMC Logistics Support Department, which are now part of the army headquarters or the theater service 

component headquarters, and which are now part of the JLSF. A number of questions 

remain about relationship of the JLSF to the CMC Logistics Support Department, TCs, 

and service components and units within the theaters.254

■ Xi’s role. At face value, the reforms strengthen Xi’s influence by emphasizing the “CMC 

chairmanship responsibility system,” promoting Xi’s thoughts and speeches on military 

issues, and naming him as commander in chief of the CMC JOCC. Yet it remains unclear 

how personally involved Xi is in the decisionmaking process, who his trusted military 

advisors are, and how he wields authority. It is also unclear what Xi’s role would be in the 

event of a crisis relative to the CMC and Politburo Standing Committee. Insight into these 

questions would be useful in determining whether elite PLA decisionmaking will remain 

collective and institutionalized, or if (and in what ways) it is reverting to a more personalistic system driven primarily by the top leader’s preferences and views.255

■ Supervisory organizations. A key to the success of the reforms will be the effectiveness 

of three supervisory organizations within the CMC: the Audit Bureau, Political and Legal 

Affairs Commission, and Discipline Inspection Commission (see appendix 2 for details). 

If successful, these organizations could address problems such as financial waste, illegal 
54 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

behavior, and corruption, especially in parts of the force especially prone to these problems (such as the former general departments). Complementing these organizations will 

be an overhaul of military laws and regulations.256 Yet the question remains: How effective 

will these reforms be in the context of a military that has been afflicted with widespread 

and long-term corruption? Details on the structure, operations, and results of these organizations will help answer this question.

■ Civilian oversight of the PLA. Whether the CMC reforms will strengthen civilian control over the PLA is an open question. The fact that the reforms were inaugurated at the 

Third Plenum in November 2013 signified that military reforms are an integral part of 

the national reform program and the legitimate business of the CCP Central Committee. 

But how civilian authorities, apart from Xi, might actually play a role in supervising PLA 

activities remains vague. One avenue would be through the development of institutional 

linkages between the CMC Political and Legal Affairs and Discipline Inspection commissions and their Central Committee counterparts. An indication of such linkages would be 

the seconding of staff from the civilian organizations to the CMC.

Conclusion

It is ironic that the PLA has executed its sweeping structural transformation just as the 

U.S. Congress and DOD are contemplating updates to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Those may 

include reforms to the C2 system, CCMDs, acquisition process, and joint training guidelines.257

Although these proposed changes are relatively modest in comparison to the recent restructuring of the PLA, in both cases national leaders are wrestling with the question of how to 

improve efficiency and force management at a time of evolving strategic challenges and limited 

resources. For China, the lesson is that there is no real end point to reform, despite the official 

2020 target completion date.258 Even if the analogy is inexact, China’s “Goldwater Nichols” will 

itself need to be continually reevaluated and updated. That task will require a sustained commitment from Xi and his successor—and by those in the PLA tasked with bringing the reform 

vision into reality.
55

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Appendix 1. Leadership

The PLA reforms resulted in a major reshuffling of senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

officers. While some senior PLA officers retain similar positions in the new organization, others were transferred to new posts. Details can be found in the table. Notable developments 

included:

■ The four general department directors became directors of the successor Central Military Committee (CMC) departments (that is, Joint Staff, Political Work, Logistics Support, and Equipment Development). All remain CMC members.

■ Directors of several CMC departments (such as the General Office and Audit Bureau) 

remain the same.

■ Two Military Region (MR) deputy commanders became CMC department directors 

(for Training Management and National Defense Mobilization).

■ Four of five theater commanders were former MR commanders, but all of them moved 

to different geographic regions. One theater commander is a former MR deputy commander.

■ Four of five MR political commissars (PCs) became PCs of the successor theater commands (that is, in the same geographic region).

■ The army is led by the former Chengdu MR commander and the PC from the Lanzhou 

MR.

■ The Strategic Support Force is commanded by the former commandant of the PLA 

Academy of Military Science. Its PC is the former Beijing MR PC.

These assignments appear to reflect a transitional arrangement in which senior officers 

have retained their ranks and moved to new positions at an appropriate grade level. No senior 

officers were observed to have been dismissed from service as part of the restructuring. However, this is likely only a temporary situation, with important changes due at the 19th Party Congress in late 2017. By that time, many senior officers will have reached retirement age (65 for 
56 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Name (EN) Name (CH) Position Previous 

Position 

Service

CMC Departments, Commissions, and Offices

General Office (办公厅)

LTG Qin 

Shengxiang

秦生祥 Director Same Position Army

Joint Staff Department (联合参谋部)

GEN Fang 

Fenghui

房峰辉 Chief of Staff; 

CMC Member

Chief of the 

General Staff, 

GSD; CMC 

Member

Army

Political Work Department (政治工作部)

GEN Zhang 

Yang

张阳 Director; CMC 

Member

Director, GPD; 

CMC Member

Army

Logistics Support Department (后勤保障部)

GEN Zhao Keshi 赵克石 Director; CMC 

Member

Director, GLD; 

CMC Member

Army

Equipment Development Department (装备发展部)

GEN Zhang 

Youxia

张又侠 Director; CMC 

Member

Director, GAD; 

CMC Member

Army

GEN Wang 

Hongyao

王洪尧 PC PC, GAD Army

Training Management Department (训练管理部)

LTG Zheng He 郑和 Director Deputy 

Commander, 

Chengdu MR

Army

MG Zhang 

Shengmin

张升民 PC Director, 

Second Artillery 

Political 

Department

Rocket Force

National Defense Mobilization Department (国防动员部)

MG Sheng Bin 盛斌 Director Deputy 

Commander, 

Shenyang MR

Army

MG Zhu 

Shengling

朱生岭 PC Director, 

Nanjing MR 

Political 

Department

Army 

Table. Confirmed Leadership of New PLA Organizations
57

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Table. Confirmed Leadership of New PLA Organizations, cont.

Name (EN) Name (CH) Position Previous 

Position 

Service

Discipline Inspection Commission (纪律检查委员会)

GEN Du Jincai 杜金才 Secretary 

General

GPD Deputy 

Director; 

Secretary 

General, GPD 

Discipline 

Inspection 

Commission

Army

Political and Legal Affairs Commission(政治法律委员会)

LTG Li Xiaofeng 李晓峰 Secretary 

General

Chief 

Procurator, 

Military 

Prosecutor 

Office

Army

Science and Technology Commission (科学技术委员会)

LTG Liu Guozhi 刘国治 Director Deputy Director, 

GAD; Director, 

GAD S&T 

Commission

Army

Strategic Planning Office (战略规划办公室)

MG Wang 

Huiqing

王辉青 Director Director, 

GSD Strategic 

Planning 

Department

Army

Reform and Organization Office (改革和编制办公室)

MG Wang 

Chengzhi

王成志 Director PC, GPD 

Direct Work 

Department

Army

International Military Cooperation Office (国际军事合作办公室)

RADM Guan 

Youfei

关友飞 Director Director, MND 

FAO

Navy

Audit Bureau (审计署)

MG Guo 

Chunfu

郭春富 Director Same Position Army
58 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Table. Confirmed Leadership of New PLA Organizations, cont.

Name (EN) Name (CH) Position Previous 

Position 

Service

Organ Affairs General Management Bureau (机关事务管理总局)

MG Liu 

Zhiming

刘志明 Director Director, 

Shenyang MR 

Joint Logistics 

Department

Army

Services

PLA Army (解放军陆军)

LTG Li 

Zuocheng

李作成 Commander Commander, 

Chengdu MR

Army

LTG Liu Lei 刘雷 PC PC, Lanzhou 

MR 

Army

PLA Rocket Force(解放军火箭军)

GEN Wei 

Fenghe

魏凤和 Commander Commander, 

SAF

Rocket Force

LTG Wang 

Jiasheng

王家胜 PC PC, SAF Rocket Force

PLA Strategic Support Force (解放军战略支援部队)

LTG Gao Jin 高津 Commander Commandant, 

AMS

Rocket Force*

GEN Liu Fulian 刘福连 PC PC, Beijing MR Army

Theater Commands

Eastern Theater Command(东部战区)

LTG Liu Yuejun 刘粤军 Commander Commander, 

Lanzhou MR

Army

LTG Zheng 

Weiping

郑卫平 PC PC, Nanjing MR Army

Southern Theater Command(南部战区)

VADM Yuan 

Yubai

袁誉柏 Commander 

(01/17–)

Commander, 

North Sea Fleet

Navy

GEN Wang 

Jiaocheng

王教成 Commander 

(01/16–12/16)

Commander, 

Shenyang MR

Army

GEN Wei Liang 魏亮 PC PC, Guangzhou 

MR

Army
59

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

officers through MR Leader grade, and 70 for CMC members, with possible exceptions).259 New 

officers will be moved into key billets. The CMC will likely include the new army commander 

and perhaps the new Strategic Support Force commander. Whether CMC department directors 

will gain or lose CMC membership remains to be seen.260

Of note, the current leadership of the CMC departments and theater commands remains 

predominantly composed of officers from the ground forces. Notable exceptions include the 

Strategic Support Force commander, who is a former Second Artillery Force officer, and the 

Western Theater Command PC, who is an air force officer (but spent most of his career in the 

army). A new Southern theater command (TC) commander, Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai, appointed in January 2017, represented the first TC commander not drawn from the ground forces. The identities of lower level officers have generally not been announced, but many of these 

Table. Confirmed Leadership of New PLA Organizations, cont.

Name (EN) Name (CH) Position Previous 

Position 

Service

Western Theater Command (西部战区)

LTG Zhao 

Zongqi

赵宗崎 Commander Commander, 

Jinan MR

Army

LTG Zhu Fuxi 朱福熙 PC PC, Chengdu 

MR

Air Force

Northern Theater Command(北部战区)

LTG Song 

Puxuan

宋普选 Commander Commander, 

Beijing MR

Army

GEN Chu Yimin 褚益民 PC PC, Shenyang 

MR

Army

Central Theater Command(中部战区)

LTG Han 

Weiguo

韩卫国 Commander Deputy 

Commander, 

Beijing MR

Army

GEN Yin 

Fanglong

殷方龙 PC Deputy Director, 

GPD

Army

Sources: “Leaders of One CMC Office, Six CMC Departments, Three CMC Commissions, and Service Commanders and Political Commissars Confirmed” [军委一厅六部三委负责人及军种司令政委确定], Xinhua, February 1, 

2016, available at <http://news.china.com.cn/2016-02/02/content_37713482.htm>; “Directors of Newly Established 

15 CMC Functional Departments Revealed” [中央军委新设15个职能部门负责人曝光], People’s Daily Overseas 

Edition [人民日报海外版], January 12, 2016, available at <http://mil.zijing.org/2016/0112/680723.shtml>.

*Unclear if service affiliation will change.
60 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

are likely mostly ground force officers as well, especially within the CMC departments.261An 

important test of whether or not the PLA will be able to develop a genuine joint force will be the 

ability of officers from other services to assume leadership roles in the CMC departments and 

theater commands. The assignment of non–ground force officers as TC commanders, for example, would indicate progress in developing “jointness” in the PLA. Of the current 31 deputy 

theater commanders, 10 are air force officers and 6 are naval officers.262
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Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Appendix 2. Central Military Committee Departments

This appendix describes the functions of the new Central Military Committee (CMC) departments, commissions, and offices that were announced on January 11, 2016. These are presented in the protocol order provided by authoritative People’s Republic China (PRC) media 

accounts.263

Departments (部/厅)

General Office (办公厅). The CMC will retain a General Office. This is a deputy Military 

Region (MR) Leader–grade organization with responsibilities for managing information flows 

between CMC members and subsidiary departments, providing advice, and performing other 

duties, such as conducting policy research.264 Authoritative Chinese sources place the General 

Office ahead of all other CMC departments, including those led by former general department 

directors (that is, Joint Staff, Political Work, Logistics Support, and Equipment Development). 

This placement underscores the bureaucratic importance of the office in coordinating between 

other CMC departments and CMC members. The director of the office remains Lieutenant 

General Qin Shengxiang (秦生祥), a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) political officer who previously served as director of the General Political Department (GPD) Organization Department. He has held the position since 2012.265 A key deputy is Major General Zhong Shaojun (钟

绍军), who previously served as a civilian secretary (秘书) to Xi Jinping during provincial posts 

in Zhejiang and Shanghai.266 A notable change to the internal structure of the General Office 

is the move of the former General Office Foreign Affairs Office (FAO), which doubled as the 

Ministry of National Defense (MND) FAO, to a separate CMC department.

Joint Staff Department (联合参谋部). The Joint Staff Department (JSD) is responsible 

for command and control, “combat command support” (作战指挥保障), campaign planning, 

formulating military strategy, organizing joint training, performing combat capability assessments, and working to ensure combat readiness (战备建设).267 Thus, the department will 

perform many of the functions of the former General Staff Department’s (GSD’s) Operations 

Department (总参作战部).268 The organization could play a significant role in the evolving 

two-level joint command and control (C2) structure by serving as the institutional link between 

the CMC members and the five theater commands. However, past studies have indicated that 

the Communications and War Readiness Office of the CMC General Office has also played 

a C2 role.269 Thus, uncertainties remain about how the CMC will pass instructions to theater 

commanders during a crisis. The JSD also contains a new Overseas Operations Office (海外行
62 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

动处), which PLA interviewees suggest will play a role in “planning and coordination” for outof-area operations, such as anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.270 Its director is former 

GSD chief of the general staff General Fang Fenghui (房峰辉), who remains a CMC member.271

Political Work Department (政治工作部). The Political Work Department performs the 

duties of the previous GPD, including political education, “human resources management,” 

and overseeing Party organizations within the military. Some have speculated that the Political Work Department might assume the responsibilities of the former GSD Military Affairs 

Department for enlisted personnel management.272 This department will be instrumental in 

strengthening the Party’s “absolute leadership” over the military, which has been a consistent 

theme of the reforms.273 Its director is former GPD director General Zhang Yang (张阳), who 

continues to hold his post as a CMC member.274

Logistics Support Department (后勤保障部). Next in protocol order is the Logistics Support Department, which is responsible for overseeing logistics support, setting standards, performing inspections, and carrying out other duties previously entrusted to the General Logistics Department (GLD).275 The former GLD’s Audit Bureau, which was transferred to the CMC 

in November 2014, will remain under direct CMC supervision (discussed below). A key focus 

of the new department will probably be on improving logistics support for joint operations, 

which has been an objective for several years.276 The relationship between the Logistics Support Department, Joint Logistics Support Force, services, and theater commands remains a key 

question. Its director is General Zhao Keshi (赵克石), who previously served as GLD director 

and remains a CMC member.277 General Zhao is expected to retire at the 19th Party Congress in 

late 2017, when he will be 70. The Logistics Support Department political commissar (PC) has 

not been announced; General Liu Yuan (刘源), the former GLD PC who had played an instrumental role in the anti-corruption campaign, retired in December 2015.278

Equipment Development Department (装备发展部). Like the former General Armament 

Department (GAD), the Equipment Development Department will perform research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) functions, and will oversee procurement management 

and information systems building (信息系统建设) for the armed forces. However, the GAD’s 

Science and Technology Commission, which has been a nexus of civil-military cooperation on 

defense technological issues, will not migrate to the Equipment Development Department and 

will instead be placed directly under the CMC (more below). According to the MND, the PLA 

aims for a division of labor in RDT&E between the new CMC department, services, and theater commands, but how this will work in practice is unclear.279 The director is General Zhang 

Youxia (张又侠), who previously headed the GAD and is a member of the CMC.280 The PC is 
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Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

former GAD PC General Wang Hongyao (王洪尧). Born in 1951, Wang will reach retirement 

age by the 19th Party Congress.

Training Management Department (训练管理部). The Training Management Department is responsible for overseeing training and professional military education, and will likely 

coordinate with the JSD, theater commands, and services to develop joint training requirements 

and assess training programs. It replaces the former GSD Military Training Department (总参

军训部), a second-level (Corps Leader–grade) department stood up in 2011.281 Establishing a 

training department under direct CMC supervision underscores the importance of strengthening “realistic” joint training across the PLA.282 Discussions with PLA officers suggest that the 

department will not have oversight over the PLA National Defense University, Academy of 

Military Science, or National University of Defense Technology, which will remain under the 

direct supervision of the CMC.283 The director is Lieutenant General Zheng He (郑和), who has 

been deputy commander of the Chengdu MR since July 2015 and was earlier the director of the 

GSD Military Training Department. The PC is MG Zhang Shengmin (张升民), former head of 

the Second Artillery Corps Political Department.

National Defense Mobilization Department (国防动员部). The National Defense Mobilization Department has oversight over the reserve forces and the provincial military commands 

(省军区), which had previously been a function of the MRs.284 This department succeeds the 

former GSD Mobilization Department (总参动员部), a second-level (Corps Leader–grade) 

department. Elevating mobilization to a separate CMC department highlights the importance 

of “civil-military integration,” given the office’s oversight over reserve force and mobilization 

planning.285 The director is Major General Sheng Bin (盛斌), who was previously deputy commander of the Shenyang MR, while its PC is Major General Zhu Shengling (朱生岭), former 

director of the Nanjing MR Political Department.

Commissions (委员会)

Discipline Inspection Commission (纪律检查委员会). The CMC Discipline Inspection 

Commission is responsible for enforcing Party discipline within the PLA, including conducting 

investigations of suspected corrupt personnel. Its mission parallels that of the civilian Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), which has played a prominent role in China’s 

anti-corruption campaign since late 2012. Although Chinese sources describe this commission as “new,”286 the CMC established a discipline inspection commission in November 1980.287

That commission was transferred to the GPD in 1990; thus, the reforms have brought it back 

under the direct oversight of the CMC. A key question concerns the relationships between 
64 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

the Discipline Inspection Commission, Political Work Department, and CDIC in carrying out 

anti-corruption investigations. Its secretary general is General Du Jincai (杜金才), previously a 

GPD deputy director in charge of the discipline inspection commission. General Du will reach 

retirement age by the 19th Party Congress.

Political and Legal Affairs Commission (政法委员会). The GPD Political and Legal Affairs Commission, originally established as the Political and Legal Affairs Leading Small Group 

in 1982, was transferred to the CMC. This organization will establish regulations and legal 

norms to improve the administration and supervision of the PLA—what the Chinese armed 

forces call “regularization” (正规化).288 It will also “prevent, investigate, and deal with” criminal 

activities in the military.289 Centralizing the military’s legal system under the CMC will reduce 

the potential for interference with the enforcement of laws and regulations at lower levels. The 

organizational parallels the civilian Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, formerly 

under Zhou Yongkang, which supervises the legal and police systems. The secretary general of 

the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission is Lieutenant General Li Xiaofeng (李晓峰) 

who previously served as the PLA’s chief procurator.

Science and Technology Commission (科学技术委员会). The PLA’s Science and Technology Commission, previously an MR Leader–grade organization within the GAD, has been 

placed directly under the CMC.290 The commission will continue to be responsible for guiding 

and advising PLA leadership on weapons development and serving as a nexus for collaboration between the armed forces and defense industry.291 Moving the commission to direct CMC 

oversight highlights the importance of civil-military integration to the PLA, a theme of the 

larger reforms. The commission is chaired by Lieutenant General Liu Guozhi (刘国治), who 

previously headed the GAD Science and Technology Commission.292 Liu has a Ph.D. in physics 

from Tsinghua University and is regarded as an expert in accelerator physics and high-power 

microwave technology.293

Offices (办公室/署/总局)

Strategic Planning Office (战略规划办公室). The Strategic Planning Office is responsible for centralizing authority over “military strategic planning.”294 It replaces the GSD Strategic 

Planning Department, a Corps Leader–grade organization that had been established in 2011 

and reportedly undertook functions such as long-term strategic analysis, resource allocation 

analysis, and organizational reform analysis.295 That department also carried out exchanges with 

the U.S. Joint Staff J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) directorate. The new CMC department may 

continue to perform some of these roles, although organizational issues appear more likely to be 
65

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

addressed within the CMC Reform and Organization Office (see below). The director is Major 

General Wang Huiqing (王辉青), who was previously director of the GSD Strategic Planning 

Department.

Reform and Organization Office (改革和编制办公室). The Reform and Organization 

Office is responsible for coordinating military reforms and managing the PLA’s organizational structure.296 The organization is likely to coordinate closely with the CMC’s military reform leading small group (中央军委深化国防和军队改革领导小组), which was established 

in 2014 to provide guidance for the entire military reform process that will be carried out 

through 2020.297 It appears to replace some functions of the former GSD Military Affairs Department (总参军务部), a Corps Leader–grade organization responsible for organizational 

planning.298 It may also acquire some responsibilities from the former GSD Strategic Planning 

Department related to organizational transformation. The original director of this office was 

Major General Wang Chengzhi (王成志), former director of the GPD Direct Work Department (总政直属工作部). In August 2016, it was announced that the new director would be 

Lieutenant General Qin Shengxiang, dual-hatted as director of the CMC General Office.299

International Military Cooperation Office (国际军事合作办公室). The CMC International Military Cooperation Office is responsible for managing foreign military exchanges 

and cooperation, and supervising foreign affairs work throughout the PLA.300 It replaces the 

previous MND FAO (国防部外事办公室), a Corps Leader–grade organization that doubled 

as the CMC General Office Foreign Affairs Office. However, the MND Information Affairs 

Bureau (国防部新闻事务局), part of the former FAO that conducts news briefings, appears 

to remain within MND. Establishing a separate office for foreign affairs under direct CMC 

oversight underscores the importance of military diplomacy, which has been an emphasis of 

Xi Jinping.301 The director of the International Military Cooperation Office is Rear Admiral 

Guan Youfei (关友飞), who previously headed the MND Foreign Affairs Office.302

Audit Bureau (审计署). The Audit Bureau is responsible for conducting audits of PLA 

finances and supervising the military’s audit system.303 This office was established in 1985 

within the CMC, placed within the GLD in 1992, and returned to the CMC in November 

2014.304 Like the Discipline Inspection Commission, the Audit Bureau will send inspection 

teams to units throughout the PLA to ensure compliance with rules and root out corruption.305 The director remains Major General Guo Chunfu (郭春富), who assumed his current 

position in December 2015.306

Organ Affairs General Management Bureau (机关事务管理总部). This is a new organization responsible for providing administrative support to CMC departments and subsidiary 
66 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

organs.307 The office appears to have been a result of a merger between the former GSD Management Support Department (总参管理保障部), a Corps Leader–grade organization that served 

a logistics function (for example, facilities management), and similar offices from the other 

general departments.308 One role of the office will be “cutting support units and personnel” (减

少保障机构和人员), which suggests that it will play a role in implementing the planned force 

reduction of 300,000 PLA personnel by the end of 2017.309 The director is Major General Liu 

Zhiming (刘志明), former head of the Shenyang MR Joint Logistics Department.

Acknowledgments

Kenneth Allen, Dennis Blasko, David Helvey, T.X. Hammes, Frank Hoffman, Alexander 

Huang, and Dennis Wilder all provided useful comments and feedback on earlier drafts. John 

Chen and David Logan provided valuable research assistance. Major David H. Bradley, USA, 

Major Jason K. Halub, USA, Miles Saunders, John Van Oudenaren, and Lieutenant Colonel 

Timothy Voss, USAFR, helped proofread the paper. Special thanks to Alexandra E. Utsey and 

Dr. John J. Church for assistance with graphics.
67

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Notes 1 For an overview, see Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2015 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DOD], 2015).

2 See David M. Finkelstein and James Mulvenon, ed., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs 

(Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses [CNA], 2005).

3 For an excellent analysis, see Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “Demystifying China’s 

Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,” The China Quarterly, no. 216 (December 2013), 

805–830.

4Annual Report to Congress, 2015, i.

5Michael S. Chase et al., China’s Incomplete Military Transformation (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2015).

6Brian Lafferty, Aaron Shraberg, and Morgan Clemens, “China’s Civil-Military Integration,” 

SITC Research Brief 2013-10, January 2013.

7Previous studies include Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, China’s Goldwater-Nichols? 

Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms, INSS Strategic Forum 294 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, April 

2016), available at <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-294.pdf>; David 

M. Finkelstein, Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and Reform of the PLA (Arlington, VA: CNA, 

2016), available at <www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U-012560-Final.pdf>; Kenneth Allen, Dennis Blasko, and John F. Corbett, “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What Is Known, Unknown, 

and Speculation (Part 1),” China Brief 16, no. 3 (February 4, 2016), available at <www.jamestown.org/

single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45069&no_cache=1#.VxfOffnR_RY>; Manoj Joshi, “Xi Jinping 

and PLA Reform,” ORF Occasional Paper, February 12, 2016, available at <www.orfonline.org/research/xi-jinping-and-pla-reform/>; and Anthony H. Cordesman, Chinese Military Organization and 

Reform, Center for Strategic and International Studies Report, August 1, 2016, available at <www.

csis.org/analysis/chinese-military-organization-and-reform>. Also see the special section on Chinese 

military reform in Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter 2016); and Dennis J. Blasko, “Integrating the 

Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 5–6 (October 2016), 685–708.

8 See David Logan, “PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces,” Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th

Quarter 2016), 57–62.

9 For an overview, see Kenneth W. Allen, “Introduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms: 

2000–2012,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, ed. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen (Vienna, VA: 

Defense Group, Inc., 2015), 12–78. In 1982, a Central Military Commission (CMC) was established 

under the State Council, but its membership is identical to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) CMC.

10 For details, see Alison A. Kaufman and Peter W. Mackenzie, Field Guide: The Culture of the 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2009), 25.

11David L. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military (Berkeley: University of California Press, 

2002).

12 For a discussion, see Bates Gill, James C. Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second 

Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, 
68 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Reference Volume v1.0, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2002), 510–586.

13 For a discussion of China’s global interests, see Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: 

Strategy, Drivers, and Tools (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2006); and David Shambaugh, China Goes 

Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

14 For a discussion, see Peng Wang, “Military Corruption in China: The Role of Guanxi in the 

Buying and Selling of Military Positions,” The China Quarterly, no. 228 (2016), 970–991.

15 For an excellent overview, see Evan S. Medeiros et al., A New Direction for China’s Defense 

Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005).

16 For an excellent overview, see Kenneth W. Allen et al., Institutional Reforms of the Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2002).

17 Ibid., 67–68.

18 See, for instance, Minnie Chan, “Hu Jintao’s Weak Grip on China’s Army Inspired Xi Jinping’s Military Shake-up: Sources,” South China Morning Post, March 11, 2015, available at <www.scmp.

com/news/china/article/1734663/hu-jintaos-weak-grip-chinas-army-inspired-president-xi-jinpingsmilitary>.

19 “CCP Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reforms for Major Issues” [中共中央

关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定], Xinhua, November 15, 2013, available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm>.

20 “China’s Reform Leading Group Holds First Meeting,” Xinhua, January 22, 2014, available at 

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/22/c_133066240.htm>.

21 For details, see Yin Pumin, “War on Graft,” Beijing Review, March 12, 2015, available at 

<www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2015-03/09/content_675435_2.htm>.

22 “Former Military Leader Guo Boxiong Expelled from CCP, to Face Justice,” Xinhua, July 30, 

2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-07/30/c_134464728.htm>; “PLA Backs 

Corruption Probe into Xu Caihou,” Xinhua, July 31, 2014, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/

news-channels/china-military-news/2014-07/31/content_6073368.htm>; “China’s Disgraced PLA General Gu Junshan Given Suspended Death Sentence for Corruption,” South China Morning Post, August 

10, 2015, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1848264/chinas-disgracedpla-general-gu-junshan-given-suspended>.

23According to PLA Daily, the outline was released to members of both the military and the 

People’s Armed Police. “Resolutely Support Reform, Proactively Reinforce Reform, and Consciously 

Dedicate Oneself to Reform” [坚决拥护改革积极支持改革自觉投身改革], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军

报], August 11, 2014, available at <http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_6087746.htm>.

24 “China to Cut Troops by 300,000: Xi,” Xinhua, September 3, 2015, available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/03/c_134583730.htm>. For an analysis, see John Chen, “Downsizing the PLA, Part 1: Military Discharge and Resettlement Policy, Past and Present,” China Brief 16, no. 

16 (October 26, 2016), 20–26; and John Chen, “Downsizing the PLA, Part 2: Military Discharge and 

Resettlement Policy, Past and Present,” China Brief 16, no. 17 (November 11, 2016).

25 “At CMC Reform Work Meeting, Xi Jinping Stresses: Comprehensively Implement Reform 

and Military Strengthening Strategy, Resolutely Take Path to Strong Military with Chinese Charac-
69

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

teristics” [习近平在中央军委改革工作会议上强调全面实施改革强军战略坚定不移走中国特

色强军之路], Xinhua, November 26, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-

11/26/c_1117274869.htm>.

26CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms [中央军委关于深化国

防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua, January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-

01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

27 “CMC Promulgates 13th Development Plan for the Armed Forces” [中央军委颁发 ‘军队

建设发展 “十三五”规划纲要’], Xinhua, May 12, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

politics/2016-05/12/c_1118855988.htm>.

28 “Xi Jinping: Stress Politics, Strive for Winning, Render Service, Play an Exemplary Role, 

Endeavor to Build the CMC Organ with ‘Four Iron Qualities,’” Xinhua, January 11, 2016, available at 

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-01/11/c_1117739283.htm/>.

29PLA English-language media have also referred to the Training Management Department as 

the “Training and Administration Department.”

30 “Expert: PLA Strategic Support Force a Key to Win Wars,” PLA Daily, January 6, 2016, 

available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-01/06/content_6846500.htm>. For an analysis, see John Costello, “The Strategic Support Force: China’s Information Warfare Service,” China Brief 16, no. 3 (February 8, 2016), available at <www.jamestown.org/

single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45075&no_cache=1#.VxjQwfnR_rc>; and John Costello, “The 

Strategic Support Force: Update and Overview,” China Brief 16, no. 19 (December 21, 2016), available at 

<https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-support-force-update-overview/>.

31 Specifically, the previous director of the GPD Security Department (总政治部保卫局) 

became a deputy secretary general of the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission, suggesting that 

counterintelligence was placed with the latter. See “Former GPD Security Department Deputy Director 

Lu Chungeng Appointed Director of the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission Comprehensive 

Bureau” [原总政保卫部副部长陆春耕出任军委政法委综合局局长], The Paper [彭派], August 31, 

2016, available at <www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1522183>.

32Nan Li, “Xi Jinping and PLA Restructuring,” paper presented at the 2016 CAPS-RANDNDU Conference on the People’s Liberation Army, November 19, 2016.

33 For details, see Kevin Pollpeter and Amy Chang, “General Armament Department,” in The 

PLA as Organization v2.0, 228–231.

34The authors thank Dennis Blasko for pointing this out.

35Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, “(Part 1).”

36 For instance, Major General Chi Xingbei, former PC of the GAD Scientific Research and 

Purchasing Department, became PC of the PLA Army Logistics Department.

37This fact should not be over-interpreted; Chinese interlocutors emphasize that general offices 

(whether of the State Council or the CCP Central Committee) are always listed first in precedence.

38Tai Ming Cheung, “The Riddle in the Middle: China’s Central Military Commission in the 

Twenty-first Century,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 90–92.

39 Interviews, 2016.
70 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

40Cheng Li, “Promoting ‘Young Guards’: The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership 

(Part III: Personal and Political),” China Leadership Monitor 50 (Summer 2016), 6.

41 “Central Military Commission Opinion on Deepening National Defense and Armed Force 

Reforms” [中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua, January 1, 2016, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm>.

42 “Li Zuocheng’s First Media Appearance as the PLA’s First Ground Force Commander” [出任

首任陆军司令员后,李作成首次接受媒体专访], People’s Daily [人民日报], January 31, 2016, available at <http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160130/47302756_0.shtml>.

43 “The Eastern Theater Army Gathers All Elite Forces in the Eastern Region, Possesses the 

Most Advanced Equipment” [东部战区陆军整合东部精锐力量 列装最先进装备], Global Times [环

球时报], February 3, 2016, available at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-02/8496145.html>.

44One apparent change was the appointment of Major General Fang Xiang as head of the 

Rocket Force Political Work Department. Fang was previously assigned to the People’s Armed Police. 

See “Nan Du Reveals First Rocket Force 11-Person Leadership Team, 1 Person Enters from Outside” [

南都披露火箭军首任11人领导班子 1人由外单位调入], Nanfang Dushi Bao [南方都市报], January 

4, 2016, available at <http://news.oeeee.com/html/201601/04/352197.html>.

45 “Establishment Ceremony Held in Beijing for Army Leading Organ, Rocket Force, Strategic 

Support Force” [陆军领导机构火箭军战略支援部队成立大会在京举行], Xinhua, January 1, 2016, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-01/01/c_1117646667.htm>; “Xi Jinping Calls for 

Powerful Missile Force,” Xinhua, December 5, 2012, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2012-12/05/c_132021964.htm>.

46 “China’s Nuclear Policy, Strategy Consistent: Spokesperson,” Xinhua, January 1, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/01/c_134970409.htm>.

47 “Establishment Ceremony Held in Beijing.”

48 Some U.S. analysts contend that the SSF is not a service, since its formal title does not 

include the character jun [军]. See Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, “(Part 1).” However, there is ambiguity 

about the SSF’s status as some authoritative Chinese sources refer to it as a “service” [军种]. See, for 

instance, “Services Such as the Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force [Conduct] Joint Readiness 

[Drills] During Spring Festival” [火箭军、战略支援部队等军种春节联合战备], Jiefangjun Bao [

解放军报], February 10, 2016, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0210/c1011-

28118502.html>.

49 For a discussion, see Joe McReynolds, “China’s Evolving Perspectives on Network Warfare: 

Lessons from the Science of Military Strategy,” China Brief 15, no. 8 (April 16, 2015), available at <www.

jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43798#.Vz3Y9vnR_RY>.

50 “More Advanced than the U.S. System! A Brilliant Future for China’s Building the Strategic Support Force” [比美军体系更先进!中国建战略支援部队大有可为], China Online [中华网], 

January 3, 2016, available at <http://military.china.com/wemedia/11173748/20160103/21063720.html>. 

For a discussion of Chinese strategic thinking on the information domain, see Kevin Pollpeter, “Controlling the Information Domain: Space, Cyber, and Electronic Warfare,” in Strategic Asia 2012-2013: 

China’s Military Challenge, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian 

Research, 2012), 163–196.
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Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

51 “Demystifying Our Army’s First Strategic Support Force” [揭秘我军首支战略支援部队], 

People’s Daily [人民日报], January 24, 2016, available at <http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb//html/2016-

01/24/nw.D110000renmrb_20160124_1-06.htm>.

52Weibo Account of Senior Colonel Shao Yongling, January 1, 2016.

53 “Expert: The Strategic Support Force Is a Key to Winning throughout the Course of Operations” [专家:战略支援队将贯穿作战全过程是致胜关键], People’s Daily Online [人民网], January 5, 

2016, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0105/c1011-28011251.html>.

54 Ibid.

55 Interviews, 2016.

56 For a discussion, see Leigh Ann Luce and Erin Richter, “Handling Logistics in a Reformed 

PLA: The Long March Towards Joint Logistics,” paper presented at the CAPS-RAND-NDU Conference 

on the People’s Liberation Army, November 19, 2016.

57 “China Sets Up Joint Logistics Force, Xi Confers Flag,” Xinhua, September 13, 2016, available 

at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/13/c_135685473.htm>.

58 “China’s Military Regrouped into Five PLA Theater Commands,” Xinhua, February 1, 2016, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/01/c_135065429.htm>. The term 战区 has 

been translated into English in several ways, including “theater commands,” “war zones,” and “strategic 

regions.” This report follows official PRC English language reports in translating the term as “theater 

commands.”

59Kenneth W. Allen et al., Institutional Reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2002), 32–34.

60Dennis J. Blasko, “A New Force Structure,” in The People’s Liberation Army in the Information 

Age, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 284.

61 “Spokesperson: PLA’s Theater Commands Adjustment and Establishment Accomplished,” 

China Military Online, February 2, 2016, available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-02/02/

content_4639118.htm>.

62Wang Xiaohui [王晓辉], “What Types of Strategic Preparations Must China’s Military Undertake?” [中国军队要做哪些战略准备], Southern Weekend [南方周末], September 11, 2015, available at <http://www.infzm.com/content/111700>. Senior Colonel Wang is deputy director of the PLA 

NDU’s Strategic Research Department.

63 “Forging a Strong and Comprehensive Joint Operations Command Structure” [锻造全面过

硬的联合作战指挥机构], Renmin Ribao [人民日报], February 28, 2016, available at <http://military.

people.com.cn/n1/2016/0228/c1011-28155506.html>.

64 Interviews, 2016.

65 “Army Adjustment and Establishment Completed in Five Theater Commands,” China 

Military Online, February 4, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/chinamilitary-news/2016-02/04/content_6890499.htm>. Of note, this map should not be treated as definitive. 

A report in the Beijing Youth Daily states that the map is “ambiguous,” and potentially contains inaccuracies, such as depicting Yunnan Province as belonging to the Western TC, when in fact some media 

reports place Yunnan in the Southern TC. The article states that the map should be used only for “reference” purposes and not treated as definitive of actual geographic boundaries. See “Designation of the 
72 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Five Theater Commands: Your Home Is Under the Protection of Which Theater Command?” [五大战

区划设:你的家乡在哪个战区的保护之下], Beijing Youth Daily Online [北青网], February 10, 2016, 

available at <http://news.qq.com/a/20160210/005411.htm>.

66There is some ambiguity about whether the Shandong Peninsula (and the North Sea Fleet, 

based in Qingdao) is assigned to the Central or Northern TC. The map included on the PLA’s official 

Web site appears to show Shandong included in the Northern TC. See also “Decoding the Military 

Reform: The North Sea Fleet Belongs to the Northern Theater Command, the Rocket Force Is Directly under the Central Military Commission” [军改解读: 北海舰队属北部战区 火箭军直属

军委], Global Times [环球时报], February 5, 2016, available at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-02/8510312.html>. However, another popular but nonauthoritative newspaper report depicts 

the North Sea Fleet as part of the Central TC. See “Xi Jinping Presents Flags to Five Theater Commands” [习近平向五大战区授予军旗], Jinghua Shibao [京华时报], February 2, 2016, available at 

<http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2016-02/02/content_278482.htm>.

67Minnie Chan and Choi Chi-yuk, “Navy Man Tipped to Command PLA’s Key Southern Region,” South China Morning Post, January 13, 2017.

68Directory of PRC Military Personalities March 2014.

69Directory of PRC Military Personalities March 2016.

70 For a discussion of potential changes to PLA ranks and grades, see Kenneth Allen, Dennis J. 

Blasko, and John Corbett, “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: What Is Known, Unknown, and 

Speculation (Part 2), China Brief 16, no 4 (February 23, 2016), available at <http://www.jamestown.org/

programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45124#.VucB5uLR_RY>. After the reforms, 

the name of this grade transitioned from “MR Leader” to “TC Leader” [战区级].

71 “Central Military Commission Opinion on Deepening National Defense and Armed Force 

Reforms.”

72 “Army Adjustment and Establishment Completed in Five Theater Commands,” PLA 

Daily, February 4, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-militarynews/2016-02/04/content_6890499.htm>.

73 Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: The 

Joint Staff, March 25, 2013), available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf>.

74 Interview, 2016.

75 “PLA Carries Out Historic Medical Mission in South China Sea,” China Daily, April 18, 

2016, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-04/18/content_24623939.htm>.

76 “China Raises Tibet Military Command’s Power Rank,” Global Times, May 13, 2016, available 

at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/982843.shtml>.

77The authors thank Kenneth Allen for this insight.

78 Finkelstein, “Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and Reform of the PLA,” 18; James C. 

Mulvenon, “China’s ‘Goldwater-Nichols’? The Long-Awaited PLA Reorganization Has Finally Arrived,” 

China Leadership Monitor 49 (Winter 2016); Saunders and Wuthnow, “China’s Goldwater-Nichols?” 

3–5. For a discussion of the contents and impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on the U.S. military, see 

James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” Joint Force Quarterly 13 (Fall 1996), 10–16; 

James R. Locher III, “Has It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” Naval War College 
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Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Review 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), 95–115; and James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station: Texas A&M University, 2002).

79 For the formal delineation of responsibilities, see Joint Publication 1, especially II-9, which 

defines the operational and administrative command relationships in the U.S. military.

80This phenomenon is known as “institutional isomorphism” in the sociology literature. See 

Paul J. Dimaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 

Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review 48, no. 2 (April 1983), 

147–160.

81 “Seizing Opportunities to Speed the Pace of Reforms Affects the Development and Future of 

Army Building” [抓住时机加快改革步伐关系军队发展和未来], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], May 28, 

2014, available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0528/c83083-25075239.html>.

82Wang Weixing, ed., Research on the Development of In-Depth Reforms of Foreign Militaries 

[外国军事改革深入发展研究] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2014).

83Wang Xiaohui, “What Strategic Preparations Must the PLA Take in a Period of Transition?” 

[转型期中国军队要做哪些战略准备], National Defense Reference [国防参考], October 27, 2015, 

available at <www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-10/27/content_6741609.htm>.

84 For an excellent analysis, see Yevgen Sautin, “The Influence of Russian Military Reform on 

PLA Reorganization,” China Brief 16, no. 6 (March 28, 2016), available at <www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45236#.VzyyI_nR_RY>.

85 For a discussion, see Joel Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations,” 

Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming.

86 Interviews, 2016; PLA service academy delegation visit to U.S. NDU, 2016.

87Chinese sources often refer to “joint” (联合) operations to describe not only cross-service, 

but also combined arms and international operations. The term is used here to apply only to crossservice operations.

88Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars,” in Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ 

Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

2011), 153–200.

89 See Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations”; Allen et al., Institutional 

Reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2002); 

Dean Cheng, “Zhanyixue and Joint Campaigns,” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs, ed. James C. 

Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2005); Wanda Ayuso and Lonnie Henley, 

“Aspiring to Jointness: PLA Training, Exercises, and Doctrine, 2008-2012,” in Assessing the People’s 

Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), 171–205; and Mark Cozad, “PLA Joint Training and 

Implications for Future Expeditionary Capabilities,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, January 21, 2016, available at <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/

testimonies/CT400/CT451/RAND_CT451.pdf>.

90Visit by a PLA service academy delegation to NDU, April 2016.

91 For an overview, see Dean Cheng, “The PLA’s Wartime Structure,” in PLA as Organization 

v2.0, 453–476.
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

92Wang Xiaohui, “What Types of Strategic Preparations Must China’s Military Undertake?” 

[中国军队要做哪些战略准备], Southern Weekend [南方周末], September 11, 2015, available at 

<www.infzm.com/content/111700>.

93 “CPC Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reforms for Major Issues.”

94 “Xi Jinping: Build a Modern Military Power System with Chinese Characteristics” [习近平:

构建中国特色现代军事力量体系], People’s Daily [人民日报], August 31, 2014, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-08/31/c_1112295195_2.htm>. The article provides quotes from Xi’s 

remarks on military reform made on December 27, 2013.

95NIDS China Security Report 2016 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2016), 62–63.

96 “At CMC Reform Work Meeting, Xi Jinping Stresses.

97CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms.

98 “Zhang Junshe: Creating New Theaters Better Protects National Sovereignty” [张军社: 重新

划设战区可更好维护国家主权], China National Radio, February 4, 2016, available at <http://military.

cnr.cn/gz/20160201/t20160201_521303310.html>. Senior Captain Zhang is vice president of the PLA 

Naval Research Institute.

99 “Army Adjustment and Establishment Completed in Five Theater Commands,” China 

Military Online, February 4, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/chinamilitary-news/2016-02/04/content_6890499.htm>.

100 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle,” China Military Online, January 

12, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/

content_6854444.htm>.

101The J3 is responsible for relaying communications between the President and Secretary of 

Defense to CCMD commanders regarding current operations and plans. See <www.jcs.mil/Directorates/J3%7COperations.aspx>.

102 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

103 “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on Mar. 31,” PRC Ministry of National Defense, 

March 31, 2016, available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-03/31/content_4648193.htm>.

104 Interview, 2016. In addition, the office helps to plan and carry out international exercises. 

See “PLA Sets Up Overseas Operations Office to Strengthen Overseas Rapid Reaction,” China Military 

Online, March 25, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-03/25/content_6977517.htm>.

105Discussion with midlevel PLA officer, October 2016.

106This is reflected in the Southern TC commander’s comments that the TCs have authority over 

“all types of national defense mobilization forces” (各种国防动员力量) within their area of responsibility. See “Southern Theater Commander: Safeguarding South China Sea Rights and Interests Is Our Most 

Important Mission” [南部战区司令员:维护南海权益是最重要使命], People’s Daily [人民日报], 

February 28, 2016, available at <www.chinanews.com/mil/2016/02-28/7775861.shtml>.

107 Joint C2 has been a focus of several recent major PLA exercises. For details, see Cozad, “PLA 

Joint Training and Implications for Future Expeditionary Capabilities.”

108 “Transcript of Eastern Theater Commander Liu Yuejun’s Interview” [东部战区司令员刘粤

军访谈录], China Military Online [中国军网], March 3, 2016, available at <http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/
75

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

zhuanti/content/2016-03/04/content_6940918.htm>.

109 “Starting with a New Style under Fluttering Red Combat Flags: Observations on the 

New Theater Commands” [开局新风起 猎猎战旗红: 东南西北中五战区成立伊始见闻], Xinhua Online [新华网], February 2, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-

02/02/c_1117973365.htm>; and Zhang Hui, “PLA Rocket Force Names 100 Officers to Commands,” 

Global Times, April 12, 2016, available at <www.globaltimes.cn/content/978291.shtml>.

110However, note that one report of Rocket Force training orders a RF battalion to “cooperate 

with theater command units to carry out firepower strikes.” The phrase “cooperate with” implies that 

RF units might not be under direct control of the theater. See Duan Jiangshan and Feng Lei, “Rocket 

Force Base Organizes Assembly Training for Battalion-Level Commanders” [火箭军墨某基地组织

营级指挥员集训], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], March 17, 2016, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-03/17/content_138031.htm>.

111One reason is that missile base commanders are corps-level officers, while TC-based army, 

air force, and naval service component commanders are MR Deputy Leader–grade officers. The authors 

thank Dennis Blasko for this insight.

112 “Starting with a New Style under Fluttering Red Combat Flags.”

113This center was reportedly constructed in the 1950s and designated as a command center in 

the event of a nuclear attack. It gained attention when the PLA denied a request by then U.S. Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to visit the facility. See “China’s Military Center Off-Limits,” Washington Times, October 14, 2005, available at <www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/oct/14/20051014-

114525-9990r/?page=all>.

114 “Chinese Military Set up Joint Operations Command Center: Sources,” Kyodo, August 7, 

2014, available at <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/07/asia-pacific/chinese-military-set-joint-operations-command-center-sources/#.VsMI-vnR_IU>.

115Harry Kazianis, “The Strategy Behind China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea,” Asia Times, 

March 17, 2016, available at <http://atimes.com/2016/03/the-strategy-behind-chinas-adiz-in-the-eastchina-sea/>.

116Austin Ramzy, “China’s President, Xi Jinping, Gains a New Title: Commander in Chief,” New 

York Times, April 21, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/world/asia/china-xi-jinpingmilitary-commander.html>.

117 Interview, 2016.

118 “Starting with a New Style under Fluttering Red Combat Flags.”

119 “Xi Jinping Inspects CMC Joint Operations Command Center” [习近平视察军委联合作

战指挥中心], China Central Television Online [央视网], April 20, 2016, available at <http://news.sina.

com.cn/c/nd/2016-04-20/doc-ifxrpvea1017691.shtml>; “Starting with a New Style under Fluttering Red 

Combat Flags.”

120 For a discussion, see Cortez Cooper, “Joint Anti-Access Operations: China’s ‘System-ofSystems’ Approach,” testimony for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 

11, available at <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT356.pdf>.

121China’s Military Strategy [中国军事战略], PRC State Council Information Office, May 2015, 

available at <www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2015-05/26/content_4588132.htm>.
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

122Costello, “The Strategic Support Force: China’s Information Warfare Service”; and Costello, 

“The Strategic Support Force: Update and Overview.”

123Kevin Pollpeter, “Towards an Integrative C4ISR System: Informationization and Joint Operations in the People’s Liberation Army,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational 

Capabilities of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen et al. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

2010), 193–236.

124Costello, “The Strategic Support Force: China’s Information Warfare Service”; and Costello, 

“The Strategic Support Force: Update and Overview.”

125Chase et al., 116.

126 “Expert: The Strategic Support Force Is a Key to Winning Throughout the Course of Operations” [专家:战略支援队将贯穿作战全过程是致胜关键], People’s Daily Online [人民网], January 5, 

2016, available at <http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0105/c1011-28011251.html>.

127 “Demystifying Our Army’s First Strategic Support Force” [揭秘我军首支战略支援部队], 

People’s Daily [人民日报], January 24, 2016, available at <http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb//html/2016-

01/24/nw.D110000renmrb_20160124_1-06.htm>.

128 For an overview of centrally managed assets in the pre-reform PLA, see Mark Stokes, “Employment of National-Level PLA Assets in a Contingency: A Cross-Strait Conflict as Case Study,” in The 

People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, ed. Andrew Scobell et al. (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, 2015), 135–158.

129Dennis J. Blasko, “The PLA Army/Ground Forces,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, 267.

130 See Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2013), 201.

131 “Li Zuocheng’s First Media Appearance as the PLA’s First Ground Force Commander” [出任

首任陆军司令员后,李作成首次接受媒体专访], People’s Daily [人民日报], January 31, 2016, available at <http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160130/47302756_0.shtml>.

132 Interview, 2013. A PLA spokesman stated that the cut would target “troops equipped with 

outdated equipment, office staff, and personnel of non-combat organizations,” though he did not 

specifically state how the services would be affected. See “Defense Ministry Holds Press Conference on 

V-Day Parade, Cut of Troops’ Number,” China Military Online, September 3, 2015, available at <http://

eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-09/03/content_4617101.htm>.

133The PLA could also disaggregate SSF and JLSF personnel from the Army, which would help 

bring the official Army figures into balance with the other services. The authors thank Dennis Blasko 

for this insight.

134 Interviews, 2016.

135 See Cozad, “PLA Joint Training and Implications for Future Expeditionary Capabilities.”

136 Ibid.

137Discussion with a senior PLA officer, April 2016.

138 “CCP Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reforms for Major Issues.”

139 “Fang Fenghui: Firmly Implement Chairman Xi’s Important Instructions and the CMC’s 

Decisions” [房峰辉:坚决贯彻习主席重要指示和军委决策部署], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], December 31, 2013, available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1231/c64102-23990954.html>.

140CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms.
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Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

141 “PLA Restructuring Changes Focus at Military Schools,” China Daily, April 28, 2016, available at <www.china.org.cn/china/2016-04/28/content_38341095.htm>.

142Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department: Evolving Organizations and Missions,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, 154–157. 

143 It may also produce a revised Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE). The last 

OMTE was published in July 2008 and took effect in 2009. See “New Outline of Military Training and 

Evaluation Promulgated,” Chinamil, July 25, 2008.

144 “CMC Sends Training Supervision Teams to All Theater Commands and Some Service 

Units” [中央军委训练监察组进驻各战区和军种部分单位], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], May 11, 

2016, available at <http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_7011148.htm>.

145However, the PLA NDU and Academy of Military Science will remain directly under the 

CMC. Discussion with midlevel PLA officer, October 2016.

146Zhang Shibo and Liu Yazhou, “Strive to Build the Highest Military Academy with the 

World’s Advanced Standards and Unique Chinese Characteristics” [努力建设具有世界先进水平和

中国特色的最高军事学府”], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], April 17, 2016, available at <http://mil.sohu.

com/20160418/n444670851.shtml>.

147 For instance, there is reportedly a joint staff course for mid-career officers that involves 

rotations at the PLAAF, PLAN, PLARF, and PLAA command academies. Discussion with a senior PLA 

officer, April 2016.

148 For a discussion, see Susan Puska, “The People’s Liberation Army General Logistics Department: Toward Joint Logistics Support,” in The PLA as Organization, Reference Volume v1.0, 247–272.

149 Susan Puska, “Taming the Hydra: Trends in China’s Military Logistics Since 2000,” in The 

PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen et al. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 553–624.

150Roger Cliff, China’s Military Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 150.

151 “Reform of Logistics Policy, System, and Support Forces Comprehensively Initiated” [后勤

政策制度和保重力量改革全面启动], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], March 20, 2014, available at <http://

news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-03-21/033929757044.shtml>.

152CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms.

153 For details, see Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 16, 2013), available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_0.pdf>.

154 “Xi Jinping Shifts Control of PLA Audit Office to Military’s Top Decision-Making 

Body,” South China Morning Post, November 7, 2014, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1633802/xi-jinping-shifts-control-pla-audit-office-militarys-top-decision-making>.

155One way it will do this is by dispatching 10 anti-corruption teams across the PLA, though 

it is unclear how much this will focus on the logistics system. See “Inspectors to Cover all of Military,” China Daily, May 5, 2016, available at <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-05/06/content_25096733.htm>.

156 In addition to the stories cited above, Chinese press reports claimed that Hu Jintao rarely 

visited his CMC office, in contrast to Xi Jinping, who reportedly spends a half-day working on 

military issues every week. Ji Beiqun, “To Reshuffle Military Generals as Fast as Mao: Xi Jinping’s 
78 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

‘Foresight’” [军队换将直追毛泽东习近平 “深谋远虑”], Duowei Newsnet [多维新闻], January 10, 

2015, available at <http://china.dwnews.com/news/2015-01-10/59629032.html>.

157Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing,” International Security 41, no. 3 (Winter 2016–2017), 38. Johnston cites a speech that Xi purportedly gave in 

December 2012 containing an analysis of the causes of the Soviet collapse.

158 Susan Finder, “Ruling the PLA According to Law: An Oxymoron?” China Brief 15, no. 21 

(November 2, 2015), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/ruling-the-pla-according-to-law-anoxymoron/>.

159CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms.

160 Sun Chiaye, “Who Is Responsible on the Central Military Commission? [中央軍委誰負責], 

Ming Pao [明報], January 29, 2015, cited in James Mulvenon, “The Yuan Stops Here: Xi Jinping and the 

‘CMC Chairman Responsibility System,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 47 (Summer 2015), available 

at <www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm47jm.pdf>. Of note, the CMC chairmanship 

responsibility system is not new but rather contained in the PRC constitution, issued in December 

1982, which states that the CMC chairman “assumes overall responsibility for the work of the Central 

Military Commission.”

161Mulvenon, “The Yuan Stops Here.”

162 “The Communique of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua, October 27, 2016.

163Wang Yushan, “The Central Military Commission Holds Its Executive Meeting to Study and 

Implement the Spirit of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee,” Xinhua, November 3, 2016.

164 “Reconfiguring Leadership and Command System of Our Military Is the Inevitable Choice 

for Strengthening and Reinvigorating the Military” [重塑我军领导指挥体制是强军兴军的必然选

择], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], November 30, 2015.

165Minnie Chan, “Xi Jinping Shifts Control of PLA Audit Office to Military’s Top Decisionmaking Body,” South China Morning Post, November 7, 2014, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/

article/1633802/xi-jinping-shifts-control-pla-audit-office-militarys-top-decision-making>.

166 “Xi Urges Breakthrough in Military Structural Reform,” Xinhua, November 26, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/26/c_134859089.htm>. 

167 “Military Experts Interpret National Defense and Military Reforms” [军事专家解读国

防和军队改革], Xinhua, November 27, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2015-

11/27/c_1117287443.htm>.

168CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms.

169 “中央军委印发’关于深化国防和军队改革 期间加强军事法规制度建设的意见’” [Central 

Military Commission Opinion on Strengthening the Construction of a Military Law and Regulation 

System During the Period of Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms], People’s Daily [人民日

报], June 2, 2016.

170 Finder.

171 “Matter of Key Importance at Present, Most Important Political Task” [当前头等大事 首

要政治任务], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], November 20, 2012, available at <http://theory.people.com.
79

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

cn/n/2012/1120/c49151-19633004.html>.

172 “Xi Stresses CPC’s Absolute Leadership Over Army,” Xinhua, November 1, 2014, available at 

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/01/c_133759418.htm>. Also see James C. Mulvenon, “Hotel Gutian: We Haven’t Had That Spirit Here Since 1929,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 46 

(Winter 2015), available at <www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46jm.pdf>. 

173Yu Guang, “Looking at Casting the Army’s Soul from the Modern Values of the Gutian 

Conference” [从古田会议的当代价值看铸牢军魂], Qiushi [求实], July 31, 2014, available at <www.

qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2014-07/31/c_1111827487.htm>.

174 “PLA Generals Take Rare Step of Swearing Loyalty to President Xi Jinping,” South China 

Morning Post, April 3, 2014, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1463386/pla-generalstake-rare-step-swearing-loyalty-president-xi-jinping>.

175 “Commentary: Improved Party Life Vital to Advanced CCP,” Xinhua, October 31, 2016, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-10/31/c_135794711.htm>; “The CMC General 

Office Issues a Notice Requiring All PLA and PAP Units to Diligently Study, Propagate, and Implement 

the Spirit of the 6th Plenum of the 18th Party Congress” [中央军委办公厅发出通知要求全军和武警

部队认真学习宣传贯彻党的十八届六中全会精神], Xinhua [新华], October 30, 2016, available at 

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-10/30/c_1119815230.htm>.

176 For a Chinese discussion of CMI, see Liu Maojie, The Strong Army Dream [强军梦], (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press [军事科学出版社], 2014), 330–342.

177 For a discussion, see Daniel Alderman et al., “The Rise of Chinese Civil-Military Integration,” in Forging China’s Military Might, ed. Tai Ming Cheung (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 109–135.

178David Yang, “Civil-Military Integration Efforts in China,” SITC Research Brief 24, September 2011; Brian Lafferty, Aaron Shraberg, and Morgan Clemens, “China’s Civil-Military Integration,” 

SITC Research Brief 2013-10, January 2013.

179Chase et al., 132–133.

180 “CCP Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reforms for Major Issues.”

181 “At CMC Reform Work Meeting, Xi Jinping Stresses.

182CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military Reforms.

183 “China’s Xi Calls for Closer Civil-Military Integration to Boost Army Combativeness,” Xinhua, March 12, 2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/12/c_134062403.htm>. 

184Pollpeter and Chang, 228–231.

185Hao Xin, “China to Create Its Own DARPA,” Science, March 11, 2016, available at available 

at <www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/china-create-its-own-darpa>.

186 See, for example, Li Qiang, The DARPA Innovation Plan [DARPA创新计划], (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press [国防科技出版社]), 2015. Li, who is affiliated with state-owned defense 

company China Electronics Technology Group Corp., served as commissioner of the GAD STC.

187 “Demystifying Our Army’s First Strategic Support Force” [揭秘我军首支战略支援部队], 

People’s Daily [人民日报], January 24, 2016, available at <http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb//html/2016-

01/24/nw.D110000renmrb_20160124_1-06.htm>.

188 “Expert: PLA Strategic Support Force a Key to Win Wars,” China Military Online, January 6, 
80 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-01/06/

content_6846500.htm>.

189 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

190Chase et al., 132.

191 For a discussion, see Dean Cheng, “Converting the Potential to the Actual: Chinese Mobilization Policies and Planning,” in The People’s Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in China, 

107–134.

192Chase, et al., 80.

193 “CCP Central Committee Decision on Deepening of Reforms for Major Issues.”

194Bai Zonglin, “Perspective on China’s Military Reform,” International Strategic Studies, no. 2 

(2016), 22.

195Nan Li, “The Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi,” in PLA 

Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, 120–140.

196These figures are based on a search for each leader’s name in the military issues section of 

the China Vitae database for the relevant periods.

197 Ji.

198Nan Li, “The Top Leaders and the PLA: The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi.”

199 “China’s Reform Leading Group Holds First Meeting,” Xinhua, January 22, 2014, available at 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/22/c_133066240.htm. 

200Bai.

201 “At CMC Reform Work Meeting, Xi Jinping Stresses.

202 “Faithfully Perform the Sacred Missions Assigned by the Party and the People,” Jiefangjun 

Bao, January 2, 2016; also see Li Jing, “President Xi Jinping Lays Down the Law to the Chinese Army in 

First ‘Precept’ Speech Since Mao Zedong,” South China Morning Post, January 4, 2016, who stresses the 

imperative nature of Xi’s precept speech, known as a Xun Ci [“admonishing words”].

203Li Xuanliang, Zhang Xuanjie, and Li Qinghua, “Meeting on Establishment of Army Leading Organ, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force Held in Beijing; Xi Jinping Confers Military Banners 

to Army, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force Units of the People’s Liberation Army and Delivers 

Speech,” Xinhua, January 1, 2016.

204Li Xuanliang, “Xi Jinping Meets with Responsible Comrades at Various Departments of 

the CMC Organ, Emphasizing the Requirements of Stressing Politics, Striving for Winning, Rendering 

Services, Playing an Exemplary Role, Endeavoring to Build the CMC Organ With ‘Four Iron Qualities,’” 

Xinhua, January 11, 2016.

205 “Xi Calls for Smaller but More Capable Army,” Xinhua, December 3, 2016, available at 

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-12/03/c_135878424.htm>.

206 “CMC General Office Director Qin Shengxiang Will Concurrently Serve as Director of the 

CMC Reform and Organization Office” [军委办公厅主任秦生祥兼任军委改革和编制办公室主任], 

The Paper [澎湃新闻], August 28, 2016, available at <http://news.qq.com/a/20160828/009988.htm>.

207Edward Wong, “The ‘Gatekeeper’ in Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle,” New York Times, September 

30, 2015, available at <http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/the-gatekeeper-in-xi-jinpingsinner-circle/>.
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Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

208 State Council Information Officer, “China’s National Defense in 2004,” December 27, 2003.

209 Saunders and Wuthnow, “China’s Goldwater-Nichols?”; Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, “(Part 

1)”; China Security Report 2016: The Expanding Scope of PLA Activities and PLA Strategy (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2016), 62.

210 Saunders and Chen, “Is the Chinese Army the Real Winner in PLA Reforms?”

211 Sun Kejia and Han Xiao, “Stepping Up Preparations to Integrate Military Reform into 

Country’s Strategic Planning” [加强统筹, 把军队改革纳入国家战略规划], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军

报], November 19, 2015, available at <http://news.10jqka.com.cn/20151119/c585953928.shtml>; also 

see Jun Mai, “PLA Pay Deal Could ‘Destabilise’ Chinese Society,” South China Morning Post, November 

19, 2015, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1880498/pla-overhaulcould-destabilise-chinese-society-military>.

212 For details, see Chen, “Downsizing the PLA, Part 1: Military Discharge and Resettlement 

Policy, Past and Present.”

213Liu Zhiming, “Build a Service Oriented Security Structure According to the ‘Four Iron’ Requirements” [按照 “四铁”要求打造一流服务保障机构], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], April 20, 2016, 

available at <www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2016-04/20/content_4650021_4.htm>.

214 “Two Ministries: No State-Owned Enterprise May Refuse to Accept Retired Soldiers” [两部

委:任何国有企业不得拒绝接收退役士兵], People’s Daily [人民网], December 28, 2015, available at 

<http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1228/c1001-27986615.html>.

215 See Kevin J. O’Brien and Neil J. Diamant, “Contentious Veterans: China’s Retired Officers 

Speak out,” Armed Forces & Society 41, no. 3 (2015), 563–581.

216 For an assessment of the likely effectiveness of these efforts, see Chen, “Downsizing the PLA, 

Part 2: Military Discharge Policy, Past and Present.” See also “Chinese Military Veterans Gather in Beijing to Protest ‘Broken Promises,’” Radio Free Asia, January 2, 2017, available at <www.rfa.org/english/

news/china/veterans-protest-01022017200052.html>.

217 See Derek Grossman and Michael S. Chase, “Why Xi is Purging the Chinese Military,” The 

National Interest, April 15, 2016, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-xi-purging-thechinese-military-15795?page=show>.

218 “China’s Defense Ministry Confirms Probe of Leading General Wang Jianping,” South China 

Morning Post, December 29, 2016, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2057961/chinas-defence-ministry-confirms-probe-leading-general>.

219 2014 interview with civilian with close ties to PLA leaders.

220 See Cheng Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2016).

221 For a useful preview of changes, see Dennis J. Blasko, “Walk, Don’t Run; Chinese Military 

Reforms in 2017,” War on the Rocks, January 9, 2017, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/

walk-dont-run-chinese-military-reforms-in-2017/>.

222 For a discussion of Chinese strategic and operational thinking on the concept of “counterintervention,” see Timothy Heath and Andrew S. Erickson, “Is China Pursuing Counter-Intervention?” 

The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (Fall 2015), 143–156.

223 For an Indian perspective on the reforms, see Manoj Joshi, “Xi Jinping and PLA Reform,” 
82 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

ORF Occasional Paper, February 2016, available at <www.orfonline.org/research/xi-jinping-and-plareform/>.

224 See Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “What Do China’s Military Reforms Mean for 

Taiwan?” NBR Commentary, May 19, 2016, available at <www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=692>.

225The remaining 58 were wearing the green uniforms donned by army and rocket force officers. See Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, “(Part 1).”

226 See Phillip C. Saunders and John Chen, “Is the Chinese Army the Real Winner in PLA Reforms?” Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter 2016), 44–48.

227 For a seminal treatment, see Samuel P. Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” American Political Science Review 55, no. 1 (March 1961), 40–52.

228Greg Chaffin, “An Interview with Andrew S. Erickson,” National Bureau of Asian Research, 

September 27, 2012, available at <http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=276>.

229 Saunders and Chen.

230The chiefs of the air force, navy, and rocket force are already ex officio CMC members.

231An exception is the new army commander, Li Zuocheng, who was a unit commander during 

the conflict.

232 “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on May 26,” China Military Online, May 26, 

2016, available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2016-05/26/content_4665371.htm>.

233 James C. Mulvenon, “China: Conditional Compliance,” in Military Professionalism in Asia: 

Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2002), 

317–335; and James C. Mulvenon, “Straining Against the Yoke? Civil-Military Relations in China after 

the Seventeenth Party Congress,” in China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, ed. 

Cheng Li (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 267–282.

234Annual Report to Congress, 63.

235 “PLA Army Commander Meets with U.S. Army Chief of Staff,” China Military Online, August 17, 2016, available at <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-militarynews/2016-08/17/content_7212176.htm>.

236 For details, see <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/US-CHINA_CRISIS_COMMUNICATIONS_ANNEX_SEP_2015.pdf>.

237 For analysis of the likely content of the next phase of PLA reforms, see David M. Finkelstein, “Get Ready for the Second Phase of Chinese Military Reform,” CNA Occasional Paper, January 

2017 (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2017); and Kenneth Allen, “China to Build Rank-Centered Military Officer 

System: What Does This Mean?” China Brief, forthcoming.

238 For a discussion, see Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Ground Forces: Moving Toward a Smaller, 

More Rapidly Deployable, Modern Combined Arms Force,” in The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Reference Volume 1.0, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2002), 309–345.

239 “China Says to Finish Military Cuts by 2017,” PLA Daily, September 3, 2015, available at 

<http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-09/03/content_6663779.

htm>.

240Blasko, “Walk, Don’t Run; Chinese Military Reforms in 2017.”
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Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

241 “President Xi Stresses Training Capable Commanders for Joint Warfare,” Xinhua, March 23, 

2016, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/23/c_135216931.htm>.

242Authors’ interviews and interactions with various PLA senior officers, 2016.

243 “China to Build Rank-Centered Military Officer System,” China Daily, December 19, 2016, 

available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-12/19/content_27713063.htm>.

244 “China’s Military Plans New System for Officers’ Ranks,” South China Morning Post, January 

9, 2017, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2060385/chinas-militaryplans-new-system-officers-ranks>.

245Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, joint experience became a prerequisite for officer 

advancement. This reshaped career incentives and helped build an officer corps with stronger joint 

qualifications. However, there has not yet been any indication that the PLA has sought to replicate those 

requirements.

246Thomas A. Bickford, “Regularization and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army: An Assessment of Change,” Asian Survey 40, no. 3 (June 2000), 456–474.

247 Finder.

248 “Military Auditing Regulation Revised,” China Daily, December 21, 2016, available at <www.

chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-12/21/content_27736363.htm>.

249TC Air Force headquarters (formerly MR Air Forces) are collocated with TC headquarters.

250 “Joint Operations Have a ‘Data Time Lag,’ How Will the Eastern Theater Command Break 

Through It?” [联合作战有 “数据时差”,东部战区咋破?], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], available at 

<www.chinanews.com/mil/2016/02-24/7770581.shtml>.

251 It is unclear whether the PLAAF plays a role in nuclear deterrence, given that several of 

China’s defense white papers discuss nuclear capabilities of the SAF and PLAN but not the PLAAF. See 

Christopher T. Yeaw, Andrew S. Erickson, and Michael S. Chase, “The Future of Chinese Nuclear Policy 

and Strategy,” in Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age, ed. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 68.

252During wartime, research indicates a “skip echelon” arrangement in which authority would 

pass from the CMC to theater commands. See Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes, 521.

253 “A Concerted Effort Begins with Open-Mindedness” [合心,从敞开胸襟开始], Jiefangjun 

Bao [解放军报], February 16, 2015, available at <www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-02/16/content_1589.htm>.

254 For a useful first cut, see Leigh Ann Luce and Erin Richter, “Handling Logistics in a Reformed PLA: The Long March to Joint Logistics,” paper presented at the 2016 CAPS-RAND-NDU PLA 

conference, Arlington, VA, November 18–19, 2016.

255Tai Ming Cheung, “The Riddle in the Middle,” 96.

256 For a discussion, see Finder.

257 “Carter Proposes Updates to Goldwater-Nichols Act,” DoD News, April 5, 2016, available 

at <www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/713930/carter-proposes-updates-to-goldwaternichols-act>.

258 Finkelstein, “Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and Reform of the PLA,” 18.

259Alice Miller, “The Central Military Commission,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, 93–94. 
84 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

Due for retirement in 2017 are General Fan Changlong, CMC vice chairman, General Zhao Keshi, 

director of the CMC Logistics Support Department, and Admiral Wu Shengli, former PLA Navy commander. All of these individuals will have reached the informal retirement age for CMC members of 70.

260 For a discussion of different possible permutations of the next CMC, see Allen, Blasko, and 

Corbett, “(Part 2).”

261Of the 69 uniformed officers present at the announcement of the new CMC organization 

on January 11, 2016, 58 were PLA Army or Rocket Force, while only six were navy and five were air 

force. This is “not an auspicious start for greater jointness at the most senior levels of the PLA command 

structure.” See Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, “(Part 1).”

262Directory of PRC Military Personalities March 2016.

263 “China Reshuffles Military Headquarters,” Xinhua, January 11, 2016, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/11/c_134998692.htm>; “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC 

Organ Reshuffle.”

264Tai Ming Cheung, “The Riddle in the Middle, 90–92.

265 “Which Generals Will Be on the CMC after the Reform?” [哪些将军这次会后调进中央军

委?], China Youth Online [中国青年网], January 12, 2016, available at <http://military.china.com/important/11132797/20160112/21122496.html>. For biographical details on Lieutenant General Qin, see 

“CMC General Office Director Qin Shengxiang Promoted to Lieutenant General” [中央军委办公厅主

任秦生祥晋升中将], Caixin Wang [财新网], July 21, 2015, available at <http://china.caixin.com/2015-

07-21/100830965.html>.

266 “New CMC Leaders Revealed, Greatest Changes to CMC General Office” [军委新领导首

亮相 军委办公厅排位变化最大], New Tang Dynasty Television, April 30, 2016, available at <http://

ca.ntdtv.com/xtr/gb/2016/04/30/a1264832.html>.

267 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

268The Operations Department was also sometimes known as the 1st Department (总参一部), 

a second-level (Corps Leader grade) department within GSD. Stokes and Easton, 142–145.

269Miller, 97.

270Discussions with midlevel PLA officers, October 2016.

271 “Latest News on Military Reform: New Positions of Former Four General Department Leaders Settled” [军改最新消息: 解放军原四总部负责人新职务落定], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], January 14, 2016, available at <http://military.china.com/important/11132797/20160114/21138743.html>.

272Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, “(Part 1).”

273 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

274 “Latest News on Military Reform.” Moreover, its deputy has been reported as General Du 

Hengyan (杜恒岩), who was most recently political commissar of the Jinan MR. See “Former Guangzhou MR Commander Xu Fenlin Comes to Beijing as Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department” [广

州军区原司令员徐粉林进京出任联合参谋部副参谋长], Nanfang Dushi Bao [南方都市报], January 

12, 2016, available at <http://epaper.oeeee.com/ipaper/A/html/2016-01/12/content_2883.htm>.

275 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

276 For instance, at its Third Plenum in November 2013, the CCP decided to push forward 

reform of logistics for joint combat operations. See “CCP Central Committee Decision on Deepening of 
85

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

Reforms for Major Issues.” See also Puska, “Taming the Hydra.”

277 “Latest News on Military Reform: New Positions of Former Four General Department Leaders Settled.”

278Li Jing and Minnie Chan, “PLA General Who Helped Xi Battle Graft in Military Retires,” 

South China Morning Post, December 30, 2015, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacydefence/article/1896634/pla-general-who-helped-xi-battle-graft-military-retires>.

279 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

280 “Latest News on Military Reform: New Positions of Former Four General Department Leaders Settled.”

281 Stokes and Easton, 154-157.

282 See “Reform Efforts Should Be Focused on the ‘Strategic Hubs’” [改革要向战略枢纽聚焦用

力], Jiefangjun Bao [解放军报], April 22, 2014, available at <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0422/

c40531-24927666.html>.

283Discussion with midlevel PLA officer, October 2016. 

284Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, “(Part 1).”

285This theme was highlighted in a Chinese report about the initial activities of the department. 

See “Demystifying the Newly Established CMC National Defense Mobilization Department” [揭秘新成

立的中央军委国防动员部], China Youth Online [中国青年报], January 29, 2016, available at <http://

zqb.cyol.com/html/2016-01/29/nw.D110000zgqnb_20160129_1-06.htm>.

286 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

287Roy Kamphausen, “The General Political Department,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, 

173.

288 For a discussion, see Bickford.

289 Strengthening the “socialist rule of law” (社会主义法制) is a theme of the broader national 

reforms, highlighted in particular at the 4th Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, held in October 

2014. See “Highlights of Communique of 4th Plenary Session of CPC Central Committee,” Xinhua, October 23, 2014, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-10/23/c_133737957.htm>.

290Pollpeter and Chang, 223–224.

291 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

292 “Which Generals Will Be on the CMC After the Reform?”

293Tai Ming Cheung, “Keeping Up with the Jundui: Reforming the Chinese Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Industrial System to Engage in Advanced Innovation,” paper presented at the 

2016 CAPS-RAND-NDU Conference on the People’s Liberation Army, November 19, 2016, 8.

294 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

295 Stokes and Easton, 153–154.

296 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

297 See “Xi Leads China’s Military Reform, Stresses Strong Army,” Xinhua, March 15, 2014, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/15/c_133188618.htm>.

298The GSD Military Affairs Department was also responsible for welfare and benefits and 

served as the personnel center for enlisted servicemen. It is unclear if the new CMC office will assume 

these duties. Stokes and Easton, 159–160.
86 

China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10

299 “CMC General Office Director Qin Shengxiang Will Concurrently Serve as Director of the 

CMC Reform and Organization Office.”

300 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

301 “Xi Jinping: Further Innovate a New Situation in Military Diplomacy” [习近平:进一步开

创军事外交新局面], Xinhua, January 29, 2015, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-

01/29/c_1114183775.htm>.

302 “Which Generals Will Be on the CMC After the Reform?”

303This organization has also been translated as “Audit Office.” However, “Audit Bureau” may be 

a better translation of shu [署] and distinguish it from bangongshi [办公室] (“office”).

304 “China Military Reaches Key Decision to Strengthen Auditing,” Xinhua, November 4, 2014, 

available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2014-11/06/content_4550175.htm>.

305 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”

306 “Guo Chunfu Becomes Director of PLA Audit Office, in a New Role Twice in a Year” [郭春

富任解放军审计署审计长 年内两度履新], Caixin Online [财新网], December 30, 2015, available at 

<http://china.caixin.com/2015-12-30/100894397.html>.

307 Jiguan [机关] may also be translated as “office” or “organization.”

308Allen, Blasko, and Corbett, “(Part 1).”

309 “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle.”
87

Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping

About the Authors

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 

and a Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University. Dr. Saunders previously worked at the Monterey Institute of International 

Studies, where he was Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program from 1999–2003, and 

served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force from 1989–1994. Dr. Saunders is co-author, with David 

Gompert, of The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era of Vulnerability

(NDU Press, 2011) and co-editor of five books on Chinese military and security issues. Dr. 

Saunders attended Harvard College and received his MPA and Ph.D. in International Relations 

from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.

Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University (NDU). Prior 

to joining NDU, he was a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, a post-doctoral fellow 

in the China and the World Program at Princeton University, and a pre-doctoral fellow at the 

Brookings Institution. His recent publications include “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint 

Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1 (2017), Posing Problems Without an Alliance: 

China-Iran Relations after the Nuclear Deal, INSS Strategic Forum 290 (NDU Press, 2016), and 

“Barriers, Springboards, and Benchmarks: China Conceptualizes the Pacific ‘Island Chains’” 

The China Quarterly 225 (2016), with Andrew S. Erickson. Dr. Wuthnow received an A.B. in 

Public and International Affairs from Princeton Universiy, an M.Phil. in Modern Chinese Studies from Oxford University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.

For a complete list of INSS publications, researchers, and staff, visit http://inss.ndu.edu

9 China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Toward a New Maritime Strategy, by Christopher H. Sharman (03/15)

8 Red China’s ‘Capitalist Bomb’: Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program, by Jonathan Ray (01/15)

7 “Not an Idea We Need to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century

by Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici, with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin (10/14)

6 China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-AmericanMilitary Confrontation, by Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice Miller (04/13)

5 Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach

by Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders (09/12)

4 Buy, Build, or Steal: China’s Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies

by Phillip C. Saunders and Joshua Wiseman (12/11)

3 China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles and Potential Solutions

by Christopher Yung and Ross Rustici, with Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman (12/10)

2 Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics

by Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders (08/10)

1 Assessing Chinese Military Transparency, by Phillip C. Saunders and Michael Kiselycznyk (06/10)

China Strategic Perspectives Series

Editor, Dr. Phillip C. Saunders