UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The European Theater of Operations 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

by 

Forrest C. Pogue 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D. C., 1989 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 53-61717 

First Printed 1954—CMH Pub 7-1 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington D.C. 20402 


THE SUPREME COMMAND 
GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Supreme Commander, 

Allied Expeditionary Force. (Photograph taken in 1947.) 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor 

Advisory Committee 

(As of 1 May 1953) 

James P. Baxter 

President, Williams College 

John D. Hicks 

University of California 

William T. Hutchinson 

University of Chicago 

S. L. A. Marshall 

Detroit News 

Charles S. Sydnor 

Duke University 

Brig. Gen. Verdi B. Barnes 

Army War College 

Brig. Gen. Leonard J. Greeley 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

Brig. Gen. Elwyn D. Post 

Army Field Forces 

Col. Thomas D. Stamps 

United States Military Academy 

Col. C. E. Beauchamp 

Command and General Staff College 

Charles H. Taylor 

Harvard University 

Office of the Chief of Military History 

Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith, Chief * 

Chief Historian Kent Roberts Greenfield 

Chief, War Histories Division Col. G. G. O’Connor 

Chief, Editorial and Publication Division Col. B. A. Day 

Chief, Editorial Branch Joseph R. Friedman 

Chief, Cartographic Branch Wsevolod Aglaimoff 

Chief, Photographic Branch Ma,j. Arthur T. Lawry 

* Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward was succeeded by General Smith on 1 February 1953. 

· . . to Those Who Served 

Foreword 

This is a history of coalition warfare. It is focused upon the agency in which 

the decisions of governments were translated into orders, and upon the decisions 

of General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. 

The narrative describes the plans and recounts the events, controversial or 

otherwise, leading up to the creation of the Supreme Command and the choice 

of a Supreme Commander for the cross-Channel attack. It follows the history of 

this great command to the surrender of Germany. It is the history not only of 

the decisions that led to victory, but of the discussions, debates, conferences and 

compromises that preceded decisions. Controversy was inevitable in an undertaking that required the subordination of national interests to the common 

good. The author does not gloss over the conflicts that arose between allied nations or individuals. The picture that emerges from these pages is one of discussion and argument, but nevertheless one of teamwork. Differences of opinion 

and the discussion incident thereto are often the price of sound decisions. 

The nature of the subject, the purpose of the author, and generous contributions of information by the British make this an Anglo-American, rather than 

a strictly American, history. Subsequent publications based on a full exploration of British sources may be expected to round out the picture and give it 

deeper perspective as the history of a joint undertaking. 

ORLANDO WARD 

Maj. Gen., U.S.A. 

Chief of Military History 

Washington, D. C. 

27 January 1953 

ix 
Note on the History of the 

European Theater of Operations 

This volume tells the story of the Supreme Headquarters of that Allied 

Expeditionary Force which seized a foothold on the German-held shores of 

western Europe in 1944 and which, by the following year, had completed the 

liberation of all western Europe. 

The history of the battles fought by the American armies of the Grand ,Al.-

liance as they drove from the Normandy beaches into the heart of Germany is 

given detailed exposition in other volumes of this series, some of which already 

have been presented to the public. The present volume deals with the command 

exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander, the decisions made by the 

Supreme Commander and his staff, and the operations conducted under the 

aegis of the Supreme Headquarters. 

The reader constantly will be reminded that the war in western Europe was 

fought by Allies and that the commands and decisions which determined the 

ultimate conduct of this war came from an Allied headquarters. Every effort 

has been made to draw on the records of all the Western Allies and the memories of their leaders, as well as the records and memories of the German High 

Command. But this volume is an integral part of a series dedicated to the 

United States Army in World War II and inevitably is written from an American point of view. 

Research for the volume was completed in 1951 and an initial draft circulated to more than fifty key participants in the events therein described. The 

author completed a final and revised manuscript in January 1952. No effort has 

been made to include information or record opinions which have been published in the United States or abroad since that date. 

The author, Forrest C. Pogue, has studied diplomatic history and international relations at Clark University and the University of Paris, receiving the 

Ph.D. degree from the former institution in 1939. Before his entry into military 

service, in 1942, he taught European history at Murray (Ky.) State College. 

Dr. Pogue made the five campaigns of the First United States Army as a combat historian, collecting information on battles from OMAHA Beach to Pilzen. 

Washington, D. C. 

15 May 1952 

x 

HUGHM.COLE 

Chief, European Section 
Preface 

The purpose of this volume is to tell how the Supreme Allied Command 

prosecuted the war against the enemy in northwest Europe in 1944-45. A part 

of that story has to do with the way in which an integrated command, devoted 

to the Allied cause, waged one of the most effective coalition wars in history. 

I have deliberately focused this account on the Supreme Commander and 

his staff, incl uding for the most part only those decisions of the Prime Minister, 

the President, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff which affected the activities of 

the Supreme Commander. On the enemy side, I have included enough detail 

on Hitler and his commanders to provide a contrast between the Allied and 

enemy command organizations. 

Although General Eisenhower commanded air, sea, and ground forces in 

the operations in northwest Europe, it has been necessary for reasons oflimitations of space and time to restrict the narrative basically to his command of the 

ground forces. Only enough material has been retained on air and naval matters to show how they affected the SHAEF command organization and to deal 

with those cases where SHAEF's intervention was required. This approach has 

seemed doubly important in a volume comprising part of the UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series. 

The Allied point of view has been considered throughout, but it has not 

always been possible to present British and French views as fully as the American because of the lack of the same ready accessibility to British and French 

files. 

Operations have been considered from the standpoint of their influence on 

the Supreme Commander's decisions and the effects of his directives on the field 

commanders. A corrective to this emphasis on command at the expense oftactical action may be found in the operational volumes of this series and in similar 

accounts now in preparation by the British and Canadian historical sections. 

This volume differs from others in the European series because of the 

greater attention necessarily given to political or nonoperational questions. To 

tell the full story ofSHAEF, I have had to interrupt the operational narrative 

on occasion in order to interject discussions of such matters as press relations, 

civil affairs, military government, psychological warfare, and relations with the 

liberated countries of Europe. As the war progressed these matters tended to 

occupy an ever-increasing proportion of the Supreme Commander's time. 

The accounts of Allied operations in this volume rest heavily on after action 

reports and semiofficial histories of the army groups and armies. These in turn 

Xl 
were based on daily situation and operational reports made during the battle. 

Since the latter reports were prepared under the stress of battle and may not 

always be wholly accurate, the narrative may repeat some of their inaccuracies 

as to dates, units involved, and precise achievements. Whenever it has been 

clear that the reports were in error, corrections have been made. The primary 

sources, however, represent operations much as the Supreme Commander saw 

them at the time when he issued his directives and are therefore more valuable 

for throwing light on his decisions than later amended accounts. 

A word of caution is necessary for the reader who may be unduly impressed 

by the accounts of controversy and difference of opinion which arose between 

commanders of the same nationality, officers of different nationalities, and 

heads of governments. The debates that stemmed from divergent viewpoints 

were in all probability heightened by disparate national interests or by clashes 

of temperament and personality. When the discussions of the participants in 

Allied conferences are seen in cold print, without the benefit of the smile which 

softened a strong argument or the wry shrug which made clear that the debate 

was for the record, and when there is no transcript of the friendly conversation 

which followed the official conference, the reader may get the impression that 

constant argument and heated controversy marked most meetings between 

Allied leaders. Likewise, interoffice memorandums, written by men at planning levels, frequently give the erroneous impression that the officers concerned 

were engaged mainly in baiting traps and digging pitfalls for their opposite 

numbers. It is inevitable that a study of such discussions will emphasize the disagreements and spell out the problems in reaching accords. The numerous basic 

decisions which were reached with only minor debate attract less attention. No 

true history of the war can be written by describing merely the disputes and 

controversies of the Allies; even less can it be written on the assumption that 

even the best of Allies can achieve agreement without prolonged discussion and 

debate. It is important to remember that different nations, although Allies, have 

divergent interests, and that they are not being unfriendly if they pursue those 

interests. 

An alliance is based on an agreement by two or more powers that they will 

oppose their combined forces and resources to a common enemy. They do not 

agree thereby to have an absolute community. of interest. The success of such 

an alliance is to bejudged, therefore, not by the amount of heat which may be 

engendered between the powers in their attempts to find a course of action 

which will most nearly preserve their individual aims while gaining a common 

goal, but rather by the degree to which the powers, while frankly working on a 

basis of self-interest, manage to achieve the one aim for which their forces were 

brought together. On that basis the \,yestern Powers forged a unity seldom, if 

ever, achieved in the history of grand alliances. Their commanders, while striving to preserve national identity and gain individual honors for their forces, still 

waged a victorious war. 

The Supreme Command has benefited greatly from the advice and help of a 

number of individuals in the United States and abroad. Only a few can be 

XII 
singled out for special mention. To the others, I have space only to express my 

deep appreciation. 

For recommending me to Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith as the person to write 

a history of SHAEF and for many helpful suggestions, I wish to thank Col. 

S. L. A. Marshall under whom I served as a combat historian in Europe. In addition to the present Chief Historian, Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, and other 

officials of the Office of the Chief of Military History whose important contributions to the volume go without saying, I should like to list the names of Maj. 

Gen. Harry J. Malony, Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Col. A. F. Clark, and Col. 

John Kemper, who are no longer with the Office, as persons who helped make 

this volume possible. 

The footnotes indicate only partially the generous way in which fellow historians employed by the Army, Air Force, and Navy in this country, Great 

Britain, and Canada have made available information in their files. I wish to 

thank in particular Brigadier H. B. Latham, Chief, British Historical Section, 

Cabinet Office, Lt. Col. A. E. Warhurst, formerly of that section, and other 

members of Brigadier Latham's staff for their assistance in gathering material 

on British forces. I am similarly indebted to Col. C. P. Stacey, Chief, Cana> 

dian Historical Section, for aid extended to me when I was writing those portions of the volume relating to the Canadian Army. These historians, it should 

be noted, do not by these actions concur in the conclusions reached by me nor 

are they responsible for my interpretations. 

Nearly one hundred British, U.S., and French officers and civilians aided 

me greatly by granting interviews in which they talked candidly of the work of 

the Supreme Commander and his headquarters. Their names have been listed 

in the bibliographical note. I have a special debt to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith, Marshal of the Air Force Lord Tedder, Lt. 

Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan, and Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker for giving generously of their time and supplying me with their private papers on the period 

concerned. Some fifty former participants in the activities of the Supreme Command were kind enough to read part or all of my manuscript. Of these I must 

make special mention of Brigadier E. T. Williams, now Warden of Rhodes 

Scholars at Oxford, who generously took many hours from his vacation in 1951 

to check the British side of this story. It is, of course, to be understood that 

neither he nor the other officers who checked the manuscript necessarily agreed 

with my conclusions. 

For assistance in exploring a number of documents in the Department of 

the Army files and the German sources I wish to express my especial appreciation to Mr. Royce Thompson of the European Section, and to Mr. Detmar 

Finke and Mrs. Magna E. Bauer of the Foreign Studies Section. I was always 

able to count on their willing assistance even when they were carrying on similar duties for other writers in our series. I have made specific mention elsewhere 

of their precise contributions to the volume. Among the employees of the Departmental Records Branch, AGO, who dealt so willingly with my requests for 

the files in their keeping, I wish to thank in particular Mr. Albert Whitt, Mrs. 

Blanche Moore, and Mrs. Ellen Smith Garrison. I have also drawn heavily on 

XIU 
the patience and the labor of Mr. Israel Wice and members of his Reference 

Branch staff in the OCMH. 

I have been fortunate throughout the writing of this volume in having the 

advice of Editor Joseph R. Friedman who has saved me from numerous errors 

and has made many suggestions for improving the narrative. Miss Constance 

Gay Morenus edited the footnotes and copy-edited the entire manuscript. Mrs. 

Helen McShane Bailey had the difficult job of preparing the index. Typing of 

the manuscript in its initial form was done by Mr. John Lee and after revision 

by Miss Beatrice Bierman. The excellent maps of the volume bear the imprint 

of Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff, whose skill as a cartographer has distinguished all 

the volumes of this series. 

The Supreme Command was written under the general direction of Dr. Hugh 

M. Cole, Chief of the European Section, Office of the Chief of Military History. 

His broad knowledge of military history and wise counsel have been of great 

aid to me throughout the writing of this volume. 

Recognition of their contributions by no means implies that the individuals 

who lent their assistance have approved either my English or my interpretations. 

For these, as well as for the general outline and the major research on this volume, I must bear the responsibility. 

Washington, D. C. 

15 January 1952 

FORREST C. POGUE 

xiv 
Contents 

Page 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

Chapter 

I . THE SUPREME COMMANDER .............. 23 

The Selection of the Supreme Commander ............ 23 

The New Commander ................... 33 

II . THE COALITION COMMAND .............. 36 

Heads of Governments ................... 36 

Combined Chiefs of Staff .................. 37 

The Supreme Commander and His Subordinates ......... 41 

The Organization of the Subordinate Commands ......... 45 

The Supreme Commander’s Directive ............. . 49 

III. THE NATURE OF SHAEF ................ 56 

Contributions of AFHQ .................. 56 

Contributions of COSSAC .................. 58 

The Chief Deputies ................... 60 

IV . THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF .............. 66 

The Powers Reserved to SHAEF ............... 66 

The Operations Division .................. 68 

The Intelligence Division .................. 71 

Administration ....................... 73 

Civil Affairs ........................ 75 

Publicity and Psychological Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . 84 

The Special Staff Divisions ................. 91 

Political Officers ...................... 95 

Committees ........................ 96 

Locations of SHAEF .................. 96 

V . PLANNING BEFORE SHAEF ............... 98 

Early Background ..................... 98 

Allied Planning and Preparation in 1943 ............ 102 

The COSSAC Plans ....................... 105 

VI . SHAEF REVISES PLANS FOR THE ATTACK ....... 107 

Strengthening and Widening the Assault and the Postponement of 

ANVIL. ...................... 108 

Increase of Airborne Units in the Assault ............ 118 

The Revised Plan ..................... 121 

VI1 . SHAEF’S AIR PROBLEMS, JANUARY–JUNE 1944 ..... 123 

Problems of Command ................... 123 

Railway Bombing Plan ................... 127 

CROSSBOW ..................... 134 

Effect of the Air Program .................. 136 

XV 
Chapter Page 

VIII . RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES .... 138 

Allied Liaison Machinery .................. 138 

Civil Affairs Agreements .................. 139 

Troubled Relations With the French Committee .......... 140 

IX . FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION ...... 158 

Intensified Air Efforts Against the Enemy ............ 158 

Propaganda Efforts Against the Enemy ............. 161 

Security for the Operation .................. 162 

The Patton Episode .................... 164 

Exercises and Maneuvers .................. 166 

The Decision To Go .................... 166 

X . D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT ............... 171 

Unfolding of the Grand Design ................ 171 

The Enemy ....................... 175 

Allied Command ..................... 180 

The Battle for Caen ..................... 183 

XI . THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE .... 192 

The Allied Situation in Late July ............... 192 

The German Situation ................... 193 

Plans for the Breakout ................... 196 

The COBRA Operation ................... 199 

Hitler Outlines His Plan .................. 201 

Eisenhower Prepares for Action ................ 203 

The Mortain Counterattack ................. 206 

Closing the Falaise Gap .................. 208 

Withdrawal to the Seine ................... 215 

XII . THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN FRANCE ........ 218 

The Second Phase of the ANVIL Controversy .......... 218 

The Landings and the Advance ................ 227 

XIII . RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH, JUNE-SEPTEMBER 

1944 .......................... 231 

Civil Affairs ....................... 231 

Command of the French Resistance Forces ............ 236 

Activities of French Resistance, June-August 1944 ......... 237 

The Liberation of Paris ................... 239 

XIV . THE PURSUIT STOPS SHORT OF THE RHINE ..... 244 

The Situation at the End of August .............. 244 

Allied Plans for an Advance to the Rhine ............ 249 

Logistical Reasonsfor the Halt ................ 256 

XV . COMMAND REORGANIZATION, JUNE-OCTOBER 1944 .. 261 

The Ground Forces ..................... 261 

The Air and Naval Forces .................. 269 

Shifts in Locations of Supreme Headquarters ........... 275 

xvi 
Chapter Page 

XVI . FIGHTING IN THE NORTH ............... 279 

Background of Operations in the Netherlands ........... 279 

The MARKET-GARDEN Operation ............ 284 

Discussion of Future Operations ................ 288 

The Battle for Antwerp ................... 298 

XVII . THE BATTLES OF ATTRITION, SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 

1944 ......................... 302 

The Enemy Regroups .................... 302 

Plans To End the War Quickly ................ 

October Battles ...................... 304 

307 

The November Offensive ................... 310 

Allied Strategy Re-examined ................. 312 

Action in December .................... 317 

XVIII . RELATIONS WITH LIBERATED COUNTRIES ...... 319 

Relations With France ................... 319 

Relations With Belgium ................... 328 

Relations With the Netherlands ................ 334 

Allied Public Information Activities in the Liberated Countries .... 336 

Other Aid to Liberated Peoples ................ 337 

XIX . PROGRAM FOR GERMANY ............... 339 

Efforts To Induce German Surrender .............. 339 

Military Government of Germany ............... 346 

XX . THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES .......... 359 

The German Plan ..................... 359 

Allied Estimate of Enemy Intentions .............. 361 

The Attack ........................ 372 

Preparations for an Allied Attack ............... 385 

The Allies Take the Initiative ................ 393 

The Attack in Northern Alsace ................ 397 

The Question of Strasbourg ................. 398 

6th Army Group Counterattack ....... ....... 402 

Effects of the German Counteroffensive .............. 404 

XXI . THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND . .......... 405 

Russian Plans ............ .......... 405 

Formulation of Allied Strategy ...... .......... 407 

General Eisenhower’s Replies ....... .......... 409 

Discussion of Strategy by the Combined Chiefs .......... 413 

Looking Toward the Rhine ........ .......... 417 

German Difficulties .......... .......... 418 

SHAEF Establishes a Forward Headquarters .......... 419 

Allied Operations, January-February 1945 . ........... 420 

The Crossing of the Rhine in the North ... .......... 427 

xvii 
Chapter Page 

XXII . THE BATTLE FOR THE RUHR .............. 434 

A Change of Plans ..................... 434 

Encircling the Ruhr .................... 436 

The Ruhr Pocket ..................... 439 

XXIII . THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE ................ 441 

Shall It Be Berlin? .................... 441 

The Area and the Enemy .................. 447 

The Nature of the Pursuit .................. 448 

Operations in the North .................. 449 

The Main Thrust to the Elbe ................ 451 

6th Army Group Oberations ................. 454 

XXIV . THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE (CONTINUED) ........ 457 

Aid for the Netherlands ................... 457 

The Stuttgart Incident ................... 459 

Avoiding Clashes With the Russians ............. 461 

The End of Hitler ...................... 469 

XXV . THE GERMAN SURRENDER ............... 475 

Early Peace Feelers .................... 475 

Doenitz Appraises the Situation ................ 478 

Piecemeal Surrenders .................... 480 

Preliminary Talks With SHAEF ............... 483 

Surrender at Reims ..................... 485 

Ceremony at Berlin ..................... 490 

XXVI . THE LAST PHASE ..................... 495 

Initial Measures ...................... 495 

Disarming the German Forces ................. 497 

The Final German Surrenders ................ 502 

Disarming the Enentv in Denmark and Norway .......... 508 

Closing Out Supreme Headquarters .............. 511 

Appendix 

A . SHAEF AND THE PRESS. JUNE 1944-MAY 1945 ...... 519 

B . SHAEF PERSONNEL .................... 529 

C . ROSTER OF KEY OFFICERS. SHAEF ........... 536 

D . FORCES UNDER SHAEF. 1944–45 ............. 539 

E . STRENGTH AND CASUALTY FIGURES .......... 542 

F . THE SUPREME COMMANDER'S ORDERS OF THE DAY . 545 

G . TABLE OF EQUIVALENT RANKS ............. 550 

GLOSSARY ........................... 551 

CODE NAMES .......................... 554 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE .................... 557 

INDEX ............................. 571 

xviii 
Tables 

No . Page 

1 . Casualties Caused by Flying Bomb and Rocket Attacks on the United 

Kingdom. 1944-45 ...................... 252 

2 . Estimated Casualties in the Ardennes ................ 396 

1945 ............................ 402 

Force, 12 .July 1944 ...................... 533 

Force, 1 February 1945 .................... 534 

Force, 1 April 1945 . . .................... 535 

tions, July 1944-June 1945 ................... 542 

3 . U.S. Battle Casualties, Ardennes-Alsace, 16 December 1944-25 January 

4 . Authorized Strength of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 

5 . Authorized Strength of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 

6 . Authorized Strength of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 

7 . Assigned Strength of U.S. Army Forces in European Theater of Opera8 . Battle Casualties of U.S. Army in European Theater of Operations, June 

1944-May 1945 ........................ 543 

9 . British and Canadian Strengths, Northwest Europe, 1944-45 ..... 543 

10 . Battle Casualties of the British 21 Army Group, D Day to V-E Day . . 544 

11 . Battle Casualties of French Army, 8 November 1942-8 May 1945 ... 544 

Charts 

1 . Allied Organization for Combined Operations. 24 May 1944 ...... 38 

2 . Chain of Command. Allied Expeditionary Force. 13 February 1944 ... 54 

3 . Supreme Headquarters. Allied Expeditionary Force. 6 June 1944 . . 67 

4 . Operational Chain of Command. AEF. 1 April 1944 ......... 159 

5 . Operational Chain of Command. AEF. 1 September 1944 ...... 262 

6 . Operational Channels. First Allied Airborne Army. 28 November 1944 . 270 

7 . Operational Chain of Command. AEF. 18 December 1944 ...... 379 

8 . Operational Chain of Command. AEF. 27 March 1945 ........ 428 

9 . Operational Chain of Command, AEF. 1 May 1945 .......... 455 

Maps 

1 . D Day to Breakout. 6 June-24 July 1944 .............. 172 

2 . Campaign in Southern France, 15 August-1 5 September 1944 ..... 226 

3 . The Arnhem Operation. 17-26 September 1944 ........... 285 

4 . Clearing the Schelde Estuary. 2 October-8 November 1944 ...... 299 

5 . Battle of the Ardennes. 16-26 December 1944 ............ 373 

6 . Battle of the Ardennes. 26 December 1944-28 January 1945 ...... 394 

7 . The Battle of Alsace. 1 January-9 February 1945 ............ 399 

9 . Battle of the Ruhr. 28 March-18 April 1945 . ............ 437 

8 . Situation in Europe. 15 January 1945 ................ 408 

xix 
Maps I-VI Are in Inverse Order Inside Back Cover 

NO. 

I. Order of Battle OB WEST. 6 June 1944 

II. Breakout and Advance to the Seine. 25 July-25 August 1944 

III. Pursuit to the German Border. 26 August-15 September 1944 

IV. Battle of Attrition. 16 September-15 December 1944 

V. Battle of the Rhineland and Crossing of the Rhine. 8 February-28 March 

1945 

VI. Drive to the Elbe, 4 April-7 May 1945 

Illustrations 

Page 

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower ............ Frontispiece 

General Morgan .......................... 24 

General Marshall and Secretary Stimson ............... 26 

Conference at Quebec ......................... 40 

Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory ................... 46 

Admiral Ramsay .......................... 46 

General Brereton .......................... 47 

General Spaatz .......................... 47 

General Bradley .......................... 50 

General Montgomery ........................ 50 

General Crerar .......................... 51 

General Dempsey ......................... 51 

General Devers .......................... 57 

General Barker .......................... 57 

Air Chief Marshal Tedder ...................... 61 

General Smith ........................... 63 

Air Vice Marshal Robb ....................... 64 

General Gale ........................... 64 

General Bull ............................ 69 

General Whiteley ......................... 69 

General Nevins ............................ 69 

Brigadier McLean ......................... 69 

General Strong ........................... 70 

General Crawford ......................... 73 

General Lee ............................ 74 

General Grasett .......................... 82 

General Davis ........................... 84 

General McClure ......................... 85 

General Cameron ......................... 94 

General Vulliamy ......................... 94 

General Kenner ........................... 94 

General Hughes .......................... 94 

xx 
Page 

High-Level Conference ....................... 110 

Air Attack ............................ 133 

General de Gaulle ......................... 148 

General Koenig .......................... 149 

Aerial Reconnaissance ....................... 160 

U . S . Mulberry .......................... 174 

Adolf Hitler ............................ 176 

Field Marshal Keitel ........................ 176 

Field Marshal von Rundstedt .................... 178 

General Baskowitz ......................... 178 

Field Marshal Rommel ....................... 195 

Field Marshal von Kluge ...................... 195 

General Patton .......................... 205 

General Hodges .......................... 205 

Field Marshal Kesselring ...................... 212 

Field Marshal Model ........................ 212 

General Patch ........................... 227 

General de Lattre de Tassigny ................... 227 

General Simpson .......................... 265 

General Gerow ........................... 266 

Air Chief Marshal Harris ...................... 272 

General Vandenberg ........................ 272 

Trianon Palace Hotel ........................ 277 

General Doolittle .......................... 317 

General Juin ........................... 398 

SHAEF atReims ......................... 420 

Admiral Burrough ......................... 430 

Meeting at the Elbe ........................ 453 

Surrender at Reims ......................... 489 

Surrender at Berlin ....................... 493 

Victory Speech ........................ 512 

I . G . Farbenindustrie Building .................. 513 

Illustrations are from the following sources 

J . C . A . Redhead, FRPS, London: page 46 (Leigh-Mallory) . Bassano Ltd., London: page 46 (Ramsay) . British Information Services: page 50 (Montgomery) . 

Canadian Army: page 51 (Crerar) . Fayer Camera Portraits, London: page 148 . Service Cinéma des Armées, France: page 398 . Walter Stoneman, London: pages 94 (Cameron, Vulliamy, Hughes), 430 . Captured German Photographs: pages 176, 178, 195, 212 . 

All other photographs are from Department of Defense files 

xxi 

Biographical Sketches* 

BRIG. GEN. FRANK A. ALLEN, JR. served as chief of the Pictorial and Radio Branch of 

the Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, from February to August 1941. 

From August 1941 to June 1943 he held various command assignments in the 

United States with the 1st, 5th, and 9th Armored Divisions. In June 1943 he assumed command of one of the 1st Armored Division's combat commands in 

North Africa. Later, in Italy, he headed Task Force Allen, which was organized 

by II Corps. In July 1944 he was appointed G–2 of the 6th Army Group. He 

came from that post in September 1944 to SHAEF as chief of the Public Relations Division. 

GENERAL OF THE ARMY HENRY H. ARNOLD, one of the first Army fliers, was a pioneer 

in the development of airplanes and air techniques in the Army. After being selected Chief of the Air Corps in 1938, he pressed for the development of aircraft 

production and for a program for the civilian training of flying cadets. In 1940 

he became Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) and in the following year Chief, Army Air 

Forces. In 1942 his title was changed to Commanding General, Army Air Forces. 

GENERAL DER PANZERTRUPPEN HERMANN BALCK served as a company grade officer in 

World War I. At the outbreak of war in 1939 Balck was in the General Staff of 

the Army and was transferred to the command of a motorized rifle regiment in 

late October 1939. During the winter and spring of 1940–41 he commanded a 

Panzer regiment and later a Panzer brigade. He returned to staff duties in the 

Army High Command in July 1941. In May 1942, Balck went to the Eastern 

Front and successively commanded Panzer divisions, corps, and an army. He was 

transferred from command of the Fourth Panzer Army in Russia to the command of 

Army Group G in September 1944 and in late December was transferred back to 

the Eastern Front to command Army Group Balck. Balck was captured in Austria 

by Allied troops on 8 May 1945. 

MAJ. GEN. RAY W. BARKER was an artillery colonel in early 1942 when he was sent 

to the United Kingdom. In May of that year, under orders from General Marshall, he associated himself with British planners working on plans for a cross- 

* The rank given in each biography is the highest held by the individual concerned during the 

1944–45 period. Unless otherwise noted, the last position given for each name on the list was the one 

held at the end of the war. 
THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Channel operation for 1943. General Barker became head of the planning group 

at Headquarters, U.S. Forces in Europe, and in addition met regularly with the 

Combined Commanders planning group. He worked from July to September 

1942 on Operation TORCH and then returned to the cross-Channel project. He 

served as G–5 (then head of war plans) for ETOUSA from June to October 1942, 

as G–3, ETOUSA, from October 1942 to April 1943, as Deputy Chief of Staff, 

ETOUSA, from February to April 1943, and as G–5, ETOUSA, from April to 

October 1943. In the spring of 1943 he became deputy to General Morgan on 

the COSSAC staff and remained there until the spring of 1944 when he became 

the SHAEF G–1. 

GENERALOBERST JOHANNES BLASKOWITZ served as an infantry officer in World War I. 

In World War II he commanded the Eighth Army during the Polish campaign, and 

after a short term of service as Commander in Chief East in Poland he was transferred to command of the Ninth Army in the west. In early June 1940 he became 

Military Governor of Northern France. Blaskowitz held this position until October 1940 when he was transferred to the command of the First Army. He retained 

this post until May 1944 when he was named commander in chief of Army Group 

G. He was relieved of command of Army Group G in late September 1944 and reinstated on 24 December 1944. On 28 January 1945 he was appointed commander 

in chief of Army Group H. This command was redesignated in early April 1945 and 

Blaskowitz became Commander in Chief Netherlands. He was captured on 8 May 

1945 at Hilversum, Holland. 

GEN. OMAR N. BRADLEY in 1940 became an assistant secretary of the General Staff 

in the War Department. In February 1941 he was given command of the 

Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga. From this post he went to the 82d Division 

early in 1942. In June of that year he assumed command of the 28th Division. 

General Marshall sent him to North Africa in February 1943 to act as an 

observer for General Eisenhower. A few weeks later Bradley became deputy 

commander of II Corps under General Patton, and in April, when Patton was 

given the task of planning the Sicilian campaign, he took command of II Corps. 

In the new command, General Bradley fought in Tunisia and Sicily. He was 

selected in September 1943 to head the First U.S. Army in the invasion of northwest Europe as well as a U.S. army group headquarters. General Bradley led the 

First Army in the Normandy campaign until 1 August 1944 when he became 

commander of the 12th Army Group. 

LT. GEN. LEWIS H. BRERETON graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1907, 

transferred to the Army in 1911, and in turn transferred to the flying section of 

the Signal Corps in 1912. He was a flier in Europe in World War I. In July 1941, 

General Brereton was given command of the Third Air Force. When war broke 

out, he was the commanding general of the Far East Air Force in the Philippine 

Islands. At the beginning of 1942 he became Deputy Air Commander in Chief, 

2 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 3 

Allied Air Forces, on the staff of General Wavell besides serving as commander 

of the Fifth Air Force. General Brereton organized and commanded the Tenth 

Air Force in India in March 1942. Two months later he became commander of 

the Middle East Air Force. In February 1943 he assumed in addition the command of U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East. In October 1943 he was transferred to the United Kingdom where he became commanding general of the 

Ninth Air Force. He was appointed commander in chief of the First Allied Airborne Army in August 1944. 

FIELD MARSHAL SIR ALAN BROOKE (Now LORD ALANBROOKE), a graduate of the 

Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, served in World War I, receiving the Distinguished Service Order with bar and other awards for his actions. By 1941 he 

had gained a reputation as the Army’s expert on mechanization. He commanded 

the 2d British Corps in France in the early part of World War II and helped to 

make possible the successful evacuation at Dunkerque. Generals Montgomery 

and Alexander served under him at that time. Shortly thereafter he became 

commander of the British Home Forces and organized the defenses of the United 

Kingdom against possible attack by the Germans. He succeeded Field Marshal 

Dill as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1941. 

MAJ. GEN. HAROLD R. BULL served as Secretary, General Staff, of the War Department in 1939. He followed this duty with assignment as Professor of Military 

Science and Tactics at Culver Military Academy, and later as assistant division 

commander of the 4th Motorized Division. After the outbreak of war, he became 

G–3 of the War Department, and went from this post to head the Replacement 

School Command, Army Ground Forces. In the summer of 1943 General Marshall sent him to North Africa as a special observer. On his return, he became the 

commanding general of III Corps, holding this post from June to September 

1943. In the latter month, he was sent to London where he became deputy G–3 

of COSSAC. In February 1944 he was appointed G–3, SHAEF. 

ADMIRAL HAROLD M. BURROUCH was assistant chief of the Naval Staff, Admiralty, 

at the beginning of the war. From 1940 to 1942 he commanded a cruiser squadron. He was commander of Naval Forces, Algiers, in 1942, and Flag Officer 

Commanding Gibraltar and Mediterranean Approaches, 1943–45. In January 

1945 he succeeded Admiral Ramsay as Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, 

Expeditionary Force. After the dissolution of SHAEF he became British Naval 

Commander-in-Chief, Germany. 

LT. GEN. M. B. BURROWS served in the North Russian Expeditionary Force, 1918–19. 

In the period 1938–40 he was military attaché at Rome, Budapest, and Tirana. 

He served as head of the British Military Mission to the USSR in 1943–44, and 

as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the West Africa Command in 

1945–46. 
4 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL ERNST BUSCH served as an infantry officer in World War I. 

He commanded the VIII Corps in the Polish compaign and in October 1939 was 

appointed commander of the Sixteenth Army. In November 1943 he was made 

acting commander in chief of Army Group Center on the Eastern Front. From May 

1944 until August 1944 Busch was commander in chief of Army Group Center. He 

was then relieved and placed in the officers’ reserve pool until March 1945 when 

he was made commander of Fuehrungsstab Nordkueste which was renamed OB 

NORDWEST in early May 1945. 

MAJ. GEN. A. M. CAMERON, a member of the antiaircraft operations section of the 

War Office at the beginning of the war, went to Antiaircraft Command Headquarters in 1940. Later he commanded a brigade and a group in the Antiaircraft 

Command. He was commanding a group on the south coast of England when 

sent to SHAEF in May 1944. 

MAJ. GEN. JOHN G. W. CLARK was commander of an infantry brigade at the start 

of the war and led it to France. Later he was a divisional commander in Palestine 

and Iraq. He served in North Africa and Sicily in 1942 and 1943 and at the end 

of 1943 he became Major General in Charge of Administration, Middle East. In 

January 1944 he was transferred to Allied Force Headquarters as chief administrative officer. One year later he became head of the SHAEF Mission 

(Netherlands). 

LT. GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS was chief of staff of VII Corps in January 1941. After 

the attack at Pearl Harbor he became chief of staff of the Hawaiian Department. 

In May 1942 he became commanding general of the 25th Division. He relieved 

the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal in December 1942 and later fought in 

the New Georgia campaign. In December 1943 he was transferred to the European Theater of Operations where he assumed command of the VII Corps and 

led it in the assault on northwest Europe. 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR ARTHUR CONINCHAM served with the New Zealand Forces 

Samoa and Egypt from 1914 to 1916 and then in Europe from 1916 to 1919. In 

World War II he served with Bomber Command, working with the Eighth Army 

in North Africa and forming the First Tactical Air Force, French North Africa. 

He furnished air support to the Eighth Army in Sicily and Italy in 1943 and 

commanded the 2d Tactical Air Force in northwest Europe in 1944–45. 

MAJ. GEN ROBERT W. CRAWFORD was district engineer in New Orleans in 1939 when 

he was called to the War Plans Division in Washington and assigned duties in 

connection with overseas supplies, munitions, allocations, and the like. By July 

1942 he was transferred to the 8th Armored Division as head of a combat command. Near the end of 1942, he became Commanding General, Services of Supply, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East. From this post he was sent in July 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 

1943 to the United Kingdom where he served for a time as deputy commander 

and later as chief of staff of the Services of Supply organization, and as G–4, 

Headquarters, ETOUSA. In November 1943 he became deputy G–4 of 

COSSAC. On the activation of SHAEF he became G–4 of SHAEF. 

REAR ADM. GEORGE E. CREASY commanded a destroyer flotilla from 1939 to May 

1940. From June 1940 to August 1942, he headed the division of antisubmarine 

warfare at the Admiralty, and in 1942–43 commanded the Duke of York, taking 

part in the North African landings. In August 1943 he joined COSSAC as naval 

chief of staff, becoming chief of staff to Admiral Ramsay when the latter was 

named to the post of Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force. 

GEN. HENRY D. G. CRERAR was senior officer, Canadian Military Headquarters, 

London, in 1939–40. In 1940–41 he served as Chief of General Staff, Canada. 

He became commander of the 2d Canadian Division Overseas in 1941. From 

1942 to 1944 he commanded the 1st Canadian Corps and for a part of the same 

period commanded the Canadian Corps Mediterranean Area (1943-44). He 

led the 1st Canadian Army in 1944–45. 

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR ANDREW B. CUNNINGHAM entered the Royal Navy in 

1898 and participated in World War I. As Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, 

between 1939 and 1942, he directed operations against the Italian Fleet at 

Taranto and Matapan and evacuated the British forces from Greece. He headed 

the British naval delegation in Washington briefly in 1942 before becoming 

Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force, North Africa. In October 

1943 he replaced Admiral Sir Dudley Pound as First Sea Lord. 

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS J. DAVIS was an aide of General MacArthur in the Philippines 

from 1928 to 1930 and returned with him to the U.S. to duty in the Office ofthe 

Chief of Staff in 1930. In September 1933 he returned to the Philippines, serving 

as assistant military adviser under MacArthur until January 1938 when he became adviser in the Philippines on adjutant general affairs. In January 1940 

Davis came back to the War Department, first in The Adjutant General’s Office 

and then as executive officer of the Special Service Branch of the War Department. In April 1942 he became executive officer in the office ofthe Chief of Administrative Services, Headquarters, SOS. He was appointed adjutant general 

of Headquarters, ETOUSA, in July 1942. From August 1942 to January 1944 

he was adjutant general of Allied Force Headquarters. In February 1944 he was 

named adjutant general of SHAEF. In April when the SHAEF Public Relations 

Division was established, he became its head. In October 1944 he returned to 

the post of adjutant general of SHAEF. 

MAJ. GEN. JOHN R. DEANE was secretary of the War Department General Staff in 

February 1942. He became American secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

5 
6 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

in September 1942. In October 1943 he was appointed as head of the US. military mission to the USSR. 

MAJ. GEN. FRANCIS DE GUINGAND, a graduate of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, was Military Assistant to the Secretary of State for War in 1939–40 and 

later became Director Military Intelligence Middle East. In 1942–44 he served 

as chief of staff of the British Eighth Army, and in 1944 he took over the same 

post in the 21 Army Group. 

GEN. SIR MILES DEMPSEY commanded the 13th Infantry Brigade in France in 1940, 

receiving the D.S.O. He returned to England to become Brigadier General Staff 

with the Canadians under Gen. A. G. L. MacNaughton. Shortly after El 

Alamein, he took command of the 13th Corps of the Eighth Army and led it in 

the Sicilian campaign and in the invasion of Italy. In January 1944 he became 

commander of the Second British Army, which he led through the remainder of 

the war in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. 

GEN. JACOB L. DEVERS became chief of the Armored Forces, Fort Knox, Ky., in the 

summer of 1941. From this post he went in May 1943 to the command of the 

European Theater of Operations. While there he helped COSSAC in its planning for the OVERLORD operation. In December 1943 he succeeded General 

Eisenhower as commanding general of the North African Theater of Operations. 

Later he was Deputy Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, and 

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. In September 

1944 he became commander of the 6th Army Group, which consisted of Seventh 

U.S. and First French Armies. 

MAJ. GEN. RICHARD H.EWING was a brigadier instructing at the Imperial Defence 

College in 1939. Shortly thereafter he was appointed Director of Military Operations at the War Office with the rank of major general. In 1940 he became Chief 

of Staff, Far East, and in 1942 joined the British Army staff in Washington. He 

spent the next two years as head of the United Kingdom Liaison Staff in 

Australia and in 1945 was appointed head of SHAEF Mission (Denmark). 

FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL, a veteran of the Boer War, served near the end of 

World War I as Field Marshal Haig's Brigadier General Staff Operations. Later 

he was on the general staff in India, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence in the War Office, and commander in chief at Aldershot. He served as 

Chief of the Imperial General Staff from May 1940 to the end of 1941. In December 1941 he was sent to Washington as head of the British Joint Staff Mission and 

senior British member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization in Washington. He was serving in this capacity at the time of his death in November 1944. 

He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 

GROSSADMIRAL KARL DOENITZ served in naval air and submarine forces in World 

War I. He was placed in sole charge of Germany's U-Boats in 1935 when he was 

appointed Fuehrer der Unterseeboote. In early 1941 Doenitz' position was raised and 

he was named Bifehlshaber der Unterseeboote. He held this position until the spring 

of 1943 when he was given supreme command of the German Navy and named 

Grossadmiral. In late April 1945 Hitler designated Doenitz as his successor in place 

of Goering. After Hitler's death Doenitz carried on the German government until 

his arrest by the Allied Command in May 1945. 

LT. GEN. JAMES H. DOOLITTLE served in World War I as a flier. He resigned from the 

Army in 1930 but continued his work in aeronautics as a civilian. He was 

recalled to duty in 1940, and in April 1942 led the first aerial raid on theJapanese mainland. He was assigned to duty with the Eighth Air Force in the 

United Kingdom inJuly 1942 and in September of that year assumed comman.d 

of the Twelfth Air Force in North Africa. In March 1943 he became comm';'nding general of the North African Strategic Air Forces. He was named commander 

of the Fifteenth Air Force in November 1943. FromJanuary 1944 until the end 

of the ~ar he headed the Eighth Air Force in the European Theater of 

Operations. 

BRIG. GEN. BEVERLY C. DUNN was district engineer at Seattle, Wash., in July 1940. 

In March 1942 he was assigned to the North Atlantic Engineer Division, New 

York. He became deputy chief engineer at Headquarters, SHAEF, in February 

1944. Shortly before the dissolution of SHAEF he succeeded General Hughes as 

chief engineer. 

GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER was graduated from West Point in 

1915 and commissioned in that year. His first assignment was with the 19th Infantry Regiment. He remained with this unit, except for short periods of 

detached service, until 1917. In September of that year he was assigned to duty 

in the 57th Infantry Regiment. During World War I he served as instructor at 

the Officer Training Camp at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., from Septeinber to December 1917, taught in the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., from 

December 1917 to February 1918, had a tour of duty with the 65th Battalion 

Engineers, which he organized at Fort Meade, Md., and commanded Camp 

Colt, Pa. After the war he commanded tank corps troops at Fort Dix, N.J., and 

at Fort Benning, Ga. In 1919 he returned to Fort Meade where he served in 

various tank battalions until January 1922. Meanwhile he graduated from the 

Infantry Tank School. In 1922 he went to the Panama Canal Zone where he 

served as executive officer at Camp Gaillard. From September to December 1924 

he was recreation officer at the headquarters of Third Corps Area. This assignment was followed by a tour as recruiting officer at Fort Logan, Colo., until 

August 1925. He then attended Command and General Staff School at Fort 

Leavenworth, graduating as an honor student inJ une 1926. A brieftour with the 

7 
8 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

24th Division followed. From January to August 1927 he was on duty with the 

American Battle Monuments Commission in Washington. He graduated from 

the Army War College in June 1928 and then went back for a year with the 

Battle Monuments Commission with duty in Washington and France. From 

November 1929 to February 1933 he was Assistant Executive, Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of War. During this period he graduated from the Army 

Industrial College. From 1933 to September 1935 he was in the Office of the 

Chief of Staff (Gen. Douglas MacArthur). He served as assistant to the military 

adviser of the Philippine Islands from September 1935 to 1940. In 1940 he was 

assigned to duty with the 15th Infantry Regiment. In November of that year he 

became chief of staff of the 3d Division, in March 1941 chief of staff of the IX 

Corps, and in June 1941 chief of staff of the Third Army. He joined the War 

Plans Division of the War Department in December 1941 and became chief of 

the division in the following February. On 25 June 1942 he was named commanding general of the European Theater of Operations. In November 1942 lie 

commanded the Allied landings in North Africa and in the same month became 

Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in North Africa. As commander of Allied 

Forces in the Mediterranean he directed operations in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy 

until December 1943 when he was named Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. In this post he directed the invasion of northwest Europe and the 

campaigns against Germany. 

MAJ. GEN. GEORGE W. E. J AMES ERSKINE was a lieutenant colonel on the staff of a 

division in England at the outbreak of war. In June 1940 he was given command 

of a battalion and in January 1941 a brigade. He went with the latter to the 

Middle East in June 1941. In February 1942 he became Brigadier General Staff, 

Headquarters, 13 Corps, and in January 1943 was given command of the 7th 

Armoured Division. He commanded this unit in the Western Desert, Italy, and 

Normandy. In August 1944 he became head of the SHAEF mission to Belgium. 

GENERALADMIRAL HANS VON FRIEDEBURG, wascommanding admiral of submarines 

in June 1944. He was appointed commander in chief of the German Navy by 

Doenitz in early May 1945 and as such signed the final capitulations in Reims 

and Berlin. He committed suicide soon thereafter. 

LT. GEN. SIR HUMFREY M. GALE was deputy director of supplies and transport in the 

War Office at the beginning of the war. Two months later he became G–4 of 3 

British Corps and went to France. In 1940, after Dunkerque, he became Major 

General in Charge of Administration (includes both G–1 and G–4 functions in 

the British Army) in the Scottish Command. He left this assignment in July 1941 

to take a similar position at Home Forces under Sir Alan Brooke. In August 1942 

he was appointed chief administrative officer on General Eisenhower’s staff in the 

Mediterranean, where he remained until February 1944. At that time he was 

appointed one of the deputy chiefs of staff of SHAEF with the title Chief Administrative Officer. 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 

LT. GEN. LEONARD T. GEROW was executive officer of the War Plans Division ofthe 

War Department from 1936 to 1939. He served as chief of staff of the 2d Division 

through 1939. In 1940 he was appointed assistant commandant of the Infantry 

School. In October 1940 he was transferred to the 8th Division and in December 

of that year he was assigned to the War Plans Division, War Department. He was 

chief of that division at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. In February 1942 he 

was given command of the 29th Division and later was put in charge of field 

forces in the European theater. In July 1943 he became commander of V Corps 

and led that unit in the assault in northwest Europe. He became commanding 

general of the Fifteenth Army in January 1945. 

REICHSMARSCHALL HERMANN GOERING was one of Germany's outstanding flyers in 

World War L He became a member ofthe Nazi party in 1922 and held many 

party positions. In 1933 he was made Reich Minister for Air and in 1935 named 

Commander in Chief of the Air Force. As President of the Council of Ministers 

for the Defense of the Reich and as Trustee for the Four Year Plan, Goering exercised great influence on the political and economic life ofthe Reich. Long designated as Hitler's successor, he was removed from this position in late April 1945. 

Goering was captured by American forces in May 1945. 

LT. GEN. SIR A. E. GRASETT, a Canadian-born officer, was stationed in China in 

1938-41. He returned to the United Kingdom in 1941 to command a division, 

and from 1941 to 1943 a corps. He next served as chief of the Liaison Branch of 

the \'Var Office, and after the organization of Supreme Headquarters he became 

chief of the European Allied Contact Section. In April 1944 he was appointed 

chief of the G-5 Division. 

GENERALOBERST HEINZ GUDERIAN, a veteran of World War I, was a strong proponent 

of armored warfare. At the outbreak of World War II, he was given command of 

XIX Panzer Corps and in this position fought in the Polish and French campaigns. 

He commanded the Second Panzer Group, later designated Second Panzer Amry, in the 

Russian campaign from June to December 1941. Guderian was tl:Ien placed in an 

officers' reserve pool until February 1943, at which time he was assigned as Inspector General of Panzer Troops. In July 19H, while still on this assignment, he was designated as acting chief of the Army General Staff. He held these positions until he 

was relieved in March 1945. Guderian was captured near Zell am See, Tirol, 10 

May 1945. 

MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE SIR ARTHUR T. HARRIS, who was commanding 

the RAF in Palestine and Transjordan in the summer of 1939, became chief of the 

No.5 Group of Bomber Command at the outbreak of war. In 1940 he became 

deputy chief of the Air Staff under Air Chief Marshal PortaL In May 1941 he 

came to the United States as head of the RAF delegation and as member of the 

British Joint Staff Mission. He remained in Washington until February 1942 

when he was named Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command. 

9 
10 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

GENERALOBERST DER WAFFEN SS PAUL HAUSSER was a member of the General Staff 

Corps and served as a divisional and corps staff officer in World War I. He was retired from the Army with the rank of Generalleutnant in 1932. Hausser became a 

member of the Waffen SS in 1934 and by 1939 had again reached his former rank 

of Generalleutnant. During the Polish campaign Hausser served on the staff of Panzer Division Kempf From October 1939 until October 1941 he commanded the 2d 

SS Panzer Division “Das Reich.” During this period he was wounded and had to be 

hospitalized until June 1942, at which time he became commander ofthe II SS 

Panzer Corps. He led this corps until the end of June 1944, fighting in the east, in 

Italy, and finally in Normandy. At the end of June 1944 Hausser was assigned to 

command the Seventh Army, holding this position until late August 1944, when he 

was again severely wounded and hospitalized until January 1945. From the end 

of January until the beginning of April 1945 Hausser commanded Army Group G. 

Thereafter, until he was taken prisoner on 13 May 1945, Hausser served on the 

staff of OB WEST 

REICHSFUEHRER SS UND CHEF DER DEUTSCHEN POLIZEI HEINRICH HIMMLER served as 

a 2d lieutenant in a Bavarian infantry regiment in World War I. A Nazi party 

member since 1925, Himmler by 1936 had brought all of the German police and 

the SS under his control. After the putsch of 20 July 1944 Himmler was also appointed Chief of the Replacement Army (Chef der Heeresruestung und Befehlshaber des 

Ersatztheeres). In late November 1944 all ofthe defenses on the eastern bank of the 

upper Rhine were placed under him as Oberbefehlshaber Oberrhein. Himmler 

retained this command until late January 1945 when he became commander in 

chief of Army Group Weichsel on the Eastern Front. On 20 March 1945 Himmler 

relinquished command of Army Group Weichsel. He was captured by Allied troops 

in early May 1945 and committed suicide shortly thereafter. 

GEN. COURTNEY H. HODGES, an overseas veteran of World War I, became commandant of the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., in October 1940. He was named 

Chief of Infantry, War Department, in May 1941, and commanding general of 

the Replacement and School Command, Army Ground Forces, in March 1942. 

Later he became commanding general of X Corps. From this post he went to the 

command ofthe Third Army in February 1943. In March 1944 he was sent to 

the European Theater of Operations as deputy commander of the First Army. He 

succeeded General Bradley in command of that army on 1 August 1944 and led 

it through France, Belgium, Germany, and to the Czechoslovakian frontier at the 

war’s end. 

MAJ. GEN. H. B. W. HUGHES was chief engineer of the Western Command in 1939 

and engineer-in-chief of General Wavell’s Middle East Command from 1940 to 

1943. In December 1943 he became chief engineer of COSSAC and in February 

of the following year chief of the Engineer Division of SHAEF. The latter post he 

held until the spring of 1945. 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 

GENERALOBERST ALFRED J ODL served as an artillery officer in World War I. In September 1939 JodI was assigned to the OKW / Wehrmachtjuehrungsstab, becoming 

chief of this office in the following month. He held this position until the close of 

the war. He became a prisoner of war in May of 1945. 

GENERAL ALPHONSE PIERRE JUIN was born in Algiers and spent much of his early 

career in North Africa. He served for a time as an aide of Marshal Lyautey and 

was regarded as a strong disciple of that commander. From 1938 to 1939 Juin was 

chief of staff to General Nogues, commander of the North African Theater of Operations. Near the close of 1939, he headed an infantry division in northern 

France and helped to cover the withdrawal to Dunkerque the following year. On 

the fall of France he became a German prisoner, but was released in 1941. In the 

summer ofthat year, he was given a command in Morocco and later in1941 was 

named commander in chief of French forces in North Africa. In 1943 he was 

placed at the head of the French Expeditionary Corps, which performed br~lliantly in Italy. In 1944 General de Gaulle appointed him to the post of Chief of 

Staff ofthe Ministry of National Defense. 

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL WILHELM KEITEL served in various staff positions at corps 

and army headquarters in World War I. He was appointed chief of OKW in 

1938, a position he held for the duration of the war. Keitel was taken into custody 

in mid-May 1945. 

MAJ. GEN. ALBERT W. KENNER was chief surgeon of the Armored Service at Fort 

Knox, Ky., at the beginning of the war. He was taken by General Patton to 

North Africa as chiefsurgeon ofthe Western Task Force in November 1942. One 

month later he became Chief Surgeon, North African Forces, under General 

Eisenhower. In 1943 he returned to Washington as Assistant Surgeon General 

with the task of training and inspecting Ground Forces medical troops. He came 

to SHAEF in February 1944 as chief medical officer. 

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL ALBERT KESSELRING, served on various divisional and corps 

staffs in World War I. After staff and troop assignments he was assigned as administrative chief to the Reich Air Ministry. Kesselring remained in this position 

until June 1936 when he was assigned as chief of the Air Force General Staff. In 

the Polish cam paign he commanded First Air Force and later in 1940 Second Air 

Force in France. In December 1941 Kesselring was appointed as Commander in 

Chief South with command of all German Air Force units in the Mediterranean 

and North African theaters. In the fall of 1943 he was redesignated as Commander in Chief Southwest with nominal command of the German armed forces 

in Italy. Kesselring was transferred to Germany as Commander in Chief West in 

March 1945 and later designated as Commander in Chief South. He was taken 

prisoner at Saalfelden on 6 May 1945. 

11 
12 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING graduated from the Naval Academy in 1901. He 

served during World War I as assistant chief of staff to the Commander in Chief, 

U.S. Fleet. Beginning in 1937 he served in succession as member of the General 

Board of the Navy, commander of the U.S. Fleet Patrol Force, and commander 

in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. In December 1941 he became Commander in Chief, 

U.S. Fleet, and in 1942 also took the title of Chief of Naval Operations. 

VICE ADM. ALAN G. KIRK in 1941 was naval attache in London, where his duties included reporting on German naval organization. From March to October 1941 

he served as Chief of Naval Intelligence in Washington. This assignment was followed by brief tours on convoy duty in the North Atlantic and in transporting 

troops to Iceland. In ~1ay 1942 he became chief of staff to Admiral Stark in London. Admiral Kirk was appointed Commander, Amphibious Force, Atlantic 

Fleet, in March 1943 and helped prepare the forces for the Sicilian operation. 

Later he was in charge of transporting some 20,000 soldiers to the Mediterranean. He served as commander of U.S. Naval Forces for the cross-Channel 

attack and held operational control of all U.S. naval forces under General Eisenhower except those in the south of France. Later he was head of the U.S. Naval 

Mission at SHAEF and was for a short time acting Allied Naval Commander 

after Admiral Ramsay was killed in January 1945. 

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL GUENTHER VON KLUGE served as an infantry and mountain 

troop officer in World War I. During the Polish and French campaigns, and the 

early part of the Russian campaign, of World War II von Kluge commanded the 

Fourth Arm)'. In December 1941 he was assigned as commander in chief of Army 

Group Center on the Eastern Front, a position he held until May 1944. Von Kluge 

relieved von Rundstedt as Commander in Chief West in early July 1944, and was 

relieved in turn by Model at the beginning of September 1944. On his way to 

Germany he committed suicide. 

GEN. PIERRE JOSEPH KOENIG was serving as a captain in the French Foreign Legion 

at the outbreak of war. As a major he led elements of the legion at Narvik in May 

andJune 1940. After these forces were withdrawn, he went back to France. On 

the fall of France he fled to the United Kingdom where he joined the Gaullist 

forces. Shortly thereafter he went to Africa. As the commander of a brigade, he 

fought at Bir Hacheim in Libya. On 1 August 1943 he became assistant chief of 

staff of the French ground forces in North Africa. The French Committee ofNationa I Liberation named him its delegate to SHAEF in March 1944 and also 

gave him the title of commander of French Forces of the Interior in Great Britain. 

When Allied forces entered France, he assumed command of the French Forces 

of the Interior in France. On the liberation of Paris in August 1944 he was named 

military governor of Paris and commander of the Military Region of Paris. In 

July 1945 he became commander in chief of French forces in Germany. 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 

GENERAL DER INFANTERIE HANS KREBS served as an infantry officer in World War 1. 

In 1939 he was in the Intelligence Division of the General Staff of the Army. Krebs 

was assigned as chief of staff of the VII Corps in December 1939 and served in this 

capacity until March 1941. He was then appointed as acting German military 

attache in Moscow, remaining in this post until the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union. FromJanuary 1942 until September 1944 he served 

as chief of staff first of the Ninth Army and later of Army Group Center on the Eastern 

Front. Krebs was appointed chief of staff of Army Group B at the beginning ofSeptember 1944 and remained in this position until 1 April 1945 when he was named 

acting chief of the General Staff. Krebs was killed or committed suicide in Berlin 

in May 1945. 

MAJ. GEN. FRANCIS H. LANAHAN, JR., was chief of the War Plans Division, Signal 

Corps, from December 1941 toJune 1942. From June to December 1942 h~ 

served as assistant director of planning in charge of the Theater Section. He ~as 

director of planning of the same branch from January toJune 1943. From August 

1943 to February 1945 he served as deputy chief of the Signal Division at 

COSSAC and SHAEF. In March 1945 he succeeded General Vulliamy as chief 

of the Signal Division, SHAEF. 

GEN. JEAN DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY commanded the 14th Infantry Division in 1940. 

He withdrew his forces into the French zone in that year. He was commanding 

a military region in the south of France in November 1942 when he was arrested 

for a demonstration he made at the time of the Allied landings in North Africa. 

He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment by the Vichy authorities but escaped from the Riom prison in September 1943 and went to the United Kingdom. At the end of the year he went to North Africa. On 18 April 1944 he was 

appointed commanding general of Armee B, which was later named the First 

French Army. 

FLEET ADMIRAL \VILLIAM D. LEAHY graduated from the Naval Academy in 1897 

and served in the war against Spain. During World War I he served on ships of 

the line and on a transport. In 1933 he became chief of the Bureau of Navigation. 

Four years later he became Chief of Naval Operations. In 1939, after he had retired, President Roosevelt appointed him governor of Puerto Rico and in the following year made him Ambassador to France. He was recalled to active duty in 

1942 and made chief of staff to the Commander in Chief, a post he held under 

Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR TRAFFORD LEIGH-MALLORY won the Distinguished Flying 

Order in the Royal Flying Corps in World War 1. He commanded the 11 and 12 

Fighter Groups in the Battle of Britain in World War II. From November 1942 to 

December 1943 he served as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Com13 
14 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

mand. At the close of 1943 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, and as such commanded the tactical air forces in support of 

the Allied Expeditionary Force. He was transferred to the post of Commander-inChief, South-East Asia Command, in the early fall of 1944, but was killed in a 

plane crash en route to that headquarters in November 1944. 

MAJ. GEN. JOHN T. LEWIS served in 1941 in the Office ofthe Secretary, General Staff, 

War Department. In February of the following year he was assigned to a coast 

artillery brigade in New York. He was named Commanding General, Military 

District of Washington, in May 1942. While in this post he was a member of the 

commission which tried the Nazi saboteurs. In September 1944 he was selected 

as chief of SHAEF Mission (France). 

BRIG. GEN. ROBERT A. MCCLURE, U.S. Millitary Attache in London in 1941 apd 

military attache to the eight governments-in-exile in the United Kingdo~, became G-2 ofETOUSA under General Eisenhower early in 1942. From November 1942 to November 1943 he headed the Public Relations, Psychological Warfare and Censorship Section at AFHQ. In November 1943 he was sent to 

COS SAC to organize a similar section. In February 1944 he became G-6 of 

SHAEF. When that division was divided later in the year, he was appointed chief 

ofthe Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF. 

BRIGADIER KENNETH G. McLEAN at the outbreak of war became a member of the 

staff of the 52d Division in Scotland. From April 1940 toJ une 1941 he was an 

Army representative on the British GHQPlanning Staff. When COSSAC was 

established in 1943, he became the Army member of the planning staff. On the 

activation ofSHAEF he was named head of the Planning Section ofG-3. 

GENERAL OF THE ARMY GEORGE C. MARSHALL was graduated from Virginia Military 

Institute in 1901 and commissioned early in the following year. He served on 

the staffs of the First and Second Armies in World War I. In July 1938 he became 

Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, General Staff, and in October was 

appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army. In September 1939 he became 

Chief of Staff of the Army. 

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL WALTER MODEL served as an infantry officer in World War 

I. During the Polish and French campaigns in 1939 and 1940 he served as a corps 

and army chief of staff. In the Russian campaign from 1941 until 1944 he served 

in succession as a division, corps, and army commander. Model in January 1944 

was assigned as commander in chief of Army Group North on the Eastern Front. In 

mid-August 1944 he was transferred to the west as Commander in Chief West 

and concurrently as commander in chief of Army Group B. Upon Rundstedt's return as Commander in Chief West in early September 1944, Model retained 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 

command of Army Group B, a post he kept until the final dissolution of Army Group 

B in April 1945. Model is said to have committed suicide at this time. 

FIELD MARSHAL SIR BERNARD LAW MONTGOMERY commanded the 3d British Division in France in the winter and spring of 1939-40. He was given temporary command of the 2 Corps at Dunkerque. In the fall of 1940 he was given the 5 Corps 

and, in 1941, the 12 Corps. In 1942 he became head of the Southeast Command. 

In the summer of that year he was told that he would head the First British Army 

in the North African invasion, but the death of General Gott, who was slated for 

the command of the British Eighth Army led to Montgomery's selection for the 

post. As commander of this army he won the battle of El Alamein, pursued Marshal Rommel's forces to Tunisia, and helped defeat the enemy in Tunisia. Later 

he led the Eighth Army to Sicily and Italy. His appointment as Commander-inChief, 21 Army Group, was announced in December 1943. He commanded the 

Allied assault forces in Normandy, serving in that capacity until 1 SepteII).b<:r 

1944 when General Eisenhower assumed control of field operations. Field Marshal Montgomery led the combined British and Canadian forces in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany for the remainder of the war. During much 

of this time the Ninth U.S. Army was also under his command. In the course of 

the Ardennes counteroffensive he was also given command of the First U.S. 

Army. 

LT. GEN. SIR FREDERICK E. MORGAN served in France in 1940 as commander of a 

group of the 1st Armoured Division. In May 1942 he was appointed to command 

the 1st Corps District, which included Lincolnshire and the East Riding of Yorkshire. In October of that year he was made commander of the 1 Corps and placed 

under General Eisenhower. He was given the task of preparing a subsidiary landing in the western Mediterranean either to reinforce the initial landings or to deal 

with a German thrust through Spain. When neither operation proved necessary, 

he was directed to plan the invasion of Sardinia. In time this was abandoned and 

he was directed to plan the invasion of Sicily. This project was later given to the 

armies in North Africa. In the spring of 1943 he became chi~f of staff to the 

Supreme Allied Commander and as such directed planning for the invasion of 

northwest Europe. He served in 1944 and 1945 as Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAEF. 

AMBASSADOR ROBERT D. MURPHY, a career diplomat, was counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Paris when war began in Europe. After the fall of France, he served 

briefly as charge d'affaires at Vichy. In November 1940 he was detailed to Algiers. In the fall of 1942 he helped in negotiations between Allied military leaders 

and the French forces in North Africa. After the invasion of that area he was 

named political adviser to General Eisenhower. Later he became Chief Civil Affairs Adviser for Italian Affairs on General Eisenhower's staff and also served as 

U.S. member of the Advisory Council to the Allied Control Commission for Italy. 

At this time he was given the rank of Ambassador. In August 1944 Mr. Murphy 

15 
16 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

was named political adviser at SHAEF and Chief of the Political Division for the 

U.S. Group Control Council set up to plan postwar occupation of Germany. 

Later he served as political adviser to Generals Eisenhower, McNarney, and 

Clay. 

BRIG. GEN. ARTHUR S. NEVINS served in the Strategy Section of the War Plans Division of the War Department from May 1941 until after the outbreak of war with 

Japan. In the spring of 1942 he went to the United Kingdom as a member of the 

planning staff for the North African invasion. When II U.S. Corps was activated 

he became its deputy chief of staff. Later he became G-3 of the Fifth U.S. Army. 

After a month in that position he worked as an Army planner on the Sicilian invasion, and was then appointed operations officer on General Alexander’s combined headquarters staff. In October 1943 he went to the United Kingdom to 

head the Plans and Operations Section of COSSAC, a post he was holding when 

he was appointed chief of the Operations Section, G-3 Division, SHAEF. 

GEN. SIR BERNARD PAGET was commandant of the Staff College, Camberley, at the 

outbreak of war. He then took command of the 13th Division in East Angliand 

in the spring of 1940 commanded British forces in the Andalsnes area during the 

expedition to Norway. After Dunkerque he was named Chief of Staff, Home 

Forces, and then served for a time as chief of the Southeast Command. When 

General Brooke became Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1942, General 

Paget succeeded him as commander of Home Forces. As head of this command, 

Paget was a member of the Combined Commanders. When the 21 Army Group 

was established in the summer of 1943, he was named to command it. On 24 

December 1943 he was assigned to the Middle East Command. 

LT. GEN. ALEXANDER M.PATCH was in command of the Infantry Replacement 

Center at Camp Croft, N. C., at the outbreak of war. In the spring of 1942 he 

commanded a U.S. infantry division in New Caledonia, and on 8 December 

1942 he assumed command of Army, Navy, and Marine forces operating against 

the enemy on Guadalcanal. He became commander of the XIV Corps in January 1943. In April of that year he returned to the United States where he took 

command of the IV Corps. He was designated commanding general of Seventh 

Army in March 1944, and in August of that year brought it into southern 

France. He commanded it in Alsace during that fall and winter and led it into 

Germany the following spring. In July 1945 he became commanding general of 

the Fourth Army at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., where he died in November 1945. 

GEN. GEORGE S. PATTON, JR., commanded the ground elements of the Western Task 

Force in the landings in North Africa in November 1942. In March 1943 he 

assumed command of the II Corps in Tunisia. In April of that year he began the 

work of planning the invasion of Sicily. He commanded the U.S. forces in the 

assault on that island. His headquarters was renamed Seventh U.S. Army after 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 17 

the landings in Sicily. He was brought to the United Kingdom as commander of 

the Third U.S. Army in the spring of 1944. It became active on the Continent on 

1 August 1944 and under his direction campaigned in France, Luxembourg, 

Belgium, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. After the war’s end he became commanding general of the Fifteenth Army. He died as a result of an automobile 

accident in December 1945. 

MR. CHARLES B.P. PEAKE entered the British diplomatic service in 1922. In 1939 he 

was made head of the News Department of the Foreign Office and Chief Press 

Adviser to the Ministry of Information. In 1941 he was temporarily attached to 

Viscount Halifax as personal assistant in Washington and promoted to be a 

counsellor of embassy. From 1942 to 1943 he was the British representative to the 

French National Committee and in October 1943 he was appointed to General 

Eisenhower’s staff as political liaison officer to the Supreme Commander with the 

rank of minister. 

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM PHILLIPS began his career in the foreign service of the United 

States as private secretary of the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain in 1903. 

Among his important appointments after that time were Ambassador to the 

Netherlands in 1920, Undersecretary of the Department of State, 1922–24 and 

1933–36, Ambassador to Italy, 1936–41, and personal representative of the President to India, 1942–43. He was appointed political adviser to the COSSAC staff 

in September 1943 and held the same position at SHAEF from its activation until 

September 1944. 

MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE SIR CHARLES PORTAL served as an observer and 

fighter pilot in World War I. In the 1930’s he commanded the British Forces in 

Aden and was Director of Organization, Air Ministry. Early in World War II he 

served on the Air Council and was Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber 

Command. He was appointed Chief of the Air Staff in October 1940. 

GROSSADMIRAL ERICH RAEDER served in fleet and staff service during World War I. 

He was commander in chief of the German Navy from 1935 until 1943, when at 

his own request he was replaced by Doenitz and appointed Inspector General of 

the German Navy (Admiralinspekteur der Kriegsmarine), a nominal title. 

ADMIRAL BERTRAM H. RAMSAY retired in 1938 after forty-two years in the Royal 

Navy, serving the last three as Chief of Staff, Home Fleet. He was recalled to 

duty in 1939 as Flag Officer Commanding, Dover, and in that post organized 

the naval forces for the evacuation of Dunkerque. Later he helped plan the 

TORCH operation, commanded a task force in the Sicilian invasion, and became 

British naval commander in the Mediterranean. He was appointed Allied Naval 

Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force, in the fall of 1943 and served in that 

post until his death in a plane crash in France on 1 January 1945. 
18 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

MR. SAMUEL REBER entered the U.S. Foreign Service in 1926. He was stationed in 

Washington at the beginning of the war, but went to Martinique on a special 

mission in early 1942. After the landings in North Africa he was transferred to 

Mr. Murphy’s staff in Algiers. From there he went to Italy in October 1943 as a 

member first of the Allied military mission and later of the Allied Control Commission. While in Italy he was attached for special duty to the Fifth Army. He 

left Italy in July 1944 and joined SHAEF as a political adviser. 

MAJ. GEN. HAROLD REDMAN was instructing at the British Staff College in 1939. He 

was then appointed to the War Cabinet Secretariat. In 1940 he was given command of a battalion in the United Kingdom. From June to December 1941 he 

commanded an infantry brigade in the Middle East. At the end of the year he 

was selected to be Brigadier General Staff, Headquarters Eighth Army. In March 

1942 he returned again to a brigade command, which he held until 1943 when 

he was appointed secretary to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. In 

August 1944 he was promoted to major general and became deputy commander 

of the French Forces of the Interior. In the following month he was appointed 

deputy head of the SHAEF mission to France. 

AIR MARSHAL JAMES M. ROBB went to Canada at the beginning of the war to help 

plan the Commonwealth Air Training Plan. In 1940 he became commander of 

the No. 2 Bomber Group in the United Kingdom. Later, he was made chief of the 

No. 15 Fighter Group, commanding the Western Approaches to the United Kingdom. In 1942, he served as deputy chief of Combined Operations Headquarters 

and then acted for a brief period as air commander at Gibralter during the invasion of North Africa. He next served as air adviser to General Eisenhower. On the 

formation of the Northwest African Air Forces in 1943, he became commander of 

RAF North Africa and deputy to General Spaatz in the Northwest African Air 

Forces. He became Deputy Chief of Staff (Air), SHAEF, in March 1944. On the 

dissolution of AEAF in October 1944, he became Chief of the Air Staff (SHAEF). 

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL ERWIN ROMMEL served as an infantry officer in World War 

I. In August 1939 he was assigned as commandant of the Fuehrerhauptquartier, a 

position he held until February 1940. Rommel participated in the French campaign as Commander of the Seventh Panzer Division. In February 1941 he was assigned to command the German troops assisting the Italians in North Africa. 

Rommel remained in Africa from September 1941 until March 1943 and commanded first Panzer Army Africa and later Army Croup Africa. In the late summer of 

1943 Rommel was assigned as commander of Army Group B in northern Italy. In 

the fall and winter of 1943 he conducted surveys of coastal defenses in the west. 

In January 1944 he again became commander of Army Group B in the west and 

retained this position until he was severely wounded in July 1944. Rommel, 

suspected of complicity in the plot of 20 July 1944, was forced to commit suicide 

in October 1944. 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL GERD VON RUNDSTEDT served as chief of staff of various 

division and corps headquarters in World War L He was retired in October 1938. 

In June 1939 he was recalled to command Army Group South in the Polish campaign. After a very short term as Commander in Chief East in occupied Poland 

he was redesignated as commander in chief of Army Group A and transferred to 

the Western Front. In May 1940 his forces broke through the Ardennes and advanced to the Channel coast. In October 1940 he was designated as Commander 

in Chief West, a position he held until the transfer of his headquarters to the east 

in the spring of 1941. During the Russian campaign von Rundstedt commanded 

Ar"!y Group South (formerly Army Group A) from June until December 1941, when 

at his own request he was relieved of command because of ill health. In March 

1942 he was assigned as Commander in Chief West. He retained this position 

until he was relieved early inJuly 1944. Von Rundstedt was reassigned to his 

former position as Commander in Chief West on 4 September 1944 and remained 

as such until his final relief on 10 March 1945. He was taken prisoner in 'Bad 

Toelz on 1 May 1945. 

MAJ. GEN. LOWELL W. ROOKS was chief of the training division of Headquarters, 

Army Ground Forces, in March 1942. InJune of that year he became chiefof 

staff of 11 Corps. He was named G-3 of Headquarters, North African Theater of 

Operations, when that headquarters was organized, and inJanuary 1944 he was 

named deputy chief of staff of Allied Force Headquarters. In March 1945 he 

became Deputy G-3, SHAEF. In this position he helped to liquidate OKW at 

the end of the war. 

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL FERDINAND SCHOERNER served as an infantry officer in 

World War I. From September 1939 until October 1943, he served with mountain troops, rising from regimental to corps commander. After a short time as an 

armored corps commander on the Eastern Front and then as a staff officer at 

OKH, he was assigned as acting commander in chief of Army Group A on the 

Eastern Front. Schoerner was appointed commander in chief of Army Group A in 

May 1944 and transferred to Ar"!y Group North as commander-in chiefinJ uly 

1944. In January 1945 he became commander of Army Group Center. 

LT. GEN. WILLIAM H. SIMPSON, veteran of overseas service in World War I, held the 

command of the 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Division, in June 1940. He was given 

command of the Infantry Replacement Training Center of the Army in April 

1941. Six months later he became commanding general of the 35th Division, and 

he served from April to September 1942 as commander of the 30th Division. For 

one month he commanded the XII Corps. In September 1943 he was placed at 

the head of the Fourth Army. In the spring of 1944 an additional army headquarters (the Eighth) was formed from the Fourth Army, and General Simpson 

was made commander of the new headquarters. He took it to the United Kingdom in May 1944 and remained as its head when it was renumbered the Ninth 

19 
20 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Army. He commanded the Ninth Army in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 

and Germany. 

LT. GEN. WALTER BEDELL SMITH was assistant secretary of the General Staffin Octotier 1939. He became Secretary, General Staff, in September 1941. In February 

1942 he was named U.S. secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and secretary 

oftheJoint Board. General Eisenhower chose him in September 1942 to be chief 

of staff of the European Theater of Operations. Later he became chief of staff of 

the Allied forces in North Africa and of the Mediterranean theater. At the end of 

1943, he became chief of staff of SHAEF. 

GEN. CARL SPAATZ served with the First Aero Squadron of the Mexican Punitive 

Expedition in 1916. During World War I he won the Distinguished Service Cross 

in combat over St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne. In 1940 he was sent to the 

United Kingdom as an official observer of the Battle of Britain. On his return fo 

the United States he became commander of the Air Corps Materiel Division. 

At the beginning of 1942 he became chief ofthe Army Air Forces Combat Command. In May of that year he was given the command of the Eighth Air Force, 

which he took to the United Kingdom in the followingJuly. Shortly thereafter 

he also became Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe. At the 

close of the year he was appointed commander of the Twelfth Air Force in North 

Africa. Two months later he was named commander of the Northwest African 

Air Forces. When the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces headquarters was established in 1943 under Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General Spaatz became its 

deputy commander. In January 1944 he went back to the United Kingdom 

where he assumed command of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe. 

MAJ. GEN. KENNETH W. D. STRONG served as assistant military attache in Berlin 

shortly before the outbreak of:.var in 1939, and in the first one and a half years 

of the war as head of the German Section, War Office. Later he commanded a 

battalion and then became chief of intelligence of Home Forces. In February 

1943 he was appointed G-2 of Allied Force Headquarters in the·Mediterranean. 

In this capacity he helped General Smith in armistice negotiations with the 

Italians. In the spring of 1944 he became G-2 of SHAEF. 

GENERALOBERST KURT STUDENT was one of Germany's first fighter pilots-in 1913-

and served in the Luftwaffe during World War I. After the outbreak of World 

War II, he took an active part in the paratroop attack on Rotterdam and in May 

1941 commanded the paratroop attack on Crete. When the Allies invaded 

Europe, Student held the position of Commander if Paratroops in OKL in Berlin, and 

from 3 September until 31 October 1944 he was commander of the First Parachute 

Army under Army Group B in the Albert Canal-Maastricht sector. For the next 

three months he commanded Army Group Student, later renamed Army Group H, in 

Holland. During the month of April 1945 he again commanded the First Para-
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 

chute Army in the Weser-Ems area. For the remaining week ofthe war, General 

Student commanded Army Group Weichsel on the Eastern Front. He was captured 

on 28 May 1945 near Flensburg. 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR ARTHUR W. TEDDER served as British air commander in the 

Middle East in 1942, helping to stop Rommel's advance toward Egypt. His 

forces also contributed to the success ofthe El Alamein attack and the subsequent 

drive toward Tunisia. From February 1943 until the end ofthe year, he served as 

Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, which included RAF 

Middle East, RAF Malta Air Command, and the Northwest African Air Forces. 

In January 1944 he was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander, SHAEF. 

LT. GEN. HOYT S. VANDENBERG served fromJune 1939 toJune 1942 as assistant chief 

of the Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. FromJune to 

August 1942 he was chief of the organization and equipment section in the A---':3 

Division of the same office. He went overseas in August 1942 as chief of staff of 

the Twelfth Air Force and served in that capacity until August of the following 

year. From August 1943 to March 1944 he was deputy chief of the Air Staffin 

Washington. He filled the post of Deputy Air Commander, Allied Expeditionary 

Air Force, from March to August 1944, and was then appointed to the command 

of the Ninth Air Force. 

MAJ. GEN. C. H. H. VULLIAMY served in 1939-40 as chief signal officer of the Antiaircraft Defence of Great Britain. In 1940 he became chief signal officer of a corps 

in Northern Ireland. He held a similar post in an army in 1941-42 before going 

to the Middle East Command as chief signal officer in 1943. In November of that 

year he became head of the Signals Division of COS SAC, and in February 1944 

became chief of the Signal Division, SHAEF. He held this post until the spring of 

1945. 

MAJ. GEN.J. F. M. WHITELEY, veteran of World War I, in which he was awarded the 

Military Cross, served as Deputy Assistant Adjutant General India from 1932 to 

1934. In the following year he became General Staff Officer, War Office, continuing as such until 1938. In World War II he served as deputy chief of staff at 

Allied Force Headquarters, was assigned briefly as chief of intelligence at 

SHAEF, and became Deputy G-3, SHAEF, in May 1944. 

GENERALOBERST KURT ZEITZLER served as an infantry officer in World War I. In 

World War II he served as a corps chief of staff in the Polish and French campaigns and as chief of staff of First Panzer Group, later First Panzer Army, in Russia 

in 1941. After a short tour as chief of staff of OB WESThe was appointed Chief 

ofthe Army General Staffin September 1942. He was relieved ofthis position in 

July 1944 and retired from the Army in January 1945. 

21 

CHAPTER I 

The Supreme Commander 

Christmas Eve, 1943, found the world 

in its fourth year of war. The Allies, still 

faced with the grim spectacle of western 

Europe under Axis domination, gained 

some cheer from the knowledge that their 

position had improved substantially in the 

year just ending. Not only had they won 

victories in the Mediterranean, on the 

Eastern Front, and in the Pacific, but the 

Western Powers and the Soviet Union had 

at last agreed upon the strategy for breaking the power of Hitler. As radio audiences 

listened that Christmas Eve to the carols 

already beginning to fill the air, they heard 

the President of the United States announce the selection of General Dwight 

David Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force 

that was to march against Germany. The 

appointment meant that an important 

milestone in World War II had been 

passed. The last great phase of the war in 

the West was about to begin and peace 

seemed somehow nearer than it had 

before. 

The Selection of the Supreme Commander 

Almost a year had elapsed between the 

Casablanca Conference, which decided 

that a Supreme Commander would be 

named, and the announcement of 24 

December. 1 The appointment had been 

postponed initially on the ground that 

more than a year would pass before the invasion of northwest Europe (Operation 

OVERLORD) could be launched. The conferees thought it sufficient at that stage to 

select a Chief of Staff to the Supreme 

Allied Commander (COSSAC) 2 and give 

him power to choose a staff and to conduct 

preliminary planning for the cross-Channel operation. Lt. Gen. Frederick E. 

Morgan was named to head the COSSAC 

staff. It was assumed that members of his 

staff would serve as a nucleus for the future 

Supreme Headquarters. 

The final decision on a Supreme Commander was delayed further for several 

different reasons-some quite clear cut 

and others indeterminate. The first, discussed at the Casablanca Conference, had 

to do with the nationality of the Supreme 

Commander. The U.S. President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, realizing that any attack 

made in the near future would have to be 

mounted largely by the British, said that 

the appointment if made then should go to 

a British officer. Prime Minister Winston 

S. Churchill proposed that the decision be 

postponed, suggesting that the question be 

settled ultimately in accordance with the 

1 The Casablanca Conference, a meeting of the 

British and U.S. heads of government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, was held in Casablanca in January 1943. This is sometimes referred to as the ANFA 

or SYMBOL Conference. See below, pp. 37–41, for discussion of Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

2 The title COSSAC was used to indicate both the 

headquarters and its head. This volume will use 

COSSAC to refer to the headquarters; General Morgan will be referred to as the COSSAC chief. 
24 

general rule that the command be held 

"by an officer of the nation which furnishes 

the majority of the troops." Through the 

spring of 1943 when plans were being discussed for small-scale operations on the 

Continent to be mounted in case of German weakening or at signs of Russian collapse, it seemed clear that British forces 

would dominate and that a British officer 

would command. In this period, the Prime 

Minister informed Field Marshal Sir Alan 

Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General 

Staff, that he would command the invasion 

of Europe. 3 Partly in anticipation of this 

appointment, General Morgan organized 

the early staff of COSSAC in accordance 

with the British staff system. 4 

By the end of April 1943, General 

Morgan had concluded that the command 

of a cross-Channel attack would have to go 

to an American, since the United States 

would have to furnish everything "to 

follow up the initial effort .... " This 

sentiment was echoed in the United States, 

where the responsible military leaders 

believed that the launching of the crossChannel operation, toward which the 

British Chiefs of Staff were believed to be 

lukewarm, would be insured if it had a 

U.S. commander.5 The Secretary of War, 

Henry L. Stimson, pressed this view on the 

President on the eve of the Allied conference at Quebec in August 1943, adding 

that the selection of Gen. George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, would 

be the best guarantee that the operation 

would be carried out. Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, unofficial adviser to the President, 

also strongl y urged the selection of General Marshall. Mr. Roosevelt, impressed 

by their reasoning, reached an agreement 

with Prime Minister Churchill at Quebec 

that an American should lead the crossChannel attack, and apparently indicated 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

GENERAL MORGAN 

that General Marshall would be named. 

Roosevelt told Secretary Stimson shortly 

after the Quebec Conference that the first 

proposal had come from Churchill 

although it meant taking the command 

from General Brooke. It is clear that the 

President wanted Marshall to have the 

" Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston, 

1951), p. 85. 

, CCS 169, 22 Jan 43, Notes on conf of 18 Jan 43, 

Casablanca Conf Min; Maj Gen Harry C. Ingles, 

Deputy Theater Comdr, to Maj Gen Charles H. 

Bonesteel, 10 May 43, photostat in AG HRB 200.3 

ETOUSA Collection of Msgs; Interv with Gen Sir 

Hastings L. Ismay, 17 Dec 46, on selection of Brooke; 

Interv with Gen Morgan, 2 Apr 46. General Ingles 

wrote General Bonesteel on 10 May 1943 that the decision to appoint the British commander had been 

made in Washington, but the author has found no 

record of this action. 

, The British Chiefs of Staff were officially called 

the Chiefs of Staff Committee just as the U.S. Chiefs 

were called the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
THE SUPREME COMMANDER 

Supreme Command in Europe, and that 

the British interposed no objection. They 

expected the U.S. Chief of Staff to be appointed, and it appears that some agreement had been made whereby he would 

act with the British Chiefs of Staff in London on matters affecting operations in the 

European theater. 6 

Even after agreeing tentatively on the 

person to be named to the Supreme Command, the President delayed making the 

final selection. While he was convinced 

that General Marshall should be chosen 

in order that he might have proper credit 

for his work in building the American 

Army, Mr. Roosevelt still wished to retain 

the Chief of Staff's services in Washington 

as long as possible. 7 

Publication of statements that General 

Marshall was to lead the cross-Channel attack received a varied reaction in the 

United States. Many newspapers took the 

appointment as a matter of course and declared that the Chief of Staff was the logical nominee for the job. Critics of the 

administration in the press and Congress 

took a different stand. Apparently not 

knowing that Secretary of War Stimson 

was urging the appointment and saying 

that it was something which General Marshall wanted more than anything else, the 

opponents ofthe President attributed the 

selection to everything from a British plot 

to get rid of a U.S. Chief of Staff who opposed their schemes to a suggestion, 

branded by Mr. Stimson as "outrageous 

libel," that the proposal was prompted by 

an administration scheme to replace General Marshall with a political general who 

would manipulate the awarding of war 

contracts in a manner to re-elect Mr. 

Roosevelt in 1944. The Army and Navy 

Journal and the Army and Navy Register, 

which reflected the views of many officers 

25 

in the services, objected to the shift on 

military grounds. So much anxiety was 

evidenced by members of Congress that 

Secretary Stimson and General Marshall 

at length found it necessary to deny the 

charges that the President was interfering 

with the War Department. 8 

Part of the concern over the proposed 

appointment arose from reports that General Marshall's colleagues on the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff were opposed to the change. 

Their reaction was due not to the fear that 

politics was involved but to the feeling that 

it was necessary to retain General Marshall as a member of the Combined. Chiefs 

of Staff where he could fight for U.S. con6 Frederick E. Morgan, Overture to Overlord (New 

York, 1950), p. 124. General Morgan's views on the 

need of an American commander are cited in Ltr, 

Gen Ingles, Deputy Theater Cmdr, to Gen Marshall, 

6 May 43, Hq ETOUSA files. For Mr. Stimson's 

views, see Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, 

On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948), 

p. 439, including quotation from his diary of August 

1943. For other views, see General Ismay's interview 

with the author, 17 December 1946; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New 

York, 1948), p. 762; and Churchill, Closing the Ring, 

pp. 85, 30 I. Statements by various British and U.S. 

officials are noted in the Diary of the 0 ffice of the 

Commander in Chief, entries for 5, 8, and 19 October 

1943, and a memorandum by General Eisenhower for 

6 Decem ber 1943. The Diary of the Office of the 

Commander in Chief, hereafter cited as Diary Office 

CinC, was kept by Capt. Harry C. Butcher, USNR, 

for Generat Eisenhower. It i'ncludes summaries of the 

Supreme Commander's activities, memoranda written 

for the diary, many of the top secret letters which 

came to or were sent by the Supreme Commander, 

and copies of plans, intelligence estimates and the like. 

Edited portions of this diary appeared in Butcher's 

My Three rears With Eisenhower (New York, 1946). 

7 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 303-04. 

8 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 759-64, has 

a convenient summary of these reactions. See also 

Congressional Record, Vol. 89, Pt. 6, 7682, 7883, Pt. II, 

App. 400 I; Army and Navy Journal, September 18, 

1943; Army and Navy Register, September II, 18, 25, 

October 2, 1943; The New rork Times, September 23-

30, 1943; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 

437-43; Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 301-03. 
GENERAL MARSHALL AND SECRETARY STIMSON 
THE SUPREME COMMANDER 

cepts of Allied strategy. Their view was 

shared by General of the Armies JohnJ. 

Pershing who, as the elder statesman of 

the Army, warned the President in midSeptember that the proposed transfer of 

the Chief of Staff would be a "fundamental and very grave error in our military policy." The President agreed on the 

need of keeping General Marshall in 

Washington, but held that the Chief of 

Staff deserved a chance to lead in the field 

the Army which he had developed. 9 

Although members of the War Department had good reason to know that there 

was no disposition on the part of the President to "kick General Marshall upstairs," 

they nonetheless feared that the shift of the 

Chief of Staff to a field command would 

result in an actual demotion and remove 

from the Combined Chiefs of Staff the 

stanchest proponent of the cross-Channel 

attack. They therefore backed proposals 

outlined by the Operations Division of the 

War Department giving General Marshall 

control of the operational forces in the 

cross-Channel attack but still retaining 

him in his position on the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. Under one such plan, the 

Chief of Staff would command all United 

Nations forces and at the same time keep 

his vote on European matters in the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization. It was 

proposed that the position of Deputy 

Supreme Commander and the command 

in the Mediterranean be given to British 

officers, while operational command of the 

cross-Channel attack should go to an 

American. 10 

To a degree the American planners were 

trying to have their cake and eat it too. 

They wanted operational command of the 

OVERLORD forces, but at the same time 

they wanted to be sure that the OVERLORD 

viewpoint was fully represented in the 

27 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. They were particularly anxious to place firm control of 

operations in the hands of an American 

general. This attitude was strengthened as 

it became increasingly clear that the 

United States would furnish more than 

half of the forces and supplies to be committed in the cross-Channel operation. 

The British, who in a sense had General 

Pershing's World War I problem of preserving their national identity in an Allied 

force, were equally determined to keep a 

large share of control over the Supreme 

Command and were not disposed to 

strengthen Washington's grip .on operations and policy. They thus balked at any 

proposal that would place a U.S. commander, not only over the Allied forces in 

Europe, but over all United Nations forces 

fighting Germany and at the same time 

9 William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York, 1950), 

pp. 191-92; Interv with Admiral Leahy, 15Ju147; 

Interv with Admiral ErnestJ. King, 7 Ju147; Henry 

H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), pp. 455-

56. Texts of Pershing and Roosevelt letters, 16 and 

20 September 1943, in Katherine Tupper MarshaU, 

Together (New York, 1946), pp. 156-57. 

10 Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, British 

Chief of the Air Staff, was suggested for the Deputy 

Supreme Commander post, Gen. Sir Harold R. L. G. 

Alexander for the Mediterranean command, and 

General Eisenhower for the European command in 

this unsigned and undated memo, The System of 

Command in the War against Germany, apparently 

written near the end of September 1943 by a member of the Operations Division of the War Department. OPD Exec, Bk 12. The memorandum, while 

not acted on at the moment, summed up several 

other proposals then in the air and foreshadowed 

the proposal the Joint Chiefs were to make in 

December 1943 at Cairo. Also of interest was a suggestion made by General Eisenhower in September 

1943 to Captain Butcher. The general proposed as 

a solution that General Marshall come to Europe to 

organize that theater, leaving a deputy chief of staff, 

possibly Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, in Washington. When the European theater was properly 

organized, General Marshall could then go to the 

Pacific and repeat the operation. Diary Office CinC, 

16 Sep 43. 
28 

would leave him a voice on the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. The Americans undoubtedly had few illusions that they could persuade the British to accept all of these 

points. It is more likely that from the beginning they were ready to settle for some 

expansion of General Marshall's powers 

beyond those of Supreme Commander in 

Europe. 

Reports of these proposals reached the 

American press and allayed some fears 

that Marshall was to be removed from a 

role in determining Allied military policy. 

The same reports caused Mr. Churchill 

some uneasiness, and he wrote Mr. Hopkins that the proposals were contrary to 

those agreed upon at Quebec.l1 

While these plans were being discussed 

in Washington and London, the President 

and his military advisers proceeded on the 

assumption that General Marshall would 

command the cross-Channel attack. General Marshall himself began to make detailed suggestions for the command structure of Operation OVERLORD. In October 

he invited his prospective chief of staff for 

the operation, General Morgan, to Washington so that the British general could acquire information about the United States 

and its people which would be of value in 

dealing with Americans at Supreme Allied 

Headquarters. General Morgan, on his arrival in Washington, pressed for immediate appointment of the Supreme 

Commander, explaining that someone 

with authority was needed to secure the 

men and materiel for the operation. He 

carried his plea to the President but was 

told that General Marshall could not be 

spared at that time. Mr. Roosevelt was 

willing, however, for the British to name a 

Deputy Supreme Commander at once. 

The British Government repeated General 

Morgan's request in October, but again 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

the President demurred, cabling this time 

that the appointment of a Supreme Commander would give away Allied plans to 

the enemy. He added that he had made no 

final decision on a replacement for a Chief 

of Staff, since it was possible that General 

Eisenhower, who was being considered for 

Marshall's place in Washington, would be 

made an army group commander in the 

cross-Channel operation. 12 

No final decision had been taken on the 

Supreme Commander and his deputy on 

the eve of the Allied conference at Cairo 

and Tehran at the end of November 1943. 

General Eisenhower, who was regarded as 

the likely successor to General Marshall as 

Chief of Staff, had been given no official 

11 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 441; 

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 762. War Department planners' final draft presented inJoint Chiefs of 

Staff OCS) paper, Command of British and U.S. 

Forces Operating against Germany, CCS 408,25 Nov 

43, SEXTANT Conf Min. It is possible that Mr. 

Churchill's opposition to an over-all Allied command 

for General Marshall was responsible for the later 

charge that the British opposed Marshall's selection as 

Supreme Commander. It should be apparent that if 

the British desired to get rid of him as an opponent 

the best way to do it was to get him off the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff and into the Supreme Commander's 

position. No evidence exists that they ever opposed 

him for the Supreme Commander's post. Indeed, all 

the evidence is the other way. Both Admirals Leahy 

and King told the author in July 1947 that the British 

offered no opposition to Marshall as commander of 

the cross-Channel attack. This same statement had 

been previously made in the most categorical fashion 

to the author by Lords Alanbrooke, Portal, Cunningham, and Ismay. General Eisenhower said in 1943 

that he had been told by Mr. Churchill that the two 

Americans acceptable to him for the command of the 

cross-Channel attack were Generals Marshall and 

Eisenhower. Memo, Eisenhower, Diary Office CinC, 

6 Dec 43; Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 303, 305. 

12 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 442; 

Morgan, Notes on Visit to Washington, Oct-Nov 43. 

A copy of these notes was given to the author by 

General Morgan. Morgan, Overture To Overlord, Ch. 

VIII; Interv with Morgan, 2 Apr 46; Leahy, I Was 

There, pp. 190-91. The cable to the British was drafted 

by Leahy and Marshall. 
THE SUPREME COMMANDER 29 

word, but various visitors to his headquarters from London and Washington in the 

fall of 1943 indicated that Marshall’s appointment as Supreme Commander and 

Eisenhower’s transfer to Washington 

would soon be announced. General Eisenhower had attempted to anticipate this 

latter move by sending word to Washington through his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. 

Walter Bedell Smith, that he would prefer 

to serve under General Marshall as army 

group commander rather than take the 

post of Army Chief of Staff. 13 

The selection of General Marshall 

seemed certain when British and U.S. 

representatives, on their way to Cairo in 

November 1943, stopped by at Allied 

Force Headquarters where General Eisenhower was in command. Mr. Hopkins said 

that General Marshall would definitely be 

Supreme Commander if the British did 

not “wash out” on the cross-Channel operation at Tehran. Admiral Ernest J. King, 

discussing the matter in the presence of 

General Marshall, told General Eisenhower that the President had tentatively 

decided to give the command to the Chief 

of Staff against the advice of the other 

members of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The 

Prime Minister somewhat later, while expressing his willingness to have either 

Marshall or Eisenhower, thought that the 

appointment would go to the Chief of Staff. 

Finally, in late November, the President 

himself explained the situation to General 

Eisenhower. Mr. Roosevelt was impressed 

by the fact that field commanders ather 

than chiefs of staff were remembered in 

history. He felt that General Marshall’s 

contributions to American victory should 

be recognized by a command in the field, 

even at the expense of losing him as Chief 

of Staff. This statement seemed to clinch 

the matter, leaving General Eisenhower, 

on the eve of his appointment as Supreme 

Commander, to assume that his work as a 

field commander would soon be ended. 14 

Shortly before the conferences at Cairo 

and Tehran, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff discussed plans for getting British consent to 

the appointment of General Marshall as 

commander of all western Allied operations against Germany, and to the organization of the strategic air forces in Europe 

and the Mediterranean under one head. 

General Marshall, embarrassed because 

the proposal that he command all Allied 

forces in Europe appeared over his signature, declared that he would concentrate 

on pushing the plan to integrate strategic 

air forces in Europe. 15 

In their discussions en route to Cairo, 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff also considered the 

possibility of giving over-all command of 

Allied operations to a British officer if that 

should be necessary to get British acceptance of the OVERLORD operation. Churchill’s statement early in the conference 

that OVERLORD “remained top of the bill” 

made any concession unnecessary. On 25 

November, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff asked 

for an arrangement which, if accepted, 

would have placed firm strategic and tactical control in the hands of the Supreme 

13 See statements by Averell Harriman, Secretary 

of the Navy Frank Knox, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, and Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham in 

Diary Office CinC. entries for 5, 8, 15, and 28 October 1943. General Smith reported after his return 

from Washington on 28 October 1943 that Marshall 

felt that any army group command would be a step 

down for Eisenhower and seemed to prefer that he 

take the position of Chief of Staff. Eisenhower’s statement possibly was responsible for Roosevelt’s remark 

noted above. See also Butcher, My Three Years With 

Eisenhower, p. 452, 

14 Memo, Eisenhower, Diary Office CinC, 6 Dec 

43; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New 

York, 1948), pp. 197–98. 

15 JCS 123d–126th Mtgs, on shipboard, 15,17, 18, 

and 19 Nov 43, ABC 334, JCS (2–14–12), Secs 5,6. 
30 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Allied Commander. 16 With an American 

in the post, Washington, rather than London, would have the dominant voice in 

decisions on strategy. The U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff asked that Allied forces in the west be 

put at once under one commander, and 

that he should “exercise command over 

the Allied force commanders in the Mediterranean, in northwest Europe, and of the 

strategic air forces.” They added that any 

delay in adopting this plan was likely to 

lead to confusion and indecision. Under 

their proposal, the Supreme Commander 

would be directed to carry out the agreed 

European strategy. He would be charged 

with the location and timing of operations 

and with the allocation of forces and matériel made available to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. His decisions would 

be subject to reversal by the Combined 

Chiefs. 17 

The British, impressed by the “immense 

political implications” of a scheme which 

they felt should receive the earnest consideration of the British and U.S. Governments, objected to the proposal. They 

pointed to political, economic, industrial, 

and domestic questions which a Supreme 

Commander would have to settle by reference to the heads of the two governments. 

The Supreme Commander, they concluded, would be able to settle only comparatively minor and strictly military 

matters. To an American argument that 

similar authority had been granted Marshal Ferdinand Foch in 1918, the British 

replied that the French commander had 

been given only the Western and Italian 

fronts, whereas the proposed arrangement 

would add to those two theaters the Balkan Front and the Turkish Front, if 

opened. They asked that the existing 

machinery for the high-level direction of 

war be retained, and that changes in it be 

confined to improving that machinery 

rather than embarking “upon an entirely 

novel experiment, which merely makes a 

cumbrous and unnecessary link in the 

chain of command, and which will surely 

lead to disillusionment and disappointment.” 18 

No agreement was reached by the U.S. 

and British representatives at Cairo before 

they recessed the conference to go to Tehran for a meeting with Marshal Joseph 

Stalin and his advisers. They were thus 

unprepared to answer the Russian leader 

on 29 November when he asked who was 

to lead the cross-Channel attack. He reminded Roosevelt and Churchill that it 

was not enough to have a chief of staff in 

charge of OVERLORD planning, since a 

newly appointed Supreme Commander 

might disapprove of what had been done 

before his selection. If a commander was 

not appointed, Marshal Stalin said, nothing would come of the operation. At this, 

the President whispered to Admiral 

Leahy: “That old Bolshevik is trying to 

force me to give him the name of our 

Supreme Commander. I just can’t tell him 

because I have not yet made up my 

mind.” 

The Prime Minister replied to Stalin 

that the British had already expressed 

their willingness to serve under a U.S. 

commander in the OVERLORD operation. 

Apparently mindful of the unsettled matter of the over-all command, Mr. Church16 JCS 126th Mtg, on shipboard, 19 Nov 43, ABC 

334, JCS (2–14–42), Secs 5, 6; Sherwood, Roosevelt and 

Hopkins, p. 767; 2d plenary session, CCS, 24 NOV 43, 

at Cairo, SEXTANT Conf Min 

17 Memo, JCS, Command of British and US. Forces 

Operating against Germany, CCS 408, 25 Nov 43, 

SEXTANT Conf Min. 

18 Memo, Br COS, Command of British and U.S. 

Forces Operating against Germany, ccs 408/ 1,26 

Nov 43, SEXTANT Conf Min; Churchill, CIosing the 

Ring, p. 305, 
THE SUPREME COMMANDER 

ill added that decisions at the conference 

might have a bearing on the choice. He 

said that the President could name the 

Supreme Commander for OVERLORD if he 

accepted the British offer to serve under a 

United States commander, and proposed 

that when the selection was made the Russian commander be told who it would be. 

Stalin hastily added that he had no desire 

to take part in the selection, but stressed 

the necessity of taking action as soon as 

possible. On 30 November, the President 

took notice of Stalin's interest in the matter by saying that the selection would be 

made in three or four days, certainly soon 

after the return of the Allied delegations to 

Cairo. Marshal Stalin's pressure for the 

immediate naming of the Supreme Commander may have hastened by a few days 

the announcement of the selection, but 

that action had already been made essential by the fact that the Allies were scheduled to launch the cross-Channel operation in May 1944, less than six months 

from the time of the conference.19 

The proposal to appoint an over-all 

commander for the forces of the Allies in 

the west was apparently dropped just before the Allied leaders left Tehran or 

shortly after they returned to Cairo.20 The 

appointment of General Marshall merely 

to head the OVERLORD attack would 

mean, as Mr. Roosevelt well realized, that 

he would not be available to press the U.S. 

case in sessions ofthe Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. Knowledge of this fact may have increased the President's reluctance to forego the services of the Chief of Staff. Furthermore, he wanted to keep General 

Marshall in Washington to handle the 

ticklish problems of relations with the 

Pacific theater and with members of Congress. These matters, Mr. Roosevelt believed, could be better handled by the 

31 

Chief of Staff than by General Eisenhower. On the other hand, he was convinced that Eisenhower could handle the 

European command successfully. Not 

only had he proved his ability to command Allied forces in the Mediterranean 

theater, but his appearance before the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff at Cairo had 

demonstrated a firm grasp of the military 

situation and added to the good impression he had previously made. Moreover, 

from the time of the first discussions ofa 

Supreme Commander for OVERLORD his 

name had been coupled with that of General Marshall's as a possible choice' to lead 

the cross-Channel operation, and it was 

clear that he was completely acceptable to 

the British for the post.21 

Still hesitant to make the final decision, 

the President on 4 December sent Mr. 

19 2d and 3d plenary sessions, Tehran Conf, 28, 30 

Nov 43, EURE.KA Conf Min; Leahy, I Was There, p. 

208. 

20 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 791, quoting 

from a set of notes of the third plenary session at 

Tehran different from those available to the author, 

notes that Roosevelt on 30 November told Stalin that 

a decision had been made that morning to appoint 

one commander for OVERLORD, another for the Mediterranean, and a third temporarily for the southernFrance invasion. It is possible that the over-all commander question was settled at this time. In any 

event, the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 3 December 

at their first formal meeting after returning to Cairo 

omitted the over-all command question from their 

agenda. They did include the questions of the integration of the U.S. air command and the directive to the 

Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theater. CCS 

133d Mtg, 3 Dec 43, at Cairo, SEXTANT Conf Min. 

21 Captain Butcher in an entry for 10 December 

1943 in Diary Office CinC records Hopkins' statement that Eisenhower's appearance before the Combined Chiefs at Cairo had made a good impression. 

Butcher also felt that Col. Elliott Roosevelt's outspoken belief that Eisenhower had succeeded in getting British and American forces to work together and 

in synchronizing Allied air, sea, and land power may 

have played some part in the President's decision. A 

somewhat contradictory statement is given in Elliott 

Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New Yark, 1946), p. 168. 
32 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Hopkins to the Chief of Staff to ask if he 

would express a preference between his 

present position and that of Supreme 

Commander. General Marshall simply replied that he would accept any decision 

the President might make. On Sunday, 5 

December, Mr. Roosevelt personally invited the Chief of Staff to make the decision. When Marshall repeated that any 

action of the President would be acceptable, Mr. Roosevelt remarked that he believed he could not sleep at night with the 

Chief of Staff out of the country. The 

President then decided to name General 

Eisenhower Supreme Commander. 22 

The Cairo Conference adjourned without the establishment of an over-all Allied 

command and without the unification of 

British and U.S. strategic air forces in the 

Mediterranean and European theaters. 23 

An arrangement was made for a British 

officer to take charge of all Allied forces in 

the Mediterranean area with the title of 

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (SACMED). The post 

went to Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, 

who was told to assume command from 

General Eisenhower when the latter, having regard to the progress of the operation 

then under way against Rome, thought it 

desirable. 24 

General Eisenhower’s first hint of his 

appointment came on the morning of 7 

December in a somewhat cryptic radiogram from General Marshall. Apparently 

assuming that General Eisenhower had 

been notified, Marshall said: “In view of 

the impending appointment of a British 

officer as your successor as Commanderin-Chief in the Mediterranean, please submit to me in Washington your recommendations in brief as to the best arrangement for handling the administration, dis 

cipline, training and supply of American 

troops assigned to Allied Force under this 

new command.” Later in the same day at 

Tunis, where General Eisenhower had 

gone to meet the President and his party, 

Mr. Roosevelt himself notified the new 

Supreme Commander of his appointment. 25 

General Eisenhower spent the remaining days of December in the Mediterranean theater continuing to supervise operations then in progress and preparing 

to hand over control of Mediterranean 

forces to General Wilson. The shifts in 

command were announced officially on 

22 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 802-03, 

has General Marshall’s own account. Mrs. Marshall’s 

Together, pp. 168-69, has a similar account. Stimson 

and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 441-42, gives the 

President’s version of the decision, and Stimson’s 

reaction to it. Compare this treatment with Roosevelt, 

As He Saw It, p. 209, in which the President’s son declares that in a conversation with him (Monday, 6 

December) the President said that the matter had 

not been finally decided, but that it seemed that 

Churchill would refuse to let Marshall take over. The 

Prime Minister’s statement at Tehran and Roosevelt’s 

offer of a choice to Marshall on Sunday, 5 December, 

indicate that the President was talking of opposition 

by the British to an over-all command for General 

Marshall and not to his command of OVERLORD. 

General Marshall on 6 December drafted for the 

President’s signature a message to Marshal Stalin 

announcing, “The immediate appointment of General Eisenhower to command the OVERLORD operation has been decided upon.” On the following day, 

at the conclusion of the Cairo Conference, the Chief 

of Staff sent the draft on to General Eisenhower as a 

memento of the appointment. Eisenhower, Crusade in 

Europe, p. 208; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 

pp. 441-42. 

23 The U.S. Chiefs decided at this time to integrate 

their own strategic air forces in the two theaters. See 

below, pp. 48-49. 

24 The Combined Chiefs indicated that when 

Eisenhower’s appointment was announced he would 

be given the title of Supreme Commander, Allied 

Expeditionary Force. CCS 138th Mtg, 7 Dec 43, 

SEXTANT Conf Min. 

25 Marshall’s message of 6 December 1943 is quoted 

in Diary Office CinC, entry for 10 December 1943. 

For President Roosevelt’s statement see Eisenhower, 

Crusade in Europe, pp. 206-07. 
THE SUPREME COMMANDER 33 

24 December by the President and Prinie 

Minister. At the same time, Mr. Churchill announced that Gen. Sir Bernard 

Law Montgomery, commander of the 

Eighth British Army, would succeed Gen. 

Sir Bernard Paget as commander of 

the 21 Army Group. Near the end of 

December, at General Marshall's urging, 

General Eisenhower prepared to go to 

Washington to discuss with the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff the allocations of men and 

matériel for OVERLORD and to take a short 

rest. On 1 January 1944, after instructing 

Generals Montgomery and Smith to 

represent him in London until his return 

from Washington, and after a brief visit 

with the Prime Minister at Marrakech, 

Eisenhower left North Africa for the 

United States. 

The New Commander 

The newly appointed Supreme Commander had advanced rapidly since 

March 1941 when, as chief of staff of IX 

Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington, he had 

been promoted to the temporary rank of 

full colonel. At that time, with the United 

States still some months away from war, 

there was little to indicate that within 

three years he would be chosen for the 

chief Allied military role in the west. His 

early Army career after graduation from 

West Point in 1915 had included wartime 

tours of duty as an instructor at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., Fort Meade, Md., and Fort 

Leavenworth, Kans., and as commandant 

of the tank training center at Camp Colt, 

Pa. Between the two wars he had gone 

through a number of Army schools, including the Infantry Tank School at Fort 

Meade, the Command and General Staff 

School at Fort Leavenworth, from which 

he graduated first in the class of 1926, the 

Army War College, and the Army Industrial College. His Army assignments included three years in Panama with the 

20th Infantry Brigade, a year in France 

while he was helping to revise the American Battle Monuments Commission's 

Guidebook to American Battlefields in Europe, a 

tour of duty at the beginning of the thirties 

as assistant executive officer in the office of 

the Assistant Secretary of War, two years 

in the office of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, 

the Chief of Staff, and four years (1935- 

39) as senior military assistant to General 

MacArthur in the Philippines. He returned to the United States in 1939 and 

held in rapid succession the posts of executive officer of the 15th Infantry Regiment, 

chief of staff of the 3d Division, and chief 

of staff of the IX Corps. 

In the summer of 1941 Colonel Eisenhower was appointed chief of staff of Lt. 

Gen. Walter Krueger's Third Army, which 

was then preparing for the Louisiana 

maneuvers against Second Army. He was 

still inconspicuous enough to be identified 

in a picture taken during maneuvers as 

"Lt. Col. D. D. Ersenbeing,” and to be 

dismissed by Second Army's intelligence 

section as a good plodding student. The 

results of the maneuvers, which newsmen 

hailed as a victory for the Third Army, 

brought him favorable acclaim for his 

performance as chief of staff. 26 In part because of this work, but undoubtedly more 

because of his knowledge of the Philippines, he was brought to the War Plans 

Division of the War Department one week 

after the Pearl Harbor disaster as deputy 

chief for the Pacific and Far East. 

Once started on his way up, General 

Eisenhower rose rapidly. Scarcely two 

26 Colonel Eisenhower was promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier general after the maneuvers. 
34 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

months after he arrived in Washington, he 

succeeded Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow as 

chief of the War Plans Division, which 

shortly afterward became the Operations 

Division of the War Department. 27 In this 

post, he strongly advocated making the 

main Allied effort in the European theater, and helped to draw up plans for a 

cross-Channel attack. In May 1942 he 

went to London to inspect the organization of American forces in the United 

Kingdom. One month later General Marshall chose him to command the newly established Headquarters, European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA), in London. 28 

While holding the ETOUSA command, 

the future leader of the cross-Channel attack was in close contact with the officers 

who were planning a proposed return to 

the Continent. He thus became acquainted 

with many of the Allied political and military leaders with whom he was later associated and became familiar with the broad 

outlines of a plan for cross-Channel operations. His work on these projects was 

interrupted in July 1942 by the decision to 

postpone the cross-Channel attack and 

launch an operation against North Africa. 

General Eisenhower was appointed commander in chief of the Allied forces for 

these operations. 29 Later as Allied commander in chief, he directed the attacks of 

German intelligence agencies at the time 

He was engaged in planning future Italian 

operations when named by President 

Rossevelt to command the Allied Expeditionary Force in northwest 

General Eisenhower’s career as a commander was a matter of acute interest to 

German intelligence agencies at the time 

of his assumption of command of the AIlied Expeditionary Force. One estimate of 

the new Supreme Commander declared: 

Eisenhower is an expert on operations of 

armored formations. He is noted for his great 

energy, and his hatred of routine office work. 

He leaves the initiative to his subordinates 

whom he manages to inspire to supreme efforts through kind understanding and easy 

discipline. His strongest point is said to be an 

ability for adjusting personalities to one 

another and smoothing over opposite viewpoints. Eisenhower enjoys the greatest popularity with Roosevelt and Churchill. 31 

This estimate hit upon that quality of 

the Supreme Commander’s most often 

stressed by those who knew him in the 

Mediterranean theater—the ability to get 

people of different nationalities and viewpoints to work together. Making Allied 

understanding his keynote, he insisted 

continually that his staff officers lay aside 

their national differences in his command. 

His willingness to go an extra mile with 

the Allies drew from some U.S. officers the 

gibe that “Ike is the best commander the 

British have” and the view that, in all decisions settled on a 51–49 percent basis, the 

5 1 percent was always in favor of the nonAmericans. 

His ability to get along with people of 

diverse temperaments was perhaps best 

exhibited in the case of Gen. Charles de 

Gaulle, leader of the French Committee of 

National Liberation. The French chief, 

27 General Eisenhower was promoted to the temporary rank of major general in March 1942. 

28 Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the 

Armies, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II (Washington, 1953), discusses this organization at some length. 

29 General Eisenhower became a lieutenant general 

in July 1942, a four-star general in February 1943, and 

a general of the army at the end of 1944. 

30 Biographical details may be found in Eisenhower, 

Crusade in Europe, and Kenneth S. Davis, Soldier of 

Democracy (New York, 1945). 

31 Luftwaffe Academy Lecture, Invasion Generals, 

Careers and Assessments, 7 Feb 44, Generalstab der 

Luftwaffe, 8. Abteilung (hist sec), British Air Ministry 

files. 
THE SUPREME COMMANDER 

despite initial anger over General Eisenhower's relations with Admiral Darlan 

and friendliness to General Giraud in 

North Africa, believed that the new Supreme Commander was the one U.S. officer with whom the French Committee 

could do business. 

General Eisenhower's conciliatory attitude was at times misleading. While genial 

in his approach, he could be extremely 

stern if the occasion demal1ded. His temper, as General Patton, among others, 

could testify, was sometimes explosive and 

his reprimands could be blistering. These 

traits were balanced by the gift of enormous patience. He showed a tendency to 

"make haste slowly" and to give people a 

chance to work out their own solutions. 

Despite remarkable self-possession, the 

Allied commander during the North African campaign showed at times that he 

lacked the thick skin which public figures 

so often require. He was extremely sensitive to newspaper charges that he was 

making political mistakes by insisting on 

dealing with matters in his theater on a 

purely military basis. At one point he retorted that he would like to be allowed to 

fight the war and let the politicians take 

care of politics. 

Although at times General Eisenhower 

35 

and his staff showed the same impatience 

with some of the advice and criticism of 

the Combined Chiefs and the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that most military commanders 

and staffs show toward their superiors, his 

relations with the high-level chiefs were 

cordial. He maintained a close relationship with General Marshall. In frequent 

personal letters, Eisenhower outlined his 

views on coming campaigns or discussed 

frankly his successes and failures. General 

Marshall replied with letters of encouragement and sought new ways by which he 

could give additional aid to his subordinate. The Chief of Staff, aware-of Eisenhower's great respect for him, prefaced 

any proffered opinion with such statements as "don't let this worry you," "don't 

let me influence your judgment," "tell me 

exactly what you need and we will get it 

for you." 

General Eisenhower brought to England in 1944 a reputation for dealing satisfactorily with British, French, and U.S. 

forces. He had established the basis for 

close co-operation with the heads of the 

Allied governments and the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. After a year of working 

with Allied forces in the Mediterranean 

area, he had demonstrated his knack for 

making a coalition work. 
CHAPTER II 

The Coalition Comll1and 

Above the new Supreme Commander 

and his fellow commanders in the various 

theaters of operations of the world, there 

was a hierarchy of command, developed 

since 1942, which included the President 

of the United States, the Prime Minister of 

Great Britain, the heads of the executive 

departments which dealt with military 

matters, and an organization of British 

and U.S. armed services leaders known as 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I This 

hierarchy was responsible for the adoption 

of grand strategy and for the granting of 

directives to the Allied commanders in 

chief. Together with the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and 

his chief subordinates they constituted the 

coalition command for the battle against 

Germany in northwest Europe. 

Heads of Governments 

The decisions of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff reflected the views of the heads of the 

British and United States Governments 

who, with their cabinet advisers, determined major national policies and strategy. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill differed somewhat in the 

degree of direct control which they exercised over their chiefs of staff. The President, as Chief Executive of the United 

States and as Commander in Chief of its 

armed forces, attended the great conferences of the Allies and helped to determine 

broad policy. On other occasions, as in the 

decision for the North African expedition 

in 1942, he intervened in the specific decisions of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. He kept 

in touch with the members of this group 

through his own chief of staff, Ac;lmiral 

William D. Leahy, who presided over 

their meetings and acquainted them with 

the President's views. Having outlined the 

policy he thought the United States should 

follow, Mr. Roosevelt was usually content 

to recommend to Congress and to the 

Prime Minister the detailed military 

measures which had been worked out by 

the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. On political issues 

affecting military operations, such as the 

recognition of the French Committee of 

National Liberation" or the development 

of the formula of unconditional surrender, 

he often did not consult his military advisers or paid little attention to their advice. 

In such cases, the President had a habit of 

consulting individuals outside the cabinet, 

such as Mr. Hopkins, or heads of departments not directly concerned with military 

matters, such as Secretary of the Treasury 

Henry J. Morgentha u, J r. This practice 

often left the Secretaries of War and Navy 

and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff without the 

1 Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic 

Planning for Coalition Waifare, 1941-42, UNITED 

STATES AR~Y IN WORLD WAR II (Washington. 1953), discusses the Allied command structure 

at some lC."ngth. 

, See below, pp. 140-52. 
THE COALITION COMMAND 37 

information on his policy they found 

necessary for their own decisions. 3 

Mr. Churchill, as leader of his party in 

the House of Commons, as Minister of Defence, and as head of the War Cabinet, 

had constitutional responsibilities to the 

British Parliament which required a closer 

connection than Mr. Roosevelt’s with the 

conduct of operations. As Minister of Defence, Churchill was linked to the British 

Chiefs of Staff Committee through Gen. 

Sir Hastings L. Ismay, his chief of staff, 

who regularly attended meetings of the 

British Chiefs. In addition, the Prime 

Minister himself frequently attended these 

sessions. It was the practice of Mr. 

Churchill, both because of his long-time 

interest in operational details and because 

of the British view that control must be 

maintained over commanders down to 

very low echelons, tokeep much closer 

contact with field commanders than did 

President Roosevelt. In response to the 

Prime Minister’s frequent demands for 

battle information, the various British 

commanders followed the practice of making reports direct to London. While still in 

the Mediterranean theater, General 

Eisenhower criticized this practice as “the 

traditional and persistent intrusion of the 

British Chiefs of Staff into details of our 

operation—frequently delving into matters which the Americans leave to their 

Field Commanders.” He described this 

 activity on another occasion as 

“the inevitable trend of the British mind 

towards ‘committee’ rather than ‘single 

command.’ ” Efforts by the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff to restrict this kind of close control 

brought a protest from Churchill. The 

Prime Minister held that. whereas such 

aloofness looked simple from a distance 

and appealed to the American sense of 

logic, it was not sufficient for a government 

to give a General a directive to beat the 

enemy and wait to see what happens. The 

matter is much more complicated. The General may well be below the level of his task, 

and has often been found so. A definite meas- ure of guidance and control is required from 

staffs and from the high Government authorities. It would not be in accordance with the 

British point of view that any such element 

should be ruled out. 

So strong was Mr. Churchill’s view on the 

subject of direct reports that Eisenhower 

on coming to the United Kingdom in January 1944 signified his willingness to permit British commanders to continue the 

practice if the Prime Minister so desired. 4 

Combined Chiefs of Staff 

The permanent machinery through 

which Great Britain and the United States 

conducted the high-level control of the 

war—the Combined Chiefs of Staff—had 

been established in Washington in January 1942. Its task was to formulate and 

execute, under the direction of the heads 

of the countries concerned, policies and 

plans relating to the strategic conduct of 

the war, allocation of munitions, broad 

war requirements, and transportation requirements. (Chart 1) As it had developed 

by January 1944, the organization consisted of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the 

British Chiefs of Staff or their designated 

representatives in Washington (British 

3 Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951). 

4 Eisenhower’s views on British practice are contained in a statement in Diary Office CinC, 16 Sep 

43. and in Ltr. Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 Feb 43. 

Eisenhower personal file. Churchill to Br COS, 24 Oct 

43, SHAEF SGS 322.01 1/1 Comd and Control for 

Opn OVERLORD. Speech. Eisenhower to his stf, 21 Jan 

44, Min of SAC’s Confs. 

THE COALITION COMMAND 39 

Joint Staff Mission). 5 After mid-1942, the 

United States was represented by Admiral 

Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral Ernest 

J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, 

and Chief of Naval Operations, 6 and Gen. 

Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, 

Army Air Forces. Their British opposite 

numbers, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 

consisted of Field Marshal Sir Alan 

Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General 

Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley 

Pound (later replaced by Admiral of the 

Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham), First 

Sea Lord, and Air Chief Marshal Sir 

Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff. General Ismay attended the meetings, but did 

not sit as a member. 

In the course of the war, conferences of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff were held 

with the President and the Prime Minister 

at Casablanca ( SYMBOL), January 1943; 

Washington (TRIDENT) May 1943; 

Quebec (QUADRANT), August 1943; Cairo 

(SEXTANT)–Tehran (EUREKA), November– 

December 1943; Quebec (OCTAGON), September 1944; Yalta (ARGONAUT), February 1945; and Potsdam (TERMINAL), July 

1945. 7 

Normally the decisions of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff were made in Washington 

in periodic meetings of the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff and the British Joint Staff Mission. 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill sat on the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff as a representative of the Minister of Defence (Mr. 

Churchill), and officers of the three services represented the British Chiefs of Staff. 8 

The British Chiefs of Staff in London generally made their views known in cables to 

Field Marshal Dill, who then outlined 

their proposals in meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Frequently he discussed the British plans directly with 

General Marshall before the British views 

were taken up formally in the meetings. 

Because of the close relationship which existed between the two men, it was often 

possible for Field Marshal Dill to iron out 

differences of opinion before the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered them formally. The ease of settling problems with 

Dill was probably responsible in part for 

Marshall's desire to centralize Combined 

Chiefs of Staff activities in Washington. 

The British, finding it much easier to settle 

matters with the COSSAC chief (and later 

with the Supreme Commander) and with 

other U.S. representatives in London, preferred, as the time for invasion approached, to transfer an increasing number of Combined Chiefs of Staff functions 

5 Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

(Washington, 1951), Ch. I, has an account of the development of this Organization. 

6 Initially Admiral Harold R. Stark, as Chief of 

Naval Operations, and Admiral King, as Commander 

in Chief, U.S. Fleet, were both members of the U.S. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. The offices held by Stark and 

King were combined in March 1942 and given to Admiral King. Stark went to London as Commander, 

U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. 

7 The official records of the conferences used the 

code words instead of place names for the conferences, while the press referred to place names. To 

avoid confusion place names are used throughout this 

volume except in the citation of documents or in 

direct quotations. ARCADIA—the conference that 

established the Combined Chiefs of Staff-was actually the first formal meeting of the President, Prime 

Minister, and the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff. It 

was held December 1941-January 1942. 

8 Field Marshal Dill died in November 1944 and 

was replaced by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland 

Wilson. The original members of the Joint Staff Mission in Washington were Lt. Gen. Sir Colville 

Weymss, head of the British Army Staff; Air Chief 

Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris, head of the Air Staff; 

and Admiral Sir Charles Little, head of the British 

Admiralty Delegation. Later changes were as follows: Maj. Gen. R. H. Dewing (March 1942), replaced in June 1942 by Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready; 

Admiral Cunningham (June 1942), replaced in 

December 1942 by Admiral Sir Percy Noble; Air Vice 

Marshal D. C. S. Evill (February 1942), replaced in 

June 1943 by Air Marshal Sir William Welsh. 
40 THE SUPREM E COM MAND 

CONFERENCE AT QUEBEC. Present at this meeting in August 1943 were (seated, left 

to right) Prime Minister Mackenzie King, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill 

and (standing) General Arnold, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Field Marshal Brooke, Admiral 

King, Field Marshal Dill, General Marshall, Admiral Pound, and Admiral Leahy. 

to the British capital. This preference and 

interest may have influenced their willingness to have General Marshall as Supreme 

Commander and may have led them to 

withdraw any initial opposition they had 

to strong powers for the Supreme Commander of Operation OVERLORD. 

In issuing directives to the supreme 

commanders, the Combined Chiefs 

usually acted through the Chiefs of Staff of 

the country that provided the commander. 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, in turn, gave this 

task to the chief of the service that had 

supplied the commander. In the case of 

General Eisenhower, therefore, the wishes 

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff were formally communicated by General Marshall. The Supreme Commander sent his messages to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the 

same channel. There were some exceptions, however, to the use of normal channels. In initiating proposals on which it 

was believed that the Supreme Commander's recommendations would be required, the British Chiefs of Staff frequently sent copies of their proposals 

directly to Eisenhower and asked him to 

inform the U . S. Chiefs of Staff of his views. 

As a result he was sometimes able to have 

his recommendations in Washington by 

the time the British cable arrived. The U .S. 

Chiefs of Staff sometimes shortened the 

time necessary for decisions by permitting 

General Eisenhower to represent them in 

discussions with the British in London. 
THE COALITION COMMAND 41 

They did not like to resort to this device too 

often, however, lest the Supreme Commander be influenced unduly by the views 

of the British Chiefs of Staff. On several occasions Marshall warned Eisenhower 

against acquiring a one-sided view of 

Anglo- American questions, and once, at 

least, asked the British Chiefs of Staff not 

to put their views before the Supreme 

Commander before the matter was discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 

Was hi ng t on. 

Inasmuch as orders to General Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were channeled through the War Department, it was 

possible for General Marshall to maintain 

a close relationship with the Supreme 

Commander and to keep the United States 

point of view constantly before him. This 

influence was balanced to a considerable 

degree by the frequent personal meetings 

between the Supreme Commander and 

the key British leaders, including General 

Eisenhower’s attendance at some meetings of the British Chiefs of Staff. Eisenhower made it a practice to lunch weekly 

with the Prime Minister and often brought 

General Smith, Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, or some other American leader with 

him. Even after Supreme Headquarters 

was moved to France, the Prime Minister 

and the Chief of the Imperial General 

Staff kept in telephonic contact with the 

Supreme Commander and visited him 

several times at his headquarters. 

The Supreme Commander and His Subordinates 

Principle of Unity 

of Command 

Two years before General Eisenhower 

took his new post, the British and U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff had agreed that one Allied 

commander should have supreme command in each theater of operations. This 

decision had followed General Marshall’s 

strong plea for unified command. Pointing 

out that problems then being settled by 

the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff would 

recur unless settled in a broader way, 

Marshall asked that one officer command 

the air, ground, and naval forces in each 

theater. He added that the Allies had 

come to this conclusion late in World War 

I but only after the needless sacrifice of 

“much valuable time, blood and treasure. 

. . . ” Mr. Churchill had opposed this principle for the Pacific, where the various 

forces would be separated by great distances, and had suggested instead individual commanders who would be responsible 

to the Supreme Command in Washington. 

After some discussion, however, Marshall’s 

views were accepted. A few days later, the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff named their first 

supreme commander—Gen. Sir Archibald 

P. Wavell—to command the air, ground, 

and sea forces of Australia, Great Britain, 

the United States, and the Netherlands in 

the Southwest Pacific. Although the need 

for this particular command disappeared 

almost as soon as it was formed, the principle was maintained, and other supreme 

commanders were chosen for areas of the 

Pacific, Middle East, Mediterranean, and 

European theaters. 9 

General Eisenhower gained his first experience with the supreme commander 

principle as Allied commander in chief in 

the Mediterranean area. Here he discovered that British and United States concepts of the role of the supreme commander differed on the degree of control 

9 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 455–57; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 106. 
42 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

the Allied commander in chief was to be 

given over troops of nationality other than 

his own. Later, in the European theater, 

he discovered that considerable differences 

also existed as to the operational control 

which a supreme commander was expected to exercise over the air, land, and 

sea forces under his command. 

Eisenhower approached his problem in 

the Mediterranean theater with the intention of escaping the practice of the past in 

which “unity of command” had been a 

“pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies, ambitions and recriminations of high-ranking officers, unwilling to 

subordinate themselves or their forces to a 

commander of different nationality or different service.” 10 He wished to escape 

these problems by developing an integrated command in which British and 

American officers were intermingled in 

each section of his headquarters. Under 

any organization of command, however, 

he discovered that he had to struggle 

against the influence of differing national 

points of view and a tradition of far looser 

alliances. 

The British, with many years of experience in coalition warfare, followed an 

older concept of allied command when, in 

1943, they drew up their instructions placing Lt. Gen. K. A. N. Anderson, commander of the First British Army in North 

Africa, under General Eisenhower’s command. Copying the directives given to 

Field Marshal Douglas Haig in World 

War I and to British commanders in 

World War II, when they were placed 

under commanders of a different nationality, the British Chiefs of Staff declared: “If 

any order given by him [the Allied Commander in Chief] appears to you to imperil 

any British troops in the Allied Force even 

though they may not be under your direct 

command, it is agreed between the British 

and United States governments that you 

will be at liberty to appeal to the War 

Office before the order is executed.” 11 

Following a principle which he was to emphasize throughout his service as an Allied 

commander, General Eisenhower asked 

Prime Minister Churchill and the British 

Chiefs of Staff for a directive stressing the 

unity of the Allied forces. He contended 

that they were “undertaking a single, unified effort in pursuit of a common object 

stated by the two governments; and that 

for attainment of this object our sole endeavor must be to use every resource and 

effort for the common good.” The British 

acceded to this request. They revised General Anderson’s instructions to say that, in 

the unlikely event he should be given an 

order which would give rise to a grave and 

exceptional situation, he had a right to appeal to the War Office, “provided that by 

so doing an opportunity is not lost nor any 

part of the Allied Force endangered. You 

will, however, first inform the Allied Commander in Chief that you intend so to appeal and you will give him your reasons.” 

This was satisfactory to Eisenhower, who 

sent a copy to the War Department as a 

useful model “in future cases of this 

kind.” 12 

10 CinC Dispatch, North African Campaign, MS, 

p. 1, OCMH files. 

11 Annex, Ltr, Stirling to Eisenhower, 8 Oct 42, 

SGS AFHQ 381–2, quoted in History of AFHQ, 

August-December 1942, 1945, MS, OCMH files. 

12 For exchange of correspondence, see entry for 9 

October 1942 in Diary Office CinC. General Ismay 

informed the author on 20 December 1947 that he recalled no similar instructions being issued Montgomery in 1944. Something like the “model” instructions were later issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney when he assumed command of U.S. Forces in the Mediterranean theater. 
THE COALITION COMMAND 43 

Control by the Supreme Commander 

In the course of planning for the crossChannel operation, the British and U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff differed over the degree of 

control the Supreme Commander should 

exercise over operations. The British, accustomed to a committee type of joint 

command in which no service had over-all 

control, favored a plan which gave broad 

powers to the land, sea, and air commanders under the Supreme Commander. 

Under this system, the Allied commander 

in chief became a chairman of a board 

rather than a true commander. The U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff opposed the British suggestions as “destructive in efficiency in that 

none of them provide for an absolute unity 

of command by the Supreme Commander 

over all elements land, air and naval. . . . ” , 13 

Illustrative of the British views was a 

Royal Air Force suggestion that the staff 

of the Supreme Commander concern itself 

primarily with inter- Allied issues which 

would be largely political. Under the Supreme Commander three Allied commanders in chief would implement all 

broad decisions through their staffs, each 

of which would be organized on a combined basis. 14 

The matter of command was brought to 

a head in the summer and fall of 1943 

when General Morgan pressed for an 

agreement on the ground command in the 

assault and for a directive to the Allied 

tactical air force commander. In the initial 

outline of the OVERLORD plan, the 

COSSAC chief recommended that the 

Allied forces in the initial assault be under 

a British army commander and that the 

Allied ground forces be under a British 

army group commander until the Brest 

peninsula had been taken or a U.S. army 

group had been established on the Continent, whichever development came first. 15 

Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, the U.S. theater commander, in early September took 

exception to the Morgan proposal. He felt 

that it would put units smaller than a 

corps under direct British command and 

would deprive the Supreme Commander 

of operational control in the early stages of 

the assault. 16 He suggested instead that 

separate U.S. and British zones of action 

be established with all U.S. forces, land, 

sea, and air, under a single U.S. commander, and that both Allied forces be directed and controlled as self-sufficient 

units by the Supreme Commander. His 

proposal for close co-ordination of the initial assault by the advanced headquarters 

of SHAEF was considered unsound by the 

COSSAC staff members who held that 

Supreme Headquarters was a strategic and 

13 Br COS Memo, CCS 75,5 Jun 42; JCS Memo, 

CCS 75/1,26 Aug 42. 

14 RAF Note on Comd Organization, 16 Apr 43, 

SHAEF SGS 322 Comd and Control of Allied Air 

Forces. It should be noted that at a time when it appeared that a British commander would lead the 

cross-Channel forces, U.S. military leaders had suggested proposals somewhat like those recommended 

by the British. For example, Eisenhower, in the Operations Division of the War Department in May 

1942, had suggested something like the system discussed above. See Eisenhower proposals, 11 May 42, 

CofS file, BOLERO 381. 

15 Appreciation of Opn OVERLORD Plan, Sec. 40, 

Pt. I, SHAEF SGS 381 Opn OVERLORD, I(a). Morgan’s proposals included three other principles which 

were to be accepted: (1) British-Canadian forces 

should be based on ports nearest the United Kingdom 

to simplify lines of communications, since it was assumed that U.S. forces would ultimately be supplied 

direct from the U.S. and would need to be on the 

western side of the attack; (2) normally no formation 

smaller than a corps should be placed under command of another nationality; and (3) troops of both 

nationalities should take part in the assault. 

16 The initial COSSAC plan for OVERLORD called 

for one U.S. and three British divisions in the assault 

under a British army commander. 
44 

not a tactical command. They felt it 

unorthodox to cut out army group and 

army headquarters, and saw no place 

where the Supreme Commander could go 

forward to direct the battle in the early 

phases and still be in touch with the Allied 

governments. 1 7 

The British Chiefs of Staff on 11 September 1943 gave their backing to the 

COSSAC command proposals and asked 

the U. S. Chiefs of Staff for their comments. 

The American answer had not been delivered when, on 12 October, the British 

pointed to the need of integrating U.S. 

and British tactical air forces under an 

Allied tactical air commander and submitted a draft directive for U.S. approval. 

A week later, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff declared that "the issuance by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff of directives to subordinates 

of the Supreme Allied Commander is unsound." They made clear that the earlier 

proposal to specify the nature of the 

ground organization was an encroachment on the powers of the Supreme Commander. 1s 

Attempting to get an early solution to 

the ground and air command questions,19 

General Morgan discussed the problems 

with General Marshall in Washington in 

late October and early November 1943. 20 

The COSSAC chief found that the U.S. 

Army Chief of Staff thought that "he 

should in some way control the assaulting 

army although I am quite certain that his 

conception falls far short of what we understand by the term 'command.''' The 

deputy chief of COSSAC, Brig. Gen. Ray 

W. Barker, pointed out that while the 

initial assault had to be commanded by an 

army commander, who would be succeeded by an army group commander 

about D plus 6, the Supreme Command 

"could and would intervene at any time" 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

the situation seemed to warrant such action. This procedure, he noted, had been 

followed at Salerno when Generals Eisenhower and Alexander had taken a hand in 

the battle, the former ordering the whole 

weight of naval and air forces into the action. In the assault stages of the crossChannel operation, it would again be the 

air and sea forces that the Supreme Command would employ to influence the 

course of the battle. General Barker proposed that complete telephonic, telegraphic, and radio contact be provided 

with forward units, so that the Supreme 

Commander could be in the closest touch 

with the battle and could intervene 

quickly if the necessity arose. General 

Morgan approved this suggestion and indicated that he would tell General 

Marshall that arrangements would be 

made for him to participate directly in the 

battle when it took place. 21 

Discussions of the British draft directive 

for the tactical air forces were expanded in 

November to include the strategic air 

forces as well. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff proposed at that time to set up an Allied 

Strategic Air Force that would include 

British and U.S. strategic forces in both 

17 Draft Ltr (unsigned), Devers to Morgan, 4 Sep 

44; Comments of COS SAC· staff on Devers' letter, 

undated; Memo on Devers' letter, \0 Sep 43. All in 

SHAEF SGS 322.011/1 Comd and Control for OVERLORD. Morgan to Devers, 16 Sep 43, ABC (22 Jan 

43), Sec 1. 

18 CCS 304/2, 304/3, and 304/4,12 and 19 Oct 43. 

19 The naval command question, which was left 

largely to the British, was not as difficult as the other 

two. This was true chiefly because of the assumption 

until shortly before D Day that the British would 

furnish nearly all the naval support for the' assault. 

20 It should be remembered that at this time it was 

generally believed that Marshall would command the 

OVERLORD operation. 

21 Morgan to Barker, 28 Oct 43; Barker to Morgan, 

3 Nov 43; Morgan to Barker, 6 Nov 43. All in Barker 

personal file. 
THE 45 

the European and Mediterranean theaters. 

General Marshall, holding that a committee could not fight the war, wanted 

part or all of the strategic air forces, as well 

as the tactical air forces, put under the 

Supreme Commander. The British Chiefs 

of Staff, while willing to let the Supreme 

Commander control those strategic air 

forces in support of his operations once the 

cross-Channel attack began, wanted to retain full control of their RAF Bomber 

Command. In their opinion, this organization was so highly specialized and so firmly 

rooted in the United Kingdom that "effective operational control could only be exercised through Bomber Command headquarters.” 22 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff ultimately decided that they would have to 

postpone a decision on the strategic air 

forces and approve a directive concerning 

tactical forces only. Perhaps to preserve 

the shadow of the Supreme Commander's 

right to issue directives to his subordinates, 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff permitted 

General Morgan to issue in the name of 

the Supreme Commander the directive to 

the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force. 23 

The matter of the ground command was 

also settled temporarily during November. 

When General Morgan returned to London from Washington in that month, he 

carried with him Marshall's views on the 

organization of the ground forces for the 

assault. Near the end of November the 

COSSAC chief discussed the matter with 

the Allied naval and air commanders and 

shortly thereafter, acting in the name of 

the Supreme Allied Command, issued a 

directive to the 21 Army Group commander. This officer, then General Paget, 

was made jointly responsible with the 

Commander, Allied Naval Expeditionary 

Force, and the Commander, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, for planning the 

assault. When so ordered, he was also to 

be responsible for its execution “until such 

time as the Supreme Allied Commander 

allocates an area of responsibility to the 

Commanding General, First Army 

Group.” The 2 1 Army Group commander 

was informed that the assault would be 

made by two corps under the Commanding General, First U.S. Army, who would 

remain in charge of land operations until 

such time as the British commander felt 

that a second army headquarters should 

be brought in. 

Later when the enlargement of the assault force and the area to be attacked required the landing of two armies instead of 

two corps, the 21 Army Group commander was charged with the task of commanding land operations. He was thus 

made de facto commander of the ground 

forces in the assault but was never given 

the title of ground commander. Further, 

while his tenure in this temporary position was not made clear, it was certain that 

the arrangement could be changed when 

the Supreme Commander so decided. 

The Organization of the Subordinate Commands 

While. the question of the Supreme 

Commander's control over operations was 

22 CCS 124th and 126th Mtg, 22 Oct and 5 Nov 

43; JSM to Br COS, 6 Nov 43. Both in SHAEF SGS 

322.01 1/2 Dirs to Subordinate Comdrs. 

23 Marshall to Devers. R–5874, 18 Nov 43, Hq SOS 

file, gives text of agreement of CCS on directives to 

Leigh-Mallory. Morgan Dir to Leigh-Mallory, 16 

Nov 43. SHAEF SGS 322.01 1/3 Summary of Dirs. 

Mtg of comdrs, 25 Nov 43, SHAEF SGS 

322.01 1/2 Dirs to Subordinate Comdrs: COSSAC 

Dirs to CinC 21 A Gp, 29 Nov 43. SHAEF SGS 

322.01 1/1 Comd and Control for Opn OVERLORD. 

See below , pp. 180–8 1, 

24 

25 

24 

25 
46 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL LEIGHMALLORY 

being considered, the subordinate commands were being organized and their 

commanders were being selected. The 

easiest problem to solve was that of the 

naval command. On the assumption that 

the Royal Navy would furnish most of the 

naval forces for the OVERLORD operation, 

the Admiralty in May 1943, shortly after 

the organization of COSSAC, had directed Admiral Sir Charles Little, Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, to proceed 

with naval planning for the cross-Channel 

operation and instructed him to increase 

his staff sufficiently to aid COSSAC in its 

work. By the summer of 1943, it was clear 

that some U.S. naval forces would have to 

be added to the attack, but that the British 

effort was still paramount; Admiral King 

at that time instructed Admiral Stark, 

chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, to 

supplement the efforts of the U.S. member of the Naval Planning Branch of 

COSSAC. The Combined Chiefs of Staff 

at the Quebec Conference in August 1943 

regularized the naval arrangement by 

naming Admiral Little as Allied Naval 

Commander-in-Chicf (Designate) for the 

OVERLORD operation. The selection was 

ADMIRAL RAMSAY 

temporary since Mr. Churchill, who had 

Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay in mind 

for the post, accepted it only on condition 

that it be reviewed later. On 25 October 

1943, Admiral Ramsay, who had organized the British naval forces for the 

withdrawal at Dunkerque and had later 

commanded task forces in the Mediter- 
THE COALITION COMMAND 

ranean, was selected as Allied Naval 

Commander. ~6 

Rear Adm. Alan G. Kirk, former Chief 

of Naval Intelligence in Washington and 

later Commander, Amphibious Force, 

Atlantic Fleet, in the fall of 1943 was made 

commander of U.S. naval forces for the 

cross-Channel attack. I~ this capacity he 

had operational control of all U.S. naval 

forces in Europe except those in the south 

GENERAL BRERETON 

of France. Administrati vel y the elements 

under Kirk were controlled by Admiral 

Stark's headquarters in London. Operational control of the U.S. forces to be used 

in the cross-Channel attack was given Admiral Ramsay on 1 April 1944.27 French 

naval forces taking part in the attack were 

attached to Admiral Kirk's force by Ad47 

GENERAL SPAATZ. (Photograph taken 

in 1946.) 

miral Thierry d' Argenlieu, commander of 

the French Navy, and were organized into 

a cruiser division under Rear Adm. Robert 

Jaujard. InJanuary 1944, Admiral Ramsay named Admiral Kirk as commander 

of the Western Task Force and Rear Adm. 

Sir Philip L. Vian as commander of the 

Eastern Task Force for the D-Day assault. 28 

26 Mr. Churchill's surprise at the British proposal 

of Admiral Little and his reservations are noted in 

Quebec Conf Min, 23 Aug 43. Ltr, H. N. Morrison to 

Admiral Ramsay, 4 Nov 43, SHAEF SGS 322 Organization and Personnel ANCXF. 

27 CinC U .S. Fleet and CNO to Comdr U.S. Forces, 

Europe, 29 Oct 43 , SHAEF SGS 322.011 / 2 Dirs to 

Subordinate Comdrs. 

2 8 Dir, Admiral Ramsay to Naval Comdr, Western 

Task Force, 31 Jan 44; Dir, Admiral Ramsay to Naval 

Comdr, Eastern Task Force, 18 Jan 44. Both in 

SHAEF SGS 322.011 / 2 Dirs to Subordinate Comdrs. 
48 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Efforts to organize the Allied tactical 

air command for OVERLORD had begun in 

the spring of 1943 when Air Chief Marshal 

Portal proposed that Air Marshal Sir 

Trafford Leigh-Mallory, head of the RAF 

Fighter Command, be considered for the 

post of Commander, Allied Expeditionary 

Air Force. 29 Portal suggested that, in case 

the Allies were unwilling to make a final 

decision at the time, they direct LeighMallory to give advice on tactical air 

planning without prejudice to the eventual 

appointment of someone else. On receiving a favorable reaction to this proposal 

from General Devers, the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff agreed to Portal’s plan and the 

British Chiefs of Staff issued appropriate 

orders to Leigh-Mallory in late June 1943. 

At Quebec the following August, the Combined Chiefs of Staff named Air Chief 

Marshal Leigh-Mallory as commander of 

the Allied Expeditionary Air Force for the 

cross-Channel operation. 30 

Under the terms of the directive that 

Leigh-Mallory received in mid-November 

1943, the RAF Tactical Air Force and air 

units which might be allotted the Air 

Defence of Great Britain 31 were to pass to 

the Allied Expeditionary Air Force immediately, and the Ninth U.S. Air Force 

on 15 December 1943. The U.S. force, 

commanded by Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, had been brought to the United 

Kingdom in September 1943. It included 

all U.S. tactical air forces in the United 

Kingdom. Administrative control over 

Ninth Air Force training, supply, and 

personnel remained in the hands of the 

main U.S. air headquarters in the United 

Kingdom, United States Strategic Air 

Forces (USSTAF). 32 

U.S. proposals for the consolidation of 

U.S. and British strategic air forces in the 

European and Mediterranean theaters 

under the Supreme Commander—presented without success in Washington in 

the fall of 1943—were again brought forward at the Cairo Conference. The British 

objected to the over-all command, but reluctantly agreed to support any administrative arrangement the United States 

wished to make for its strategic air forces 

in the Mediterranean and the European 

theaters. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff at the 

close of the Cairo Conference ordered the 

establishment of the U.S. Strategic Air 

Forces in Europe. Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, 

commander of the U.S. air forces in the 

Mediterranean and of the Northwest African Air Forces, was named chief of the 

new headquarters. He was given operational control of the Eighth Air Force in 

the United Kingdom and the Fifteenth 

Air Force in the Mediterranean, and administrative control of the Eighth and 

Ninth Air Forces. Spaatz’s control was 

subject to two restrictions: the Chief of the 

Air Staff, RAF, representing the Com29 Before this time the U.S. strategic air forces sent 

to the United Kingdom for participation in the 

POINTBLANK operation against Germany in 1943 were 

placed, along with RAF Bomber Command, under 

the strategic direction of Air Chief Marshal Portal, 

who acted as agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

30 Portal to Devers, 16 Jun 43; Maj Gen Ira C. 

Eaker to Devers, 17 Jun 43; Devers to Portal, 19 Jun 

43. All in AG Active Records Branch 312.1 Devers 

Correspondence (1 943). Portal’s proposal to Br COS, 

COS (43) 125th Mtg, 16 Jun 43, SHAEF SGS 

322.011/2 Dirs to Subordinate Comdrs; CCS 113th 

Mtg, 20 Aug 43, Quebec Conf Min. 

31 Air Defence of Great Britain replaced Fighter 

Command in spring of 1944. (Leigh-Mallory was directly responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for the 

Air Defence of Great Britain until such time as his 

headquarters moved overseas when separate arrangements were to be made.) In October 1944 Fighter 

Command was revived. Journal of the Royal United 

Service Institution, XC, February 1945. 

32 Marshall to Devers, R-5874, 18 Nov 43, Hq SOS 

file, gives text of agreement of CCS on directives to 

Leigh-Mallory. Dir, Morgan to Leigh-Mallory, 16 

Nov 43, SHAEF SGS 322.01 1/3 Summary of Dirs. 
THE COALITION COMMAND 

bined Chiefs of Staff, was to co-ordinate 

bomber forces in Operation POINTBLANK, 

the Combined Bomber Offensive; the U.S. 

theater commanders in case of necessity 

could declare a state of emergency and 

make such use of strategic air forces as they 

found necessary at the time. 33 

As no agreement was reached in the 

summer or fall of 1943 on the selection of 

a ground force commander comparable in 

authority to the Allied naval and air force 

commanders, it became clear that the assignment would be likely to devolve on an 

Allied army group or army commander 

as a temporary appointment during the 

assault phase. The British had a claim on 

this post, not only because the initial assaults were to be made from Britain, but 

because they had both an army group and 

an army headquarters organized and 

available to start assault planning by the 

time the COSSAC plan was drawn Up.34 

General Morgan and General Devers 

urged in the summer of 1943 that the 

United States establish similar headquarters in the United Kingdom, but not until 

October were the 1st U.S. Army Group 

and First U.S. Army activated. 

General Paget was selected as the first 

commander of 21 Army Group. When it 

became apparent that this headquarters 

would command the Allied forces in the 

assault, it became necessary to place an 

officer recently seasoned in combat at its 

head. For this post the Prime Minister and 

the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 

chose General Montgomery, who had led 

the Eighth British Army to victory in 

Africa, in Sicily, and in Italy. His appointment was announced on Christmas Day, 

1943. General Eisenhower was not consulted officially on this selection, inasmuch 

as it was one solely for the British to make. 

He had earlier expressed a preferenc~ for 

49 

Gen. Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, who 

had served as Allied army group commander in Italy, but was told that the offi-

. cer could not be spared from the Mediterranean theater. 35 

In selecting the commander of Second 

British Army, General Montgomery 

turned to the Mediterranean theater and 

gave his backing to Lt. Gen. Miles C. 

Dempsey, who had commanded a corps in 

Italy in Montgomery's army. Early in 

1944, Gen. Henry D. G. Crerar, who was 

commanding a Canadian corps in Italy, 

was appointed commander of the First 

Canadian Army. 

The command of both the 1st U.S. 

Army Group and the First U.S. Army was 

given temporarily in the fall of. 1943 to 

General Bradley. Separate headquarters 

were organized, the army at Clifton College, Bristol, and the army group at Bryanston Square, London. 36 

The Supreme Commander's Directive 

General Eisenhower assumed command 

of the Allied forces in mid-January 1944, 

but did not receive a directive until nearly 

a month later. A draft had been submitted 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as 

30 October 1943, but the failure of the 

U.S. and British Chiefs to agree on the 

exact powers of the Supreme Commander 

33 Wesley Frank Craven andJames Lea Cate, eds., 

The Am!)! AH- Forces in World War II: II, EuropeTORCH to POINTBLANK, August 1942 to December 

1943 (Chicago 1949), pp. 751-56. 

34 21 Army Group, Second British Army, and 

Headquarters, First Canadian Army, were all activated in the summer of 1943. 

35 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 211; Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Aug 43, Eisenhower personal 

file. 

36 Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York, 

1951), Ch. I. It is clear that General Bradley was the 

first choice of both General Marshall and General 

Eisenhower for this post. 
50 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

GENERAL BRADLEY. (Photograph 

taken in 1950.) 

or the precise objectives to be assigned resulted, as in the case of Air Chief Marshal 

Leigh-Mallory’s directive, in a long delay. 

The obstacles to agreement on these and 

other points lay in differences of policy 

which had existed between the British and 

U.S. leaders since 1942. On the chief 

point—that the main effort of the Western 

Allies should be exerted against Germany-there was no dispute. On the manner in which that aim was to be achieved 

there was less agreement. The differences 

had their origins in the national interests 

of the United States and Great Britain, in 

their past history, and in the political 

philosophy of their leaders. If these elements are taken into account, it becomes 

clear that the controversies which sometimes marked the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were not personal 

quarrels growing out of individual ambitions or bias or pique. Nor were they based 

on national antipathies, though the discussions were sharpened at times by 

clashes of temperament and personality 

and by differences of national interests. 

Rather they reflected the fact that allies, 

like the different armed services of a nation, can agree thoroughly on the big issue 

of war and yet have entirely opposite conGENERAL MONTGOMERY 

cepts of the way in which the main object 

is to be reached. A failure to understand 

this fact could reduce the story of this 

great allied coalition, perhaps the most 

successful in history, to a study in personal 

and national recriminations. 

In the making of Allied grand strategy, 

the selection of a Supreme Commander, 

and the writing of his directive, the Allies 

often disagreed as to the best way to over- 
THE COALITION COMMAND 

come Germany. The United States, believing that only a power drive to the heart 

of the Continent would defeat the enemy 

quickly, chose the cross-Channel operation 

as the speediest and least costly of lives in 

the long run. The British, in the light of 

heavy commitments around the world and 

their doubts of the wisdom of a direct attack on enemy fortifications in northwest 

Europe, preferred to approach the enemy 

GENERAL CRERAR 

by flanking movements in the Mediterranean theater. 

There was, of course, more to the matter than this. The United States in its de~ 

sire to end the war in Europe quickly was 

motivated in large part by the fact that 

there were strong demands in the United 

States for greater pressure against Japan. 

The Navy in particular was reluctant to 

51 

GENERAL DEMPSEY 

take additional forces from the Pacific for 

operations which seemed not to affect directly the war against Germany. There 

was also the suspicion that the British had 

long-range interests in the Mediterranean 

area which were no affair of the United 

States, and that U .S. resources should not 

be diverted from the principal operation to 

any enterprise which was not specifically a 

part of the main offensive against the 

enemy. 

To the British, the attack in the Mediterranean was the best way of fighting the 

Germans, with the additional virtue of 

aiding British interests. It appeared, at 

times, that the Americans were not being 

completely realistic in their planning, and 

a note of asperity sometimes crept into the 

arguments of the British planners when 

they concluded that the Americans on the 
S2 

ground of eschewing politics were urging 

a strategy that would prove costly in men 

and materiel. Some British representatives 

also had the feeling that the United States 

was not thoroughly aware of all the political and strategic implications involved in 

a European war. As a result, particularly 

in the first months after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, there was a tendency for the British to attempt to instruct 

the U.S. representatives in the proper 

forms of strategy. This created the impression in some quarters that the British were 

trying to control Allied operations. As a 

counteraction to this, the American representatives sought to control or have an 

equal share in the management of operations which involved large numbers of 

U.S. troops. 

In describing the mission and outlining 

the powers of the Supreme Allied Commander, the British Chiefs of Staff were 

aware that the Allied commander in chief 

would come from the U.S. Army. Since 

this fact could give additional weight to 

U.S. views on operations, the British desired to delimit in precise terms the nature 

of the Supreme Commander's task, and to 

broaden the powers of the chief air, 

ground, and sea commanders, most or all 

of whom would be British. TheU.S. Chiefs 

of Staff preferred to write the directive in 

broad terms and limit the powers of the 

subordinate commanders. In their proposals, they suggested grants of authority 

to the Allied commander in chief over 

British and U.S. forces which the British 

Chiefs of Staff would have been unwilling 

to give one of their own commanders. 

When on S January 1944 the British 

Chiefs of Staff submitted a draft directive 

enumerating the duties of the subordinate 

commanders in chief, General Morgan, 

who had earlier warned General Marshall 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

of the plan," objected in particular to a 

listing of the powers of the ground force 

commander, which he believed would 

later cause embarrassment to the Supreme 

Commander. The COSSAC chief urged 

that this section of the draft directive be 

limited to a listing of land forces to be 

placed at the disposal of General Eisenhower, leaving him free to issue such directives to his army group commanders as he 

saw fit. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggested 

that the appendixes in the British plan 

dealing with Allied commanders be considered only as informational guidance for 

the Supreme Commander. After some discussion, the British Chiefs agreed to strike 

out these sections."" The way was thus left 

open for the Supreme Commander to develop his control over the forces put under 

his command without being hampered by 

restrictions. The Combined Chiefs of Staff 

did leave one important command question unanswered, however, when they 

postponed for later settlement the problem 

of what proportion of the Allied strategic 

air forces in Europe should be placed under the Supreme Commander. 

The demarcation of the Supreme Commander's "task" in the directive constituted still another problem for the Com-

;" G~neral.Morgan had written in November that 

the British Chiefs of Staff would soon submit a directive for the ground force commander which "prescribes a command relationship within a component 

element of the forces under the command of SAC 

[the Supreme Allied Commander] and assigns a mission to the commander of that element. This is considered to be an exclusive function of SAC." Morgan 

to Marshall. 18 Nov 43. SHAEF SGS 322.011/2 Dirs 

to Subordinate Comdrs . 

. 1.' Br COS toJSM, 5Jan 44; Morgan to Marshall 

for Eisenhower, 7 Jan 45. Both in SHAEF SGS 

322.011 CCS Dir to SCAEF. A number of charts of 

proposals and counterproposals submitted by the U.S. 

and British Chiefs of Staff in January and February 

1944 and correspondence containing the arguments 

and final decision may also be found in the above file. 
THE COALITION COMMAND 

bined Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff held that the British had not gone far 

enough in their initial statement, "You 

will enter the Continent of Europe and 

undertake operations to secure lodgments 

from which further offensive action can be 

aimed at the heart of Germany." Fearful 

that the British might be trying to limit 

operations to establishment of a beachhead and a holding action, while the main 

operations went on elsewhere, the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff insisted on a more positive 

order: "You shall enter the Continent ... 

and undertake operations striking at the 

heart of Germany and destroy her forces." 

This bold declaration seemed unrealistic 

to the British in view of the fact that the 

available Allied force of forty divisions was 

obviously insufficient to overwhelm the 

German Army. Amendments were ultimately added to the American version, 

which retained the aim of the U.S. statement, while associating the forces of the 

United Nations in the operation. This revised draft was accepted by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff on 11 February, and the 

final directive was issued on 12 February 

1944.3~ 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive 

to General Eisenhower declared: 

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme 

Allied Commander of the forces placed under 

your orders for operations for the liberation 

of Europe from the Germans. Your title will 

be Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. 

2. Task. You will enter the continent of 

Europe, and, in conjunction with the other 

United Nations, undertake operations aimed 

at the heart of Germany and the destruction 

of her armed forces. The date for entering the 

Continent is the month of May 1944. After 

adequate channel ports have been secured, 

exploitation will be directed to securing an 

area that will facilitate both ground and air 

operations against the enemy. 

53 

3. Notwithstanding the target date above, 

you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as the withdrawal by the enemy 

on your front, to effect a re-entry into the 

Continent with such forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for 

vour assistance. , 4. Command. You are responsible to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise 

command generally in accordance with the 

diagram at Appendix A. Direct communication with the United States and British Chie[" 

of Staff is authorized in the interest offacilitating your operations and for arranging 

necessary logistic support. 

S. Logistics. In the United Kingdom the 

responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement and supply of forces to 

meet the requirements of your plan will rest 

with British Service Ministries so far as 

British Forces are concerned. So far as 

United States Forces are concerned, this 

responsibility will rest with the United States 

War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the co-ordination oflogistical 

arrangements on the continent. You will also 

be responsible for co-ordinating the requirements of British and United States Forces 

under your command. 

6. Co-ordination of operations if other Forces 

and Agencies. In preparation for your assault 

on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and Air 

Forces, agencies of sabotage, subversion and 

propaganda, acting under a variety of 

authorities, are now in action. You may 

recommend any variation in these activities 

which may seem to you desirable. 

7. Relationship to United Nations Forces in 

other areas. Responsibility will rest with the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the forces of 

the U.S.S.R. for your guidance in timing 

your operations. It is understood that the 

Soviet forces will launch an offensive at about 

the same time as OVERLORD with the object of 

preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the \Vestern front. 

The Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-

.", See entire file SHAEF SGS 322.011 CCS Dir to 

SCAEF. 

THE COALITION COMMAND 55 

ranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the 

launching of an attack against the south of 

France at about the same time as OVERLORD. 

The scope and timing of his operations will be 

decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. YOU 

will establish contact with him and submit to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and 

recommendations regarding operations from 

the Mediterranean in support of your attack 

from the United Kingdom. The Combined 

Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in Southern 

France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely 

recommendations compatible with this 

regard. 

8. Relationship with Allied Governments-the 

re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of 

Enemy Territories. Further instructions will be 

issued to you on these subjects at a later date. 

Under the provisions of this document, 

General Eisenhower, who had been functioning as Supreme Commander for 

nearly a month, assumed formal command 

of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, on 13 February, and on the 

following day announced the of his 

principal Staff officers. 40 (Chart 2) 

The Supreme Commander had good 

reasons for being pleased with his directive. Stated in the most general terms, it 

left him great freedom in exercising command and in outlining the details of his 

operations against Germany. The restrictive features which might have reduced 

him to the position of a political chairman 

of allied forces or which would have narrowed the scope of his mission had been 

omitted. The greatest allied army in history had been placed under his control. 

40 The Supreme Commander’s General Order 1 , 

announcing assumption of Supreme Command effective at 120 1, was dated 13 February 1944. General 

Order 2, listing appointments, is dated 14 February 

1944. 
CHAPTER III 

The Nature of SHAEF 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was formally established in 

London in mid-February 1944, but it had 

actually been in the process of development for more than two years. It drew its 

basic principles of organization and many 

of its key personnel from two headquarters 

which had been established many months 

before. One of these, Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), which had served as 

General Eisenhower’s command post in 

the Mediterranean theater, had provided 

a laboratory for testing principles and procedures of the command and training of 

U.S. and British staffs in combined operations. The other, Headquarters, Chief of 

Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander 

(COSSAC), had been established in the 

spring of 1943 to plan the cross-Channel 

attack and to serve as the nucleus for the 

ultimate Supreme Headquarters. 

Contributions of AFHQ 

The importance of AFHQ’s contribution to the SHAEF organization was 

expressed in General Eisenhower’s postwar judgment that some of his key advisers 

in northwest Europe had learned “during 

the African campaigns, the art of dealing 

with large Allied forces, operating under 

single command.” At AFHQ, General 

Eisenhower had developed an integrated 

command in which British or U.S. officers 

of a staff division could make decisions affecting forces of either nationality. Officers 

were carefully selected for their ability to 

fit into such a staff. Many of them, otherwise capable, were transferred when found 

unsuitable for such an assignment. The 

task, as Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. 

Tedder, the Deputy Supreme Commander 

of SHAEF, later testified, involved “getting the right people and being ruthless . . . 

and you must be ruthless. . . . If a man 

does not fit he will never learn the language and you will never make a team; 

that is the guts of the whole thing, the 

team. . . .” 1 U.S. officers who were not 

wholly in accord with General Eisenhower’s weeding-out process had a grim 

joke to the effect that the way to get sent 

back to the United States “by slow boat” 

was to say something insulting about a 

foreign officer of the headquarters. Others 

charged the British with using the complaint that certain officers were un-cooperative to rid the headquarters of 

United States officers who were aggressive 

in defending the American point of view. 

To General Eisenhower, the important 

thing was to establish a completely Allied 

headquarters. When he went to SHAEF 

he was able to take key advisers from 

AFHQ and be certain that he would have 

1 Address of Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, “Problems of 

an Integrated Headquarters,” Journal of the Royal 

United Service Institution, XC (November, 1945), 455- 

62, with statements by Lord Tedder; Eisenhower, 

Crusade in Europe, p. 134. 
THE NATURE OF SHAEF 57 

men who were thoroughly sold on Allied 

co-operation. 

As Allied commander in chief in the 

Mediterranean theater, General Eisenhower learned the métier of Supreme 

Command and became familiar with most 

of the problems he later faced at SHAEF. 

Questions such as the recognition of a 

French political authority, the formulation 

of civil affairs and military government 

GENERAL DEVERS. (Photograph 

taken in 1946.) 

programs, the proper handling of press 

relations, the expansion of the psychological warfare program, and the establishment of air-ground co-operation all reappeared in the European Theater of 

Operations. Not only had the Supreme 

Commander been schooled in the techniques of approaching these problems, but 

GENERAL BARKER 

he trained a staff that was also familiar 

with them. Ultimately Allied Force Headquarters furnished SHAEF with the 

Supreme Commander, Deputy Supreme 

Commander, chief of staff, chief administrative officer, chief of intelligence, deputy 

chief of operations, deputy chief of civil 

affairs, chief of press relations, chief of the 

psychological warfare division, and adjutant general. The British Chiefs of Staff in 

filling key command and staff positions for 

the invasion of northern France also drew 

on the Mediterranean for a number of 

men acquainted with Eisenhower and his 

staff. This list included the chiefs of staff 

of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force and 

the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force; the 

commander of British land forces and his 

chief air commander; and the British 

army commander for the invasion. The 
58 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Canadian commander had also served in 

Italy. United States officers who had formerly served under General Eisenhower 

in the Mediterranean before coming to the 

United Kingdom included the chief of the 

United States Army Air Forces in Europe, 

the commander of the Eighth Air Force, 

and the commanders of the two U.S. 

armies listed for participation in the early 

phases of the attack. 

Contributions of COSSAC 

In many ways, Supreme Headquarters 

was a continuation of the COSSAC staff 

which had been organized in April 1943 

along lines discussed by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in January 1943 at Casablanca and modified in March and April. 

General Morgan, as Chief of Staff to the 

Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), 

had been directed to prepare a diversionary plan with the object of pinning the enemy in the west and keeping alive the 

threat of a cross-Channel attack in 1943 

(COCKADE), to plan a return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration (RANKIN), and to plan a full-scale 

assault on the Continent as early as possible in 1944 (OVERLORD). 2 

The COSSAC staff was developed 

throughout 1943 on the basis that it would 

serve ultimately as the staff of the Supreme 

Commander. Its chief and many of its 

members were taken into the SHAEF 

organization. It was thus possible not only 

to preserve but also to draw upon the ideas 

of early planning groups which had 

preceded COSSAC. 

Before his appointment as COSSAC 

chief, General Morgan had recommended 

that a staff be formed immediately as “the 

nucleus of the eventual Allied GHQ in the 

field” and that it be prepared at the 

earliest moment to assume direction of all 

offensive enterprises initiated from the 

United Kingdom. He proposed to combine from the beginning all functions of 

planning and execution and to direct all 

future activity toward the defeat of the 

German Army. He desired complete 

amalgamation of the U.S. and British 

services in the machinery of the high command with the understanding that the ultimate issue would be decided by the 

Allied strategic reserve of land forces, 

“namely the American army.” 3 

General Morgan set up his staff in London at Norfolk House, St. James’s Square, 

built on the site of the birthplace of George 

III of England. With the aid of his U.S. 

deputy, Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker, the 

COSSAC chief began to select the future 

SHAEF staff and to outline the operations 

which the future Supreme Commander 

was to carry into effect. When, in the late 

summer of 1943, it became clear that an 

American officer would become the Supreme Commander, he sought to place 

Americans in a number of key spots and to 

2 Code names mentioned above were supplied later. 

For background of COSSAC, see Maj Duncan Emrich 

and Maj F. D. Price, History of COSSAC, prep at 

SHAEF, 1945, MS, OCMH files; CCS 169, 22 Jan 

43; 67th Mtg, 22 Jan 43, Casablanca Conf Min; COS 

(43) 105 (0), 8 Mar 43; COS (43) 110 (0), 9 Mar 43; 

COS (43) 148 (0), 23 Mar 43; COS (43) 170 (0), 1 

Apr 43; COS (43) 215 (0), 26 Apr 43. These COS (43) 

papers are in SHAEF SGS files, Bundle D, COS (43) 

Papers, I, 1–299. See also COS (43) 55th Mtg (0) 

25 Mar 43; COS (43) 57th Mtg (0), 26 Mar 43; COS 

(43) 64th Mtg (0), 2 Apr 43; COS (43) 67th Mtg (0), 

6 Apr 43; COS (43) 85th Mtg (0), 23 Apr 43. These 

documents are in SHAEF SGS files, Bundle B, COS 

(43) Min, I. 

3 Memo, Gen Morgan, 23 Mar 43, Annex, Cross 

Channel Operations, COS (43) 148 (0); Interv with 

Gen Morgan, 8 Feb 47; Morgan, Overture to Overlord, 

Ch. I. General Morgan indicated in a speech of 17 

April 1943 that he was following suggestions of Lt. 

Gen. Frank M. Andrews, Commanding General, 

ETOUSA. SHAEF SGS Min of COSSAC Confs. 
THE NATURE OF SHAEF 59 

reorganize COSSAC along American 

lines. Much of this work was handed over 

to General Barker, the ranking U.S. officer 

at the headquarters. As a result of this 

shift, two U.S. officers were brought to 

London as deputy chiefs of the operations 

and supply sections with the understanding that they would later head these two 

sections under the Supreme Commander. 

General Eisenhower’s chief of publicity 

and psychological warfare and members 

of the civil affairs section of Allied Force 

Headquarters were also brought to 

COSSAC in the fall of 1943 to prepare for 

roles in SHAEF. 4 

General Marshall, in September 1943, 

at the time when it was assumed he would 

lead the cross-Channel operation, told 

General Devers, Commanding General, 

ETOUSA, that full support must be given 

General Morgan “in his difficult task of 

organizing an efficient, operational staff 

for our Supreme Commander.” General 

Marshall suggested that the Supreme 

Headquarters have General Morgan as 

chief of staff, U.S. officers as deputy chief 

of staff and chief of operations, a British 

officer as chief of intelligence, and a British 

officer as chief of administration until the 

bulk of supplies began to come from the 

United States, at which time he would be 

replaced by a U.S. officer. Marshall proposed that the press and propaganda sections be headed by U.S. and British 

officers with coequal powers. He added 

that in each staff section the second in 

command was to be of the nationality opposite to that of his chief. In order that the 

staff should be well balanced, General 

Marchall recommended strong naval, air, 

and ground representation, with a possible 

reduction of naval representation after the 

initial assault. The Allied naval and air 

staffs were to be of a size necessary “to 

effect the coordinated direction of the 

forces” under their commands. 5 

Both General Marshall and General 

Morgan believed that the ultimate Supreme Headquarters should be modeled 

on Marshal Foch’s World War I staff, described by the COSSAC chief as a “really 

small body of selected officers who dealt 

with the major decisions on broad lines, 

the day-to-day work of the war being 

delegated completely to the commanders 

of army groups.” 6 Such a headquarters 

would have been sufficient only for a Supreme Commander who was merely 

chairman of the Allied forces. Once it became clear that General Eisenhower 

would direct operations, the need for a 

larger staff became apparent. 

The appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander also required other changes in the COSSAC 

plans. It was natural that the new commander, having developed a satisfactory 

staff at Allied Force Headquarters, would 

want to bring a number of his advisers 

with him. Even before he assumed his new 

post, General Eisenhower directed General Smith to study the personnel situation 

4 Emrich and Price, History of COSSAC, pp. 9-11 ; 

Morgan, Overture to Overlord, pp. 2 13-22. 

5 Marshall to Devers, 24 Sep 43, OPD Exec. Morgan, Overture to Overlord, Ch. IX, is valuable on the 

organization of the staff. 

6 Address, Morgan to stf, I7 Apr 43, SHAEF SGS 

Min of COSSAC Confs. The author has been unable 

to find a precise list of the officers on Foch’s staff. Sir 

Frederick Maurice, Lessons of Allied Co-Operation, I914- 

I918 (London, 1942), p. 142, speaks of Foch starting 

with a small staff of about a dozen officers and later 

adding. an administrative staff. Gen. Maxime Wey- ” 

gand. Foch (Paris, 1947). pp. 199-200, indicates that 

outside of the members of the Allied missions, who 

had access to the office of the General Staff, there was 

a group of about twenty officers with the Commander 

in Chief of the Allied Armies. The author is indebted 

to Dr. T. D. Shumate, Jr., who is working on a study 

of the Supreme War Council in World War I, for 

these references. 
60 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

for SHAEF. This officer, after studying the 

COSSAC organization, proposed changes 

in it based on Allied experiences at 

AFHQ. He initially asked for an enlarged 

staff, on the ground that the existing organization was not large enough for a 

commander who intended to control operations in the field. Fresh from the Mediterranean headquarters, General Smith was 

aware that civil affairs, press relations, 

psychological warfare and other such activities of an Allied headquarters would 

require large staffs. To fill these and other 

posts in the new SHAEF organization he 

began to draw on Allied Force Headquarters for key officers whose names had 

already been suggested by General Eisenhower. 7 

A steady flow of personnel northward 

began in January 1944 and increased until 

the British Chief of the Imperial General 

Staff feared that the new Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, would not have 

enough experienced officers to run his 

headquarters. The new arrivals introduced changes in several COSSAC divisions, although an attempt was made to 

retain most of the COSSAC members and 

reassure them about the intentions of the 

new regime. General Eisenhower at the 

outset made clear that he had no purpose 

of sweeping clean the organization which 

was already functioning in London. 

Rather he wished “to integrate himself 

upon the existing staffs in SAC” 8 and 

develop the same unity of action which 

had prevailed in the Mediterranean. General Morgan was made deputy chief of 

staff of SHAEF, General Barker was 

placed at the head of one of the general 

staff divisions, and other key members of 

the COSSAC staff were retained in their 

positions. By selecting men from both 

headquarters who were faithful to the idea 

of “integration,” the Supreme Commander was able to make the transition 

without serious disturbance, although 

several division heads were replaced and 

other personnel shifted. For a time the 

COSSAC members, who had been planning the cross-Channel invasion for a 

number of months, resented the newcomers’ boasts of the “sand in their boots” 

they had picked up in North Africa. The 

Allied Force Headquarters officers, for 

their part, often complained that the 

COSSAC people lacked real knowledge of 

combat and were inclined to be academic 

in their approach to operational planning. 

Both groups, in time, found it necessary to 

coalesce in the face of British and U.S. 

combat soldiers from the Mediterranean 

theater who were inclined to smile at the 

suggestion that members of high level 

headquarters knew anything about battle 

conditions. By the eve of the invasion, the 

integrated SHAEF staff was functioning as 

an efficient unit. 9 

The Chief Deputies 

Air Chief Marshal Tedder was chosen 

as Deputy Supreme Commander of 

SHAEF in January 1944. General Eisenhower did not have a hand in his selection, 

but he was highly pleased that the British 

made this choice. The two men had been 

closely associated in the Mediterranean 

7 Interv with Gen Smith, 13 May 47; Interv with 

Brig Gen Thomas J. Betts, former deputy G–2 of 

SHAEF, 19 May 50. 

8 In this case SAC is used to mean Supreme Headquarters. Normally it was used as an abbreviation for 

Supreme Allied Commander. General Eisenhower 

was also frequently referred to as SCAEF (Supreme 

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force), 

9 Address, Eisenhower to members of his stf. 24 Jan 

44, summarized in Min of SAC’s Confs. Statements 

as to integration of SHAEF based on interviews by 

author with many members of the SHAEF staff, 
THE NATURE OF SHAEF 61 

theater and shared the same views on the 

integration of Allied staffs. General Eisenhower had proposed Tedder for the post of 

chief airman at SHAEF before he knew 

that the British officer was being considered for the post of deputy. Tedder had 

served as British air commander in the 

Middle East in 1942, helping to stop Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel’s advance toward Egypt. The air marshal’s 

forces had also contributed significantly to 

the success of General Montgomery’s El 

Alamein attack and the subsequent drive 

toward Tunisia. From 17 February 1943 

until his appointment as Deputy Supreme 

Commander, Tedder had served as Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Allied 

Air Forces, which included RAF Middle 

East, RAF Malta Air Command, and the 

Northwest African Air Forces. The Northwest African command included British 

and U.S. air forces in support of General 

Eisenhower. In the Mediterranean post, 

Tedder came to be held in high esteem by 

many of the U.S. and British airmen who 

were later brought to the United Kingdom to command various air units in support of the cross-Channel attack. German 

intelligence agencies showed a wholesome 

respect for the new deputy. Shortly after 

his selection, one of them reported: 

Tedder is on good terms with Eisenhower 

to whom he is superior in both intelligence 

and energy. The coming operations will be 

conducted by him to a great extent. He regards the Air Force as a “spearhead artillery” 

rendering the enemy vulnerable to an attack. 

His tactics in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, 

based on this theory, provided for air support 

for the advance of even the smallest Army 

units. . . . Under Tedder’s influence the cooperation between the Air Force and Army 

has become excellent. 

Tedder does not take unnecessary risks. 

Unless other factors play a part, he will 

undertake the invasion only after achieving 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL TEDDER 

complete air supremacy and after large-scale 

bombing of the Reich. 

Tedder is said to be taciturn especially 

since he lost his eldest son in an air battle 

over London. He is very popular with the 

troops on account of his consideration and 

unassuming appearance. 

Obviously we are dealing here with one of 

the most eminent personalities amongst the 

invasion leaders. 10 

Air Chief Marshal Tedder became the 

chief co-ordinator of Allied air efforts in 

support of the cross-Channel operation. 

The Deputy Supreme Commander made 

no effort to form a special staff through 

which to deal with air activities, restricting 

his function in many cases to that of a 

10 Luftwaffe Academy Lecture, Invasion Generals, 

Careers and Assessments, 7 Feb 44, Generalstab der 

Luftwaffe, 8. Abteilung (hist sec), British Air Ministry 

files. 
62 

chairman or moderator of daily air conferences at which the chief strategic and tactical air commanders were represented. 

He also worked with the Air Staff 

(SHAEF) which was set up under a separate deputy chief of staff for air. 

Tedder participated in General Eisenhower's morning conferences, giving advice both as Deputy Supreme Commander 

and as chief airman. The demands of air 

activities on his time and the fact that 

Tedder was not a ground force officer led 

many members of the SHAEF staff to consult him only on air matters. General 

Eisenhower used his deputy frequently to 

explain SHAEF policy to the British 

Chiefs of Staff and occasionally sent him 

on highly important missions, such as that 

to Moscow in January 1945. In the early 

months of the OVERLORD operation, the 

Supreme Commander charged his deputy 

with the task of insuring that ground commanders asked for and got the air support 

necessary for their operations. Tedder also 

intervened directly when he felt it necessary to bar projects that he considered 

wasteful of planes or contrary to existing 

doctrines of proper employment of air 

forces in combat. In all these assignments, 

he worked quietly and effectively, taking 

many problems, particularly those relating to the air forces, off the Supreme Commander's shoulders. 12 

General Eisenhower had chosen as his 

chief of staff at SHAEF the officer who 

had held a similar post in the Mediterranean theater.12 Prime Minister Churchill suggested that General Smith stay at 

Allied Force Headquarters as deputy commander but, in the face of General 

Eisenhower's insistence, gave way. Smith 

had served before the war as Secretary of 

the General Staff in the War Department 

and later as secretary to the Combined 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He was 

thoroughly acquainted with high-level 

staff work and with the individuals who 

made up the Supreme Allied Command. 

Capable of being extremely tough and 

brusque in manner, he also knew the 

value of the smooth approach. He was 

thus useful as a hatchet man for the Supreme Commander, and also qualified to 

represent him in missions which required 

diplomatic skill. General Eisenhower considered him a perfect chief of staff. 

General Smith guarded the approaches 

to General Eisenhower somewhat more 

jealously than the British staff members of 

SHAEF would have liked. He directed the 

flow of correspondence into his office and 

cut down the number of direct contacts 

between the Supreme Commander and 

the SHAEF deputies and staff members. 

Shortly after his arrival Smith made a 

major change in that direction by reorganizing the Central Secretariat of COSSAC, 

headed by Maj. Martin McLaren, along 

lines of the American Secretary of the 

General Staff system. He attempted to run 

the new staff for a time with Major 

McLaren and Col. Dan Gilmer, who had 

been secretary of the general staff in the 

Mediterranean, but the experiment 

proved unsuccessful. Colonel Gilmer went 

to the War Department as chief of the 

European theater section of the Operations Division, and Major McLaren to the 

G–3 Division of SHAEF. Lt. Col, Ford 

Trimble, onetime aide of Gen. Douglas 

11 Interviews with many members of the SHAEF 

staff, including General Smith, Air Chief Marshal Sir 

James M. Robb, and General Morgan in 1946 and 

1947, and especially with Wing Commander Leslie 

Scarman, wartime personal assistant to Air Chief 

Marshal Tedder, 25 February 1947. 

12 General Smith was also the chief of staff of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. 
THE NATURE OF SHAEF 

GENERAL SMITH 

MacArthur, became secretary of the general staff. 13 

In accord with American practice all 

staff studies originating in the SHAEF 

divisions came to the chief of staff before 

being passed on to the Supreme Commander. In this way papers that did not 

need General Eisenhower's approval were 

handled by General Smith. Many items of 

correspondence prepared for the Supreme 

Commander's signature were issued by 

the chief of staff for his chief without being 

passed on to him. To make certain that 

General Eisenhower was kept informed of 

all action, the secretary of the general staff 

prepared a special log of incoming and 

outgoing messages which was shown to 

him each day. Careful lists of all decisions 

by the chief of staff were kept for the inspection of the Supreme Commander. The 

chief of staff held his own daily morning 

63 

conference just before that of the Supreme 

Commander. In the latter conference it 

was possible for key U.S. and British members of the staff to present matters directly 

to the Supreme Commander. 

The office of the chief of staff was tightly 

organized and its head gained the reputation of a driver. His ruthless cutting of verbiage from papers and his demand for 

clearly stated proposals were a great aid to 

efficiency. At the risk of exercising some of 

the functions that belonged to the Deputy 

Supreme Commander, he also saved General Eisenhower from many details of administration which could have become 

overwhelming. While in London, General 

Smith saw the Prime Minister and members of the British Chiefs of Staff frequently 

and proved helpful to Eisenhower in working out numerous details with them. He 

was even more valuable in dealing with 

the French after SHAEF moved to the 

Continent, consulting with Gen. AlphonsePierre Juin and Maj. Gen. Pierre Joseph 

Koenig on matters pertaining to the liberation of France. 

The selection of General Smith as chief 

of staff filled the place which had previously been intended for General Morgan. 

Since it was felt that the COSSAC chief 

might hot want to serve in a lesser post at 

Supreme Headquarters, arrangements 

were made to offer him command of a 

British corps. Instead Morgan asked to 

serve in some capacity in SHAEF. Thereupon, General Eisenhower accepted General Smith's recommendation that the 

former COS SAC head become deputy 

chief of staff. In this post, General Morgan 

acted from ti me to ti me as chief of staff. 

13 Colonel Trimble, who succeeded Colonel Gilmer 

in March 1944, gave way to Col. Carter Burgess in 

November 1944. The latter in turn was succeeded by 

CoI.J. B. Moore, III, at the end of March 1945. 
64 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

AIR VICE MARSHAL ROBB 

He was also given numerous special assignments to co-ordinate the work of 

various SHAEF divisions. General Smith 

after the war described the COSSAC chief 

as his British alter ego, “a man I wouldn’t 

willingly have dispensed with.” 14 

A second deputy chief of staff (chief administrative officer), Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey 

M. Gale, came to SHAEF from a similar 

position at A F H Q a t the strong insistence 

of General Eisenhower. When Field Marshal Brooke demurred at the shift, Smith 

pointed out that Eisenhower had always 

felt “he would be unwilling to undertake 

another large Allied Command without 

Gale’s administrative assistance. . . . He 

has that irreplaceable quality of being able 

to handle British-American supply problems with tact and judgment and he is 

almost as familiar with the American system of supply as with the British.” General 

Gale found his position at SHAEF to be 

somewhat different from that at Allied 

Force Headquarters. In the Mediterranean he had also had responsibility for 

British troops behind the front. In the 

European theater, 21 Army Group controlled its own supply and the American 

units had their Headquarters, Communications Zone. At SHAEF, therefore, he 

GENERAL GALE 

had less real control over supply and administration than at Allied Force Headquarters. His duties consisted of co-ordinating the activities of G–1, G–4, and 

the supply elements of G–5. He also 

served as chairman of various high-level 

committees that dealt with matters of sup- 

——— 

14 Interv with Gen Smith, 13 May 47. 
THE NATURE OF SHAEF 

ply. One of his chief tasks was to anticipate 

future bottlenecks and to study ways in 

which they might be avoided. ", 

The third deputy, Air Vice Marshal 

James M. Robb, who became Deputy 

Chief of Staff (Air), had served at one time 

in the Mediterranean as General Eisenhower's air adviser. Later he became 

commander of RAF North Africa and 

deputy to General Spaatz, commander of 

the Northwest African Air Forces. j(; At 

SHAEF the air marshal co-ordinated all 

correspondence and planning of the various SHAEF divisions in regard to air 

activities. 

The selection of the chief deputies was 

followed in turn by the naming of the 

65 

heads of the various divisions-a story 

which will be told in some detail elsewhere 

in this vol ume." By mid-J anuary most of 

the key positions of the headquarters had 

been filled and Supreme Headquarters 

was functioning. By mid-February General Eisenhower had his formal directive 

and his command was officially under 

way. It is important now to examine what 

had already been done by SHAEF's predecessors and what yet remained to be 

achieved before the offensive against 

northwest Europe could be launched. 

]c. Interv with Gt'n Gale, 27 Jan 47. 

I" Interv with Air Chief Marshal Sir James M. 

Robb,3 Feb 47. 

" Ch. IV, below, The Machinery of SHAEF. 
CHAPTER IV 

The Machinery of SHAEF 

Even before SHAEF had been formed, 

COSSAC had handed over the tactical 

planning of the cross-Channel attack to 

the Commander - in - Chief, 21 Army 

Group, the Allied Naval Commander-inChief, Expeditionary Force (ANCXF), 

and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF). Later, the 

detailed planning of the ground force assault was given to the armies involved in 

the attack. Headquarters, ANCXF, and 

AEAF drew up detailed plans of their 

own. As a result SHAEF did not playa 

prominent role in the operational planning for the initial stages of OVERLORD and 

may appear to the casual observer to have 

been almost completely divorced from 

control of the assault. An examination of 

the machinery of SHAEF will help to correct this misconception. 

The Powers Reserved to SHAEF 

General Eisenhower, in appointing General Montgomery to command U.S. and 

British ground.forces in the assault, gave 

him operational control of the forces to be 

used in the early days of the attack. The 

temporary nature of the arrangement was 

understood. The Supreme Commander, 

while delegating for an interval operational control of Allied ground forces, did 

not lay aside his responsibility for making 

tactical decisions that involved major 

changes in the OVERLORD plan or the calling forward of additional troops. His intervention was also necessary to get increased 

air or naval support for the ground forces. 

In the administrative sphere, where supply and personnel were concerned, the 

Supreme Commander retained a l~rge 

number of duties. As the chief Allied headquarters, SHAEF co-ordinated interservice and inter-Allied administrative policy. 

This co-ordination extended to such matters as policy on the hiring of labor, the 

purchase of supplies, welfare, health, discipline and awards, prisoners of war, 

movement, and the construction of airfields. It was the task of SHAEF to prepare 

outline administrative plans for future Allied operations, allocate scarce resources 

until shi pped overseas, deal on national 

policy matters with non- U.S. and British 

powers, determine policy on POL (petrol, 

oil, and lubricants) matters, and make 

representations to the U.S. and British 

ministries and departments concerning 

policy and materiel requirements when 

they influenced the theater as a whole. 1 

(Chart 3) 

In the so-called political sphere the 

Supreme Commander and his staff were 

particularly busy. Few if any of these responsibilities had been delegated to subordinate commanders. Representing Great 

I SHAEF Dir to Ramsay, Leigh-Mallory, and 

Montgomery, 10 Mar 44; see also SHAEF Dir to 

FUSAG, 10 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS 322.011/2 Dirs to 

Subordinate Comdrs. 
CHART 3-SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 6 .rUNE 1944 

SUPREME COMMANDER 

Gen Dwight D. Eisc:nhowe-r 

DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER 

Air Chi.f Morsl!al Sir Arthur W. T .dd .. 

CHIEf Of STAff 

L, Ge" Walf.r B. Smith 

AIR COMMANDER IN CHIEF 

Air Chief MOBhal Sir 1. L. Leigh-Mallm)' 

DEPUTY AIR COMMANDER IN CHIEf 

Moj 64:1'1 Hoyt S. VOFldlirnber<J 

.1, ... -_- _______________ _ 

l CHIEF OF STAFF Adm G, E. ((tosy 

Copt M. J. Monl*r,h 

,--. , • 

NAVAL TASK fORCE 

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT 

Col Robcut O. Brown Mol H. J Rothwefl Brtg Gen Roh~Ht A, McClure 

._----j 

I 

AIR TASK fORCE 

Command 

(o_o,dmation 
68 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Britain and the United States in relations 

with representatives of France, preparing 

for civil affairs administration after the 

liberation of occupied countries, and planning for military government for conquered Germany were all tasks which the 

Supreme Commander retained. Somewhat allied to these activities were those 

relating to press relations, censorship, and 

psychological warfare—all matters which 

had to be carefully co-ordinated at the 

highest Allied headquarters. 

SHAEF also retained active control 

of long-range planning for the period after 

the establishment of the bridgehead and 

the drive into Germany. Before D Day, its 

staff had outlined plans and amassed considerable data relating to the advance into 

Germany and the crossing of the Rhine. 

The Operations Division 

The nerve center of SHAEF was the 

G–3 Division. Here planning and operations were combined. The chief of this division, Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, had 

been assigned to the operations branch of 

COSSAC in the fall of 1943 in preparation 

for his appointment to the SHAEF post. 

He had previously served as G–3 of the 

War Department, acted as special observer for the War Department in the 

Mediterranean theater in the summer of 

1943, and then commanded the III U.S. 

Corps. On 14 February he succeeded Maj. 

Gen. Charles A. West (Br.) as G–3 of 

SHAEF. West remained as deputy until 

May 1944 when he was replaced by Maj. 

Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley (Br.), deputy chief 

of staff at Allied Force Headquarters and 

briefly chief of intelligence of SHAEF. The 

two most important sections of G–3, plans 

and operations, had initially been united 

under Brig. Gen. Arthur S. Nevins, formerly a member of the TORCH planning 

staff, later briefly G–3 of Fifth Army, and 

subsequently General Alexander’s operations officer in the Sicilian campaign. Near 

the end of May 1944 the two sections were 

separated, but General Nevins continued 

to co-ordinate their work. Brigadier Kenneth G. McLean, who had been chief 

Army planner at COSSAC from the beginning, headed the plans section. In 

March 1945, Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks 

(U.S.) was added as deputy to General 

Bull. 

The planning section, designated Planning Staff, SHAEF, 2 was set up in midMarch 1944 to co-ordinate planning for 

SHAEF operations. Members of the staff 

included representatives of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, the Allied Naval 

Expeditionary Force, and the general and 

special staffs of SHAEF. They made estimates of the current situation, outlined 

plans for all future operations, and made 

detailed plans for the posthostilities period. 

Before D Day, this staff worked on plans 

for taking the Channel Islands, for operations in northwest Europe in case Germany suddenly surrendered, for forcing 

the Seine and capturing the Seine ports including Paris, for action to be taken in 

Norway in case of a German surrender, 

and for a course of action to be followed 

after the capture of the lodgment area. 3 

The operations section prepared and issued operational directives and orders 

based on plans drawn up by the planning 

staff and approved by the chief of operations and the chief of staff. It drew up and 

issued detailed standing operating procedures essential to the proper co-ordination 

2 Known briefly in early March as the Combined 

3 Minutes of eight Planning Staff meetings held 

Planning Staff. 

prior to D Day, Gen Nevins personal papers. 
GENERAL BULL (1950 portrait). 

GENERAL NEVINS 

GENERAL WHITELEY 

BRIGADIER McLEAN 
70 

of the various arms and services. It also 

planned projects to mislead the enemy as 

to Allied intentions. Special subsections 

dealt with the co-ordination of airborne 

operations, defense against chemical warfare, and the arrangements for gathering 

meteorological information. 

The operations section also directed Resistance activities in France outside the 21 

Army Group sphere, co-operated with the 

Psychological Warfare Division in formation of propaganda policy and co-ordinated its action with operations, provided 

G-3 operational contact with Allied missions, and co-ordinated the preparation of 

communiques. It was also the duty of this 

section to aid in preparing combined situation and intelligence reports, daily and 

weekly summaries, reports of progress on 

current studies, and liaison reports. 

An important activity of the operations 

section was that of maintaining the 

SHAEF War Room where information 

was drawn from the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force headquarters, the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 21 Army Group, the 

U.S. strategical and tactical air forces, 

Bomber Command, the meteorological 

section, Special Force Headquarters, and 

the G-1, G-2, and G-4 Divisions. Daily 

and weekly reports summarized this information. In the SHAEF War Room 

operations officers posted information on 

future air, ground, and naval plans, the 

Allied order of battle, including location 

and numbers of aircraft, the situation of 

current operations on the eastern and 

western fronts, meteorological forecasts, 

the enemy order of battle (including 

ground divisional strength, the enemy 

coastal defense system, and the location of 

major enemy air forces), and G-4 movements and plans. 4 

SHAEF G-3 maintained liaison with 21 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

GENERAL STRONG. (Photograph 

taken in 1945.) 

Army Group, the Allied Expeditionary 

Air Force, the Allied Naval Expeditionary 

Force, and the Strategic Air Forces. Part 

of this task was handled by regular liaison 

staffs which remained at the headquarters 

in question. The greater part was carried 

on by personal visits, frequent telephone 

conversations, and participation in combined conferences. Officers ofthe G-3 Division made a special effort to visit forward 

headquarters as frequently as possible. 

General Bull, who had served for a time in 

North Africa as an observer for the War 

Department and, later, for General Eisenhower, took a special interest in this phase 

• SOP ofOps 'A' Sub-Section, II May 44, and Ltr, 

Morgan to Under Secy of State, WO, relating to Ops 

'B' Sub-Section, 3Jun 44, SHAEF G-3 322.01 Organization and Personnel G-3. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

of SHAEF's work. As the forces under 

General Eisenhower increased in the winter of 1944 and the spring of 1945, General 

Bull assumed increasingly the responsibility for maintaining contact with army 

group commanders. The deputy G-3, 

General Whiteley, kept in close touch with 

Maj. Gen. Francis de Guingand, the 21 

Army Group chief of staff, and worked out 

with him personally many operational 

questions concerning General Montgomery's forces. 

Because of the command situation that 

existed before D Day, the Supreme Commander found himself relying on two 

sources of operational advice and information. When, as often occurred during the 

assault, he was called upon merely to give 

a nod of approval to a plan proposed by 

General Montgomery or General Bradley, 

he was dependent largely upon planning 

done by someone else's staff. In such matters as directing Resistance operations, increasing airborne forces for the assault, 

planning for railway bombing, and other 

problems involving forces of different services and more than one nationality, he 

turned more frequently to his own staff. 

The Intelligence Division 

Before leaving the Mediterranean in 

December 1943, General Eisenhower indicated that he wanted Maj. Gen. Kenneth 

W. D. Strong (Br.), G-2 of Allied Force 

Headquarters, as his chief of intelligence 

at SHAEF. This officer had served as assistant military attache in Berlin shortly 

before the beginning of the war and later 

for more than a year as head of the German section of the War Office. Eisenhower's request, coming on the heels of 

numerous other shifts from the Mediterranean theater, met opposition from the 

71 

War Office. When initial appeals proved 

ineffective, General Whiteley was appointed to the post. In May 1944 after further requests by Generals Eisenhower and 

Smith, the British agreed to the transfer of 

General Strong, and he became chief of intelligence on 25 May 1944.' His deputy, 

Brig .. Gen. Thomas J. Betts (U.S.), had 

come to SHAEF some weeks earlier from 

the Mediterranean theater. 

SHAEF, of course, did not attempt to 

collect intelligence by interrogating prisoners, nor did it send out air and ground 

reconnaissance patrols. For this typ'e of information it depended, like the army 

groups, on the armies and subordinate 

units. For spot information, it was assumed, the lower headquarters would 

have to depend on their own resources. 

Such information was collated at army 

headquarters and sent back to the army 

groups and to SHAEF. 

SHAEF G-2 received estimates and information from the armies and the army 

groups, from Resistance groups, either directly or indirectly, from reports of the Office of Strategic Services and the Political 

Warfare Executive, from the estimates of 

the War and Navy Departments in Washington, and from the Joint Intelligence 

Committee (London).'; 

Shortly after its establishment, SHAEF 

took over much of the personnel and files 

of the Theater Intelligence Section (TIS) 

which had been set up by the British in 

1940. Initially British in make-up, this organization added U.S. personnel in 1943. 

-, General VVhiteley, as already noted, became deputy chief of operations. 

b JIe (London) consisted of representatives of the 

Foreign Office, Air Ministry, Admiralty, War Office, 

and Ministry of Economic Warfare. It farmed out 

various questions to the Theater Intelligence Section, 

the Interservice Intelligence Section, and other intelligence groups. The joint staff then undertook to determine the significance of the information. 
i2 

As a part of British Home Forces and later 

of COSSAC, the section conducted considerable research on Germany and 

enemy-occupied territory and collated reports on enemy movements and dispositions. It furnished a mass of topographical 

information, and detailed reports on 

enemy order of battle and the location of 

enemy guns and fortifications. Lt. Col. 

John Austin, a Magdalen don who had 

headed the order of battle section under 

the Theater Intelligence Section, set up a 

similar section under SHAEF. 

General Strong at the end of June 1944 

proposed that SHAEF establish aJoint Intelligence Committee (SHAEF) which 

would consist of one V.S. and one British 

representative from each service, a British 

or V.S. member to deal with economic 

questions, and, when necessary, a British 

and V.S. member to represent the Political Advisers of the Supreme Commander. 

Headed by the SHAEF chief of intelligence, this committee \\'as to keep under 

constant review the military and political 

situation in the area for which the Supreme 

Commander was responsible. It was to be 

the sole producer of intelligence appreciations for the Planning Staff, SHAEF, and 

to be the final authority on all intelligence 

matters for SHAEF. As long as SHAEF remained in the United Kingdom, the committee was required to keep in close touch 

with the Joint Intelligence Committee 

(London) to maintain a full exchange of 

information. The system was adopted in 

July 1944 with General Smith's reluctant 

a pproval. The SH AE F chief of staff indicated that he felt it tended to recognize the 

"command by eommittee" system which 

the Supreme Commander was trying to 

avoid.' 

The varied intelligence which came to 

Supreme Headquarters was collected, asTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

sessed, and passed on to subordinate headquarters in weekly intelligence summaries 

and periodic estimates. Part of the information sifted down to the lower headquarters either in the form of news summaries 

or often in the form of annexes appended 

to the regular reports. These summaries 

suffered somewhat from a time lag and by 

no means represented the information 

available at SHAEF at any given time.' 

Certain intelligence that could not be issued generall y for fear of endangering the 

sources naturally had to be omitted from 

the summaries. Thus, the Supreme Commander and the army groups depended 

for their most current and most complete 

information on personal briefings by their 

chiefs of intelligence or members of the intelligence staffs. The army groups kept the 

SHAEF staff abreast of developments in 

their areas with nightly reports direct to 

Supreme Headquarters. 

Much of the work of SHAEF G-2, like 

that of the Operations Division, was carried on by personal contact between members of the SHAEF and army group staffs. 

The relationships between members of the 

G-2 staffs of SHAEF and the army groups 

were cordial. V nfortunately, the same 

thing could not always be said of relations 

between the army groups and the armies. 

General Strong organized his group 

along British lines. His chief deputy, General Betts, had served for some years on the 

\Var Department G-2 staff and had attended the Combined Chiefs of Staff conferences at Washington, Quebec, and 

Cairo in 1943 as a G-2 representative. 

Smith to Strong, 4 Jul 44, and Dir to JIG 

(SHAEF), SJul 44, SHAEF SGS 322.01 G-2, Organization and Personnel G-2 Di\', SHAEF. 

, In a few cases, when an important change in the 

military situation occurred just after a report was issued, one or more additional pages were sent out with 

new information. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

The operational intelligence chief, Brigadier E.]. Foord (Br.) had served in the 'intelligence section of the War Office and 

then as chief of the operational intelligence 

subsection of Allied Force Headquarters in 

the Mediterranean. 

Administration 

COSSAC had intended initially to follow the British system of putting both personnel and supply activities under an 

administrative division with subsections 

devoted to these matters. When a decision 

was made near the end of 1943 to extend 

the U.S. system of organization throughout the headquarters, separate G-1 and 

G-4 Divisions were established. That 

neither division ever had as muchoperational control as the G-2 and G-3 Divisions was due chiefly to differences in personnel and supply organizations in the 

British and U.S. armies which required 

entirely separate logistic arrangements for 

the two forces. Control of British troops 

and supplies for OVERLORD was vested in 

21 Army Group. Control of U.S. troops 

and supplies was given to Headquarters, 

ETOUSA, which General Eisenhower 

commanded as the senior U.S. commander in Europe. The actual task of supply in the battle zone was handed over to 

a U .S. supply headquarters. Administrative control of British tactical air forces was 

placed under Air Chief Marshal LeighMallory as long as his Headquarters, 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force, existed. 

Headquarters, USST AF, retained administrative control of U .S. units assigned to 

AEAF. 

General Barker, who had been deputy 

chief of COSSAC, became the chief of the 

G-1 (Personnel) Divisiotl ofSHAEF. His 

original deputy, Brigadier R. F. R. Becher 

73 

GENERAL CRAWFORD 

(Br.), was replaced in May 1944 by 

Brigadier T.]. N. Bosville. The G-4 (Supply) chief of SHAEF was Maj. Gen. 

Robert W. Crawford, who had served as 

Commanding General, Services of Supply, 

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East,and 

later as chief of staff of the Services of Supply organization in the United Kingdom. 

He was appointed deputy G- 4 of 

COSSAC in November 1943 with the 

understandirtg that he would later exchange places with Maj. Gen. N. C. D. 

Brownjohn (Br.) then the G-4 of that 

headquarters. This shift took place in February 1944. General Brownjohn remained 

as deputy G-4 until August 1944 when he 

was succeeded by Maj. Gen. C. M. Smith 

(Br.). In March 1944 three special deputies were added to the G-4 Division to 

help determine priorities, allocate sup-
74 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

plies, and assign space at railways, ports, 

airfields, and other facilities to the various 

services. 9 

Because of General Eisenhower's dual 

role as Supreme Commander and as U.S. 

theater commander, the organization of 

the supply services in the U.S. zone is significant to this study. To simplify U.S. 

administration, General Eisenhower in 

mid-January 1944 ordered the consolidation of Headquarters, ETOUSA, and 

Headquarters, Services of Supply. This 

enlarged headquarters inherited the name 

of ETOUSA, and was commanded by 

General Eisenhower with General Smith 

as its chief of staff. It was actually controlled by Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, deputy 

theater commander for supply and administration, formerly the commanding general of the Services of Supply. General Lee 

was also slated to command Headquarters, Communications Zone, which was to 

be established on the Continent after the 

invasion to control supply of U.S. troops. 

General Eisenhower tended to rely on 

U.S. members of his SHAEF staff for advice concerning most operational matters, 

and he used Headquarters, ETOUSA, 

for communication with the War Department on administrative matters and as an 

authorizing agency for all U.S. commands 

that operated under Supreme Headquarters. The exact responsibility of the G–1 

and G–4 at SHAEF and their counterparts at U.S. supply headquarters was 

never thoroughly defined. While it was 

natural for the Supreme Commander to 

turn to the U.S. staff officers nearest at 

hand for advice on purely U.S. questions, 

the G–1 and G–4 at theater headquarters 

were more closely in touch with the War 

Department and had closer control of U.S. 

men and supplies coming to the United 

Kingdom and the Continent. Staff officers 

____ 

GENERAL LEE 

at SHAEF were never completely successful in their efforts to control supply and 

personnel policy relating solely to U.S. 

forces. On matters involving allocation of 

supplies and men among the Allied forces 

and on certain problems pertaining to 

the entire British, French, and U.S. force, 

they played a more important role.10 

9 These officers were: Maj. Gen. Charles S. Napier 

(Br.) and Col. Howard A. Malin (U.S.) for movement 

and transportation, and Brigadier Douglas H. Bond 

(Br.) for petroleum and fuel. In late May Col. Walter 

C. Pew (U.S.) was added as deputy G–4 for petroleum 

and fuel, and Col. Wilbur S. Elliott (U.S.) replaced 

Colonel Malin. In December 1944, Brig. Gen. John A. 

Appleton (U.S.) became Director General, Military 

Railways. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) E. K. Clark (U.S.) 

was added as deputy G–4 in January 1945, and Brig. 

Gen. Theron D. Weaver (U.S.) became chief of the 

Petroleum Branch in February 1945. 

10 The author has relied principally for these details on [Robert w. Coakley] Organization and Command in the European Theater of Operations, Pt. II 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

Civil Affairs 

The organization of SHAEF's Civil 

Affairs Division (G-5) requires more detailed study than that of the other general 

staff divisions. Since it was of fairly recent 

origin, the COSSAC and SHAEF planners had to work out new procedures and 

systems of operating. Unlike the other general staff divisions, G-5 could not be set up 

simply by copying long-established U.S. 

or British practices. Instead, it was necessary to draw on fairly recent experiences 

of the Allies in the Mediterranean, and 

these did not conform exactly to the needs 

of a Supreme Headquarters in the European theater. A second factor making for 

difficulty arose from differences of opinion 

between the British and U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff, between the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and 

the State Department, between the 

COS SAC and the AFHQ elements of 

SHAEF, and between individuals, as to 

theory of civil affairs and methods of control. Again, because of the political angles 

involved, SHAEF from the beginning exercised closer control of civil affairs operations than of other operations. Finally, 

the Supreme Commander and his chief of 

staff had to intervene more directly in the 

final settlement of the civil affairs organization than they did in the case of the 

other divisions. 

Differences Between Military Government 

and Civil Affairs 

At the beginning of World War II, 

there was no clear-cut distinction between 

military government and the administration of civil affairs, both of which the G-5 

of The Administrative and Logistical History of the 

ETO, Hist Div USFET, 1946, MS, OCMH files. See 

also Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies. 

75 

division of SHAEF had to deal with. It 

was known that military government referred to the authority established in occupied territory of the enemy and that it was 

intended largely to preserve order in zones 

in enemy areas through which the victorious armies were passing. The term was applied more often, of course, to the authority 

that was established in a defeated country 

after the conclusion of an armistice. In 

World War I, the practice had been to 

continue existing local governments in 

power with military supervision and with 

some safeguards against disobedience of 

the orders issued by the occupying power. 

Attempts were made to restore the previous economic and social framework as 

soon as possible in order to reduce the responsibilities of military units for feeding 

the population and running the government. 

In World War II an entirely different 

situation existed. In Italian-held territory 

in the Mediterranean, and in German territory on the Continent, the Allies undertook to eliminate the former Fascist and 

Nazi officeholders, to root out the political 

theories which Mussolini and Hitler had 

put into the legal systems of the two countries, to change Fascist- and Nazi-inspired 

economic regulations-in short, to effect a 

political revolution under Allied auspices. 

Part of this task was handed over to the 

military commanders who first set foot on 

enemy territory. They soon discovered 

that former views on the subje€t were not 

suited to the new concept of military government, and they found, in the early days 

at least, that they lacked officers with the 

technical knowledge to assume the tasks of 

mayors,. directors of railways, directors of 

waterworks, directors of power plants, and 

dozens of other key jobs which were formerly performed by the party faithful who 
76 

now under Allied policy had to be ruthlessly weeded out. Under World War I conditions, it was possible for a commander 

to restore the former officials, under 

proper military supervision, and let them 

govern as before. The new system required 

the conquering armies to establish new 

city and district administrations. 

Ci viI affairs had also changed since 

World War 1. It had become clear in that 

earlier conflict that "total war," which 

choked essential highways with great 

masses of dispossessed people, required 

commanders to restore some semblance of 

civil authority if military operations were 

to be continued. In the 1914-18 period, 

the British and U.S. armies had been able 

to leave this problem largely to the French 

Government and Army, which at most 

needed only some supplies and transport 

to restore civil administration. In preparing for the invasion of Europe through 

France in the spring of 1944, SHAEF 

realized that the French civil administration that would be found had been either 

under the control of German military 

authority or under Vichy. In either case, 

it seemed likely that the existing government would have to undergo considerable 

change. Further, the greater damage 

caused by the bombardments of World 

War II meant that the liberating armies 

would have to support the local populations or furnish transport to a far greater 

degree than they had before. Worse still, 

they could not expect the French forces, 

which were themselves being supplied 

from Allied sources, to take on this responsibility. Inasmuch as hungry civilians, 

however sympathetic to the Allies, were 

likely to become dangerous if left unfed, 

the Allied commanders, as a matter of 

necessity, had to engage in widespread 

activities in the realm of civil affairs. MiliTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

tary commanders were not always pleased 

at having to turn their attention from the 

task of winning battles to the business of 

feeding people and of making electric 

plants and waterworks function again. 

They were frequently even less willing to 

have groups of officers from higher headquarters carry out civil affairs activities in 

the forward zone. As a result, command 

channels and command responsibility for 

civil affairs became points of contention 

among the various headquarters. 

Developing a System if Allied Control 

General Morgan, who has described the 

task of setting up a civil affairs organization for SHAEF as "the most vexatious 

and least $atisfactory" of COSSAC's many 

tasks, attempted as early asJuly 1943 to 

establish a civil affairs branch and to draw 

up a set of guiding principles for civil 

affairs planning. Almost immediately he 

was caught in a debate between the British 

and U.S. Chiefs of Staff over whether the 

control of civil affairs should be centered 

in London or Washington, and in a 

COSSAC-versus-AFHQ argument over 

the nature of civil affairs command in the 

field. There is little wonder that in his description of these discussions, General 

Morgan recalls the remark of a member of 

his staff that "there were plenty of affairs, 

but the difficulty was to keep them civil." 11 

The British had a variety of reasons for 

attempting to centralize civil affairs control in London. Not only had they had 

considerable experience with governing 

occupied countries throughout modern 

history, but they had taken up the responsibility of military government in Italian 

and African possessions as early as 1940-

11 Morgan, Overture to Overlord, pp. 227-28. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 77 

41. Before the United States entered the 

war, the British had established procedures and policy for military government. 

In June 1942, they formed an Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee 

under Sir Frederick Bovenschen, Permanent Under Secretary of State for War, to 

co-ordinate planning for military government. The commander of United States 

Forces in Europe was invited to send observers to meetings of the committee, apparently in the hope of making it the combined agency for determining Allied civil 

affairs policy. 

The British were in a position to say 

that they had a going concern in London 

and were prepared to lay down military 

government policy. It is possible that they 

desired to keep this control in London, not 

only because they felt themselves in a better position to handle these matters, but 

because they believed that a London committee could act more quickly on European matters and that decisions affecting 

British interests would be more satisfactorily settled. Parliament and Congress 

had expressed some dissatisfaction over 

U.S. dealings with Darlan in North 

Africa, and there were indications that 

Roosevelt and Churchill did not see eye to 

eye on the question f colonies. The British 

naturally desired to have firm control over 

any of their former colonies which might 

be recovered by Allied forces. 

The President wanted to make sure that 

U.S. forces were not used merely to restore 

colonies or to carry out a policy in military 

government laid down by another power. 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff were also of the 

opinion that over-all control of military 

government could best be handled from 

Washington. In July 1943, they and the 

British Chiefs of Staff agreed to establish a Combined Civil Affairs Committee 

(CCAC) in Washington to control civil affairs and military government policy for 

all theaters. The charter of the committee 

gave assurances that, if British or Dominion territory were recovered from the enemy, the nations concerned could submit 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff an outline of policies for use in the civil affairs 

administration of such possessions. The 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, in turn, were to 

consult the force commander charged with 

taking and holding such territory and, on 

his recommendation, to accept those proposals which would not interfere with the 

military purpose of the operation. 12 

Establishment of the committee in 

Washington did not settle the problem of 

control. The reasons for continued debate 

have been well stated by General Morgan: 

If territory was to be liberated or conquered by combined forces, then obviously 

the reinstatement of the life of those territories must similarly be undertaken by combined means. But the British had been at this 

liberation and conquest business already for 

some years, and they had set up for themselves an organization to see to this thing. To 

them it seemed a possibly unnecessary complication to duplicate the British effort in this 

respect over in the United States of America. 

It appeared to them that there were two 

alternatives: one could either reinforce the 

British setup to give it combined status, or 

one could regard the British setup as it stood 

as the British contribution towards the combined effect desired with an equivalent 

United States outfit in Washington. 13 

The British attempted to pursue the first 

of these alternatives by holding that attendance of U.S. observers at meetings of 

the Administration of Territories (Europe) 

12 Details on early developments of the British organization are given in Historical Notes, SHAEF G–5 

file. Charter CCAC, CCS 190/6/D, 15 Jul 43, ABC 

014 (11–27–42), Sec 1. 

13 Morgan, Overture to Overlord, pp. 231–32. 
78 

Committee constituted combined action 

on civil affairs and military government 

matters. When the U.S. representatives 

rejected this view, the British declined for 

a number of weeks to deal with the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in Washington. The net effect of this impasse, 

according to Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, 

chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the 

War Department, was to deprive the Supreme Commander for three months of 

any guidance on military government and 

civil affairs. 14 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff resolved 

the problem at the end of January 1944 by 

establishing the London Sub-Committee 

of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. 

This body was empowered to advise the 

Supreme Commanders of Europe and the 

Mediterranean, solve the civil affairs problems which did not justify reference to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, make recommendations on problems referred to it by 

the CCAC in Washington, and receive 

from the British Government its views in 

regard to British or Dominion territory 

outside the Pacific which might be recovered from the enemy. The Administration of Territories (Europe)' Committee 

was abolished. 15 Even after this action, 

the War Department remained watchful 

lest the British try to enlarge the powers of 

the European Advisory Commission, organized by Britain, the United States, and 

the USSR in London in late 1943 to draw 

up surrender terms for Germany and Axis 

satellites and to consider such other questions on liberation of Allied countries as 

might be submitted by the three governments. 16 

An illustration of the delays which followed these debates over jurisdiction may 

be found in the efforts of the United States 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

and Great Britain to conclude a civil 

affairs agreement with the Norwegian 

Government-in-exile. Allied negotiations 

to get an agreement with Norway covering such matters as the restoration of civil 

authority, the requisitioning of supplies, 

and the hiring of labor were begun as 

early as May 1943 by the Administration 

of Territories (Europe) Committee. The 

Foreign Office aided in preparing the 

necessary documents, but negotiations 

were kept on a strictly military level. The 

British authorities, wishing to avoid delays 

which they feared would follow submission of the agreement to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Civil 

Affairs Committee, in July 1943 sent it to 

General Devers on the chance that he 

could get direct approval from the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff. Their hope proved unfounded, although General Devers 

promptly gave his assent to the document 

and proposed that with some modifications it become a model for similar agreements in the future. The U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff, in order to avoid any precedent 

which would recognize the authority of 

the Administration of Territories (Europe) 

Committee to -act on civil affairs matters 

14 General Hilldring's opposite number in the British War Office was Maj. Gen. S. W. Kirby, head of 

the Civil Affairs Directorate in Great Britain. 

15 Ltr, Barker to Hilldring,'23 Nov 43; Bendetsen 

to Hilldring, 15 Nov 43;James C. Dunn to William 

Phillips, 4 Dec 43. All in CAD 370.21 COSSAC. McCloy to Winant, 3580, 4 Jan 44; Hilldring to McSherry, 53, 29 Jan 44. Both in CAD 334 CCAC. Secy 

War to Commanding Gens, 8 Feb 44, (text of revised 

charter ofCCAC, 29Jan 44), SHAEF G-5 23-27.02; 

Memo for Record, 19 Jan 44, COS (44), 142d Mtg 

(0), 28Jan 44, ABC 014, Sec 2; Morgan, Overture to 

Overlord, pp. 231-32. 

16 This action had been decided on at the Moscow 

Conference in October 1943, but formal action was 

not taken until near the end of the war. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

for the Allies, asked that both the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Combined 

Civil Affairs Committee deal with the 

matter. An attempt was also made to get 

reactions of the State Deparment, but a 

request for its opinion brought merely the 

reply of "no comment." Accepting this as 

a negative form of approval, the Combined Chiefs of Staff proceeded with a discussion of the final draft. After some delay, 

which Ambassador William Phillips 

blamed more on questions of prestige than 

on details of the document, the British and 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff also agreed near the 

end of January 1944 to proceed with Belgium and the Netherlands on the basis of 

the Norwegian draft. 1 7 

Once the Combined Chiefs of Staff had 

agreed on the general form of the documents, the British and U.S. Governments 

proceeded to conclude separate accords 

with the occupied countries. The U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff in January 1944 maintained 

that the State Department would have to 

conclude agreements with these countries 

in order to make them binding. The State 

Department, as a matter of fact, already 

had under consideration draft agreements 

with Norway and the Netherlands. Secretary of State Cordell Hull held that since 

these were for military purposes they 

should be entered into directly between 

the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces in 

Europe, and the countries concerned. At 

the end of February, the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff instructed General Eisenhower to 

conclude a civil affairs agreement on 

behalf of the United States with Norway. 

Mter a delay to permit the USSR to conclude a similar agreement with Norway, 

separate accor-ds were signed with Norway 

on 16 May 1944 by representatives of the 

United States, Great Britain, and the 

79 

USSR. Later, similar documents were 

drawn up for the other occupied countries. 18 

Development of Civil Affairs Machinery 

at COSSA C and SHAEF 

The development of civil affairs machinery for COSSAC and SHAEF was as 

complicated as the efforts, mentioned 

earlier, to establish Allied control of civil 

affairs. Initially, there had been little difficulty. The Prime Minister and the President had answered General Morgan's 

request for guidance on civil affairs and 

military government by declaring at Quebec on 22 August 1943 that their governments would assume responsibility for the 

administration of territory conquered by 

their forces. In liberated territories, the 

British and U.S. forces were to exercise 

military authority until the enemy's defeat, but would agree to the maintenance 

17 Memo, Col John C. Blizzard for Maj Gen 

Thomas T. Handy, I Ju143; Notes on JCS, 95th Mtg, 

6Jul 43;JCS 96th Mtg, 13Jul 43; CCS 102d Mtg, 16 

Ju143; Memo for record, 26 Aug 43; Draft agreement, 

CCS 274/4, 4 Oct 43; CCS 122d Mtg, 8 Oct 43; 

Memo, Col Frank N. Roberts for Gen Handy, 5 Oct 

43; CCS 122d and 123d Mtgs, 8 and 15 Oct 43; Forrest B. Royal to Comdr Coleridge, 19 Oct 43; Memo, 

Representatives ofBr COS, CCS 445,22 Dec 43; CCS 

142d Mtg, 21 Jan 44. All in ABC 014 Norway (4Jul 

43), Sec I. Barker to Phillips, 22 Dec 43, with note by 

Phillips on 23 Dec 43; Cbl 21, CCS to Eisenhower, 23 

Jan 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 014.1 Norway, Civil Affairs Dir for Norway. 

18 Handy to CAD, 5Jan 44; Hilldring to Handy, 10 

Jan 44; Handy to CAD, 16Jan 44; Leahy to Secy 

State, JCS 398/2, 21 Jan 44; Hull to Leahy, JCS 

398/3, 25 Jan 44; Rpt, Hilldring to JCS, 12 Jan 44. 

All in ABC 014 Norway.JCS to Eisenhower, 10 Feb 

44; State Dept Rad Bull 118, 16 May 44. Both in 

SHAEF SGS 014.1 Norway, Civil Affairs Dir for Norway. JCS to Eisenhower, 24 Feb 44; SHAEF to 

AGWAR, S-50493, 19 Apr 44; AGWAR to SHAEF, 

W-30279, 30 Apr 44. All in SHAEF SGS 014.1 Netherlands, Civil Affairs Dir for Netherlands. 
80 

oflaw and order by the liberated peoples 

with necessary aid from the United States 

and Great Britain. 19 

Meanwhile, the Combined Civil Affairs 

Committee on 18 August 1943 had decided that the Allied commanders in chief 

should plan and handle civil affairs on the 

military level under a directive of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Morgan, therefore, proceeded in early September to select a civil affairs staff. Maj. Gen. 

Sir Roger Lumley, former governor of 

Bombay, was appointed senior British civil 

affairs officer for COSSAC, with Brig. 

Gen. Cornelius E. Ryan, chief of the 

ETOUSA civil affairs section, as his U.S. 

opposite number. Shortly afterward, General Ryan was chosen to organize the civil 

affairs section of 1st U.S. Army Group and 

was replaced on the COSSAC staffby Col. 

Karl R. Bendetsen. With the shift ofGeneral Ryan, the civil affairs section of 

ETOUSA was abolished and its planning 

functions were given to COSSAC and 1st 

U.S. Army Group.20 

In developing the civil affairs branch at 

COSSAC, General Morgan proceeded on 

the theory that the civil affairs organization in the field should insure that refugees 

not interfere with Allied operations, that 

it should relieve the Supreme Commander 

of anxiety over events behind his lines, and 

that it should guarantee that liberated or 

captured resources of military value would 

be placed at the disposal of the Allied 

forces. This was sound doctrine on which 

to build, but unfortunately, when it came 

to establishing machinery for carrying it 

out, the COSSAC chief found himself at a 

loss. The problem has been succinctly described by General Morgan as follows: 

Starting from a basis of complete ignorance 

and confronted with this agglomeration of 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

confusing evidence, it is little wonder that 

COSSAC set off entirely on the wrong foot as 

regards its Civil Affairs planning. Round a 

small central section to study the question 

generally were formed "country sections" to 

study the problems of France, Belgium, Holland, and Norway on the broad assumption 

that for each of these countries would be 

needed something of the nature of the AMG 

[Allied Military Government] organisation 

for Italy .... 21 

COSSAC planners in the fall of 1943 

soon disagreed over the question of how far 

the system of civil affairs and military 

government used in Sicily and Italy should 

be copied. Broadly speaking, the Allies 

had set up a system of military government which was to a great extent independent of the normal military structure. 

A chief civil affairs officer maintained a direct line of command through his regional 

civil affairs officers to provincial and local 

administrators. When a similar system was 

proposed by COSSAC planners, it was attacked by a group of civil affairs officers, 

led by Colonel Bendetsen, who opposed a 

system so largely independent of the military chain of command, and held that the 

princi pIes designed to apply to conquered 

territory were unsuitable for liberated 

countries. 22 What might be called anti19 Morgan to Under Secretary of State for War, 21 

Jul 43, SHAEF G-5 Gen File 3510 Civil AgenciesVoluntary Association; CCS 320, 20 Aug 43, QUADRANT Conf Min; Copy of Roosevelt-Churchill agreement at Quebec, 22 Aug 43, SHAEF G-5 ping file 

27.01. 

20 Hilldring to Hammond, 19 Aug 43; Mtg at Norfolk House, 1 Sep 43; Memo, Ryan to Hilldring, 5 Sep 

43; Morgan to Hilldring, 21 Oct 43; Bendetsen to 

Barker, 20 Oct 43. All in CAD 370.21 COSSAC. 

ETOUSA GO 88, 26 Nov 43; ETOUSA Memo 90,2 

Dec 43. Both in ETOUSA files. 

21 Morgan, Overture to Overlord, pp. 227-29. 

22 Details of the military government system in 

North Africa, Sicily, and Italy are contained in Lt. 

Robert W. Komer, Civil Affairs in the Mediterranean 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

Mediterranean views were contained in 

the COSSAC handbook on civil affairs 

which was issued on 13 December 1943. 

By it military commanders were made responsible for civil affairs operations, which 

were to be handled through regular 

channels of command.23 

The handbook was criticized almost immediately by Brig. Gen. Frank J. 

McSherry, .formerly deputy civil affairs 

oipcer in Sicily and chief of Headquarters, 

Allied Military Government for Italy outside Naples and the Army Zone. McSherry 

had been assigned to the COSSAC Civil 

Affairs Branch in mid-December 1943. 

With the aid of Lt. Col. William Chanler 

of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, he argued in early January 1944 for 

a return to a system more like that used in 

the Mediterranean theater. The COSSAC 

Civil Affairs Branch brushed these efforts 

aside with the statement that it had 

"abandoned with finality the concept applied elsewhere which undertakes to execute civil affairs operations through a separate channel either parallel to or divergent from the chain of command." General Smith, who had now arrived on the 

scene from the Mediterranean, countered 

this statement with a reminder that since 

he came from an area where the concept 

was applied, and was in large measure responsible for it, he would have to have further evidence before abandoning it.24 

In the next two months, a fight was 

waged over the concept of civil affairs to be 

adopted and the real control of the program. The G-5 Division ofSHAEF underTheater, Hist Sec, MTOUSA, 1946, MS, OCMH 

files. Barker to Hilldring, 23 Nov 43; Ltrs, Bendetsen 

to Hilldring, 20, 21, 27, 31 Oct and 6, 10, and 15 Nov 

43. All in CAD 370.21 COSSAC, Sec 1. See also Albert K. Weinberg, Soldiers Become Governors, a volume in preparation for this se~ies. 

81 

went two major changes in that time. On 

15 February General Lumley, who had 

been a supporter of Colonel Bendetsen, beCame sole head of the division, and Brig. 

Gen. Julius C. Holmes, who had recently 

been brought up from the Civil Affairs 

Branch at Allied Force Headquarters, was 

appointed deputy. Colonel Bendetsen was 

transferred to another headquarters. The 

country sections, which had been eliminated in the shifts ofthe fall of 1943, were 

replaced, and General McSherry, Deputy 

Civil Affairs Officer, was made responsible 

for reorganizing these sections, preparing 

detailed civil affairs plans, and training 

personne1. 25 In April the G-5 Division underwent its second reorganization in fulfillment of a decision reached in early J anuary 1944. General Smith had indicated to 

the War Department at that time that 

someone with more experience and rank 

than General Lumley's or Colonel Bendetsen's should be appointe,d. He had proposed a U.S. officer for the position, suggesting among others Maj. Gen. Lucius D. 

Clay, but withdrew the proposal when 

General Eisenhower decided that it waS 

preferable to have a British officer in 

charge of civil affairs in order to avoid 

23 Handbook, Standard Policy and Procedure for 

Combined Civil Affairs Operations in Northwest Europe, COSSAC, 13 Dec 43, SHAEF SGS 014.1 Civil 

Affairs in Northwest Europe. (It should be noted that 

there is also a two-volume file with virtually the same 

designation: SHAEF SGS 014.1 Civil Affairs in 

Northwest Europe, Vols. I and II.) 

24 Memo, McSherry for Lumley, 30 Jan 44, SHAEF 

G-S PIng File 27.01. Memo, Chanler for Cots, 

SHAEF, 5 Feb 44; Memo, McSherry for Cots; 

SHAEF,7 Feb 44; Memo, Smith for Lumley, B Feb 

44. All in SHAEF SGS 014.1 Civil Affairs in Northwest Europe. Unsigned, undated memo, apparently in 

answer to McSherry memo of 30 Jan 44, SHAEF G-5 

PIng File 15.01. 

25 SHAEF Stf Memo 2, 15 Feb 44, SHAEF AG 

files; McSherry to Hilldring, 11 Mar 44, CAD 370.21 

COSSAC. 
82 

criticism of SHAEF policy in areas where 

the British had long-established interests. 26 

The Supreme Commander, after consultation with British authorities, on 22 April 

appointed Lt. Gen. A. E. Grasett, the chief 

ofSHAEF's European Allied Contact Section, to head the G-5 Division.27 General 

Holmes became his deputy. In December 

1944 he was succeeded by General 

McSherry. 

These changes in organization by no 

means indicated that the Mediterranean 

concepts of civil affairs were to prevail entirely in SHAEF. Generals Holmes and 

McSherry asked in March 1944 that the 

fundamental concept of the COSSAC 

handbook, which placed the full civil affairs burden on tactical commanders, be 

abandoned and the handbook revised accordingly. General Holmes went further 

and asked that the deputy civil affairs officer, in addition to carrying on his duties 

for planning and training, be directed to 

supervise and direct civil affairs activities 

under SHAEF and issue technical instructions to civil affairs staffs at lower echelons. 

These suggestions were strongly opposed 

by General Lumley and by Brigadier T. 

Robbins, Chief of Civil Affairs, 21 Army 

Group. After some debate SHAEF decided to amend but not drop. the handbook. It was also accepted that the civil 

affairs· staffs should be more closely integrated with existing staffs throughout the 

command system, and that 'SHAEF 

should avoid establishment of a civil affairs headquarters which was unrelated to 

military headquarters. 28 

General Grasett had indicated before 

the formal announcement of his appointment that he accepted some of the views of 

his predecessor on the organization of civil 

affairs. He believed that field commanders 

should be directly responsible for civil affairs operations, and that their policy 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

GENERAL GRASETT 

should be guided by an amended Handbook on Standard Policy and Procedure 

for Civil Affairs. On 30 April, he reorganized part of the G~5 Division, abolishing 

the post of deputy civil affairs officer and 

transferring General McSherry to the post 

of chief of operations. The country sections 

were now placed directly under the chief 

26 It is possible that a desire to respect similar British interests may have prompted General Smith to 

tell General Holmes when the revision of the handbook was proposed that " there were substantial political reasons why the document cannot be scrapped. 

... "Ltr, Holmes to Hilldring, 16 Mar 44, CAD 

370.21 COSSAC. 

27 Smith to Hilldring, W-9500, 7 Jan 44, CAD 

COSSAC 370.21. Memo, Hilldring for Marshall, I 

Apr 44, CAD 210.31. SHAEF GO 9, 22 Apr 44, 

SHAEF SGS G-5 Ping File 15.0 I. 

28 Holmes to Cots, SHAEF, 9 Mar 44; Gale to 

Cots, SHAEF, 13 Mar 44; Smith to Lumley, 14 Mar 

44. All in SHAEF SGS 322.01 Organization and Personnel G-5 Div, I. Robbins to Cots, SHAEF, 11 Mar 

44, SHAEF SGS 014.1 Civil Affairs in Northwest Europe; McSherry to Hilldring, 11 Mar 44, CAD 370.21 

COSSAC. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

of the G-5 Division, and any hint of a possible echelon between SHAEF and the 

army groups in the field was ended. General Grasett announced that the sections 

for France, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium-Luxembourg would ultimately become the civil affairs sections of SHAEF 

missions sent to those countries, and that 

the German section would provide the 

nucleus of military government in enemy 

territory. He also indicated that in the first 

phase of operations 21 Army Group, working through its civil affairs staff, would be 

responsible for all civil affairs activities in 

France. On the activation of a U.S. army 

group on the Continent, the SHAEF G-5 

was to assume direct responsibility for coordinating civil affairs operations in the 

field. While all branches ofSHAEF would 

have normal staff responsibility for such 

operations, the small French section of the 

operations branch· of G-5 was charged 

with general supervision and co-ordination 

of activities pertaining to France. 29 

Some of the views of the former Mediterranean civil affairs officers were incorporated in the revised handbook issued 

by SHAEF on 1 May 1944. The princIpal amendments were those specifying 

SHAEF's control over civil affairs act.ivities in the field. To the declaration in the 

original version that tactical commanders 

were responsible for civil affairs operations 

in their area, there was added the phrase, 

"in accordance with the policies laid down 

by the Supreme Commander." To the initial statement that normal command 

channels would be followed was added: 

"with direct communications between 

Civil Affairs staffs of Commands on matters peculiar to Civil Affairs." The scope of 

such activities was broadened to apply "to 

the areas affected by military operations." 

Thus it was possible, if necessary, to apply 

civil affairs jurisdiction to the whole of a 

83 

country even though Allied forces might 

be in only a part of it. The objective of . 

civil affairs operations was restated as an 

effort to insure "that conditions exist 

among the civilian population which will 

not interfere with operations against the 

enemy, but will promote these operations." Stricken out was the statement that 

the commander's responsibility did not 

embrace the rehabilitation of a country or 

its industries. Both handbooks agreed that 

relief, except as otherwise directed, would 

be limited to that required by military 

necessity, and that civil affairs operations 

in liberated areas would continue only until the situation permitted the Allied national authority concerned to assume control. Finally, the revised handbook provided for consistency of interpretation and 

application of policies in each of the countries by requiring that country manuals be 

issued for the use of tactical commanders.30 

SHAEF G-5 spent the remaining days 

before the invasion on improving the civil 

affairs organization. The training of civil 

affairs officers sent from the United States 

was emphasized. All new arrivals were interviewed at the European Civil Affairs 

Training Center, which had been established in December 1943 at Shrivenham 

under Col. Cuthbert P. Stearns, and an effort was made to train them in handling 

specific problems in the cities to which 

they were to be assigned. 

General Eisenhower expressed his 

views as to the importance of the civil affairs officers in an address shortly before D 

Day. Saying that they were "as modern as 

29 Memo, Grasett for CofS, SHAEF, 19 Apr 44; 

SHAEF StfMemo 43,30 Apr 44. Both in SHAEF GS ping file 15.01. 

30 SHAEF handbook, Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in Northwest Europe, 13 Dec 43, and as revised, 1 May 44. 

Original handbook in SHAEF SGS Civil Affairs in 

Northwest Europe 014.1; revision in OCMH. 
84 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

GENERAL DAVIS 

radar and just as important to the command,” he declared that the army would 

fail if they did not do their job of organizing the rear areas as quickly as possible. 

Repeating his often-stated view that the 

task of soldiers was to defeat the enemy, he 

rejected the idea that the purpose of civil 

affairs was to serve any nationalistic aim 

and asked them to remember that “you 

are not politicians or anything else but soldiers.” Their organization, he added, had 

been gradually developed as a result of experience, and had been accepted because 

of military necessity. Their task, therefore, 

although humanitarian in results, was “to 

help us win the war.” 31 

Publicity and Psychological Warfare 

A Publicity and Psychological Warfare 

Division (G–6) under Brig. Gen. Robert 

A. McClure, who headed a similar division at Allied Force Headquarters, was 

formally activated by SHAEF on 14 February 1944 to co-ordinate all Allied press 

and psychological warfare agencies operating in northwest Europe. This general 

staff division proved to be short lived, since 

it was divided on 13 April into two special 

staff divisions: Psychological Warfare under General McClure, and Public Relations under Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Davis, 

the former adjutant general at SHAEF. 

Inasmuch as the two were to continue separately along lines laid down previously 

for the combined division, it is necessary to 

consider their background together and 

then to examine their development as they 

went their separate ways. 

The British had begun as early as September 1939 to beam broadcasts at the 

enemy and to direct the dropping of propaganda leaflets through such agencies as 

the Ministry of Information, the Political 

Intelligence Department of the Foreign 

Office, and the British Broadcasting Corporation. The United States, after its entry into the war, reinforced British efforts 

with the activities of the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic 

Services. Both the British and U.S. civilian 

organizations had their own special appropriations, personnel, and equipment. 

Their activities included preparation for 

the cross-Channel attack. 32 

Political policies affecting the work of 

these agencies were set then, as during the 

period of SHAEF’s operations, by the 

President, the Prime Minister, the Foreign 

31 Remarks, Eisenhower before ECAD and SHAEF 

Officer Personnel at Civil Affairs Center, 9 May 44, 

SHAEF G–5 Hist File 10, Histories and Monograph. 

32 Psychological Warfare Division (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations in the Western European Operation, 

1944–45 (Bad Homburg, 1945), pp. 13–20. This study 

was prepared by the division shortly after the end of 

the war and is its official after action report. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

Office, and the State Department. The 

Ministry of Information was responsible to 

Parliament for British propaganda. The 

degree of control exercised by the Office of 

War Information and the Office of Strategic Services was not always so clear cut, inasmuch as President R()osevelt in giving 

the former the chief responsibility for 

foreign propaganda activities, did not bar 

the latter's use of propaganda weapons for 

breaking enemy morale. 33 

The Allies initially gave the task ofissuing broad directives for Allied propaganda 

efforts in northwest Europe to the Political 

Warfare Executive34 and the Office of War 

Information. Such directives naturally required agreement in Washington and London. This arrangement was modified in 

the late summer of 1943, after the Allies 

had found themselves unprepared for the 

task of getting maximum psychological results from the fall of Mussolini. A new organization, known as the London Coordinating Committee for Political Warfare, 

and consisting of the representatives of the 

Foreign Office, the Political Warfare Executive, British Chiefs of Staff, State Department, Office of War Informatibn, and . 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff, was established to issue directives for emergency propaganda 

activities. 35 The U.S. members of the 

group soon complained that the British 

were attempting to use it to decide routine 

as well as emergency propaganda policy. 

. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff prepared a protest but reconsidered when the State Department praised the work of the London 

Committee. Control of propaganda was 

centered in London much more fully than 

were civil affairs and similar matters. 

While the Combined Chiefs of Staff passed 

on propaganda plans relating to military 

operations, they tended to restrict their activities to approval of broad plans. Indicative of the difference in War Department 

85 

GENERAL McCLURE 

control over civil affairs and propaganda 

was the fact that civil affairs was handled 

by a special division, whereas propaganda 

was restricted to a branch of the intelligence division. 36 

33 App. B to Note by Secy JPS, Exec Order 9312, 9 

Mar 43; Incl B to note by Secys PWPS, 13 Jan 44. 

Both in ABC Propaganda Com (15 Aug 43) 334. 

H Made up of representatives of War Office, Admiralty, Foreign Office, and the Ministry ofInformation. 

35 This committee was known also by such names 

as the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee, London Emergency Propaganda Committee, 

and London Propaganda Coordinating Committee. 

Its members were Sir Orme Sargent (Foreign Office), 

Chairman, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart (Political Warfare Executive), Deputy Chairman, General Ismay 

(representative of the British Chiefs of Staff), Howard 

Bucknell (State Department), Wallace Carroll (Office 

of War Information), and Admiral Harold R. Stark 

(representative of the U.S.'Qh.iefs of Staff). 

36 Memo for Info 171,23 Dec 43, ABC 334 Propaganda Com (15 Aug 43) 334; PaId M. A. Linebarger, 

Psychological Waifare (Washington>1948), Chs. 10-13 ; 

PWD (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations, pp. 13-20. 
86 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Development of the press and propaganda division of SHAEF was influenced 

to a degree by the Information and Censorship Section (INC), established at Allied Force Headquarters in January 1943 

under General McClure. After studying 

the North African organization, General 

Morgan in April 1943 proposed a similar 

branch for COSSAC and appointed a 

small staff to plan such a branch for 

SHAEF. In September 1943 he formally 

proposed the establishment of a Publicity 

and Psychological Warfare Section for 

SHAEF, and “a single channel to coordinate press and radio comment guidance in 

the U.S. with similar guidance to the 

UK....” 37 

COSSAC’s proposal, approved promptly by the British Chiefs of Staff, was 

countered by a U.S. suggestion that it 

await the appointment of the Supreme 

Commander. Contrary to the views of 

both British and U.S. advisers in London, 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff desired joint heads 

for the organization. General Marshall, 

agreeing that the proposal violated sound 

principles of organization, justified it on 

the ground that the people of the United 

States and Great Britain would have more 

confidence in the operation if they knew 

their interests were being looked after by 

their own representatives. Asked by the 

British to reconsider this stand, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to leave the 

matter to the Supreme Commander. He 

settled it early in 1944 when he 

a preference for a single U.S. head of the 

division and a British deputy, and General 

McClure, who had been brought from the 

Allied Force Headquarters in November 

1943 to head the COSSAC Publicity and 

Psychological Branch, was selected as 

chief of the new G-6 Division.38 

The new organization was criticized on 

the ground that one ofits functions might 

be cultivated at the expense of the other, 

depending on the major interest of the 

chief of the division. Inasmuch as psychological warfare activities required close 

co-ordination between the G-6 Division 

and the British and U.S. civilian agencies 

for propaganda, the press representatives 

feared that their problems might be nglected. General McClure recognized the 

difficulty in April 1944 when he disclosed 

that “these fundamentally different organizations could be directed more effectively 

if separated and reestablished directly in 

contact with appropriate operational and 

command channels.” This initial suggestion for the abolition of the G-6 Division 

was approved, but his later proposal of 10 

April to make the Psychological Warfare 

Division a general staff division was disregarded. The separation, as already 

noted, was completed on 13 April.39 

Psychological Warfare Division 

The task of Psychological Warfare in 

the first phase of its activities-the period 

before and after D Day until German 

morale began to crumble-consisted of 

long-term efforts to create in the German 

soldier’s mind a belief in the reliability of 

Allied statements, in Allied unity, and in 

the certainty of German defeat. The shortterm objective for phase one comprised 

the spreading of defeatism by showing 

Allied supremacy in men and weapons, 

37 Morgan to Br COS, 7 Sep 43, SHAEF SGS 

322.01 Publicity and Psychological Warfare Div. 

38 Ltr, Morgan to Devers, 20 Sep 43; CCS 124th 

Mtg, 22 Oct 43; JSM 1277, 23 Oct 43; Br COS to 

JSM, COS (W) 923, 2 Nov 43; Memo, Barker for 

CCS, 31 Dec 43. All in SHAEF SGS Publicity and 

Psychological Warfare 322.01. SHAEF GO 2, 14 Feb 

44. 

39 Memo, McClure for CofS, SHAEF, 5 Apr 44; 

Memo, McClure for CofS, SHAEF, 10 Apr 44; 

SHAEF GO 8, 13 Apr 44. All in SHAEF SGS 322.01 

Organization and Personnel Public Relations Div, I. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

emphasizing kind treatment of prisoners 

by the Allies, stimulating German anxiety 

about the danger of a two-front war and 

of sabotage and resistance by occupied 

peoples, and sowing distrust between the 

German Air Force and Army. After D 

Day greater effort was to be placed on 

spreading distrust of foreigners in the German Army.40 

Plans to achieve these ends, prepared 

by the representatives ofthe Political Warfare Executive and the Office of War Information at SHAEF and approved by the 

Supreme Commander, had been sent to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the 

abolition ofthe G-6 Division. In order to 

save time, General Eisenhower directed 

his staff to proceed on the assumption that 

the plan would be accepted. The State 

Department, which had not been asked 

for its opinion in advance, concluded that 

it was faced by afait accompli and did little 

more than propose a few minor changes 

which were incorporated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their statement of 

general agreement with the Publicity and 

Psychological Warfare plans on 11 May 

1944. By the time final changes were approved, the plan was already being carried 

out in many of its essential features. 41 

Allied operations were supported by 

three types of propaganda: strategic, combat, and consolidation. With the first type, 

strategic, SHAEF had little to do. Undermining the enemy's will to resist and sustaining the morale of Allied sympathizers 

were missions carried on by the Office of 

War Information, the Political Warfare 

Executive, the Ministry of Information, 

and the Office of Strategic Services under 

Office of War Information-Political Warfare Executive directives. The means included radio broadcasts, dropping of 

leaflets, and the use of agents. Combat 

propaganda was carried out in accordance 

87 

with SHAEF directives by army groups 

and, when necessary, by Allied naval and 

air forces. Activities of this type included 

the collection of psychological warfare information, use of tactical leaflets, and 

operation of mobile broadcasting units, 

mobile public address systems, monitoring 

service, and field printing. Consolidation 

propaganda operations, reserved specifically to SHAEF, included the collection of 

psychological warfare information; the 

operation or control and servicing oflocal 

newspapers, radio stations, and motion 

picture houses; distribution ofpropagahda 

literature and displays; and liaison with 

various headquarters on psychological 

warfare matters. In an effort to unify 

psychological warfare efforts, representatives of the chief civilian agencies engaged 

in propaganda activities-C. D. Jackson 

(OWl), R. H. S. Crossman (PWE),Dennis Routh (MOl), and Fred Oechsner 

(OSS)-were appointed as deputies to 

General McClure. 42 

General McClure met difficulties in 

persuading the 1st and 21 Army Groups 

to establish a general staff section in each 

headquarters to handle psychological warfare matters. The 1st Army Group, while 

not convinced ofthe need of establishing 

such a section, agreed after a short delay, 

but the 21 Army Group did not comply 

40 Early drafts and final text of SHAEF's "Standard 

Directive for Psychological Warfare against Members 

of the German Armed Forces," 16Jun 44, SHAEF 

SGS 091/412/3 Psychological Warfare against Germany, I. 

41 Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 12,3 Apr 44, SHAEF 

SGS 381/1 P and PW Outline Plan OVERLORD, I; 

SHAEF to Air CinC, AEAF, 11 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 

091.412 Propaganda, I; CCS 545,13 Apr 44; Memo, 

State Dept to Col Frank McCarthy, 22 Apr 44; CCS 

545/2, 11 May 44. Both in ABC 385 Europe (23 Sep 

43), Sec 3. 

42 SHAEF Opns Memo 8, 11 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS 

322.01 Publicity and Psychological Warfare Div; 

PWD (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations, p. 15. 
88 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

until March. To guide the army groups, 

SHAEF drew up before D Day a directive 

for psychological warfare against the Germans. Its principles were generally followed in the early days of the invasion, 

but it was not formally issued until midJune. 

The Allied propaganda program was 

intended to aid the Supreme Commander 

to fulfill his mission with the most economical use of troops and equipment possible. 

At the same time, nothing was to be done 

to prejudice Allied policy toward Germany after the war ended. There was to 

be no suggestion that the German Army 

would be absolved from guilt of aggression 

or that German militarism would be allowed to continue in any form after the 

war. It was assumed that the Germans, 

having heard such propaganda in 1918, 

would be immune to this type of appeal 

and would fight against it. Instead the 

Allies were to stress the enemy’s lack of 

manpower and equipment, the weakness 

of the Luftwaffe, and the superiority of the 

Allies, and to play up the ineffectiveness of 

Hitler’s leadership, the impossibility of 

dealing successfully with two fronts, and 

the unlikelihood of German victory. The 

German soldier was to be convinced that 

he had done his full duty as a fighting man 

and could surrender with honor. 43 

Public Relations Division 

The Public Relations Division was 

charged with responsibility for control of 

press, photographic, and radio censorship 

in the Supreme Commander’s zone of operations, for general control over all communications which might be available in 

the military zone for the press, for information to press and radio correspondents 

for communiqués, and for policy for news 

correspondents in the European Theater 

of Operations. 44 

In carrying out its various duties, the 

Public Relations Division was caught between the necessity of maintaining strict 

operational security and the attempt to 

give the people of Great Britain and the 

United States the maximum number of 

details about their forces. Many delicate 

problems faced the SHAEF officials in 

struggling with this dilemma. The information given correspondents before D Day, 

the movement of correspondents in the 

preinvasion period, and the briefing of 

correspondents from neutral countries 

might all be helpful to the enemy. Allied 

commanders found, for example, that the 

dating of a dispatch from a zone of concentration or a statement by a well-known 

correspondent like Ernie Pyle or Alan 

Moorehead that he had been in a specific 

part of the United Kingdom might draw 

attention to Allied preparations. The 

Prime Minister was alarmed when a British military writer showed him privately 

the main outlines of the invasion plan 

which he had put together from fragments 

of information given him unwittingly by a 

number of officers. Even more disconcerting were the rather accurate surmises as to 

Allied plans which correspondents made 

in the absence of official statements. 45 

The situation in the United Kingdom 

became worse as the number of correspondents rapidly increased in anticipa43 SHAEF directive on psychological warfare, 16 

Jun 44, SHAEF SGS 09 1 /4 12/3 Psychological Warfare against Germany, I. 

44 SHAEF Opns Memo 24, Press Policy, 24 Apr 44, 

SHAEF SGS Policy re Release of Info to Press 000.7; 

History of U.S. and Supreme Headquarters, AEF, 

Press Censorship in the European Theater of Operations, 1942–45, MS, mimeo, Chs. 2–3, OCMH files. 

45 See Ltr, Churchill to Eisenhower, 28 Jan 44, and 

other correspondence on subject in SHAEF SGS 

000.7 Policy re Release of Info to Press. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 89 

tion of D Day. There was no rigid control 

over newsmen and photographers like that 

enforced by censors in the field. In concern 

over these developments in the opening 

days of 1944, the British Chiefs of Staff 

had asked that General Eisenhower be 

informed of the situation as soon as he 

arrived in London. General McClure 

recommended that a carefully selected 

and limited number of correspondents be 

accredited to SHAEF and that their dispatches be subjected to military censorship. The need for some form of control 

was accentuated near the end ofJanuary 

by a British security report which showed 

that secrecy of invasion preparations had 

been compromised by continued accounts 

of General Montgomery’s visits to invasion 

ports and by a statement from ENSA, the 

British equivalent of the United Services 

Organization (USO), that it was ready to 

proceed overseas after the end of January. 

The Prime Minister reminded the Supreme Commander that efforts were being 

made to persuade editors in the United 

States and Great Britain not to make forecasts as to the possible date of the crossChannel attack or the size of forces to be 

employed. Churchill suggested that “a 

very stringent attitude should be adopted 

in regard to communication to Press Correspondents in this country of any background information about OVERLORD 

operations, either before they start, or 

while they proceed.” 46 

General Eisenhower, preferring to proceed slowly with the accrediting of correspondents to his headquarters, said that 

Mr. Brendan Bracken, director of the 

Ministry of Information, had agreed to 

talk with General McClure concerning 

“the best means of keeping the Press securely in the dark” without appearing to 

treat them as outsiders. The Supreme 

Commander insisted on the necessity of 

assuring the correspondents that the 

SHAEF press relations staff was friendly 

to them. Among steps which General 

Eisenhower took to preserve secrecy were 

the reissuance of a British circular of the 

preceding April forbidding senior commanders to hold press conferences on operational matters without special permission, and a directive to General McClure 

to co-ordinate all U.S. public relations 

policy for the theater.47 

As the date for the invasion approached, 

Mr. William Phillips, the United States 

political officer for SHAEF, proposed that 

General Eisenhower brief the press on the 

combined effort of the Allies in order that 

they might have something “exciting and 

imaginative” to think about before D Day. 

General Eisenhower agreed to the suggestion, and gave an “off the record” interview on 16 May. He had prepared the 

way by issuing an order to his unit commanders two weeks before the conference 

reminding them that correspondents once 

they had been accredited to SHAEF were 

considered as “quasi-staff officers.” Therefore, they were to be given all reasonable 

assistance. They were to be allowed to 

talk freely with officers and enlisted men 

and to “see the machinery of war in operation in order to visualize and transmit to 

the public the conditions under which the 

men from their countries are waging war 

against the enemy.” He read this order to 

the correspondents at the beginning of his 

46 Ismay to CCOSSAC, 14 Jan 44; McClure to CofS, 

SHAEF, 22 Jan 44; McClure to CofS, SHAEF, 23 Jan 

44; Ltr, Churchill to Eisenhower, 28 Jan 44. All in 

SHAEF SGS 000.7 Policy re Release of Info to Press, I. 

47 Ltr, Eisenhower to Churchill, 6 Feb 44; Incl to 

Ltr, Brig Ian C. Jacob to Smith, 31 Jan 44; Memo, 

Brig Jacob for Smith, 7 Feb 44; Memo, Smith for Lee, 

Bradley, and others, 11 Feb 44. All in SHAEF SGS 

000.7 Policy re Release of Info to Press. 
90 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

mid-May conference, reiterating his belief 

that public opinion wins wars. “Without 

public opinion back of us,” he added, “we 

would be nothing but mercenaries.’’ The 

people should be informed if the tide of 

battle was going against them, and if the 

fault lay with the leadership. He promised that there would be no censorship of 

any criticism the correspondents might 

make of him, because he did not believe 

that “a military man in high places should 

use his extraordinary power to protect 

himself.” 48 

On 1 May 1944, SHAEF issued its plans 

for control of the press during the OVERLORD operations. It was to accredit correspondents, radiomen, photographers, and 

newsreel men and assign them to lower 

units in accordance with a block system by 

which a specified number was to be accepted by each unit. Correspondents from 

the various Allied countries were tc be 

treated on a basis of equality in regard to 

communications, transportation, and the 

like. During the next month, the Public 

Relations Division worked at the task of 

compiling a list of accredited photographers, press correspondents, and radiomen. The list on 7 June 1944 numbered 

530. 49 

Press Censorship 

In carrying out its task of censoring 

news and photographs, SHAEF followed 

British and U.S. practices developed in the 

United Kingdom after the outbreak of 

war. U.S. censors had been appointed in 

1942 shortly after U.S. troops arrived in 

the United Kingdom, and worked in close 

contact with the British censors. In late 

April 1944, a Joint Press Censorship 

Group, headed by Lt. Col. Richard H. 

Merrick (U.S.) and including officers 

from the Allied ground, sea, and air forces 

was organized. Its purpose was to advise 

the British Ministry of Information on 

censorship of press and radio material 

originating in the United Kingdom which 

dealt with contemplated operations, and 

to censor material returned to the United 

Kingdom from the Continent. The chief 

of the Public Relations Division was made 

responsible for the censorship of press material originating in the United Kingdom 

which dealt with U.S. forces. 50 

SHAEF gave responsibility for field 

press censorship to the army group commanders. These were to consult, if necessary, with Allied air and naval commanders. In censoring news, they were to 

be guided by the principle that “the minimum of information would be withheld 

from the public consistent with security.” 

In general they were not to release military 

information that might prove helpful to 

the enemy, unauthenticated, inaccurate, 

or false reports, or reports likely to injure 

the morale of the Allied forces. The following items were among those which could 

48 Phillips to CofS, SHAEF, 10 Apr 44; Davis to 

CofS, SHAEF, 16 May 44; Memo, Eisenhower for all 

unit comdrs, AEF, 8 May 44, and draft of 3 May 44 

with major changes in Eisenhower’s handwriting; 

Eisenhower interview with correspondents, 22 May 

44. All in SHAEF SGS 000.74 Press Correspondents. 

49 Public Relations plans and annexes, 1 May 44, 

SHAEF SGS 38 1 /9 Public Relations Plan for OVERLORD: list of correspondents accredited by SHAEF, 

7 Jun 44, SHAEF SGS 000.74 Press Correspondents. 

The 530 photographers, reporters, and radiomen were 

distributed as follows: U.S.: press associations 72, radio 

25, individual newspapers 79, magazines 35, photographers (including newsreel cameramen) 25, Army 

correspondents 19—total 255; British: press associations 30, individual newspapers 118, radio 48, magazines 7, photographers 12—total 2 15; Canadian: press 

associations 7, newspapers 13, radio 5, magazines 1— 

total 26; Australian: press associations 10, newspapers 

15, total—25; Allied (French, Dutch, and Norwegian) —9. 

50 SHAEF Opns Memo 27, 25 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 

000.73 Policy and infraction of Press Censorship. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 91 

be cleared only by SHAEF censors: (1) all 

matters of high policy involving SHAEF 

or the Supreme Commander; (2) the release of information on troops of various 

nationalities taking part in actions; (3) 

casualties and troop strength; (4) cipher 

work and code words; (5) civil affairs; (6) 

confirmation of enemy allegations, atrocities, and the like; (7) escapes; (8) gas and 

chemical warfare; (9) military equipment; 

(10) strength and morale of troops; (1 1) 

high-ranking officers at SHAEF; (12) 

changes in command and movement of 

high-ranking officers; ( 13) stories concerning prisoners of war involving harsh treatment; (14) psychological warfare; (15) resistance and underground movements; 

(16) sabotage and spies; and (17) naval 

ships and commanders. 51 

Censors were guided by a press censorship bible, a 200-page mimeographed 

document containing the censorship policy 

of British, Canadian, and U.S. forces in 

the European theater. This was supplemented by daily directives, known as Press 

Relations Censorship Guidances and Press 

Censors’ Guidances, which listed items to 

be stopped or passed by the censors; by the 

Secret List, issued monthly by the War 

Office, containing the security classification of Allied equipment; by “Trend of 

Copy,” a summary of the type of newspaper copy which had been passed or 

stopped by the censors; and by pertinent 

Ministry of Information statements 52 

The Special Staff Divisions 

With the exception of the Adjutant 

General’s Division, which confined its 

activities chiefly to Supreme Headquarters, the special staff divisions of SHAEF 

were supervisory rather than operational 

in nature. The chiefs of most of these divisions spoke of their functions as being 

mainly those of inspectors general. The 

divisions strengthened the unity of Allied 

operations by co-ordinating the work of 

the army groups and the supply organizations. They estimated future needs of the 

various field forces, checked plans made at 

lower levels, helped smooth out difficulties 

between lower headquarters, and used the 

authority of the Supreme Commander to 

get men or equipment needed for carrying 

out various operations. 

Adjutant General’s Division 

The Adjutant General’s Division was 

established on U.S. principles of organization and staffed largely by U.S. officers 

and men. 53 It performed the usual adjutant general functions, handling incoming 

and outgoing mail, preparing and editing 

orders, preparing circulars and directives, 

and filing records. It shared some of 

these functions with the Office of the 

Secretary, General Staff. General Davis, 

the original adjutant general, had held the 

same post at Allied Force Headquarters 

until brought by General Eisenhower to 

SHAEF. At the end of March 1944 General Davis received his assignment as head 

of the Public Relations Division. He was 

succeeded as head of the Adjutant Gen51 Public relations plan issued 1 May 44 with annexes, SHAEF SGS 381 / 9 OVERLORD Public Relations Plan; SHAEF Opns Memo 27, 25 Apr 44, 

SHAEF SGS 000.73 Policy and Infraction of Press 

Censorship, I; PRD, History of Press Censorship, pp. 

102–03. 

52 PRD, History of Press Censorship, pp. 85–87. For 

press relations activities from June 1944 to May 1945 

see below, Appendix A. 

53 Unlike other SHAEF divisions, the AG Division 

had no British deputy. At peak strength, the division 

had 23 British officers and men (1 officer, 2 warrant 

officers, and 20 enlisted men) as compared to 102 U.S. 

members (18 officers, 10 warrant officers, and 74 enlisted men). 
92 

eral's Division by his deputy, Col. Emil C. 

Boehnke. In October 1944, General Davis 

returned to his original position as adjutant general. 

Signal Division 

The Signal Division, like most SHAEF 

staff divisions, was engaged primarily in 

high-level plan:ning. It also co-ordinated 

all Allied signal activities. The division examined the requirements of British and 

U.S. forces for signal personnel and equipment, and helped work out policy and priorities relative to the issuance of equipment. It prepared frequency allotments 

for radios and co-ordinated radar plans 

and operations, codes and cipher systems 

to be used by forces under SHAEF, all operating procedures, and all wire and cable 

systems in the United Kingdom and the 

projected areas of operations. Much of 

this work was done through a Combined 

Signal Committee of which the SHAEF 

chief signal officer was chairman. _ This 

committee consisted of representatives of 

SHAEF, the Allied Naval Expeditionary 

Force, the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 

Headquarters, European Theater ofOperations, and the army groups. 

The original intention had been to select a U.S. officer as head of the division, 

but in view of the dependence of the Allied 

forces on the British communications system during the preinvasion and early invasion periods the post went to a British 

officer, Maj. Gen. C. H. H. Vulliamy, who 

was brought from the Middle East Command. Maj. Gen. Francis H. Lanahan,Jr. 

(U.S.), was selected as his deputy. The 

U.S. officer was given a free hand in dealing with U.S . .signal personnel and equipment. General Lanahan succeeded General Vulliamy when the latter was transTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

ferred to the India Command in April 

1945. Maj. Gen. L. B. Nicholls (Br.) then 

became Deputy Signal Officer. 

British and U.S. signal units commanded by a U.S. colonel handled SHAEF 

communications. SHAEF also undertook 

to control the maintenance oflines up to 

points some twenty miles from the front 

lines. The actual work, however, was carried on in this SHAEF zone by Headquarters, Communications Zone. The SHAEF 

signal division put in lines for correspondents working for Supreme Headquarters, 

but had no control of psychological warfare or intelligence signal communications. 54 

Engineer Division 

The work of the SHAEF Engineer Division was limited maiply to co-ordinating 

the work of the army groups. An important function was to anticipate army 

group needs for engineer supplies and help 

procure engineer materiel from the Allied 

supply organizations. These tasks were 

complicated because there was no clear 

demarcation of responsibilities between 

the G-4 and the Engineer Division. By 

planning ahead, the division was able to 

furnish the army groups with terrain 

studies, engineer intelligence studies, recommendations on new techniques, equipment, and tactics, and outline engineer 

estimates of the situation. 

The Engineer Division's responsibilities 

for allocating engineer materials between 

the army groups were limited in northwest 

Europe because in most things the national forces were already well enough 

supplied from their own engineer stocks. 

One exceptio"n was timber, which tended 

54 Interv with Gen VuJliamy, 22Jan 47. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

to be largely in one army's area. SHAEF 

was required to intervene and make more 

equita,ble division of this scarce commodity.55 

The Engineer Division was headed 

throughout 1944 by a British officer, Maj. 

Gen. H. B. W. Hughes, who held a similar 

position in the Middle East Command. He 

was succeeded by his U.S. deputy, Brig. 

Gen. Beverly C. Dunn in February 1945. 

Brigadier R. Briggs then became deputy. 

The four chief branches of the divisiongeneral administration, operations, transportation, and aerodrome constructionwere all headed by U. S. officers. During 

his ten ure, General Hughes usually worked 

with the British military groups and the 

Ministry of Transport and Supply, while 

General Dunn dealt with the U.S. units. 

Medical Division 

SHAEF's smallest division, the medical, 

which during most of the war consisted of 

thirteen officers and men, was responsible 

for the medical services of the Allied Expeditionary Force. In the words of Maj. Gen. 

Albert W. Kenner, the chief of the Medical Division, his jo b "was more that of a 

medical Inspector General than anything 

else." His task was to integrate and coordinate British and U.S. medical planning and later that of the French forces. 

General Kenner was directed to correct 

any medical practices which were not up 

to standard. 56 

The Medical Division performed its 

functions by maintaining liaison with 

British and U.S. army groups, Headquarters, ETOUSA, the War Office, Admiralty, Air Ministry, and Ministry of 

Health, giving advice and reports to the 

Supreme Commander and staff on all 

matters relating to the British and U.S. 

93 

medical service within the Command, collecting and collati~g all available medical 

data, visiting medical installations, demonstrations, exercises, experiments, and 

trials in the European and other theaters 

and making reports on them. 

General Kenner, who had served as 

Chief Surgeon, North African Forces, 

remained as head of the Medical Division throughout the life of SHAEF. Three 

British officers, Brigadier E. A. Sutton, 

Brigadier R. W. Galloway, and Brigadier 

H. L. Garson, served in succession as his 

deputies. 

Air Defense Division 

The Air Defense Division was based on 

a similar organization which had been established in the Mediterranean theater in 

1943 in order to prevent Allied antiaircraft units from shooting down their own 

planes as they had at Bari. The Mediterranean practice of having a major general 

at Allied Force Headquarters to command 

the antiaircraft group directly was made 

unfeasible in the European command by 

the presence of three, and later of four, 

widely separated groups. Maj. Gen. A. M. 

Cameron was told, therefore, on his appointment that he was to be more an inspector general than a staff chief. He was 

to make sure that there were no gaps in 

port defenses between the three services 

and to act in the Supreme Commander's 

name to make changes if they were 

needed.57 

Other tasks of the Air Defense Division 

included the adjustment of antiaircraft 

units between the army groups and the 

Ninth Air Force. At Cherbourg, for exam55 Interv with Gen Hughes, 12 Feb 47. 

56 Interv with Gen Kenner, 27 May 48. 

57 Interv with Gen Cameron, 22Jan 47. 
GENERAL CAMERON GENERAL VULLIAMY 

GENERAL KENNER GENERAL HUGHES 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

pIe, SHAEF added British elements to aid 

the U.S. antiaircraft elements; at Antwerp 

it did the reverse. These allocations were 

normally made by the deputy, initially a 

British officer, Col. W. S.]. Carter. He was 

replaced in February 1945 by Brig. Gen. 

Samuel L. McCroskey (U.S.). 

. Political Officers 

The political officers at SHAEF were 

diplomats selected by the Department of 

State and the Foreign Office to represent 

them at Supreme Headquarters. Both the 

United States and Great Britain continued a practice which they had started 

at General Eisenhower's headquarters 

shortly after the landings in North Africa. 

The advisers thus named remained as 

civilian officials under the control of their 

superiors in Washington and London. 

Their purpose was to make available to 

the Supreme Commander political information which might help him in planning 

and to acquaint him with the political implications of proposed actions. 58 

The political officers were called on in 

particular in regard to civil affairs, military government, psychological warfare, 

intelligence, and posthostilities planning. 

The Foreign Office appointed Mr. Charles 

B. P. Peake as political adviser to the 

COSSAC organization in September 1943. 

About the middle of that month, the Secretary of State appointed William Phillips 

as his representative to the Chief of Staff 

to the Supreme Allied Commander with 

the rank of Ambassador. Early in 1944 

both Mr. Peake and Mr. Phillips were appointed to the SHAEF staff with the title 

of Political Officers. 59 In this capacity they 

made suggestions relative to the civil affairs organization for France, giving their 

support to SHAEF's efforts to find a 

95 

French political authority with which the 

Supreme Commander could deal. They 

also helped the psychological warfare division ofSHAEF draw up a proposed statement on unconditional surrender which 

might soften that formula. They were also 

included among the members of the Joint 

Intelligence Committee (SHAEF). The 

SHAEF officials gave the political officers 

full opportunities to follow planning and 

to question any plans that might have a 

political bearing. The two advisers reported to the SHAEF chief of staff contents of political dispatches which they 

thought might be of interest to Generals 

Eisenhower and Smith. 

At the beginning of September 1944 

Mr. Phillips was assigned other duties and 

Mr. Samuel Reber, who had been counsellor of mission on Mr. Phillips' staff, was 

designated by the President as Political 

Officer at SHAEF for France and other 

liberated countries.60 Shortly afterward, 

Ambassador Robert D. Murphy was appointed as Political Officer for German Affairs. He was well acquainted with General Eisenhower and many members of 

.6 This section has drawn on information furnished 

by Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, former Ambassador Phillips, and Mr. Samuel Reber to the author 

in letters of 6 September 1951, 23 October 1951, and 

30 October 195 L Mr. Murphy says of his appointment it'! North Africa: " ... as far as I know, my 

assignment to AFHQas Political Adviser and Chief 

Civil Affairs Officer was the first instance in our history of such an arrangement under which a'civilian 

was attached to a military headquarters and permitted 

to participate in regular staff meetings with access to 

classified communications, both military and politicaL 

As there was apparently no precedent for it, General 

Eisenhower was guided largely by his own goodjudgment and conception of the needs of the situation. 

These usually were concurred in by the British elem~nt of his headquarters." 

59 SHAEF GO 2, 14 Feb 44. (The title Political Adviser was used from time to time in SHAEF correspondence, but Political Officer was the title which 

normally appeared in SHAEF organization charts). 

60 SHAEF GO 18, 2 Sep 44. 
96 

the SHAEF staff, having served as Political Adviser in North Africa, as Chief Civil 

Affairs Adviser on Italian Affairs at Allied 

Force Headquarters, and as U.S. member 

on the Advisory Council of the Allied Control Commission for Italy. Mr. Charles 

Peake remained as the British Political 

Officer until February 1945 when he was 

replaced by Mr. Christopher Steel. 

In the period between the liberation of 

Paris and the re-establishment of the U.S. 

and British Embassies there, the SHAEF 

political officers were responsible for nonmilitary relations with national authorities 

that might be functioning in France. They 

were also charged with co-ordinating the 

work of the special SHAEF missions to 

continental governments. As normal 

diplomatic channels were re-established, 

the functions of these officers decreased. 

Mr. Peake's successor devoted himselfprimarily to German affairs after his appointment in February 1945. Mr. Reber was 

transferred to another post in April 1945. 

Mr. Murphy's position was somewhat 

complicated in that he served as a representative of the State Department with the 

rank of Ambassador on the SHAEF staff 

and also as director of the Political Division in the U.S. Group Control Council, 

set up under Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. 

Wickersham to formulate policy and 

create the nucleus of the organization of 

U.S. military government in Germany.61 

It was his responsibility to reflect the 

views of the Department of State in the 

preparation of the papers drawn up by 

this group. He also kept abreast of the activities of the European Advisory Commission which was engaged in drawing up 

surrender terms for Germany and policy 

for the occupation of that country. 

The various political officers had their 

own staffs, including both military and 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

State Department personnel. They had direct access to the Supreme Commander 

but usually conducted their business 

through the chief of staff. They also attended staff conferences of the Supreme 

Commander and of the chief of staff 

when matters pertaining to the liberated 

countries and Germany were discussed. 

Committees 

Inter-Allied committees handled much 

of SHAEF's work of co-ordination. In 

many cases, these groups were headed by 

SHAEF deputy chiefs of staff or chiefs of 

division. Their multifold activities. extended to such questions as fuel, transportation, equipment of troops in liberated 

countries, combined civil affairs activities, 

censorship, intelligence, psychological 

warfare, displaced persons, counterintelligence, forestry and timber supply, communications, prisoners of war, and radio 

broadcasting. After the liberation of the 

various occupied countries, SHAEF was 

represented through its missions on a Four 

Party Committee, which dealt with all 

problems relating to imports for the civilian economy, a subcommittee on coal, a 

coal working party, a port working party, 

an inter-Allied railroad commission, an inter-Allied waterways commission, a military Rhine agency, a merchant marine 

commission, a POL working party, and an 

informal committee on food supplies. Still 

later, SHAEF was also represented on 

CCS committees dealing with military 

government for Germany. 

Locations if SHAEF 

SHAEF opened formally in the old 

COSSAC headquarters at Norfolk House, 

61 See below, p. 351. 
THE MACHINERY OF SHAEF 

but moved in March 1944 to Bushy Park, 

near Kingston-on-Thames, on the outskirts of London. WIDE WING, as it was 

known in military code, was built in a part 

of the park used by the Eighth Air Force, 

and opened in March 1944. It had been 

selected after some search to meet General 

Eisenhower's insistence that his headquarters not be set up in a large city. A hutted 

camp was built between 10 January and 1 

March 1944 to fill the SHAEFrequest for 

130,000 square feet of floor space and for 

billets to accommodate 688 officers and 

2,156 enlisted men. New units continued 

to be attached to or located near Supreme 

Headquarters, so that at the time of invasion, accommodations had been built for 

750 officers and 6,000 enlisted men. 62 

Shortly after the movement of SHAEF 

from London to Bushy Park, additional 

planning was started for the establishment 

of advanced echelons of Supreme Headquarters. An advance command post 

known as SHARPENER was opened for the 

Supreme Commander in early May at 

Portsmouth near the advance headquarters of 21 Army Group and the Allied 

Naval Expeditionary Force. Anpther advanced post of SHAEF was set up at Stanmore, adjacent to the Headquarters, 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force. 63 

One of the chief considerations in the 

establishment of these and later command 

posts was the availability of adequate 

signal communications needed to connect 

the Supreme Commander with London, 

Washington, Algiers (and later Caserta), 

and the army group commanders. In the 

United Kingdom this task was simplified 

by the Defence Telecommunications Network of Great Britain, consisting of circuits 

transferred from the civil trunk system and 

of circuits newly constructed. The British 

97 

naval, air, and army headquarters also 

had their own wire systems in addition to 

the regular civil telephone system. For 

a time after the move to Bushy Park, 

SHAEF used the lines of the Eighth Air 

Force. Later new construction improved 

and greatly extended these communications. Remote control lines connected 

SHAEF with its bombproof signal center 

at the north end ofthe underground shelter at Goodge Street Station in London, 

where telephone, radio, and telegraph facilities were opened on 11 March 1944. 

This signal center served SHAEF as an 

outlet until the end of the war. SHAEF 

communications throughout the war were 

handled by the U.S. 3118th Signal Se;vice Battalion and the British 5 Headquarters Signals, both of which were frequently 

enlarged. 64 

By the time of the invasion, the basic 

framework of Supreme Headquarters had 

been built. Later developments were confined to minor changes to make it conform 

to operational demands or to prepare it 

for post hostilities occupation duties. Earlier concepts of a small "Foch type" headquarters suitable for a commander whose 

task was to be restricted to over-all coordination had been forgotten. Instead 

there had been organized a headquarters 

large enough to permit General Eisenhower to exercise, in many cases directly, 

the great variety of functions assigned to 

the Supreme Commander, including, after 

1 September 1944, the direction of ground 

operations in the field. 

62 Interv with Brig Gen Robert Q. Brown (Commandant of SHAEF), Dec 45. 

63 Col Kutz's Memo dtd "April 1944" in answer to 

Gen Bull's Memo of 26 Apr 44, SHAEF G-3 (Movement, Composition, etc.), GCT, 370.5-41 Ops A. 

64 Rpt of Signal Div, SHAEF, I, 1-48. 
CHAPTER V 

Planning Before SHAEF 

SHAEF drew heavily on its predecessor 

commands for principles of organization 

and key personnel. In planning, it depended even more heavily on the British 

and U.S. staffs which since early in the 

war had been making strategic decisions 

and tactical and logistical preparations for 

a cross-Channel attack. Without these preliminary efforts, the Supreme Commander 

and his subordinates could not have hoped 

to launch Operation OVERLORD in June 

1944. 

Early Background 

Prime Minister Churchill had considered the idea of an early return to the 

Continent even as the final British elemerits were being evacuted from the ports 

of Normandy and Brittany in June 1940, 

and as he was having to improvise defensive measures against a German attack. 

He ordered the organization of raiding 

forces to hit the coasts of countries occupied by the enemy and in July 1940 set up 

a Combined Operations Headquarters to 

handle these activities. Thinking in terms 

of ultimate tank attacks along the Channel 

coast, he asked his planners to develop special landing craft which could carry armored vehicles to the far shore. These 

armored elements, he hoped, could make 

deep raids inland, cut vital communication lines, and then make their escape. 

Larger forces he predicted, might surprise 

Calais or Boulogne, kill or capture the 

enemy garrison, and hold the area until 

preparation had been made to reduce it. 

Mr. Churchill’s orders turned the minds 

of the British planners toward offensive 

operations and launched a program of 

landing craft production that was essential 

to the ultimate cross-Channel attack. 1 

In September 1941, Gen. Sir John Dill, 

Chief of the Imperial General Staff, directed the British military planners to 

formulate a plan for a return to the Continent. He added significantly that it should 

take into consideration the capabilities of 

U.S. construction. Members of the Future 

Operational Planning Section, GHQ, 

were gathering data on such an operation 

before the end of that year. The British 

Chiefs of Staff Committee gave further impetus to this planning on 2 January 1942 

by directing General Paget, then Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, “to prepare an outline for operations on the Continent in the final phases and to review the 

plan periodically with a view to being able 

to put it into effect if a sudden change in 

the situation should appear to warrant 

such a course.’’ 2 

1 Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston, 

1949), Ch. 12; Lt Col Paddy Corbett, The Evolution 

and Development of Amphibious Technique and Material, 1945, MS, OCMH files; Brig A. H. Head, The 

Evolution and Development of Amphibious Technique and Material, 1945, MS, OCMH files; Rear 

Adm Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to author, 18 

Feb 47. 

2 Brigadier A. H. Head, “Amphibious Operations,” 

Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, XCI (No- 
PLANNING BEFORE SHAEF 

After a brief study of the problems involved in a cross-Channel attack, the 

British Joint Planners agreed that the 

greatest contribution to the Allied cause in 

1942 would be to divert enemy forces from 

the Eastern Front. An examination of German fortifications on the Channel coast of 

Europe led them to conclude, however, 

that no sustained land operation could be 

made in that area in 1942. Their proposal 

that chief emphasis be placed on forcing 

the German Air Force to fight in the west 

was accepted by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

The latter directed the Combined Commanders-an informal planning staff consisting of General Paget, Home Forces, Air 

Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, Fighter 

Command, and Vice Adm. Lord Louis 

Mountbatten, Combined Operations-to 

make plans for this purpose. 3 

In the United States, the War Department was also turning its attention to 

plans for attacking the enemy in northwest Europe. Committed to the policy of 

defeating Germany first, the United States 

started moving troops to the United Kingdom in the early months of 1942. Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the British 

Isles (USAFBI), was established in London on 8January 1942 under Maj. Gen. 

James E. Chaney, and Headquarters, V 

Corps, was sent to Northern Ireland in the 

same month. Brig. Gen. Ira C. Eaker and 

the staff of his bomber command, constituting the advance elements of the U.S. 

Army Air Forces in Great Britain, arrived 

inJanuary; forward detachments ofthe 

VIII Bomber Command began to appear 

in February.4 

vember, 1946),485-94; Br COS 2d Mtg, 2 Jan 42, 

quoted in Capt. Martin McLaren, The Story of 

SLEDGEHAMMER, MS, OCMH files. (Captain McLaren was a member of General Paget's staff and later 

secretary of the COSSAC staff.) 

99 

The views of General Marshall and his 

staff were well illustrated in a War Plans 

Division memorandum of 28 February 

1942 presented by General Eisenhower, 

then the WPD chief. Emphasizing the importance of keeping the USSR in the war, 

Eisenhower proposed that the United 

States immediately extend lend-lease aid 

to the Red forces and initiate operations to 

draw sizable portions of the German Army 

from the Russian front. In particular, he 

urged the development of a definite plan 

for operations against northwest Europe in 

conjunction with the British on a scale 

sufficiently great "to engage from the middle of May onward, an increasing portion 

of the German Air Force, and by late summer an increasing amount of his ground 

forces." On 16 March the U.S. Joint Staff 

Planners, made up of representatives from 

the planning staffs ofthe Army, Navy, and 

Air Force, reported on alternative plans 

for U.S. Forces. They held that the United 

States should restrict its Pacific theater 

activities to existing commitments and 

concentrate on building up forces in the 

United Kingdom. This suggestion reached 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the same day 

the British presented a tentative plan for 

invading the Le Havre area of France during the summer of 1942 in case of severe 

3 The Combined Commanders contributed heavily 

to the fund of knowledge on which COSSAC was later 

to draw. This staff was later enlarged to include the 

British Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth (Admiral 

Sir Charles Little), and the Commander, U.S. Forces 

in Europe, also attended some meetings. Air Chief 

Marshal Douglas was later replaced on the committee 

by Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory. See Harrison, 

Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. I, for details of the important 

work done by this group. 

• The author has drawn mainly in these early sections on Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Chs. I-VII; 

and Cline, Washington Command Post: OPD. See also 

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Chs. XXIV, XXV, 

and Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition 

Waifare,1941-42. 
100 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

deterioration of the enemy’s position. At 

the suggestion of General Marshall, the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff now ordered a 

study made of the possibilities of (1) landing and maintaining forces on the Continent in 1942 and (2) an invasion early in 

1943. 

Meanwhile, in London, the Combined 

Commanders continued their investigations of invasion possibilities. After a somewhat gloomy forecast in March, they 

reported in April that if one did not have 

to consider the dangerous weakening of 

the defenses of the United Kingdom, and 

if they could find means of supplying an 

attacking force, an operation against the 

Continent was practicable. They warned, 

however, that if the enemy made a major 

diversion of his forces to the west the Allies 

would face the loss of equipment and most 

of their troops. The British Chiefs of Staff 

now asked for a study of possible landings 

which could be made should Russia be 

dangerously hard pressed in 1942. To this 

query the Commanders replied on 13 

April that, other than air action, raiding 

was the only means of achieving this 

objective. 5 

Shortly before the final April report by 

the Combined Commanders, General 

Marshall and Mr. Hopkins went to London to discuss Allied strategy for 1942 and 

1943. In the first definite plan for a largescale cross-Channel operation presented to 

the British Chiefs of Staff, General Marshall proposed to build up the U.S. force 

to one million men for an invasion of the 

Continent on 1 April 1943. The British 

were to contribute an additional eighteen 

divisions. In case of an emergency created 

by a serious weakening of Russia or the 

probable collapse of Germany, a force was 

to be put in readiness to enter the Continent in the fall of 1942. The British on 14 

April accepted the Marshall proposals. 

The name BOLERO was given to the buildup preparation, and names of plans already in existence for the return to the 

Continent were assigned to the other 

phases of the Marshall proposal. The 

emergency return to the Continent was 

named SLEDGEHAMMER, and the assault in 

northwest Europe for 1943 was called 

ROUNDUP. 

Almost before the Americans returned 

to the United States, there were indications that Mr. Churchill was uncertain 

that a cross-Channel operation could be 

put into effect in the near future. Churchill 

and General Brooke reopened the whole 

question during a trip to Washington in 

late June. While agreeing with the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff that the Allies should be 

prepared to act offensively in 1942, they 

proposed that alternative operations be 

made ready in case no sound and successful plan for the cross-Channel attack could 

be contrived. They asked particularly that 

the possibilities of an attack in North 

Africa be explored. 6 

The Prime Minister’s revival of the proposal for a North African operation and 

his reluctance to undertake the crossChannel attack in 1942 upset the plans of 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, who were proceeding with the build-up in the United Kingdom. General Marshall felt that if the 

Allies did not divert enemy forces from the 

Russian front in 1942 a full-scale attack on 

northwest Europe might be ineffective in 

1943. He feared also that if they turned to 

the North African operation they would 

make a build-up in the United Kingdom 

impossible in 1942 and would curtail, if 

5 McLaren, The Story Of SLEDGEHAMMER. 

6 Such an operation had already been considered 

under the name of Operation GYMNAST. 
PLANNING BEFORE SHAEF 101 

not make impossible, the full-scale attack 

in 1943. He and Admiral King held that, 

if they were not to have complete adherence to the build-up plan for 1942, they 

should turn to the Pacific theater and 

strike decisively against Japan with full 

strength and ample reserves. 7 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff on 25 June 

strengthened their build-up efforts in the 

United Kingdom by establishing a Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. General Eisenhower was appointed 

theater commander. Three weeks later the 

President sent General Marshall, Admiral 

King, and Mr. Hopkins to London to get 

an agreement from the British on operations for 1942 and 1943. Mr. Roosevelt 

stressed the importance of bringing U.S. 

ground troops into action against the enemy in order to aid the Russians in 1942. 

Believing that SLEDGEHAMMER might be 

the operation that would “save Russia this 

year,” he instructed his representatives to 

abandon it only if they were sure it was 

impossible. In that event, they were to 

consider other plans to use U.S. troops in 

1942. Unlike General Marshall and Admiral King, Roosevelt refused to consider 

the alternative of an all-out effort in the 

Pacific, insisting that the defeat ofJapan 

would not mean the defeat of Germany, 

whereas the surrender of Germany would 

mean the downfall of Japan, perhaps without the firing of a shot or the loss of a life. 8 

The British Chiefs of Staff had taken a 

firm position on the cross-Channel operation before the Americans arrived. They 

had decided that British commitments in 

Africa, the Middle East, and India, their 

efforts in keeping the sea lanes Open, and 

their air activities were such that it would 

be impossible to undertake a cross-Channel attack seriously in 1942. Further, they 

feared that the mounting of SLEDGEHAMMER would ruin prospects for ROUNDUP in 

1943. Soon after General Marshall 

reached London he realized that an alternative plan would have to be accepted for 

1942. Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt then decided that the Allies would 

invade North Africa. General Eisenhower 

was appointed to lead the operation. 9 

The North African invasion, known as 

TORCH, strongly influenced preparations 

for the cross-Channel attack. By diverting 

Allied resources to the Mediterranean, it 

interfered seriously with the BOLERO 

build-up in the United Kingdom and, as 

General Marshall had feared, rendered 

ROUNDUP impracticable in 1943. So much 

of the air strength of the Eighth U.S. Air 

Force was sent to the Mediterranean that 

its efforts against Germany, begun in the 

summer of 1942, were virtually abandoned. The British, however, continued 

their bombing activities against the Reich. 

The campaign in the Mediterranean was 

extended in 1943 to Sicily and to Italy. 

Despite the failure to get a cross-Channel attack under way, preparations for 

such an operation continued and many 

developments in the United Kingdom and 

the United States strengthened the Allied 

position for an ultimate assault on northwest Europe. Until the spring of 1943, the 

Combined Commanders, with representatives of Headquarters, ETOUSA, sitting 

in on their meetings, worked on cross7 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 590–91, has 

an excellent summary of possible reasons why Mr. 

Churchill opposed a cross-Channel attack in 1942. See 

also Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack. For General Maxshall’s view, see his letter to General Eisenhower, 16 

Jul 42, OPD Misc File. 

8 Presidential dir to Marshall, Hopkins, and King, 

16 Jul42, copy in Diary Office CinC, 18 Jul 42. 

9 Churchhill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston, 1950), pp. 

381, 433–51; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 70. 
102 

Channel plans. 10 Although planning 

during this period was frequently on an 

academic level, the various staffs gathered 

information on amphibious operations, assault training centers developed new techniques, and movements and transportation 

directors put ports and railroad centers in 

condition to handle the invasion forces 

when the proper time came. At the same 

time bombing raids against the enemy 

were increasing, and U.S. production was 

hitting its stride. 

The period was marked by efforts in the 

United Kingdom to organize and aid Resistance forces in the occupied countries. 

Propaganda campaigns were launched 

against the Axis in the hope of softening 

enemy opposition before the invasion of 

northwest Europe began. In North Africa, 

the Allies moved toward an understanding with the French and took steps to arm 

French units. Some of these were to perform brilliantly against the enemy in Italy. 

Others, raised and equipped in 1943, were 

to fight later in southern France and 

northwest Europe. 

In August 1942, while TORCH preparations were under way, a force of 5,000 

troops, mostly Canadian, attacked Dieppe. 

Despite heavy casualties suffered by these 

units, the raid was of great importance to 

the Allies in the development of amphibious tactics. It made clear the necessity of 

overwhelming naval and air support for a 

successful assault on coastal fortifications. 11 

Perhaps most important to the future 

commanders of the cross-Channel attack 

was the time they gained during Mediterranean operations in 1942 and 1943 to 

develop new doctrines and to train leaders 

in the lessons learned in battle. New ideas 

acquired in fighting were passed on to 

units then being activated. 

In the United Kingdom, the training of 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

troops who were to fight in northwest 

Europe became constantly more realistic 

as General Paget, commander of Home 

Forces, prepared British soldiers for coming operations. In the United States, Lt. 

Gen. Lesley]. McNair, equally wedded to 

principles of toughness, thoroughness, and 

realism in training, put through a similar 

program for his Ground Forces. More important was the direct training in combat 

acquired in North Africa. To Mr. Hanson 

Baldwin, New York Times military commentator, North Africa was "a training 

and testing ground, a college on the conduct of war by the Allies, a dress rehearsal 

for the far larger and more difficult operations ... that are still to come." 12 

Allied Planning and Preparation in 1943 

In] anuary 1943, after the first phases 

of the North African operations had 

proved successful, the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff met with President Roosevelt and 

Mr. Churchill at Casablanca to map plans 

for the future. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

held that the main operation in 1943 must 

be made in northwest Europe. The British, 

still uncertain that the Allies were capable 

of mounting a successful cross-Channel 

assault before 1944, maintained that the 

Mediterranean offered the best immediate 

prospects for success. General Marshall 

argued that the United Kingdom was a 

better base from which to attack since 

more effective air support could be given 

from there, and operations from there 

could be more easily supplied from the 

10 In the absence of General Eisenhower, his deputy 

theater commander, Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle, 

acted as chief American representative in the United 

Kingdom. 

11 Col C. P. Stacey, The Canadian Arnry, 1939-45 

(Ottawa, 1948), pp. 83-86. 

12 New York Times, May 12, 1943. 
PLANNING BEFORE SHAEF 103 

United States 13 The British countered 

effectively that the Allies could not afford 

to leave their forces in the Mediterranean 

idle while preparations were being made 

in the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel operation. In the face of this fact and 

the British disinclination to undertake 

ROUNDUP in 1943, the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff decided to make the invasion of Sicily 

(Operation HUSKY) the next major operation for 1943. 14 

The Allies agreed at Casablanca to start 

preparations for an eventual cross-Channel attack. They decided that a combined 

staff should be established to plan for such 

an operation, and they ordered further 

that a combined bomber offensive be 

launched against Germany to undermine 

the enemy’s capacity for armed resistance. 

The former decision resulted, as already 

indicated, in the naming of General Morgan to head the COSSAC staff. The decision on an air offensive resulted in the 

directive of 10 June 1943 officially opening 

the bombing offensive known as POINTBLANK. 

In a second conference, held in Washington in May 1943, the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff issued a supplementary directive 

to General Morgan, ordering him to plan 

an operation with a target date of 1 May 

1944 to secure a lodgment area on the 

Continent from which further operations 

could be launched. The plan was to be 

based on the presence in the United Kingdom of twenty-nine divisions, of which 

nine were available for the assault period. 

COSSAC was ordered to start an immediate expansion of logistical facilities in the 

United Kingdom and to prepare an outline plan for submission to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff on 1 August 1943. 15 

After working on the plan throughout 

June and the first half of July, General 

Morgan and his staff presented it to the 

British Chiefs of Staff on 15 July 1943. The 

COSSAC planners set forth the conditions 

under which the attack (OVERLORD) could 

be made, the area where a landing would 

be feasible, and the steps whereby the assault would be developed. 16 As a means of 

aiding the assault, General Morgan asked 

that the most effective threat possible be 

made on the south coast of France in order 

to pin down German forces in that area. 

He also suggested that plans be made for 

the occupation of the ports of southern 

France in case of German withdrawal 

from that region. 17 

Before leaving London for the Quebec 

Conference in August 1943 the British 

Chiefs of Staff examined the OVERLORD 

plan and instructed General Morgan to 

continue his planning, paying particular 

attention to the enemy’s power to delay 

the Allied advance. After examining alternative plans, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

approved the COSSAC outline plan for 

the cross-Channel operation and endorsed 

the action of the British Chiefs of Staff in 

authorizing General Morgan to continue 

detailed planning and preparations. They 

also directed Allied Force Headquarters 

to plan a diversionary attack in southern 

France. Prime Minister Churchill accepted the OVERLORD plan subject to the 

warning that a review of the decision 

would be asked if later intelligence reports 

indicated that German ground or air 

strength was greater than that anticipated 

13 CCS 55th Mtg, 14 Jan 43, Casablanca Conf Min. 

14 CCS 2d Mtg with President and Prime Minister, 

18 Jan 43, Casablanca Conf Min. 

15 Draft Supplementary Dir to COSSAC, 25 May 

43, Washington Conf Min. 

16 See below, pp. 105-06, for more complete 

details. 

17 Opn OVERLORD, Rpt and Appreciation, COS 

(43) 416 (0), SHAEF SGS Opn OVERLORD 381 I (a). 
104 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

by the planners in estimating the possible 

success of the operation. 18 

The Combined Bomber Offensive 

began almost simultaneously with 

COSSAC planning. The outline plan for 

it was endorsed by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, who directed the Eighth U.S. Air 

Force and the RAF Bomber Command to 

initiate the bomber attack against the 

enemy. 

British bomber forces since 1940 had 

made an increasing number of raids over 

Germany, and the Eighth U.S. Air Force 

had joined them in these activities in the 

summer of 1942. Before the Casablanca 

Conference, however, the raids had been 

carried on without a definite statement as 

to the priorities of targets, the mission to 

be accomplished, or the timing of the combined activities. The Combined Bomber 

Offensive was an attempt to integrate and 

expand the British and U.S. bombing 

efforts against Germany. At Casablanca 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff specified that 

the purpose of the operation would be 

“the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial 

and economic systems, and the undermining of the morale of the German 

people to a point where their capacity for 

armed resistance is fatally weakened.” At 

the same meeting and in later conferences, 

Allied planners had agreed that the target 

priorities should include the following as 

primary objectives: enemy submarine 

yards and bases, the German aircraft industry, ball bearings, and oil. Secondary 

objectives included synthetic rubber and 

tires and military motor transport vehicles. 

German fighter strength was-listed “as an 

intermediate objective second to none in 

priority.” 19 

The late Summer and early fall of 1943 

saw increasing interest of the COSSAC 

staff in one of its initial tasks—planning 

for a return to the Continent in case of 

German collapse or withdrawal from the 

occupied countries. A plan to meet this 

situation had been presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference. The march of events in August 

and early September, indicating growing 

Axis weakness, gave rise to the hope that 

such a plan rather than one for an all-out 

cross-Channel assault might be the one 

used by the Allies. The fall of Mussolini 

near the end of July, the rapid conquest of 

Sicily in August, and Italy’s unconditional 

surrender at the beginning of September 

seemed to indicate that the Axis was disintegrating under Allied blows. On the 

Eastern Front there was even greater encouragement as the Russian attack, which 

began in the Orel salient in July, spread 

along the entire front. A powerful drive in 

the vicinity of Kharkov brought the fall of 

that city in mid-August and threw the 

Germans back toward the Dnieper. The 

air battle increased in intensity with August witnessing Allied attacks on the Messerschmitt factories near Vienna and the 

raid on the Ploesti oilfields in România. 

The month of September was to see the 

greatest air fights in Europe since the 

Battle of Britain. On 9 September, the day 

of the Allied invasion of the Italian mainland at Salerno, the Joint Intelligence 

Sub-committee of the War Cabinet, impressed by the parallels between the condition of Germany in August 1918 and 

August 1943, concluded that “a study of 

the picture as a whole leads us inevitably 

to the conclusion that Germany is, if anything, in a worse condition today than she 

18 1st and 2d Mtgs of President and Prime Minister, 

19, 23 Aug 43, Quebec Conf Min. 

19 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, Vol. II, 

Ch. 11; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. VI. Useful 

background on British bombing operations can be 

found in Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive (New 

York, 1947), Chs. I-VII. 
PLANNING BEFORE SHAEF 

was at the same period in 1918." They believed that if the Allies could take advantage of Germany's declining strength to 

press home attacks by land and sea; maintain 

and even intensify their air offensives; exploit 

the instability of southeast Europe; and pursue a vigorous political and propaganda campaign, we may see the defection of the rest of 

Germany's European Allies and, even before 

the end of this year, convince the German 

people and military leaders that a continuation of the war is more to be feared than the 

consequences of inevitable defeat. With the 

German people no longer willing to endure 

useless bloodshed and destruction and the 

military leaders convinced of the 'futility of 

resistance there might be, as in Italy, some 

sudden change of regime to prepare the way 

for a request for an Armistice. 20 

Although this prediction proved to be 

nothing more than what one British officer 

described as "our annual collapse of Germany prediction," 21 it required the 

COSSAC staff to rush planning for measures to be taken in the case of enemy collapse. A report in October that a meeting 

of the German high command had been 

called gave rise to hopeful speculation in 

London, leading General Barker to cable 

General Morgan in Washington, "We 

here are of the opinion that RANKIN 'C' [a 

plan to be put into effect in case of Germany's surrender] becomes more and 

more ofa probability." 22 

As winter approached, the Allies became less hopeful about an early collapse 

of the enemy. It became clear that the 

enemy, despite increasingly heavy raids, 

was able to continue his production of aircraft by moving factories farther inside 

Germany. Near the year's end, the 

enemy's fighter force in the west was actually increasing in strength. There was also 

some doubt that the Combined Bomber 

Offensive could complete its work before 

the target day set for the cross-Channel 

attack, particularly in the light of Air 

105 

Chief Marshal Portal's statement in early 

December 1943 that PO~NTBLANK was 

three months behind schedule. The airmen believed, nonetheless, that given sufficient bomber resources they could rapidly 

reduce the enemy's air force to impotence 

and achieve air superiority for the Allies. 23 

At the Cairo Conference in December 

1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

reached a firm conclusion as to operations 

for 1944. They declared that the crossChannel attack and the landings in southern France were to be the supreme operations for 1944 and that nothing should be 

undertaken in any other part ofthe world 

which might prevent their success. The 

Allies thus made OVERLORD the chief order 

of business for the coming year. The appointment of General Eisenhower as 

Supreme Commander opened the final 

phase of preparations for the cross-Channel assault. 24 

The COSSA C Plans 

On their arrival in London in 1944, the 

new members of SHAEF were briefed on 

the plans outlined by COSSAC in 1943. 

In one case, that of diversion plans, 

COSSAC had actually carried out a specific operation. Under the general name of 

COCKADE, British and United States forces 

had built up threats against the Continent 

to give the impression that an attack 

might be launched in 1943. U.S. forces 

had made feints in the direction of the 

20 Probabilities of a German Collapse, 9 Sep 43,JIC 

(43) 367 Final, OPD Exec 9, Bk 12. 

21 Int~rvs with Commodore John Hughes-Hallett, 

11,12Feb47. 

22 Barker to Morgan, 20 Oct 43, Barker personal 

file. See below, p. 106, for description of the RANKIN 

plan. . 

23 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, Vol. II, 

Ch. 21; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. VI. 

24 Reportto the President and Prime Minister, CCS 

426/1,6 Dec 43, Cairo ConfMin. 
106 

Brest peninsula (WADHAM), British forces 

in Scotland had simulated preparations 

for attack against Norway (TINDALL), and 

Allied forces had directed threats toward 

the Pas-de-Calais (STARKEY). It was not 

clear to what extent these efforts had been 

successful in worrying the enemy, but 

General Morgan felt that they might have 

been responsible to some degree for German activity in the Pas-de-Calais and the 

Cotentin area. It is possible that these efforts raised fears about landings in the Pasde-Calais which lasted until well into the 

following year. 25 

COSSAC had also prepared three plans, 

all phases of Operation RANKIN (Cases A, 

B, and C), designed to be put into effect in 

the event of a sudden change in Germany's 

position. The plans provided for Allied action in case of (A) "substantial weakening 

of the strength and morale of the German 

armed forces" to the extent that a successful assault could be made by Anglo-American forces before OVERLORD, (B) German 

withdrawal from occupied countries, and 

(C) German unconditional surrender and 

cessation of organized resistance. 26 

The newcomers from AFHQ were interested at the moment mainly in 

COSSAC's proposals for the invasion of 

northwest Europe. The OVERLORD plan 

related in somewhat broad terms the steps 

necessary for making a successful assault, 

for building up supply and personnel in 

the lodgment area, and for carrying on operations during the first ninety days of battle. Although it was quite general in 

nature, the plan afforded much valuable 

information in a series of appendixes dealing with such topics as port capacities, 

naval requirements, availability of ships 

and landing craft, availability of ground 

forces, attainment of the necessary air 

superiority for a successful landing, planning data for landing craft and shipping, 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

rate of build-up, Resistance groups, enemy 

naval forces, enemy defense system, 

beaches, meteorological conditions, topography of the assault area, administrative 

considerations, and methods of improving 

discharge facilities on the French coast. 27 

The OVERLORD plan had as its object 

the mounting and executing of "an operation with forces and equipment established 

in the United Kingdom, and with target 

date 1st May 1944, to secure a lodgment 

on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed." In 

the opening phases of the attack COSSAC 

proposed to land two British and one U.S. 

divisions with one U.S. and one British in 

the immediate follow-up to seize the Caen 

area, lying between the Orne River and 

the base of the Cotentin peninsula. They 

were then to seek the early capture of the 

port of Cherbourg and the area suitable 

for airfields near Caen. Before the assault, 

a combined offensive consisting of air and 

sea action, propaganda, political and economic pressure, and sabotage was to be 

launched to soften German resistance. 28 

Much remained to be done by the new 

Supreme Headquarters, but COSSAC 

and its predecessors had contributed 

mightily to the final plan by fixing in general the area of the coming attack and by 

providing considerable groundwork and 

organization on which the new Supreme 

Commander and his subordinates could 

build. 

25 Maj Duncan Emrich and Maj F. D. Price, History of COS SAC, prep at SHAEF, 1945, MS. For German fears of an attack in the Pas-de-Calais in 1944 see 

below, p. 180. 

26 Final Rpt to President and Prime Minister, CCS 

319/5,24 Aug 43, Quebec ConfMin. 

27 Details of the COSSAC plan and amendments 

made by later planners will be found in Harrison, 

Cross-Channel Attack, Chs. II, V. 

28 Opn OVERLORD, Rpt and Appreciation with appendixes, and covering letter, SHAEF SGS Opn 

OVERLORD 381 I (a). 
CHAPTER VI 

SHAEF Revises Plans for 

the Attack 

In the months between the Quebec 

Conference and General Eisenhower's formal assumption of the Supreme Command, COSSAC handed over to the 

commanders of the 21 Army Group, the 

Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, and 

the Allied Expeditionary Air Force many 

of the detailed planning tasks for Operation OVERLORD. General Morgan retained 

for SHAEF, however, numerous administrative duties in addition to specific responsibilities for problems of a political or 

strategic nature. Most important, SHAEF 

advice was required on those broad questions of policy which had to be decided by 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

General Eisenhower, after relinquishing 

command of the Mediterranean theater in 

December 1943, went to Washington for 

conferences relative to the cross-Channel 

operation. To represent him in the United 

Kingdom until his arrival, the Supreme 

Commander sent his chief of staff, General 

Smith, and the newly appointed commander of 21 Army Group, General 

Montgomery. Before the British commander arrived in London on 2January, 

his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Francis de 

Guingand, and General Smith had examined the COSSAC plan for OVERLORD and 

were prepared to present their views to the 

21 Army Group commander. Their reactions, which General de Guingand thought 

similar to those "of any trained soldier," 

favored a greater weight of assault forces, 

a quicker build-up, a larger airlift, and a 

less restricted area of landing. General 

Eisenhower was informed of these views by 

General Smith and General Montgomery 

before he left Washington. Montgomery 

was particularly insistent that General 

Eisenhower take personal action, saying 

that no final decision would be made until 

the Supreme Commander expressed his 

wishes, and asking, "Will you hurl yourself into the contest and what we want, get 

for us?" 1 

SHAEF now concentrated on means of 

strengthening the cross-Channel attack. 

All planning groups that had considered 

the OVERLORD operation were impressed 

by the fact that the Allies in the assault 

faced a potential enemy opposition far 

superior to the number of troops that could 

be landed in a few hours or days. Despite 

the great force located in the United Kingdom, the success of the operation depended 

on the number of men who could be landed 

in the assault waves and on the speed with 

which follow-up forces could be brought 

ashore and supplied. To gain the margin of 

victory, the Allies would have to limit the 

I Maj. Gen. Sir Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (New York, 1947), pp. 340-44; Montgomery to 

Eisenhower, W-4918, 10Jan 44, SHAEF SGS 560 

[Vessels]. 
108 

movement of enemy reinforcements into 

the beachhead, capture ports rapidly, and 

prepare artificial harbors that would serve 

until natural ones could be seized. The 

earlier planners had foreseen these needs 

and had done what they could to prepare 

for them. But not until the commanders 

responsible for the actual battle were appointed was a completely realistic appraisal of the situation possible. A number 

of problems confronted the Supreme Commander in preparing for the cross-Channel 

attack: broadening the assault front, procuring additional landing craft, making 

better use of available landing craft, dropping or landing more airborne units, increasing naval fire support, and insuring 

the isolation of the beachhead by increased 

air operations. 

Strengthening and Widening the Assault 

and the Postponement of ANVIL 

As soon as the outline plan for OVERLORD was presented, the need for a wider 

invasion front and a stronger force than 

recommended by COSSAC inJuly 1943 

was widely recognized. While suggesting a 

landing by three divisions in the assault 

and two divisions in the follow-up in the 

Caen area, the COS SAC planners had 

added that additional forces would be 

valuable in the cross-Channel attack. 

Churchill, Marshall, and Hopkins on seeing the COSSAC proposals at the Quebec 

Conference all declared that the assault 

should be strengthened. Similar statements were made by General Smith in 

October 1943 when General Morgan told 

him in Washington of the plan, and by 

General Eisenhower about the same time 

in Algiers when he was informed by 

Brig. Gen. William E. Chambers, a 

COSSAC staff member, of the essential 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

provisions of the plan. Although Eisenhower and Smith did not realize the roles 

they were later to play in the OVERLORD 

operation, they expressed surprise at the 

weakness of the attacking force, inasmuch 

as they had used greater strength in the 

Sicilian landings. At the end of October, 

General Eisenhower, then being talked of 

as a possible commander of the crossChannel attack, stated his doubts about 

the plan because it did not have "enough 

wallop in the initial attack." 2 

Mr. Churchill showed General Montgomery a copy of the COSSAC plan at 

Marrakech on 1 January 1944. The 21 

Army Group commander also found the 

invasion front too narrow and the assault 

force too small. He was told to examine 

the COSSAC plan in detail when he went 

to the United Kingdom and to recommend changes necessary to the success of 

the operation. 3 

Before General Montgomery arrived in 

London on 2 January 1944, his chief of 

staff and the SHAEF chief of staff had examined the OVERLORD plan and were prepared to recommend a widening of the assault area, When the 21 Army Group 

commander was briefed in London on 3 

January, he took strong exception to the 

narrowness of the proposed assault area. 

Pointing vigorously at various points of the 

2 Interv with Smith, 9 May 47. Eisenhower Memo 

for Diary, 8 Feb 44; Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 Feb 

44. Both in Diary Office Cine. General Eisenhower's 

statement as to the lack of "wallop" was made to Captain Butcher on 28 October 1943, Diary Office CinCo 

For earlier views on the size of the invasion forces by 

General Eisenhower, see CCS, 58th Mtg, 16 Jan 43, 

Casablanca Conf Min; Mtg ofJCS with President, 16 

Jan 43; Algiers Conf Min, 29, 31 May 43. 

3 Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Normandy 

to the Baltic (New York, 1948), pp. 5-6. Cf. de Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 338; Eisenhower, Crusade 

in Europe, p. 217. See also Diary Office CinC, 16 Jan 

44,8 Feb 44. 
SHAEF REVISES PLANS FOR THE ATTACK 109 

map on both sides of the Cotentin, in the 

areas of Dieppe, Le Havre, and Brest, he 

said, "We should land here and here." He 

also raised for the first time the proposal 

that Operation ANVIL, the landing in 

southerr. France, be dropped except as a 

threat in order that landing craft earmarked for ANVIL could be diverted to 

OVERLORD. General Smith, while privately 

of the opinion that a threat in the south of 

France would be as effective. in the early 

stages of the cross-Channel attack as the 

proposed full-scale assault, declined to accede to the proposal until General Eisenhower could examine it.4 

General Montgomery again stressed the 

need of broadening the assault front in his 

meeting with the British and U.S. army 

commanders on 7 January 1944. Speaking 

as a representative of the Supreme Commander, he insisted on changes in the 

COS SAC plan to strengthen the landing 

and follow-up forces. He no longer recommended landings around Le Havre or 

Brittany, but suggested an area from "Varreville on the east coast of thf Cotentin to 

Cabourg west of the Orne" -approximately the same sector recommended by 

the Combined Commanders in March 

1943. In order to permit the armies and 

corps to go in on their own fronts, he proposed ..l change in command arrangements 

by which a British army and a U.S. army 

would control the assault corps, thus requiring 21 Army Group instead of First 

U.S. Army to exercise command on D 

Day. The U.S. army on the right would 

capture Cherbourg and the Cotentin 

peninsula and subsequently develop operations to the south and west, while the 

British army would operate "to the south 

to prevent any interference with the 

American army from the East." 5 

Generals Montgomery and Smith. informed General Eisenhower and Mr. 

Churchill that there must be a stronger 

OVERLORD even at the expense of ANVIL. 

The Prime Minister reminded President 

Roosevelt that he had always hoped "the 

initial assault at OVERLORD could be with 

heavier forces than we have hitherto maintained." The case for strengthening OVERLORD at the expense of ANVIL was also supported by General Morgan who held that 

landings in the south of France could do 

little more than pin down three or four divisions of German mobile reserves, an effect which could be achieved as well by 

a threat. He believed the existing strategic 

conception involved "an unsound diversion of forces from the main 'OVERLORD' 

[assault] area to a subsidiary assault area, 

where they [were 1 unlikely to pay the same 

dividend." His views were reinforced two 

days later by a request from Air Chief 

Marshal Leigh-Mallory, Admiral Ramsay, and General Montgomery for half of 

ANVIL'S two-divisional lift. 

The British ChiefS of Staff were not convinced at the moment of the wisdom of 

weakening or dropping the ANVIL operation. Admiral Cunningham believed that 

a landing in southern France would 

almost certainly force the diversion of 

enemy forces to that area, and Air Chief 

Marshal Portal declared that possession of 

the ports in southern France would increase the rate of build-up of U.S. forces 

on the Continent. When, however, on 12 

, De Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 340-44, tells 

of the work done by General Smith and himself. 

Brigadier McLean, who briefed Montgomery on the 

COSSAC plan, gave the author on 11 March 1947 a 

summary of the discussion. For Smith's view, see 

Smith to Eisenhower, W-9389, 5 Jan 44, Eisenhower 

personal file. 

521 Army Group Memo, "l'<otes taken on meeting 

of army commanders and their chiefs of staff at Headquarters, 21 Army Group, 7 Jan 44," OCMH files. 
110 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE in London. Seated, left to right: Air Chief Marshal 

Tedder, General Eisenhower, and General Montgomery. Standing: General Bradley, Admiral 

Ramsay, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, General Smith. 

January the Joint Planning Staff reported 

the feasibility ofreducing the ANVIL assault to a diversionary attack, Field Marshal Brooke and Air Chief Marshal Portal 

agreed that the operation should not be 

permitted to stand in the way of OVERLORD'S success. Admiral Cunningham, on 

the other hand,-was reluctant to accept 

this view, pointing out in addition to other 

arguments that grave difficulties would be 

raised with the French who had intended 

that the bulk of their forces should participate in the southern landing.

6 The British 

Chiefs of Staff on 14 Jan uary informed 

the Prime Minister that the ideal arrangement would be a stronger OVERLORD and 

a two- or three-division ANVIL. 7 

General Eisenhower on his arrival in 

London was thus faced with the necessity 

of changing the plan for the assault and of 

securing the reallocation of resources intended for an operation in a theater other 

than his own. He promptly apprised General Marshall of his problems, assuring the 

U.S. Chief of Staff that he considered a 

serious reduction in the southern France 

operation justified only as a last resort. 

Since General Eisenhower's headquarters 

6 Memo, Morgan for Br COS, 6Jan 44 , Reply to 

JPS Questionnaire on Implications of Proposed Modification of Operation OVERLORD, 8 Jan 44; Br COS 

5th Mtg, 7 Jan 44 ; Rpt ofJPS on ANVIL-OVERLORD, 

12 Jan 44; Br COS 10th M tg, 13 Jan 44. All in 

SHAEF SGS 370.2 / 2 Opn From Mediterranean in 

Support of OVERLORD, I. 

7 Br COS to Prime Minister, 14 Jan 44, Eisenhower 

personal file. 
SHAEF REVISES PLANS FOR THE ATTACK 111 

in the Mediterranean had prepared both a 

diversionary plan for southern France in 

the fall of 1943 and the ANVIL outline plan 

as directed by the Cairo Conference at the 

end of the year, the Supreme Commander 

was aware of the importance of the ANVIL 

operation to the cross-Channel attack. He 

not only desired the southern France operation to draw away Germans from the 

OVERLORD area, but held that the landings should be made in order to keep the 

promise given the Russians at Tehran, to 

utilize French forces scheduled for commitment in ANVIL, and to make the best 

possible use of Allied forces in the Mediterranean. 8 

While stressing the value of preserving 

ANVIL, the Supreme Commander emphasized the critical importance of a stronger 

OVERLORD attack. On 23 January, he formally proposed that the number of divisions in the initial assault be increased 

from three to five. This meant that to the 

two British divisions and one U.S. division 

which COSSAC planned to land in the 

Caen area, there would be added a British 

division west of Ouistreham and a U.S. 

division on the east coast of the Cotentin. 

Besides an airborne landing in the Caen 

area, General Eisenhower wanted an airborne division to seize the exit from the 

Cotentin beaches, with a second airborne 

division to follow within twenty-four hours. 

This revised plan naturally required additional landing craft, naval fire support, 

and aircraft, with particular emphasis on 

LST’s, LCT’s, 9 and troop carrier aircraft. 

Believing that OVERLORD and ANVIL 

should be viewed as “one whole,” the 

Supreme Commander said that an ideal 

plan would include a five-division OVERLORD and a three-division ANVIL. He 

agreed, however, that if forces were not 

available for both assaults priority should 

go to OVERLORD. As the date for the attack 

he preferred 1 May, but he was willing to 

accept a postponement if that would secure additional strength for the operation. 10 

The British Chiefs of Staff, who together 

with the Prime Minister had become increasingly dubious over the prospects of 

launching ANVIL simultaneously with 

OVERLORD, 11 promptly agreed that the 

cross-Channel attack should be given 

overriding priority. They also asked for 

postponement of the invasion until the end 

of May or the beginning of June in order 

to increase the chance that the Russian 

attack would have begun on the Eastern 

Front, and to gain an extra month’s production of landing craft. The U.S. Chiefs 

of Staff, still insistent on a two-division 

ANVIL, accepted the postponement of the 

target date to a time not later than 31 

May. 12 

While the Allied planners were seeking 

means to mount the OVERLORD and ANVIL operations simultaneously, military 

events in Italy were working against their 

efforts. The Allies had launched an operation on 22 January 1944 at Anzio in the 

hope that their forces could shortly take 

Rome and drive northward to put additional pressure on the enemy. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had thought that 

8 Montgomery to Eisenhower, W–4918, 10 Jan 44, 

SHAEF SGS 560 [Vessels], 11; Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Jan 44, Eisenhower personal file. 

9 Landing Ship, Tank, and Landing Craft, Tank. 

10 Eisenhower to Marshall, W–9856, 22 Jan 44; 

Eisenhower to CCS, B-33, 23 Jan 44, Eisenhower personal file. 

11 Admiral Cunningham still held that his colleagues perhaps underestimated the value of even a 

weak ANVIL on the enemy. Br COS 21st Mtg, 24 Jan 

44, COS (44) Min. 

12 Br COS to JSM, COS (W) 1094, 26 Jan 44; JSM 

to Br COS, JSM 1478, 1 Feb 44, SHAEF SGS 560 

[Vessels], II. 
112 

landing craft allocated to the attack at 

Anzio would be needed for only a short 

time and would then be available for the 

OVERLORD and ANVIL operations. After a 

hopeful beginning, the Allied forces met 

stiffened German resistance and determined counterattacks which forced them 

to use units intended for ANVIL. Continuance of the beachhead battle prevented 

release of precious landing craft. The British,lukewarm toward ANVIL, argued that 

the enemy decision to fight in Italy tied up 

divisions which would otherwise have 

been available for use against OVERLORD 

and thus served the diversionary purpose 

for which ANVIL was intended. They held 

that the strategic situation in the Mediterranean had changed since the Cairo 

Conference and should be re-examined. 13 

Thus far in the discussion of plans for 

widening the assault area, the ANVIL operation had been mentioned merely as an 

attack which must be weakened or postponed in order to get additional support 

for OVERLORD. About 1 February, debate 

over the landings in southern France entered a new phase. Apparently encouraged 

by the fact that the Italian fighting was 

creating a diversion of German units from 

the area of the cross-Channel attack, Mr. 

Churchill on 4 February opened a strong 

onslaught against ANVIL as a desirable operation. He declared that as a result of the 

distance between the areas in which 

OVERLORD and ANVIL were to be 

launched, the ruggedness of the terrain 

which Allied forces from the south of 

France would have to cover in a move 

northward, and the defensive strength of 

modern weapons which would oppose 

them, the ANVIL operation was not "strategically interwoven with OVERLORD." At 

his suggestion, the British Chiefs of Staff 

proposed that ANVIL "as at present 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

planned" be canceled and that the Mediterranean commander be directed to submit plans for the use of his forces to contain 

the maximum number of enemy troops in 

his theater. They believed that a shift of 

landing craft intended for ANVIL to OVERLORD would meet the full requirements of 

the cross-Channel attack, which would 

then be made ready by the first week in 

JuneY General Eisenhower, who still 

wanted the ANVIL operation, now concluded that developments in Italy created 

the possibility that forces there could not 

be disentangled in time to put on a strong 

operation in southern France. Privately, 

he expressed the doubt that ANVIL 

and OVERLORD could be launched 

simultaneously. 15 

Although the unfavorable progress of 

the Anzio operation gave some basis for 

the British proposal to cancel ANVIL, the 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff viewed the suggestion 

with suspicion. They saw in the proposed 

cancellation the continuation of what they 

described as the British policy of pushing 

operations in the Mediterranean at the expense of the cross-Channel attack. At the 

Washington Conference in May 1943, 

General Marshall had warned that operations in the Mediterranean would swallow 

the men and landing craft intended for the 

main operation in northwest Europe. He 

had agreed to the operation in Sicily because it seemed that no other use could be 

made of the forces in the Mediterranean at 

the moment. Salerno had followed, and 

13 

SGS 

OVERLORD, 1. 

for Churchill, 2 Feb 44, SHAEF 

Mediterranean in Support of 

14 35th Mtg, 4 Feb 44, COS (44), SHAEF SGS 

370.2/2 Opn From Mediterranean in Support of 

OVERLORD, I; Br COS tojSM, 4 Feb 44, COS (W) 

1126, COS (44) Min. . 

15 Eisenhower to Marshall, W-10786, 6 Feb 44, 

Eisenhower personal file; Diary Office CinC, 7 Feb 44. 
SHAEF REVISES PLANS FOR THE ATTACK 113 

then Anzio, and now it appeared that 

more demands would be made on resources earmarked for OVERLORD. The 

Chief of Staff felt so strongly about the 

matter that, while agreeing to the cancellation of ANVIL if the Supreme Commander thought it essential to strengthen 

OVERLORD, he expressed fear that the 

British Chiefs ·of Staff might be influencing General Eisenhower's views. "I merely 

wish," he added, "to be certain that localit is is not developing and that pressure on 

you has not warped your judgment." 16 

The imputation of "localitis" to the 

Supreme Commander's views emphasized 

the difficulty of General Eisenhower's position throughout the ANVIL controversy. 

As a tactical commander desiring to 

strengthen the OVERLORD operation, he 

was sometimes receptive to proposals 

which the U.S. Chiefs of Staff opposed. He 

defended himself vigorously in this case 

against the suggestion of British influence, 

pointing out that he had advocated a 

broader front since the OVERLORD plan 

was first explained to him in October 

1943 and insisting that he always fought 

for the preservation of the ANVIL operation. 17 

American skepticism regarding the 

British stand was due in part to the conviction that sufficient resources were present in Europe to provide a seven-division 

lift of personnel and an eight-division lift 

of vehicles. This the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

believed to be adequate for both the 

OVERLORD and ANVIL operations. Neither 

the British nor the SHAEF planners 

agreed with the estimate, which they believed to be based on a faulty analysis of 

the number of men and vehicles that 

could be carried under combat conditions. 

In an effort to settle this disagreement and 

the whole problem of ANVIL, the Prime 

Minister invited the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to 

London to discuss the matter. They suggested instead that General Eisenhower 

act as their direct representative with the 

British, and they sent as his technical advisers Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., 

and Maj. Gen.John E. Hull. 

Throughout February General Eisenhower attempted to find enough landing 

craft for both operations. The British and 

SHAEF planners stuck to their view that 

under combat conditions the landing craft 

available would not carry the number of 

soldiers and vehicles which the U.S. representatives showed mathematically the 

craft could hold. The technical observers 

from the United States were not impressed, one of them reporting that the 

British had no interest in ANVIL, since they 

believed that OVERLORD was "the only 

one that will pay us dividends." 18 

In an effort to meet General Eisenhower's wishes to save ANVIL, the SHAEF 

planners in mid-February came up with 

a plan to increase the size of loads and 

make more efficient use of the landing 

craft already available. General Montgomery, who believed that the landing 

craft allotment for OVERLORD was already 

too scanty, initially objected to the proposal on the ground that it would "compromise tactical flexibility, introduce 

added complications, bring additional 

hazards into the operations, and thus generally endanger success." After discussing 

16 JSM to Br COS,JSM 1494,6 Feb 44; Marshall 

to Eisenhower, 78, 7 Feb 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 

370.2/2 Opn From Mediterranean in Support of 

OVERLORD, I. At one point during this period, the 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff asked the British not to discuss 

certain points with General Eisenhower before he had 

a chance to give Washington his opinion. 

17 Eisenhower to Marshall, W-l0786, 8 Feb 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

18 Gen Hull to Gen Handy, 15 Feb 44, SHAEF SGS 

560 [Vessels), II. 
114 

the matter with General Eisenhower, and 

with Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory 

and Admiral Ramsay, who agreed with 

some reluctance to accept the SHAEF 

proposal, General Montgomery withdrew 

his opposition. General Eisenhower now 

reported to the British Chiefs of Staff that 

by making sacrifices and accepting every 

possible risk it would be possible to launch 

the strengthened OVERLORD and at the 

same time save the two-division ANVIL operation. He admitted, however, that in the 

light of developments in Italy it might no 

longer be practicable to undertake the 

landings in southern France. Encouraged 

by this admission the British Chiefs of Staff 

called attention to the opportunity of 

"bleeding and burning German divisions" 

as a result of Hitler's decision to fight south 

of Rome, and argued that it would be 

"wholly unjustifiable to keep any formation out of Italy on the ground that it was 

going to be required for ANVIL." They proposed to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, therefore, 

that the existing state of uncertainty be 

ended and ANVIL canceled immediately.19 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, informed by 

their technical advisers in London that the 

ANVIL operation was possible if the British 

would attempt it, held to the view that the 

landings in southern France should be 

made. They were willing, however, if the 

situation had not improved in Italy by 1 

April, to review the situation in the Mediterranean and then decide if ANVIL should 

be postponed. Arrangements made by 

General Eisenhower were to be supported 

by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, subject to the 

approval of the President. That there 

should be no doubt of his reaction, the 

President directed Admiral Leahy to remind the Supreme Commander that the 

United States was committed to a third 

power (Russia) and that he did not feel the 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Western Allies had any right to abandon 

the commitment for ANVIL without taking 

the matter up with that third power. 20 

The Supreme Commander's position 

thus became increasingly difficult as he 

attempted to decide what was best for him 

as the commander of OVERLORD and also 

tried to present as strongly as possible the 

U.S. arguments. His embarrassment was 

shown particularly in the discussions with 

the British Chiefs of Staff on 22 February. 

Speaking officially for the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff, he opposed cancellation of ANVIL 

until the last possible moment for decision. 

He added that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff did 

not necessarily regard ANVIL as an operation involving an eventual use of two divisions in the assault and ten divisions in the 

build-up, although they did want a twodivision assault force in the Mediterranean. He felt they would accept as fulfillment of the commitment at Tehran a 

diversionary operation on the largest scale 

possible after the Mediterranean theater 

had met the requirements of the campaign 

in Italy.21 

The British Chiefs of Staff agreed to 

continue ANVIL planning under the interpretations given by General Eisenhower 

provided the Italian campaign received 

"overriding priority over all existing and 

future operations in the Mediterranean to 

contain the maximum number of the enemy." They asked that the situation be 

19 For the detailed debate over loadings and the 

efforts to increase the use of the available craft, see 

Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. V. Montgomery to 

Eisenhower, 16 Feb 44, SHAEF SGS 560 [Vessels], 

II; 5th Mtg, 18 Feb 44, Min SAC's Conf. Memo, 

Eisenhower for Br COS, 19 Feb 44; COS (44) 52d 

Mtg, 19 Feb 44; Br COS toJSM, COS (W) 1156,19 

Feb 44. All in SHAEF SGS 381 OVERLORD-ANVIL, I. 

20 JCS to Eisenhower, 153,21 Feb 44;JCS to Eisenhower, 151,21 Feb 44; Leahy to Eisenhower, 154,21 

Feb 44, Eisenhower personal file. 

21 54th Mtg, 22 Feb 44, COS (44). 
SHAEF REVISES PLANS FOR THE ATTACK 115 

reviewed on 20 March and that if ANVIL 

was found to be impracticable all craft in 

excess of the lift for one division should be 

moved from the Mediterranean. This proposal was accepted by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff and approved by the 

President and Prime Minister. 22 

The decision of 26 February marked a 

retreat by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff from 

their positive stand for a strong ANVIL to a 

tentative agreement that a decision would 

be suspended. The operation was left at 

the mercy of developments in Italy which, 

at the time of the agreement, were becoming increasingly unfavorable to the mounting of ANVIL. Gen. Sir Henry Maitland 

Wilson, Supreme Commander in the 

Mediterranean, had reported on 22 February that continuous attacks by the enemy since the 16th of the month had 

inflicted heavy casualties and contributed 

to the exhaustion of his troops. He found it 

difficult to withdraw forces needed for ANVIL, and recommended cancellation of the 

landings in southern France. This suggestion seemed to make more likely the dropping of the ANVIL operation, but nearly a 

month's delay ensued before a decision 

was reached. Pressed by his commanders 

for a prompt decision, General Eisenhower 

suggested that he might get action by 

cabling General Marshall that ANVIL was 

impossible. General Smith, although favoring the postponement of ANVIL, felt this 

action was not necessary and would give 

the impression that they were changing 

their minds too quickly. The Supreme 

Commander agreed that Admiral Ramsay 

should inform the Mediterranean commander which ships he intended to withdraw from that area if ANVIL was canceled 

on 21 March. Nearly a month before the 

final review, the SHAEF planners clearly 

had little doubt that plans for landings in 

southern France simultaneously with 

OVERLORD would have to be canceled.23 

A new element was introduced into 

planning for Mediterranean operations at 

the end of February when General Alexander requested additional craft for his 

troop movements, thus upsetting the timetable for the transfer from the Mediterranean of certain craft earmarked for 

OVERLORD. The British had now gone 

beyond suggesting that ANVIL ~be canceled 

asa means of aiding OVERLORD to proposing that landing craft be withheld from 

OVERLORD in order to insure the success of 

operations in Italy. To get immediate aid 

for operations there, they requested that 

LST's in the Mediterranean be left there, 

and be replaced in the OVERLORD buildup with landing craft dispatched directly 

from the United States. The U.S. Chiefs 

of Staff agreed to delay the movement of 

craft from the Mediterranean, but opposed sending additional craft to that area 

until a decision was made on ANVIL. This 

compromise afforded the means of saving 

the southern France operation, but it created a new problem for General Eisenhower. The effort to keep ANVIL alive, he 

stated flatly, had created a situation which 

was "actually militating strongly against 

the plans and preparations for OVERLORD." He saw nothing in the Italian sitution which indicated "an increase in the 

likelihood of ANVIL on the two divisionten division basis." On the contrary, he 

believed it would be necessary to draw on 

22 COS to JSM, 23 Feb 44, reproduced as CCS 

465/11, 24 Feb 44, CCS files; CCS to Eisenhower, 

FACS 13,26 Feb 44, Eisenhower personal file;JSM 

to Br COS,JSM 1538,25 Feb 44, SHAEF SGS 381 

OVERLORD-ANVIL, 1. 

23 Wilson to Br COS, MEDCOS 41, 22 Feb 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381 OVERLORD-ANVIL, I; 6th Mtg, 26 

Feb 44, Min of SAC's Conf. 
116 

landing craft intended for ANVIL for the 

minimum lift for OVERLORD. 24 

By the time set for reviewing the situation in the Mediterranean, Generals 

Eisenhower and Wilson had agreed that 

landing craft in that area should be reduced to a one-division lift. General Wilson 

wanted these craft to support intensive 

operations up the mainland ofItaly, while 

General Eisenhower asked merely that 

everything possible be done by threat, 

feint, and actual operations to·keep enemy 

troops in the Mediterranean area. Yielding to the logic of the situation in Italy, 

and to General Eisenhower's view that 

"ANVIL as we originally visualized it is no 

longer a possibility either from the standpoint of time in which to make all necessary preparations or in probable availability offresh and effective troops at the 

appointed time," the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

agreed that ANVIL must be delayed. The 

British Chiefs of Staff gained only a part 

of their wish. Instead of the cancellation of 

ANVIL which they recommended, they received a counterproposal that a two-division invasion of southern France be made 

on 10 July 1944. The Americans were 

willing to underwrite this operation by diverting LST's and LCT's earmarked for 

the Pacific on the hard and fast condition 

that the British agree "that preparation 

for the delayed ANVIL will be vigorously 

pressed and that it is the firm intention to 

mount this operation in support of OVERLORD with the target date indicated." 25 

The strong U.S. demand for a positive 

guarantee of an ANVIL operation inJuly as 

a price for more landing craft in the Mediterranean was compared by Field Marshal Brooke to the "pointing of a pistol," 

as he indicated his un willingness to give 

assurances for operations four or five 

months in the future. General Eisenhower 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

reminded the British Chief of the Imperial 

General Staff that, in view of the pressure 

of U.S. opinion and Congress for greater 

activity in the Pacific, General Marshall 

had made substantial concessions by 

agreeing to divert craft intended for the 

Pacific to the Mediterranean. Aware that 

General Marshall had softened his demands for ANVIL to "some sizable operation of the nature of ANVIL," General 

Eisenhower suggested that the U.S. Chiefs 

of Staff might be persuaded to accept a 

British reservation to postpone until July 

a decision as to the place of attack. Thus 

reassured, the British suggested that General Wilson be instructed to prepare not 

only a plan for ANVIL, but also alternative 

plans for containing the maximum number of Germans in Italy if the enemy continued to fight there. 26 

Dissatisfied with the British reluctance 

to name a definite target date, the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff asked for a decision. The 

British then submitted a revised directive 

for General Wilson which was acceptable 

save for a provision giving priority to 

Italian operations over ANVIL. The Americans declared themselves "shocked" to see 

"how gaily" the British "proposed to accept their legacy while disregarding the 

terms of the will," and they refused to 

divert craft to the Mediterranean on the 

basis of the new proposal. Mr. Churchill 

24 Wilson to WO, 28 Feb 44; Wilson to Br COS, 29 

Feb 44, SHAEF SGS 381 OVERLORD-ANVIL, I; Br 

COS toJSM, COS (W) 1184, 1 Mar 44:JSM to Br 

COS,JSM 1558,4 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS 560 [Vessels], III; Eisenhower to Marshall, B-245, 9 Mar 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

25 Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Mar 44; JSM to Br 

COS,JSM 1594, 24 Mar 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 

381 OVERLORD-ANVIL, 1. 

26 12th Mtg, 27 Mar 44, Min of SAC's Confs; Marshall to Eisenhower, W -14078, 25 Mar 44, Eisenhower personal file; Br COS to JSM, COS (W) 1241, 

28 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS 381 OVERLORD-ANVIL, 1. 
SHAEF REVISES PLANS FOR THE ATTACK 117 

now joined the discussion. He urged the 

continuance of operations then under way 

in Italy to join the Anzio bridgehead with 

the main forces and asked postponement 

of the decision on whether to go all olit for 

ANVIL or exploit the victory in Italy. Such 

an option would not exist unless the LST's 

intended for the Pacific were diverted to 

the Mediterranean. General Marshall declared that the choice depended on starting ANVIL preparations immediately. The 

United States, he explained, could not 

stop the momentum it had started in the 

Pacific "unless there was assurance that 

we are to have an operation in the effectiveness of which we have complete faith." 

This development distressed General 

Eisenhower. While agreeing that the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff must take a firm stand, he 

regarded the decision not to divert craft 

intended for the Pacific to the Mediterranean as a "sad blow" for OVERLORD. 27 

The British met the situation with a 

directive that neither fixed a target date 

nor mentioned additional landing craft. 

This tentative solution was accepted by 

Washington on 18 April, and on the following day the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

directed General Wilson to: (a) launch as 

early as possible an all-out offensive in 

Italy, (b) develop the most effective threat 

possible to contain German forces in 

southern France; and (c) make plans for 

the "best possible use of the amphibious 

lift remaining to you, either in support of 

operations in Italy, or in order to take advantage of opportunities arising in the 

south of France or elsewhere for the furtherance of your objects and to press forward vigorously and whole-heartedly with 

all preparations which do not prejudice 

the achievement of the fullest success in 

(a) above." 28 

The directive to General Wilson was 

at best a temporary solution which settled 

nothing definitely in the Mediterranean. 

The chief effect of the three-month discussion, so far as it concerned OVERLORD, was 

in the gain of additional lift for the initial 

assault at the expense of postponing ANVIL, which had been designed to aid the 

Normandy landings. In the opinion of the 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff, the loss of the effect 

of ANVIL on D Day was compensated for 

only slightly by operations which might be 

carried out on the Italian mainland. They 

hoped, therefore, to get a positive agreement that ANVIL would be launched early 

enough in the summer of 1944 to aid the 

OVERLORD operations. The British on 

their side had succeeded in postponing an 

operation which they feared would interfere with Allied activities in Italy, and had 

left the way open for further advance on 

the Italian mainland. The failure to settle 

Mediterranean strategy before the OVERLORD D Day presaged further controversy 

between the British and U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff, added further complications to the 

OVERLORD operation, and increased the 

perplexities of the Supreme Commander. 

For the moment, however, he was able to 

breathe more easily in the assurance that 

landing craft essential to the five-division 

assault which had been accepted in early 

February would actually be diverted from 

the Mediterranean in time. 

27 Handy to Eisenhower, W-16455, 31 Mar 44, 

Handy to Eisenhower, W-18619, 5 Apr 44, E'HAEF 

SGS 381 OVERLORD-ANVIL, I;JSM to Chiefs of Staff, 

FMD 183, I Apr 44, OPD Mise File; Prime Minister 

to Dill for Marshall, 1895, 12 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 

370.2/2 Opn From Mediterranean in Support of 

OVERLORD, I; Marshall to Eisenhower, W-228IO, 14 

Apr 44, Eisenhower personal file; Diary Office CinC, 

18 Apr 44. 

28 Dir, CCS to Gen Wilson, COSMED 90" 19 Apr 

44, SHAEF SGS 370.2/2 Opn From Mediterranean 

in Support of OVERLORD, I. 
118 

Increase of Airborne Units in the Assault 

General Montgomery's proposals for 

increasing the width of the assault area 

included a landing by U.S. forces on the 

Cotentin peninsula. Both he and General 

Bradley agreed that this action was necessary to the early capture of the vital port 

of Cherbourg. The landing was made hazardous, however, by the nature of the 

terraiI1 at the neck of the Cotentin. 

Marshy lands on either side of the Carentan estuary separated the areas in which 

the two main bodies of U. S. forces were to 

land. Worse still, the exits from the beaches 

of the eastern Cotentin were restricted to 

causeways along a flooded area. The Allied planners decided, therefore, that airborne drops in the Cotentin peninsula 

were essential in order to seize the causeways and prevent the enemy from destroying them, to prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements to Cherbourg, and to 

aid in the link-up with U.S. forces to the 

east. To carry out these plans, General 

Montgomery asked for two airborne divisions, in addition to the airborne division 

already earmarked for action east ofCaen 

in the British sector. 29 

After considering these proposals for a 

time, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, 

the Allied Expeditionary Air Force commander, announced his opposition. With 

the aircraft then allotted, he said, a second 

division could not be dropped until 

twenty-four hours after the initial landing. 

He was especially concerned over losses 

which glider forces would take both because of the unsatisfactory landing fields 

in the area and because of the heavy antiaircraft fire he thought they would face. 30 

Backing for a greater use of airborne 

forces promptly came from both London 

and Washington. Mr. Churchill, "not at 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

all satisfied" at the report that a lift existed 

for only one airborne division, asked General Eisenhower for a statement of the 

maximum number of these divisions he 

wished to launch simultaneously in the DDay attack. The Supreme Commander at 

once requested two airborne divisions in 

the initial attack with a third to follow 

twenty-four hours later. In the face of a 

ca utious report from the chief of the air 

staff that the lack of trained crews made it 

impossible to furnish simultaneous lift for 

two airborne divisions, General Eisenhower reduced his demands. He asked for 

not less than «one airborne division and one 

regimental combat team (brigade) of a second 

airborne division, with sufficient depth to 

enable a second division to be dropped 

complete 24 hours later." 31 

The Prime Minister, concerned because 

the Supreme Commander's request for 

two airborne divisions was not being met, 

pressed the question at a War Cabinet 

meeting on 8 February. Portal warned 

that further increases in the lift would 

lower the quality of the forces. LeighMallory added that, in view of the bottleneck which existed in the training of troop 

carrier crews, he thought it impossible to 

"increase the initial force by one more 

pilot." Disappointed at the list of difficulties and objections, Mr. Churchill asked 

that further studies be made on increasing 

the production of additional airlift. The 

discussion encouraged General Eisenhower 

29 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 8; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 232-34. 

30 3d Mtg, 24 Jan 44, Min of SAC's Confs, SHAEF 

SGS 387/ 11; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 234. 

31 SHAEF file COS (44) 96 (0), 29 Jan 44; COS 

(44) 135 (0), 6 Feb 44; Memo, Smith for Br COS, 7 

Feb 44, sub: Airborne Forces for OVERLORD, SHAEF 

SGS 373/2 Employment of Airborne Forces in Opn 

OVERLORD, 1. Quotation with italics from Smith 

memo. 
SHAEF REVISES PLANS FOR THE ATTACK 119 

to hope that he would get at least his 

minimum demand.32 

While the Allied airmen struggled with 

the problem of increasing the airborne lift 

to one and two-thirds divisions, Generals 

Marshall and Arnold proposed an even 

greater use of airborne troops than that 

asked by General Eisenhower and his 

commanders. Arnold was disturbed because Eisenhower's staff spoke only of 

assigning airborne forces tactical missions 

in the rear of the enemy lines. He felt that 

this would put them down in the midst of 

enemy reserve units. He proposed instead 

the use of airborne forces in mass (four to 

six divisions) some distance beyond the enemy lines where they could strike at 

German reinforcements and supplies.33 

General Marshall shared many of General Arnold's beliefs. During the period 

when he had been thought of for the post 

of Supreme Commander, he had considered ways of properly exploiting air power 

in combination with ground troops and 

had determined to make better use of airborne forces even if, in the event of British 

opposition to his ideas, he had to carry 

them out exclusively with U.S. troops. 

During this period General Arnold had 

directed airborne specialists to prepare 

plans for General Marshall's use. In February 1944 Marshall sent members of his 

staff to London to explain these projects 

to the SHAEF planners. Of three proposals, he preferred one for the establishment of an airhead in Normandy gener-· 

ally south of Evreux which would require 

an initial drop of two airborne divisions 

by D plus 2, and the landing by glider of 

an infantry division by D plus 6.34 He 

believed this scheme, designed to divert 

the enemy from the bridgehead and pose 

an alternati ve strategic thrust, constituted 

a true vertical envelopment and would 

create a strategic threat strong enough to 

make the enemy revise his defense plans' 

considerably.35 

General Eisenhower said that he could 

not accept the Air Force proposal. He desired to commit the initial airborne forces 

in a manner that would permit their regrouping for other tactical purposes and 

would give them ground mobility in their 

early operations. While approving the 

conception of a mass vertical envelopment, 

he believed that it could come only after 

the beachhead had been gained and a 

striking force built up. He insisted that the 

Allies first had to get firmly established on 

the Continent and then seize a good sheltered harbor. Next, he wanted to make 

certain that no significant part of the Allied forces was in a position where it could 

be isolated and defeated in detail. Airborne troops that landed too far from 

other forces would be immobile until they 

could be reached by ground forces. The 

Supreme Commander recalled in this connection that the landings at Anzio had run 

into difficulties when the enemy, seeing 

that the Allied thrust "could not be immediately translated into mobile tactical action," 

had attacked instead ofwithdrawing.s6 

32 SHAEF file COS (44) 40th Mtg (0), 8 Feb 44; 

Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 Feb 44, Eisenhower 

personal file. 

33 Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 520-21. 

34 The other two included: (1) the use of airborne 

troops in three groups to block the movement ofhostile reserves as then located, which he rejected as 

placing too few men at critical points, and (2) the establishment of an airhead near Argentan to seize airfields and restrict hostile movements, which he opposed as failing to constitute a major strategic threat 

to the enemy. 

35 Marshall to Eisenhower, 10 Feb 44, Eisenhower 

personal file; Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 520-21; Mtg 

at Hq 21 A Gp to discuss revised airborne plan for 

Opn NEPTUNE, 18 Feb 44, SHAEF SGS 373/2 Employment of Airborne Forces in Opn OVERLORD, I. 

.3 6 Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Feb 44, Eisenhower 

personal file. 
120 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

General Eisenhower continued with an 

exposition of the factors on which the 

existing airborne plan was based and 

which, he believed, compelled the Allies 

to visualize airborne operations “as an immediate tactical rather than a long-range 

adjunct of landing operations.” Noting 

that General Marshall had complained 

that the only trouble with the plan for the 

strategic use of airborne force “is that we 

have never done anything like this before, 

and frankly, that reaction makes me 

tired,” the Supreme Commander proclaimed that he himself was loath “ever to 

uphold the conservative as opposed to the 

bold.” He promised to study the War Department ideas carefully “because on one 

point of your letter I am in almost fanatical agreement-I believe we can lick the 

Hun only by being ahead of him in ideas 

as well as in material resources.” 37 

Generals Montgomery and Bradley 

agreed with General Eisenhower’s views 

on the airborne proposals. The First Army 

commander argued that nothing should 

be allowed to deflect the Allies from the 

early capture of Cherbourg, and the 21 

Army Group commander proposed that 

any additional airborne resources be used 

to hold the enemy away from Caen. 38 

General Marshall in sending the delegation to SHAEF to explain the plans for the 

use of airborne troops had concluded, 

“Please believe that, as usual, I do not 

want to embarrass you with undue pressure.” General Eisenhower thus felt free to 

disregard the strategic employment of airborne forces for the moment and to press 

for their tactical use in the initial assault. 39 

The problem of getting additional airlift for the attack was linked, like the question of finding more landing craft, to the 

Allied decision on ANVIL. If the invasion 

of southern France was undertaken simultaneously with OVERLORD, it would require all available airlift in the Mediterranean theater. The decision to postpone 

ANVIL helped to ease the situation. The 

planners in April set up a drop of the parachutists of the U.S. 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions in the Cotentin, and all 

but one battalion of the British 6th Airborne Division in the Caen area. 

Provisions for an augmented airborne 

attack met increased pessimism from 

Leigh-Mallory. Because of the great importance attached to dropping three parachute regiments in the Ste. Mére-EgliseCarentan area, he accepted the plan for 

dropping parachutists, but with reluctance. Losses to troop-carrier aircraft and 

gliders, he warned General Montgomery, 

were likely to be so high and the chance of 

success was so slight that glider operations 

could not be justified. The Allied Expeditionary Air Force commander advised 

General Eisenhower that the operation in 

its existing form violated official airborne 

doctrine on several counts and repeated 

many of the mistakes of the Sicilian campaign. In view of General Bradley’s conviction, backed by General Montgomery, 

that the Cotentin landings should not be 

attempted without airborne operations, 

General Eisenhower decided to continue 

plans for both parachute and glider 

attacks. 40 

The airborne plans were further complicated in late May when the enemy was 

37 Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Feb 44, Eisenhower 

personal file. 

38 Mtg at 21 A Gp, 18 Feb 44, SHAEF SGS 373/2 

Employment of Airborne Forces in Opn OVERLORD, I. 

39 Marshall to Eisenhower, 10 Feb 44, Eisenhower 

personal file. 

40 Ltr, Leigh-Mallory to Montgomery, 23 Apr 44; 

Ltr, Leigh-Mallory to Eisenhower, 23 Apr 44. Both 

in SHAEF SGS 373/2 Employment of Airborne 

Forces in Opn OVERLORD, I. Eisenhower Memo dtd 

22 May 44, Diary Office CinC, 23 May 44. 
SHAEF REVISES PLANS FOR THE ATTACK 121 

discovered to be reinforcing the area where 

the 82d Airborne Division planned to 

drop. This intelligence required a change 

in the drop zones, which increased the 

difficulties for the glider units. Air Chief 

Marshal Leigh- Mallory, gravely concerned over this development, warned the 

Supreme Commander that it was probable that “at the most 30 per cent of the 

glider loads will become effective for use 

against the enemy.” He concluded that 

the operation was likely “to yield results 

so far short of what the Army C-in-C expects and requires that if the success of the 

seaborne assault in this area depends on 

the airborne, it will be seriously prejudiced.” 41 

General Eisenhower was aware of the 

dangers faced by the airborne forces and 

agreed with Leigh-Mallory as to the nature of the risks involved. He found it necessary nonetheless to heed the requests of 

his ground force commanders. The airborne operation, he decided, was essential 

to the whole operation and “must go on.” 

“ Consequently,’’ he concluded, “there is 

nothing for it but for you, the Army Commander and the Troop Carrier Commander to work out to the last detail every 

single thing that may diminish these 

hazards.” 42 

The Revised Plan 

The initial OVERLORD plan which 

SHAEF and the other Allied headquarters examined at the beginning of 1944 

underwent many changes in the five 

months that followed. While the highlevel questions of widening the assault 

area and strengthening the attack force 

came directly to the Supreme Commander 

and required his intervention with the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, other Allied 

commanders were working out the exact 

details by which the operation was to be 

made effective. As early as 1 February 

1944, the Allied naval commander, the 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force commander, and the Commander-in-Chief, 21 

Army Group, had issued an Initial Joint 

Plan as the basis of planning by subordinate commanders. Detailed planning for 

ground forces was handed over to Second 

British Army and First U.S. Army, while 

naval and air plans were to be worked out 

by Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary 

Air Force, and Allied naval headquarter. 43 

At every level the emphasis was on 

strengthening the assault. Plans to this end 

included increased air operations to destroy rail and highway communications 

into the beachhead area, heavier naval 

fire support to destroy the beach fortifications that would oppose the invading 

force, and augmented ground and airborne assault and follow-up forces to 

achieve the initial objectives quickly and 

establish a firm beachhead capable of resisting the most desperate enemy counterattacks. In many of these efforts, the 

planners at army, corps, or divisional level 

were able to work out their problems without calling on the Supreme Commander. 

When they did ask for help, they received 

it without stint. Less than a month after 

his arrival in London, General Eisenhower 

had written General Marshall that from 

D Day until D plus 60 the operation 

41 Ltr, Leigh-Mallory to SAC, 29 May 44, SHAEF 

SGS 393/2 Employment of Airborne Forces in Opn 

OVERLORD, I. 

42 Ltr, Eisenhower to Leigh-Mallory, 30 May 44, 

SHAEF SGS 373/2 Employment of Airborne Forces 

in Opn OVERLORD, I. 

43 Neptune Initial Joint Plan by ANCXF, AEAF, 

and 21 A Gp, 1 Feb 44, as revised 2 Mar 44, SHAEF 

files. 
122 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

would absorb everything the Allies could 

possibly pour into it.44 It was a warning he 

let neither the British nor the U.S. Government forget. 

By the end of May 1944, the initial 

COSSAC plan had been changed from an 

attack by three infantry divisions and part 

of an airborne division in the assault, plus 

two in the follow-up in the area between 

the Orne and the base of the Cotentin, to

an attack by five infantry divisions and 

elements of three airborne divisions in the 

assault, plus two follow-up forces-already 

afloat-in an area some fifty miles wide

between the east coast of the Cotentin and 

the Orne. To put these forces ashore, the 

number of landing craft and naval ships 

had been heavily reinforced both from the 

Mediterranean and from the United 

States. To make certain that the enemy 

could not readily reinforce the assault area 

with men and supplies, a strengthened 

tactical and strategic air program was 

being developed to wreck the railway and 

highway communications leading into 

northwest France. 

4 4 Eisenhower to Marshall, W–10786, 8 Feb 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
CHAPTER VII 

SHAEF’s Air Problems, 

January–June 1944 

Before General Eisenhower could put 

into effect the preparatory air plans for the 

OVERLORD attack, he found it necessary to 

deal with a number of problems relating 

to air command, the employment of strategic air forces, and measures to be used 

against enemy long-range rockets and 

pilotless aircraft. COSSAC had tried to 

settle some of these matters earlier, but 

had found, as in the case of landing craft 

and additional divisions for the assault, 

that it was necessary to wait until the Supreme Commander was appointed to get 

action. 

Problems of Command 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in November 1943 had postponed a decision on 

the command of the strategic air forces in 

OVERLORD. The delay had arisen in part 

because the British were unwilling to hand 

over control of their bombers for OVERLORD until a time nearer the assault. They 

feared that measures might be taken 

which would diminish the effect of the 

combined bombing offensive against Germany. They were also anxious that 

nothing be done to affect the program of 

bombing rocket-launching sites or to remove forces of the Coastal Command from 

British control. There appeared to be even 

stronger feeling—shared by U.S. bomber 

commanders—against entrusting the 

bombers to Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, whose war experience had been in 

the Fighter Command.’ 

This last point of opposition stressed a 

problem which had confronted General 

Eisenhower since his arrival in the United 

Kingdom. He personally would have preferred Air Chief Marshal Tedder as chief 

Allied air commander for OVERLORD, and 

he had made such a recommendation before Tedder was chosen Deputy Supreme 

Commander. Eisenhower was influenced 

by the fact that Tedder, as his air deputy 

in the Mediterranean, was aware of the 

problems involved in the air support of 

ground troops. Near the end of December 

the Supreme Commander had noted the 

importance of having a few senior officers 

with such experience. “Otherwise,” he 

warned, “a commander is forever fighting 

with those airmen who, regardless of the 

ground situation, want to send big bombers on missions that have nothing to do 

with the critical effort.” While admitting 

that “a fighter commander of the very 

highest caliber” like Leigh-Mallory would 

be badly needed in the battle, he deplored 

the tendency “to freeze organization so 

that the commander may not use trusted 

Diary Office CinC, 29 Feb, 22 Mar 44. 
124 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

and superior subordinates in their proper 

spheres. . . .” 2 

General Eisenhower initially approached 

the British with “long and patient explaining” to show that he had no great interest 

in controlling the Coastal Command, no 

possible desire to diminish the bombing offensive against Germany, and no intention 

of permitting the big bombers to be misused on targets for which they were not 

suited. Toward the end of February he became more insistent in his requests that 

RAF Bomber Command be placed under 

his control. The Prime Minister, however, 

desired to keep this command independent 

of SHAEF or at least to limit the number 

of bombers under the Supreme Commander. General Eisenhower at length declared that, inasmuch as the U.S. air force 

in the United Kingdom, which was larger 

than that of the British, had been given to 

the Supreme Commander, he could not 

face the U.S. Chiefs of Staff if the British 

withheld their bomber force. During the 

period of discussion General Eisenhower 

declared that if the British were for anything less than an all-out effort for the 

cross-Channel attack he would “simply 

have to go home.” The Prime Minister 

near the end of February agreed to accept 

any agreement that Portal and Eisenhower found satisfactory. 3 

Apparently in an effort to overcome 

what he believed to be the Prime Minister’s reluctance to place strategic air forces 

under Leigh-Mallory, General Eisenhower said on 29 February that he was 

prepared to exert direct supervision of all 

air forces through Tedder. Under this arrangement Air Chief Marshal Tedder 

would be the directing head of all OVERLORD air forces with Leigh-Mallory, 

Spaatz, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur 

T. Harris, Commander, RAF Bomber 

Command, operating on a co-ordinate 

plane. Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory’s 

position would be unchanged so far as assigned forces were concerned, but those 

attached for definite periods or tasks would 

not be placed under his command. 4 

On 9 March Chief of the Air Staff Portal, in consultation with Air Chief Marshal Tedder, produced a draft agreement 

on the use of the strategic air forces which 

General Eisenhower described as “exactly 

what we want.” To still any lingering fears, 

the Supreme Commander formally accepted intervention by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff if they wished to impose additional tasks on the bomber forces, or by 

the British Chiefs of Staff if the requirements for the security of the British Isles 

were not fully met. Tedder was to co-ordinate operations in execution of the 

OVERLORD strategic air plan, and LeighMallory was to co-ordinate the tactical air 

plan under the supervision of Tedder. It 

was understood that, once the assault 

forces had been established on the Continent, the directive for the employment of 

strategic bombing forces was to be revised. 5 

The draft agreement was passed on to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff in midMarch. In presenting it, the British Chiefs 

of Staff declared that when the air pro2 Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Dec 43; Eisenhower 

to Marshall, W–8550, 25 Dec 43. Both in Eisenhower 

personal file. Diary Office CinC, 29 Feb, 3 Mar 44. 

The latter entry contains a memorandum by the Supreme Commander explaining the problems which 

faced him on his arrival in London. 

3 Diary Office CinC, 3, 11, 22 Mar 44.. 

4 Memo, Eisenhower for Tedder, 29 Feb 44, Diary 

Office CinC. 

5 Diary Office CinC, 29 Feb, 3 and 11 Mar 44. Ltr, 

Portal to Eisenhower, 9 Mar 44; Br COS to JSM, 13 

Mar 44; CCS Memo, Control of Strategic Bombing 

for OVERLORD, 27 Mar 44. All in SHAEF SGS 373/1 

Policy re: Control and Employment of USSTAF and 

Bomber Command. 
SHAEF’S AIR PROBLEMS, JANUARY-JUNE 1944 125 

gram developed by the Supreme Commander for the support of the cross-Channel operation had been approved jointly 

by Eisenhower, as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in executing the crossChannel attack, and by the Chief of the 

Air Staff, as executive of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff for the execution of the 

Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany, “the responsibility for supervision 

of air operations out of England of all the 

forces engaged in the program, including 

the United States Strategic Air Force and 

the British Bomber Command, together 

with any other air forces that might be 

made available, should pass to the 

Supreme Commander.” Those strategic 

forces which would not be used in support 

of the cross-Channel attack, the British 

Chiefs of Staff declared, would be committed in accordance with arrangements 

made by Air Chief Marshal Portal and 

General Eisenhower, with supervision of 

the effort being shared by both of them. 

The explanatory statements added that 

the British were unlikely to use the proposed reservation over the control of strategic air forces unless they were needed for 

attacks on rocket launching sites or for a 

similar emergency, in which case they 

would inform the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

immediately. 6 

The U.S. Chiefs at once protested that 

the new proposals did not give General 

Eisenhower “command” of the strategic 

air forces. The British, reminding the 

Americans that the Supreme Commander 

had approved their draft and had even 

written parts of it, explained their desire 

to leave in the control of the strategic air 

commanders those air forces not assigned 

to the cross-Channel attack. Despite General Eisenhower’s original acceptance of 

the British draft, he became disturbed by 

the question raised over the matter of 

“command” and insisted that no doubt be 

left that he had authority and responsibility “for controlling air operations of all 

three of these forces during the critical 

period of OVERLORD.” 7 He had now 

reached the point where he was ready “to 

take drastic action and inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that unless the matter 

is settled at once I will request relief from 

this command.” 8 

The point at issue was settled ultimately 

on 7 April by the Combined Chiefs’ statement that “the USA Strategic Air Force 

and British Bomber Command will operate under the direction of the Supreme 

Commander, in conformity with agreements between him and the Chief of the 

Air Staff as approved by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff.” 9 With this arrangement 

made, the Chief of the Air Staff notified 

the commanders of the British and U.S. 

bomber forces that he and General Eisenhower had approved, with the exception of 

certain targets in enemy-occupied territory, the air plan developed to support the 

cross-Channel attack. The direction of 

RAF Bomber Command and USSTAF 

forces assigned to the Combined Bomber 

Offensive and the cross-Channel attack 

6 Br COS to CCS, CCS 520, 17 Mar 44, SHAEF 

SGS 373/1 Policy re: Control and Employment of 

USSTAF and Bomber Command. 

7 JSM to War Cabinet Office, JSM 1581, 17 Mar 

44; Br COS to JSM, COS(W) 1220, 7 Mar 44. Both 

in SHAEF SGS 373/1 Policy re: Control and Employment of USSTAF and Bomber Command. 

8 Eisenhower Memo, Diary Office CinC, 22 Mar 

44. This memo seems not to have been passed on to 

anyone. 

9 CCS to Eisenhower, W–19763, 7 Apr 44, SHAEF 

SGS 373/1 Policy re: Control and Employment of 

USSTAF and Bomber Command. (This CCS message 

contains a reference to the CCS 520 series, which includes the statement presented to the CCS by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff on 17 March 

44; see above, n. 6.) 
126 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

was to pass to the Supreme Commander 

on 14 April. 10 

Tedder on 15 April defined the over-all 

mission of the strategic air forces as the 

same as that for POINTBLANK: to prepare 

for the cross-Channel attack by destroying 

and dislocating the German military, industrial, and economic system. USSTAF's 

primary job was described as the destruction of the German Air Force, with the 

secondary aim of bombing the enemy 

transportation system, an objective which 

had been accepted only a short time before 

after weeks of discussion. 11 The RAF 

Bomber Command was to continue its 

main mission of disorganizing German industry, with its operations complementing 

the operations of USSTAF as far as possible. Responsibility for dealing with the 

threats of long-range rockets and pilotless aircraft was placed on the commander 

of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, who 

was authorized to ask for strategic bomber 

aid through the Deputy Supreme Commander. 12 

Once control of strategic and tactical 

air forces was settled, Air Chief Marshal 

Leigh-Mallory sought to unify the control 

of tactical air forces for the assault period. 

On 1 May, over the protests of General 

Brereton, the Ninth Air Force commander, Leigh-Mallory set up an Advanced Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, under Air Marshal Sir 

Arthur Coningham, commander of the 2d 

Tactical Air Force, to plan and co-ordinate 

the operations of those British and U.S. 

tactical air forces allotted to him. In late 

May, the Supreme Commander directed 

the 2 1 Army Group commander to deal 

with only one air chief during the assault 

period. Ground force requests for air support were now to go directly to the Commander, Advanced Headquarters, AEAF, 

at Uxbridge, where advanced headquarters of the 2d Tactical Air Force and the 

Ninth Air Force were also located. Information on targets of special importance 

not directly connected with the battle area 

was to be sent by the 21 Army Group to 

the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force. 13 

At the beginning of the cross-Channel 

attack, therefore, General Eisenhower had 

under his control those portions of the 

strategic air forces of RAF Bomber Command and USSTAF allotted him for the 

POINTBLANK andOVERLORD operations. 

His tactical support-under the control of 

the Allied Expeditionary Air Force—consisted of the Ninth U.S. Air Force, the 2d 

Tactical Air Force, and such forces as 

should be allocated from the Air Defence 

of Great Britain. The Allied air forces were 

co-ordinated after 1 May through the Air 

Operations Planning Staff of SHAEF located at Stanmore, main headquarters of 

AEAF. At Stanmore daily conferences 

were held by the Deputy Supreme Commander, the commander of AEAF, and 

the Allied strategic and tactical air force 

commanders. The Allied tactical air force 

10 Ltr, Portal to Spaatz, 13 Apr 44; Air Marshal Sir 

Norman H. Bottomley to Comdr, Bomber Comd, 13 

Apr 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 373/1 Policy re: Control 

and Employment of USSTAF and Bomber Command. 

11 See below, pp. 127–31. 

12 Directive by SHAEF (prepared by Deputy SAC 

and issued by the Supreme Commander) to USSTAF 

and Bomber Command for the support of OVERLORD 

during the preparatory period, 17 Apr 44, SHAEF 

SGS 373/1 Policy re: Control and Employment of 

USSTAF and Bomber Command. 

13 AEAF to 2d Tactical Air Force and Ninth Air 

Force, 9 May 44, sub: Establishment of Advanced 

AEAF, with atchd dir of 1 May 44; SAC Dir to 21 A 

Gp and C-in-C AEAF, Control of air forces during 

the initial phase of NEPTUNE—general principles [date 

uncertain-may be 18, 19, or 20 May 44], SHAEF 

SGS 373/1 Policy re: Control and Employment of 

USSTAF and Bomber Command. 
SHAEF’S AIR PROBLEMS, JANUARY-JUNE 1944 127 

commanders held similar daily meetings 

at Advanced Headquarters, AEAF, Uxbridge, to co-ordinate operations of the 2d 

Tactical and Ninth Air Forces. A Combined Operations Room, consisting of 

representatives of the two tactical air 

forces, and a Combined Control Center, 

including representatives of the fighter 

units and commands in support of operations were also established at Uxbridge. 

The control center “planned, co-ordinated 

and controlled all fighter operations in the 

initial phases of the operations; it was also 

responsible for issuing executive instructions for the fighter bombers.’’ The Combined Reconnaissance Center at Uxbridge 

co-ordinated photographic and visual 

reconnaissance. 14 

Railway Bombing Plan 

SHAEF’s chief contribution to air support for the assault came from its strong 

insistence on the adoption of a railway 

bombing plan. 15 In getting the proposal 

adopted, Eisenhower, Tedder, and LeighMallory were vigorously opposed, on both 

strategic and political grounds, by most of 

the bomber commanders, by members of 

the 21 Army Group staff, and by the 

Prime Minister and most of the War 

Cabinet. 

Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory’s 

staff in January 1944 presented SHAEF 

with a plan for destroying railway marshaling yards and repair facilities in the invasion area. Based on an analysis by Professor S.Zuckerman, scientific adviser to the 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force on railway 

bombing in Italy, the proposal provided 

for a ninety-day attack against thirty-nine 

targets in Germany and thirty-three in 

Belgium and France for the purpose of dislocating railway systems supplying the 

enemy forces in the west. 16 

As soon as it was presented, the railway 

bombing plan was attacked by U.S. and 

British bomber commanders who feared 

that their bombing forces would be diverted from the Combined Bomber Offensive and used on targets which did not give 

a satisfactory return. General Spaatz, 

commander of the U.S. Strategic Air 

Forces, had previously expressed the belief 

that if the Allies could use their full bombing forces against the enemy they might be 

able to conquer Germany without an amphibious invasion. 17 Air Chief Marshal 

Harris feared that if there was any major 

shift of strategic bomber forces to purely 

“army cooperation work” the Allies would 

soon lose the combined bombing offensive’s effect for the past year. The AEAF 

planners, on the other hand, believed that 

the strategic bombing forces had already 

14 Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, 

Despatch to the Supreme Commander, AEF, November 1944, Supplement to The London Gazette, December 

31, 1946, pp. 1–3. 

15 The plan was known by several names: “the 

transportation bombing plan,” “the Zuckerman 

plan,” “the AEAF plan,” “the Tedder plan,” and 

“the railway bombing plan.” 

16 Rpt of Conf at Norfolk House, 13 Jan 44, dtd 14 

Jan 44, USSTAF files. (The author is indebted to Col. 

Charles Warner, USAF, and Dr. Gordon Harrison for 

these and other notes taken from the USSTAF files.) 

For the U.S. Air Force account of the railway bombing plan, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea 

Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II: III, Europe: 

ARGUMENT to V-E Day (Chicago, 1951), pp. 77-79, 

149-62. 

17 Butcher, My Three Tears with Eisenhower, p. 447, 

quotes General Spaatz as saying in 1943 that, after 

the weather cleared in the spring so that bombing 

could be persistent and continuous from both the 

United Kingdom and the Mediterranean, he was confident that Germany would give up in three months. 

As a result he did not think OVERLORD necessary or 

desirable. Apparently Air Chief Marshal Harris 

shared this view although, once it was decided that an 

invasion was to be made, he “did not quarrel with the 

decision to place the bomber force at the disposal of 

the invading armies. . . .” Harris, Bomber Offensive, p. 

192. 
128 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

completed enough of their programs to 

spare planes that would help the ground 

forces insure the success of their assault 

operations. 

There were two specific objections to the 

railway bombing plan: the proposed offensive would have no effect on the OVERLORD 

battle during the first twenty days when it 

was most needed; peoples of the occupied 

countries might react unfavorably to the 

attacks over their territory. The first objection was countered by eliminating 

targets in Germany and by increasing the 

number of objectives in France, including 

fourteen in southern France to be attacked 

from the Mediterranean theater. The Allied Air Bombing Committee, to which the 

plan was submitted for study, on 24 January accepted Leigh-Mallory’s conclusion 

that the proposed plan was the “only 

practicable method of dealing with the 

enemy’s rail communications and that it 

satisfied army requirements.” Because of 

possible War Cabinet opposition to bombing targets in enemy-occupied territory, 

Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory agreed 

that there were political implications 

which the British Chiefs of Staff would 

have to consider. He proposed to start the 

bombing program as soon as their sanction 

could be received. 18 

The Allied Expeditionary Air Force on 

12 February 1944 formally presented its 

plan for destroying enemy rail transportation by striking at the “traffic flow potential” (main repair centers, servicing centers, and signaling systems). Oppostion 

from the United States Strategic Air 

Forces, and the hint of disapproval from 

the British Chief of the Air staff, brought 

Air Chief Marshal Tedder into the picture 

as the leading proponent of the plan. Acting with the full support of the Supreme 

Commander, Tedder made the proposal 

his own, and in late February and early 

March was probably chiefly responsible 

for saving it. 19 

In March and early April, the opposition to the railway bombing plan mounted 

until it seemed to be doomed. Field Marshal Brooke doubted the effectiveness of 

the proposed attack, pointing to experience in Italy which left serious doubt that 

it would be possible to reduce the capacity 

of railroads decisively. Far more telling 

against the plan was the political objection. Air Chief Marshal Portal reminded 

the planners of a War Cabinet ruling of 3 

June 1940 which forbade attacks in occupied countries if any doubt existed as to 

the accuracy of bombing and if any large 

error involved the risk of serious damage 

to a populated area. In the light of an estimate by the Ministry of Home Security 

that the proposed plan would cause 

80,000–160,000 casualties, of which one 

fourth might be deaths, political approval 

of the plan seemed unlikely.” 

Air Chief Tedder brought matters to a 

head on 24 March. He cut through many 

of the objections with the reminder that 

the Allies had to destroy the enemy’s air 

forces before D Day and delay his movements toward the lodgment area. POINTBLANK, already contributing to this end, 

had to be adjusted to “prepare the way for 

the assault and subsequent land cam18 Allied Air Force Bombing Com, Norfolk House 

6th Mtg, 24 Jan 44, USSTAF file. Morgan to Leigh Mallory, 10 Jan 44; Leigh-Mallory to Morgan 31 Jan 

44; Maj Gen P.G. Whitefoord to Morgan, 25 Jan 44 

All in SHAEF SGS 373.24 Military Objectives for 

Aerial Bombardment, I. 

The importance of the work of Tedder is confirmed by entries in Diary Office CinC, Sir Arthur 

Harris’ Bomber Offensive, and statements to the author 

by Sir James M. Robb, Lord Portal, and others. 

Note by Maj Gen Hollis on mtg of Br COS, 19 

Mar 44, COS(44) 273 (0), 19 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS 

373.24 Military Objectives for Aerial Bombardment, I. 
SHAEF’S AIR PROBLEMS, JANUARY-JUNE 1944 129 

paign.” To do the job effectively a target 

system was required against which all 

available forces could be directed, on 

which the maximum number of effective 

hits could be made, and from which the 

widest possible choice of targets would be 

provided. Tedder thus questioned the view 

of the strategic bombing commanders that 

there was no need of OVERLORD if the 

strategic bombing program against industry in Germany could be carried on actively for several more months. Tedder 

next examined General Spaatz’s proposal 

for increased concentration on targets in 

Germany, with particular emphasis on the 

petroleum industry. This “oil plan,” which 

became the chief alternative to the railway 

bombing plan in the discussions that followed, aimed not so much at immediate 

aid to an amphibious landing on the Continent as at an offensive which might in 

itself destroy the German war potential. 

On that issue Air Chief Marshal Tedder 

decided to make his fight. He held that the 

worth of any plan at the moment lay in 

the aid it would bring to OVERLORD before 

D Day. After considering alternate plans, 

he concluded that the scheme to bomb 

railway marshaling yards and repair centers offered a reasonable prospect of disorganizing enemy movement and supply 

and made it easier to block traffic with 

tactical air strikes after D Day. In reaching these conclusions he swept aside U.S. 

proposals, submitted on the basis of information that the tonnage of bombs required 

for the purpose would be prohibitive, for 

attacks that would be confined to railway 

and road bridges. 21 

In presenting these arguments before 

the Bombing Policy Conference on 25 

March, Air Chief Marshal Tedder asked 

for continuance of the highest priority for 

POINTBLANK attacks deep into Germany 

which would weaken the German Air 

Force. After these requirements were fulfilled, however, he wanted the remaining 

air effort used to “delay and disorganize 

enemy ground movement both during and 

after the ‘NEPTUNE’ assault so as to help 

the army get ashore and stay ashore.’’ To 

achieve this objective, he urged second 

priority for the railway bombing plan, although he admitted it would not prevent 

all enemy traffic from reaching the beachhead. These arguments impressed General 

Eisenhower who, as the commander responsible for getting troops firmly established ashore, was interested in short-range 

as well as long-range bombing results. The 

Supreme Commander insisted that, since 

the first five or six weeks of OVERLORD 

were likely to be most critical, it was essential to take every possible step to insure 

that the assault forces landed and held 

their ground. The air forces’ greatest contribution in this period was hindrance of 

enemy movement. In the absence of a more 

productive alternative, Eisenhower asked 

for the adoption of the AEAF plan. He 

agreed to a War Office suggestion that a 

study be made to determine whether 

bombing of a smaller area would be more 

effective, but held that it was “only necessary to show that there would be some 

reduction of German transportation, however small, to justfy adopting this plan, 

provided there was no alternative available.” 22 

General Spaatz now strongly urged the 

attack on the oil resources of the enemy as 

an effective alternative plan. He maintained that the strategic bomber attacks 

21 Memo by Tedder, 24 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS 

373/1 Policy re: Control and Employment of 

USSTAF and Bomber Command. 22 Bombing Policy Conf Mtg, 25 Mar 44, CAS 

Misc/61/Final, U.S. Air Force files. 
130 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

on the railways, in the time and with the 

forces available, would neither affect the 

course of the initial battle nor prevent the 

movement of German reserves from other 

fronts. The oil plan would weaken enemy 

resistance on all fronts, hastening the success of OVERLORD after D Day. Furthermore, it would force the German Air Force 

to fight, thus giving the Allies an opportunity to reduce the remaining air strength 

of the enemy. General Eisenhower now 

intervened to say that it was clear the railway bombing plan “meant very little 

change in the present Bomber Command 

Program,” and that the main question was 

whether the U.S. forces could carry out 

their part in it. In the light of Air Chief 

Marshal Harris’ and General Spaatz’s 

doubts that the Tedder plan could be completed before D Day, the Supreme Commander asked General Spaatz to consider 

information which Air Chief Marshal 

Tedder would supply regarding the contribution of the U.S. bomber forces and to 

report whether the requirements could be 

met. The Deputy Supreme Commander 

was then to prepare a draft directive based 

on the Spaatz study, and the Supreme 

Commander and the British Chief of the 

Air Staff would make their final decisions. 23 

In preparing his report to Air Chief 

Marshal Tedder, General Spaatz revealed 

one of his major worries over the railway 

bombing plan. He was willing to see it 

adopted for France where the bombing 

effort could be shared with Bomber Command and the tactical bomber forces of 

AEAF, but he wished to keep a free hand 

for the use of his surplus forces in Germany. On 31 March he accepted the attack on the German Air Force and on the 

railroads in France as prerequisites to the 

success of OVERLORD, but held that no 

conclusive answer had been given to the 

question of whether attacks on railroads 

or oil in Germany would have more effect 

on OVERLORD. Although he agreed that 

the oil attack might have been a less definite impact in the time allotted, he believed it certain to be more far-reaching 

in the long run. He asked, therefore, that 

the priority for attacks by USSTAF be 

given to: (1) German Air Force and ball 

bearings, (2) rail transportation in occupied countries, and (3) synthetic oil 

plants. 24 

The railway bombing plan next came 

under fire from British quarters. The Joint 

Intelligence Sub-committee, already 

doubtful about the proposal, reported in 

early April that despite bombings which 

had already taken place on enemy railroads there was no sign of any serious 

failure on their part to move vital military 

and economic traffic. Admitting that the 

shortage of railway cars was critical, the 

subcommittee nevertheless held it was not 

so severe as to prevent the system from 

handling the enemy’s minimum rail requirements in France and the Low Countries after D Day. This report led Field 

Marshal Brooke to question whether the 

Allies were justified in taking bombers off 

German Air Force targets and placing 

them on railroads. 25 

A more serious threat to the execution 

of the AEAF plan was the political objection to it which became increasingly pronounced in April and May. The War 

Cabinet on 3 April took “a grave and on 

the whole an adverse view of the proposal . . .” because of possible injuries and 

23 Ibid. 

24 Memo, Spaatz for Eisenhower, 3 1 Mar 44, Diary 

Office CinC. 

25 JIC Report, 3 Apr 44, COS (44) 112th Mtg, 6 

Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 373.24 Military Objectives for 

Aerial Bombardment. I. 
SHAEF’S AIR PROBLEMS, JANUARY-JUNE 1944 131 

deaths to thousands of French civilians. 

Pressed by the War Cabinet to refer the 

matter to the Defence Committee, President Roosevelt, and the Department of 

State, Mr. Churchill expressed his fear 

concerning the wisdom of the plan to General Eisenhower. The latter, aware of the 

serious implications of the railway bombing scheme, reminded the Prime Minister 

that one of the chief factors leading to the 

acceptance of the OVERLORD plan was the 

belief that “our overpowering air force 

would make feasible an operation which 

might otherwise be considered extremely 

hazardous, if not foolhardy.” He asked 

that they proceed with the plan. While 

sympathetic with the views of the French, 

he noted that, since they were “now 

slaves,” no one should have a greater interest than they in the measures leading to 

the success of the invasion.26 

Although targets in France were still 

subject to War Cabinet control, the Supreme Commander and his staff moved 

steadily toward the implementation of the 

plan. The decision on 27 March by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff that the strategic 

air forces would pass to the Supreme Commander in mid-April made the situation 

easier. When Air Chief Marshal Tedder 

objected to further delay in starting attacks on rail centers, General Eisenhower 

decided to use the occasion of his assumption of the strategic bombing forces to announce that the plan had been approved 

with the exception of certain listed targets. 

He made clear that the political effects of 

the plan would be kept under continuous 

review. An advisory committee consisting 

of the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, a 

scientific adviser, and representatives of 

the Air Ministry, USSTAF, Bomber Command, AEAF, Railway Research Service, 

SHAEF G–2, and SHAEF G–3 was appointed to aid the Deputy Supreme Commander supervise the railway bombing 

plan.27 The issue, however, was not yet 

settled. 

Hopes for speedy approval of all proposed targets in occupied countries were 

not realized. Less than two months before 

D Day, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory 

reported that of twenty-seven targets on 

which clearance was requested only fourteen had been approved for attacks, and of 

this number only five had been listed for 

unrestricted bombing. SHAEF announced 

an enlarged list of selected targets on the 

following day but withdrew it on 29 April, 

apparently in the face of War Cabinet opposition. With the exception of the Secretaries of State for War and Air, the entire 

Cabinet held the plan to be of doubtful 

military value and likely political disadvantage. The members suggested instead 

that the United States Air Forces prepare 

a plan for the strategic air forces which 

would not cost more than 100 lives per 

target. Mr. Churchill forwarded this recommendation to the President and the 

Supreme Commander, sending the latter 

in addition a report by Sir Robert Bruce 

Lockhart’s Political Committee that recent Allied air raids in France had been 

“catastrophic” for French morale. General 

Eisenhower and Air Chief Marshal Tedder 

stood firm in the face of these objections, 

the Supreme Commander declaring, “I 

have stuck by my guns because there is no 

other way in which this tremendous air 

force can help us, during the preparatory 

period, to get ashore and stay there.” He 

26 Churchill to Eisenhower, 3 Apr 44; Eisenhower 

to Churchill, 5 Apr 44. Both in Diary Office CinC. 27 Dir, 15 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 373/1 Policy re: 

Control and Employment of USSTAF and Bomber 

Command; Mtg of air comdrs, 15 Apr 44, SHAEF 

SGS 373.24 Military Objectives for Aerial Bombardment, I. 
132 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

pointed out that suggested alternatives for 

bombing troop concentrations and supply 

dumps would probably kill four Frenchmen for every German.28 

To the warnings of Mr. Churchill and 

the War Cabinet were next added the 

request of the French Committee of National Liberation that the French command be consulted on targets, and the 

suggestion that it take control of the bombing. The latter proposal was not taken 

seriously, but General Smith in early May 

arranged for Maj. Gen. Pierre Joseph 

Koenig, head of the French forces in the 

United Kingdom, to consult with Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder on bombings which 

might involve the loss of French lives. General Smith reported that, to his surprise, 

General Koenig took a “much more coldblooded view than we do.’’ The French 

commander had remarked, “This is war 

and it must be expected that people will 

be killed. ... We would take twice the 

anticipated loss to be rid of the Germans.” 29 

General Eisenhower and Air Chief 

Marshal Leigh-Mallory at the end of April, 

pressed once more for a final decision on 

all their targets. With the aid of Air Chief 

Marshal Portal, they were able to get the 

Prime Minister’s reluctant approval for 

the bombings, provided the casualty list in 

occupied countries did not rise above 

10,000. Mr. Churchill was disturbed, however, and continued to watch the operations closely, demanding only a week before D Day why the Deputy Supreme 

Commander had not examined the Political Committee’s report on French reactions to the bombings, and adding, “I am 

afraid you are piling up an awful load of 

hate.” 30 

Opinions of airmen and students of the 

railway bombing plan differ greatly as to 

its effect on German movement. The 

strategic air forces hold that it was the attack on the bridges and not the railway 

bombings which wrecked the German supply plan. Even the German commanders, 

while strong in their belief that the various 

air attacks were ruinous to their counteroffensive plans, disagreed as to which were 

the most successful. As to the general effectiveness of the bombings, both tactical and 

strategic, there can be do doubt. 

By D Day some 76,200 tons of bombs 

had been dropped on rail centers (71,000), 

bridges (4,400), and open lines (800). The 

bridges were down the length of the Seine 

from Rouen to Mantes-Gassicourt before 

D Day, and on 26 May all routes over the 

Seine north of Paris were closed to rail 

traffic and remained closed for the following month. Railway traffic dropped 

sharply between 19 May and 9 June, the 

index (based on 100 for January and February 1944) falling from 69 to 38, and by 

mid-July dropping further to 23. Although 

French collaborationists roused some feeling against the Allies as a result of losses 

from bombings, there is no evidence that 

pro-German sentiment increased sharply 

because of the transportation attacks. The 

fears of USSTAF that it would have to 

bear the burden of transportation attacks 

did not prove correct: Bomber Command 

struck at a greater number of targets and 

28 Ltr, AEAF to SHAEF; 19 Apr 44; Dir, Eisenhower to AEAF, 20 Apr 44; Memo, SGS to CofS, 20 

Apr 44; Dir, Eisenhower to Leigh-Mallory, Spaatz, 

and Harris, 29 Apr 44; Ltr Churchill to Eisenhower 

with incls, 28 Apr 44. All in SHAEF SGS 373.24 Military Objectives for Aerial Bombardment, I. Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 Apr 44, Eisenhower personal 

file. 29 Memo, French Com of National Liberation, 5 

May 44, File of Air Chief Marshal Robb; Interv with 

Sir James Robb, 3 Feb 47; Smith to Marshall, 

S–5 1984, 17 May 44, Eisenhower personal file. 30 Copy of note, Churchill to Tedder, OCMH files. 
AIR ATTACK on the railway yards at Domfront, France (above). Shattered railway bridge 

over the Seine at Port du Gravier (below). 
134 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

dropped a larger tonnage of bombs on the 

occupied areas in the pre-D-Day period 

than did the United States Eighth Air 

Force. General Eisenhower, writing later, 

had no doubt that it had been wise to press 

for the plan. In his postwar report he 

declared: 

The fate of the Continent depended upon 

the ability of our forces to seize a foothold and 

to maintain that foothold against everything 

we expected the enemy to throw against us. 

No single factor contributing to the success of 

our efforts in Normandy could be overlooked 

or disregarded. Military events, I believe, 

justified the decision taken, and the French 

people, far from being alienated, accepted 

the hardships and suffering with a realism 

worthy of a far-sighted nation.31 

CROSSBOW 

Prominent among the enemy weapons 

against which General Eisenhower found 

it necessary to turn the Allied air effort before D Day were the long-range rockets 

and pilotless aircraft known by the Germans as vengeance weapons (Vergeltungswaffen). General Eisenhower, fearful of 

attacks by these weapons on Allied marshaling areas during the critical period of 

concentration of assault forces, urged 

strong bombing attacks on their launching 

sites to prevent enemy forces from disrupting his invasion plans.32 

In the spring of 1943, Allied intelligence discovered a German research station at Peenemuende on the Baltic Sea 

engaged in experiments with guided missiles. General Morgan was informed of 

these activities, but the responsibility for 

dealing with them was apparently given to 

the British Bomber Command. An effective raid on Peenemuende on the night of 

17–18 August 1943 forced the enemy to 

disperse his experimental activities and set 

up underground sites. 33 

Allied apprehension was increased in 

the late fall of 1943 when sixty-nine “ski 

sites” apparently intended as launching 

platforms for pilotless aircraft were photographed within a 150-mile radius of London, chiefly in the Pas-de-Calais and 

Cherbourg area.34 At the rate of construction which had been observed, it appeared 

31 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. 6, has drawn 

heavily on German sources in addition to the other 

information used in other reports. His account gives 

strong backing to the effectiveness of the railway 

bombing plan. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces 

in World War II, Vol. III, Ch. 6, are inclined to the 

strategic air forces view, but they have not made use 

of some of the enemy records used by Harrison. The 

author has used statistical information from the two 

books. Other material on the subject may be found in 

“The Effects of the OVERLORD Air Plan to Disrupt the 

Enemy Rail Connections,” 4 Nov 44, BAU Report I, 

SHAEF SGS BAU 334; Leigh-Mallory Despatch, p. 

44; 12 A Gp Air Effects Com, Effect of Airpower on 

Military Operations, 15 Jul 45; Minutes of the 

THUNDERBOLT Conference held in London summer of 1947 to examine the effectiveness of air operations in Overlord; Report by the Supreme Commander to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of 

the AEF, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 (Washington, 1946), 

p. 16; Army Air Forces Evaluation Board in ETO, 

Summary Report on Effectiveness of Air Attack 

Against Rail Transportation in the Battle of France, 

1 Jun 45, p. 3, Air University, Maxwell Field, Ala. 

Leigh-Mallory Despatch, p. 14, says that in the period 

of the operation of the transportation plan, 9 February-6 June 44, AEAF dropped 10,125, Bomber Command 44,744, and U.S. Eighth Air Force, 11,648 tons. 

From the Mediterranean, the Fifteenth Air Force 

dropped 3,074 tons of bombs on targets in southern 

France. The SHAEF Bombing Analysis Unit, reporting on the period 6 March-6 June 1944, shows that 

AEAF dropped 10,486, Bomber Command 40,921, 

U.S. Eighth Air Force 7,886, and U.S. Fifteenth Air 

Force 3,074 tons of bombs. 32 These weapons and the German operation employing them were referred to initially by the Allies 

as BODYLINE. Later the name was changed to CROSSBOW, a general term that was applied as well to Allied 

countermeasures against the German long-range 

weapons program. The air forces in referring to target 

sites in their attacks spoke of NOBALL targets. 33 For a convenient summary of early developments 

of the V weapons and Allied operations against them, 

see War Office, MI 4/14, The German Long-Range 

Rocket Programme, 1930–45, 30 Oct 45, G–2 Docu- 
SHAEF’S AIR PROBLEMS, JANUARY–JUNE 1944 135 

that the enemy would have twenty of the 

sites completed by early January 1944, 

and the remainder by February with the 

possibility of a full-scale attack by that 

time. Attempting to counter these new 

menaces, the British Chiefs of Staff ordered bombing raids against them as early 

as 5 December 1943. These were not completely successful, as a result of unfavorable weather. 35 

General Morgan was asked in December 1943 to study the probable effect of 

the enemy’s vengeance weapon, which 

might be equal to the force of a 2000-ton 

bombing raid every twenty-four hours, on 

the launching of OVERLORD. He was to examine the steps that could be taken to 

mount the cross-Channel attack from 

British bases outside the range of the pilotless aircraft. The COSSAC staff members, 

after considering the probable effects of 

the V-weapon attacks, concluded that 

they might prejudice, but not preclude, 

the launching of the assault from the south 

coast of England. Although they recommended maximum dispersion before and 

during embarkation, a movement of assault forces outside the range of the enemy 

weapons, they believed, would have serious effects on training and efficiency. General Morgan declared that it was not 

possible to launch OVERLORD in its existing form unless the forces assembled and 

sailed from the south coast. 36 

British air attacks begun on 5 December 

1943 were strengthened after the middle 

ment Library; Harris, Bomber Offensive, pp. 182-85; 

United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), 

Report on the CROSSBOW Campaign: The Air Offensive Against the V Weapons, 24 Sep 45. Also see detailed story of the operation prior to D Day in Craven 

and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 

III, Ch. IV; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 140n. 

34 The sites were so called because “of a big store 

room construction which from the air looked very 

like a ski. . . .” Leigh-Mallory Despatch, p. 53. 

of the month by the Eighth Air Force, 

which was ordered to hit the NOBALL targets when weather conditions were not 

suitable for deep penetration of Germany. 

Attacks on the approximately one hundred ski sites reported between St. Omer 

and Neufchâtel and a small area south of 

Cherbourg were intensified and top priority was given the attack on five active 

larger sites apparently designed for the 

launching of rockets. Reports of successful 

results in January 1944, and a decline in 

German claims of a new weapon of reprisal, led Allied intelligence agencies to 

conclude near the close of the month that 

there was no likelihood of an attack by the 

new weapons for at least four weeks. 37 

The Supreme Commander was asked in 

early February to submit a revised report 

on the possible effect of CROSSBOW on

OVERLORD. Impressed, perhaps, by satisfactory reports of recent Allied raids, 

SHAEF reported in late March that the 

direct effects of enemy V weapons were 

among the “smaller hazards of war to 

which OVERLORD is liable’’ and that the 

probable casualties did not make it necessary to move the assault forces west of 

Southampton. The Allies received additional encouragement in mid- April when 

the air forces reported that of the ninetysix ski sites attacked, sixty-five were in 

damage category A, which was believed 

sufficient to prevent the enemy from 

launching weapons before making extensive repairs. Despite this assurance, the 

35 COS (43) 760 (0), 14 Dec 43, SHAEF files; 

Leigh-Mallory Despatch, p. 53 

36 Ltr, Price to Morgan, 16 Dec 43; Interim rpt by 

COSSAC on effect of CROSSBOW on OVERLORD, 20

Dec 43. Both in SHAEF SGS 381 CROSSBOW. 

37 USSBS, Report on the CROSSBOW Campaign, pp. 

6, 19; Leigh-Mallory Despatch, p. 53; Rpt, Asst Chief 

of Air Staff (Intelligence) to Br COS, War Cabinet, 

28 Jan 44, SHAEF SGS 381 CROSSBOW. 
136 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

British Chiefs of Staffs were apprehensive 

over a reduction in the scale of Allied attacks on these targets in March and April. 

They estimated that repair and construction of launching sites were gaining on the 

damage made by the bomber forces. Availing themselves of a provision in the Supreme Commander’s directive permitting 

them to intervene in matters affecting the 

security of the British Isles, they asked that 

attacks on these sites be given priority over 

all other operations except POINTBLANK 

until the threat was overcome. 38 

Shortly before D Day, the British Chiefs 

of Staff reviewed the V-weapon situation 

and made the following recommendations: 

that the percentage of tactical air force 

efforts (10 percent of the total) then being 

expended against ski sites be continued 

until about D Day unless some unforeseen 

development arose; that a decision be 

made about 1 June concerning the attack 

on supply sites or “modified” sites, of 

which approximately fifty had been located. The Deputy Supreme Commander 

asked that visual attacks be carried out at 

the first favorable opportunity against 

some of the larger sites. 39 

Between August 1943 and 6 June 1944, 

more than 32,000 sorties were flown and 

3 1,000 tons of bombs were dropped in the 

attack on launching sites. In March and 

April 1944, the tactical air forces expended 

22 percent and the Eighth Air Force 13 

percent of their total efforts in operations 

against these targets. However, Air Chief 

Marshal Leigh-Mallory noted that this 

activity had not interfered with his preparatory operations for OVERLORD, and 

the Eighth Air Force reported that on only 

two days between 1 December 1943 and 1 

September 1944 was there any substantial 

diversion from its attacks on German targets. The AEAF commander concluded 

that by D Day eighty-six out of ninetyseven pilotless aircraft sites and two of the 

seven identified rocket sites had been neutralized. At least seventy-four modified 

sites were not revealed by photographic 

reconnaissance until after D Day, and 

these remained as targets for future air and 

ground attacks. The combined efforts of 

the tactical and strategic air forces succeeded in delaying enemy attacks with 

pilotless aircraft until one week after 

D Day and were a strong factor in reducing the effectiveness of the ultimate 

assault . 40 

Effect of the Air Program 

While the Supreme Commander was 

attempting to get full approval of the railway bombing program, the POINTBLANK 

operation continued in full force against its 

primary objectives in Germany. The 

USSTAF oil plan went into effect in April 

and was beginning to yield some results 

before D Day. Experiments in the bombing of bridges in occupied countries 

showed that these operations were much 

less costly than had been predicted, and 

the program was pressed with great success 

by the air forces. This, and the railway 

bombing operations, which at length got 

into full swing, effectively damaged enemy 

communications and interfered with 

38 Memo, SHAEF for Br COS, 23 Mar 44, sub: 

Effects of CROSSBOW on OVERLORD; USSTAF to 

Arnold, U-6 10 15, 16 Apr 44; Ismay to Eisenhower, 18 

Apr 44; Tedder to Spaatz, 19 Apr 44. All in SHAEF 

SGS 38 1 CROSSBOW. USSBS, Report on the CROSSbow Campaign, p. 19. 

39 COS (44) 460 (0), 26 May 44; Ltr, Hollis to COfS 

SHAEF, 30 May 44, SHAEF SGS 381 CROSSBOW. 

40 COS (44) 460 (0), 26 May 44; Note by Air Staff, 

CROSSBOW Effect of Diversion of Air Effort on OVERLORD; Leigh-Mallory Despatch, p. 54; USSBS, Report 

on the CROSSBOW Campaign, pp. 2-3. Cf. Craven and 

Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, III, 104–06. 
SHAEF’S AIR PROBLEMS, JANUARY–JUNE 1944 137 

the Germans’ freedom of movement to 

threatened areas. The bombings of launching sites for pilotless aircraft aided the invasion forces at least negatively by postponing bombardment of the marshaling 

areas by these weapons. The ground forces 

were also helped greatly in their planning 

by the information on enemy movements 

and defenses gathered by photographic 

reconnaissance units. All air activities were 

supplemented immediately before and 

after D Day by the raids of thousands of 

tactical aircraft over the lodgment area. 

These combined efforts reduced almost to 

zero the enemy’s ability to conduct aerial 

reconnaissance over the marshaling area 

or to launch any effective aerial countermeasures against the invasion forces. By 

D Day the Allied air forces had established 

their superiority over the enemy in western 

Europe, and the effects of months of 

pounding German industry and wearing 

away the German Air Force were to be seen 

at last when the invasion was launched. 
CHAPTER VIII 

Relations With the Occupied 

Countries 

General Eisenhower made great efforts 

to strengthen the OVERLORD attack by 

seeking continually to get for his crusade 

the maximum support of the leaders and 

peoples of occupied Europe. In the spring 

of 1944 SHAEF intensified efforts, started 

long before D Day, to organize and direct 

Resistance activities. The Allied governments and SHAEF also attempted to lay 

the basis for smooth relationships after D 

Day by drawing up a series of civil affairs 

agreements with the governments-in-exile 

and by organizing SHAEF missions which 

would deal with these governments once 

they were re-established in their countries. 

General Eisenhower tried in particular to 

get the support of the French leaders-inexile, not only because much of the early 

fighting would be in France, but because 

that country was expected ultimately to 

furnish some ten divisions for the coming 

campaigns. 

Allied Liaison Machinery 

In establishing liaison with the governments-in-exile, SHAEF started with machinery which had been developed in the 

United Kingdom as early as 1939. The 

governments-in-exile of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, 

Poland, Greece, and Yugoslavia had been 

established in London, and of Luxembourg in Canada in the period between 

1939 and 1941. The French National 

Committee, organized by Gen. Charles 

de Gaulle in London in 1940, undertook 

to speak for the French government. Diplomatic relations were carried on with the 

various governments-in-exile by the British through representatives of the Foreign 

Office, and by the United States through 

Ambassador Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, 

Jr., former Ambassador to Poland. The 

British services also maintained special 

military liaison with the governments-inexile, inasmuch as most of them had land, 

sea, or air contingents under British command. By August 1943 Belgian, Dutch, 

Polish, and Czech units had military liaison 

with 21 Army Group, Norwegian units 

with the 52d Division (Br.), and the 

French forces with the War Office. Once 

SHAEF appeared on the scene some 

change was required in the military and 

political liaison system. 

In October 1943, at General Morgan's 

insistence, the British Chiefs of Staff 

agreed to the establishment of liaison missions by the governments-in-exile at 

COSSAC. Relations between such groups 

and Supreme Headquarters were co-or- 
RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 139 

dinated in January 1944 by a European 

Contact Section, SHAEF, under Lt. Gen. 

A. E. Grasett and former Ambassador 

Biddle, now a lieutenant colonel, his chief 

deputy. General Grasett proposed in 

March 1944 that missions from these governments be appointed to SHAEF, to 21 

Army Group, and, where necessary, to 1st 

U.S. Army Group. Members of these missions were to give advice on all matters 

concerning their countries to the commanders to whom they were accredited. 

They were to control their own administrative personnel. 1 

At the time of the invasion, Norway had 

a liaison mission with the Allied Land 

Forces (Norway) commander, General Sir 

Andrew Thorne. The head of this mission 

was assigned to SHAEF. The governments 

of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and the 

Netherlands each had a liaison mission attached to SHAEF or to the army group to 

which they had assigned troops, and 

Poland had liaison groups with SHAEF 

and the U.S. and British army groups. No 

arrangements had been concluded with 

the French. In order to aid the Allied 

forces in France, however, approximately 

150 French officers had been in training in 

London since November 1943 for liaison 

duties with tactical units. Shortly before 

D Day General Eisenhower asked the 

French Committee to supply additional 

officers for this purpose, indicating that 

some 550 would be needed. 2 

Also in process of development were 

SHAEF missions that were to be sent to 

France, Belgium and Luxembourg, the 

Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway after 

their governments had been restored to 

power. Toward the end of April 1944 General Grasett asked the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff to decide on the nationality of the 

heads of the missions, suggesting that the 

nation which occupied a given country 

during its liberation should furnish the 

chief of the mission there. The proposal 

was premature since the Prime Minister 

and the President had not yet come to a 

conclusion regarding the zones which their 

countries were to occupy. General Smith 

proposed as a temporary expedient that 

mission “cadres” be organized under acting chiefs and that the final selection be 

left until an agreement had been reached 

on British and U.S. zones. This agreement 

had not been made before D Day. 3 

Civil Affairs Agreements 

Even before liaison arrangements had 

been concluded, the United States and 

Great Britain were negotiating civil affairs 

agreements with some of the governmentsin-exile. These agreements were intended 

to govern relations between the restored 

governments and the Allied Expeditionary 

Force during the period of military control. Negotiations with Norway, Belgium, 

and the Netherlands were prolonged for a 

number of months because of questions of 

procedure which arose between the 

United States and Britain. On 16 May 

1 Recommendation of Gen Morgan noted in 191st 

Mtg, 18 Aug 43, COS Min (43); Morgan Memo, 24 

Sep 43, COS Min (43) 575 (0); Conf, 2 Mar 44, 

SHAEF G–5, European Allied Contact Sec (General). 

2 Memo, Grasett, 14 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 322.01 

Liaison Agreement with Allied Govts. SHAEF Memo, 

Policy for Future Liaison Arrangements between 

SHAEF and the European Allies, 25 Apr 44; Lt. Col. 

McFie to COSSAC, 25 Nov 43; G–3 to AFHQ, 

S–52398, 23 May 44. All in SHAEF European Allied 

Contact Sec. 

3 Memo, Grasett for CofS SHAEF, 27 Apr 44; Morgan to Smith, 1 May 44; Smith handwritten memo 

for Morgan, undated; Morgan to Grasett, 2 May 44. 

All in SHAEF SGS 322.01 Liaison Agreements with 

Allied Govts. 
140 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

1944, separate agreements were signed 

with Norway by representatives of the 

United States, Great Britain, and the 

USSR, and with Belgium and the Netherlands by the United States and Great 

Britain. The conclusion of an accord with 

France was delayed until after the crossChannel attack, and the agreement with 

Denmark could not be signed until that 

country and its government were liberated. 

Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands 

gave the Supreme Commander control in 

those portions of their countries which 

should be liberated by him until such time 

as he felt the military situation would permit him to turn over administrative responsibility to the national governments. 

Among the salient provisions of the civil 

affairs agreements were those which reestablished national courts, granted the 

Allies exclusive legal jurisdiction over 

members of their forces except in case of 

offenses against local laws, confirmed the 

power of the Allied commander in chief to 

requisition billets and supplies and make 

use of lands, buildings, transportation, and 

other services needed for military purposes, and established claims commissions. 

Questions not covered in these agreements 

were left for further negotiations; some of 

these were not settled until the end of the 

war. 4 

The military missions of Belgium, the 

Netherlands, and Norway were asked on 

25 May 1944 to provide Officers to advise 

the Allied military authorities on administration, intelligence, plans and operations, 

civil affairs, public relations, and psychological warfare in relation to the three 

countries. The way was thus open to simple and direct dealing with three of the 

five countries whose liberation SHAEF 

was shortly to undertake. 

Troubled Relations with the 

French Committee 

Factors Creating Difficulties 

The difficulties that arose between the 

French Committee and the United States 

and Great Britain created one of the “most 

acutely annoying” problems faced by 

General Eisenhower before D Day and 

during the first weeks of the invasion. 5 

They grew out of General de Gaulle’s desire to restore France to the position of a 

great power with himself as the sole 

responsible authority. His proclamation in 

the summer of 1940 that the war was not 

lost and his prompt organization of the 

French National Committee in London 

created a rallying point for those Frenchmen who were willing to resist the Germans and the Vichy regime. Unfortunately, he and his followers alienated a 

number of Frenchmen both inside and 

outside France who felt that their efforts 

at resistance were being overlooked by 

de Gaulle. Among these were former Regular Army officers who, although they 

were in the area controlled by Vichy, were 

engaged in schemes to aid the Allies in the 

liberation of France. Some of the Frenchmen outside France preferred to follow the 

lead of Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud in his 

program of restoring French independence. At times these groups became so intense in their rivalry for control of the 

4 AGWAR to SHAEF, W–32575, 5 May 44, 

SHAEF SGS 014.1 Belgium, Civil Affairs Dir for Belgium, I. ETOUSA to AG WAR, S–5 168 1, 1 1 May 

44; State Dept Rad Bull 118, 16 May 44. Both in 

SHAEF SGS 014.1 Norway,Civil Affairs Dir for Norway. Details of the agreements may also be found in 

the directives of the three governments, which are in 

the above SHAEF SGS Norway and Belgium files and 

in SHAEF SGS 014.1 Netherlands, Civil Affairs Dir 

for Netherlands. 

5 The quoted phrase is General Eisenhower’s. 
RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 141 

French forces outside France that it was 

difficult for the Allies to know what course 

to follow. 

The Allies’ decision to make use of Admiral Jean François Darlan during the 

North African operations offended Frenchmen in both Giraudist and Gaullist circles 

and made them somewhat suspicious of 

Allied intentions. The de Gaulle group 

was further alienated by favor shown to 

the Giraudist group. President Roosevelt 

and Secretary of State Hull, while strongly 

in favor of restoring freedom to France, 

were not convinced that General de Gaulle 

or his followers represented the majority of 

the French people. They felt that any 

recognition of the French Committee of 

National Liberation, which Generals de 

Gaulle and Giraud had sponsored in June 

1943 as a successor of the French National 

Committee, might force an unwanted regime on France. The President feared in 

particular that de Gaulle’s desire was 

aimed more at gaining political control of 

France than at defeating the Germans. De 

Gaulle’s threats of punishment for adherents of Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain left 

many Allied leaders with the impression 

that his program in a liberated France 

might produce civil war. 

The British and U.S. Governments frequently differed in their attitudes toward 

de Gaulle. The British had given their 

backing to the first de Gaulle committee in 

1940. The Prime Minister, while often 

stern with the French general and inclined 

to resent some of his views, tended to seek 

some understanding between the general 

and Mr. Roosevelt. It is probable that but 

for the strong opposition of the President 

to the French Committee the British 

would have recognized it as the provisional government of France before D 

Day-a move which would have simplified SHAEF’s task in dealing with French 

civil affairs. 

The United States in July 1942 had selected representatives to consult with General de Gaulle and the French Committee 

in London on all matters relative to the 

conduct of war which concerned the 

French. 6 Because the President had not 

been attracted to de Gaulle, however, he 

was prepared to deal with other representatives of the French people. Mr. Roosevelt had accepted the French Committee 

of National Liberation with strong reservations. In August 1943 he said that he 

welcomed its formation, but expected it to 

function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the active prosecution of the war and to be 

subject to the military requirements of the 

Allied commanders. The committee was 

recognized as a political body functioning 

within specific limitations during the 

period of the war, but not as a government. 

“Later on,’’ the President said, “the people 

of France, in a free and untrammeled 

manner, will proceed in due course to select their own government and their own 

officials to administer it.” He directed 

General Eisenhower to deal with the 

French military authorities and not with 

the French Committee on matters involving French forces. 7 This instruction had 

the effect not only of reducing the governmental authority of the French CommitAdmiral Stark, commander of U.S. Naval Forces 

in Europe, represented the Navy, and Brig. Gen. 

Charles L. Bolté, chief of staff of Headquarters, 

ETOUSA, represented the Army. Through his chief 

of staff, General Eisenhower was made aware of 

French problems from the time he became the 

ETOUSA commander. Inasmuch as there were several changes in the Army representative, Admiral 

Stark and his staff provided the continuity for U.S. 

relations with French representatives in London. 

Statement by Roosevelt, 26 Aug 43, ABC 334.08 

French Com of National Liberation. 
142 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

tee but of increasing the power of General 

Giraud, commander in chief of the French 

forces. The inevitable result was to increase division among the French factions. 

There continued to appear in London and 

other capitals committees and liaison officers representing the Giraudists, Gaullists, 

and various splinter groups. The task of 

Supreme Headquarters, which needed 

some specific authority with which to deal 

on matters of French Resistance, the command of French troops, and agreements 

for the administration of civil affairs in 

liberated France, was thus made more 

difficult. 

Civil Affairs Agreements With France 

The desire of General de Gaulle to establish the authority of the French Committee of National Liberation was responsible for many difficulties which arose 

between the Allies and the French in 1943 

and 1944. In no case was the clash over 

authority more evident than in the discussions of an arrangement for the administration of civil affairs in the liberated areas 

of France. 

Early in its preparations for civil affairs 

administration, COSSAC stressed the 

need for an agreement with the French 

during the operations in northwest Europe. 

General Barker, deputy chief of COSSAC, 

discussed the matter in August 1943 

with Secretary Hull and Mr. James C. 

Dunn of the State Department. They 

agreed that a formula should be worked 

out for dealing with the French. A draft 

agreement to this end was presented by the 

United States and Great Britain at the 

Moscow Conference in the fall of 1943. 

The Western Allies declared that, subiect 

to the primary purpose of defeating Germany, the landing in France was to have 

the purpose of liberating the French at the 

earliest moment from their oppressors and 

of creating conditions in which a democratically constituted government might 

be able to take responsibility for civil administration. Until the people could make 

a free choice of the government which they 

desired, they were to be given “the largest 

measure of personal and political liberty 

compatible with military security. . . . ” 

The civil administration under the Supreme Commander was to be restored as 

far as possible to the French, and a director 

of civil affairs was to be appointed by the 

Supreme Commander from the French 

contingent or liaison mission connected 

with military operations in France. A 

French Military Mission for Civil Affairs 

was to be invited to Supreme Headquarters and associated in the direction of civil 

affairs once operations started. To make 

certain that the French would have a free 

choice in establishing their government, 

the Supreme Commander was to hold the 

scales even between all French groups 

sympathetic to the Allied cause. The Allies 

stated categorically that the Supreme 

Commander would have no dealings with 

the Vichy regime “except for the purpose 

of liquidating it,” and would keep no person in office who had willfully collaborated 

with the enemy or deliberately acted in a 

hostile manner toward the Allied cause. 8 

This proposal displeased the French 

Committee of National Liberation. Its 

members felt that they had played the 

major part in French Resistance and were 

the persons best prepared to take over the 

8 Barker to Morgan, 23 and 30 Aug 43, Barker personal file; Annex 5 to Moscow Conf Min (U.S. title 

“Civil Affairs for France”; British title, “Basic Scheme 

for Administration of Liberated France”), 1 Nov 43, 

OPD 337. General Hilldring and General Devers 

had discussed phases of this paper in cables of 11 and 

23 October 1943, and General Hilldring circulated 

an undated and unsigned copy of the document in 

question. These papers may be found in SHAEF SGS 

014.1 France, Civil Affairs Dir for France, I. 
RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 143 

reins of government in France once it was 

liberated. At the end of September 1943 

they had placed all political authority of 

the French Committee as the future government of France in the hands of General 

de Gaulle. General de Gaulle, in turn, had 

specifically charged M. André Philip, as 

Commissioner of Interior, with the duty of 

setting up civil administration in liberated 

France. In October M. Philip informed 

Allied leaders in London of the intentions 

of his group. He also explained that, when 

a military liaison mission was appointed to 

SHAEF, it would represent the French 

Committee and not the military commander in chief. General Giraud would 

control French forces engaged in continental operations and any zone of the 

armies which might be established. As 

soon as possible after liberation, however, 

the liberated areas were to pass over to the 

zone of interior and would be administered by M. Philip. The Resistance groups 

then under the Council of Resistance 

would be expected to come under French 

political authority rather than under the 

French commander in chief. M. Philip indicated that one of the main duties of 

French Resistance forces at the time of the 

invasion would be to protect power stations and industrial property. He felt that, 

since the Germans would probably evacuate France soon after the landings, it was 

more important for the French Committee 

to concentrate on administering liberated 

areas rather than on taking measures 

against the enemy. 9 

This stress on political rather than military preparations strengthened Mr. Roosevelt’s suspicion of General de Gaulle and 

the French Committee. On his way to the 

Cairo Conference, the President pointed 

out that de Gaulle would be just behind 

the armies when they penetrated into 

France and that his faction would take 

over as rapidly as the armies advanced. 

These views of French intentions were apparently responsible for President Roosevelt’s insistence in November on changing 

the existing military plan for an emergency invasion (RANKIN), so that the 

United States would have no responsibility 

for occupying France in case of German 

collapse or sudden withdrawal from that 

country. 10 

The British, friendlier to the claims of 

the French Committee of National Liberation than the United States and seemingly 

more realistic about the extent to which 

that group represented the French people, 

proposed in December that the committee 

be placed on a governmental level with 

the United States and Great Britain. The 

State Department was willing to accept 

only an alternative British suggestion that 

the Allies draw up with the French necessary plans for civil affairs in metropolitan 

liberated areas. At the end of April the 

President reiterated his strong opposition 

to dealing with the French Committee on 

any save a military basis. “It is my desire 

at the present time,” he told General 

Marshall, “that the military questions 

which involve the French forces be handled directly between the Allied Commander in Chief and French military 

authorities and not as one sovereign government in full possession of its sovereignty 

and another government which has no de 

facto sovereignty.” 11 

The French Committee had presented a 

9 ‘‘Summary of views expressed by M. André 

Philip in London, Oct 43,” with comments by Gen 

Barker to Ambassador Phillips, 27 Oct 43, Barker 

papers. 

10 Memo by T. T. H. (Handy), 19 NOV 43, sub: 

RANKIN; Memo by Col G. A. Lincoln, 23 Nov 43 

Both in OPD Exec 9, Bks 11, 13. Mtg, President and 

JCS, at sea, 19 Nov 43; JCS 547/2. 

11 Dunn to Phillips, 4 Dec 43, with Incl, British 

proposals, Barker papers; Roosevelt to Marshall, 28 

Apr 44, ABC 090.771 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-A. 
144 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

draft agreement on civil administration to 

the U.S. and British representatives in Algiers on 7 September 1943. When no action had been taken by the Allies by early 

January 1944, the French Commissioner 

of Foreign Affairs, Mr. René Massigli, 

warned that if no agreement was made before D Day the Allies would face the alternatives of dealing with the Vichy government or establishing a regime of direct 

administration. Either of these, he added, 

would cause profound confusion among 

the French people. 12 

The Supreme Commander and his staff 

were thoroughly aware of the dangers involved in allowing this and other questions 

to drag on after the cross-Channel attack. 

They had been told by French sources in 

late December 1943 that the youth of 

France favored de Gaulle because they felt 

that he was “the reincarnation of the spirit 

of resistance to Germany and not because 

of any allegiance to him, of whose shortcomings they are fully aware.” General 

Smith, who disavowed any pro-Gaullist 

sentiments, felt in early January 1944 that 

there was no better vehicle to use in dealing with liberated France than the French 

Committee. He hoped, if no agreement 

could be reached with it, that at least a 

French official would be selected who 

could handle civil affairs in France pending an election in that country. 13 

General Eisenhower, while in Washington in early January, gained the impression that the President and War and State 

Department officials were willing for him 

to deal with the French Committee of National Liberation. On his arrival in London, he urged the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff to take prompt action for the crystallization of civil affairs administration in 

France, and requested that General de 

Gaulle be asked to designate individuals 

with whom SHAEF could enter into immediate negotiations in London. Mr. 

Churchill suggested caution, not only because he doubted that President Roosevelt 

would accept the committee as the dominant French authority, but because of his 

personal objection to “the crude appeal to 

General de Gaulle to designate individuals 

or groups of individuals” for negotiations 

in London. If the French Committee of 

National Liberation was to be taken into 

immediate partnership, the Allies should 

be careful about individuals selected for 

negotiations, and make certain they were 

acceptable to both sides. 14 

The Civil Affairs Division of the War 

Department in late January leaned toward the use of the French Committee of 

National Liberation in civil affairs matters, but in March it directed SHAEF to 

drop any planning based on this suggestion. In mid-March President Roosevelt 

sent a directive representing his views and 

approved by the State and War Departments to Secretary Stimson for transmittal 

to the Supreme Commander. The directive 

resembled in many respects the views on 

civil affairs submitted by the United States 

and Great Britain at the Moscow Conference. The initial proposal to appoint a 

French director for civil affairs was eliminated, and the Supreme Commander was 

empowered to decide “where, when and 

how the civil administration of France” 

should be exercised by French citizens. He 

12 Ltr, Massigli to Wilson, 6 Jan 44, SHAEF SGS 

092 France, French Relations, I. 

13 Rpt from French sources, 20 Dec 43, McClure 

jnl, 20 Dec 43; Smith to Hilldring, W–9500, 7 Jan 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

14 Eisenhower to CCS, B-15, 19 Jan 44, SHAEF 

SGS 014.1 France, Civil Affairs Dir for France, I; JSM 

to Br COS, DON 145, 22 Jan 44, COS (44) 21st Mtg, 

24 Jan 44; Minute by Prime Minister for Br COS, 

COS (44) 73 (0), 25 Jan 44, SHAEF SGS 092 France, 

French Relations, I. 
RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 145 

was permitted to consult with the French 

Committee of National Liberation and at 

his discretion to allow it to select and install officials needed for civil administration, subject to the distinct understanding 

that this action did not constitute recognition of the committee as the government of 

France. The Supreme Commander was to 

require from the French Committee of 

National Liberation, or from any other 

group with which he might negotiate, 

guarantees that (1) it had no intention of 

exercising the powers of government indefinitely, (2) it favored the re-establishment of all French liberties, and (3) it 

would take no action to entrench itself 

pending the selection of a constitutional 

government by free choice of the French 

people. The Vichy government was specifically excluded from the groups with 

which General Eisenhower might deal. 

The Supreme Commander was to be 

guided in all his actions by three paramount aims: (1) the prompt and complete defeat of Germany, (2) the earliest 

possible liberation of France, and (3) “the 

fostering of democratic methods and conditions under which a French government 

may ultimately be established according 

to the free choice of the French people as 

the government under which they wish to 

live.” 15 

In late March 1944, the President authorized Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson, 

who was returning from Washington to 

Algiers, to give General de Gaulle the following message: if General Eisenhower 

decided to deal with the French Committee of National Liberation, it was likely 

that he would continue that relationship 

provided the committee did a good job, 

refrained from extreme measures, kept 

good order, and co-operated with the military authorities. Both this statement and 

the earlier draft directive were unilateral 

actions by the President without specific 

British sanction. Mr. Roosevelt held, however, that the matter had been settled and 

was later nettled by the insistence of General Smith, General Holmes, and other 

SHAEF officials that a positive agreement 

still had to be made between the Allies and 

the French Committee of National Liberation. 16 

The French Committee of National 

Liberation continued to press its claims to 

act as the government of liberated France. 

On 14 March it provided for the appointment of a delegate to exercise all regulatory and administrative powers of the 

French Committee in liberated French 

territory until the committee could handle 

these functions directly. Four days later 

General de Gaulle informed the Consultative Assembly in Algiers of the efforts to 

reach agreements on civil affairs with the 

British and U.S. Governments and added 

that the committee did not have a voice in 

foreign affairs commensurate with its obligations. Apparently weary of Allied delay, 

he declared on 27 March, “France, who 

brought freedom to the world and who has 

been, and still remains, its champion, does 

not need to consult outside opinions to 

reach a decision on how she will reconstitute liberty at home.” A week later, he 

said: “Wherever they may be and whatever may happen, Frenchmen must accept 

15 Ltr. Smith to Ismay, 23 Jan 44, Note, Ismay to 

Br COS, 24 Jan 44; JSM to Br COS, DON 145, 23 

Jan 44; Prime Minister to Br COS, COS (44) 73 (0), 

25 Jan 44; Hilldring to Eisenhower, 233, 5 Mar 44; 

Marshall to Eisenhower, 324, 17 Mar 44 (original 

letter from Roosevelt to Secy War, 15 Mar 44, CofS 

091 France). All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, French 

Relations, I. 

16 Memo of conversation with President by Arnbassador Wilson, 24 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS 092 

France, French Relations, I. Interv with Gen Holmes, 

13 May 47. 
146 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

orders only from this Government from 

the moment they are no longer personally 

subjected to enemy coercion. No authority 

is valid unless it acts in the name of this 

Government.” The general restated this 

view on 21 April when he said in an interview that the establishment of the administration of France could be assured only 

by the French people. “The only point 

open for discussion is that of the collaboration to be assured between the French 

Administration and the inter-Allied military authorities.” 17 

Apparently with an eye to allaying Allied fears as to the future intentions of the 

French Committee, the Consultative Assembly on 30 March adopted an ordinance providing for the election of a Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage 

within one year after the complete liberation of France. After elections were held 

in two thirds of the metropolitan departments, including the Seine, the Provisional 

Consultative Assembly was to become the 

Provisional Representative Assembly, to 

which the French Committee would surrender its power. These proposals were 

accepted by the French Committee on 21 

April 1944. 18 Some of the reassuring effects 

of this action were lost a few days later 

when the French Committee of National 

Liberation in early April gave de Gaulle 

final authority in matters relating to 

French armed forces. General Giraud, 

who felt that he had been reduced to the 

position of a figurehead, announced his 

intention of resigning as head of the French 

forces, although General Devers and Ambassador Duff Cooper tried to dissuade 

him. He refused the committee’s proffer of 

the post of Inspector General of the French 

Armies and announced that he would go 

into retirement. 19 

Still seeking a formal agreement with 

the French, SHAEF was encouraged on 9 

April when Secretary of State Hull declared that it was “of the utmost importance that civil authority in France should 

be exercised by Frenchmen, should be 

swiftly established, and should operate in 

accordance with advanced planning as 

fully as military operations will permit.” 

Although the United States could not recognize the French Committee of National 

Liberation as the government of France, 

Mr. Hull added, the President was disposed “to see the French Committee for 

National Liberation exercise leadership to 

establish law and order under the supervision of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.” 

The Prime Minister, assuming that this 

declaration changed previous U.S. policy, 

promptly approved it. 20 

General Koenig, who had become 

senior French commander in the United 

Kingdom in April, and General Eisen17 Ordinance Concerning the Exercise of Military 

and Civil Powers on the Territory of France as It 

Becomes Liberated, French Com of National Liberation, 14 Mar 44; Translations of speeches by Political 

Info Sec, U.S. Naval Hq, French Series 17, Plans for 

Future Administration of Liberated French Territory, 

9 May 44. French texts approved by General 

de Gaulle may be seen in Charles de Gaulle, Discours 

et Messages, 1940–46 (Paris, 1946). 

Draft Ordinance on Return to Republican Government in France After Liberation, SHAEF SGS 092 

France, French Relations, I. The draft included comments by Mr. Charles Peake, British political officer 

at SHAEF, who feared that the Resistance organizations might be trying to organize a dictatorship in 

France. 

Wilson to CCS, NAF 661, 4 Apr 44; Wilson to 

CCS, NAF 662, 5 Apr 44; Wilson to CCS, NAF 669, 

8 Apr 44. All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, French 

Relations, I. 20 Memo, William Phillips for CofS SHAEF, 4 Apr 

44, sub: Presidential Paper on France; Memo, Gen 

McClure for CofS SHAEF, 5 Apr 44, sub: Draft Dir 

(French); Memo, Gen McClure for CofS SHAEF, 11 

Apr 44, sub: Planning With the French. All in SHAEF 

SGS 092 France, French Relations, I. Churchill to 

Roosevelt, 643, 12 Apr 44, OPD misc file. London 

Times, April 10, 1944. 
RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 147 

hower saw in Hull’s statement a formula 

that could be translated into a workable 

agreement. The Supreme Commander 

asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for 

authority to initiate conversations with 

Koenig on such matters as civilian labor, 

banks and security exchanges, transfer of 

property, custody of enemy property, public safety, public health, civilian supply, 

and displaced persons. He declared that 

he would not go beyond the limitations set 

by the President, as interpreted by Secretary Hull. While waiting for action by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, which he was 

not to get before D Day, the Supreme 

Commander permitted Generals Grasett 

and Morgan to begin informal discussions 

with General Koenig and his staff. At the 

first meeting on 25 April, General Koenig 

asked that questions involving the sovereignty of France be put aside until later.21 

Representatives from SHAEF, 21 Army 

Group, 1st U.S. Army Group, AFHQ, 

the European Contact Section, and the 

French Military Mission then agreed to 

establish special committees to consider 

the numerous civil affairs problems.22 

Unfortunately, the French Committee 

suspended these informal meetings shortly 

after they started. Its action was in protest 

against a British announcement, made for 

security reasons at the insistence of the 

British Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme 

Commander, that from 17 April all foreign 

diplomatic representatives save those from 

the United States and Russia would be 

barred from sending or receiving uncensored communications. 23 The French 

Committee of National Liberation refused 

to submit to this censorship. The resultant 

lack of communications between the 

French Committee in Algiers and its mission in London made virtually impossible 

any formal agreement before D Day. During this period, however, General de 

Gaulle told an American correspondent 

that, although he was concerned over 

French relations with President Roosevelt, 

he believed negotiations between Generals 

Koenig and Eisenhower would “go well 

because of Eisenhower’s friendly disposition toward France.” The French general 

took a conciliatory line in confining his 

requests for lifting the censorship to cables 

concerning operational preparations of interest to the French. Reassured by this attitude, President Roosevelt agreed to leave 

the matter to Mr. Churchill’s discretion. 

Arrangements were made whereby British 

and U.S. authorities examined French 

cables before they were dispatched from 

London and then permitted them to be 

sent in French code on General Koenig’s 

assurance that no change would be made 

in the original text.24 

Even before an agreement was worked 

out which might permit the reopening of 

discussions between SHAEF and the 

French representatives, Mr. Hull and the 

President had made clear that the Hull 

formula of 9 April could not be interpreted 

as a basic change in Mr. Roosevelt’s view 

toward de Gaulle and the French Committee. Mr. Hull defined his position on 11 

21 The original minutes translated his proposal as 

an agreement that the question of French sovereignty 

would be dealt with later on. The minutes were corrected at General Koenig’s request. 22 Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 15, 20 Apr 44; 

SHAEF SGS to AFHQ S–50937, 29 Apr 44; Min of 

Mtg at Norfolk House, 25 Apr 44, dtd 26 Apr 44, and 

correction of min, 9 May 44. All in SHAEF SGS 092 

France, French Relations, I. 23 Brooke to Eisenhower, 17 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 

311.7/1 Stoppage of Diplomatic Communications. 2 4 De Gaulle interv with unnamed American reporter, cited in State Dept cbl to Eisenhower, 20 May 

44, Diary Office CinC, 20 and 22 May 44. Koenig to 

Grasett, 16 May 44; Roosevelt to Churchill, 542, 

20 May 44; Churchill note to Foreign Secy, 23 May 

44. All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I. 
148 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

GENERAL DE GAULLE 

May with a statement to the British Ambassador in Washington that there seemed 

to be a tendency of the British Government 

to use his speech of 9 April “exclusively as 

their formula for dealing with French 

civil affairs even though the President 

had declined to modify the suggested directive to General Eisenhower which was 

stronger than my speech in some respects. 

The danger of such a tendency and of employing words as a substitute formula was 

pointed out by me from the point of view 

of working relations between the Prime 

Minister and the President.’’ Two days 

later the President reiterated to General 

Eisenhower his views on dealing with de 

Gaulle. Agreeing that the Supreme Commander had full authority to discuss matters with the French Committee on a military level, the President emphasized his 

personal opposition to any action at a 

political level, since he was unable to recognize any government of France until the 

French people had an opportunity to make 

a free choice. Alluding again to his familiar 

figure of speech that the French were still 

shell-shocked from their war experience, 

the President insisted, “We have no right 

to color their views or to give any group 

the sole right to impose one side of a case 

on them.” 25 

The President’s message of mid-May 

had been prompted by General Eisenhower’s request that he be allowed to inform General Koenig of the date and place 

of the OVERLORD attack and that General 

de Gaulle be brought to London for a DDay broadcast to the French people in 

behalf of the Allies. The British Chiefs of 

Staff had objected to the first proposal as a 

violation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

instructions of 1 April forbidding the release of information to the French which 

might compromise the OVERLORD operation. General Eisenhower, describing his 

position as embarrassing and “potentially 

dangerous,” suggested that the difficulty 

be met by inviting General de Gaulle to 

London where he could be briefed on 

OVERLORD. President Roosevelt agreed 

that General de Gaulle could be briefed 

provided he did not return to Algiers until 

after the invasion had been launched. Mr. 

Roosevelt had then added his warning 

against discussions with the French chief 

on a political level. 26 

25 Hull to U.S. Ambassador, London, 11 May 44, 

SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I. Roosevelt to Eisenhower, W–36054, 13 May 44; Marshall 

to Eisenhower, W–36189, 13 May 44. Both in Eisenhower personal file. 

26 Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 24, 11 May 44; Roosevelt to Eisenhower, W–36054, 13 May 44; Marshall 

to Eisenhower, W–36189: 13 May 44; Smith to Marshall, 14 May 44. All in Eisenhower personal file. 
RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 149 

The proposal to bring General de 

Gaulle to London for a briefing on OVERLORD continued to hang fire until near the 

end of May. After the President’s statement that the French general could be 

briefed only if he agreed to come to London and stayed until after the invasion, the 

Prime Minister indicated that to invite 

de Gaulle under conditions he would 

probably regard as insulting would be unwise. Late in May, SHAEF stressed the 

importance of having the French general 

appeal to the French to support Allied 

Forces under the Supreme Commander, 

and Mr. Churchill agreed that de Gaulle 

should be invited to London. 27 

On his arrival in the United Kingdom 

on 4 June, General de Gaulle was shown 

a message the SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division had prepared for him to deliver on D Day. He agreed to speak along 

the lines SHAEF outlined but refused to 

use the prepared speech, on the grounds 

that it stressed too strongly French obedience to the Allied Command and made no 

mention of the Algiers committee. This reaction was responsible for a comic opera 

prelude to the invasion which saw General Smith, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, 

General McClure, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Mr. Churchill arguing 

the question with the recalcitrant general. 

A series of cables to Washington charted 

the progress of the discussion with bulletins 

to the effect that “General de Gaulle will 

speak,” “General de Gaulle will not 

speak,” and “the General has changed his 

mind.” The Allied leaders sought to convince de Gaulle that his standing in 

France would be damaged if it became 

known that he was in London and had refused to add his voice to those of the heads 

of the governments-in-exile who were also 

scheduled to speak to their peoples on the 

GENERAL KOENIG 

day of the attack. General de Gaulle’s request that the Supreme Commander 

change his D-Day appeal to mention the 

French Committee could not be satisfied, 

since the text had been approved in London and Washington, and recordings had 

been made for broadcasting. The Allies 

finally agreed that General de Gaulle 

could make such an allusion in his speech. 

Despite this concession it was not until the 

early morning of 6 June that the French 

general at last agreed to speak. The final 

text represented a victory by General de 

Gaulle in that it stated that the first condition for the French was to follow the in27 Roosevelt to Churchill, 542, 20 May 44; Churchill to Foreign Secy, 23 May 44; Churchill to Foreign 

Secy, 26 May 44. All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, 

French Relations, I. London Times, May 27, 1944. 
150 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

structions of their government and their 

chiefs in the battle that lay ahead and 

made no special effort to emphasize the 

authority of the Allied Command. 28 

Fortunately for the success of the civil 

affairs program in France, SHAEF and 

the subordinate commands had proceeded 

to establish working arrangements with 

French representatives at nonpolitical 

levels. A number of the officials General 

de Gaulle planned to use in Normandy as 

soon as the area was liberated were in the 

United Kingdom, and many of them were 

in contact with British and U.S. civil affairs representatives. The French liaison 

officers that were in training in the United 

Kingdom for their future assignments with 

the British and U.S. civil affairs detachments were concerned at the moment less 

with the question of political sovereignty 

than with their task of getting the civilian 

organization of the liberated areas back 

into operation as soon as possible after the 

Allies were ashore. Thus the lack of close 

relationship between the French Committee and the British and U.S. Governments 

was less serious than it might at first appear. It was perhaps especially helpful that 

21 Army Group, which could be expected 

to reflect the British Government’s willingness to make some concessions to the 

French Committee, was charged with responsibility for civil affairs activities during 

the first phase of operations in France. 

The Command and Use of French Troops 

Among the subjects which the French 

and the Allies did not settle during the 

pre-D-Day period was the command of 

French troops. Fortunately for the Supreme Commander, agreements made in 

early 1943 laid the basis for raising and 

arming French units to support Allied operations. President Roosevelt had agreed, 

in principle, at the Casablanca Conference 

to arm eight infantry and three armored 

divisions for the French. The eleven divisions, to be employed under the Allied 

commander in chief against the common 

enemy, were to be equipped by the United 

States and organized according to U.S. 

Tables of Organization and Equipment. 

The existing Gaullist forces, roughly 

15,000 strong, had been equipped and 

supplied by the British since 1940. The 

British continued to maintain them until 

all French forces were fused in 1943. The 

total number of divisions to be equipped 

by the United States was reduced to five 

infantry and three armored divisions on 

the recommendation of General Eisenhower, who felt that the French could not 

provide sufficient supply units for eleven 

divisions organized aceording to US. 

models. As the divisions were equipped 

they were committed in the Mediterranean, five of them being employed before the summer of 1944. All plans for the 

invasion of southern France in 1944 relied 

heavily on the use of French forces, and, as 

a result, the Allies laid little emphasis on 

committing anything more than a token 

French force in the cross-Channel attack. 29 

Difficulties arose between the Allies and 

the French Committee of National Liberation in the winter of 1943, when the committee refused to send the 9th Colonial 

Infantry Division to Italy, despite orders 

of General Giraud, commander of French 

28 Intervs with Gen de Gaulle, 14 Jan 47, Sir 

Robert Bruce Lockhart, 18 Feb 47, Gen McClure, 29 

Mar 47, and Gen Smith, 12 May 47; Gen McClure’s 

jnl for May 44; de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, pp. 

442–44 (text of speech). 

29 This introductory section has been based largely 

on Dr. Marcel Vigneras’ monograph on Rearmament 

of the French Forces in World-War II, now in preparation in the Office of the Chief of Military History. 
RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 151 

Forces. This refusal, resulting from friction between the committee and General 

Giraud and not between the committee 

and the Allied commander in chief, still 

threatened to interfere with Allied operations. General Eisenhower warned General Giraud at this point that the United 

States would not continue to arm French 

units unless the committee gave assurances 

that its actions would be governed in the 

future by military rather than political 

considerations. 30 

A conference on the use of French 

troops was held in Algiers at the end of 

December by British and U.S. diplomatic 

and military representatives and French 

officers in General de Gaulle’s office. The 

way to a firm agreement was paved by 

General Smith’s assurance that French 

units would play a key role in the landings 

in southern France and that a token 

French force, preferably a division, would 

be used in northern France, particularly 

in the area near Paris. On 30 December 

M. Massigli informed U.S. Ambassador 

Wilson and British representative Harold 

MacMillan that General Smith’s statements had satisfied the chief “anxieties” 

of the French Committee, and that it had 

now decided “to put the French Forces 

mentioned above at the disposition of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, to be used by 

the Allied commander in chief, in consultation with the French Command, for the 

execution of the operations of which the 

broad outlines have been given.” He urged 

the Allied representatives to forward to 

their governments for speedy approval the 

draft directive for over-all command of 

French forces which he had presented 

three days earlier. 31 

The U.S. and British diplomatic representatives accepted M. Massigli’s statement as settling the question of command 

of French forces to be used from the Mediterranean. They found it more difficult to 

agree to the French Committee’s reservation of the right to intervene with the 

British and U.S. Governments and the Allied commander in chief in order to insure 

that the allotment of French forces should 

take French interests “into account as 

completely as possible.” The Combined 

Chiefs of Staff refused to consider relations 

on a governmental level between the 

French Committee of National Liberation 

and the United States and Great Britain.32 

Members of the British Government 

were inclined to give some backing to the 

French Committee’s claim. President 

Roosevelt, who considered the tone of the 

French replies dictatorial, in late April instructed General Marshall to see that 

questions involving French forces were 

handled between the Allied commanders 

in chief and the French military authorities. In mid-May, the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff ordered General Wilson to present 

the draft, as amended by the Allies, to the 

French Committee of National Liberation 

for signature. 33 

The French, already offended by the suspension of the right to use their diplomatic 

cipher in sending messages from the 

30 Eisenhower to Giraud, 14 Dec 43, text sent to 

CCS on following day, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Rearmament and Employment of French Forces, Policies 

and Agreements, I. 

31 Algiers to War Dept, NAF 578, 4 Jan 44, cites 

Massigli to Wilson message, 30 Dec 43, ABC 091.711 

France (6 Oct 43), Sec I-A. 

32 Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 578, 4 Jan 44; Wilson 

to CCS, NAF 625, 22 Feb 44; CCS to Wilson, FAN 

343, 12 Mar 44. All in SHAEF SGS 475 France, Rearmament, Command and Employment of French 

Forces, Policies and Agreements, I. 

33 JCS 804/2, 22 Apr 44; copy of French message, 

3 Apr 44; Roosevelt to Prime Minister (paraphrase), 

8 Apr 44; JCS 804/4, 29 Apr 44, with Incl, Note, 

Roosevelt to Marshall, 28 Apr 44; CCS to Wilson, 

FAN 343 (12 Mar 44), 18 May 44. All in ABC 

091.711 France (6 Oct 43). Sec I-A. 
152 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

United Kingdom, were in no mood to 

yield on the directive. As a result no agreement for over-all command of French 

forces was concluded before the invasion of 

northwest Europe. Inasmuch as no French 

forces were to be committed in the assault, 

the lack of a formal agreement was not of 

immediate importance. Further, General 

Eisenhower had declared in North Africa 

that unless his orders were obeyed, the 

supply of French units would cease.34 

French Resistance 

In his efforts to guarantee the success of 

the D-Day landings, General Eisenhower 

drew on the support of the Resistance organizations. which had been developed in 

France since 1940. Organized spontaneously inside France these groups gave their 

allegiance to various leaders. By D Day 

they were divided into five movements: 

L’Armée Secrète, which consisted of four 

groups in the northern and three in the 

southern zone; the Maquis, made up of 

young men who had fled to the mountains 

of the Haute-Savoie to avoid German 

forced labor drafts; the Francs Tireurs et 

Partisans, a Communist-controlled paramilitary section of the Communist Front 

National, which had affiliated with L’Armée 

Secrète; and Groupe de l’Armée, which was 

Giraudist in sympathy and made up 

largely of members of the demobilized 

Vichy army. L’Armée Secrète was the largest 

of the movements. It was governed by the 

Conseil National de la Résistance in Paris, under the guidance of the Bureau Central 

de Renseignements et d’Action (Militaire) 

(BCRA), which had branches in London 

and Algiers. The Bureau acted on orders 

from the French Committee in Algiers.35 

The whole Resistance movement was 

initially encouraged and co-ordinated by 

the Special Operations Executive (SOE) 

set up by the British early in the war to 

encourage patriot movements in occupied 

countries throughout the world. The organization, headed by Maj. Gen. Colin 

Gubbins, was a responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. The British 

Government furnished men, transport, 

and material for Resistance groups, and 

the Special Operations Executive, the 

War Office, and the Admiralty controlled 

special operations relating to the Resistance forces.36 They dealt with L’Armée 

Secrète through a Gaullist-controlled bureau in London. The other units acted 

either directly or through missions or committees appointed by the Giraudists and 

other special groups. 

The Special Operations Executive had 

initiated small-scale operations in France 

in the spring of 1941, but its plans for extensive use of Resistance forces in 1942 

34 Note, Gen Eisenhower, 11 Jun 51, OCMH files. 35 Mtg at Norfolk House, 9 Mar 44, dtd 28 Mar 44;

Jt Int Sub-Com Rpt on French Resistance, 19 Apr 

44. Both in SHAEF SGS 370.64 France, French Resistance (Guerilla Warfare), I. The various branches 

of the Bureau were abbreviated as BCRA, BCRAL, 

BCRAA. Apparently the London group at one time 

was also abbreviated BRAL. Since the London 

branch was the more important as far as SHAEF 

was concerned, it is that branch to which this volume 

will refer and the abbreviation BCRAL will be used 

hereafter. 36 For a discussion of SOE and its work, see Maj. 

Gen. Sir Colin Gubbins, “Resistance Movements in 

the War,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,

XCIII (May, 1948), 210–23. For a detailed study of 

the Resistance movement see The French Forces of 

the Interior, prep in French Resistance Unit, Hist 

Sec, ETOUSA, 1944, MS, OCMH files. The author 

is also indebted for comments on these and other matters dealing with the French to a special memorandum by Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, who read 

the initial draft section on French Resistance. Captain Kittredge, who as a member of Admiral Stark’s 

staff in London served as interpreter in many interviews with the French leaders, emphasized the important role played by those Resistance units which 

were not controlled by the French Committee. 
RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 153 

had been postponed when the projected 

invasion was shifted from northern France 

to the Mediterranean. Early in 1943, planning for the use of French Resistance forces 

was again emphasized. In the summer of 

that year, the United States established a 

Special Operations Branch of the Office of 

Strategic Services in London to aid in 

Resistance planning.37 

COSSAC, seeing no immediate need for 

Resistance plans in the spring and summer 

of 1943, gave little supervision to the activities of the British and U.S. special operations sections before the fall of that year 

although these groups maintained liaison 

with COSSAC. After the outline plans 

for OVERLORD and RANKIN had been 

completed, General Morgan extended 

COSSAC’s control over the work of the 

special operations sections. In October 

1943 the British Chiefs of Staff placed under the Supreme Commander (designate) 

the Special Operations Executive activities 

in his sphere of operations, and in November the U.S. Chiefs of Staff gave him similar authority over the Special Operations 

Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. 

In the following March, the two organizations, headed by Brigadier E. F. MocklerFerryman (SOE), and Col. Joseph F. 

Haskell (SO), took the title of Special 

Force Headquarters (SFHQ).38 

Steps were also taken in the spring of 

1944 to co-ordinate Allied Resistance operations with the French Committee of 

National Liberation and French Regular 

Army forces. Gen. François d’Astier de la 

Vigerie, who had been representing the 

French Committee in the United Kingdom since 1943, was directed to (1) participate in the planning of Resistance operations, (2) maintain liaison with the 

French Military Mission in London and 

with the Supreme Commander, (3) supervise special operations carried out in 

France from bases in Great Britain, (4) act 

as representative of the French Committee 

of National Liberation to the Supreme 

Commander in all matters concerning 

military administration in the northern 

theater of operations, and (5) act as military representative of the French Committee of National Liberation in London.39 

General Koenig replaced General 

d’Astier de la Vigerie in March 1944. 

Near the end of April, Koenig announced 

the organization of the Supreme Command of French Forces in Great Britain 

and the European Theater of Operations. 

He created a general staff of the French 

Forces of the Interior and of Administrative Liaison (FILA). The staff included 

two executive branches, one, BCRAL, for 

Resistance work, and the other, Mission 

Militaire Liaison Administrative (MMLA), 

for liberated territories. 

Meanwhile, the Supreme Commander 

on 23 March 1944 had assumed control 

over all special operations in his sphere of 

activity. A special section of SHAEF G–3 

was directed to take responsibility for these 

operations. SHAEF’s control included 

general direction and planning, instructions as to target priorities, reduction or 

increase of activities to conform to the Supreme Commander’s plans, and directions 

37 First draft of operational dir in SOE/SO, Jan 

44, SHAEF G–3 Ops C 322–7, gives background information. 38 The period of 1942–44 is covered by Organization and Terms of Reference, SHAEF G–3 Ops C 

322–7 (lst, 2d, and 3d covers). See, in particular, 

SOE/OSS Outline Plan for Supporting Operation 

OVERLORD, 30 Aug 43; Gen Morgan, Proposal for 

Control by COSSAC of SOE/SO Activities in Northwest Europe, 2 Oct 43; COS (43) 237th mtg, 15 Oct 

43; Hq ETOUSA SC file 370.2/Gen, 11 Nov 43. 39 Extract of memorandum signed by General 

Giraud, laying down the duties of the senior French 

general officer in Great Britain, 24 January 1944, 

SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I. 
154 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

as to the effort to be expended on various 

activities. SHAEF’s sphere of operations 

included Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, 

northwest and southern Germany, and 

possibly Austria. An area in southern 

France was suballotted to the Mediterranean commander for operations in support of the invasion of southern France.40 

SHAEF-controlled operations were to be 

carried on mostly in France, both because 

they could be more effective there and because the Allies preferred passive rather 

than active resistance in the occupied 

countries outside France during the invasion period.41 

SHAEF required the special operations 

agencies to co-ordinate their activities with 

21 and 12th Army Groups and their associated air and naval commanders. The 

activities included sabotage, measures to 

undermine the enemy’s morale, and interference with enemy military preparations. 

Special stress was to be placed on measures 

designed to aid the assault and on plans to 

be put into effect in case of a German withdrawal. SHAEF settled a jurisdictional 

dispute between the special operations and 

the psychological warfare agencies with its 

decision that the special operations groups 

could continue to distribute propaganda if 

such work did not affect adversely their 

other activities. Both the special operations 

and psychological warfare agencies were 

instructed to conform to basic plans prepared in accordance with SHAEF directives. 42 

In late May, SHAEF found it necessary 

to issue still another directive on the co-ordination of Resistance activities when a 

controversy developed between Special 

Force Headquarters and the commander 

of the Special Air Service. The latter 

group had been established under the control of Lt. Gen. F. A. M. Browning, commander of Airborne Troops, 21 Army 

Group, to furnish trained troops to stiffen 

Resistance organizations in France. General Browning, opposed to control of these 

forces by Special Force Headquarters, 

proposed in mid-May 1944 that a new 

headquarters be formed under SHAEF to 

co-ordinate the actions of Special Operations Executive, Office of Strategic Services, Political Warfare Executive, and the 

Special Air Service. General Eisenhower 

refused, saying that Resistance was a 

strategic weapon which would be controlled by SHAEF through Special Force 

Headquarters.43 

SHAEF, having accepted Resistance 

activities as a means of aiding the crossChannel attack, set about early in 1944 

finding the means of supplying the Resistance forces with arms and sabotage 

material. Such a program had been outlined back in 1941 and the British special 

operations groups had already worked out 

the pattern for getting such aid to France. 

Initial operations had consisted of little 

more than the parachuting of small arms 

and ammunition to isolated French 

groups, but they gradually became more 

ambitious. In the fall of 1943, the Allies 

began to develop special units of Allied 

40 On 20 May 1944 control of Resistance groups in 

southern France reverted to SHAEF by mutual agreement of the two commanders. SHAEF then issued 

general directives to the Mediterranean commander 

for action by him in support of the Normandy invasion and the proposed assault in southern France. 41 Appendix to rpt of 29 Apr 44, Resistance in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway, SHAEF 

SGS 370.64 France, French Resistance Groups 

(Guerilla Warfare), I. 4 2 SHAEF dir to SOE/SO, 23 Mar 44, SHAEF G-3 

Ops C 322-7. 43 Ltr. Browning to Bull. 15 May 44: Lt Col J. H. 

Alms to Bull, 19 May 44; Bull to Browning, 22-May 

44; SAC to 21 A Gp, Dir on jt opns by Resistance 

forces and SAS troops, 24 May 44. All in SHAEF G-3 

Ops C 322-7. 
RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 155 

officers and men to drop behind the 

enemy lines to aid in Resistance work. 

One type, called the “Jedburgh team,” 

consisted of three commissioned or noncommissioned officers, one of whom was 

usually French. One member of each team 

was a radio operator and each team had 

its own means of communications. Another type, called an “operational group” 

and made up of four officers and thirty enlisted men, was set up to attack military 

targets and public works and to aid Resistance elements. Five of these groups from 

England and six from North Africa were 

ultimately sent. Still a third type, Special 

Air Service, consisted of two British regiments, two French parachute battalions, 

and a Belgian Independent Company, 

some 2,000 men in all. Troops of this service were trained either to operate unassisted by Resistance forces, to augment 

Resistance forces, to provide headquarters 

elements and junior leadership for a command organization in Resistance localities, 

or to provide trained specialists for Resistance forces. 

In early February 1944, SHAEF became concerned over the lack of adequate 

airlift for the Resistance program. U.S. 

officers at SHAEF and in the Special Operations Branch of the Office of Strategic 

Services were worried in particular by the 

great difference in the number of British 

and U.S. planes assigned to supporting 

Resistance operations. The disparity between the eighty-five British and fourteen 

U.S. aircraft used for this purpose in February 1944 was increased toward the end 

of the month when the British assigned 

additional aircraft to the special operations units. Colonel Haskell, head of the 

Special Operations Branch, reported that, 

in terms of supplies and aircraft, aid to 

French Resistance was preponderantly 

British and would “quite rightly be recognized by the French as such.” He contrasted delays and difficulties in getting 

the promised U.S. planes with British 

action in making available their supplementary number of thirty-two Stirlings 

one week after they had been allocated.44 

U.S. tardiness in furnishing aircraft, 

which Colonel Haskell, Ambassador William Phillips, and others feared would be 

interpreted by the French as due to American indifference, stemmed from the difficulty of fulfilling all of the U.S. strategic 

bombing commitments. In mid-January, 

it had been found that a priority system 

and a careful scheduling of operations 

were required if the heavy demands of the 

Special Intelligence Services, Special Operations, Psychological Warfare, and the 

proposed railway bombing program were 

to be filled. A special committee under 

Lord Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare, undertook to regularize the use of aircraft for these various activities.45

Both General Spaatz and Air Chief 

Marshal Leigh-Mallory reminded SHAEF 

in mid-March that the POINTBLANK commitments left no additional aircraft for 

Resistance activities. Air Chief Marshal 

Tedder expressed strong doubts concerning 

“the merits of the SOE/SO request and 

the efficacy of the organization.” 46 Un44 Ltr, Haskell to Hq OSS, Washington, 22 Feb 44, 

SHAEF G-3 SOE/SO Ops C 322-7 Organization 

and Terms of Reference, 2d cover. 45 For view of Ambassador Phillips, see note of 17 

Feb 44 in Memo, Bull for CofS, 18 Feb 44, SHAEF 

G-3 Ops C 322-7 SOE/SO Organization and Terms 

of Reference, 2d cover. Memo by Bull on mtg of 13 

Jan 44; Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 Mar 44; Eisenhower to Marshall, B-270, 14 Mar 44. All in SHAEF 

SGS 370.64 France, French Resistance Groups 

(Guerilla Warfare), I. 46 Bull to Chief, Plans and Opns Sec, SHAEF G-3, 

9 Mar 44; Paper by Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell, 

27 Mar 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 370.64 France, 

French Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), I. 
156 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

fortunately, General de Gaulle did not 

realize the factors involved in the U.S. 

failure to provide more aircraft. The State 

Department became sufficiently alarmed 

at his pointed references to British aid to 

warn General Eisenhower that the impression was being spread that the United 

States was opposed on political grounds to 

arming French Resistance forces. The Supreme Commander, at General Marshall’s 

request, examined the situation on I May. 

He admitted that recent supplementary 

allotments of aircraft by the British had 

considerably changed the initial permanent allotment of thirty-two U.S. and 

twenty-two British aircraft. More British 

than U.S. supplies were being sent, he explained, because British stockpiles were 

more easily available and because British 

articles of issue, having been furnished 

Resistance forces earlier, were more acceptable to the French who were now 

accustomed to their use. General Eisenhower asked for more personnel and 

means to equalize the contributions, and 

added that he would try to explain the 

U.S. position to General Koenig. 47 

Despite shortages in aircraft, the special 

operations agencies were successful in getting considerable quantities of supplies to 

the Resistance groups in France. By midApril, an estimated 100,000 men had arms 

and ammunition. In the face of vigorous 

German countermeasures in 1943, and the 

efforts of a strong Vichy police system, 

estimated at 250,000, headed by Joseph 

Darnand, the Resistance movement continued to be active. Besides supplying information on the movement of German 

units, the Resistance forces conducted 

small-scale acts of sabotage. Their major 

effort was directed against the railways. 

Pre-D-Day intelligence reports pointed to 

the destruction or damage of 730 locomotives in a three-and-one-half month 

period. 48 To deal with this problem the 

Germans had been forced to increase their 

own railway employees in France from 

10,000 in January 1944 to 50,000 and to 

install rigid supervision of rail lines and 

personnel. SHAEF estimated that even 

with these difficulties, the enemy could 

carry on efforts against the Allied landings 

if he could maintain 100 trains per day. 

Since the capacity of German-controlled 

strategic lines was about 200 per day, the 

margin was still large. The Joint Intelligence Sub-committee concluded cautiously, therefore, that the effort of the 

Resistance would be in the nature of a 

bonus which could not be determined with 

certainty and could not be taken into account in operational planning. The 

SHAEF planners asked only for a measure 

of delay to enemy reinforcements, pointing 

out that, while this might seem too small a 

result for such a great expenditure of lives 

and effort, the delay would come at “the 

critical period of OVERLORD when every 

hour is vital.” 49 

The French drew up a series of plans in 

London under the general direction of the 

Allied special operations agencies. These 

plans, approved by SHAEF in the spring 

of 1944, included a number of specific operations against strategic railroads and 

highways, the electrical distribution sys47 JCS to Eisenhower, 17 Mar 44; Eisenhower to 

JCS, 1 May 44. Both in SHAEF G–3 Ops C 322–7 

Organization and Terms of Reference, 2d cover. 

Marshall to Eisenhower, W–30283, 30 Apr 44, 

SHAEF SGS 370.64 France. French Resistance 

Groups (Guerilla Warfare), I. 

48 JIC (44) 159, War Cabinet, Jt Intel Sub-Com 

Rpt, 19 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 370.64 France, French 

Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), I. 

49 JIC (44), 159 (0), Jt Intel Sub-Com Rpt, 19 Apr 

44; SHAEF G–3 Memo, 29 Apr 44, sub: Resistance 

by General Public in France, SHAEF SGS 370.64 

France, French Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), I. 
RELATIONS WITH THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 157 

tem, telephone and telegraph lines, munitions and gasoline dumps, and enemy 

headquarters. 

Some weeks before D Day, special operations agencies instructed Resistance units 

to listen to British Broadcasting Corporation announcements at the beginning and 

middle of each month in order to get an 

alert for the commencement of operations. 

As soon as they received the first message,

they were to remain on the alert for a second message which would give the signal. 

SHAEF’s Message A was broadcast by 

BBC on 1 June and repeated the following 

day. On the night of 5 June all B messages 

were sent. On the following morning, the 

Resistance forces began to send detailed 

information on current enemy movements 

and started a series of attacks to forestall 

enemy reinforcement of the assault area.50 

50 The French Forces of the Interior, Ch. II, pp. 

387-88, OCMH. 
CHAPTER IX 

Final Preparations 

for the Invasion 

In the final weeks before D Day, General Eisenhower spent much of his time 

visiting Allied units and observing maneuvers and exercises. A firm believer that a 

commander should show himself to the 

troops, he, in common with General 

Montgomery and General Bradley, made 

numerous trips to military units. In spite 

of conferences, staff meetings, and the reception of prominent visitors, he found 

time in the period between 1 February 

and 1 June to visit twenty-six divisions, 

twenty-four airfields, five ships of war, and 

a number of depots, shops, hospitals, and 

other installations. 1 

He attempted to see as many men as 

possible, to examine their weapons and 

equipment, to speak informally to them 

about the value of their specific tasks and 

the importance of the larger mission of 

which they were a part. He was anxious 

not only to inspire the troops under his 

command to do their best, but to develop 

a feeling on the part of both the British 

and U.S. troops that they were brothersin-arms. 

While these visits were in progress, the 

Allies were intensifying the air attacks on 

the invasion coast, strengthening the propaganda campaign against the enemy, and 

making plans for effective use of the 

French Resistance forces. The Supreme 

Commander himself was called on to 

recommend and take action on security 

measures, to discipline some of his commanders because of their breaches of security or issuance of unapproved statements, and to give the final order for the 

assault. (Chart 4) 

Intensified Air Efforts Against the Enemy 

Air preparations for OVERLORD were 

intensified in April 1944 and continued 

with increased force until the assault. 

Aside from the POINTBLANK operations, 

which aided OVERLORD by attacks on the 

German economy and air force, Allied air 

activities consisted of a number of different 

campaigns designed especially to expose 

and soften up the enemy in the invasion 

area. One of these, photographic reconnaissance, begun more than a year before, 

furnished the assault commanders with 

photo coverage of the European coast from 

the Netherlands to the Spanish frontier. 

It was thus possible to plot coastal defenses, bridges, prospective airfields, airborne drop zones, flooded areas, and 

enemy dumps and depots. From 1 April to 

1 A list of visits has been included in Eisenhower, 

Crusade in Europe, p. 238. Butcher, My Three Years With 

Eisenhower, contains a number of references to General Eisenhower's visits to troops in the period mentioned. 

160 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE photograph of beach defenses.

5 June 1944, the Allied Expeditionary Air 

Force flew more than 3,000 photographic 

reconnaissance sorties and the other air 

commands flew an additional 1,500.2 

In March 1944 the Allied air forces 

started their bombing operations against 

enemy lines of communications in France 

and Belgium with attacks against railway 

marshaling yards and repair stations. In 

the last weeks of May they began bombing 

locomotives and bridges. Mid-April 1944 

had already seen the opening of a special 

campaign to neutralize coastal defenses, 

and early May the start of an offensive on 

enemy radar installations and wireless 

telegraph facilities, ammunition and fuel 

dumps, military camps and headquarters, 

and airfields. The attack on V-weapon 

launching sites, which had been inaugurated earlier in the year, was stepped up 

as the invasion period approached. Air 

forces were also busy protecting the Allied 

naval and ground forces against enemy 

bombers and reconnaissance planes during the assembly of the assault forces. Air 

Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory estimated 

that in the six weeks before D Day the enemy flew only 125 reconnaissance sorties in 

the Channel area and four over the 

Thames Estuary and the east coast. Very 

few of these approached land. Thus the 

2 The information for this section has been taken 

from Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, 

Despatch to the Supreme Commander, AEF, November 1944, Supplement to The London Gazette, December 

31, 1946, pp. 42-54. Statistical information has been 

included to give some idea of the forces employed and 

the tonnages of bombs dropped. All statistics, as the 

dispatch notes, are subject to correction. See also 

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War 

II: III, ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 

1945 (Chicago, 1951), pp. 138-81. 
FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION 161 

presence of the great concentrations of 

men and craft did not become known to 

the enemy. Those occasional bombers 

which ventured over the British Isles were 

usually dealt with effectively and were responsible for only incidental damage. 

Propaganda Efforts Against the Enemy 

Long-range strategic propaganda campaigns were continued in 1944, being 

changed only to focus attention on the 

cross-Channel attack. The British Broadcasting Corporation, which had been active since 1939 in attacking German 

morale and encouraging the people of occupied countries to resist, was joined 

before D Day by the Office of War Information short-wave transmitters operating 

under the name of the American Broadcasting Station in Europe (ABSIE). A 

leaflet campaign, carried on since 1939 

with the effective aid of the Royal Air 

Force and augmented after August 1943 

by the Eighth Air Force, was intensified 

in the three months before D Day. During 

the period between 1939 and D Day some 

two and three-quarter billion leaflets were 

distributed of which more than two billion 

were dropped by the Royal Air Force. 3 In 

addition, propaganda agencies supporting 

SHAEF operations produced and dropped 

a daily leaflet newspaper to the German 

troops. Beginning on 25 April 1944 and 

continuing until the end of the war, Allied 

planes dropped between a half million and 

a million copies of each edition of Nachrichten fuer die Truppe. This publication contained timely and accurate military information and news from the German home 

front designed to gain the German soldier’s confidence in the truthfulness of the 

source and to keep him fully informed of 

the defeats suffered by the Germans and 

their allies. 4 

Besides carrying on pre-D-Day efforts 

to undermine German morale, the Allies 

appealed to peoples in occupied countries 

to resist the enemy and to prepare to support the Allied cause actively when liberating forces landed on the Continent. Allied planes dropped weekly newspapers 

carrying news of interest and encouragement to occupied areas. Beginning with 

the British Courrier de I’Air for the French, 

and adding the American L’Amérique en 

Guerre, the propaganda agencies extended 

their activities to other occupied countries 

and to Germany. The work of disseminating leaflets and newspapers, initially borne 

in large part by the Royal Air Force, was 

assumed more and more by the Eighth Air 

Force, which assigned a special squadron 

of B–17’s for the purpose. 5 

On 20 May 1944 the British Broadcasting Corporation and the American Broadcasting Station in Europe began a series of 

“Voice of SHAEF” broadcasts beamed at 

France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. Seven broadcasts 

made before D Day instructed the peoples 

of those occupied countries to gather information which the Allied forces would need 

on their arrival, but to refrain from premature uprisings. 6 

3 Memo, SHAEF for Br COS, 14 Mar 44, SHAEF 

SGS 091.412 Propaganda, I. Psychological Warfare 

Division (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations in the 

Western European Operation, 1944–45 (Bad Homburg, 

1945) pp. 17, 159. 

2 PWD (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations, p. 46, 

says Nachrichten appeared in two editions which ran 

from 750,000 to a million copies each. The same 

volume speaks of “up to a half million copies dailysometimes more . . .” (p. 163) and again “quantities 

per issue ranged as high as 1,700,000 copies” (Exhibit 

21). 

3 PWD (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations, p. 

159. 

4 Texts of Voice of SHAEF broadcasts are in PWD 

(SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations, pp. 106-11. 
162 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Security for the Operation 

One of the important requirements for 

the commander of any great military offensive is the gaining of surprise. Because 

of the hazards involved in assaulting a 

heavily fortified coast, this element was 

vital to the success of OVERLORD. But the 

extensive movements and concentrations 

of men, supplies, and ships made the task 

of preserving the necessary secrecy especially difficult. The most rigid precautions 

became necessary. COSSAC in August 

1943 established the OVERLORD Security 

Sub-Committee of the Inter-Services Security Board to draft special regulations 

for guarding secrets of the cross-Channel 

operation. At the recommendation of the 

subcommittee, COSSAC in September 

1943 adopted a special procedure, known 

as BIGOT, by which all papers relating to 

the OVERLORD operations which disclosed 

the target area or the precise dates of the 

assault were limited in circulation to a 

small group of officers and men and subjected to stringent safeguards. The code 

word NEPTUNE was applied to these papers 

to distinguish them from OVERLORD documents that did not have to be handled 

with the same extreme degree of caution.7 

The most crucial period for secrecy was 

that from mid-March until after D Day 

when the heaviest concentrations of troops 

and landing craft in the coastal areas were 

being made. To deal with the problem, 

SHAEF asked for regulations during the 

critical weeks of preparation which would 

bar the entry of civilians into coastal areas, 

stop members of the armed forces from 

taking leave outside the United Kingdom, 

and forbid foreign diplomats from sending 

messages in code from the United Kingdom. A special committee headed by Sir 

Findlater Stewart and consisting of representatives of the British service ministries, 

COSSAC (SHAEF), the Home Office, the 

Ministry of Home Security, and the Ministry of Health undertook to formulate 

such regulations.8 

The civil ministries promptly objected 

to some of the proposals. General Morgan 

protested strongly against their stand and 

stressed the grave military need for security inasmuch as even a forty-eight-hour 

warning to the Germans of Allied dispositions or intentions would seriously diminish the chances of a successful landing. 

Intimating that the civil ministries were 

holding back in fear of offending the civilian population, he warned, “If we fail, 

there won’t be any more politics—and certainly no more Lend-Lease!” In view of 

the Prime Minister’s and War Office’s opposition to outright bans on visits of civilians to restricted coastal areas, which Mr. 

Churchill thought could be handled more 

effectively by a ban on all communications 

from the United Kingdom in the final 

critical weeks, no action was taken in the 

first two months of 1944.9 

While broad security policy was being 

considered by the ministries, General 

Eisenhower ordered all units under his 

command to maintain the highest standard of individual security discipline and to 

mete out severe disciplinary action in case 

of violation of security. He required that 

the greatest care be used, except in case of 

7 Memo, Maj Gen P. G. Whitefoord, 14 Aug 43; 

Security Instruction 1, Communications, 17 Sep 43. 

Both in SHAEF SGS 380.01/4 Security for Opns. 8 Memo with appendices by Gen Whitefoord, 9 Sep 

43; Barker to VCIGS, 18 Oct 43; COS (44) 7th mtg, 

10 Jan 44; COS (44) 10th mtg, 13 Jan 44; Memo, 

Smith for Br COS, 20 Jan 44. All in SHAEF SGS 

380.01/4 Security for Opns. 9 COS (44) 7th mtg, 10 Jan 44; Memo by Gilmer 

for Smith concerning Morgan’s ltr, 4 Feb 44; Morgan 

to G-2 and G-3, 9 Feb 44. All in SHAEF SGS 

380.01/4 Security for Opns. 
FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION 163 

operational necessity, to guard persons 

familiar with the chief details of impending operations from unnecessary exposure 

to capture by the enemy as a result of participation in preliminary landing operations, reconnaissance, or flights over the 

battle area.10 

General Montgomery in early March 

urged the Supreme Commander to request 

a ban, on visits by civilians to restricted 

areas. General Eisenhower now insisted 

that the War Cabinet impose the ban. He 

warned that it “would go hard with our 

consciences if we were to feel, in later 

years, that by neglecting any security precaution we had compromised the success 

of these vital operations or needlessly 

squandered men’s lives.” Four days later 

the War Cabinet declared that from April 

a visitor’s ban would be imposed “throughout the coastal region from the Wash to 

Cornwall, with the addition of an area in 

Scotland adjacent to the Firth of Forth.”11 

Despite the ban on visits to coastal areas, 

censorship of outgoing mail and news dispatched from the United Kingdom, and 

restrictions on travel, there were still possible sources of leaks. The most feared of 

these were diplomatic communications not 

subject to censorship. The Foreign Office 

and War Cabinet were understandably reluctant to apply so drastic a measure as 

censorship to the correspondence of Allied 

representatives. But General Eisenhower, 

regarding this source of leakage as “the 

gravest risk to the security of our operations and to lives of our sailors, soldiers, 

and airmen,” on 9 April asked that such a 

ban be put into effect as soon as possible 

after mid-April. On 17 April, the War 

Cabinet ruled that from that date foreign 

diplomatic representatives would not be 

permitted to receive or send uncensored 

communications and that couriers of such 

staffs would not be allowed to leave the 

United Kingdom. The restrictions were 

applied to all foreign countries save the 

United States and the USSR. Strong protests were immediately forthcoming, particularly in the case of the French Committee of National Liberation which 

ordered General Koenig to break off negotiations with SHAEF. A modification of 

the ban was later made in favor of the 

French, but the basic rule stood until after 

D Day.12 

Despite many precautions, leaks in security occurred. A scare developed in late 

March when secret documents dealing 

with phases of the OVERLORD operation 

were discovered in the Chicago post office. 

Improperly wrapped, the envelope containing them had come open and its contents noted casually by a dozen postal 

employees. A flurry ensued in Washington 

and London until it was found that a sergeant in Headquarters, ETOUSA, had 

addressed the envelope to his sister in 

Chicago through an error. Investigation 

showed that carelessness and not espionage 

was involved.13 Far more serious and spectacular was the case of the commander of 

the IX Air Force Service Command in the 

United Kingdom. The general, in the 

presence of a number of guests in a public 

dining room at Claridge’s Hotel on 18 

April, declared that the invasion would 

begin before 15 June 1944. When details 

10 Eisenhower to 21 A Gp, FUSAG, AEAF, and 

ANCXF, 23 Feb 44; Morgan to ANCXF and AEAF, 

28 Feb 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 380.01/4 Security 

for Opns. 

11 Montgomery to Eisenhower, 3 Mar 44; Eisenhower to Br COS, 6 Mar 44; Hollis to Eisenhower, 

11 Mar 44. All in SHAEF SGS 380.01/4 Security 

for Opns. 

12 Eisenhower to Brooke, 9 Apr 44; Brooke to 

Eisenhower, 17 Aug 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 311.7/1 

Stoppage of Diplomatic Communication. 13 Diary Office CinC, 23 Mar and 4 Apr 44. 
164 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

of the incident were confirmed, General 

Eisenhower, a West Point classmate of the 

officer, ordered him removed from his 

post, reduced to his permanent rank of 

colonel, and sent back to the United 

States.14 

After the war, German files in Berlin revealed that the enemy by the opening 

weeks of 1944 had discovered the meaning 

of OVERLORD and was certain that the 

main attack for 1944 would be in western 

Europe and not the eastern Mediterranean. This information, which reached the 

Germans from sources in the British Embassy, Ankara, initially identified the 

main attack as OVERLOCK. Later reports, 

rated by the Germans as accurate since 

their disclosure was contrary to English interest,were regarded as “conclusive evidence 

that the Anglo-Saxons are determined to force a 

show-down by opening the second front in 1944. 

However, this second front will not be in the Balkans.” The analysis of 8 February 1944 by 

the Chief of the Western Branch of the Intelligence Division of the German Army 

(OKH/Fremde Heere West) stated: 

1. For 1944 an operation is planned outside 

the Mediterranean that will seek to force a deci- sion and, therefore, will be carried out with 

all available forces. This operation is prob- ably being prepared under the code name of 

OVERLORD. The intention of committing 

large forces becomes clear from the fact that 

the operation is expected to produce the final 

military decision within a comparatively 

short period of time. . . . On 18 Jan44, there- fore, the Anglo-Saxon command was committed to a 

large-scale operation which would seek afinal deci- sion (second front). 

The documents lack any indication of the 

exact area of this major attack. However, the 

distribution of enemy forces and troop move- ments clearly point to England as a point of 

departure. 

Two weeks later, an intelligence report 

added: 

The frequently expressed determination to 

bring the war to an end in 1944 is to be consid- ered the keynote of the enemy’s operational plan-. ning. It is also repeatedly mentioned as a 

definite fact that the decision will be sought 

by a large-scale attack in western Europe. In this 

connection Turkey’s entry into the war is con- sidered of value only within a limited period 

of time. From the foregoing facts it must be 

concluded that a showdown is to be attempted 

during the first—or at latest during the sec- ond-third of 1944. The early start of opera- tions in Italy (fighting at Cassino and Anzio) 

which must be considered only with the 

framework of the over-all operational plan- ning of the enemy (holding attack) points in 

the same direction.15 

The possibility that the name of the operation would leak out had always been 

considered by the OVERLORD planners. 

They would have been relieved to know 

that their most carefully guarded secretthe exact area of the main blow and the 

approximate date—were not included in 

the German intelligence estimatesi Later, 

they would have reflected that by the end 

of May everything which appeared in the 

January and February estimates, except 

the code name OVERLORD, could have 

been easily surmised from the accounts in 

the Allied press. 

The Patton Episode 

Scarcely had General Eisenhower punished the Air Force general for a breach of 

security when he was faced with the prospect of removing an Army commander, Lt. 

Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., from command 

14 Diary Office CinC, 12 May 44; New York Times, 

June 7, 10, 1944; Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 May 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 15 German Foreign Office political report IM 51 

gRs, 8 Jan- 44 (copy dtd 12 Jan 44), Intelligence 

analysis, Militaerische Auswertung der Sonderunterlagen 

WFSt ueber Tuerkei aus dem Zeitabschnitt Sept. 43-Jan. 

44, 8 and 21 Feb 44, Oberkommando des Heeres/Fremde 

Heere West Hundakte Chef. [Italics in original.] 
FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION 165 

of the Third U.S. Army. In an effort to 

avoid any incident in the United Kingdom 

which might reawaken the public’s memory of the Sicilian episode in which General Patton had slapped a patient in an 

Army hospital, General Eisenhower had 

warned the Third Army commander 

shortly after his arrival not to make public 

speeches without permission, and to guard 

all his statements so that there would be no 

chance of misinterpretation. Shortly afterward, as the result of a flurry over a speech 

he had made before a U.S. group in England, General Patton promised to refrain 

from public utterances. Near the end of 

April, however, in speaking before what 

he believed to be a private gathering, the 

Third Army commander declared that the 

United States and Great Britain would 

run the world of the future. This apparent 

affront to other Allied powers led to angry 

outcries in the U.S. Congress and press. 

General Marshall, who was trying to win 

Congressional approval for an Army permanent promotion list including General 

Patton’s name, was dismayed by the incident which brought into question the 

Third Army commander’s fitness for command and threatened to kill all Army 

promotions. 16 

General Eisenhower asked General 

Marshall if retention of General Patton 

would diminish the confidence of the public and the government in the War Department, indicating that in such a case 

stern disciplinary action would be required. He then sent a blistering letter to 

General Patton asking for a complete 

explanation and warning him of the 

“serious potentialities’’ of his speech. Reflecting on the fact that the Third Army 

commander seemed incapable of holding 

his tongue, General Eisenhower informed 

General Marshall that “on all the evidence now available I will relieve him 

from command and send him home unless 

some new and unforeseen information 

should be developed in the case.” He was 

reluctant to take this action in view of 

General Patton’s proved ability to conduct 

“a ruthless drive,” and added that there 

was always the possibility that the war 

might yet develop a situation where Patton, despite his lack of balance, “should be 

rushed into the breach.” 17 

Before receiving the second message suggesting relief of the Third Army commander, General Marshall assured General Eisenhower that confidence of the 

public in the War Department had to be 

measured against the success of the OVERLORD operation. He declared: “If you feel 

that the operation can be carried on with 

the same assurance of success with [Lt. 

Gen. Courtney H.] Hodges in command, 

for example, instead of Patton, all well and 

good. If you doubt it, then between us we 

can bear the burden of the already unfortunate reaction. I fear the harm has already 

been fatal to the confirmation of the permanent list.” On 1 May General Marshall 

gave General Eisenhower exclusive responsibility for deciding whether or not to keep 

Patton in command. He insisted that the 

position of the War Department was not to 

be considered in the decision, but “only 

OVERLORD and your own heavy responsibility for its success.’’ 18 

The Supreme Commander, aware “that 

the relief of Patton would lose to us his ex16 Marshall to Eisenhower (apparently 26 Apr 44), 

Diary Office CinC, 11 Dec 44. 

17 Smith to Marshall, 27 Apr 44; Eisenhower to 

Marshall, 29 Apr 44; Eisenhower to Patton, 29 Apr 

44; Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 Apr 44. These messages in Diary Office CinC and Eisenhower personal 

file. 

18 Marshall to Eisenhower, 29 Apr 44; McNarney 

for Marshall to Eisenhower, 1 May 44. Both in Eisenhower personal file. 
166 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

perience as commander of an Army in battle and his demonstrated ability of getting 

the utmost out of soldiers in offensive operations,” decided on the basis of the effects upon OVERLORD to retain his subordinate in command. He informed the 

Third Army commander that he was being kept despite damaging repercussions 

resulting from his personal indiscretions. 

“I do this,” he added, “solely because of 

my faith in you as a battle leader and for 

no other motives.” The decision was applauded in Washington by Secretary 

Stimson who praised General Eisenhower’s 

judicial poise and good judgment “as well 

as the great courage which you have 

shown in making this decision.” 19 

Exercises and Maneuvers 

The numerous exercises held before the 

invasion gave the Supreme Commander 

an excellent opportunity to see his troops 

in action and to find errors which would 

need elimination before D Day. Beginning in late December 1943, a series of exercises was held at brigade, divisional, and 

corps level. Final rehearsals were held in 

late April and early May in the south of 

England. Activities included the concentration, marshaling, and embarkation of 

troops, a short movement by water, disembarkation with naval and air support, a 

beach assault using service ammunition, 

the securing of a beachhead, and a rapid 

advance inland. The rehearsals were 

planned to resemble the OVERLORD operation, except for differences in the sequences 

of landings and timing made to deceive 

the enemy if he was observing the maneuvers. The Allies were perturbed when, 

during one of the last exercises, a German 

E-boat attacked seven LST’s, sinking two 

of the craft with more than 700 casualties. 

The enemy concluded that the craft were 

engaged in exercises, but seemed to draw 

no conclusions from them relative to the 

cross-Channel operation. 

The rehearsals were followed by the 

final and major briefing of the key commanders. This conference was held under 

the supervision of SHAEF on 15 May in 

St. Paul’s School, General Montgomery’s 

headquarters in London, in the presence 

of the King, the Prime Minister, Field 

Marshal Smuts, the British Chiefs of Staff, 

members of the War Cabinet, and the chief 

Allied commanders-one of the great military gatherings of the war. General Eisenhower opened the meeting and was followed by General Montgomery, Admiral 

Ramsay, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, and General Bradley who gave broad 

outlines of the revised plans for OVERLORD 

as well as a statement of the support the 

various commanders were to receive in 

their operations. The King and the Prime 

Minister also made short speeches. Of this 

dramatic meeting, General Eisenhower 

later wrote that it “not only marked the 

virtual completion of all preliminary planning and preparation but seemed to impart additional confidence as each of the 

scores of commanders and staff officers 

present learned in detail the extent of the 

assistance he would receive for his own 

particular part of the vast undertaking.” 20 

The Decision To Go 

With final preparations under way, the 

Supreme Commander considered the allimportant question of the date for OVER19 Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 May 44; Eisenhower 

to Patton, 3 May 44. Both in Eisenhower personal 

file. Stimson to Eisenhower, 5 May 44, Diary Office 

CinC. 

20 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 539- 

40; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 245. 
FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION 167 

LORD. In the discussions at Tehran, 1 May 

1944 had been provisionally accepted. 

When it became necessary to enlarge the 

assault area and seek more landing craft, 

the date was changed to the end of May. 

Ultimately the target date—Y Day-the 

date on which all preparations had to be 

complete, was set for 1 June. It was understood that D Day, the day of attack, would 

come as soon thereafter as the tides, phases 

of the moon, hours of daylight, and 

weather would permit. A study of these 

factors revealed that only three days in 

early June—5,6, and 7-filled all requirements of the invasion force. On 8 May, the 

Supreme Commander after a discussion 

with his commanders selected the date of 

Y plus 4 (5 June). General Eisenhower informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 

this decision on 17 May, saying that 6 and 

7 June were acceptable in case bad weather 

interfered but that any further postponement required major changes in the operation or a delay until 19 June when tidal 

conditions would again be favorable. He 

asked them to notify the Russians, who 

had promised to start their attack shortly 

after the cross-Channel assault, of the 

change in date. 21 

On the assumption that the attack 

would be made on 5 June, the Supreme 

Commander gave orders in mid-May for 

the concentration of the assault force near 

the invasion port areas of southern England. The enormous heaps of munitions, 

supplies, and equipment which had been 

stored throughout the United Kingdom 

were now moved by unending convoys to 

the south. As warehouses overflowed, the 

matériel was placed in carefully camouflaged positions along the roadways preparatory to final loading. Thousands of 

men next moved into tented areas in the 

fields of Cornwall, Devon, Sussex, and the 

other southern counties, whence they 

could be taken to landing craft waiting in 

near-by coves and inlets and then transported to the great concentrations of ships 

at Portland, Plymouth, Portsmouth, 

Southampton, and the Isle of Wight. 

Meanwhile, special efforts were made to 

get the men keyed to the proper psychological pitch for the attack. General Eisenhower urged his commanders to overcome 

any lack of a will to fight on the part of 

their troops by explaining the critical importance of defeating the Germans. Articles in Army publications stressed the 

vicious policies and beliefs of the enemy 

and the necessity of dealing ruthlessly with 

him. To combat the fears of those who anticipated heavy losses in the invasion and 

dreaded the shock and pain of battle, the 

Supreme Commander urged troop leaders 

to discuss candidly with their men the DDay prospects. Service newspapers, like 

Stars and Stripes, ran special articles which 

described the miracles of modern combat 

medicine and gave optimistic predictions 

on the chance of survival. 

The best psychological preparations for 

the cross-Channel landings lay, however, 

in the personal briefings which unit commanders gave their men. Gathered together in units as small as platoons and 

squads, the men carefully studied their 

particular assignment for D Day. Foamrubber models of the beaches, detailed 

maps and charts of the landing area, photographs of fortifications and obstacles 

were analyzed for enemy strength and 

weakness. An attempt was made to orient 

each man, showing him his place in rela21 Diary, Office CinC, 9 May 44; Eisenhower to 

CCS, SCAF 30, 17 May 44. Maj. Gen. John Russell 

Deane, in The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts 

at Wartime Co-Operation With Russia (New York, 1947), 

p. 150, tells of various changes in date which he gave 

the Russians in Moscow. 
168 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

tion to other men in his platoon and the 

units on his flanks. He became familiar 

with the landmarks which were supposed 

to greet him when he got ashore, the exits 

by which he could leave the beach, and 

the likely locations of minefields and machine gun nests. More important to his 

peace of mind was the assurance of powerful naval and air support which was supposed to neutralize enemy opposition. At 

last, after the marshaling areas were carefully sealed off from the rest of England by 

wire and armed guards, the men were 

given the exact place of landing, the target 

date of the attack, and the broad outline of 

what the Allies expected to do once they 

got ashore. Before the end of May, it was 

clear that this concentration was not 

merely another exercise. 

With the final briefings went the waterproofing of vehicles, the checking of weapons, adjustments of personal gear, and 

last-minute inspections. Invasion money 

was issued, family allotments made, and 

precautions given on the proper behavior 

of soldiers in liberated countries. Spurred 

by a last-minute warning that the enemy 

might use gas to stop the invasion, the Allied commanders reiterated their standing 

instructions concerning the means of detecting and combating such attacks. Nor 

were the perils of the sea forgotten as seasick pills and vomit bags were handed out, 

and lifebelts issued and tested. Now that 

the men knew where they were going, 

French phrase books were distributed and 

enterprising linguists held occasional 

classes for soldiers who looked forward to 

social interludes on the Continent. At 

length, cigarettes, toothbrushes, extra 

socks, K and D rations, and rounds of ammunition were passed out to each soldier. 

Little remained then but to get a crew cut, 

write a last letter home, and make a final 

inspection of equipment. By 1 June, as the 

units farthest from the invasion area began 

their move, few details had been overlooked. The first days of June brought an 

almost unbearable tension as the men, 

aware that their return home depended on 

the speed and effectiveness with which 

they completed their task, waited impatiently for the word to go. 

But that word depended on one factor 

that could not be arranged by the planners-the weather. In the last days of 

May, the Supreme Commander began to 

watch the weather forecasts very closely. 

He got in the habit of talking over the reports with the Chief Meteorological Officer, SHAEF, Group Captain J. M. Stagg, 

so that he understood fully the value of the 

reports and the basis on which they were 

made. On 1 June, General Eisenhower arranged for the Allied commanders to meet 

him daily to consider the final decision for 

the attack. He realized that it was unlikely 

that so great an operation could be started 

and then stopped again without complete 

loss of secrecy. Loadings of ships had begun by 1 June, and it was clear that putting back to harbor and unloading ships 

would give rise to mishaps. Worse still, a 

delay meant an additional chance for the 

enemy’s pilotless aircraft to begin their operations, or the possibility that the next 

favorable period for tides in mid-June 

would have even less satisfactory weather 

than that which would prevail on 5 June. 

Even more important was the effect of 

postponement on morale. The men who 

composed the assault forces had been 

brought to a pitch of readiness which 

would be hard to reach again. All these 

factors had to be weighed by the Supreme 

Commander as he studied the reports of 

the weatherman and debated whether or 

not to give the signal for the attack. 
FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION 169 

Weather information was furnished the 

Supreme Commander by a Meteorological Committee presided over by the Chief 

Meteorological Officer, SHAEF, and including meteorological officers from the 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force, the Allied 

Naval Expeditionary Force, the Admiralty, U.S. Weather Services (U.S. Army 

Air Forces in Europe), and the Air Ministry. In most cases, the officers submitted 

their opinions by telephone to the chairman, their reports were opened to general 

discussion, and a final forecast was drawn 

up which was in turn presented for the approval or disapproval of the various 

weather officers. 22 

Forecasts which were somewhat optimistic on 29 May were less hopeful by 2 

June, but since there was some lack of certainty the Supreme Commander decided 

to order part of the assault forces to sail 

toward rendezvous points the following 

’morning. The weather experts on 3 June 

again reported unpromising weather 

which would probably rule out 5 June as 

D Day, but General Eisenhower confirmed orders for one of the U.S. task 

forces to sail subject to a possible last-minute change. In the early morning of 4 

June, the meteorological officers revealed 

that conditions on the following day would 

not permit the air forces to carry out their 

part of the assault program. Neither the 

air nor the naval commanders felt they 

should start the attack under the circumstances, although General Montgomery 

indicated his forces were ready to go. General Eisenhower, recalling that the operation had been accepted as feasible only if 

Allied air superiority could- be brought to 

bear, ordered a twenty-four-hour postponement and called for a meeting at 2130 

that evening to decide whether the attack 

could begin on 6 June. Convoys already at 

sea were ordered to turn back. 

The decisive meeting was held, as the 

others had been, near Portsmouth in the 

Allied Naval Expeditionary Force mess 

room at Southwick House, Admiral Ramsay’s headquarters. The meeting place was 

a large room, lined on three sides by bookcases which were mostly empty, and containing a table and a number of easy 

chairs. Present in addition to General 

Eisenhower were Tedder, Leigh-Mallory, 

Robb, Wigglesworth, Smith, Montgomery, Strong, Bull, de Guingand, Gale, 

Ramsay, and Creasy. Once the group was 

seated informally in the easy chairs, the 

weatherman, Group Captain Stagg, accompanied as usual by Instructor Commander John Fleming of the Royal Navy 

and Lt. Col. Donald D. Yates of the U.S. 

Army Air Forces, presented the agreed-on 

forecast. A new weather front had recently 

been observed which gave some hope of 

improvement throughout 5 June and until 

the morning of Tuesday the 6th. The skies 

were expected to clear, sufficiently for 

heavy bombers to operate during the night 

of the 5th and at H Hour the following 

morning, although it was possible that 

later changes might interfere with fighterbombers and with spotting for naval bombardment. Some hope was thus given, but 

there was a chance that the reports were 

wrong and the fleet would be forced to 

turn back. Any possibility of postponing 

the decision for several hours until a new 

forecast could be made was dashed, however, by Admiral Ramsay’s declaration 

that “Admiral Kirk must be told within 

22 Report by Allied Naval CinC Expeditionary 

Force on Operation NEPTUNE, App. 16, I, 156–65. 

(This appendix contains detailed forecasts during the 

period in question, showing the opinions of the various meteorological officers.) Memo, SHAEF, 26 May 

44, sub: Weather Forecasts, SHAEF G–3 Ops A 

000.91 Meteorological Matters. 
170 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

the next half hour if OVERLORD is totake 

place on Tuesday. If he is told it is on and 

his forces sail and are then recalled, they 

will not be ready again for Wednesday 

morning; therefore a further postponement 

would be for 48 hours.” General Eisenhower polled his advisers. Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory was pessimistic and 

believed that the operation would be 

“chancey,” a conclusion in which Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder concurred. General 

Montgomery, reiterating his advice of the 

previous day, voted “Go!” The question 

was now up to the Supreme Commander. 

He could take the gamble and launch the 

attack with the possibility he would lack 

air support, or he could turn back the task 

forces and await the fortunes of a later 

date. The fatefulness of his decision 

strongly impressed the assembled commanders, several of whom wrote accounts 

of the moment. General Smith was struck 

by “the loneliness and isolation of a commander at a time when such a momentous 

decision was to be taken by him, with full 

knowledge that failure or success rests on 

his individual decision.” The Supreme 

Commander calmly weighed the alternatives, pointing out that it was the danger 

of not going which was “too chancey.” The 

question, as he saw it, was “just how long 

can you hang this operation at the end of 

a limb and let it hang there.” To this question there could be only one answer: 

The orders went out to the fleet that the 

attack was on, but a final meeting of the 

Supreme Commander and his aides was 

“Go.” 23 

set for the early morning of 5 June. At 0330 

as the Allied commanders started for their 

meeting place, they found little in the 

weather to make them hopeful. The rain 

and wind and mud that greeted them as 

they made their way to the naval headquarters gave no promise of fair weather 

for the 6th. However, the experts, who had 

made a final forecast at 0200, offered some 

hope that the 6th might see a break in the 

weather which might last thirty-six hours. 

They were unwilling to predict what might 

happen after that time. On the basis of this 

advice, General Eisenhower held to his decision of the previous evening. Using the 

code which he had already sent the War 

Department, he notified the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff: “Halcyon plus 5 finally and 

definitely confirmed.” 24 

Accounts of the two final meetings have been 

written by Air Vice Marshal James M. Robb (a 

signed carbon copy of his original report, written on 

the morning of 5 June 1944, was given by him to the 

author); Gen Bull, Memo for Record, 5 June 44, 

SHAEF G–3 file; Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, “Eisenhower’s Six Great Decisions,” Saturday Evening Post, 

June 8, 1946, p. 218; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 

pp. 249-50; de Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 372– 

74; and Leigh-Mallory Despatch, Supplement to The 

London Gazette, December 31, 1946, p. 55. The author 

has also received statements by Eisenhower, Tedder, 

Creasy, and Strong. There are some differences as to 

the exact phrasing of General Eisenhower’s final statements in making the decision and for that reason the 

accounts of Robb and Bull have been omitted. Both 

General Bull and Air Marshal Robb have given lists 

of the persons present, although General Bull omits 

General Gale from the list. Both accounts indicate 

that Air Marshal Coningham was present at the 

earlier meetings. 

24 Diary Office CinC, 5 Jan 44, contains details on 

the decision apparently given Butcher by General 

Eisenhower shortly after the decision was made. 
CHAPTER X 

D Day to the Breakout 

Unfolding of the Grand Design 

The long months of planning by 

SHAEF, its predecessors, and the subordinate commands culminated on 6 June in 

the great assault. Shortly before midnight, 

5 June, elements of a British and two U.S. 

airborne divisions took to the air from various fields in southern England and headed 

for the Cotentin peninsula and for points 

east of the Orne River. (Map I) Already 

mine sweepers of the Eastern and Western 

Task Forces were clearing ship lanes to the 

selected beaches—UTAH and OMAHA for

the U.S. forces, and GOLD, JUNO, and 

SWORD for the British. On their way to a 

rendezvous point south of the Isle of Wight 

were five naval forces; two additional follow-up forces were loaded and at sea. 

Aboard the craft of Admiral Ramsay’s task 

force of more than 5,000 vessels were elements of three U.S., two British, and one 

Canadian divisions. Overhead the bombers and fighters were starting a day’s offensive which was to see nearly 11,000 sorties 

and the dropping of nearly 12,000 tons of 

bombs. Meanwhile, the Supreme Commander and General Montgomery waited 

in their advance headquarters at Portsmouth for the first news of the landings. 

General Eisenhower, having stayed with 

elements of the 101st Airborne Division at 

their camp near Newbury until near midnight, returned tohis camp to await news 

of the landings. For the moment, control 

of the battle had passed from his hands. 

Like most battles, that on D Day did 

not go exactly as planned. But in its main 

objective of getting ashore against a determined enemy it was completely successful 

and at a cost lower than anyone, had 

hoped. The naval and air forces had prepared the way for the seaborne landings. 

In the Cotentin, the two U.S. airborne divisions, despite scattered drops, cleared 

enough of their objectives and diverted the 

enemy sufficiently to allow seaborne elements of the VII Corps virtually to walk 

ashore. All other assault troops had a hard 

fight on the beaches and beyond. In the 

center of the attack, the V Corps met a 

strong, determined German division, the 

352d which had been placed in line as 

early as March but had not been definitely 

located there by Allied intelligence. 1 Suffering heavy casualties and splintered by 

obstinate German opposition in a series of 

resistance nests, the V Corps with the 

effective aid of naval fire struggled inland 

to gain by the end of the day a precarious 

toehold not more than a mile deep. 2 On 

1 Brigadier E. T. Williams, former chief of intelligence of 2 I Army Group, says (letter to author, 1 August 1951) that there was some conjecture as to the 

probability of its being there, but no definite proof. 

2 V Corps lost some 2,000 dead, wounded, and 

missing, as opposed to VII Corps’ 200. The 82d and 

101st Airborne Divisions lost approximately 2.500. 

Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 284, 300, 331 ; 

[Roland G. Ruppenthal] Utah Beach to Cherbourg, 

AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION (Washington. 

1947), p. 55. 
D DAY TO BREAKOUT 

6 June - 24 July 1944 

.,.,.,.,.,.,.,. FRONT LINE, 24 JULY 

--- MAIN HIGHWAY 

Elevatians in meters 

HlJamon 

MAP 1 
D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT 173 

the left, British airborne units had successfully secured their target areas east of the 

Orne. Infantry of the 1 and 30 British 

Corps, meeting uneven resistance, had engaged in costly fighting but were able to 

smash through in the direction of Bayeux. 

Neither Bayeux nor Caen, listed as possible 

D-Day objectives, was seized. 3 

Despite all the difficulties, the troops 

had got ashore, mostly in good condition. 

Only fragmentary reports of the landing 

drifted back to SHAEF advance headquarters at Portsmouth, where the Supreme Commander fretted for lack of 

news. Indications that both airborne and 

infantry losses along the fifty-mile front 

were lighter than expected were encouraging, but this bright aspect did not make up 

for the fact that the forces in the center had 

gone only 1,500 to 2,000 yards inland and 

were in no position to meet the enemy 

armored counterattack which the OVERLORD planners anticipated by D plus 3. 

The marshy land at the eastern neck of the 

Cherbourg peninsula and hard-fighting 

enemy elements still lay between the Allied 

center and right. 

In view of the difficulties in the Allied 

center, Eisenhower became particularly 

concerned with speeding up the junction 

of the two U.S. beachheads. On 7 June, 

accompanied by Admiral Ramsay and 

members of the SHAEF staff, he viewed 

the invasion front from the mine layer 

Apollo and conferred on board at various 

times during the day with Generals Montgomery and Bradley, and Rear Admirals 

Alan G. Kirk, John L. Hall, and Sir Philip 

L. Vian. A decision was made in the 

course of the day to give special attention at 

once to closing the Carentan–Isigny gap 

between VII and V Corps. Eisenhower 

ordered the tactical plan changed to give 

priority to that task, 4 and the entire 101st 

Airborne Division was directed against 

Carentan while the V Corps continued its 

planned expansion east, west, and south. 

Carentan fell on 12 June and the corps 

link-up was solidified during the next two 

days. The VII Corps at the same time 

pushed north to Quinéville and across the 

Merderet River. On the central front concentric drives by U.S. and British forces by 

8 June had closed the initial gap at the 

Drôme River between the V and 30 British 

Corps. The V Corps then pushed through 

the bocage country to within a few miles of 

St. Lô before grinding to a halt in the face 

of stiffening enemy defense and increasing 

terrain obstacles. The 1 British Corps in 

the meantime was struggling slowly toward Caen. The Germans, considering 

Caen the gateway to Paris, massed their 

reserves to defend it and stopped the British short of the city. By the end of the first 

week of the invasion, Eisenhower's forces 

had consolidated a bridgehead eight to 

twelve miles deep extending in a rough arc 

from points just east of the Orne on the 

east to Quinéville in the north. 

Behind the front, supply groups labored 

to build up a backlog of fuel, food, and 

ammunition which would make possible 

the next phase of the attack to break out of 

the beachheads. Considered of paramount 

importance in this program was the creation of breakwaters and floating piers 

known as MULBERRY A and MULBERRY B, 

which were to be built at OMAHA Beach 

1 Detailed accounts of the D-Day story are given in 

Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. VIII; Ruppenthal, 

Utah Beach to Cherbourg; [Charles H. Taylor] Omaha 

Beachhead. AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION 

(Washington, 1945); Montgomery, Normandy to the 

Baltic, Ch. VIII; Stacey, The Canadian Army, Ch. XI. 

4 Eisenhower to Marshall, SCAF 48, 8 Jun 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
u.s. MULBERRY before and after the storm if 19-22 June. 
D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT 

and Arromanches-Ies-Bains. The task of 

putting these harbors into operation was 

fraught with great difficulties: craft and 

materiel had to be towed across the Channel, the ships that were to act as breakwaters had to be sunk so as to provide 

maximum protection for shipping, and the 

piers had to be anchored so as to withstand 

wind and tides. The British proved to be 

more successful with their breakwater at 

Arromanches than did the U.S. forces on 

OMAHA Beach. Although the British 

moved more slowly, they had their harbor 

more securely placed when a heavy gale 

struck the Channel in the period of 19-22 

June and destroyed much of the U.S. 

MULBERRY. Virtually no unloading took 

place for forty-eight hours. So complete 

was the destruction that a decision was 

made to discontinue the building of the 

U.S. MULBERRY. Some parts were salvaged for the artificial harbor at Arromanches. 

Before the gale, the Allies were approaching target figures for unloading on 

their beaches. They had varied the initial 

priorities shortly after mid-June, however, 

in response to General Montgomery's request for a quicker build-up of combat 

troops ashore. In both British and U.S. 

sectors combat forces were brought in a 

few days to a week earlier than planned, 

while the build-up of service and supporting troops was reduced proportionately. 

Some shortages occurred in supplies, but 

with the exception of artillery ammunition 

these were not serious because casualties 

and materiel consumption were less than 

had been anticipated. By the day the gale 

began, the British had landed 314,547 

men, 54,000 vehicles, and 102,000 tons of 

supplies, while the Americans put ashore 

314,504 men, 41,000 vehicles, and 116,000 

tons of supplies. 5 

175 

The Enemy 

The combined Allied command had 

worked smoothly to brihg the full force of 

naval, air, and ground power to bear on 

the enemy. The Germans from almost the 

first blow had been off balance, despite 

years of preparation to meet just such an 

attack as struck on 6 June. For this failure 

there are many explanations. Most striking perhaps was the German lack of the 

sort of unified command which the Allies 

had in SHAEF. At the head of the German 

state was Adolf Hitler, bearing the resounding title of Fuehrer und Reichskanzler 

des Grossdeutschen Rez'ches und Oberster Befehlshaber der Deutschen Wehrmacht, a dictator 

who controlled the Army, not only as the 

political head of the Reich, but also from 

1941 on as actual Commander in Chief of 

the Army (Oberbefehlshaber des HeeresOb. d. H.). His Armed Forces High Command ( Oberkommando der WehrmachtOKW), headed by Generalfeldmarschall 

Wilhelm Keitel, theoretically was used by 

Hitler in controlling the Army (Oberkommando des Heeres-OKH), the Navy (Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine-OKM), and 

the Air Force (Oberkommando der LlffiwaffeOKL) High Commands. But this was so 

in name only. OKW's control was nullified by the fact that the head of the Air 

Force, Reichsmarschall Hermann Goer-

, British statistics are from COSINTREP 36 (statistics for 18 June 44), 20 Jun 44, SHAEF AG 370, 2/11; 

U.S. statistics from [Clifford L. Jones] NEPTUNE: 

Training for and Mounting the Operation, and the 

Artificial Ports (The Administrative and Logistical 

History of the ETO, Pt. VI), MS, II, 175n, OCMH. 

COSINTREP 36 shows a figure of 307,439 men for 

U.S. forces as opposed to the Jones figure. J ones's figures were based on daily reports of unloadings submitted by the engineer special brigades on OMAHA 

and UTAH Beaches. The nature and validity of the 

various reports are discussed in Ruppenthal. Logistical 

Support of the Armies. 
176 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

ADOLF HITLER 

ing, and the head of the Navy, first Grossadmiral Erich Raeder and later Grossadmiral Karl Doenitz, had personal 

relationships with Hitler stronger than 

those of OKW, and by the opposition of 

the Army to any unification of the services. As the war in the east occupied more 

and more of Hitler’s and the Army’s attention, OKH was turned into the main 

headquarters for the war in the east, while 

OKW became the chief headquarters for 

dealing with the war in other theaters. 

Within OKH the conduct of operations 

was in the hands of the Army General 

Staff (Generalstab des Heeres—Gen. St. d. H.), 

initially under Generaloberst Franz 

Halder and later successively under Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler, Generaloberst 

Heinz Guderian, and General der Infanterie Hans Krebs. Within OKW the conduct of operations was handled by the 

Armed Forces Operations Staff (Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab —WFSt) under General 

der Artillerie Alfred Jodl. 6 

The confusion which existed in the 

German high command in Berlin extended to the west as well. Until 6 June 

when the Allied forces stormed ashore, 

there existed no unified control of the 

FIELD MARSHAL KEITEL 

enemy forces in France nor any clear-cut 

policy on how to deal with the attack. 

Hitler’s absorption with the problems of 

the Eastern Front, his lack of a consistent 

6 The organizational structure and evolution of 

OKW and OKH have been described in great detail 

by committees of German officers working under the 

auspices of the Historical Division between 1946 and 

1948. See MSS # T–101, The German Armed Forces 

High Command (Winter et al.) and # T- 1 1 I, The 

German Army High Command (Halder et al.). See 

also Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. IV. 
D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT 

policy for the west, and his unwillingness 

to mark out clearly the authority of commanders in the field were among the factors responsible for this situation. Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt had 

been reappointed Commander in Chief 

West (Dberbefehlshaber West) in March 

1942, but he had never been given control 

of the air and naval forces of the area. 

Rather their authority extended in some 

cases to units essential to his activities. The 

Third Air Force (Generalfeldmarschall 

Hugo Sperrle), whose planes were to support the ground troops in the west, had 

administrative control over paratroopers 

under Rundstedt's command, as well as 

control over antiaircraft units. Navy Group 

West (Admiral Theodor Krancke) controlled most of the coast artillery of the 

area, although an arrangement existed 

whereby in the event of a landing this artillery was to be placed at the disposal of 

the ground commanders. Security forces, 

used in the occupation of France, were under two military governors (Militaerbefehlshaber) of France and Northern France 

(including Belgium), who were subordinated directly to OKH. For tactical purposes against invasion forces they could be 

placed under Rundstedt. While the intention was to make all forces in the west 

available to the Commander in Chief West 

in case of a landing, the command organization which would make effective use 

of them possible was never clearly established. 7 

More damaging still to German unified 

command was the ground force situation. 

The German theater headquarters in the 

west (Netherlands, Belgium, and France) 

since late 1940 was DB WEST The Commander in Chief West was concurrently 

the commander in chief of Army Group D 

and as such exercised command over the 

177 

ground forces in the theater: Armed Forces 

Commander Netherlands; Fifteenth, Seventh, 

First, and, since August 1943, Nineteenth 

Armies. Rundstedt's control had been encroached upon at the end of 1943 when 

the energetic and able Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, commanding the 

Arnry Group for Special Employment and directly subordinate to OKW, came to the 

west. Rommel had been made responsible 

for the inspection of all coastal defenses in 

the west and ordered to prepare specific 

plans to repel Allied landings in this area. 

His headquarters was also earmarked as a 

reserve command to conduct the principal 

battle in case of an invasion. His direct 

subordination to OK W was terminated by 

mutual agreement between Rundstedt 

and Rommel in early January 1944. Rommel's headquarters was redesignated as 

Arnry Group B, and he was, in his capacity 

as the anti-invasion commander, given 

tactical command over the German forces 

in northwestcrn France, Belgium, and the 

Netherlands. However, Rommel retained 

his former inspection functions for the 

coastal defenses and so remained in a 

position to influence over-all policy. 

Differences of opinion existed between 

DB WEST and Army Group B as to the exact 

role Rommel would play and the extent of 

his powers in case of an invasion. Rommel 

as a field marshal had the right of direct 

appeal to Hitler as Commander in Chief 

of the Army, and he made use of it to gain 

support for his views. Thus in the spring of 

1944 for a short period Rommel won 

broader powers for his command, control 

of all armored and motorized units and all 

7 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Chs. IV and VII, 

has detailed information on the enemy. As in that volume, the term Commander in Chief West will be used 

here to refer to the person holding the title Oberbefehlshaber West, while the abbreviated form OB WEST 

will refer to his headquarters. 
178 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

FIELD MARSHAL VON RUNDSTEDT 

GHQ artillery in the west, and some control over the German armies in southwestern France and on the Mediterranean 

coast. However, after further study of the 

effect of these powers upon the command 

in the west, Hitler reversed his opinion and 

canceled the extra powers given Rommel. 

In May of 1944, Rundstedt, in an effort to 

make clear his status as theater commander and to counterbalance Rommel’s 

position, established Army Group G under 

Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz to 

command the German forces in southwestern France and on the Mediterranean 

coast. In spite of this move and in spite of 

his nominally subordinate position, Rommel retained a disproportionate influence 

in the west until after the invasion. 

The lack of unity manifested itself most 

strikingly in the disagreement on defense 

policies to be followed against an Allied 

landing. Rommel, who had learned in 

Africa of the effect air superiority could 

have on the movement of armored forces, 

felt that the Germans would lack mobility 

to deal with an Allied invasion backed by 

strong air support. He held, therefore, that 

the British and U.S. assault must be met 

with mines, barricades, and heavy fortifiGENERAL BLASKOWITZ 

cations. Ground reserves must be brought 

forward near the coast so that they could 

crush the attack in forty-eight hours. 

Rundstedt believed that some reserves 

must be held back from the coast in position to be sent against the main point of 

Allied strength. The period from Rommel’s appointment to D Day was marked 

by his attempts to get control of the re- 
D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT 

serves, and by Rundstedt's efforts to hold 

something back. Rundstedt in November 

1943 set up Panzer Group West (General der 

Panzertruppen Leo Freiherr Geyr von 

Schweppenburg) to control armored units 

in any large-scale counterattack against 

Allied landings. Geyr's stanch support of 

Rundstedt's views on defense made impossible co-operation with Rommel on the 

employment of armored forces against a 

landing. While Rommel in the spring of 

1944 was unsuccessful in gaining complete 

control of all armored and motorized units 

in the west, he nonetheless achieved a partial victory when three panzer divisions 

were assigned to him as Ar11!}' Group B reserves. Like many other arrangements of 

the period, this assignment was somewhat 

complicated, since Geyr retained the responsibility for the training and organization of the units, while Rommel had 

tactical control. The latter's position was 

further confused when four panzer-type 

divisions were set aside as a central mobile 

reserve under the direct command of 

OKW. Thus D Day found an uneasy arrangement between Rundstedt and Rommel in which neither had real control and 

in which the policy of defense against 

Allied landings was undetermined. 

The forces available to the enemy commanders for use on D Day left much to be 

desired. Rundstedt's command at that 

time consisted of fifty-eight divisions. Of 

these, thirty-three were static or reserve 

and fit only for limited employment. 8 The 

forces available were divided into army 

groups: Army Group B under Rommel and 

Army Group Gunder Blaskowitz. Rommel's 

forces held the Brittany, Normandy, and 

Channel coasts, while Blaskowitz's units 

held southern France and the French 

Atlantic coast. 9 (Map I) 

In the assault area proper, which was 

179 

almost in its entirety under Seventh Ar11!}"s 

jurisdiction, the enemy had seven infantry 

divisions. 1o One panzer division had been 

brought forward to Caen and some elements were on the coast in that area. In 

Brittany, besides the three static divisions, 

there were three infantry and one parachute divisions. An additional parachute 

division was in process of being organized. 

The nearest armor reserves were all south 

or east of the British left flank. One panzer 

division was in the area of Evreux, another 

south of Chartres, and a third was astride 

the Seine between Paris and Rouen. Other 

reinforcements had to come from south of 

the Loire or from the Pas-de-Calais area. 

The enemy forces in the west, while considerably strengthened since February and 

March 1944 by new units and equipment, 

still showed the effects of being spread too 

thin, of having served as a replacement 

pool for the Eastern Front, and of having 

their ranks filled with worn-out troops 

from campaigns in the east. So-called mobile units frequently had little more than 

horse-drawn vehicles and bicycles to give 

them mobility. Many of the panzer units, 

• Static divisions were immobile defense divisions. 

They were designed as permanent garrison troops for 

the west. 

9 Rommel's forces included: Seventh Army (Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann), which held Brittany and 

a substantial part of Normandy; Fifteenth Army (Generalobcrst Hans von Salmuth), which held the Kanalkues/e (the coastal area from Dunkerque to the Seine 

estuary); and, for tactical purposes, Armed Forces Commander Netherlands (General der Luftwaffe Friedrich 

Christiansen). Blaskowitz' command included First 

Army (General der Infanterie Kurt von der Chevallerie), which held the Atlantic coast of France south 

of Brittany, and Nineteenth Army (General der Infanterie Georg von Sodenstern), which held the French 

Mediterranean coast. 

10 The 319th Division stationed on the Channel 

Islands never figured in any of the fighting. Because 

of Hitler's orders, the Germans could not even consider it as a reserve. It will therefore not be included 

in any calculations of Se~enth Army's strength. 
180 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

despite a speed-up in the delivery of tanks 

in the spring of 1944, lacked half of their 

heavier armored weapons. 

The area struck by the Allies was by no 

means the best defended. Since the main 

British and U.S. attack was expected in 

the Pas-de-Calais, the earlier emphasis 

had been placed on building defenses 

there.” The result was that, even though 

defense construction efforts between the 

Orne and Cherbourg had been greatly accelerated in 1944, the assault area was 

much less protected than Rommel had 

planned. Even after the D-Day attack, 

OKW and the field commanders held to 

the view that the main Allied offensive 

would be directed east of the Seine on the 

Kanalkueste. While Hitler, almost alone 

among his advisers, had concluded that 

the Cotentin and Caen areas were logical 

places for an attack and had ordered them 

reinforced, he shared the general delusion 

that the main landings would come in the 

Pas-de-Calais. As a result, there was no 

attempt in the early weeks of the invasion 

to order Fifteenth Army troops to Normandy. The Allies had worked hard to 

create the impression that they were massing forces on the east coast of England for 

an attack on the Kanalkueste, and German 

intelligence made the error of estimating 

the Allied force before D Day at more 

than double its actual strength.” 

With confusion of authority in the German command, lack of an agreed policy 

for dealing with the Allies, a mistaken 

notion that the attack of 6 June was perhaps not the main one, lack of air support, 

supply difficulties, and troops who showed 

either the strain of too many campaigns 

on many fronts or the softness and carelessness promoted by four years of static 

duty on the Atlantic coast, the enemy was 

ill prepared to meet the massive blow 

which the Allies unleashed by land, sea, 

and air. On the side of the enemy lay the 

advantage of fixed positions, however incomplete, against forces landing from 

small craft, interior supply lines, knowledge of the terrain, hedgerows which were 

of enormous value to the defender, and 

years of experience. Time would show that 

the advantages favored the invading 

forces, but there were enough factors on 

the side of the enemy to enable him to 

make a tough fight in the beachhead. 

Allied Command 

The command of Allied ground forces 

in the assault had been given to General 

Montgomery several months before the invasion of Europe. On 1 June 1944 General 

Eisenhower announced that until several 

armies were deployed on a secure beachhead and until developing operations indicated the desirability of a command 

reorganization, “all Ground Forces on the 

Continent [would be] under the Commander in Chief, 21st Army Group.”13 

During this period, General Eisenhower 

retained direct responsibility only for approving major operational policies and the 

principal phases of operational plans. As 

long as the area of operations remained 

constricted and as long as it was necessary 

to keep Supreme Headquarters physically 

in the United Kingdom, the Supreme 

11 The term, “Pas-de-Calais,” as used in this volume, applies to the coast line washed by the Strait of 

Dover between Dunkerque and the Somme. 

12 The estimate was approximately 80 divisions, 10 

of which were believed to be airborne. The United 

States had 20 divisions in the United Kingdom on D 

Day; British and Canadian forces numbered 18. Not 

until near the end of the war did the Allied force surpass the German estimate. 

13 Memo, Command and Organization after D Day 

OVERLORD, 1 Jun 44, SHAEF G-3 322.011-1. Command and Control of U.S./British Forces. 
D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT 181 

Commander felt he had to place control 

of day-to-day actions in the hands of one 

man. Under plans of campaigns approved 

by General Eisenhower, General Montgomery held responsibility for the co-ordination of ground operations, including 

such matters as timing the attacks, fixing 

local objectives, and establishing boundaries. Until the lodgment area could be 

firmly held, the Allied armies were to 

operate under the OVERLORD plan which 

had been outlined before D Day. 

General Eisenhower began during the 

first week of the operation to visit his 

ground commanders and early in July 

established a small advance command 

post in Normandy near the British commander. He was kept informed of operational developments and future plans 

were outlined to him for approval. In 

many cases, his intervention took the 

form of a mere nod of assent; in others he 

personally directed air or supply agencies 

to provide prompt and adequate support 

to the Allied forces. Until the 12th Army 

Group was established at the beginning of 

August, 14 however, the actual command of 

Allied ground forces in the field was General Montgomery's and his actions are a 

vital part of the story of the Supreme 

Command. 15 

Though the initial lodgment gained 

during the first week was smaller than the 

Allies had planned, they had grounds for 

optimism in that their casualties had been 

unexpectedly light and the anticipated 

enemy counterattack had failed to materialize. On 13 June General Montgomery, pleased over developments on his 

front, expressed his intention of capturing 

Caen, establishing a strong eastern flank 

astride the Orne River from the Channel 

as far south as Thury-Harcourt, some 

fifteen miles south of Caen, and setting up 

the 8 British Corps in the area about Mont 

Pinçon, west of Thury-Harcourt, and 

Flers, some thirty-five miles south of Caen. 

(See Map I .) First Army was to hold firmly 

at Caumont and Carentan, thrust southwest from Caumont toward Villedieu and 

Avranches while sending other forces in a 

northwesterly direction toward La Hayedu-Puits and Valognes, and capture Cherbourg. In the course of the day, the arrival 

of German armored elements on General 

Montgomery's front led him to revise his 

plans and limit the advance in the British 

zone. Emphasis was placed on pulling the 

enemy on to the Second British Army 

while U.S. forces pushed toward Cherbourg. 16 

Despite Montgomery's second thought, 

both Caen and Cherbourg remained the 

primary objectives for Allied forces in midJune. The former opened the way to nearby airfields and small neighboring ports. 

Cherbourg was vitally important if the 

Allies were to get a major port into full 

operation before the end of the summer 

when it was feared that open beaches 

could no longer be used for unloading supplies and troops. General Montgomery, 

believing that Caen “was really the key to 

Cherbourg,” in that capture of the former 

would release forces then required to insure the security of the left flank, on 18 

June set the Second British Army's immediate task as the seizure of Caen. Operations were to begin on the 18th and reach 

their peak on the 22d. He directed the 

First U.S. Army to isolate the Cotentin 

14 See below, pages 203–04, for some changes during the month of August. 

15 An excellent summary of the command arrangements during the weeks of the assault and the reasons 

for the setup are given in Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, CPA 9–0230, 19 Aug 44, Eisenhower personal 

file. 

16 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 85–91. 
182 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

peninsula and then thrust northward 

through Valognes to Cherbourg. As a second priority, the First Army was to send 

other units from their positions east of 

Carentan southward toward St. Lô to 

secure the high ground east of the Vire 

which dominated the town. Montgomery 

hoped that Caen and Cherbourg would be 

taken by 24 June. 17 The order of 18 June 

was changed the following day, and the 

strong attack planned on the left wing 

against Caen was shifted to the right, 

southeast of Caen. The operations were 

postponed from 18 to 22 June. The great 

gale forced another postponement to the 

25th. 

In the west better progress was reported. 

The VII Corps cut the Cotentin peninsula 

on 18 June and then, driving north with 

three divisions, forced the surrender of 

Cherbourg on 26 and 27 June. The entire 

peninsula was cleared by 1 July. In the operation, the corps sustained some 22,000 

casualties, while the enemy lost 39,000 

prisoners and an undetermined number of 

dead and wounded. 18 

The enemy at Caen stood firm. Montgomery’s renewed attack of 25-26 June, 

hit hard by German armored counterattacks, could not get moving. When two 

new enemy panzer divisions (the 9th and 

10th SS), brought from the Eastern Front, 

were identified, Montgomery ordered a 

halt and began regrouping his forces with 

the intention of withdrawing his armor 

into a reserve prepared for renewed 

thrusts 19 

At the end of June, the Second British 

Army with a force equivalent to some sixteen divisions was holding a front approximately thirty-three miles long running 

northeastward from Caumont to the 

Channel. 20 Along the twenty miles of that 

front between Caumont and Caen, the 

enemy had concentrated seven armored 

divisions and elements of an eighth, or two 

thirds of the German armor in France, 

while two infantry divisions faced the extreme left flank of the British forces. The 

First U.S. Army with thirteen divisions, 

including two armored and two airborne, 

was holding a front some fifty to fifty-five 

miles long extending from Caumont westward to Barneville and the sea. Opposed 

to this force were seven German divisions. 21 

The German armored divisions, although superior to British and U.S. 

armored units in numbers, had been badly 

battered in the June fighting. Suffering 

from the shortage of fuel and the breakdown of tank maintenance service brought 

about by Allied air and artillery operations, they were unable to bring their 

whole strength to bear. Nevertheless, the 

enemy forces waged a savage fight. 

The Allies were fortunate that even at 

the end of June the enemy still feared a 

main attack on the Pas-de-Calais. At Hitler’s orders the Fiƒteenth Army, which could 

have sent additional reinforcements 

17 Montgomery dir to comdrs, M–502, 18 Jun 44, 

FUSA files 21 A Gp dirs. 

18 Ruppenthal, Utah Beach to Cherbourg, p. 199. 

19 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 100-101. 

20 There were twelve and one-half divisions (including three armored and one airborne) plus seven 

independent armored brigades and three independent 

infantry brigades, or approximately sixteen divisions 

according to British Historical Section estimates. 

21 Actually nine divisions were listed, but of three 

of these there were only remnants. First U.S. Army 

estimated that their combined strength was “probably . . . only one full strength infantry division.” At 

the end of June, moreover, First Army declared that 

only a “battle group” each from the 265th and 275th 

Divisions (included in the total) had reached its front. 

Some forces of the 2d Panzer Division were active in 

late June on the extreme left flank of the U.S. line. 

Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 102-06; 

FUSA Rpt of Opns, pp. 91-92. Throughout this and 

the following chapter the author has relied heavily on 

a study of German units made by Mrs. Magna E. 

Bauer of the Foreign Studies Branch, OCMH. 
D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT 

against the Allies, was holding most of its 

divisions in place. The Allies had continued since D Day to play on German 

fears of another landing. A special effort 

had been made to persuade the Germans 

that General Patton was waiting with a 

group of armies in eastern England ready 

for an attack. Various ruses were used to 

heighten German apprehensions conCerning the Kanalkueste. When General Patton 

went to the Continent as commander of 

the Third U.S. Army and it became necessary to commit the 1st U.S. Army Group 

to action, the unit was renamed 12th 

Army Group, and a paper unit was left in 

the United Kingdom. Lt. Gen. Lesley J. 

McNair was appointed commander of the 

1st Army Group inJuly. 

The Battlefor Caen 

The successful culmination of the Cherbourg campaign found neither the battle 

for Caen nor the attack toward St. La 

progressing well. Heavy concentrations of 

German armor helped slow British forces 

to the east; hedgerows of the bocage country 

slowed the advance of the British right 

wing and the entire U.S. army. Tanks 

were confined for the most part to narrow 

roads bordered by hedges which afforded 

excellent cover to the German guns, and 

the infantry had to dig out an enemy entrenched in the hedgerows of hundreds of 

tiny orchards in the Calvados countryside. 

Heavy rains interfered with air reconnaissance and virtually stopped tactical air 

attacks. As the struggle for St. La bogged 

down in a slow and costly fight, the danger 

developed that an attritional battle such 

as the Allies had fought in Flanders in 

World War I might be imminent. 

With the diminution of the battle's 

tempo, the satisfaction which the Allies 

183 

had felt over gammg a foothold on the 

Continent gave way to disappointment 

and criticism. As early as mid-June General Montgomery was blamed not only by 

many U.S., but by some British, commanders for his slowness in taking Caen. 

Among the British, the chief critics were 

airmen who felt that the 21 Army Group 

commander had let them down by his 

failure to take terrain in the airfield country southeast of Caen. 22 Although General 

Montgomery and his chief of staff, General 

de Guingand, were able to argue effectively that they had made no final commitment as to the date of capturing the 

airfields, the critics cited the 21 Army 

Group commander's speech to army chiefs 

on 7 April 1944 in which he had said that 

the task of the Second British Army was 

"to assault to the West of the R. Orne and 

to develop operations to the south-east, in 

order to secure airfield sites and to protect 

the eastern flank of First U.S. Army while 

the latter is capturing Cherbourg." Further, they felt he had not lived up to his 

analysis of the situation on 15 May 1944 

when he stressed the need of deep armored 

penetrations and the pegging out of claims 

well inland to hold the ground dominating 

road axes in the bocage country. 23 

These criticisms appear to rest on a 

fundamental misunderstanding of Montgomery's intentions in Normandy. His 

plan, as interpreted by him, by his staff, 

and, more recently, by General Bradley, 

22 Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory was a notable 

exception. 

23 Brief Summary of Operation OVERLORD as Mfecting the Army, address to officers in the four field 

armies in London, 7 April 1944; Address by General 

Montgomery to the General Officers of the Four 

Field Armies on 15 May 1944 (notes). Photostatic 

reproduction of the originals, including General 

Montgomery's penciled alterations, furnished the 

author by the Historical Section, Cabinet Office. 
184 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

was to draw enemy forces on to the British 

front in the Caen area, while U.S. forces 

were making the main Allied drive on the 

right. General Bradley has appraised the 

situation in his statement: 

For another four weeks it fell to the British 

to pin down superior enemy forces in that 

sector [Caen] while we maneuvered into position for the U.S. breakout. With the Allied 

world crying for blitzkrieg the first week after 

we landed, the British endured their passive 

role with patience and forbearing. . . . In setting the stage for our breakout the British 

were forced to endure the barbs of critics who 

shamed them for failing to push out vigorously as the Americans did. The intense 

rivalry that afterward strained relations between the British and American commands 

might be said to have sunk its psychological 

roots into that passive mission of the British 

on the beachhead. 24 

While General Montgomery had initially planned to take Caen and the airfields beyond in the first days of the assault, 

he concluded that he was achieving the 

main objective of pulling armor on to that 

front by a continued drive in the direction 

of Caen. There was no ruin of his main 

plan in the failure to take that city. The 

Supreme Commander, while staking great 

importance on the U.S. breakout west of 

St. Lô was eager to see a more spirited offensive in the east. It was perhaps for this 

reason that the two commanders did not 

always see eye to eye in Normandy. Eisenhower desired to hit the enemy hard 

wherever he could be attacked. Montgomery held that it was enough to keep the 

enemy occupied in the east while the main 

drive went forward in the west. Some 

members of his staff believed that the 

Eisenhower policy might secure immediate gains but endanger the chance to get 

the enemy into a position where he could 

be hit decisively. 25 

Criticism was moderated for a short 

time during the closing days of June as 

U.S. forces took Cherbourg and cleared 

the northern Cotentin. When U.S. and 

British drives in the first week of July fell 

short of the objectives of St. Lô and Caen, 

charges that Montgomery was too cautious increased. General Eisenhower’s 

closest U.S. and British advisers now proposed that he tactfully tell the 2 1 Army 

Group commander to push the fight for 

Caen. Clearly worried about the delay, 

the Supreme Commander had instructed 

Air Chief Marshal Tedder only a short 

time before “to keep the closest touch with 

General Montgomery or his representatives in 2 1st Army Group, not merely to 

see that their requests are satisfied but to 

see that they have asked for every kind of 

support that is practicable and in maximum volume that can be delivered.” On 

7 July, he sent the British commander a 

statement of desired objectives, rather 

than a firm order to fight a more aggressive battle. General Eisenhower spoke of 

the arrival of German reinforcements on 

the U.S. front which had stalled the advance toward St. Lô and permitted the 

enemy to withdraw armor for a reserve 

force. Noting that “a major full-dress attack on the left flank” had not yet been 

attempted,. he offered to phase forward 

any unit General Montgomery wanted, 

and to make a U.S. armored division 

available for an attack on the left flank if 

needed. He assured the 21 Army Group 

commander that everything humanly pos24 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story p. 326. 

25 For General Montgomery’s intentions, see Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 1 18–24, and de 

Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 392–400. British views 

were obtained in interviews with Montgomery’s G–2 

and G–3 and with the commander of the Second 

British Army. For General Bradley’s views, see his A 

Soldier’s Story, pp. 316–18 and 325–26. 
D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT 

sible would be done "to assist you in any 

plan that promises to give us the elbow 

room we need. The air and everything else 

will be available. 26 

General Montgomery, whose staffwas 

already considering plans for breaking out 

ofthe lodgment area and for seizing the 

Brittany peninsula, responded to this 

friendly nudge with the confident assurance that there would be no stalemate. He 

stressed the difficulties of keeping the initiative, and at the same time of avoiding 

reverses. He reminded the Supreme Commander that the British had taken advantage of the enemy's willingness to resist at 

Caen to draw enemy armor to that flank 

while the First Army captured Cherbourg. 

The 21 Army Group commander indicated that a new attack to take Caen was 

under way, and added: "I shall always 

ensure that I am well balanced; at present 

I have no fears of any offensive move the 

enemy might make; I am concentrating 

on making the battle swing our way." 27 

An all-out attack to seize Caen was 

launched by the Second British Army on 

8 July with three infantry divisions and 

two armored brigades. As a means of preparing the way, General Montgomery had 

requested a heavy bombardment on the 

northern outskirts of the city. In accordance with his request, Bomber Command 

dropped 2,300 tons of bombs between 

2150 and 2230, 7 July. At 0420 the following morning, 1 British Corps attacked 

west and north of Caen. Canadian forces 

took Franqueville to the west, while British forces cleared two small towns just 

north of the city and closed into its northeast corner at the end of the day. On the 

following day elements of British and 

Canadian forces pushed into the city; 

mopping up was completed on the 10th. 

The Second British Army had thus fin185 

ished the task of capturing that part of 

Caen which lay west of the Orne, but the 

large suburban areas (Faubourg de Vaucelles and Colom belles) east of the ri ver 

remained in enemy hands. 28 Air Chief 

Marshal Harris, chief of Bomber Command, declared after· the war that, while 

the effect of the bombing attack at Caen 

was such that the enemy temporarily lost 

all power of offensive action, the British 

Army had not exploited its opportunities. 

This was due, he said, partly to its delay 

in starting the attack after the bombing, 

and to its failure to continue the offensive 

after the initial successes of 8-9 J uly .. General Montgomery, in his account of the 

battle, has stated that it was obviously desirable to carry out the bombing immediately before the attack, but that owing 

to the weather forecast it was decided to 

carry out the bombing on the evening before the attack. He adds that the advance 

was slowed by cratering and obstruction 

from masses of debris caused by the force 

of the bombing. 29 

Criticism ofthe Second British Army's 

alleged failure to follow upits opportu26 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 7 Jul 44, SHAEF 

SGS 381 OVERLORD,I(a). 

27 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-S08, 8Jul44, 

SHAEF SGS 381 OVERLORD, I(a). 

28 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 114-18; 

Stacey, The Canadian Army, pp. 188-90. 

29 Harris, Bomber Offensive, p. 211; Montgomery, 

Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 117 -18. It is not clear wha t 

the forecast was which led to the decision to bomb on 

the evening of 7 July instead of On the morning of 8 

July. The weather forecast for the night of 7-8 July 

was: " ... good clear areas in France. Much cumulus 

and nimbocumulus at Nantes, little cloud at Paris." 

Operation Record Book, Appendices Bomber Command Operations, Vol. 4, 4 Jul 44, liM/AI/SA, 

AHB-Night Raid Report Book 6S4. As early as 6 

July, the air forces had been told that an appreciable 

air effort would probably be required on the evening 

of7 July. Extract from Advanced Operational Book of 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 6July 1944, p. 9. This 

extract and extracts from the report cited above are 

inOCMH. 
186 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

nities at Caen was intensified ten days 

later when an attack, described by the 

press as a major attempt to break out toward the east, was stopped after gains of 

some ten thousand yards. Comingjust at 

the time that the U.S. forces, after weeks 

of delays, had finally taken St. Lô, the 

Caen offensive was represented as having 

failed. This criticism rested basically on 

the continued misunderstanding by the 

general public of General Montgomery’s 

intentions. It is well, therefore, to study 

them as he outlined them on 8 July to 

General Eisenhower. The following extracts from his letter summarized his 

position : 

3. Initially, my main pre-occupations 

were: 

(a) To ensure that we kept the initiative, 

and, 

(b) To have no setbacks or reverses. 

It was not always too easy to comply with 

these two fundamental principles, especially 

during the period when we were not too 

strong ourselves and were trying to build up 

our strength. 

But that period is now over, and we can 

now set about the enemy-and are doing so. 

4. I think we must be quite clear as to 

what is vital, and what is not; if we get our 

sense of values wrong we may go astray. 

There are three things which stand out very 

clearly in my mind: 

(a) First. 

We must get the Brittany Peninsula. . . . (b) Second. 

We do not want to get hemmed in to a 

relatively small area; we must have spacefor manoeuvre, for administration, and for 

airfields. 

(c) Third. 

We want to engage the enemy in battle, to 

write-off his troops, and generally to kill Germans. Exactly where we do this does not 

matter, so long as (a) and (b) are complied 

with. 

5. The first thing we had to do was to capture Cherbourg. 

I wanted Caen too, but we could not manage both at the same time and it was clear to 

me that the enemy would resist fiercely in the 

Caen sector. 

So I laid plans to develop operations 

towards the R. Odon on the Second Army 

front, designed to draw the enemy reserves on 

to the British sector so that the First U.S. 

Army could get to do its business in the west 

all the easier. We were greatly hampered by 

very bad weather. . . . But this offensive did draw a great deal on 

it; and I then gave instructions to the First 

Army to get on quickly with its offensive 

southwards on the western flank. . . . 6. The First Army advance on the right 

has been slower than I thought would be the 

case; the country is terribly close, the weather 

has been atrocious, and certain enemy. reserves have been brought in against it. 

So I then decided to set my eastern flank 

alight, and to put the wind up the enemy by 

seizing Caen and getting bridgeheads over 

the Orne; this action would, indirectly, help 

the business going on over on the western 

flank. 

These operations by Second Army on the 

eastern flank began today; they are going 

very well; they aim at securing Caen and at 

getting our eastern flank on the Orne Riverwith bridgeheads over it. 

7. Having got our eastern flank on the 

Orne, I shall then organize the o erations on 

the eastern flank so that our a ffairs on the 

western flank can be got on with the quicker. 

It may be the best proposition is for the 

Second Army to continue its effort, and to 

drive southwards with its left flank on the 

Orne; or it may be a good proposition for it 

to cross the Orne and establish itself on the 

Falaise road. 

Alternatively, having got Caen and established the eastern flank on the Orne, it may 

be best for Second Army to take over all the 

Caumont area-and to the west of it-and 

thus release some of Bradley’s divisions for 

the southward “drive” on the western flank. 

8. Day to day events in the next few days 

will show which is best. 

The attack of Second Army towards Caen, 

which is going on now, is a big show; so far 

only 1 Corps is engaged; 8 Corps takes up 

the running on Monday morning (10 July). 

I shall put everything into it. 
D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT 187 

It is all part of the bigger tactical plan, 

and it is all in accordance with para 4 above. 

11. I do not need an American armoured 

division for use on my eastern flank; we really 

have all the armour we need. The great thing 

now is to get First and Third Armies up to a 

good strength, and to get them cracking on 

the southward thrust on the western flank, 

and then to turn Patton westwards into the 

Brittany peninsula.30 

............... 

On 10 July, the 21 Army Group commander issued orders for the coming Allied 

offensive. He directed the First Army to 

push its right wing strongly southward, to 

pivot on its left, and to swing south and 

east on the general line Le Bény-BocageVire-Mortain-Fougéres. Once it reached 

the base of the Cotentin peninsula, it was 

to send a corps into Brittany, directed on 

Rennes and St. Malo. Meanwhile, plans 

were to be made for the second phase of 

the drive in which First Army’s strong 

right wing was to make a wide sweep of 

the bocage country toward Laval-Mayenne 

and Le Mans-Alençon. 

General Montgomery reminded his 

commanders that his broad policy remained unchanged: “It is to draw the 

main enemy forces in to the battle on our 

eastern flank, and to fight them there, so 

that our affairs on the western flank may 

proceed the easier.” He then added that 

since the enemy had been able to bring 

up reinforcements to oppose the First 

Army’s advance, and since it was important to speed up the attack on the 

western flank, the operations of the Second 

British Army “must . . . be so staged that 

they will have a direct influence on the 

operations of the First Army, as well as 

holding enemy forces on the eastern flank.” 

A degree of caution marked his statement 

that, while he hoped to take the Faubourg 

de Vaucelles, east of the Orne, in the forthcoming attack, he was not prepared “to 

have heavy casualties to obtain this bridgehead . . . as we shall have -plenty elsewhere.” He assigned to his units operating 

south of Caen the general line ThuryHarcourt-Mont Pinçon-Le Bény-Bocage 

as their objective. A reserve of three 

armored divisions was organized for possible operations east of the Orne in the general area Caen-Falaise.31 This directive, 

therefore, contained provisions for a limited-objective attack east and south of 

Caen (GOODWOOD) with the major aim of 

aiding the First Army’s advance in the 

west (COBRA), while providing a strong 

reserve armored force for exploitation 

toward Falaise.32 

The press did not know of these orders. 

Newsmen in the week preceding the attack stressed the fact that the crucial blow 

for the breakout from the lodgment area 

was to be struck near Caen. Some of General Montgomery’s chief advisers have 

suggested that misconceptions as to the 

21 Army Group commander’s objectives 

perhaps arose from the overemphasis he 

placed on the decisiveness of the operation 

in order to insure full air support for the 

operation. Strategic bomber commanders 

did not like to take their planes off strategic targets for limited offensives. The 

tendency, therefore, was for the ground 

commander to stress heavily the importance of the attack he wanted supported. 

This emphasis may be seen in Montgomery’s request to Eisenhower of 12 July. 

30 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-508, 8 Jul 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381 OVERLORD, I(a). 31 Montgomery’s statement and the assignment of 

three armored divisions to the GOODWOOD attack led 

even some members of the 21 Army Group staff to 

believe that a deep and rapid penetration on the eastern flank was intended. 32 Montgomery to army comdrs, M-510, 10 Jul 44, 

First U.S. Army files (21 A Gp dirs). 
188 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Referring specifically to his operations between Caen and Falaise, he declared: 

‘‘This operation will take place on Monday 17th July. Grateful if you will issue 

orders that the whole weight of the air 

power is to be available on that day to support my land battle. . . . My whole eastern flank will burst into flames on Saturday. The operation on Monday may have 

far-reaching results. . . . ” 33 

General Eisenhower responded enthusiastically, saying that all senior airmen 

were in full accord with the plan because 

it would be “a brilliant stroke which will 

knock loose our present shackles.” He 

passed on these views to Air Chief Marshal 

Tedder who assured General Montgomery, 

“All the Air Forces will be full out to support your far-reaching and decisive plan 

to the utmost of their ability.” The 21

Army Group commander in expressing his 

thanks for these promises of support explained that the plan “if successful promises to be decisive and therefore necessary 

that the air forces bring full weight to 

bear.” .General Eisenhower, perhaps misunderstanding the full import of Montgomery’s plans, replied: 

With respect to the plan, I am confident 

that it will reap a harvest from all the sow- ing you have been doing during the past 

weeks. With our whole front acting aggressively against the enemy so that he is pinned 

to the ground, O’Connor’s [Lt. Gen. Sir 

Richard O’Connor, 8 British Corps com- mander] plunge into his vitals will be de- cisive. I am not discounting the difficulties, 

nor the initial losses, but in this case I am 

viewing the prospects with the most tremen- dous optimism and enthusiasm. I would not 

be at all surprised to see you gaining a victory 

that will make some of the “old classics” look 

like a skirmish between patrols. 

As an added indication that the Supreme 

Commander thought the drive to the east 

was likely to be something spectacular, 

there is the final statement that 21 Army 

Group could count on Bradley “to keep 

his troops fighting like the very devil, 

twenty-four hours a day, to provide the 

opportunity your armored corps will need, 

and to make the victory complete.” 34 

Allied airmen were particularly impressed by the scale of air power requested 

to support the Caen attack. General Montgomery’s request came at a time when 

plans were being made for the First Army’s 

breakout. west of St. Lô. Although the 

latter offensive was listed as the main 

operation in the lodgment area, the attack 

near Caen was supported by 7,700 tons of

bombs as opposed to 4,790 tons near 

St. Lô.35 While the restricted area of the 

St. Lô bombing meant that the small 

tonnage of bombs gave greater saturation 

of the area, Air Chief Marshal LeighMallory in his survey of the six major air 

attacks in Normandy declared that the 

bombing offensive at Caen was “the heaviest and most concentrated air attack 

in support of ground troops ever attempted.” 36 

33 Dempsey to author, 12 Mar 47; Williams to 

author, 1 Aug 51 ; de Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 

401-03; Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-49, 12 Jul 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 34 Eisenhower to Montgomery, S-55476, 13 Jul 44; 

Montgomery to Tedder, M-53, 14 Jul 44; Eisenhower 

to Montgomery, 14 Jul 44. All in Eisenhower personal 

file. Tedder to Montgomery, 13 Jul 44, SHAEF SGS 

381 OVERLORD, I(a). 35 A British reviewer of this chapter has noted that 

General Bradley would not accept cratering and 

“torn-down buildings” but would have liked to have 

the support of Bomber Command. British heavy 

bombers, he adds, were excluded from the support 

program because for some technical reason they could 

not carry the necessary small bombs. The author’s 

purpose in contrasting the tonnages dropped is not 

to imply lack of British air support for COBRA, but 

rather to note the importance attached to air support 

for GOODWOOD. 36 Leigh-Mallory Despatch, p. 64. Harris, Bomber 

Offensive, p. 212, cites the tonnage at Caen as 6,800. 

Stacey, The Canadian Army, p. 189, uses LeighMallory’s figure. 
D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT 189 

Heavy bombers opened the attack south 

and east of Caen at 0545, 18 July, with a 

forty-five minute pounding. After an interval of thirty minutes, medium bombers attacked for another three quarters of an 

hour. In all some 1,676 heavy bombers 

and 343 medium and light bombers of the 

Bomber Command and the Eighth and 

Ninth Air Forces hit the German positions, dropping more than three times the 

tonnage loosed on Caen ten days earlier. 

Ground attacks began at 0745. Three 

armored divisions operating in the center 

of the line progressed well in the morning, 

but were brought to a standstill in the 

afternoon by heavy antitank fire and 

armored counterattacks. To the right and 

left of the armored units, the infantry 

made limited advances in heavy rain on 

the 19th and 20th. By evening of the 20th, 

the British forces had come to a halt. The 

infantry relieved the armored units, which 

were drawn back into reserve, and plans 

were made for a later advance to push the 

left flank eastward to the Dives and gain 

additional ground between the Odon and 

the Orne. Of the 18–20 July attack, General Montgomery said: “We had, however, largely attained our purpose; in the 

centre 8 Corps, had advanced ten thousand yards, fought and destroyed many 

enemy tanks, and taken two thousand 

prisoners. The eastern suburbs of Caen 

had been cleared and the Orne bridgehead had been more than doubled in 

size.” 37 

Although the 21 Army Group attack 

had achieved its objective of attracting 

German armor to the eastern front and 

thus aiding the U.S. breakout to the west, 

now scheduled for 24 July, it was difficult 

to convince newsmen that so much ground 

and air strength had been expended with 

the idea of gaining such modest results. 

The skepticism was the more pronounced 

because of an interview which General 

Montgomery gave the press after the offensive opened. Apparently in an effort to 

dispel the unjust assumption that British 

troops were doing little fighting, and to 

disguise the big U.S. drive, he stressed the 

decisiveness of the attack then under way 

south of Caen. When the offensive had 

halted, General Montgomery’s statements 

were contrasted with General Dempsey’s 

pronouncement at the conclusion of the 

battle that there had been no intention of 

doing anything more than establishing a 

bridgehead over the Orne. The reaction 

of many newsmen was perhaps best expressed by Drew Middleton, a New York 

Times correspondent whose columns had 

been friendly to General Montgomery, 

but who now wrote: “In view of this statement [ Second British Army’s] the preliminary ballyhoo attending the offensive by 

Twenty-First Army Group and the use of 

the words ‘broke through’ in the first statement from that headquarters were all the 

more regrettable.” 38 

Allied airmen were angry because their 

powerful air strike was followed by such 

limited ground gains—“seven thousand 

tons of bombs for seven miles” as one air 

marshal put it. In heated discussions at 

SHAEF, critics of General Montgomery 

condemned his slowness in advancing. 

Some British and U.S. staff members, 

who appeared unaware of Montgomery’s 

main objectives, speculated on the possibility of relieving the 21 Army Group 

commander in order to speed up the advance south of Caen. The Supreme Commander was cool to these suggestions and 

to proposals that he speedily assume com37 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 127-34; 

Stacey, The Canadian Army, pp. 188–90. See also 

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, 

III, 207–09. 

38 New York Times dispatches, July 17–25, 1944. 
190 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

mand of the field forces. Even when a 

British member of his staff warned him 

that the U.S. forces would think he had 

sold them out to the British if he continued to support Montgomery, General 

Eisenhower showed considerable reluctance to intervene in the battle beyond 

making a firm request for more rapid advances on the British front. 39 

Although refraining from any positive 

action relative to shifts in the Allied command, General Eisenhower apparently 

shared the view held by others at SHAEF 

that Montgomery should have pushed 

faster and harder at Caen. In his letter of 

21 July to the British commander, the 

strongest he had yet written to him, the 

Supreme Commander indicated that, after 

the Second British Army had been unable 

in late June and early July to provide 

favorable conditions for the First Army’s 

drive to the south, he had pinned his hopes 

on a major drive in the Caen area. That 

he did not regard a strong, limited action 

around Caen as the same thing was shown 

rather strikingly in his next statement: “A 

few days ago, when armored divisions of 

Second Army, assisted by a tremendous 

air attack, broke through the enemy’s 

forward lines, I was extremely hopeful and 

optimistic. I thought that at last we had 

him and were going to roll him up. That 

did not come about.” Now, his immediate 

hopes were pinned on Bradley’s attack 

west of St. Lô, which would require Allied 

aggressiveness all along the line. General 

Eisenhower specified a continuous strong 

attack and the gaining of terrain for airfields and space on the eastern flank as 

contributions expected of General Dempsey’s forces. The Supreme Commander 

added that he was aware of the serious 

reinforcement problem which faced the 

British, but felt that this was another reason why they should get their attack under 

way. “Eventually,” he pointed out, “the 

American ground strength will necessarily 

be much greater than the British. But 

while we have equality in size we must go 

forward shoulder to shoulder, with honors 

and sacrifices equally shared.” 40 

At the time this letter was being written, 

General Montgomery was issuing a new 

directive ordering intensive operations 

along the Second British Army front. This 

was sent to Eisenhower with a request that 

the 21 Army Group commander be informed if they did not now see eye to eye 

on operations. The Supreme Commander 

replied that they were apparently in complete agreement that a vigorous and persistent offensive should be sustained by 

both First and Second Armies.41 

Even as the plans were being made for 

the renewed offensive which was to lead to 

the breakout, criticism of General Montgomery continued to mount in the press. 

When informed by the War Department 

near the end ofJuly that some newspapers 

in the United States were still attacking 

General Montgomery, the Supreme Commander emphasized his personal responsibility for the policy which had been followed in Normandy since the invasion. He 

declared that such critics apparently forgot that “I am not only inescapably re39 Butcher, My Three Tears With Eisenhower, pp. 617 - 

24, makes clear the strong feeling which existed at 

SHAEF during this period on the matter of Caen. 

The information has been checked by interviews with 

nearly every key member of SHAEF and by examination of private papers and diaries. See Crusade in 

Europe, pp. 266-68, for General Eisenhower’s postwar 

reaction. 40 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 21 JuI 44, Eisenhower personal file. 41Montgomery to Bradley, Dempsey, and others, 

M-512, 21 Jul 44, 12 A Gp files 371.3 Military Objectives. Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-65, 22 Jul 

44; Eisenhower to Montgomery, 23 Jul 44. Both in 

Eisenhower personal file. 
D DAY TO THE BREAKOUT 191 

sponsible for strategy and general missions 

in this operation but seemingly also ignore 

the fact that it is my responsibility to determine the efficiency of my various subordinates and make appropriate report to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff if I become 

dissatisfied.’’ 4 2 

General Eisenhower’s assurances, which 

might have been essential had the impasse in Normandy continued, were 

proved to be unnecessary by the turn of 

events. As his words were written, the 

Allied forces were on the move—toward 

Falaise in the east and toward Brittany in 

the west. The frustrations and irritations, 

born of inaction and stalemate, which had 

stirred the Allied press to criticism, were 

to evaporate, at least for a time, as the 

Allied forces burst through the German 

lines and swept toward Paris. 

42 Eisenhower to Surles, FWD 12498, 30 Jul 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
CHAPTER XI 

The Breakout and Pursuit 

to the Seine 

Beginning on 25 July, General Eisenhower’s forces unleashed a heavy air and 

ground attack west of St. Lô and smashed 

the enemy opposition blocking the Allied 

advance. In four weeks the battle of stalemate in the bocage had changed to one of 

great mobility as the Allied forces searched 

out the enemy along the Loire and toward 

Brest, encircled and destroyed thousands 

of German troops in a great enveloping 

movement at Falaise, and dashed to the 

Seine to cut off the Germans and threaten 

Paris. All this was in accord with the 

broad outlines of earlier plans, but the 

speed with which the drives were executed 

and with which the enemy opposition collapsed west of the Seine followed from the 

unexpected opportunities which Allied 

commanders had turned to their advantage. (Map II) 

The Allied Situation in Late July 

On 18 July as the British opened an offensive south of Caen, the U.S. forces 

ended their fight for St. Lô which had 

been carried on sporadically since June. 

The battle had been unusually bitter, 

costing elements of five U.S. divisions 

nearly 1 1,000 casualties in two weeks. In 

gaining St. Lô the First U.S. Army opened 

an important road center to the south and 

east from the OM AHA and UT AH beaches 

and provided maneuver area for a drive to 

the south then being planned.1 To the east, 

the British were poised for further advances in the direction of Falaise. 

Despite these victories, the Allied gains 

still did not appear impressive when measured on a map of France. After nearly 

seven weeks of fighting, the deepest penetrations were some twenty-five to thirty 

miles deep on an eighty-mile front. The 

British and Canadians had suffered some 

49,000 casualties, and the U.S. forces some 

73,000. These losses had been almost completely replaced before the attack, and at 

the time of the breakout units were practically up to strength. At that time the 

British and Canadians had an equivalent 

of sixteen and the U.S. forces seventeen 

divisions in the field. By 23 July, a cumulative tota1 of 591,000 British and Canadian and 770,000 U.S. troops had been 

landed in Normandy.2 The U.S. forces 

had, in addition to the two airborne divi1 [2d Lt. David Garth] St. Lô AMERICAN 

FORCES IN ACTION (Washington, 1947). 2 Cumulative strength includes only the number 

landed and does not reflect evacuated wounded, 

dead, or those units taken back to the United Kingdom for refitting. Statistics for British and U.S. casualties and strength were seldom reported for the 

same time of the day and often not on the same day. 

In the present case 22 July at 2400 is taken for U.S. 

casualties (SHAEF G-3 Summary 51, 27 Jul 44) and 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 193 

sions then being re-equipped after their 

work in the assault, three divisions in the 

process of moving from the United Kingdom to the Continent, two more ready to 

move from the United Kingdom, and 

other divisions in the Mediterranean and 

the United States ready to move at the 

rate of three to five a month.3 

The supply situation was for the most 

part favorable. Allied naval and air forces 

had virtually eliminated any threat to 

shipping in the Channel. Landing of cargo 

over the beaches continued to increase, 

and on 19 July the first supplies were 

brought in through Cherbourg. The ammunition shortage, which had been apparent in the first days of the invasion, 

had not been solved but had been improved. Supply detachments were being 

strengthened to handle augmented demands, although they were cramped for 

space as a result of the restricted area held 

by the Allied forces. 

Notwithstanding the favorable situation, the Allies had not forgotten the gale 

of mid-June and the fact that the bulk of 

their supplies and personnel still had to 

come over open beaches which were at the 

mercy of Channel storms. The opening of 

both the Brittany and the Seine ports was 

necessary, the Allies believed, if they were 

to be sure of their logistical support during 

the fall and winter months. Their previous 

experience in rehabilitating ports destroyed by retreating Germans demon23 July at 0600 is taken for British casualties (SHAEF 

G-3 Summary 30, 26 Jul 44). The nearest date to 

these on which both British and U.S. cumulative 

strengths are listed is 21 July (SHAEF G-3 Summary 

47, 23 Jul 44). Statistics for 1 August 1944 show a 

greater disproportion both of strength and casualties. Cumulative strength for that date shows 934,000 

U.S. and 682,000 British and Canadian, with casualties of 86,000 U.S. as opposed to approximately 

56,000 British and Canadian (SHAEF G-3 Summary 

58, 3 Aug 44). 

strated the necessity of capturing the ports 

within a few weeks if they were to be put 

back in working order before bad weather 

closed in. Early planning after the invasion, therefore, emphasized operations to 

seize Brest, Le Havre, Quiberon Bay, 

Morlaix, and other French ports. While 

General Eisenhower looked toward the 

German border and beyond to the Rhine 

and to Berlin, he was interested immediately in the vital French ports. 

The German Situation 

The difficulties under which the enemy 

labored before D Day became greater as 

the battle in Normandy continued. The 

old problems of divided authority, low 

state of troops in France, lack of mobility 

and armament, and almost total absence 

of air support still remained. Allied naval 

fire power had been unexpectedly heavy 

in the beachhead during the early days of 

the invasion. Allied air superiority made 

movements of German reinforcements 

and supplies almost impossible while permitting the Allied forces to land their 

matériel and move it forward with impunity. Hitler’s continual interference in 

tactical decisions caused confusion among 

the field commanders. Misjudging Allied 

intentions, the Fuehrer and OKW held 

the main forces of Fifteenth Army in the 

Pas-de-Calais until nearly the end of July. 

Throughout all of June and two thirds of 

July the enemy assumed that a second 

landing would be made north of the Seine, 

and it was not until the 19th that the first 

armored division was released from 

3 Twenty U.S. divisions were actually on the Continent by the time the drive for the Seine began. The 

Polish Armored Division and the 4th Canadian Armored Division were committed by 5 August. Three 

additional U.S. divisions came in as part of the invasion forces in southern France in mid-August. 
194 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Fifteenth Army for the Normandy front. 

Widespread differences existed between 

OB WEST and OKW as to the nature of 

the battle to be waged in Normandy. 

The Germans had been forced into a defensive battle, their reserves were being 

committed piecemeal, and lack of replacements brought a thinning of the front 

which, without speedy reinforcement, 

meant the German line must ultimately 

collapse. Hitler’s orders to stand and fight 

required units to be kept in untenable 

positions until there was no chance for 

them to withdraw without heavy losses. 

Von Rundstedt and Rommel discussed the 

situation with Hitler at the end of June, 

and on 1 July Rundstedt proposed that 

the Germans abandon the Caen bridgehead and establish a defense line running 

roughly from Caen to Caumont. Jodl, 

chief of the operations staff of OKW, opposed this move on the ground that it foreshadowed a German evacuation of 

France. When Hitler backed Jodl, Rundstedt replied that, unless his line was 

shortened in a few days, several of his 

armored divisions would soon be too 

battle weary for further action. Rundstedt 

was replaced a short time later as Commander in Chief West by Generalfeldmarschall Guenther von Kluge. Geyr von 

Schweppenburg, commander of Panzer 

Group West and a supporter of Rundstedt’s 

views, was replaced by General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Eberbach. 4 

On 20 July an unsuccessful attempt on 

Hitler’s life uncovered evidence of a conspiracy in which a number of generals and 

members of the General Staff were implicated. This effort, intended to open the 

way to a negotiated peace which would 

save Germany from total defeat, proved to 

be premature. Some of the bolder officers 

were court-martialed and executed and 

others were removed from posts of responsibility. Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich 

Himmler’s power over internal security 

was increased. Commanders who recommended evacuation of territory or who 

spoke of possible defeat were often looked 

upon with suspicion. 

Among the commanders suspected of 

complicity in the plot was Field Marshal 

Rommel, although he had been incapable 

of participating in the attempted assassination because of injurjes he had received 

on 17 July when an Allied plane strafed 

the staff car in which he was riding in 

Normandy. Suffering from an injured eye, 

a fractured skull, and a brain concussion, 

he was out of combat throughout the summer and early fall of 1944. He died in the 

middle of October from poison which he 

took in preference to standing trial. His 

reward was a state funeral ordered by the 

Fuehrer. 5 Rommel’s command of Army 

Group B was assumed in mid-July by von 

Kluge in addition to his other duties. 

Enemy losses for the period 6 June-23 

July were approximately the same as those 

suffered by the Allies. German sources 

estimated casualties for that period at 

116,863. While the Allies had replaced 

nearly all their losses by the end of July, 

enemy reinforcements numbered only 

some 10,000. The effect appeared in the 

number of understrength divisions which 

4 Panzer Group West was assigned to Seventh Army on 

7 June 1944. On 10 June 1944 the headquartersof 

Panzer Croup West was bombed out and the remnants 

were subordinated directly to OB WEST for rehabilitation. On 28 June 1944 Panzer Group West was 

assigned to Army Group E and took command of the 

Seine-Drôme sector. 

5 Official Notes by Martin Bormann Reference to 

Field Marshal Rommel, 28 Sep 44; Statement on 

Rommel’s death by Heinrich Doose (who drove the 

car in which Rommel died), 30 May 45. Both in Officer’s Personnel Files, OKH/Hccres-PersonaIamt, Personalakten. 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 195 

the enemy had for use against the Allies. 

On the 25th, the Seventh Army had at most 

thirteen weak divisions to oppose fifteen 

full-strength U.S. divisions. Panzer Group 

West, facing a British equivalent strength 

of seventeen divisions, had nominally nine 

infantry divisions and six or seven panzer 

divisions, of which two or three infantry 

divisions and one panzer division were 

only then in the process of being transFIELD MARSHAL VON KLUGE 

FIELD MARSHAL ROMMEL 

ferred to that front. It was assumed that 

an additional thirteen or fourteen divisions could be brought into the battle area. 

Of these, two had been rehabilitated in 

southern France, two divisions were being 

sent to Normandy from other theaters, five 

divisions were due to arrive by mid-August from northern France and Belgium, 

and five additional units could be raised 

by stripping the coasts of the Netherlands, 

Belgium, and northern France.6 

Despite obvious weakness, the enemy's 

position was not hopeless, as his stout resistance to Allied action demonstrated. 

The hedgerows of Normandy were favorable to the defender, and the Germans, 

3 OB WEST, KTB 1.-31.VII.44, 24 Jul 44; SHAEF 

G-3 Daily Summary, 25 Jul 44; Situation map 

(1 :200,000) of the WFSt Operations Abteilung (H) (referred to hereafter as WFSt/Op. [H]), dated 26 Jul 

44, showing situation on 25 Jul 44; 12th A Gp situation map for 25 Jul 44; 12th A Gp Final Rpt G-2, 

Vol. 3, Annex B; MS # B-722, The Situation, 24 

July 1944 (Gersdorff). The last-named document is 

the first of a series of reports, MSS # B-722 to 729, 

The Campaign in Northern France 25 Jul 44-14 Sep 

44, written in part by von Gersdorff, chief of staff of 

Seventh Army in Normandy, and in part by field 

commanders participating in that campaign. 
196 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

expert at digging in, still made good use of 

the terrain to compensate for their inferiority in manpower and matériel. Also 

in their favor was the fact that the Allies 

still lacked room in which they could 

maneuver and bring the full force of their 

mobile units to bear. As long as they could 

be kept locked in the Cotentin peninsula 

and hemmed in at the Orne, there was a 

hope that Normandy could be held. 

Plans for the Breakout 

As early as 1942, planners of the Combined Commanders in London had visualized a landing in the Caen area and a 

swing southward into Brittany and then 

eastward to Paris. The COSSAC planners 

in their outline plan of 1943 had done the 

same. Both terrain features and military 

considerations favored such a campaign. 

An attack due south from St. Lô toward 

the Loire and a turning movement to the 

east at the base of the Cotentin peninsula 

would have several advantages. Such an 

attack would cut off the Brittany peninsula, give the formations advancing on 

Paris a secure right flank on the Loire, and 

permit the Allies to force the enemy back 

against the Seine. The enemy would be 

compelled to withdraw through hilly 

country lying between the British forces in 

the north and the U.S. forces in the south 

instead of using the better escape route 

lying through the Orléans Gap–a level 

area located roughly between Chartres 

and Orléans. A retreat southward through 

this area would give the Germans an opportunity to join up with their forces in 

southern France or to gain contact with 

units in Alsace. This could be forestalled 

by the Allies with an armored thrust that 

would put them in a position to outflank 

such a movement and force the enemy 

into a narrow area north of Paris. Meanwhile, it was possible that the swing to the 

south would cut off enemy units in the 

Brittany peninsula from those in the rest 

of northern France and permit them to be 

defeated in detail. The Allies hoped that 

the opening of the Brittany ports would 

follow rapidly. 

Less than two weeks after the invasion 

of Normandy, as the Allied forces strained 

to edge forward a few hundred yards each 

day, 21 Army Group planners outlined a 

plan for exploiting a deterioration in the 

German capacity to resist. They forecast a 

much more rapid sweep to the east than 

SHAEF planners had envisaged in their 

pre-D-Day plans which were based on the 

assumptions that the enemy would resist 

to the Seine and that the Brittany ports 

would be captured and furnishing some 

supplies for the U.S. forces before any 

major drive began to the east. This original concept of a deliberate advance to the 

Seine, followed by a three-week build-up, 

was abandoned by the 21 Army Group 

planners in favor of a British crossing of 

the Seine with the mission of enveloping 

Paris on the north, while the First U.S. 

Army followed through the OrlCans Gap 

and south of Paris as fast as maintenance 

would permit. It was hoped that a pause 

to regroup would not be necessary until 

the forces were east of the Seine. 7 

7 Development of Operations From the Bridgehead 

to Secure Lodgment Area and Advance Beyond, 21 A 

Gp plans. Opn LUCKY STRIKE, examination by planning staff, 20 Jun 44, and app., 21 A Gp, Appreciation of Possible Development of Operation LUCKY 

STRIKE, 18 Jun 44; 21 A Gp, Opn LUCKY STRIKE, 

Appreciation of Possible Development of Operations 

From the Bridgehead, 27 Jun 44. All in SHAEF 

AEAF 928. SHAEF planners paper, Post-NEPTUNE 

Courses of Action After Capture of the Lodgment 

Area, Sec. II, 30 May 44, and G–3’s covering letter, 

31 May 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post-OVERLORD Planning, I. 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 197 

Seeing no chance of any sudden deterioration of the German capacity to resist, 

SHAEF Planning Staff members reacted 

unfavorably to several features of the 21 

Army Group plan. They believed that the 

early capture of Seine ports would not 

compensate for the lack of ports in Brittany, and took the position that the proposed plan would be acceptable only if it 

did not greatly delay the capture of the 

latter ports. Without a greater build-up of 

U.S. supplies, they saw no chance of supporting any but the smallest U.S. force 

east of the Seine or south and southeast of 

Paris. They believed, therefore, that the 

proposed pursuit must be limited in 

scope, 8 suggesting that it might be possible 

for British and Canadian forces to cross 

the Seine, while U.S. units guarded the 21 

Army Group right flank west of the river. 9 

Before the Allies could rush their forces 

to the Seine, they first had to break out of 

the confines of the bocage country. It was to 

this problem that General Eisenhower and 

his commanders turned their attention in 

the early days of July. The direction of 

such an attack had been discussed even 

earlier. A broad plan indicating that the 

main offensive was to be on the U.S. front 

and would consist of a turning movement 

at the base of the Cotentin peninsula had 

been made by 21 Army Group before D 

Day and approved by General Eisenhower.. At the end of June General Montgomery had directed First Army to swing 

southward and eastward to the general 

line Caumont-Vire-Mortain-Fougéres, to 

send one corps westward into Brittany, 

and to plan for a wide sweep eastward toward the objectives Laval–Mayenne and 

Le Mans-AlenGon. 10 Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley had discussed future 

plans on 1 July. By 10 July, General Bradley and his First Army staff had drawn up 

Operation COBRA, designed as a limited 

attack for the purpose of penetrating “the 

enemy’s defenses west of St. Lô by VII 

Corps and exploiting this penetration with 

a strong armored and motorized thrust 

deep into the enemy’s rear towards Coutances” 11 Montgomery approved the 

plan shortly after the middle of the month, 

and the field commanders then took up 

with Tedder, Leigh-Mallory, Spaatz, and 

other tactical and strategic air commanders the co-ordination of the air efforts for 

the attack. 

8 SHAEF Operations LUCKY STRIKE, BENEFICIARY, 

and HANDS UP, examination by Planning Staff, 29 

Jun 44; SHAEF Operation LUCKY STRIKE, BENEFICIARY, and HANDS UP, examination by Planning Staff, 

3 Jul 44. Both in SHAEF AEAF 928. The initial 21 

Army Group draft, recognizing the difficulties that 

might face U.S. forces inasmuch as they might have 

to move 150 miles in ten to fifteen days, had indicated 

the possibility of stopping the advance on the line 

Cabourg-Sées to re-form U.S. forces and construct 

airfields. 

9 The air members of the SHAEF Planning Staff 

held that the group was too cautious and unimaginative in giving this unfavorable report. Memo by Gp 

Capt Peter Broad, 28 Jun 44; SHAEF Operation 

LUCKY STRIKE, BENEFICIARY, and HANDS UP, examination by Planning Staff, 3 Jul 44. Both in SHAEF 

AEAF 928. 

10 Montgomery dir to army comdrs, M-505, 30 Jun 

44, FUSA files L–348 21 A Gp dirs. 

11 Operation COBRA, 13 Jul 44, FUSA files L–348 

(18 B); Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 316–32. The 

COBRA operation is frequently misnamed the St. Lô 

operation apparently because the attack on that city 

was so recently in the news and possibly because the 

short name was helpful to headline writers. COBRA is 

also used incorrectly to refer to the entire breakout 

and pursuit period. LUCKY STRIKE, the name for the 

earlier 21 Army Group plan to exploit a deterioration 

in the German will to resist, is also incorrectly used to 

refer to the breakout and pursuit period. No single 

code name covers the entire operation from 25 July to 

25 August. COBRA isproperly applicable only to the 

period 25 July-1 August 1944. The British attack 

made at the same time was called GOODWOOD and 

that of the Canadians SPRING. Later British and 

Canadian attacks were known as TOTALIZE and 

TRACTABLE. 
198 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

At this crucial period between stalemate and breakout, the Allied command 

arrangement of D Day was still in effect. 

General Eisenhower made frequent visits 

by plane to his field commanders while 

maintaining his forward command post at 

Portsmouth and his main headquarters at 

WIDEWING. Often he was called on to do 

little more than to give a nod of approval 

to the plans made by the field commanders. He and his staff influenced the 

operations in this period by phasing 

forward additional units, by speeding up 

deliveries of ammunition and equipment, 

and by co-ordinating the Allied air effort. 

In some cases, General Eisenhower, by 

virtue of his control of U.S. forces as 

theater commander, dealt more directly 

with General Bradley than with General 

Montgomery. 

Actual control of all ground operations 

was still in the hands of General Montgomery. He, in turn, allowed General 

Bradley considerable freedom relative to 

plans for First Army. General Bradley has 

said of this relationship: 

He [Montgomery] exercised his Allied 

authority with wisdom, forbearance, and 

restraint. While coordinating our movements 

with those of Dempsey’s, Monty carefully 

avoided getting mixed up in U.S. command 

decisions, but instead granted us the latitude 

to operate as freely and as independently as 

we chose. At no time did he probe into First 

Army with the indulgent manner he sometimes displayed among those subordinates 

who were also his countrymen. I could not 

have wanted a more tolerant or judicious 

commander. Not once did he confront us 

with an arbitrary directive and not once did 

he reject any plan that we had devised. 12 

General Montgomery’s attacks for Caen 

were to gain additional maneuver room 

and to aid the U.S. drive toward the 

south. His offensive of 18 July was designed to draw enemy forces from General 

Bradley’s front west of St. Lô, so that U.S. 

forces could get into position for a largescale advance. When General Bradley’s 

attack, initially set for 18 July, was postponed because of bad weather, General 

Montgomery set the 24th for the second 

try and restated his over-all plans for the 

breakout. The First Army was to cut off 

the enemy in the Périers-Lessay area in 

the southern Cotentin; the Third Army 

was then to swing south and east on the 

western flank into Brittany. Meanwhile, 

the Second British Army, fighting hard on 

the eastern flank, was to keep the enemy 

pinned down in the Caen sector and 

maintain a continuous threat of an advance toward Falaise and Argentan. Not 

sure of what might happen, General 

Montgomery said he “intended to ‘crack 

about’ and try to bring about a major 

withdrawal in front of Brad.” 13 

To encourage General Bradley in “the 

largest ground assault yet staged in this 

war by American troops exclusively,” 

General Eisenhower sent the First Army 

commander a message accepting full personal responsibility for the “necessary 

price of victory” Pointing out that the 

British forces were to carry on a vigorous 

attack, the Supreme Commander said 

that this aid would enable Bradley “to 

push every advantage with an ardor 

verging on recklessness.” General Eisenhower looked ahead to the possible results 

which might be attained and prophesied 

that, if the Second Army should break 

through simultaneously with the U.S. 

forces, the results would be “incalculable.” 14 

12 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 3 19–20. 

13 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M–514, 24 Jul 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

14 Eisenhower to Montgomery for Bradley, FWD12438, 24 Jul 44, Eisenhower personal file. 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 199 

The COBRA Operation 

General Bradley's operation got off to a 

false start on 24July. The attack was postponed because of bad weather after some 

of the heavy bombers had actually started 

their preparation in the break-through 

area. On the following day, better weather 

made possible the launching ofthe saturation bombing plan worked out by IX 

Tactical Air Command (Maj. Gen. Elwood 

R. Quesada) and First Army. At 0940approximately 350 fighter bombers made a 

twenty-minute attack on a 250-yard strip 

along the Periers-St. La road, west of 

St. La. This action was followed by an 

hour's bombing of an area 2,500 by 6,000 

yards in which 1,887 heavy and medium 

bombers and 559 fighter bombers of the 

Eighth and Ninth Air Forces dropped 

more than 4,000 tons of expl~ives. The 

ground forces, despite casualties suffered 

by forward elements from bombs that fell 

short, moved forward at 1100. It was 

found that the air attack had stunned the 

enemy, destroying his communications 

and rendering many of his weapons ineffecti ve. The VII Corps commander, 

Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins later concluded that "the bombing was the decisive 

factor in the initial success of the breakthrough." One tragic feature of the air assault was the death of General McNair, 

who had gone forward to view the attack 

and was struck by one of the U.S. bombs 

which fell short. To replace General 

McN air as head of the fictitious 1st U.S. 

Army Group, the War Department sent 

Lt. Gen. John L DeWitt, former commander of the Western Defense Command. Is 

The VII Corps followed the bombing 

with armored and infantry attacks. In the 

next three days its two armored and four 

infantry divisions overran enemy positions. 

At the same time, General Bradley's other 

three corps were making steady advances. 

News of the initial successes was slow in 

reaching General Eisenhower, but he 

maintained that the men were fighting for 

all their worth and that the enemy would 

soon crack under the pressure. Impressed 

by the reported effects of bombing on 

enemy morale, he felt that a concerted intensive drive could break through the 

whole defense system' of the enemy on a 

selected front, and that the Allies were 

going "to get a great victory, very soon. "t6 

The COBRA operation was completed in 

its basic details on 28 July with the First 

" Unpublished draft account of VII Corps actions 

in Hq ETOUSA Hist Sec narrative on Opn COBRA; 

Eighth Air Force, Special Report on Operations, 24-

25 JuIH, dtd 11 Sep 44; USSTAF, Report of Investigation, 14 Aug 44; 12th A Gp, Effect of Air Power on 

Military Operations. All in OCMH files. Craven and 

Cate, The Am!)' Air Forces in World War II, III, 231-43. 

Statistics on the number of airplanes and tons of 

bombs dropped vary in different accounts. The author has used those given in the Craven and Cate 

volume, p. 232. 

The bombing at St. La, although heavy, was actually only the third largest in Normandy in number of 

tons dropped according to the report of Air Chief 

Marshal Leigh-Mallory. The largest was that at Caen 

on 18 July when 1,676 heavies and 343 mediums 

dropped 7,700 tons. The second largest was in support 

ofthe Canadian Army along the Caen-Falaise road 

on the night of 7-8 August and the succeeding day. 

More than 5,200 tons of bombs were dropped by 

1,450 bombers of the Eighth Air Force and Bomber 

Command. There were three other important preparations in Normandy: in support of British at Caen, 

8July-2,662 tons by 467 bombers of Bomber Command; in support of British south of Caumont, 30 

July-2,227 tons by 693 heavies of Bomber Command 

and over 500 light and medium bombers of AEAF; in 

support of Canadians near Falaise, 14 August-3,723 

tons by 811 bombers of Bomber Command. FUSA 

Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44, Bk. I; Air Chief 

Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Despatch to the 

Supreme Commander, AEF, November 1944, Supplenunl to The London Ga;:ette, December 31,1946, pp. 

64-65. 

18 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 26Ju144, Eisenhower personal file. 
200 

Army's capture of Coutances. The four 

U.S. corps were then ordered to press their 

attack southward General Bradley reported that he and his men were feeling 

"pretty cocky" and refused to have their 

enthusiasm dampened by reports that the 

enemy was sending reinforcements. "I 

can assure you," he told General Eisenhower, "that we are taking every calculated risk and we believe we have the 

Germans out of the ditches and in complete demoralization and expect to take 

full advantage of them." He paid special 

tribute for his success to the tactical air 

forces, pointing to the close liaison between planes and tank formations and the 

"picnic" the air forces had enjoyed in 

dealing with enemy daylight movements. 

"I cannot say too much," he added, "for 

the fine cooperation Quesada and his 

command have given us in the last few 

days." 17 

The enemy commanders in their own 

way paid tribute to the effectiveness of airground co-operation. They complained 

that low-flying planes subjected traffic to 

long delays or stopped it entirely, with the 

result that reinforcements could not be 

brought up readily. Composite experiences of German commanders were described after the war in the following 

statement: 

Covered by their air force, the [Allied] 

troops who had penetrated into the line 

affected the rear of the German units to such 

an extent that the unity of the defense deteriorated and the battle finally turned into 

separate fights for hills, localities, and individual farms. The command was almost entirely dependent on radio-communication, 

since all wire-lines had been destroyed and 

messengers were shot in the enemy-saturated 

terrain. The separate units fought-on their 

own-as small combat teams, and had 

hardly any contact with neighboring troops. 18 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

While the U.S. forces advanced in the 

west, General Montgomery moved his 

British and Canadian forces forward on 

the eastern flank. Early on 25July, before 

the heavy bombardment west of St. Lo, 

Canadian forces had started southward 

toward Falaise. In a day of desperate 

fighting, troops of Lt. Gen. G. G. Simonds' 

2d Canadian Corps struck at an area 

heavily held by enemy armor. They suffered more than 1,000 casualties in an attack that took little territory but helped to 

conceal the direction of the main offensive 

and to delay the enemy's shift of reserves 

to the U.S. front. 19 General Montgomery 

now directed the Second British Army to 

strike in the Caumont area and ordered 

all British and Canadian forces to attack 

to the greatest degree possible with the 

resources available. He declared that the 

enemy "must be worried, and shot up, 

and attacked, and raided, whenever and 

wherever possible; the object of such activity will be to improve our own positions, to gain ground, to keep the enemy 

from transferring forces across to the 

western flank to oppose the American 

advance, and generally to 'Write off' German personnel and equipment." 20 

Shortly before this directive was issued, 

the First Canadian Army had become active on the' Continent. Its commander, 

General Crerar, had been in Normandy 

since mid-June, but because maneuver 

space for another army was lacking his 

headquarters did not become operational 

11 Bradley to Eisenhower, 28 J ul 44, Eisenhower 

personal file. See also Craven and Gate, The Army Air 

Forces in World WaT II, III, 235-43. 

,. MS # B-723, The American B:eakthrough in 

the Direction of Avranches (Gersdorff). 

,. Stacey, The Canadian AT"!)" pp. 190-94. 

20 Montgomery to army comdrs, M-515, 27 Jul44, 

12 A Gp 371.3 Military Objectives, I; Montgomery, 

Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 139-41. 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 201 

until 23 July. On that date he took over 

1 British Corps and the extreme eastern 

sector of the Allied front; on 31 July 2d 

Canadian Corps came under his command. The Canadian Army now held the 

front south ofCaen. 21 

As the U.S. attack gained momentum, 

General Eisenhower pressed General 

Montgomery to speed up his advance in 

the Caumont area. "Never was time more 

vital to us, and we should not wait on 

weather or on perfection of detail of preparation." In the same spirit of urgency, 

General Montgomery ordered General 

Dempsey to throw all caution overboard, 

to take risks, "to accept any casualties and 

to step on the gas for Vire." 22 

On 28 July, Generals Montgomery, 

Bradley, and Dempsey discussed plans 

for the "complete dislocation'" of the 

enemy, and General Montgomery informed the Supreme Commander of the 

prospects for a great victory.23 Highly 

pleased, Eisenhower replied: "From all 

reports your plan continues to develop 

beautifully. I learn you have a column in 

Avranches. This is great news and Bradley must quickly make our position there 

impregnable. . . . With Canadian Army 

fighting intensively to prevent enemy 

movement away from the Caen area 

Dempsey's attack coupled with Bradley's 

will clean up the area west of Orne once 

and for all. Good luck." 24 

Hitler Outlines His Plan 

Severely shaken by the bombardments 

of25July and hard hit by the advancing 

ground forces, Field Marshal von Kluge 

on 27 July obtained OKW's permission to 

transfer a panzer corps from the British 

front to the western side of the line. 25 On 

the same day, he also requested the transfer to the combat area of two divisions 

from the Pas-de-Calais, a third from the 

Atlantic coast of France, and a fourth 

from southern France. In support of his 

request for shifting forces from the Pas-deCalais, OB WEST reported that there was 

a possibility that an alleged newly organized 12th Army Group containing the 

Third U.S. Army and three corps was 

shortly to be sent to Normandy, and that 

it seemed probable that no second landing 

would be made. Hitler approved the release of units from the Pas-de-Calais and 

the Atlantic coast, but refused to weaken 

the defenses of southern France: At the 

end of the month, OB WEST again pressed 

OKW to strip all quiet sectors in order to 

prevent an Allied breakout. 26 

On 31July, Hitler held a particularly 

significant conference in his East Pruss ian 

headquarters with Jodi and other military 

advisers. In the course of the meeting he 

revealed his deep distrust of the high-level 

commanders of the Army, his reasons for 

pressing the battle in the west, and the 

plan of campaign he had for the coming 

months. Hitler's bitter reactions to the attempt on his life of 20 July bared the gulf 

between him and theRegular Army commanders. He described it as the symptom 

of blood poisoning which permeated the 

highest command. Condemning many of 

21 Stacey, The Canadian Army, p. 194. 

22 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 28Jul 44; Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-68, 28 Jul 44. Both in 

Eisenhower personal file. 

23 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-70, 29 J ul 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

24 Eisenhower to Montgomery, SHAEF FWD 

12505, 31 Jul 44, Eisenhower personal file. 

25 MS # B-723 (Gersdorff). 

2. OKW/WFSt, KTB Ausarbeitung, der Westen. 1.lV.-

16.XIl.44 (referred to hereafter as Der Westen [Maj. 

Percy Schramm]); OB WEST, KTB 1.-31. VII.44, 25, 

26,27,31 Ju144; Panzer-Armeeoberkommando 5 (referred 

to hereafter as Fifth Panzer Amry), KTB 10. VI.-

B. VIII. 44 , 26, 27 Jul44. 
202 

the field marshals and generals as "destroyers" and traitors, he asked how he 

could keep up morale among ordinary soldiers when once-trusted leaders dealt with 

the enemy. He declared that the signal and 

supply systems were filled with traitors and 

insisted that he could not inform his field 

commanders in the west of the broad strategic plans of the Reich, since they would 

be known to the Allied powers almost as 

soon as the details reached Paris.' He decided, therefore, to tell von Kluge only 

enough of future plans for the Commander in Chief West to carryon immediate operations. Concluding that the imminent development in the west would 

decide Germany's destiny, and that von 

Kluge could not assume such an immense 

responsibility, Hitler ordered a small 

operations headquarters established which 

could serve him later when he expected 

to go to Alsace-Lorraine or western Germany to assume the direction of operations in the west. 27 

Throughout the talk, which was little 

more than a monologue, the Fuehrer 

stressed the problem of leadership, demanding that in the future his commandersbe picked on the basis of loyalty 

and willingness to fight rather than in accordance with seniority. He asked that 

brave men, regardless of rank, be selected 

to hold the Channel and Atlantic ports 

and not "big mouths" like the commander 

at Cherbourg who had issued bold declarations and then had surrendered at the 

first Allied blow. He caustically condemned commanders, particularly those 

of noble birth, who felt they would do well 

by surrendering to the Allies. He paid 

tribute to Marshal Tito, saying that here 

was a man without military background 

who deserved the title of marshal because 

he had the will to fight. 

Hitler's strategy of holding tenaciously 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

to ports and ground in the west, a poliey 

much attacked after the war by his commanders, can be better understood in the 

light of the arguments he advanced to 

JodI. He insisted that Germany's problem 

was a moral and not a material one. So far 

as the Eastern Front was concerned, he believed that Germany would be able, with 

some effort, to stabilize the existing grave 

situation. He lashed out at those who felt 

that it was possible to come to some sort 

of arrangement with the Reich's enemies, 

saying that this was not a struggle which 

would be settled by negotiation or some 

clever tactical maneuver, but tather a 

Hunnish war in which one or the other 

of the antagonists had to perish. Speaking of his worries over the Balkans, Hitler 

made clear that continual losses might 

lead to defection by Hungary and Bulgaria or to a change in the attitude of the 

countries which were then neutral. A decisive action or a successful large-scale 

battle was essential to strengthen Germany's position. 

Hitler explained that he did not wish to 

keep his armies. tied up in Italy, but he felt 

that a withdrawal would free Allied forces 

in that area for fighting elsewhere. He 

added that it was better to fight in another 

country than to bring the battle to the 

Reich. 

For France, the Fuehrer, was quite specific. He knew that he had to make longrange plans for a withdrawal, but insisted 

on keeping them secret. He repeated that 

he intended to withhold knowledge of his 

broad plans from the Commander in Chief 

West, but did agree that certain definite 

points would be outlined. His orders to 

von Kluge included the following: (1) if 

27 Minutes of conference of 31 July 1944: Besprechung des Fuehrers mit Generaloberst Jodi am 3/.7./944 

in der Wolfsschanze (near Rastenburg, East Prussia); 

Der Westen (Schramm). 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 203 

German forces had to withdraw from the 

French coa,st, all major ports were to be 

held by garrisons under carefully picked 

commanders who would hold their positions to the last; (2) all railroad equipment 

and installations and all bridges were to 

be destroyed in territory that was abandoned; (3) the Commander in Chief West 

was to provide certain specific units with 

organic means of transportation and with 

mobile weapons; (4) no withdrawing from 

the line then occupied could be tolerated-the ground had to be held with 

fanatical determination. It was better to 

stand than to withdraw, Hitler pointed 

out, since any retreat confronted the Germans with the disadvantages of mobile 

warfare in an area where the Allies had air 

superiority. Further, the Germans lacked 

prepared positions to which they could 

pull back. Any surrender of ports increased the opportunities for the Allied 

forces to build up a crushing superiority in 

men and materiel. 

Despite his fear of a retreat that would 

give the Allies more room for maneuver, 

Hitler did issue orders for the construction 

of new defense positions along the Somme 

and the Marne. He indicated his displeasure with previous efforts, saying that 

there was a tendency to build a "show 

place" in the fortifications and to display 

these to inspectors, while hiding the weakness of the defensive lines. Delays in constructing positions, he maintained, were 

due to the demands of army groups to retain control of their rear areas. Now, he 

insisted that the work be done by the 

Organization Todt with the assistance of 

local labor. 

At the close of the conference a further 

meeting was held between Hitler,Jodl, 

and JodI's deputy, General der Artillerie 

Walter Warlimont, who was to go to 

France to acquaint von Kluge with such 

parts of the new plans as it was thought 

proper for him to know. Warlimont vainly 

endeavored to obtain from Hitler or JodI 

a clear statement of what he was to tell 

von Kluge. Under his persistent questioning, he finally succeeded in obtaining from 

a thoroughly vexed Hitler an abrupt answer: "Tell Field Marshal von Kluge that 

he should keep his eyes riveted to the front 

and on the enemy without ever looking 

backward. If and when precautionary 

measures have to be taken in the rear of 

the theater of operations in the West, 

everything necessary will be done by 

OKWand OKWalone." 28 

Shortly after Warlimont's departure, a 

special staff was formed to execute measures which had been discussed at the conference, the military governor of France 

was charged with the responsibility for 

constructing the Somme-Marne position, 

and the commander of the Replacement 

Army was ordered to refit the West Wall. 

Eisenhower Prepares Jor Action 

Meanwhile, the command of U.S. forces 

was being reorganized in preparation for 

the next phase of their offensive. On 19 

July General Bradley stated that as soon 

as Operation COBRA was completed the 

U.S. forces-on the Continent would number eighteen divisions and would soon 

afterward be increased by three more. In 

accordance with a SHAEF memorandum 

of 1 June 1944, he recommended that they 

be organized into two armies and a U.S. 

army group be brought in to command 

them. 29 General Montgomery, who was 

aware that such a change would be made 

when the U.S. build-up on the Continent 

required two American armies and that 

28 MS # C-099 a, OKW Activities-"Der Westen" 

(I Apr-31 Dec 1944), PI. II (Warlimont). 

Z9 See below, pp. 261-63. 
204 

this would be followed in due course by 

General Eisenhower's assumption of personal control of operations, agreed to the 

proposal. 

On 25 July, General Eisenhower directed that the U.S. ground forces on the 

Continent be regrouped into the First and 

Third Armies under the control of 12th 

Army Group which General Bradley was 

to command. The regrouping was to take 

place on a date set by Bradley, who was to 

give three days' prior notice to SHAEF 

and 21 Army Group. The new army 

group was to remain under the command 

of the commander in chief of the 21 Army 

Group until the Supreme Commander allocated a specific "area ofresponsibility" 

to the commanding general of the 12th 

Army Group. It was understood that Lt. 

Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, assistant commander of the First Army, was to succeed 

General Bradley in command of that 

army, and that General Patton, the Third 

Army commander, was to take over some 

of the divisions then on the Continent. To 

prePflre them for their task, General Bradley on 28 July directed Hodges to keep 

touch with the three left corps, and told 

Patton to form the six divisions on First 

Army's right into two corps while they 

were on the move. The Third Army commander was instructed to keep track of 

these corps so that he would be familiar 

with the tactical situation when his army 

became operational. General Bradley set 

1 August as the date for the new arrangement to go into effect. For the next month 

General Montgomery retained over-all 

control of ground forces on the Continent, 

but channeled all orders to U.S. forces 

through the 12th Army Group.30 

General Eisenhower, encouraged by 

the reports of late July to hope for a 

complete break-through, again reminded 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

General Montgomery of the need for bold 

action by Allied armored and mobile columns against the enemy flanks. He indicated that supplies could be dropped by 

aircraft to such units in case of an emergency, and recalled that the tremendous 

assets in the Troop Carrier Command and 

in the mastery of the air should not be 

neglected. "I know," the Supreme Commander added, "that you will keep hammering as long as you have a single shot 

in the locker." 31 

In his optimism, General Eisenhower 

foresa w a chance for the Allies to win a 

tactical victory and create virt.ually an 

open flank. If this happened he proposed 

to send only a small part of his forces into 

Brittany while using the bulk of the Allied 

units to destroy the enemy west of the 

Rhine, and exploit as far to the east as 

possible. As an alternative, in case the 

enemy stripped the area south of Caen 

and tried to set up a line from Caen to 

Avranches south of Vire, Montgomery was 

to thrust forward in the lower Seine valley. 

Operation SWORDHILT, a combined amphibious-airborne operation to seize the 

area east of Brest, was also to be launched. 

The Supreme Commander did not believe 

that the enemy could interfere with his 

plans and predicted that if the Allies could 

have a period often qays to two weeks of 

really good weather they could secure "a 

most significant success." 32 

The 21 Army Group commander, it 

will be recalled, had already ordered the 

30 Bradley to Montgomery, 19 Jul 44, and Montgomery's concurrence; Memo, Eisenhower for Brad-, 

ley, 25Ju144, sub: Comd and Organization, V.S. 

Ground Forces, SHAEF G-3 322.011-1 Command 

and Control of V.S./British Forces; Bradley to Eisenhower, 28Ju144, Eisenhower personal file. 

31 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 2 Aug 44, SHAEF 

SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I (a). 

32 Eisenhower to Marshall, S-56667, 2 Aug 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 205 

British forces to continue their drive southward in an effort to keep enemy armor 

away from the west, while First Army 

forces turned southeastward toward Vire 

and Third Army began the task of clearing the enemy from Brittany. Now that 

the First Army had opened the corridor at 

the bottom of the Cotentin peninsula, the 

spotlight was to be shifted to the Third 

Army. Patton’s forces were ordered to adGENERAL PATTON. (Photograph 

taken in 1945.) 

vance south from the vicinity of Avranches 

to Rennes, then to turn west and capture 

the Brittany peninsula and open the Brittany ports. 33 

So far as his reserves in Brittany were 

concerned the enemy was ill prepared to 

meet the armored onslaught being prepared by the Third Army. Piecemeal 

GENERAL HODGES 

commitment of enemy forces from Brittany during June and July had resulted in 

the serious weakening of the German position there. French Resistance forces had 

harassed the enemy and interfered with 

his movements. On 1 August, German 

forces in Brittany amounted to fewer than 

ten battalions of German infantry, four 

Ost battalions, and some 50,000 naval and 

service troops. 34 These troops were scattered among the various ports and so disposed that miles of front were left entirely 

33 Montgomery dir to army comdrs, M–515,27 JuI 

44, FUSA files L-345; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 

44-22 Feb 45, Bk. I, p. 1; FO 1, 4 Aug 44 (confirmation of verbal orders issued 1 Aug 44), TUSA AAR, I. 

34 Ost battalions had been formed on the eastern 

front from anti-Bolshevik Russian peoples, frequently 

prisoners of war. They had been transferred to the 

west at the rate of two Ost battalions for one German 

battalion. 
206 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

open to the Third Army’s advance. General Patton explained this situation to his 

staff, although he jokingly warned them. 

not to let the newsmen know how weak 

the enemy was. 35 

Despite their weakness in Brittany, it 

was clear that the Germans could cause 

the Third Army some difficulty. Col. 

Oscar Koch, General Patton’s chief of intelligence, warned on 2 August that the 

reported movement of enemy armor westward created the possibility of a major 

counterattack to drive a wedge to the 

Channel between the northern and southern columns of the Third Army, rendering 

the southern columns logistically inoperative. General Patton’s characteristic reaction was that, while his units might be cut 

off for a short time, he would not find it 

difficult to re-establish his position. 36 

General Montgomery by 30 July had 

pushed two corps forward from the Caumont front toward Vire and Mont Pinqon, 

pinning down II SS Panzer Corps so that it 

was not available for an enemy counterattack at Avranches. On 1 August the 

Third Army sent one corps due west into 

Brittany, but launched two others southward and southeastward, holding a fourth 

in reserve. By 4 August Rennes had fallen 

and armored spearheads had bypassed St. 

Mala and Dinan and were headed for 

Brest. First Army units at the same time 

swung toward Vire. These rapid drives 

were aided not only by the weakness of 

enemy opposition, particularly in Brittany, but by air cover furnished the armored columns by the tactical air commands, whose scale of support increased 

daily. 37 

General Montgomery answered the 

Supreme Commander’s request for continued exploitation of the enemy’s weakened position on 4 August by ordering 

General Crerar, whose forces held the 

eastern flank of the British line, to drive 

for Falaise not later than 8 August and 

cut off the withdrawal of German forces 

then facing General Dempsey west of 

Thury-Harcourt. Dempsey was to continue his move south and east toward 

Argentan. Meanwhile, Montgomery 

noted, General Hodges was to maintain 

his swing eastward with his left flank on 

the Domfront-Alenqon axis. General Patton’s army, save for one corps needed to 

clear up Brittany, was to attack due east 

from Rennes toward Laval and Angers. 

The British commander, saying that the 

Allied forces had “unloosed the shackles 

that were holding us down and have 

knocked away the ‘key rivets,’ ” swung the 

Allied right flank toward Paris with the 

intention of forcing the enemy back 

against the Seine, whose bridges had been 

destroyed between Paris and the sea. 

Minor counterthrusts that von Kluge had 

been making at the base of the Cotentin 

were discounted, since his delaying actions 

seemed likely to provide an opportunity 

for the Allies to swing around quickly and 

cut off the German routes of escape. 38 

The Mortain Counterattack 

The Germans, meanwhile, were planning a counterthrust by the Seventh Army 

to pierce the U.S. line between Mortain 

35 Entry in diary of historical officer with the Third 

Army, OCMH files; G–2 Periodic Rpt, 2 Aug 44, 

TUSA AAR, II. 

36 G–2 Periodic Rpt, 2 Aug 44, TUSA AAR, II; 

entry in diary of historical officer with Third Army, 

2 Aug 44, OCMH files. 

37 TUSA Rpt of Opns, I; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 

Aug 44-22 Feb 45, Bk. I, p. 4; MS # B-725, The 

German Counterattack Against Avranches (Gersdorff); Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, III, 243-53. 

38 Montgomery, dir to army comdrs, M-516, 4 Aug 

44; Montgomery, dir to army comdrs, M–5 17, 6 Aug 

44. Both in SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I (a). 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 207 

and Avranches in the southern Cotentin 

and cut off and destroy U.S. forces in Brittany. Hitler's order for this counterattack 

reached OB WEST on 2 August and was 

passed on to von Kluge at Army Group B 

headquarters. The Commander in Chief 

West later declared that he believed the 

plan to be grandiose and impossible offulfillment, but at the moment he appears to 

have expressed agreement with the directive. 39 

Hitler authorized von Kluge to shorten 

his line slightly east and west ofVire and 

move forces from there and from the Caen 

front to the area of Sourdeval for the counterattack. Units were also sent from the 

Pas-de-Calais area, inasmuch as the Germans now thought a landing in that area 

unlikely. A gap which had been opened 

between Panzer Group West and Seventh 

A.rmy was closed by German forces on 3 

August.4o They succeeded in consolidating 

their lines on their northwestern and western front and in forming a security line to 

the south. Fully accepting the threat to 

Brittany, von Kluge pushed preparations 

for his operation, deciding to attack at the 

end of the first week of August even if the 

assembly oftroops was not complete. Hitler, for once somewhat cautious, held that 

the attack could succeed only if it was 

postponed until all available troops were 

concentrated. Moreover, he ordered General Eberbach to lead the attack, but the 

Commander in Chief West, deciding that 

it was impossible to delay any longer and 

too late to change commanders, retained 

Generaloberst der Waffen SS Paul Hausser in charge ofthe operation. 41 

After Hitler had given his last-minute 

permission to execute the attack as 

planned, provided the two army commanders would trade places immediately 

after the attack, he decided to send Generalmajor Walter Buhle from his own 

headquarters to see that his wishes were 

carried out. 42 

In the late evening of 6 August, von 

Kluge launched the Mortain counterattack. Hitler described it as "a unique, 

never re-curring opportunity for a complete reversal of the situation." Elements, 

many very small and scattered, of six armored divisions struck by way of Mortain 

to assault the area between the See and 

the Selune Rivers. The force 'ofthe leading armored units hit the First Army, 

dealing a heavy blow to the 30th Division. 

Elements ofthe unit were encircled but 

contin ued to fight. The Germans made 

some progress in the early hours of 7 Au-

.90B WEST, lITB 1.-31. VIIl.44, 2 Aug 44; Der 

Westen (Schramm); 01 Special Interrogation Report 

39, Rittmeister Wilhelm Seheidt, 30 April 1947, The 

War in the West, 6Jun 44-'Mar 45, Headquarters, 

7707 Military Intelligence Service Center, APO 757, 

U.S. Army (referred to hereafter as 01-SIR/39 

[Scheidt]). The author of this report was the assistant 

to Generalmajor Walter Scherff, Hitler's Plenipotentiary for Military History. Scheidt relied heavily for 

his information on Der Westen (Schramm), which was 

made available to him after his capture. Consequently 

this report gives a good over-all picture as well as interesting details, but lays no claim to complete 

accuracy of fact and dates. No copy of Hitler's order 

of 2 August has been found so far. Its general content 

is reflected in the teletype from von Kluge to his army 

commanders ordering the preparations of the attack 

toward Avranches, 3 August 1944. Huresgruppe B 

(referred to hereafter as Army Group B), Ia Operations 

BeJehle9. VI.-31.VIII.44 . 

•• Pan;;:;er Group West was renamed Fifth Pan;;:;f!r 

A771!Y, effective 5 August 1944. 

.. Actually Hitler was not so much concerned with 

relieving General Hau5ser as with eliminating the 

XLVII Pan;;:;er Corps commander, General der Panzertruppen Hans Freiherr von Funck. The attack proper 

was led by General Funck as the corps commander 

under General Hausser as the Seventh Army commander. 

420B WEST, KTB 1.-31. VIII. 44, 3 to 6 Aug 44; 

Der Westen (Schramm); OI-SIR/39 (Scheidt; Amry 

Group B, lITB 16. VII.-4.X.44, 3 and 6 Aug 44; Situation maps (1:200,000) of WFSt/Op.(H), 3 to 5 Aug 

44; Armeeoberkommando 7 (referred to hereafter as Seventh Army), KTB Anlagen (Reports and Orders) 

31. VII.-19. VIII.44, 4 Aug 44. 
208 

gust, but the Allied air forces blasted them 

near noon. The enemy credited these attacks with stopping his initial thrust, mentioning especially the work of British 

Typhoons. German air support was almost 

nonexistent. 43 

General Bradley quickly countered the 

German thrust with two additional divisions. In the meantime, Third Army units 

filled the area between Laval and Le 

Mans, threatening the south flank of the 

enemy. To the northeast, General Crerar's 

army struck on 7 August with tanks, artillery, and air east of the Orne on the 

Caen-Falaise road, menacing the rear of 

the attackers. To meet this new situation, 

the Germans were forced to draw on 

newly arrived armored and infantry elements intended for the attack on 

Avranches. Toward midnight on 8 Auggust, von Kluge found it necessary to discontin ue his attack. Nonetheless, he 

ordered preparations for its later renewal. 44 

Hitler was not immediately convinced 

that ihis drive toward Avranches had 

failed. Still hoping to cut off Allied forces 

in Brittany and then turn north to retake 

important harbors and parts of the sea 

coast essential to Allied supply, he insisted 

on resuming the counterattack. On 9 

August he blamed von Kluge for making 

his first attack too early and at a time 

especially suited for Allied air operations. 

He ordered the Commander in Chief 

West to renew the action, this time from 

the area of Domfront, southeast of Mortain. To free additional units for the operation, the Seventh Arn~ was permitted to 

withdraw to new positions. Hitler declared that he alone would give the date 

for the new attack. At the same time, the 

First Army was supposed to assemble an 

attack force in the Paris area. 45 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Closing the Falaise Gap 

While Hitler in East Prussia indulged 

himself in the illusion that he could roll up 

the U.S. forces in the Cotentin, the Allies 

moved boldly to encircle his troops. The 

enemy in sending the mass of his armored 

forces into the area southwest of Falaise 

had given the British and U.S. armies an 

opportunity to trap them between Falaise 

and Argentan. But the adoption of such a 

plan of action was not witHout its dangers 

for the Allies. Twelve U.S. divisions had 

been pushed through the corridor at 

Avranches and were still open to the menace of an enemy break-through to the sea 

which would cut the lines of communications. The question was whether to use 

General Bradley's remaining four divisions to hold the front at Mortain or to 

send them around the enemy's left flank. 

After some consideration, the Allied commanders decided on the bolder course. 

Noting that the enemy was trying to hold 

both Avranches and in front ofCaen, General Eisenhower on 8 August concluded 

.30I-SIR/39 (Scheidt); OB WEST, KTB 1.-

31. VIII.44, 6,7 Aug 44; Teletype Army Group B to OB 

WEST, 6 Aug 44. Army Group B, Ia Operations Refehle 

9. VI.-31. VIII.44. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces 

in World War II, III, 249, gives statistics of British and 

U.S. air forces. A British Operations Research Group 

with the 2.1 Army Group' which examined the 

knocked-out and abandoned tanks in this area shortly 

after the attack cone! uded that more of the tanks were 

knocked out by -U.S. artillery and bazookas than by 

British or U.S. planes. The group did agree that the 

air forces were responsible for a number of indirect 

losses that resulted when crews fled leaving their tanks 

intact or when they destroyed them with special 

charges. (The report was shown to the author by a 

member of the team that made the report.) 

44 Seventh Army, KTB (Draft) 6. VI.-16. VIII. 44, 8 

Aug 44. 

'5 Der Westen (Schramm); Hitler's order of 2300 

hours, 9 Aug 44 (WFSt/Op.Nr.772801 /44). Army 

Group B, Ia Fuehrerbefehle 17. VI.-25.IX.44, 10 Aug 44; 

Warlimont statement, 12 Aug 44. Der Westen 

(Schramm). 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 209 

that the U.S. right wing, then driving due 

eastward, should turn to the north and attack the enemy in the rear. “On a visit to 

Bradley today,” he wrote, “I found that 

he had already acted on this idea and had 

secured Montgomery’s agreement to a 

sharp change in direction toward the 

Northeast instead of continuing toward 

the East, as envisaged in M–517 [ Montgomery’s directive of 6 August].” 46 

On the following day, the Supreme 

Commander reported to General Marshall: “Under my urgent directions all 

possible strength is turned to the destruction of the forces facing us.” Seeing the 

chance to clear the enemy from France, 

he was unwilling to detach forces merely 

to speed capture of the Brittany ports. 

Patton, Bradley, and Montgomery [he 

added] are all imbued with the necessity 

of acting and alive to the opportunity. Patton 

has the marching wing which will turn in 

rather sharply to the northeast from the general vicinity of Le Mans and just to the west 

thereof marching toward Alenqon and 

Falaise. The enemy’s bitter resistance and 

counterattacks in the area between Mortain 

and south of Caen makes it appear that we 

have a good chance to encircle and destroy 

a lot of his forces. You can well imagine how 

badly I want additional ports and the second 

that the issue of this battle is determined I 

will turn into Brittany enough forces to accomplish the quick downfall of the ports. 47 

General Montgomery confirmed the 

new plan in a directive of 11 August. Preparing now to deal with the Germans between the Loire and the Seine, the 21 

Army Group commander called for the 

U.S. forces to swing their left flank from 

the Le Mans area almost due north to 

Alenqon. The First Canadian Army was 

to seize Falaise and move on Argentan, 

while the Second British Army on its right 

moved to the west and south. General 

Bradley directed the Third Army to shift 

its left wing toward the northeast, seize a 

bridgehead over the Sarthe at Le Mans, 

and prepare to strike the enemy flank and 

rear in the direction of Argentan. To its 

left, the First Army was to smash the enemy in the area Vire-Mortain-Domfront. 

General Hodges’ drive, while not as 

sweeping as General Patton’s, was more 

complicated. The First Army advance 

“consisted of a thrust toward the southeast and a ninety-degree turn toward the 

northeast at the enemy flank and rear. It 

was a left wheel against the inter-army 

boundary and the effort of the First Army 

was to be directly at and perpendicular to 

the boundary between our army and that 

of the British.” All Allied forces were to be 

prepared to put into effect a wide envelopment at the Seine should the enemy 

escape the trap near Falaise. 48 

The airborne planners at SHAEF now 

proposed operations to bar the escape of 

the enemy by way of the Paris-Orléans 

Gap and across the lower Seine. They 

worked up a plan to capture and control 

important road nets during the period 

16-27 August (Operation TRANSFIGURE). 

Variants on the plan called for airborne 

forces to block attempts at escape across 

the upper or lower Seine and to expedite 

pursuit across that river. General Bradley 

on 13 August even discussed the possibility 

of cutting off the German retreat by drawing airborne forces across the roads leading northeast from Falaise and Argentan, 

although he agreed with General Brereton’s view that they should not be used “in 

46 Eisenhower Memo, Diary Office CinC, 8 Aug 44. 

47 Eisenhower to Marshall, S-57189, 9 Aug 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

48 Montgomery dir to army comdrs, M-518, 11 Aug 

44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning; 12th 

A Gp Ltr of Instructions 4, 8 Aug 44, 12th A Gp Rpt 

of Opns, V; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 

45, Bk. I, pp. 9-10. 
210 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

small harassing operations such as requested by General Montgomery.” He 

felt there was a possibility of using them 

two weeks later in making the “Long 

Hook” at the Seine, but saw no value in 

tightening the noose in the “Short Hook” 

near Falaise unless the drop could be 

made within five days. 49 

General Eisenhower tentatively decided 

on 15 August to cancel TRANSFIGURE and 

utilize the airlift needed for the operation 

to carry gasoline to the ground forces in 

the Le Mans area. His decision virtually 

brought to an end planning for that drop. 

When General Patton’s forces soon overran the drop area, General Whiteley, 

SHAEF deputy chief of operations, suggested that available airborne forces be 

used to seize Boulogne or Calais. Air Chief 

Marshal Tedder and General Eisenhower, 

though still uncertain whether an air drop 

might be needed at the river itself, authorized the necessary plans. General Bradley 

on 19 August informed XVIII Corps (Airborne) that no assistance would be needed 

for a crossing in his zone of action, and 

representatives of 21 Army Group indicated that, if by 21 August ground troops 

were able to cross the Seine without delay, 

no call would be made on the airborne 

force for aid in that area. 50 

With the Allied turning movement 

under way, the enemy’s only chance for 

escape lay in an immediate withdrawal 

to the east. Instead Hitler was regrouping 

his forces for another attack toward 

Avranches. On 10 and 11 August, von 

Kluge sent repeated messages to OKW on 

the dangerous situation in which he found 

himself. Late on the 10th, he announced 

that the Allies were advancing from Le 

Mans toward Alenqon and that it was 

clear the U.S. forces were trying to join 

British forces in the north to pinch off the 

Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army. Pointing out that a major German attack could 

not be made for at least ten days, he asked 

permission to make a short, sharp armored 

thrust at the U.S. spearheads pushing to 

the north. Before giving his approval, Hitler asked for more specific justification for 

the ten-day delay. Von Kluge consulted 

with his chief subordinates and declared 

at midday of 11 August that another 

strike at Avranches was no longer feasible. 

Instead, wholehearted measures would 

have to be taken against the impending 

envelopment by the Third Army forces. 

He proposed to regroup the armored 

forces for an attack near Alenqon and to 

withdraw Seventh Army’s western salient, 

and he asked for additional forces to protect his flanks against the Allies. Without 

waiting for Hitler’s permission, he took the 

responsibility of giving preliminary orders 

for such action. 

Hitler took von Kluge’s proposal as a 

personal affront, particularly when von 

Kluge insisted that the Fuehrer make a 

final decision. He held that the Commander in Chief West wanted an order to 

retreat-a possibility that Hitler was unwilling to consider. Telephone conversations between Jodl and von Kluge may 

have convinced Hitler of the need for a 

temporary reversal of attack direction. On 

the afternoon of the 11th, Hitler suspended his order of 9 August for a renewed attack on Avranches and declared 

that the primary aim was to eliminate the 

49 Outline Plans 1, 2, and 3, dtd I7 and 19 Aug 44, 

included in SHAEF G-3 Crossing of the Seine 

GCT/24562/A. B; Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton 

Diaries (New York, 1946), pp. 323-24, 329-30, 

332-33. 

50 Whiteley to Chief Plans Sec G-3 SHAEF, 17 Aug 

44, SHAEF G-3 24533/Ops Future Opns; Tedder to 

Eisenhower and latter’s reply, Diary Office CinC, 19 

Aug 44. 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 211 

threat to the south flank of the German 

army group by launching a concentric 

armored attack under General Eberbach 

against the flank of American XV Corps. 

In addition he directed First Army to assemble the forces at its disposal around 

Chartres to meet threats in that area. He 

ordered troops concentrated on both wings 

ofthe northern front for defensive action 

in the areas of Falaise and Mortain, agreeing that von Kluge could shorten his line 

near Sourdeval and Mortain in order to 

free forces. ~l 

Hitler's change of plans came too late 

to meet von Kluge's immediate needs. The 

German situation on the north had 

worsened steadily since 7 August when 

British and Canadian forces had attacked 

on both sides of the Orne. German units 

had been forced to withdraw southward 

on both the 8th and 9th. To the south, elements of the Third Army were near 

.Chartres. The Seventh Army lost its rear installations during the period, and the task 

of supplying it had to be assumed by the 

Fifth Panzer Army. Shortly afterward an Allied thrust to the north cut off all but one 

of the enemy's supply roads. 52 

As German armor withdrew to new 

lines in mid-August, the First Army 

pressed to the northeast. Meanwhile, the 

Third Army, with all its corps active for 

the first time, threw its full weight into the 

battle. One corps hammered away at fortresses in Brittany, while the others pushed 

to the north and the east. By 14 August, 

elements of Patton's forces were north of 

Argentan; Dreux, Chartres, and Orleans 

were set as goals for the rest. The Third 

Army's northern swing sharply compressed General Hodges' zone, pinching 

out two corps on 15 and 16 August. 

As early as 14 August many signs 

pointed to the enemy's collapse west of the 

Seine. Not only were spectacular gains being made in northern France, but a landing in southern France scheduled for 15 

August was expected to shake enemy 

morale. 53 General Eisenhower, sensing the 

possi bilities of the situation, called on the 

Allied forces to seize the fleeting but definite opportunity to gain a major victory 

in France. He sent the following appeal to 

the troops under his command: 

I request every airman to make it his direct 

responsibility that the enemy is blasted unceasingly by day and by night, and is denied 

safety either in fight or flight. 

I request every sailor to make sure that no 

part of the hostile forces can either escape or 

be reinforced by sea, and that our comrades 

on the land want for nothing that guns and 

ships and ships' companies can bring to 

them. 

I request every soldier to go forward to his 

assigned objective with the determination 

that the enemy can survive only through surrender; let no foot of ground once gained be 

relinquished nor a single German escape 

through a line once established. 54 

The deterioration of the German position was marked at this point by a com51 General Eberbach on 9 August 1944 took command of a provisional Panzer Group Eberbach temporarily turning command of the Fifth Panzer Army 

over to SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer und Generaloberst 

der Waffen SS Sepp Dietrich. First Army was transferred from Army Group G to Army Group B on II 

August 1944 . 

• 20B WEST, KTB 1.-31. VIlI.44, 7 to II Aug 44; 

AI71!)' Group B, Ia Lagllbeurteilungen 20. V.-ll.XA4 and 

Ia Tagmneldungen 6.YI.-31.VIII.H, 7 to 11 Aug 44; Der 

Westen (Schramm); Seventh Army, KTB (Draft) 6. VI.-

16. VIII.44 , 11 Aug 44; MS # B-725 (Gersdorff); 

OI-SIR/39 (Scheidt); Hitler's order of 11 Aug 4:4-

(WFSt/Op Nr. 772830/44). Army Group B, Ia Fuehrerbefthle, 17. VI.-25.IX.44, 12 Aug 44; Warlimont statements, 12 and 18 Aug 44. DlIr Westen (Schramm). 

,. See below, Ch. XII, for account of landing in 

southern France. 

•• Messages to Troops of the AEF, 14 Aug 44, 

SHAEF AG 335.18. This message was not included 

in SGS file ofthe Supreme Commander's messages to 

AEF, but it was broadcast by General Eisenhower. It 

was mimeographed and distributed to the troops. 
212 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

FIELD MARSHAL KESSELRING 

mand crisis in the west. On 14 August, 

Hitler, still angered by von Kluge’s request 

for a final decision on Normandy, blamed 

the Commander in Chief West for the 

situation which had developed, saying 

that the difficulties had followed from 

improper handling of the attack on 

Avranches. On the morning of the following day,von Kluge left the headquarters 

of the Fifth Panzer Army with the intention 

of meeting the commander of the Seventh 

Army and General Eberbach for a conference at the latter’s command post at the 

front. An Allied strafing attack, which 

wounded members of his staff and destroyed his radio, prevented von Kluge 

from reaching Eberbach’s headquarters 

until late in the day. News of his arrival 

did not reach OB WEST or OKW until 

early the next morning. This absence of 

the Commander in Chief West during a 

highly critical period when the subordinate commanders were clamoring for 

instructions led Hitler to order first that 

General Hausser temporarily take command of Army Group B and then that Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring and 

Generalfeldrnarschall Walter Model come 

to OKW. One or the other was to be 

chosen as successor to von Kluge in case 

FIELD MARSHAL MODEL 

he did not return. His absence had another and more sinister effect in that Hitler gave credence to the rumor relayed to 

him that von Kluge had been on his way 

to meet Allied representatives to arrange 

for a surrender of his forces. Confessions 

that heavily implicated von Kluge had 

been forcibly obtained from some of the 

members of the 20 July conspiracy and 

given to Hitler by Ernst Kaltenbrunner, 

Chief of the Security Police and Security 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 213 

Service. The result was that Hitler on 16 

August decided to remove von Kluge and 

appoint Model to the command of OB 

WEST. 55 

Hitler gave orders on 16 August to fight 

the battle of Falaise to the end. The forces 

in the pocket astride and west of the 

Falaise-Argentan road were to be moved 

first east of the Orne and then east ofthe 

Dives. Army Group B was to hold the "corner post" of Falaise and widen the escape 

corridor by mobile action in the area of 

Argentan. On the 16th General Jodi gave 

Model some verbal directives on the future conduct of operations in the west, 

supplementing them with instructions 

from the Fuehrer for the establishment of 

a new position as far west as possible in 

front of the Seine-Yo nne line. German 

forces withdrawing from southwestern and 

southern France were to be integrated in 

this n~w/position.56 The big problem at 

~e moment was to prevent the Allies from 

crossing the Seine and getting beyond 

Paris. Shortly before his relief von Kluge 

discussed this problem with Generalleutnant Dietrich von Choltitz, Armed 

Forces Commander Greater Paris, and directed 

him to hold the city as long as possible. 

On 17 August von Kluge was formally 

relieved of his command. Two days later, 

while en route to Germany by car, he took 

cyanide and died. Suicide, he said in a last 

letter to Hitler, appeared to be the only 

honorable course left open to him. While 

he felt no guilt for the defeat of his forces, 

he saw little prospect of a sympathetic 

hearing in Germany. He called upon the 

Fuehrer to recognize the hopelessness of 

the German situation and to conclude a 

peace.57 

Despite the problems of the enemy, the 

task of closing in for the final kill in Normandy was not easy. Not only did the 

Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies fight fiercely 

to hold open the jaws of the trap that was 

slowly closing, but the difficulty of readjusting Allied army group boundaries in 

the battle area interfered with the optimum use of Allied forces committed in the 

Falaise area. As early as 6 August, the 21 

Army Group commander had set a 

boundary between the British and U.S. 

forces some sixteen miles south of Falaise 

and a few miles south of Argentan. On 11 

August, in disregard of this arrangement, 

General Patton directed Maj. Gen. Wade 

H. Haislip, commander of the XV Corps, 

to "push on slowly direction of Falaise allowing your rear elements to close: Road: 

Argentan-Falaise your bounqary inclusive. Upon arrival Falaise continue to push 

on slowly until you contact our Allies." 58 

By the 13th, the XV Corps had reached 

the vicinity of Argentan and other ele50 This shift in command was followed at the beginning of September by the relief and arrest ofGeneralleutnant Han Speidel, A r71ry Group B chief of staff, 

for suspected complicity in the 20 July plot. OB 

WEST, KTB 1.-31. VIII.44; Der Westen (Schramm); 

Minutes of conference between Hitler and Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal and Generalleutnant 

Hans Krebs on 31 Aug 44, part of the collection 

known as Minutes of Conferences between Hitler and 

Members of the German Armed Forces High Command, December 1942-March 1945 (referred to hereafter as Minutes.of Hitler Conferences); Jodi Diary, 

31 Ju144; Hans Speidel, We Difended Normandy (London, 1951) . 

• 60B WEST, KTB 1.-31. VIII.44, 16 Aug 44; Warlimont statement, 18 Aug 44. Der Westen (Schramm); 

Lt Col Karl Kleyser statement, 25 Aug 44. Der Westen 

(Schramm). 

57 Von Kluge's suicide was interpreted by the 

Nazis, particularly by Bormann, as a means of escaping trial and almost certain execution. Minutes of 

Hitler Conferences, 31 Jul 44; Kluge file, 20 Jul 44 

trial collection; Ltr, von Kluge to Hitler, 18 Aug 44, 

in Dietrich v. Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten (Zuerich, 

1951). 

'8 Montgomery dir to army comdrs, M-517, 6 Aug 

44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I (a); 

12th A Gp, Ltr of Instructions 3, 6 Aug 44, 12th A 

Gp Rpt of Opns, V; Cors Third Army to CG XV 

Corps, 12 Aug 44, TUSA Rpt of Opns, I. 
214 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

ments of the Third Army were pushing 

east and northeast of that city. General 

Bradley, to avoid colliding with the British 

forces coming from the north, firmly ordered General Patton to halt at Argentan 

and build up his forces on that shoulder. 5 9 

In the next two or three days, between 

the time that forward elements of General 

Patton’s forces were barred from proceeding north of the army group boundary and 

the time that a readjustment in the line 

was made, the enemy withdrew some of 

his divisions while carrying on counterattacks around the eastern edges of the 

trap. General Patton felt that the order to 

halt had deprived him of a chance to take 

Falaise and close the gap, thus permitting 

a number of the enemy to escape. How 

many of the thousands that ultimately got 

out of the trap could have been held in the 

Falaise Pocket on 13 or 14 August if forward elements of the Third Army had 

been pushed across the army group 

boundary cannot be firmly established. 

Some of the enemy commanders who were 

in Normandy at the time were inclined to 

believe after the war that the rigid boundary had interfered with an envelopment of 

the Seventh and Fifth Panzer Armies. 60 

General Eisenhower later explained 

that the rapidity of U.S. movements during August made it impossible for General 

Montgomery “to achieve the hour-byhour coordination that might have won us 

a complete battle of annihilation.” Mixups had occurred along the front which 

could be straightened out only by stopping units in place, even at the expense of 

permitting some Germans to escape. 

When U.S. commanders had protested to 

General Bradley against restrictions on 

their movements across the interarmy 

boundary, the Supreme Commander had 

backed the 12th Army Group commander’s decision to adhere to the boundary 

established. 61 

On 15 August, General Montgomery 

decided to change the boundary to permit 

U.S. troops to come further north. On the 

same day, the First Army troops pushed 

their way to the boundary west of Argentan, and General Hodges asked permission to continue his advance north of the 

line to Putanges. The 21 Army Group 

commander, some of whose advisers had 

previously favored a shift in the line, 

readily agreed, and the U.S. forces pushed 

their way across the army group boundary, advancing north of the Flers–Argentan road. Later, he approved U.S. thrusts 

north of the line toward Chambois and 

Trun. 62 

From the 15th on, the enemy attempted 

59 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 375-77. See George 

S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It, p. 105, for suggestion 

that he may have been stopped because British forces 

had sowed time bombs in the area. Stacey, The Canadian Army, p. 204 (footnote), notes that 12th Army 

Group informed the British that time bombs had been 

dropped in the Argentan-Falaise area. Craven and 

Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, III, 257-58, 

says that U.S. air forces did plant time bombs in the 

area to prevent the enemy’s escape but concludes that 

“the halt order of I3 August could not reasonably 

have been occasioned by fear that delayed-action 

bombs would take American lives.” 

General Bradley in his memoirs notes that General 

Montgomery had never prohibited nor had he (Bradley) ever proposed that U.S. forces close the gap from 

Argentan to Falaise. He adds: “TO have driven pellmell into Montgomery’s line of advance could easily 

have resulted in a disastrous error of recognition. In 

halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult with Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton 

was mine alone; it never went beyond my CP.” (p. 

377.) 

60 MS # B–727, The Battle of the Falaise-Argentan Pocket (Gersdorff); MS # B–726, Defensive 

Fighting of the Fifth Panzer Army from 25 July to 25 

August 1944 (Gersdorff. 

61 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 278-79; Diary 

Office CinC, 17 Aug 44. 

62 Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 10 Sep 44, Eisenhower personal file; Ltr, Brig Williams to author, 10 

Aug 51. 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 215 

to pull his forces out of the trap near 

Falaise. Some frantic efforts were made to 

cut off Allied armored spearheads and thus 

keep open an escape route to the east. 

Supply difficulties increased constantly 

and efforts were made to fly in fuel for the 

German armored elements covering the 

retreat. Meanwhile, the 2d Canadian 

Corps was racing southward to close the 

gap. General Simonds' two armored divi· 

sions, one Canadian and one Polish, were 

gi ven this task. Canadian forces took Trun 

on the 18th, while Polish and Canadian 

forces sped toward Chambois. Here on the 

evening of 19 August, elements of General 

Hodges' V Corps met Polish tankers to 

complete the encirclement of Seventh Army 

and parts of Fifth Pan<.,er Army, an estimated 125,000 men. 

Withdrawal to the Seine 

Just before the trap was closed, Hitler 

had given Field Marshal Model a number 

of heavy tasks. The new Commander in 

Chief West was ordered to withdraw 

Seventh Army across the Seine in order to 

avoid being cut off, to use armored forces 

to connect elements forming the ring 

around Paris, to defend the area southeast 

of Paris so that Nineteenth Army troops from 

the south of France would be able to withdraw, to prevent an Allied crossing ofthe 

Seine south of Paris, and to bar Allied advances in a northerly direction along the 

lower Seine. These orders came too late to 

aid many of the forces in the trap. For 

three days, fighter-bombers and massed 

artillery had been punishing them as they 

sought desperately to escape. Seventh Army, 

its position now virtually hopeless, decided 

to move its headquarters out of the 

threatened area. Most of the staff escaped, 

but General Hausser, the army commander, was wounded. Once the pocket 

was completely closed, the Fifth Pan<.,er 

Army, which Eberbach again commanded, 

regrouped for a counterattack to free elements of Seventh Army. The units still in the 

trap forced open a small corrider while 

simultaneously armored elements smashing from east of the encircled area hit the 

Allies near Trun and St. Lambert-surDives and helped to extricate the escaping 

units. In the course of heavy fighting during the next three days, some 30,000 to 

35,000 soldiers escaped, leaving the bulk 

of their tanks, vehicles, and artillery behind. The Fifth Panzer Army, placed in 

charge of the entire area from the Channel to just west of Paris, was ordered to 

collect fleeing units of the entrapped divisions at points west of the Seine. Few of 

the units were in any condition to 

con tin ue the fight. 63 

On 19 August, General Eisenhower had 

discussed with his army group commanders plans for the pursuit of the fleeing 

enemy. They defined their immediate objective as the destruction of the enemy 

forces west of the Seine. To gain this end, 

General Montgomery the following day 

directed elements of the First Canadian 

Army and of 12th Army Group to hold 

63 Stacey, TheCanadian Army, pp. 204-06; Craven 

and eate, The Arm}' Air Forces in World War II, III, 

256-75. Der Westen (Schramm); OB WEST, KTB 1.-

31.VIII.44, 15,16,17,19,20 Aug 44; MS # B-727 

(Gersdorft); Army Group B, [a Tagesmeldungen 6. VI.-

31. VIIIA4, 19,20 Aug 44; Fifth Panzer Army, KTB 

9. VIlI.-9.1x'44, 20 Aug 44. Rad, Army Group B to Seventh Army, 18 Aug 44; Rad, Army Group B to II SS 

Panzer Corps and Fifth Panzer Army, 18 Aug 44. Both 

in Army Group B, la Operations Befthle 9. VI.-31. VIII.#. 

Teletype, Army Group B (Ia Nr. 6078/44) to Fifth Panzer Army, 16 Aug 44; Order by Model (la Nr. 6376/#) 

to Fifth Panzer Arm}', 21 Aug 44. Both in Fifth Pan<;er 

Am!)" KTB Anlaglln9. Vlll.-9.1X.44. For the information on units that escaped from the Falaise Gap, the 

author has relied on a special study of German units 

conducted by Mrs. Magna Bauer ofOCMH. 
216 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

firmly the northern and southern sides of 

the “bottle” in which the enemy was 

trapped, keeping the “cork” in position in 

the eastern end. Other elements of the 

12th Army Group were to drive northward to the lower Seine to block the 

enemy’s withdrawal. The 21 Army Group 

was to give first priority to mopping up the 

Falaise Pocket before pushing to the Seine. 

When it was ready for this latter drive, the 

U.S. forces pushing to the north were to 

withdraw from the British front. 64 

These widespread shifts of Allied units 

created great confusion in Allied lines of 

communications. Already on 19 August, 

General Eisenhower had reported that 

U.S. and British units were entangled as 

a result of “rapid advances and consequent overlapping in attacks on a converging and fluent front.” These problems 

were magnified when U.S. forces made a 

wide envelopment northward along the 

left bank of the Seine directly across the 

Second British Army’s front. Generals 

Montgomery and Dempsey, occupied in 

mopping up enemy forces in the Falaise 

Pocket, had accepted the American 

maneuver as a means of destroying the 

enemy west of the Seine in that area and 

of cutting off the German retreat across 

the Seine. 65 

Elements of both the First and Third 

Armies wheeled northeast along the left 

bank of the Seine after 20 August. The 

Third Army, whose widely separated units 

had announced the capture of St. Malo on 

17 August and the establishment of a 

bridgehead across the Seine at MantesGassicourt on 20 August, now sent its left 

wing marching in the direction of Vernon. 

To its left, the First Army pushed a corps 

almost due north of Dreux on 20 August. 

Elements of this unit were in Evreux on 

the 23d and by the 25th had carried directly across the front of the Second British Army to Elbeuf some eleven miles 

southwest of Rouen. 66 

The Second British Army started its 

drive for the Seine on 20 August. Grounding one corps, whose transport was taken 

for the advance, General Dempsey sent 

forward the two other corps under his 

command. One corps passed through U.S. 

forces northeast of Argentan on the 20th 

and pushed forward to the Verneuil-Breteuil area where it stopped on the 23d as 

elements of the First Army drove across its 

front toward the north. The other corps, 

moving forward rapidly from Chambois, 

on the 26th sent elements across theaxis 

of the First Army’s advance in preparation 

for a crossing of the Seine at Louviers. The 

First Canadian Army, with a Canadian 

and a British corps under its command, 

sped eastward on 23 August leaving two 

divisions to complete mopping up activities in the pocket. The 2d Canadian 

Corps reached the Seine and made contact with U.S. forces near Elbeuf on the 

26th. Meanwhile, General Crerar had 

sent the British corps under his command 

along his seaward flank toward the Seine. 

Despite heavy opposition in the Pont1’Evéque and Lisieux areas, elements of 

this unit reached the Seine on 27 August.64 

64 Notes of a conference between Bradley and Patton, 19 August 1944, in which the former outlined 

plans agreed on at a previous meeting the same day 

between Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley; 

Memo for record, 19 Aug 44. Both in 12th A Gp 371.3 

Military Objectives, I. Montgomery dir to army 

comdrs, M-519, 20 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post 

OVERLORD Planning, I(a). 

65 Bradley to Eisenhower, 10 Sep 44, Eisenhower 

personal file, discusses the conference with Montgomery and Dempsey in which this envelopment was 

approved. See also Bradley dir to army comdrs, addenda to Ltr of Instructions 5 (17 Aug 44), 19 Aug 44, 

12 A Gp Rpt of Opns, V; Montgomery dir to army 

comdrs, M-519, 20 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post 

OVERLORD Planning, I(a). 

66 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 172. 

67 Ibid., pp. 176–78; Stacey, The Canadian Army, 

pp. 207–08. 
THE BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 217 

The Allies by 26 August had driven the 

retreating Germans into new pockets near 

the loops in the lower Seine between EIbeuf and Le Havre. No bridges existed 

across the Seine below Paris, and the ferries were insufficient to accommodate the 

troops hurrying to cross the river. Allied 

airplanes destroyed the few military 

bridges that were erected almost as soon 

as they were set up. Panic increased as 

troops and vehicles piled up and fighterbombers blasted massed columns waiting 

to cross. Allied tanks added to the confusion when they reached the river and 

began firing on the ferries. In view of these 

difficulties, some German generals later 

expressed surprise that they were able to 

bring anything across at all. 68 

Some confusion resulted from the northward thrust of U.S. forces across the British front. General Montgomery, in authorizing the move, had been aware of this 

possibility and had authorized direct contact between army, corps, and division 

commanders to settle difficulties. A misunderstanding arose, nevertheless, when 

General Dempsey was quoted in early 

September as saying that he had been delayed forty-eight hours when required to 

hold back his units while the U.S. forces 

withdrew. General Bradley, feeling that 

this statement was a reflection on his command, pointed out that the drive northward had been approved by General 

Montgomery after the 21 Army Group 

commander had said British forces were 

not in the position at the moment to carry 

out the maneuver. The U.S. commander 

argued that the First Army's push to 

Elbeuf had speeded the advance of the 

Second British Army by removing the 

enemy from its path. General Montgomery, informed of the complaint, immediately sent his "profound apologies" to the 

12th Army Group commander. General 

Dempsey later declared that, while he still 

believed his troops could have reached the 

Seine earlier but for the delay caused by 

the withdrawal of U.S. forces across his 

front, he would be glad to be held up 

again ifhe could have the type of support 

he received from General Bradley's forces 

on that occasion. 69 

Although the Allies had not destroyed 

all of the enemy forces in Normandy, they 

had won a resounding victory. German 

troops that escaped to the right bank of 

the Seine arrived there with little more 

than their rifles. Five decimated divisions 

had to be sent to Germany. The broken 

remnants of the remaining eleven infantry 

divisions yielded personnel barely sufficient for four reconstituted units, each 

with only a handful of artillery pieces and 

little other materiel. What remained of 

five Army and six SS panzer divisions, 

when bolstered by newly arrived personnel and materiel replacements, amounted 

to eleven regimental combatteams, each 

with five to ten operationally fit tanks and 

a few batteries of artillery. 70 

.80B WEST, KTB 1.-31. Vfll.44, 26 Aug 44; MS 

# B-729, Report on the Fighting of the Fifth Panzer 

Army from 24 August to 4 September 44 (Col. Paul 

Frank); MSS # T-121, 122, and 123, Geschichtetks 

"Oberbefehlshaber West," edited by Generalleutnant 

Bodo Zimmermann (Ia [G-3] of OB WEST), Pt. I, B, 

IV (referred to hereafter as MS # T -121, MS # 

T -122, or MS # T-123 [Zimmermann et al.]). This 

is a million-word manuscript prepared in part by 

Zimmermann, in part by generals and general· staff 

officers associated with OB WEST, OKW, OKL, 

OKH, OKM, and various subordinate commands. 

It was written under the auspices of the Historical 

Division, U. S. War Department, between 1946 and 

1948. 

69 Clipping from London Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, September 5,1944, Diary Office CinC; Ltr, 

Bradley to Eisenhower, 10 Sep 44, Eisenhower personal file; Interv with Dempsey, 12 Mar 47. 

70 Rpt. Army Group B (fa Nr. 6704/44) by Model to 

Chief OKW/WFSt, 29 Aug 44. Army Group B, fa 

Lagebeurteilungen 20. V. -11. X.44. 
CHAPTER XII 

The Call1paign in 

Southern France 

In mid-August as General Eisenhower's 

forces closed in on the enemy in the 

Falaise Pocket and prepared to cross the 

Seine, a second Allied force landed in 

southern France with the objects of aiding 

the battle in Normandy and of opening 

major ports through which troops could 

be landed for the impending battle for 

Germany. This operation, ANVIL, envisaged by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

early in 1943 and agreed upon at Tehran 

in December ofthat year, had been laid 

aside temporarily in the spring of 1944. At 

that time OVERLORD'S demands for landing craft required the shifting ofresources 

earmarked for southern France. Some of 

the British appear to have hoped that they 

had heard the last of ANVIL, but the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower 

continued to insist that it be launched as 

soon as possible. Because of his confirmed 

belief that the operation was important to 

OVERLORD'S success, the Supreme Commander became deeply involved in the 

ANVIL controversy during the late spring 

and early summer of 1944. 

The Second Phase rifthe ANVIL Controversy 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff and General 

Eisenhower never relinquished their view 

that ANVIL was essential to OVERLORD 

both to divert enemy forces from the lodgment area in the north and to gain additional ports in the south. While the second 

factor became the more important as the 

time approached for the operation, it was 

the need for diversion which General 

Eisenhower stressed in June 1944. The 

British, however, preferred to use available resources in the Mediterranean for a 

thrust into northern Italy and an advance 

through the Trieste area and the Ljubljana 

Gap into central Europe to join forces 

with Russian troops, who had resumed 

their advance westward in June. Mr. 

Churchill made no effort to conceal his 

pronounced distaste for the' landings in 

southern France and brought pressure on 

the Supreme Commander .and the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff to shake the ANVIL concept. 

On this issue, Mr. Churchill and General 

Eisenhower differed fundamentally, and 

the latter was deeply disturbed at the 

strong feeling evinced by the Prime Minister on the subject. 

The Joint. Chiefs of Staff before the 

OVERLORD D Day pressed their British 

colleagues to name a date for the ANVIL 

operation. The British Chiefs for their part 

asked General Wilson, Supreme Allied 

Commander in the Mediterranean, to 

suggest alternative plans for operations in 

his area during the summer and fall of 
THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 219 

1944. In mid-May he suggested that the 

largest amphibious operation likely to be 

practicable was one launched against 

southern France in the area of Toulon or 

Sete, more than one hundred miles due 

west of Toulon. T-his would open the way 

for an advance up the Rhone valley or 

westward through the Toulouse Gap. Wilson warned, how"ever, that such an operation would leave only limited offensive 

power for a campaign in Italy.1 

The entry ofthe Allies into Rome two 

days before the Normandy invasion enableq General Wilson on 7 June to declare 

his readiness to launch an amphibious operation about 15 August on the largest 

scale permitted by his available resources. 

The statement found ready listeners at 

SHAEF where planners were at work on 

the best means of using strategic reserves 

to support OVERLORD. To them, an assault 

in the south of France would help OVERLORD either by diverting enemy forces 

from the bridgehead or by bringing more 

Allied troops into France for an all-out attack. In the case of a stalemate, an assault 

from the Mediterranean seemed essential 

as a means of dra wing enemy forces from 

Normandy. If, on the other hand, the battle went according to plan, there were 

more divisions available for the European 

theater than could be maintained, according to current estimates, through the ports 

of the lodgment area up to D plus 180. 

Therefore, the best chance for use of maximum Allied resources against the enemy 

seemed to lie in ANVIL or some similar op'-

eration from the Mediterranean. 2 

Future operations in the Mediterranean 

theater were discussed by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in London on 11 June. 

While they expressed a willingness to explore various possibilities, the basic differences which had existed in the early spring 

between U.S. and British points of view 

again came to light. Field Marshal Brooke 

was interested in the possibilities offurther 

advances in Italy in view of General Alexander's belief that he could reach the PisaRimini line by 15 July; Air Chief Marshal 

Portal noted opportunities for a move 

northeast by way of Istria if Russian advances from the east made the project 

feasible. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, though 

willing to discuss other plans of action, 

held firmly to an operation in the western 

Mediterranean. As a means of initiating 

planning, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

agreed that a three-division assault should 

be mounted from the Mediterranean 

about 25 July. General Wilson was made 

responsible for submitting plans for operations at Sete and Istria, and General 

Eisenhower for the Bay of Biscay. At the 

moment the British Chiefs of Staff believed 

that landings at Sete or on the west coast 

of France would be the ones most likely to 

aid the OVERLORD operation. 3 They did 

not favor a landing in the Marseille area. 

General Eisenhower, charged with planning an operation in southwestern France, 

described Bordeaux as the only worthwhile objective in that area but believed 

that it was impractical to attack it. In 

southeastern France, he preferred a landing at Sete to one at Marseille, since the 

former would make' it easier to open 

1 AFHQ toJSM and JCS, MEDCOS 110, 17 May 

44; AFHQ to Br COS, MEDCOS 111, 18 May 44; 

AMSSO to SACEA, COSSEA 105,24 May 44. All 

in SHAEF SGS 370.2/2 Operation from the Mediterranean in Support of OVERLORD, II. 

2 Wilson to Br COS, MEDCOS 125, 7 Jun 44; 

SHAEF G-3 Ping Sec Study, Use of the Mediterranean Strategic Reserves, 10Jan 44. SHAEF SGS 

370.2/2 Operation from the Mediterranean in Support of OVERLORD, II. 

3 CCS Conf, 163d Mtg, London, 11 Jun 44; CCS 

to Wilson, OZ-3116, 14 Jun 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 

370.2/2 Operation from the Mediterranean in Support of OVERLORD, II. 
220 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Bordeaux. As to a choice between the 

Adriatic and southern France, he favored 

the latter since a landing there would keep 

more Germans away from the lodgment 

area in the north. In addition, it would 

“reap the benefit of French resistance,” 

which he said was yielding results beyond 

his expectations and was particularly 

strong in the south of France. 4 

The Mediterranean Supreme Commander on 17 June discussed the problem 

with his commanders in chief and with 

Generals Marshall and Arnold. While 

preferring an operation which would give 

complete support to a thrust from the Po 

valley into central Europe, he was impressed by General Marshall’s argument 

which 

brought out clearly for the first time a point 

which seems to be of paramount importance . . . namely that there are between 

40 and 50 divisions in the United States 

which cannot be introduced into France as 

rapidly as desired or maintained there 

through the ports of Northwest France or by 

staging through the United Kingdom; and, 

therefore, if the weight of these divisions is to 

be brought to bear upon the enemy in 

France, we must seize another major port at an early date. 5 

General Wilson next turned to the 

British thesis that OVERLORD could be 

aided elsewhere than in the south of 

France. Since by 19 June there no longer 

seemed to be any fear about the security of 

the beachhead, he emphasized a strategy 

that would divert German units from 

France and face the enemy with prospects 

of defeat in 1944. He conceded that, if the 

main consideration was seizure of another 

major port, the ANVIL operation should be 

carried out as planned. In this case, he 

preferred an assault against Toulon rather 

than the Séte area inasmuch as the former 

would make the most effective use of 

French Resistance forces, make available 

the huge port capacity of Marseille, and 

virtually end the submarine menace in the 

Mediterranean. 

Set over against these advantages, which 

seemed to be sufficient to prove the case of 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, was the fact that 

ANVIL could not be launched until 15 

August at the earliest without danger of 

prejudicing the fight in Italy south of the 

Pisa-Rimini line. Stopping the Allied 

forces in front of the Pisa-Rimini line, he 

said, meant breaking up a first-class fighting force after months of co-operation, and 

switching forces from Italy to southern 

France would impose a six-week pause on 

the Mediterranean operation which would 

permit the enemy to rest and regroup his 

forces. General Wilson proposed, instead, 

that the Allies exploit “the present success in Italy through the Pisa-Rimini line 

across the Po and then . . . advance 

toward southern Hungary through the 

Ljubljana Gap,” the latter advance being 

taken in conjunction with amphibious and 

airborne attacks against the enemy to divert at least ten divisions from the Balkans 

and France into northern Italy. 

General Eisenhower presented a different view of the ANVIL operation to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff four days later. 

He stressed. the fact that OVERLORD was 

the decisive campaign of 1944 and that a 

stalemate would be regarded by the world 

as a defeat, with possible far-reaching 

effects on the war effort of the Russians. 

With the Bordeaux expedition precluded, 

he found that the ANVIL operation pro4 Eisenhower to Wilson, S-53967, 16 Jun 44, 

SHAEF SGS 370.2/2 Operation from the Mediterranean in Support of OVERLORD, II. 

5 This and the two succeeding paragraphs are 

based on General Wilson’s letter to General Eisenhower, 19 June 1944, SHAEF SGS 370.2/2 Operation 

from the Mediterranean in Support of OVERLORD, II. 
THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 221 

vided the most direct route to northern 

France, “where the battles for the Ruhr 

will be fought.” Such an operation would 

not only divert enemy divisions from the 

OVERLORD area, but also provide a port 

through which reinforcements from the 

United States could be deployed and a 

route over which they could advance for 

battle in northern France. While agreeing 

that the port of Marseille was less desirable 

than Bordeaux from the standpoint of distance from the United States and of proximity to the OVERLORD area, the time factor was so important that he thought the 

Bordeaux operation could be rejected in 

favor of the ANVIL operation. “France,” 

he insisted, “is the decisive theater. This 

decision was taken long ago by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In my view, the resources of Great Britain and the U.S. will 

not permit us to maintain two major 

theaters in the European War, each with 

decisive missions.” He recommended, 

therefore, that the Mediterranean resources be used to launch the ANVIL operation not later than 30 August and preferably fifteen days earlier. Anticipating a 

renewed proposal for an advance in the 

Adriatic area, he asked that if ANVIL was 

not launched by 30 August all French divisions and one or two U.S. divisions 

allocated for ANVIL be made available for 

OVERLORD operations as soon as they 

could be brought into the latter area. 6 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff immediately 

gave their blessing to General Eisenhower’s arguments, suggesting only that 

1 August was a better date for the operation and ruling unacceptable any proposals to commit Mediterranean resources 

in large-scale operations in either northern 

Italy or the Balkans. To General Eisenhower’s reasons for preferring the ANVIL 

operation, they added that it would put 

French troops into the fight for their 

homeland, employ a number of battletrained U.S. troops from the Mediterranean, make the best possible use of the air 

build-up in Corsica, and concentrate the 

Allied forces and put them into battle in 

the decisive theater. 7 

Prime Minister Churchill, whether he 

was disturbed by the tone of this communication, which he described as “arbitrary,” or whether he saw in the American 

stand an end to any hope of further major 

advances in the Mediterranean, now 

opened a strong campaign with the President and the Supreme Commander to 

break the “deadlock” which he found existing between the British and U.S. Chiefs 

of Staff. On receipt of the U.S. note, he 

cabled Mr. Roosevelt asking that the latter “consent to hear both sides” before 

making up his mind, He expressed his 

willingness to help General Eisenhower, 

but not at the expense of the complete ruin 

“of our great affairs in the Mediterranean 

and we take it hard that this should be demanded of us.’’ In a lengthy survey of the 

question, he held that a landing place 

must be chosen in relation to both the 

main effort of Eisenhower and the strain 

on Germany. Political considerations such 

as revolts or surrender of satellites he also 

believed to be valid and important factors. 

He found the taking of Le Havre and St. 

Nazaire to have a far closer relation to the 

battle than the seizure of ports in the 

Mediterranean, and believed that an action from Bayonne or some smaller port 

on the Bay of Biscay to take Bordeaux was 

to be preferred to a “heavy footed” ap6 Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 53, 23 Jun 44, SHAEF 

SGS 370.2/2 Operation from the Mediterranean in 

Support of OVERLORD, II. 

7 JSM to AMSSO, JSM 112, 24 Jun 44, SHAEF 

SGS 370.2/2 Operation from the Mediterranean in 

Support of OVERLORD, II. 
222 

proach from Sete. Pointing to the 400 

miles from Marseille to Paris, and the additional 200 miles to Cherbourg, he called 

an attack in the Marseille area "bleak and 

sterile" and found it difficult to believe 

that an operation there or at Toulon or 

Sete could have any influence on OVERLORD in the coming summer and fall. He 

agreed that the proposed operation for the 

Adriatic was equally unrelated to OVERLORD, but cited General Wilson's belief 

that he could have Trieste by September. 

In the light of these . arguments, he 

declared: 

Whether we should ruin all hopes of a 

major victory in Italy and all its fronts and 

condemn ourselves to a passive role in that 

theatre, after having broken up the fine 

Allied army which is advancing so rapidly 

through that Peninsula, for the sake of ANVIL 

with all its limitations, is indeed a grave 

question for His Majesty's Government and 

the President, with the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, to decide. R 

Before he received the last cables of the 

Prime Minister, President Roosevelt had 

concurred completely with the stand of 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and had declared 

.macceptable General Wilson's proposal 

to use nearly all Mediterranean resources 

for an advance into northern Italy and 

thence to the northeast. He agreed that 

nothing could be worse than a deadlock of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to a future 

course, adding: "You and I must prevent 

this and I think we should support the 

views of the Supreme Allied Commander. 

He is definitely for ANVIL and wants action 

in the field by August 30th preferably 

earlier." 9 

This answer did not deter the British 

Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister 

from making other attempts to change the 

U.S. stand. General Eisenhower encouraged the Washington Chiefs to hold their 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

ground with a statement on 29 June that 

while he believed the British were honestly 

convinced that a drive toward Trieste 

would aid OVERLORD more than an assault in southern France, and would make 

one more attempt to persuade the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff of the value of the Trieste 

move, they would not permit "an impasse 

to arrive" and would "consequently agree 

to ANVIL." He thought that in such an 

event they would propose to strengthen 

that operation, with Gentral Alexander 

taking over responsibility for ANVIL as the 

principal offensive in the Mediterranean 

theater. "I would personally be gl3;d to see 

him in charge. . . . Since in the long run 

France is to be more the business of Britain r than of ours, I would be delighted to 

see more British divisions III that 

country." 10 

General Eisenhower's prediction as to 

the approaching British decision on ANVIL 

proved correct. The Prime Minister on 

1 July in the course of a telephone conversation with the Supre~ Commander, during which the latter stressed the need of an 

additional port through which to pour 

U.S. divisions waiting in the United 

States, indicated that he would approve 

the operation. On the following day the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to General Wilson along the lines of 

the earlie~ U.S. proposals. The Mediter-

• Churchill to Roosevelt, 714, 25Jun 44; Prime 

Minister to President, 718,28 Jun 44; Prime Minister to President, 717, 28Jun 44. All in OPD Exec 

10, 63c. 

9 President to Prime Minister, 575, 28Jun 44, OPD 

Exec 10, 63b. A note on the message indicated that 

this was in answer to 714. I t would appear to have 

been sent before messages 717 and 718 were received. 

The entire correspondence is summarized in the following messages from Marshall to 'Eisenhower: W58039, W-58040, W-58041, 29Jun 44, Eisenhower 

personal file. 

'" Eisenhower to Marshall, S-54760, 29 Jun 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 223 

ranean commander was instructed to 

make every possible effort to launch ANVIL 

on a basis of a three-division assault by 14 

August. The SHAEF commander was directed to release as early as possible the 

additional resources required for ANVILin accordance with agreements already 

concluded with the Mediterranean commander. 11 

During late June, while the broader 

strategy in the Mediterranean was being 

discussed, representatives of SHAEF and 

AFHQ had worked out details on the release of naval support and landing craft as 

well as air strength needed from northwest 

Europe for the ANVIL operation. SHAEF, 

hard pressed in matters of supply, won a 

postponement until 15 July of the shifting 

of landing craft requested by AFHQ and 

indicated a desire not to release any aircraft unless General Wilson considered it 

absolutely necessary. Similar delays were 

requested on the release of warships required for ANVIL but permitted to be kept 

by SHAEF until after the taking of Cherbourg. Agreements relative to the shift of 

resources for an airborne operation were 

arranged in early July. 12 

As the commander in whose interest the 

landings in the Mediterranean were to be 

launched and as the future chief of the 

forces participating in ANVIL, General 

Eisenhower on 6 July outlined the objectives of the ANVIL operation for General 

Wilson. He described these as (1) containing and destroying forces that might 

otherwise oppose OVERLORD, (2) securing 

a major port in southern France for the 

entry of additional forces, (3) advancing 

northward to threaten enemy flanks and 

communications, and (4) developing lines 

of communications to support ANVIL 

forces and later reinforcements. These 

aims could be achieved by securing the 

Marseille area and marching up the 

Rhône to Lyon. General Wilson was to retain the ANVIL command until SHAEF assumed the responsibility. The Mediterranean commander was also to have administrative charge of the ANVIL forces, 

including civil affairs in the area south 

and east of the departments of Doubs, 

Côte-d'Or, Niévre, Allier, Puy-de-DBme, 

Cantal, Aveyron, Tarn, and HauteGaronne, and be prepared to maintain 

ANVIL forces beyond that area if SHAEF 

was unable to do so. In order to insure uniformity in civil affairs policy, General Wilson was asked to administer these matters 

in accordance with SHAEF's interim directive of 14 May 1944, which had been 

issued to the Mediterranean commander 

as a guide in civil affairs planning for 

southern France. Control of Resistance 

forces in the southern area of France was 

passed to General Wilson, but SHAEF retained responsibility for co-ordinating Resistance policy throughout France. 

SHAEF was to supply the Resistance 

forces in the south of France in order to 

develop maximum French aid for ANVIL. 

General Eisenhower's headquarters also 

undertook the task of co-ordinating publicity and psychological warfare in the 

ANVIL area. 13 

11 Diary Office CinC, 1 Jul 44; CCS to AFHQ, 

COSMED 139, 2 Jul 44, SHAEF SGS 370.2/2 Operation from the Mediterranean in Support of OVERLORD, II. 

12 SHAEF to CCS, SCAF 54, 26 Jun 44; Memo, 

G–4 SHAEF for CAO, 26 Jun 44; Wilson to Br COS, 

MEDCOS 131, 24 Jun 44; Mtg, SHAEF, 26 Jun 44, 

relative to release of forces from OVERLORD forMediterranean; ANCXF to NCWTF, 27 Jun 44; 

COMNAVEU to SHAEF, 19 Jun 44; ANCXF to 

SHAEF, 20 Jun 44; outgoing msg, COMNAVEU, 22 

Jun 44; Memo for CofS, sgd Moore, 22 Jun 44. All in 

SHAEF SGS 370.2/2 Operation from the Mediterranean in Support of OVERLORD, II.

13 SHAEF to AFHQ, S-55130, 6 Jul 44, SHAEF 

SGS 370.2/2 Operation from the Mediterranean in 

Support of OVERLORD, II. 
224 

General Wilson accepted most of the 

suggestions outlined by the Supreme Commander, but emphasized that his supply 

services were prepared only to support an 

advance 225 miles from the invasion area 

and would have to have additional outside aid iffurther demands were made on 

them. Besides preparing the ANVIL operation, General Wilson intended to press the 

attack in Italy to seize the line of the Po 

and then advance north of that river to secure the line Venice-Padua-VeronaBrescia. 14 

Meanwhile, the British Chiefs of Staff 

continued their opposition to ANVIL. Lest 

there be any dou bt as to their attitude, 

they cabled Washington on 12 July that 

neither His Majesty's Government nor the 

British Chiefs of Staff considered Operation ANVIL the "correct strategy" for the 

Allies, and that they had given way only 

to dispel the view that the British were 

using delaying tactics to gain their point. 

They assured the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 

however, that having accepted the decision they would do their utmost to make 

it work. Mr. Churchill wrote along a similar line to Mr. Hopkins on 19July, saying: 

"We have submitted under protest to the 

decision of the United States Chiefs of 

Staff even in a theatre where we have been 

accorded the right to nominate the Supreme Commander. You can be sure we 

shall try our best to make the operation a 

success. I only hope it will not ruin greater 

projects." 15 

Mr. Churchill apparently by early July 

had gi ven up hope of shifting the Allied 

effort from southern France. However, 

after the breakout in Normandy he cabled 

the President that, since the course of 

events in Normandy and Brittany had 

given good prospects that the whole of the 

Brittany peninsula would soon be in AlTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

lied hands, they should consider switching 

ANVIL "into the main and vital theatre 

where it can immediately play the part at 

close quarters in the great and victorious 

battles in which we are now engaged." 16 

He threw out the suggestion that they 

might find some point from St. Nazaire 

northward along the Brittany peninsula 

already liberated by U.S. troops where a 

landing could be made. The divisions assigned to ANVIL/DRAGOON could thus be 

brought in rapidly and sent into battle by 

the shortest route across France. The 

President, who had been absent since midJuly on a trip which took him tG Pearl 

Harbor, apparently made no immediate 

reply, and Mr. Churchill next expressed 

his fears to Mr. Hopkins. The h".tter felt 

that supply problems involved in shifting 

the landings to the Brittany peninsula were 

insurmountable, and that the President 

would not agree to a change. Hopkins believed that the attack from the south 

would go much more quickly than expected and that "a tremendous victory" 

was in store for the Allies. The President 

shortly afterward sent a similar message, 

giving as his considered opinion: "ANVIL 

should be launched as planned at the earliest practicable date and I have full confidence that it will be successful and of 

" Wilson to Eisenhower, F-692B3, 6Ju144; Wilson 

to Eisenhower, FX 69BB3, B Jul 44; Wilson to Br 

COS, FX 69B15, BJu144. All in SHAEF SGS 370.2/2 

Operation from the Mediterranean in Support of 

OVERLORD, II. 

n Br COS to JSM, 12 Jul 44, Eisenhower personal file; Prime Minister to Hopkins, 19 Jul 44, OPD 

Exec 10, 63b. 

'6 Mr. Churchill actually used the new code name 

DRAGOON which had been chosen for ANVIL a few 

days before. Such changes were frequently made in 

the name of an operation in the fear that the original 

had become known to the enemy. In order to avoid 

confusion for th~ reader, the term ANVIL/DRAGOON 

will hereafter be used except in the case of direct 

quotations. 
THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 225 

great assistance to Eisenhower in driving 

the Hun from France." 17 

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister made a 

final effort to change the views of the Supreme Commander. On 5 August, Mr. 

Churchill, meeting with General Eisenhower and Admirals Cunningham, Ramsay, and William G. Tennant, had warned 

of the great opportunity which would be 

missed if the ANVIL/DRAGOON forces were 

not moved from the Toulon area to Brest, 

Lorient, St. Nazaire, or perhaps even the 

Channel ports. Admiral Cunningham 

supported the Prime Minister against 

General Eisenhower, who was backed by 

Admirals Ramsay and Tennant. Holding 

the view that sound strategy required the 

Allies to force the Germans to fight on the 

maximum number of fronts, General 

Eisenhower adhered to the original plan. 

To make certain that no doubt existed as 

to his position, the Supreme Commander 

cabled Washington that he would not 

"under any conditions agree at this moment to a cancellation of DRAGOON." General Wilson also struck a blow at the 

Prime Minister's arguments at this point 

when he reported that, even though the 

French forces could be diverted to the 

Brittany ports without difficulty, the U.S. 

forces had started loading and any change 

would lead to delay.ls 

Despite these statements, the Prime 

Minister took up the question again with 

General Eisenhower in several interviews 

which proved unusually trying for the 

Supreme Commander. On 9 August, in a 

meeting at 10 Downing Street described 

by General Eisenhower as one of the most 

difficult sessions in which he engaged during the war, the Prime Minister pressed 

his point. Intimating that the United 

States was taking the role of "a big strong 

and dominating partner" rather than attempting to understand the British position, the Prime Minister expressed his 

concern at the apparent indifference of the 

United States toward the Italian campaign. H' Obviously "stirred, upset and 

even despondent," Mr. Churchill seemed 

to feel that the success of his whole administration would be involved in the failure 

to push General Alexander's drive to the 

north. General Eisenhower suggested that 

if Mr. Churchill had political reasons for 

backing a campaign into the Balkans he 

should take up the matter with President 

Roosevelt. The Supreme Commander was 

willing to change his plan of campaign if 

political considerations were to be paramount; on military grounds alone he felt 

he could not yield. Mr. Churchill continued to press his case. These arguments, 

however painful to General Eisenhower, 

did not change his views, and he again assured the War Department of his strong 

opposition to "a cancellation or a major 

modification of DRAGOON." 20 

With this new evidence that the United 

States would not yield, the British Chiefs 

of Staff on 10 August notified General 

Wilson that he was to proceed with 

17 Br COS toJSM, 5 Aug 44, Eisenhower personal 

file. Prime Minister to President, 742, 4 Aug 44; Hopkins to Prime -Minister (given in Memo for SGS, 

7 Aug 44); President to Prime Minister, 596, 7 Aug 

44; Prime Minister to President, 7 Aug 44. All in 

OPD Exec 10, 63b. Summaries of three messages 

given in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 810, 

812-13. 

18 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, p. 635; 

Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD-12612, 5 Aug 44, 

Eisenhower personal file; Wilson to CCS, FX 79468, 

5 Aug 44, AFHQ file; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 

pp.281-84. 

19 The quoted words are General Eisenhower's 

paraphrase. 

20 Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 and II Aug 44, Eisenhower personal file. Butcher, My Three Years With 

Eisenhower, p. 639, and Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 

pp. 281-84, reconstruct parts of the conversation. 
226 

CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 

15 August - 15 September 1944 

~} MAIN AXIS. OF ADVANCE, SEVENTH ARMV 

rTTTTTTTm THIRD ARMY FRONT, 15 SEPTEMBER 

~ ~ GERMAN FRONT, ELEMS 19TH ARMY, 15 SE? 

o CONTACT POINTS, ReN ELEMS THIRD AND 

SEVENTH ARMIES, 12 SEPTEMBER 

Shaded area terrOIn above 400 mefers 

100 KILOMETERS 

MAP2 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

ANVIL/DRAGOON as planned, a directive 

which was confirmed by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff on the following day-only 

four days before the landing. 21 

Deepl y distressed by the interview of 9 

August, General Eisenhower attempted to 

reassure the Prime Minister of the good 

faith and good will of the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff. He denied that there was any intent 

on the part of anyone in the U.S. war machine to disregard British views or "coldbloodedly to leave Britain holding an 

empty bag in any of our joint undertakings." In his concluding paragraphs, he 

stressed the degree of co-operation-which 

had been achieved in the Allied staffs: 

In two years I think we have developed 

such a fine spirit and machinery in our Geld 

direction that no consideration of British versus American interests ever occurs to any of 

the indi vid uals comprising my staff or serving as one of my principal commanders. I 

would feel that much of my hard work over 

the past months had been irretrievably lost if 

we now should lose faith in the organisms 

that have given higher direction to our war 

effort, because such lack of faith would 

quickly be reflected in discord .in our field 

command. 

During all these months I have leaned on 

you often, and have always looked to you 

with complete confidence when I felt the 

need of additional support. This adds a sentimental to my very practical reasons for hoping, most earnestly, that' in spite of disappointment, we will all adhere tenaciously to 

the concepts of control brought forth by the 

President and yourself two and one half years 

ago. 22 

Mr. Churchill quickly set the matter 

right on 15 August with this message: 

Thank you for your kind letter of August 

11. Many congratulations on brilliant opera21 Br COS to AFHQ, 10 Aug 44; CCS to AFHQ, 

II Aug 44. Both in SHAEF cbllog. 

22 Eisenhower to Prime Minister, II Aug 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 227 

tions in Anjou and Normandy. There must 

have been a magnificent fight and logistic 

penetration of American turning movement 

will long excite wonder. Every good wish.23 

The Landings and the Advance 

General Wilson launched the longawaited attack on the southern coast of 

France on 15 August. (Map 2) British, 

GENERAL PATCH 

French, and U.S. forces under Lt. Gen. 

Alexander M. Patch, commander of the 

Seventh U.S. Army, began landing that 

morning against light opposition in the 

area east of Toulon. French forces under 

Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, commander of French Army B, landed over 

the U.S. beaches on the second day and 

started their drive for Toulon and Marseille. General de Lattre commanded the 

GENERAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY 

II French Corps in the assault and was 

subordinated to General Patch. It was understood that later he would revert to 

command of the French Army.24 

At the time of the landings, Army Group 

G had eleven divisions with which to hold 

France south of the Loire. OKW had considered withdrawing General Blaskowitz' 

forces to a line nearer to the German bor23 Prime Minister to Eisenhower, 15 Aug 44, Eisenhower personal file. 

24 The author has drawn some operational details 

of this chapter from the official history of the campaign in southern France prepared in the OCMH by 

Maj. James David T. Hamilton. See also Report by the 

Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff on the Operation in Southern France, August 

1944 (Washington, 1946); Seventh Army Rpt ofOpns, 

I; and Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, Histoire de 

In Premiere Armee Franfaise (Paris, 1949). Two important German sources are Der Westen (Schramm) 

and MS # T-121 (Zimmermann et a/.). 
228 

der, but had taken no action when the 

attack came. In the face of a major Allied offensive, OKW on 17-18 August 

ordered Army Group G to evacuate both the 

Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts except 

for the fortresses and ports. The LXIV 

Corps, which had been in charge of troops 

in southwestern France since First Army 

was withdrawn a few weeks before to build 

up a Seine defense line southeast of Paris, 

formed three march groups and withdrew 

eastward, south of the Loire, toward 

Dijon. Nineteenth Army, meanwhile, retreated northward through the Rhone 

valley toward the Plateau de Langres. 25 

The first two weeks of the Allied attack 

exceeded all expectations as to the speed 

with which the initial objectives were 

seized. The period saw two major ports, 

Toulon and Marseille, opened and more 

than 57,000 prisoners taken at the cost of 

4,000 French and 2,700 American casualties. The only direct effect of the landings 

on the fortunes of OVERLORD seems to 

have been the cancellation of movement 

orders for the 338th Division, which was 

already on its way to Normandy.26 Indirectly, however, the scattering of enemy 

forces south of the Loire and the approach 

of Allied forces to the 12th Army Group's 

right flank meant the strengthening of 

General Eisenhower's position. More important to later operations in the north 

was the promise that the opening of Marseille would provide a new port through 

which men and supplies could be brought 

for a sustained drive into Germany. General Eisenhower, greatly pleased at the 

success of ANVIL/DRAGOON, was gratified 

still further when the Prime Minister, who 

had observed the landings, wired: 

I watched this landing yesterday from afar. 

All I have seen there makes me admire 

the perfect precision with which the landing 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

was arranged and intimate collaboration of 

British-American forces. 

Mindful of the difficulties which had preceded the operation, the Supreme Commander replied: 

I am delighted to note in your latest telegram to me that you have personally and 

legally adopted the DRAGOON. I am sure that 

he will grow fat and prosperous under your 

watchfulness. !fyou can guarantee that your 

presence at all such operations will have the 

same effect that it did in this wonderful show 

I ,vill make sure that in my future operations 

in this theater you are given a fleet of your 

own. I hope you will hurry back to us as I 

have many things to talk over with you. With 

warm and respectful regard. IKE.27 

In early September the U.S. and French 

forces pushed north ward toward Lyon 

and Dijon to prevent a junction between 

enemy forces from the south and southwest and to par their escape routes to Germany. The enemy evacuated Lyon before 

the French and U.S. forces arrived there 

on 3 September, and Dijon fell to the 

French without a fight on the 11 tho On the 

following day, French forces that had 

pushed beyond Dijon in the direction of 

the Third U.S. Army made a junction 

with OVERLORD units near CMuillon-surSeine. 28 

The junction of Allied forces spelled defeat for those enemy forces from southwest25 Armeegruppe G (referred to hereafter as Army 

Group G) KTB NT. 2 and Anlagen 1. VII-30.IX.44; OB 

WEST, KTB 1.-31.VIlI.44; Der Westen (Schramm); 

DB WEST, A Study in Command (Zimmermann 

et al.), written under the auspices of the Department 

of the Army Hist¢>rical Division in 1946. 

260B WEST, VB 1.-31.VIII.44, 15 Aug 14. 21 PriII)e Ministfr to Eisenhower, 18 Aug 44; Eisenhower to Wilson f'~r Prime Minister, 24 Aug 44. Both 

in Eisenhower pe~sonal file. 

28 The time an& place of the first meeting like that 

of so many other j;unctions during the war is a sub· 

ject of some controversy. Individual jeeploads of soldier.s and at least Qne courier plane had sought out 

e1enj.ents of the other of the approaching forces before 
THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 229 

ern France still west of Dijon. Two of the 

three march groups which had started 

from the Atlantic area and other miscellaneous units passed Dijon before that city 

was captured, but the third unit, Group 

Elster, some 20,000 strong, including elements of the 159th Division and a large 

number of noncombatant personnel (administrative personnel, Wehrmacht civilian personnel, auxiliary workers), proceeded more slowly and was cut off by the 

junction at Chatillon-sur-Seine. Continually harassed by the French Forces ofthe 

Interior and the XIX Tactical Air Command and cut off from Germany by the 

Third Army's advance, this group began 

negotiations for capitulation on 10 September and formally surrendered on the 

16th. The final honor of accepting the 

surrender went to the Ninth U.S. Army, 

which had recently been assigned the 

Third Army's sector along the Loire. In 

recognition of the role played by the air 

forces in protecting the Allied right flank 

and in forcing the enemy surrender, the 

Ninth Army commander invited the commanding general of the XIX Tactical Air 

Command to take part in the ceremonIes. 

Upon the link-up of General Eisenhower's forces with those advancing from 

the south, the direction of the French attack was changed to conform to the Supreme Commander's original views. The 

II French Corps suspended its advance 

northward and regrouped its forces between VI U.S. Corps (Lt. Gen. Lucian K. 

12 and reconnaissance elements of the 

A:'iVIL/DRAGOON forces had met at 

Sam bernon on the evening of 10-11 September. 

Seventh Army Rpt ofOpns, I, 271-72; TUSA AAR, 

I, 69. Report by the Supreme Allied Commander iv1editerranean prefers 11 September as the date of meeting; 

de Lattre, His/oire de ta Premiere Arm!e Franfaise, pp. 

161-62, accepts the 12 September date. 

Truscott) and the I French Corps. The 

U.S. forces seized Vesoul on 13 September, thus blocking the last escape route to 

Belfort in the U.S. zone. On 16 September 

General Truscott's corps occupied Lure 

and Luxeuil-Ies-Bains, which controlled 

two other important corridors to Germany, but was not in time to catch the 

main body of enemy forces. The U.S. divisions, as a result of supply shortages and 

stiffening enemy resist\,mce, itow came almost to a halt some fi£teen miles short of 

the Moselle while awaiting relief by the II 

French Corps and the general regrouping 

of Allied forces. 

On 15 September a major change in 

command had been made. By agreement 

between General Eisenhower and General 

Wilson, the forces from the Mediterranean 

passed to SHAEF control and were placed 

under the 6th Army Group (Lt. Gen. 

Jacob L. Devers) which became operational on that date. Control of French 

Army B, soon to be named First French 

Army, was given to 6th Army Group. 

In the month which had passed since 

Allied forces stormed ashore in southern 

France, the forces of General Patch and 

General de Lattre had swept westward 

from the assault beaches to Avignon and 

northward up the Rhone valley for a distance of more than 400 air-line miles. 

Their rapid advance had forced the enemy to evacuate France south of the Loire, 

except for a few ports, and had inflicted 

heavy losses on Arnry Group G. Some consolation for the Germans remained in the 

fact that General Blaskowitz' skillful handling of the retreat had saved more than 

half of his forces. Despite this action, he 

29 OB WEST, A Study in Command (Zimmermann et at.); OB WEST KTB 1.C30.IX.44, 5 and 9 

Sep 44; Conquer.' The Story of Ninth Army, 1944-45 

(Washington, 1947), pp. 47-50; TUSA AAR, I, 50, 
230 

was replaced on 21 September by General 

der Panzertruppen Hermann Balck, then 

commander of the Fourth Panzer Ar~ on 

the Eastern Front. Ar~ Group G, to which 

the Fifth Panzer Ar~ had been transferred 

in the hope that it could deliver a counterattack against the Third Army from the 

Plateau de Langres, by mid-September 

took up the protection of the left wing of 

the German line north of the Swiss border. 

The Fifth Panzer Ar~ and part of the First 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Ar~ were committed against the Third 

U.S. Army, and the battered Nineteenth 

Ar~ was given the task of opposing the 

French and U.S. forces under General 

Devers. 3o 

30 Fifth Panzer Army was taken out of the line on 

6 September 1944 and attached directly to OB 

WEST,. on II September 1944 it was assigned to 

Army Group G. First Army was transferred from Amry 

Group B to Army GrQup G on 8 September 1944. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Relations With the French, 

June-SepteIllber 1944 

The Supreme Commander had become 

painfully aware, long before D Day, that 

smooth relations with General de Gaulle 

and the French Committee of National 

Liberation were of critical importance to 

Allied operations. Involved in this question were such matters as the administration of civil affairs in liberated France, the 

command of French Resistance forces, 

and the establishment of a provisional 

government in Paris after its liberation. 

General Eisenhower was concerned, therefore, with Allied efforts to establish a 

working arrangement with the French 

Committee. 

Civil Affairs 

Civil affairs activities in France during 

the first phase of operations were under 

the general control of the 21 Army 

Group.' Not until the activation of a U.S. 

army group did SHAEF assume direct responsibility for these operations in the 

field. During the first weeks of the invasion, therefore, many of the decisions relative to the re-establishment of civil affairs 

administration in Normandy were handled directly at 21 Army Group. The fact 

that the British Government was more inclined to recognize the French Committee 

than was the United States may have simplified the task of General Montgomery's 

officers in dealing with the Gaullist representatives in Normandy. 

In those civil affairs problems which 

required decisions at governmental levels, 

SHAEF was involved directly-the more 

so in cases that meant any implied recognition of the sovereignty of the French 

Committee, particularly in those instances 

where the Foreign Office and the State 

Department appeared willing to go farther than the President toward co-operation with de Gaulle. Where the matter 

affected military operations, the Supreme 

Commander was sometimes approached 

in the hope that he could help in finding a 

working solution to the problem. 

An example of the type of case which 

came to General Eisenhower's attention 

was that relating to the issuance of in vasion currency to Allied troops. Like many 

other French civil affairs questions this 

had been discussed by French and Allied 

representatives since 1943, and had 

bogged down. on the issue of the sovereignty of the French Committee. In an 

effort to avoid depreciating French currency by issuing yellow-seal dollars and 

British Military Authority notes to the 

troops, as in Italy, the British and U.S. auI See above, p. 83. 
232 

thorities arranged in December 1943 to 

print special invasion money in Washington for the use of the armies. Before this 

could be done, the British Ambassador 

"unexpectedly" notified the State Department that his government preferred a 

French national currency issued by the 

French Committee of National Liberation. The immediate effect was to delay 

any decision on the issue for a number of 

weeks. To bring the matter to a head, the 

British Secretary of State for War, Sir 

J ames Grigg, appealed to General Eisenhower at the end of January 1944, reminding him that currency was "a vital ifuninteresting necessity to successful operations." 2 If General Eisenhower had ever 

doubted the necessity of settling such 

problems promptly, he had sufficient 

reason to change his mind when they continued to reappear in the spring and summer of 1944. 

In early May, General Eisenhower forwarded to Washington proposals based on 

preliminary discussions with the French 

Military Mission in London regarding the 

whole financial situation in France. After 

a period of three weeks, having received 

no direction on the problem, he proposed 

as "a solution of desperation" to issue a 

proclamation declaring the supplemental 

francs legal tender. The Supreme Commander and his chief of staff doubted their 

legal right to issue such a proclamation 

and feared it would be considered a flagrant violation of French sovereignty, but 

they felt they would have to take such action unless they received other instructions 

by 28 May. 

Before this second proposal was received, General Eisenhower's program of 

early May had been approved in principle 

at "the highest American level," subject to 

certain specified conditions, and passed 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

on to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for 

study. Among these conditions were the 

following: arrangements made with the 

French Committee of National Liberation 

must not preclude consultation with or the 

reception of aid from other representatives 

of the French people; authority for issuing 

supplemental francs belonged to SHAEF, 

and any statement of the French Committee of National Liberation would merely 

be a supporting announcement. 3 

No agreement had been reached with 

the French by the time General de Gaulle 

reached London shortly before D Day. He 

was dissatisfied when he found that limited 

quantities of supplemental francs in small 

denominations had actually been given to 

British and U.S. soldiers in the assault 

units, and that larger quantities were 

ready when needed to supplement the five 

and one-half billion metropolitan francs 

put at the disposal of Allied forces by the 

War Office. His anger at this assumption 

of what he considered to be a prerogative 

of the French Committee of National Liberation apparently influenced him to forbid the 180 French liaison officers trained 

for civil affairs duties to sail with the assault units on D Day. He finally relented 

sufficiently to permit twenty liaison officers 

to accompany Allied troops.4 

President Roosevelt's announcement on 

9 June that General de Gaulle would be 

welcome in Washington for a visit in late 

2 Grigg to Eisenhower, 27 Jan 44; Hilldring to 

Barker, 17 Dec 43; CCS to Eisenhower, 31 Jan 44. 

All in SHAEF SGS 123 Invasion Currency, I. 

3 Eisenhower to CCS for CCAC, VOG 32, 4 May 

44; Eisenhower to CCS for CCAC, VOG 53, 25 May 

44; Smith to McCloy, S-52510, 25 May 44; Hilldring 

to Holmes, 41408,25 May 44 (written on 25 May, 

but not sent until the following day), SHAEF SGS 

123 Invasion Currency, I. 

"New York Times, June 8, 1944; Eisenhower to 

CCS, VOG 65, 9 Jun 44, SHAEF SGS 123 Invasion 

Currency, I. 
RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH 

June or early July raised some hope for an 

early agreement on currency and other 

questions. General de Gaulle dashed this 

hope almost immediately by his statement 

that no agreement existed between the 

French Committee and the United States 

and Great Britain regarding French cooperation in the administration ofliberatedFrance. He feared that General 

Eisenhower's address and proclamation to 

the French, which made no mention of 

General de Gaulle and the French Committee of National Liberation, foreshadowed "a sort of taking over of power in 

France by the Allies' military command." 

He warned that "the issuance of a socalled French currency in France without 

any agreement and without any guarantee 

fromthe French authority can lead only 

to serious complications." 5 

Mr. Churchill promptly urged President Roosevelt to make a decision on the 

currency question. While the Prime Minister did not believe that General de 

Gaulle would brand the invasion francs 

as counterfeit, as he was rumored to be 

ready to do, he feared that the Allies faced 

the alternatives of permitting de Gaulle to 

obtain new status as the price for backing 

the notes or of themselves guaranteeing 

the money. The President, with the tone of 

irritation he frequently showed where de 

Gaulle was concerned, suggested telling 

the French general that, if the French people would not accept the invasion currency, General Eisenhower would be 

authorized to use British Military Authority money and yellow-seal dollars. 

Therefore, if General de Gaulle encouraged the French to refuse invasion money, 

he would be responsible for the certain 

depreciation of the franc which would follow. The President opposed any effort to 

press General de Gaulle for a statement 

233 

supporting the new currency, but agreed 

that, if he wanted to issue something on his 

individual responsibility, he could put his 

signature on any currency statement "in 

any capacity that he desires, even to that 

of the King of Siam." 6 

The Allied press widely reported General de Gaulle's angry statements over 

invasion currency and his action relative 

to French liaison officers and apparently 

greatly exaggerated the difficulties which 

existed between the invasion forces and 

the French Committee. Some members of 

the Foreign Office pressed for a policy of 

greater co-operation with the committee. 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, who had gone to 

Europe on 9 June to visit the new beachhead and discuss further policy, became 

alarmed over the situation. They notified 

the President that, although he had the 

support of the Prime Minister on the 

French question, this was one matter on 

which Mr. Churchill could not dominate 

the Foreign Office or the Cabinet. The 

U.S. Chiefs considered the French situation unhappy at best and potentially 

dangerous in view of its possible effect on 

the French Resistance forces. 7 

Meanwhile, a 21 Army Group liaison 

officer reported a satisfactory situation in 

the British beachhead. The invasion currency was being accepted, and for the 

most part an enthusiastic welcome greeted 

the Allied forces. The liaison officer concluded from discussions with people in the 

area that the average man looked to 

de Gaulle "as the natural and inevitable 

5 New York Tlmes,july 10, II, 1944. 

6 Prime Minister to President, 686, 9 jun 44; Prime 

Minister to President, 696, 10 jun 44; Paraphrase of 

Msg, .President to Prime Minister, 12 jun 44, cited in 

Hilldring to Holmes, W-50351" 13 jun 44. All in 

SHAEF SGS 123 Invasion Currency, I. 

'Marshall, King, and Arnold to President, 

S-53809, 14 jun 44, Eisenhower personal file. 
234 

leader of Free France." They were not 

clear, he added, as to whether or not they 

regarded de Gaulle as the head of a provisional government, but he was certain 

that if the general landed as head of such 

a government he would be accepted. 8 

The President, while not inclined to do 

any favors for de Gaulle, was willing to 

make full use of any organization or influence the general had which would aid the 

Allied military effort, provided the result 

was not to impose the French Committee 

on the French people by force of U.S. and 

British arms. General Marshall received 

this assurance in London about the time 

General de Gaulle was visiting Bayeux 

and Isigny and receiving a noisy welcome. 

By 16 June when the French chief returned to Algiers, he had strengthened his 

position with the French people in the liberated areas and with the British Government. Apparently aware of reports that 

the Prime Minister was under pressure to 

ask for outright recognition of the French 

Committee as the provisional government 

of France, de Gaulle left M. Pierre Vienot 

and several assistants behind to discuss 

civil affairs problems with British representatives. These officials opened negotiations on a civil affairs agreement similar to 

that concluded with Belgium before the 

invasion. 9 

Feeling certain of support in British and 

U.S. political circles as well as among military authorities on the beachhead, General de Gaulle spoke confidently in his 

address to the French Consultative Assembly at Algiers on 18 June. Speaking on 

the anniversary ofthe date he called the 

French people to arms in 1940, he stressed 

the efforts which the French had already 

personally expended for their Ii beration. 

Casting a glance at the British and U.S. 

Governments, he noted that France, havTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

ing had long experience with other countries, knew that foreign support would 

sometimes be given hesitantly, and that 

France's friends, however numerous, 

would not always give free and immediate 

aid. He informed the assembly of the 

steps he had taken to establish the committee's authority in liberated France. 

M. Fran<;ois Coulet had already assumed 

the office of Commissioner of the Republic 

for the Region of Normandy, thus becoming the representative of the committee in 

liberated areas with general administrative authority over prefectural, subprefectural, and municipal authorities. Coulet 

was directly responsible to General Koenig, but had the right of direct appeal to 

London or Algiers. Col. Pierre de Chevigne, another supporter of the committee, 

was territorial military governor of the 

subregion of Rouen. General de Gaulle 

further assured the assembly that General 

Koenig as commander of French forces 

under General Eisenhower conserved all 

the rights of recourse to French national 

authority that any other national commander had under an interallied system. 

He praised the strategic understanding of 

General Eisenhower "in whom the French 

Government had complete confidence for 

the victorious conduct of the common 

military operations." 10 

The tribute to General Eisenhower in a 

R. Ellias, Preliminary Report on Reconnaissance of British Beachhead, 9-12 Jun 44, 

SHAEF SGS 014 France (Oct 43-Aug 44), Civil 

Affairs Dir for France, I. 

• Notes on de Gaulle visit, 14 Jun 44; Roosevelt to 

Marshall, 14 Jun 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 092 

France, French Relations, II. Holmes to McCloy, 

S-54099, 18Jun 44; Holmes to McCloy, S-54530, 23 

Jun 44. Both in Eisenhower personal file. 

10 Text of addresses to Consultative Assembly on 

18 and 26 June 1944, de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, 

pp. 444-50; Smith to Hilldring, 4 Jul 44, SHAEF 

Civil Affairs CCS Dirs. 
RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH 235 

speech underlining French sovereignty 

indicated a willingness on the part of General de Gaulle to help prepare a favorable 

atmosphere for the talks he was to have 

with President Roosevelt in July. SHAEF 

representatives attempted in the meantime to conclude directly with General 

Koenig a working agreement on supplemental francs until a formal financial 

agreement could be made. On 4 July, 

General Smith informed the War Department of General Koenig’s assurance that 

supplemental francs would be accepted 

even for taxes. The liaison officer problem 

had also been straightened out to a considerable extent. French military tactical 

liaison officers were attached to Allied 

army groups, corps, and divisions, and 

French administrative liaison officers were 

assigned to the French civil administration for civil affairs liaison between their 

various offices and the Allied forces. General Smith was especially pleased about 

the excellent relations that existed between the Allied commanders and General 

Koenig. 11 

General de Gaulle, accompanied by 

Gen. Emile Bethouart, French Chief of 

Staff, M. Gaston Palewski, Chief of the 

Civil Cabinet, and MM. Hervé Alphand 

and Jacques Paris of the French Foreign 

Office, arrived in Washington on 6 July. 

Both the President and the general made 

efforts to be affable, and their representatives set about arranging a satisfactory settlement of their differences. On 8 July, the 

State, War, and Treasury Departments 

sent a memorandum to the President suggesting that a civil affairs agreement similar to those concluded with Belgium the 

Netherlands, and Norway be signed with 

the French Committee of National Liberation. The president informed the press on 

11 July that the United States had 

decided to consider the committee the 

dominant political authority of France 

until elections could be held to determine 

the will of the French people. The door 

was left open, however, for other groups in 

France to present conflicting claims to 

authority, with the understanding that the 

Supreme Commander, under his power to 

maintain peaceful relations in a military 

area, could make final decisions. Some 

press observers saw little change in this 

from the pre-D-day state of affairs, except

in the trend toward cordiality, but it was 

generally recognized that the situation 

had improved. General de Gaulle, on 

leaving Washington, expressed satisfaction 

with the talks he had held with the President. Lest there be any doubt of his intention to conserve the sovereignty of France, 

however, he declared in Ottawa on 11 

July that it would be not only an error but 

an impossibility to exclude France from 

her true place among the great nations of 

the world. 12 

Some delays yet remained before the 

civil affairs agreements drafted separately 

in London and Washington could be concluded with the French. The Allies were 

to reach Paris before General Eisenhower 

and General Koenig signed them. However, the talks in Washington, as well as 

the friendly relationships between Generals Eisenhower and Smith and General 

Koenig, helped to mitigate a portion of the 

difficulties that existed in June. Improvised 

arrangements, already in effect in Nor11 Smith to Hilldring, 4 Jul 44, SHAEF Civil 

Affairs CCS Dirs. 

12 Holmes, WD, to Smith, 8 Jul 44, SHAEF Civil 

Affairs CCS Dirs; Interview with press, 10 July 1944, 

in de Gaulle, Discours et Messages; New York Times, 

July 6–13, 1944; John J. McCloy, ASW, to Stimson 

(giving the text of message from Roosevelt to a Certain Naval Person [Churchill] in which the President 

informed Churchill of his decision), Diary Office 

CinC, 11 Jul 44. 
236 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

mandy before the talks began, continued 

to work until more formal agreements 

could be put into effect. 

Command of French Resistance Forces 

The Supreme Commander instituted a 

major change in the command organization of the French Forces of the Interior 

shortly after D Day, not only to satisfy the 

French desire to exercise control over Resistance forces, but also to insure effective 

support of Allied operations by these units. 

General Koenig, commander of the 

French forces in the United Kingdom, had 

asked for such a command reorganization 

shortly before D Day. He pointed out that 

for almost four years the Resistance forces 

of France had carried on their work while 

the French headquarters in Great Britain 

had no share in the control of such activities. With D Day in sight and the prospect of the movement of thousands of 

French patriots toward the beachhead 

area, the French Committee of National 

Liberation wanted General Koenig to organize a headquarters of the French 

Forces of the Interior under the Supreme 

Commander to control these Resistance 

forces. General Koenig asked that all 

agencies dealing with the activities of the 

French Forces of the Interior be brought 

under one headquarters and that a French 

commander be appointed under the Supreme Commander to head the group.13 

On 2 June, General Whiteley of 

SHAEF and General Koenig reached 

agreement, subject to General Eisenhower’s concurrence, that Koenig would 

assume command of the French Forces of 

the Interior and act under the instructions 

of the Supreme Commander. The French 

general was to issue his directives through 

Special Force Headquarters. In addition, 

a tripartite regional staff under Colonel 

Vernon (Colonel Vernon’s real name was 

Jean Ziegler) was set up within Special 

Force Headquarters to deal with all matters pertaining to France. The French 

Committee of National Liberation 

promptly approved these arrangements 

and announced that the French Forces of 

the Interior consisted of all fighting or 

service units participating in the fight 

against the enemy on home territory. The 

committee added that these forces were an 

integral part of the French Army and entitled to all the rights and privileges of 

regular soldiers.14 

SHAEF issued General Koenig’s directive as commander of French Forces of the 

Interior on 17 June. On the basic consideration that the French Forces of the 

Interior were to furnish maximum support 

to Allied operations on the Continent, the 

Supreme Commander directed General 

Koenig to delay the concentration of 

enemy forces in Normandy and Brittany 

by (1) impeding the movement of German 

reserves, (2) disrupting enemy lines of 

communications and rear areas, and (3) 

compelling the enemy to maintain large 

forces in his rear areas to contain resistance. General Eisenhower instructed 

Allied ground force commanders to ask for 

Resistance help in normal tactical operations according to priorities set by 

operational requirements. The initial 

efforts were to be aimed at the Normandy 

bridgehead and Brittany to delay or prevent the movement of enemy formations 

to these areas. Later, Resistance forces 

were to concentrate on other parts of 

13 Koenig to Smith, 24 May 44, sub: Organization 

of Comd of FFI, SHAEF SGS 322 FFI, Command 

and Control of French Forces of the Interior. 

14 Smith to Koenig, 31 May 44; Koenig to Smith, 

9 Jun 44; Proclamation of French Republic Provisional Government, 9 Jun 44; Smith to Koenig, 12 

Jun 44. All in SHAEF SGS 322 FFI, Command and 

Control of French Forces of the Interior. 
RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH 

France. The third priority was given to attacks on the enemy telecommunication 

system. 15 

General Eisenhower regularized the 

status of General Koenig on 23 June by 

announcing that the latter commanded 

the French Forces of the Interior with the 

status of any Allied commander serving 

under General Eisenhower. It was General Koenig's duty, consonant with the 

obligations of senior American and British 

commanders, to indicate if orders given 

him were "in serious conflict" with those 

issued by the French Committee of N ational Liberation. In such a case, it was 

the duty and prerogative of General 

Koenig to refer the matter to Algiers for 

policy guidance. 16 

The Supreme Commander indicated in 

July that Koenig would gradually relieve 

the Special Force Headquarters of its responsibilities in connection with French 

Resistance, and that SHAEF and Special 

Force Headquarters would aid him in 

working out a program for taking over 

these responsibilities. The shift was delayed, however, and not until 21 August 

was the staff of the French Forces of the 

Interior integrated in accordance with 

SHAEF's directive of 1 August. Maj. Gen. 

Harold Redman and Col. Joseph F. Haskell were appointed as deputies to General 

Koenig. Special Force Headquarters, Special Force detachments with army groups 

and armies, and a number of the Allied 

planning sections for Resistance operations were transferred to General Koenig's 

headquarters. 17 

Activities if French Resistance 

June-August 1944 

Long before control over French Resistance forces passed to General Koenig, 

those elements had proved their worth to 

237 

the Supreme Commander's forces in 

France. At SHAEF's direction Special 

Force Headquarters on the night of 5-6 

June ordered Resistance groups in France 

to put into effect D-Day plans for general 

harassing action and sabotage of railroads, 

highways, and telecommunications. Rail 

lines were damaged or destroyed in parts 

of northeast and southeast France. French 

partisans rendered valuable aid in delaying the movement of German units to the 

beachhead, particularly in the case of an 

armored division which was forced to take 

twelve days for its move from Toulouse to 

the beachhead. By the end of June, Special Force Headquarters declared that the 

results had "far surpassed" those generally 

expected. Whenever sufficiently armed, 

these forces had "displayed unity in action 

and a high fighting spirit." In Brittany, 

the French Forces of the Interior, strengthened by elements flown in from the United 

Kingdom, were speedily organized. They 

proved of great value in the early weeks of 

the invasion in furnishing information on 

enemy activities in this area to Allied intelligence units. In southeast France, the 

Resistance forces were particularly strong. 

By early July they controlled almost 

wholly the Vercors area and the eastern 

portion of the department of Ain, had a 

strong measure of authority in the departments of Indne, Haute-Vienne, and 

northern Dordogne, and· were strong 

15 SHAEF Dir to.Gen Koenig, 17 Jun 44, SHAEF 

SGS 322 FFI, Command and Control of the French 

Forces of the Interior. 

16 SHAEF Dir, 23 Jun 44, sub: Designation of 

Comdr of FFI, SHAEF SGS 322 FFI, Command and 

Control of the French Forces of the Interior. 

17 Notes of decisions made at mtg held at SHAEF, 

Whiteley, Koenig, et al., 10 Jul 44, SHAEF SGS 322 

FFI, Command and Control of French Forces of the 

Interior; SHAEF Dir to Koenig, I Aug 44; SHAEF 

G-3 Memo, 21 Aug 44, sub: Formation of EtatMajor FFI, SHAEF G-3 322-8 Operational Dir to 

SFHQ. 
238 

enough to hold specific positions for daylight drops of arms or troops in the Massif 

Central, Vosges, Morvan, Jura, and 

Savoie. is 

In July the Resistance forces intensified 

their attacks on enemy rail movements. 

They carried on their chief activity against 

the enemy in Normandy south. of the 

beachhead, in the Rhone valley, against 

lines of communications through the Toulouse Gap, and in the Paris-Orleans Gap. 

They had enlarged their control in the 

south of France to include parts of the 

Saone-et-Loire, Cantal, Gard, and the 

eastern parts of the Isere, Hautes-Alpes, 

and Basses-Alpes, but a violent German 

counterattack in the Vercors had dispersed 

the Resistance forces in that area. Special 

Force Headquarters estimated that by the 

end of July there were 70,000 armed Resistants in the south of France. In Brittany, 

these forces worked directly with U.S. 

units after the Allied breakout in lateJ uly. 

In Belgium during the same period, Resistance forces attacked railroads which 

could bring troops and supplies to Germans in northern France. Their work was 

hampered by their shortage of supplies, 

since only two planeloads were dropped in 

July. SHAEF approved plans for overt 

action in the Ardennes during the month. 19 

In Brittany, southern France, and the 

area of the Loire and Paris, French Resistance forces greatly aided the pursuit to the 

Seine in August. Specifically, they supported the Third Army in Brittany and 

the Seventh U.S. and First French Armies 

in the southern beachhead and the Rhone 

valley. In the advance to the Seine, the 

French Forces of the Interior helped protect the southern flank of the Third Army 

by interfering with enemy railroad and 

highway movements and enemy telecommunications, by developing open resistance on as wide a scale as possible, by 

. THE SUPREME COMMAND 

providing tactical intelligence, by preserving installations of value to the Allied 

forces, and by mopping up bypassed 

enemy positions. Reporting on the work 

of these forces in Brittany, General Eisenhower later declared: 

Special mention must be made of the great 

assistance given us by the F.F.I. in the task of 

reducing Brittany. The overt resistance forces 

in this area had been built up since June 

around a core ofS.A.S. troops of the French 

4th Parachute Battalion to a total strength of 

some 30,000 men. On the night of 4/5 August the Etat-Major was dispatched to take 

charge of their operations. As the Allied 

columns advanced, these French forces ambushed the retreating enemy, attacked 

isolated grou ps and strongpoints, and protected bridges from destruction. When our 

armor had swept past them they were given 

the task of clearing up the localities where 

pockets of Germans remained, and of keeping open the Allied lines of communication. 

They also provided our troops with invaluable assistance in supplying information of 

the enemy's dispositions and intentions. Not 

least in importance, they had, by their ceaseless harassing activities, surrounded the Germans with a terrible atmosphere of danger 

and hatred which ate into the confidence of 

the leaders and the courage of the soldiers.20 

The Resistance forces interfered with 

the enemy retreat through the Rhone valley by denying him use of some of the railroads along the river, and by ambushing 

forces moving along the highways in that 

area. Some bands carried on guerrilla 

18 Rpt, SFHQ to SHAEF, 10th Monthly Rpt (for 

Jun 44), IOJuI44, SHAEF SGS 319.1/10 Monthly 

SOE/SO Rpts (SFHQ). For detailed study of this 

subject see The French Forces of the Interior, prep 

in French Resistance Unit, Hist Sec, ETOUSA, 1944, 

MS, Pt. II, Chs. I, II, OCMH files. 

19 Rpt, SFHQ to SHAEF, 11th Monthly Rpt (for 

Jul44), 10 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 319.1/10 Monthly 

SOE/SO Rpts (SFHQ). 

20 Report by the Supreme Comman.der to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied 

Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 (Washington, 1946), p. 41. 
RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH 

warfare against enemy headquarters and 

supply depots in the south, while others 

sought to protect port facilities at Toulon, 

Marseille, and Sete against enemy destruction at the time of the Allied landings 

in those areas. In mid-August when it 

became clear that the enemy was preparing to evacuate field forces from France 

south of the Loire and west of the line 

Orleans-, Toulouse-Tarbes, SHAEF gave 

the task ofliberating that part of the area 

which lay outside the zone of Allied Force 

Headquarters to the French Forces of the 

Interior. The Resistance forces were directed to disrupt the movement of troops, 

annihilate petty garrisons and isolate 

larger ones, seize communications centers 

such as Limoges, Poitiers, and Chateauroux, capture airfields to allow the landing 

of supplies for the Resistance forces in the 

Massif Central, close the Spanish frontier 

to escaping German troops, and preserve 

port facilities and public utilities from destruction by the enemy. The forces in the 

south gave valuable assistance to the 

French Army in its attack on Marseille 

and Toulon, and later inflicted losses on 

enemy forces retreating northward. They 

were particularly active against Germans 

withdrawing from the Bordeaux area, and 

were an important factor in forcing the 

surrender of nearly 20,000 persons under 

Generalmajor Botho Elster. After the 

Allied forces swept to the Seine and 

beyond, the Resistance groups remained 

active along the Atlantic Coast in the 

sieges of German garrisons at St. N azaire, 

La Rochelle, and Bordeaux. 21 

The Liberation cif Paris 

The Supreme Commander's desire to 

respect the sensibilities of the French and 

at the same time make certain that the 

enemy was driven from the French capital 

239 

influenced his decisions of late August relating to the entry into Paris. In the incidents connected with these developments, 

one may also see the need of the French 

Committee for British and U.S. backing, 

the efforts of General de Gaulle to establish the French Committee's sovereignty 

in France, and the co-operative efforts of 

U.S. and French units in a common cause. 

British and U.S. leaders had recognized 

as early as May 1943 that it was politically 

important to include a French division in 

the early campaigns to reconquer French 

soil. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed 

during the Washington Conference 

(TRIDENT), at the urging of President 

Roosevelt, that the possibility of adding a 

French division to the assault forces should 

be seriously considered. In mid-January 

1944, General Morgan in discussing Allied 

plans for an entry into Paris said that it 

was "of paramount importance that 

amongst the first troops to enter Paris shall 

be Frenchmen." General Eisenhower accepted this suggestion and added that a 

unit large enough to be called a division 

should be brought from North Africa to 

co-operate with U.S. forces in northern 

France. Brig. Gen. Jacques-Philippe 

Leclerc's 2d French Armored Division was 

ultimately selected for this purpose. As a 

part of General Patton's forces, the unit 

was committed to action after the breakout and was active in the pursuit to the 

Seine. 22 

21 The French Forces ofInterior, Pte II, Chs. I, II; 

Conquer: The Story of Ninth Army, pp. 49-50. 

22 4th and 5th plenary sessions, 21, 23 May 43, CCS 

Final Rpt to President and Prime Minister, CCS 

242/6, 25 May 43, TRIDENT Conf Min. Morgan to 

SHAEF G-3, 14 Jan 44; Record of conversation between General d' Astier de la Vigerie and General 

Eisenhower, 22 January 1944, by Comdr. Tracy B. 

Kittredge (with corrections and additic;ms by General 

Eisenhower); SHAEF to Br COS, 28Jim 44; Morgan 

to SHAEF G-3, 28 Feb 44. All in'SHAEF SGS 381 

France, French Participation in OVERLORD, I. 
240 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

The Supreme Commander made no 

final decision relative to the taking of 

Paris until the Falaise battle. He had intended initially to bypass Paris and to 

pinch it out, hoping to postpone as long as 

possible the task of supplying the city. His 

views were passed on to General Montgomery, who declared on 20 August that 

the 12th Army Group should “assemble 

its right wing west and southwest of Paris 

and capture that city when the Commanding General considers the suitable 

moment has arrived-and not before. It is 

important that we should not attempt to 

secure Paris until it is a sound military 

proposition to do so. This is in accordance 

with the views and wishes of the Supreme 

Commander, and this policy will obtain 

unless and until he issues orders to the 

contrary.” 23 

Resistance forces in Paris had in the 

meantime started a train of events which 

required a prompt decision by the Supreme Commander. On 15 August, the 

Paris police, railway workers, and other 

government employees took advantage of 

the Allied advance and the withdrawal of 

part of the enemy garrison from the city to 

call a general strike. As the movement 

spread through the city, Resistance forces 

asked Allied headquarters in London for 

aid and prepared a general insurrection in 

the French capital. On 19 August they 

seized the Prefecture of Police and issued 

a call for an uprising in the city. That 

evening, the German commander of the 

city, General von Choltitz, asked for a suspension of hostilities in order to examine 

the situation. He and Resistance representatives arranged a truce until noon, 

23 August, in order that German forces 

west of the city could be withdrawn to 

points east of Paris without having to fight 

their way out of the capital. Resistance 

forces took advantage of the lull to seize 

the Ministry of Interior, the Hôtel de Ville, 

and other public buildings. 24 

As the insurrection in Paris spread, Resistance leaders attempted to get help from 

the Allies before the truce terminated on 

23 August. When messages to London 

were delayed, the Resistance forces dispatched representatives to Allied forces 

nearest Paris. General de Gaulle, who had 

arrived in France from Algiers, told General Eisenhower on 21 August that he was 

concerned lest the disappearance of police 

forces and German units from Paris and 

the extreme shortage of food shortly lead 

to trouble in the capital. He believed it 

“really necessary to occupy Paris as soon 

as possible with French and Allied forces, 

even if it should produce some fighting 

and some damage within the city.” He 

warned that if disorder occurred it would 

be difficult later to take things in hand 

without serious incidents which might 

ultimately hamper military operations. 

He nominated General Koenig as military 

governor of Paris to confer with General 

Eisenhower on the question of occupation 

in case the latter decided to proceed without delay. General Eisenhower, after talking to General Koenig, declared: “It looks 

23 Memo of info from CG, 12 A Gp, 23 Aug 44, 

atchd to V Corps FO 21 (photostat), V Corps Operatiom in the ETO, 6 January 1942–9 May 1945 (printed in 

Paris, 1945), p. 200; 21 A Gp, Operational Situation 

and Dir, M–519, 20 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post 

OVERLORD Planning, I (a). Compare 21 Army Group 

order with statement in Montgomery, Normandy to the 

Baltic, p. 172, to the effect that “Paris should be captured when General Patton considered that a suitable 

time had arrived.” It seems, instead, that General 

Bradley was the commanding general. For General 

Patton’s view on the entry into Paris, see his War as 

I Knew It, pp. 116–17. 

24 This and succeeding paragraphs, unless otherwise noted, are based on The French Forces of the 

Interior, Pt. II, Ch. II, Sec. 6, The Liberation of Paris. 
RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH 241 

now as if we’d be compelled to go into 

Paris. Bradley and his G–2 think we can 

and must walk in.” 25 

While General Eisenhower was deciding that he would have to order Allied 

forces into Paris, representatives of the Resistance went to the Third Army headquarters and asked that Allied forces enter 

the capital. They were sent back to General Bradley’s headquarters, where they 

reported that the French Forces. of the Interior controlled all of the main city of 

Paris and the bridges leading to Paris 

from the west. Ammunition stocks were 

low, they added, and they feared that if 

Resistance forces were not promptly relieved shortly after noon on the 23d, “they 

might be severely dealt with by the Germans if the Germans decide to return to 

the city. . . . ” General Eisenhower had 

already concluded that an Allied force 

should enter Paris as soon as possible after 

the armistice expired. He emphasized that 

no advance party was to be sent into the 

city until after that time, and that he did 

not want a severe fight to take place. General Bradley ordered the 2d French 

Armored Division to go into the city, while 

the 4th U.S. Division went along the 

southern limits of the French capital to 

seize crossings of the Seine south of Paris 

and to occupy positions to the south and 

southeast. He placed these operations 

under V Corps. 26 

On 24 August, General Bradley 

changed his initial orders and directed 

both the 2d French Armored and the 4th 

Divisions to enter Paris. Early on the following morning both units reported they 

had entered the city. They rapidly cleared 

out enemy resistance and forced the capitulation of General von Choltitz, who 

surrendered formally to General Leclerc 

at 1515. Shortly afterward, Maj. Gen. 

Leonard T. Gerow, the V Corps commander, established his tactical command 

post at the Hôtel des Invalides. Three days 

later he notified General Koenig that 

command of the city was being shifted to 

the French. The French general, named 

military governor of Paris by General de 

Gaulle some days before, noted in reply 

that he had assumed that command on 

25 August and that the French authorities 

alone had handled the administration of 

Paris since its liberation. 27 

General Koenig’s emphasis on the fact 

that the French were in control of their 

own affairs reflected General de Gaulle’s 

determination to settle without delay the 

matter of the French Committee’s authority. British and U.S. officials had discussed 

the possibility of de Gaulle’s entry into 

Paris some days before, and there had 

been a disposition to delay his entry until 

some agreement could be reached. The 

French general settled the matter in midAugust by notifying General Eisenhower 

that he proposed to come from Algiers to 

France. The Supreme Commander, assuming that General de Gaulle planned 

to enter Paris and to remain in France, 

foresaw possible embarrassment if the 

French general arrived before the recognition of a French provisional government. 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff on 17 August said they had no objection to the proposed visit and instructed Eisenhower to 

follow his own proposal of receiving 

25 Ltr, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 21 Aug 44, with 

Denciled annotations by Eisenhower. SHAEF SGS 

092 France, French Relations, II. 

26 Memo of info from CG 12th A Gp, 23 Aug 44 

(photostat), V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 200. Cf. 

Bradley. A Soldier’s Story, pp. 390–92. 

27 Biadley, A Soldier’s story, p. 392. Ltr, Gerow to 

Koenig, 28 Aug 44; Ltr, Koenig to Gerow, 31 Aug 

44. Photostats of both in V Corps Operations in the 

ETO, p. 209. 
242 

de Gaulle as commander of the French 

forces. 28 

SHAEF proposed that the French 

leader come by. U.S. plane and land in 

London before proceeding to the Continent. Apparently suspecting that this was 

an attempt to keep him out of France 

rather than a measure to protect his plane 

from possible Allied attack, he announced 

that he was leaving in his own plane and 

would land in Cherbourg or Rennes. After 

a warning by General Eisenhower that 

Allied antiaircraft crews might not recognize the type of plane in which General 

de Gaulle would be fiying, and a refusal to 

accept responsibility for his safety, the 

French commander agreed to delay his 

trip one day and to check over the English 

coast before landing at Cherbourg. He 

came by his own plane on 18 August and 

joined the 2d French Armored Division in 

time to enter Paris on 25 August. 29 

On 26 August, General de Gaulle directed Leclerc's forces to parade through 

Paris. This order was contrary to instructions of General Gerow, who feared that 

Germans or German sympathizers in the 

city might fire on the French troops. 

Later, when some shots were fired, General de Gaulle expressed his regrets, and 

General Koenig agreed to co-operate with 

the U.S. commander. 3o 

In order to get General de Gaulle's impressions of the general situation in Paris 

and to show that the Allies had taken part 

in the liberation of Paris, General Eisenhower visited the French capital on 

27 August. Wishing to have the British 

represented, he invited General Montgomery to accompany him, but the British 

commander felt unable to leave his troops 

at that time. 31 General Eisenhower recalls 

that during the visit General de Gaulle 

expressed anxiety about conditions in 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Paris, and asked that two U.S. divisions 

be put at his disposal to give a show of 

force and establish his position. For this 

purpose, the Supreme Commander arranged for U.S. forces on the way to the 

front to march through Paris and be reviewed by Generals de Gaulle and Bradley. The 28th Division was sent through 

on 29 August on the way to the battlefront 

northeast of the city.32 

On 29 August, General Eisenhower 

passed on to General Bradley a request 

from General de Gaulle that the 2d 

French Armored Division be left in Paris 

until other troops came up from the south. 

The Supreme Commander instructed the 

12th Army Group commander to handle 

the matter as he thought best. General 

Bradley arranged for the French division 

to remain for the rest of August. On 3 

September, General de Gaulle asked that 

Leclerc's force be sent eastward, saying 

that order and calm had been restored to 

the capital and it was desirable that 

28 ccs to Eisenhower, 17 Aug 44, Eisenhower personal file. . 

29 Eisenhower to CCS (two msgs), 16 Aug 44; Wilson to SHAEF, 17 Aug 44; Eaker to de Gaulle, 17 

Aug 44; Wilson to Eisenhower, 18 Aug 44. All in 

SHAEF cbllog. 

30 Col Norman H. Vissering to SHAEF, 262343 and 

262357, Aug 44, SHAEF cbllog. 

31 Diary Office CinC, 26 Aug 44, entry written by 

General Eisenhower's British military assistant, Colonel Gault. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 26 Aug 44; 

Montgomery to Eisenhower, 27 Aug 44. Both in 

Eisenhower personal file. 

32 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 297-98. When 

this statement by General Eisenhower appeared, General de Gaulle denied that he had asked for such support. He declared that his position was strong, since 

Paris on 25 August had recognized the authority of 

the provisional government by unanimous and indescribable enthusiasm and that the move of American 

divisions through the French capital several days later 

had nothing to do with the re-establishment of national sovereignty. He had saluted the U.S. forces 

when they marched through the city but had "not at 

all asked for them." New York Times, December 7, 

1948. 
RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH 243 

French troops be used in active operations. 

The French units, which had proudly carried their country’s standard back to their 

nation’s capital, returned to battle on 

8 September. 33 Many months of battle lay 

ahead, but they were now able to feel that 

the period of defeats was at an end and 

that France, by her own efforts and the 

support of Great Britain and the United 

States, was on the road to victory and 

reconstruction. 

33 De Gaulle to Eisenhower, 26 Aug 44, SHAEF 

SGS 092 France, French Relations, II. Eisenhower to 

12th A Gp comdr, 29 Aug 44; de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 3 Sep 44. Both in SHAEF cbl log. Movement 

order, 7 Sep 44, 2d French Armd Div Opn Orders. 
CHAPTER XIV 

The Pursuit Stops Short of 

the Rhine 

In the three weeks between 18 August 

and 11 September, British and Canadian 

forces drove eastward from Falaise to the 

Seine, overran the flying bomb sites in the 

Pas-de-Calais, and wiped out the memories of Dieppe and Dunkerque. The First 

U.S. Army crossed the Seine, captured a 

large enemy force at the Mons Pocket, and 

dashed through Belgium. The Third 

Army swept through the Brittany peninsula, ran wild through the ArgentanLaval-Chartres area, and lent its forces 

to clear part of the First Army and British 

sectors while pushing other units south 

and east of Paris. By mid-September, General Eisenhower's troops had driven the 

enemy back to a line running along the 

Dutch border and southward along the 

German border to a point near Trier, and 

thence to Metz. In less than two weeks, the 

Allies had gone more than 200 miles from 

the Seine to the German border, clearing 

allnorthern France and the greater part 

of Belgium and Luxembourg. They had 

penetrated into the Netherlands and in 

places crossed the German frontier. From 

the south, U.S. and French forces had advanced more than 300 miles up the Rhone 

valley and helped to clear southern and 

southwestern France of the enemy. They 

had made contact with the right flank of 

General Bradley's army group on 12 September and were in process of establishing 

a line running southward from Metz by 

way of Epinal and Belfort to the Swiss 

border. By 15 September the vast bulk of 

occupied western Europe had been freed 

and the battle had been carried to German soil. (Map III) These great events, 

coming in less time than it had taken to 

capture Caen and St. Lo, raised the hopes 

of the Allies and led them to believe that 

quick victory before winter was in their 

grasp. Instead, the great drive lost its 

momentum at the West Wall and a winter 

of hard fighting remained in the Vosges, 

the Huertgen Forest, the Ardennes, and 

in the plains of the Maas and the Roer. 

The Situation at the End of August 

Toward the end of August 1944, Allied 

intelligence agencies, aware of the desperate straits of the enemy and viewing 

constantly the increasing evidence of his 

demoralization, saw German defeat near 

at hand if the Allied attack could be continued and the enemy allowed no chance 

to regroup or strengthen his defenses. With 

these possibilities in mind, the SHAEF 

G-2 summary declared near the end of 

August: "The August battles have done it 

and the enemy in the West has had it. Two 

and a half months of bitter fighting have 
THE PURSUIT STOPS SHORT OF THE RHINE 245 

brought the end of the war in Europe 

within sight, almost within reach." A week 

later it described the German Army in the 

west as "no longer a cohesive force but a 

number of fugitive battle groups, disorganized and even demoralized, short of 

equipment and arms." The First Army 

chief of intelligence saw a thoroughly disorganized enemy and predicted that political upheaval in Germany might well occur "within 30 to 60 days of our investiture 

of Festung Deutschland." The Combined 

Intelligence Committee, which had foreseen possible German collapse in the fall 

I)f 1943, was certain in the first week of 

September that the German strategic 

situation had deteriorated to the point 

"that no recovery is now possible." Holding that neither the German government 

then in power nor any Nazi successor was 

likely to surrender, the committee saw collapse taking the form of piecemeal surrenders by field commanders. It concluded 

that "organized resistance under the control of the German High Command is 

unlikely to continue beyond 1 December 

1944, and ... it may end even sooner." 1 

This enthusiasm was not shared by all 

commanders or intelligence chiefs, nor was 

it borne out entirely by the situation in 

Germany. General Eisenhower had 

warned newspaper reporters against undue optimism in an interview on 20 

August. His forces had advanced so rapidly, he felt, and supply lines were so 

strained that "further movement in large 

parts of the front even against very weak 

opposition is almost impossible." General 

Patton's chief of intelligence showed 

greater caution than either his colleague at 

SHAEF or his commander at Third Army. 

At a time when SHAEF was declaring the 

Germans no longer a cohesive force and 

General Patton believed he could cross the 

German border in ten days, Colonel Koch 

declared: 

Despite the crippling factors of shattered 

communications, disorganization and tremendous losses in personnel and equipment, 

the enemy nevertheless has been able to 

maintain a sufficiently cohesive front to exercise an overall control of his tactical situation. 

His withdrawal, though continuing, has not 

been a rout or mass collapse. Numerous new 

identifications in contact in recent days have 

demonstrated clearly that, despite the enormous difficulties under which he is operating, 

the enemy is still capable of bringing new elements into the battle area and transferring 

some from other fronts. 

* * * 

It is clear from all indications that the 

fixed determination of the Nazis is to wage a 

last-ditch struggle in the field at all costs. It 

must be constantly kept in mind that fundamentally the enemy is playing for time. 

Weather will soon be one of his most potent 

Allies as well as terrain, as we move east to 

narrowing corridors. . . . But barring internal upheavel in the homeland and the remoter possibility of insurrection within the 

Wehrmacht, it can be expected that the 

German armies will continue to fight until 

destroyed or captured. 2 

Developments in the Reich and among 

the German armies in the west gave 

grounds both for Allied optimism and for 

caution as to the enemy's ability to continue the fight. The enemy situation, extremely confused when the Falaise trap 

was dosed, became chaotic after the retreat east of the Seine. By the end of August, Model, still attempting to direct both 

OB WEST and Amry Group B, saw his position grow progressively worse as Allied 

SHAEF Weekly Intel Summaries 23 and 24,26 

Aug and 2 Sep 44, SHAEF G-2 Rpts; FUSA G-2 

Estimate 24, 3 Sep 44, Opns Rpts; Rpt of Combined 

Intel Com, Prospects of a German Collapse and Surrender as of 8 Sep 44, CCS 660/1, 9 Sep 44, OCTAGON 

ConfMin. . 

, TUSA G-2 Estimate 9, 28 Aug 44, TUSA AAR, 

II. 
246 

forces broke through the Somme-MarneSaone line and threatened the line MeuseMoselle. Hitler's reaction was to announce 

that Rundstedt had been recalled to the 

post of Commander in Chief West, that 

Model would retain Army Group B, and 

that the West Wall (Siegfried Lipe) position would be strengthened. On 3 September, Hitler admitted that exhaustion of the 

forces in the west and lack of immediately 

available reserves made it impossible to 

indicate positions other than the fortresses 

which could and must be held. He ordered 

instead that an attempt be made to gain 

the maximum amount of time for the organization and transfer of new divisions 

and the improvement of German defenses 

in the west. Forces on the north and in the 

center were to fight stubbornly for every 

foot of ground, while preventing the Allies 

from making any major envelopment. 

Army Group G was to gather a reserve force 

in the area of the Vosges which was initially to cover the retreat from southern 

France and then to strike deeply in the 

U.S, southern flank. Meanwhile, the Chief 

of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army was to retain responsibility 

for the defense of the West Wall from the 

Swiss border to Roermond. Efforts were 

also made to provide new units for the defense. Army Gro'up G was instructed to use 

as replacemend men from the ground, air, 

and naval elements that were then withdrawing from southern and southwestern 

France. 3 

On the following day, Model informed 

the Fuehrer that the forces in the west 

could hold only on the line Albert CanalMeuse River-Siegfried Line extensions. 

This stand he said, would require at least 

twenty-five fresh divisions and an armored 

reserve of five or six panzer divisions. He 

asked for immediate reinforcements and 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

for ten infantry and five panzer divisions 

by 15 September. Von Rundstedt supported these views. The new Commander 

in Chief West reported on 7 September 

that Army Group B was worn out and that 

it had only 100 tanks in operating condition. Saying that the Allies had complete 

air superiority, that an airborne attack 

could be expected, and that a ground 

forces drive in the direction of Aachen 

seriously menaced his position in the 

north, he asked at once for five or preferably ten divisions with assault gun battalions and antitank weapons and emphasized the need of aerial support. He added 

that at least six weeks would be necessary 

to get the West Wall ready for defense, 

and requested more armor and weapons 

to protect his existing positions for that 

length of time. 4 

Hitler found himself hard pressed on 

the matter of reinforcements because of 

the situation in the east. The Allies were 

aided at this juncture, as they had been 

since June, by a sustained Russian drive 

along a front stretching more than 800 

miles from Finland to the Black Sea. Beginning their offensive within a week after 

the landings in Normandy, the Red 

armies by 5 September had forced Finland 

to sue for peace, had driven to East Prussia, threatening to cut off enemy forces in 

the Baltic area, and had swept into Poland 

" OI-SIR/39 (Scheidt); Der Westen (Schramm); 

Hitler's order of 1 Sep 44, Nr. 773134/44. Office of 

Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer Directives and Other 

Top-Level Directives of the German Armed Forces. 

1942-1945. (Referred to hereafter as aNI Fuehrer Directives.) Fuehrer Directives is a selection of translated 

documents from German naval archives. Hitler's 

orders of 3 and 4 Sep 44 (WFSt Op. Nr. 773189/44 

and OKW/WFSt Nr. 773222/44). Army Group B, III 

Fuehrerbefehle 17. VI.-25.IX.44. 

4 Teletype, Model to Jodi, 4 Sep 44; Teletype, 

Rundstedt to Keitel, 7 Sep 44. Both in Army Group B, 

Ia Lagebeurteilungen 20. V.-11.X.44. 
THE PURSUIT STOPS SHORT OF THE RHINE 247 

to the gates of Warsaw, where they 

stopped. In late August and early September they seized the Ploesti oil fields, forced 

the collapse of Romania, and turned Bulgaria to the Allied side. The Germans had 

to commit more than two million men on 

the Eastern Front as compared to approximately 700,000 in the west. Incomplete 

statistics indicate that the Germans suffered over 900,000 casualties on the Russian front during June, July, and August. 

The casualties inflicted by Soviet forces on 

the Germans prompted Mr. Churchill to 

tell the House of Commons in early August that the Russian Army had done "the 

main work of tearing the guts out of the 

German army." He added: "In the air 

and on the oceans we could maintain our 

place, but there was no force in the world 

which could have been called into being, 

except after several more years, that would 

have been able to maul and break the 

German army unless it had been subjected 

to the terrible slaughter and manhandling 

that has fallen to it through the strength of 

the Russian Soviet armies." 5 

The Russian efforts, tremendous though 

they were, rested heavily on material contributions of the United States, Great 

Britain, and Canada in the form oflendlease. In the period Octc ber 1941 to 30 

June 1944, the Allies had supplied nearly 

11,000 aircraft, more than 4,900 tanks, 

and 263,000 vehicles, including trucks, 

jeeps, trailers, armored cars, and the like. 

The vehicles, equivalent to more than 

one-third the total number landed on the 

Continent for the United States forces 

until the end of the war, were oftremendous importance to the mobility of the 

Red Army. Indeed, it is estimated that by 

the middle of 1944 American trucks carried one half of the Russian supplies. It is 

worthy of note that the tanks would have 

supplied the initial T /0 requirements of 

more than 18 American armored divisions, 

and the trucks and other vehicles would 

have supplied the organic requirements of 

more than 110 armored or 125 American 

infantry divisions as then organized. 6 

A glance at the bill of casualties presented in the west could have given Hitler 

little encouragement. In three months of 

fighting, nearly 300,000 Germans were 

dead, wounded, and missing, while an additional force of more than 230,000 officers 

and men, of whom 85,000 belonged to the 

Field Army, had gone into the fortresses of 

, Strength figures on German forces in the west and 

east in August-September 1944 are discussed by H. 

M. Cole in The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, 1950), 

pp. 29-43. Mr. Churchill's statement to the House of 

Commons was cited in 302 H. C. Deb. 1474 (Hansard's 1943-44). 

6 Office of Foreign Liquidation, Foreign Economics 

Section, Dept of State, Report on War Aid Furnished 

by the U.S. to the U.S.S.R., June 22, 1941-September 

20, 1945; Sixleenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations: For the Period Ended June 30,1944 (Washington, 1944); War Department Field Manual 101-10, 

Organization, Technical and Logistical Data, 10 Oct 

43 and 12 Oct 44 (organization of armored and infantry divisions); Historical Section, Headquarters, 

ETOUSA, American Enterprise in Europe (Paris, 1945); 

Transportation Corps Monthly Rpt, 31 May 45, and 

Consolidated Statistics of TC Ops in ETO, I Jan 42-

8 May 45, contained in Historical Report of the 

Transportation Corps in ETO, Vol. VII (Apr-MayJun 45). 

The statistics on tanks and vehicles sent the Russians indicate the number actually shipped, less those 

lost or diverted elsewhere, prior to I July 1944. Undoubtedly part of these were still in the supply pipelines going into Russia, and were not available during 

most of the period in question. 

Only organic transportation of the division is considered in the statistics relative to the number of U.S. 

divisions which could have been supplied from tanks 

and vehicles furnished the Red Army. It is clear that 

a number of vehicles far in excess of the divisional 

table of organization is essential to supply a division, 

depending on distance from a port, conditions of combat, and the like. By the same to)<:en the replacement 

factor for combat losses or normal wear on tanks 

would require a reserve of tanks beyond that mentioned. 
248 

western Europe to remain until the final 

surrender. The toll of high-level commanders-dead, removed, or capturedwas heavy. Rommel, an army group commander, was badly wounded/ one army 

commander (Generaloberst Friedrich 

Dollmann) was dead, another (Hausser) 

badly wounded, a third (Eberbach) captured, and a fourth (Chevallerie) relieved. 

Three OB VVEST commanders (von Rundstedt, von Kluge, and Model) had been 

relieved during the period, although 

Rundstedt was reinstated. Von Kluge, 

who had also been relieved of the Army 

Group B command, was dead by his own 

hand. 8 

German estimates of Allied strength 

gave even less comfort. Still heavily overestimating the opposing divisions, the 

enemy spoke at the end of the first week in 

September of 54 Allied divisions on the 

Continent. 9 Although the number was 

grossly exaggerated, even a more accurate 

listing would have been discouraging. 

General Eisenhower had at the moment 

some 38 divisions (20 U.S., 13 British, 3 

Canadian, 1 Polish, and 1 French), and 5 

to 8 U.S. and French divisions still under 

the Mediterranean commander were being landed in the south of France. The actual number still in the line or in support 

cannot be estimated precisely inasll\uch as 

three divisions or more had been withdrawn for re-equipping. Nor is it clear 

how many men carried as wounded and 

missing during the period had returned to 

duty. Nevertheless, the number was still 

substantially in excess of the 700,000 men 

now in the enemy's forty-nine and a half 

divisions and attached units stationed in 

the west. 10 

Hitler refused to regard the situation as 

hopeless. New units were in the process of 

formation. OKW notified the Commander 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

in Chief West that he would get four infantry divisions between 13 and 25 September, and that in the period 15 to 30 

September his forces would be reinforced 

by two panzer brigades, several antitank 

companies, former fortress battalions, and 

other reconverted units. An attempt was 

made to encourage OB VVESTby pointing 

out that the Allies had been overoptimistic 

and that their boasts in late August both 

at home and in the field that the war was 

about at an end had proved false. Hitler 

pressed the work of strengthening the 

West Wall defenses, rushing workers and 

materials to the task. By 10 September 

more than 200,000 workers were engaged 

in construction on these fortifications. In a 

move to aid the defense efforts, OKW 

gave the Commander in Chief West jurisdiction over all branches of the Wehrmacht, control over the work on West Wall 

defenses, and permission to call on all 

7 Another army group commander, B1askowitz, 

was soon to be relieved. 

8 SHAEF estimated German losses as of 29 August 

1944 at 400,000. Memo, SHAEF G-2 for SAC, 29 

Aug 44, SHAEF G-2 Intel on Germany GBI/o1-

A/091-3. See Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 31, for 

information on German casualties. 

9 Teletype, Rundstedt to Keitel, cited above, n. 4. 

10 Strength statistics for both Allied and enemy 

forces are open to question. The Allied order of battle 

for 1 September is given in SHAEF G-3 War Room 

Summary 87,1 September 1944. Strength as of that 

period showed a cumulative total since 6 June of 

826,700 in the British area and 1,211,200 in the U.S. 

area. These statistics do not include the U.S. and 

French forces pouring into southern France which 

were to total six French and three U.S. divisions by 

15 September. Cumulative casualties since D Day 

(not including 6th Army Group figures) were over 

200,000 (124,394 for the U.S. forces as of 30 August 

and 82,309 for the British and Canadians as of 31 

August. With the exception of 36,486 dead (20,668 

American and 15,818 British and Canadian) it is not 

clear how many of the 200,000 casualties had been 

returned to duty. (For cumulative casualties, see 

SHAEF G-3 War Room Summary 91, 5 September 

1944.) 
THE PURSUIT STOPS SHORT OF THE RHINE 249 

agencies in the western theater of war for 

aid.ll 

Indications that the enemy was determined to hold in the west appeared in a 

reprint of captured minutes of a meeting 

at the German Ministry of Propaganda on 

4 September, circulated by 12th Army 

Group later in the month. The German 

representatjves, anticipating the transportation difficulties ofthe Allies, predicted 

that the advance would soon be halted. In 

this event, they added, the Germans 

would be able to make use of new weapons 

then in preparation, and wait for the inevitable squabble which would arise between the Russians and the British over 

the Balkans. "It is certain," they said, 

"that the political conflicts will increase 

with the apparent approach of an Allied 

victory, and some day will cause cracks in 

the house of our enemies which no longer 

can be repaired." 12 

Allied Plans for an Advance to the Rhine 

Against this background of enemy disorder and frantic attempts to re-establish 

a new defense line, Allied commanders 

were considering various plans for clearing northern France and Belgium and advancing to the German bor~;r and the 

Rhine. The SHAEF planners, at least a 

month before D Day, had outlined general strategy to be followed for the defeat 

of Germany after capture of the lodgment 

area. Recalling that the Supreme Commander had been charged with the task of 

undertaking operations "aimed at the 

heart of Germany and the destruction of 

her armed forces," the planners selected 

what they considered to be the chief target area of Germany and the best route 

by which this objective could be reached. 

They recognized Berlin as the ultimate 

Allied goal but held that the city was "too 

far east to be the objective of a campaign 

in the West." Instead, they set their eyes 

on the Ruhr, saying that it was the only 

area in western Germany of vital economic importance, that an attack on the 

area would force the enemy to commit his 

main forces there and thus give the Allies 

a chance to bring them to battle and destroy them, and that capture of the area 

would have a tremendous effect on German morale. 13 

From the beginning, therefore, there 

was a SHAEF plan to angle the attack 

from the Seine in the direction of the 

Ruhr. This plan, it will be recalled, was 

based on the idea of a slow advance after 

a careful build-up at the Seine and a series 

of actions which would push the enemy 

forces back to the German frontier north 

of Aachen by D plus 330 (2 May 1945). It 

was considered dangerous to attack by a 

single route and thus canalize the advance 

and open it to a concentrated enemy attack. SHAEF decided in favor of "a broad 

front both north and south of the Ardennes," which would give the Allies the 

advantages of maneuver and the ability to 

shift the main weight of attack. If the 

enemy could be forced to extend his forces 

to meet threats in the Metz Gap and the 

Maubeuge-Liege areas and to maintain 

his coastal defenses along the Channel 

11 OI-SIR/39 (Scheidt); Der Westen (Schramm); 

Hitler's order of 7 Sep 44. Nr. 0010783/44. ONI 

Fuehrer Directives. 

12 Rpt of Conf of ministers at Ministry of Propaganda, 4 Sep 44, in Annex 2 to 12th A Gp Periodic 

Rpt 106, 19 Sep 44, 12th A Gp Periodic File, 28 

Jul-Nov 44. 

13 This and the following paragraphs on the SHAEF 

plan are taken from SHAEF Planning Staff draft, Post 

:-.IEPTU1'iE Courses of Action After Capture of the 

Lodgment Area, Main Objectives and Axis of Advance, I, 3 May 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD 

Planning, 1. 
250 

coast, his hold would be weakened along 

the whole front. In this circumstance, a 

deep penetration on both sides of the Ardennes or north of that area would force 

an enemy withdrawal from the Ardennes 

west of the Liege-Luxembourg line for a 

concentration to meet the Allied main 

thrust. In the light of these conclusions, the 

SHAEF planners recommended that the 

main line of advance be along the line 

Amiens-Maubeuge-Liege-the Ruhr, with 

a subsidiary attack on the line VerdunMetz. 

When the enemy began to retire from 

Normandy in confusion after mid-August, 

General Eisenhower returned to the preD-Day concept for the advance into Germany. While favoring a major thrust into 

the Ruhr area, he still wanted a secondary 

attack to the south of the Ardennes. Some 

observers felt that in holding to this view 

he was overlooking the fact that the bulk 

of the enemy forces, once held east of the 

Seine, had been committed in the Mortain 

and FalaiseGap areas and were no longer 

available to threaten any single line of advance which might be made to the northeast or to the east. To them, speed was 

needed to destroy the enemy before he 

could piece together enough of his shattered elements for a defense of the West 

Wall or the Rhine. 

In mid-August, before it was clear that 

the German collapse west of the Seine 

would be as sweeping as it proved to be, 

Generals Bradley and Patton discussed a 

scheme for sending three corps across the 

Rhine near Wiesbaden, Mannheim, and 

Karlsruhe to end the war speedily. To 

them this was the shortest route into Germany and one that promised the best dividends. General Bradley thought that both 

First and Third Armies should execute the 

maneuver, whereas General Patton beTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

lieved that the Third Army alone, if given 

sufficient supplies, could move to t4e-, 

Metz-Nancy-Epinal area and cross the 

German border in ten days. General 

Montgomery at the same time was considering an entirely different approach to 

the problem, an approach somewhat 

nearer the initial SHAEF concept than 

that of General Bradley and General Patton. Wanting as quickly as possible to clear 

the Pas-de-Calais coast with its V-bomb 

sites, to get airfields in Belgium, and to secure the port at Antwerp, Montgomery 

felt that the main drive should be made 

toward the northeast. In the belief that his 

own British and Canadian forces would be 

unable to accomplish all of these missions 

quickly, he proposed that part or all of 

General Bradley's forces should move 

northeastward with their right flank on 

the Ardennes, cutting the enemy lines of 

communications and facilitating the advance of the British forces. 

The British and U.S. commanders, each 

conscious of the opportunities on his own 

front and desirous of seizing them quickly, 

favored single thrusts into enemy territory. 

One would have swung nearly all of the 

Allied force to the northeast; the other 

would have thrust the main U.S. forces 

almost due east. 

On 22 August, General Eisenhower 

considered the various plans of his subordinates. He expressed his intention eventually to direct 21 Army Group north of 

the Ardennes while 12th Army Group advanced beyond Paris and prepared to 

strike just south of the Ardennes. At the 

moment, however, he had certain tactical 

requirements to consider. In order to aid 

21 Army Group in carrying out its immediate missions of destroying forces between 

the Seine and the Pas-de-Calais, it was 

necessary, he felt, to reinforce the British 
THE PURSUIT STOPS SHORT OF THE RHINE 251 

army group with an entire airborne command and such other forces as might be 

required. He added that General Bradley's rate of advance east of Paris would 

depend on the speed with which ports in 

Brittany could be cleared and the Allied 

supply situation improved. 14 

General Montgomery on the 23d reminded the Supreme Commander that to 

sweep through the Pas-de-Calais to Antwerp he would need an entire U.S. army 

moving on his right flank. General Bradley argued that one corps would be sufficient for this purpose. General Eisenhower, although believing the British 

commander overcautious, acceded to his 

request,in order to insure success. At the 

same time, he ordered General Bradley to 

use his remaining forces to clear the ports 

in Brittany, defend U.S. lines of communications against possible attacks from the 

Paris area, and amass supplies for an advance eastward toward Metz. Told by the 

services of supply that they could support 

the British advances through northern 

France and Belgium, Eisenhower wrote 

Montgomery: "All of us having agreed 

upon this general plan, the principal 

thing we must now strive for is speed in 

execution. All of the Supply people have 

assured us that they can support the 

move, beginning this minute-let us assume that they know exactly what they 

are talking about and get about it vigorously and without delay." 15 

In supporting General Montgomery's 

attack with a U.S. army, the First, General Eisenhower also allocated the bulk of 

12th Army Group's gasoline to that army, 

thus depriving Third Army ofthe means 

of making a rapid drive to the east. It was 

a blow to the hopes of General Patton, 

who felt that the British commander had 

outargued the Supreme Commander. 

Patton drew some solace from the fact 

that he still had seven good divisions going 

in the direction he and Bradley always 

wanted to gO.16 Furthermore, he still had 

eight days in which to advance before the 

drying up of his fuel supply led him to a 

temporary halt. 

General Eisenhower in explaining his 

decision to General Marshall said that he 

had temporarily changed his basic plan 

for attacking both to the northeast and the 

east in order to help General Montgomery 

seize tremendously important objectives 

in the northeast. He considered the 

change necessary even though it interfered 

with his desire to push eastward through 

Metz, because 21 Army Group lacked sufficient strength to do the jon. He added 

that he did not doubt 12th Army Group's 

ability to reach the Franco-German border, but "saw no point in getting there 

until we are in a position to do something 

about it." 17 

On 26 August, General Montgomery, 

still acting as commander of ground forces 

on the Continent, repeated the Supreme 

Commander's decisions to the Allied generals. He assigned the following tasks: the 

First Canadian Army was to clear the Pasde-Calais; the Second British Army was to 

advance rapidly into Belgium; and the 

First U.S. Army was to support the British 

advance by driving forward on the ParisBrussels axis to establish forces in the 

Maastricht-Liege area east of Brussels and 

the Charleroi-Namur area south of Brus14 Eisenhower to Marshall, CPA 90235,22 Aug 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

15 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Aug 44, confinning agreements of the preceding day, SHAEF SGS 

381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I; Bradley, A Soldier's 

Story, pp. 399-401; Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Sep 44, 

Diary Office CinCo 

16 Patton, War as I Knew It, pp: 116-17. 

17 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Aug 44, Eisenhower personal file .. 
252 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

TABLE 1—CASUALTIES CAUSED BY FLYING BOMB AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON THE UNITED 

KINGDOM, 1944–45 

sels. The 21 Army Group commander 

stressed a special British problem which 

had developed since mid-June in his reminder that a speedy advance would 

“bring quick relief to our families and 

friends in England by over-running the 

flying bomb launching sites in the Pas de 

Calais.” 18 (Table 1) 

General Bradley confirmed the broad 

outline of General Montgomery’s directive but asked that the inter-army-group 

boundary be changed to give Brussels to, 

the Second British instead of to the First 

U.S. Army. This shift was accepted by the 

21 Army Group commander. In addition 

to making these arrangements for First 

Army, General Bradley directed the Third 

Army to complete the reduction of Brittany, protect the south flank of 12th Army 

Group, and prepare for a continuation of 

its advance to seize crossings of the Rhine 

between Mannheim and Koblenz. 19 

General Eisenhower’s decision to shift 

the First U.S. Army northward temporarily during the British advance from the 

Seine to Antwerp was accompanied by a 

firm resolution to return as soon as possible to the early SHAEF policy of advancing toward Germany by routes north of 

the Ardennes and south of that area 

through the Metz Gap. At the beginning 

of September, his planners began to study 

means by which one corps from the First 

Army could now be used to support a 

move of the Third Army toward the Saar 

and a move either up to the Moselle or toward Frankfurt while the remainder of the 

British and U.S. forces were going northeast. On 2 September at Chartres, General 

Eisenhower discussed future plans with 

18 Montgomery to army comdrs, M-520, 26 Aug 

44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I. Mr. 

Churchill at the beginning of August estimated that 

between 13 June when the first V-bombs were 

dropped on the United Kingdom and 1 August more 

than 5,700 robot bombs had killed nearly 5000 people, 

seriously injured 14,000, destroyed 17,000 homes, and 

damaged 80,000. Address by Mr. Churchill, August 2, 

1944, 302 H. C. Deb. 1475 (Hansard’s 1943-44). Postwar estimates indicate that between 12 June 1944 

and 29 March 1945 nearly 5,900 bombs fell in the 

United Kingdom, killing over 5,800 people and seriously injuring nearly 17,000 more. In the period 8 

September 1944 to 27 March 1945 more than a 

thousand rockets were to fall in the United Kingdom, 

killing 2,855 people and seriously injuring 6,268 more. 

For efforts of SHAEF and the air forces to deal with 

the continued CROSSBOW threat in the summer of 

1944, see Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, Vol. III, Ch. 15, “CROSSBOW—Second 

Phase.” The authors indicate that U.S. bomber commanders and, to a lesser extent, British bomber chiefs 

opposed Air Chief Marshal Tedder’s insistence on a 

continued bombing of V-weapon launching sites. 

The bomber commanders preferred to concentrate 

more heavily on German economy and support of 
THE PURSUIT STOPS SHORT OF THE RHINE 253 

Generals Bradley, Hodges, and Patton. As 

a result of decisions made there, the 12th 

Army Group commander told his subordinates to prepare for an advance by the 

Third Army and one corps of the First 

Army toward Mannhdm, Frankfurt, and 

Koblenz. 20 

General Eisenhower qualified his approval of the drive to the east with his 

statement that it would depend on the success of the northern thrust, which had 

prior claim on supplies. He also warned of 

the supply problems which might give 

trouble in the future and noted: 

We have advanced so rapidly that further 

movement in large parts of the front even 

against very weak opposition is almost impossible. . . . The closer we get to the Siegfried Line the more we will be stretched administratively and eventually a period of 

relative inaction will be imposed upon us. 

The potential danger is that while we are 

temporarily stalled the enemy will be able to 

pick up bits and pieces of forces everywhere 

and re-organize them swiftly for defending 

the Siegfried Line or the Rhine. It is obvious 

from an over-all viewpoint we must now as 

never before keep the enemy stretched everywhere. n 

From Field Marshal Montgomery's 

point of view, the scarcity of supplies provided no basis for a strategy of stretching 

the enemy everywhere. 22 Instead, he insisted that Allied resources were insuffithe Allied land battle as a better means of stopping 

the V -weapon attack. The authors conclude that the 

lar<l,,··sc:al" CROSSBOW operations during the period 

were a failure but that they offered firm evidence 

that "the Allies could respond too generously rather 

than too niggardly to whatever threats might arise 

to jeopardize the execution of the grand strategic 

designs so carefully prepared and so skilfully executed 

in the pursuance of one objective-defeat of the 

enemy in Europe." (P. 541.) 

19 12th A Gp, Ltr of Instr 6, 25 Aug 44, 12th A Gp 

Rpt of Opns, V, 85-87; Ltr, Bradley to Montgomery, 

26 Aug 44, 12th A Gp Military Objectives 371.3; 

Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 208. 

cient for two full-blooded attacks and that 

a compromise solution would merely prolong the war. He urged that the drive to 

the Ruhr be given full backing, saying, 

"We have now reached a stage where one 

really powerful and full-blooded thrust toward Berlin is likely to get there and thus 

end the German war." 23 

General Eisenhower replied that no reallocation of existing resources "would be 

20 Memo, Nevins for Chief Ops A Sub-Sec G-3 

SHAEF, 1 Sep 44, OCMH files; points of discussion 

at Chartres given in Notes on Meeting of Supreme 

Commander and Commanders, 2 Sep 44, 12th A Gp 

Military Objectives 371.3; Memo, G-3' SHAEF for 

Colli SHAEF, 3 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning L General Patton says (War as I Knew 

It, pp. 120-24) that General Bull, the SHAEF G-3, 

refused to approve this plan on 30 August while on a 

staff visit to Bradley's advance headquarters. "We 

[Bradley and Pattonl finally persuaded General 

Eisenhower" to approve the plan on 2 September. 

General Bull recommended the plan in a memorandum of 3 September in which he said that, in 

view of reported German weakness along the West 

Wall, the reduction of the size of Allied forces driving northeast of the Ardennes was not only practicable "but desirable .. , to maintain the speed of 

advance," 

21 Eisenhower to comdrs, FWD 13765,4 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLOJ<D Planning, I; Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD 13792,4 Sep 44, Eisenhower 

personal file. 

22 General Montgomery's appointment as field 

marshal was announced on I September. Mr. Churchill had informed General Eisenhower on 22 August 

that the promotion would be made to run from the 

termination of Montgomery's command of Allied assault forces, This the Prime Minister considered a 

necessary concession to British public opinion. He 

added that the promotion, which would make Montgomery outrank both Eisenhower and Bradley, would 

make no difference in the field marshal's position in 

regard to high-ranking U.S. officers. AMSSO to 

Eisenhower, 4891, 22 Aug 44, Eisenhower personal 

file. 

23 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-160, 4 Sep 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. Compare this with the statement, Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic .• p, 193: 

"My own view was that one powerful, full-blooded 

thrust across the Rhine and into the heart of Germany, backed by the whole of tlie resources of the 

Allied armies, would be likely to achieve decisive 

results." 
254 

adequate to sustain a thrust to Berlin." 

Since the bulk of the German Army in the 

west had been destroyed, he went on, it 

was imperative to breach the Siegfried 

Line, cross the Rhine on a wide front, and 

seize the Ruhr and the Saar. Such a drive 

would give the Allies a stranglehold on 

two of Germany's chief industrial areas 

and largely wreck its ability to wage war. 

It would assist in cutting off the forces retreatirig from the south of France, give the 

Allies freedom of action, and force the 

enemy to disperse his forces over a wide 

front.24 The Supreme Commander, while 

giving priority to Montgomery's advance 

to the northeast, thought it important to 

get "Patton moving again so that we may 

be fully prepared to carry out the original 

conception for the final stages of the campaign." As he saw it at the time, the logical move was to take advantage of all existing lines of communications in the 

advance toward Germany and to bring 

the southern wing of the OVERLORD forces 

on to the Rhine at Koblenz. At the same 

time, airborne forces would be used to 

seize crossings over the Rhine thus placing 

the Allies in a position to thrust deep into 

the Ruhr and threaten Berlin. The execution of these drives rested, he added, on 

speed, which in turn relied on maintenance-"now stretched to the limit." 25 

Field Marshal Montgomery argued 

that the maintenance question emphasized the need for putting all supplies behind one thrust into Germany. Believing 

"with all respect . . . that a reallocation 

of our present resources of every description would be adequate to get one thrust 

to Berlin," he asked General Eisenhower 

to reconsider his decision. SHAEF planners felt that Montgomery's view was optimistic. They suggested that a maximum 

of three Allied corps could be pushed to 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Berlin by the end of September only if 

five corps were grounded in Normandy 

and Brittany, if Antwerp-captured on 4 

September-and ports in the Pas-deCalais were producing some 7,000 tons of 

supplies a day, and if an airlift was bringing in 2,000 tons daily.26 Nonetheless, 

SHAEF made a considerable effort to provide additional support for Montgomery's 

battle. General de Guingand reported to 

his superior on 7 September that SHAEF 

had met 80 percent of the British requests 

for locomotives and rolling stock and that 

an increased allocation would be made. 

He added that the northern thrust was to 

have priority on air supply and would be 

allocated the airborne army as a means of 

capturing Walcheren Island and clearing 

the Schelde estuary in the hope of opening 

the approaches to Antwerp.27 

The new allocations, while welcome, 

were much less than Field Marshal Montgomery thought necessary for a powerful 

thrust into Germany. Worse still, in his 

view, the Supreme Commander during 

the first week in September had authorized General Bradley to continue the attack to the east and to allocate additional 

fuel supplies to the Third Army. Under 

these authorizations, the 12th Army 

Group commander ordered crossings of 

the Rhine by the First Army near 

Cologne, Bonn, and Koblenz and by the 

24 Eisenhower to Montgomery, FWD 13889,5 Sep 

44, Eisenhower personal file. 

25 Memo for record, Eisenhower, 5 Sep 44, Diary 

Office CinCo 

26 Although Antwerp itself was seized almost intact, 

Germans on Walcheren Island and to the south of 

the Schelde estuary prevented ships from coming up 

the Schelde to Antwerp. 

27 Montgomery to Eisenhower, 7 Sep 44, Diary 

Office CinC; Ping paper, Logistical Implications of 

Rapid Thrust to Berlin, Sep 44, SHAEF G-4 Logistical Forecasts, Folder 13; Cbl ADSEC (21 A Gp 

CotS) to T AC HQ EXFOR (Montgomery), 7 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, 1. 
THE PURSUIT STOPS SHORT OF THE RHINE 255 

Third Army in the vicinity of Mannheim 

and Mainz, and, if possible, near Karlsruhe. 28 

General Eisenhower discussed the 

routes of advance and other problems with 

his army group commanders and the Allied naval commander on 9, 10, and 11 

September. In the most important of the 

three conferences, he met with Air Chief 

Marshal Tedder, General Gale, and Field 

Marshal Montgomery on 10 September at 

Brussels. The Supreme Commander refused to consider what he called "a pencil 

like thrust" into the heart of Germany.29 

Since the Germans still had reserves, he 

believed that a single thrust on any part 

of the front would meet with certain destruction. General Eisenhower was unwilling, therefore, to stop operations in the 

south. He emphasized that his chief interest was in opening the port of Antwerp, 

but added that he was willing to defer this 

operation until an effort could be made to 

obtain a bridgehead over the Rhine at 

Arnhem and outflank the defenses of the 

Siegfried Line. 30 

General Patton's forces went forward 

rapidly, and on 14 September General 

Bradley was able to announce that Third 

Army had crossed the Moselle in force. 

Noting that the next forty-eight hours 

would indicate how fast Patton could go, 

the 12th Army Group commander added 

that if Third Army could not make any 

real progress northeast from the Metz area 

he would shift it to the north. But the 

Supreme Commander now relaxed his 

previous order to the point of saying that 

if Montgomery could go ahead on the 

maintenance promised him, and if Hodges 

could be kept fully supplied up to the time 

he reached his first principal objective, 

there was no reason "why Patton should 

not keep on acting offensively if conditions 

for offensive action were favorable." 31 

These concessions to 12th Army Group, 

however hedged about with conditions, 

appeared to Field Marshal Montgomery 

to undermine plans for the approaching 

airborne operation near Arnhem and the 

campaign to open the port of Antwerp. To 

some members of his staff, the granting'of 

permission for Patton to continue to drive 

to the east, while Montgomery was oriented toward the northeast, prevented 

any commander from landing a solid 

punch and weakened the center of the Allied line in the area of the Ardennes. To 

Field Marshal Montgomery's worried 

comments on the subject, General Eisenhower replied on the eve of the Arnhem 

operation: "I sent a senior staff officer to 

General Bradley yesterday to see that all 

of his forces and distribution of his supplies 

will coordinate effectively with this idea. 

While he had issued a temporary directive 

on September 10 that on the surface did 

not conform clearly to this conception of 

making our principal drive with our left, 

the actual fact is that everything he is do- . 

ing will work out exactly as you visualize 

28 Bradley Itr of instructions to comdrs (in confirmation of previo1J>S verbal orders), 10 44, SHAEF 

SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, Bradley, Ii 

Soldier's Story, pp. 410-14. 

Z9 It should be noted that Field Marshal Montgomery spoke of the thrust as "full-blooded. Inasmuch as his proposals involved the use of the Second 

British Army and two corps of the First U.S. Army 

for an advance between Arnhem and the Ardennes, 

his term "full-blooded" seems the more accurate 

description. General Patton's earlier proposal for an 

advance toward Berlin by two corps seems to conform more nearly to the term "pencil like." 

3D Notes on mtg at Brussels, 10 Sep 44, by Tedder, 

OCMH files; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 

306-07. 

31 Bradley to Eisenhower, 12 Sep 44; Dir, Eisenhower to army comdrs, FWD 14764, 13 Sep 44. Both 

in SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERL()RD Planning, L 

Bradley to Eisenhower, 14 Sep 4( 12th A Gp 371.3 

Military Objectives, I; Eisenhower to Bradley, 15 

Sep 44, Eisenhower personal file. 
256 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

it.” He added: “SO Bradley’s left is striking hard to support you; Third Army is 

pushing north to support Hodges; and 

Sixth Army Group is being pushed up to 

give right flank support to the whole.” 32 

The Supreme Commander’s emphasis 

on the opening of the port of Antwerp at 

the conference of 10 September may be 

said to mark a new phase in Allied operational planning. At the beginning of 

September, the stress had been on thrusts 

to the Rhine. This strategy had been encouraged by the capture of Antwerp on 

4 September. But when it was clear that 

this prize was of no value until the enemy 

had been dislodged from his positions 

north and south of the Schelde estuary, 

stretching for some fifty miles to the sea, 

General Eisenhower gave priority to an 

operation to clear the estuary. After his 

conferences of 9, 10, and 11 September, he 

became confirmed in his view that “the 

early winning of deep water ports and improved maintenance facilities in our rear 

are prerequisites to a final all-out assault 

on Germany proper.” He was influenced 

by the fact that the Allies were still supported logistically over the open beaches 

and that a week or ten days of bad weather 

in the Channel could paralyze the movements of the armies. He now ordered 21 

Army Group to secure promptly the approaches to Antwerp and Rotterdam in 

addition to the Channel ports, 12th Army 

Group to reduce Brest, and 6th and 12th 

Army Groups to open lines from Marseille 

to the north. 33 In his insistence on deepwater ports, General Eisenhower was supported by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

From their conference at Quebec they had 

expressed their preference for the northern 

over the southern routes of advance into 

Germany and had stressed the necessity 

for opening the northwest ports, “particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before the 

bad weather sets in.” 34 

Before the Antwerp operation could be 

started, Field Marshal Montgomery carried out his offensive near Arnhem. With 

the end of that attack, the pursuit into 

Germany came to a full halt. 35 On other 

fronts, it had virtually come to a standstill 

by mid-September. A review of the logistical situation of the Allied forces in the 

preceding four to six weeks may help explain why the pursuit stopped short of the 

Rhine. 

Logistical Reasons for the Halt 

It is clear that the demands of four 

rapidly advancing armies, requiring as 

much as a million gallons of gasoline daily, 

overtaxed the Allied lines of communications, which extended in some cases as far 

back as Cherbourg and the invasion 

32 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M–181, 9 Sep 44; 

Montgomery to Eisenhower, M–192, 11 Sep 44; 

Eisenhower to Montgomery (comments on Montgomery’s statements to Gen Smith), FWD 14758, 13 

Sep 44; Eisenhower to Montgomery, 16 Sep 41. All 

in SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I. 

Comments of members of 21 Army Group staff to 

author in series of interviews 

33 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M–192, 11 Sep 44; 

Eisenhower to Montgomery, FWD 14758, 13 Sep 44; 

Dir, Eisenhower to army comdrs, FWD 14764, 13 Sep 

44. All in SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I. 

34 CCS to Eisenhower, OCTAGON 16, 12 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I. In discussing General Eisenhower’s propasals of alternative 

routes into Germany, Field Marshal Brooke thought 

the northern route should be strengthened as much 

as possible. He asked for the most energetic efforts to 

secure and open the port of Antwerp as a valuable 

base for future operations on the northern flank. He 

felt there had not been enough emphasis on these two 

points. His proposed draft reply was the one sent General Eisenhower. CCS 172d mtg, OCTAGON (Quebec), 

12 Sep 44. 

35 For discussion of the Arnhem operation, see 

below, Ch. XVI. 
THE PURSUIT STOPS SHORT OF THE RHINE 257 

beaches. These limitations certainly made 

impossible a number of simultaneous 

drives through the Siegfried Line and also 

made doubtful the success of a single 

thrust beyond the Rhine. From the beginning of OVERLORD planning, the various 

staffs had recognized supply difficulties as 

one of their major problems. They had 

stressed, therefore, the necessity of capturing sufficient ports to provide adequate 

and easily accessible stores, emphasizing 

the vital importance of Cherbourg, Le 

Havre, and the ports of Brittany if a drive 

into Germany was to be sustained. The 

planners assumed, as a result, that the rate 

of the advance beyond the Seine would be 

much less rapid than the rate actually 

achieved. In procurement estimates of 

June 1944, designedly optimistic for purposes of planning, D plus 90 (4 September 

1944) was set for reaching the Seine, D 

plus 200 (23 December 1944) the Belgian 

frontier, D plus 330 (2 May 1945) the 

German frontier north of Aachen, and D 

plus 360 (1 June 1945) the surrender. 

Both the first and last of these dates 

proved pessimistic. The Third Army 

reached the Seine on D plus 75 (20 August 1944) and the surrender came on D 

plus 336 (8 May 1945). These predictions, 

later pointed to with pride by the Allied 

staffs, have tended to obscure the more 

important fact, so far as supplies were concerned, that on D plus 97 (11 September 

1944), one week after they were expected 

to reach the Seine and some seven months 

before they were supposed to reach the 

German border north of Aachen, the 

Allies actually sent units across the Reich 

frontier. But it was in this period of the 

great pursuit between the Seine and Germany that supply and transport facilities 

proved hopelessly insufficient for the slashing attack which developed. True, in midAugust, when the armies were beginning 

to be pinched for supplies, the planners 

changed their calculations. At that time 

British planners estimated that bridgeheads could be established over the Seine 

at Rouen in the period between 10 August 

and 10 September, and that after the latter date an advance could be made on 

Amiens. The SHAEF planners were less 

optimistic, holding that any advance in 

strength before October east of the SeineLoire River line would have to .be conducted mainly by British forces. They suggested that an advance in strength by 

U.S. forces beyond the Mantes-GassicourtOrleans line be delayed until late 

October. Because the Allies would have to 

feed the population of Paris if they took the 

city, the SHAEF planners favored postponing its capture until rail facilities were 

developed in Brittany and Normandy and 

the Seine ports were captured. 36 As late as 

23 August, the 12th Army Group deputy 

chief of supply estimated that the British 

would be at the Seine on 1 September, the 

Somme on 15 September, and on other 

objectives (apparently northern France 

and Belgium) by 1 November. General 

de Guingand, 21 Army Group chief of 

staff, concurred with these estimates ex36 SHAEF G-4 Post NEPTUNE Operations Administrative Appreciation, 17 Jun 44, SHAEF G-4 370.2 

Post-NEPTUNE Operations Logistic Studies. 21 A Gp 

Plan, Development of Current Operations, 11 Aug 44; 

Air Staff SHAEF, Development of Operations from 

the Bridgehead to Secure Lodgment Area and Advance Beyond (21 A Gp Plans); SHAEF G-3 Plan, 

Post NEPTUNE Operations, 17 Aug 44, Sec. III, 

SHAEF G-3 Post OVERLORD Planning, 18008,370-

31. When the preliminary draft of the 21 A Gp Plan 

was received at SHAEF at the end of July, Group 

Captain Gleave, one of the SHAEF planners, indicated that, whereas SHAEF felt that the paper was 

too optimistic, Air Marshal Coningham considered 

the plan not bold enough. Gleave to SASO, AEAF, 2 

Aug 44, SHAEF file Air Staff (SHAEF). 
258 

cept that he expected to gain the "other 

objectives" by 15 October. 37 

In mid-August as the tremendous possibilities of a rapid advance became evident, the Allied supply organizations 

made great efforts to provide the means 

for the offensives which were developing. 

Communications Zone troops were laying 

pipelines for carrying fuel, constructing at 

the peak as much as thirty to forty miles a 

day, Special emphasis was placed on the 

rapid restoration of railroad lines so that 

overburdened truck companies could be 

used more economically. At the height of 

supply difficulties in the last week of August, an emergency airlift and the Red 

Ball Express truck line were set up to deal 

with the gasoline shortages which became 

more acute as the advance continued beyond the Seine. 38 

The liberation of Paris, as SHAEF supply planners had feared, increased the 

heavy load thrown on the U.S. supply organization and interfered directly with the 

flow offuel to combat elements. The additional burden came at a time when aircraft engaged in carrying fuel to the First 

Army were supposed to be returned to the 

Air Transport Command for training in 

preparation for forthcoming airborne 

attacks. 39 On 29 August, the 12th Army 

Group chief of civil affairs found that the 

French capital needed 2,400 tons of supplies daily and proposed that they be 

brought by air. General Bradley initially 

authorized 500 tons at the expense of mil itary requirements, but added in another 

message the same day that additional information on supply requirements in the 

city required that a "total of 1500 tons 

daily regardless of cost to the military 

effort, be delivered at once." 40 The reassignment of aircraft to airborne training 

and the diversion of air tonnage to civil 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

affairs supplies coincided with the almost 

complete cessation of gasoline deliveries to 

the Third Army, which had been the chief 

beneficiary of the airlift since 25 August. 

Another complication appeared as the 

armies moved farther to the east: the problem of constructing sufficient and proper 

airfields to receive the airplanes necessary 

to maintain the pace which was being set 

on the ground. The rapid advance of 

armored col umns meant that the burden 

thrown on airfield construction agencies 

in the matter of materials, men, and time 

was much greater than the capacities of 

the organization which had been set up. 

The chief of staff of IX Engineer Command, which was charged with the task of 

building and maintaining airfields, gave 

eloquent testimony after the war on the 

problems confronting the Allies in their 

attempts to supply the rush to the Rhine. 

In analyzing the claim that General Patton could have gone to Germany in ten 

days, he declared: 

Had Patton continued through the Saar 

Valley and the Vosges it must have been 

without close air support and with a very 

small contribution in the way of air supply 

beyond the Reims-Epernay line. We could 

have fixed up Confians, Metz, and NancyAzelot in time to have done some good, but 

the next possible fields were at Haguenau 

and Strasburg with no fields except Trier be37 Memo on conf with Maj Gen Miles Graham, 21 

A Gp G-4, et al., dtd 23 Aug 44, SHAEF 12th A Gp 

G-4 Papers, Drawer II, Folder II. 

38 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, discusses these efforts in detail. Mr. Royce L. Thompson 

of OCMH has prepared an exhaustive study of the 

gasoline shortages from the official reports of SHAEF, 

Communications Zone, and the army group, army, 

corps, and division files. This study is in OCMH files. 

39 See Craven and Cate, The Amry Air Forces in 

World War II, III, 275-77. 

40 12th A Gp to SHAEE et al., -QX 21026, 29 Aug 

44; 12th A Gp to COMZ Fwd, QX 21043,29 Aug 

44. Both in SHAEF G-4 581.2 Transportation by Air 

of Supplies and Equipment, II (1944). 
THE PURSUIT STOPS SHORT OF THE RHINE 259 

tween there and Koln-Maastricht Plain. I 

would not have liked to tackle the job of supplying Patton over the Vosges and through 

the Pfalz during that October. I don't doubt 

that we could have carried about 2 armored 

and one mtz. division up to Koln, but then 

where. Certainly not across the Rhine. A 

good task force of Panzerfaust, manned by 

Hitler youth could have finished them offbefore they reached Kassel!' 

Whether a diversion of all supplies to 

Field Marshal Montgomery's forces would 

have enabled him to cross the Rhine before the enemy could reorganize his defenses cannot be finally settled. To let the 

21 Army Group have all the support it 

wanted in late August would have meant 

stopping the Third U.S. Army near Paris, 

delaying a link-up between the OVERLORD 

and the ANVIL forces, failing to capture 

enemy elements retreating from southwestern France to Germany, and opening 

the right wing of the army to a possible 

enemy attack. If the Rhine could have 

been crossed while the enemy was still unprepared and the shock of that event had 

shaken the Reich into collapse or its 

armies into surrender, obviously these 

eventualities would not have mattered. If 

the single thrust across the Rhine had 

failed to smash German resistance, there 

is some doubt that the forces could have 

been maintained at full operational scale. 

It is equally difficult to determine 

whether the diversion of all available supplies to General Patton would have permitted him to reach the Rhine in ten days 

or two weeks. On this subject, the Third 

Army chief of operations noted at the end 

of August 1944 that there was an indication that the army would necessarily have 

to slow its pace "to permit supply echelons 

to make adjustments that would enable 

them to keep up." This was attributed in 

part to the fact that the Third Army was 

responsible for operations on fronts 600 

miles apart, and responsible for a flank of 

over 1,000 miles which it was covering 

with less than two divisions plus the XIX 

Tactical Air Command. 42 

The failure of the Allies to realize their 

hopes of victory in late August may have 

followed in part from a deficiency of optimism on the part of OVERLORD planners.43 The means of communication, 

built for a slower, more ponderous drive 

than that which developed, could not sustain the ten- or twenty-day pursuit that 

opened the way to the smashing of the 

enemy short of the Rhine. The original 

supply estimates emphasized the opening 

of the Brittany ports and Le Havre and 

the amassing of supplies west of the Seine 

before beginning a drive toward the Ruhr. 

The Brittany ports were still judged to be 

of primary importance as late as 1 September. By 9 September, when Generals 

Patton and Bradley discussed the matter, 

there had been a considerable change in 

opinion. General Patton later wrote: "We 

both felt that the taking of Brest at that 

time was useless, because it was too far 

away and the harbor was too badly destroyed. On the other hand, we agreed 

that, when the American Army had once 

put its hand to the plow, it should not let 

go. Therefore, it was necessary to take 

Brest." 44 At least three excellent divisions 

of the Third Army and valuable transport 

41 Ltr, Col Herbert W. Ehrgott to Ralph Ingersoll, 

25 J ul 46, copy furnished by Ehrgott to Air Historical 

Section, U.S. Air Force. 

42 G-3 Summary for Aug 44, TUSA AAR, I. See 

also Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 22. In his statement, "the iron rules oflogisties were in full operation 

and ... the Third Army, making an attack subsidiary to the Allied main effort, would be the first to 

suffer therefrom." 

4.1 This is discussed fully in Ruppenthal, Logistical 

Support of the Armies. 

44 Patton, War as I Knew It, pp. 127-28. 
260 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

were heavily involved here at a time when 

troops and vehicles were desperately 

needed to the east. 

In hardly any respect were the Allies 

prepared to take advantage of the great 

opportunity offered them to destroy the 

German forces before winter. The buildup of men and certain critical supplies 

in the United. Kingdom, the arrival of 

divisions in France, the requisition and 

transport of civil affairs supplies, the organization for military government, 45 the 

rebuilding of rail lines, the laying of pipelines-virtually the whole intricate military machine was geared to a slower rate 

of advance than that required in late August. Unfortunately the period of the great 

opportunity lasted for only a few weeks 

and there was not sufficient time, however 

vast the effort, to make the necessary readjustments in the logistical machinery which 

would insure speedy victory. 

In this period of confusion, of overstrained supply lines, of strident demands 

for many different courses of action, most 

of which would have been excellent had 

the means been available, the Supreme 

Commander decided to stick by his initial 

plan of making the main attack in the 

north, with a subsidiary advance in the 

south. In the first bold thrust across the 

Seine, when he wished to clear the Pas-deCalais and capture Antwerp, he approved 

Montgomery’s drive to the northeast and 

threw most of the First Army into support 

of the British advance. This required the 

allocation of most of the U.S. gasoline supplies to the First Army and brought the 

Third Army virtually to a halt just east of 

Paris. When by 5 September the supply 

situation eased slightly General Eisenhower agreed that the Third Army could 

resume its drive toward the Saar and 

Frankfurt and thus returned to the earlier 

SHAEF concept of a dual thrust. At the 

same time he sent all but one corps of the 

First Army northeastward in support of 

the main offensive. Within the next two 

weeks he was to offer the 21 Army Group 

commander the bulk of available locomotives and rolling stock, the transport of 

three U.S. divisions, and the resources of 

the airborne army. In these various decisions, he attempted to take advantage of 

any momentary opportunities for exploitation which might be offered, while 

clinging to the objectives laid down before 

D Day as vital to victory: seizure of industrial areas essential to Germany’s continuance of the war, use of routes which offered 

the best opportunity for maneuver while 

stretching the enemy’s forces over a broad 

front, and elimination of the maximum 

number of Germans west of the fortifications of the West Wall and of the Rhine. 

45 For example, policy on the issuance of occupation 

money for Germany was not settled until three weeks 

after the Allies had crossed the German frontier. 
CHAPTER XV 

Command Reorganization, 

June-October 1944 

A number of changes in command arrangements affecting the Allied Expeditionary Force marked the period between 

the invasion of Normandy and the entry 

into Germany. These included the Supreme Commander's assumption of direct 

control of the forces in the field, the activation of new army group headquarters, the 

shifting of four additional armies to the 

Continent, the clarification of relations between SHAEF and U.S. theater staffs, and 

the reorganization of strategic and tactical 

air commands. (Chart 5) 

The Ground Forces 

General Eisenhower Takes Command 

The Normandy invasion began under 

an arrangement by which General Montgomery was to command the ground assault forces until such time as the Supreme 

Commander should take personal control 

of operations in the field. The date of 

change-over was to be determined in part 

by the build-up of U.S. forces on the Continent; no shift appeared necessary so long 

as only one U.S. army was ashore. When, 

however, a second U.S. army should be ,required, the Supreme Commander proposed to bring forward a U.S. army group 

to co-ordinate the actions of the two U.S. 

armies. He would then decide the point at 

which he should take over the task of coordinating the British and U.S. army 

groups. 1 

The Third U.S. Army, brought from the 

United States and put under the command of General Patton in late 1943, remained in England during the first weeks 

of the invasion while some of its divisions 

were sent to the Continent for initial use in 

the First Army. The plan for the breakout 

from the Cotentin peninsula required the 

employment of some of these units. At the 

opening of the attack on 25 July, General 

Eisenhower announced that, on a date set 

by General Bradley, the U.S. forces on the 

Continent were to be regrouped under the 

12th Army Group.2 An additional statement to the effect that U.S. assault forces 

were to remain under General Montgomery until General Eisenhower allocated a specific area of responsibility for 

1 Memo, Command and Organization after D Day 

OVERLORD, I Jun 44, SHAEF G-3 322.011-1 Command and Control of U.S./British Forces. 

2 This army group had initially been called 1st U.S. 

Army Group and had been commanded since October 1943 by General Bradley. For purposes of deceiving the Germans, it now became 12th Army 

Group. First U.S. Army Group was retained on 

paper and in the German imagination. As already 

n<:>ted, General McNair and, later; General DeWitt 

were appointed to head this paper army group to 

maintain the fiction. 

COMMAND REORGANIZATION, JUNE-OCTOBER 1944 263 

the U.S. army group immediately led to 

some confusion in the press. 3 Although the 

12th Army Group became active on the 

Continent on 1 August and Montgomery 

channeled his orders to the U.S. armies 

through it, the 21 Army Group commander retained over-all control until 1 

September. 

This arrangement was valuable in that 

it permitted one commander to co-ordinate Allied forces during the period of the 

breakout and pursuit. But it led many 

people in Great Britain and the United 

States to overestimate the degree to which 

General Bradley's army group was subordinated to General Montgomery. 

Throughout August, General Montgomery continued as before to issue operationalinstructions to the U.S. forces, but 

he consulted General Bradley increasingly 

as a partner instead of a subordinate and 

gave him great latitude in directing the 

U.S. forces. General Bradley presented 

some of his plans directly to General 

Eisenhower. The difference in the command relationship which existed between 

the 21 Army Group and the U.S. forces in 

J~ne and July and the arrangement in 

effect in August was largely that between 

the direction of an operation and the coordinatioq of a joint effort! 

On the day General Bradley assumed 

command of 12th Army Group on the 

Continent, the Third U.S. Army became 

operational. The enemy was aware almost 

immediately that General Patton was in 

action and announced the news to the 

world, although the Allied press was forbidden to print any notice of the fact. 

Som'e of General Patton's subordinates 

criticized the ban severely, charging 

SHAEF with jealousy of their chief. 

SHAEF had explained its reason for this 

action in the memorandum of 25 July on 

command reorganization. Desiring to continue the threat against the Pas-de-Calais 

based on the suggestion that General 

Patton had an army group in the United 

Kingdom poised for an attack, SHAEF 

asked that the Third Army commander's 

presence on the Continent be kept secret 

until it was certain that the Gennans had 

positively identified him. Since a common 

trick of the enemy was to announce the arrival of new units in the hope of getting a 

confirmation or denial, SHAEF waited 

several days before making a statement. 

When it did come, without any explanation bf the reason for secrecy, the feeling 

was heightened that Supreme Headquarters had some ulterior reason for its 

silence. 5 

Scarcely had criticism of SHAEF's handling of the Patton story subsided when a 

greater iIproar arose over the announcement of the activation of the new U.S. 

army group. In mid-August, as a result of 

a censor's error, press correspondents were 

allowed to announce that 12th Army 

Group had been activated and that General Bradley was now equal in authority 

with General Montgomery. Since the 

latter statement would not become true 

until General Eisenhower assumed direct 

command in the field, an arrangement 

scheduled for 1 September, SHAEF 

officials denied the statement without 

adding that the change would be made 

within a short time. Some London papers, 

, Memo, Eisenhower for Bradley, 25 Jul 44, sub: 

Comd and Organization V.S. Ground Forces, 

SHAEF G-3 322.011-1 Command and Control of 

V.S./British Forces. The same file contains a letter 

from Bradley to Montgomery, 19 July 1944, suggesting this arrangement, and Montgomery's agreement. 

4 See above, p. 198, for Bradley's description of 

command relations. 

5 Memo, Eisenhower to Bradley, 25 Jul 44, 

SHAEF G-3 322.011-1 Command and Control of 

V.S./British Forces. 
264 

unaware of the projected command arrangements, sharply attacked the original 

statement, asking that persons responsible 

for it be punished and that an apology be 

made to General Montgomery. In the 

United States some newspapers lashed out 

at the command arrangements in Europe 

s::lying that British officers had been given 

the posts of ground, air, and naval commanders, thus reducing General Eisenhower to the role of figurehead. Fearing 

that this criticism would spread and be 

injected into Congressional debate, General Marshall wrote General Eisenhower 

that" The Secretary [Mr. Stimson] and I 

and apparently all Americans" were 

strongly of the opinion that it was time for 

the Supreme Commander to take direct 

command-at least of the U.S. forces. To 

this recommendation, already made by 

Tedder and Smith, General Marshall 

added: "The astonishing success of the 

campaign up to the present moment has 

evoked emphatic expression of confidence 

in you and Bradley. The late announcement I have just referred to has cast a 

damper on the public enthusiasm." 6 

General Eisenhower was startled by the 

reaction and indicated that General Bradley shared his feelings. Apparently irritated, he replied: "It seems that so far as 

the press and public are concerned a resounding victory is not sufficient; the question of 'how' is equally important." It 

would be a great pity, he agreed, if General Bradley were denied full credit for his 

brilliant work "merely because general 

instructions and policies he has pursued 

have been channeled through Montgomery." The current command arrangement, he noted, had been adopted because 

it was impossible to move Supreme Headquarters to the Continent until an adequate communications network could be 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

secured to connect the United Kingdom 

and the Continent. While waiting for this 

development, General Eisenhower added, 

he had found it necessary to make one person responsible for the temporary control 

of ground forces in Normandy and had 

chosen General Montgomery on the basis 

of seniority and experience. In carrying 

out that task, the British commander had 

worked always under plans approved by 

the Supreme Commander, who made his 

influence felt by frequent visits to the 

battlefront. By 19 August, General Eisenhower was inclined to agree with the U.S. 

Chief of Staff that the time for a change 

was near at hand, and he hoped that the 

establishment of new communications 

would make possible the move of SHAEF 

to the Continent on 1 September. Even 

in the absence of such direct control, the 

Supreme Commander still felt justified in 

saying, "No major effort takes place in this 

Theater by ground, sea or air except with 

my approval and no one in the Allied 

Command presumes to question my supreme authority and responsibility for the 

whole campaign." 7 

Anticipating his assumption of direct 

control in the field, General Eisenhower 

had sent his headquarters commandant 

and the chief of the Signal Division to the 

Continent in early August to find a site 

which would have adequate communications for Supreme Headquarters. Toward 

the end of August, they decided thatJullouville, a small townjust south of Granville at the base of the Cotentin peninsula, 

6 Marshall to Eisenhower, W-82265, 17 Aug 44; 

Surles to Eisenhower, 19 Aug 44. Both in SHAEF cbl 

log. Copies of articles in London Daily Mirror, vVashington Times-Herald, and other papers in Diary Office 

CinC, 19 Aug 44; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 

300. 

7 Eisenhower to Marshall, CPA 90230, 19 Aug 44, 

SHAEF ebllog. 
COMMAND REORGANIZATION, JUNE-OCTOBER 1944 265 

GENERAL SIMPSON. (Photograph 

taken in 1945.) 

would serve. With this assurance, the Supreme Commander announced that he 

would assume direct operational control 

on 1 September with General Montgomery and General Bradley as respective 

commanders of the Northern and Central 

Groups of Armies. 8 

SHAEF became operational on the 

Continent on 1 September at Jullouville. 

Its forces, now consisting of two army 

groups (21 and 12th) and four armies, 

were soon augmented by another army 

group and three armies. One of these 

armies, the Ninth, which had been 

brought to the United Kingdom shortly 

before the invasion, became operational 

under Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson on 5 

September 1944 and was assigned to the 

12th Army Group. On that date General 

Simpson took command of all forces in the 

Brittany peninsula which had been operating there under General Patton's command. 9 The other units, which were even 

then engaged in the battle for southern 

France, were shortly to be incorporated 

into General Eisenhower's command as 

the 6th Army Group. 

Command of ANVIL/DRAGOON Forces 

General Eisenhower had assumed before D Day that one U.S. and one British 

army group would be sufficient to control 

Allied forces on the Continent. He did not 

object, however, in July 1944 when the 

War Department suggested that the 6th 

Army Group be created to command the 

Allied forces that would land in the south 

of France. Both the War Department and 

Headquarters, North African Theater of 

Operations (NATOUSA), emphasized 

that this additional army group was 

needed to co-ordinate civil affairs and to 

assure U.S. control of the operation. The 

Supreme Commander also agreed to the 

selection of General Devers for the 6th 

Army Group post. To dispel a rumor that 

he was opposed to the appointment, he 

cabled Washington that, while he did not 

know General Devers well, all reports 

were that he was doing a fine job and had 

the faculty of inspiring troops. 10 

General Wilson, Supreme Commander 

in the Mediterranean, and General Eisenhower agreed before the landings in southern France that troops put ashore in that 

8 Eisenhower to all comds, 25 Aug 44, SHAEF cbl 

log. 

9 Conquer: The Story of Ninth Army, p. 21. 

10 Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Jul 44, Eisenhower 

personal file. 
266 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

area would ultimately be placed under 

SHAEF, but probably not until they had 

advanced in strength north of Lyon. Before that time General Eisenhower was to 

keep General Wilson informed of his 

scheme of action in order that the Mediterranean commander's campaign would 

conform to OVERLORD operations. SHAEF 

was not ready to take over the maintenance of the 6th Army Group immediately; reserve stocks of supplies in the 

Mediterranean could be used for some 

weeks to support the forces in southern 

France. General Eisenhower also proposed 

that Allied Force Headquarters retain responsibility for civil affairs in the south of 

France as long as that headquarters continued to supply the ANVIL/DRAGOON 

forces. These suggestions were accepted by 

General Wilson. 11 

The rapid advance of the ANVIL armies 

from the south and the sweep of the OVERLORD forces to the east in the opening days 

of September hastened SHAEF's assumption of the operational control of units 

coming from the south. At 0001, 15 September, in accordance with the order of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the 6th 

Army Group became operational under 

the command of General Devers. It and 

the First French and Seventh U.S. Armies 

passed from Allied Force Headquarters to 

SHAEF. The Twelfth Air Force handed 

over the XII Tactical Air Command to the 

Ninth Air Force. For the moment, Allied 

Force Headquarters retained responsibility for the administration, logistical support, and maintenance of ANVIL/DRAGOON 

forces and civil affairs in the south of 

France. 12 

Fifteenth Army 

Before the second U.S. army was comGENERAL GEROW. (Photograph taken 

in 1948.) 

mitted in Normandy, the War Department made plans to activate a fifth U.S. 

army, the Fifteenth, which was ultimately 

to be added to the forces under the Supreme Commander's control. The army 

was activated at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., 

in August 1944. It began operations in the 

United Kingdom in late November of the 

same year. Toward the end of December 

the unit began moving to the Continent 

where it became operational on 6 January 

1945. Ten days later General Gerow, com11 Eisenhower to Marshall and Wilson, FWD 

13445, 31 Aug 44; Wilson to Eisenhower, FX-91666, 

3 Sep 44. Both in AFHQ CAO 1202, ANVIL (20-A 

134 E). Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Aug 44, Diary 

Office CinC. 

12 AFHQ to 6th A Gp, FX 24922, 14 Sep 44; 

SHAEF to 6th A Gp, FWD 14827, 14 Sep 44. Both 

in AFHQCAO 1202 ANVIL (20-A, 134 E). 
COMMAND REORGANIZATION, JUNE-OCTOBER 1944 267 

mander of V Corps, took command of the 

new army. 13 

SHAEF, ETOUSA, and Communications zone 

in 1944 

General Eisenhower’s dual role of Supreme Commander and U.S. theater 

commander was accompanied by some 

complications in the handling of U.S. administrative and supply matters on the 

Continent in 1944–45. Basically the difficulty arose because General Eisenhower 

did not wish to set up a separate theater 

administrative staff. He realized that there 

existed a shortage of qualified staff officers 

and that it was necessary if possible to 

avoid establishing an additional staff. He 

tended frequently, therefore, to call upon 

U.S. members of the SHAEF G–4 Division as well as members of Headquarters, 

Communications Zone, for advice in administration and supply matters. 14 

In mid-January 1944, General Eisenhower had consolidated Headquarters, 

European Theater of Operations, U.S. 

Army, which was responsible for all U.S. 

forces in the theater, and Headquarters, 

Services of Supply, which had the chief responsibility for mounting and supplying 

the U.S. part of the operation. At the same 

time he appointed Maj. Gen. John C. H. 

Lee, the Services of Supply commander, as 

deputy theater commander with special 

responsibilities for administration and 

supply. General Lee’s tasks included command of the Communications Zone 

troops in the United Kingdom and on 

the Continent, necessary activities in connection with static defense, and performance of additional duties delegated by the 

theater commander. 15 

Several problems soon developed out 

of the new arrangements. Combat commanders did not like the fact that the chief 

of the services of supply was in a position 

to control the inflow of reinforcements and 

supplies in such a way as to discriminate 

against the field forces. Since there was no 

other U.S. headquarters to act as an umpire, the U.S. members of the G–4 Division, SHAEF, sometimes found themselves 

acting as General Eisenhower’s advisers in 

these matters. General Lee and his staff 

felt that the SHAEF G–4, General Crawford, was attempting to control all U.S. 

supply matters. Shortly before D Day, 

General Lee asked for a clarification of the 

whole command relationship. On D Day, 

General Smith drafted an order saying 

that General Eisenhower would use U.S. 

members of the SHAEF staff only in those 

purely U.S. matters which remained under 

his direct control. 16 

General Eisenhower found that he had 

to intervene personally in the matter in 

early June and again in mid-July. On the 

latter occasion, he emphasized that the determination of broad policies, objectives, 

and priorities affecting two or more major 

U.S. commands was the responsibility of 

the U.S. theater commander. He proposed 

to delegate part of these duties to the 

major commands- 12th Army Group, 

Communications Zone, and USSTAF. 

General Eisenhower stipulated, however, 

that as theater commander he would 

utilize both the U.S. elements of the 

SHAEF staff and the chiefs of special and 

13 History of the Fifteenth United States Army, 21 August 1944 to 11 July 1945 (apparently printed in Germany, 1946), pp. 6-18. 

14 Eisenhower note for author, Aug 51; Ltr, Lt Col 

Roy Lamson to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, Chief of 

Military History, 9 Aug 51. Both in OCMH files. 

15 Hq ETOUSA GO 5, 17 Jan 44. ETOUSA files. 

16 Ltr, Lee to Eisenhower, 29 May 44; Draft GO 

by Gen Smith, 6 Jun 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 322 

ETOUSA, Organization and Administrative Command. 
268 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

technical services of ETOUSA for 

advice. 17 

In order that no question should remain 

in the minds of his staff members, General 

Eisenhower on 21 July laid down the procedure for carrying out “so-called American administration in this Allied theater of 

operations.” Communications with various U.S. headquarters on supply were to 

be channeled through the Communications Zone commander, since he retained 

all theater duties except decisions and 

policy on major differences among the 

principal U.S. commands. Because it was 

clearly impossible to separate U.S. and 

Allied matters completely, General Eisenhower added, he would habitually use 

“the senior U.S. officer in each of our several sections as an advisor on applicable 

U.S. matters, when the subject is of the 

type that requires the Theater Commander to take personal action.” Although 

this arrangement, he noted, did not make 

SHAEF officers part of the theater staff, 

they were “convenient agents responsible 

to me for advice and where necessary, for 

following up something of particular 

importance.’’ 18 

The new system failed to satisfy either 

the Communications Zone or SHAEF G– 

4 staffs. The former felt that the situation 

was unsatisfactory in that it separated the 

theater commander from his staff, required 

the expansion of U.S. personnel at SHAEF 

to handle supply matters, and weakened 

the position of Communications Zone 

relative to other U.S. commands in Europe which tended to look to SHAEF in 

administrative matters. Army group and 

army commanders were likewise dissatisfied with the arrangements of mid-July. 

The supply problems that developed in 

late August and early September, particularly the ammunition and gasoline shortages, led to strong criticism of Headquarters, Communications Zone. As a result, 

General Crawford, the SHAEF G–4, in 

mid-September asked that the U.S. members of the SHAEF staff be given “a considerably greater measure of supervision 

than [seemed] to be contemplated by existing orders.” He did not mean that General Lee’s staff should cease to function, 

but held that increased supervision by 

SHAEF was required in such matters as 

speeding up ammunition for U.S. units in 

the Brest peninsula, shifting U.S. supplies 

to the 21 Army Group, and allocating 

rolling stock. An alternative solution, he 

added, was to attach strong elements of 

Communications Zone to SHAEF to act 

directly under the Supreme Commander. 19 General Eisenhower did not 

take action on these proposals, and the 

same general organization continued to 

exist until the end of 1944. While the administrative system was marked by friction, its functioning was assured by the 

fact that Generals Eisenhower and Smith 

were sufficiently near Communications 

Zone to make sure that difficulties were 

held to a minimum and that their operational decisions were promptly implemented. 

————— 

17 Memo, DDE [Eisenhower] for CofS SHAEF, 

18 Jul 44, issued 19 Jul 44 by Hq ETOUSA as Memo 

on Organization and Command of U.S. Forces, 

SHAEF AG 322.1 (ETO). 

18 Memo, Eisenhower for CofS SHAEF, 21 Jul 44, 

SHAEF SGS 322 ETOUSA, Organization and Administrative Command. 

19 [Robert W. Coakley], Organization and Command in the ETO, Pt. II of The Administrative and 

Logistical History of the ETO, Hist Div USFET, 

1946, MS, II, 209-16; General Board Rpt 127, Organization and Functions of the Communications 

Zone, Ch. I, pp. 9-10; Crawford to CofS SHAEF, 

18 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 322 ETOUSA, Organization 

and Administrative Control. See also Ruppenthal, 

Logistical Support of the Armies, for a discussion of command organization in the European theater. 
COMMAND REORGANIZATION, JUNE-OCTOBER 1944 269 

The Air and Naval Forces 

Formation if the First 

Allied Airborne Army 

The establishment of the First Allied 

Airborne Army under SHAEF to co-ordinate the varied elements of air and ground 

forces essential for airborne operations on 

the Continent was one of the major command changes of 1944. Such co-ordination proved necessary because parachute 

and glider troops used in the airborne operations were part of the ground force organization, while the aircraft which 

carried the troops, furnished escorts, and 

resupplied the airborne units were under 

air force command. The problem became 

further complicated when both British 

and U.S. air and ground forces were involved. To simplify the command difficulties and make possible the thorough exploitation of airborne forces, the First 

Allied Airborne Army was created. 

(Chart 6) 

Back of the formation of a special army 

headquarters to plan and carry out airborne operations was the campaign of the 

War Department for greater strategic use 

of airborne forces. Since February 1944, 

Generals Marshall and Arnold had reiterated to the Supreme Commander the 

importance of strategic employment of 

these units. General Eisenhower agreed 

with their views in principle, but, as has 

been observed, doubted the feasibility of 

using them strategically in the opening 

phases of the assault when it would be difficult if not impossible to open lines of 

communications to them. As the War Department continued to press for a strategic 

airborne operation using up to six divisions, it became evident that an airborne 

headquarters which could plan and execute such activities was necessary. On 20 

May 1944, SHAEF set the period between 

12 and 26 June as the time for the activation of such an organization. Two weeks 

later, SHAEF asked AEAF and the army 

groups for their reactions to a plan by 

which airborne divisions and necessary air 

forces would be brought under one organization for planning, command, and co-ordination. The 21 Army Group approved 

but asked tha1 the activation be postponed until SHAEF assumed operational 

command of the ground forces. The U.S. 

army group disapproved on the ground 

that United States airborne troops should 

be controlled by a U.S. rather than an Allied command. On 20 June, General 

Eisenhower approved the organization of 

a combined United States-British Airborne Troop Command, established as a 

modified corps headquarters under a U.S. 

Army Air Forces officer with the rank of 

lieutenant general. The new headquarters 

was to be activated about the time SHAEF 

became operational on the Continent. 20 

In explaining his action to General 

Marshall, General Eisenhower declared 

that it was necessary because a suitable 

agency was lacking for joint planning between the troop carrier command and the 

airborne divisions. The airborne commander, he said, would be able to assume 

such responsibilities as joint training, development of operational projects, and 

logistical support of airborne operations 

until these functions could be taken over 

by normal agencies. If an airborne attack 

by two or three divisions took place in a 

20 Memo, SHAEF G-3 for CofS SHAEF, 20 May 

44; SHAEF G-3 to FUSAG, 21 A Gp, and AEAF, 

sub: Establishment of Combined U.S.-Br Airborne 

Troops Hq, 2 Jun 44; 21 A Gp to SHAEF, 4 Jun 44; 

FUSAG to SHAEF, 8Jun 44; AEAF to SHAEF, 8 

Jun 44; Memo, Gen Smith for G-3, 20 Jun 44. All in 

SHAEF G-3 Formation of FAA A 17281/1/Airborne. 
CHAR! 6-0PERATIONAL CHANNELS, FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY, 28 NOVEMBER 1944 

SUPREME COMMANDER 

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 

r I 

Allied Noyal Commander Ground Unit to Which 

EJ:peditionary Force Airborne Are Attached 

1 i 

• • • I 

I L ________________ • FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY 1-_______________ .1 HEADQUARTERS (FAAA) 

SFHQ 

• • 

I I 1 I 

I 

IX TROOP XVIII CORPS HEADOUARTERS RAF TRANSPORT & TROOP 

CARRIER COMMAND (AIRBORNE) (US) AIRBORNE CORPS CARRIER FORMA nON (BRITISH) WHEN ALLOCATED 

I I 

I I I I I I 

l82d AIRBORNE I 1,0", AIRBORNE I '''h AIRoORNE I I SEPARATE' I I·'h AIRBORNE I I,,, AIRBORNE 

I 

1 POLISH 

DIVISION DIVISION I SAS TROOPS f DIVISION AlB UNITS DIVISION DIVISION PARA_BRIG 

_____ COMMAND 

_. ___ CO-ORDINATION 

Source. Statistic, Sec, SGS, SHAH. 
COMMAND REORGANIZATION, JUNE-OCTOBER 1944 271 

single area, a temporary corps commander 

would be designated to conduct the fighting on the ground. He would operate under directives from the airborne headquarters until he joined the nearest army, 

which would then take operational and 

logistical responsibility for his units. 21 No 

persuasion seemed to be necessary so far as 

the U. S. Chief of Staff was concerned if 

one may judge by the' Ninth Air Force 

commander's remark of mid-July that he 

knew" General Marshall had insisted on 

the creation of an airborne army." 22 

In mid-July both the AEAF and the 

Ninth Air Force commanders proposed 

changes in the airborne command scheme. 

Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, the Ninth Air 

Force chief, felt he should be given responsi bility for airborne operations inasmuch as the major airborne troop carrier 

forces were American. The AEAF commander, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, proposed that U.S. airborne forces be 

placed under a special corps commander 

and that both U.S. and British airborne 

troops be unified under one command. At 

the same time, he wished to limit the latter command to control of the ground 

forces, while reserving for AEAF responsibility for all air aspects of airborne operations. 23 

SHAEF replied with the reminder that 

General Eisenhower had studied the airborne problem for more than one and onehalf years and that he felt the proposed reorganization the proper one. On 8 August, 

Supreme Headquarters announced the 

establishment of Combined Airborne 

Headquarters, and eight days later, at the 

suggestion of its new commander, it was 

renamed the First Allied Airborne Army. 

General Brereton was appointed chief of 

the new headquarters, and Lt. Gen. F. A. 

M. Browning, commander of the British 

Airborne Corps, was named his deputy.24 

Placed under the new army were IX 

Troop Carrier Command, XVIII U.S. 

Corps (Airborne) headquarters, British, 

Airborne Troops, including 1st Polish 

Parachute Brigade, and the Combined 

Air Transport Operations Room 

(CATOR). Royal Air Force Transport 

and Troop Carrier formations were placed 

under First Allied Airborne Army only 

when specifically allocated. 25 

At the request of AEAF, Supreme 

Headquarters announced on 18 August 

that the First Allied Airborne Army would 

control its own airlift, but that AEAF 

would retain the responsibility for supporting air operations. In September, the 

functions of General Brereton's command 

were further limited by an agreement that 

the First Allied Airborne Army would 

confine itself to outline planning and to 

operational command. Headquarters, Airborne Troops, though under the operational command of General Brereton, was 

21 Marshall to Eisenhower, W -56294, 26 J un 44; 

Arnold to Spaatz and Smith, WX-61600, 7 Ju144; 

Eisenhower to Marshall, S-55192, 8 Jul 44. All in 

SHAEF G-3 Formation of FAA A I 7281/I/Airborne. 

22 Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, entry for 17 July 

1944, p. 309, 

23 Ltr, Brereton to Eisenhower, 25 Jul 44, sub: 

Organization and Contemplated Opns of Air Army; 

Leigh-Mallory to Eisenhower, 17 Jul 44, sub: Organization of a Combined U.S.-Br Airborne Troop Hq, 

Both in SHAEF SGS 322 FAAA, Organization and 

Command F AAA. 

24 General Brereton's selection brought a general 

shift in which he was succeeded as head of Ninth Air 

Force by Maj, Gen, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, then 

Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, AEAF. Vandenberg was replaced by Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce, 

Deputy Commanding General, Ninth Air Force. 

25 Memo, SHAEF for WO, Br COS, et at., 8 Aug 

44, sub: Reorganization of Airborne Forces; SHAEF 

dir to Brereton, 8 Aug 44; Brereton to SAC, 4 Aug 

44; Memo by SHAEF G-3, 15 Aug 44; SHAEF 

memo, Redesignation of Combined Airborne Forces, 

16 Aug 44; Smith to AEAF com dr, 18 Aug 44; 

SHAEF dir to AEAF and USAAFE, 9 Aug 44. All in 

SHAEF G-3 Formation of FAA A I 7281/I/Airborne. 
272 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL HARRIS 

to have direct access to 21 Army Group or 

the War Office for administrative purposes. Air-transported formations were to 

remain under the command of ground 

formations concerned, being placed under 

the command of Headquarters, Airborne 

Troops, when necessary. 26 

Strategic Bom ber Command 

Among the command shifts of September, one of the most important was that 

involving the strategic air forces. This was 

made in accordance with the agreement of 

mid-April 1944 by which the Supreme 

Commander had assumed control of the 

strategic air forces supporting OVERLORD 

operations. It was clearly understood that, 

after the Allied forces had established 

themselves on the Continent, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would review the initial directive for the employment of the 

bomber forces and the method of their employment. 27 At the beginning of September, General Eisenhower was informed 

that changes in the air command arrangement would be made at the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff conference shortly to be 

held in Quebec. The Supreme Commander promptly urged that existing arrangements be continued. He recalled that 

GENERAL VANDENBERG. (Photograph taken in 1950.) 

the basic conception underlying the campaign was the possession of an overpowering air force which made feasible an other26 Smith to AEAF, 18 Aug 44; Mtg at WO, 22 Sep 

44, to discuss functions of FAAA, SHAEF G–3 Formation of FAAA 17281/1/Airborne. 

27 Memo, CCS for SAC, 27 Mar 44; Portal to 

Spaatz, 13 Apr 44; Air Ministry to Bomber Comd, 13 

Apr 44. All in SHAEF SGS 373/1 Policy re: Control 

and Employment of USSTAF and Bomber Com- 
COMMAND REORGANIZATION, JUNE-OCTOBER 1944 273 

wise impossible campaign. The air forces 

had lived up to expectations, virtually destroying the German Air Force, disrupting 

enemy communications, neutralizing 

beach defenses, aiding the ground forces 

to break through enemy lines, and fulfilling all other demands made on them. 

Meanwhile, the strategic air forces had 

been committed to the greatest extent possible on strategic targets and had prevented substantial rehabilitation of enemy 

industry and oil production. At present 

the ground forces were almost beyond the 

range of medium bombers, and in emergencies would require heavy bomber support. General Eisenhower said that he believed this emergency type of aid 

depended on the continuation of the existing command system. He added that 

General Spaatz shared his views on the 

existing system. 28 

At the Quebec meeting in mid-September, the Combined Chiefs of Staff ultimately decided that considerations in 

addition to those advanced by the Supreme Commander had to be taken into 

account. They concluded on 14 September that the Chief of the Air Staff, Royal 

Air Force (Portal), and the Commanding 

General, U.S. Army Air Forces (Arnold), 

should exercise control of all strategic 

bomber forces in Europe. The Deputy 

Chief of the Air Staff, RAF (Air Marshal 

Sir Norman H. Bottomley), and the Commanding General, United States Strategic 

Air Forces (Spaatz), were to provide control and local co-ordination through consultation. 29 

A new directive for the strategic air 

forces issued at this time undertook to inmand. For description of the April arrangements, see 

above, p. 125. For general discussion of the shift in 

strategic air forces command see Craven and Cate, 

The Army Air Forces in World War II, III, 3 19-22. 

sure continuation of a broad strategic 

bombing program as well as adequate 

bomber support for General Eisenhower’s 

ground operations. The over-all mission of 

the strategic air forces remained “the progressive destruction and dislocation of the 

German military, industrial and economic 

systems and the direct support of Land 

and Naval forces.” The Supreme Commander’s calls for aid in battle were to be 

filled promptly, The Combined Chiefs of 

Staff were to prescribe attacks in support 

of the Soviet ground forces. 30 The strategic 

air forces were to co-ordinate their activities with the operations of the tactical air 

forces, consulting as necessary the AEAF 

commander, who would normally co-ordinate air action in accordance with ground 

force requirements. In a list of priorities 

worked out by the strategic air force commanders in consultation with Air Chief 

Marshal Tedder, first priority for strategic 

bombing was given to the destruction of 

the petroleum industry with special emphasis on gasoline. Second priority targets 

were the German rail and water transportation systems, tank production plants 

and depots and ordnance depots, and 

motor transport production plants and 

While General Eisenhower would have 

28 Eisenhower to Marshall and Arnold, FWD 

13605, 2 Sep 44; Eisenhower to Arnold, FWD 13657, 

3 Sep 44. Both in Eisenhower personal file. 

29 Portal and Arnold to USSTAF for Spaatz, 14 Sep 

44; RAF London to Bottomley, OCTAGON 29,14 Sep 

44. Both in SHAEF SGS 373/1 Policy re: Control and 

Employment of USSTAF and Bomber Command. 

30 Portal and Arnold to USSTAF for Spaatz, 14 Sep 

44; RAF London to Bottomley, OCTAGON 29, 14 Sep 

44. Both in SHAEF SGS 373/1 Policy re: Control and 

Employment of USSTAF and Bomber Command. 

31 Bottomley to Bomber Comd, 25 Sep 44; Spaatz 

to SAC, 3 Oct 44, with attached dir for control of 

strategic air forces in Europe. Both in SHAEF SGS 

373/1 Policy re: Control and Employment of 

USSTAF and Bomber Command. 
274 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

preferred complete control of strategic air 

forces at SHAEF, he told General Marshall that the new arrangement would be 

satisfactory because of the “goodwill of the 

individuals concerned” and the assurances 

that his operations would be supported. 

He knew he could depend on the backing 

of General Spaatz, and he had found that 

Air Chief Marshal Harris was one of the 

most effective and Co-operative members 

of the Allied team. The Supreme Commander added that the British bomber 

commander had not only met every request but had led the way in finding new 

ways and means for particular types of 

planes to be of use on the battlefield. 32 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force 

Less than a month after the shift in the 

strategic air forces command, Air Chief 

Marshal Leigh-Mallory was appointed to 

command the Allied air forces in southeastern Asia, and the Allied Expeditionary 

Air Force was abolished. In September 

1944, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten 

had sounded out General Eisenhower on 

the possibility of getting the AEAF chief 

released to head up the Southeast Asia air 

command. General Arnold opposed this 

shift on the ground that a U.S. and not a 

British airman should be named to the 

post. At the same time, the U.S. air chief 

was strongly in favor of abolishing Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 

which he felt no longer served any useful 

purpose. He found, however, that the chief 

difficulty in getting the headquarters abolished lay in finding a suitable appointmerit for Leigh-Mallory. General Eisenbower, when informed of this situation, 

cabled General Arnold: 

Under present circumstances I agree we 

could get along without Leigh-Mallory’s 

Headquarters. The fact is, however, that 

through every day of this campaign LeighMallory has proved his intense desire to cooperate and a very admirable grasp of the 

whole situation. Our plans for reorganization 

when and if he is detached will eliminate that 

headquarters and all the functions it has 

been performing will be centered right here 

at SHAEF. But you should not be under any 

misapprehension as to Leigh-Mallory’s qualifications and attitude. Admitting that upon first glance he seems to be a bit difficult, he is 

one of the type that never ceases to develop 

and above all, he is a real fighter, which 

1 like. He is an experienced and valuable 

officer. 

There is no need to manufacture a job merely to get rid of Leigh-Mallory but on the 

other hand, as I explained above, if he is 

taken out of here for any reason I will not assign another man to his present title. 

The initiative for Leigh-Mallory’s eventual release came from the British Air 

Ministry. On 20 September, Sir Archibald 

Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, pointed 

to decisions which had been made at 

Quebec relative to southeastern Asia and 

added that Air Chief Marshal LeighMallory should go out to head the Allied 

air forces there as soon as possible. General 

Eisenhower asked for a delay until 10 or 

15 October inasmuch as Leigh-Mallory 

was intimately mixed up with the heavy 

fighting then in progress. 33 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force was dissolved at 0001, 15 October 1944, shortly 

after Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory 

32 Eisenhower to Marshall, 25 Sep 44, Eisenhower 

Personal file. Harris, Bomber Offensive, PP. 214–163 

indicates that his relations with SHAEF were extremely cordial. 

33 Arnold to Eisenhower, 6 Sep 44; Eisenhower to 

Arnold, 14 Sep 44; Sinclair to Eisenhower, 20 Sep 44; 

Eisenhower to Sinclair, 22 Sep 44. All in Diary Office 

CinC, 14, 20, and 22 Sep 44. For a summary of the 

discussion leading to the termination of AEAF, see 

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, III, 620–22. 
COMMAND REORGANIZATION, JUNE-OCTOBER 1944 275 

left for his new post. 34 SHAEF Air Staff 

was then set up under a Chief of Staff 

(Air), Air Vice Marshal Robb, then serving as SHAEF Deputy Chief of Staff (Air), 

to absorb the operational functions of 

AEAF and reallocate its responsibilities. 

Air Chief Marshal Tedder was assigned 

the tasks of co-ordinating the Allied tactical air forces and of stating the Supreme 

Commander's requirements for strategic 

bombing. Administrative functions previously exercised over Royal Air Forces by 

the AEAF commander were now given to 

the commander of 2d Tactical Air Force, 

while similar administrative control of 

U.S. forces remained in the hands of the 

USSTAF commander. 35 

Allied Naval Forces 

The main task of the Allied naval forces 

under SHAEF was completed once the invading units in southern France had 

linked up with the troops from the OVERLORD area. Important duties still remained, however, in connection with such 

matters as guarding troop and supply 

ships in the Channel and off the southern 

coast of France and co-ordinating the efforts of the Allied naval forces with port 

reconstruction units in western Europe. 

Another major naval concern was planning for later campaigns, such as the opening of Antwerp and the crossing of the 

Rhine, which would require naval 

support. 

Throughout the remainder of the war, 

the Allied naval commander and a small 

staff remained at SHAEF. Admiral Ramsay held the post of ANCXF until his 

death in a plane crash at the beginning of 

1945. He was succeeded by Admiral 

Harold M. Burrough. After SHAEF had 

moved across the Channel in the early fall 

of 1944, Admiral Kirk was established at 

that headquarters as head of the U.S. 

naval elements on the Continent. 

Shifts in Locations of Supreme Headquarters 

The numerous command changes between June and October 1944 had been 

accompanied by almost as many shifts in 

the locations of Supreme Headquarters. It 

will be recalled that on D Day the main 

force of SHAEF was located at Bushy 

Park near London and General Eisenhower had a small advance command 

post-SHARPENER-near General Montgomery's headquarters at Portsmouth. 

Later inJune the Supreme Commander 

decided to enlarge the forward headquarters at Portsmouth. On 1 July, a tented 

camp capable of housing 400 officers and 

1,000 enlisted men was opened. 36 Members from all the divisions of the headquarters were present, but G-2, G-3, and 

Secretary, General Staff, personnel predominated. Adequate telephone, teleprinter, and radio facilities kept the headquarters in close connection with the War 

Office, the War Department, and the 

army groups. Four daily flights in addition 

to the usual dispatch-rider letter service 

connected SHAEF Forward and SHAEF 

Main. 37 

34 Leigh-Mallory was killed in November in a 

plane crash while en route to the Southeast Asia 

Command. 

35 SHAEF Memo, 14 Oct 44, sub: Command and 

Control of Allied Air Forces, SHAEF G-3 322.011-1 

Ops A Command and Control of U.S./~ritish Forces; 

Notes of mtg at SHAEF Fwd, 3 Oct 44, to decide 

RAF organization at SHAEF in place of AEAF, 

SHAEF SGS 322 SHAEF, Organization ofSHAEF, 1. 

36 This headquarters was known by the code name 

SHIPMATE. See movement orders to Portsmouth in 

SHAEF SGS 370.5/4 Location of Battle Hq AEF, and 

SHAEF SGS 370.5-1 Movement ofSHAEF. 

37 Details on camps given to author by Maj. George 

S. Bare and Miss Mattie A. Pinette, formerly of Gen-
276 

Plans made before D Day to establish 

SHAEF advance command posts near 

both U.S. and British army headquarters 

on the Continent were not fully carried 

out. On 7 August, however, General 

Eisenhower established a small advance 

headquarters, known as SHELLBURST, in a 

combined tent and trailer camp near 

Tournieres, twelve miles southwest of 

Bayeux. 

By the time of the move to Tournieres, 

SHAEF officials were planning a move of 

the Forward Headquarters from Portsmouth to the Continent. The new headquarters was constructed on the grounds 

of La colonie scola ire de St. Ouen) a school on 

the outskirts of Jullouville. The largest 

building of the school housed the communications center, the War Room, and 

messes, as wen as providing billets for female personnel. Offices were located in 

prefabricated huts, while officers and men 

were quartered in tents. The chiefproblem in establishing the headquarters was 

the installation of adequate communications for Supreme Headquarters atJullouville, and for the nearby forward echelons 

of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, the 

Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, the 

U.S. Strategic Air Forces, and the French 

command, which were located in and 

around Granville. Accommodations were 

provided initially at Jullouville for 1,500 

officers and men, but they soon proved insufficient as signal units, supply detachments, and other groups needed by a large 

headquarters were brought in. While the 

eral Eisenhower's staff. Chief sources for this section, 

unless otherwise noted, are: SHAEF SG" 370.5/4 

Site Plans-Portsmouth; SHAEF SGS 370.5/4 Location of Battle Headquarters, I, II; SHAEF SGS 370.5-

I Movement of SHAEF; Intervs with Brig Gen 

Robert Q. Brown, Hq Commandant SHAEF, and Lt 

Col H.J. Rothwell, Camp Commandant SHAEF; Ltr, 

M~ Bare to author. 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

general and special staff divisions at 

SHAEF Forward numbered only some 

318 officers and 478 enlisted men, the attached units ultimately pushed the total 

to 750 officers and 2,500 men. Movement 

to the new headquarters from Portsmouth 

began on 28 August, five parties coming 

by sea and air at staggered intervals. The 

small camp at Tournieres was integrated 

in Forward Headquarters while Main 

Headquarters remained for the time being 

at Bushy Park. 

By the time Forward Headquarters of 

SHAEF opened at Jullouville, the tide of 

battle had shifted from Normandy to 

points beyond the Seine. The situation 

gave rise to the criticism that the Supreme 

Commander was too far removed from the 

front lines at one of the most critical parts 

of the battle. Almost as soon as he reached 

Jullouville, he ordered preparations made 

to move both Forward and Main echelons 

of Supreme Headquarters nearer the combat zone. He had previously emphasized 

that when a second move was made, the 

headquarters should be near a major 

communications center. On no condition, 

however, was it to be in a large city, particularly Paris, where there were "too 

many temptations to go night clubbing." 

Versailles was ultimately chosen as the 

new site. On 6 September, General Eisenhower, who was attempting to keep in 

touch with his commanders by jeep and 

plane, directed that his headquarters 

move forward as soon as it could without 

inconveniencing the 12th Army Group, 

which had its headquarters located in that 

vicinity. The move was to include all organizations located near J ullouville and 

Granville. As soon as possible, SHAEF 

Main was to be brought from the United 

Kingdom. The headquarters began its 

move from Normandy to Versailles on 15 
COMMAND REORGANIZATION, JUNE-OCTOBER 1944 277 

TRIANON PALACE HOTEL, SHAEF Headquarters. 

September and opened there officially on 

the 20th. 

Offices of the general staff divisions 

were established in the Trianon Palace 

Hotel near grounds of the Petit Trianon. 

Special staff sections were located in the 

Grandes Ecuries, and the Air Staff in the 

Petites Ecuries. Hotels Reservoir, Royale, 

and Vittel were also used. Enlisted men 

were billeted in Satory Camp, and officers 

in homes along the Seine between St. 

Cloud and St. Germain-en-Laye. New 

buildings had to be requisitioned continually as the number of assigned and attached units increased. General Vulliamy, 

the chief of the Signal Division, pointed 

out that within a week after the move the 

estimated figures were more than 

doubled. 3s 

In accordance with his policy of keeping 

a small advance headquarters as near as 

possible to the army groups, General 

Eisenhower in early September directed 

that a camp be built forward of Versailles. 

This headquarters was opened on 19 September at Gueux about seven miles northwest of Reims,just off the Laon highway. 

As in Normandy it consisted of a small 

staff installed in tents and trailers. Instead 

of an orchard, the men used the grounds 

and clubhouse belonging to the Athletic 

Club of Reims. General Eisenhower continued to use this advance site until 17 

February 1945 when the forward echelon 

of SHAEF moved to Reims. He, of course, 

38 An advance party of the Seine Base Section estimated before the move that SHAEF would ultimately 

require space for 2,000 officers and 10,000 enlisted 

men, and 750,000 square feet of office space. 
278 

retained offices in Versailles and in 

London. 39 

At the end of September, various 

echelons of SHAEF Main began their 

move from the United Kingdom to Versailles by air. The move was completed by 

5 October. Rear Headquarters, SHAEF, 

consisting of approximately 1,500 officers 

and men, moved from Bushy Park to 

Bryanston Square in London on 9-10 

October. A small contingent was located 

at Goodge Street Tunnel, which was now 

used as an underground storage place for 

important SHAEF records. 

While at Versailles, SHAEF made great 

progress in improving its communications 

facilities. The French postal, telegraph, 

and telephone service (PTT) helped to 

establish the Paris Military Switchboard, 

which provided trunk service by connecting military exchanges in other centers to 

the Paris exchange via the French PTT 

system. To avoid confusion SHAEF took 

control of the main trunk telecommunications network and established the AEF 

Long Lines Control to allocate circuits in 

the rehabilitated French systems. 40 Radio 

communication between the Supreme 

Commander and his army group comTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

manders was assured in early September 

by the establishment of several radio circuits known as RED LINE which were set up 

exclusively for messages to and from the 

Supreme Commander. 

By t October, the Supreme Commander had gathered firmly into his 

hands the control of Allied forces from 

Holland to the Mediterranean and from 

the German frontier westward to the Atlantic. He commanded as well U.S. air 

and ground forces in the United Kingdom. Under his direct control he had one 

British, one Canadian, one French, one 

Allied airborne, and four U.S. armies as 

well as the British and U.S. tactical air 

forces. While he no longer controlled any 

part of the strategic air forces, he still had 

first call on them for necessary support of 

his ground operations. With his headquarters set up on the Continent and with 

an adequate radio and telegraphic link to 

his chief subordinates, he could now personally direct operations against the Third 

Reich. 

39 Details on this advance headauarters were 

furnished the author by Major Bare i~ a letter of 7 

November 1949. 

40 Rpt of Signal Div, SHAEF, Vols. IV, V, OCMH. 
CHAPTER XVI 

Fighting in the North 

The great drive across northern France 

and Belgium began to lose its momentum 

in the first week of September and was 

showing signs of coming to a halt by the 

middle of the month as Allied lines of supply became intolerably stretched. Shortly 

thereafter the Allies launched an airborne 

operation (MARKET-GARDEN) in the 

Netherlands in the hope of establishing a 

bridgehead across the Rhine before the 

enemy could reorganize his forces for an 

effective defense. 

Background of Operations in the Netherlands 

In agreeing to the operation MARKETGARDEN, General Eisenhower seems to 

have been influenced not only by a desire 

to get a bridgehead across the Rhine but 

by the hope of utilizing the First Allied 

Airborne Army, which had been awaiting 

action since July and August. Aware that 

Generals Marshall and Arnold were both 

deeply interested in the strategic use of 

airborne forces, General Eisenhower had 

sought a suitable occasion for employing 

these resources. In mid-July he asked for 

an airborne plan marked by imagination 

and daring which would make a maximum contribution to the destruction of 

German armies in western Europe. The 

desire to implement such a plan helped to 

influence the foundation of the First Allied 

Airborne Army. When various factors delayed its organization, the Supreme Commander told General Smith: " ... Brereton should be working in his new job instantly. Please inform him that I am particularly anxious about the navigational 

qualifications of the transport command 

crews. He is to get on this in an intensive 

way. He is to keep me in touch with his 

progress. There is nothing we are undertaking about which I am more concerned 

than this job of his. I want him on the ball 

with all his might." General Arnold in 

August asked General Eisenhower for a 

broad outline for the employment of airborne forces, noting that troop carrier 

planes were not "comparing at all favorably with combat plane missions (other 

than supply and training) accomplished 

and hours in the air." 1 

When it became clear that the First 

Allied Airborne Army would not be employed west of the Seine, the Deputy Supreme Commander and the SHAEF 

deputy G-3 proposed the strategic use of 

these forces in the area of Boulogne or 

Calais. 2 In addition, the SHAEF planners 

asked the airborne army to examine plans 

to employ airborne forces north of the 

Somme between the Oise and Abbeville, 

and north of the Aisne in the neighborhood of Soissons. Meanwhile, General 

Brereton completed plans for an operation 

to capture Boulogne. This was abandoned 

near the end of August when it became 

1 The Brereton Diaries, pp. 308-09, 322, 333. 

2 See above, p. 210. 
280 

apparent that the ground forces would bypass or capture the city before the operation could be launched. 

At this juncture, General de Guingand 

outlined for General Brereton the types of 

airborne operations 21 Army Group desired in the coming weeks. He reminded 

the First Allied Airborne commander that 

General Eisenhower, although willing to 

leave the specific operations up to Generals Montgomery and Brereton, was insistent that the airborne forces be used. 

The 21 Army Group chief of staff thought 

the airborne forces should speed the advance northeast across the Somme, 

prevent enemy elements in the coastal 

area from reinforcing the main line, and 

provide a reserve to clear the area when 

contact was made with troops advancing 

from the south. He suggested an operation 

in the Doullens area north of Amiens. 

General Brereton explained that, while his 

forces were at the disposal of General 

Montgomery, it was necessary first to decide on the advisability of particular operations. He ultimately refused the Doullens 

drop because he thought that a link-up of 

ground forces would occur within fortyeight hours. In view of the rapidity of the 

ground forces' advance, General Brereton 

proposed that all planning be discarded 

except that which aimed at action in the 

Aachen-Maastricht area. He pointed out 

that the armies were moving so swiftly 

that the airborne army could not keep up 

with them unless its transport was released 

from air supply operations. 3 

General Brereton not only opposed 

using airborne forces for operations which 

he believed the ground forces could perform, but he was showing concern over the 

Supreme Command's tendency to permit 

the Troop Carrier Command to be used 

for supply instead of its primary role of 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

carrying soldiers. Almost solid opposition 

from ground commanders confronted 

General Brereton's recommendation that 

aircraft intended primarily for tactical airborne missions be released from the task of 

carrying supplies. "Inability to take advantage of the chance of delivering a 

paralyzing blow by airborne action," he 

insisted, "was due to lack of Troop Carrier 

aircraft which could have been made 

available immediately for airborne operations had they not been used for resupply 

and evacuation." He held that airborne 

planning should be conducted at the Supreme Commander's level. Along with 

General Arnold, he believed that the conception of the employment of the First 

Allied Airborne Army as a strategic force 

was not properly understood. 4 

After the operation to seize Boulogne 

was canceled, an air drop at Tournai 

(LINNET I) was planned. This was set aside, 

in turn, on the evening of 2 September by 

21 Army Group as a result of adverse 

weather and delay. General Eisenhower 

and Air Chief Marshal Tedder on 3 September gave their backing to an operation 

planned for the Aachen-Maastricht Gap 

(LINNET II). The final decision on this 

project was left to Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley. General 

Brereton believed that the disorganization 

of the enemy required immediate launching of the operation. He declared that the 

operation should be mounted on 4 September or not at all. General Browning, 

deputy commander of the First Allied 

Airborne Army, protested that insufficient time had been given. When General 

3 Highlights of mtg at Hq 21 A Gp, 25 Aug 44, 

SHAEF FAAA, Plans for Operations. The Brereton 

Diaries, p. 336, gives General Brereton's reactions. 

4 The Brereton Diaries, p. 339; Arnold, Global Mission, p. 521; for a ground force view, see 12th A Gp 

G-4 AAR, Aug 44. 
FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 

Brereton held to his resolution, General 

Browning tendered his resignation. The 

airborne army commander declared next 

day that only General Eisenhower could 

act upon the matter, and General Browning withdrew his letter. The entire problem was settled apparently as the result of 

the slowing of the ground battle; on 5 September LINNET II was canceled. 5 

Airborne planners devised eighteen different plans in forty days only to have 

many of the objectives overrun by the 

ground troops before any action could be 

taken. The schedule of operations had 

been disrupted temporarily in the last half 

of August when for an interval of nearly 

two weeks troop carrier aircraft were diverted to the supply of ground troops. 

Only after a strong reminder by General 

Brereton that these planes were needed for 

training in preparation for new operations 

were they withdrawn from supply activities. Even then, the air drops for which the 

troop carrier units had been withdrawn 

were canceled. 

Meanwhile the airborne headquarters 

and the 21 Army Group were exploring 

other ways in which the airborne army 

might be used. By 5 September, Field 

Marshal Montgomery had decided in 

favor of an air drop of one and one-half 

divisions on 7 September to seize river 

crossings in the Arnhem-Nijmegen area 

(Operation COMET).6 This operation was 

postponed from day to day and finally 

canceled on 10 September as a result of 

bad weather and stiffened enemy resistance. A decision was finally made to 

strengthen the attack and not to abandon 

it. First Allied Airborne Army was informed on the 10th that General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery 

wanted an operation in the general area 

specified in COMET. A decision was made 

281 

to enlarge the air drop to three and onehalf divisions, to seize bridges over the 

Maas, Waal, and Neder Rijn at Grave, 

Nijmegen, and Arnhem (Operation 

MARKET), and to open a corridor from 

Eindhoven northward for the passage of 

British ground forces' into Germany 

(Operation GARDEN). 

Although some individuals at 12th 

Army Group and First Allied Airborne 

Army, and even some members of the 21 

Army Group staff, expressed opposition to 

the plan, it seemed to fit the pattern of current Allied strategy. It conformed to General Arnold's recommendation for an 

operation some distance east of the 

enemy's forward positions and beyond the 

area where enemy reserves were normally 

located; it afforded an opportunity for 

using the long-idle airborne resources; it 

was in accord with Field Marshal Montgomery's desire for a thrust north pf the 

Rhine while the enemy was disorganized; 

it would help reorient the Allied drive in 

the direction 21 Army Group thought it 

should go; and it appeared to General 

Eisenhower to be the boldest and best 

move the Allies could make at the moment. The Supreme Commander realized 

that the momentum ofthe drive into Germany was being lost and thought that by 

this action it might be possible to get 

a bridgehead across the Rhine before the 

Allies were stopped. The airborne divisions, he knew, were in good condition and 

could be supported without throwing a 

crushing burden on the already overstrained supply lines. At worst, General 

The Brereton Diaries, pp. 33i-38, entries for 3,4, 

and 5 September 1944. 

6 CofS 21 A Gp Conf, 5 Sep 44, 21 A Gp file,!;; 

SHAEF G-3 Memo, 21 Oct 44, sub: Projected Abn 

Opns, SHAEF G-3 Future Opns 24533/0ps: SHAEF 

F AAA, Plan for Operation COMET. A list of operations is given in The Brereton Diaries, pp. 339-40. 
282 

Eisenhower thought the operation would 

strengthen the 21 Army Group in its later 

fight to clear the Schelde estuary. Field 

Marshal Montgomery examined the objections that the proposed route of advance "involved the additional obstacle of 

the Lower Rhine (Neder Rijn) as compared with more easterly approaches, and 

would carry us to an area relatively remote 

from the Ruhr." He considered that these 

were overriden by certain major advantages: (1) the operation would outflank 

the Siegfried Line defenses; (2) it would be 

on the line which the enemy would consider the least likely for the Allies to use; 

and (3) the area was the one with the 

easiest range for the Allied airborne forces. 7 

Operation MARKET was placed under 

General Browning's British Airborne 

Corps. Specifically, it provided for the 

lO1st U.S. Airborne Division to seize key 

points on the highway between Eindhoven 

and Grave, the 82d U.S. Airborne Division to take bridges at Nijmegen and 

Grave, and the 1st British Airborne Division to capture the bridges at Arnhem. 

The 1st Polish Parachute Brigade was to 

reinforce this last effort. The 52d British 

(Lowland) Division was to be flown in 

later to strengthen the Arnhem bridgehead. While these attacks were under way, 

the Second British Army was to launch 

Operation GARDEN. The 30 British Corps 

was to spearhead a drive with the British 

Guards Armored Division and follow up 

its efforts with the 43d and 50th Divisions. 

The corps was to advance from the line of 

the Meuse-Escaut Canal along a narrow 

corridor from Eindhoven northward and 

push across the bridges which had been 

secured by airborne forces to Arnhem 

some sixty-four miles away. Thrusting 

thence to the IJsselmeer, nearly one hundred miles from the original jump-off 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

point, it was to cut off the escape route of 

the enemy in western Holland and then 

turn northeast into Germany. Meanwhile, 

the 12 and 8 British Corps on the flanks of 

the 30 British Corps were to advance in 

support of the attack. 8 

The boldness of the operation was apparent. Its success required a rapid advance by ground forces along a narrow 

corridor more than sixty miles from the 

advanced British positions at the MeuseEscaut Canal, and several days of favorable flying conditions at a season when the 

weather in northwest Europe was normally bad. 

Set over against the factors making for 

caution was the belief, still generally held 

at most Allied headquarters, that the 

enemy forces which had fled through 

northern France and Belgium would be 

unable to stop and conduct any sort of 

effective defense against the Allied armies. 

Limiting factors on continued Allied advances were believed to be based more on 

Allied shortages of supply than on the 

enemy's capacity to resist. Fairly typical of 

the Allied point of view was SHAEF's estimate of the situation a week before the 

Arnhem operation. Enemy strength 

721 A Gp, Operation MARKET-GARDEN, 7-26 

Sep 44, SHAEF .I-'AAA; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 

416-18. General Bradley says he obj ected strenuously to the plan but "1 nevertheless freely concede 

that Monty's plan for Arnhem was one of the most 

imaginative of the war." Brereton, in a letter to General Ward, 10 June 1951, OCMH, says that he opposed the operation as planned (The Brereton Diaries, 

pp. 340, 342); Ltr, Brig Williams to author, 12 Aug 

51; Arnold, Global Mission, p. 521; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 307; Notes by Gen Eisenhower, 

16Jun 51, OCMH files; Montgomery, Normandy to 

the Baltic, p. 224. For an air force view ofthe operation see Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, III. 598-611. 

• Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Airborne Operations in 

Holland (Sep-Oct 44), SHAEF FAAA; outline plan 

for Operation COMET in same file; outline of Operation MARKET-GARDEN in SHAEF G-3 file. 
FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 

throughout the west was listed at fortyeight divisions or approximately twenty 

infantry and four armored divisions at full 

strength. 9 This included four divisions 

which had to remain in the fortresses and 

three others outside the area of the Siegfried Line. SHAEF thus assumed that the 

immediate defense of the West Wall would 

be left to the 200,000 men who had escaped from· France and an additional 

100,000 who might yet escape from Belgium and southern France or be brought 

from Germany. This defending force, the 

SHAEF G-2 concluded, would not be 

greater than eleven infantry and four 

armored divisions at full strength. As to reinforcements, an estimate which was believed to be unduly fair to the enemy 

added a "speculative dozen" divisions 

which might "struggle up" in the course of 

the month. It was considered "most unlikely that more than the true equivalent 

offour panzer grenadier divisions with 600 

tanks" would be found. The G-2 declared: 

"The Westwall cannot be held with this 

amount, even when supplemented by 

many oddments and large amounts of 

flak." 10 In the light of this and other similar assessments of the enemy situation, it 

would have been difficult for General 

Eisenhower or Field Marshal Montgomery, even in the face oflogistical difficulties, to justify stopping the great pursuit 

without some effort to pierce or outflank 

the West Wall defenses. 

The optimism reflected in SHAEF's 

intelligence estimate was also evidenced 

four days before the attack in the statement by Headquarters, Airborne Corps, 

that the enemy had few infantry reserves 

and a total armored strength of not more 

than fifty to one hundred tanks. While 

there were numerous signs that the enemy 

was. strengthening the defenses of the river 

283 

and canal lines through Arnhem and 

Nijmegen, it was believed that the troops 

manning them were not numerous and 

were of "low category." The 1st British 

Airborne Division's report later described 

Allied estimates as follows: "It was 

thought that the enemy must still be disorganized after his long and hasty retreat 

from south of the River Seine and that 

though there might be numerous small 

bodies of enemy in the area, he would not 

be capable of organized resistance to any 

great extent." Only on the very.eve of the 

attack was a warning note sounded. The 

SHAEF G-2 at that time declared that the 

«9 SS Panzer Division) and with it presumably the 10) has been reported as withdrawing to the Arnhem area of Holland; 

there they will probably both collect new 

tanks from a depot reported in the area of 

Cleves." 11 

Supply difficulties intensified the problems of MARKET-GARDEN at the outset of 

planning. On 11 September, Field Marshal Montgomery notified General Eisenhower that the latter's failure to give 

priority to the northern thrust over other 

operations meant that the attack could not 

be made before 26 September. The Supreme Commander then sent his chief of 

staff to assure the 21 Army Group commander that 1 ,000 tons of supplies per day 

would be delivered by Allied planes and 

U.S. truck companies. Field Marshal 

Montgomery now reconsidered and set 1 7 

September as the target day for the operation. To the Supreme Commander he 

wired: "Most grateful to you personally 

• See above, p. 248, for actual strength. 

10 SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 25, week ending 9 Sep 44, SHAEF G-2 file. 

11 Hq Abn Troops Operational Instruction 1, 13 

Sep 44; 1st Abn Div AAR on Opn MARKET, Pts. 1-3. 

Both in SHAEF FAAA. SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 26, week ending 16 Sep 44, SHAEF G-2 file. 
284 

and to Beetle for all you are doing for 

us." 12 

Despite the narrow margin of logistical support for MARKET-GARDEN, Field 

Marshal Montgomery now believed that, 

if weather conditions permitted full development of Allied air power and unhindered use of airborne forces, he had 

sufficient supplies to secure the Rhine 

bridgehead. Later, in reporting on the 

operation, he declared that. it was necessary to shorten the time for building up 

supplies in order to prevent the enemy 

from reorganizing. He added: "After careful consideration it was decided to take 

this administrative risk, subsequently fully 

justified, and the actual date of the start 

of the operation was advanced by six 

days." To reduce the risk, the Field Marshal suggested on 14 September that U.S. 

forces create a diversion along the MetzNancy front during the period 14-26 September in order to pull the enemy away 

from Arnhem. Two days later he indicated 

that, inasmuch as the Third Army operations in Lorraine were producing a sufficient threat, no special feint was necessary.13 

In order to get transport for the additional 500 tons which had to be hauled 

daily from Bayeux to Brussels during the 

MARKET-GARDEN operation, SHAEF ordered the newly arrived 26th, 95th, and 

104th U.S. Infantry Divisions stripped of 

their vehicles, save those needed for selfmaintenance. Using the freed vehicles, 

provisional units were substituted for more 

experienced U.S. truck companies on the 

Red Ball route, and the companies thus 

made available were then transferred to 

the British Red Lion route. By 8 October, 

at which time British supplies began to go 

by rail, these companies had hauled more 

than 18,000 tons of supplies. A daily 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

average of627 tons, about half of it British 

POL and the remainder U.S. supplies, was 

transported over the 306-mile forward 

route. 14 

The MARKET-GARDEN Operation 

Operation MARKET-GARDEN started according to plan in the early afternoon of 17 

September as elements of the lst British 

and 82d and 10 lst Airborne Divisions 

began dropping near Arnhem, Grave, and 

Veghel. (Map 3) At approximately the 

same time, the 30 British Corps moved 

from a point north of the Meuse-Escaut 

Canal toward Eindhoven. In the largest 

airborne attack undertaken up to that 

time, the Allied forces landed with light 

losses. Soon afterward they ran into serious trouble. The general area of the southeastern Netherlands was held by the First 

Parachute Arrrry (Generaloberst Kurt Student)~ which was in the process of consolidation when the airborne force struck. 

Though surprised by the airborne force 

and not prepared for an attack, General 

Student was able to draw on the II SS 

Panzer Corps, then regrouping northeast of 

Arnhem, and to bring up to Nijmegen the 

II Parachute Corps with several parachute 

12 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-205, 16 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I; Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-197, 12 Sep 44, Eisenhower personal file. General Eisenhower had made 

clear that during the airborne operation the 500 tons 

delivered by airlift would have to be made up by 

emergency measures, since all available aircraft 

would be used in MARKET-GARDEN. Eisenhower to 

Montgomery, FWD 14 758, 13 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 

381 Post OVERLORD Planning, 1. 

13 SHAEF to 12th A Gp, FWD 14837, 14 Sep44, 

SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I; 

SHAEFtoEXFOR(21 A Gp),FWD 15007, 16Sep 

44; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 220; 21 A 

Gp Rpt, MARKET-GARDEN, 17 -26 Sep 44, SHAEF 

file. 

11 History of G-4, ComZ, ETO, prep by Hist Sec, 

G-4, COMZ, MS, Sec. III, Ch. 3, OCMH files. 
R Johnstone 

MAP 3 
286 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Kampfgruppen which were reorganizing 

near Cologne. Student was aided by a 

captured copy of the Allied attack order 

which reached him within two hours after 

the landing. An infantry division, en route 

to the area from the Fifteenth Army area at 

the time of the attack, was detrained and 

put into the attack against the 101st Airborne Division near Son. The enemy was 

also helped by the fact that Field Marshal 

Model, who had his Army Group B headquarters near Arnhem, was able to coordinate the fighting at Arnhem and 

Nijmegen. The defense was quickly organized and new forces brought up. The 

enemy sent all available combat aircraft 

to help his antiaircraft stop the Allied 

attack. 15 

Despite prompt and unexpectedly 

strong enemy reaction, the Allies made 

some gains during the first day. By midnight, the 101st and the 82d Airborne Divisions were well established near Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The 1st British Airborne Division, dropping some six to eight 

miles west of Arnhem, lost the effect of the 

initial surprise by landing too far from the 

objective. Elements of the division took the 

north end of the Arnhem highway bridge, 

which was still intact. Many miles to the 

south, British armored units, starting their 

advance in the early afternoon from the 

Meuse-Escaut Canal bridgehead, ran into 

heavy opposition from parachute and SS 

panzer troops. Even though progress was 

“disappointingly slow,” the general feeling 

was one of optimism. 16 

For the next five days, increasingly bad 

weather and the arrival of German reinforcements upset Allied plans. The dropping of additional Allied units was delayed 

four hours on 18 September and resupply 

efforts were so disrupted that they were 

only 30 percent effective. Worse weather 

on the 19th held up reinforcements for the 

82d U.S. and 1st British Airborne Divisions. The 1st Polish Parachute Brigade, 

which was expected to arrive in the 

Arnhem area on the 18th, did not land 

until the 21st. Even then its drop zones 

had to be altered to points south of the 

Neder Rijn and only half of the force was 

put down near Arnhem. In the south, the 

101st Airborne Division took Eindhoven 

on the 18th and the 82d Airborne, aided 

by the Guards Armored Division, seized 

railroad and highway bridges at Nijmegen 

on 20 September. The enemy, despite 

these setbacks, rushed sufficient units to 

the Nijmegen area to delay armored 

elements from reaching Arnhem. 

The plight of the 1st British Airborne 

Division, desperate after the first day, was 

not “known to any satisfactory extent” at 

Headquarters, British Airborne Corps, 

until the 20th. Not only was it impossible 

to push through ground force aid as 

planned, but the rest of the division outside Arnhem was unable to join up with 

the small group holding the north end of 

the bridge. Efforts to reinforce the group 

were thwarted by bad weather. Resupply 

difficulties arose when the division was 

unable to capture its supply dropping 

zone. It could neither notify the air transport forces nor arrange for another supply 

site. As a result, the bulk of ammunition 

and supplies flown in fell into enemy 

hands. The group at the Arnhem highway 

bridge, unable to get ammunition, was 

forced to surrender on the 21st. 

The other British airborne units near 

Arnhem, now shadows of their former 

15 MS # B-717, Supplement to Report by Oberst 

i. G. Geyer (Student); Der Westen (Schramm). First 

Parachute Army was assigned to Army Group B on 6 

September 1944. 

16 Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Airborne Operations in 

Holland (Sep-Oct 44), SHAEF FAAA. 
FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 

strength, were cut off from the river and 

unable to get support from the air. Nevertheless they continued to fight in the hope 

that armor from the south could get 

through. The Guards Armored Division, 

advancing northward from Nijmegen on 

the 21st, was quickly stopped. The 43d 

Division was now brought up and its advanced brigade crossed the Nijmegen 

bridge on the morning of 22 September. 

On that day, the Guards Armored was 

forced to send back a mixed brigade to 

deal with an enemy attack on the supply 

corridor near Veghel well to the south of 

Nijmegen. On the same day, the 43d Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade 

linked up at Driel but became heavily engaged in a fight to keep the corridor open 

from Nijmegen to Driel. Only a small 

force of Poles succeeded in crossing the 

Neder Rijn on the evening of 22 September. By the evening of the 23d, the situation of the airborne forces near Arnhem 

was so critical that the commander of the 

Second British Army gave his approval 

for a withdrawal should it prove necessary. 

On the morning of 25 September, the 

position of the 1st British Airborne Division had obviously become untenable. 

Acting under the authority previously 

granted, the division prepared to withdraw that night. Beginning at 2200, the 

British brought more than 2,000 of the 

division and recent reinforcements south 

of the Neder Rijn. Some 6,400 of those 

who had gone in north of the river were 

dead or missing. 17 

The Allies had failed in their effort to 

establish a bridgehead across the lower 

Rhine. They still retained, however, the 

important bridgeheads over the Maas and 

the Waal at Grave and Nijmegen. The 

British line had been extended nearly. fifty 

miles northeast of the position of 17 Sep287 

tember. The enemy showed his concern 

over these gains by the fury with which he 

attempted to eliminate the corridor and 

new bridgeheads held by U.S. and British 

forces. Field Marshal Montgomery found 

it necessary to retain the 82d and WIst 

U.S. Airborne Divisions in the line. 18 General Brereton opposed this action, warning that these divisions would be rendered 

unavailable for the future operations then 

being proposed by the 12th and 21 Army 

Groups. In the remaining weeks between 

26 September and 5 November the two 

units suffered losses slightly greater than 

those sustained by them during the 

MARKET operation. 19 

Both Field Marshal Montgomery and 

General Brereton hailed the airborne 

phase of the operation as a success. They 

were correct insofar as the initial units 

landed in accordance with plan and held 

their bridgeheads at Nijmegen and Eindhoven. The failure to hold Arnhem, however, ended the possibility of a quick drive 

onto the north German plain, and the severity of the enemy reaction deprived the 

armies of any immediate airborne support 

for further drops along the Rhine. Numerous reasons were adduced for the failure of the operation to attain complete 

success. The 21 Army Group, in summarizing the reasons, concluded that under 

north European climatic conditions "an 

17 Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Airborne Operations 

in Holland, p. S. 

18 The Polish Parachute Brigade left the area on 

7 October. 

19 The Brereton Diaries, pp. 361, 367-68. The 82d 

Airborne Division's casualties of 1,432 in the September operation were increased by 1,912, and the 10 lst 

Airborne Division's 2,1 10 were increased by 1,682 in 

the weeks following the initial action. Nearly 12,000 

casualties were sustained by the British and U.S. 

airborne divisions, the troop carrier. crews and pilots, 

and the air support groups between 17 and 25 September. Hq Br Abn Corps, Allied Airborne Operations in Holland. 
288 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

airborne plan which relies upon linking 

the airborne forces dropped on D Day and 

dropping additional forces at D plus 1 is 

risky, since the weather may frustrate the 

plan.” Field Marshal Montgomery was 

inclined to believe that good weather 

would have made possible a completely 

successful operation. The First Allied Airborne Army declared: “The airborne 

Mission . . . was accomplished. The airborne troops seized the fifty mile corridor 

desired by CinC, Northern Group of 

Armies, and held it longer than planned. 

The fact that the weight of exploiting 

troops was insufficient to carry them past 

Arnhem in time to take advantage of the 

effort does not detract from their success.” 

A German analysis, captured by the Allies 

after the operation, concluded that the Allies’ “chief mistake was not to have landed 

the entire First British Airborne Division 

at once rather than over a period of 3 days 

and that a second airborne division was 

not dropped in the area west of Arnhem.” 

General Browning pointed to the fact that 

the almost total failure of communications 

prevented his headquarters from knowing 

the seriousness of the 1st British Airborne 

Division’s situation until forty-eight hours 

too late. If he had known it sooner, he believed, it would have been possible to 

move the division to the area of Renkum, 

where a good bridgehead could have been 

held over the Neder Rijn, and the 30 British Corps would have had a chance to 

cross against little opposition. Undoubtedly, much of the trouble came because 

the 30 British Corps had to move some 

sixty-four miles to Arnhem over one main 

road which was vulnerable to enemy at 

tack. Instead of the expected two to four 

days, nearly a week was required for the 

advance to Arnhem. It is possible that the 

operation would not have been undertaken but for the Allied belief that the 

enemy between Eindhoven and Arnhem 

was weak and demoralized. One may 

readily believe that the Germans were 

right in concluding that the strength of the 

II SS Panzer Corps in the area was “a nasty 

surprise for the Allies.” 20 

So far as the debate between proponents of the single thrust to the north or 

south of the Ardennes was concerned, the 

result at Arnhem settled nothing. To some 

partisans, the operation proved that Field 

Marshal Montgomery had been wrong in 

insisting on his drive in the north. Other 

observers thought that MARKET-GARDEN 

might have succeeded had the Supreme 

Commander halted all advances south of 

the Ardennes. To SHAEF, the outcome of 

the gamble to outflank the West Wall 

meant that all efforts would now have to 

be turned toward capturing the approaches to Antwerp and building up a 

backlog of supplies sufficient to resume an 

all-out offensive against Germany. For the 

Germans, their success in stopping the 

Arnhem thrust short of its objective meant 

additional time in which to reorganize 

their forces and prepare for the attack they 

knew would come. For the soldier, the dismal prospect of spending a cold winter in 

France, Belgium, or Germany was increased. 

Discussion of Future Operations 

While the Arnhem operation was still in 

the preparatory state, General Eisenhower 

and his subordinates had been examining 

20 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 243; Hq 

Br Abn Corps, Allied Airborne Operations in Holland; 21 A Gp Rpt, MARKET-GARDEN, 17–26 Sep 

44, SHAEF files; Covering ltr, First Allied Airborne 

Army operations i Holland (Sep–Nov 44), FAAA, 18 

Dec 44, sub: German Analysis of Arnhem, SHAEF 

FAAA. 
FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 

plans for future operations in Germany. A 

number of questions arose in the course of 

discussions between the Supreme Commander and the 21 Army Group commander which persisted until the spring of 

1945. Several points of honest disagreement were found which involved not only 

divergent views as to proper strategy but 

also national interests of Great Britain and 

the United States. A study of these debates 

is essential to an understanding of the 

problems of coalition command. 

Not only did General Eisenhower have 

to consider the strategy which he thought 

best, but he had to give due weight to the 

strategic and tactical views held by the 

chief military commanders of other nationalities under his command. As Supreme Commander and as the principal 

U.S. commander in the European theater, 

he sometimes gave orders to his U.S. army 

group and army commanders which they 

considered inimical to their interests. At 

the same time he appeared to be giving 

greater freedom of action and discussion of 

strategy to the British army group commander. This impression developed to 

some extent from the fact that while Field 

Marshal Montgomery was the leader of a 

British army group, and as such occupied 

the same level of authority as Generals 

Bradley and Devers, he was also the chief 

British commander in the field, in close 

contact with the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff and in a position to 

know and defend the British strategic 

point of view. Suggestions that he presented to the Supreme Commander might 

represent either ideas that the British 

Chiefs of Staff were expressing to the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff or views of his own that 

would be backed by the British Chiefs in 

later meetings. In these cases it was not 

always possible for the Supreme Com289 

mander to decide the matter simply by 

saying, "Here is an order: execute it." 

Generals Bradley and Devers, on the 

other hand, while sometimes in control of 

larger forces and technically at the same 

level of command as the field marshal, did 

not have exactly the same position. The 

Supreme Commander was the chief U.S. 

military representative in Europe. It was 

he who was in contact with the U.S. Chiefs 

of Staff and it was his views on strategy 

which were expressed in Washington. His 

orders to the U.S. army groups had the 

full weight of both the Combined Chiefs 

and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff behind them. 

In both the U.S. and British armies it 

was understood that proposed plans might 

be debated and various viewpoints developed. General Eisenhower encouraged 

this type of discussion and often invited 

criticism of his plans. It is possi ble, however, that he added to his own command 

problems by failing to make clear to Field 

Marshal Montgomery when the "discussion" stage had ended and the "execution" stage had begun. Associates of the 

British commander have emphasized that 

he never failed to obey a direct order, but 

that he would continue to press his viewpoints as long as he was permitted to do so. 

Perhaps the Supreme Commander, accustomed to more ready compliance from his 

U.S. army group commanders, delayed 

too long in issuing positive directions to 

Montgomery. Perhaps, anxious to give a 

full voice to the British allies, he was more 

tolerant of strong dissent from the field 

marshal than he should have been. Whatever the reason, some of his SHAEF advisers thought him overslow in issuing final 

orders stopping further discussion on Antwerp and closing debate on the question of 

command. It is difficult" to sustain the 

charge that Montgomery willfully dis-
290 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

obeyed orders. It is plausible to say that he 

felt he was representing firmly the best interests of his country and attempting to set 

forth what he and his superiors in the 

United Kingdom considered to be the best 

strategy for the Allies to pursue in Europe. 

When his statements on these matters 

were accompanied by what appeared to 

be a touch of patronage or cocky self-assurance, some members of the SHAEF 

staff viewed them as approaching insubordination. There is no evidence that General Eisenhower shared these views. 

Because of the various elements involved 

in the discussions on policy in 1944 and 

1945, any true account of the period is 

certain to give the impression of continual 

bickering between SHAEF and 21 Army 

Group. Indeed, a few people have concluded as a result that coalition command 

is virtually an impossibility. In this, as in 

many other cases, the vast number of cooperative efforts which raised only a few 

questions and arguments are too often 

overlooked or forgotten, by both the historian and the reader who turn rapidly 

through pages of dull agreement and seek 

out the more interesting paragraphs of 

controversy. If these last deserve considerable attention, it is for the good reason 

that the strength of coalitions is tested by 

controversies and trials. 

On 15 September, General Eisenhower 

looked beyond the Arnhem attack and 

the Antwerp operation, which he expected 

to follow, to action that the Allies should 

take after they seized the Ruhr, Saar, and 

Frankfurt areas. He named Berlin as the 

ultimate Allied goal and said he desired 

to move on it “by the most direct and expeditious route, with combined U.S.-British forces supported by other available 

forces moving through key centres and occupying strategic areas on the flanks, all in 

one co-ordinated, concerted operation.” 

This was the nub of what was to be known 

as his “broad front” strategy. Having 

stated it, he virtually invited a debate by 

asking his army group commanders to 

give their reactions. 21 

Only the day before, Field Marshal 

Montgomery had given an indication of 

his views when he proposed that, once the 

Second British Army had an IJssel River 

line running from Arnhem northward to 

Zwolle near the IJsselmeer, and had established deep bridgeheads across the river, 

the Allies should push eastward toward 

Osnabrueck and Hamm. The weight 

would be directed to the right toward 

Hamm, from which a strong thrust would 

be made southward along the eastern face 

of the Ruhr. Meanwhile, the Canadian 

Army was to capture Boulogne and Calais 

and turn its full attention to the opening 

of the approaches to Antwerp. 22 

In answer to General Eisenhower’s invitation, the field marshal now repeated 

what one might call the “narrow front” 

view. Since it introduced new arguments 

relative to the logistical possibilities open 

to the Allied forces, it is worthy of quotation at some length. The 21 Army Group 

commander declared: 

1. I suggest that the whole matter as to 

what is possible, and what is NOT possible, 

is very closely linked up with the administrative situation. The vital factor is time; 

what we have to do, we must do quickly. 

2. In view of para. 1, it is my opinion that 

a concerted operation in which all the available land armies move forward into Germany is not possible; the maintenance resources, and the general administrative 

21 Eisenhower to army group comdrs, 15 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I. 

22 21 A Gp General Operational Situation and Dir, 

M–525, 14 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD 

Planning, I. 
FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 

situation, will not allow of this being done 

quickly. 

. 3 .. But forces adequate in strength for the 

Job III hand could be supplied and maintained, provided the general axis of advance 

was suitable and provided these forces had 

cou:plete priority in all respects as regards 

maIntenance. 

4. It is my own personal opinion that we 

sh:;tll ~ot achieve what we want hy going for obJec~lves such as Nurnberg, Augsburg, 

MUlllCh, etc., and by establishing our forces 

in central Germany. 

5. I consider that the best objective is the 

Ruhr, and thence on to Berlin by the northern route. On that route are the ports, and on 

that route we can use our sea power to the 

best advantages. On other routes we would 

merely contain as many German forces as we 

could.23 

Having stated his argument, Field Marshal Montgomery noted the alternatives. 

If General Eisenhower agreed that the 

northern route should be used, then the 

British commander believed that the 21 

Army Group plus the First U.S. Army of 

nine divisions would be sufficient. Such a 

force, he added, "must have everything it 

needed in the maintenance line; other Armies 

would do the best they could with what 

was left over." If, he continued, the proper 

axis was by Frankfurt and central Germany "then I suggest that 12 Army Group 

of three Armies would be used and would 

have all the maintenance. 21 Army Group 

would do the best it could with what was 

left over; or possibly the Second British 

Army would be wanted in a secondary 

role on the left flank of the movement." 

To his earlier arguments for a northern 

thrust, the field marshal had actually 

added a plea for an all-out thrust on 

either his or Bradley'S front. This point 

was obscured by two observations. In one, 

he declared: "In brief, I consider that as 

TIME is so very important, we have got 

to decide what is necessary to go to Berlin 

291 

and finish the war; the remainder must 

playa secondary role. It is my opinion that 

three Armies are enough, if you select the 

northern route, and I consider, from a 

maintenance point of view, it could be 

done." In the second, his concluding statement, he indicated that the discussion was 

in accordance with general views expressed by telegram on 4 September, and 

he attached a copy of that telegram. 

The views of both 4 and 18 September 

were at variance with General Bradley's 

estimate of the situation. While noting 

that terrain studies showed "that the route 

north of the area is best," he returned to 

the pre-D-Day view, which had been frequently repeated, that drives should be 

made to both the north and south of the 

Ruhr. He thought that the main southern 

attack toward the Ruhr should be made 

from Frankfurt and that this would require holding the Rhine from Cologne to 

Frankfurt. After both drives had passed 

the Ruhr, he proposed that one main 

spearhead be directed toward Berlin, 

while the other armies supported it with 

simultaneous thrusts. He added that while 

territorial gains were important there 

might be cases where the destruction cJ 

hostile armies should have priority over 

purely territorial gains. 24 

The Supreme Commander now had set 

before him two different plans of action. 

Apparently seeing in Montgomery's proposal nothing more than a restatement of 

his 4 September argument for a push to 

the north, he declared against a "narrow 

front" policy. While specifically accepting 

the Ruhr-to-Berlin route for an all-out offensive into Germany, he firmly rejected 

23 Montgomery to Eisenhower, 1.8 Sep 44, entry in 

Diary Office CinC for 20 Sep 44. Italics in original. 

24 Memo, Bradley for Eisenhower, 21 Sep 44, Eisenhower personal file. 
292 

Field Marshal Montgomery's suggestion 

that all troops except those in the 21 Army 

Group and the First U.S. Army should 

"stop in place where they are and that we 

can strip all these additional divisions 

from their transport and everything else to 

support one single knife-like drive toward 

Berlin." The Supreme Commander 

added: "What I do believe is that we must 

marshal our strength up along the western 

. borders of Germany, to the Rhine ifpossible, insure adequate maintenance by getting Antwerp to working at full blast at 

the earliest possible moment and then carry out the drive you suggest." He denied 

that this meant that he was considering an 

advance into Germany with all armies 

moving abreast. Rather, the chief advance 

after the crossing of the Rhine would be 

made by Montgomery's forces and the 

First U.S. Army. But General Bradley's 

forces, less First Army, would move forward in a supporting position to prevent 

the concentration of German forces 

against the front and the flank. The Supreme Commander noted in passing that 

preference had been given to Field Marshal Montgomery's armies throughout the 

campaign while the other forces had been 

fighting "with a halter around their necks 

in the way of supplies." "You may not 

know," he continued, "that for four days 

straight Patton has been receiving serious 

counter-attacks and during the last seven 

days, without attempting any real advance himself, has captured about 9,000 

prisoners and knocked out 720 tanks." 25 

He could not believe, said General 

Eisenhower in his letter of20 September, 

that there was any great difference in his 

and the field marshal's concepts of fighting the battle against Germany. This 

opinion arose in part from his assumption 

that Montgomery was merely repeating 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

his early September views. 

The 21 Army Group commander now 

undertook to make quite clear the points 

on which the two disagreed. To the British 

commander, the Supreme Commander's 

acceptance of a main thrust in the north 

as the chief business of the Allies meant 

that men and supplies should be concentrated on the single operation. Always in 

favor of making sure of his position before 

attacking, he regarded as bad tactics any 

subsidiary action that would weaken the 

main offensive. To him the granting of permission to General Bradley or General 

Patton to move forces to the south meant 

that the right wing was being permitted to 

angle away from the proper direction of 

attack and that a battle might be brought 

on from which it would be impossible to 

disengage the forces in the south. 

In some respects, Montgomery's arguments and fears were similar to those expressed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in their 

arguments with the British Chiefs concerning the Mediterranean campaign. 

General Marshall, in particular, had 

feared that no matter how much the British might favor OVERLORD the continual 

involvement of Allied forces in the Mediterranean would require ever-new commitments which would distract the AngloAmerican forces from their major operation in northwest Europe. To Field Marshal Montgomery, the granting of a division or additional tons of fuel to General 

Patton meant not only that the Third 

Army commander was dealing in operations which did not contribute directly to 

the ~ain attack, but that with the best 

faith in the world he was likely to get into 

new battles which would require further 

diversion of men and supplies from the 

25 Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 20 Sep 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 

main operation. It appears that 21 Army 

Group also believed that Patton would use 

any opportunity he had to bring on other 

engagements so that he would have to 

have additional support. 26 

There thus appears on occasion in the 

correspondence between General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery an 

intimation by the latter that the Supreme 

Commander, while committed to the 

northern operation, was prone to permit 

operations harmful to the northern thrust. 

Thus the constant recurrence of the theme: 

you have said let us go on the nbrth but 

you have allowed certain departures from 

that operation. This was not only irritating to General Eisenhower, who believed 

that there were sufficient resources to carry 

on the additional secondary actions in 

the south, but it was alarming to Generals 

Bradley and Patton, who thought that 

their troops and stockpiles of material 

were being raided to support a British operation while they were relegated to a secondary role. Feelings were undoubtedly 

strong on both sides. But for the reasons 

previously mentioned the field marshal 

continued the discussion, while the U.S. 

commanders accepted the orders they 

were given and kept their complaints 

among themselves. At the same time, General Patton, if his war memoirs are to be 

accepted unreservedly, believed that since 

the Supreme Commander was too closely 

committed to Field Marshal Montgomery's plan of operations the Third Army 

had to make the greatest possible use of 

any loopholes in the Supreme Commander's orders to push the battle on its 

front.27 

Field Marshal Montgomery on 21 September made clear his anxiety about the 

Supreme Commander's current policy. 

He declared: 

293 

I can not agree that our concepts are 

the same and I am sure you would wish me to 

be quite frank and open in the matter. I have 

always said stop the right and go on with the 

left but the right has been allowed to go on so 

far that it has outstripped its maintenance and 

we have lost flexibility. In your letter you still 

want to go on further with your right and you 

state in your Para. 6 that all of Bradley's 

Army Group will move forward sufficiently 

etc. I would say that the right flank of 12 

Army Group should be given a very direct 

order to halt and if this order is not obeyed 

we shall get into greater difficulties. The net 

result of the matter in my opinion is that if 

you want to get the Ruhr you will have to 

put every single thing into the left hook and 

stop everything else. It is my opinion that if 

this is not done you will not get the Ruhr. 

Your very great friend MONTy.28 

In thanking Montgomery for clarifYing 

the situation, General Eisenhower said 

that he did not agree with the 4 September view that the Allied forces had 

reached the stage where a single thrust 

could be made all the way to BJrlin with 

all other troops virtually immobile. He did 

accept emphatically what the field marshal had to say on attaining the Ruhr and 

added: 

. .. No one is more anxious than I to 

get to the Ruhr quickly. It is for the cam26 General Patton's testimony has it that he proposed to do just that. 

27 This process, General Patton called the "rock 

soup method." He described it as follows: "In other 

words, in order to attack, we had first to pretend to 

reconnoiter, then reinforce the reconnaissance, and 

finally put on an attack-all depending on what gasoline land ammunition we could secure." Again, speaking of Field Marshal Montgomery's efforts to have 

all the U.S. troops halt while he attacked in the north, 

General Patton says: "In order to avoid such an 

eventuality, it was evident that the Third Army 

should get deeply involved at once, so I asked Bradley 

not to call me until after dark on the nineteenth." 

Patton, Waras! Knew!t, pp. 125, (33,265. 

28 Ltr, Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-223, 21 Sep 

44, Eisenhower personal file. 
294 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

paign from there onward deep into the heart 

of Germany for which I insist all other troops 

must be in position to support the main drive. 

The main drive must logically go by the 

North. It is because I am anxious to organize 

that final drive quickly upon the capture of 

the Ruhr that I insist upon the importance 

of Antwerp. As I have told you I am prepared to give you everything for the capture 

of the approaches to Antwerp, including all 

the air forces and anything else you can support. Warm regard, IKE. 29 

The matters of Antwerp, the Ruhr, and 

future advances into Germany were all 

discussed by General Eisenhower and 

most of his chief subordinates at Versailles 

on 22 September. Unfortunately, the field 

commander most directly concerned, 

Field Marshal Montgomery, felt that because of operational demands he could 

not be present and sent his chief of staff to 

represent him. Had he been present, it is 

possible that later misunderstandings over 

priority for operations might have been 

avoided. The Supreme Commander, 

while interested in future drives into Germany, asked early in the conference for 

“general acceptance of the fact that the 

possession of an additional major deepwater port on our north flank was an indispensable prerequisite for the final drive 

into Germany.” Further, he asked that a 

clear distinction be made between logistical requirements for the present operations which aimed at breaching the Siegfried Line and seizing the Ruhr and the 

requirements for a final drive on Berlin. 30 

In the course of the conference, Eisenhower also declared, “The envelopment of 

the Ruhr from the north by 21st Army 

Group, supported by 1st Army, is the main 

effort of the present phase of operations.” 

He noted that the field marshal was to 

open the port of Antwerp and develop operations culminating in a strong attack on 

the Ruhr from the north. General Bradley 

was to support these actions by taking 

over the 8 British Corps sector and by continuing a thrust, as far as current resources 

permitted, toward Cologne and Bonn. He 

was to be prepared to seize any favorable 

opportunity to cross the Rhine and attack 

the Ruhr from the south when the supply 

situation permitted. The remainder of the 

12th Army Group (i. e., the Third Army) 

was to take no more aggressive action than 

that permitted by the supply situation 

after the full requirements of the main effort had been met. The 6th Army Group 

was notified that it could continue its operations to capture Mulhouse and Strasbourg inasmuch as these would not divert 

supplies from other operations and would 

contain enemy forces that otherwise might 

be sent to the north. Pleased with the decision, General de Guingand wired the 21 

Army Group commander that his plan 

had been given “100 per cent support.” 

Although Field Marshal Montgomery had 

not been given command of the First U.S. 

Army as requested, he was permitted, as 

a means of saving time in case of emergencies, to communicate directly with 

General Hodges. 31 

General Eisenhower hoped that the 

conference of 22 September had cleared 

the air and that complete understanding 

had been reached which should hold at 

least until the completion of the effort to 

take the Ruhr. In outlining the decision to 

Field Marshal Montgomery, the Supreme 

Commander emphasized the way in 

29 Eisenhower to Montgomery, FWD 15407, 22 

Sep 44, Eisenhower personal file. 

30 Montgomery to Smith, 21 Sep 44, Diary Office 

CinC; Mtg at SHAEF Fwd, 22 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 

381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I. 

31 Mtg at SHAEF Fwd, 22 Sep 44; Eisenhower to 

Bradley, FWD 15510, 23 Sep 44. Both in SHAEF 

SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I. De Guingand 

to Montgomery, ER/3, 22 Sep 44, Diary Office CinC. 
FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 295 

which U.S. efforts were aiding the attack 

in the north. He was glad to grant additional aid by directing General Bradley to 

take over part of the British zone, but 

warned that the Allies “must not blink the 

fact that we are getting fearfully stretched 

south of Aachen and may get a nasty little 

‘Kasserine’ if the enemy chooses at any 

place to concentrate a bit of strength.” 

However, in view of the enemy’s lack of 

transport and supplies, he felt that the 

Allied forces should be all right. In a gesture evidently meant to wipe out any unpleasant memories of former disagreements over policy, the Supreme Commander concluded: 

Good luck to you. I regard it as a great 

pity that all of us cannot keep in closer touch 

with each other because I find, without exception, when all of us can get together and 

look the various features of our problems 

squarely in the face, the answers usually become obvious. 

Do not hesitate for a second to let me know 

at any time that anything seems to you to go 

wrong, particularly where I, my staff, or any 

forces not directly under your control can be 

of help. If we can gain our present objective, 

then even if the enemy attempts to prolong 

the contest we will rapidly get into position 

to go right squarely to his heart and crush 

him utterly. Of course, we need Antwerp. 

Again, good luck and warm personal 

regards. 32 

The decisions of 22 September had 

been made at a time when there was still 

some hope of holding the Arnhem bridgehead and perhaps outflanking the West 

Wall fortifications. Once this opportunity 

was gone, Field Marshal Montgomery 

sought to push one more operation toward 

the Rhine. While agreeing that the opening of Antwerp was essential to any deep 

advance into Germany, he proposed that 

he seize the opportunity to destroy the 

enemy forces barring the way to the Ruhr. 

He suggested that, as the Canadian army 

cleared the approaches to Antwerp, the 

British army should operate from the 

Nijmegen area against the northwest 

corner of the Ruhr in conjunction with a 

First U.S. Army drive toward Cologne. 

These forces, he proposed, should seek 

bridgeheads over the Rhine north and 

south of the Ruhr. It was clear that all 

hope of “bouncing” over the Rhine had 

now been abandoned and that, instead of 

an initial long thrust toward Hamm and 

a subsequent U.S. drive toward Cologne, 

there would now be two converging attacks by the Second British and the First 

U.S. Armies against the western Ruhr. 33 

Unfortunately, all of these projects 

could not be carried out at once. The First 

Canadian Army’s drive of 2 October to 

cut the isthmus leading from western Holland to South Beveland and to destroy 

enemy forces south of the Schelde estuary 

met strong resistance, and the convergent 

British-U.S. drives against the Ruhr had 

to be postponed. Field Marshal Montgomery found it necessary to commit British forces to aid the First U.S. Army, 

which had been unable to clear the area 

west of the Meuse. He said ammunition 

shortages had been responsible in part for 

these difficulties. With British forces committed west of the Meuse, Montgomery 

reported, his remaining forces were too 

weak to launch the main attack from the 

Nijmegen area against the northwest 

corner of the Ruhr. The British commander reminded General Eisenhower 

that in his view the existing command 

situation between the 21 Army Group and 

32 Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, I. 

33 21 A Gp Operational Situation and Dir, M-527, 

27 Sep 44, 12th A Gp 371.3 Military Objectives, I; 

de Guingand to Smith, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381 

Post OVERLORD Planning, II. 
296 

the First U.S. Army was unsatisfactory.34 

General Eisenhower agreed that the 

commitments of the 21 Army Group were 

far too heavy for its resources. As a 

remedy, he made two suggestions: the 

U.S. forces could take over the line 

Maashees-Wesel as a northern boundary, 

or they could transfer two U.S. divisions 

to Montgomery and establish the boundary farther to the south. He agreed that 

plans for a co-ordinated attack· to the 

Rhine should be postponed until more 

U.S. divisions could be brought up. Six of 

these, he noted, were being held in staging 

areas on the Continent because of the lack 

of supplies to maintain them in the line. 

The Supreme Commander proposed that 

both army groups retain as their first mission the gaining of the Rhine north of 

Bonn and asked consistent support of the 

First U.S. Army's efforts to get its immediate objective at Dueren. 35 

The second of General Eisenhower's 

suggestions for strengthening the 21 Army 

Group was accepted. General Bradley arranged for an armored division to be sent 

northward at once and made available an 

infantry division which could be used in 

clearing the Antwerp area. 36 He reported 

that as a result of this action Field Marshal Montgomery had declared that he 

was "completely satisfied as to the command set-up in the north at that time and 

did not need any additional assistance." 37 

Apparently through the first week in 

October General Eisenhower had hoped 

that the 21 Army Group could clear the 

Schelde estuary while driving toward 

some of its other objectives.1\s the early 

days of the month passed· without 

Antwerp's being opened to Allied shipping, he stressed increasingly the necessity 

of placing that objective first. A report of 

the British Navy on 9 October that the 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

First Canadian Army would be unable to 

move until 1 November unless supplied 

promptly with adequate ammunition 

stocks prompted him to warn Field Marshal Montgomery that unless Antwerp 

was opened by the middle of November 

all Allied operations would come to a 

standstill. He declared that "of all our operations on our entire front from Switzerland to the Channel, I consider Antwerp 

of first importance, and I believe that the 

operations designed to clear up the entrance require your personal attention." 38 

Apparently stung by the implication that 

he was not pushing the attack for 

Antwerp, the 21 Army Group commander 

denied the Navy's "wild statements" concerning the First Canadian Army's operations, pointing out that the attack was already under way and going well. In passing, he reminded the Supreme Commander that the conference of 22 September had listed the attack on the Ruhr as 

the main effort of the current phase of operations, and that General Eisenhower on 

the preceding day had declared that the 

first mission of both army groups was 

gaining the Rhine north of Bonn.39 

The priority of the Antwerp operation 

was spelled out by General Eisenhower in 

messages of 10 and 13 October. In the 

former he declared: "Let me assure you 

that nothing I may ever say or write with 

34 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-260, 6 Oct 44; 

Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-264, 7 Oct 44. Both 

in Eisenhower personal file. 

35 Eisenhower to 21 A Gp for Bradley (message 

undated but apparently written 8 October 1944), 

Eisenhower personal file. 

36 Both of these were to continue to be supported 

logistically by the U.S. supply services. 

37 Bradley to Hodges, 8 Oct 44, Eisenhower personal file. 

38 Eisenhower to Montgomery, S-61466, 9 Oct 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. . 

39 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-268, 9 Oct 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 

regard to future plans in our advance eastward is meant to indicate any lessening of 

the need for Antwerp, which I have always held as vital, and which has grown 

more pressing as we enter the bad weather 

period." Three days later, after Field 

Marshal Montgomery had suggested 

changes in the command arrangement to 

give him greater flexibility in his operations, General Eisenhower moved once 

more to dispel any doubts on t.he matter 

of Antwerp. In one of his most explicit letters of the war, he declared that the question was not one of command but oftaking Antwerp. He did not know the exact 

state ofthe field marshal's forces, but knew 

that they were rich in supplies as compared with U.S. and French units all the 

way to Switzerland. Because of logistical 

shortages, it was essential that Antwerp be 

put quickly in workable condition. This 

view, he added, was shared by the British 

and U.S. Army Chiefs, General Marshall 

and Field Marshal Brooke, who on a 

recent visit to SHAEF had emphasized 

the vital importance of clearing that port. 

Despite the desire to open Antwerp, 

SHAEF had approved the operation at 

Arnhem and Nijmegen, which, while not 

completely successful, had proved its 

worth. But all recent experiences had 

made clear the great need for opening the 

Schelde estuary, and he was willing, as 

always, to give additional U.S. troops and 

supplies to make that possible. He added 

that he was repeating this in order to emphasize that the operation involved no 

matter of command, "Since everything 

that can be brought in to help, no matter 

of what nationality, belongs to you." 40 

Then in a strong declaration of policy, 

designed to end further discussion of a 

change in command, General Eisenhower 

presented his concept of "logical com297 

mand arrangements for the future," saying that if Field Marshal Montgomerystill 

classed them as "unsatisfactory" there 

would exist an issue which must be settled 

in the interests offuture efficiency. "I am 

quite well aware," he said, "of the powers 

and limitations of an Allied Command, 

and if you, as the senior commander in 

this Theater of one of the great Allies, feel 

that my conceptions and directives are 

such as to endanger the success. of operations, it is our duty to refer the matter to 

higher authority for any action they may 

choose to take, however drastic." 

He agreed that for anyone major task 

on a battlefield, "a single battlefield commander" was needed who could devote 

his whole attention to a particular operation. For this reason armies and army 

groups had been established. When the 

battlefront stretched, as it did now, from 

Switzerland to the North Sea, he did not 

agree "that one man can stay so close to 

the day by day movement of divisions and 

corps that he can keep a 'battle grip' upon 

the overall situation and direct it intelligently." The Allies were no longer confronted with a Normandy beachhead. 

Rather, the campaign over such an extended front was broken up into more or 

less clearly outlined areas of operations, of 

which one was the principal and the 

others of secondary nature. The over-all 

commander, in this case the Supreme 

Commander, then had the task of adjusting the larger boundaries, assigning support by air or by ground and airborne 

troops, and shifting the emphasis in supply arrangements. 

For the immediate attack on the Ruhr, 

he felt that one commander should be re40 See Eisenhower to Montgomery, 10 and 13 October 1944, Eisenhower personal file, for this and the 

succeeding four paragraphs. 
298 

sponsible, but it was not clear which commander would be in position to provide 

the strength of the task. At present, it appeared that the current commitments of 

the 21 Army Group would leave it with 

such depleted forces facing eastward that 

it could not be expected to carry out anything more than supporting movements 

in the attack on the Ruhr. He proposed, 

therefore, to give the task of capturing the 

Ruhr to the 12th Army Group with the 21 

Army Group in the supporting role. Looking beyond the seizure of that objective, 

he noted that the 21 Army Group would 

be concentrated north of the Ruhr and 

thus be in a position to participate in the 

direct attack toward Berlin. Originally, 

he continued, he had hoped that the field 

marshal would take Antwerp and clear up 

the western coast of Holland rapidly and 

therefore be in a position to make a major 

attack on the Ruhr, an operation for 

which U.S. units would have been made 

available to the 21 Army Group. He had 

gathered from the recent conference, however, that Montgomery agreed with the 

view that the British army group "could 

not produce the bulk of the forces required 

for the direct Ruhr attack." 

The Supreme Commander then turned 

his attention to the question of nationalism versus military considerations and reminded the 21 Army Group chief that 

there had never been any hesitation in 

putting U.S. forces under British command. He added: 

It would be quite futile to deny that questions of nationalism often enter our problems. 

It is nations that make war, and when they 

find themselves associated as Allies, it is quite 

often necessary to make concessions that 

recognize the existence of inescapabl~ national differences. For example, due to dIfferences in equipment, it necessary that the 12th 

Army Group depend primarily upon a Line 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

of Communications that is separate so far as 

possible from that of 21st Army Group. 

Wherever we can we keep people of the , . same nations serving under theIr own commanders. It is the job of soldiers, as I see it, 

to meet their military problenis sanely, sensibly, and logically, and while not s~utting 

our eyes to the fact th~t we are two d~fferent 

nations, produce solutIOns that permIt effective cooperation, mutual support and effective results. Good will and mutual confidence 

are, of course, mandatory. 

Even before this message reached the 21 

Army Group commander, Montgomery 

appears to have concluded that the First 

U.S. Army could not reach the Rhine and 

there was no reason for British forces to 

move alone toward the Ruhr. He had already dispatched the Second British Army 

to help the Canadian forces speed the 

opening of Antwerp. After receiving General Eisenhower's letter, the field marshal 

terminated the discussion of the Ruhr, 

Antwerp, and command arrangements 

with the assurance that "you will hear no 

more on the subject of command from 

me." He wrote: 

I have given you my views and ~ou h~ve 

given your answer. I and all of us wIll weIgh 

in one hundred percent to do what you want 

and we will pull it through w!th~:)Ut. a doubt. 

I have given Antwerp top pnonty III all ~perations in 21 Army Group and all energIes 

and efforts will now be devoted towards 

opening up the place. Your very devoted and 

loyal subordinate!" 

The Battle for Antwerp 

The full attention of 21 Army Group 

was focused on clearing the Schelde 

estuary in mid-October. The task, simple 

41 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-77, 14 Oct 44; 

Eisenhower to Montgomery, 15 Oct 44; Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-281, 16 Oct 44. All in Eisenhower personal file. 21 A Gp Operational Situati.o.n 

and Dir, M-532, 16 Oct 44, 12th A Gp 371.3 Mlhtary Objectives, II. 
FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 

CLEARING 

THE SCHELDE ESTUARY 

2 October-8 November 1944 

rTTTTTT"M ALLIED FRONT LlN[" 2 OCTOBER 

~ AXIS OF ADVANCE 

MAP4 

to state, was far from easy to execute. The 

enemy, intent on denying the Allies use of 

the tremendously important port of 

Antwerp, had reinforced the fortifications 

and coastal guns on the island of Walcheren, the South Beveland peninsula, 

and the mainland south of the Schelde 

estuary to prevent shipping from reaching 

the Allied-held docks at Antwerp. (Map 4) 

Unfortunately for the Allies, the enemy 

had saved many of his troops in the area 

from destruction and had managed to 

strengthen his positions. General der Infanterie Gustav von Zangen, who had 

succeeded Generaloberst Hans von Salmuth as commander of the Fifteenth Army 

in late August, had managed to withdraw 

part of his troops from the Pas-de-Calais 

in good order and had established a de299 

fense line south of the Schelde estuary 

after the fall of Antwerp. To keep the 

escape route open for other retreating 

units, the commander had brought the 

division guarding the approaches to Antwerp down to the area of Ghent on 4 September. As quickly as other forces could 

be brought up, he put them into the line 

near Woensdrecht to protect the isthmus. 

By this means he was a ble both to block 

the Allied advance and to keep open an 

escape route to the north and east. On 

6 September, after the forces to the west 

had been brought into Belgium, he ordered a general withdrawal northward 

across the Schelde estuary to Walcheren 

Island. Allied air activity harassed the 

move, but in a period of slightly more 

than two weeks an estimated 80,000 men 
300 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

and nearly 600 pieces of artillery together 

with supply vehicles, antitank guns, and 

assault guns, were withdrawn without 

major losses. During the remainder of 

September, while the Allies were heavily 

engaged in attacks on the Channel fortresses and at Arnhem and Nijmegen, the 

Germans built up their defenses in the 

areas directly south of the Schelde estuary, 

the area north of Antwerp, and on the 

isthmus near Woensdrecht. 42 

The initial task of clearing the Schelde 

estuary had been assigned to the First 

Canadian Army, while the Second British 

and the First U.S. Armies were driving 

toward the Ruhr. Now, as General Eisenhower pressed for the opening of Antwerp, 

the latter two armies put part of their 

forces at the disposal of General Simonds, 

commanding the Canadian army in the 

absence of General Crerar (in the United 

Kingdom on sick leave). 43 The Canadians 

began to drive north from the AntwerpTurnhout Canal and the suburbs of Antwerp on 2 October. They took Woensdrecht fifteen days later after heavy fighting. On their right, troops of the 1 British 

Corps pushed north and northwest upon 

Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom and 

assisted the Canadians in sealing off the 

South Beveland isthmus from the mainland on 23 October. Meanwhile, an 

especially bitter fight developed to the 

west in the area between the Leopold 

Canal and Breskens as the Canadians 

sought to clear the pocket directly south of 

the Schelde estuary. Breskens finally fell 

on 22 October, and the entire area was 

cleared by 3 November, yielding more 

than 12,500 prisoners. 

The First Canadian Army began its attack for South Beveland on 25 October 

with an advance westward from Woensdrecht. On 25–26 October, British forces 

sailed from Terneuzen and struck northward across the estuary. Making assault 

landings near Baarland, they drove across 

the island. By the end of 30 October, the 

Canadian and British forces had linked 

up, cleared South Beveland of the enemy, 

and sent a small column to North Beveland to put down any resistance that 

might be offered there. 

The worst obstacle was still to be faced 

on Walcheren Island some fifty miles west 

of Antwerp. Here a garrison estimated at 

6,000 to 7,000, well dug in and equipped 

with strong antiaircraft batteries and 

coastal defenses, maintained the last barrier between Allied shipping and Antwerp. General Simonds in September had 

originated and pressed, against the opposition of some airmen, a plan for bombing 

the dikes on Walcheren. While the scale of 

heavy bomber attacks, which began in 

the first days of October, was insufficient, 

the air efforts were responsible for breaching the dikes and forcing the enemy out of 

some of his low-lying positions. The main 

reliance for driving the Germans out of the 

island had to be placed, however, on seaborne assaults together with an attack 

from South Beveland. 44 

On the morning of 1 November, British 

Commandos from Breskens began landing near Vlissingen. A larger force made 

up of Royal Navy and British Commando units, mounted at Ostend, made a 

frontal assault on the strong undamaged 

42 MS # B-249, Battles of the Fifteenth Army in 

Northern France and Holland, 28 Aug-10 Nov 44 

(Zangen); MS # B-475, Battles of the Weenth Army 

between the Meuse-Scheldt Canal and the Lower 

Meuse, 15 Sep-10 Nov 44 (Zangen); Der Westen 

(Schramm). 

43 Maj. Gen. C. Foulkes temporarily succeeded 

General Simonds as commander of the 2d Canadian 

Corps. 

44 Stacey, The Canadian Army, p. 228 
FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 

fortifications in the area of Westkapelle at 

the extreme western end of the island. The 

landing craft were particularly hard hit 

by enemy shore defenses. Despite heavy 

opposition, the force was successfully put 

ashore and started its eastward drive 

across the island. Meanwhile, the units 

which had landed from Breskens seized 

Vlissingen on 2 November. On the following day, the two forces linked up and 

began systematically clearing the enemy 

from the island. On 8 November, German 

resistance ended. 45 

The period 1 October to 8 November in 

the Antwerp sector had proved costly to 

both the Allies and the enemy. The forces 

under the First Canadian Army had suffered nearly 13,000 casualties, but they 

had inflicted much heavier losses on the 

enemy, whose casualties in prisoners alone 

totaled some 40,000. 46 

General Eisenhower was able to inform 

301 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 3 November that the a pproaches to Antwerp had 

been cleared. Even as the last resistance 

was being rooted out on Walcheren Island, 

minesweeping activities began on the 

Schelde estuary. Some three weeks later, 

on 28 November, the first convoy of Allied 

ships reached the port of Antwerp. 

45 For general discussions of the battle for the 

Schelde estuary, see Stacey, The Canadian Army, Ch. 

XIV; Mongomery, Normandy to the Baltic, Ch. XIII. 

46 Stacey, The Canadian Army, p. 229. These figures 

were based on General Simonds' contemporary report to General Crerar, 22 November 1944. Compare 

statistics with those given in Eisenhower, Crusade in 

Europe, p. 327. The 10,000 German prisoners listed 

in the Eisenhower volume were apparently those 

taken on Walcheren and Beveland, while more than 

27,000 Allied casualties were approximately those 

suffered along the entire 21 Army Group front from 

Walcheren to Nijmegen during the period. It should 

be recalled that operations to clear the Schelde 

estuary were controlled by the First Canadian Army 

but contained British, U.S., and Polish elements as 

well. More than 6,000 of the 13,000 casualties were 

Canadian. 
CHAPTER XVII 

The Battles of Attrition, 

September-December 1944 

While the 21 Army Group, aided by the 

First Allied Airborne Army and elements 

of the First U.S. Army, carried out the attack on Arnhem and operations around 

Antwerp, the 12th (less First Army) and 

6th Army Groups probed at German 

weakness and sought to wear down the 

enemy in the area between Belgium and 

the Swiss border. (Map IV) Campaigns in 

late September and early October were 

based on the belief that Hitler's forces were 

still disintegrating and that some lucky 

push might find a soft spot in the opposing 

lines which would permit the Allies to advance to the Rhine before the dead of 

winter. Later, when it became evident that 

the Germans had reorganized their forces 

and had succeeded in manning the West 

Wall fortifications against the Allied offensive, General Eisenhower refused to accept a static policy for the winter, feeling 

that even minor advances were better than 

completely defensive tactics. "We were 

certain," he wrote after the war, "that by 

continuing an unremitting offensive we 

would, in spite of hardship and privation, 

gain additional advantages over the 

enemy. Specifically we were convinced 

that this policy would result in shortening 

the war and therefore in the saving of 

thousands of Allied lives." 1 

The Enemy Regroups 

The enemy by mid-September had performed amazing feats in improvising units 

to hold the West Wall defenses and in creating an opposition which was often formidable. It is possible, as British and U.S. 

proponents of the single thrust to the Rhine 

argue, that these efforts were impressive 

only because the attempt to advance on a 

broad front enabled small groups of 

second- and third-rate troops to hold up 

the Allied advance. A complex of varying 

factors, however, as already indicated, 

entered into the Supreme Commander's 

decisions on these points. Whether the 

efforts of Field Marshal Model or General 

Blaskowitz or the so-called caution of the 

Allied command was responsible, it is 

clear that by the time of the Arnhem attack the Germans were in a position to 

meet with considerable force either a 

single or a double thrust by the Allies. 

Three moves ordered by Hitler before 

the drive across northern France affected 

the Allied attacks offall and early winter. 

By late July, the German leader had directed that eighteen divisions be formed 

for use against the Russians and the West1 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 323. 
THE BATTLES OF ATTRITION 

ern Allies. Two of these were sent to the 

west by 1 September. In midsummer approximately one hundred fortress infantry 

battalions, formerly used in the rear areas, 

were made available for battle. About 

four fifths of these were ultimately sent to 

the west. Some were in action by midSeptember. More important still were 

twenty-five Volks Grenadier divisions, which 

Hitler had ordered organized in midAugust as a general reserve. These began 

to come into the line at the beginning of 

October and were supposed to be completely organized by 1 December. By 5 

November eight of them had been sent to 

Field Marshal Rundstedt's forces, two 

were in the east, and the remaining fifteen 

in the Replacement Army.2 

In actions that exerted pressure on the 

Germans south of the MARKET-GARDEN 

area in September, the First U.S. Army 

sent one corps across the Meuse above 

Liege to gain contact with the British at 

Maeseyck and start a drive toward Geilenkirchen. Another corps forced the Germans back into West Wall defenses southeast of Aachen before settling down to 

meager gains for the remainder of the 

month. The southernmost corps crossed 

into Germany, but made little progress. 

Even though the period was rather unproductive in results, it cost the First Army 

nearly 10,000 casualties. 

The Third Army at the beginning of 

September was extended along a 450-mile 

(air-line) front from Brest to the Moselle. 

In order to leave the army free for activities toward the east, General Bradley on 5 

September gave its missions of clearing the 

Brest peninsula and protecting the southern flank of the 12th Army Group to General Simpson's newly arrived Ninth Army. 

The VIII Corps, already engaged in the 

303 

Brest peninsula, was transferred from the 

Third to the Ninth Army and continued 

its attack under the new command. Three 

days later, General Simpson opened a 

three-divisional attack against Brest which 

cleared the city on 18 September. The last 

resistance in the Brest peninsula ceased on 

21 September. In the course of fighting for 

the area, the Third and Ninth Armies took 

more than 37,000 prisoners anq killed an 

estimated 4,000 Germans. The Ninth 

Army suffered approximately 3,000 casualties in the campaign. The port of Brest 

was too badly wrecked to be of any immediate value. Its port facilities, however, 

once considered vital to any Allied advance into Germany, were no longer 

essential to the Allies 

On the surrender of the Brest peninsula, 

the Ninth Army invested German-held 

ports on the Atlantic Coast, which were 

estimated to hold some 25,000 enemy 

troops. The task of besieging the cities was 

handed over to the 94th Di vision. This 

unit, with French Forces of the Interior elements, French naval units, and a French 

bomber squadron, undertook the containment of enemy forces spread along the 

southwest coast of France. At the close of 

September, the Ninth Army, which had 

also been receiving and processing divisions as they arrived on the Continent, was 

ordered into the line between the First and 

Third Armies, roughly in the area running from St. Vith to Bollendorf. U.S. activities in western France were then 

brought directly under 12th Army Group; 

the job of handling newly arrived troops 

was given to Communications Zone. 

2 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, Ch. I; Rpt, Uebersicht 

ueber die in Aufstellung und Umgliederung befindlichen 

Verbaende des Heeres u. Pz. Verbaende der Waifen SS 

(Stand 5.XI.44). OKH/Organisations Abteilung (referred to hereafter as OKH/Org.Abt.) 
304 

The Third Army, almost completely 

halted at the end of August by gasoline 

shortages and increasing enemy opposition, resumed its advance on 4 September 

with the mission of crossing the Moselle 

and movi*g to positions on the Rhine. 

Preparations, unknown to the Third 

Army, had been initiated by Hitler and 

OB WEST as early as 28 August for a 

counterattack against the southern flank 

of the Allied forces. The initial proposal, 

which envisaged a blow in the Troyes sector and a penetration northward between 

the Seine and the Marne, was given up 

when General Patton's forces reached the 

Meuse on 3 September. Hitler on that day 

gave instructions to OB WEST for a different plan. This scheme, "the most ambitious to be advanced during the months 

between the Mortain counterattack and 

the Ardennes offensive," provided for the 

left wing of Hitler's forces (Army Group G) 

to cover the German retreat from southern and southwestern France and to strike 

against the extended south flank of the 

Third Army. Had the attack been effective, it could have prevented the junction 

of the Third and Seventh Armies and 

rolled up the right flank of the OVERLORD 

forces, pushing the Third Army back 

toward Reims and exposing the U.S. lines 

of communications. 3 

Hitler's deep interest in the proposed 

counterattack was shown by his promise 

of additional armored elements and by 

his personal selection of General der 

Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel as 

head of the Fifth Panzer Army, which was to 

make the attack. Unfortunately for the 

enemy, the promised reinforcements were 

not delivered in sufficient quantities to influence the battle. Units were committed 

piecemeal, and the Americans were able to 

deal with them separately. On 13 September, before the German offensive could be 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

mounted in the Neufchateau-Mirecourt 

area, the 2d French Armored Division 

supported by the XIX Tactical Air Command inflicted a loss of sixty tanks on the 

enemy-one ofthe heaviest armored losses 

suffered by the Germans in northwest 

Europe in a single day. Five days later the 

enemy reluctantly undertook the task of 

eliminating the Third Army's bridgehead 

at Pont-a-Mousson and restoring the 

Moselle line north of Nancy. The reverses 

they suffered in that area were used by 

Hitler on 21 September as grounds for replacing Blaskowitz, the Army Group G commander, with General Balck. For ten days, 

in the face of recommendations from field 

commanders that the attack be stopped, 

Hitler ordered that it be continued. By the 

end of September the German threat to 

the Allied flank had been ended. Von 

Rundstedt now asked in vain for reinforcements to meet expected Third Army attacks. Instead, Hitler shifted forces northward to meet the Second British Army 

attack. On 1 October, the Fifth Panzer 

Army and the Third U.S. Army were both 

on the defensive. 

The 6th Army Group forces, which had 

driven more than 400 miles in scarcely a 

month, came to an almost complete standstill in mid-September, although the 

Seventh Army, after regrouping, was able 

to send three divisions across the Moselle 

by the end of the month. Supply difficulties kept the First French Army virtually 

idle. 

October Battles 

The month of October, outside the 21 

Army Group zone, was marked by two 

major actions by U.S. forces-the taking 

3 Cole, The Lorraine Campaign; pp. 190-219. Complete details on these plans and the results of the 

counterthrust are given in Chapters IV and V of Dr. 

Cole's volume. 
THE BATTLES OF ATTRITION 305 

of Aachen and the attack on Metz. The month of October. In addition to these 

First Army on 29 September ordered its 

forces to conduct limited operations from 

the vicinity of Deurne, north of Maastricht, 

to protect the right flank of 21 Army 

Group, and to make a co-ordinated attack 

about 1 October with the mission of taking 

Dueren and Cologne. The two northern 

corps were directed to surround and capture Aachen and then push toward the 

Rhine. They attacked on 2 October, but 

met stubborn resistance from an enemy reinforced by units from the Arnhem area 

and other sectors of the Western Front 

and encouraged by Hitler's pleas for a 

last-ditch fight. A heavy bombardment by 

the IX Tactical Air Command between 11 

and 13 October softened opposition, and 

the U.S. forces began house-to-house fighting inside Aachen on the 14th. Two days 

later the city was encircled and attempts 

to relieve it were beaten back. Continual 

daily poundings by Allied artillery and 

methodical clean-up operations in various parts of the city by U.S. infantry 

forced the garrison to surrender on 21 

October. 

To the south of General Hodges' forces, 

the Third Army on 2 October had 

launched an attack on the Metz fortifications. Part of Fort Driant was occupied 

after bitter fighting, but extremely heavy 

enemy resistance led the American forces 

to withdraw on 12 October. Reduced ammunition supplies at this point required 

postponement of a new offensive until 

November. An attack for Maizieres-IesMetz, some six miles north of Metz, was 

carried on against stubborn opposition 

until the month's end, but for the most 

part the Third Army's activities during the 

last half of October were summarized 

under the head of "aggressive patrolling." 

Supply difficulties and bad weather 

harassed 6th Army Group throughout the 

problems, the First French Army had the 

tasks of integrating French Forces of the 

Interior into the Regular Army, and of 

"whitening" 4 the African divisions whose 

native members were unable to endure the 

cold of the Vosges. General Patch's forces 

during the month seized the high ground 

dominating the Meurthe valley in the 

St. Die area and took nearly 6,000 prisoners. In the first half of October, General 

de Lattre attempted to advance north of 

the Vosges toward Colmar, but the increasing severity of the weather soon made 

it necessary to abandon this effort. General 

de Lattre so notified his commanders on 

17 October and turned to the task of getting more men and supplies for his army. 

As the weather grew progressively worse, 

General Eisenhower saw his forces at the 

West Wall slowed to advances of a few 

yards a day. Deprived of air and, sometimes, of armored support, the Allies endured severe hardship but produced little 

that was tangible in the way of ground 

won. No period saw more dogged fighting 

or required more stamina and physical 

tenacity on the part of the soldiers than 

that between late October and the end of 

December. It was a time of stockpiling 

supplies, of digging in, and of battling 

painfully to straighten the lines. This 

period more than any other of the war in 

northern Europe belonged to the foot 

soldiers. The high-level communiques 

which day after day spoke of "actions confined to aggressive patrolling" were insufficient tributes to the fighting qualities of 

men who managed to exist and even advance a little in areas plagued with freezing rain, driving snow, record floods, endless stretches of mud, and biting cold. 

Until more supplies could be brought up, 

1 The process of replacing native members with 

whites. 
306 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

strategic decisions were of little importance. At best there was talk of what could 

be done later. Meanwhile, trenchfoot and 

respiratory diseases took their toll of men 

who came to understand more fully what 

soldiers in the Russian and Italian theaters 

had undergone in the winter battles of the 

preceding years. 

Before the difficulties of the campaign 

became so thoroughly apparent, General 

Eisenhower had been hopeful of pressing 

a successful attack along the entire line. In 

mid-October, as the British pressed their 

battle to clear the approaches to Antwerp, 

he anticipated a great increase in supplies 

for November which would make it possible to push his offensive. His chief of intelligence, General Strong, saw November 

as the month Hitler dreaded most. While 

he believed that the German leader hoped 

to launch some counterstroke about that 

time, Strong concluded that attrition was 

slowly reducing the enemy’s power to attack. His policy of switching armor back 

and forth between Aachen and Nijmegen 

indicated that he had barely one hundred 

tanks or just enough to deal with one 

penetration at a time. SHAEF estimated 

that on the relatively stable front between 

Venlo and Nancy the Allies had taken an 

average of 1,300 prisoners a day during 

the period 10 September to 9 October. 

This meant, if other casualties were set at 

a normal proportion, that the enemy had 

a casualty rate of 4,000 a day, “or one ‘division’ on his new standard every day or 

two, through simple attrition in the line.” 

The result, the SHAEF G–2 believed, was 

that the enemy was getting into the same 

dangerous situation that had prevailed in 

Normandy. “The dwindling fire brigade 

is switched with increasing rapidity and 

increasing wear and tear from one fire to 

another.” 5 

A number of considerations influenced 

General Eisenhower to press his offensive 

in late October. Not only did he desire to 

continue to drain enemy manpower, but 

he wanted to make certain that the Germans had no chance to move into better 

positions and to build up their forces. He 

was aware of many difficulties which lay 

in his way, and the many different demands for men and supplies. The Schelde 

estuary was still not open; Allied forces 

were getting farther away from air bases 

in the United Kingdom; and transportation problems were increasing as the 

winter approached. Despite the repair and 

improvement of rail systems, the matter 

of transport remained critical. Two other 

problems loomed increasingly larger. In a 

series of inspection trips which he made to 

most of the Allied units down to divisional 

level during October, General Eisenhower 

heard continually of shortages in amniunition and the lack of riflemen replacements. 

The ammunition shortage was not merely 

one of port capacity and distributional 

facilities, but also one of inadequate production in the United States. 6 The manpower problem had arisen for several reasons, but prominent among them was the 

fact that planners in the United States had 

misjudged the role which riflemen were 

going to play in the war and had put too 

many men in branches other than the Infantry. Because of the time factor, the only 

solution was a rigid comb-out of men in 

the communications zone and the zone of 

interior who might be readily reconverted 

into foot soldiers. By the end of October a 

study of such plans was under way in the 

5 SHAEF, G–2 Weekly Intel Summary 30, 15 Oct 

44, SHAEF G–2 files. 

6 Eisenhower to Marshall, S–63259, 20 Oct 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
THE BATTLES OF ATTRITION 307 

zone of interior and in the European 

Theater of Operations. 7 

Plans To End the War Quickly 

On 20 October the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff in Washington decided to study the 

possibility of an all-out offensive that 

could conceivably end the war before the 

close of 1944. In the course of discussing 

with the Combined Chiefs the advisability 

of releasing the heretofore-secret proximity fuze for use in battle, General 

Marshall indicated that the release of 

secret weapons was bound up with their 

use to end the war speedily. In the light of 

an apparent agreement that the matter 

was the proper subject of a directive to the 

Supreme Commander, General Marshall 

instructed his staff to draft a memorandum 

on the subject to General Eisenhower. 

His advisers proposed that the Allies 

should make an all-out effort to defeat the 

German armies before 1 January 1945. 

This effort, they thought, would require 

release of weapons whose use had hitherto 

been restricted for security reasons and 

elimination of those strategic air force 

operations which did not effect an immediate reduction in German capabilities. 

It would also require commitment of strategic reserves and theater stockpiles without regard to their position by the end of 

the year, and would have a bearing on the 

continuation in action of units which 

otherwise would be withdrawn for rehabilitation and training for 1945 operations. General Eisenhower was informed 

that this draft was under consideration 

and was based on the assumption that 

Germany could be defeated in 1944 if the 

utmost use was made of all Allied resources. General Marshall added, “Be 

frank with me. I will accept your decision.” General Eisenhower replied that he 

was as anxious as the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff to wind up the operation as quickly 

as possible. His logistical problems had 

become so acute, however, that all his 

plans had made the clearing of the approaches to Antwerp a sine qua non to the 

waging of the final all-out battle. He 

agreed that, with the divisions in the 

European theater and those on their way, 

there was a possibility that they might 

achieve the desired break. 8 

Changes were made in the original draft 

to emphasize that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and 

the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, would consult together as to the way 

the latter could best aid the defeat of Germany by 1 January 1945. This referred in 

particular to the possible transfer of troops 

to France. The revised version was then 

submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff for 

their comments. 9 

On 29 October, the Joint Planning Staff 

of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee re7 See study by Robert R. Palmer and William R. 

Keast, “The Provision of Enlisted Replacements” in 

Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. 

Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat 

Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II (Washington, 1948). On both ammunition 

and manpower shortages, see Ruppenthal, Logistical 

Support of the Armies, Vol. II, now in preparation. 

8 Memo, G. C. M. (Gen Marshall) for Gen Handy 

and Gen Hull, 20 Oct 44, OPD 381 TS, Sec XVIII, 

Case 538/2; Draft of Dir to Eisenhower, Wilson, 

et al.. SS 316. 20 Oct 44. ABC 381 Strategy Sec Papers (7 Jan 43); Marshall to Eisenhower, W-50676, 

22 Oct 44, SHAEF message file, Folder 27, Plans and 

Operations (13 May 44–23 May 45); Eisenhower to 

Marshall, S–63616, 23 Oct 44, Eisenhower personal 

file. 

9 The date of the revised document is not given. 

The major revisions seem to have been in the phrasing rather than the intent, although the provisions 

relating to strategic air forces were changed to say 

that these forces would act in accordance with the 

Supreme Commander’s directions. OPD 381 TS, Sec 

XVIII, Case 538. 
308 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

plied to the U.S. proposals. The planners 

concluded that the earliest date that could 

be suggested for the war’s end was 31 January 1945, and the latest was 15 May 

1945. Analyzing the proposed directive, 

they held that General Eisenhower’s future actions were governed by the date 

Antwerp could be opened to shipping. To 

launch an all-out offensive before its opening, they added, “would be to court failure, and would probably have the effect 

of prolonging the war well into 1945.” As 

to the means suggested by General Marshall to shorten the war, the members of 

the Joint Planning Staff had some reservations. They were inclined to question 

his proposal for changing the main air effort, feeling that the strategic air forces 

should continue to give top priority to oil 

targets. As a result of previous bombings, 

they pointed out, oil production had been 

reduced in September to about 23 percent 

of its preattack (April) level. If the attacks 

were suspended, the Joint Planning Staff 

believed, the enemy would be able to raise 

production to 50 percent of the preattack 

level within one month. The planners, 

noting that these targets would not absorb 

all the available strategic bomber forces, 

suggested the value of a series of heavy attacks on selected areas of the Ruhr. This 

effffort could also be aided by attacks on 

the German transportation system, with 

especial emphasis on barges and vulnerable points on canals. They added that 

General Eisenhower retained the right to 

call for direct bomber support of his land 

forces, but that he had agreed to reduce 

these demands as far as practicable. As for 

operations in the Mediterranean, the British felt that maximum pressure should be 

continued in that theater until the launching of the offensive in the west. The had 

already recommended release of the proximity fuze for use against the enemy, and 

they welcomed the use of various psychological warfare and diversionary activities 

that would aid the Supreme Commander’s 

battle. 

The British Chiefs of Staff accepted 

these views of their planners and requested 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to withhold the 

proposed directive for the time being. 

General Marshall, therefore, on 1 November directed that nothing be done about 

the matter until further notice.” 

While these plans were being discussed 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allied air planners were discussing various 

campaigns for shortening the war by intensified air action. Under directives of 

September 1944, the strategic air forces 

had given first priority to the German oil 

industry and had placed enemy ordnance 

depots, armored fighting vehicle assembly 

plants, and motor vehicle assembly plants 

in the second priority list. At this time the 

German oil situation was believed to be 

desperate, but the Allied airmen feared 

that a few weeks of respite from Allied 

bomber attacks would permit the Germans to restore their oil production to 60 

percent of the normal output. U.S. 

bomber experts considered this view confirmed in October when bad weather and 

commitments to support of land operations cut Eighth Air Force missions against 

10 Rpt, Jt Plng Stf, 29 Oct 44, sub: Plng Date for 

End of War With Germany, JP (44) 262 (Final); Rpt, 

Jt Plng Stf, 29 Oct 44, sub: Opns in Europe, JP (44) 

275 (Final); Memo by Br Representatives, 31 Oct 44, 

sub: Immediate Supreme Effort in Western Europe; 

Memo, H.H.F. (Lt-Col Harvey H. Fischer, member 

of Strategy Sec, Strategy and Policy Group, OPD) for 

Gen Roberts (Brig Gen Frank N, Roberts, Chief, 

Strategy and Policy Group, OPD), 1 Nov 44. Colonel 

Fischer said in his memorandum, “Chief of Staff has 

issued verbal instructions that nothing more should 

be done on this matter.” All these papers are in ABC 

384 Europe (4 Aug 43), Sec 1A. 
THE BATTLES OF ATTRITION 309 

oil targets. They estimated that the enemy 

oil output for October rose seven points or 

30 percent of the preattack level. Meanwhile, discouraging results were coming in 

about the attacks on ordnance depots and 

assembly plants. Bad weather and the priority of oil targets left few days for attacks 

on the second-priority targets. As a result 

the airmen concluded in October that 

their attacks were clearly not having a decisive influence on the enemy’s efforts to 

re-equip his armies. They were, therefore, 

aware of the inconclusiveness of these attacks when, in late October, General 

Marshall spoke of throwing all Allied efforts into an offensive to end the war 

against Germany by the end of the year. 11 

Against this background of somewhat 

disappointing results, Air Chief Marshal 

Tedder and the Air Ministry reopened the 

possibility of using the strategic air forces 

for attacks on railway centers and marshaling yards. Tedder had advocated this 

project successfully in the spring of 1944 

and believed it to have been mainly responsible for paralyzing the rail system in 

northern France. He asked that the strategic air forces concentrate their principal 

attacks on the Ruhr with bombings of the 

rail centers, oil targets, canal systems, and 

centers of population. The SHAEF intelligence division gave the plan only qualified approval. Its chief, General Strong, 

agreed that the air and ground battle 

against Germany should be co-ordinated 

and felt that an attack on transport would 

probably give the best over-all effect. He 

believed, however, that oil targets should 

continue to have top priority and added 

that recent reports as to the decreased importance of the Ruhr in Germany’s econprobably would require a reassessment of its worth. He thought that a future 

air offensive should probably be extended 

to the whole enemy transportation 

system. 12 

Despite doubts among railway and intelligence experts as to the degree of success that the transportation scheme might 

obtain, top commanders, meeting at 

SHAEF near the end of October, decided 

that bombing of German transportation 

would be given priority second only to operations against synthetic oil plants. General Spaatz and Air Marshal Bottomley 

issued a directive to this effect on 28 October 1944. 13 

The proposals to end the war in 1944 

by means of an all-out offensive had actually come too late to be effective. Such an 

attack could succeed only if it were made 

while the enemy was still disorganized. 

Once he had established himself in his defenses, the Allies had to get a port within 

a reasonable distance of the battle area in 

order to stockpile weapons and supplies 

for a new attack. Until Antwerp was open 

and matériel had begun to move through 

it, the granting of permission to use new 

weapons and to shift priorities would be of 

little value. The end of October found the 

battle for Antwerp still in progress. Since 

it would be nearly a month at best before 

ships would be unloading in that port, it 

appeared more reasonable during the remaining days of 1944 to concentrate on an 

attempt to reach and establish bridgeheads across the Rhine than to launch an 

offensive to end the war. 

11 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, Vol. III, Ch. 18, “Autumn Assault on Germany.” 

12 Deputy Supreme Commander’s Notes on Air 

policy To Be Adopted With a View to the Rapid Defeat of Germany, 25 Oct 44; Strong to Tedder, 28 Oct 

44. Both in SHAEF G–2 Intel on Germany GBI/01- 

A/09 1–3. 

13 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, III, 653. 
310 

The November Offensive 

On 18 October,just before the Combined Chiefs of Staff had raised the question oflaunching a campaign to conclude 

the war in Europe before the end of 1944, 

the Supreme Commander and the 12th 

and 21 Army Group commanders met at 

Brussels to discuss a more modest program 

for November and perhaps December 

1944. Since General Eisenhower had decided that the British and Canadian 

forces would have to concentrate during 

the next several weeks on the task of clearing the Schelde estuary, he concluded that 

the drive toward the Rhine, heretofore 

largely a 21 Army Group mission, should 

be assumed by the First and Ninth U.S. 

Armies. General Hodges was to attempt 

to establish a bridgehead south of Cologne, 

while General Simpson's forces protected 

his left flank between Sittard and Aachen. 

To the right of the First Army, General 

Patton's forces were to advance in a northeasterly direction in support of the main 

thrust. Meanwhile, General Devers' 

French and U.S. forces were to attempt to 

cross the Rhine in their sector. 14 For the 

first time since late August, the main 

thrust was given to the U.S. forces, and 

the Allied forces were oriented directly at 

and south of the Ruhr, instead of north of 

that area. If these various drives proved 

successful in establishing bridgeheads 

across the Rhine before the 21 Army 

Group was free to return to its missions, it 

would be impossible to return to the strategy which Field Marshal Montgomery 

had favored since late August and which 

the Supreme Commander had approved 

in its broad aspects. 

In agreeing to this operation, which differed from that envisaged by the British 

Chiefs of Staff and the 21 Army Group 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

commander, General Eisenhower followed 

his policy of closing up along as much of 

the Rhine as possible and of hitting the 

Germans at every possible point in order 

to keep them str;etched. Nonetheless, he 

opened himself lip to British suspicions 

that he was straying from his earlier strategic commitments. 

The Supreme Commander on 28 October confirmed his decisions made ten days 

earlier at Brussels and pressed preparations by the Ninth and First U.S. Armies. 15 

During the next two weeks he visited 

every division in the two armies and was 

pleased to find their morale good. His 

chief worry was the weather. It was so severe, he reported, that it was breaking a 

number of records which had stood for 

twenty-five to fifty years. Despite the 

problems of mud, rain, and fog, he retained his optimism and assured General 

Marshall that the Allies would yet make 

the Germans wish they had gone east of 

the Rhine when they withdrew from 

France. There still remained in his mind, 

however, considerable anxiety over the 

state of supplies-a concern expressed 

shortly after the opening of the November 

offensive in a public appeal for greater Allied efforts to keep industrial production 

at a maximum. 16 

14 Decision reached at SAC's conf, Brussels, 18 Oct 

44; SAC's dir confirming decisions of Brussels conf, 

SCAF 114, 28 Oct 44; Revisions in dir, SCAF 119, 

2 Nov 44. All in SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD 

Planning, II. 

15 SAC's dir confirming decisions of Brussels conf, 

SCAF 114, 28 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, II. The plan had to be changed at 

the beginning of N ovem ber because of a limited offensive launched by the enemy against British forces 

on 27 October. Field Marshal Montgomery found it 

necessary to clear the area west of the Maas before 

advancing from the Nijmegen area between the Maas 

and the Rhine. 

16 Eisenhower to Marshall, 11 Nov 44, Eisenhower 

personal file; Eisenhower press conference, New York 

Times, November 22,1944. 
THE BATTLES OF ATTRITION 

Two subsidiary attacks preceded the 

main November offensive. The first, ordered by First Army to secure the Schmidt 

area just north of important dams on the 

Urft and Roer Rivers, was launched by V 

Corps on 2 November. The Americans 

seized the town of Schmidt, but a sharp 

enemy reaction and supply difficulties 

forced them to withdraw and terminate 

the action.!7 On 12 November, the Second 

British Army moved eastward for the purpose of forcing the Maas in its area. Enemy 

resistance was not heavy, but minefields, 

mud, and bad weather delayed the advance. By 22 November, the British had 

succeeded in. clearing the west bank of the 

Maas opposite Roermond. 

The Ninth and First Armies launched 

the main offensive in the early afternoon of 

16 November after an air preparation described as the largest "air-ground cooperative effort yet undertaken by the Allied 

air forces." The bombardment destroyed 

the center of Dueren and nearly wiped out 

nearby cities like Eschweiler andJuelich.!8 

Two German divisions in the process of 

shifting positions were severely hit. In the 

Ninth Army's sector, ground forces made 

good progress during the first three days of 

the attack, but units in the First Army area 

had less success. The enemy used his West 

Wall fortifications effectively, particularly 

in the Huertgen Forest where poor road 

nets, often little more than forest trails, 

slowed or stopped armored advances. Infantrymen proceeding through the dense 

woods were subjected to the terrors of 

mines and artillery tree bursts. Rain and 

snow added to the difficulties and the 

misery of the combatants. Resistance stiffened along the entire front as the enemy 

brought up reinforcements, forcing a virtual stalemate on the U.S. units. A final 

spurt of action near the month's close 

311 

brought the Ninth Army to the Roer in 

most of its sector, while the First Armyesta blished a front on the line of the Inde 

and opened a drive toward the Roer in the 

Huertgen area. British efforts to make 

General Bradley's left flank more secure 

had continued through November, ending 

with the elimination of enemy positions 

near Venlo and with attacks east of Geilenkirchen in the first week of December. 

In the Third Army's area, General Patton turned his attention both to the drive 

against the Saar and . to the battle for 

Metz. His troops encircled Metz on 18 

November and on the following day entered the city. Four days later, all enemy 

resistance in the city itself ceased, although 

the battle for the outlying forts continued. 

Meanwhile, other Third Army elements, 

advancing on the right, forced the enemy 

back into the Siegfried Line from Nennig 

to Saarlautern and reached the Saar at 

Hilbringen. 

The 6th Army Group, cast only for a 

supporting role in November, gained several of the month's most important victories. The Seventh Army attacked as early 

as 13 November with the object of capturing Sarrebourg and forcing the Saverne 

Gap. Task forces of the 2d French Armored Division were sent to Saverne on 22 

November. The division was next ordered 

to aid the drive on Strasbourg and opened 

an attack against that famous city on 23 

November. Within a few hours armored 

elements had cleared the city and reached 

the Kehl bridge at the Rhine. 

17 A detailed account of this battle is given in 

Charles B. MacDonald and Sidney T. Matthews, 

Three Battles: A rna ville, Altu::;::;o, and Schmidt, UNITED 

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1952). 

18 The Eighth Air Force dropped more than 4,000 

tons of bombs, and the RAF :Somber Command 

dropped nearly 5,700. Craven and Cate, The Army Air 

Forces in World War II, III, 631-32. 
312 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

General de Lattre’s First French Army 

on the extreme south flank also added a 

string of victories to the Allied list in the 

last two weeks of November. Starting on 

the 14th with the intention of forcing the 

Belfort Gap and driving the enemy from 

Alsace, the First French Army rapidly 

cleared the industrial area southwest of 

Belfort. I French Corps liberated Belfort, 

Altkirch, and Mulhouse between 18 and 

25 November and then drove toward Colmar and Neuf-Brisach with the intention 

of crossing the Rhine near the latter city. 

The II French Corps, ordered to advance 

toward the center of Alsace and aid the 

advance to the north, linked up at Burnhaupt, ten miles west of Mulhouse, with 

the I French Corps, and caught a number 

of Germans in the trap. In their two weeks’ 

battle, one of their hardest and most successful fights of the war, the French killed 

an estimated 10,000 Germans and took 

another 17,000 as prisoners. The First 

French Army’s losses were estimated at 

more than 10,000. 19 

Allied St ra tegy Re- examined 

The fighting in November, while bringing the Allies closer to the Rhine, proved 

costly and failed to achieve the hopedfor successes on the Ninth and First Army 

fronts. Field Marshal Montgomery discussed this outcome with General Eisenhower on 28 November, and two days 

later said that in his opinion the Supreme 

Commander’s failure to implement his directive of 28 October was responsible for 

the situation. The October directive, the 

21 Army Group commander recalled, 

ordered the main effort to be made in the 

north, the decisive defeat of the enemy 

west of the Rhine, the establishment of 

bridgeheads over the Rhine and IJssel 

Rivers, and the deployment of Allied 

forces in strength east of the Rhine in 

preparation for the seizure of the Ruhr. 

“We have achieved none of this,” the field 

marshal said, “and we have no hope of 

doing so. We have therefore failed; and 

we have suffered a strategic reverse.” 

Montgomery continued: 

3. We now require a new plan. And this 

time we must not fail, The need to get the German war finished early is vital, in view of 

other factors. The new plan must not fail. 

4. In the new plan we must get away from 

the doctrine of attacking in so many places 

that nowhere are we strong enough to get decisive results. We must concentrate such 

strength on the main selected thrust that success will be certain. It is in this respect that 

we failed badly in the present operations. 20 

Closely connected with the request for 

a new plan was a renewed appeal for 

closer ground force co-ordination. Field 

Marshal Montgomery said: 

5. The theatre divides itself naturally into 

two fronts; one north of the Ardennes and 

one south of the Ardennes. We want one 

commander in full operational control north 

of the Ardennes, and one south. 

6. I did suggest that you might consider 

having a land force commander to work 

under you and run the land battle for you. 

But you discarded this idea as not being 

suitable, and we did not discuss it any more. 

7. You suggested that a better solution 

would be to put 12 Army Group and 21 

Army Group both north of the Ardennes, 

and to put Bradley under my operational 

command. 

8. I said that Bradley and I together are a 

good team. We worked together in Normandy, under you, and we won a great victory. Things have not been so good since you 

separated us. I believe to be certain of success you want to bring us together again; and 

19 De Lattre, Histoire de la Premiére Armée Française, 

Pt. IV. 

20 Montgomery to Eisenhower, 30 Nov 44, Diary 

Office CinC. Italics in original. 
THE BATTLES OF ATTRITION 

one of us should have the full operational 

control north ofthe Ardennes; and if you decide that I should do that work-that is O. K. 

byme. 21 

To understand the field marshal's reference to strategic reverse, it is necessary to 

recall the earlier plans and his proposals. 

Before the Schelde campaign, it should be 

remembered, the Supreme Commander 

had put the main emphasis upon a thrust 

to the north-one in which the Allies 

would ultimately cross the Rhine north of 

the Ruhr. 22 With the shift of the British 

and Canadian forces to the Schelde estuary operation, the drive toward the 

Rhine had moved temporarily to the 

Ninth and First U.S. Army fronts with the 

main emphasis on the Bonn-Cologne 

area.Ifthis orientation continued, the Allied forces would be in a position to cross 

the Rhine north of the Ardennes, but 

south of the Ruhr. They would absorb 

forces that would otherwise have been 

available for the 21 Army Group drive 

farther north. Thus, when the field marshal sharply criticized operations which 

had taken place in November, he was 

talking not merely of fail ures to ad vance 

to Bonn and Cologne, but of failures to 

contin ue in the northeast direction to 

which he and, he thought, SHAEF were 

committed. To get involved in operations 

which led away from that direction he 

considered faulty strategy, and to drive in 

the wrong direction, particularly without 

reaching the Rhine, was "a strategic 

reverse." 

General Eisenhower, who interpreted 

the field marshal's reference to "a strategic reverse" as a general condemnation of 

past plans wrote Montgomery a letter in 

which he flatly contradicted the statement that they had failed. He summarized the successes of the campaigns up to 

313 

that point and defended firmly his recent 

broad front policy. His letter read in part: 

I am not quite sure I know exactly what 

you mean by strategic reverse; certainly to 

date we have failed to achieve all that we had 

hoped to by this time, which hopes and plans 

were based upon conditions as we knew them 

or estimated them when the plans were 

made. The Ruhr is an important place, but 

let us never forget for one second that our 

primary objective is to defeat the Germans 

who are barring our way into Germany. The 

Ruhr itself was always given as a geographical objective, not only for its importance to 

Germany, but because it was believed that in 

that region the German forces would be largely 

concentrated to meet our attacks. 

Specifically, I agree to the following: 

a. We must determine how much profit 

there is in the continuation of our current attacks in the 12th Army Group area, and 

whether they give real promise ofreaching 

the Rhine. 

b. We must recast our future general plans 

in the light of conditions as they now exist. 

c. We must choose the best line of attack to 

assure success, including the maintenance of 

deception lines. 

I also stated that from my personal viewpoint, it would be simpler for me to have the 

battle zone divided into two general sectors, 

in each of which one individual could achieve 

close battle coordination. I expressed some 

doubt whether this zone should be divided on 

the basis of our rear areas or on the basis of 

natural lines of advance into Germany. 

There was some question in my mind 

whether the Ardennes or the Ruhr should 

mark the dividing line, ifsuch a plan should 

be ildopted. 

I do not agree that things have gone badly 

since Normandy, merely because we have 

not gained all we had hoped to gain. In fact, 

the situation is somewhat analogous to that 

which existed in Normandy for so long. Our 

line as late as D plus 60 was not greatly different than what we hoped to hold in the first 

week, but I never looked upon the situation 

then existing as a strategic reverse, even 

21 Ibid. 

22 See above, p. 294. 
314 

though out of the circumstances of our long 

confinement in the narrow beach head have 

developed some of our greatest later difficulties. If we had advanced from the beginning 

as we had hoped, our maintenance services 

would have been in a position to supply us 

during the critical September days, when we 

actually reached the limit of our resources. 

Moreover, I do not agree that more 

strength could have been thrown to the 

North than was actually maintained there 

during early September. Lines of communication in the north were so stretched that 

even delivery of five hundred tons to you at 

Brussels cost Bradley three divisions, the possession of which might have easily placed him 

on the Rhine in the Worms area. 

We gained a great victory in Normandy. 

Bradley's brilliant breakthrough made possible the great exploitation by all forces, which 

blasted France and Belgium and almost carried us across the Rhine. Had we not advanced on a relatively broad front, we would 

now have the spectacle of a long narrow line 

of communication, constantly threatened on 

the right flank and weakened by detachments oflarge fighting formations. In addition, we would have had a similar picture in 

the south, stretching all the way from Marseilles to Dijon. As it is, we now have a rear 

that is cleared of the enemy. We can look to 

the front. 

I have no intention of stopping Devers' 

and Patton's operations as long as they 

are cleaning up our right flank and giving us 

capability of concentration. On the other hand, I 

do not intend to push these attacks senselessly. 

It is going to be very important to us later 

on to have two strings to our bow. Don't forget that you were very wise in making a provision for this at· Mareth, and it paid off. 

* * * 

I most definitely appreciate the frankness 

of your statements, and the usual friendly 

way in which they are stated, but I beg of you 

not to continue to look upon the past performances of this great fighting force as a 

failure because we have not achieved all that 

we could have hoped. 

I am quite sure that you, Bradley, and I 

can remain masters of the situation and the 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

victory we want will certainly be achieved. 

But we must look at this whole great affair 

stretching from Marseilles to the lower Rhine 

as one great theater. We must plan so when 

our next attack starts we will be able to obtain maximum results from all our forces, 

under the conditions now existing. IKE.23 

Field Marshal Montgomery quickly 

pointed out that he had never intimated 

the work of the Allied forces had been a 

failure, but that he had said they had 

failed to carry out the directive of 28 October. General Eisenhower immediately 

sent his "prompt and abject apologies" for 

giving the letter an interpretation which 

the writer had not intended. 24 

Within a week after Field Marshal 

Montgomery had expressed to General 

Eisenhower his fears concerning Allied 

strategy, Mr. Churchill voiced similar 

anxieties to President Roosevelt. Conceding that current attacks had brought a 

number of splendid trophies such as Metz 

and Strasbourg, the Prime Minister nevertheless felt that the Allies "had definitely 

failed to achieve the strategic object we 

gave our armies five weeks ago." They 

had not reached the Rhine in the northern 

and most important sector of the front, 

and would have to continue the battle for 

many weeks before they could hope to do 

so. The British statesman was equally worried about the over-all strategic picture. 

He saw a marked degree offrustration in 

Italy, which he blamed in part on the diversion of forces to the landings in southern France; a large part of the enemy 

forces had escaped from the Balkan peninsula; the plans for Burma were not going 

well; and China had bee-n eliminated as a 

2:1 Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, I Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. Italics in original. 

2. Ltr, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 2 Dec 44; Ltr, 

Eisenhower to Montgomery, 2 Dec 44. Both in Diary 

Office CinCo 
THE BATTLES OF ATTRITION 

combatant. He believed that the situation 

required another meeting shortly of the 

Allied leaders to discuss the future. Mr. 

Roosevelt, in the letter he drafted in reply, 

declared that he was less disappointed 

than the Prime Minister about results, 

partly because he had been less optimistic 

over the time element six months previously. The President said that he had 

bicycled over most of the Rhine terrain 

"in the old days" and, as a result, had 

never been as sanguine about the ease of 

getting across the river as had some of the 

Allied commanders. Despite disappointments, he believed that the agreed broad 

strategy was going according to plan. He 

reminded the Prime Minister that they 

were in the position of commanders in 

chief who had prepared their plans, issued 

their orders, and committed their resources to battle. "For the time being, 

even if a little behind schedule, it seems 

to me the prosecution and outcome of the 

battles lie with our Field Commanders in 

whom I have every confidence." He was 

heartened by the fact that the enemy was 

being chewed up, and that Allied supplies 

were being piled up for later offensives. "I 

still cannot see dearly when, but soon a 

decisive break in our favor is bound to 

come. 25 

General Eisenhower was keenly aware 

of the difficulties that faced his force. But 

he was pleased to find from his visits to 

various lower headquarters that everyone 

was "in surprisingly good heart and condition." In a report to General Marshall, he 

threw a little light indirectly on his own 

problems in a remark that the corps, 

army, and army group commanders were 

standing up well. Their good condition 

was due, he intimated, to the fact that 

they had to worry only about tactics and 

local maintenance "without ... having to 

315 

burden themselves with politics, priorities, 

shipping and Maquis" on the one hand 

and without having to undergo the "more 

direct battle strains of a Division commander" on the other. The Supreme 

Commander was not hopeful of immediate success since the enemy was sending 

new divisions to the west, and he felt that 

much depended on the scale of the anticipated winter offensive of the Russians. 

He saw some hope in the fact that the 

enemy was badly stretched in the west and 

was forced to shift his units constantly to 

protect various points threatened by the 

Allies. To continue this strain, he proposed 

to keep up a number of limited attacks 

toward the Rhine, while preparing an allout offensive. He frankly admitted that he 

was not overly optimistic about the immediate results of these thrusts since it 

appeared that unless "some trouble develops from within Germany, a possibility of 

which there is now no real evidence, [the 

enemy] should be able to maintain a 

strong defensive front for some time, assisted by weather, floods and muddy 

ground." 26 

The Allied air commanders were also 

pessimistic because of their fear that the 

German Air Force might stage a comeback in 1945. In the closing months of 

1944 there was evidence that German 

fighters were steadily increasing in number, and there was some fear that the Germans might put their jet planes into the 

battle before the Allies. General Spaatz 

warned General Arnold in early November of the possibility of an upsurge in Gerto Roosevelt, 844, 6 Dec 44; President 

to Leahy, proposed reply to Prime Minister (the President added "Clear with Marshall and King"), 8 Dec 

44, OPD Exec, Leahy file. . 

26 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Dec 44, SHAEF 

SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, II. 
316 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

man air strength, 27 and Lt. Gen. James H. 

Doolittle indicated in midmonth that the 

Eighth Air Force might have to drop its 

strategic objectives in order to reconquer 

the enemy air forces. For the moment, 

however, the U.S. airmen continued to 

place their chief emphasis on the offensive 

against oil. This decision was reaffirmed 

on 5 December by top Allied commanders 

at SHAEF when they agreed to hold oil 

in first place, give second priority to carpet bombing in support of the ground 

forces, and make transportation bombing 

third in the list of targets. 28 

Despite evidence of Germany's staying 

power, the Allied commanders still hoped 

to launch an all-out offensive against the 

enemy in the early weeks of 1945. General 

Eisenhower, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, 

Field Marshal Montgomery, and General 

Bradley met at Maastricht on 7 December 

to discuss such a campaign. The 21 Army 

Group commander again presented his 

plan for a concentrated thrust across the 

Rhine north of the Ruhr while reducing 

operations on the rest of the front to containing actions. General Eisenhower once 

more declared that the Frankfurt area was 

suitable for an attack and that he did not 

propose to check the advance on General 

Patton's front. Field Marshal Montgomery seemed to feel that the argument was 

back at the same point it had reached in 

September. If attacks were made simultaneously in the north and south, he 

feared that neither would succeed. He 

held, therefore, that there was a fundamental difference between their viewsGeneral Eisenhower, apparently desiring 

to reconcile their points of view, insisted 

that they differed only as to the point of 

origin of the secondary thrust, since both 

agreed that the main attack would be 

made north of the Ruhr by the 21 Army 

Group with the support of a U.S. army 

(the Ninth) of ten divisions. The Supreme 

Commander also denied that he and the 

field marshal differed fundamentally in 

their views on command. The 21 Army 

Group commander had again asked that 

all operations north of the Ardennes be 

placed under one commander. General 

Eisenhower maintained, as he had several 

times before, that command boundaries 

must be determined by the nature of the 

operations in front of the line and not by 

geographical features in the rear. Since 

the main operations were to be made 

north of the Ruhr, he thought that it was 

a better dividing line than the Ardennes. 29 

The Maastricht conference concluded 

with a decision by the Supreme Commander in favor of a major attack north 

of the Ruhr in 1945 with secondary attacks by U.S. forces farther to the south. 

To him this was what he had always 

favored. Believing that he had sufficient 

forces to support the northern thrust adequately and still mount a subsidiary 

attack, he saw no difference between his 

concept and that of the 21 Army Group 

commander. But to Field Marshal Montgomery, who believed that experiences of 

the past few months demonstrated the 

lack of sufficient resources for both attacks, 

the difference was between success and 

failure-and therefore fundamental. In 

terms of complete understanding and 

agreement, these viewpoints were never 

really reconciled. On the other hand, Gen27 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, III, 663, and n. 126, say that the German Air 

Force was numerically larger in December 1944 than 

it had ever been. 

28 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, III, 657–66. 

29 Notes of mtg at Maastricht, 7 Dec 44, DSC/- 

TS.100/12, 8 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD planning, II. 
THE BATTLES OF ATTRITION 

eral Eisenhower, with control of the U.S. 

forces and supplies that Field Marshal 

Montgomery deemed essential to the allout attack in the north, was in a position 

to make his view prevail. For this reason, 

if for no other, there was never a deadlock 

between the two commanders in chief. 

Action in December 

The chief emphasis in early December 

. was on preparations for an all-out offensive north of the Ardennes early in 1945. 

Since General Eisenhower wished to 

maintain pressure on the enemy and since 

he felt there were divisions and resources 

south of the Ardennes which would not be 

needed for this attack, he gave permission 

for the Third Army, supported by the 

Seventh Army, to prepare for an offensive 

against the Saar beginning on 19 December. He cautioned General Bradley that 

unless the operation made great progress 

it would have to be stopped after a week. 

In outlining the operation, SHAEF made 

clear that it was intended to aid the main 

effort in the north, and that any crossing 

ofthe Rhine south of the Moselle was to 

be restricted until the success of operations 

in the north was assured. 3 0 

North of the Ardennes, the British and 

U.S. commanders now attempted to improve their positions. Field Marshal 

Montgomery ordered a limited-objective 

attack in the Heinsberg area for this purpose early in December. In the Ninth 

Army sector, General Simpson's forces 

cleared up enemy pockets near Juelich 

and closed to the Roer at mid month. To 

his right, General Hodges' forces advanced 

through the Huertgen Forest and reached 

the Roer. Unwilling to cross that river 

while the enemy held the dams on the 

Urft and the Roer to the south, and find317 

GENERAL DOOLITTLE 

ing that repeated air attacks could neither 

dislodge the enemy nor destroy the dams, 

General Bradley directed the First Army 

to launch an attack to seize this objective. 

The operation, which began on 13 December, was suspended three days later as 

the result of the Ardennes counteroffensive. Despite the limited nature of the First 

and Ninth Army attacks between 16 November and 16 December, the fighting 

was exceedingly bitter and costly. The 

Ninth Army suffered some 10,000 casualties, and the First Army, which was 

heavily hit in the Huertgen Forest area, 

had three divisions severely mauled and 

suffered over 21 ,000 casualties. 

3 0 M emo, G-3 SRAEF for ColS SRAEF, 12 Dec 

44, sub: Future Opns; Memo, G- 3 SHAEF for CoIS 

SHAEF, 15 Dec 44, sub: Proposed ·Ltr to Gen Bradley. 

Both in SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, II. 
318 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Farther to the south, General Patton’s 

forces crossed the Saar River in several 

places early in December and pressed 

their attack on Saarlautern. Back near 

Metz, other elements of the army took the 

last of the fortifications in that area on 12 

December. Preparations were also pushed 

for the projected offensive of 19 December. 

The Seventh Army now reoriented its 

forces almost directly to the north to support this attack. The shift took away leftflank support from the First French Army, 

which was deeply involved at the moment 

in preparations for the capture of German-held ports along the southwestern 

coast of France (Operation INDEPENDENCE). Some compensation was made in 

the shift of two divisions, one American, to 

General de Lattre, but his forces were unable to carry out their mission of clearing 

the Colmar Pocket. 31 The French commander had to request that operations in 

western France be delayed and that two 

additional divisions be given the First 

French Army for operations in the Colmar 

area. He also asked General de Gaulle for 

French troops to fill vacancies in the existing divisions, pointing out that morale was 

deteriorating among the North African 

troops because they had seen their comrades die without any French troops to replace t hem. 32 

The Seventh Army on 7 December 

drove northward between the Sarre and 

the Rhine. By 16 December one corps had 

sent elements of all its divisions up to the 

German frontier, while another carried on 

a heavy fight for the strongly fortified area 

around Bitche. By the end of December, 

General Patch’s forces held northern 

Alsace from the Third Army boundary, 

just east of Sarreguemines, to the Rhine, 

and thence southward along the Rhine to 

the First French Army boundary some ten 

miles south of Strasbourg. General de 

Lattre held sectors along the Rhine both 

north and south of the enemy’s Colmar 

bridgehead. 

On the eve of the Ardennes counteroffensive, the Allies were preparing all 

along the line for main or secondary attacks toward the Rhine and beyond. Field 

Marshal Montgomery’s long-range planning looked toward the crossing of the 

Rhine north of the Ruhr by the 21 Army 

Group supported by the Ninth Army. 

Meanwhile, the Ninth and First Armies 

pressed forward to the Roer and looked 

beyond to the Rhine–the Ninth Army as 

an integral part of the main thrust, and 

the First Army in a supporting role. Hence 

the main thrust was characterized as 

being north of the Ruhr, although the 

supporting attack extended the advance 

southward to the Ardennes. South of the 

Ardennes, the Third Army was poised for 

an offensive toward the Rhine. To its right, 

the Seventh Army was pushing up to the 

West Wall positions or to the Rhine. The 

First French Army was already established on the Rhine to the right and left of 

the enemy’s Calmar Pocket. The only 

static area was the Ardennes, which was 

being held thinly so that troops could be 

committed to attacks elsewhere. It is clear 

that by mid-December the attitude of the 

Allies strongly favored the offensive. 

31 This was the first time in the war that a major 

U.S. unit was placed under French command. 

32 De Lattre, Histoire de la Premiére Armée Française, 

Ch. X. 
CHAPTER XVIII 

Relations With Liberated 

Countries 

The liberation of France and Belgium 

and part of the Netherlands in the fall of 

1944 presented to SHAEF and the Supreme Commander a number of problems 

in the administration of civil affairs which 

increased steadily until the end of the 

year. Because of the political factors involved, many questions which otherwise 

could have been settled at lower levels had 

to be handled by the Supreme Commander or his immediate subordinates. 

They found, of course, that the prompt 

and proper settlement of these difficulties 

was essential to smooth-running military 

operations in the liberated countries. 

Relations With France 

Civil Affairs Agreement With France 

Not until 26 August, the day after the 

Allies entered Paris and more than two 

months after they had arri\;'ed in France, 

was a formal civil affairs agreement concluded with French authorities. This 

agreement, requested by General Eisenhower before D Day and agreed on in 

principle in Washington during General 

de Gaulle's visit there in July was not 

finally initialed in Washington until 

15 August.' Shortly thereafter General 

Eisenhower was instructed to exchange 

ratifications of the agreement with General Koenig on behalf of the U ni ted States 

while the British did the same at foreign 

minister level. Thus even at the moment 

of formal agreement, the United States 

held to its policy of dealing with the 

French at a military rather than a governmental level. The Combined Chiefs of 

Staff issued General Eisenhower their directive relative to civil affairs with France 

on 23 August and the formal exchange of 

ratifications was made at the Hotel des 

Invalides on the 26th. 2 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 

directive authorized the Supreme Commander to deal with the French Committee of National Li beration as the de facto 

authority in France. By the terms of the 

five memorandums which made up the 

1 See above, Ch. XIII. 

2 The contents of the following files are valuable 

on this phase of negotiations: SHAEF SGS 014.1 

France, Civil Affairs Dir for France, I; and SHAEF 

G-5 702 Dirs-France. The agreement actually bears 

the date 25 August 1945. This was done to make it 

coincide with a Washington press announcement, 

after it became clear that General Koenig and General Eisenhower could not make the exchange in 

person on the 25th. The terms were transmitted by 

the Supreme Commander to the French commander 

by radio on the 25th and General Koenig arranged 

for his letter of exchange to bear that date. Interv 

with Gen Holmes, 5Jun 47; photostatic copy ofLtr, 

Koenig to Eisenhower, 25 Aug 44, SHAEF G-5 730 

Internal Affairs Branch. 
320 

civil affairs agreement, General Eisenhower was authorized to take all measures 

essential to the successful conduct of military operations. To simplify the administration of civil affairs in France, the 

French Committee of National Liberation 

agreed to the establishment of a forward 

zone and a zone of interior. In the former, 

a military delegate, appointed by the 

French Committee and acting in accordance with French law, was to carry out 

those measures deemed necessary by the 

Supreme Commander. In emergencies affecting military operations or where no 

French authority was available, the Supreme Commander could act alone. The 

Allied chief was also permitted to ask the 

French delegate to take action under the 

French Law of Siege. In the zone of interior, the French authorities had full 

power of administration, subject to military requirements of the Supreme Commander. The right of the Allies to use 

ports, fortified naval bases, and troop concentration points in the zone of interior 

was guaranteed. 3 

In matters pertaining to the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the Allied forces over their 

troops, the establishment of claims commissions, and the. procedure for requisitioning supplies and services and the like, 

the agreement followed the lines already 

laid down in the earlier civil affairs memorandums concluded separately between 

the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, and between Great 

Britain and the same powers. One important memorandum-that dealing with 

paper currency issued for the use of Allied 

forces in continental France-settled a 

problem which had troubled the Supreme 

Commander in the early days of the invasion. The French Committee accepted this 

paper currency as if it had been issued by 

the Central French Treasury and agreed 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

that any similar currency issued in the 

future would be furnished by the French 

Treasury and put at the disposal of the 

Allied forces in the amount deemed necessary by the Supreme Commander. Another 

important memorandum was that dealing 

with censorship. By its provisions the Supreme Commander was to exercise strict 

military censorship in the forward zone. 

In the zone of interior, the French services 

agreed to consult the censorship authorities of SHAEF on aU matters relating to 

military operations and to impose censorship instructions given by Supreme Headquarters. French authorities were to have 

no control over publications intended 

solely for Allied troops other than French. 

SHAEF Mission (France) 

Much of the work of dealing with the 

French was given by the Supreme Commander to the SHAEF Mission (France), 

which had been organized before the invasion for that purpose. The mission was 

to provide liaison between the French 

Government and Supreme Headquarters 

and was to furnish a staff to aid the Frenth 

in dealing with civil affairs in liberated 

France. Maj. Gen. John 1": Lewis, formerly 

commanding general of the Military District of vVashington, headed the mission, 

and General Redman served as his British 

deputy. The mission was established in 

Paris on 3 September by CoL Alden K. 

Sibley. He, and later General Redman, 

served temporarily as head of the mission 

until General Lewis assumed command in 

mid-September. 4 

3 For texts of the civil affairs memorandums see 

photostatic copy of agreement initialed in Washington, 15 August 1944, SHAEF G-~ 702 Dirs-Franee. 

4 See the series of papers between dates 31 August 

1944 and 8 September 1944 dealing with the establishment of the mission, in SHAEF SGS 322.01/5 

SHAEF Mission (France). 
RELATIONS WITH LIBERATED COUNTRIES 321 

General Eisenhower accredited General 

Lewis to General de Gaulle on 15 September and gave the head of the mission the 

task of representing the Supreme Commander in official dealings by SHAEF 

with the French de facto authority. The 

mission was to be the authorizing and 

screening agency when commands under 

SHAEF wished to establish contact with 

the “French authority.” 5 

Shortly after the establishment of the 

SHAEF mission, General Koenig appointed Lt. Gen. Louis Koeltz as his personal liaison officer at SHAEF. SHAEF 

agreed to the arrangement after it had 

been made clear that he was merely to 

report to SHAEF the views of the French 

Government on questions put to it by 

SHAEF Mission (France). In particular, 

General Koeltz was charged with presenting to SHAEF the French views on military dispositions in regard to Germany as 

well as over-all plans for the use and 

armament of French forces. 6 

Problems Arising Out of the Move to Paris 

The liberation of Paris and the re-establishment of French authority there were 

accompanied by a rush to the French 

capital of military and civilian personnel 

from outside the Continent. The groups 

involved were frequently of such importance that requests for transportation 

came directly to the SHAEF chief of staff 

and even to the Supreme Commander at 

a time when operational demands on 

them were extremely heavy. One of the 

first such problems arose in early September when General de Gaulle asked for aid 

in moving some 3,000 administrative 

officers from Algiers to the French capital. 

When SHAEF officials held that such “a 

mass immigration” was impossible and 

asked the French chief to set a priority for 

the movement of various echelons of this 

group, General de Gaulle protested to 

General Eisenhower that Supreme Headquarters was holding up the shift of French 

officials to Paris. The Supreme Commander denied any such intent, and repeated the request for a priority list according to which the transfer could be 

made. This was worked out by 11 September and General Eisenhower ordered that 

the 100 most important officers be brought 

immediately by air, and the remainder as 

and when an opportunity offered. The 

movement was finally completed by 1 

November. 7 

Special requests to the SHAEF chief of 

staff and his deputies for movements of 

various Allied civilian groups and individuals to the French capital multiplied 

5 SHAEF dir to Gen Lewis, 15 Sep 44, SHAEF 

Mission (France) file, France Mission 091.112–1, I. 

SHAEF to Lewis, 28 Mar 45, sub: Amendment to 

Dir; SHAEF to Lewis, 22 Feb 45, sub: Amendment 

to Dir. Both in SHAEF SGS 322.01/5 SHAEF Mission (France). 

Among the important sections of SHAEF Mission 

(France) and their chiefs were the following: G–5 

Section, Brigadier S. S. Lee; Naval Division, Vice 

Adm. Alan G. Kirk; Air Division, Air Commodore 

Lord Arthur Forbes; and Rearmament Division, Brig. 

Gen. Harold F. Loomis. Later Brig. Gen. Jack W. 

Wood became head of the Air Division, retaining Air 

Commodore Forbes as his deputy. Brig. Gen. John 

A. Appleton, Director General, Military Railways, 

and Chief, Military Railways Branch, G–4 Division, 

SHAEF, was later made available to the G–4, SHAEF 

Mission (France), for consultation on railway matters. Stf Memo 16, SHAEF Mission (France), 14 Oct 

44; Ramsay to Lewis, Ramsay to Kirk, 13 Oct 44; 

Organization, SHAEF Mission (France), Mar 45. All 

in SHAEF SGS 322.01/5 SHAEF Mission (France). 

6 Memo,SHAEF for SHAEF Mission (France), 15 

Sep 44, Sub: Liaison With French National Authority; Juin to Smith, 18 Sep 44; Juin to SHAEF Mission (France), 28 Sep 44; Instr atchd to Ltr, Juin to 

Lewis, 28 Sep 44; Lewis to Smith, 29 Sep 44, with 

Smith’s note, “I have no objection. If you have none, 

I suggest we accept Gen Koeltz on this basis.” All in 

SHAEF SGS 322.01/21 French Military Mission 

(Liaison With the French). 

7 See extensive correspondence on the subject 

throughout September and October 1944 in SHAEF 

SGS 092 France, French Relations, III. 
322 

after mid-September. Indicative of this 

type of problem, which frequently took the 

time of SHAEF officiais at the highest 

level, was the request of an Allied embassy for the movement of seventeen members of its staff plus Italian enlisted men, 

Arab houseboys, and several French and 

Belgian civilians and their chauffeurs. 

This plea was brought to the attention of 

at least three high-ranking members of 

SHAEF. General Morgan, to whom the 

problem was ultimately presented, approved the movement of members of the 

staff but ruled out the additional attached 

personnel. 8 

Businessmen as well as officials sought 

admittance to the French capital. This 

question of entry was aired in late September by the London Daily Mail. The newspaper alleged that British officials were 

being held up when they attempted to go 

to Paris, whereas U.S. businessmen were 

arriving in the uniforms of Red Cross 

workers or junior officers and being given 

special priority. These charges, though 

not substantiated, were brought to General Smith's attention by the SHAEF 

Public Relations Division, which suggested that a fixed policy on the transportation of civilians to Paris be made public. 

At this point SHAEF also investigated the 

appearance of an advertisement of a U.S. 

firm on a billboard along the ChampsElysees shortly after the Allied forces entered the city. When it was found that a 

Red Cross representative had acted as 

intermediary between U.S. and French 

advertising agencies, SHAEF ordered the 

man returned home. The Red Cross 

organization concurred in the action. 9 

The Supreme Commander was especially concerned about the movement of 

U.S. personnel into Paris. In England, he 

had insisted that his own headquarters be 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

moved out of London, and he held that so 

far as possible military headquarters 

should stay out oflarge cities. Despite this 

often-expressed view, Headquarters, Communications Zone, moved its forward 

echelon from areas near Cherbourg to 

Paris during the early days of September 

before the Supreme Commander was 

aware of the shift. Army commanders 

charged that vital gasoline supplies were 

used in the move, and that the headquarters was out of touch with the supply 

situation at a time when its control was 

critically needed. The commanding general of Communications Zone, General 

Lee, held that the headquarters had to be 

moved forward in order to keep in touch 

with the supply situation, and he believed 

it necessary to go into the chief communications center of France. 

Advance parties of General Lee's headquarters requisitioned most of the hotels 

and buildings occupied by the German 

forces in Paris and asked for additional 

billets. General Koenig on hearing that 

8,000 officers and 21,000 men were to settle in the city pointed out that they would 

require more hotels than Paris possessed. 

He objected to the requisitioning of schools 

for billets and suggested that a great part 

of the U.S. force be located outside the 

city. General Smith agreed that schools 

should not be requisitioned, and General 

Eisenhower promptly prohibited the es-

(ablishment of any Allied headquarters 

within the area of Paris without his specific 

approval. Shortly thereafter a member of 

his personal staff reported unfavorably on 

the rapid increase of U.S. personnel in the 

to Morgan, 11 Sep 44; Morgan to AF 

1 and 2, 12 Sep 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 092 France, 

French Relations, III. 

• Gen Allen to Gen Smith, S-60275, 21 Sep 44; 

Barker to CofS SHAEF, 14 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 

014.1 Paris, Civil Affairs in Paris, I. 
RELATIONS WITH LIBERATED COUNTRIES 323 

city, their dress, discipline, and conduct. 

He noted in particular, that members of 

the supply organization were engaged in 

black market activities near the Arc de 

Triomphe. 

General Eisenhower then issued the 

Communications Zone commander a 

sharp order to stop the entry into Paris of 

every individual not needed there for essential duty, and to send away everyone 

whose presence was not necessary. He 

added that the initial move had been made 

without his knowledge and that he was 

permitting the headquarters to remain 

only because of the difficulty of making a 

shift at that stage of operations. He characterized the influx of U.S. personnel, including the members of General Lee's 

headquarters, as "extremely unwise" and 

insisted that the situation be corrected as 

quickly as possible without interfering 

with the operations of fighting units. 10 

To give force to this directive, General 

Smith in October held a conference with 

members of the SHAEF staff and Communications Zone and got a promise that 

the latter would release one fourth of its 

167 hotels and Seine Base Section would 

release all but twenty of its 129 hotels in 

the city. Nevertheless, the number of requests by U.S. units for building space in 

the Paris region continued to increase. M. 

François Coulet, delegate for interallied 

relations to the SHAEF Mission (France), 

protested in mid-December that nearly all 

available premises had been occupied, and 

that the French people were beginning to 

think that U.S. Army demands were in exof those made by the Germans. The 

Ardennes counterattack within the Same 

week effectively ended complaints on this 

score for a time. 11 

The overcrowding of Paris was increased when U.S. and British leave centers were established there. By 1 February 

1945, 8,400 U.S. and 700 British soldiers 

were reaching the city daily on seventytwo-hour passes. Studies at that time indicated that more than 21,000 persons belonging to U.S. units were located in an 

area bound by a road net approximately 

fifteen miles from the geographical center 

of Paris. Troops in the Seine Section outside this zone and the Department of the 

Seine pushed the total to over 160,000. 

SHAEF in March 1945 sought once more 

to move part of this force outside the Department of the Seine, but found the task 

impossible. The situation had not been 

greatly improved at the close of the war. 

Even after redeployment began, the Allies 

were unable to vacate billet space rapidly 

enough to meet French needs. 12 

French Rearmament 

One of the chief problems in the fall of 

1944 was the rearmament of French 

forces. The United States and Great Britain, as already indicated, had begun to 

rearm French troops long before the crossChannel attack. The United States had 

taken on this task in North Africa. 13 had 

largely equipped the forces that fought in 

Italy, and then had furnished supplies for 

French forces in the OVERLORD and ANVIL 

operations. By the fall of 1944 eight divi10 Koenig to SHAEF Fwd Liaison Sec, 9 Sep 44; 

Smith to Koenig, FWD 14542, 11 Sep 44; Eisenhower 

to ANCXF, USSTAF, AEAF, et al., FWD 14637, 

12 Sep 44; Sibley to Crawford, 12 Sep 44; Eisenhower 

to Lee, FWD 15033, 16 Sep 44. All in SHAEF SGS 

014.1 Paris, Civil Affairs in Paris, I. 

11 Conf, Gen Smith with members of SHAEF, 

COMZ, et al., Paris, 20 Oct 44; Coulet to SHAEF 

Mission, 11 Dec 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 014.1 Paris, 

Civil Affairs in Paris. I. 

12 Rpt to SHAEF as of 1 Feb 45, SCAEF to 

ANCXF, et al., 8 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS 0 014.1 Paris, 

civil Affairs in Paris. I. 

13 See above, p. 150. 
324 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

sions equipped by the Allies were in 

France. Once the liberation of France had 

been completed, the French authorities 

pressed for Allied approval of a program, 

outlined before D Day, for arming liberated manpower. Assuming that a large 

number of men of military age would be 

liberated shortly after the invasion of the 

Continent, the French had asked for aid in 

raising new divisions. SHAEF explained 

that its main need was not for fighting 

men, but for some 172,000 men (of whom 

140,000 would be French) to guard lines 

of communications and maintain internal 

security. These troops, who would require 

far less equipment than regular fighting 

units, would be in a position to relieve 

fighting men who otherwise would have 

to be assigned to such duties. 14 

The French authorities stressed the importance to national morale of arming 

mobilized personnel as soon as possible. 

General Grasett, the SHAEF G–5, agreed 

that the failure to use French liberated 

manpower in fighting units might have a 

serious psychological effect on other troops 

at the front. He warned that the French 

would never be convinced that maintaining internal security and furnishing unskilled labor in base areas constituted 

appropriate tasks for their men of military 

age. General Eisenhower replied that his 

immediate need was for internal security 

and garrison troops, but said that he was 

willing to make an effort to equip a few 

Commando-type units for combat action. 

The problem of the proper use of liberated 

manpower had not been settled at the time 

of the landings in southern France in midAugust. 

The manpower question became more 

pressing in September 1944 as the rapid 

sweep of Allied forces across northern 

France and up the Rhône valley made 

available thousands of Frenchmen of military age. The French high command set 

about the task of organizing two new divisions from these troops, and spoke of raising the number to five. This figure, the 

French indicated, had been accepted in 

principle during General de Gaulle's visit 

to Washington in July 1944. General Marshall then asked that the matter be settled 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

To deal with questions affecting the 

French metropolitan forces, the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in the fall of 1944 moved to 

Paris the Joint Rearmament Commission, 

a Franco-American group which had been 

organized in December 1942 to deal with 

the rearmament of the French. In October 

the group became the Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission (France). Brig. Gen. 

Harold F. Loomis, who had headed the 

commission in North Africa, remained its 

chief. In December, British members were 

added to the group and the new integrated 

staff section was made responsible for rearmament questions concerning all liberated countries in Europe. 15 

14 This section, save where otherwise noted, is 

based on Dr. Marcel Vigneras’ The Rearmament of 

the French Forces in World War II, now in preparation for the series U N I T E D S T A T E S ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR II. 

15 The Rearmament Division was charged with the 

following duties: (1) to set xp and implement ground 

and air rearmament programs which the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff had approved or might approve in 

SHAEF’s sphere, (2) to provide inspection and training groups for the formation of approved units, (3) 

to co-ordinate within SHAEF and with the nation 

concerned all demands for rearmament of units not in 

approved rearmament programs, (4) to keep the staff 

sections of SHAEF and missions to foreign governments informed regarding rearmament programs and 

proposals for rearmament put forward by various nations. SHAEF to SHAEF Mission (France), 22 Dec 44, 

sub: Inclusion of Disarmament Div in SHAEF Mission (France); SHAEF to all concerned, 29 Dec 44, 

sub: Rearmament Div, SHAEF Mission (France). 

Both in SHAEF SGS 322.01/5 SHAEF Mission 

(France). 
RELATIONS WITH LIBERATED COUNTRIES 325 

The slowing of the Allied offensive in 

September 1944 and the growing lack of 

infantry replacements led General Eisenhower at the end of October to re-examine 

the possibility of equipping additional 

French divisions. In September, he had 

doubted that new divisions could be 

equipped and trained in time to be of 

value in the campaigns in northwest Europe, but he now asked that the matter be 

reopened. He suggested raising two additional French divisions and increasing the 

liberated manpower ceiling from 172,000 

to 460,000. This new figure included 

243,000 Frenchmen. The revised estimate 

was intended to take care of new manpower commitments such as those needed 

for territorial command headquarters, the 

gendarmerie, garde mobile, labor battalions, 

and the like. 

In mid-November 1944, the French 

submitted a proposal to SHAEF for equipping eight new divisions. At SHAEF's insistence the proposal was revised to meet 

SHAEF's needs for security and line-ofcommunications troops and forwarded to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. That group, 

despite SHAEF's declaration that all or 

any part of the plan would be of great 

value to the Allied forces, did not act upon 

it immediately. The proposal was still 

pending when the enemy counteroffensive 

of mid-December made Allied manpower 

a major problem. 

Recognition of the French Provisional 

Government 

President Roosevelt was disappointed in 

his hope that the French Committee would 

be satisfied with the defacto recognition 

provided in the August agreement. On 30 

August 1944, General de Gaulle proclaimed the establishment in Paris of the 

Provisional Government of the French 

Republic. Two weeks later he announced 

that elections to determine the form of the 

French government would be held as soon 

as French sovereignty had been restored, 

her territories liberated, and the French 

war prisoners and deportees returned to 

their homes. 16 

In mid-September the U.S. political officer at SHAEF, Mr. Samuel Reber, 

warned the State Department that failure 

to grant early recognition to the French 

Provisional Government might cause it to 

lose prestige and leave it poorly equipped. 

The Supreme Commander, when asked in 

October by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff for his 

recommendations, urged formal recognition of the de Gaulle group as the provisional government of France. This opinion, 

which coincided with views already held 

by many European countries, apparently 

found ready acceptance in Washington. 

On 23 October, the United States, the 

Soviet Union, Great Britain, and some 

five other nations recognized the French 

Provisional Government headed by General de Gaulle. A French zone of interior 

in which civil rather than military authority would prevail was proclaimed the 

same day. The United States named Mr. 

Jefferson Caffery, who was acting as the 

American diplomatic representative "near 

the de facto authority of France," as ambassador to the new government. As their 

ambassador, the British named Mr. Duff 

Cooper. Shortly afterward, General Eisenhower and the head of the SHAEF Mission (France) were told to rely on these 

two representatives, rather than the British and U.S. political officers at SHAEF, 

16 De Gaulle, Discours et Messages, pp. 485-86. 
326 

for political advice on French affairs. 17 

The proclamation of a French zone of 

interior on 23 October 1944 followed negotiations of more than a month between 

General de Gaulle and SHAEF representatives. During late September and 

early October, SHAEF and French authorities selected the departments to be included in the new zone and exchanged 

assurances that the civil affairs agreement 

signed in August would remain in effect 

in this area. The Supreme Commander on 

13 October suggested that the French 

Government declare that a zone of interior 

existed within the boundaries of the following departments: Seine-Inferieure, 

Oise, Seine-et-Marne, Yonne, Nievre, 

Saone-et-Loire, Rhone, Ardeche, and 

Gard. The French made clear that military zones would be established along the 

Atlantic coast where German resistance 

still existed. 18 

The zone of interior was not enlarged 

until 1945. Shortly after the New Year, the 

SHAEF deputy G-3 suggested that 

SHAEF extend it before the French asked 

for such action, and thus anticipate their 

complaint that concessions were made 

only after repeated requests. 19 Headquarters, Communications Zone, strongly objected to this proposal, pointing to the 

various difficulties which would arise in 

regard to Allied control of railroads, the 

requisitioning of billets and hospitals, and 

other administrative questions. SHAEF 

postponed a decision for the moment and 

called conferences to settle some of the existing administrative problems. General 

Morgan, acting in place oftheSHAEF 

chief of staff, held that the difficulties cited 

would exist whether or not the zone of interior was extended, and he directed the 

SHAEF G-3 to study the expansion of the 

zone to include all of France except 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Alsace-Lorraine. Before the study could be 

completed, GeneralJuin asked for an enlargement of the zone of interior, but requested less than SHAEF was prepared to 

give. SHAEF staff members thought the 

French had purposely omitted departments along the frontiers in the fear that 

the Ministry of War would have to surrender its control of these regions to the 

Ministry of the Interior. 20 SHAEF approved the French proposals, subject to the 

proviso that the agreements of25 August 

should not be affected. The Atlantic and 

Dunkerque areas, where the Germans 

were still resisting, were to continue to be 

military zones, and hospitals andother 

military and supply installations in the 

new zone of interior were to remain in Allied hands. 21 The new zone of interior, expanded to include the departments of 

Pas-de-Calais, Somme, Aisne, Marne, 

Aube, Haute-Marne, Cote-d'Or, Drome, 

Vaucluse, Bouches-du-Rhone, and Var, 

was announced on 24 April 1945. 22 

Shortly after conclusion of the armistice 

with the enemy in May 1945 the French 

Government asked that all France be in17 SHAEF Fwd (Reber) to WD for State Dept for 

Dunn, FWD 14734, 13 Sep 44;JCS to Eisenhower, 

W-47959, 17 Oct 44; Eisenhower toJCS, S-63111, 

20 Oct 44. All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, French 

Relations, III. 

18 Eisenhower toJuin, 13 Oct 44; Eisenhower to 

A Gp and COMZ comdrs, 13 Oct 44; Juin to Eisenhower, 18 Oct 44, and related papers, Sep-Oct 44. 

All in SHAEF SGS 371 France, Zone of the Interior, 

I. 

19 Memo, Whiteley for CofS SHAEF, 10Jan 45, 

SHAEF SGS 371 France, Zone of the Interior, 1. 

20 Memo, G-2 SHAEF for G-3 SHAEF, 24 Mar 

45; Morgan to G-3 SHAEF, 5 Mar 45; Larkin 

(Deputy CG COMZ) to SHAEF, 14 Mar 45. All in 

SHAEF SGS 371 France, Zone of the Interior, 1. 

21 Smith to Juin, 11 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS 371 

France, Zone of the Interior, 1. 

22 SHAEF to AGW AR for cbs, FWD 19789,23 

Apr 45, SHAEF SGS 371 France, Zone of the Interior,1. 
RELATIONS WITH LIBERATED COUNTRIES 327 

eluded in the zone of interior, but added 

that the frontier departments were to remain in the hands of the War Ministry 

rather than being transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. SHAEF did not object to this extension, asking only that 

existing arrangements relating to accommodations, transportation, airfields, and 

ports be confirmed. The extension was put 

into effect by the French on 13 July 1945.23 

Dissolution 0/ the French Resistance Forces 

With the liberation of Paris, the French 

Committee of National Liberation as well 

as SHAEF became aware ofthe need of 

bringing the French Forces of the Interior 

under the control of the newly established 

French authority. Fearful of the danger to 

public order which might come from irresponsible partisan bands after the liberation, General Koenig as early as 11 August 

issued instructions for receiving volunteers 

from the French Forces of the Interior into 

the French Regular Army. Two weeks 

later General de Gaulle decreed that elements of the Resistance forces likely to 

participate in coming operations were to 

be regularly drafted into the Army as the 

territory in which they fought was liberated. On 28 August he dissolved the high 

command of the underground forces in 

Paris and gave its duties to the commanding generals of the different military 

regions into which France was divided. 

The commanding generals of existing 

units were authorized to accept all volunteers from the French Forces of the Interior as replacements or as members of 

new units. Volunteers were also to be accepted to fill the needs of the gendarmerie, 

garde mobile, and other local police and defense elements. Units were to be activated 

to keep order in the rear areas and were 

held liable to combat duty at the discretion of the commanding officers of the 

military regions. Further decrees ruled 

that all the men who had voluntarily 

fought the enemy during operations leadingto the liberation of national territory 

belonged to the French Forces ofthe Interior. They were held to constitute an integral part of the French Army and were 

subjected to Army regulations. Existing 

FFI units were to be reorganized immediately into separate infantry battalions or 

so far as practicable into similar units of 

other arms.24 

SHAEF, vitally interested in all measures looking toward the establishment of 

order in France while military operations 

were in progress, was especially concerned 

about the reactions of Resistance forces to 

General de Gaulle's orders. The Military 

Resistance Committee (COMAC) immediately criticized the decree as unfavorable to a national, popular, and democratic army. This reaction, which SHAEF 

thought might have been politically inspired, also appeared to rest on the feeling 

of many Resistance leaders that their personal deserts would be overlooked once 

they were integrated into the Regular 

Army. Many of the Resistance leaders had 

acquired high rank in the FFI and resented being placed under Regular Army 

officers who had been less active during 

23 Bull to SHAEF divs, 15 May 45; SHAEF to A 

Gps et al., 31 May 45; Morgan for Smith to Juin, 

6Jun 45; SHAEF Memo, Extension of the Zone of 

the Interior, in France, 2 Jul 45; SHAEF to CCS, 

SCAF 479, 13Ju145. Ail in SHAEF SGS 371 France, 

Zone of the Interior, 1. 

24 Koenig, General Instructions, Organization of 

the FFI, 11 Aug 44; de Gaulle decision, 28 Aug 44; 

Minister of War A. Diethelm to Dept of CofS and 

CGs Military Regions, 28 Aug 44, Ministry of War 

decree on organization of FFI, 19 Sep 44; Ministry 

of War decree on status of FFI, 20 Sep 44. All in 

SHAEF SGS 322 FFI, Command and Control ofFFI. 
328 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

the war. In addition, many members of 

the Resistance preferred to remain under 

their former commanders. General de 

Lattre understood this reaction and made 

an effort to absorb the FFI elements into 

his army with the least damage possible to 

the esprit de corps that they had developed. 

Many members of the FFI gave up their 

arms and returned to their homes, while 

137,000 ultimately joined the 250,000 

Regular forces of the Army of the Rhine 

and the Danube. In parts of Brittany, 

however, where few Allied troops were left 

after the rapid advance to the east, Resistance members insisted on retaining 

their arms to deal with enemy groups that 

had been overrun. 

In September, the French authorities, 

fearing trouble from Communist-inspired 

troops, asked SHAEF to divert elements 

of the First French Army to disaffected 

areas to preserve internal stability. Operational requirements made it impossible 

for General Eisenhower to grant this request, but he agreed to recommend that 

the Mediterranean Supreme Commander 

send French forces from his theater to 

France where they could be used for keeping order. SHAEF, he emphasized, desired that order be preserved in France, 

and by French, not by Allied, authorities. 

In mid-October General Lewis reported 

that. while danger of excesses by extremist 

elements ofthe FFI still existed, the worst 

period of disorganization had passed. As 

late as February 1945, however, General 

de Gaulle asked for the withdrawal of several large French units from the Army 

zone for reconstitution and training and to 

insure that contact was maintained ‘‘between certain regions of the country and 

its organized army.” Despite fears of possible trouble, the dissolution of the Resistance forces throughout France was accomplished for the most part without 

incident. 25 

After the official dissolution of the 

French Forces of the Interior in the liberated areas of France, General Koenig 

remained in command of these forces in 

enemy-occupied areas. He was directed on 

23 November to relinquish this control at 

the end of the month, and the French 

Forces of the Interior in occupied areas 

were ordered to come under the local military regional commanders. The section of 

the former FFI headquarters in London, 

which had remained in operation to deal 

with Resistance activities in nonliberated 

France, was also ordered to close on 1 

December . 26 

Relations With Belgium 

Civil affairs problems in Belgium differed in some respects from those in France 

but were no less difficult to settle. King 

Leopold was in captivity, but the legal 

government of Belgium, headed by Prime 

Minister Hubert Pierlot, was returned to 

power in Brussels by the Allies very shortly 

after the city was liberated. As a matter of 

fact, the first task of Maj. Gen. G. W. E. J. 

Erskine (Br.), head of the SHAEF Mission 

(Belgium), was to arrange speedy passage 

for members of the Belgian Government 

25 PWD Intel Sec, Special Rpt (France) 10, 9 Oct 

44, SHAEF SGS 322 FFI, Command and Control of 

FFI. Juin to Eisenhower, 11 Sep 44; Bull to 6th A Gp, 

19 Sep 44; de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 21 Sep 44; 

Memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 22 Sep 44; Eisenhower 

to de Gaulle, 25 Sep 44; 6th A Gp to SHAEF, 

B–16713.26 Sep 44; de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 15 Feb 

45. All in SHAEF SGS 475/2 France, Employment of 

French Forces, I and II. Rpt, Gen Lewis to SAC, 

Progress Rpt 3, 19 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 219 French 

Mission Fortnightly Reports, 1/23, I; SHAEF Mission (France) to SHAEF G–2, 6 Dec 44, SHAEF Mission (France) AG 09 1.7 1.711–5 1–5 (Fr) Combined, II. 

26 SHAEF Mission (France) AG 091. 711–5 (Fr) 

Combined, II. 
RELATIONS WITH LIBERATED COUNTRIES 329 

and Parliament to Brussels in time for the 

opening of Parliament on 19 September 

1944.27 Once this was settled satisfactorily, 

he gave his aid to the solution of a number 

of pressing problems, such as rushing the 

release of a Belgian franc note issue prepared by the Bank of England, disarming 

the Resistance forces, establishing an 

armed gendarmerie to keep order, and arming Belgian forces to protect Allied lines of 

communications. 28 As in France, the 

SHAEF Mission had no desire to interfere 

in the control of internal affairs but intended to help the existing government 

prevent any disorders that were likely to 

interfere with Allied operations. 

Belgian Resistance Forces 

SHAEF's two main interests in Belgium 

in the fall of 1944 were the rapid establishment of order and the raising of special 

battalions to support the Allied forces. 

These measures were closely tied up with 

the dissolution of the Resistance forces in 

Belgium, which were believed to be infiltrated by left-wing sympathizers opposed 

to the Pierlot government. The situation 

was somewhat delicate in view of the valuable contributions made by the Resistance 

forces to the liberation of Belgium. The 

underground units had numbered an estimated 30,000 effective members at the 

time the Allies reached the Belgian border 

and rapidly increased their forces as the 

enemy was driven eastward. While the depletion of stores in August had reduced 

their activities somewhat in the period before 1 September, they had made a valuable contribution after that date. When 

the Allies crossed the border, they sent 

Special Air Service forces to aid the Resistance units that were proving to be especially useful in the southern Ardennes 

and in the Hainaut Province. Placed 

under Maj. Gen. Yvan Gerard Gerard at 

the end of August, the Resistance elements 

aided the Allied advance in particular by 

mopping up isolated pockets of Germans 

and by protecting the flanks of the Allied 

arnlies. 29 

In asking that the Resistance forces be 

dissolved, the Pierlot government desired 

first of all to esta blish order. In addition, 

however, it hoped to draw on these elements for manpower to increase the gendarmerie, strengthen the Regular Army, 

and organize special battalions for the Allies. SHAEF was especially interested in 

this last objective. In September, U.S. 

units had used Belgian forces of the interior in the drive across Belgium, but they 

could not employ them in Germany unless they became part of the Belgian Army. 

SHAEF favored the Belgian Government's effort to dissolve the Resistance organizations and integrate their members 

into Regular Army and police units. As a 

step toward this end General Eisenhower 

joined the Belgian Government in inviting 

the populace to surrender all arms and 

military equipment. A delay by many in 

accepting this invitation heightened the 

government's apprehension. On 29 September, the Supreme Commander, in an 

Order of the Day recognizing and praising the great contri butions of the Resistance forces to Belgium's liberation, said 

that they could now best serve their country by turning in their weapons and waiting for instructions as to the part they 

27 General Erskine's deputy was Col. John B. Sherman (U.S.). 

28 Rpt, Erskine to SHAEF (Morgan), 15 Sep 44; 

SHAEF to Erskine, 15 Sep 44. SHAEF SGS 322.01/6 

SHAEF Mission (Belgium). 

29 Rpts, SFHQ to SHAEF, Monthly Rpts 12 and 

13 (Aug and Sep 44), 10 Sep and 10 Oct 44, SHAEF 

SGS 319.1/10 Monthly SOE/SO Rpts SFHQ. 
330 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

could play in the coming fight against 

Germany. The Front de l’Indépendence, 

which represented many of the Resistance 

organizations, anticipated this request by 

announcing that until its program was accomplished it would not disarm. La Nation 

Belge, one of the conservative newspapers 

of Brussels, was amused by General Eisenhower’s suggestion that the Resistance 

forces should surrender their arms on the 

ground that they were urgently needed for 

other purposes. It commented: “Others 

besides ourselves will catch the humor of 

the lecture; it is not for nothing that General Eisenhower is from Mark Twain’s 

country. It is absolutely American, and 

now we may expect the Belgians, who are 

supposed to have a sense of humor, will 

respond by deferring without delay to a bit 

of advice that is not the less imperative for 

having been given in a fatherly fashion.” 30 

Many Resistance elements retained 

their arms and remained outside regular 

Belgian police and military organizations. 

SHAEF representatives pressed the question of raising special battalions at a meeting in Brussels on 10 October with officers 

of the 12th Army Group and the Belgian 

Ministry of National Defense. The Belgians made a commitment to raise fortyfour battalions for the Allied forces, and 

SHAEF agreed to request equipment from 

the War Office for the units which were to 

be enrolled in the Belgian National Army. 

Belgian representatives declared that the 

required number of men, some 62,000 in 

all, would be raised even if conscription 

had to be used. Of this number, approximately 35,200 were to go to the forty-four 

battalions, 17,000 into labor groups, and 

10,000 to the gendermerie. 31 

SHAEF Mission (Belgium) reported a 

non-co-operative attitude on the part of 

the Resistance forces, adding that this reaction was a mixture of opposition to the 

government, resentment over food and 

coal shortages, and a feeling that they were 

not being properly rewarded for their efforts. Near the end of October, General 

Erskine warned the Supreme Commander 

that the continued existence of an armed 

Resistance force, now estimated at 70,000, 

as opposed to some 6,000 members of the 

police and gendarmerie, made possible 

serious rioting which would cause a breakdown of government. General Eisenhower, 

concerned over the possible effect of such 

a development on military operations, reminded the Belgian Premier that the carrying of arms, except by those specifically 

authorized to do so by army group commanders, could no longer be permitted in 

the zone of the armies. The Belgian Government now called on civilians to turn in 

their weapons to the nearest gendarmerie 

barracks and receive a disbanding indemnity. Resistance forces were also invited to enlist in the Regular Army. 32 

The Supreme Commander made a formal visit to Brussels on 9 November and 

spoke before the Belgian Parliament and 

at a ceremony honoring the Belgian unknown soldier. His appearance was believed to be helpful to the government. 

30 Rpt, Belgian Press Opinion, 3 Oct 44, Daily 

Summary of Newspapers (hereafter cited as Belgian 

Press Opinion), SHAEF G–5 hist file 17.02 Mission 

to Belgium, Final Rpt, I. The author has relied on 

SHAEF SGS 016/1 Summary of Decisions, II, for 

statements relative to the proclamation of 29 September 1944. It should be noted that the author has followed SHAEF reports on developments in Belgium 

in 1944–45, and has used reports of the SHAEF Mission (Belgium) in his interpretations of events. 

31 Mtg at SHAEF Mission (Belgium), 10 Oct 44, 

SHAEF SGS 322.01/6 SHAEF Mission (Belgium). 

32 Erskine to SHAEF, 21 Oct 44, SHAEF G–5 

132.02 Mission to Belgium; Belgian Press Opinion; 

Eisenhower to Belgian Prime Minister, 27 Oct 44, 

summarized in SHAEF SGS 016/1 Summary of Decisions, II. 
RELATIONS WITH LIBERATED COUNTRIES 331 

Four days later the Ministry of National 

Defense set 18 November as the date for 

demobilizing the Resistance forces. The 

temporary permission of 13 September 

giving members ofthe Resistance groups 

the right to bear arms was withdrawn. In 

the meantime, anticipating possible trouble on 18 November, SHAEF officials 

drew up a directive which, while disavowing any desire to interfere in Belgian affairs, instructed General Erskine to take 

full precautions to secure Allied installations and lines of communications in 

Belgium. He was to intervene only if the 

Belgian Government called for aid, or if 

strikes, riots, and picketing made such action necessary to safeguard military operations. Independent action was to be 

taken only in an extreme emergency. Requests for military assistance from the 

Allies were to be in writing and, if possible, to have government approvaL 33 

The Resistance representative and the 

two Communist members of the Pierlot 

cabinet resigned in protest against the government's decree of 13 November. When 

this action was followed by a demonstration against the government, General 

Erskine conferred with the three former 

ministers and reminded them that the 

necessities of war and military operations 

required that no unauthorized person 

should bear arms. He requested formally 

that the Resistance forces turn their arms 

over to the government and avoid incidents which might bring conflicts with the 

Allied forces. He emphasized that the Allies would support the Ministry fully. The 

three former ministers now joined General 

Erskine in a statement designed to avoid 

clashes between the Resistance and Allied 

forces. Some Belgian newspapers expressed 

regret that Allied representatives had been 

called in to settle a problem which the Belgian Government should have handled. 

Shortly after the meeting of General 

Erskine with the disaffected ministers, the 

Resistance groups agreed to collect all 

arms and hand them in to the "inter-allied 

authorities." 34 

Strong feeling against the government 

nevertheless persisted. On 25 November 

a demonstration was organized in the Rue 

de la Loi near the chief government building in Brussels. Anticipating trouble, British commanders in Brussels had ordered 

their forces to stand by to give aid to the 

Belgian Government. Allied armored 

vehicles were moved near the government 

buildings but took no part in breaking up 

the demonstration. The Communist press 

in Belgium quickly protested the government's action against the demonstrators 

and reprinted with glee a London News 

Chronicle editorial saying that the incident 

showed the unpopularity of the Pierlot 

government, which was holding its authority with the support of the Allied high 

command. The London Times warned 

that it would be disastrous if the Allies exposed themselves to the charge of favoring 

or boycotting this or that ideology or of 

maintaining in power a group of ministers 

that had no substantial backing in popular 

opinion and would be likely to disappear 

once the army was withdrawn. General 

Erskine found it necessary to explain that 

he had ordered an alert of Allied forces in 

the city because of the possible effect a 

flare-up would have on the Allied lines of 

33 Telet of ministerial decree, 13 Nov 44, App. B 

(Capt. A. W. Williams, Historical Summary of Events 

in Belgium from Liberation to July 45), SHAEF G-5 

hist file 17.02 Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, I; Dir 

on internal security in Belgium, 18 Nov 44, SHAEF 

G-5 132.02 Mission to Belgium. The directive was 

apparently signed on 17 November-I 944 and General 

Erskine seems"to have known of it on that date. 

3< Belgian Press Opinion, 17, 19 Nov 44. 
332 

communications. The Belgian episode, 

which coincided with British intervention 

in Greece, brought formal questions in the 

House of Commons as to Allied policy in 

liberated countries. Mr. Churchill made 

clear that General Erskine represented 

and was directly responsible to the Supreme Commander. He added, "I have no 

hesitation in saying not only did we obey 

General Eisenhower's orders, but we 

thought these orders wise and sensible."35 

The demonstration of 25 November 

was followed by an attempt on the part of 

left-wing elements to organize a general 

strike. Before it made any progress the 

workers' committee voted to return to 

work in order not to interfere with the 

Allied war effort. Attacks on the government continued until the German counteroffensive of mid-December 1944. At 

that point the Front de l'lndependence offered 

the complete backing of the Resistance 

units to the Allied military authorities. 

The Allies preferred not to reactivate these 

forces, but rather to make use of the Belgian Regular Army. The immediate effect 

of the German attack was to bring demands from nearly all elements of the 

Belgian press for unified action against the 

Germans. It brought as well new problems 

such as the care of refugees from the 

Ardennes area, and increased damage to 

homes arising from the intensification of 

the flying-bomb attacks. 

Civil Difense and Food 

One of the tragedies of the war was that 

Belgium, which was liberated quickly and 

with comparatively little loss, later suffered heavily from German flying bombs 

and from the German counteroffensive of 

December 1944. Even before the port of 

Antwerp was cleared for traffic in late fall 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

of 1944, the enemy had opened a V-bomb 

attack on it in the hope of making it unusable. Beginning 13 October 1944, the 

Germans turned on Belgium much of the 

fury they had once vented on England. 

These attacks continued until the end of 

March 1945, but seemed to be at their 

heaviest about ·the time of the German 

counteroffensive. In six months, more than 

5,000 bombs fell in Belgium causing 

casualties of more than 8,000 dead and 

missing, and 23,584 wounded. The blow 

fell heaviest on the provinces of Antwerp 

and Liege. In Antwerp the bombs hit two 

thirds of the houses, seriously damaging or 

wholly destroying more than one fifth of 

them. In Liege the percentage of serious 

damage was even greater. The attacks laid 

a heavy burden on SHAEF civil and operational units. Besides keeping the port 

of Antwerp in operation, they had to aid 

the Belgians in maintaining civilian defense, in meeting fire-fighting emergencies, 

and in solving health problems.36 

The SHAEF Mission (Belgium) and 

civil affairs authorities of the Allied forces 

were also troubled by the problem of supplying Belgium with food. From SHAEF's 

standpoint, an adequate food supply was 

needed to prevent demonstrations, to get 

coal mined, and to maintain the ports in 

full operation. General Erskine in late N 0-

vember became particularly worried because of SHAEF statements that sufficient 

civil affairs supplies had been delivered in 

November for the rest of the year and no 

35 Details of these events can be found in the New 

York Times, November 26, 30, December 2, 3, and 8, 

1944, and in Belgian Press Opinion. 

36 Address of Commissioner for the Defense of the 

Civil Population, History of Fire and Civil Defense 

in Belgium, l6Jun 45, App. F (Summary of VI and 

V2 Attacks in Belgium), Civil Defense-Antwerp, 

SHAEF G-5 hist file, Mission to Belgium 17.02, Final 

Rpt,1. 
RELATIONS WITH LIBERATED COUNTRIES 333 

more were available for Belgium in December. Food supplies were very short and 

he feared that the Allies would be charged 

with breaking their promises. At his urging, SHAEF on 6 December authorized a 

special allotment often thousand tons of 

supplies for December at the expense of 

other commitments. 37 

The German counteroffensive in the 

Ardennes made the shortage of food even 

more acute. This shortage was blamed for 

a strike of dock workers at Antwerp in 

January 1945, and General Erskine 

warned that additional troubles might follow. Not only were further strikes among 

dock workers and coal miners likely but a 

danger of disorders along the Allied lines 

of communications threatened. General 

Erskine reported in mid-February that the 

government recently formed by M. 

Achille van Acker might be seriously 

weakened if food shortages continued. The 

general urged, therefore, that a strenuous 

effort be made to replace Belgian losses in 

the Ardennes resulting from enemy action, 

that a reserve stockpile of one month's imports be established, that plans be approved to increase supplementary rations 

for workers, and that the Belgian Government be pressed to the limit to carry out 

its part in the collection and distribution 

of food. Even before this report came in, 

General Eisenhower had informed the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff of the situation. 

Explaining that the arrival of supplies 

from the United States and the United 

Kingdom was falling behind schedule, he 

urged that 100,000 tons of civil affairs supplies be made available immediately from 

stocks in the United Kingdom to offset the 

shipping lag. The state of affairs created 

in Belgium and the Netherlands by the 

delay was "sufficiently serious to warrant 

Civil Affairs requirements being treated 

as a matter of operational urgency." The 

Combined Chiefs of Staff met the emergency in Belgium by releasing 55,000 tons 

of supplies from stocks in the United Kingdom, and by assuring the Supreme 

Commander that part of the supplies from 

the United States would soon arrive. They 

reminded General Eisenhower, however, 

that the chief cause for the serious situation lay in SHAEF's failure to present its 

requirements to the Combined Civil 

Affairs Committee until late in December. 

To prevent recurrence of similar crises, 

SHAEF now asked the Belgian Government to make estimates of requirements 

running into the following November. A 

special effort was made by SHAEF in 

March and April to insure that these 

would be met. 38 

Besides its other duties, the SHAEF 

Mission (Belgium) had the responsibility 

of representing the Supreme Commander 

in Luxembourg. SHAEF had initially 

planned to set up a separate mission for 

that country and had issued a directive to 

Brigadier S. O. Jones in September 1944 

as head of the mission. When the Allied 

forces halted on the eastern borders of 

Luxembourg, thus leaving the country in 

the f-orward zone of operations, SHAEF 

decided to withdraw the mission. After 

1 December 1944, SHAEF was represented through the Luxembourg Civil 

Affairs Detachment. In April 1945, General Erskine was directed to assume responsibility for Luxembourg, and Col. F. 

E. Fraser, head of the civil affairs detach37 Erskine to Smith, 25 Nov 44; Smith to Erskine, 

6 Dec 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 014.1 Civil Affairs 

Dir for Belgium, I. 

38 Erskine to CofS SHAEF, 18 Feb 45; SHAEF to 

CCS, SCAF 210,14 Feb 45; CCS to SHAEF, FACS 

143, 23 Feb 45; Ltr, Smith to CCS and CCAC, 28 

Apr 45. All in SHAEF SGS 014.1 Belgium, Civil Affairs Dir for Belgium, II. 
334 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

ment in that country, was designated as 

deputy. In May 1945, in order to avoid 

confusion with other civil affairs detachments in Luxembourg, Colonel Fraser’s 

unit was redesignated SHAEF Mission 

(Luxembourg) with General Erskine as 

chief and Colonel Fraser as deputy. 39 

Relations With the Netherlands 

The Supreme Commander issued a directive to Maj. Gen. J. K. Edwards (Br.) 

as head of the SHAEF Mission (Netherlands) in mid-Septembei 1944, but the 

establishment of the mission was postponed as the clearing of the country was 

delayed. Brig. Gen. George P. Howell 

(U.S.) was appointed deputy chief of the 

mission at the end of September, and an 

advance detachment was sent to Brussels 

shortly thereafter. No formal accreditation 

of the SHAEF mission was made to the 

Netherlands Government until early December when an advance detachment of 

that government began to move to Dutch 

soil. 40 

Because the Netherlands Government 

was located in London during most of the 

fall of 1944, some of the most important 

issues affecting the Netherlands were 

brought directly to the British Foreign and 

War Offices instead of to SHAEF. The 

Netherlands Government intervened with 

the British in October when SHAEF proposed to bomb Vlissingen in preparation 

for an attack to clear the Schelde estuary. 

As a result of Dutch opposition, the British 

Government banned all bombing of the 

city unless it was authorized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Eisenhower, 

when informed of this action, made clear 

his desire to spare the Dutch city, but 

added that it would be a serious matter to 

withhold this aid from the Canadian 

Army and thereby aid the enemy. This 

argument was enough to overcome the 

doubts of the British Chiefs of Staff. They 

now declared that, although every effort 

should be made to spare noncombatants, 

the view of the Supreme Commander in 

such matters must prevail. Despite this approval, the bombing scheduled for 1 November did not take place. 41 

In early October, Queen Wilhelmina of 

the Netherlands and her Prime Minister, 

P. S. Gerbrandy, appealed to the President and the Prime Minister to approve 

shipments of food and medical supplies 

through the Swedish Red Cross to occupied portions of the Netherlands. Both 

Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt held 

that the matter was a military responsibility. General Eisenhower voiced no objection to the proposal. Before it could be 

implemented, however, proposals were 

brought forward for sending a Red Cross 

ship from Lisbon, for air-dropping food on 

the three principal cities in occupied 

Netherlands, and for sending an International Red Cross ship from Basel down 

the Rhine to Arnhem and Rotterdam. 

39 See entire contents of SHAEF SGS 322.01/4 

SHAEF Mission (Luxembourg). 

40 See entire file, SHAEF SGS 322.01/7 SHAEF 

Mission (Netherlands). In January 1945, General 

Edwards was succeeded as head of the mission by 

Maj. Gen. John G. W. Clark (Br.). The latter retained his headquarters in Brussels until April 1945 

when he was given permission to move the mission 

to Breda. During April another change came in the 

command of the mission: General Howell had to be 

returned to the United States because of ill health 

and was replaced by Col. John Griffith. After the surrender of Germany, the SHAEF mission moved to 

The Hague. Shortly after its arrival there it absorbed 

Headquarters, Netherlands District, which had been 

set up by the British, and retained duties and responsibilities of that headquarters with regard to the 

relief of the Netherlands until the end of Tune 1945. 

41 Br COS to Eisenhower, 30 Apr 44; Eisenhower 

to Br COS, 31 1 Oct 44; Br COS to Eisenhower, 311 Oct 

44. All in SHAEF cbl log. Ltr, Col Stacey to author, 

Aug 51. 
RELATIONS WITH LIBERATED COUNTRIES 335 

General Eisenhower, near the end of October, approved the sending of Swedish 

reliefships or a ship from Lisbon even at 

the risk that some of the supplies would be 

taken by the enemy. The air dropping of 

supplies he opposed, since there was no 

way of assuring that they would reach the 

civilian population. He ruled out the dispatching of a ship from Basel down the 

Rhine on operational grounds, agreeing 

with the British Chiefs of Staff that such 

action would interfere with Allied air attacks on German river traffic. The fact 

that the Germans readily accepted the 

latter plan was considered to be sufficient 

indication that it played into their hands. 42 

Arrangements made to move supplies 

from Sweden broke down soon afterward 

because the Netherlands Red Cross lacked 

sufficient transportation to distribute supplies. In December a new plan was worked 

out by which two Swedish ships would 

bring their cargoes from Goteborg to 

Delfzijl where barges would pick them up 

and take them to points of distribution. An 

arrangement was reached with the Germans in the third week of January for this 

movement. The ship from Lisbon was to 

move to Goteborg at this time but was to 

wait until there was evidence that the supplies of the first ship were delivered. 43 

The Dutch faced not only the problem 

of feeding the inhabitants of the occupied 

regions of their country, but also the burden of distributing civil affairs supplies for 

the liberated areas. They were forced to 

cut the daily ration below that in effect 

during the enemy occupation. As in 

France, complaints were voiced in the 

liberated areas that the Allied forces were 

feeding German prisoners and refugees 

better than they did the liberated peoples. 

In mid-December Prime Minister Gerbrandy proposed in a letter to the Supreme Commander that the relief of the 

Netherlands be given first priority-even 

over the slogan of "defeat the Germans 

first." He asked that the Netherlands Government be permitted to handle those details of relief work vhich it could do best 

and that 21 Army Group be instructed to 

consult the Netherlands Government on 

matters relating to relief planning. General Eisenhower, who found the letter 

"quite moving," directed that the Dutch 

be kept informed and be consulted on all 

matters relating to relief. By the close of 

the year, the Dutch Prime Minister believed that some progress had been made, 

but the head of the SHAEF mission reported that members ofthe Netherlands 

Government felt that they had had little 

information of any practical progress since 

21 Army Group had been made responsible for relief activities. He recommended 

that the Netherlands Government and its 

Navy and Military Administration be represented in all relief planning. Inasmuch 

as the greater part of the Netherlands 

remained in the hands of the enemy until 

the end of the war, it was not possible until 

then to find a satisfactory solution to the 

food problem. As a result, some of the 

42 Msg, Wilhelmina to President Roosevelt, 

8 Oct 44, President to Queen Wilhelmina, 26 Oct 

44 (both quoted inJCS to Eisenhower, W-52805, 26 

Oct 44); Maj Desmond Morton to Gen Smith, 12 

Oct 44; Foreign Office to Br COS, 5 Oct 44; Br COS 

to Eisenhower, 6322, 27 Oct 44; Eisenhower to Br 

COS, S-64652, 30 Oct 44; Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 

115, 29 Oct 44; Eisenhower to Br COS, S-613 25, 

7 Oct 44; Br COS to Eisenhower, 6479, 3 Nov 44; 

Eisenhower to Br COS, S-65384, 4 Nov 44; Eisenhower to Br COS, S-65 714, 6 Nov 44; Eisenhower to 

CCS and Br COS, SCAF 132, 15 Nov 44. All in 

SHAEF SGS 014.1 Netherlands, Civil Affairs Dir for 

Netherlands, I. 

.1< Br COS toJSM, 7277,12 Dec 44; Eisenhower 

to Br COS, S-71810, 21 Dec 44; Br COS to SHAEF, 

7499,22 Dec 44; Br COS toJSM, 499, 19 Jan 45. All 

in SHAEF SGS 014.1 Netherlands, Civil Affairs Dir 

for Netherlands, II and Ill. 
336 

peoples of occupied regions of the N etherlands were near the point of starvation 

when the war came to a close. 44 

Allied Public Information Activities 

in the Liberated Countries 

SHAEF attempted to improve relations 

with liberated countries and to encourage 

the spirit of resistance in occupied areas by 

means of a program of radio broadcasts, 

publication of newspapers, and distribution of Allied magazines and books. 

SHAEF's Psychological Warfare Division 

devoted much of its effort to these public 

information activities. 

The division used its facilities effectively 

in the early days of the invasion to give 

warnings to inhabitants living near the invasion coasts. Beginning on D Day, the 

Voice of SHAEF warned citizens near the 

Channel coasts to leave the area. 45 In the 

days that followed, SHAEF broadcast 

evacuation warnings and freq uently directed the dropping of leaflets shortly before heavy air raids. The warnings applied 

not only to areas subject to bombardment 

but also to the coastal waters of Denmark, 

Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 

France where action might take place. 

Announcements advising fishermen to 

stay in port were made until 10 August. 

SHAEF's Psychological Warfare Division also informed inhabitants in liberated 

countries of the way in which they could 

aid the Allied armies, countered rumors 

which might be spread, and rendered assistance to liberated governments in reconstituting their media of public information. The division entrusted these 

efforts to its Allied Information Service 

CAIS). The advance group of this agency 

landed in Cherbourg in early July 1944 

and at the req uest of the First Army asTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

sumed part of the public information 

activities in the Normandy area. The AIS 

established civilian press and radio service 

in Cherbourg and aided the civilian radio 

program in Rennes. Representatives of 

the service entered Paris on 25 August and 

continued their work there until shortly 

before the end of the war, although some 

AIS functions were gradually transferred 

to civilian agencies. In the Low Countries 

and Denmark, three Psychological Warfare consolidation teams were established 

to work with the SHAEF missions and 

SHAEF co-ordinated their work. In Norway, civilian agencies handled most of the 

information activities with the aid of the 

Psychological Warfare Division. 

The tasks of the Allied Information 

Service were also extended to displays of 

photographs and charts depicting the 

Allied war efforts, distribution of publications, photographs, and motion pictures, 

and the servicing of newspapers in the 

liberated area. 

In an effort to acquaint the French people with Allied war efforts, civilian agencies prepared fifteen posters which the 

mayors of French cities were given to 

distribute as they saw fit. In Paris, the 

Allied Information Service opened an exhibit room at the Place de L'Opera for the 

display of photographs, charts, and posters 

outlining the war activities of the United 

Nations. The exhibit attracted nearly a 

44 Prince Bernhard to CofS SHAEF, 1 Nov 44; 

Gerbrandy to Eisenhower, 16 Dec 44; Smith to Gerbrandy, 22 Dec 44; Eisenhower to Gerbrandy, 23 Dec 

44; Edwards to Morgan, 27 Dec 44. All in SHAEF 

SGS 014.1 Netherlands, Civil Affairs Dir for Netherlands, I and II. See below, Chapter XXIV, for negotiations near the end of the war between General 

Smith and Seyss-lnquart relative to the feeding of the 

population of occupied Netherlands. 

45 The Voice of SHAEF was the name applied to 

special broadcasts from SHAEF in the name of the 

Supreme Commander. 
RELATIONS WITH LIBERATED COUNTRIES 337 

quarter-million people between mid-October and mid-December 1944. The interest evinced by the Parisians induced the 

Allied Information Service to send similar 

exhibits to twenty-seven French cities between December 1944 and the end of the 

war. More than seven million people 

registered at the exhibits during this 

period. 

Also effective in the liberated areas was 

the sale at low prices of both the English 

texts and French versions of American 

and British books. Two illustrated publications- Voir (American) and Cadran 

(British)-were prepared as well. Later, 

digest-type magazines made up of selections from British and American publications were put on sale. Between the 

distribution of the first publications in 

France on 10 July 1944 and the end of the 

war more than 15,570,000 copies were 

sold. 

To provide information in France in 

June 1944, psychological warfare teams 

with the British and American armies 

printed news sheets at Bayeux and Isigny. 

Later a daily newspaper was printed at 

Cherbourg. The project, started by the 

First Army Psychological Warfare Team, 

was turned over to the Allied Information 

Service inJuly 1944. Wall news bulletins 

were printed and sent to the smaller towns 

for display. These activities proved unnecessary in Paris inasmuch as fourteen Resistance papers were in circulation there 

when the city was liberated. The number 

increased tremendously within a few 

weeks. The Allied Information Service 

aided these publications by distributing 

newsprint, special articles, and photographs. 

The SHAEF Psychological Warfare 

Division and the Allied Information Service helped service strategic radio activities, 

operated mobile transmitters, assisted 

civilian radio broadcasting in the liberated 

areas, and ultimately operated the static 

transmitter at Luxembourg. Although the 

original work of mobile broadcasting was 

done by army group teams, the Psychological Warfare Division tended to take 

over this function in rear areas. In Cherbourg, the Psychological Warfare Division 

furnished the transmitter and ran a purely 

Allied station. In Rennes, Paris, and other 

cities where the transmitters were still 

available, the division supplied equipment 

to put them into operation and furnished 

material for broadcasts. 

The most important work performed by 

the radio section of the Psychological Warfare Division during the war was that of 

operating Radio Luxembourg after its 

capture in September 1944. This station, 

which had a ISO-kilowatt transmitter, had 

been damaged by the Germans before 

they left the city, but psychological warfare experts of 12th Army Group started 

repairs almost immediately after arriving 

in Luxembourg. On 3 October 1944, personnel from the SHAEF Psychological 

Warfare Division, acting under an agreement signed by the Allies and Luxembourg in May 1944, took over the station. 

The first daily SHAEF news program 

went on the air on 10 November 1944, 

and a complete program was gradually 

built up which ultimately ran twelve 

hours a day. The station was off the air 

from 20 to 30 December as a result of the 

German attack in the Ardennes. 

Other Aid to Liberated Peoples 

Assistance in re-establishing and maintaining public order, rearming ofthegendarmerie and the equipping of security and 

line-of-communications troops, and the 
338 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

restoration of public information facilities 

were only a few of the civil affairs activities 

in which SHAEF agencies participated. 

Much of the actual work was performed 

by civil affairs detachments with the army 

groups, armies, and corps, but SHAEF 

gave its full support to the speedy restoration of civil government by establishing 

uniform procedures and policies, by allocating transportation and scarce supplies, 

by co-ordinating military and civil requirements, and by acting as intermediary 

between the civilian governments and the 

subordinate military authorities. 
CHAPTER XIX 

Progralll for Gerlllany 

The means of hastening German surrender by other than military efforts, the 

government of occupied areas of Germany 

while the war was still in progress, and the 

method of dealing with Germany after the 

final surrender constituted problems that 

concerned SHAEF as well as the governments of the United States, Great Britain, 

the USSR, and France. The Supreme 

Commander and his headquarters were 

frequently called on for suggestions as to 

Allied policy in regard to Germany. 

Sometimes SHAEF on its own initiative 

outlined possible solutions for Allied consideration, and on other occasions it implemented the policy laid down by higher 

authority. Throughout the war, the Allied 

governments were slow in reaching final 

conclusions on a program for Germany. 

The reasons were not far to seek. First of 

all, three, and later, four, nations with 

somewhat disparate aims had to agree on 

a policy-always a slow process. Various 

agencies in the individual Allied nations, . 

especially in the United States, had to be 

consulted on postwar policy. Finally, there 

were often jurisdictional disagreements 

among the European Advisory Commission, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and other units set up to handle 

problems relating to Germany. The result 

of the delays was that the Supreme Commander was frequently without official 

policy to guide him at the time he most 

needed it,1 

Efforts To Induce German Surrender 

Allied planners were hopeful from the 

start of planning for OVERLORD in the 

summer of 1943 that the enemy might collapse or be induced to surrender before or 

shortly after the invasion. It will be recalled that three RANKIN plans were outlined to deal with developments in the 

case of collapse, of withdrawal from the 

occupied areas, and of outright surrender. 2 

While hopes of German surrender before 

D Day were almost completely discarded 

by the first of 1944, the Allied military 

planners believed that the German people 

were weary of war and disgusted with 

their Nazi leaders and that a proper appeal to them might bring a revolt or at 

least weaken the German will to resist. 

Unconditional Surrender Formula 

In planning propaganda appeals to the 

German people, the SHAEF planners 

found themselves handicapped by the unconditional surrender formula announced 

by President Roosevelt at Casablanca. He 

1 See above, Ch. IV. For relations of the European 

Advisory Commission and other Allied agencies, see 

Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany, 

New Light on How the Zones were Drawn," Foreign 

Affairs, XXVIII (July, 1950), 580-604. Mr. Mosely 

was political adviser to Ambassador John G. Winant 

on the European Advisory Commission from June 

1944 to August 1945. 

2 See above, Ch. V. 
340 

and the Prime Minister had later issued 

explanatory statements which removed 

any suggestion of Allied terrorism or acts 

of vengeance directed at the whole German people, but they had not succeeded 

in evolving a version of the formula which 

Allied propagandists could use to persuade the German people to seek peace. 3 

SHAEF planners feared that the Germans would put up a last-ditch fight in 

preference to accepting unconditional surrender. General Barker, the G-1, inJanuary 1944 held that it would be a grave 

mistake to treat unconditional surrender 

as "our irreducible demand," and General 

McClure, responsible for psychological 

warfare against the enemy, asked that he 

be permitted at least to distinguish between the German leaders and the people 

in propaganda aimed at the enemy.4 

SHAEF fears were shared in Washington where Secretaries Hull and Stimson, 

who had already expressed disapproval 

of unconditional surrender terms, tried to 

get the President to modify his formula. 

Intelligence reports in Washington and 

London indicated in the early weeks of 

1944 that enemy leaders were using fear of 

Allied demands to strengthen the resistance of their people. The U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff in March urged the President to 

restate his demands in a way that would 

reassure the German people, but Mr. 

Roosevelt preferred to let the matter stay 

as it was at the time. And there were good 

reasons advanced in favor of his stand. 

General Hilldring, War Department director of civil affairs, doubted that the 

United Nations could afford to bind themselves by a pact to treat the enemy in any 

specific manner, and Mr.JohnJ. McCloy, 

Assistant Secretary of War, suggested that 

it was not unconditional surrender but 

fear of the Red Army which kept the GerTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

mans fighting. Although it is possible that 

these views did not reach the President, he 

was probably aware of Mr. Churchill's 

view that the Allies should avoid any 

specific statement of terms which would 

permit the Germans later to claim they 

were tricked. 5 

In mid-April 1944, Generals Eisenhower and Smith impressed on Under 

Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, 

Jr., who was then in London, the need of 

clarifying the principle of unconditional 

surrender. They felt that by making clear 

to the German people the basis on which 

they would be treated after surrender the 

Allies could create a willingness on the 

part of the population to give up and perhaps also induce a German Badogli9 to 

take steps leading to surrender. They 

asked for ajoint statement by the United 

States, Great Britain, and the Soviet 

Union defining unconditional surrender 

and guaranteeing law and order in the 

Reich. Once a beachhead was established 

in northwest Europe, they added, the Supreme Commander should issue a statement recapitulating the terms of surrender 

and calling on the enemy to lay down his 

arms. If such a step was not taken, General Smith indicated, the Allies would find 

it impossible to exploit the advantages 

which would be gained from the effect of a 

successful landing. The President was apparently unmoved by these suggestions, 

3 Churchill, The Hinge of Fale, pp. 685-91; Cordell 

Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), 

Vol. II, Ch. 13. 

4 Memo, Barker for McClure, 27 Jan 44, SHAEF 

SGS 322.01 Publicity and Psychological Warfare; 

Interv with Gen McClure, 29 Mar 47. 

5 Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II, Ch. 13; Notes on mtgof 

McClure, Peake, Phillips, el at., 11 Feb 44, McClure 

jnl.JIC Paper, 19 Feb 44;JCS 718/1, 16 Mar 44 with 

atchd papers (memos by Hilldring and McCloy); 

Memo,JCS for President, 25 Mar 44. All in ABC 

387 Germany (18 Dec 43), Sec 3. 
PROGRAM FOR GERMANY 341 

saying only that any reply should have his 

approval before being sent. Mr. Hull interpreted this statement to mean that the 

President was holding strongly to his unconditional surrender stand. Three weeks 

later, Mr. Roosevelt did yield to Russian 

and British pressure for modifications of 

unconditional surrender so far as it 

affected the German satellite countries, 

and agreed that some latitude could be 

shown in surrender settlements with Bulgaria and România. 6 

General Eisenhower, though eager to 

remove exaggerated fears of the German 

people, nonetheless believed that terms of 

capitulation should include the surrender 

of the armed forces of the Axis powers and 

the handing over of designated political 

and military leaders for trial. For the rest, 

he favored the declaration, “The masses 

of the population in the Axis countries will 

be expected and required to take up again 

their normal pursuits of peace in order 

that conditions of starvation and privation 

may be ameliorated.” He recognized that 

any such declaration had to meet the demands of the Soviet Union, which was 

likely to insist on using several million 

Germans after the war, and that a statement to this effect would play into the 

hands of German propagandists. Unless 

the problem could be overcome in some 

way, he thought it best to drop the whole 

matter of attempting to state Allied 

demands. 7 

A statement to meet the Supreme Commander’s requirements was prepared in 

General McClure’s office in late May. 

touched up by Mr. Robert Sherwood and 

put into final shape by Mr.Phillips, political officer at SHAEF. President Roosevelt 

at this time agreed that a declaration 

be made to the German people 

which would place the chief stress on the 

inevitability of their defeat. The British 

War Cabinet and the Prime Minister disapproved this suggestion. Mr. Churchill 

was quoted as saying that any declaration 

to the German people which omitted their 

war crimes would be subject later to 

enemy charges of Allied bad faith, but 

that listing of such crimes would be likely 

to terrify the Germans and lead them to 

fight the more fanatically. The Prime Minister on 24 May, in an address to the 

House of Commons, had gone as far as he 

cared to go with the statement that, while 

unconditional surrender gave the enemy 

no rights, it relieved the Allies of none of 

their duties. “Justice,” he added, “will 

have to be done and retribution will fall 

upon the wicked and the cruel.” 8 

The invasion of France thus began 

without any action on SHAEF’s request 

for a concrete statement of war aims 

which would weaken enemy resistance to 

the Allied landings. The only concession 

by Washington and London was that 

something might be done later when Allied 

operations met with “a large measure of 

success.’’ 9 Plans were discussed in June 

6 Stettinius to Hull, 14 Apr 44, Diary Office CinC; 

Hull, Memoirs, 11, 1578; Wallace Carroll, Persuade or 

Perish (Boston, 1948), pp. 319-20. 

7 Eisenhower to CofS SHAEF, 20 May 44, Diary 

Office CinC. This seems at variance with the statement of Fred Smith in “The Rise and Fall of the 

Morgenthau Plan,” United Nations World, I (March, 

1947), 32-37, that General Eisenhower either suggested parts of the Morgenthau plan or agreed with 

its broad implications. (Mr. Smith was a member of 

Secretary Morgenthau’s staff in 1944.) See Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe p. 287. 

8 Memo prepared for PWD (unsigned), 29 May 44, 

with notations by Peake and Phillips, SHAEF SGS 

091.412/3 Psychological Warfare Against Germany, I; 

Churchill, address to House of Commons, 24 May 

44, text in Louise Wilhelmine Holborn, ed., War and 

Peace Aims of the UnitedNations (Boston, 1943-48), p. 

497; Hull, Memoirs, 11, 1580. 

9 Notation by Phillips on Memo prepared for PWD 

(unsigned), 29 May 44, SHAEF SGS 091.412/3 

Psychological Warfare Against Germany, I. 
342 

andJuly for the presurrender period.of 

German occupation and for the posthostilities period, but in mid-August nothing 

besides "unconditional surrender" had yet 

been devised. An attempt by the Office of 

War Information to draw up a paper for 

guidance on long-range propaganda for 

Germany was challenged by the War Department on the ground that it suggested 

a soft treatment of the enemy. The policy 

of "non fraternization" and the impression 

on the Germans of their war guilt were 

said to be the fundamental principles of 

War Department policy. In making this 

explanation, General Hilldring took exception to OWl's statement that the end 

of the war meant the end of German suffering and the beginning of reconstruction 

economically, culturally, and socially.lO 

From the standpoint of SHAEF's psychological warfare campaign to persuade 

the enemy to surrender, the situation was 

worsened in September 1944 when word 

leaked out that Secretary of the Treasury 

Morgenthau had persuaded President 

Roosevelt and the Prime Minister at Quebec to approve a plan to convert Germany 

"into a country primarily agricultural and 

pastoral in character." Under strong pressure from the Secretaries of State and War, 

the President said that he had never intended to accept a proposal for making a 

wholly agricultural nation out of Germany. No public statement was made to 

this effect and the idea continued to persist in administration circles and in German propaganda. The Voelkischer Beobachter, in a typical press reaction, warned: 

"The German people must realize that we 

are engaged in a life and death struggle 

which imposes on every German the duty 

to do his utmost for the victorious conclusion of the war and the frustration of the 

plans of destruction planned by these canTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

nibals." The Berliner Morgenpost called it a 

"satanic plan of annihilation," and the 12 

Uhr Blatt declared that the "aim of these 

conditions, inspired by the Jews, is the annihilation of the German people in the 

quickest way." The enemy henceforth was 

to couple these themes and those relating 

to unconditional surrender with claims 

that Allied occupation authorities in Germany were carrying out a reign of terror. 

General McClure, trying to get a propaganda policy which would at least gain 

the backing of Germans in areas already 

occupied by Allied forces, was told by the 

War Department that he should follow the 

general line laid down by the President in 

an address on 22 October. In it Mr. Roosevelt insisted that there would be no bargain with "Nazi conspirators," to whom 

should be left no shred of control nor a single element of military power or military 

potential. He had brought no charge 

against the German race and he had assured the German people that they would 

not be enslaved.ll 

The War and State Department instructions were more valuable in getting German co-operation in areas already occupied than in helping to break the will to 

resist of those Germans not yet conquered. 

General Eisenhower explained this difference on 20 November when he asked as a 

matter of urgency that a means be found 

to reduce enemy resistance. He noted that 

it was based on the iron discipline of the 

10 Ibid.; WD G-2 to CAD, 17 Aug 44, and CAD to 

G-2, 26 Aug 44; both in CAD 091.412 (2-25-43), 

Sec 1. 

11 Memo, Stettinius for President, 27 Oct 44, containing statement of Winant to State Dept, 17 Oct 

44, concerning PWD proposals, CAD 091.412 (2-

25-43), Sec 1. McCloy to Smith, W-52734, 26 Oct 

44; Smith to McCloy, S-64199, 27 Oct 44; McCloy 

to Smith, WX-56779, 3 Nov 44. All in SHAEF SGS 

091.412/3 Psychological Warfar~ Against Germany, 

I. Carroll, Persuade or Perish. pp. 326-29. 
PROGRAM FOR GERMANY 

Wehrmacht and the stranglehold of the 

Nazi party, and on successful enemy propaganda which was convincing the German 

people that unconditional surrender 

meant the complete devastation of Germany and its destruction as a nation. 12 

At the suggestion of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, the President in late November proposed a statement assuring 

the enemy that the Allies were not seeking 

to devastate or destroy Germany. Reservations were then made by Prime Minister 

Churchill and the War Cabinet, who 

feared that such a statement, if made during a period of comparative stalemate, 

might be interpreted as a sign of Allied 

weakness. Mr. Churchill added that the 

Germans feared, not Allied occupation, 

but conquest by the Russians. He suggested that the Allies go along as they were 

until winter arrived. "In the meantime," 

he concluded, "I shall remain set on unconditional surrender which is where you 

put me." General Eisenhower, when informed of this reaction, agreed that the 

joint proclamation should follow an operation universally recognized as a definite 

success. 13 

After the failure of the Allies to agree in 

October or November 1944 on a statement regarding unconditional surrender 

which could be released to the German 

people, the British Chiefs of Staff set up a 

committee to discuss arrangements for a 

plan to break enemy morale. General 

McClure represented SHAEF in meetings 

of the group. Apparently it could arrive at 

no satisfactory formula. The question was 

later discussed at Yalta, and a statement 

on Allied aims was issued at the conclusion 

of the conference. President Roosevelt, 

Mr. Churchill, and Marshal Stalin on 11 

February 1945 declared: "It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism 

343 

and nazism and to insure that Germany 

will never again be able to disturb the 

peace of the world. . . . It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, 

but only when nazism and militarism have 

been extirpated will there be hope for a 

decent life for Germans, and a place for 

them in the comity of nations." 14 With 

this explanation of the meaning of un conditional surrender, SHAEF had to be 

content. 

Psychological Waifare Appeals to the Enemy 

Because SHAEF had no success before 

D Day in getting a definition of "unconditional surrender" that would appeal to the 

German people, it had to direct its chief efforts at the German soldier. The Psychological Warfare Division made a special 

attempt to persuade the individual fighting man that it was no disgrace to surrender after he had fought courageously 

in the field. 

In early propaganda activities during 

the static period of hedgerow fighting, 

teams attached to combat units aimed 

special appeals at groups of Germans who 

were outnumbered and threatened with 

annihilation. To persuade the enemy of 

his hopeless position, the teams used statements in German describing the actual 

tactical situation. Many of their efforts 

'" Eisenhower to CCS, S-67648 (SCAF 134),20 

Nov 44, SHAEF SGS 091.412/3 Psychological Warfare Against Germany, 1. 

'3 Marshall to Eisenhower, W-66936, 22 Nov 44; 

Roosevelt to AG\VAR for Eisenhower, 25 Nov 44; 

Churchill to Eisenhower, 26 Nov 44; Eisenhower to 

Churchill, 26 Nov 44; Eisenhower to Marshall, CPA 

90359,27 Nov 44. All in Eisenhower personal file. 

14 Br COS to ]SM, 6845, 25 Nov 44; Smith to 

Ismay, S-68298, 25 Nov 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 

091.412/3 Psychological Warfare Against Germany, 

I; Statement of Allied aims, February 11, 1945, War 

and Peace Aims of the United N alions, pp. 20- 21. 
344 

were successful. In Brittany, the psychQlogical warfare teams concentrated their 

efforts on the fortress garrisons. At St. 

Malo, the psychological warfare teams 

were directed to study various surrender 

appeals previously used, including the one 

issued to Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright by the Japanese at Corregidor. The 

enemy was told that no humiliation could 

be attached to a surrender in the face of 

overwhelming odds. This particular appeal met with no success. A more effective 

propaganda device during the periods of 

heavy fighting was the Passierschein, or safeconduct pass, which carried the signature 

of General Eisenhower and gave instructions on how German soldiers could surrender. This safe-conduct leaflet, which 

was dropped or fired into enemy lines, carried the seals of Great Britain and the 

United States, and declared in both German and English: "The German soldier 

who carries this safe conduct is using it as 

a sign of his genuine wish to give himself 

up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked 

after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from 

the danger zone as soon as possible." 

While no one can be certain of the leaflet's 

effectiveness in inducing the enemy to surrender, more prisoners saw it than any 

other propaganda leaflet and a large number who surrendered had been carrying 

their copies for several weeks in case they 

should decide to give Up.15 

When the Allied forces approached 

Germany, the Voice of SHAEF urged all 

foreign workers in Germany to leave factories at the earliest opportunity, to boycott those among them who were in liaison 

with the Germans, and to avoid any unorganized action. They were advised to remain as the German Army withdrew, to 

prevent the retreating forces from destroying installations if possible, and to gather 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

information about the enemy which would 

be of value to the Allies. Another campaign reminded the German people that 

it was dangerous to remain in areas subject to bombing and warned them against 

committing atrocities against Allied prisoners and foreign workers.16 

After the occupation of the first captured cities of Germany began, the SHAEF 

Psychological Warfare Division attempted 

to offset charges of Allied mistreatment of 

Germans and to dispel other fear!! of Allied 

occupation policy. To aid this program, 

the division used a newspaper, Aachener 

Nachrichten, which had been started initially by 12th Army Group's Psychological 

Warfare Section. This, the first newspapp,r 

published under Allied auspices in Germany, ultimately attained a circulation of 

52,000. 

In October 1944, seeing the unlikelihood of getting a suitable revision of the 

unconditional surrender formula for propaganda purposes, General McClure 

turned his attention to a campaign designed to get German support for Allied 

military government in the occupied areas. 

In November, the War and State Departments suggested a number of aims for 

SHAEF to follow in this effort. These 

stressed the advantage of Allied rule over 

that of the Nazis, the fact that responsibility for German suffering lay on the Nazis, 

and the assurance that the average German would be allowed to live and work 

without molestation if he obeyed Allied 

regulations and committed no crimes. 

SHAEF told the various Allied psychological warfare units at lower level of these 

aims on 16 November, adding that no ap-

" The author has relied heavily for this and other 

information in this section on Psychological Warfare 

Division (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations. 

16 Voice ofSHAEF broadcasts 27-32, 5-13 Sep 44, 

translation given in PWD (SHAEF), An Account of Its 

Operations, pp. 120-22. 
PROGRAM FOR GERMANY 

peals were to be made to the Germans in 

the nonoccupied areas but that they were 

to be informed of the way in which Allied 

military government actually functioned 

in those German areas then occupied by 

the Allied armies. 17 

In accordance with a SHAEF directive 

of20 October on "Propaganda Treatment 

of Military Government," General McClure and his staff now prepared thirteen 

broadcasts to explain the nature of military government to the Germans. Beginning on 4 December, the programs wer<:: 

given daily until completed by the British 

Broadcasting Corporation, American 

Broadcasting Station in Europe, and 

Radio Luxembourg. The broadcasts 

stated the major points of the Allied militarygovernment program: steps for destroying the Nazi regime, the assumption 

of local government by the Allied commanders, changes in economic controls, 

termination of oppressive laws, and the 

like. No effort was made to hide the severity of military occupation, but the announcements made evident an intention 

to establish a system in accord with "the 

dictates of humanity, justice, and civilized 

standards." 18 

The leaflet war against the Germans 

which had been carried on intensively bebefore the invasion was greatly increased 

after 6 June. Making use of planes, artillery, and, occasionally, agents, the Allied 

psychological warfare agencies distributed 

newspapers and millions ofleaflets to the 

enemy forces, as well as news sheets to the 

peoples in occupied countries. In June 

1944, the Allied air forces dropped nearly 

five million copies of a newspaper for German troops, two and a half million periodicals, and approximately six million 

strategic and thirty-five and a half million 

tactical leaflets on the enemy. These did 

not include those fired from artillery and 

345 

disseminated by hand. Copies of leaflets 

distributed in languages other than German totaled more than thirty-eight and a 

half millions. 19 

The Allies made a special drive in late 

July to distribute a bulletin reciting the details of the 20 July attempt to kill Hitler. 

On the evenings of23 and 24July, planes 

dropped nearly four million leaflets about 

the subject on the enemy front in Normandy and distributed nearly three quarters of a million newspapers giving the information. Evidence that these and other 

leaflets were effective was seen in efforts of 

German commanders to prevent their 

men from reading the propaganda. Radio 

denials and special orientation programs 

designed to answer the leaflets indicated 

that the Allied program was feared by the 

enemy.20 

The Germans naturally retaliated with 

their own leaflets and radio appeals. An 

analysis of the line they were taking in the 

fall of 1944 showed that the Germans were 

attempting to playoff the various Allies 

against each other, stressing particularly 

the coming struggle between the Russians 

and the West. In their efforts to counteract the effect of Allied appeals, the enemy 

propagandists said that by inflicting heavy 

casualties on the Allies the German Army 

would gain more favorable peace terms 

for the Reich. The German soldier was 

17 Psychological Warfare Policy and Info Memo 

7,16 Nov 44, SHAEF SGS 091.412 Propaganda; Carroll, Persuade or Perzsh, pp. 328-29. 

18 Statements by Spokesmen of Military Government, 25 Nov 44 (texts of military government proclamations), SHAEF SGS 091.412/3 Psychological 

Warfare Against Germany, I. 

19 Psychological Warfare Rpt 7, 17 Jul 44, SHAEF 

SGS 091.412 Propaganda, I. 

20 The Leaflet Propaganda Front, Report on Special Operations During OVERLORD (atchd to Gen 

McClure's communication slip of 4 Aug 44); McClure 

to Cols SHAEF, 29 Aug 44; Goebbels Gives Leaflet 

Warning, 30 Sep 44. All in SHAEF SGS 091.412 

Propaganda, I. 
346 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

told it was better to die than to live in a 

conquered Germany. 21 

In the course of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, the Psychological 

Warfare Division stopped its appeals for 

German surrender and turned instead to 

exaggerated statements of what the enemy 

expected to gain. SHAEF broadcasts emphasized that Hitler had promised to take 

Liege, Namur, and Verdun before Christmas. The Allies hoped thereby to magnify 

the disillusionment of the enemy once the 

counteroffensive was defeated. 22 

In the final days of the war, the psychological warfare agencies made new leaflet 

appeals to the German civilian and to 

foreign workers in Germany. Civilians in 

the battle zones were told to evacuate 

danger areas, to evade service in the Volkssturm, and to avoid needless destruction of 

their homes. Foreign workers were advised 

by leaflets to practice sabotage or malingering, to refuse to work in munitions factories, and to spread rumors. Instructions 

were given to displaced persons both in 

leaflets and in a four-page newspaper 

called SHAEF which was printed in 

several languages. At one time, small fuze 

incendiaries were dropped to foreign 

workers with instructions on how to use 

them in sabotage operations (BRADDOCK 

11). By the time the war ended, the Allied 

air forces had dropped nearly six billion 

leaflets. Of this number three and a quarter billions were distributed between 6 

June 1944 and 8 May 1945. 23 

Military Government of Germary 

While the Allies were conducting military operations against the enemy and 

searching for means to induce him to surrender, they were also confronted with the 

task Of establishing policy and procedures 

for governing occupied German territory 

during the presurrender period. It was essential to devise a program that would restore sufficient order in the occupied areas 

to avoid interference by the conquered 

populace with military operations and 

that would possibly offset the dire warnings of German propagandists as to the 

fate of their people who fell into Allied 

hands. Such a program was simpler than 

the long-range military government programs then being planned for the postwar 

period. Until the war's end, SHAEF and 

its army groups needed a program that 

would combat starvation and disease, destroy all vestiges of Nazi control, prevent 

local guerrilla warfare, and set the basic 

machinery of community life to functioning again. 

By the time SHAEF started to operate 

in January 1944, a number of agencies 

were already engaged in planning for Allied military government in Germany. 

The War Department had charged its 

Civil Affairs Division with the task of planning for U.S. military occupation in the 

Reich in both the presurrender and posthostilities periods. In Great Britain, the 

British Chiefs of Staff had established the 

Post Hostilities Planning Sub-committee 

to do a similar job for them. The British, 

in the spring of 1944, went further and established a Control Commission Military 

Section under Maj. Gen. Charles A. West 

to provide and train the staffs of various 

21 See Rpt of U.S. Legation at Bern, 23 Nov 44; 

summaries of German propaganda in PWD news 

digests, SHAEF SGS 091.412 Propadanda, I. 

22 PWD guidance bulletin, 20 Dec 44-1 Jan 45, 

SHAEF SGS 091.412 Propaganda, I. 

23 PWD (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations, pp. 

159, 167, 53. Of the nearly six billion leaflets, some 

57 Percent were dropped by U.S. air forces. For a 

description of their activities, see Craven and Cate, 

The Army Air Forces in World War II, III, 494-98. 
PROGRAM FOR GERMANY 

British missions for posthostilities work. 

Meanwhile, both the Foreign Office and 

the State Department had committees 

busy studying postwar problems. 

As early as November 1943, Headquarters, COSSAC, had submitted to the various Allied commands in the United 

Kingdom a civil affairs-military government plan for Europe. Based on existing 

military government manuals, the outline 

was very gel).eral. As soon as the G-5 Division of SHAEF was formed, it continued 

the planning which had been started under COSSAC. A German country unit 

was established by the division in March 

1944 to prepare a handbook on military 

government for the Reich. The SHAEF 

G-3 Division was already at work on similar matters, having established a PostHostilities Planning Sub-Section of its 

Plans Branch to work in liaison on these 

problems with the British service ministries, the U.S. advisers to the European 

Advisory Commission, and the appropriate agencies ofETOUSA. In the absence 

of a directive from the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff, this subsection and other SHAEF 

agencies began preparing papers on such 

questions as armistice terms, displaced 

persons, prisoners of war, disarmament, 

martial law, control of German courts, 

and co-ordination of movement and transport facilities. These papers ultimately became the bases of the so-called ECLIPSE 

memorandums. 24 In March 1944, a 

SHAEF study on the armistice and posthostilities period, dealing with various 

problems which would confront the Supreme Commander between the end of 

hostilities and the termination of SHAEF, 

listed some thirty-eight studies either 

planned or in preparation for this interim 

period. By the end of April some seventytwo studies were being made. 25 

347 

Presurrender Directive 

General Eisenhower, in an effort to get 

some positive guidance on which to base 

the burgeoning plans of his civil affairs 

agencies, asked the Combined Ci,:il 

Affairs Committee in the spring of r944 

for a definitive directive on military government. The CCAC informed him that 

the European Advisory Commission was 

working on a directive and program for 

Germany. In view of the fact, however, 

that SHAEF would need some guidance 

before the members of the commission 

could reach an agreement, the CCAC 

initiated a directive for the presurrender 

period, with the understanding that it 

would be subject to amendment by the 

European Advisory Commission. The directive was approved informally by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff and dispatched 

to the Supreme Commander on 28 April 

1944. The European Advisory Commission later circulated it for Soviet examination. 26 

The presurrender directive for Germany and for those parts of Austria which 

might be overrun by the Allied Expeditionary Force granted the Supreme 

Commander supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority in all areas 

occupied by his troops. It declared that 

24 ECLIPSE was a name given in November 1944 to 

posthostilities plans for Germany. The original code 

name, TALISMAN, was changed after itwas reported 

to be known to the enemy. 

25 Much of this section is based on Office, Chief 

Historian, EUCOM, Planning for the Occupation 

of Germany, compiled and written by Martin P. 

Detels, Jr., Col A.R.C. Sander, Francis Chase, and 

Joseph Starr, 1947, MS, OCMH files; and on 

[Richard M. Welling] Germany: Plans and Policies 

(Bk. VI of History of the Civil Affairs Division, War 

Department Special Staff, World War II [until 

March 1946]), MS, OCMH files. 

26 Welling, History of the Civil Affairs Division, 

Bk. VI. 
348 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

military government was to be an Allied 

undertaking and was to be administered 

in the interests of the United Nations. No 

political agencies or political representatives of Great Britain and the United 

States were to have part in military government, and representatives of civilian 

agencies of the two countries and of the 

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 

Administration (UNRRA) were to participate only when the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff should so decide on the recommendation of the Supreme Commander. 27 

The Allied commander in chief was directed to discourage fraternization between Allied troops and the Germans in 

occupied areas. He was to take sweeping 

measures to dissolve the Nazi organization 

and system of government and to eliminate the General Staff and prevent its revival. Besides maintaining law and order 

and restoring “normal conditions among 

the civilian population as soon as possible, 

in so far as such conditions would not interfere with military operations,” he was 

to make clear that the occupation was intended to destroy Nazism and Fascism. 

On the more constructive side, the Supreme Commander was to free Allied 

prisoners of war and place them under 

military control pending other disposition; 

permit freedom of speech, press, and worship, subject to military exigencies and the 

prohibition of Nazi activities; and establish local government, making use of Germans or of Allied officials according to the 

decision of the Supreme Commander. If 

SHAEF forces entered Austrian territory, 

they were to follow political aims fundamentally different from those in effect-in 

Germany, since the Allied purpose in 

Austria was liberation. Fraternization was 

to be permitted and political activity given 

greater latitude. 28 

At the end of May 1944 the presurrender directive to General Eisenhower 

was completed with the approval of a 

Financial Guide for Germany and an 

Economic and Relief Guide for Germany. 

Where possible the Supreme Commander 

was to work through existing German administrative and economic machinery in 

carrying out his program, keeping in mind 

the necessity of removing the Nazis from 

power. 29 

Allied Zones of Occupation 

With the presurrender directive out of 

the way, Allied planners in the United 

States and Europe were able to return to 

the outlining of zones of occupation in 

Germany, a subject they had been discussing since the summer and fall of 1943. 

COSSAC in its initial proposals for the occupation of Europe in case of German collapse had assumed that Allied troops 

would have to take the responsibility for 

disarming enemy forces in the occupied 

countries and returning them to Germany. 

Occupation zones were outlined, therefore, in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 

Norway, and Denmark in addition to Germany, and the United States was made 

27 UNRRA was an organization created by the 

United Nations in 1943 to aid refugees and displaced 

persons in former Axis-occupied countries in Europe 

and Asia. 

28 CCS Memo for SAC, 28 Apr 44, CCAC 014 Germany (1 1-15-43), Sec I. As presented by CCAC to 

CCS for approval this paper carried the number 

CCAC 69/5. The same document when forwarded 

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff was given the number CCS 551. 

29 Financial Guide for Germany, App. C, and 

Economic and Relief Guide for Germany, App. D, 

CCS 55 1/2, 24 May 44 (approved as CCS 551/3,31 

May 44), CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), SecI. 

Modifications were made in the financial guide by 

CCS 551/5, 31 Aug 44, SHAEF G–5 hist file, 

(CCS) and 1A (CCS Dirs). 
PROGRAM FOR GERMANY 349 

responsible for France, Belgium, and 

southern Germany. 30 President Roosevelt, 

however, as a result of his difficulties with 

General de Gaulle, had become reluctant 

to have any more political dealings with 

French authorities than necessary and 

wanted to avoid any responsibility for 

France. This feeling apparently influenced 

him, at least in part, in favor of a northern 

zone of occupation in Germany which 

would permit the United States to supply 

its troops through north German rather 

than through French ports. He also insisted that the United States should have 

Berlin. 31 At Quebec and again at Cairo 

the conferees discussed these matters without reaching any final conclusions. 

The President in February 1944 said 

that he wanted to stay out of the problems 

of southern Europe after the war, adding 

that it was out of the question for the 

United States to have the postwar burden 

of reconstructing France, Italy, and the 

Balkans. This he considered another reason why the United States should have a 

northern rather than a southern zone of 

occupation. Arguing that the British were 

far more interested than the United States 

in southern Europe, he saw no reason why 

they should not take an occupation zone 

in that area. He emphasized that the 

United States would be only “too glad” to 

take its troops out of all Europe as soon as 

the British were ready to take over. In this, 

he was merely repeating his statement of 

the previous fall that the United States’ 

postwar occupation would probably consist of about one million troops and last for 

about two years. 32 

In mid-February 1944 General Eisenhower had suggested to the War Department that the United States refuse to take 

any responsibility for any specific area in 

Europe. Instead, he proposed that responsibility be accepted only so long as orders 

and policies were issued through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the event that 

Great Britain desired some specific area, 

the United States should withdraw its occupation forces. He justified this idea on 

the ground that, since the United States 

had to furnish a large share of the relief, it 

should “be strongly represented in the 

whole controlling system.” Again at the 

end of March, he opposed proposals for 

separate U.S. and British military government administrations in Germany. He believed it practical to have British occupation troops in one zone and U.S. in 

another with a combined administrative 

body functioning in both. This view was 

not approved in Washington where the 

President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff held 

that the United States should have the 

northern zone of Germany. They also had 

the feeling that no impression should be 

given to the Soviet authorities that they 

were being confronted with a combined 

British- American view before being consulted. 33 

General Eisenhower returned to his 

theme just before D Day. He believed that 

the President had not distinguished between a complete and arbitrary division of 

Europe into separate British and U.S. 

zones on the one hand, and a complete 

amalgamation of British and U.S. units on 

30 See below, page 351, for details relating to the 

Russian zone of occupation. 

31 Mtg, President and JCS, at sea, 19 Nov 43. 

32 Ibid.; Memo by T.T.H. (Handy), 19 Nov 43, 

sub: RANKIN, OPD Exec 9; CCS 134th Mtg, 4 Dec 

43, SEXTANT Conf Min; CCS 143d Mtg, 28 Jan 44; 

CCS 144th Mtg, 4 Feb 44; Memo, President for Actg 

Secy State, 21 Feb 44, ABC 384 Northwest Europe 

(20 Aug 43), Sec 1B. 

33 Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Feb 44; Handy to 

Eisenhower, 21 Feb 44. Both in OPD Exec 9, Bk 15. 

Winant to Secy State, COMEA 50, 30 Mar 44; proposed draft of cable from Marshall to Eisenhower, 2 

Apr 44, CAD 210.31. 
350 

the other. There was no question that the 

bulk of the forces of the two armies should 

be divided because of operational necessity, and because of convenience in handling supply and administration. The 

chief point was whether a sharp line would 

be drawn between the two or whether 

over-all Allied control should continue. 

General Eisenhower believed it would be 

easier for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to 

operate through an Allied commander 

than through independent commanders. 

There was also the danger that, instead of 

having a solid front, the British and U.S. 

area commanders would find themselves 

trying to settle all questions on a British 

versus U.S. basis, thus giving the Russians 

a chance to side with one at the expense of 

the other.34 This argument did not change 

the policy in Washington. 

The President continued to sit tight in 

regard to occupation zones throughJune 

and July. In early August the Russians in 

the European Advisory Commission raised 

the question of zones and asked that they 

be settled between Britain and the United 

States as soon as possible. The State Department proposed that the United States 

accept the southern zone of Germany in 

exchange for British promises to take over 

the occupation of France, Italy, and the 

Balkans, if necessary, and to grant the 

United States sufficient ports in the Low 

Countries and Germany to permit supply 

and evacuation of U.S. troops without dependence on French ports. The State Department suggested that the northern area 

might have "a great many headaches" 

and quite a bit of shooting. The President 

said he was unable to understand why any 

discussion was necessary with the Russians 

since an agreement had been made that 

they might police that part of Germany in 

which they had expressed a desire to exercise control. As to the general question of 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

the zones of occupation, he said he merely 

awaited an agreement by the Prime Minister that U.S. troops would police northwest Germany.a5 

When mid-August arrived without any 

final decision on the zones, General Eisenhower declared that he would have to approach the problem on a purely military 

basis and send his forces in with the 21 

Army Group on the left. This action, of 

course, meant that British forces would be 

occupying Belgium, Holland, and northwest Germany, while U.S. forces would be 

in the south. 36 The necessity of having 

some arrangement made by the European 

Advisory Commission before Allied forces 

entered Germany may have led that body 

to hasten its approval of the text of a 

protocol between the United States, Great 

Britain, and the USSR on 12 September 

providing for the boundaries of the three 

zones of occupation. Even the protocol did 

not decide whether the United States or 

Great Britain would have the northwest 

or southwest zone of Germany. It merely 

noted the boundaries and said that the allocation of zones would be settled by joint 

agreement. 37 

3. Memo, Eisenhower for Cors SHAEF, 20 May 

44, used as basis for Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 27 

May 44, Diary Office CinCo In an entry of 27 May, 

Captain Butcher explained that some historian might 

read into the general's letter a desire to continue as 

Allied commander in chief. He noted that, while 

General Eisenhower had indicated he would like the 

job of ridding the world of the German General Staff 

and all it stood for, he also wanted to get on with 

the war so he could "get home and go fishing." 

Butcher thought he was merely being consistent in 

urging unity of command. 

35 Stettini us to President, 2 Aug 44; President to 

Stettinius, 3 Aug 44. Both in OPD Exec 10, Item 63c. 

3. SHAEF to WD, FWD 12936, 17 Aug 44, CCAC 

014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2. 

37 Approval oftext of protocol between U.K., U.s., 

and USSR on zones of occupation in Germany and 

administration of Greater Berlin, 12 Sep 44 (photostat 

of signed agreement), CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-

43), Sec 2. 
PROGRAM FOR GERMANY 35 1 

On the day that the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff examined the question in Quebec, 

Admiral Leahy explained the military 

reasons why the United States should have 

the northwest zone. Admiral King, however, took the view that it would be easier 

for the United States to occupy the southwest zone of Germany if at the same time 

arrangements could be made to evacuate 

American troops and to supply occupation 

forces through the northern German ports. 

The question was referred to President 

Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. The President now agreed that the British forces 

would “occupy Germany west of the 

Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the 

line from Coblenz following the northern 

border of Hessen and Nassau to the border 

of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.” The United States was to occupy 

Germany east of the Rhine and south of 

the British zone eastward to the Russian 

zone. The British zone thus included the 

Ruhr, the Rhineland north of Koblenz, 

and the northern German ports, while the 

Americans had Bavaria, the Saar, and the 

Rhineland south of Koblenz. The USSR 

occupied the rest of Germany with the exception of Berlin, which was to be held on 

a tripartite basis. At President Roosevelt’s 

insistence, the United States received control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and the necessary staging areas in 

their immediate vicinity. U.S. forces were 

also to have access to the western and 

northwestern seaports and passage 

through the British-controlled area. 38 

Final ratifications by the governments 

were not completed until 6 February 1945, 

by which time U.S. and British forces were 

already carrying out military occupation 

functions in western Germany. Approximately a week later, at the conclusion of 

the Yalta Conference, the Allies announced that France would be invited to 

take a zone of occupation, and that its 

boundaries would be worked out by the 

four powers through their members on the 

European Advisory Commission. 39 

Postsurrender Preparations 

While discussions were in progress on 

zones of occupation, SHAEF turned its attention to the preparation of handbooks 

and directives for postsurrender military 

government of Germany. The British had 

already taken independent action in April 

and May 1944 by establishing the British 

Control Commission Military Section 

under General West to provide and train 

the cadres of various British missions for 

posthostilities work. 40 General Eisenhower 

and his staff in June 1944 recommended 

that the United States take similar action, 

and in August the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

formally established the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) to act in close 

liaison with similar British and Soviet 

groups. Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham, representative of SHAEF at European Advisory Commission meetings, was 

selected as acting deputy to the chief U.S. 

representative on the Control Council and 

placed in charge of organizing the U.S. 

group. 41 

General Eisenhower announced in late 

August that during the presurrender 

period the U.S. control group would be re38 CCS 172d Mtg, 12 Sep 44; CCS 176th Mtg, 16 

Sep 44. Both in OCTAGON Conf Min. 

39 See below, pp. 464-65. 

40 SHAEF G–4 Weekly Rpt 1, Administrative 

Planning for Post-Hostilities Period, 3 Aug 44, 

SHAEF G–3 31 2.1-2 Post Hostilities Planning, 

Bundle O. 

41 Mtg, SHAEF G–5, 13 Jun 44; Memo by SAC, 

19 Jun 44; Smith to JCS, 20 Jun 44. All in SHAEF 

G–5 803 Internal Affairs Branch, Military Govt in 

Germany, Gen Corres, Jacket 2. ETOUSA GO 80, 

9 Aug 44; Rpt, U.S. Group Control Council, 1-15 

Sep 44, G–5 hist file 17.05 German Country Unit 

and US. Control Council. 
352 

sponsible to him as U.S. theater commander, and the British group would be 

responsible to the British Government. In 

the initial stage after surrender, the British 

and U.S. control groups were to function 

together under the Supreme Commander-but not under SHAEF. The 

agreed policy of Great Britain, the United 

States, and the USSR was to be passed on 

to the Supreme Commander through the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Eisenhower was to use the Control Commission/Council as his normal channel of 

communication to the German central 

authority. The SHAEF G-3 was to coordinate posthostilities planningY 

The British in early September proposed instead that General Eisenhower 

use the Control Commission/Council in 

framing occupation policy, referring any 

disagreements to the Combined Civil 

Affairs Committee (London). The Supreme Commander indicated his willingness to have the U.S. and British control 

agencies represent their separate governments but preferred that they appeal disagreements to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. Pending decisions by the Combined 

Chiefs, he added, the Supreme Commander's decision "must be binding." He 

reaffirmed his intention of establishing the 

nucleus Control Commission/Council in 

Berlin as soon as conditions permitted and 

of using it in his communications with the 

central German authority. He insisted, 

however, that no such authority could be 

given the Anglo-American group until 

stability and adequate communications 

had been established in Berlin 43 

General Eisenhower defined his policy 

even more firmly in a memorandum to his 

army group commanders on 15 November 

1944. He declared that, during the period 

between the surrender of Germany and 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

the termination of combined command, 

he would retain ultimate responsibility in 

its widest sense for control of the German 

forces, military government, and disbandment and disarmament. To prevent any 

divergence of policy in the U.S. and British spheres of occupation, no agreements 

on policy were to be made between army 

groups and their respective control commissions without SHAEF's concurrence. 44 

The question of French participation in 

combined control groups for Germany 

arose in September when General de 

Gaulle indicated that he wanted French 

troops to take part in operations in Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff 

agreed to General Eisenhower's proposal 

that during the period of combined command the German occupation should be 

on a strictly Allied basis and that U.S., 

British, and French forces should be employed in accordance with military requirements and without regard to political 

factors. In November, the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff suggested that until Germany was defeated the participation of the 

French should be limited to forming part 

of the U.S. and British military government teams. Such a suggestion, Eisenhower warned, would lead to violent reactions on the part of the French. He 

pointed to plans then under way for conducting a French military government 

school under SHAEF supervision, and 

suggested that he be permitted to use 

French military government teams in 

42 SHAEF Stf Memo 104, 23 Aug 44, SHAEF G-5 

803 Internal Affairs Branch, Military Govt in Germany, Gen Corres,Jacket 2. 

43 SHAEF to CCS, FWD 13854,5 Sep 44, CCAC 

014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2. 

"Eisenhower to A Gp com drs, 15 Nov 44, SHAEF 

G-5 803/3 Internal Affairs Branch, Military Govt in 

Germany, Relationship With Control Commission/ 

Council. 
PROGRAM FOR GERMANY 353 

those areas occupied by the French. Apparently this permission was granted, for 

the French military government school 

was subsequently opened and its first 

teams were placed under 6th Army Group 

in mid-March 1945. 45 

Policy and Directives for Occupation of Germany 

By the time the Allied armies were established in the Normandy beachhead, 

various British and U.S. agencies were 

drawing up handbooks, manuals, and directives for the occupation of Germany. 

By June, the German country unit of 

SHAEF had prepared the first draft of a 

Handbook for Military Government in 

Germany, the British Control Commission 

Military Section had started a manual on 

disarmament, SHAEF G–1 was preparing 

a Handbook for Unit Commanders (Germany), and SHAEF G–5 was drafting a 

directive to guide army group commanders when they entered enemy territory. 

Early drafts of many of these texts were 

circulated in Supreme Headquarters and 

occasionally sent to service ministries in 

London and to interested branches of the 

State, Treasury, and War Departments in 

Washington. By late June, General Hilldring, War Department director of civil 

affairs, had seen SHAEF papers dealing 

with preparations for the presurrender 

and posthostilities periods and had reminded General Smith that the European 

Advisory Commission was charged with 

formulating recommendations forthe German surrender and for the control and occupation of Germany after its defeat or 

surrender. He added that no agreements 

had yet been made as to the duration of 

military government in Germany or the 

type of organization to be established after 

thecessationofmilitarygovernment. 46 In 

the absence of any specific directive or 

guidance, the SHAEF agencies and divisions continued to make plans, and in 

August had drafts of a handbook and directives to army group commanders for 

the initial stages of military occupation 

ready for distribution. 

On 17 August, General Eisenhower 

warned the War .Department that the Allied forces might begin their occupation of 

Germany sooner than had been expected. 

Less than a week later, after the Falaise 

Gap was closed and shortly before Paris 

fell, he called for guidance on Germany. 

Plans for occupation of the Reich, he said 

in a cable to the Combined Chiefs on 23 

August, were being based on the presurrender directive, but the directive rested 

on the assumption that the Allies would 

have to fight their way into Germany and 

that they would have behind their lines 

enemy territory in which the military 

forces would have to re-establish law and 

order and be responsible for the economic 

well-being of the people. It also assumed 

that ultimately there would be a mass surrender of the German Army, and that 

some central authority would be left. Now, 

however, it appeared that no single surrender would take place and the Allied 

45 Eisenhower's msg and CCS reply appended to 

CCAC 140/2, 10 Oct 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11- 

15-43), Sec 3. CCS to Eisenhower, WX 58337 

(FACS 106), 6 Nov 44; Eisenhower to CCS, S–66513 

(SCAF 129). 12 Nov 44. Both in SHAEF G–5 803 

Military Govt in Germany, General Correspondence, 

Jacket 1. For French military government units and 

schools, see SHAEF Mission (France) AG 09 1.7 1 1- 

1(Fr), through 30 September 1944. 

46 Planning for the Occupation of Germany, 

OCMH files; Hilldring to Smith, 1 Jul 44, CAD 014 

Germany (7-10-42), Sec 7. Among the SHAEF 

papers that Hilldring had seen were SHAEF/21540/ 

1/Ops, sub: PS SHAEF (44) 10-Primary Disarmament of the German Forces, and SHAEF/21542/0ps, 

sub: PS SHAEF (44) 9—preparation for the Surrender and Post-Hostilities Middle Period, 29 Apr 44. 
354 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

forces might find a chaotic Germany in 

which guerrilla warfare and civil war 

could be expected. In such a case it would 

be impossible to control or save the economic structure of the country. If this were 

true, the Supreme Commander, added, he 

felt that he could not take responsibility 

for the control and support of the German 

economic structure. 47 

The Civil Affairs Division of the War 

Department had anticipated General 

Eisenhower’s earlier warning of 17 August 

by suggesting that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee draft a statement of general policies for SHAEF’s guidance if the 

German surrender came before a detailed 

postsurrender directive could be issued. 48 

On 23 August, representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, recognizing the complications which had arisen 

from the fact that the European Advisory 

Commission had reached no agreement on 

a great number of directives, urged the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff to give the Supreme Commander guidance relative to 

the military government of Germany in 

the early stages of the postsurrender 

period. Fearing that the handbook and 

directives under preparation by SHAEF 

might conflict with Allied policies, they 

asked that General Eisenhower’s instructions to his army groups coincide with 

British and U.S. postwar plans. They also 

requested that the Supreme Commander 

be instructed as to his proper relationship 

with the U.S. and British elements of the 

Group Control Council and Control Commission, suggesting that these agencies be 

directed to aid SHAEF in military government and in case of disagreement to submit their differences to the Combined 

Civil Affairs Committee (London) rather 

than to the main committee in Washington. 49 The Combined Chiefs of Staff now 

proposed that General Eisenhower be told 

to continue his planning along the lines indicated in his cable of 23 August and 

noted that appropriate directives would 

be issued him in due course. 50 

Before any final arrangements could be 

made, President Roosevelt intervened decisively. Draft copies of the Handbook for 

Military Government in Germany had 

been submitted for comment to the 

Foreign Office, the Civil Affairs Division, 

and other government agencies. One copy 

had found its way to the President, apparently through the Treasury Department. Mr. Roosevelt, in a strong memorandum to Secretary Stimson on 26 

August, described the handbook as “pretty 

bad” and directed that it be withdrawn if 

it had not been sent out. The handbook 

displeased the President because of its emphasis on seeing that the governmental 

machinery of Germany ran efficiently and 

on retaining the highly centralized German administrative system unless higher 

authority directed otherwise. He disliked 

the statements that military government, 

officers would see to it that needed commodities and stores were imported, industrial plants converted from war to consumer goods production, essential economic activities subsidized where 

necessary, and German foreign trade reconstructed with priority for the needs of 

47 SHAEF to WD, FWD 12936, 17 Aug 44, CCAC 

Germany (11–15–43), Sec 2; Eisenhower to CCS, 

FWD 13 128 (SCAF 68), 23 Aug 44, SHAEF G–5 803 

Internal Affairs Branch, Military Govt in Germany, 

General Correspondence, Jacket 2. 

48 Memo by Dir CAD, CCAC 119, 15 Aug 44, 

CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2. 

49 Memo by Br COS representative, CCS 658, 23 

Aug 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2. The 

proposed directive appears in the CCAC files as 

CCAC 119/1, 24 Aug 44. 

50 Memo, CCS for CAD, 24 Aug 44, CCAC 014 

Germany (1 1-15-43), Sec 2. 
PROGRAM FOR GERMANY 

the United Nations. President Roosevelt 

expressed displeasure because so many 

Americans and Englishmen held that the 

people of Germany were not responsible 

for the war, a view he insisted was not 

based on fact. "The German people as a 

whole must have it driven home to them," 

he declared, "that the whole nation has 

been engaged in a lawless conspiracy 

against the decencies of modern civilization." If they needed food beyond what 

they had, to keep body and soul together, 

they should be fed with soup from Army 

kitchens, but he was unwilling to start a 

Works Progress Administration, a Civilian 

Conservation Corps, or a Public Works 

Administration for Germany when the 

Army of Occupation entered on its 

duties. 51 

This memorandum got immediate results. The War Department directed 

SHAEF to suspend its handbooks on Germany and its directives to army group 

commanders, since they were strenuously 

objected to on the highest United States 

level and were in many respects inconsistent with the presurrender directives. There 

were British objections as well, the War 

Department indicated. General Smith 

called attention to the difficult position in 

which this order left Supreme Headquarters and added that SHAEF could not do 

business on an informal basis in matters of 

such importance. He asked that instructions to suspend the handbook and directives be issued by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. This request had already been antici pated and instructions were on the way 

by the time General Smith's cable was received. 52 

The Combined Civil Affairs Committee, in view of the likelihood that Allied 

troops would shortly be in Germany and 

the possibility that Germany would soon 

355 

collapse, was stirred to action. It decided 

to inform the Supreme Commander that, 

if Germany surrendered before he received 

a directive to guide him in that contingency, he might carryon military government under the existing presurrender 

directive. This action was suspended, however, when the Supreme Commander requested permission to comment on the 

new instructions before they were issued. 53 

Later in the same day, the Combined Civil 

Affairs Committee notified General Eisenhower that he might issue preshrrender interim directives based on directives of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. It instructed 

him, however, to block out of the haridbook aU directives that assumed a policy 

of general economic or administrative rehabilitation. As for post hostilities guidance, the committee informed him that a 

directi ve to meet the needs of that period 

was then under consideration. 54 

SHAEF sent final drafts of its German 

directive and handbook to Washington, 

pointing out that they had been prepared 

in accordance with the presurrender directives but modified to meet the possibility that there would be chaos in Germany 

when the Allied armies arrived. SHAEF 

officials added that they had neither the 

51 Memo, PI'esident for Secy War, 26 Aug 44, CAD 

014 Germany (7-10-42), Sec 8. 

52 Telephone conversation, Hilldring, Marcus, and 

Boettiger with Sherman, 28 Aug 44; Smith to Hilldring, FWD 13405,30 Aug 44; Hilldring to Holmes, 

30 Aug 44; WD to SHAEF, WAR 89024 (GOV 100), 

29 Aug 44. All in CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), 

Sec 2. Hilldring to Smith, W-89253, 31 Aug 44, 

SHAEF AG 014.1-1 Germany, Military Govt. The 

War Department message of 29 August 1944,90024 

(GOV 100), was received on 31 August. 

53 Notes on mtg in Mr. McCloy's office, 29 Aug 44; 

SHAEF to WD, FWD 13496 (SCAF 70), 1 Sep 44; 

CCS to SHAEF, WAR 24564 (GOV 103),2 Sep 44. 

All in CCAC 014 Germany (11-15"':43), Sec 2. 

54 CCAC to Eisenhower, WAR 24569 (GOV 102), 

1 Sep 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2. 
356 

facilities nor the time to block out of the 

handbook passages relating to general economic provisions and rehabilitation, and 

suggested they be permitted to issue the 

handbook and directive with covering 

notes stating categorically that the commanders were not to apply the offending 

provisions. 55 

The Supreme Commander issued his interim directive to 21 and 12th Army 

Groups on 10 September 1944, delegating 

to Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley responsibility for executing 

his policy in their zones. As soon as they 

occupied any part of Germany, they were 

to establish military government. SHAEF 

was to set policy for the distribution ofrelief and rehabilitation supplies to Allied 

displaced persons in Germany and for the 

distribution of supplies, approved by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, to the civil population of Germany. On request of the 

army group commanders, SHAEF was to 

furnish military government staffs, detachments, and experts. The army group commanders were empowered in their areas 

to enforce the terms of surrender and to 

take necessary steps to maintain order and 

wipe out the traces of Nazism. 56 

Meanwhile, SHAEF's draft handbook 

and proclamations were undergoing careful scrutiny in Washington. The U.S. 

members of the Combined Civil Affairs 

Committee felt that the handbook should 

be rewritten to insure that (1) no steps beyond those necessary for military purposes 

should be taken for the economic rehabilitation of Germany; (2) no relief supplies 

except the minimum necessary to prevent 

disease and disorder that might interfere 

with military operations should be imported or distributed; and (3) no Nazi, 

Nazi sympathizer, nor Nazi organization 

should be continued in office for purposes 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

of convenience or expediency. The Supreme Commander's proposed proclama~ 

tion to the German people was to be 

changed so as to carry no implication that 

Germany was to be treated as a Ii berated 

country. The Supreme Commander was 

informed that, ifhe could not hold up distribution of the handbook until changes 

could be made, he should issue it with a 

covering note to the effect that it would 

not be used during the postsurrender 

period of military government. Apparently 

without waiting for any further order, the 

SHAEF G-5 on 15 September directed 

the army group commanders to insert a 

fly leafin all copies of the interim directive 

and handbook for military government 

stating that the three basic principles mentioned above were to be applied and adding that the directive would apply only to 

the presurrender period. 57 

SHAEF's proposed proclamation to the 

Germans on military government was reviewed next in Washington. The first paragraph led to considerable discussion. After 

some examination to make certain that 

the German word for "conquerors" did 

not give the impression that the Allies were 

"looters," British and U.S. officials examined the statement that the Nazi rule 

would be overthrown "as in other countries Ii berated from the horrors of Nazi 

tyranny." This seemed to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff to leave the impression that 

Germany was to be treated as a liberated 

country. After exchanging cables with 

"SHAEF to CCS, FWD 13851 (SCAF 73),5 Sep 

44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2. 

56 SHAEF Interim Directive for Military Government of Germany, 10 Sep 44, SHAEF AG 014.1-1 

Germany, Military Govt. 

57 Hilldring to Holmes, W -29982, 13 Sep 44; 

SHAEF G-5 to A Gp com drs and COMZ, FWD 

14955,15 Sep 44. Both in SHAEF AG 014.1-1 Germany, Military Govt. 
PROGRAM FOR GERMANY 

Washington over a period of approximately two weeks, and after reprinting the 

proclamation three times to incorporate 

changes, SHAEF released it to the press on 

28 September. The key paragraph now 

read: 

The Allied Forces serving under my Command have now entered Germany. We come 

as conquerors, but not as oppressors. In the 

area of Germany occupied by the forces under my Command, we shall obliterate 

Nazism and German militarism. We shall 

overthrow the Nazi rule, dissolve the Nazi 

Party and abolish the cruel and oppressive 

and discriminatory laws and institutions 

which the party has created. We shall eradicate that German militarism which has so 

often disrupted the peace of the world. Military and party leaders, the Gestapo and 

others suspected of crimes and atrocities, will 

be tried, and if guilty, punished as they deserve. 58 

The proclamation permitted no doubt 

on the part of the Germans that Allies intended to annihilate the Hitlerian system. 

Although the softening phrases of the 

original draft had been stricken from the 

document, the omission of unconditional 

surrender from the statement permitted 

the Germans some hope as to the effects of 

the occupation. 

Another question raised by the Supreme Commander concerning his occupation policy was also dealt with in September. It will be recalled that in August 

General Eisenhower had expressed the 

fear that he would be unable to support 

the German economic system and had 

asked to be relieved of his responsibility in 

that connection. The War Department 

was inclined to accept his recommendation, but the British representatives in 

Washington were unable to agree that collapse of the whole economic structure was 

inevitable. They urged that the Supreme 

Commander do his best to carry out the 

357 

policy prescribed in the presurrender directive. In order to deal with the impasse, 

General Hilldring, in a message which he 

also sent to the British, suggested that 

General Eisenhower recall his original request and note that he felt the contingencies he had discussed could be adequately 

handled under the provisions of his presurrender directive. General HiIldring 

suggested that the cable be so worded that 

it would not require an answer. SHAEF 

promptly complied, thereby disposing 

neatly of at least one topic of transatlantic 

correspondence. 59 

The SHAEF staff was gratified to hear 

in September that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee was examining the text of 

a post hostilities directive. Unfortunately, 

SHAEF had to wait until the end of the 

fighting for specific instructions. The delays were based in particular on the inability of the British and the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff to agree on the type of document 

which should be issued. The British representatives in the Combined Civil Affairs 

Committee believed, for example, that 

General Eisenhower could get along for 

some time after the defeat of Germany on 

the basis of his presurrender directive. 

Even when drafts were submitted to the 

committee, considerable divergence developed among the various representatives 

as to what should be included. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that not until late 

in April 1945 was a posthostilities directive 

approved. This had not reached SHAEF 

on the day the armistice was signed at 

58 SHAEF Fwd to CCS and CCAC, VOG 134, 28 

Sep 44, and other correspondence and cables of 15-28 

September, SHAEF AG 014.1-1 Germany, Military 

Govt. 5. Hilldring to Holmes, WAR 31224, 15 Sep 44; 

SHAEF to WD, SCAF 88,18 Sep 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 3. 
358 

Reims. General Eisenhower reminded the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff at that time that 

he was still operating under directives limited in application to the presurrender 

period. He considered the issuance of a 

new directive unnecessary, however, since 

policies developed under the postsurrender drafts did not differ markedly 

from those set down in the presurrender 

documents. In the absence of a new directive, he proposed to continue his current 

policies and directives until the termination of the combined command. On 11 

May 1945, President Harry S. Truman 

approved the directives of the U.S. Chiefs 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

of Staff for General Eisenhower as commander in chief of the United States 

Forces of Occupation regarding the military government of Germany. This document, which was to guide General Eisenhower in his activities as U.S. commander 

after the dissolution of SHAEF, was dispatched on 15 May 1945.60 

60 SHAEF to WD, FWD 16012,27 Sep 44, CAD 

014 Germany (7-10-42), Sec 9; CCAC 45th Mtg, 12 

Oct 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 3; 

SHARF to WD, SCAF 362, 7 May 45; IPCOG 1/4, 

11 May 45; .Note by Secretaries on Directive to CinC, 

U.S. Forces of Occupation, Regarding the Military 

Government of Germany, 26 Apr 45; JCS to Eisenhower, WAR B3249, 16 May 45. All in CCAC 014 

Germany (11-15-43), Sec B. 
CHAPTER XX 

The Winter Counteroffensives 

The German Plan 

While the Allies were pressing their 

offensive toward the Rhine in the fall of 

1944, Hitler was planning an attack in the 

Ardennes region to roll up and destroy 

Allied forces north of the line AntwerpBrussels-Bastogne. Conceived by the 

Fuehrer at the beginning or middle of 

September, the counteroffensive was intended as a crippling blow to slow or stop 

the Allied advance.' 

The first weeks of September saw few 

developments that would justify German 

hopes for success. The enemy made an attempt to roll back the southern flank of 

12th Army Group and the month ended 

without his regaining the initiative in that 

area. Elsewhere, Hitler's generals had 

managed to improvise defenses that interfered with Allied plans for a quick breakthrough to the Rhine. Despite this success, 

Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who had 

returned as Commander in Chief West at 

the beginning of September, was not optimistic. In a report written after the war, he 

recalled that in his contemporary estimate 

of the situation he predicted that the main 

Allied thrust would skirt Aachen and aim 

at northern Germany and Berlin. He believed that most of the U.S. forces, once 

they approached the German border, 

would wheel in a northeasterly direction, 

advance across the line Trier-Aachen in 

the direction of the Cologne-Ruhr area, 

and then proceed toward northern Germany. In this case, southern Germany 

would fall automatically even if attacked 

only by minor forces. 2 

Hitler was much more hopeful. On 13 

September 1944, he ordered the Sixth 

Panzer Army constituted with the idea of 

using it in a counteroffensive against the 

Allies. 3 During the next ten days, he 

ordered two panzer corps disengaged from 

battle and transferred to the new army. 

About the same time, he outlined his proposals to JodI, asking for plans to implement his general scheme. JodI presented 

1 Considerable confusion exists as to the sense in 

which the terms counterattack and counteroffensive were 

used during this period. Although there are instances 

where no clear line of demarcation can be drawn, 

the term counterattack properly applies to a tactical 

situation in which a defending force reacts to an 

enemy attack with an offensive action pursuing limited objectives. It is carried out mostly by local reserves and is limited in scope and duration. The term 

counteroffensive belongs rather to the realm of strategy. 

It denotes an operation mounted on a large scale, 

often involving commitment of strategic reserves, and 

capable of affecting the further development of the 

whole campaign. The primary aim ofa counterof-', 

fensive is complete reversal of the situation created by 

the attacker and seizure of the initiative from the 

enemy. 

2 Field Marshal von Rundstedt's undated "Critique" which precedes MS # 1-121 (Zimmermann 

et al.). The author is indebted for the greater part of 

the information in this chapter relating to German 

plans and operations to Mrs. Magna E. Bauer of the 

Office of the Chief of Military History who not only 

did the basic research in the German documents but 

carefully checked the completed narrative for errors. 

3 The primary mission of the Sixth Panzer Army was 

to supervise the rehabilitation of the armored divi-
360 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

his draft on 11 October; it was formally 

described to von Rundstedt and Model 

on 1 November. While the Commander 

in Chief West may have received some 

hint of these preparations before that 

time, it is clear that he was not the 

originator of the “Rundstedt counteroffensive.” 4 

The plan called for Army Group B to attack with twenty-nine or thirty divisions 5 

in the area of the Ardennes with the objective of destroying Allied forces north of the 

line Antwerp–Brussels–Bastogne and 

thereby bringing about a decisive change 

in the over-all situation. These efforts were 

to be co-ordinated with those of Army 

Group H, 6 which was located north of Army 

Group B. Army Groups G and Oberrhein, south 

of Army Group B, were ordered to tie up 

Allied forces. The initial break-through 

was to be aided by Operation GREIF, in 

which German officers and men dressed in 

U.S. uniforms and driving U.S. vehicles 

were to spread confusion by issuing false 

orders and by seizing bridges and key 

points. They were to be aided by some 800 

parachutists who were to be dropped in 

the Malmédy area. 7 

Although Hitler’s advisers were less 

hopeful than he about the prospects of the 

counteroffensive, they agreed it should be 

attempted. Keitel and Jodl declared after 

the war that, while the counteroffensive 

involved some risks, it was necessary to 

make an effort in late 1944 to check the 

threat of an Allied break-through from 

Aachen toward Cologne. Von Rundstedt 

sions, both SS and Army, which were earmarked for 

the Ardennes counteroffensive. In view of the mixed 

composition of its staff the Sixth Panzer Army was sometimes referred to as the Sixth SS Panzer Army. Allied 

intelligence officers usually identified it as such. However, in nearly all official references to it as late as 

April 1945 by the OKH and the army groups under 

which it served, it is designated as Sixth Panzer Army. 

and Model believed that, if surprise could, 

be achieved and the attacking forces supplied, there was a chance for its success. 

Both doubted that the forces available 

were strong enough for the operation. For 

this reason Model, who was to command 

Army Group B in the attack, proposed and 

von Rundstedt approved a “little solution” involving a pincer movement around 

Aachen to cut off the Allied forces in that 

area. Model continued to urge it as late as 

10-11 December, but Hitler rejected it. 

Despite the doubts of von Rundstedt and 

the commanders of the units involved, 

they thought that the Ardennes area was 

suitable for attack. They believed the attempt worth making, although they 

doubted whether more than half the distance proposed could be covered with the 

resources available. If the first half of the 

counteroffensive succeeded, they could 

then decide whether the rest of the plan 

was feasible. 8 

4 MS # A-862, The Preparations for the German 

Offensive in the Ardennes, September-16 December 

1944 (Schramm). A full account of the enemy preparations will be given in the chief study on the counteroffensive-Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes, now in 

preparation for the UNITED STATES ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR 11 series. 

5 Elements of twenty-eight divisions were actually 

used. 

6 In October 1944 it was decided to organize a new 

army group headquarters, so as to relieve Army Group 

B of a part of its load. On 29 October Army Group 

Student assumed command of Fifteenth Army, Armed 

Forces Commander Netherlands, and First Parachute Army. 

Army Group Student was renamed Army Group H on 11 

November, with Student as army group commander. 

7 See Enclosure No. 2 to letter from Jodl to the chief 

of staff of OB WEST, Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal, entitled Grundgedanken der Operation “Wacht am 

Rhein”, 1 Nov 44. OB WEST, KTB Anlage50 1. VU31.XII.44; MS # A-862 (Schramm). On 26 November 1944 Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler was 

designated Oberbeƒehlshaber Oberrhein and was ordered 

to take command of all Army, Air Force, and SS elements on the east bank of the Rhine between Bien 

Wald and the Swiss border. 

8 MS # A-862. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 361 

To hide their intentions the Germans 

worked out elaborate deception plans. All 

preparations were to be made under the 

guise of a counterattack against the Allied 

drive toward the Rhine. Only a small 

number of high-ranking officers were permitted to know the details of the plan, and 

the defensive nature of the preparations 

was stressed. All movements of German 

forces assigned for the counteroffensive 

were arranged to fit into the deception 

plan. The newly activated Sixth Panzer 

Army was not to be brought into the line 

until the eve of the attack, and all of its 

movements to the front were to be made 

by night. Both the Fifth and Sixth Panzer 

Armies were given fake names, and other 

units were shifted or renamed in order to 

confuse· the Allies. To make certain that 

no slip-ups would occur, some of the units 

earmarked for the attack were left off 

situation maps at even the highest headquarters. 9 

The deception plans were to play an important part in the surprise gained by the 

enemy. In this effort the Germans were 

aided not only by the plausibility of their 

story but also by the fact that the Allies, 

now that they were on German soil, no 

longer had the excellent local information 

and certain other types of intelligence that 

had been available in France and Belgium. 

Allied Estimate if Enemy Intentions 

In their December preparations to 

launch a drive toward the Rhine, the 

Allies had concentrated forces north and 

south of the Ardennes, leaving that area 

thinly held by one corps over a seventymile front. As troops were sent from the 

Ardennes to the north, General Eisenhower had pointed out that they were 

getting stretched and there was a danger 

of a "nasty little Kasserine," but he did 

not change his dispositions. General Bradley believed that he could afford to take a 

risk in the area in order to mount a strong 

attack against the enemy. In making these 

decisions, the commanders were taking a 

type of calculated risk common in all 

battles or campaigns where a given force 

lacks sufficient troops to concentrate at the 

point of main attack and still hold strongly 

elsewhere. The decision to concentrate 

north and south of the Ardennes was made 

because those areas provided the best 

routes of advance into Germany, but there 

were also adequate grounds for choosing 

the Ardennes as the area to be weakly 

held. Although the enemy had come 

through the Ardennes in 1870 and again 

in 1940, the terrain was not suited for 

mobile warfare, particularly in the winter 

months when bad weather was likely to 

make the poor road net even less valuable 

than usual. 

While the Germans prepared the Ardennes counteroffensive, the Allies made 

use of normal intelligence sources such as 

air reconnaissance, captured documents, 

prisoner interrogation, and patrol reports. 

They also had some information from OSS 

agents, but this varied from army to 

army."0 From the sources available, the 

Allied intelligence sections predicted 

rather accurately that the enemy lacked 

the means of preventing the Allies from 

9 See Order, OKW to OB WEST, signed by Jodi, 5 

Nov 44. OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50 1'vII.-31.XIl.44; 

MS # A-862 (Schramm); MS # A-896, OB WEST -

34 Questions, 1 Sep-8 May 45 (Westphal). 

10 The Ninth and Third Armies had OSS detachments, but all except a small section of the one at First 

Army had been withdrawn on the recommendation 

of that headquarters when the 12th Army Group became operational. Thereafter the OSS detachments 

formerly at First Army operated from army group 

level. 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns, III, 136-37; Interv 

with Col B. A. Dickson, 6 Feb 52. 
362 

reaching the heart of Germany and destroying her military might, and that the 

enemy would make his major stand west 

of the Rhine. They were also able to locate most of the enemy units and to plot 

their general movements. 

The various intelligence sections published these estimates in weekly and, at 

some levels, daily summaries. Because 

there was a time lag between the reception of information and its publication and 

because some information was too highly 

classified to be circulated, the published 

estimates were supplemented by daily reports at conferences of the commanders 

and their staffs and by personal reports to 

the commanders. Few, if any, records were 

kept of these meetings, and it is necessary 

to depend heavily upon the printed estimates for the views of the intelligence 

chiefs. With certain qualifications, however, it is safe to make use of these sources. 

Inasmuch as no major change was made 

in the general conclusions about enemy 

capabilities in the estimates of October 

and November, it may be assumed that 

these represent generally the thinking of 

the intelligence sections of that period. 

For December, when the nature of the 

warnings becomes important, it is necessary to know what additional information 

was given. In the absence of a record of the 

oral briefings, one can do little more than 

apply a rule of thumb test: was the warning of such weight that the commander 

found it necessary to make any immediate changes in his tactical dispositions? 

This test must naturally be used with caution since the intelligence officer's warnings may have been ignored by his commander. It may normally be assumed, 

however, that no commander intentionally 

permits his forces to be overwhelmed. The 

problem of judging the nature of intelliTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

gence warnings is an exceptionally thorny 

one, particularly when they are given 

orally and when they are later involved 

in controversy. The intelligence chief tends 

to give a number of alternative capabilities which the enemy may develop, and 

since he is obliged to emphasize the maximum effort the enemy may make he often 

hits on all the courses of action the enemy 

can possibly take. In such a case, he is able 

to claim later that he forecast the enemy's 

action accurately. The commander, accustomed to rather gloomy forecasts, has 

to have something more than an array of 

enemy capabilities if he is to continue 

battle at all. At this point he wants an intelligence officer to give him a precise 

statement as to the action the enemy seems 

most likely to take. The ideal intelligence 

report would be one which would say that 

a force of a specific number of divisions is 

likely to strike within a given period along 

a particular front to carry out a particular 

mission. The prospects are slim, however, 

that any intelligence officer, short of getting a copy of the operational orders from 

the enemy commander in chief, colild 

make such a report. The most that any 

commander expects is an approximation 

of that type of information. 

In the case of the Ardennes, some intelligence officers believed that they provided 

such warning to their superiors and that 

either the intelligence sections at higher 

echelons or the commanders themselves 

ignored it. With the reminder that the 

materials at hand are incomplete, that 

there were a number of important oral 

briefings which may have contradicted 

the information given in daily or weekly 

summaries, and that the chief commanders involved, Generals Eisenhower 

and Bradley, have assumed full responsibility for any errors of judgment made in 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 363 

the Ardennes, the question of what the 

intelligence reports said about enemy intentions and what the Allied commanders 

did about them can be explored. 

As early as 1 October, the SHAEF G-2 

reported that the Seventh Army was withdrawing armor from the line and that a 

panzer army would soon emerge to give 

Army Group B the same type of armored 

support which the Fifth Panzer Army gave 

Army Group G. As the enemy withdrawals 

continued later in the month, leaving the 

Ardennes dangerously short of troops, 

SHAEF concluded that a reshuffle of 

enemy forces was under way to strengthen 

Army Group B around Aachen. This view 

was seconded by the estimates of the army 

groups and armies in the north. II 

SHAEF concluded near the end of 

October that the Germans would soon be 

able to collect a reserve of panzer and 

parachute units with which they could attack the Allies-probably in the north. 

The 12th Army Group predicted that if 

the enemy was left free until 1 December 

he would be able to build a powerful 

striking force, and named the area near 

Paderborn and Muenster as the possible 

site for training and organizing its armored 

elements. SHAEF added that Hitler was 

preparing this panzer force in Westphalia 

for action against the Allies in November. 

The principal doubt revolved around 

whether it would be used for a counterattack after the launching of an Allied 

offensive or for a spoiling attack. In the 

opinion of the 12th Army Group, the 

enemy's most serious capability WqS a 

counterattack with armored reserves 

against any Allied break-through toward 

the Rhine in the Ninth and First Army 

sectors. The 21 Army Group saw in German activities the possible forerunner of 

an attack which would act as an "emotional counterblast to the memories of 11 

November." l~ 

By the end of the first week in November, a German deserter had reported that 

panzer units then re-forming in Westphalia were part of the Sixth Panzer Army. 

In releasing this statement, SHAEF also 

revealed that the Fifth Panzer Army, identified on SHAEF maps as having been in 

the line the preceding week, had not been 

heard of for some weeks. 13 

By mid-November there was evidence 

that activities in Westphalia were accompanied by enemy troop movements east of 

the area from the Ruhr to Luxembourg. 

Impressed by the "truly colossal effort" 

which the enemy had made in forming or 

re-creating at least five panzer and five 

parachute divisions during September and 

October, SHAEF concluded that the 

enemy's hand was dealt for "a final showdown before the winter." On the assumpII SHAEF Weekly Intel Summaries 28-30, weeks 

ending 1,8, and 15 Oct 44; 12th A Gp Weekly Intel 

Summary 9, week ending 7 Oct 44; 21 A Gp Intel Review 163,8 Oct 44; FUSA G-2 Estimate 33, 17 Oct 

44; TUSA G-2 Periodic Rpt 130, 19 Oct 44. 

Much of this material comes from a detailed study 

made by Mr. Royce L. Thompson ofOCMH of intelligence reports of 12th and 21 Army Groups, First, 

Third, and Ninth Armies, V and VIII Corps, and the 

seven divisions stationed in the area hit by the German counteroffensive. The study covered the period 

1 September-16 December 1944. The author has 

carefully examined the weekly and periodic reports 

issued by SHAEF, the army groups, and armies for 

this period. 

12 SHAEF Weekly Intel Summaries 31-32, weeks 

ending 22,29 Oct 44; 12th A Gp Weekly Intel Summaries 11-12, weeks ending 21, 28 Oct 44; 21 A Gp 

Intel Review 165,30 Oct 44; FUSA G-2 Estimate 

34,31 Oct 44; TUSA G-2 Periodic Rpts 134, 137, 

138, 139, and 141, for 23,26,27,28, and 30 Oct 44; 

NUSA G-2 Periodic Rpt 52, 26 Oct 44. 

I;) SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 33, week ending 5 Nov 44; 12th A Gp Weekly Intel Summary 13, 

week ending 4 Nov 44; FUSA G-2 Periodic Rpt 149, 

5 Nov 44; TUSA G-2 Periodic Rp't 149, 7 Nov 44; 

NUSA Periodic Rpt 65, 9 Nov 44; 21 A Gp Intel Review 166, 10 Nov 44. 
364 

tion that the enemy was organizing a reserve to repel an Allied offensive, SHAEF 

decided it was logical for the Germans to 

use their new panzer army against Allied 

thrusts building up north of the Eifel (a 

northeastern prolongation of the Ardennes).14 

In general, the 12th Army Group 

reached the same conclusions. The enemy 

was deemed capable of reinforcing his 

u'nits west of Cologne with all ava~lable 

armored reserves for (1) an attack on the 

north flank of the Ninth Army or the 

south flank of the VII Corps, or for (2) a 

counterattack against any further eastward advance by the Allies toward 

Cologne. The First Army G-2 was somewhat more positive in his view that the 

enemy would stake everything on an offensive in the west. His estimate declared: 

It is believed that this entire front has been 

stiffened to hold against an Allied offensive 

while he launches his blow in the north, 

probably between Aachen and Venlo, with 

the possible scheme of maneuver of a penetration to the west and southwest on both 

banks of the Meuse. Although his immediate 

stocks of fuel are probably ample, it may be 

difficult for him to maintain a sustained 

offensi ve. 15 

In these early summaries, the Allied intelligence chiefs clearly assumed that, 

since the Germans knew of the Allied 

intention to push toward the Ruhr, they 

had built an armored force to cope with it. 

Anxieties about the strength of a counterstroke were dispelled by the belief that bad 

weather and fuel shortages would interfere with anything more serious than a 

spoiling attack. 16 Instead of being alarmed 

at the moment about any danger to the 

thinned-out Ardennes region, General 

Bradley, when told of the enemy concentrations, worried chiefly about the struggle 

he expected between the Roer and the 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Rhine. He told General Smith that he 

would prefer a counterattack in November since the Allies could kill the Germans 

more easily if they would come out of their 

holes. 17 

The illusion that the Germans were preparing to meet an Allied attack toward 

the Ruhr persisted through November. 

Correctly, the intelligence sections identified the movement of panzer divisions on 

their way from Westphalia to the Duesseldorf-Cologne area. By 20 November, they 

agreed that the Sixth Panzer Army was west 

of the Rhine prepared to defend the Roer 

River line and prevent Allied thrusts to 

the Rhine. Three of the Fifth Panzer Army's 

five divisions were reported to be behind 

the enemy front in the Aachen sector. This 

report seemed to confirm the opinion that 

here the Allies should find "Rundstedt's 

only two panzer armies fighting side by 

side to deny [them] the approaches to the 

most vital sector of Germany-the Ruhr." 

The First Army believed that the enemy 

"lost a big advantage in not being able to 

put in a spoiling attack prior to the commencement of the present Allied offensive." Before the Germans could go over 

to the offensive, they would now have to 

wait until a soft spot developed on the 

14 SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 34, week ending 12 Nov 44. 

15 12th A Gp Weekly Intel Summary 14, week 

ending 11 Nov 44; FUSA G-2 Estimate 35, 12 Nov 

44. 

16 The Allied error as to fuel shortages was caused 

in part by a misreading of captured documents 

which showed the enemy to be making drastic efforts 

to conserve gasoline. These documents, as SHAEF 

admitted later, were assumed to indicate an immediate critical shortage of fuel rather than an all-out 

effort to build sufficient reserves for an attack. SHAEF 

Weekly Intel Summaries 37 and 38, weeks ending 3 

and 10 Dec 44. Some intelligence officers were later 

inclined to blame what they called overoptimistic Air 

Force estimates of the destruction of German oil 

reserves. 

17 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 441-42. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 365 

Allied front or until an Allied attack was 

stopped as the result of hea vy losses. 18 

In December, the Allied intelligence 

sections showed uneasiness as the enemy 

shuffled his divisions between the northern and southern parts of his front. They 

tended increasingly to predict that the 

enemy was planning an attack, perhaps 

before Christmas, but they never positively settled on the Ardennes as the place 

of attack. During the week ending 3 December, SHAEF spotted various tank 

movements from the Rhine toward Bitburg in the Eifel-opposite the Ardennes. 

Considerable activity was noted in this 

area, but the arrival of new units seemed 

to be balanced by the withdrawal of 

others. The 12th Army Group concluded 

that the enemy's policy was to use the 

newly arrived units in the Ardennes sector 

opposite the thinned-out VIII Corps sector in order to be able to shift the more experienced troops to more critical sectors. 

The First Army also announced the movement of troops to the Bitburg area but 

added, "During the past month there has 

been a definite pattern for the seasoning of 

newly-formed divisions in the comparatively quiet sector opposite VIII Corps 

prior to their dispatch to more active 

fronts." The VIII Corps, against which 

the enemy was to launch the full fury of 

his armored attack, paraphrased this view 

six days before the attack: "The enemy's 

present practice of bringing new divisions 

to this sector to receive front line experience and then relieving them out for commitment elsewhere indicates his desire to 

have this sector of the front remain quiet 

and inactive." In the last hours before the 

attack, the corps hinted at suspicious activity in the area, but its last periodic report before the attack, issued on 15 

December, indicated that enemy capabilities showed no change. 19 

The SHAEF intelligence chief in the 

final weeks before the enemy counteroffensive became worried over enemy movements toward the Ardennes and the Strasbourg area and gave some warning to 

both General Eisenhower and General 

Bradley.20 On 10 December, the Third 

18 SHAEF G-2 Intel Summary 35, week ending 19 

Nov 44; 12th A Gp Intel Summary 15, 18 Nov 44; 

FUSA G-2 Periodic Rpt 163, 20 Nov 44; TUSA 

G-2 Periodic Rpt 158, 16 Nov 44 (reprints SHAEF 

Intel Summary 34 on enemy capabilities); NUSA 

G-2 Periodic Rpt 74, 18 Nov 44; FUSA G-2 Estimate 

36, 20 Nov 44. 

19 SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 37, week ending 

3 Dec 44; Intel Rpt at 12th A Gp CGs briefing, 

7 Dec 44; 12th A Gp G-3 Sec Rpt, Dec 44; FUSA 

G-2 Estimate 37, 10 Dec 44; VIII Corps G-2 Estimate 12, 9 Dec 44; VIII Corps Periodic Rpts 175-81, 

9-15 Dec 44. 

20 General Strong, in a letter to the author, 31 

August 1951, says: "At these meetings [chief of staff's 

morning conferences at SHAEF] daily for a period of 

at least a fortnight before the attack, I called attention to the possible three uses of the reforming Panzer 

Army (a) to go to Russia; (b) to counter attack an 

Allied penetration; (c) to stage a relieving attack 

through the Ardennes .... Course (c) so impressed 

General Smith that he asked if General Bradley was 

a ware of this possibility. I replied in the affirmative 

but nevertheless General Smith instructed me to go 

to 12 AG and see General Bradley personally and 

warn him. This would be about the first week in 

December. I saw General Bradley personally for 

about % hour and he told me he was aware of the 

danger but that he had earmarked certain divisions 

to move into the Ardennes area should the enemy attack there .... " General Smith in an interview with 

the author, 1 November 1951, declared: "General 

Strong ... said the attack might come in the Ardennes or east of the Vosges whenever the Germans 

had a prediction of six days of bad weather. He 

didn't know which would be the real attack. As a 

consequence of this I sent him to see Bradley and 

Bradley said let them come .... " Lt. Col. Roy Lamson, SHAPE Historian, in a letter to the author, 26 

September 1951, cites General Eisenhower as saying 

that "the possibility of a break through was certainly 

made known to him by General Strong." Eisenhower 

said he had discussed the situation in detail with 

General Bradley but had decided to keep moving 

rather than build up in defensive line. See also Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 338-40. Cf. Bradley, 

A Soldier's Story, pp. 461-64. 
366 

Army became strongly impressed by the 

withdrawal of German elements from the 

line. This reserve, which included two 

panzer divisions, might enable the enemy 

"to mount a spoiling offensive in an effort 

to unhinge the Allied assault on Festung 

Deutschland." By the 13th, the Third Army 

believed that the enemy was planning a 

counteroffensive in which the armor of the 

Sixth Panzer Army would be used in the area 

between Aachen and Dueren. 21 

Perhaps the most frequently quoted intelligence estimate of this period and the 

one commonly regarded as the most accurate was that issued by the First Army on 

10 December. Some observers, who believe that this estimate and the later additions to it gave a sufficient basis for expecting the 16 December attack, have 

advanced various reasons why these warnings were unheeded. They cite the fact 

that relations between the First Army 

chief of staff and chief of operations, on the 

one hand, and the chief of intelligence, on 

the other, were not always as close as they 

should have been. Others state that some 

coolness or jealousy existed between the 

12th Army Group and First Army G-2's. 

Still others say that the First Army G-2's 

predictions were sometimes discounted because he tended to identify units on the 

Western Front which were known to be 

elsewhere. 22 For present purposes it is sufficient to find whether or not the forecasts 

of an impending enemy attack were of 

such a nature as to cause the First Army 

commander and the commanders above 

him to order a change in the dispositions of 

the U.S. forces to meet an attack in the 

Ardennes. 

The 10 December estimate began with 

a general summary of the current situation. It indicated that since the last report 

of 20 November 1944 the enemy had stubTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

bornly contested every foot of ground in 

the First Army zone. "He has defended," 

it continued, "with one Armd, one Para, 

one pz Gren and eighteen Inf Divs. 116 

pz Div is now out of the line for repair, 3 

pz Gr is about due, ten InfDivs have been 

consolidated into four for a net loss of six, 

one Inf Div was dissolved and a further 

Div, 3 Para, is badly mauled." The enemy 

was reported to be intensifying his defenses 

back of the line of the Roer and along the 

line of the Erft. "His armored reserve," the 

estimate added, "appears to be quartered 

in houses and barns along the railroads 

generally in a semi-circle from Duesseldorf 

to Koblenz, with Koeln [Cologne] as the 

center point." To the First Army G-2 it 

seemed plain that the enemy's "strategy in 

defense of the Reich is based on the exhaustion of our offensive to be followed by 

an all-out counterattack with armor, between the Roer and the Erft, supported by 

every weapon he can bring to bear." 23 

The First Army estimate mentioned 

some evidence of a build-up in the Bitburg-Wittlich area (an area from which 

21 TUSA G-2 Periodic Rpts 186-88, 14-16 Dec 44. 

22 The author has discussed this problem at some 

length with the G-2's ofSHAEF, 12th Army Group, 

21 Army Group, First Army, and with one or more 

staff members of each G-2 Division at these headquarters. While some effort was made by the principals to discount the effect of the personalities involved, there seems little doubt that some personality conflicts, and sometimes a tendency to question 

the validity of predictions, existed between the 12th 

Army Group and First Army G-2's. There was apparently a disposition at lower headquarters to feel 

that SHAEF's intelligence estimates were not always 

up to date. On the other hand, it is clear that G-2 

staff members at the working levels frequently had 

close personal relationships which made up for any 

difficulties that existed between the chiefs of the sections. Therefore, it is easy to overestimate the influence of difficulties between the headquarters or within any headquarters. 

23 This and the succeeding paragraphs relating to 

the IO December estimate are taken from FUSA G-2 

Estimate 37, 10 Dec 44. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 367 

part of the counteroffensive was launched 

on 16 December), where Panzer Division 

Grossdeutschland and Panzer Lehr Division, 

or some of its elements, were reported to 

be. A captured order asking for German 

soldiers speaking "the American dialect" 

to report to Skorzeny's headquarters by 1 

November for special training was taken 

as an indication that special operations 

for sabotage and attacks on Allied command posts and vital installations were in 

progress. 24 First Army intelligence officers 

were impressed by the fact that'morale 

among freshly captured prisoners of war 

was unusually high and that they appeared eager to return to the battle for 

Germany. These and other factors made 

it apparent that 

von Rundstedt, who obviously is conducting 

military operations without the benefit of intuition, has skilfully defended and husbanded 

his forces and is preparing for his part in the 

all-out application of every weapon at the 

focal point and the correct time to achieve 

defense of the Reich west of the Rhine by inflicting as great a defeat on the Allies as possible. Indications to date point to the location 

of the focal point as being between Roermond and Schleiden, and within this bracket 

the concentrated force will be applied to the 

Allied force judged by the German High 

Command to be the greatest threat to successful defense of the Reich. 25 

These conclusions hit accurately on 

many details of the enemy build-up. The 

signs, such as improved enemy morale and 

the organization of teams consisting of soldiers speaking American, all pointed toward increased enemy activity. At the 

same time, the First Army chief of intelligence was somewhat wide of the mark in 

several of his estimates. The bracketing of 

the focal point of attack between Roermond and Schleiden, which covered part 

of the Second British Army's front, all of 

the Ninth Army's front, and less than half 

of the First Army's front, was less precise 

than the information General Hodges 

needed if he was to make a major shift of 

his troops to the south. The southernmost 

line indicated by this prediction was 

slightly north of the Ardennes area where 

the counteroffensive took place. The placing of the armored reserve in the vicinity 

of Cologne, while fairly correct, made it 

possible that the front of attack would be 

considerably north of the Ardennes. Like 

his fellow intelligence chiefs, the First 

Army G-2 indicated that the enemy 

would send his concentrated forces against 

those Allied forces which most strongly 

24 SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Otto Skorzeny commanded a unit known as Panzer Brigade 150, which 

was to use U.S. Army uniforms and equipment to 

spread confusion behind the Allied lines. 

25 The Roermond-Schleiden concentration estimate was based, according to Col. B. A. Dickson, the 

First Army G-2, on air reconnaissance information 

which was tabulated by First Army on 8 December. 

A photograph of the map, marked "Study of Enemy 

Armd Reserves, 8 Dec 44," shows priority one, two, 

and three targets on these reserves. I n the area above 

a line drawn Gemuend-Muenstereifel-Sinzig-the 

Rhine, an area somewhat to the north of that struck 

by the enemy on 16 December, there are twenty-six 

first-priority and three third-priority targets. In the 

area below that line-or one corresponding more 

closely to the Ardennes area-there were ten firstpriority (four at the Rhine and one at Mayen), 

twelve second-priority, and two third-priority targets. 

According to these maps, therefore, the chief concentration of armored reserves was much nearer Cologne 

and Aachen than the area where the attack took 

place. First Army correctly identified on its front elements of fourteen divisions which ultimately attacked 

in the Ardennes. It located the Sixth Panzer Army in 

an area between Muenchen-Gladbach (on the Second British and Ninth Army front) in the north and 

Remagen-Blankenheim in the south. Colonel Dickson holds that the fact that 50 percent of the targets 

were south of Cologne showed that the attack could 

be expected in the Ardennes area. (Interv with Dickson, 6 Feb 52.) It could, of course, also show that an 

attack could be expected in the Aachen area, which 

is what prisoner-of-war rumors Cited by First Army 

on 15 December indicated. 
368 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

threatened Germany. These were definitely north of the Ardennes. 

The First Army report came close to the 

truth with its identification of one armored 

division and elements of another in the 

Wittlich-Bitburg sector. Unfortunately for 

First Army’s later claim of accurate 

prophecy, the estimate ended by destroying part of the effect of its warning. Speaking of German strategy, the First Army 

intelligence chief said: 

The restoration of the West Wall is still a 

probable strategic objective. . . . The enemy 

has let his situation in both the upper Rhine 

and south of the Moselle deteriorate while 

stiII conserving reserves between Duesseldorf 

and Koeln. Von Rundstedt apparently is accepting defeats in the south rather than compromise his hope of a decisive success in the 

north. This would appear to be the keynote 

of his strategy in the defense of the Reich west 

of the Rhine. During the past month there 

has been a definite pattern for the seasoning 

of newly-formed divisions in the comparatively quiet sector opposite VIII Corps prior 

to their dispatch to more active fronts. The 

enemy is well aware of the tactical “ace” 

which he holds in the Roer River dams. Our 

recent attempts to breach the dam walls by 

air bombardment, as yet Unsuccessful, have 

served to emphasize our own concern with 

the flooding of the Roer valley. The enemy 

has reacted by building up his forces on the 

route of approach to the Schwammenauel 

and the Urfttalsperre, the key dams in this 

system of barrages. Besides the divisions in 

the Sixth Panzer Army, the enemy has 2 Pz 

and 116 Pz Divs conditionally available for 

local counterattacks in the defense of the 

dams, in addition to at least two Volks-grenadier divisions which are available from the 

VIII Corm sector. 

The importance of the Roer dams to 

both the Allies and the enemy seems to 

have outweighed other factors when the 

First Army intelligence chief drew his conclusions as to possible enemy capabilities. 

Four of these were listed. In the first, the 

enemy was considered capable of continuing his defense of the line of the Roer 

north of Dueren, his present lines west of 

the Roer covering the dams, and the West 

Wall to the south. Next, he was considered 

capable of “concentrated counterattack 

with air, armor, infantry and secret weapons at a selected focal point at a time of 

his own choosing.” A third capability was 

defense of the line of the Erft and retirement east of the Rhine. Last, he was capable of collapse or surrender. The first of 

these conclusions, reflecting a static defense by the enemy plus a build-up in 

threatened areas like those near the Roer 

dams, was regarded as current. Number 3 

was described as probable if enemy counterattacks proved unsuccessful, and number 4 was spoken of merely as a possibility. 

The important capability was number 2. 

Here, where the First Army intelligence 

chief had an opportunity to pin down the 

point of attack, he, like his fellow intelligence officers, failed to qualify as a completely accurate prophet. To his commander, who needed to know what 

changes in troop dispositions on First 

Army’s front were required as a result of 

enemy activities, he reported: 

. . . The exercise of capability 2a(2) [the 

capability referring to a counteroffensive] is 

to be expected when our major ground forces 

have crossed the Roer River, and if the dams 

are not controlled by us, maximum use will 

be made by the enemy of flooding of the Roer 

in conjunction with his counterattack. 

As reasons for his conclusion, he added: 

The enemy is apparently reconciled to the 

loss of Alsace and to defending behind the 

upper Rhine. He is now fighting in the Saarlautern area and along the Saar River in defensive action similar to that in the Aachen 

sector. There is no disposition to retire behind the Rhine except where he has been 

forced to do so, and this occurred in a sector 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 369 

where his West Wall is east of the Rhine. The 

continual building up offorces to the west of 

the Rhine points consistently to his staking 

all on the counteroffensive as stated in capability 2a(2). 

Despite these intimations that something might happen before the end of the 

year, there were few indications that at 

those headquarters most involved-VIII 

Corps, First Army, 12th Army Group, and 

SHAEF -the counteroffensive of 16 December was expected by the commanders 

concerned. 26 It is necessary, in this connection, to determine what the various commanders and their staffs were doing to 

prepare against an attack in the last days 

before the counteroffensive. 

At SHAEF, the Supreme Commander, 

although a ware of the predictions of his 

chief of intelligence, was not sufficiently 

impressed by the imminent danger to the 

Ardennes area to stress its defense at the 

expense of other sectors. Instead his attention was turned on 14 December to the 

Colmar bridgehead sector. In order to 

eliminate this enemy salient, which was 

keeping eight Allied divisions busy, General Eisenhower authorized General 

Devers to suspend the operation then being prepared by the First French Army 

against enemy garrisons on the Atlantic 

coast of France (Operation INDEPENDENCE) 

and use the forces thus released against 

the Colmar bridgehead. 27 On the morning of 15 December, the SHAEF G-3 

briefing officer, though presumably aware 

of the current intelligence estimates, said 

that there was nothing to report from the 

Ardennes sector. Z8 

The 12th Army Group, which had 

shown some uneasiness earlier, declared 

on 12 December, "It is now certain that 

attrition is steadily sapping the strength of 

German forces on the western front and 

that the crust of defenses is thinner, more 

brittle and more vulnerable than it appears on G-2 maps or to troops in the 

line." 29 At 21 Army Group, it was assumed 

that von Rundstedt, known to be a cautious commander, would not risk his panzer divisions forward of the Cologne-Bonn 

area until the Allied drive beyond the 

Roer had advanced to the point that 

Model's army group could not deal with 

it or until the position of the Allies was 

such that an abrupt counteroffensive 

would put an end to their prospects for 

the winter. There was certainly no sense of 

imminent attack at that headquarters: 

General de Guingand, the chief of staff, 

went to the United Kingdom on 15 December, and Field Marshal Montgomery 

asked General Eisenhower on the same 

day if he had any objection to his going to 

the United Kingdom the following week. 3D 

26 General Brereton in The Brereton Diaries, p. 387, 

says that his G-2 came closer than any other chief of 

intelligence to predicting the attack. Apparently in 

view of the fact that no airborne units were then in 

the line, the estimate went without notice. 

27 SHAEF to Devers, S-70750, 14 Dec 44; Gen 

Bull, Memo for CofS SHAEF, 14 Dec 44. Both in 

SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, II. 

28 Notes of conf, 15 Dec 44, in notes of Allied Air 

Commanders Conf, Nov 44-May 45, Air Staff 

(SHAEF) files 505.39-2, Air Hist Archives. 

2" 12th A Gp Summary 18, 12 Dec 44. Some 12th 

Army Group intelligence officers attribute the 

sweeping language of this report to the fact that they 

hadjust decided that they should make their reports 

more dramatic in order to get them read. They 

therefore got a former journalist, Maj. Ralph McA. 

Ingersoll, to put some color in the 12 December report. Its language was less guarded as a result. See 

also Ltr, Brig Gen Edwin L. Sibert to Williams, 11 

Dec 44, 12th A Gp 371.3 Military Objectives, III, in 

which the 12th Army Group chief of intelligence 

speaks of the enemy's weak position. General Sibert 

in a statement to the author, 11 May 1951, said that 

while the letter bore his signature, it was drafted by 

someone else and merely reflected the current intelligence re ports. 

:10 21 A Gp Intel Review 168, 3 D.ec 44, Eisenhower 

personal file; de Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 425; 

Ltr, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 15 Dec 44, Eisen-
370 

The First Army, which on 10 December spoke of a counterattack when the 

Allies had crossed the Roer, issued several 

supplementary reports before the 16th. 

Two days before the attack it reprinted 

VIII Corps' report of a German woman's 

statement that equipment and troops were 

being massed in the area of Bitburg. The 

presence of engineers with bridging equipment suggested to the First Army the possibility of offensive action. The First Army 

estimate declared on 15 December: 

Reinforcements for the West Wall between 

Dueren and Trier continue to arrive. The 

identification of at least three or four newly 

re-formed divisions along the Army front 

must be reckoned with during the next few 

days. Although the enemy is resorting to his 

attack propaganda to bolster morale of the 

troops, it is possible that a limited scale offensive will be launched for the purpose of 

achieving a Christmas morale "victory" for 

civilian consumption. Many PWs now speak 

of the coming attack between the 17th and 

25th of December, while others relate promises of the "recapture of Aachen as a Christmas present for the Fuehrer." 

VIII Corps reports that an abrupt change 

of routine of enemy personnel opposite 9th 

Armored Division strongly suggests that new 

troops may have arrived in that area. (Comment: Very likely a recently arrived Volkshower personal file. Field Marshal Montgomery in 

his letter jokingly enclosed a statement for £5 for a 

bet made on 11 October 1943 in which General 

Eisenhower had wagered that the war would end before Christmas 1944. General Eisenhower on 16 December replied in the same jesting vein, "I still have 

nine days, and while it seems almost certain that you 

will have an extra five pounds for Christmas, you will 

not get it until that day." Eisenhower to Montgomery, 16 Dec 44, Eisenhower personal file. Bradley 

quotes Field Marshal Montgomery as saying in an 

estimate published at 21 Army Group on 16 December 1944: "The enemy is at present fighting a defensive campaign on all fronts; his situation is such 

that he cannot stage major offensive operations .... " 

General Bradley says that if he had been preparing 

an estimate on that day he would have said the same 

thing. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 460. 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

grenadier Division coming in to relieve 212 

Volksgrenadier Div.) 31 

In this report, the First Army had come 

close to an exact date for the counteroffensive although spoiling the accuracy ofthe 

prediction by mention of a "limited scale 

offensive" and the recapture of Aachen. 

Moreover, its comment on the VIII Corps 

suggestion that new troops had arrived in 

its area seemed to say only that routine relief was in progress. These conclusions may 

help to explain why, although 17 December was spoken of as a possible date for the 

attack, the First Army chief of intelligence 

was on leave in Paris, on the 16th, when 

the Germans attacked. 32 

There is little evidence that First Army's 

intelligence estimates brought any important changes in the dispositions of corps or 

divisions in First Army to meet a possible 

counteroffensive. 33 Rather than sending 

additional forces into the VIII Corps sector, where the brunt of the German counteroffensive fell, the First Army on 13 De31 FUSA G-2 Periodic Rpt 189, 15 Dec 44. 

32 Colonel Dickson in an interview with the author 

on 6 February 1952, said he had already given all the 

warnings he could to the First Army commander, the 

chief of staff, and the chief of operations. He added 

that he had been without any leave since the Normandy operations and that when he was offered a 

short leave in Paris on the 15th he was so much in 

need of a rest that he decided to risk being away from 

his headquarters when the attack came. He was summoned to 12th Army Group headquarters the following day and returned to First Army by way of VIII 

Corps on the 17th. 

33 This statement was confirmed by General 

Hodges, in an interview with the author, 12 January 

1950. His chief of intelligence, General Hodges said, 

had noted movements of the enemy into the Ardennes 

sector, but "all of us thought they were getting ready 

to hit us when we crossed the Roer." He added, "You 

know my intelligence chief was on leave when the 

attack came; he wouldn't have been if he had expected an attack." Colonel Dickson in his interview 

with the author on 6 February 1952 recalled, on the 

contrary, that General Hodges, after reading the 

1 0 December prediction, asked General Bradley for 

two extra divisions and was refused. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 371 

cember took a combat command from the 

9th Armored Division, the VIII Corps' 

reserve, and gave it to the V Corps, which 

was preparing to launch an attack. The V 

Corps made little use of the combat command, however, and the First Army listed 

it on 15 December among other units to 

be returned to parent organizations. No 

sense of urgency seems to have prompted 

this move, inasmuch as the combat command was not notified to move until the 

following morning, and it did not actually 

go into action until the morning of 17 December. 34 Lt. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, 

VIII Corps commander in December 

1944, pointed out after the war that there 

could have been no great alarm about his 

weakened front, since he had been directed 

in December to simulate the movement of 

additional units into his area in order to 

draw enemy divisions to his front. He had 

carried out part of these activities early in 

the month and was told to resume the 

program later, but he was relieved of this 

responsibility when the Germans struck on 

16 December. 35 

The army group commander most concerned, General Bradley, has written that 

nothing short of "an unequivocal indication of impending attack in the Ardennes 

could have induced me to quit the winter 

offensive," and that he received no such 

indication. He insists that, while the First 

Army's observations could have been interpreted to suggest the possibility of an 

enemy counteroffensive, they were not 

convincing enough to lead him to postpone his attack. 

Nor [he adds] was my own G-2 at Army 

Group, Brigadier General Sibert, sufficiently impres~ed by these reports to come to me 

with a warning. By this time I commanded 

almost three quarters of a million men on a 

230-mile front. It was impossible for me even 

to scan the intelligence estimates of subordinate units. As a consequence, I looked to my 

own G-2 and to the Army commanders to 

keep me informed on the enemy's capabilities. Hodges neither spoke to Middleton, one 

of his own corps commanders, of any premonitions in theArdennes, nor did he telephone me in advance of the offensive. Indeed 

no one came to me with a warning on the 

danger of a counterattack there. 36 

In analyzing the intelligence situation 

before the Ardennes counteroffensive, one 

may well ask what additional information 

the Allies would have needed to predict 

the 16 December attack. In many ways 

their information was highly accurate. 

Most of the units which made up the panzer armies had been spotted days and even 

weeks before the attack. Air reconnaissance, while hampered at times by bad 

weather, had marked the steady stream of 

men and supplies westward across the 

Rhine. 37 Despite the clever deceptive 

measures of the enemy, the Allied intelligence experts had correctly analyzed most 

of the German dispositions and, in the 

closing hours before the counteroffensive, 

were aware of shifts toward the Ardennes 

area and of the arrival of new units in the 

zone of VIII Corps. But with all this, they 

34 A detailed study of the movement of this combat command was made for the author by Mr. Royce 

Thompson of OCMH. 

:13 Ltr, Gen Middleton to Theater Historian, 30 Jul 

45. A file on this operation may be found in Combat 

Interview File 350, AG Records . 

. 16 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 461-64. Compare 

General Bradley's last statement above with General 

Strong's recollections, n. 20, above. and Bradley's 

statement to General Smith, p. 374, below. The question seems to have been one of the strength of General Strong's warning. This, indeed, seems to be the 

point at issue throughout. It is clear that nearly all 

the intelligence chiefs did feel that an attack in the 

Ardennes was possible, but the question is how clear 

and effective they made this warning in discussing 

the matter with commanders. 

37 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, Vol. III, Ch. 19. 
372 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

did not convince Generals Eisenhower, 

Bradley, Hodges, and Middleton, the commanders whose forces were to take the 

brunt of attack, that an attack by two panzer armies in the Ardennes area about the 

middle of December was imminent enough 

to force any change in existing Allied 

plans. The commanders were loath to 

move their troops about from point to 

point to meet every possible threat, since 

such action would disrupt all of their offensive plans and reduce their activities to 

the construction of countermoves against 

the enemy. Perhaps as important in their 

consideration as this element were several 

factors which lessened their fear of possible 

enemy attacks: (1) the Allied emphasis on 

offensive rather than defensive action; (2) 

the conclusion that the enemy was straining every nerve to stop the Allied attack 

against Cologne and the Ruhr and would 

be likely to attack when the Allies had 

crossed the Roer; (3) the erroneous belief 

that von Rundstedt, a reasonable and cautious man, was controlling strategy in the 

west; (4) the view that Germany’s fuel 

shortage would make any enemy offensive 

unsuccessful; and (5) the conviction that 

any attack the enemy was capable of 

mounting would lead only to a quicker 

German defeat. 

The Attack 

The Germans hit the First Army front 

in the early morning of 16 December. The 

Sixth Panzer Army attacked south of Monschau with the mission of seizing the 

Meuse bridges between Liége and Huy. 

(Map 5) Its ultimate objective was the Al - bert Canal in the area between Maastricht 

and Antwerp. Farther south, the Fifth Panzer Army attacked in the direction of St. 

Vith and Bastogne. It was to sweep across 

the Meuse between Andenne and Givet to 

the vicinity of Brussels and Antwerp, with 

the mission of forestalling Allied counterattacks in the rear of the Sixth Panzer Army 

anywhere between Antwerp and Givet. 

While the initial main thrusts were in 

progress, the Seventh Army protected the 

southern flank of the attacking forces. The 

Fifteenth Army, meanwhile, provided cover 

for the northern flank of the counteroffensive and launched a series of holding attacks to tie up U.S. forces in that area. 

According to German plans, it was also to 

seize the first opportunity to encircle and 

wipe out the Allied forces in the Aachen 

salient with a concentrated attack. Army 

Group H, between the attacking Army Group 

B and the North Sea, was ordered to prepare for a subsidiary attack to be made as 

soon as the development of the situation 

should permit. Army Group G, south of the 

attacking forces, was to repel any further 

advances of the Allies in that area. Both 

army groups, as well as Army Group Oberrhein were ordered to support the main attack by following up any retrograde movement of the Allies. 38 

The smashing blow against the First 

Army front drove back five U.S. divisions 

in the Ardennes area. The surprise gained 

by the attack and the disruption of communications rapidly created such widespread confusion along the front that the 

extent of the enemy action was not known 

for several hours at higher headquarters. 

More than four hours after the first assault, 

no report of it had been received at the 

12th Army Group. At the 0915 briefing at 

General Bradley’s headquarters, the repre38 Operation order of Army Group B, 9 Dec 44. OB 

WEST, KTB Anlage 50 I. VII.-31.XII.44; OB WEST, 

KTB 1.-3I.XII.44, 15 to 18 Dec 44; FUSA Rpt of 

Opns, 1 Aug 44-22 Feb 45, Vol. I. Cole, The Ardennes, will give the detailed operational story of the 

counteroffensive. 
Lou~o lI\. 0 \ 

V'-: 

( 

~ (': 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

.• '--.. --............ 

16-26 December 1944 

I'TT'T'TTTM ALLIED FRONT LINE, 15 DECEMBER 

LIMIT OFGERM~H PEHETA.n ON, 26 DEC 

GERMAN ARMY BOUNDARY 

iIIIlI!mJmIIlmI WEST WAH 

to 

! 

MAP5 

o 

, 

o 

' 0 , ' I 

10 20 

!p 'p M ILES 

30 KILOWETf:RS 
374 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

sentative of the operations group reported 

no change on the VIII Corps front, and 

the intelligence representative added 

merely that the move of the 326th Division 

northward “might be the answer to the 

numerous vehicular movements in the 

northern VIII Corps sector.” In the early 

afternoon, the First Army and the 12th 

Army Group learned of captured orders 

which indicated that a desperate all-out 

effort had been launched against the 

Allies. 39 

News of the attack reached General 

Bradley at Supreme Headquarters on the 

afternoon of 16 December while he was in 

conference with General Eisenhower and 

members of the SHAEF staff. The 12th 

Army Group commander recalls that 

General Smith said: “. . . you’ve been 

wishing for a counterattack. Now it looks 

as though you’ve got it.” General Bradley, 

in turn, replied: “A counterattack, yes, 

but I’ll be damned if I wanted one this 

big.” 40 Generals Eisenhower and Bradley 

at once conferred and ordered reinforcements to the threatened area. Two 

armored divisions, one north and one 

south of the Ardennes, were directed to 

close into the threatened sector. General 

Bradley then instructed his army commanders to alert the divisions they had 

free for employment in the Ardennes 

area. 41 

Meanwhile the SHAEF staff searched 

for reserves to throw into the battle. The 

question was an old one to SHAEF, which 

since 20 November had been trying to locate enough units to form a reserve corps. 

General Eisenhower had wanted to build 

up such a force in the event that he needed 

to reinforce a success north or south of the 

Ardennes, but he had been unable to get 

much beyond the point of asking the army 

groups what divisions they could make 

available for such a purpose. 42 The 

SHAEF reserve on the Continent consisted only of the XVIII Corps (Airborne), 

whose two divisions had only recently 

been withdrawn from the Netherlands to 

Reims for refitting. On the 17th SHAEF 

alerted these units to move to the threatened sector. Bastogne, because of its excellent road net, was selected as the point 

where the units would be committed. 43 By 

the time they arrived, the 12th Army 

Group had made dispositions for the defense of Bastogne and ordered the airborne 

units to positions north of the town. 

Ultimately the 82d Airborne Division was 

sent to the north flank of the Ardennes 

sector, while the 101st was moved into 

Bastogne where a combat command of the 

10th Armored Division was already established. The Supreme Commander on the 

17th also ordered an armored and an airborne division to the Continent. 44 

As reports of the German counteroffensive began to pour into Supreme Head39 12th A Gp briefings, 16 Dec 44, 12th A Gp files; 

Msg, V Corps to FUSA, 1244 hours, 16 Dec 44, in 

FUSA G–2 Jnl, 1450 hours, 16 Dec 44. V Corps reported receiving the information from 99th Division 

at 1350, 16 Dec 44. 

40 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 449-50; Diary 

Office CinC, 17 Dec 44 

41 Memo by Eisenhower, 23 Dec 44, Diary Office 

CinC. Almost the same statement, describing the action, appears in the Diary Office CinC, 17 Dec 44. 

These two statements are cited in Crusade in Europe, 

p. 344. Cf. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 464–65. 

42 G–3 Plng Stf Memo, Possibilities of Mutual Reinforcement, 20 Nov 44; Eisenhower to Bradley and 

Devers, 3 Dec 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 381 Post 

OVERLORD Planning, II. 

43 General Smith had agreed to the selection of 

Bastogne by General Whiteley, deputy G–3, according to Smith’s statement to the ETO Historical Division, 14 September 1945. In a statement made to the 

author on 8 May 1947, General Smith recalled that 

General Strong also aided in the selection. 

44 Memo by Eisenhower, 23 Dec 44, Diary Office 

CinC. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 375 

quarters, there was no inclination to 

underestimate the gravity of the situation 

or to deny that the enemy had achieved 

complete surprise. Air Chief Marshal 

Tedder, in a statement made shortly after 

the attack, said that Supreme Headquarters had been caught unawares. He attributed the surprise to the fact that the 

SHAEF intelligence section, while stating 

that the Germans were holding the Sixth 

Panzer Army in reserve, had failed to indicate that any early use was to be made of 

it. General Spaatz, in answer to a query 

by General Arnold as to the part played 

by air reconnaissance before the breakthrough, cabled that the counteroffensive 

had "undoubtedly caught us off balance." 

He paid tribute to the cleverness of the 

Germans in shifting their forces in a manner which hid their intentions, and added 

that bad weather had seriously interfered 

with air reconnaissance activities. 45 General Eisenhower believed that there had 

been a failure to evaluate correctly the 

strength of the forces that the enemy could 

thrust through the Ardennes. He pointed 

out to General Marshall that "all of us, 

without exception, were astonished at the 

ability of the Volkssturm [sic] divisions to 

act offensively." 46 

Even as the first decisions were being 

made at Supreme Headquarters, First 

Army units were putting up strong defensive actions which forced the Germans to 

withdraw in the Fifteenth Army sector and 

slowed the drives of the two panzer armies, 

thus upsetting completely the timetable of 

the enemy commanders. The German 

high command had hoped that by taking 

advantage of surprise they could put part 

of their force across the Meuse by the end 

of the second day. This ambitious program 

was thwarted in the early hours of the attack when Allied units. falling back slowly 

near Monschau and in front of St. Vith, 

delayed the enemy sufficiently to give time 

for reserves to be sent up. The slowing of 

the Sixth Panzer Army advance persisted 

and was ultimately to have its effect on the 

more successful Fifth Panzer Army drive, 

which required the movement of the right 

wing forces as a screen. The Seventh Army, 

in charge of flank protection to the south, 

made little progress. Army Group H, north of 

the attack front, reported no changes. In 

the area of Army Group G, south of the attacking forces, the Germans were able to 

hold their own against strong Allied 

pressure. 

On 18 December, the third day of the 

attack, Hitler ordered a basic change in 

plans. 47 He canceled the subsidiary attack 

for which the Fifteenth Army had been 

alerted and which Rundstedt had ordered 

to start on 19 December. Instead, all 

available forces were to be used to help the 

two panzer armies push through the 

breaches already opened. Von Rundstedt 

gave the necessary orders. He also urged 

the Seventh Army to increase its efforts so as 

to create full freedom of maneuver for 

Fifth Panzer Army. Moreover, now that the 

supplementary attack by Fifteenth Army 

would no longer take place, the Germans 

considered an attack farther north of 

much greater importance. Army Group H, 

on the British front, received orders to intensify preparations for an attack to be 

43 Tedder memo, 17 Dec 44, OCMH files. Arnold 

to Spaatz, 30 Dec 44; Spaatz to Arnold, 7 Jan 45. 

Both in Air Staff SHAEF files, USST AF Incoming 

Msgs 519.800.1. 

46 Eisenhower to Marshall, S- 71794, 21 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

47 General Smith in a statement to the author, I 

November 1951, says that Jodi, shortly after the war, 

told him he realized on the third'day of the attack 

that it had failed. Rundstedt shared this view (see below, p. 384). 
376 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

launched on short notice over the Waal 

and lower Meuse. 48 

In the first two days of the German 

attack, the Allies still thought it might be 

nothing more than an effort to pull forces 

away from their offensives then being 

planned. On the evening of 18 December, 

however, General Bradley informed General Patton that the situation appeared 

worse than initially believed. He had received the impression, he. added, that 

General Eisenhower intended to give the 

VIII Corps to Third Army and would 

shortly launch a new offensive. 49 The Supreme Commander, apparently believing 

that part of the 12th Army Group could 

stop the German attack while the rest 

joined the 21 Army Group in a renewed 

offensive, seriously thought of launching 

an attack with all the forces north of the 

Moselle. He considered having the 21 

Army Group attack southeast from the 

Nijmegen area between the Rhine and the 

Meuse, while the 12th Army Group 

checked the enemy, secured the lines of 

communications along the line NamurLiége–Aachen, relieved the 21 Army 

Group east of the Meuse, and launched a 

counteroffensive converging on the general area Bonn-Cologne. Then the 6th 

Army Group, reinforced by four divisions 

from the 12th Army Group, was to take 

over part of the 12th Army Group’s zone, 

moving northward to a line running from 

St. Dizier to Thionville and thence along 

the Moselle. 50 

These long-range plans underwent considerable changes by the time Allied commanders conferred at Verdun the following morning. Apparently influenced by 

growing evidence that the enemy was 

making an all-out attack toward the 

Meuse, General Eisenhower placed the 

immediate emphasis on checking that 

drive. He opened the Verdun conference 

by asking that his commanders show him 

nothing but cheerful faces. Actually, they 

all appeared to be calm and one of them, 

General Patton, expressed enthusiasm 

over the prospect of trapping the enemy 

and cutting him to pieces. In view of the 

major thrust then under way in the 

Ardennes sector and the possibility of an 

attack in the Trier sector, the Supreme 

Commander limited his proposed offensive to counterthrusts on either side of the 

enemy salient in the Ardennes. In areas 

not vital to this main purpose, he declared, 

he was ready “to yield ground in order to 

insure the security of essential areas and to 

add strength to [the Allied] counteroffensive.” He now directed the 6th Army 

Group to move forces to Saarlautern 

where it would defend against any major 

penetration. Subject to securing essential 

lines of communications, General Devers 

was to be prepared to yield ground rather 

than endanger the integrity of his forces. 

General Bradley was to check the enemy’s 

advance east of the Meuse and, in conjunction with Field Marshal Montgomery’s forces, launch an attack against the 

enemy salient. The British forces were also 

ordered to stop the enemy in their area 

east and south of the Meuse, paying par48 MS # A-858, The Course of Events of the German Offensive in the Ardennes, 16 Dec 44 to 14 Jan 

45 (Schramm); OB WEST, KTB 1.-31.XII.44, 18 to 

20 Dec 44. 

49 Gen Patton, Notes on Bastogne, entry for 18 Dec 

44, TUSA AAR; Diary, Brig Gen Hobart R. Gay, 

TUSA CofS, 18 Dec 44, OCMH files. General Betts, 

deputy G–2 of SHAEF, in a letter to the author, 

5 September 1951, says that it was “almost a week 

before we realized that Hitler, in fact, was out to split 

the Allied Armies apart.” General Bradley in A Soldier’s Story, p. 455, says that when he first got news 

of the attack he thought it a spoiling attack to force a halt on Patton’s advance into the Saar. 

50 Eisenhower to 12th A Gp’ and 6th A Gp, 

S–71400, 1900 hours, 18 Dec 44, SHAEF cbl log; also 

Diary CinC, 18 Dec 44. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 377 

ticular attention to securing the line of the 

Meuse from Namur to Liege. 51 

By these measures the whole front south 

of the Moselle passed to strict defense. 

General Devers, who received one division 

instead of the four originally intended for 

him, was ordered to push farther north 

than initially planned and take over most 

of Third Army's sector. General Patton in 

the meantime prepared to move north 

with six divisions, take over the VIII 

Corps, and organize a major attack 

against the south flank of the German 

penetration on 22 or 23 December. The 

general plan now required the plugging of 

holes in the Allied line in the north and 

the co-ordination of attacks launched from 

south of the German penetration. 52 

Having started forces in the direction of 

the Ardennes sector, the Supreme Commander next turned to the task of massing 

a reserve force for use in stopping further 

enemy attacks or in renewing an Allied 

offensive. For this purpose, he not only 

halted offensives directed toward the 

Rhine but considered the possibility of 

shortening his line. On the 19th, he asked 

Field Marshal Montgomery to examine 

the situation on his northern flank with a 

view "to the possibility of giving up, if 

necessary, some ground in order to shorten 

our line and collect a strong reserve for the 

purpose of destroying the enemy in Belgium." On the following day, he told General Bradley that the Allies must not let 

the fear of losing ground around Aachen 

deter them from adopting the best line of 

defense. He directed the 12th Army Group 

commander to choose the line he could 

hold most cheaply and effectively, no matter how far back he had to go to establish 

it. In these statements, he apparently intended the line of the Meuse to mark the 

limit ofwithdrawa1. 53 

Field Marshal Montgomery had been 

in the process of moving the 30 British 

Corps northward and had already taken 

steps to use this force of three infantry divisions, one armored division, and three 

armored brigades to protect his southern 

flank. On 17 December, he ordered reserve divisions of this corps, the only Allied 

reserve then available, to go into positions 

west of the Meuse. Two dayslater, he directed the corps to stop all northward 

movement and to assemble in the Louvain-St. Trond area where it would be ip 

a position to aid where needed. Later, by 

moving elements of this corps into First 

Army positions along the line of the 

Meuse, Montgomery made it possible for 

General Hodges to commit all of his forces 

against the enemy. 54 

While General Patton was engaged in 

the herculean effort of disengaging his 

troops from battle in the Saar, completely 

changing their direction, and throwing 

them into the Ardennes battle, and while 

Field Marshal Montgomery was taking 

measures to aid the U.S. forces north of 

the Ardennes, General Hodges' forces in 

'the Bulge fought desperately to halt the 

German drive or at least check its speed. 

The enemy in this period moved ever 

51 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 350; Patton, 

Notes on Bastogne, entry for 19 Dec 44. TUSA AAR; 

Patton, War as I Knew It, p. 190; Eisenhower to A Gp 

comdrs, S-71724, 20 Dec 44, SHAEF c bl log. 

52 Patton, War as I Knew It, p. 191; Patton, Notes on 

Bastogne, entry for 19 Dec 44; Eisenhower, Crusade in 

Europe, p. 351; Eisenhower to Marshall for CCS, 

SCAF 149, 19 Dec 44, Eisenhower personal file. 

53 Eisenhower to Montgomery, S-71591, 19 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file; Air Marshal Robb's notes 

on a meeting of airmen in the Supreme Commander's office, 1000 hours, 20 December 1944 (with penciled notes by General Eisenhower), in OCMH files; 

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 350. 

54 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 280-81; 

Comments by Hist Sec, Cabinet Office, to the author, 

10Ju151. 
378 

closer to St. Vith and Bastogne, smashing 

some First Army units and isolating 

others. In the face of powerful attacks, the 

U.S. forces succeeded in improvising effective counterattacks. U.S. armor delayed 

the enemy in the area of St. Vith until new 

positions could be established to the west. 

On the north flank of the break-through, 

First Army forces in one of the most 

critical battles of the cam paign held the 

Elsenborn ridge, the village of Butgenbach 

south of the ridge, and the MalmedyStavelot line against repeated attacks by 

elements of the Sixth Panzer Army, thus 

buying time needed by the Allied forces. 

Despite the prompt reaction of the 

Allied units to the German threat, the 

enemy columns continued to forge westward. On the evening of 19 December, 

General Strong, the SHAEF chief of intelligence, feared that the Germans would 

soon drive a wedge between General 

Bradley's forces, making it impossible for 

him to retain contact with First U.S. Army 

from his advanced headquarters in the 

city of Luxembourg. He confided these 

anxieties to General Whiteley, the deputy 

chief of operations, and the two went to 

General Smith with the proposal that 

Field Marshal Montgomery be given command of U.S. forces north of the Ardennes. 

The SHAEF chief of staff initially rejected 

the proposal but, on being told that there 

had been no close contact for two days between the 12th Army Group and the First 

Army, agreed to make the recommendation to General Eisenhower. Sometime in 

the course of the evening, General Smith 

telephoned General Bradley to discuss the 

proposed shift. The 12th Army Group 

commander doubted that the change-over 

was necessary, but was mainly concerned 

because it might discredit the American 

command. This reaction was indicated in 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

his statement: "Certainly if Monty's were 

an American command, I would agree 

with you entirely. It would be the logical 

thing to do." He also admitted that if the 

British commander was in charge of all 

operations north of the Ardennes, he 

might be more inclined to use his reserve 

forces against the enemy. Field Marshal 

Montgomery was apparently notified unofficially the same evening that a change 

in command would be made. The formal 

shift was made the following day when the 

Supreme Commander put Field Marshal 

Montgomery in temporary command of 

all forces north of the Ardennes. 55 (Chart 7) 

General Eisenhower subsequently justified the shift on the ground that the salient 

north of the Ardennes had become one 

battlefront "with a single reserve which 

might be called upon to operate in support 

either of the British and Canadian Armies 

or of the American Ninth and First 

Armies." Prime Minister Churchill immediately approved the action, saying that 

the arrangement would make the British 

reserve instantly available for use wherever needed, regardless of previously 

defined zones. It led, however, to great resentment on the part of many Americans, 

particularly at Headquarters, 12th Army 

Group, and Third Army.56 

55 The shift was also accompanied by an agreement between representatives of SHAEF, USSTAF, 

and the Ninth Air Force to place the two tastical 

commands then in support of the U.S. forces north of 

the Ardennes under the operational control of Air 

Marshal Coning ham, commander of the tactical air 

forces in support of the 21 Army Group. Enough 

fighter-bombers were shifted from the north to bring 

up to ten groups the air forces supporting General 

Patton. Robb, Notes on mtg, 20 Dec 44, OCMH files. 

56 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 281; Intervs with Strong, 12 Dec 47, Whiteley, 18 Dec 46, 

Smith, 8 May 47, and Bradley, 6 Nov 46; Eisenhower, 

Crusade in Europe, p. 355; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 

475-77; Robb, Notes on mtg, 20 Dec 44, OCMH files. 

The bitter feeling which existed at the two U.S. head-
F 

O 

T 

R 

A 

H 

C 
380 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

General Bradley in his postwar memoirs 

indicated that he saw in the shift evidence 

of considerable nervousness at SHAEF 

over developments in the Ardennes. He 

also called attention to SHAEF’s orders 

for the destruction of bridges over the 

Meuse in case of withdrawal as another 

such indication. 57 The orders to destroy 

the Meuse bridges, hedged about with 

many restrictions to avoid precipitate destruction by the guards, were similar to directions normally issued when enemy 

tanks were located in positions from which 

they could reach a river line. It is true that 

SHAEF sent hurry-up messages to Washington asking for more men and supplies, 

that the Supreme Commander was willing 

to give up territory in order to shorten his 

line and amass a strategic reserve, and 

that a personal bodyguard was assigned to 

General Eisenhower to protect him against 

an alleged assassin band under Skorzeny. 

These measures could have been attributed to nervousness, panic, or, perhaps 

more plausibly, to reasonable precaution. 

On receiving instructions to take command, Field Marshal Montgomery called 

Generals Hodges and Simpson to a conference at First Army headquarters, where 

he issued orders for reorganization of the 

battle. The Ninth Army took over part of 

First Army’s zone. General Collins, who 

relinquished the area and the divisions 

quarters is reflected in books like Ralph Ingersoll’s 

Top Secret (New York, 1946), Robert S. Allen’s Lucky 

Forward: The History of Patton’s Third U.S. Army (New 

York, 1947), and Patton’s War as I Knew It. The strong 

animus toward SHAEF which prevailed at the two 

headquarters among junior officers, even before the 

Ardennes developments, was the subject of a special 

report by a War Department observer in early December 1944. It is interesting to note that while staff 

members of 12th Army Group and Third Army 

thought that SHAEF was unduly influenced by 2 1 

Army Group, a number of officers at 2 1 Army Group 

fancied that Generals Bradley and Patton had the 

inside track to the Supreme Commander. 

which Ninth Army brought under its control, was given a reserve force of one 

armored and two infantry divisions and 

told to assemble them near the northwest 

corner of the German salient (Durbuy– 

Marche), where he was to be available for 

operations to blunt the enemy advance or 

for later counterthrusts. The Third Army 

extended its boundary northward to a line 

running from Givet to St. Vith. Montgomery was hopeful at the close of the day that 

the situation could be restored, and he said 

he saw no reason at the moment “to give 

up any of the ground that [had] been 

gained in the last few days by such hard 

fighting.” 58 

With the increase of Allied efforts 

against the enemy and the reorganization 

of the Allied command, General Eisenhower took steps to encourage his commanders and soldiers. In a special Order 

of the Day he pointed to the opportunities 

presented by the enemy’s action: 

By rushing out from his fixed defenses the 

enemy may give us the chance to turn his 

great gamble into his worst defeat. So I call 

upon every man, of all the Allies, to rise now 

to new heights of courage, of resolution and 

of effort. Let everyone hold before him a 

single thought—to destroy the enemy on the 

ground, in the air, everywhere—destroy him! 

United in this determination and with unshakable faith in the cause for which we fight, we will, with God’s help, go forward to our 

greatest victory. 59 

On the same day, he recommended to 

General Marshall the promotions of Generals Bradley and Spaatz, pointing out 

that the time was particularly opportune 

in the case of the former. He added that 

the 12th Army Group commander had 

57 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 475-76. 

58 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M–384, 20 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

59 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 354-55. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 381 

"kept his head magnificently and ... proceeded methodically and energetically to 

meet the situation. In no quarter is there 

any tendency to place any blame upon 

Bradley." 60 

On the 22d, General Eisenhower notified Field Marshal Montgomery that he 

was sending messages of encouragement to 

Generals Hodges and Simpson. General 

Eisenhower pointed out that unless the 

First Army commander became exhausted 

he would always wage a good fight. He 

added that he wished Field Marshal 

Montgomery to keep in touch with his 

subordinates and let him know of any 

changes which should be needed on the 

United States side. 61 This last was apparently in answer to an earlier statement of 

Field Marshal Montgomery's that some 

changes in command might become necessary because of physical exhaustion, but 

that he was unwilling to relieve U.S. commanders personally. General Smith told 

him that should this action become necessary it would be done by the Supreme 

Commander. On the evening of the 22d, 

Montgomery reported that while Hodges 

had originally been a bit shaken, very 

tired, and in need of moral support, he was 

improving. 62 , 

The Supreme Commander was encouraged personally by messages from Washington and London in the days following 

the German counteroffensive. The Prime 

Minister cabled General Eisenhower on 

22 December that as a mark of confidence 

in the Supreme Commander's leadership, 

the British intended to find an additional 

250,000 men to put at his disposal. About 

the same time, General Marshall said that 

orders had been given that General Eisenhower was to be left free to give his entire 

attention to the fighting. The U.S. Chief 

of Staff added: "I shall merely say now 

that you have our complete confidence." 63 

The emphasis north of the Ardennes 

during the first week of the German offensive was necessarily on defensive measures. 

Heavily hit and badly stretched, General 

Hodges could do little more than meet 

enemy attacks as they developed and hope 

that he could get a reserve for later use in 

an effective counterstroke. South 0f the 

Ardennes, however, Generals Bradley and 

Patton were moving rapidly to strike at 

the enemy penetrations. General Patton 

was notified on 19 December that he was 

to throw his main weight to the north. Two 

days later he had broken off his battle in 

the Saar area and was attacking toward 

Bastogne. In what General Bradley has 

described as "one of the most astonishing 

feats of generalship of our campaign in the 

'Vest," General Patton swung the bulk of 

the Third Army on a ninety-degree angle 

and moved it north from fifty to seventy 

miles into the new attack. His forces were 

met by enemy air attacks and by stubborn 

resistance that delayed the relief of 

Bastogne. 64 

SHAEF meanwhile struggled to build a 

reserve force to deal with further enemy 

counteroffensives or to be committed in an 

Allied offensive. The SHAEF staff feared 

that, without some plan for building a reserve, U.S. divisions would be committed 

piecemeal. General Eisenhower, though 

positive that Bastogne would be held, di60 Eisenhower to Marshall, 8-71794, 21 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

61 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 8-71982, 22 Dec 

44, Eisenhower personal file. 

62 Smith to author, 8 May 47; Montgomery to 

Eisenhower, M-389, 22 Dec 44, Eisenhower personal 

file. 

6' Churchill to Eisenhower, 22 Dec 44, SHAEF cbl 

log; Marshall to Eisenhower, W-81088, 23 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

6. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 472-74; TU8A Rpt 

of Opns, Vol. I. 
382 

rected that Allied counterattacks beyond 

that point be postponed for the moment. 

He thought that General Patton might 

persuade General Bradley to authorize a 

Third Army attack at once aimed at going 

"right through" without waiting for the 

fully co-ordinated counteroffensive.65 

Forces for the Allied attack were gathered from a number of points. By 24 December, priorities had been set for the 

speedy movement of one armored and 

three infantry divisions from the United 

Kingdom to the Continent, and the shipment of units in the United States already 

earmarked for the European theater was 

accelerated. By Christmas, one British 

division had passed to First U.S. Army 

control and three other British divisions 

held . the west bank of the Meuse from 

Givet to Liege. On 21 December, General 

Lee had ordered supply units to defend 

crossings of the Meuse and to defend 

vital installations within the Communications Zone. Two days later, General de 

Gaulle alerted security units of the four 

military regions of northeastern France 

and ordered them to move at once to positions on the Sambre and the Meuse. These 

units were to be reinforced as soon as possible by troops from the zone of interior 

and by part or all of a French infantry 

division. Maj. Gen. Andre Dody was 

placed in charge of the French forces defending the line of the Meuse. 66 

As the enemy continued his drive toward the Meuse, Field Marshal Montgomery, who had been hopeful on 

20 December that no ground would have 

to be given up, expressed both optimism 

and pessimism. He reported on the 22d 

that Ninth Army had been ordered to get 

two divisions into reserve and that efforts 

were being made to establish a similar reserve for First Army. He added, "First 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Army is now reorganized and it: good trim 

and we will fight a good battle up here." 

On other matters he was less hopeful. 

"From information available here," he 

noted, "I am not optimistic that the attack 

of Third Army will be strong enough to 

do what is needed and I suggest Seventh 

German Army will possibly hold off Patton from interfering with the progress 

westwards of Fifth Panzer Army. In this 

case I will have to deal unaided with both 

Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies .... " 67 

The 21 Army Group commander became worried on the 23d when it seemed 

clear that the Fifth Panzer Arnry was swinging northwestward and trying to envelop 

VII Corps to the west. He was "disturbed 

at the weak local arrangements, particularly in infantry, of most of the divisions in 

the First and Ninth Armies." He reported 

that the V Corps divisions were understrength by some 7,000, mostly in infantry, 

and asked if something could be done to 

get replacements "for this serious discrepancy." 68 

When enemy pressure increased on the 

right flank ofthe First Army, Field Marshal Montgomery decided he would have 

to shorten the front. On Christmas Day he 

ordered the 82d Airborne Division to 

withdraw from the salient it held in the 

Vielsalm area west of St. Vith and come 

back to the general line Grandmenil-

.5 Notes on mtgs in SAC's office, 21 Dec 44, 

OCMH files. 

66 Msgs, SHAEF to COMZ and ETOUSA, 18-23 

Dec 44; Lee to all base sees, EX-76867, 21 Dec 44. 

All in SHAEF chi log. FUSA Rpt of Opns, Aug 44-

Feh 45, Vol. I. De Gaulle to Minister of War, 23 Dec 

44; Dody to Bradley, 29 Dec 44; Bradley to Dody, 3 

Jan 45. All in 12 A Gp 322.011 Commanders and 

Command Relations, I. 

67 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-389, 22 Dec 44. 

Eisenhower personal file. 

68 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-390, 23 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 383 

Trois-Ponts. He also ordered the British 

51st Division to move from the Ninth to 

the First Army reserve on the 26th. 69 

The British commander discussed the 

Allied situation with General Bradley on 

the 25th and indicated that he could not 

pass over to offensive action at the 

moment. The 12th Army Group commander said he hoped to get to Bastogne 

but doubted his ability to go farther without replacements. In reporting this reaction to the Supreme Commander, Montgomery added that the Allies, if they 

intended to take the initiative from the 

Germans, would need more troops. Unaware that SHAEF was even then in the 

process of sending a message promising 

17,000 replacements to the First and 

Third Armies by the end of December, the 

British commander indicated that additional troops could be found only by withdrawing Allied forces from salients and 

holding shorter fronts. He suggested that 

this aspect of the problem be examined on 

the southern front.70 

These reactions left Bradley with the 

feeling that the 21 Army Group commander had adopted a purely defensive 

attitude. The U.S. general now asked that 

American forces north of the Ardennes be 

returned to him and suggested that 12th 

Army Group headquarters be moved to 

Namur where it could assure co-ordination of the U.S. forces.7I 

The U.S. commanders attacked vigorously the suggestion of even a limited 

withdrawal. Generals Hodges and Collins 

expressed their disapproval, and, when 

the matter was left to them to resolve, decided to stay where they were. General 

Patton's staff insisted that the Saar positions should be held, saying that a withdrawal would have serious psychological 

effects on the soldiers who had taken the 

area. The Third Army commander himself was strongly opposed to any pulling 

back. General Bradley at this point wrote 

General Hodges and outlined his views. 

While making clear that he had no control over the First Army and that his 

letter was not to be considered as a directive, the 12th Army Group commander 

said that he viewed with misgivings any 

plan to give up terrain which might be 

favorable for future operations. Aware 

that the First Army had been hard hit, 

he nevertheless believed that the enemy 

divisions had also suffered heavily and 

were now weaker than General Hodges' 

forces. 72 

General Bradley's optimism was ju!';ti-

£led by conditions within the German 

69 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-394, 25 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

70 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-396, 25 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. SHAEF's message on replacements, dated 25 December 1944, reached Montgomery the following day. Note, Br Hist Sec to author, 

23 Apr 52. 

71 Air Marshal Robb's notes on a meeting in General Smith's office, 26 December 1944, give General 

Bradley's reactions as reported by General Smith. 

Field Marshal Montgomery, according to Patton, War 

as I Knew It, p. 203, had told General Bradley that 

First Army could not attack for at least three months 

and that the only offensive effort that could be made 

would be that of Third Army, which the Bri tish commander considered too weak. It would be necessary, 

therefore, to fall back to the line of the Saar-Vosges 

or to the Moselle to get a sufficient number of divisions for the attack. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 480-

81, says only: "Although I had hoped Montgomery 

would soon join our counter-attack with one from the 

north, I found him waiting expectantly for one last 

enemy blow on the flank. Not until he was certain 

that the enemy had exhausted himself, would Montgomery plunge in for the kill. Disappointed at the 

prospect of further delay, I headed back to St. 

Trond." 

72 Patton, War as I Knew It, pp. 203-05, has the full 

memorandum. Bradley to Hodges, 26 Dec 44, 12th A 

Gp 371.3 Military Objectives, IV'- The question of 

his withdrawal will be treated at length in Cole's The 

Ardennes. 
384 

armies. Their attack, whose success had 

been staked on surprise and speed, had 

now lost the effect of surprise and was 

falling more and more behind schedule. 

The Sixth Panzer Army had failed to break 

through the Monschau-Malmedy area. 

St. Vith had held out three times as long 

as the Germans had anticipated, and 

Bastogne, which had been expected to 

fall the second day of the offensive, stubbornly held out afTer the Germans had 

surrounded it. Field Marshal von Rundstedt claimed after the war that he was 

aware by the third day of the attack that 

he could not achieve his assigned objectives. He added tl,at, when OKW insisted on pushing the counteroffensive, his 

answer was that his forces must start preparing to defend the territory they had 

already taken. 

Whatever Rundstedt replied at the 

time, he was probably not as hopeful as 

Hitler and his advisers. On 26 December 

they believed that A rrrry Group B could 

thrust forces 'across the Meuse if the 

Seventh A rrrry forces could regain their 

equilibrium in the south, if Bastogne could 

be taken, and if the Fifth and Sixth Panzer 

Armies, in a co-ordinated effort in the center, could destroy Allied forces between 

the Ourthe and the Meuse north of the 

line Marche-Dinant. With these objectives in mind, they proposed to order the 

Fifth Panzer Arrrry, alneady far in the lead, 

to turn off to the northeast as soon as it 

reached the Meuse so as to outflank the 

Allied forces east of the river and attack 

them from the rear, while the Sixth Panzer 

A rrrry continued a vigorous attack to the 

west and northwest. A supplementary 

thrust by Fifteenth A rrrry farther north near 

Dueren, intended to hold the U.S. forces 

in the salient around Aachen, was considered very desirable but canceled as 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

being too costly. The Germans, hopeful of 

tying up U.S. forces south of the Ardennes, 

had ordered A rmy Group G to prepare an 

attack from Bitche against U.S. forces in 

the Wissembourg area. Apparently realizing that these various efforts would ultimately force the cancellation of longstanding plans for a supplementary attack by Army Group H in the north, the 

German high command nevertheless continued preparations for a time on paper at 

least, possibly as a means of deceiving the 

Allies. In reality. the German estimates at 

the time were based on reports which had 

been superseded by events. The front commands at the three crucial points must 

have known on the 26th that their efforts 

had failed. 73 

The German situation was destined to 

grow worse. The fog, which had interfered 

with air activity since the beginning of the 

attack, lifted on 23 December and the 

Allied air offensive was renewed. Allied 

planes immediately rushed supplies to 

beleaguered units like those in Bastogne 

and opened powerful attacks against 

enemy armored columns and supply lines. 

The steady roar of hundreds of Allied aircraft over the threatened area brought 

renewed hopes to the hard-pressed forces 

that their Christmas would be a thankful 

one. 74 A symbol of the changed situation 

for the Allies was the arrival on 26 Decem73 See study by Magna E. Bauer and Charles von 

Luettichau, Key Dates During the Ardennes Offensive, 1944, OCMH files. 

74 Craven and Cate, The Army An Forces in World 

War II, III, 690-92. The 9th Bombardment Division 

of the Ninth Air Force sent out more sorties on 23 

December than it had since the battles in Normandy. 

It dispatched 624 bombers in the course of the day. 

The day also saw attack by 417 heavy bombers of the 

Eighth Air Force and 696 fighter-bomber sorties. In 

the period 23-31 December, Ninth Air Force, with 

two Eighth Air Force fighter-bomber groups under 

its temporary operational control, flew 10,305 sorties. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 385 

ber at Bastogne of advance elements of 

General Patton's tanks, which had broken 

through from the south. 

On the same day, miles to the west near 

Dinant, First Army armored formations 

smashed the enemy's most ambitious bid 

to reach the Meuse. Other German drives 

were turned back near Celles. Enemy 

armored units had outrun their supplies, 

and their stalled vehicles jammed the 

roads and became easy prey to the Allied 

bombers. By the 28th, as a heavy snowfall 

slowed enemy armor, Germans were in the 

process of pulling back. General Patton 

ordered his forces to push northward to 

Houffalize and to continue their march 

toward St. Vith. General Hodges at the 

same time moved his units southward with 

the object oflinking up with these Third 

Army forces. The first phase of the enemy 

counteroffensive had been brought to an 

end and the second begun. The enemy 

drive to the Meuse had been effectively 

stopped. But the enemy still had to be 

driven back from Luxembourg and 

Belgium. 75 

Preparations for an A !lied Attack 

On 28 December General Eisenhower 

and Field Marshal Montgomery met at 

Hasselt, Belgium, to plot an Allied offensive against the enemy.76 The British commander insisted that a reserve be created 

to deal with other enemy counteroffensives 

and to launch an Allied counterattack. He 

emphasized the need of pressing the fight 

against the enemy in order to prevent von 

Rundstedt from withdrawing armored 

forces to build a reserve. Planning to 

strengthen his front and reorganize his 

forces, he proposed to start a drive on New 

Year's Day or shortly thereafter if the 

enemy had made no attack by that time. 77 

Proposals for a Ground Commander 

In discussing the new drive against the 

enemy, Field Marshal Montgomery suggested that the Allied forces in this offensive be placed under the control of one 

commander. This renewal of an old proposal was accompanied by a reminder 

that failure had attended the Supreme 

Commander's previous dependence on coordination of British and U.S. forces rather 

than definite operational control. To anyone made sensitive by British press criticisms oflate December, it might have appeared that the British were making use of 

the early reverses in the Ardennes to register a lack of confidence in the Supreme 

Commander's direction of operations. In 

75 FUSA Rpt ofOpns, Vol. I; TUSA Rpt ofOpns, 

Vol. I; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 481-82; Entry 

dtd 26 Dec 44 in OB WEST, KTB 1.-31.XII.44. 

76 The meeting had been slightly delayed because 

of the bombing of General Eisenhower's special 

train-in the railway yards near Paris-on 26 December. The trip to Hasselt was com plica ted because of 

the heavy guard given General Eisenhower as a result of a report that German forces under Colonel 

Skorzeny had slipped through the American lines to 

Paris with the object of killing key Allied commanders (Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 359-60). German plans for the Ardennes offensive do not indicate 

that Skorzeny's forces were intended to carry out 

such a mission. 

Field Marshal Montgomery's plane was also 

bombed during the course of the Ardennes battle. 

General Eisenhower immediately put his own plane 

at the field marshal's disposal. De Guingand's plane 

was also destroyed. 

77 The draft of a letter from Eisenhower to Montgomery, 29 December 1944, Eisenhower personal file, 

recapitulates the pqints discussed at the meeting. (A 

note in General Eisenhower's writing says "probably 

not sent.") It accords generally with the general's recollections in Crusade in Europe, pp. 360-61, although 

it cites 1 January 1945 instead of 3 January as the 

date of Field Marshal Montgomery's proposed drive. 

General de Guingand in meetings at SHAEF on 31 

December denied that Montgomery had committed 

himself firmly to an attack on 1 January, but said it 

might be made on the 2d or 3d. Robb, Notes on CofS 

and SAC confs, 31 Dec 44, OCMH files. 
386 

reality nothing was said at this time that 

had not been stated on various other occasions by the 21 Army Group commander 

and his advisers. Undoubtedly he was emboldened by the fact that the Supreme 

Commander had given him command of 

U.S. forces north of the Ardennes in 

December, and he pressed this point 

home. Montgomery held that the key to 

future success lay in the assignment of all 

available offensive power to the northern 

line of the advance to the Ruhr and the 

establishment of one-man control of the 

whole tactical battle in the north.78 

SHAEF, the War Department, and the 

U.S. commanders in Europe were opposed 

to leaving forces north of the Ardennes 

under the 21 Army Group. On learning 

that the London press was predicting such 

a move, General Marshall cabled General Eisenhower: 

My feeling is this: under no circumstances 

make any concessions of any kind whatsoever. You not only have our complete confidence but there would be a terrific resentment in this country following such action. I 

am not assuming that you had in mind such 

a concession. Ijust wish you to be certain of 

our attitude on this side. You are doing a fine 

job and go on and give them hell. 79 

Conscious of this backing, and of General Bradley's strong feelings about the 

current command arrangements, the Supreme Commander said that he was willing to leave one U.S. army with the 21 

Army Group on the basis of military 

necessity and as a token of confidence in 

the British commander but would go no 

further. 80 General Eisenhower added that 

he was disturbed because of the field 

marshal's predictions of failure unless his 

views were met in detail. Thanking the 

21 Army Group commander for his "frank 

and friendly counsels," the Supreme 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Commander declared that he would deplore "the development of such an unbridgeable gulf of convictions between us 

that we would have to present our differences to the CC/S. The confusion and 

debate that would follow would certainly 

damage the good will and devotion to a 

common cause that have made this Allied 

Force unique in history." 81 

Several of General Eisenhower's closest 

advisers at SHAEF now counseled him to 

force a showdown with the 21 Army 

Group commander. General Smith, who 

favored such a course, discussed frankly 

with Montgomery's chief of staff the difficulties which were arising. General de 

Guingand, in turn, informed his chief of 

the strong feelings which existed on the 

subject at SHAEF and warned that in a 

showdown someone would have to go and 

it would not be the Supreme Commander. 

Field Marshal Montgomery, who seemed 

78 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-540, 29 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

79 Marshall to Eisenhower, W-84337, 30 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

80 General Eisenhower had indicated in a meeting 

with his staff on 30 December that he proposed to 

return First Army to General Bradley when the situation was restored in the Ardennes. In the course of 

the conference, the Supreme Commander's advisers 

agreed that Montgomery had quickly restored the 

situation in the First Army area, straightened out the 

army and brought order out of disorder. When it 

came to the need for offensive action they felt he was 

far behind Bradley. They feared his alleged overcareful policy would cause the Allies to miss a chance 

to inflict a severe defeat on the enemy in the immediate future. While the group referred specifically to 

Field Marshal Montgomery's policy during the Ardennes fight, it. is not unfair to say that it represented generally SHAEF's attitude toward the 21 

Army Group commander. Discussions at meeting 

based on Air Marshal Robb's notes on Supreme Commander's conference, 30 December 1944. It should 

be noted that Generals Smith, Strong, and Whiteley 

and Air Marshal Robb usually met with General 

Eisenhower during this period. 

81 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 31 Dec 44, Eisenhower personal file. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 387 

to be genuinely surprised at the strong 

feeling engendered by his views, discussed with de Guingand the necessary 

action for changing the existing situation. 

On 31 December, in a letter designed to 

clear the air, the British commander wrote 

General Eisenhower expressing distress if 

the previous letter had proved upsetting. 

He conceded that there were probably 

many factors involved in the command 

question which he did not know about, 

and pledged his 100 percent co-operation 

in backing any decision the Supreme 

Commander might make. 82 

Aware, perhaps, that Field Marshal 

Montgomery's requests coming on the 

heels of criticism of the Supreme Commander in the London press might be construed as a lack offaith in General Eisenhower's leadership, the Prime Minister in 

early January assured the President that 

His Majesty's Government had complete 

confidence in the Supreme Commander 

and acutely regretted any attacks which 

had been made on him. "He, Montgomery, Bradley, and Patton," Churchill 

wrote, "are closely knit and it would be 

a tragedy to break this group which has 

already for a year given results beyond 

the dreams of military avarice." He added 

that British troops were ready at all times 

to carry out General Eisenhower's orders. 

The Prime Minister extended his cordial 

congratulations on the gallantry of U.S. 

troops, particularly at Bastogne, and declared that the 7th Armored and the 1st 

and 9th Divisions had performed the 

"highest acts of soldierly devotion at heavy 

personal sacrifice." 83 

Field Marshal Montgomery and the 

British Chiefs of Staff revived the command question on at least two other occasions, but the possibility of its being seriously considered by General Eisenhower 

was pretty effectively killed by the reactions of U.S. commanders to an interview 

given the Allied press by Field Marshal 

Montgomery on 7 January 1945. Members of his staff had feared that there might 

be an unfavorable reaction and had attempted to prevent the press conference 

or at least tone down the statements of 

their chief. He insisted, however, that 

something had to be done to counteract 

British press criticisms of General Eisenhower and other U.S. commanders. 

The British commander made a lengthy 

analysis of the Ardennes battle and paid 

tribute to the U.S. soldier as "a brave 

fighting man, steady under fire, and with 

the tenacity in battle that stamps the first 

class soldier." To the fighting qualities of 

these men, he said, was due the basic 

credit for stopping Rundstedt. The field 

marshal made a strong appeal for full 

backing for the Supreme Commander, 

saying that he personally was devoted to 

General Eisenhower and was grieved by 

the uncomplimentary articles concerning 

him which had appeared in the British 

press. He pleaded for Allied solidarity, declaring, "Anyone who tries to break up the 

team spirit ofthe Allies is definitely helping the enemy." 84 

Read in its entirety, the statementjustified the New York Times's editorial comment: "No handsomer tribute was ever 

paid to the American soldier than that of 

Field Marshal Montgomery in the midst 

of combat." 85 But it was his tone and what 

his chief of staff characterized as a "what 

82 De Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 432-45; 

Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-406, 31 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

83 Paraphrase of Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 7 Jan 

45, in Memo, Leahy for Marshall et al., 8 Jan 45, 

OPD Exec 9, Bk 24, Item 1539. 

84 New York Times, January 8,1945. 

85 New York Times,January 9,1945. 
388 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

a good boy am I” attitude that offended 

General Bradley and his subordinates. 86 

Passages of the interview singled out by 

the 12th Army Group commander were 

these : 

When Rundstedt attacked on December 

16, he obtained a tactical surprise. He drove 

a deep wedge into the center of the United 

States First Army and the split might have 

become awkward; the Germans had broken 

right through a weak spot, and were heading 

for the Meuse. 

As soon as I saw what was happening I 

took certain steps myself to ensure that if the 

Germans got to the Meuse they would certainly not get over that river. And I carried 

out certain movements so as to provide 

balanced dispositions to meet the threatened 

danger; these were, at the time, merely precautions, i. e. I was thinking ahead. 

Then the situation began to deteriorate. 

But the whole allied team rallied to meet the 

danger; national considerations were thrown 

overboard; General Eisenhower placed me in 

command of the whole Northern front. 

I employed the whole available power of 

the British Group of Armies; this power was 

brought into play very gradually and in such 

a way that it would not interfere with the 

American lines of communications. Finally it 

was put into battle with a bang and today 

British divisions are fighting hard on the 

right flank of the United States First Army. 

You have thus the picture of British troops 

fighting on both sides of American forces who 

have suffered a hard blow. This is a fine 

Allied picture. 

The battle has some similarity to the battle 

that began on 3 1 August 1942 when Rommel 

made his last bid to capture Egypt and was 

“seen off” by the Eighth Army. 87 

The 12th Army Group commander and 

his staff, already sensitive because of the 

shift in command, were exasperated, if not 

outraged, by the interview. Their feelings 

were further roused a few days later when 

a German station broke in on a BBC channel and, imitating a British broadcast, 

criticized the handling of the battle by 

U.S. commanders. Mr. Brendan Bracken, 

chief of British press affairs, immediately 

branded the broadcast as false and expressed British confidence in General 

Eisenhower and the U.S. forces. But much 

damage had been done to U.S.-British 

command relations. 88 

General Bradley believed that SHAEF 

might have settled the whole matter at the 

time of the initial shift in command, if it 

had made clear the fact that the whole 

shift was temporary. By mid-January, he 

felt that the confidence of the U.S. soldiers 

and of the U.S. public in their commanders was at stake. He further argued 

that U.S. public opinion would not permit 

the battle south of the Ardennes to be neglected, and he emphasized the political 

importance in the United States of giving 

the next major offensive to a U.S. commander. When General Eisenhower mentioned the matter of a ground forces 

commander, General Bradley flatly said if 

he were placed under Field Marshal 

Montgomery’s command he would ask to 

be relieved. 89 

Weeks after the Montgomery interview, 

General Eisenhower was still getting 

strong reactions from his U.S. commanders 

and the U.S. press. He later declared, “NO 

single incident that I have ever encountered throughout my experience as an 

Allied commander has been so difficult to 

combat as this particular outburst in the 

papers.” 90 Aware of these feelings, the 

86 De Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 434. 

87 New York Times, January 8, 1945. This version 

is slightly different from that in Bradley, A Soldier’s 

St ory, pp. 484–85. It is possible that Bradley’s was 

taken from the BBC broadcast which he mentions. 

88 Bracken to Smith, RR-15103, 10 Jan 45, SHAEF 

cbl log. 

89 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 487–88. 

90 Eisenhower to Bradley, 16 Jan 45; Eisenhower 

to Marshall, 8 Feb 45. Both in Eisenhower personal 

file. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 389 

Prime Minister had already done his best 

to set the record straight. On 18January, 

in summarizing for the House of Commons 

the state of Allied fortunes throughout the 

world, he paid a great tribute to the U.S. 

commander and theU.S. forces in the Ardennes. Part of his statement follows: 

I have seen it suggested that the terrific 

battle which has been proceeding since 16th 

December on the American front IS an AngloAmerican battle. In fact, however, the United 

States troops have done almost all the fighting and have suffered almost all the losses. 

They have suffered losses almost equal to 

those on both sides in the battle of Gettysburg. Only one British Army Corps has been 

engaged in this action. All the rest of the 30 

or more divisions, which have been fighting 

continuously for the last month, are United 

States troops. The Americans have engaged 

30 or 40 men for every one we have engaged, 

and they have lost 60 to 80 men for everyone 

of ours. That is a point I want to make. Care 

must be taken in telling our proud tale not to 

claim for the British army an undue share of 

what is undoubtedly the greatest American 

battle of the war and will, I believe, be 

regarded as an ever famous American 

victory.91 

After describing the manner in which 

the battle had been carried on, Mr. 

Churchill sternly warned: "Let no one 

lend himself to the chatter of mischiefmakers when issues of this momentous 

consequence are being successfully decided by the sword." Despite his generous 

words and timely warning, the shift in 

command during December continued to 

rankle in the minds of the U.S. commanders. General Eisenhower could 

scarcely have ignored this factor in the debates which followed relative to making 

the main drive on Field Marshal Montgomery's front and on the question of 

placing additional U.S. troops under 21 

Army Group command. 

Even while General Eisenhower was 

faced with sharp American reactions to 

Montgomery's temporary assumption of 

command of all Allied troops north of the 

Ardennes, the British Chiefs of Staff were 

proposing the appointment of a single 

ground force commander for the remainder of the war. They argued, in defense of 

this suggestion, that General Eisenhower 

was too heavily occupied with matters of 

supply, political complexities, and the 

like to handle ground force operations. 

The Supreme Commander, when notified 

of this recommendation, declared that the 

Ruhr was the logical dividing line between the British and U.S. army groups, 

and that there was no way in which a 

ground forces commander could secure 

better co-ordination or direction of the 

battle than could the Supreme Commander. Rather the ground commander 

would merely complicate matters by getting involved in questions of allocations 

of men and supplies and the development 

of communications-matters which properly belonged to the Supreme Commander. While disavowing any nationalistic viewpoints, General Eisenhower emphasized that the establishment of two 

ground commanders, one on either side 

of the Luxembourg area, would put 

forty-five to fifty U.S. divisions and fourteen British divisions under the 21 Army 

Group for an offensive task; the other 

commander would be left with a defensive task only. He considered such a plan 

illogical and, with the personalities involved, one that would not work welL He 

conceded only that, in view of the size of 

the ground forces, it would be convenient 

ifthe Deputy Supreme Commander were 

"' 407 H.C. Deb. (Hansard's l!iH-45), pars. 415-

18. 
390 

a ground force rather than aIr force 

officer. 92 

General Marshall feared that General 

Eisenhower's closing remark meant that 

he was weakening under heavy British 

pressure to put one of their officers in 

charge of the ground forces. Recognizing 

that the Supreme Commander needed 

someone to visit forward units and keep 

contact with top ground commanders, he 

offered to send an officer fr.()m Washington 

for the job and suggested that General 

Eisenhower get a British officer as well. 

General Eisenhower replied that he would 

strenuously object to a deputy for ground 

operations and that he would consider 

only a deputy without portfolio who would 

be directly responsible to the Supreme 

Commander. His present deputy, he 

added, was "a loyal, splendid man," 

whose only difficulty arose from the unwillingness of senior ground commanders 

to take his opinion on purely ground matters. Advice in these matters was available, 

however, from General Smith, who was 

highly respected in all echelons, and from 

General Bull, who was sent frequently to 

the lower headquarters. The Supreme 

Commander proposed to bring to his 

headquarters Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks, 

formerly of AFHQ, who, together with 

General Whiteley, would stay on the road 

constantly.93 

The ground commander question 

cropped up again in mid-February when 

the British asked if General Eisenhower 

would accept Field Marshal Alexander as 

his deputy. The Supreme Commander reminded Field Marshal Brooke that he had 

previously said he would take a replacement for Air Chief Marshal Tedder if the 

latter were assigned elsewhere. In case of 

a change, he could not accept "any intermediary headquarters, either official or 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

unofficial in character," between himself 

and the army group commanders. General 

Eisenhower called attention to controversies over command which had arisen in 

January and warned that if the newspapers attempted to describe Alexander's 

appointment as the establishment of a new 

ground command he would have to issue a 

formal statement that might hurt the feelings of the British officer and give the press 

"another opportunity to indulge in futile 

but nevertheless disturbing arguments." 

In standing firm on this issue, General 

Eisenhower was aware that he now had 

the backing of Field Marshal Montgomery. The latter, who felt that an intermediate command or any interference with 

the "clear line of authority extending 

from ... [Eisenhower] ... to him should 

be carefully avoided," was described by 

the Supreme Commander as bei'ng "most 

emphatic in insisting that the command 

arrangements I have made are as nearly 

perfect as circumstances, including diverse nationalities, will permit." 94 

Mr. Churchill, on seeing these statements, became disturbed at what he int.erpreted as an intention to reduce the position of Deputy Supreme Commander if a 

change was made. General Eisenhower 

reassured him on this point and pointed 

out his strong affection for Field Marshal 

Alexander. "Moreover," he went on, "far 

from regarding this problem from a British versus American viewpoint, my whole 

effort is to exercise the authority of my office so as to weld and preserve the sense of 

92 Eisenhower to Marshall, S-74437, 10 Jan 45; 

Eisenhower to Marshall, S-74461, 10 Jan 45. Both in 

Eisenhower personal file. 

93 Marshall to Eisenhower, W-90175, II Jan 45; 

Eisenhower to Marshall, S-74678, 12 Jan 45. Both in 

Eisenhower personal file. 

94 Eisenhower to Brooke, 16 Feb 45, Eisenhower 

personal file. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 391 

partnership that to my mind is absolutely 

essential to the winning of the war and to 

our common welfare.” 95 

Field Marshal Montgomery added his 

voice to General Eisenhower’s in early 

March, suggesting that the command setup be left as it was and warning that a 

change would merely raise a storm and 

put everything back. 96 This attitude on 

the part of one who had formerly stoutly 

favored something like a ground commander pretty effectively settled the matter. In a conference with Eisenhower and 

Tedder on 5 March, the Prime Minister 

agreed that the decision regarding command arrangements belonged entirely to 

General Eisenhower. Thus the command 

situation was left as it had been arranged 

in January. The Ninth U.S. Army remained under the 2 1 Army Group for the 

Rhineland battle, but the other U.S. 

forces stayed under General Bradley or 

General Devers. General Eisenhower 

cabled General Marshall on 14 March, “I 

suppose you know the Prime Minister has 

withdrawn his suggestion of making any 

change in my deputy.” 97 

Allied Manpower Difficulties 

Discussions of command had been accompanied by Allied efforts to solve the 

manpower problem, which had been intensified by heavy U.S. losses in the opening days of the Ardennes counteroffensive. 98 At a time when the number of soldiers in the U.S. Army stood at the highest 

in the history of the United States, riflemen available for front-line duty were in 

short supply. This scarcity in the midst of 

plenty was due not only to the difficulty of 

working out a year or two in advance the 

proper allotment of manpower among the 

various services and their branches but 

also to the increasingly heavy losses among 

riflemen. 99 

The British manpower situation, which 

had been strained even before the invasion 

in June 1944 as a result of heavy commitments around the world and the losses in 

four years of fighting, was much worse 

than that of the U.S. forces. Some existing 

units had to be broken up to fill ranks 

which had been thinned during the battle 

for Antwerp. The French, who had a potentially rich source of manpower, were in 

no position to give immediate aid to the 

Allies. For some months they had urged 

the activation of new divisions, but the 

Allies, needing the supplies and equipment they would have had to give to the 

new units, had postponed any action on 

the matter. 

The Ardennes crisis forced the Allies to 

re-examine their resources. Mr. Churchill, 

as already pointed out, had ordered special 

measures to get another quarter of a million men. General Eisenhower, who on the 

eve of the Ardennes attack had directed 

his rear echelon headquarters to comb out 

their ranks for men fitted for combat, demanded redoubled efforts in that direction. At the end of December, he reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 

the possibility of raising additional units 

from Belgian, Polish, and French manpower sources. He emphasized particu95 Ltr, Eisenhower to Prime Minister, 25 Feb 45, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

96 Montgomery to Eisenhower, 4 Mar 45, Eisenhower personal file. 

97 Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Mar 45, Eisenhower 

personal file. 

98 See below, p. 396. 

99 Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, 

and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat 

Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II (Washington, 1946), Mobilization of the 

Ground Army, pp. 189-98, 242-44. See above, Ch. 

XVII, p. 306. See also Ruppenthal, Logistical Support 

of the Armies, Vol. II, now in preparation. 
392 

larly that the French should be able to 

form five of a proposed eight divisions by 

1 May 1945. The Combined Chiefs of 

Staff accepted in principle the task of 

equipping eight additional French divisions plus 460,000 line-of-communications 

and security troops (of whom 243,000 

would be French). They added, however, 

that they had to await the outcome of the 

Ardennes battle before making a decision 

as to the supplies which could be made 

available. 10o 

General Eisenhower's pleas to the War 

Department, backed by appeals of the 

Prime Minister to the President, may have 

spurred efforts already under way to meet 

the manpbwer crisis in Europe. The Joint 

Chiefs of $taff shortly after receiving news 

of the Ardennes had moved up the sailing 

date of three infantry, one airborne, and 

three armbred divisions so that they would 

leave inJanuary and early February. Two 

infantry divisions, not previously intended 

for the European theater, were allocated 

at once to General Eisenhower and listed 

for mid-February departure. In addition, 

General Marshall initiated a comb-out of 

the defense commands and other installations in the United States, Alaska, and 

Panama. 101• 

In authorizing these various moves, the 

J oint Chiefs of Staff had allocated every 

available unit. The President was informed 

that once these had sailed all divisions 

would have left the United States for overseas theaters. It was therefore necessary for 

General Eisenhower to make drastic efforts to find additional troops in his own 

theater. On 6 January 1945, General Marshall proposed that a War Department 

manpower expert come to Europe to survey the situation there. After the finger 

had been pointed at available men, the 

Chief of Staff continued, a "tough 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

hatchetm<l.n" with rank should be sent 

over to force the rear echelon commanders to give up the soldiers in their 

commands fit for combat duty. General 

Eisenhower welcomed these p:roposals; 

asking that the two men be sent ahead. He 

outlined other possible ways to a,lleviate 

the manpower shortage. These iI)cluded 

the opening of a major Russian offensive 

that would force the Germans to stop shifting troQPs to the west, the bringing of several divisions from Italy, and the speedier 

development of French units. He also indicated that the Army could not "deny the 

Negro volunteer a chance to serve in battle" and, as a final suggestion, asked if the 

Marines might be willing to turn over 

100,000 men to the European theater. 102 

To expedite the search for replacements 

in the European theater, General Eisenhower appointed Lt. Gen. Ben Lear, then 

chief of the Army Ground Forces, as deputy theater commander with special duties 

for personnel and morale. Later, he gave 

General Barker, the SHAEF chief of personnel, an increased measure of control 

over U.S. personnel policy. These grants 

were both restricted by the fact that the 

theater chiefs of services continued to serve 

under the Commanding General, Communications Zone. Despite difficulties 

some progress was made in getting addi100 Eisenhower to WD, 30 Dec 44; WD to SHAEF, 

30 Dec 44. Both in COMZ Cbls, ETO Adm. 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, and 

Vigneras, French Rearmament, contain detailed diS"-

cussions of this problem. 

101 Marshall to Eisenhower, W-88482, 8 Jan 45, 

Eisenhower personal file; Memo, Leahy for President 

(undated but apparently in answer to Churchill 

cable of 7 January 1945), OPD Exec 9, Bk 24. 

10' Marshall to Eisenhower, W-87829, 6 Jan 45; 

Marshall to Eisenhower, W-8877"(, 8 Jan 45; Eisenhower to Marshall, S-74003, 7 Jan 45. Eisenhower 

personal file. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 393 

tional men for the combat units."o3 

Closely allied to the question of manpower was that of supplying front-line 

forces. Combat commanders believed that 

Headquarters, Communications Zone, 

was not only getting a lion's share of men 

who came from the United States but also 

was taking too large a percentage of critical supplies. Inasking for a careful check 

on manpower, General Marshall also insisted that the supply situation be examined. InJanuary he sent Lt. Gen. Brehon 

B. Somervell, the Army Service Forces 

chief, to look into the functioning of the 

supply services. Marshall made clear that 

in taking this step he was not implying 

that the commander of Headquarters, 

Communications Zone, was unfitted for 

his post. Rather he wished to find if there 

was any basis for the complaints being 

made by front-line commanders. He 

warned that they must not be allowed to 

feel that they were suffering heavily and 

working with reduced forces while the rear 

echelon elements continued to operate 

with "plenty of fat meat." After careful 

study, General Somervell suggested a 

number of ways for improving the work of 

the Communications Zone, but he made 

no recommendations for a radical change 

of command. 104 

The turn of the tide in the Ardennes 

battle and the renewal of the Allied offensive there toward the end of January 

eased the pressure on the Allies with regard to men and supplies. While never 

having as much of either as they would 

have liked, the combat commanders found 

that for the most part they were now able 

to get ahead with the job. 

The Allies Take the Initiative 

On 10January, Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley issued orders 

for a co-ordinated attack on 13 January in 

the Ardennes, which was designed to trap 

the enemy or to drive him back into Germany."05 The offensive's first objective was 

the link-up of Allied forces at Houffalize. 

(Map 6) Once this was completed, the 

Allies were to execute a major thrust from 

the north to retake St. Vith and the nearby high ground in an effort to deny the 

enemy lateral ground communications 

through St. Vith and to eliminate most of 

the enemy salient between the Elsenborn 

area and the First Army's. southern 

boundary. Before the big push started, attacks were already under way. The Third 

Army had been maintaining a continuous 

offensive since 22 December, vigorous 

Allied aerial attacks had been hitting the 

enemy, and the First Army attack that began on 3 January had been making some 

progress. At mid-January, however, a 

fully co-ordinated, full-scale offensive was 

launched. With the opening of this attack, 

the Allies seized the initiative, and they 

were not to relinq uish it again." 06 

Shortly before the Allies began their 

drive in the north, their forces were heavily attacked in the Vosges mountains and 

in the Strasbourg area. General Bradley 

feared that SHAEF might stop the Third 

Army attack in the Ardennes area in order 

to deal with this southern thrust. He be1O:l Hq ETOUSA GO 5, 23 Jan 44; Interv with Gen 

Lear, 3 May 48. 

104 Marshall to Eisenhower, W -87829, 6 Jan 45; 

Marshall to Eisenhower, W-88777, 8Jan 45. Both in 

Eisenhower personal file. Hq ASF 200.02 Gen 

SomervelJ's Inspection Trip to the ETO 333. See 

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. 

II, for full discussion of this matter. 

10.' This attack, envisaged by the Allies in late 

December, had become obvious to the enemy by 28 

December, as shown by an entry of that date in the 

OB WEST KTB. 

106 A detailed account of the Allied attack will be 

found in Cole, The Ardennes. 
BATTLE OF THE ARDENNES 

26 December 1944 - 28 January 1945 

- GERMAN FRONT LINE. OATE INDICATED 

~ AXIS OF ALLIED ATTACK 

IIIlIIIIIJDIImD WEST WALL 

'9, 'I 

M~P6 

o 

I 

o 

10 20 30 MILES , ! • 

I~ lio 3~ KILOMETERS 

°P,iim 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 395 

lieved that the army should stay on the offensive. General Patton, unimpressed by 

attacks on his XX Corps front in the 

south, strongly criticized what he called 

the strictly defensive views of SHAEF. 107 

Supreme Headquarters was worried about 

the situation to the south and wanted to 

form a SHAEF reserve, but it did not interfere with the opening of the attack. 

There was adequate basis for concern 

over the Alsatian counteroffensive. But the 

enemy’s efforts in the Ardennes were at an 

end. As early as 3 January, Field Marshal 

Rundstedt had informed his commanders 

that there was no prospect for the success 

of the Ardennes attack as planned. On 8 

January, Hitler authorized limited withdrawals of his forces in that area, including the movement of nearly all of the Sixth 

Panzer Army to an area northeast of St. 

Vith and east of Wiltz where Allied counterattacks were expected. On the following 

day, the armored units of the Sixth Panzer 

Army were ordered out of the line and sent 

to a rest area in the rear of Army Group G. 

Five days later, a general withdrawal to a 

line east of Houffalize was approved. 108 

As the German units started withdrawing, the Allied forces pressed in toward 

Houffalize. They took the town on the 

15th, and elements of the First and Third 

Armies linked up on the following day. In 

accordance with earlier arrangements, 

SHAEF now readjusted the Allied command setup. Control of the First Army 

was handed back to General Bradley at 

midnight of 17 January, while the Ninth 

Army was directed to remain under Field 

Marshal Montgomery for his attack toward the Rhine. 109 In anticipation of this 

shift in command, the 21 Army Group 

commander had already expressed his admiration to General Bradley for the work 

of the U.S. forces. He wrote: 

MY DEAR BRAD 

It does seem as if the battle of the “salient” 

will shortly be drawing to a close, and when 

it is all clean and tidy I imagine that your 

armies will be returning to your operational 

command. 

I would like to say two things:- 

First: What a great honour it has been for 

me to command such fine troops. 

Second: how well they have all done. 

It has been a great pleasure to work with 

Hodges and Simpson: both have done very 

well. 

And the Corps Commanders in the First 

Army (Gerow, Collins, Ridgway) have been 

quite magnificent; it must be most exceptional to find such a good lot of Corps Commanders gathered together in one Army. 

All of us in the northern side of the salient 

would like to say how much we have admired 

the operations that have been conducted on 

the southern side; if you had not held on 

firmly to Bastogne the whole situation might 

have become very awkward. 

My kind regard to you and to George 

Patton. 

Yrs very sincerely, 

B.L. MONTGOMERY 110 

The U.S. forces now redoubled their 

pressure on the Germans, who fell back 

“with skill and dogged fighting” toward 

Germany. The skill of their ground troops’ 

was no match, however, for continuous attacks from the air. Despite bad flying 

weather, the Allied air forces kept up their 

strikes against the enemy columns. 111 Any 

107 Diary, Gen Gay, 11, 14 Jan 45, OCMH files. 

108 MS # C-020, Ausarbeitung, Die Deutsche Wehrmacht in der letzten Phase des Krieges, 1 Jan-7 May 45 

(Schramm). This manuscript was prepared from the 

draft OKW/ WFSt records and daily notes in 1948. 

109 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 492. 

110 Montgomery to Bradley, 12 Jan 45, Eisenhower 

personal file. A copy of the original was sent to General Eisenhower with the covering note: “It has been 

a very great honour for me to command two 

American armies.” 

111 Particularly striking were the results gained by 

the air forces on 22 January-a day in which the XIX 

Tactical Air Command claimed over 1,100 motor vehicles destroyed and another 536 damaged. The 
396 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

TABLE 2-EsTlMATED CASUALTIES IN THE ARDENNES 

Force Total Killed Wounded Misaing 

Total Allied _____ ___ ________ _______ __ . ____ . ________ _ _ 76,890 8,607 47, 129 21, 144 

Total U. S ________________________ ___ ______ _______ _ _ 75,482 8,407 46, ]70 20,905 

First U. S. Army ___ .____ ____ ______ ______ ______ ___________ . __ 39,957 

35,525 

1, 408 

4~ 629 23.152 12, 176 

8,729 

239 

Third U. S. Army ________ ____ ___________ __ ___ _____ __ ______ _ 3,778 23, 018 

30 Br. Corps (to 17 Jan) ___ ."-- -~-- ----- ----- -- --- ----- __ 200 969 

s""m: G-3 SHAEF to G-2 SHAEt'. 2 Feb 45, SHAEF G-l file Bottle 01 the Arden.eo GCf/l70-49/0p. A. 

hopes the Germans had of bettering their 

situation by transferring forces from the 

east were dashed by the opening of the 

Russian offensive on 12 January. On 20 

January, as the situation worsened in both 

east and west, Hitler notified von Rundstedt to be prepared to send the Sixth Panzer Army with four SS panzer divisions and 

the two Fuehrer brigades to the Russian 

front. Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler was 

transferred at the same time from Army 

Group Oberrhein, which he had commanded 

since November 1944, to Army Group 

Weichsel in the east. Von Rundstedt was 

also ordered to regroup his forces to meet 

an expected Allied thrust to the Ruhr. 

One by one the gains so quickly taken 

were given up to the Allies, while troops 

and materiel desperately needed for the 

defense of the Roer and the Rhine were 

smashe;d by ground and air forces as the 

retreating columns clogged the road nets 

of the Ardennes. By 28January 1945, all 

the ground which the Allies had lost to the 

enemy in the Ardennes counteroffensive 

had been retaken. 

enemy air force made its most vigorous attack on 1 

January 1945, using about 700 planes. Craven and 

Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, III, 709-

10,665. 

In simple bookkeeping terms, one cannot be sure of the cost to the enemy in 

men. The First U.S. Army estimated that 

by mid-January von Rundstedthad lost 

one fourth of the men with whom he 

opened the 16 December attack, as well 

as one half of the vehicles. Some Allied estimates ran as high as 103,900 casualties, 

excluding nonbattle losses and including 

more than 24,000 killed and 16,000 prisoners. Enemy estimates were somewhat 

lower. In one case, a figure of 92,234 total 

casualties is mentioned; in others, the figure is fixed at 81,834 including 12,652 

dead. Enemy claims of 125,000 casualties 

inflicted on Allied units have proved to be 

greatly exaggerated. Nonetheless, the cost 

to U.S. forces was heavy. Statistics furnished General Eisenhower at the beginning of February 1945, while undoubtedly 

only approximations, give an idea of the 

considerable losses taken by the Allied 

forces. (Table 2) The estimates indicate 

that the twenty-nine U.S. and four British 

divisions employed at one time or another 

in the Ardennes area sustained 76,780 

casualties, of which nearly 40,000 were in 

the First Army, 35,525 in the Third Army, 

and 1,408 in the 30 British Corps. If the 

lowest German estimate of enemy losses 

can be taken as correct, the casualties were 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 397 

roughly the same on both sides. The great 

difference was-and of this the Germans 

were thoroughly conscious-the Allies 

could replace their losses in men and 

materiel; the enemy could not. 112 

The Attack in Northern A/sace 

While General Eisenhower was still reorganizing his forces to drive the enemy 

from the Ardennes, he was faced with 

another German attack in Alsace. It came 

at a time when he was attempting to form 

a reserve force from the army group in the 

threatened region and forced him to 

consider a withdrawal from part of Alsace. 

This, in turn, raised a political issue between the Supreme Commander and the 

French Government. 

Hitler had considered a counteroffensive in northern Alsace in the fall of 1944, 

but had put it aside in favor of the Ardennes operation. When that counteroffensive began to go badly and when he 

realized that the U.S. forces in the area 

had been shifted northward to aid First 

Army, he again turned his attention to 

Alsace. There Army Group GJs First Army 

and Army Group OberrheinJs Nineteenth Army 

opposed General Devers' Seventh U.S. 

and First French Armies. The Germans on 

24 and 25 December formulated plans for 

an operation called NORD WIND. They 

planned to attack from West Wall positions near the boundary of northern 

Alsace and drive east and west of Bitche 

toward the Saverne Gap lying directly to 

the south. German forces that were to 

cross the Rhine north of Strasbourg and 

enemy units from the Colmar bridgehead 

were supposed to link up with the northern force east of the Vosges mountains. If 

this maneuver succeeded, U.S. units in the 

northeastern Alsatian salient would be cut 

off, Strasbourg endangered, and the 

French forces near Colmar threatened 

with defeat.ll3 (Map 7) 

When the Seventh U.S. Army intelligence section on 26 December estimated 

that the enemy might attack northern 

Alsace between 1 and 3 Jan uary, General 

Devers flew to Paris to discuss the situation 

on his front. General Eisenhower and his 

staff, still preoccupied with the Ardennes 

battle, apparently repeated their previous 

advice that the 6th Army Group commander be prepared to give ground 

rather than endanger the integrity of his 

forces. As a result of the conference with 

SHAEF officials, General Devers ordered 

General de Lattre and General Patch to 

remain on the defensive. He listed three 

intermediate positions to which the forces 

in northern Alsace could fall back. At the 

same time he asked his commanders to 

hold Strasbourg and Mulhouse if 

possible. 114 

As signs of a possible German attack 

multiplied, General Devers asked the 

Supreme Commander to leave with the 

6th Army Group the units earmarked for 

SHAEF reserve until the threat to northern Alsace disappeared or until the Sev112 FUSA Rpt of Opns, Vol. I; MS # A-858, 

Schramm, Course of Events of the German Offensive in 

the Ardennes; The War in the West 01-SIR/39 

(Scheidt), p. 109; MS # C-020, History of the Armed 

Forces (Schramm), p. 108. The figures in Table 2 

represent a hasty compilation prepared for General 

Eisenhower during the action. For a postwar summary of the Ardennes-Alsace campaign casualties, 

see below, Table 3. For tabular summaries of Allied 

strength and casualty figures during entire period of 

the war, see Appendix E. 

113 Seventh Army History, II, Ch. XXII; Army 

Group G, KTB Nr. 3b 1.-31.XIl.44, 21 to 25 Dec 44; 

MS # C-020 (Schramm). The tactical control of 

Nineteenth Army had been transferred from Army 

Group G to Army Group Oberrhein on 7 December 1944. 

114 6th A Gp, Ltr of Instr 7, 28 Dec 44, and other 

entries in 6th A Gp Opn Rpts, Dec 44. 
398 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

GENERAL JUIN 

enth Army could build a reserve of its 

own. 115 

Before SHAEF had a chance to answer 

the request, the enemy had acted. Striking 

just before midnight on 31 December, the 

German forces drove southward from their 

West Wall positions against the Seventh 

U.S. Army in the area south of Bitche. 

This attack was executed in two main 

drives, of which the western one was 

halted after two days of fighting, while the 

eastern one pressed forward to the western 

passages of the Vosges. The enemy, however, was still short of the Saverne Gap on 

5 January. 

The Question of Strasbourg 

General Eisenhower, in the face of the 

new attack, had to decide whether or not 

to fall back to new positions in northern 

Alsace. As early as 26 December, he had 

considered the possibility of shortening his 

line in that area in order to get a SHAEF 

reserve. In discussing the matter with his 

,advisers at that time, he had said that he 

might have to bring his forces back to the 

Vosges mountains, thus leaving Strasbourg 

exposed to the enemy. When Tedder questioned the wisdom of the action, the Supreme Commander said that he had been 

willing to consider the measure only because of the great need for a strategic 

reserve. He agreed that it would be a disappointment to give up ground, but added 

that the area then held by General Devers 

was not the one in which the 6th Army 

Group commander had been told to put 

his weight .116 

The hint of a withdrawal from Strasbourg was especially unwelcome to the 

French. General Juin, Chief of Staff of the 

Ministry of Defense, when informed on 

30 December that a withdrawal might be 

necessary, strongly disapproved the suggestion and spoke of placing newly organized FFI units at Devers' disposal to 

defend the Strasbourg area. Despite this 

reaction and the reluctance of the 6th 

Army Group commander to give up the 

territory, General Eisenhower on 1 January ordered General Devers to shorten 

his line in northeastern Alsace and to hold 

the Alsace plain with reconnaissance and 

observation forces only. This order, which 

the French might have accepted on purely 

military grounds, was politically unacceptable. Strasbourg, lost to the French 

115 6th A Gp Weekly Intel Summary 15, 30 Dec 

44; 6th A Gp Opns Rpts, Dec 44; SUSA G–2 Estimate 6, 29 Dec 44; SUSA Diary, 14 Aug 44-3 1 Jan 

45; Devers to SHAEF, 3 1 Dec 44, 6th A Gp Opns 

Rpts, Dec 44. 

116 Air Marshal Robb, Notes of mtg in SAC’s office, 

26 Dec 44, OCMH files; SUSA Rpt of Opns, Vol. 11; 

6th A Gp Opns Rpts, Dec 44. 
MAP 7 

THE BATTLE OF ALSACE 1 January - 9 February 1945 

ALLIED FRONT LINE, 31 DECEMBER 1944 

GERMAN ATTACKS, 1-25 JANUARY 

ALLIED ATTACKS, 20 JANUARY-9 FEBRUARY 

(REDUCTION OF COLMAR POCKET) 

Boundaries as of J January 

o lh 2'0 3'0 KILOMETERS 

10 20 30 MILES ! ! , 10 0 , , ,," I 

NINETEENTH ARMY 

IN COLMAR POCKET 

H. Damon 
400 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

from 1870 to 1918 and again from 1940 to 

its liberation in 1944, could not be handed 

back to the enemy without severe political 

repercussions. On 1 January, General de 

Gaulle expressed his anxiety over the proposed withdrawal and General Juin asked 

that the order be reconsidered. Next day, 

in a stormy session with General Smith, 

General Juin indicated that the French 

might remove their forces from General 

Eisenhower's control if the Supreme Commander persisted in his plan to withdraw. 

When on 3 January General Patch passed 

on the order for forces under his command 

to evacuate Strasbourg, the French military governor of the city, General 

Schwartz, warned of the terrible reprisals 

the Germans would take against inhabitants of Strasbourg in case of withdrawal 

and added that he could not undertake 

any such action without a direct order 

from the French Government. 117 

General de Gaulle went further on 

3 January and declared that the deliberate 

evacuation of Alsace and part of Lorraine 

without a fight would be a major error 

from both the military and the national 

points of view. He informed the Supreme 

Commander that General de Lattre was 

being advised "to defend with the French 

forces he had the position he [was] at 

present occupying and to equally defend 

Strasbourg, even if the American forces 

[withdrew] on the left.” 118 

General Eisenhower discussed the withdrawal from Strasbourg with his staff on 

the morning of 3 January,apparently before receiving General de Gaulle's protest 

against that measure. Once the withdrawal to the Vosges had been made, the 

Supreme Commander said, Allied armor 

should still be able to operate in the Alsace 

plain north of Strasbourg to delay or stop 

an enemy advance on that city. He 

thought that the bulk of the Allied forces 

would have to come back from northeastern Alsace, and that they should send out 

mobile elements to give warnings of the 

enemy's advance. General Eisenhower 

and his advisers examined in particular 

the grave political repercussions of the 

withdrawal. They realized that the action 

could mean a breaking away of the French 

from the Allies. Opinions were expressed 

that more than 100,000 inhabitants would 

have to be evacuated from Strasbourg 

and that 300,000 to 400,000 inhabitants 

of the area would be subject to possible reprisals by the Germans. The staff concluded that the Prime Minister, who was 

scheduled to arrive at Versailles that afternoon, would have to be briefed on the 

necessity of the withdrawal, since General 

de Gaulle would probably raise with him 

the question of Strasbourg. 119 

Shortly after making his protest to General Eisenhower on 3 January, General de 

Gaulle appealed to President Roosevelt 

and to Mr. Churchill to stop the withdrawal. The Supreme Commander was 

apparently unaware of this action at the 

time of his morning conference that day. 120 

The President promptly refused to act in 

117 6th A Gp Ltr of Instr 7, 28 Dec 44; 6th A Gp 

Opns Rpts, Dec 44, p. 98; Air Marshal Robb, Notes 

on mtgs in SAC’s office, 1, 3 Jan 45, OCMH files; 

Schwartz to Patch, 3 Jan 45, SUSA Diary, Vol. II. 

118 Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 2 Jan 45; de Gaulle 

to Eisenhower, 3 Jan 45; Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 

5 Jan 45. All in Diary Office CinC. Citation of the 

de Gaulle letter is from the translation prepared for 

General Eisenhower. This copy does not show the 

exact time the message was written or received. It is 

likely that it arrived after the morning meeting held 

by the Supreme Commander and his staff, but before 

the conference of Generals Eisenhower and de Gaulle 

in the afternoon. 

119 Robb, Notes on mtg in SAC‘s office, 3 Jan 45, 

OCMH files. 

120 Caffery to State Dept and President from 

de Gaulle, 3 Jan 45, Diary Office CinC. Sometime 

during the day Ambassador Caffery gave the mes- 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 401 

the matter and notified the Secretary of 

State, through whom the appeal was sent, 

that the question was a military one and 

should be taken up with General Eisenhower. The Prime Minister flew to Versailles from the United Kingdom on the 

3d. He had lunch with the Supreme Commander and afterward sat in on a conference attended by Field Marshal Brooke 

and Generals Eisenhower, Smith, Whiteley, and Strong. Still later in the day he 

was present at General Eisenhower's 

conference with Generals de Gaulle and 

Juin. 121 

Before his meeting with de Gaulle on 

the afternoon of 3 January, General Eisenhower had decided to modify his initial 

plans for withdrawal "to the extent of 

merely swinging the Sixth Corps back 

from its sharp salient with its left resting in 

the Vosges and its right extending southward generally towards Strasbourg." This 

change was accepted by General de Gaulle 

when it was presented. The Prime Minister did not intervene in the discussion but 

approved the new arrangement, saying 

that he appreciated the concern of the 

French leaders over the possible political 

effects of a withdrawal from Strasbourg. 122 

The change of orders in regard to Strasbourg led to considerable uncertainty at 

army level where several sets of completely 

contradictory instructions were received in 

the course of a few hours. Strasbourg was 

virtually undefended for a part of one day. 

On SHAEF's change of its initial order, 

General Devers accepted the Seventh 

Army suggestion that a position be established along the Maginot Line and the 

Rhine River and that several successive 

sage to General Eisenhower. The Ambassador, in 

accepting the message for transmittal, told de Gaulle 

he would take this action. Caffery to President and 

Secy State, 3 Jan 45, OPD 381, Sec 1. 

lines be organized to which withdrawal 

could be made later if it became necessary.123 The city itself was never again left 

unprotected. 

Indications of U.S. withdrawals between the lower Vosges and the Rhine 

may have been responsible for a decision 

of the enemy to turn his main attention 

from the area of Bitche to points farther 

east. Starting on 4January, the Germans 

attacked south of Wissembourg, and on 

5 January other units drove across the 

Rhine north of Strasbourg. More attacks 

south of Strasbourg followed on 7 January. 

121 Marshall to Eisenhower, 7 Jan 45; Eisenhower 

to Marshall, S-73871, 6Jan 45. Both in Eisenhower 

personal file. Entry in Diary Office CinC, 3Jan 45; 

statements of de Gaulle and Juin to author. General 

Eisenhower told General Marshall in a message of 

6January 1945 that the Prime Minister's presence in 

Paris on 3 January was purely coincidental. 

122 Eisenhower to Marshall, S-73871, 6 Jan 45, 

Eisenhower personal file; entry in Diary Office CinC, 

3 Jan 46. In the fall of 1945, several French newspapers reported that General Eisenhower had 

changed his order under pressure from the Prime 

Minister. Mr. Churchill at that time informed General Eisenhower that he was willing to issue a contradiction of the story, if the U.S. commander thought it 

worth while. Eisenhower said that no statement was 

necessary, but took the occasion to remind Mr. 

Churchill that the latter, with his usual confidence, 

had left the settlement of the matter to the Supreme 

Commander. General Eisenhower said that he had 

been convinced by General de Gaulle that the 

political developments which would follow a partial 

withdrawal in Alsace would lead to a deterioration 

of the situation in the rear areas far in excess of the 

value of getting one or two divisions for the SHAEF 

reserve. In 1949, when the city of Strasbourg gave Mr. 

Churchill an award for having saved the city in 

January 1945, the former Prime Minister confirmed 

a statement that he had flown to France on General 

de Gaulle's appeal, but paid tribute to General 

Eisenhower "as that great American soldier who was 

willing to assume additional risks rather than expose 

the people of Strasbourg to German vengeance." 

Churchill to Eisenhower, 8 Nov 45; Eisenhower to 

Churchill, 9 Nov 45. Both in Eis'enhower personal 

file. New York Times, August 16, 1949. 

123 SUSA Rpt of Opns, Vol. II, Ch. XXII. 
402 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

TABLE 3-U. S. BA'ITLE CASUALTIES, ARDENNES-ALSACE, 16 DECEMBER 1944-25 JANUARY 

1945 

Type Total Divilionl Nondivilio ... l 

Unitt 

1lotal ____________________ __ __ ____ __________ ____ _____ ___ _ G 104,944 88, 165 16, 779 I 

Killed in action ___ __ __________________________________ ___ _____ _ 15,982 

62, 372 

23,554 

bl,802 

12,340 

53,216 

20, 102 

3,642 

9, 156 

3,452 

Wounded in action __________ _______________ . _______ ___ ___ ___ __ • 

Capturcd ___ ______________ __ ________ ______ ____________________ _ 

Returned to duty from missing in action _____ ___________ _________ _ 2, 333 

174 

469 

Died while missing 60 in action __________ ___ _____ __ ___ ___ __________ _ 234 

• Thele data do 1\ot include nonbaule caloahiu due to Iron bite, injurie, behind t,he Line-I. licknc5I, and other caJu.1ltiea-not reaultinr 

trom enemy' action. 

b. Early compilatlonl in t945 of caauJltica .showed more than 20,000 a5 mininB in .etion. In lubsequent months- and ye.ur. mo.t of the.e 

'Were found to ha ve been c:,aptured, killed ,n action, or wounded 10 action. A. a. r~ult, catullty accounting adjustmenu reduc.ed the miuingin·ilction totala and increa&ed the appropriate c.alqoriea. 

Souret: The Adjutant Gen ... l, Strength Autnoriz.otion Branch. 1951-52. 

Between 8 and 25 January, the enemy 

fought stubbornly to extend his gains from 

the bridgeheads, and the U .S. forces found 

it necessary to establish alternate lines to 

which they could retire. (Table 3) The 

French were made responsible for the defense of Strasbourg during the period. 124 

6th Army Group Counterattack 

Toward the end of January, General 

Eisenhower released five U.S. divisions 

and 12,000 service troops from the 

SHAEF reserve to 6th Army Group. A 

U.S. corps was placed under General de 

Lattre to help him reduce the Colmar 

Pocket. The Supreme Commander, wanting to see the Germans pushed out ofthis 

salient and across the Rhine, pressed the 

French to reduce the pocket promptly. In 

so doing he repeated an appeal that he 

had made earlier in the month. He reminded General de Gaulle of the need of 

keeping French infantry units at full 

strength and said that it might be easier 

to get equipment for new French divisions 

if it were possible to show that those in 

existence were being properly maintained. 

In a conference with GeneralJuin on 23 

January, the Supreme Commander again 

referred to the importance of the campaign in Alsace and expressed the hope 

that the French forces would be inspired 

to excel their own former records. 

The French leaders reacted sharply. On 

being told of the conversation, General de 

Gaulle expressed surprise at the "severity 

of a judgment" he believed directed solely 

at the French command. GeneralJuin, in 

a conference on the following day, reminded the Supreme Commander that 

since November the length of the First 

French Army's front had been doubled 

without any proportionate increase in reinforcements. Despite this fact, the French 

had not lost any ground and were even 

then developing an offensive in the face of 

problems of terrain, weather, fatigue , and 

\24 Army Group G, KTB NT. 4 1.I.-2B.II.45, 4 to 7 

Jan 45. 
THE WINTER COUNTEROFFENSIVES 403 

insufficient resources. It was difficult in 

view of these conditions, he said bluntly, 

to avoid a comparison "between the valiant efforts they furnish and the goings-on 

in the neighboring Army [apparently the 

Seventh] further to the North." General 

Juin asked that the problem in Alsace be 

treated as an army group question and not 

as something solely French. He added: "If 

errors have been committed, and they are 

divided, the fact remains, nevertheless, 

that the important thing today is that you 

win the battle of Alsace as you have won 

the battle of the Ardennes. That, in my 

opinion, as I told you yesterday, should be 

your sole preoccupation of the moment." 125 

General Eisenhower promptly disclaimed any intention of casting reflections 

on the French efforts and repeated that 

never as an Allied commander had he 

"compared unfavorably the troops and 

leaders of one nationality with respect to 

any other." He also accepted General 

J uin's suggestion that the matter be 

thoroughly discussed with General de 

Gaulle. The ensuing conference, like several others held previously between the 

Supreme Commander and the French 

leader, was extremely frank but devoid of 

recriminations. General Eisenhower made 

clear that he had no intention of criticizing 

or minimizing the contributions of the 

army of any particular nationality, but 

wished to impress on every member of the 

First French Army the critical significance 

of the offensive to clear the Colmar Pocket. 

He wanted the French to carry out the 

Alsatian operation with the same punch 

that they had used in Italy, the south of 

France, and the Belfort drive. General de 

Gaulle reminded the Supreme Commander that the French forces were tired 

as a result of the long period they had 

been kept in the lines. He agreed to try to 

instill into them the drive and will essential to the success of the operation, but reminded General Eisenhower that Allied 

infantry strength was weak, artillery support was not sufficient to insure the success 

oflarge-scale operations, air reinforcement 

was diminished because of bad weather, 

and the enemy was resolved to fight a lastditch battle. In the light of these factors, 

he believed that the troops could undertake only local actions in the near future. 

At the same time, he thought that sufficient units could be built up in the rear of 

these forces for a large-scale attack. The 

Supreme Commander nodded assent 

to this analysis and made clear that he was 

doing his best to get equipment for additional French divisions. He expressed his 

appreciation for the straightforward discussion with General de Gaulle, inasmuch 

as "a frank exchange of views -on little 

problems that seemed at the moment to be 

difficult always led to a mutually satisfactory understanding." 126 

While these talks over the role of the 

French were in progress, the enemy had 

made a final attack against the Allied 

positions in northern Alsace. The Seventh 

Army repelled this drive on 25 January 

and regained the initiative which it held 

for the remainder of the war. Hitler, at this 

point, desiring to hold his reserves for further defensive efforts, suspended attacks in 

the lower Vosges and lower Alsace. While 

the Seventh Army held firmly in the Sarre 

valley and made minor gains in the area 

flooded by the Moder, the First French 

125 Ltr, Juin to Eisenhower, 24 Jan 45; Eisenhower 

to Juin, 24 Jan 45. Both in Eisenhower personal file. 

126 Resume of conversation" Eisenhower and 

de Gaulle, 25 Jan 45 (made by Lt Col L. E. Dostert), 

Diary Office CinC, 26 Jan 45. 
404 

Army opened its attack to clear the Colmar Pocket. On 29 J an uary, General de 

Lattre sent his U.S. corps against Colmar, 

which fell four days later. The French 

forces, which had pushed steadily eastward, linked up with U.S. units on 5 February to split the Colmar Pocket. Von 

Rundstedt, already authorized by Hitler 

to withdraw from the area when it proved 

necessary, now pulled back and ordered 

his forces east of the Rhine. As the Germans started withdrawing, the French and 

U.S. forces quickly cleared the Colmar 

Pocket, completing their task on 9 February. In northern Alsace and eastern Lorraine, the Seventh Army started a drive on 

17 February to straighten its lines, establishing a foothold on German soil just 

south of Saarbruecken at the month's end. 

In the meantime to the left of the Seventh 

Army, Third Army units had driven 

through the Orscholz Switch Line to 

points east of Sarrebourg and south of 

Trier, occupying a considerable portion of 

German soil. 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Effects if the German Counterrdfensive 

The battles between 16 December and 

9 February in the Ardennes sector and in 

Alsace inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. 

By coming out of their established positions from which the Allied troops had 

tried so painfully to eject them, the Germans had lost men and materiel they 

could not replace. Despite these reverses, 

they still managed to maintain some of 

their fighting spirit. Even as they were 

withdrawing, the Nazi hierarchy organized the old and the very young into Volkssturm units, talked darkly of "Werewolf" 

units which would strike terror into invading forces, and hoped that the diminishing 

numbers of the fanatical faithful would be 

sufficient to rally the others to fight for the 

homeland. So far as the Allies were concerned, the enemy had done his worst and 

had failed. There could now be little doubt 

of the ultimate result. The question was: 

how great would be the price and how 

long the struggle? 
CHAPTER XXI 

The Battle for the Rhineland 

The enemy counteroffensive in the Ardennes halted the Allied advance but did 

not stop preparations for later attacks. 

While the main energies of the Supreme 

Commander were directed toward shifting his forces to parry the German 

thrusts, his staff continued to work on 

plans for clearing the area west of the 

Rhine, for crossing the Rhine, and for advancing eastward into Germany. From the 

end of December on, General Eisenhower 

turned his attention increasingly to these 

operations. 

Russian Plans 

In planning for winter and spring offensives, the Supreme Commander found that 

much depended on the date and scale of 

the Red Army’s anticipated winter offensive. The appearance of German divisions 

transferred to the Western Front from 

Hungary and East Prussia increased his 

problems and made it difficult to know 

how to plan, and he had little indication 

from the Russians of their intentions. 1 

Marshal Stalin, for his part, did not fail 

to seek information regarding the plans of 

the Western powers. On 14 December, in 

talking with Ambassador Harriman, the 

Soviet chief asked about General Eisenhower’s future moves. Harriman said that 

the SHAEF forces were preparing to push 

to the Rhine and that they desired to operate in concert with the Russians. For this 

reason, he added, the Supreme Commander needed to be informed about developments on the Eastern Front. Stalin 

replied that he would consult with his staff 

and would probably be able to give some 

information in about a week. He noted 

that bad weather had prevented the Red 

Army from making the best use of its 

superiority in artillery and air power, but 

a winter offensive, he assured the Ambassador, would be launched. 2 

Apparently the Russian leader’s answers were not passed on directly to General Eisenhower, for on 21 December, a 

week after Harriman’s talk with Stalin, the 

Supreme Commander asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for information from 

the Russians. He spoke again of the recent 

tendency of the Germans to move divisions 

from the east to the west. “The arrival of 

these divisions,” he declared, “obviously 

influences the events in my area and if the 

trend continues it will affect the decisions 

which I have to make regarding future 

strategy in the west. . . . If, for instance, 

it is the Russian intention to launch a 

major offensive in the course of this or next 

month, knowledge of the fact would be of 

the utmost importance to me and I would 

condition my plans accordingly. Can any1 Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS 

381 Post OVERLORD Planning, II. 

2 Mil Mission Moscow to WD,. M–22052, 17 Dec 

44, OPD cbl files (TS). 
406 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

thing be done to effect this coordination?” 3 

The general proposed to send to Stalin a 

high-ranking officer of the SHAEF staff 

who would be prepared to tell the marshal 

of forthcoming Allied plans and in return 

receive information on the Red Army. 

President Roosevelt, in response to this 

request, on 23 December asked Marshal 

Stalin to receive a SHAEF staff officer to 

discuss the situation in the west and its 

relation to the Russian front. The President added that the situation in Belgium 

was not bad, but that it was necessary to 

see what came next. The Russian leader 

promptly agreed to the proposed conference. 4 

The War Department’s announcement 

that Marshal Stalin would receive a 

SHAEF representative also informed the 

Supreme Commander of suggestions made 

by the Russian leader to Mr. Churchill 

during the latter’s Moscow visit in October 

1944 and to Mr. Harriman in December. 

On both occasions the marshal had spoken 

of a possible transfer of Allied forces from 

Italy to the Balkans to join the Russians 

near Vienna. At the October meeting he 

had inquired about the possibility of an 

Allied advance through Switzerland to 

outflank the West Wall, and in the December conversation he had spoken casually of a possible break-through by General Devers’ forces to the east to link up 

with the Red Army’s left flank. 5 The 

Combined Chiefs of Staff in their instructions for the SHAEF representatives removed entirely from the realm of discussion the question of breaching Swiss neutrality. The suggested break-through by 

General Devers’ forces toward Vienna 

was vetoed as conflicting with the northern drive into Germany then being 

planned. In the matter of sending forces 

from Italy to the Balkans, a plan which 

the Allies had already considered for 

some time, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

showed greater interest. They suggested 

that General Alexander or his representatives might be sent to Moscow later for a 

conference on that subject. So this matter 

too was removed from the list which 

Eisenhower’s representatives could discuss. 6 

The SHAEF party, consisting of Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder, General Bull, and 

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts, after delays 

caused by bad weather and aircraft difficulties, finally arrived in the Russian 

capital on 14 January. Marshal Stalin received the three officers on the following 

night and at once informed them that the 

long-awaited Russian offensive, some 150 

3 SHAEF to WD, SCAF 155, 21 Dec 44, OPD cbl 

files (TS). Not only does this letter indicate that General Eisenhower was apparently unaware of Marshal 

Stalin’s statement that he would probably have some 

information in a week, but General Marshall’s letter 

giving details of the proposal for a link-up of Allied 

forces in southeastern Austria was not sent until 25 

December. 

4 Marshall to Eisenhower, WX–82070, 25 Dec 44, 

Eisenhower personal file; Marshall to Eisenhower, 

FACS 118, 26 Dec 44, OPD cbl files (TS). 

5 Marshall to Eisenhower, WARX–82070, 24 Dec 

44, Eisenhower personal file. Mil Mission Moscow 

to WD, M–22149, 24 Dec 44; Mil Mission Moscow 

to WD, MX-22154, 25 Dec 44. Both in OPD cbl files 

(TS). Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, head of the US. 

Military Mission to Moscow, said that Stalin had 

spoken of General Devers’ move only casually, and 

that mention of it had been included to emphasize 

that Stalin’s thinking was apparently directed toward joint action between the Red Army and the 

Western forces. 

6 CCS to Eisenhower, FACS 119, 29 Dec 44, 

SHAEF G–3 3 12.3- 1 Correspondence and Communication with the Russians; Prime Minister to President, 3 1 Dec 44, OPD 336 (TS), Sec I. Mr. Churchill’s suggestion of 3 1 December that General Alexander join the SHAEF group going to the Russian 

capital in order to discuss the Balkan operation appears to have been dropped as the result of Field 

Marshal Wilson’s statement to the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff (MEDCOS 228, 8 Jan 45) that he would soon 

have to go on the defensive in Italy. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 

to 160 divisions in strength and intended 

to last from two to two and one-half 

months, had been launched on 12January 

with the mission of reaching the line of the 

Oder. The Russian leader declared that 

the attack, which had been under preparation for more than a month, had been 

delayed until the weather was more 

favorable but that he had decided to 

launch it speedily in view of Allied difficulties in the west. The attack had come, 

of course, two weeks after the German 

offensi ve had been stopped in the 

Ardennes. 7 (Map 8) 

The Russian chief showed great interest 

in General Eisenhower's plans and offered 

advice on how to proceed. While agreeing 

that the Ruhr was the best place to attack, 

he noted that the enemy would also be 

aware of that fact and would be on guard. 

He recommended that SHAEF amass a 

strategic reserve of some ten divisions for 

any further offensive, but, when told that 

this could be collected only at the expense 

of a withdrawal from Strasbourg, he admitted that such a move would be of great 

military and psychological value for the 

enemy. 

Informed by Air Chief Marshal Tedder 

that SHAEF's chief interest, now that the 

offensive was started, was in the ability of 

the Red Army to harass the. Germans from 

mid-March to late May, Stalin said he 

could not promise a full-scale offensive 

throughout that period but would use 

units organized for the purpose to stir up 

the enemy and prevent him from moving to 

the Western Front. In commenting on the 

Germans, the Russian leader declared that 

they had more stubbornness than brains 

and that the Ardennes attack was very 

stupid. He saw no possibility of German 

surrender before summer, however, since 

there was no leader around whom op407 

position against Hitler could coalesce. 

While taking credit for applying pressure on the Eastern Front to aid the western advance, Stalin revealed that he was 

well aware of his own interest in exerting 

such pressure. In parting, he told the 

SHAEF representatives that although he 

had no treaty with the Western Allies he 

considered it a proper, sound, and selfish 

policy for all of them to help one another 

in time of difficulties. It would be as 

foolish for him to stand aside while the 

Germans annihilated the Allies, he added, 

as it was wise for the Allies to prevent the 

enemy from crushing the Russians. 

Allied permanent representatives in 

Moscow were pleased with the results of 

the meeting, which they described as one 

of the most successful conferences ever 

held between Allied and Russian representatives in Moscow. They credited Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder's direct approach 

with much of this success. 8 

Formulation if Allied Strategy 

At the end of December 1944, the Supreme Commander had decided that once 

7 This and the four succeeding paragraphs are 

based on Memo of conf with Marshal Stalin, 15 Jan 

45, Smith papers; Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, 18Jan 45 (quoted in Br COS toJSM, 19Jan 

45), Eisenhower personal file; Intervs with Air Chief 

Marshal Tedder and Gen Betts; Harriman to Eisenhower, 17 Jan 45, Diary Office CinC, 28 Jan 45. 

8 The direct approach to the Russians was recommended to General Eisenhower by General Marshall about the time of the meeting in Moscow. Speaking of a letter of congratulation which the Supreme 

Commander had forwarded through the War Department a short time before, the U.S. Chief of Staff 

declared: "In future I suggest that you approach 

them [the Russians] in simple Main Street Abilene 

style. They are rather cynically disposed toward the 

diplomatic phrasing of our compliments and seem 

almost to appreciate downright rough talk of which 

I give a full measure." Marshall to Eisenhower, 17 

Jan 45, Eisenhower personal file. 
SITUATION IN EUROPE 

15 January 1945 

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MAP 8 

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R, r.!o!uu/olfe 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 409 

the Ardennes salient was reduced he 

would return the First Army to General 

Bradley and direct the 12th Army Group 

commander to open a drive with the 

First and Third Armies in the direction 

of Pruem and Bonn. The 2 1 Army Group 

would retain the Ninth Army and resume 

preparations for a major drive to the 

Rhine directed north of the Ruhr. South of 

the Ardennes, the front below the Moselle 

was to remain strictly on the defensive. 9 

In suggesting that the First aud Third 

Armies should push toward the Rhine 

south of the Ruhr, General Eisenhower 

again raised the question of where the 

weight of the Allied attack should be 

pressed home, an issue long debated between him and Field Marshal Montgomery. On 10 January, the British Chiefs 

of Staff asked formally for a review of his 

strategy by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

Insisting that there would not be sufficient 

strength for two main attacks, the British 

asked that one major thrust be selected 

and that only those forces not needed for 

this purpose be used for other operations. 

This approach would rather effectively 

rule out any action by the Third Army. 

Further, they urged that all activities for 

the remainder of the winter bear a direct 

relation to the main front for the spring 

offensive, a suggestion which if accepted 

could conceivably stop the entire operation then being considered by General 

Bradley. The British Chiefs recommended 

that the Supreme Commander be asked 

to submit by the end of January reviews 

of the progress of his operations to date, 

the effects of the Ardennes counteroffensive on his forces, and his plans for the 

late winter and spring. 10 

With these actions, the British Chiefs of 

Staff entered the debate which previously 

had been carried on mainly by General 

Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery. In presenting their questions, they 

appeared to be in the position of championing Montgomery against his superior. 

If the U.S. Chiefs of Staff so interpreted 

the British action, the question could easily 

become one of whether the Supreme 

Commander was to be upheld rather 

than one of which strategy was better. 

Inasmuch as Field Marshal Montgomery’s 

program would have to be adopted over 

General Eisenhower’s protest and since 

British strategy depended on the shift of 

at least two U.S. armies to British command, it was doubtful from the outset that 

the consent of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

could be obtained. 

General Eisenhower’s Replies 

The Supreme Commander was aware 

of the British views before the formal request was made and had his arguments 

ready for submission before being asked 

for them. In replies sent to General 

Marshall on 10 January, he reiterated 

many of the points which he had made 

to Field Marshal Montgomery in November and December 1944. In the first he 

defended the broad front policy, saying 

that in order to concentrate a powerful 

force north of the Ruhr for the invasion 

of Germany he had to have a firm defensive line which could be held with minimum forces. With such a line, the Allies 

could threaten the enemy at various 

points and make easier an invasion in the 

north. But unless the Allies held the Rhine 

“substantially” throughout its length, he 

warned, the enemy with his West Wall de9 Eisenhower to Montgomery, and atchd outline 

plan, 31 Dec 44, Eisenhower personal file. 

10 Marshall to Eisenhower, W–89338, 10 Jan 45, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
410 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

fenses would be in a position to concentrate for further counterattacks against 

the Allied lines of communications. Despite a desire to close to the Rhine, he 

added, top priority had been given the 

area north of the Ardennes during late 

October and November and only secondary actions had been permitted south of 

that area. He had authorized subsidiary 

actions in the Saar valley with units 

which could not profitably be used in the 

north in the hope that they might drive 

the enemy across the Rhine in that area. 

In the last few days before the Ardennes 

counteroffensive, when rugged and flooded 

terrain had strongly limited the 2 1 Army 

Group's offensive action, he had permitted General Patton to make one more 

effort to reach the Rhine. 11 

General Eisenhower declared that he 

was bewildered at British insistence on assurances as to the northern thrust. He 

repeated that there had never been any 

doubt of placing his main strength north 

of the Ruhr and putting that effort under 

one commander. To the suggestion that 

his strong concentrations of forces south of 

the Ruhr did not square with his pledge to 

put everything possible in the northern 

thrust, the Supreme Commander replied 

that he had been told initially by Field 

Marshal Montgomery that only twentyfive divisions could be sustained in an attack through the northern area. After 

“almost arbitrary action” on the part of 

SHAEF, he added, the 21 Army Group 

commander had sought means of using a 

larger force. 

On two matters, General Eisenhower 

conceded, definite differences had developed between himself and Field Marshals Brooke and Montgomery. These 

British officers seemed to consider it logical 

to advance into Germany on the front 

from Bonn northward, while leaving the 

rest of the Allied front south of that position relatively static. In Eisenhower's 

opinion, the Ardennes counteroffensive 

showed that, without a strong natural line, 

the Allies, if they remained static in the 

south, would have to use more divisions 

there than they were willing to take away 

from the major offensive. A second argument had arisen over the point from which 

the Allies should launch the principal attack in support of the main thrust in the 

north. The British favored the area BonnCologne. Eisenhower held that the 

country east of this area was very unfavorable for action, and cited arguments by 

General Bradley and others in favor of the 

Frankfurt area. He repeated that it was 

his intention to make a secondary attack, 

designed only to force the dispersal. of 

enemy troops and to permit the Allies to 

use all possible crossings and lines of communications. The U.S. commander said 

he would accept loyally any decision of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the 

proper place for attack, but warned that 

unless their long defensive flank was situ-. 

ated firmly on an easily defended line the 

Allies would have to immobilize more 

troops than they could afford. 12 

These arguments failed to persuade the 

British Chiefs of Staff, even as similar 

statements had failed to convince the 21 

Army Group commander that a main 

thrust in the north and a secondary attack in the south were compatible. The 

difficulty seemed to develop mainly because of their feeling that any secondary 

action in which General Patton was concerned would probably become a major 

11 Eisenhower to Marshall, S–74461, 10 Jan 45, 

Eisenhower personal file. 

12 Eisenhower to Marshall, S–74437, 10 Jan 45, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 

one. They feared, first, that the stockpile 

of resources would be diminished and, 

second, that a successful limited attack 

might develop into a larger drive which 

would force the commitment of the main 

Allied force in an area less productive of 

results than the north. The whole argument turned, as did the earlier one on the 

same subject, on whether or not the Supreme Commander in backing these limited attacks would seriously weaken or 

make impossible the main offensive. On 

this question, the various commanders 

could not agree, and there was no immediate decisive result in the field that would 

give a pragmatic answer to the problem. 

In the absence of such an answer, other 

factors could not be ignored. On the one 

hand, there was the Ardennes counteroffensive which, in the opinion of many 

British observers, showed the danger of the 

broad front policy. On the other hand, 

U.S. commanders were convinced that 

public opinion in the United States demanded a major thrust in the area south 

of the Ardennes. No matter how many 

arguments might be demonstrated in behalf of the British position, it was difficult 

for the Supreme Commander to continue 

shifting U.S. troops to the 21 Army Group 

and at the same time refuse to U.S. commanders, who had made sweeping advances in the previous summer and who 

felt that they had been cheated of a Rhine 

crossing at that time by concessions to the 

British commander, the chance to make at 

least small-scale assaults in their area. 

General Eisenhower's dilemma was stated 

succinctly in December by one of his key 

British advisers. This officer, while favoring the northern thrust, explained that the 

Supreme Commander had twice said "no" 

to Generals Bradley and Patton while giving preference to the north. Since decisive 

411 

results were gained in neither case, it was 

becoming increasingly difficult for him to 

say "no" to his U.S. commanders again. 

The next problem of importance was 

the strength necessary to defeat the enemy 

in western Europe. To the Allied commander in mid-January it appeared that 

a weak and ineffectual Russian offensive, 

a partial enemy withdrawal from Italy to 

the west, and a continued enemy withdrawal from Norway to the west would 

make it possible for the enemy to keep a 

maximum of one hundred divisions on the 

Western Front and prevent a spring offensive. Lacking these conditions, the Germans could maintain only about eighty 

understrength divisions. To oppose these 

forces, the Supreme Commander estimated that the Allies by spring would 

have eighty-five divisions, with five to 

eight new French divisions in the process 

of being trained and equipped and with 

the existing eight French divisions brought 

to full combat strength. 13 

The chief problem confronting the 

Allies at the moment, General Eisenhower 

believed, arose from the enemy's frontier 

defenses. These formidable positions 

enabled the Germans to concentrate 

safely for counterattacks. The Supreme 

Commander insisted on a good natural 

line for the defensive parts of the Allied 

front, saying that for the most part it 

should be the line of the Rhine, although 

at some points he felt that it might not be 

worth the effort to eliminate "the extremel y strong but constricted bridgeheads." In these statements, General 

Eisenhower showed the effect of the Ardennes counteroffensive on his thinking. 

Before 16 December, he had still been 

13 This and the succeeding five paragraphs are 

based on Eisenhower to Marshall, S-75090, 15 Jan 

45, Eisenhower personal file. 
412 

willing to take a chance on a sudden 

thrust in some sector in the hope of getting 

a break-through to the Rhine; now he 

talked more of closing up to the Rhine 

along the entire front before attempting to 

force a crossing. This development in 

thinking, while perhaps owing something 

to the earlier "broad front" theory, probably owed more to the Ardennes attacks. 

It may also have marked some concession 

to General Bradley's wish to make limited 

advances south of the Ardennes. Not to be 

overlooked is the fact that in November 

and December the main hope had been to 

keep pushing in the hope that something 

might work before winter closed in; in 

January all eyes were turned toward 

spring when it might be possible to undertake an all-out offensive again. 

The Supreme Commander next considered whether the eighty-five divisions 

available in the spring would be enough 

to win the war in the west. He believed 

they might be if the Russian offensive went 

well. But, he added, this strength was not 

sufficient to permit the Allies to depend 

entirely on one plan of action. If, for example, the enemy concentrated his forces 

north of the Ruhr, it might be impossible 

to break through in that area. The forces 

available for such an attack would, of 

course, be conditioned by the defensive 

requirements of the Allied forces. If they 

were on the line of the Rhine at the time 

the offensive started, twenty-five divisions 

would suffice for the defense and reserve, 

and fifty-five divisions would be available 

for attack. If the line remained where it 

was in January, short of the Rhine in the 

area north of Alsace, the defensive force 

and reserve would have to be increased by 

twenty divisions and the offensive forces 

reduced by the same amount. Even the 

elimination of the Colmar Pocket, with 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

the rest of the line remaining the same, 

would give only ten more divisions for the 

offensive. Since thirty-five divisions were 

needed for a full-scale offensive in the 

north, General Eisenhower reasoned that 

a line short of the Rhine would leave him 

only just enough divisions for the main offensive and without any of the twenty 

divisions he wanted for a secondary attack 

in the Frankfurt area. With little prospect 

of getting this number of divisions, he 

found it increasingly desirable to destroy 

the German forces west of the Rhine and 

to close up to the Rhine all along the front. 

This move, he believed, would be even 

more necessary should the Russian drive 

fail or prove ineffectual. 14 

In the final installments of his letters on 

strategy for coming operations, General 

Eisenhower visualized the first phase as 

the destruction of enemy forces west of the 

Rhine and closing to the Rhine along most 

of its length. He proposed first to launch a 

series of operations north of the Moselle 

to destroy the enemy and then to close to 

the Rhine north of Duesseldorf. Next he 

would direct his main efforts toward destroying the enemy on the remainder of 

the front west of the Rhine. 15 The second 

phase of operations, coming after the 

Allied forces had closed to the Rhine, 

would include attempts to seize bridgeheads over the Rhine between Emmerich 

H These views were strongly presented in his message to Montgomery, 17 January 1945, Eisenhower 

personal file. 

15 This and the following paragraph are taken 

from Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF lBO, 20 Jan 45, 

SHAEF SGS 3BI Post OVERLORD Planning, III. This 

message had been anticipated to an extent by a 

SHAEF Planning Staff Memo on Future Operations 

(Final Draft), 23 Dec 44, SHAEF G-3 file G-3 IBOl9 

Plans Future Operations-1945, I. Eisenhower had 

also outlined the three phases of future operations in 

a lett.er to Marshall, S-7 4461, 10 January 1945, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 

and Wesel in the north and between 

Mainz and Karlsruhe in the south. These 

objectives attained, the Allied forces 

would then open phase three, advancing 

from the lower Rhine into the plains of 

northern Germany and from the MainzKarlsruhe area to Frankfurt and Kassel. 

Running through the plans for these 

separate phases was a continued emphasis 

on a much broader plan of attack than 

that advocated by the British Chiefs of 

Staff or Field Marshal Montgomery. To 

General Eisenhower, a crossing in the 

south would permit the Allies to seize the 

Saar basin, an .area of major industrial 

importance, and would give them the 

major airfields in the Frankfurt-Giessen 

area. More important, it would give 

greater flexibility to his plan. A single 

main thrust in the north would possibly be 

met by a major enemy concentration of 

forces. Developing the attack from the 

south would allow the Allies, if necessary, 

to shift the main weight from north to 

south, and would give them several different means of developing their attack 

once they reached the Kassel area. At that 

point, they could thrust northward to cut 

communications out of the Ruhr, they 

could drive northeast toward Berlin, or 

they could advance eastward toward 

Leipzig. 

Discussion oj Strategy by the Combined Chiefs 

The answers of the Supreme Commander did not allay the fears of the British 

Chiefs of Staff. To them, the continuous 

emphasis on closing to the Rhine and the 

stress on a thrust in the Frankfurt area 

made the main offensive in the north impossible. They decided, therefore, that the 

question would have to be examined further by the Combined Chiefs of Staff be413 

fore the Yalta Conference in early February. The issue came to a head in late 

January 1945, shortly before the meeting 

with Marshal Stalin. 

En route to Yalta, General Marshall, 

wishing to get General Eisenhower's views 

but realizing that it would be difficult for 

the Supreme Commander to leave his 

headquarters for an extended period, 

asked that Eisenhower meet him at Marseille. Marshall there discussed future 

Allied plans and assured Eisenhower that 

he would back the SHAEF strategy. He 

also made clear that he would not accept 

a ground commander, saying that ifsuch 

a step were approved he would not remain 

as Chief of Staff. 16 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff stopped 

at Malta on 30 January to review Allied 

strategy for northwest Europe before proceeding to the Yalta Conference. Generals 

Smith and Bull of Supreme Headquarters 

presented the plans of the Supreme Commander. The British Chiefs of Staff feared 

that General Eisenhower would make no 

effort to cross the Rhine, even in the north, 

until all territory west of the river was 

clear of the enemy. They were not satisfied by General Smith's view that his chief 

would not delay a crossing (1) if resistance 

was such that an attempt to clear the west 

bank would take until midsummer or (2) 

if the delay interfered with a chance to 

seize a bridgehead and cross in strength on 

the northern front. General Smith wired 

General Eisenhower that the British 

wanted written assurance that the main 

effort would be made in the north and that 

Hi The meeting at ·Marseille was apparently held on 

27 January, although there is some confusion in accounts. See Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

pp. 751-52; and Edward R. Stettinius,Jr., Roosevelt 

and the Russians: The Yalta Confere.nce (Garden City, 

N. y., 1949), p. 35; Notes on confwith Gen Marshall, 

28 Jan 45, Diary Office CinCo 
414 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

the Rhine crossing would not be delayed 

until the entire area west of the river was 

cleared. He also sent the draft of a statement suggested by General Marshall 

which declared that the SHAEF plan was: 

“(A) To carry out immediately a series of 

operations north of the Moselle with a 

view to destroying the enemy and closing 

the Rhine north of Duesseldorf. (B) to direct our efforts to eliminating other enemy 

forces west of the Rhine which still constitute an obstacle or a potential threat to 

our subsequent Rhine crossings operations.” The Supreme Commander accepted this phrasing and then added: 

“You may assure the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff in my name that I will seize the 

Rhine crossings in the north just as soon as 

this is a feasible operation and without 

waiting to close the Rhine throughout its 

length. Further, I will advance across the 

Rhine in the north with maximum strength 

and complete determination immediately 

the situation in the south allows me to collect necessary forces without incurring unreasonable risks.” On 2 February, the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted the 

Supreme Commander’s plan as explained 

by his cable. 17 

General Eisenhower had met the two 

objections Of the British mentioned by 

General Smith by saying that the main effort would be in the north and that he 

would not delay the crossing until the entire area west of the Rhine was cleared— 

but it is doubtful that his statements were 

entirelywhat they wanted. The way was 

still open for continuing operations south 

of the Ruhr and south of the Moselle 

which Field Marshal Montgomery regarded as directly prejudicial to his operations, Since two questions were subject to 

various interpretations—namely, (I) what 

German forces constituted a potential 

threat to subsequent operations; (2) at 

what time could forces be collected in the 

south without incurring unreasonable 

risks-there was still the possibility of future misunderstandings. With the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff solidly behind the Supreme 

Commander, it seemed clear that it was 

his interpretation which would prevail. 

The meeting at Malta also saw the end 

of proposals to intensify the Allied effort in 

the Mediterranean. In the summer and 

fall of 1944, these had taken the form of 

suggestions by Mr. Churchill, but not by 

the British Chiefs of Staff, to shift some 

Allied forces into the Balkans. The U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff, 18 opposed to operations 

which they considered to be mainly political, were firm in the belief that no U.S. 

troops should be used in that area, but 

they were not inclined to oppose British 

activity there if the forces used were not 

needed to assure victory elsewhere. 19 The 

chances that any Allied divisions would be 

available for such operations were dimin17 CCS 182d Mtg, 30 Jan 45, at Malta; CCS 183d 

Mtg, 31 Jan 45, at Malta. Smith to Eisenhower, 

CRICKET 18, 30 Jan 45; Eisenhower to Smith, 

S–77211. 31 Tan 45: Smith to Eisenhower, 2 Feb 45. 

All in Eisenhower personal file. 

18 It should be noted that Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, 

commander of the Fifth U.S. Army in Italy and later 

of the 15th Army Group, favored the Churchillian 

position. See Clark’s Calculated Risk (New York, 1950), 

pp. 367-72. 

19 The U.S. Joint Staff Planners had said in August 

1944: “While the United States has no interest in 

Southeast Europe, this area is of vital interest to the 

British. . . . It is to our best interests to support 

Great Britain in any Southeast operations insofar as 

is consistent with our established policies.” JWPC 

259/7, Preparations for Next Allied Staff Conference 

(War against Germany), 26 Aug 44, ABC 337 (14 

Sep 44), Sec 1; cf. JCS 1034, War Against Germany, 

4 Sep 44, same file. In September, Lt. Gen. Thomas 

T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, said that if 

the Fifth U.S. Army was to be left in the Mediterranean it should be used “in a campaign to the northeast of the Adriatic pointed towards Vienna and de- 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 

ished in October 1944 when the military 

situation in Italy worsened. General Wilson reported that it was impossible for him 

to go into the Balkans unless he had three 

new divisions, but the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

felt that nothing important could be 

gained by this diversion of forces. They 

proposed instead that elements of the Fifth 

U.S. Army be transferred from Italy to 

northwest Europe where they could influence the main offensive and that the U.S. 

amphibious resources in the Mediterranean be sent to the Pacific. Prime Minister 

Churchill now entered the discussion with 

proposals which seemed intended to justify his previous policy in that area. He 

talked with the Mediterranean commanders and reported that he "was much 

distressed by their tale." In a cable to the 

President, Mr. Churchill recalled his bitter fight against the southern France operations, remarking, "It seems so much 

was taken away from our Italian front 

against Germany as just to deny a complete victory in this theater." He asked the 

President to deflect to the Fifth U.S. Army 

two or three U.S. divisions intended for 

northwest Europe and reiterated his confidence in the plan for capturing the 

Istrian Peninsula-a plan "in accordance 

with over all strategic objective, namely 

the expulsion from or destruction in Italy 

of Kesselring's army." When the President 

refused on the ground that the divisions 

were needed for the main battle in northwest Europe and for resting battle-weary 

units there, Mr. Churchill discussed with 

the Mediterranean commanders the possigned to destroy German forces, and definitely not 

to influence the political situation in the Balkans." 

Memo, T.T.H. (Handy) for CofS, n.d. (about 15 

Sep 44), sub: Note for Conf with President, ABC 337 

(14 Sep 44), Sec I. 

415 

sibility oflanding forces through Adriatic 

ports clf':ared by Yugoslav Partisans and 

advancing up the Adriatic coast. He spoke 

of a possible amphibious assault against 

Trieste or Fiume.20 

The United States was willing to reopen the Balkans question only on the 

condition that the situation in Italy or 

northwest Europe improved to the extent 

that surplus forces might become available 

for the proposed campaign. The situation 

in both these areas had not improved sufficiently by late January 1945 to justify 

diverting forces from those theaters. Reports at that time from Field Marshal 

Alexander, who had replaced Field Marshal Wilson in the Mediterranean when 

the latter went to Washington to head the 

British mission there,21 indicated that his 

forces were tired out and that he was 

abandoning the offensive. He had enough 

artillery ammunition for only fifteen days 

in attack. When that was expended, he 

20 Cbl, Wilson to Br COS, MEDCOS 201, 9 Oct 

44; Gen Hull to Smith, WAR 45060, 11 Oct 44, WD 

cbllog; Memo,JCS for President, n.d. (penciled notation "Gen McNarney okayed 1030 14th Oct. Also 

Adm King, Gen Arnold."), ABC 384 Mediterranean 

(26 Oct 43), Sec I-A; Cbl, Churchill to President, 

793,11 Oct 44, Incl toJCS 1096, Additional U.S. Divisions for the Mediterranean Theater, 11 Oct 44. 

Marshall to Eisenhower, WAR 47746, 17 Oct 44; Cbl, 

Wilson to CCS, MEDCOS 205, 24 Oct 44. Both in 

WD cbl log. JP (44) 277 (Final) Operations in the 

Mediterranean Theater; MEDCOS 205, 29 Oct 44, 

ABC 384 Mediterranean (26 Oct 43), Sec I; CCS 

677/3 Future Operations in the Mediterranean, 17 

Nov 44; Memo, McFarland for Leahy, King, Arnold, 

16 Nov 44, ABC 384 Mediterranean (26 Oct 43), Sec 

I-A. This and the two following paragraphs dealing 

with the question of the Balkans have been condensed 

from a detailed draft written by Dr. Gordon A. Harrison for inclusion in another volume of the U.S. 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series. On his decision 

not to include the material in his volume, he placed 

his draft and his notes at the disposal of the author. 

21 Field Marshal Wilson succeeded Field Marshal 

Dill, who had died a short time before. 
416 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

said, he might have difficulty in containing the enemy and would not be able to 

follow up an enemy withdrawal. In northwest Europe, the German counteroffensive had inflicted heavy losses on General 

Eisenhower’s forces and faced him with 

the need for additional replacements. Instead of being able to give up divisions 

from his front to Italy, he needed whatever Field Marshal Alexander could spare. 

Suggestions of an immediate transfer of 

units from Italy to the north were dropped, 

however, by General Eisenhower when he 

was told that such a step involved the risk 

of losing some of the existing Allied positions in Italy, including Leghorn and 

Florence. He did ask that the bulk of the 

Twelfth Air Force be transferred at once to 

support General Devers’ 6th Army 

Group. 22 

Another factor affecting the decision on 

the Balkans was the Russian offensive, 

which had begun on 12 January. In two 

weeks, the Red Army was reported to 

have cut off some thirty German divisions 

in Latvia, and it was assumed that the 

Germans were so disorganized that they 

could not make a strong stand short of the 

Oder. This drive relieved pressure on the 

western fronts in Italy and northwest Europe and made unnecessary any thrust 

into central Europe from the south. By the 

time of the Malta Conference at the end of 

January, it was clear that the Allies had to 

work out a co-ordinated offensive from the 

west. They also had to speed up operations 

in order to prevent the enemy from shifting forces from the west to the east and in 

order to take advantage of the reductions 

in the enemy forces which had already 

taken place in the west. When Field Marshal Brooke presented these points at the 

meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

agreed almost without discussion to order 

the immediate transfer of three divisions 

from Italy to northwest Europe and the 

shift of two more as soon as they could be 

released from operations then under way 

in Greece. On 2 February, the Combined 

Chiefs sent a directive to this effect to Field 

Marshal Alexander, saying that it was 

their intention “to build up the maximum 

possible strength on the western front and 

to seek a decision in that theater.” Besides 

moving these ground forces, Field Marshal 

Alexander was to move two fighter groups 

at once to northwest Europe and to prepare to move as much more of the Twelfth 

Air Force as could be spared without hazard to his mission in the Mediterranean. 

For reasons which do not appear in the 

official records, it was decided that the five 

divisions should be British and Canadian 

and that the Fifth U.S. Army should remain in Italy. These withdrawals, which 

were to be made between the first of February and mid-March, meant that the 

Allies would have to pass permanently to 

the defensive in Italy and concentrate on 

limited attacks and deception to contain 

as many German units as possible, while 

preparing to take advantage of any German weakening or withdrawals 23 . 

22 Alexander to Br COS and JSM (for JCS), 

MEDCOS 237, 23 Jan 45, WD cbl log; M05, Note on 

transfer of forces from Italy to northwest Europe, 10 

Jan 45, 0100/12-D AFHQ G–3 Plans Sec 41/2 

Mediterranean Future Opns and Strategy, Dec 44- 

Jun 45 (92344F), Serial 36. McNarney to Marshall, 

E-85295, 12 Jan 45; Eisenhower to Marshall, S–7509, 

15 Jan 45. Both in WD cbl log. 

23 Deane to Bissell, 22487, 27 Jan 45, WD cbl log; 

JCS 1237, Strategy in Northwest Europe, 29 Jan 45; 

CCS 183d Mtg, 31 Jan 45; CCS 182d Mtg, 30 Jan 45; 

CCS 185th Mtg, 2 Feb 45; Min, Malta Conf, in 

ARGONAUT Conf Min; CCS to Alexander, CRICKET 

3A, 2 Feb 45, WD cbl log; Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 

204, 8 Feb 45, Eisenhower personal file; CCS to 

Alexander, FAN 501, Incl to CCS 773/3, Operations 

in the Mediterranean, 17 Feb 45. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 

Looking Toward the Rhine 

First and Third Army Attacks 

On 18January, the day after the First 

Army's return to General Bradley's command, General Eisenhower directed the 

12th Army Group commander to continue 

his offensive "to take advantage of the 

enemy's present unfavorable position in 

the Ardennes, inflict the maximum losses 

on him, seize any opportunity of breaching the Siegfried Line and, if successful, 

advance northeast on the axis Prum-Euskirchen." Bradley was to press this attack 

with "all possible vigor" as long as there 

was a reasonable chance of achieving a decisive victory. If the assault could not succeed, he was to be prepared to pass to the 

defensive in the Ardennes sector and shift 

his attack to the sector of the Northern 

Group of Armies. This action, while not 

expected to supersede General Montgomery's preparations farther north, was an 

attempt to take advantage of the momentum already gained against the enemy in 

the First Army sector without a pause for 

regroupmg. 

General Eisenhower's orders introduced 

one element of uncertainty into the plans 

then being made by Field Marshal Montgomery for an attack by the First Canadian Army between the Maas and Rhine 

(Operation VERITABLE), and a thrust 

northeastward by the Ninth U.S. Army to 

link up with the Canadians on the Rhine 

(Operation GRENADE). The Ninth Army, 

which had been reduced to two corps and 

five divisions by withdrawals during the 

Ardennes fight, needed new units from 

First and Third Armies for its operation. 

Field Marshal Montgomery had asked 

that General Simpson's forces be increased 

to sixteen divisions, but General Eisen417 

hower had decided that twelve was the 

maximum to be assigned. These were not 

forthcoming, of course, as long as General 

Bradley's advances continued in the south. 

If, therefore, the First Army advance continued to be successful, Montgomery 

might have to launch Operation VERITABLE without Ninth Army's supporting attack. For several days between midJanuary and the end of the month, the 

forces in the north continued preparations 

without knowing whether there would be 

an operation GRENADE. To prepare against 

delays in the event that the First Army attack bogged down, the Supreme Commander directed Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley to have 

plans for the offensive toward the Rhine 

north of Duesseldorf ready for launching 

whenever he decided not to continue with 

the First Army attack. 

At the end of January, General Bradley's forces had pushed the enemy back to 

the West Wall in their sector. At that time, 

the 12th Army Group commander wanted 

to drive through the Eifel region to the 

Rhine, but his forces were beginning to 

meet delays and there was little evidence 

that they could achieve the immediate decisive success which General Eisenhower 

had stipulated as a condition of a continued advance in that area. He was not 

surprised therefore on 1 February to find 

that VERITABLE and GRENADE "were on" 

and that his own attack was to stop. 

VERITABLE was to be launched on 8 February, and GRENADE on the same day or 

two days later. General Bradley began at 

once to shift units to Ninth Army for its 

operation, and prepared to go on the defensive except for an attack by First Army 

units to clear the Roer Dam area. On 2 

February, he asked both Hodges and Patton what they could accomplish with the 
418 

forces they had after transferring divisions 

to Ninth Army. When told that they 

thought they might continue to advance 

until 10 February, he agreed that they 

could keep up a push until that time. 24 

Given some latitude as to the time for 

stopping his attack, General Bradley decided to permit General Patton to make 

limited advances in the Eifel region north 

of the Moselle. The matter was kept quiet 

so as not to draw objections from Field 

Marshal Montgomery. As a result, General Patton thought that he and General 

Bradley were "putting something over" on 

SHAEF.25 Field Marshal Montgomery 

apparently became aware that something 

was afoot, and this may have been responsi ble for some of his protests that the operations in the north were not being 

properly backed. 

German Difficulties 

Since the end of December the enemy 

situation had greatly deteriorated. Not 

only had the German forces been thrown 

back in the west with considerable loss in 

men and materiel, but their losses in territory and men to the Red Army after the 

Russian drive began in mid-January were 

even heavier. SHAEF reported at the end 

of January that Marshal Konstantin ~. 

Rokossovski had moved northward from 

Warsaw to the Baltic in an advance which 

isolated East Prussia from the Reich, 

while other Russian armies were driving 

into the eastern half of the province. Marshal Ivan S. Konev forced his way westward across the south of Poland to the 

Oder and established several bridgeheads. 

The industry of Upper Silesia suffered 

heavily from this advance. Between these 

two forces, Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov 

smashed westward from Warsaw through 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

L6dz and past Poznan, outstripping the 

armies on his flanks and sending spearheads to points within one hundred miles 

of Berlin. The Red armies went more 

slowly in the south, actually meeting a 

German counteroffensive in Hungary, but 

for the most part they overwhelmed the 

enemy forces. The third week of their attack found advance elements of Marshal 

Zhukov's forces at points on or- near the 

Oder 280 miles west of the positions they 

had left near Warsaw on 12January. In 

air-line distances, they had averaged 

fourteen miles a day.26 The offensive had a 

twofold effect on the battle in the west. 

The loss ofthe Silesian industries forced 

the Germans to rely more heavily on the 

Ruhr and Saar plants, and the pressure of 

the Russians meant that no reinforcements 

would be available from the Eastern Front 

for use against the Allies. 27 

The gravity of the German situation in 

the west was thoroughly evident to Field 

Marshal von Rundstedt. He was especially fearful that the Allies, in pursuing 

their main objective of crossing the Rhine, 

would bypass the West Wall and roll up 

the German positions from the rear. He 

had no fuel reserves and he felt that his 

ammunition stockpiles were only one third 

24 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 495-97. Notes on 

Confwith Gen Bradley, Brig Gen A. Franklin Kibler, 

1 Feb 45; Notes on Conf, Gen Bradley with comdrs 

First, Third, Ninth Armies, at Hq First Army, Gen 

Kibler, 2 Feb 45. Both in 12th A Gp 371.3 Military 

Objectives, VI. 

25 Bradley, A Soldiers Story, p. 501. General Bradley 

says that Genera1cisenhower had agreed to the action 

without the knowledge of the 12th Army Group or 

Third Army staffs. There is no documentary evidence 

on this incident in General Eisenhower's papers. cr. 

Patton, War as [ Knew It, p. 235. 

26 SHAEF Intel Summary 45, week ending 28Jan 

45; SHAEF Intel Summary 46, week ending 4 Feb 

45. Both in SHAEF G-2 files. 

27 SHAEF Intel Summary 46, week ending 4 Feb 

45; SHAEF Intel Summary 47, week ending 11 Feb 

45. Both in SHAEF G-2 files. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 419 

of what he needed. In particular, he 

lacked reinforcements for his units. Of his 

three army groups, Army Group H) which 

had the task of protecting the German 

north flank, was in the best position. 

Troops were sent to it from other front sectors and from the rear, and it had the First 

Parachute Army) a unit of comparatively 

high combat value, at full strength. Army 

Group B was in a less fortunate position. Its 

extended front was held by twenty-five 

divisions of which all but six had been 

heavily battered in the Ardennes fighting. 

The actual strength per kilometer was estimated by the Germans at twenty-six 

infantrymen, one to two artillery pieces, 

and less than one antitank gun. The entire 

army group had fewer than 200 armored 

vehicles. Army Group G) which had been 

roughly handled by U.S. and French 

troops in the south, was apparently even 

more depleted than its northern neighbor.28 

SHAEF Establishes a Forward Headquarters 

In preparation for the drive toward the 

Rhine and beyond, General Eisenhower 

ordered that a forward echelon of his 

headquarters be established nearer the 

front. Before this time, a small advanced 

command post had been set up for him at 

Gueux near Reims, and later, as the Allied 

forces moved forward, two Supreme 

Headquarters Advance Conference Establishments had been opened near Luxembourg and Spa. 29 As early as October 

1944, Verdun, Reims, Luxembourg, Liege, 

Metz, and Spa were all considered as possible sites for the new forward headquarters. The initial decision to move to 

Luxembourg was changed in early December, and Reims was selected instead. 

This move was postponed as a result of the 

Ardennes counteroffensive, but in midFebruary preparations were made to carry 

it out. 

On 18 February 1945, the advance 

party of SHAEF Forward began its move 

from Versailles to Reims. Two days later 

the transfer was completed, and the new 

headquarters opened at the College 

Moderne et Technique de Gan;ons, Ecole 

Superieur de Commerce. 30 The College 

building had been constructed in 1931 by 

the Department of the Marne for the technical training of French boys ten to nineteen years of age. It was a modern, threestoried, red brick structure capable of 

holding some 1,500 students. The general 

staff was located in the school while other 

divisions were in the Conservatory of 

28 MS # B-147, Army Group H, 10 Nov 44-10 Mar 

45 (Col Rolf Geyer, G-3 [Ia] of Army Group 11); MS 

# A-964, Die Folgen der Ardennen-o.ffensive and MS # 

A-965, Die Kaempfe der Heeresgruppe B nach der Ardennen- 0. ffensive bis zum Rueckzug ueber den Rhein, 25 

Jan-21 Mar 45 (both by Generalmajor Karl 

Wagener, Chief of Staff of Fifth Panzer Army and later 

of Army Group B); MS # B-026, Effects of Ardennes 

Offensive on Army Group G and MS # B-600, Army 

Group G, 25 Jan-21 Mar 45 (both by Hausser). 

On 27 January 1945 the headquarters of o.berbefehlshaber o.berrhein was transferred to the Eastern Front as 

Army Group Weichsel with Himmler as army group 

commander. Army Group G on 28 January took command of the former o.berbefehlshaber o.berrhein sector 

and troops. On the same date Hausser replaced 

Blaskowitz as army group commander. On 29 January General Blaskowiti replaced Student as commander of Army Group H while Student took command 

of First Parachute Army. 

29 The Advance Conference Establishments served 

"as convenient meeting places for senior commanders and senior Supreme Headquarters, AEF, staff officers. Messing, overnight accommodation and telephone communications [were] furnished in each 

SHAC on a limited scale." Ltr, Gen Whiteley, G-3 

SHAEF, 8 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS 322 SHAEF Advance Conference Establishments. 

30 This is the name which appears over the main 

entrance. SHAEF records identify the school as Ecole 

Professionelle and Ecole Pratique de Commerce et 

d'Industrie, which apparently are names of schools 

of the college. 
420 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

SHAEF AT REIMS. German prisoners pass the Allied headquarters: 

Music and an office building at 1 Rue Talleyrand. Hotels provided billets for officers, and the CaserneJeanne d' Arc and 

Caserne Colbert housed enlisted personnel. As in the case of earlier locations, estimates for space needs at Reims proved too 

low as new detachments were brought to 

Supreme Headquarters. Near the war's 

end, SHAEF Forward had increased to 

1,200 officers and 4,000 men, or nearly 

double the original estimate of required 

strength.

3 1 

Allied Operations, January-February 1945 

In shifting the main attack at the end of 

January from the First Army front to the 

north, General Eisenhower had instructed 

General Bradley to use a force of two or 

three di visions to seize the dams on the 

Urft and Roer Rivers which had been a 

threat to the Allied advance since the previous fall. (See Map IV) It had been 

realized for some months that, so long as 

the Germans held the Schwammenauel 

Dam and the smaller barriers above it, 

they could open the discharge val ves and 

flood the Roer valley at any time the Allies 

started an attack north of it. Attempts to 

destroy the dams by bomber attack in the 

winter of 1944 had proved futile . An of3 1 Chief sources: Interv with Brig Ge n Robert Q. 

Brown, SHAEF Hq command.ant, Dec 45; Interv 

with Prof. M . Fauvet, instructor in the college at 

Reims, Dec 46. SHAEF SGS 370.5 / 4 Location of 

Battle Hq SHAEF, II. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 

fensive to take the dam by ground action 

had been launched on 13 December, but 

it was stopped after the enemy breakthrough on the 16th. On 4 February, the 

First Army undertook the task of seizing 

the Schwammenauel barrier. Five days 

later, as U.S. units pushed down to the 

dam from positions north of it, the Germans released the pent-up waters of the 

Roer. Two weeks were to pass before the 

flood waters subsided along the Roer valley, but the danger that the enemy would 

open the dams while an attack was in 

progress was ended. 

While the First Army dealt with the 

Roer dams, Field Marshal Montgomery 

readied his attack in the north. The British 

commander proposed to destroy German 

forces in the area between the Maas and 

the Rhine from the Nijmegen bridgehead 

south to a line fromJuelich to Duesseldorf. 

(Map V) To carry out this plan, he intended to send the First Canadian Army, 

made up of thirteen British and Canadian 

divisions, southeastward from Nijmegen to 

the line running from Geldern to Xanten 

and then clear the entire area to the 

Rhine. Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Army 

with its twelve divisions was to cross the 

Roer River in the area between J uelich 

and Linnich and head for the Rhine between Duesseldorf and Moers. Later, the 

Second British Army, with a U.S. corps 

allotted to it, was to push eastward between the other two armies to Rheinberg 

and the west bank of the Rhine in that 

area. 3~ Both General Crerar's and General 

Simpson's forces were faced by unfavorable terrain. The units tinder the First 

Canadian Army had to attack through the 

Reichswald and the flooded valleys of the 

Maas, the Niers, and the Rhine, while the 

Ninth Army was confronted by the flood 

waters in the Roer valley. 

421 

General Crerar opened his attack in the 

early morning of 8 February after a heavy 

air and artillery preparation. Floods delayed his advance, forcing his units in 

some areas to use amphibious vehicles in 

their attacks. As a result, they did not 

clear the Reichswald until 13 February. 

The second phase of his offensive, the capturing of enemy positions south of the 

Reichswald near Goch, was completed between 18 and 21 February. 

Before General Crerar opened the third 

phase of his attack, the Ninth Army, 

whose operation had been postponed some 

two weeks until the flood waters of the 

Roer could subside,joined the battle. At 

0245 on 23 February, General Simpson 

sent his assault forces across the Roer. 

Enemy artillery and the swiftness of the 

current gave the men in the assault boats 

some trouble, but by the close of the day 

they established a bridgehead across the 

river. Especially helpful during the crossing was the XXIX Tactical Air Command, which flew more sorties in the 

course of the day than it had on any previous day of the war. General Simpson 

strengthened his bridgehead and then 

began to push out to the east and northeast while building up his forces for a 

large-scale breakout. At the end of the 

month, he ordered his armor into the 

action. The enemy in the meantime had 

started withdrawing from the RoermondVenlo area in order to escape an outflanking movement by the Ninth Army. As 

Army Group H pulled its units back toward 

the Rhine, towns in the Roermond area 

which had previously put up a lively defense began to surrender with little or no 

opposition. Hitler ordered his forces to 

32 21 A Gp dir, M-548, 21 Jan 45, Eisenhower personal file; Stacey, The Canadian Army, pp. 237-38; 

Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 184. 
422 

continue to hold positions west of the 

Rhine until defenses could be constructed 

east of the river, but this edict proved increasingly difficult to obey as the Ninth 

Army forces pushed eastward toward 

Duesseldorf and northward toward Geldern and Wesel. 33 

Under General Eisenhower's order to 

provide right·wing protection for the 

Ninth Army's eastward drive, the First 

Army made a simultaneous crossing of the 

Roer on the morning of 23 February. 

Armored elements crossed the following 

day and drove rapidly eastward to the 

Erft, where they paused on 28 February, 

giving the Ninth Army adequate assurance that its right flank was secure while 

it was driving toward the north. 

Farther to the south, General Patton 

had been pushing his limited advances. 

Just to the right of the First Army, the 

Third Army advanced astride the Moselle 

across a series of flooded, heavily defended 

streams. By the end of February, it had 

opened a path up the Pruem valley toward 

the Rhine, had eliminated a salient known 

as the Vianden Gap, had cleared the triangle of land between the Saar and the 

Moselle, and had passed through most of 

the West Wall defenses in its zone to points 

within three miles of Trier. 

As the tempo of the Third Army 

advance accelerated, General Patton became increasingly impatient to stage a 

break-through on the 1944 scale. On 20 

February he pressed General Bradley to 

give him additional divisions for an attack 

in the area of Trier and the Saar. He 

pointed out that the great proportion of 

U.S. troops in Europe were not fighting 

and warned that "all of us in high position 

will surely be held accountable for the failure to take offensive action when offensive 

action is possible." General Bradley 

agreed that advances were possible in the 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Third Army sector, but added that higher 

authority had decided to make the thrust 

elsewhere. He reminded General Patton: 

"Regardless of what you and I think of 

this decision, we are good enough soldiers 

to carry out these orders." Indicating 

that the First and Third Armies were to 

play the major role in the next big attack, 

Bradley suggested that the present opportunity be used to refit and retrain troops so 

that they would be able to deliver a decisive blow when the proper moment 

came. 34 

On 1 March, Generals Eisenhower and 

Bradley visited General Simpson to discuss further plans for his army. The Supreme Commander was especially interested in the Ninth Army's plans to seize a 

Rhine bridge intact. While this objective 

was not achieved, General Simpson's 

forces did succeed on 2 March in reaching 

the Rhine in the vicinity of Neuss. On this, 

the ninth day of his attack, General Simpson reported that seven of his twelve divisions had nothing to do. He proposed, 

therefore, making a surprise crossing of the 

Rhine. Field Marshal Montgomery indicated that he preferred the planned 

assault of the Rhine on a broad front between Rheinberg and Emmerich. The 

Ninth Army completed its main mission 

on 5 March, having uncovered the Rhine 

from Duesseldorf to Moers. In its seventeen days of fighting it had driven fifty 

miles with fewer than 7,300 casualties, 

while killing an estimated 6,000 Germans 

and taking some 30,000 prisoners. 35 

General Crerar later declared that the 

Ninth Army "attack led to the strategic 

defeat of the enemy." He added, however, 

:;:; MS # B-147 (Geyer). 

34 Patton to Bradley, 20 Feb 45; Bradley to Patton, 

21 Feb 45. Both in 12th A Gp 371.3 Military Objectives, VI. See an earlier complaint by General Patton 

in his War as I Knew It, p. 240. 

35 Conquer: The Story of Ninth Army, Ch. V. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 423 

that it did not have any immediate effect 

on the hard battle which his troops had to 

face between the Roer and the Rhine. 

That it did not was due apparently to a 

shift of enemy units northward during the 

period before the Ninth Army offensive. 

As a result, bitter resistance met General 

Crerar’s forces on 26 February when they 

opened the third phase of their operation 

in an offensive toward Xanten. While 

these units were delayed by stiffened 

enemy opposition near Xanten, First 

Canadian Army elements farther southwest linked up with Ninth Army units at 

Geldern and made parallel drives for the 

Rhine, clearing all organized resistance in 

their zone between the Maas and the 

Rhine. The cost of clearing the northern 

area had not been light for the British and 

Canadian forces involved. In a little less 

than a month, they had suffered nearly 

16,000 casualties, one third of them Canadian. More than 23,000 Germans had 

been captured in the fight. 36 

With forces under the 21 Army Group 

securely anchored on the Rhine, it was 

possible in March for General Bradley to 

open an offensive in his sector to clear the 

enemy from the area north of the Moselle. 

A plan for this operation had been submitted to General Eisenhower at his request at the end of February and had been 

approved by him. General Bradley proposed to complete his current operation in 

support of the Ninth Army, to invest 

Cologne from the north and to advance 

from the northwest and west to secure the 

Koblenz sector, and to close to the Rhine 

in the entire zone north of the Moselle. 37 

General Bradley opened his new offensive on 1 March. To the right of the Ninth 

Army, General Hodges’ forces made new 

crossings of the Erft, and rapidly exploited 

their bridgeheads. They shattered the 

right wing of the Fifteenth Army and cut it 

off from Cologne and Duesseldorf. General Hodges pressed forward toward the 

Rhine, entering Euskirchen on 4 March. 

His armored elements, which were roaring 

toward Cologne, broke into the defenses of 

the great cathedral city on the 5th; on the 

following day they reported it almost 

cleared. 

To the south of Cologne, General 

Hodges gave other units of his army the 

mission of pushing to the Rhine and then 

turning southward to cross the Ahr and 

make contact with the Third Army elements which, now unleashed, were driving 

to the north. The advantages of seizing a 

bridge across the Rhine were discussed, 

but apparently no one entertained more 

than a vague hope that the opportunity 

could be found. Apparently no specific 

order was issued for such an action, and 

no plan was outlined for such an eventuality. 38 

U.S. armored elements drove into the 

town of Remagen in the early afternoon of 

7 March and discovered that the near-by 

36 Stacey, The Canadian Army, pp. 247-54. Stacey 

estimates that the Canadian and U.S. attacks to; 

gether cost the Germans about 90,000 killed, 

wounded, and captured. 

37 Ltr, Eisenhower to Bradley, 20 Feb 45; Memo, 

Bull for COfS SHAEF, 27 Feb 45; Note, on draft letter 

of 28 February 1945, that oral notification of approval had been given Bradley. All in SHAEF SGS 

38 1 Post OVERLORD Planning, III. 12th A Gp Ltr of 

Instr 16, 3 Mar 45, confirming oral instructions previously issued and outline of operations plans dated 

23 February 1945, 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns, Vol. V. 

38 Combat interviews of 2d Information and Historical Team with staff members of First Army, III 

Corps, and 9th Armored Division (MSS 300, 340, and 

341) in March 1945 indicate considerable divergence 

on the matter of intentions. The official journals do 

not show any specific orders on the subject, and the 

men who took the bridge near Remagen indicate that 

they were given none before reaching the town. As 

late as the morning of 7 March, a First Army staff 

officer made clear that the III Corps mission to proceed southward after reaching Remagen remained 

unchanged. The question will be considered at length 

in The Rhineland and Central Germany, a volume 

in preparation for this series. 
424 

Ludendorff Bridge across the Rhine was 

still intact. They reported this fact to their 

commander, Brig. Gen. William M. Hoge, 

who promptly ordered his men to take the 

bridge. It had not been destroyed at that 

time because the guards appointed to blow 

it up were waiting for German units still 

west of the Rhine to cross. As the first U.S. 

elements reached the bridge, the guards 

exploded demolition charges, creating a 

crater at the west end of the structure 

which prevented vehicles from crossing. A 

small American patrol now went forward 

to cut.the wires of remaining demolition 

charges. Rushing across the bridge in the 

face of fire from the eastern towers of the 

bridge and from the far shore, the men 

quickl y reached the east bank of the Rhine 

and established positions. 

Reports were hurried rearward to 

higher headquarters asking for instructions to meet the unexpected development. Each commander confirmed the 

action taken by his subordinate and asked 

further instructions from his superior. 

When the report reached General Bradley, he ordered General Hodges to throw 

everything he had across the Rhine to exploit his bridgehead. The 12th Army 

Group commander discussed the situation 

with the SHAEF chief of operations, General Bull, who was visiting General Bradley's headquarters. The SHAEF officer, 

aware of heavy Allied commitments to a 

crossing farther to the north, suggested 

that General Eisenhower be consulted as 

to the number of divisions to be diverted 

before any further action was taken. A call 

was thereupon made to the Supreme 

Commander, who enthusiastically approved General Bradley's dispositions. On 

8 March, he informed the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff that the railway bridge at 

Remagen had been captured and added: 

"Bradley is rushing troops to secure adeTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

quate bridgehead with the idea that this 

will constitute greatest possible threat as 

supporting effort for main attack." 39 

While other First Army units cleared 

the west bank of the Rhine from Sinzig 

northward to the Ninth Army boundary, 

those in the bridgehead east of the river 

sought to expand their sector. By 12 

March, the First Army held a twentythree-kilometer front east of the Rhine 

and was employing three infantry divisions and part of an armored division in 

the area. By the time of the crossing in the 

north, about ten days later, the sector had 

been extended north to the Sieg River on 

both sides of Siegburg, east to the autobahn which ran toward Frankfurt, and 

south to Neuwied. Meanwhile the enemy 

had made frantic efforts to wipe out the 

bridgehead. Reinforcements were brought 

from north and south of the area and committed piecemeal in a desperate effort to 

stop the flow of U.S. forces across the river. 

The Luftwaffe launched a number of 

savage attacks against the bridge itself, but 

it was successfully defended by massed 

Allied antiaircraft units stronger by 50 

percent than the number of such elements 

used by Allied forces the previous year to 

protect the Normandy beaches. The 

bridge, weakened by direct hits from longrange artillery, at length collapsed but not 

until the engineers had put in their own 

bridges. 

While the First Army was seizing its 

Rhine bridge and enlarging its sector east 

of the river, the Third Army was also driving to the Rhine. General Bradley's plan 

oflate February directed General Patton 

to (1) secure bri dgeheads over the K yll 

39 Eisenhower to WD, SCAF 223, 1234 hours, 8 

Mar 45, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, 

III. See Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 379; 

Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 767-68; 

and Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 510-13. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 

and concentrate his forces for further advances to the east, (2) prepare an attack 

from the Kyll to seize the Mainz-Koblenz 

area and, if the enemy was weak, to secure 

a Moselle bridgehead to the southeast, and 

(3) clear the enemy from the area between 

the Moselle and the Ahr and link up with 

the right flank of the First Army. In early 

March, General Patton pushed armored 

elements in the Eifel toward the Rhine. By 

11 March they had eliminated the German forces in the Eifel and the Allied 

forces held the Rhine from Emmerich to 

Koblenz. 

To the south of Third Army, General 

Devers' armies next entered the picture. 

General Eisenhower on 8 March had 

ordered the 6th Army Group, which had 

remained quiet since clearing the Colmar 

bridgehead in early February, to prepare 

for offensive action as soon as the 12th 

Army Group completed its operations in 

the north. General Patch's forces, with one 

French corps attached, were to attack in 

the general direction of the valley of the 

Blies and Homburg-KaiserslauternWorms with the objective of breaching the 

West Wall, destroying the enemy in its 

zone, and seizing a bridgehead east of the 

Rhine in the Worms area. 40 The First 

Allied Airborne Army was ordered to prepare an airborne operation should it be 

necessary for the support of the 6th Army 

Group's Rhine crossing. The First French 

Army was to defend the Rhine along its 

front during the Seventh Army operation, 

and the Third Army was to aid General 

Patch's forces in his offensive in the Saar. 

General Eisenhower arranged for coordination by the Seventh and Third 

Armies during their operations by directing the two army commanders to deal directly with each other in matters regarding 

the form, method, location, and timing of 

attacks.41 

425 

The Saar-Palatinate triangle, which 

was to be attacked by elements of the Seventh and the Third Armies in this March 

offensi ve, was bounded by the Rhine, the 

Moselle, and the Lauter-Sarre line. It was 

marked by four major terrain featuresthe Rhine valley, the Haardt mountains, 

the Saarbruecken-Kaiserslautern-Worms 

corridor, and the Hunsrueck mountainsand contained the valuable Saar basin. 

Despite the importance of the area, Army 

Group G could not get the forces needed to 

defend it. The three armies in the general 

area were extremely weak, the First Army 

having lost an estimated 30 to 50 percent 

of its strength in the February fighting, 

and the Seventh Army having been severely 

shaken in the Ardennes. The Nineteenth 

Army, which was transferred to direct OB 

WEST control in early March, was reduced to "absolute impotence," inasmuch 

as it had lost all of its combat units and 

now consisted mainly of ineffective Volkssturm and security units. The 6th Army 

Group chief of intelligence believed that 

there was no doubt that the Germans 

would be forced east of the Rhine, and 

that General Hausser's only decision was 

how many Germans he wished to leave in 

Allied hands west of the river. 42 

General Patch, supported by the XII 

Tactical Air Command, opened his battle 

for the Saar on 15 March from the north40 This operation was named UNDERTONE. 

41 SUSA Rpt of Opns, Vol. III; TUSA Rpt of 

Opns, Vol. I. 

42 6th A Gp G-2 Weekly Intel Summary 26, 17 

Mar 45, 6th A Gp AAR, Mar 45. This summary 

agrees with SHAEF and Third Army summaries of 

the period as well as with estimates made later by 

enemy commanders in the area. See also MS # 

B-026 (Hausser); MS # B-500, Defense of the 

Upper Rhine Front in the Karlsruhe-Basel Sector, 

and Fighting Withdrawal by the Nineteenth Army, to 

the Alps, up to the Capitulation, 22 Mar-5 May 45 

(Col Kurt Brandstaedter, Chief of Staff of Nineteenth 

Army). Seventh Army was transferred from Army Group 

B to Army Group G on 2 March 1945. 
426 

ern Alsace area through which the enemy 

had made his counteroffensive of early 

January. Aided by Third Army drives 

north of it, the Seventh Army drove its 

right more than twenty miles in the first 

five days of the attack against isolated and 

ineffective resistance. Its center and left, 

battling the fortifications of the West Wall, 

made less progress. Meanwhile, General 

Patton's armored elements swept across 

the enemy rear in the Palatinate triangle. 

Some of his units seized Koblenz, and 

others smashed through Bad Kreuznach 

toward Mainz. By 18 March, the Third 

Army was threatening the Frankfurt corridor between Mainz and Worms. A rapid 

move by General Patton's forces to St. 

Wendel in the rear of the Saar fortifications helped overcome enemy resistance in 

that area, and aided the Seventh Army to 

enter Saarbruecken on 19 March. 

In the light of the Third Army's swift 

moves, General Eisenhower on 17 March 

at a meeting of army group and army 

commanders at Luneville had arranged 

for General Patton to assume some of the 

Seventh Army's objectives. Fearing that 

faulty liaison between the two armies 

might permit some of the enemy in the 

Saar to escape, the Supreme Commander 

directed them to prepare, if necessary, to 

merge the command posts of the two 

armies. But the two commanders concerned assured him that this move would 

not be needed. 43 

Even as the Allied commanders explored new ways of strengthening their attack against the enemy, the Army Group G 

commander pleaded for permission to 

withdraw his forces east of the Rhine. Initially, he was told to hold in place, but as 

the U.S. pressure increased he was permitted to send the Seventh Army staff across 

the river. General Patch's forces gained 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

greater momentum in the meantime and 

broke through the West Wall positions on· 

20 March. They made contact with Third 

Army elements on the following day. By 

25 March the Saar-Palatinate triangle 

had been overrun, and the Seventh Army 

had started its preparations for a Rhine 

crossing. 44 

North of the Seventh Army, General 

Patton had sent his units forward with 

great effect; on 21 March he announced 

that his three corps had reached the 

Rhine. They cleared Landau and Mainz 

on the 22d, and shortly before midnight 

elements of the army began an assault 

crossing of the Rhine near Oppenheim. 

Before daylight of the 23d six battalions of 

infantry had been put across the river at 

the cost of twenty-eight casualties. Nearly 

a day ahead of Montgomery in the north, 

Patton had his Rhine crossing. 45 

The First French Army, which had carried out a defensive mission during the 

Seventh Army operation, contributed significantly to General Patch's battle. General Devers' order of 10 March had shifted 

armored and artillery elements to the 

Seventh Army and had held other armor 

in the 6th Army Group reserve for the operation. On the 18th, General de Lattre 

asked that a part of his forces be returned 

so that the French might playa still larger 

role in the offensive. Instead, General 

Devers formed a special task force consisting of a French infantry and a French 

armored division and attached it to a U.S. 

corps, with the understanding that the 

43 Patton, War as I Knew It, p. 262; SUSA Rpt of 

Opns, III, 720. 

44 MSS # B-026 and # B-600 (both by Hausser); 

MS # B-703, The Fighting of Army Group G in the 

West. The Final Battle in Central and Southern Germany until Capitulation, 22 Mar-6 May 45 (Col 

Horst Wilutzky, G-3 [Ia] of Army Group G). 

45 Patton, War as I Knew It, pp. 266-67, 272-74. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 427 

task force would revert to the First French 

Army when the line of the Erlen was 

reached. Meanwhile, General de Lattre’s 

forces were charged with defending the 

Rhine from Drusenheim south, a considerable task for the French commander’s 

four divisions. 46 

General de Lattre’s wishes were gratified on 19 March when elements of the 

special task force crossed the Lauter and 

entered German territory. Electrified by 

the thought of fighting on the soil of the 

enemy after years of hated German occupation, the French forces rushed forward 

against heavy opposition to establish their 

flag firmly on the territory of the Reich. 

General de Lattre underlined 19 March as 

“a great day for French hearts.” Almost 

immediately, he asked General Devers for 

an enlarged zone along the Rhine that 

would give the French better sites for 

crossing and permit them to capture some 

well-known German city. The 6th Army 

Group commander promptly shifted the 

interarmy boundary north to include 

Speyer in the French zone. 47 

The Crossing of the Rhine in the North 

With the clearing of the Saar–Palatinate triangle, General Eisenhower’s 

forces had closed to the Rhine from Arnhem to the Swiss border and had concluded the most difficult part of the battle 

for Germany. (Chart 8) The West Wall 

which had barred the Allied advance in 

September had now been left behind, and 

the days of painfully slow advances 

through mud, ice, and snow were ended. 

German units, shattered in the Ardennes 

fighting, lacked the strength to stop the 

onrushing Allied forces whose numbers increased daily. Meanwhile, the air war constantly gained in intensity. Despite the 

increase of enemy jet-propelled aircraft 

and indications that the enemy’s productive capacity had still not been destroyed, 

the Germans did not have the means in 

March to block the tremendous air 

strength being thrown against their industrial centers. By the end of the month the 

Allied strategic bombers were almost out 

of targets. 48 

The German position in late March was 

obviously critical. Toward the end of the 

month, SHAEF intelligence declared that 

Army Group G had been driven back across 

the Rhine with twelve of its divisions virtually destroyed. The Allies had taken 

more than 100,000 prisoners since crossing 

the Moselle, raising the total in the Rhineland battles to more than 250,000. These 

prisoners together with the killed and 

wounded amounted to the strength of 

more than twenty full divisions. The socalled divisions in the west now numbered 

over sixty, but four of them were only divisional staffs, eleven were Kampfgruppen, 

seven were described as remnants, and 

others were drastically weakened. They 

equaled only some twenty-six complete 

divisions. Allied strength by this time had 

risen to eighty-five divisions, five of them 

airborne and twenty-three armored. On 

all fronts there was dismal news for the 

enemy. In Upper Silesia the Russians had 

launched a new offensive which gained 

twenty-five miles on a thirty-mile front in 

its first day, and there were rumors of a 

fresh drive in Hungary. The Allied air of46 Ltr of Instr 11, Devers to de Lattre and Patch, 

10 Mar 45; Modification of Ltr 11, Devers to de 

Lattre and Patch, 18 Mar 45, and notes on plng. All 

in 6th A Gp AAR, Mar 45. 

47 De Lattre, Histoire de la Première Armée Française, 

Chs. XIII and XIV; 6th A Gp Ltr of Instr 12, 27 

Mar 45, 6th A Gp AAR, Mar 45. 

48 For the story of air activities in this period, see 

Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War 

II, Vol. III, Ch. 20. 
CHART 8 - 0PERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND , AEF, 27 M ARC H 1945 

SUPREME COMMAND£R 

Gt,..fal 0' lite At,..,. Eb.~o . ... 

D£PVTY SUPAEME COMMANDER 

A" ' .. 1.1 MOl1hol T ",Odel 

I I I I I I COMMUNICATIONS SOUTHERN GROUP FIRST TACTICAL CENTRAL GROUP SECOND TACTICAL NORTHERN GROUP ZONE (US) Of c~ r ARMIES .. AIR FORCE (PROV) Of ARMIES AIR FORCE " .. Of ARMIES L, GI" Ln L,G."D,uI. MOl G." W.,b".1 Ad"" HQlokl M. 8"'/TtWgt, l, Gltl'l ~od .'f Ar. MOl,ha' {aflin.,M1\'I fl.ld Mgl~1 Mc)n,.go""t1~ 

· • • FIRST AlliED NINTH AIRBORNE ARMY AIR FORCE 1I Glt'! Qnen-ton MoJ GRQ VOf'Idlt",b .. ,'J 

I I I I I 1 

I SEVENTH II RRST Jf FIFTEENlH I THIRD I FIRST J ~ FIRST J I SECOND II NINlH BASE US ARMY fRENCH ARMY US ARMY US ARMY US ARMY CANADIAN ARM BRITISH ARMY US ARMY SECTIONS II G.n PaJc:}, Gel'! d'At",i. l.JG.,,~ow L, Gcn Porto" II GI" Hod,., Gc ... Ctaot It c;.,. .'"P~ l lG."Sj1PlpSQft d. lOll,. ~ Tauf"," 

IX I.OOf' <" •• '(R r H '" coRP< II ' IRtNCH <ORPS I .. wco~ [ v., com 'r v CORPS r l .5' com J H tfH CORPS COMMAND Mol G_ 8106h It ~ 8flh-ori Mof&",Ha._ Mol 0." Mldtll ..... MClI~H",." lIG...C.od. •. uo-8a!ft: •• I Mot~o. XIII CORPS lt: .. r ~c;..,W Ool'f 

AiOflOO': coOPS r- xv CO.PS [ [I' 10110(0; COOPS Mol G." Hc!hllo lot c;,. ... ~I 

McijG'I'I(iol" 

Met; '" G COR.. ... ( ddr ~ [ VII CO' " Moj~( ll~, H "'0; CORPS l. C.lliR;,cM._ I M!I ,VICOR" ,G..A~ , r ItAf 1RANSPORT " 

l'~A't~:1t Mo.X1 (CAPS ilbt.," 'J Mo. xx v.,. co.... w ... " r [ MOl "' GI", COIIPS V_ r·rUf H lr >0'0; Gotfl Hoo. (OAPS oc.,\ I MOXI. 

l G ... 

co.,., M(l.,~ ~ A5 AllOCAUO 

'VIII(~~' E J ~ ,0 CON CO'''J Mot 0 . 1\ Rid,_v l' GM Sl",OfId_ 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 429 

fensive against oil, which had been started 

at General Spaatz's insistence in the preceding spring, had virtually destroyed the 

fuel reserves of the Reich. Air attacks on 

railroads and bridges disrupted transportation, while round-the-clock bombings of 

the great German cities brought home 

daily to the enemy the futility of continuing the war. The Allied air forces set new 

records for air strikes nearly every day, 

making as many as 11,000 sorties in one 

twenty-four-hour period. 49 By the end of 

March, the German Army could no longer 

be considered a major obstacle. Nevertheless, the Allied intelligence chiefs could see 

no chance of surrender as long as Hitler 

and Himmler continued to control the 

destinies of the Reich. The Allies were 

committed, therefore, to "a systematic annihilation of the German armed forces." 50 

The enemy, already mortally wounded 

west ofthe Rhine, made some attempt to 

protect the river line. This task fell to the 

new Commander in Chief West, Field 

Marshal Kesselring, former commander 

in Italy, who took Rundstedt's place 

shortly after the Allies captured the 

Remagen bridge. Staff members of Army 

Group H thought that the British might attack south of Arnhem to roll up the Rhine 

defenses and then turn to the east or assault across the Rhine between Emmerich 

and the Ruhr. They believed that an airborne operation to facilitate this crossing 

might be made northeast of Wesel. Canadian forces were expected to attack the 

Twenty-Fifth Army as a means of protecting 

the British northern flank while U.S. 

forces crossed south of Wesel. Of the two 

alternatives, the crossing near Emmerich 

seemed to Army Group H the more likely. 

With this in mind, the commander assigned the Twenty-Fifth Army a long frontal 

sector which included the area between 

Arnhem and Emmerich. The stronger 

First Parachute Army was to defend the 

region most seriously threatened by British 

and U.S. forces-the area between Rees 

and Dinslaken. Expecting the Allied offensive to come quickly, the Am!)' Group H 

commander hastily tried to strengthen his 

defenses. To the south, Army Group B, which 

had been preoccupied with the Remagen 

bridgehead since early March, was in no 

position to stop an attack. Much weaker 

still was Army Group G, whose Seventh Army 

had virtually ceased to exist. 51 

While Kesselring struggled to get his 

forces ready for the Allied attack, General 

Eisenhower waited confidently for the 

start of his offensive. Field Marshal Montgomery's careful preparations north of the 

Ruhr had left nothing to chance. The Allied Naval Command, headed by Admiral 

Harold M. Burrough, which had busied 

itself mostly with supply matters since the 

completion of the landings in southern 

France, was asked to aid in preparing an 

amphibious assault. 52 A Navy detachment 

was added to the planning group for the 

Rhine crossing in November, and small 

landing craft were made available for the 

operation. General Brereton and his First 

Allied Airborne Army staff set to work to 

plan a major airborne attack east of the 

Rhine to insure the success of the crossing. 

49 Craven and Cate, The Am!)' Air Forces in World 

War II, Vol. III, Ch. 20. See also MS # C-020 

(Schramm). 

50 SHAEF Intel Summary 53, week ending 25 Mar 

45; SHAEF daily G-3 War Room summary, 25 Mar 

45. 

5) MS # B-414, Am!)' Group H (OB NORD WEST) 

10 Mar-9 May 45 (Col Rolf Geyer, G-3 [Ia] of Amry 

Group H and later of OB NORDWEST); MS # 

B-593, The Battles of Am!)' Group B on the Rhine up 

to its dissolution, 22 Mar-17 Apr 45 (Wagener); MS 

# B-703 (Wilutzky). . 

.52 Admiral Burrough had succeeded Admiral 

Ramsay, who had been killed at the beginning of 

January 1945 in a plane crash near Paris. 
430 

Near the end of January 1945, Field 

Marshal Montgomery issued specific 

orders for the Rhine crossing. His initial 

plan called for General Dempsey's Second 

British Army, with a U.S. corps attached, 

to force crossings at Rheinberg, Xanten, 

and Rees. This directive "flabbergasted" 

General Simpson, who was given no command role in the crossing. He was especially disturbed because U.S. forces in the 

attack would have to pass through the 

Second British Army's zone. The Ninth 

Army commander took up the matter 

with General Dempsey, and after several 

lengthy discussions the two commanders 

recommended that Field Marshal Montgomery revise his plans to give the Ninth 

Army a larger role in the operation. On 

4 February, the 21 Army Group commander instructed General Simpson to 

make a crossing at Rheinberg while General Dempsey launched assaults at Xanten 

and Rees. 53 

, In early February, Field Marshal Montgomery set 15 March as the target date for 

the crossing. 54 A SHAEF directive of 8 

March changed this date to the 24th and 

outlined the main features of .the operation. Field Marshal Montgomery spelled 

out these instructions in a directive dated 

9 March to Generals Dempsey, Crerar, 

and Simpson. The mission of the 21 

Army Group was described as the crossing of the Rhine north of the Ruhr to 

secure a firm bridgehead with a view to 

developing operations to isolate the Ruhr 

and penetrate more deeply into Germany. 

The Ninth Army was to cross the Rhine 

south of Wesel, protect the 21 Army 

Group's right flank, and develop the 

bridgehead south of the Lippe. The 

Second British Army, aided by U.S. airborne forces, was to capture Wesel and 

secure the bridgehead north of the Lippe.

55 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

ADMIRAL BURROUGH 

Air preparations to isolate the battlefield began two weeks or more before the 

actual crossing. In addition to attacking 

the area bounded generally by the line 

Bonn-Siegen-Soest-Hamm-MuensterRheine- Lingen-Zwolle, the British and 

American airmen hit bridges all the way 

from Bremen to Cologne. The air strikes 

interfered with traffic between the Ruhr 

and the rest of the Reich, seriously im53 Conquer: T he Story of Ninth Army. Ch, VI; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, Ch. XVII. 

5 4 The operation by this time had been named 

Operation PLUNDER. 

55 21 A Gp o,rders for the Battle of the Rhine, 

M-559, 9 Ma r 45 , 12th A Gp 37 1.3 Military Objectives, VI. General Eisenhower's original dir to comdrs, 

SCAF 224,8 Ma r 45; Supplementary dir, Eisenhower 

to comdrs, SCAF 23 1, 13 Mar 45 , SHAEF SGS 38 I 

Post OVERLORD Planning, III. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 431 

peding efforts to reinforce the threatened the casualties of the two airborne units. At 

area. 56 the end of three days, the U.S. airborne 

The Second British Army started its division had lost 1,584 and the British diRhine assault at 2100 on 23 March, after vision 1,344. 59 

a heavy artillery preparation. Elements of By the end of the first day's fighting, the 

two corps speedily crossed the river, sev- Allies had established a firm bridgehead 

eral advance groups making the trip in running as much as six miles in depth. 

seven minutes. While some units turned British and U.S. forces had made ajunctoward Rees, others, after a preparatory tion in Wesel, but fighting was still in 

bombing, attacked Wesel. The Ninth progress in the town. Losses tended to be 

Army, in the meantime, had set its forces light along the front, although opposition 

in motion, Generals Eisenhower and in the British sector was heavier than that 

Simpson watching from a church tower on the Ninth Army front. While hardly 

while the artillery preparation was being any German aircraft were seen during the 

made. At 0200 on 24 March, Ninth Army first day in the bridgehead, some harmless 

elements began crossing south of Wesel, raids were made during the night against 

completing the operation with compara- Allied bridge sites. Fighter-bombers of the 

tive ease. So little effort was required to XXIX Tactical Air Command in the 

overrun the enemy forward positions that Ninth Army sector had their biggest day of 

Ninth Army historians described the oper- the war to date, and the 2d Tactical Air 

ation as more an engineering task than a Force also contributed heavily to the 

tactical maneuver. General Simpson's battle. 60 

losses during the first day were extremely On the second day of fighting, Prime 

light for such an operation-41 killed,450 Minister Churchill, Field Marshals Brooke 

wounded, and 7 missing. 57 and Montgomery, and General Simpson 

General Eisenhower was an interested crossed the Rhine to inspect the new 

spectator later during the morning of24 bridgehead. 61 They found engineers busily 

March when the First Allied Airborne engaged in bridging the river, and the inArmy launched Operation VARSITY. Ele- fantry steadily pressing eastward. 

ments of two airborne divisions, one U.S. South of the 21 Army Group, forces of 

and one British, flown from bases in 56 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 322. 

France and the United Kingdom, began 57 Conquer: The Story of Ninth Army. Ch. VI; Montto land at 1000 in the British zone north of' gomery, Normandy to the Baltic, Ch. XVII. A special study of the British operation has been made: British 

Wesel. More than 14,000 soldiers were Army of the Rhine, Operation PLUNDER (printed in 

flown in or parachuted. 58 In this, perhaps Germany, 1947). 

the most successful Allied airborne opera- 58 Conquer: The Story of Ninth Army, p. 247. The 

Brereton Diaries, p. 414, gives the number of men 

tion in Europe, British and U.S. forces dropped as 4,978 British and 9,387 American. 

quickl y established their positions. Ele- 59 The Brereton Diaries, p. 414. 

ments of one division J' oined up with 60 Conquer: The Story of Ninth Army, p. 252. 61 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 390, gives the 

British infantry elements by midafternoon; date of this crossing as 24 March, the first day of the 

the other division made contact with battle. The New York Times, March 26, 1945, and 

British Commandos about noon and was Conquer, p. 252, give the date as 25 March. BBC War 

Report, 6 June 1944-5 May 1945 (London, 1946), p. 333, 

on its objective by dark. Initial losses were gives text of broadcast on 25 March which says the 

slight, but stiffening opposition increased group crossed that day. 
432 

Generals Bradley and Devers were also on 

the move. The Third Army was ordered on 

25 March to exploit its crossings over the 

Rhine, seize the line Hanau-Giessen, and 

be prepared to continue the advance 

toward Kassel. On the following day, the 

Third Army units seized a bridge intact 

across the Main near Frankfurt and entered the outskirts of that city. By 29 

March, they had made contact with the 

First Army units in the vicinity of Wiesbaden and had cleared Frankfurt of the 

enemy. The Third Army was now directed to advance on the Hersfeld-Kassel 

area and drive the Germans east of the 

Hohe Rhoen mountains-Werra RiverWeser River line. Rugged and wooded 

terrain gave some trouble, but the lack of 

effective enemy opposition permitted U.S. 

armor to gain up to thirty miles a day at 

the end of March. By 2 April, bridgeheads 

had been established across the Werra in 

several places and elements of the Third 

Army were in the city of Kassel. The distance between advanced elements of 

Allied and Russian troops was now less 

than 250 miles. 

Once the forces in the north had established their bridgehead, the signal was 

given for crossings of the Rhine in the 6th 

Army Group area. The Seventh Army 

launched its attack north and south of 

Worms at 0230 on 26 March. Despite a 

sharp enemy reaction north of the city, 

four divisions were across the river by the 

end of the second day of the attack. At this 

time, the Seventh Army estimated that 

there were only 6,000 enemy combat effectives on its front, and indicated that the 

Germans were apparently confused as to 

the location of some of their troops. The 

U.S. army pushed the attack vigorously 

and crossed the Main in several places on 

the 29th. Opposition that developed east 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

of the Main at the close of the month 

temporarily slowed General Patch's advance in that area. Other Seventh Army 

forces crossed the Rhine at Mannheim and 

entered Heidelberg at the beginning of 

April. 

These successes of the U.S. forces 

alarmed General de Lattre. He had been 

told on 27 March to prepare to cross the 

Rhine near Germersheim with the mission 

of seizing Karlsruhe, Pforzheim, and 

Stuttgart, but had been given no date for 

his attack. Fearing that the Seventh Army 

would soon advance into the area earmarked for the French offensive, he prepared to attack at the first opportunity, 

and General de Gaulle encouraged him 

in these efforts. Interpreting Allied delay 

in establishing a French zone of occupation as an indication of unwillingness to 

recognize French claims, de Gaulle was 

determined to seize a sector along the 

Rhine. He wired General de Lattre that 

a rapid crossing of the Rhine by the First 

French Army was "a question of the 

highest national interest." Before receiving this message, the French army commander had already set the date of his assault for the evening of 30-31 March, saying that his decision was conditioned not 

by the degree of preparation needed but 

by the situation caused by the U.S. advance. To the surprise of General Devers, 

who sent word to the French commander 

on 30 March to speed up his plans for an 

offensi ve, General de Lattre announced 

that he would make a crossing the following morning. 62 

Despite the shortness of time for preparation and the lack of sufficient assault 

boats, French forces were put across the 

62 6th A Gp Ltr ofInstr 12, 27 Mar 45, 6th A Gp 

AAR, Mar 45; de Lattre, Histoire de fa Premiere Armee 

Franfaise, pp. 489-91. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RHINELAND 433 

Rhine near Speyer in the early morning 

of 31 March. Other elements crossed the 

same day near Germersheim. Toward 

noon French troops met U.S. armored 

units that had already driven into the area 

de Lattre was supposed to clear. The 

French general felt that his haste had been 

justified inasmuch as “twenty-four hours 

later, the push of fourteen divisions of 

Patch’s army in the direction of the Pforzheim Gap would have condemned us to a 

secondary role in the invasion of the 

Reich.” 63 

The 6th Army Group advances inflicted 

fresh losses on Army Croup G‘s already disorganized forces. By 3 April, the Seventh 

Army was thrown back through the Thueringer Wald. Army Group G found it necessary at this juncture to take over the Nineteenth Army from OB WEST which could 

not regain contact with the army. OKW, 

seemingly unaware of the gravity of the 

situation, demanded that a counterattack 

be sent against the Allies, although it was 

unable to make available any additional 

troops. Instead of sending replacements, 

OKW relieved commanders. The army 

group chief of staff was removed on 2 

April, and the commander in chief two 

days later. General der Infanterie Friedrich Schulz, formerly on the Eastern 

Front, succeeded to the command of Army 

Group G. Hitler demanded that the First 

Army prepare to attack northward to cut 

off the U.S. forces that had pushed to 

Wuerzburg. He asked for two weeks’ time 

in which to prepare jet-propelled fighters 

and “miracle weapons” for use against the 

Allies. Army Group G, now the only highlevel organization in southern Germany, 

could do nothing except carry out a 

planned withdrawal to the Franconian 

and Swabian Albs and then to the 

Danube. 64 

The Supreme Commander was deeply 

gratified by the successes won by his forces 

in the Rhineland. Feeling that his broad 

front policy had been vindicated, he wrote 

General Marshall on 26 March: 

Naturally I am immensely pleased that the 

campaign west of the Rhine that Bradley and 

I planned last summer and insisted upon as 

a necessary preliminary to a deep penetration east of the Rhine, has been carried out 

so closely in accordance with conception. You 

possibly know at one time the C.I.G.S. [Field 

Marshal Brooke] thought I was wrong in 

what I was trying to do and argued heatedly 

on the matter. Yesterday I saw him on the 

banks of the Rhine and he was gracious 

enough to say that I was right, and that my 

current plans and operations are well calculated to meet the current situation. The point 

is that the great defeats, in some cases almost 

complete destruction, inflicted on the German forces west of the Rhine, have left him 

with very badly depleted strength to man 

that formidable obstacle. It was those victories that made possible the bold and relatively easy advances that both the First and 

Third Armies are now making toward Kassel. 

I hope this does not sound boastful, but I 

must admit to a great satisfaction that the 

things that Bradley and I have believed in 

from the beginning and have carried out in 

the face of some opposition from within and 

without, have matured so splendidly. 65 

63 De Lattre, Histoire de la Première Armèe Française, 

64 MS # B–703 (Wilutzky). 

65 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Mar 45, Eisenhower personal file. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 

372, gives a much more extensive account of Field 

Marshal Brooke’s statement than that quoted in this 

letter, which is cited as the source. 

p. 499. 
CHAPTER XXII 

The Battle for the Ruhr 

By the end of March General Eisenhower's armies had crossed the Rhine in 

force and were prepared to encircle the 

Ruhr and to open offensives toward the 

Elbe. Before undertaking these operations, 

however, the Supreme Commander made 

some changes in earlier plans both as to 

the direction of the main thrusts and the 

forces allocated for them. 

A Change of Plans 

Shortly before the attack at Arnhem in 

September 1944, General Eisenhower had 

studied the strategy for Allied forces to follow once they crossed the Rhine and had 

concluded that the main thrust should go 

from the Ruhr to Berlin. Supporting forces 

to accompany this thrust would move forward in "one coordinated, concerted operation." Recognizing that Berlin might be 

in the hands of the Russians before the 

Allies could reach the Elbe, he suggested 

that in such a case, instead of making a 

concentrated drive toward the German 

capital, the 21 Army Group might take 

the Hannover area and the ports near 

Hamburg, the 12th Army Group part or 

all of the Leipzig-Dresden area, and the 

6th Army Group the Augsburg-Munich 

area. 1 

At the end of December when General 

Eisenhower assigned the Ninth Army to 

Field Marshal Montgomery for the drive 

to the Rhine in the area of the Ruhr, the 

spectacular Russian drives of the summer 

of 1944 had come to an end and there appeared to be a chance that some months 

might elapse before the Red armies 

reached Berlin. It is possible that at that 

time the Supreme Commander may have 

intended to let the British retain th~Ninth 

Army for the main drive toward Berlin. 

By the end of March when the Allied 

forces had crossed the Rhine, the changed 

situation in both the east and the west 

prompted him to reconsider his earlier 

plans. Marshal Stalin's full-scale offensive, 

launched in mid-January, had driven the 

Germans back on the Oder. By 11 March, 

SHAEF intelligence sources indicated that 

Marshal Zhukov's spearheads were at 

Seelow, only twenty-eight miles from Berlin. Despite hurried German preparations 

to defend the city, there seemed to be little 

chance that it could hold out against a 

Russian attack. 

Once Berlin was ruled out, there were 

strong reasons for making the main attack 

south and east of the Ruhr. There, with 

the Ruhr cleared, lay the remaining important industrial areas of western Germany. For a number of months, as the 

Ruhr took heavy poundings from Allied 

1 Eisenhower to Bradley, Montgomery, and Devers, 

15 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, 1. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RUHR 

bombers, the enemy had been moving 

important factories to other parts of the 

Reich. SHAEF intelligence experts who 

had suggested in October that the Ruhr 

was losing its industrial importance believed that, even with it in Allied hands, 

"Germany would still be in possession of 

the bulk of her engineering and armament manufacturing facilities-at least 

those sections engaged on processing . . . 

equipment." SHAEF also suggested that 

emphasis be placed on offensives to interfere with rumored enemy plans to build 

a National Redoubt in the mountainous 

area running from western Austria as far 

north as the lakes below Munich and as 

far south as the Italian lakes. While there 

was some feeling in Allied circles that the 

Redoubt existed more in propaganda 

than in fact, Washington was sufficiently 

impressed for General Marshall to suggest at the end of March that U.S. forces 

attack from Nuremberg toward Linz or 

from Karlsruhe toward Munich to prevent the enemy from organizing resistance 

in southern Germany.2 

Although never made explicit, other 

factors undoubtedly played some part in 

influencing the Supreme Commander's 

final decision. The surprise crossings of the 

Rhine at Remagen and Oppenheim· before 

the main assault in the north and the rapid 

exploitation of this advantage in the two 

areas had placed General Bradley's forces 

in a position to playa major role in the 

sweep through Germany. These unexpected strokes of fortune caught the public 

imagination, particularly in the United 

States, and reinforced the 12th Army 

Group commander's request for a larger 

part in the drive to the Elbe than he had 

played in reaching the Rhine. It seems 

probable that General Eisenhower also 

435 

desired to let the 12th Army Group see 

what it could do. He knew that the Montgomery interview of January 1945 still 

"rankled" in General Bradley's mind, and 

that General Marshall felt that the work of 

commanders like General Bradley and 

General Hodges had been neglected by the 

press. 

At the end of March, the Supreme Commander took special pains to underline the 

contri butions of these two officers. Of 

General Bradley, he said: 

He has never once held back in attempting 

any maneuver, no matter how bold in conception and never has he paused to regroup 

when there was opportunity lying on his 

front. His handling of his army commanders 

has been superb and his energy, commonsense, tactical skill and complete loyalty have 

made him a great lieutenant on whom I can 

always rely with the greatest confidence. I 

consider Bradley the greatest battle-line 

commander I have met in this war. 

Of Hodges, he wrote that from the end of 

February "his drive, clear-headed and 

tactical skill have shone even more 

brightly than they did in his great pursuit 

across France, in which First Army's part 

was the most difficult given to any United 

States formation but brilliantly and 

speedily executed, often against much resistance." General Eisenhower added that 

he had no desire to detract from the work 

of other commanders, all of whom had 

performed "in a splendid manner," but he 

felt that the First Army's work had been 

overlooked in the headlines and that 

others had received credit for things that 

Bradley and Hodges were primarily responsible for. In the light of this belief, it 

2 SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 51, II Mar 45, 

SHAEF G-2 file. Marshall to Eisenhower, W-593 15, 

27 Mar 45; Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD 18273,28 

Mar 45. Both in Eisenhower personal file. 
436 

is not surprising to find him giving the 

main offensive to them. 3 

On 28 March, after Field Marshal 

Montgomery had outlined plans for the 

21 Army Group together with the Ninth 

U.S. Army to drive to the Elbe in the area 

north of Magdeburg, General Eisenhower 

announced that General Bradley's forces 

would make the main offensive east of the 

Rhine. The Supreme Commander approved existing arrangements, whereby 

the Ninth Army, while still under 21 

Army Group command, and the First 

Army were to encircle the Ruhr. On completion of that mission, the Ninth Army 

was to revert to the 12th Army Group, 

which was to assume the tasks of mopping up and occupying the Ruhr, and 

making the major Allied thrust along the 

axis Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden to link up 

with the Russians. Thus the decisive role, 

which Field Marshal Montgomery had 

planned for his forces, and to which he 

believed the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

had given general sanction, was changed. 4 

Instead, the lesser task of protecting General Bradley's northern flank during the 

offensive in central Germany was given to 

him, although he was to have the use of 

the Ninth Army if he needed it after the 

Allies had reached the Elbe. To the south 

of the 12th Army Group, General Devers 

was ordered to protect the right flank of 

the main advance and he prepared to 

move through the Danube valley to link 

up with the Russians. 5 

Undoubtedly disappointed at General 

Eisenhower's decision, Field Marshal 

Montgomery asked permission to keep the 

Ninth Army until his forces reached the 

Elbe, since he felt that a shift at the moment would delay the great movement 

which was developing. The Supreme 

Commander held firm to his decision, exTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

plaining that General Bradley would need 

elements of both the Ninth and First 

Armies to clear the Ruhr. before starting 

his push to the Elbe. Further, since the 

12th Army Group commander intended to 

bring up the Fifteenth U.S. Army to assume the occupation duties of the First 

and Ninth Armies in the Rhineland, he 

would need control of the three armies in 

order to co-ordinate their relief. 6 

Encircling the Ruhr 

The operation to encircle the Ruhr was 

basically unaffected by the changes announced by the Supreme Commander on 

28 March, since the First Army attack 

3 Marshall to Eisenhower, WX-57751, 23 Mar 45; 

Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD 18341, 30 Mar 45. 

Both in Eisenhower personal file. Field Marshal 

Montgomery in Normandy to the Baltic, p. 210, suggests that the change was made "as a result of the 

general enemy situation, and particularly in view of 

the rapid American success following the seizure of 

the Remagen bridge .... " 

4 See preceding chapter for the discussion by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff at Malta. It appears that 

General Eisenhower's explanatory statement relative 

to his future operations applies to the field marshal's 

thrust across the Rhine north of the Ruhr and not 

to the advance after the encirclement of the Ruhr. 

5 Eisenhower to CCS, 27 Mar 45; Montgomery to 

Eisenhower, M-562, 27 Mar 45; Eisenhower to 

Montgomery, FWD 18272, 28 Mar 45; Eisenhower 

to Devers, 26 Mar 45. All in Eisenhower personal 

file. 21 A Gp Ltr of Intentions, M-563, 28 Mar 45, 

SHAEF SGS 381 Post OVERLORD Planning, III. 

6 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-562/1, 27 Mar 

45; Eisenhower to Montgomery, FWD 18389,31 Mar 

45. Both in Eisenhower personal file. The Fifteenth 

Army, headed by Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, had 

become operational on 6 January 1945. Its main purpose was to handle occupation duties for the other 

American armies. Among the other duties which it 

held at various times in 1945 were controlling the 

SHAEF reserve, surveying the line of the Meuse with 

a view to assuming responsibility for its d'efense, planning the occupation of the Bremen-Bremerhaven 

enclave, planning the organization of the Berlin District headquarters, and assuming on 31 March 1945 

from the 12th Army Group the responsibility for 

containing enemy forces in Lorieni and St. Nazaire. 

History of the FIfteenth Army. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RUHR 437 

MAP 9 

south of the area was already under way 

and making good progress, and little was 

needed except co-ordination between it 

and the Ninth Army offensive. On the 

28th the 12th Army Group changed the 

First Army’s planned advance northeast 

of Kassel to a drive almost directly north 

from positions already attained on the 

Siegen–Giessen line, and on the 29th General Simpson ordered his forces to establish contact with General Hodges’ forces 

then attacking toward Paderborn. (Map9) 

Allied progress in the Ruhr area had 

been aided greatly by the enemy’s miscal- 
438 

culations and by the general deterioration 

of his position east of the Rhine. Field 

Marshal Model, the Army Group B commander, had shifted his forces shortly before the crossings of 24 March to meet an 

anticipated drive to the north by U.S. 

forces from the Remagen bridgehead. He 

was thus out of position to meet any attack 

directed eastward. Model counterattacked 

to close gaps on his army group's front, 

and he attempted to bring up some reserves, but the First Army's armored attacks of 25 March began to break through 

his positions before any reinforcements 

could arrive. He failed in his efforts to halt 

the advance on a line of resistance between 

the Sieg and the Lahn and soon found that 

he was virtually out of touch with his disorganized forces. Worse still, his army 

group lost all connection with Army Group 

G to the south, and there was danger that 

the Allied advance in the north, which 

seemed to proceed "like a peacetime maneuver, executed with all technical means 

of modern warfare," would soon separate 

his forces from the army group in the 

north. On 27 March, when he suggested 

withdrawing part of his forces behind the 

Sieg while holding on the Rhine front, he 

was informed that Hitler, trying to organize a new army east of the Ruhr, had 

prohibited on pain of death any further 

withdrawals or loss of inhabited localities. 

On Model's north, Army Group H was 

hard hit by the 21 Army Group crossings, 

and its collapse appeared to be a matter of 

days. In that event, an Allied thrust eastward into central Germany and northward in the direction of Bremen and Hamburg seemed possible. Seeking to restore 

its position, Army Group H suggested that it 

be allowed to withdraw from the areas 

threatened by encirclement. It asked permission to stop the First Army's breakTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

through of Army Group B, which was 

endangering its southern flank, to establish a Weser River defense position, and to 

withdraw troops and supplies from most of 

the Netherlands in order to use them in 

building up a new defense front in the 

northeast tip of the country. OKW rejected these requests, ordering all forces to 

hold in place with the means available. 

Except for the promise of some training 

units from Denmark, there appeared to 

be little prospect for reinforcements. 7 

Forbidden to withdraw to new positions, and unable to build up tenable 

positions when they were forced to fall 

back, the Germans could neither stop nor 

escape the relentless advance of Allied 

forces. Armored elements of the First and 

Ninth Armies, intent on a link-up, made 

contact on 1 April at Lippstadt, just west 

of the agreed-onjunction point ofPaderborn, to complete what General Eisenhower has described as "the largest double 

envelopment in history." 8 Caught in the 

Ruhr Pocket were Army Group B, with most 

of the forces in its Fifth Panzer and Fifteenth 

Armies, and elements of Ar"!y Group H's 

First Parachute Army. Seven corps and the 

major elements of nineteen divisions plus 

some 100,000 antiaircraft personnel were 

included in an enemy force which totaled 

nearly one third of a million men. The 

pocket comprised nearly 4,000 square 

miles between the Sieg River in the south 

and the Lippe River in the north, measuring some fifty-five miles from north to 

south and seventy miles from east to west. 9 

7 MS # B-593 (Wagener); MS # B-414 (Geyer); 

MS # C-020 (Schramm). 

8 Report by the Supreme Commander, p. 104. 

"FUSA Rpt of Opns, 23 Feb-':S May 45, Vol. I; 

Conquer: The Story of Ninth Army, p. 269. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE RUHR 439 

The Ruhr Pocket 

The Supreme Commander returned the 

Ninth Army to the 12th Army Group on 

4 April. In anticipation of the move, 

representatives of First and Ninth Armies 

had already set an interarmy boundary 

along the line of the Ruhr River–Nuttlar– 

Ruethen–Paderborn and agreed that General Simpson’s forces were to clear the industrial area north of the Ruhr River, 

while the First Army took the rugged terrain to the south. 

Inside the pocket, Field Marshal Model 

dismissed the possibility of surrender so 

long as he could pin down Allied forces 

that might be used elsewhere, but he discounted the possibility of getting large 

groups out of the area in the face of Allied 

air and armored attacks. As for the 

chances of holding the pocket for any 

length of time, he found that rations were 

estimated to be sufficient to supply the 

troops and civil population in the area for 

three or four weeks and that there was 

ammunition for two to three weeks if a 

major battle could be avoided. Some fuel 

was available for vehicles. The area was 

fairly well suited for defense, protected as 

it was on three sides by the Lippe, Rhine, 

and Sieg Rivers. The army group commander attempted initially to reinforce the 

eastern sector of the pocket in the hope 

that aid could be brought into that area 

from the east or that his forces might break 

out in small groups, but these hopes diminished steadly after the fall of Muenster and 

Gotha in the first week of April. For the 

most part, the troops of Army Group B offered little resistance and pulled back 

when faced by a strong attack. Fears that 

they might adopt a scorched earth policy 

as they withdrew brought pleas from German industrialists that the remaining resources of the area be spared. There is 

evidence that OKW orders for widespread 

destruction of plants and communications 

were read and not passed on by Model in 

this period. 10 

At the beginning of April, Secretary of 

War Stimson made efforts to spare the 

Ruhr industrial facilities any further loss, 

expressing fears about the economic future 

of Europe if more damage was inflicted on 

the Ruhr. He wondered if it was necessary 

for military purposes to destroy the remaining industry in the area. Admirals 

Leahy and King questioned whether General Eisenhower should be bothered with 

that problem in the midst of his battle, but 

General Marshall decided to seek an 

unofficial opinion. In so doing he avoided 

any effort to limit the Supreme Commander’s future action and said that it was 

assumed that he would proceed in “the 

manner best adapted to the security and 

rapidity of the thrusts into Germany.” The 

U.S. Army Chief of Staff added that he 

had no views on the subject “except that I 

think the fat is probably in the fire and 

whatever the political conclusions it is too 

late, too impracticable to take any action 

for such reason.” General Eisenhower, 

who regarded “the substantial elimination 

of the enemy forces in the Ruhr as a military necessity” was nonetheless preparing 

to bypass the built-up areas as much as 

possible and to avoid useless or unnecessary damage to existing industrial facilities. 

Great damage had already been done by 

heavy bombers, but he realized that the 

remaining assets should be preserved. He 

noted that, save for support of tactical operations, air attacks had virtually ceased. 11 

10 MS # B-593 (Wagener); MS # (C–020 

(Schramm). 

11 Marshall to Eisenhower, W–64236, 6 Apr 45; 

Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD 18697, 7 Apr 45. Both 

in SHAEF cbl log. 
440 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

In preparation for the final offensive to 

destroy the German armies in the pocket, 

the Fifteenth U.S. Army on 1 April took 

over the occupation duties of the First and 

Ninth Armies on the west bank of the 

Rhine from Bonn to Neuss. It was directed 

to extend its defensive sector on the west 

bank to Homberg by 5 April and be prepared to occupy, organize, and govern the 

Rheinprovinz, Saarland, Pfalz, and Rheinhessen as the eastward advance of the 

Allied forces uncovered these areas, 12 

Two corps of the First Army and one 

corps and part of another of the Ninth 

Army on 6 April undertook the task of reducing the Ruhr Pocket, while the remainder of the two armies drove toward 

the Elbe. Two days later, advance elements of the two armies driving from the 

north and south of the pocket linked up. 

Pressing from the north, east, and south, 

the Allied divisions by mid-April had reduced the territory held by the enemy to 

an area with a twenty-eight mile diameter. 

Available ammunition and food had now 

decreased to an estimated three days’ supply, but Field Marshal Model still rejected 

suggestions by members of his staff that he 

capitulate. Despite this resolution, he 

could not stop the U.S. armies. On 14 

April, General Simpson’s forces ended all 

German resistance north of the Ruhr 

River and General Hodges’ units divided 

the forces remaining south of the river into 

two main pockets. 

In the face of these disasters, OKW ordered Army Group B to break out of the 

pocket. The message was read and simply 

filed, for the events of the day had made 

action useless. On 15 April, the First Army 

broadened the point of contact with the 

Ninth Army at the Ruhr and turned both 

to the west and east to crush the remaining 

opposition. With defeat obviously a few 

days or hours away, the Germans adopted 

a novel procedure to avoid formal capitulation. On the morning of 17 April, they 

announced the dissolution of Army Group B. 

The extremely young and the very old soldiers were dismissed from the service and 

told to return home. The remaining officers and men were told they could stay to 

be overrun and then surrender, could try 

to make their way home in uniform or 

civilian clothes and without weapons, or 

try to break through to another front. 

Field Marshal Model thus did not have to 

take responsibility for a surrender. He disappeared from the scene shortly thereafter 

and no trace of him was subsequently 

found, although members of his staff testified that he committed suicide 13 . 

Organized resistance in the Ruhr district ended on the morning of 18 April. In 

the approximately three weeks since they 

had encircled the area, Allied forces had 

taken more than 317,000 German prisoners, including twenty-four generals and 

an admiral. The enemy’s token resistance 

had not interfered effectively with the 

Allied sweep to the east. Although parts of 

four corps had to be left to deal with the 

pocket, General Bradley’s forces raced on 

without major difficulty to the Elbe. 14 

12 FUSA Rpt of Opns, 23 Feb-8 May 45; History of 

the Fifteenth Army, pp. 39–50, 

13 MS # B-593 (Wagener): MS # C–020 

(Schramm); Daily Sitrep West, 16 Apr 45. OKH 

Operations Abteilung, KTB (Draft) 16–24.IV. 45, 17 

Apr 45. 

14 FUSA Rpt of Opns, 23 Feb-8 May 45; Conquer: 

The Story pf Ninth Army, Ch. VII. 
CHAPTER XXIII 

The Drive to the Elbe 

The battle for the Ruhr, however great 

the number of men involved, was but an 

episode in the campaigns of April which 

saw most of western and central Germany 

overrun and occupied by Allied forces. In 

less time than it took to bring resistance to 

an end in the pocket, elements of one army 

reached the Elbe, and others were within 

a few days of a junction with the Russians 

and entry into Czechoslovakia and Austria. As victory appeared only a few weeks 

away, the tactical considerations of the 

battle for Germany began to recede and 

political factors to take their place. But, 

ironically, the very period in which political guidance was perhaps the most needed 

was the one in which only the field commander could exercise real control. The 

British Chiefs of Staff tried doggedly to inject a note of political realism into the 

situation, but found that remote control of 

a battlefield stretching from the North Sea 

to the Italian Alps was well-nigh impossible, especially when the U.S. President 

and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff preferred to 

lea ve the final stages of the battle in the 

hands of the Supreme Commander. 

Shall It Be Berlin? 

In no respect was the difference in British and U.S. viewpoints more clearly 

shown than in the case of Berlin. The Supreme Commander in mid-September 

had looked on the German capital as his 

ultimate objective, but by late March he 

had decided to direct his main drive toward Leipzig instead to link up with the 

Russians. This decision displeased the 

British because it meant the abandonment 

of Berlin as the objective and minimized 

the 21 Army Group's share in the offensive. It was made more unpalatable when 

on 28 March General Eisenhower asked 

the Allied military missions in Moscow to 

inform Marshal Stalin of his change in 

plans. The British Chiefs of Staff felt that 

the Supreme Commander, in informing 

the Russians directly of his decision, had 

not only made a political mistake but had 

also exceeded his powers. They promptly 

proposed that the Allied missions in Moscow be told to hold up delivery of later 

amplifications of SHAEF plans. If the 

Russians had already received these plans, 

the British said, they should be asked to 

delay their answer until the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff could discuss the matter. 1 

Sharply rejecting the British proposal as 

one that would discredit or at least lower 

the prestige of a highly successful commander in the field, the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff said that any modification in the initial communication should be made, if at 

all, by the Supreme Commander, whose 

I Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 252, 

28 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS 373.5 Bomb line, Liaison, 

and Co-ordination of Fronts, I; Memo by Br COS 

(Plan of Campaign in Western Europe), CCS 805, 29 

Mar 45, ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), Sec I-D. Eisenhower to Prime Minister, F\VD 18334,30 Mar 45; 

Prime Minister to Eisenhower, 2072, 31 Mar 45. Both 

in Eisenhower personal file. 
442 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

proposals they found to be in line with 

agreed-on strategy and with his initial directive. In what might be interpreted as a 

dig at the strategic views of the British 

Chiefs of Staff and Field Marshal Montgomery, they pointed to the battle in the 

Rhineland as a vindication of the Supreme 

Commander’s military judgment. There, 

while the northern drive was making 

good, the secondary drive, which General 

Eisenhower had insisted on against British 

opposition, had achieved an outstanding 

success and had made it possible for the 

Northern Group of Armies to accelerate 

its drive across the north German plain. 

The U.S. Chiefs were willing to ask the 

Supreme Commander for an amplification 

of his plan and for a delay of further messages to Moscow until he had heard from 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but they indicated that any change in their view that 

his ideas were sound was unlikely. Rather, 

they believed that the battle for Germany 

had reached the point “where the commander in the field is the best judge of the 

measures which offer the earliest prospects 

of destroying the German armies or their 

power to resist.” 2 

The British were dismayed by the US. 

Chiefs’ reaction. The Prime Minister assured both President Roosevelt and General Eisenhower that the British had no 

intention of disparaging or lowering the 

prestige of the Supreme Commander, and 

that their reaction had been prompted by 

their concern over plans and procedures 

which apparently left the fortunes of a million British troops to be settled without 

reference to British authority. 3 He added 

that he felt the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had 

done less than justice to British efforts in 

the war. The British had suffered Severe 

losses in holding the hinge of the attacks at 

both Caen and Wesel, but because of the 

nature of their task they had not shown 

the spectacular gains made by the US. 

forces. He favored an advance to the Elbe 

at the highest speed, but hoped that the 

shift in direction would not destroy the 

weight and momentum of Montgomery’s 

drive and leave the British forces in an almost static condition along the Elbe when 

and if they reached it. 

Turning now from Eisenhower’s plans 

as they affected the 2 1 Army Group, the 

Prime Minister spoke of the political factors involved in a failure to drive to Berlin. 

He declared: 

Having dealt with and I trust disposed of 

these misunderstandings between the truest 

friends and comrades that ever fought side by 

side as Allies, I venture to put to you a few 

considerations upon the merits of the changes in our original plans now desired by General 

Eisenhower. . . . I say quite frankly that 

Berlin remains of high strategic importance. 

Nothing will exert a psychological effect of 

despair upon all German forces of resistance 

equal to that of the fall of Berlin. It will be 

the supreme signal of defeat to the German 

people. On the other hand, if left to itself to 

maintain a siege by the Russians among its 

ruins and as long as the German flag flies 

there, it will animate the resistance of all Germans under arms. 

There is moreover another aspect which it 

is proper for you and me to consider. The 

Russian armies will no doubt overrun all 

Austria and enter Vienna. If they also take 

Berlin, will not their impression that they 

have been the overwhelming contributor to 

our common victory be unduly imprinted in 

their minds, and may this not lead them into 

a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future? I therefore consider that from a political standpoint we 

2 Memo by JCS, CCS 805,2, 30 Mar 45, ABC 384 

Europe (5 Aug 43), Sec 1-D. 

3 Churchill to Eisenhower, 2072. 31 Mar 45; 

Churchill to Eisenhower, 2096, 2 Apr 45. Both in 

Eisenhower personal file. Churchill to Roosevelt, 931, 

1 Apr 45, Incl to CCS 805, 29 Mar 45, ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 431, Sec 1-D. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE 

should march as far east into Germanv as 

possible and that should Berlin be in' our 

grasp we should certainly take it. This also 

appears sound on military grounds. 4 

Both the President and the Supreme 

Commander denied any American intent 

to underestimate British contributions to 

the campaigns in northwest Europe. Mr. 

Roosevelt explained that the U.S. insistence on upholding the Supreme Commander was an enunciation of a wellknown military principle rather than an 

anti-British reaction. The unfortunate 

impression that the U.S. Chiefs had reflected on the performances of the 21 

Army Group arose, he thought, from the 

U.S. Chiefs' failure to stress factors such as 

military obstacles and the strength and 

quality of opposing forces which had contributed to the difficulties facing Field 

Marshal Montgomery's forces. The President said he could not see that the Supreme Commander's plans involved any 

far-reaching change from the plan approved at Malta. He expressed regret that 

the Prime Minister should have been worried by the phrasing of a formal paper, but 

regretted even more that "at the moment 

of a great victory we should become involved in such unfortunate reactions." 5 

General Eisenhower, "disturbed, if not 

hurt" at the suggestion that he had any 

thought of relegating the British forces to 

a restricted sphere, assured the Prime 

Minister that "nothing is further from my 

mind and I think my record over two and 

one-half years of commanding Allied 

forces should eliminate any such idea." 

The current offensive had been selected as 

the one which would contribute most effectively to the disintegration of the 

remaining enemy forces and the German 

power to resist. Once the Allies reached 

the Elbe, he thought it probable that U.S. 

443 

forces would be shifted to Field Marshal 

Montgomery, who would then be sent 

across the river in the north and to a line 

reaching at least to Luebeck on the Baltic 

coast. If German opposition crumbled 

progressively, there seemed to be little difference between gaining the central position and crossing the Elbe. If resistance 

stiffened, however, it was vital for the 

Allies not to be dispersed. Inasmuch as 

British and Canadian forces were to advance in exactly the same zones that had 

been planned by Field Marshal Montgomery, Eisenhower saw no reason why 

the role, actions, or prestige of those forces 

should be materially decreased by the shift 

of the Ninth Army from Montgomery's to 

Bradley's command. The maximum extent to which the plans might be affected 

was in a possible short delay in making a 

powerful thrust across the Elbe. As for the 

drive to Berlin, the Supreme Commander 

made no promises. If it could be brought 

into the Allied orbit, he declared, honors 

would be equally shared between the British and U.S. forces. 6 

Although his suggested plan for Field 

Marshal Montgomery to retain the Ninth 

Army and to march to the Elbe and then 

to Berlin had not been accepted, Mr. 

Churchill said that changes in the earlier 

strategy were fewer than he had initially 

believed. He assured the President that relations with General Eisenhower were still 

of the most friendly nature and concluded 

with what he described as one of his few 

• Churchill to Roosevelt, 931, 1 Apr 45, Inc! to CCS 

805, 29 Mar 45, ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), Sec 

I-D. 

o Draft of msg, President to Prime Minister (with 

notation "Dispatched as is per White House"), in reply to msg of I Apr 45, ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 

Sec I-D. 

• Eisenhower to Churchill, FWD 18428, 1 Apr 45, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
444 

Latin quotations: "Amantium irae amoris 

integratio est." The War Department 

promptly turned this happy token ofrestored good relations into English-

" Lovers' quarrels are a part oflove" -and 

sent it to General Eisenhower. 7 

Mr. Churchill's words ended the discussion over the 21 Army Group's past contributions to Allied victory and its role in 

future campaigns, but did not dispose of 

the question of Berlin and the relations of 

the Western Allies with the USSR. Made 

suspicious by the alacrity with which Marshil Stalin agreed to General Eisenhower's 

decision to drive for Leipzig instead of 

Berlin and by Russian agreement that 

Berlin was no longer of strategic importance, the British Chiefs of Staff urged that 

this phase of the Supreme Commander's 

program be reconsidered. Since they felt 

that it was primarily a matter more of political than of military importance, they 

asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

remind the Supreme Commander of the 

desirability of taking Berlin. Apparently 

wishing to avoid any further communications to Moscow on the subject before the 

Combined Chiefs could pass on it, the 

British also asked that a proper procedure 

for communicating with the USSR be laid 

down for SHAEF. They stressed that 

proper channels for dealing with the Russians were from heads of states to heads of 

states, and from high command to high 

command, and they indicated their belief 

that sufficient time existed for normal 

channels to be used. 8 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff pointed to the 

eight days which had been consumed in 

discussions over General Eisenhower's announcement of plans on 28 March as evidence that committee action could not 

effectively deal with operational matters 

at the speed they were then developing. 

"As the situation stands today," they deTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

elared, "the center is a pocket, the right is 

rapidly moving and the left is making progress. Overnight, this situation may 

change. Even now air forces are overlapping in their offensive against the enemy. 

Only Eisenhower is in a position to know 

how to fight his battle, and to exploit to 

the full the changing situation." Nor were 

they disturbed by General Eisenhower's 

failure to send his plans to Marshal Stalin 

through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. His 

message to the Red leader had gone to 

him as head of the Soviet armed forces and 

not as head of the state and, therefore, was 

not outside normal channels. While it was 

true that he could have dealt instead with 

the Red Army Chief of Staff, experience 

had shown that any attempt to get decisions on a level lower than Stalin's met interminable and unacceptable delays. 

Instead of agreeing to bar direct dealings 

with the Russians, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

proposed that the Supreme Commander 

be authorized to communicate directly 

with the Soviet military authority on all 

matters requiring co-ordination of Russian 

and Allied operations. 9 

On the broader political question of getting to Berlin before the Russians, the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff reacted as they had done 

formerly in regard to proposals of Balkan 

operations. Their view was that the busi7 Churchill to Roosevelt, 933, 5 Apr 45; Marshall 

to Eisenhower, W-64244, 6 Apr 45, Eisenhower personal file. 

S Memo by representatives of Br COS, CCS 805/4, 

4 Apr 45, and Inc! A, Mil Mission Moscow to WD 

(Msg, Stalin to Eisenhower), MX-23588, I Apr 45, 

ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), Sec I-D. 

9 Memo by jCS, CCS 805/5, 6 Apr 45, ABC 384 

Europe (5 Aug 43), Sec I-D. General Eisenhower was 

informed of this memorandum and of the British note 

which prompted it in Marshall to Eisenhower, W64349, 6 Apr 45, Eisenhower personal file. SHAEF 

G-3 Division said on II April 1945 that the cable 

constituted authority for the Supreme Commander to 

communicate directly with the Soviet high command. 

The secretary of the general staff thought that suffi-
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE 445 

ness of the armed forces was to get the war 

ended as soon as possible and not to worry 

about the matter of prestige which would 

come from entering a particular capital. 

Militarily there was the strongest basis 

for such a view. At the time, when it appeared clear that the U.S. forces could not 

possibly outrace the Russians for the German capital, when it was already known 

that the Russian occupation would reach 

far west of the Elbe and that anything 

taken by the Allies east of that river would 

have to be evacuated,” when the Allies 

still faced a strong foe in the Pacific against 

whom it was then supposed that Russian 

help would be needed, there was little disposition on the part of the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff to push to Berlin. The President, who 

at Yalta had made concessions in various 

parts of the world to the Russians apparently to insure their aid against Japan, 

would probably not have agreed with the 

U.S. Chiefs had they taken the opposite 

view. It is not clear whether the matter 

was ever presented to Mr. Roosevelt, who 

was then at Warm Springs, Georgia, where 

he was to die in less than a week. The U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff in a statement of their views 

which may have reflected the President’s 

thinking, said, “Such psychological and 

political advantages as would result from 

the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the 

Russians should not override the imperative military consideration, which in our 

opinion is the destruction and dismembercient authority had already been granted in the Combined Chiefs of Staff cable of December authorizing 

the Supreme Commander to send representatives to 

Stalin (CCS to SHAEF, FACS 118, 26 Dec 44, OPD 

cbl files [TS]). To make certain that no objection 

would be made on political grounds, SHAEF section 

chiefs were instructed to send all cables in future to 

the Soviet high command and not directly to Marshal 

Stalin. Nevins to DAC G–3, 11 Apr 45; Nevins to 

DAC G–3, 12 Apr 45; DAC G–3 to Sec Chiefs, 15 

Apr 45. All in SHAEF G–3 321.3-1 Correspondence 

and Communication with the Russians. 

ment of the German armed forces.” 11 

General Eisenhower had discussed the 

military considerations involved in the 

drive to Berlin with General Bradley 

shortly after the Allies had crossed the 

Rhine. Impressed by the fact that nearly 

two hundred miles separated the Allied 

bridgehead from the Elbe, and that fifty 

miles of lowlands, covered by streams, 

lakes and canals, separated the Elbe from 

Berlin, the 12th Army Group commander 

had said that it might cost 100,000 casualties to break through from the Elbe to Berlin. Viewing Berlin as a political prize 

only, and not wishing to take a U.S. army 

from his front in order to reinforce a drive 

by Field Marshal Montgomery to reach 

Berlin, he said that the estimated casualties were “a pretty stiff price to pay for a 

prestige objective, especially when we’ve 

got to fall back and let the other fellow 

take over.” 12 

10 This did not apply to Berlin, which was to be 

held jointly by the Western Allies and the Russians. 

It is questionable that the knowledge of the zones constituted the main factor in SHAEF’s thinking at the 

time. General Eisenhower wrote in 1948: 

“I already knew of the Allied political agreements 

that divided Germany into post-hostilities occupational zones. . . . ............... 

“The future division of Germany did not influence 

our military plans for the final conquest of the country. Military plans, I believed, should be devised with 

the single aim of speeding victory; by later adjustment 

troops of the several nations could be concentrated 

into their own national sectors.” Crusade in Europe, p. 

396. See also below, pp. 463-66. 

11 Memo by JCS, CCS 805/5, 6 Apr 45, ABC 384 

Europe (5 Aug 43), Sec 1-D. 

12 Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 535-36. In a significant statement, General Bradley says of this reaction: “Had Eisenhower even contemplated sending 

Montgomery ahead to Berlin, he would have had to 

reinforce that British flank with not less than one 

American Army. I could see no political advantage 

accruing from the capture of Berlin, that would offset 

the need for quick destruction of the German Army 

on our front. As soldiers we looked naively on the 

British inclination to complicate the war with political 

foresight and nonmilitary objectives.” Pp. 535-36. 
446 

The Supreme Allied Commander informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 

7 April of his reluctance to make Berlin a 

major objective now that it had lost much 

of its military importance. It was much 

more important, he felt, to divide the 

enemy west of the Elbe by making a central thrust to Leipzig, and to establish the 

Allied left flank on the Baltic coast near 

Luebeck to prevent Russian occupation of 

Schleswig-Holstein. His indication of wi 1-

lingness in the case of Luebeck to carryon 

an operation to forestall the Russians did 

not mean that he was weakening on his 

decision as to Berlin. He said that, if after 

the taking of Leipzig it appeared that he 

could push on to Berlin at low cost, he was 

willing to do so. "But," he added: 

I regard it as militarily unsound at this stage 

of the proceedings to make Berlin a major 

objective, particularly in view ofthe fact that 

it is only 35 miles from the Russian lines. I 

am the first to admit that a war is waged in 

pursuance of political aims, and ifthe Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the 

Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely 

military considerations in this theater, I 

would cheerfully readjust my plans and my 

thinking so as to carry out such an operation. 13 

Admiral Leahy has written that there is 

no evidence in his notes that the Combined Chiefs of Staff ever took up the question of the move on Berlin, and there 

seems to be little doubt that the decision 

was left by them to the Supreme Commander. 14 Despite the feeling of the British, the way had been left open to a purely 

military decision on Berlin. That decision 

was made clear by the Supreme Commander on 8 April when Field Marshal 

Montgomery requested ten U.S. divisions 

for a main thrust toward Luebeck and 

Berlin. Betraying a note of impatience, 

General Eisenhower declared: "You must 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

not lose sight of the fact that during the 

advance to Leipzig you have the role of 

protecting Bradley's northern flank. It is 

not his role to protect your southern flank. 

My directive is quite clear on this point. 

Naturally, if Bradley is delayed, and you 

feel strong enough to push out ahead of 

him in the advance to the Elbe, this will 

be to the good." Agreeing that the push to 

Luebeck and Kiel should be made after 

the El be had been reached, he asked how 

many U.S. divisions Montgomery would 

need for that operation omitting Danish 

operations and the push to Berlin. Of the 

taking of the German capital the Supreme 

Commander said: "As regards Berlin I am 

quite ready to admit that it has political 

and psychological significance but of far 

greater importance will be the location of 

the remaining German forces in relation 

to Berlin. It is on them that I am going to 

concentrate my attention. Naturally, if! 

get an opportunity to capture Berlin 

cheaply, I will take it."15 

The Berlin question was raised once 

more before the Russians captured the 

city. On that occasion, a U.S. commander, 

General Simpson, having reached the 

Elbe, suggested that he be permitted to go 

to the German capital. The Supreme 

13 Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD 18710,7 Apr 45, 

Eisenhower personal file. Many of the points were 

stated in an earlier message, Eisenhower to Marshall, 

SHAEF 260, 31 Mar 45, ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 

Sec I-D. 

14 Leahy, I Was There, p. 351. General Eisenhower 

in a letter to the author, 20 February 1952, said, "So 

far as my memory serves, I believe it is correct that the 

7 April message was not answered by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff." 

15 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-568, 6 Apr 45; 

Eisenhower to Montgomery, 8 Apr 45. Both in Eisenhower personal file. Field Marshal Montgomery replied: "It is quite clear to me what you want. I will 

crack along the north flank 100 per cent and will do 

all I can to draw the enemy forces away from the 

main effort being made by Bradley." Montgomery to 

Eisenhower, M-I070, Eisenhower personal file. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE 

Commander instead ordered that he hold 

on the Elbe while turning his units northward in the direction of Luebeck and 

southward toward the National Redoubt 

area. In informing the 'War Department 

of this action, General Eisenhower said 

that not only were those objectives vastly 

more important than Berlin but that to 

plan for an immediate effort against Berlin "would be foolish in view of the relative situation of the Russians and ourselves. . . . While it is true we have 

seized a small bridgehead over the Elbe, it 

must be remembered that only our spearheads are up to that river; our center of 

gravity is well back of there." 1(; 

The Area and the Enemy 

The Allied drives from positions east of 

the Rhine to the Elbe were channelized to 

a considerable degree by four main geographical zones: the Northern Lowland, 

the Loess Belt, the Central Upland, and 

the Bavarian Plateau. (Map VI) The first, 

through which elements of the Canadian 

and British armies advanced, extends westward into the Low Countries and eastward into Poland with its northern border 

on the North Sea and Denmark, and 

its southern border south of Berlin. The 

north west sector of the region is extremely 

fiat. The Loess Belt, which was invaded by 

Second British Army and some elements 

ofthe Ninth and First Armies, lies between 

the Ruhr and the Elbe and is drained by 

the Weser and the Leine. It is mainly undulating and marked by open country, 

hedgeless fields, and absence of streams at 

its western end, west of Kassel. The Central Upland, through which most ofthe 

First Army and a part of Third Army 

traveled, covers the central part of Germany. It consists of "forest highlands, low 

447 

wooded scarps and open treeless plateaus." 

The Bavarian Plateau, a large triangular 

region lying between the Alps to the south, 

the Schwaebische Alb to the northwest, 

and the Bavarian and Bohemian forest 

uplands to the northeast, consists in the 

west of open arable lands marked with 

woods, marshes, and lakes, and in the east 

of rolling country. Elements of the Third, 

Seventh, and First French Armies went 

through these sectors. 

After considering these terrain features, 

SHAEF planners concluded as early as 

September 1944 that it was possible for the 

enemy to set up defenses along the 'river 

lines in the north, in the central mountains 

east of Frankfurt and Karlsruhe, and 

along prepared positions in the forest areas 

of the south. Through most of the mountain barriers, however, there were roads 

that, except in the heavy snows of the 

higher mountainous areas, were passable 

throughout the year. It was fairly clear to 

SHAEF that the enemy could make little 

use of terrain features east of the Rhine to 

stop an Allied offensive toward the Elbe. 17 

Despite the defensive limitations of the 

central German terrain, it still offered 

more serious resistance to the Allied advance on most fronts than did the German 

Army. The disorganization and weakness 

of the enemy forces which had been observed before the crossings of the Rhine 

became constantly greater as the beaten 

units splintered and fell back without any 

prepared positions behind which they 

could regroup or conduct a defense. As a 

consequence of this and other factors 

SHAEF intelligence summaries became 

16 to Marshall, 15 Apr 45, Eisenhower 

personal file; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 537-39, 

17 SHAEF G-3 Appreciation, Factors Affecting the 

Advance Into Germany After the Occupation of the 

Ruhr, 24 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, Post OVERLORD 

Planning, I. 
448 

increasingly optimistic after the beginning 

of April. They spoke of the little opposition offered by an "apathetic and supine" 

citizenry, and named the task of distributing foodstuffs to the inhabitants of captured towns and cities as the chief problem 

confronting the Allies. The possibility that 

German armed forces might fortify an 

area in western Austria, the National Redoubt, was not completely discounted, but 

the Allies tended to minimize the threat as 

their forces continued the advance into 

central Germany. By mid-April there was 

evidence that all but the most fanatic 

Nazis had given up hope of escaping decisive defeat. The intelligence experts assumed that any optimism the enemy might 

have rested on his belief in three possibilities: (1) friction between the Allies and 

the Russians when they met in central 

Germany; (2) a possible fight in the National Redoubt throughout the winter; 

and (3) the emergence of a large-scale 

guerrilla movement throughout the country.18 

The Nature rifthe Pursuit 

The campaign from 1 April until the 

end of the war is likely to be cited frequently in the future because it is replete 

with perfect "book" solutions to military 

problems. It was possible in most cases for 

commanders to set missions for their 

forces, allot troops and supplies, and know 

that their phase lines would be reached. 

Only when objectives were taken far before the hour chosen were the timetables 

upset. By its very nature, therefore, the 

great pursuit across central Germany may 

mislead the student who attempts to draw 

lessons of value for future campaigns. 

Allied superiority in quality of troops, mobility, air power, materiel, and morale was 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

such that only a duplication of the deterioration of enemy forces such as that which 

existed in April 1945 would again make 

possible the type of slashing attack that 

developed. Units were able to leave their 

supply bases far behind, to ask that gasoline supplies be delivered by air some miles 

beyond the positions they then held, to 

ignore wide gaps on their flanks, to leave 

in their rear enemy units which surpassed 

them in numbers, to roam far and wide in 

enemy territory without any adequate intelligence of the enemy situation, to let 

their main lines of communications become jammed with German civilia~s and 

liberated peoples-and still be certain that 

the enemy would give little trouble. Only 

in the last days when the Allied advance 

reached the edge of the dwindling airfields 

of the Reich did the Luftwaffe manage to 

mount occasional small attacks. At best, 

these merely proved annoying at bridge 

sites, and did little to stop even the small 

jeeploads of advance parties which sometimes went ahead of the armor into enemyheld towns. 

The enemy fell apart but waited to be 

overrun. A German high command virtually ceased to exist and even regimental 

headquarters had difficulty in knowing 

the dispositions of their troops or the situation on their flanks. In those instances 

where unit commanders still received Hitler's messages to hold their positions, they 

tended to ignore them as having little relationship to the realities of their situation. 

Expedients such as the calling up of Volkssturm units proved futile. These last hopes 

of Hitler's army readily laid down their 

arms except in a few cases where their resistance was stiffened by SS elements. And 

lS JIC Political Intel Rpt, 6 Apr 45; Rpt on the National Redoubt, 10 Apr 45; Political Intel Rpt, 14 Apr 

45. All in SHARF G-2 JIC SHARF (45) papers. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE 

the general public, which might have 

furnished cadres for guerrilla warfare, 

proved uninterested in partisan activities. 

Near the war's end, civilians in many cities 

sent word that they were ready to surrender and asked that bloodless entries be 

made into their towns. Frequently they 

begged the German military commander 

of their area to evacuate his troops before 

the Allies arri ved, and in a few instances 

they actually helped the Allied troops 

force the local German commander to surrender. The favorite color of enemy towns 

that April was "tattletale grey" as windows were filled with symbols of surrender. 

The great pursuit makes a fascinating 

story. In a few weeks Allied unit journals 

chronicled the names of the great German 

cities, making a catalogue of conquests 

which no previous invader from the west 

had ever compiled in so short a time. Each 

army could boast of thousands of prisoners 

and square miles captured and nearly 

every unit could cite its triumphal parades 

by the score. Even small psychological 

warfare teams or prisoner of war interrogation units could sometimes claim to 

have been first in a village; individual 

jeeploads of soldiers stored up material for 

reminiscences about how they nearly 

reached Berlin or Prague before the Red 

Army. So rapid was the pursuit that official accounts varied greatly. In one sector 

of a large city, one division would be fighting hotly against some rear guard group, 

while elsewhere in the same city another 

Allied division would be marching in 

without any resistance. A town that may 

have been undefended when the first 

Allied reconnaissance elements announced 

their entry sometimes suddenly became 

the center of a short but bitter fight as German units from points west of the town 

were caught withdrawing through it. 

449 

In the eighteen days required to close 

and destroy the Ruhr Pocket the Allied 

forces north and south of that area roared 

on to the Elbe, often against no opposition, 

adding thousands of square miles and 

hundreds of thousands of prisoners to the 

total territory and men taken. The situation was best described by hackneyed 

allusions to the great flood of men and 

tanks that poured through the lands of the 

enemy. These, while diverted occasionally 

by a strong point, reached out to every 

main channel of communication and engulfed the straggling armies, which, 

attempting to reach a place of safety, 

found themselves outraced by the torrent 

which had burst forth from west of the 

Rhine. Enemy strong points, except in the 

Ruhr Pocket and the Harz mountains, 

were of little effect in slowing the Allied 

armies which inundated the mountain 

passes, the plains, and the lowlands of the 

Reich. In their wake was left the wreckage 

of war, the wandering hordes of displaced 

persons, liberated prisoners, and German 

families returning to their homes, clogging 

the road nets and threateningto hold back 

the great motor columns which streamed 

on relentlessly. Those who attempted to 

stop the Allies took on the appearance of 

anxious levee workers who toil frenziedly 

to raise a new barrier of sandbags even as 

the waters lap at their feet, knowing that 

nothing save a miracle can make their belated efforts succeed. Apparently feeling 

that they could not stem the tide, the Germans in most sectors made a half-hearted 

resistance and then merely waited until 

the flood rolled over them. 

Operations in the North 

Because of the wide dispersion of Genera} Eisenhower's forces in April, he was 
450 

usually able during this period to intervene directly only in those cases where 

inter-army-group shifts were required, a 

major change in the direction of an army 

group or army was needed, or a command 

question with political overtones was involved. Even army group, army, and corps 

commanders had difficulty in knowing the 

exact whereabouts of their units at any 

particular time of the day. For the purposes of this narrative it is necessary to 

show only the main outlines of the campaigns of the various army groups and the 

points at which the Supreme Commander 

intervened to an important degree. 

Field Marshal Montgomery, it will be 

recalled, had planned a major drive toward the Elbe by the Second British, First 

Canadian, and Ninth U.S. Armies. On 

the withdrawal of the Ninth Army, the 21 

Army Group commander indicated that 

the mission of General Crerar's army was 

still to open a supply route through Arnhem, to drive northward to clear the 

northeastern and western Netherlands, 

and to move along the coastal belt on the 

Second British Army's left to take the 

Emden-Wilhelmshaven peninsula. General Dempsey's army was still to drive for 

the line of the Elbe in his sector and reduce the ports of Bremen and Hamburg. 19 

The Second British Army scheme of 

maneuver, once the drive to Berlin was 

ruled out, was conditioned by the course 

of the lower Elbe and the location of the 

north German ports. The Elbe, which 

flows almost due north through the area in 

which the Ninth and First Armies were attacking, takes a sharp turn to the northwest near Wittenberg. In attempting to 

clear the left bank ofthe river, therefore, 

the eastbound British columns once they 

reached the Weser and the Aller turned 

sharpl y to the left and ended by driving 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

almost due north to hit the Elbe. Units on 

the extreme left, especially on the Canadian Army front, were directed almost due 

north from the beginning of their attack. 

This shift also put the main body of the 

British Army on the Elbe just south of 

Hamburg and in a position to drive across 

the base of the Jutland peninsula to the 

Baltic. By this means it could cut off an 

enemy retreat from Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein and prevent the area from 

falling into Soviet hands. 

The attack to the Elbe was fairly uneventful by past standards of fighting, the 

right wing bridging the Weser on 5 April 

and sweeping on to the Elbe whose left 

bank it cleared by the 24th. Columns in 

the center and the left met much stiffer 

resistance, particularly along the Dortmund-Ems Canal, but by 26 April they 

had pushed up to the Elbe south of Hamburg, cleared Bremen, and sent columns 

toward the naval base ofCuxhaven. 

On the British left, the First Canadian 

Army was in the process of moving northeast, due north, and west. Driving from a 

bridgehead near Emmerich, one column 

established a bridgehead over the Ems on 

8 April and advanced against some ofthe 

stiffest resistance met in the north during 

this period against the naval bases at 

Emden and Wilhelmshaven. To the west, 

another column driving due north from 

Emmerich linked up with Special Air 

Service units, which had been dropped 

well into the rear of the German lines, and 

drove rapidly to the North Sea. By the end 

of the third week in April, all enemy resistance in the northeastern Netherlands, 

save for small pockets along the Ems 

estuary, had been eliminated. These re-

.. Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 328-38; 

21 A Gp, Operational Dir M-563, 28 Mar 45, General Board files, 21 A Gp Operational Dirs. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE 451 

maining groups surrended by 3 May. 

On the extreme left of the Canadian 

line, newly arrived troops from Italy 

crossed the Neder Rijn on 12 April, cleared 

Arnhem two days later, and reached the 

[Jsselmeer on the 18th. Operations aimed 

at clearing the rest of the western Netherands were halted on 22 April after the 

German high commissioner for the Netherlands, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, said that if 

:he Canadians would halt east of the 

Grebbe line, he would not flood the area. 20 

With his forces firmly established on the 

west bank of the Elbe, Field Marshal 

.Montgomery prepared his offensive toward 

Luebeck to seal off the Jutland peninsula. 

General Eisenhower had looked on this 

operation approvingly in early April as 

one proposal with political implications 

which he was willing to back. Knowing 

of Mr. Churchill’s interest in the matter 

and desiring to make good on his earlier 

promise to give Montgomery anything 

:hat was needed for an attack to the north 

once the Allies reached the Elbe, he sent 

General Bradley to check on the 2 1 Army 

Group’s requirements and later went himself to ascertain that everything required 

for the operation’s success was made available by SHAEF. Told that a U.S. corps 

and part-time use of the railway bridge at 

Wesel were sufficient, the Supreme Commander at once made available the U.S. 

airborne corps and the desired logistical 

Support. Later, when the condition of 

roads in the British area and the necessity 

of building up administrative support of 

the attack led to delays, General Eisenhower called Montgoniery’s attention to 

he growing fluidity of the German deSense in front of the Red Army and reemphasized the need of a rapid thrust to 

Luebeck. He recalled the Prime Minster’s keen interest in the operation and 

made clear that all of SHAEF’s resources 

were available to insure the speed and 

success of the action. The field marshal 

reminded Eisenhower that his plans for 

driving to Luebeck had been changed by 

the shift of the Ninth Army to the 12th 

Army Group, and that he was doing the 

best he could with what he had left. To 

keep the record straight, the Supreme 

Commander informed the British and U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff of his past efforts and his 

present intentions of giving all possible 

aid for the push northward. 21 

The Second British Army established 

bridgeheads across the lower Elbe-on 29 

and 30 April, and on 1 May started a 

series of drives that rapidly cleared the 

area. One armored column advanced 

thirty miles on the 2d and entered Luebeck without opposition, while another 

went forty miles northeastward to enter 

Wismar a few hours before the Russians. 

The campaign for the Baltic area ended on 

3 May when Hamburg surrendered without a fight. 22 

The Main Thrust to the Elbe 

While the 21 Army Group drive in the 

north turned to the left to follow the curve 

20 Seyss-Inquart’s full title was: Reichskommissar 

fuer die besetzten niederlaendischen Gebiete. 

21 Eisenhower to Montgomery, FWD 18389, 31 

Mar 45; Eisenhower to Montgomery, 9 Apr 45; Eisenhower to Marshall, 27 Apr 45; Eisenhower to Brooke, 

27 Apr 45. General Marshall, in a message beginning 

“Don’t let this message bother you,” made one of his 

rare inquiries on a tactical action when the airborne 

allotment was made. Pointing to the heavy fighting 

the 82d Airborne Division had undergone, he asked 

if “your staff people keep in mind the percentages of 

casualties suffered by various divisions in relation to 

their assignments at this final stage of the war.” General Eisenhower made clear that all assignments were 

made in the interest of speed and economy of fuel and 

transportation. Marshall to Eisenhower, W–75411, 1 

May 45; Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 May 45. Both in 

SHAEF cbl log. 

22 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 343-45. 
452 

of the Elbe, General Bradley's offensive 

tended to turn toward the right. The direction of his drive was influenced to a 

degree by the southeastward bend of the 

Elbe south of Dessau, but to a greater extent by the orientation of the Central and 

Southern Groups of Armies toward Bavaria and Austria to clean out the enemy 

in the Redoubt region. The chief delays in 

the Ninth and First Army sectors came in 

the Ruhr Pocket area and in the Harz 

mountains. The clearance of the Ruhr occupied elements of two corps of each army 

during most of the month. In the Harz 

mountain fight, elements from a corps of 

each army had to be committed for more 

than a week. This latter fight had developed at the end of the first week in April 

when OKW ordered the enemy forces in 

that area to hold their positions as a base 

of future operations for the new Twelfth 

Army then being organized east of the 

Elbe. Before anything except some of the 

army's staff could arrive, the German 

forces in that sector had been overwhelmed. 

Save in these two fights, the two armies 

were concerned more with supplies than 

with the enemy during April. The First 

Army, having a longer axis of advance 

than General Simpson's forces, was particularly hampered by the long truck haul 

from the Rhine, and the problem became 

more difficult with each mile that the 

army pushed eastward. Some forward elements were more than 280 miles from the 

Rhine and were forced to undertake some 

round-trip hauls in excess of 700 miles. 

This situation was improved somewhat on 

7 April with the completion of the first rail 

line east of the Rhine, but it was not eased 

completely until the end of the war. 

Having left strong forces behind to 

crush the enemy in the Ruhr, the two U.S. 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

armies pushed forward from positions 

north and south of that sector during the 

first week in April. The Ninth Army, having the shortest distance to go to reach the 

Elbe, attained its objective a week after 

starting its offensive. On the evening of 11 

April, General Simpson's advance armored 

spearheads climaxed the day's drive of 

fifty-seven miles by dashing to the Elbe 

near Magdeburg. On the 12th, the day of 

President Roosevelt's death, they established a bridgehead over the river, while 

further north other elements entered 

Tangermuendejust fifty-three miles from 

Berlin. A second bridgehead was established south of Magdeburg on the 13th in 

the face of enemy air attacks. The enemy, 

hoping to forestall a possible break-through 

from the northernmost bridgehead toward 

Berlin, counterattacked on 14 April and 

forced the U.S. troops back across the river 

in that sector. The southern bridgehead 

held firm. While some elements of the 

First Army were being slowed temporarily 

in the Harz mountain area, its southern 

columns drove forward through Leipzig 

on the 18th and advanced toward .the 

Mulde. 

On reaching the Elbe, General Simpson 

raised with General Bradley the possibility 

of pushing on to Berlin. The 12th Army 

Group commander, who had already advised General Eisenhower against the 

move and who knew of SHAEF's view 

that the central forces should stop on the 

Elbe until other objectives were taken to 

the north and south, directed the Ninth 

Army commander to hold in place on the 

line of the river and await contact with the 

Red Army. The retention of a bridgehead 

over the Elbe was left to his discretion. 

The following week was spent, therefore, 

in clearing the enemy from the army zone 

west of the Elbe. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE 453 

MEETING AT THE ELBE. Brig. Gen. Charles G. Helmick and Maj. Gen. Clarence R. 

Huebner cif the U.S. V Corps meet with Soviet representatives near Torgau, Germany. 

Meanwhile, Generals Eisenhower and 

- Bradley were drawing a stop line for the 

First Army forces. Since in most of the 

zones then held by General Hodges the 

Elbe swung out sharply toward the east, it 

was necessary to find another line farther 

to the west so that there would not be an 

extended salient to the right of the Ninth 

Army. This was found in the Mulde 

River, which runs into the Elbe at Dessau. 

In accordance with a 12th Army Group 

order of 12 April which stipulated that 

forces of the First Army were not to advance east of the Mulde without permission of its commander, General Hodges 

on 24 April declared that only small U.S. 

patrols were to cross that river. His stop 

order was broad enough to permit forces 

much larger than a normal patrol to cross 

the river. On 25 April, three of these roving units made contact with Red Army 

forward elements at the Mulde, at the 

Elbe, and beyond the Elbe. The first 

formal meeting between U.S. and Russian 

divisional commanders took place near 

Torgau on the following day. 

To the right of the First Army, General 

Patton's forces had been advancing southeast against little opposition since early 

April. Except for heavily wooded areas in 

the Thueringer Wald, the terrain through 

which Third Army now moved was unsuitable for defense. Opposition was swept 

away, and by 11 April the army was re-
454 

porting that it was not meeting any semblance of resistance. On that day, General Bradley set a restraining line for 

General Patton's forces a little to the west 

of the Czechoslovakian border. On the 

14th, elements of the army raced forward 

to points within ten miles of the Czech 

frontier. They were now ordered to regroup in preparation for a new mission 

which would take them into Czechoslovakia and southward into Bavaria and 

Austria. Patrols crossed into Czechoslovakia on the 17th, but the army's' main 

activities in the next few days were concerned with the sideslipping of units 

southward while the First Army took over 

part of the sector in the north. On the 22d 

the drive southeastward in the direction of 

the Danube and the Austrian border 

picked up full speed. Gains of fifteen and 

twenty miles a day became common along 

the entire line and were made at extremely low costs in men. The Third 

Army, reporting its casualties on 23 April, 

indicated that its losses were the smallest 

of any day of battle to that point: three 

killed, thirty-seven wounded, and five 

missing. It had taken nearly 9,000 

prisoners. 

General Patton's forces broke through 

hastily improvised defenses on the Isar 

and the Inn at the close of April and 

crossed into Austria to seize Linz on 4 

May. A day later, the Third Army took 

over part of the First Army's sector and 

one of its corps as General Hodges started 

preparations to move his headquarters to 

the United States, where it was to be reconstituted for duty in the Pacific. ~3 Some 

of Patton's forces were sent at once into 

Pilzen, which was already in the hands of 

the Czech Partisans. In accordance with 

recent arrangements worked out between 

General Eisenhower and the Red Army 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

high command, General Bradley now 

ordered the Third Army to advance to a 

line running north and south through 

Ceske Budejovice (Budweis)-PilzenKarlsbad and be prepared to advance 

eastward. 24 The surrender at Reims came 

before General Patton's forces had pushed 

up to the new boundary at all points. 

They made contact with the Russians on 

the 8th, but there was a delay of several 

days before the Red Army closed up completely to the inter-Allied boundary. 

6th Army Group Operation~ . 

The 6th Army Group offensive, while 

subsidiary to General Bradley's offensive 

in the north, was nonetheless crucial to 

the entire Allied attack. Not only were 

General Devers' northern units expected 

to give flank protection to the right wing 

of Patton's army, but other elements 

were to seize the Augsburg-Munich area, 

clear the sector just north of the Swiss 

border, drive into Austria, and ultimately 

link up with Allied forces in northern 

Italy. 

General Devers' forces, like those of the 

army group to the north, swung to the 

southeast. The sharp turn southward of 

the Third Army between the Czech 

border and Nuremberg cut off the Seventh 

Army from any further advance to the east 

and Patch's force had to move almost due 

south from Nuremberg. This turn was accompanied by an even more abrupt reorientation of the First French Army. 

The Seventh Army's chief fight in the 

period came in early April against enemy 

positions along the line of the Neckar. 

23 The First Army's other two corps were shifted to 

the Ninth Army on 6 May. 

" See below, p. 469. 
CHART 9-0PERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND, AEF, 1 MAY 1945 

SUPREME COMMANDER General of the Army Eisenhower 

DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER 

Air Chi.f Marsllal T.dder 

I I I I NORTHERN GROUP COMMUNICATIONS SOUTHERN GROUP FIRST TACTICAL CENTRAL GROUP SECOND TACTICAL OF ARMIES ANCXF I 

ZONE (US) OF ARMIES ... AIR FORCE (PROV) OF ARMIES AIR FORCE ... Field Marshal Adm Harold M. Burrough: 

l' Gen lee Gen Devers Moi Gen Webster Gen Bradley Air Marshal Coningham Montgomery I 

• • 

· FIRST ALLIED NINTH AIRBORNE ARMY AIR FORCE 

It Gen Brereton LI Gen Vandenber<J 

I I I I I I 

BASE SECTIONS I SEVENTH II FIRST II FIFTEENTH 

I THIRD I FIRST II NINTH II FIRST I SECOND FRENCH ARMY CANADIAN US ARMY Gen d'Armee US ARMY US ARMY US ARMY US ARMY ARMY BRITISH ARMY Lt Gen Patch de Lottre de Tassigny Lt Gen Gerow Gen Patton Gen Hodges Lt Gen Simpson Gen Crerar Lt Gen Dempsey 

'x CARRIER TROOP r , V, CORPS .11' FRENCH CORPS r H XXII CORPS I, "' CORPS + I V CORPS r I XII' CORPS r H 1ST CDN CORPS I , 8TH CORPS 

COMMAND Mal Gen Brook, LI Gen Belhaven Mej Gen Horman Moj Gen Va ... Flul Moi Gen Huebner Maj Gen Gitlem LtGen Foulluilj LI Gen Barke. 

Maj Gen Willio"" 

HQ CORPS A'RBORNE r It 

XV 

Gen CORPS Hgislip 11,11 II Gen 

FRENCH de MonWJben COR"'; r Ma; Gen Gale 

Y XXII' CORPS Ma, Gen GaRey l Mal XII Gen CORPS I.won r I Lt VII G.n CORPS Collins r l MOJGenAndllfson XV, CORPS r , ,D CDN CORPS j LIGenSimondl 

, 12TH CORPS 

LI Gen Rilchie 

RAF TRANSPORT & 

XX, CORPS I I XX CORPS r I VII' CORPS "r I X'X CORPS ~ , 1ST CORPS TROOP CARRIER 

FORMATIONS Mai Gen Mrlburn LIGenWoll.e. Mo; G.n Middleton Mo; G.n McLain Lt Gen CIOCI. •• 

AS ALLOCATED 

I XV", A/B CORPS}, 30TH CORPS I Maj Gen Rid, .... oy Lt G.n Honoe'" 
456 

After a nine-day battle, it swept on to 

Nuremberg. The Germans resisted fanatically for three days, but the city succumbed on the 20th. In the course of this 

action, the Third Army, which was beginning to turn southward across the Seventh 

Army's front was given some twenty-five 

percent of the sector initially intended for 

General Patch's forces. Meanwhile, the 

First French Army, which had seized 

Karlsruhe on 3 April and pushed east and 

south into the Black Forest (Schwarz 

Wald) as well as southward along the east 

bank of the upper Rhine, was sending a 

column to aid in taking Stuttgart. U.S. 

forces enveloped the city, while the French 

cut it off from enemy elements in the 

Black Forest. The two Allied forces then 

joined up on 22 April and the city fell to 

the French on the following day. 

After the fall of Nuremberg, General 

Eisenhower ordered General Devers to 

shift the Seventh Army into southern Bavaria and the Tirol to make certain that 

the enemy did not establish a National 

Redoubt in that region. General Devers 

sent the French Army, now considerably 

blocked by this broad turn across its front, 

toward Ulm and the Danube in its sector. 

On 22 April, elements of both armies 

crossed the Danube, becoming entangled 

as they tried to operate in the area around 

Ulm. The action from this point on was 

marked less by enemy opposition than by 

traffic jams on the roads in Bavaria. The 

period also saw evidence of resistance on 

the part of German civilians against any 

further continuance of the war by the 

military leaders. At Augsburg, when the 

military commander refused to heed 

civilian pleas to surrender, civilian parties 

led Seventh Army elements to his command post. Near the month's end, as U.S. 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

elements started the encirclement of 

Munich, an underground group, aided by 

a small band of German soldiers, in a premature coup arrested the Nazi governor 

of Ba varia and seized the radio station of 

Munich in an effort to surrender the city 

before serious fighting started. The coup 

proved abortive, but the city, which General Eisenhower termed "the cradle of the 

Nazi beast," surrendered on 30 April after 

an action in which three infantry divisions, 

two armored divisions, and a cavalry 

group all claimed to have had a hand. 

At the beginning of May, General de 

Lattre began clearing the Austrian .province of Vorarl berg near Lake Constance, 

while General Patch drove from Munich 

southward through the Inn valley toward 

I tal y and southeastward to Salzburg. 

With the aid of Austrian Partisans, who 

acted as guides, Seventh Army units 

pushed to the Brenner Pass and took 

Brenner shortly after midnight on the 

morning of 4 May. Later in the morning, 

they made contact with advance elements 

of the Fifth U.S. Army coming up from 

northern Italy. In the Salzburg area, 

trouble developed when Seventh Army 

found it necessary, because of the mountainous area in its left-wing sector, to push 

into the Third Army zone. In order to 

avoid a tie-up offorces or the opening of a 

gap through which "the enemy could 

escape, General Eisenhower on 2 May arranged with Generals Bradley and Devers 

to switch Salzburg from the Third Army 

to the Seventh Army zone. After an advance, which \;Vas described as "less a combat problem than a motor march . . . ," 

the city surrendered on 4 May. A few 

hours later, the Allies completed the last 

important action in the area, the capture 

of Berchtesgaden. (Chart 9) 
CHAPTER XXIV 

The Drive to the Elbe 

(Continued) 

As the Supreme Commander's armies 

drove to,the Elbe, SHAEF was confronted 

with a variety of developments. These included such diverse items as Allied attempts to feed the people in occupied 

areas of the Netherlands, difficulties with 

the French over the occupation of Stuttgart, discussions with the Russians on 

liaison and a line of demarcation between 

Western and Russian forces, the death of 

Hitler, and Admiral Doenitz' assumption 

of power in Germany. 

Aidfor the Netherlands 

In the closing week of April, the Allies 

suspended their operations in the western 

Netherlands to permit representatives of 

the Supreme Commander and of the Nazi 

high commissioner in the Netherlands, 

Seyss-Inquart, to discuss procedures for 

feeding the population in the occupied 

area of that country. This problem had 

concerned the Western powers since the 

Arnhem operation in the fall of 1944. 

Food shortages had resulted partly because of an embargo imposed by Seyss-Inquart in retaliation for a Dutch slow-down 

and stoppage of railway traffic in the 

occupied area. After considerable negotiations, some food had been brought in 

through the Swedish Red Cross and from 

Switzerland in January 1945. In the same 

month SHAEF sent representatives to 

Eindhoven to discuss the relief prol?lem 

with Dutch medical experts. After other 

meetings at London and Brussels, doctors 

and trained personnel were selected to 

handle treatment of individuals in an advanced stage of starvation. In April, 

despite the aid of Red Cross agencies and 

severe rationing, the food situation threatened to become disastrous. As food stocks 

reached their lowest ebb, and as the Germans hinted they would flood the country 

in case of an attack, the Netherlands Government-in-exile appealed to the Allies for 

help. Meanwhile, Seyss-Inquart discussed 

with Doctor Hirschfeld, Secretary-General of Economics, various means of avoiding catastrophe in the Netherlands. The 

Reichskommissar indicated that he might 

be willing to open negotiations on the subject with Allied authorities, and this word 

was passed on to London. On 19 April, 

Prime Minister Churchill asked the authorities in Washington for their opinions. 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, doubting that the 

Germans would carry out their threats 

against the Dutch, pointed to the dangers 

of tampering with the unconditional surrender formula and possible unfavorable 

Russian reactions. They asked that nothing be done without previous consultation 
458 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

with the Russians and General Eisenhower. The Supreme Commander when 

asked for his views declared that something must be done to aid the Dutch even 

at the risk of interfering with military operations. He approved discussions with 

Seyss-Inquart, subject to Russian concurrence. If no agreement could be reached, 

he felt that the First Canadian Army 

would have to be used to aid the people of 

the occupied area. 1 

General Eisenhower, increasingly concerned over the Dutch situation, warned 

the German commander in the Netherlands that he would be punished if the 

Germans intensified Dutch suffering. Hostilities were suspended on the morning of 

28 April, and General de Guingand and 

Brigadier E. T. Williams of the 21 Army 

Group staff proceeded to Achterveld to 

meet German representatives. The British 

officers presented Allied plans for aiding 

the population of the Netherlands, but the 

meeting foundered when the Germans indicated that they did not have authority 

to agree to anything. General de Guingand then insisted that they return in 

forty-eight hours with Seyss-Inquart or, at 

least, with his full authority to act. 2 

On 30 April, Seyss-Inquart and his staff 

met an Allied delegation which included 

Generals Smith and Strong of SHAEF; 

Maj. Gen. Ivan Susloparoff, who had been 

authorized by Moscow to represent the 

USSR in the talks; General de Guingand 

and Brigadier Williams of the 21 Army 

Group; Maj. Gen. A. Galloway, British 

commander of the Netherlands District; 

and Prince Bernhard, commander in chief 

of the Netherlands forces. Arrangements 

were worked out for dropping food from 

Allied planes at Some ten points. In addition, one road was to be opened to trucks, 

and food ships were to be received at Rotterdam. On 1 May, in accordance with 

these agreements, Allied planes began relief operations. SHAEF broadcasts informed the inhabitants where to pick up 

supplies and warned the enemy not to interfere with the air drop. On the following 

day, trucks crossed from the liberated 

Netherlands into the occupied zone. Fullscale rescue efforts could not be undertaken, however, until after the armistice. 3 

While discussing the matter of aid to the 

Dutch, General Smith attempted to impress on Seyss-Inquart the hopelessness of 

the German situation in the Netherlands 

and suggested that the time was ripe for a 

truce or unconditional surrender. The 

Reichskommissar agreed with the argument, but said that as long as German 

civil and military authorities in the 

Netherlands were in touch with Berlin 

they would have to leave matters of surrender to their superiors. He also argued 

that the Germans in the Netherlands 

should continue to fight as long as any 

government existed in Germany. General 

Smith, who had dealt politely with SeyssInquart during the earlier interview, now 

threatened him with punishment if his 

policies caused further loss of life in the 

Netherlands. The Reichskommissar admitted his obligations to lighten the burden on the Dutch and promised to do 

what he could to help them. He also asked 

1 Malnutrition and Starvation in Western Netherlands. 

September 1944-324 1945 (The Hague, 1948), pp. 5-45. 

Marshall to Eisenhower, W–70055, 19 Apr 45: Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD 19562, 20 Apr 45. Both in 

Eisenhower personal file. 

2 Eisenhower to Marshall, 23 Apr 45; Eisenhower 

to Marshall, 27 Apr 45. Both in Eisenhower personal 

file; de Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 445-49; Ltr, 

Brig Williams to author, 22 Sep 51, 

3 Memo, Smith for Eisenhower, 1 May 45, Diary 

Office CinC, 1 May 45; de Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 450-51; Interv with Brig Williams, 30-31 

May 47. Stacey, The Canadian Army, p. 268, says that 

5 10 tons of food were dropped as early as 29 April. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE (CONTINUED) 459 

for a safe-conduct to go to Germany to discuss the matter of a truce and possibly an 

over-all surrender in the Netherlands. On 

the grounds that he could surrender ifhe 

wished to do so, and further that he had 

radio contact with Berlin and could get 

necessary instructions by that means, his 

request was refused. 4 

The Stuttgart Incident 

After Stuttgart was enveloped by forces 

of the Seventh Army, the First French 

Army took the city. On the day before it 

fell, General Devers had redrawn the 

boundary lines in his sector to give Stuttgart to General Patch's forces. His purpose 

was to prevent U.S. and French units from 

becoming entangled and to provide 

proper lines of communications for his 

armies. General de Gaulle, however, apparently thought that the U.S. commander was more interested in getting the 

French out of this important German city 

than in the effective working of Seventh 

Army's supply lines. He decided therefore 

that until France was definitely assigned a 

zone of occupation by the Allies he should 

hold on to what he had. He indicated to 

General de Lattre that a political and not 

a military matter was involved and that 

this was a case where French forces were 

not answerable to General Eisenhower or 

General Devers. Consequently, when U.S. 

forces moved into Stuttgart on 24 April to 

relieve French units in the city, they found 

the French polite but determined not to 

leave. When General Devers for a second 

time directed the First French Army to 

evacuate the city, General de Gaulle 

issued the following order to General de 

Lattre: 

I require you to maintain a French garrison 

at Stuttgart and to institute immediately a 

military government. To eventual observations [of the Americans 1 you will reply 

that the orders of your Government are to 

hold and administer the territory conquered 

by our troops until the French zone of occupation has been fixed between the interested 

Governments, which to your knowledge has 

not been done. 

General de Lattre thereupon informed the 

6th Army Group commander that he 

could not hand over the city but added 

that Stuttgart could be used by the 6th 

Army Group.5 

On an appeal from the 6th Army Group 

that its authority was being flouted, general Eisenhower protested officially to 

General de Gaulle, saying that the city was 

urgently needed as a link in the Seventh 

Army's supply line. He expressed concern at the French use ofthe issue to force 

political concessions by the British and 

U.S. Governments and declared: 

Under the circumstances, I must of course 

accept the situation, as I myself am unwilling 

to take any action which would reduce the 

effectiveness of the military effort against 

Germany, either by withholding supplies 

from the First French Army or by other 

measures which would affect their fighting 

strength. Moreover, I will never personally 

be a party to initiating any type of struggle 

or quarrel between your government and 

troops under my command which can result 

only in weakening bonds of national friendship as well as the exemplary spirit of cooperation that characterized the actions of French 

and American forces in the battle line. Accordingly I am seeking another solution for 

the maintenance of the Seventh Army. 

Eisenhower put on record a firm statement of his belief that "the issuance direct 

4 Memo, Smith for Eisenhower, I May 45, Diary 

Office CinC, 1 May 45; de Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 451-53; Interv with Williams, 30-31 May 47. 

5 De Lattre, Histoire de La Premiere Armee Franfaise, 

pp.565-70. 
460 

to the First French Army of orders based 

on political grounds which run counter to 

the operational orders given through the 

military chain of com mand, violates the 

understanding with the United States 

Government under which French divisions 

armed and equipped by the United States 

were to be placed under the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff whose orders I am carrying 

out in this theater of operations." It became his duty, he said, to refer the matter 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a 

statement that he could "no longer count 

with certainty upon the operational use of 

any French forces they may contemplate 

equipping in the future." He regretted 

that he had no knowledge of the negotiations between the French and Allied 

governments concerning a French zone of 

occupation. "Consequently the embarrassment I am experiencing in supplying and 

administering the Seventh U.S. Army, 

and in coordinating military operations 

involving the First French Army seems to 

me the more regrettable." 6 

General de Gaulle disposed of the initial protest with a reminder that the presence of French headquarters in Nancy and 

Metz had not been an obstacle to "General Patton's magnificent successes." He 

admitted that the difficulty which had 

arisen had been none of the Supreme 

Commander's doing. It was due rather to 

the lack of agreement and liaison between 

France and the Allied governments "on 

that which relates to the war policy in general and in particular to the occupation of 

German territory." The French Government, not being able to integrate its views 

with those of the Allies, had to put them 

forward separately. Since the French had 

no part in the meetings of the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, decisions taken by this 

group failed to take into account French 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

national requirements. This situation had 

resulted, de Gaulle said, 

in forcing me, personally-although to my 

great regret-to step in sometimes, either 

with respect to plans or their execution. You 

are certainly aware, that while agreeing to 

place French operational forces in the western theater under your Supreme Command, 

I have always reserved the right of the 

French Government eventually to take the 

necessary steps in order that French Forces 

should be employed in accordance with the 

national interest of France which is the only 

interest that they should serve. 

He pointed out that arms for these forces 

had come in under lend-lease and' that 

French services were given in return, and 

he recalled the sore point that no new 

French divisions had been completely 

equipped by the United States since the 

beginning of operations in the west "in 

spite of all that had appeared to have been 

understood a long time ago." He expressed 

his appreciation for the part General 

Eisenhower personally had played and 

said he hoped that a fine spirit would continue between French and U.S. forces in 

the field. General Eisenhower, in thanking de Gaulle for the courtesy of a very full 

explanation, declared that he understood 

the French chief's position. ". . . while 

I regret," the Supreme Commander went 

on, "that you find it necessary to inject 

political considerations into a campaign in 

which my functions are purely military, I 

am gratified to know that you understand 

my situation and attitude." 7 

In Washington, President Truman said 

he was shocked at the implications ofGenera I de Gaulle's action, and concerned be6 Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 28 Apr 45, SHAEF cbl 

log. 

7 Eisenhower to CCS, 2 May 45 (Text of Ltr, de 

Gaulle to Eisenhower, 1 May 45, and Reply, Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 2 May 45), SHAEF cbllog. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE (CONTINUED) 461 

cause reports of the incident that had 

reached the United States from French 

sources were likely to result in a storm of 

resentment. If the time had come when the 

French Army was to be considered as carrying out only the political wishes of the 

French Government, then the command 

structure would have to be rearranged. 

General de Gaulle expressed his wish that 

such situations would not arise, and indicated that they could be avoided easily 

if France's allies would only recognize 

"that questions so closely touching France 

as the occupation of German territory 

should be discussed and decided with her." 

This unfortunately had not been the case 

"in spite of my repeated request." 8 

So far as General Eisenhower was concerned, the incident had already been 

closed by the withdrawal of U.S. troops 

from Stuttgart. The war was so near its 

end that any inconvenience in keeping his 

supply lines open was annoying but not 

serious. Soon after the episode, the Allies 

agreed on a French zone of occupation 

and a part for France in the control machinery for Germany, thus meeting 

de Gaulle's main demands. 

Avoiding Clashes With the Russians 

In the war in northeast Europe, as in 

any coalition war where allied and associated powers are driving headlong toward 

each other through enemy territory, there 

existed by the end of March the danger 

that within a few weeks or even days 

clashes might arise between friendly 

ground forces. Such collisions could and 

did happen between units fighting side by 

side when proper co-ordination or liaison 

was missing. The danger was much greater 

in the case of the Russians and the Western powers because there was no direct 

wire communication and the battle had 

reached the point that even division commanders were not always sure within 

twenty to forty miles where their forward 

elements could be located at a given 

moment. This difficulty did not become 

acute among the ground forces until early 

April 1945, but it had been causing troubles between the Soviet and British and 

U.S. air forces since the previous summer 

and fall. Efforts made since the time of the 

June 1944 landings to work out sol utions 

to these problems had been complicated 

by the lack of agreements on such matters 

as the drawing of bom b lines, the 'nature 

of lines of demarcation, the procedure to 

be followed when contact was imminent, 

withdrawal of various troops to their 

proper zones of occupation, and the question of advancing beyond an agreed line 

of demarcation when it seemed essential to 

save friendly occupied peoples from German fury. 

The Soviet leaders could not rid themselves of their fears of the Western capitalist 

powers or, perhaps, of their recollections 

that allies could suddenly become enemies. 

Throughout the war, therefore, they were 

unwilling to trust the Western powers with 

much information concerning the Red 

Army's activities. This closed door resulted 

in an unwillingness on their part to permit 

the establishment of real liaison machinery 

between the East and West or, where they 

had consented to some such arrangement, 

a tendency to render it unworkable by repeated delays. Some political co-operation 

had been worked out between the British 

and the Russians after the German invasion of the USSR, and between the AmerS Paraphrase of President Truman's and General 

de Gaulle's messages cited in Diary Office Cine. The 

Truman letter is also in Marshall to Eisenhower, W76554, 3 May 45, SHAEF cbllog. 
462 

icans and the Russians after the negotiation of the lend-lease agreement in 1941, 

but systematic efforts to co-ordinate Russian plans and those being made for the 

invasion of Europe came only at the close 

of 1943. V.S. and British military missions 

in Moscow, headed respectively by General Deane and Lt. Gen. G. LeQ. Martel 

(replaced in March 1944 by Lt. Gen. M. 

B. Burrows, and in March 1945 by Admiral E. R. Archer), undertook to keep 

the Russians informed of the daily operations of the Western powers and to get 

some information in return on the actions 

of the Red forces. Shortly after the Normandy landings, an arrangement was 

made by which the Allies furnished the 

Soviet Government outlines of General 

Eisenhower's proposed operations and, 

when necessary, his plans for the future. 

The Russians, in return, gave the Allied 

military missions in Moscow advance 

copies of the Red Army communiques a 

short time before their release to the press. 

For any serious attempt to co-ordinate 

military activities, the Supreme Commander had to indicate his wishes to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff for transmittal 

to the military missions in Moscow and 

then to the Red Army Chief of Staff. On 

a matter of any importance, the communication was passed on to Marshal 

Stalin. If his answer was favorable, the 

whole process was repeated in reverse. In 

the early days of ground operations, this 

matter of holding partners at arm's length 

was merely exasperating. But as the war 

neared an end the problem became potentially dangerous. 9 

Attempts had been made to co-ordinate 

the boundaries of occupation zones for 

Germany by the creation of the European 

Advisory Commission late in 1943. This 

body had started on its task early in 1944. 

THESVPREMECOMMAND 

Meanwhile, the Allies had tried to work 

out other effective methods of operational 

liaison. Marshal Stalin mentioned inJune 

1944 the possibility of a combined military 

staff for this purpose, and the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff went so far as to talk of the 

possibility of establishing a tripartite committee in Moscow with consultative and 

advisory powers to aid in co-ordinating 

operational and strategical matters. For 

some reason, Marshal Stalin in September 

postponed discussion of the matter on the 

pretext that he did not wish to discuss it 

until General Burrows was replaced as 

head of the British Military Mission in 

Moscow. This officer was withdrawn in 

the following month, but no permanent replacement was named until March 1945. 

The consultative committee was never 

established. 10 

General Eaker, worried in June about 

the need of co-ordinating attacks by his 

Mediterranean air forces and the Russian 

air forces over targets in southeast Europe, 

had sent an air representative to Moscow 

to meet daily with a member of the Russian General Staff to adjust air operations. 

In November the question of co-ordinating air and ground force actions became 

serious when V.S. fighters, attacking what 

they considered to be a German column 

in Yugoslavia, were charged with killing 

a Russian lieutenant general and several 

soldiers. The V.S. Chiefs of Staff promptly apologized but urged that more effective liaison be established. The Russians 

not only reacted unfavorably to this pro-

"The author has relied to a considerable extent on 

General Deane's The Strange Alliance. Many of the 

pertinent documents cited by Deane may be found 

in SHAEF SGS 373.5 Bomb-line, Liaison, and Coordination of Fronts, I, and SHAEF SGS 380.01/1 

Exchange of Information on Operations Between the 

Allies and Russia, I. 

10 Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 142-54-. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE (CONTINUED) 463 

posal but stopped efforts at informal liaison 

which one of their army commanders had 

worked out with the Mediterranean air 

forces. When the matter dragged on into 

December 1944, General Eaker adopted 

the procedure of informing the Russians of 

the bomb line he intended to observe and 

leaving up to them the responsibility for 

co-ordination. To his surprise, they made 

no protest. 11 

In northwest Europe, the matter of air 

liaison was somewhat more complicated. 

When Red Army advances into Poland 

threatened to bring Soviet columns into 

the area being attacked by air forces from 

the west, General Deane suggested a bomb 

line which would run some fifty to a 

hundred miles west of the Russian lines. 

The. Soviet representatives, apparently 

with the purpose of barring the British 

from dropping supplies to Poles loyal to the 

London Polish Government-in-exile, made 

a counterproposal of a line which would 

have prevented General Spaatz's forces 

from going east of Berlin. No agree'!l1ent 

on this suggestion had been reached before 

the meeting at Yalta. 12 At the conference 

in the Crimea, the Western powers again 

raised the question, but the Russian representatives showed little disposition to reach 

an agreement. When General Marshall 

warned of possible repetitions of the bombing in Yugoslavia, Gen. Alexei Antonov, 

the Red Army Chief of Staff, said that the 

difficulty there was due not to the lack of 

liaison but to mistakes in navigation. The 

Russians persisted in their demands for a 

rigid bomb line which could be changed 

only occasionally, and they asked that the 

Allied bombing forces submit for clearance twenty-four hours before the attack 

lists of targets on the Russian front. The 

Combined Chiefs of Staff thereupon decided to continue General Eaker's arrangement of giving the Russians advance 

notice of proposed operations and letting 

the Soviet forces do the co-ordinating. 

Finally, in March 1945, the Russians 

agreed to the initial Allied suggestion at 

Yalta whereby the bomb line moved daily 

in accordance with Red Army advances. 

The Western powers agreed not to attack 

a zone within 200 miles of the Russian 

positions without giving the Soviet commanders twenty-four hours' notice. The 

suggestion by the Russians that silence on 

their part would be regarded as disapproval was not accepted. They had the 

responsibility, therefore, of specifying 

which, if any, of the proposed targets were 

within the forbidden zone. 13 

As the Russians continued to drive 

toward the west, a formal agreement on 

lines of demarcation and zones of occupation became necessary. The European Advisory Commission had discussed 

these matters in London early in 1944. A 

British plan for dividing Germany into 

three zones, in virtually the same form 

that was ultimately accepted, was presented in January 1944. This proposal, 

which brought Russia well to the west of 

the Elbe, was accepted by the USSR rep11 Deane, Strange Alliance, 135-39. CCS to Wilson, FAN 454,20 Nov 44; Mil Mission Moscow to 

CCS, MX-21802, 22 Nov 44; Wilson to CCS, NAF 

817, 24 Nov 44;CCS to Wilson, FAN 458, 24 Nov 

44;JCS to Deane, WX-67900, 24 Nov 44; Wilson to 

CCS, NAF 820, 27 Nov 44; CCS to Deane and 

Archer, WX-69568, 28 Nov 44; Wilson to CCS, 

NAF 822, 30 Nov 44. All in SHAEF SGS 373.5 

Bomb-line, Liaison, and Co-ordination of Fronts, I. 

12 Spaatz to Arnold, Sp-163, 28 Nov 44. SHAEF 

approved this statement. SHAEF to CCS, SCAF tW, 

3 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS 373.5 Bomb-line, Liaison and 

Co-ordination of Fronts, 1; Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 138-39. 

13 1st, 2d Tripartite Mtgs, Yalta, 5, 9 Feb 45, 

ARGONAUT Conf Min; Extract, CCS 188th Mtg, 9 

Feb 45, SHAEF SGS 373.5 Bomb-line, Liaison and 

Co-ordination of Fronts, I; Deane, The Strange Alli· 

ance, p. 139. 
464 

resentative in February and apparently 

satisfied the Civil Affairs Division of the 

War Department. Toward the end of 

February, representatives of the Civil 

Affairs Division proposed a new plan by 

which the three occupation areas would 

meet at Berlin. The proposal was regarded 

as vague and unworkable, and work on 

the zones came to a stop until April 1944 

when the President authorized his representative in London to approve the broad 

outlines of the initial British proposal for 

the zones of occupation. He objected only 

to the suggestion that the United States 

should occupy a zone in the south of Germany and asked instead for occupational 

duties in the north. 14 His insistence on this 

point held up final agreement on the 

protocol dealing with zones of occupation 

until after the second Quebec conference, 

when he finally accepted a zone in the 

south of Germany. Not until September 

1944 did the European Advisory Commission send its protocol on zones of occupation to the three governments chiefly 

concerned. Even then final approval was 

delayed because the British and U.S. representatives could not reach agreement on 

U.S. entry rights in the Bremerhaven area. 

This matter was settled in November, and 

the revised protocol was approved by the 

British government in December 1944. 15 

In January 1945, the U.S. Ambassador 

to Great Britain, John 'Winant, became 

disturbed over the fact that the United 

States and the Soviet Union had still not 

formally approved the zones of occupation. He expressed his concern to Mr. 

Hopkins when the latter was on his way to 

the Allied meetings at Malta and Yalta, 

and said he feared that, if no agreement 

was reached soon, the Russians might continue to advance westward after they had 

crossed the border of the zone outlined for 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

them. Secretary of State Stettinius, and 

Foreign Secretary Eden discussed the 

question at Malta on 1 February and 

agreed to urge the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff to reach an immediate decision on 

the German occupation zones. Later that 

day, General Marshall and Field Marshal 

Brooke, after talking over the matter with 

Stettinius and Eden, authorized the dispatch of a cable informing the European 

Advisory Commission that the British and 

U.S. Governments had now approved the 

protocol of the zones of occupation. This 

action was taken apparently without reference to the President. Stettinius ind~cates 

that, when Roosevelt arrived at Malta on 

2 February, he "seemed greatly relieved 

when I told him that General Marshall 

and Field Marshal Brooke had finally approved the plan for the German zones of 

occupation and that Eden and I had sent 

instructions to our representatives on 

the European Advisory Commission in 

London." 16 

The agenda of the Yalta Conference included for discussion the question of final 

agreement on the zones of occupation. Actually, of course, as far as the boundaries 

were concerned, the United States and 

Great Britain had made the decision 

before the conferees reached Yalta. The 

point which remained to be settled at the 

conference was whether or not France 

would be given a zone. In a meeting of the 

President and Marshal Stalin on 4 February, the Soviet leader seemed to concur 

with the tripartite zone arrangement outlined by the European Advisory Commission but was disinclined to admit 

14 See above, Ch. XIX, pp. 349-51. 

15 Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany, 

New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," Foreign 

Affairs, XXVIII Uuly, 1950),580-604. 

16 Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 56, 63, 69. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE (CONTINUED) 465 

France. This matter was thoroughly explored on 5 February, and Marshal Stalin 

ultimately agreed with some reluctance to 

the British and U.S. plan to give France a 

zone in western Germany. Stalin made 

clear that it would not be at the expense of 

the Russian sphere. Soviet approval of the 

European Advisory Commission's protocol 

was given on 6 February. The fact that 

agreement had been reached was announced as part of the final report issued 

at the close of the Crimean conference. 17 

This fact gave rise to the befief that the 

zones of occupation were worked out at 

Yalta. Historically, it is of value to note 

that the zones as finally drawn were 

initially outlined months before Yalta by 

representatives of the political authority 

of the United States, Great Britain, and 

the USSR. Final approval of the zones 

involved both the political authorities and 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 18 

The zones, drawn on the basis of equalizing population and resources among the 

occupying powers, did not correspond 

with military requirements as far as a 

stopping place was concerned. Part of the 

Russian zone ran well to the west of the 

Elbe, and it was not logical for the troops 

of the Western powers to stop their advance at the edge of that area leaving the 

German forces unbeaten within the zone 

until the Red Army could close the gap. It 

became clear, therefore, that the various 

armies from the east and west should continue to advance until they actually linked 

up or until they reached some clearly 

recognizable line of demarcation shortly 

before a junction was imminent. General 

Eisenhower indicated in early April that it 

was not practical t9 restrict operations on 

either side by a demarcation prepared in 

advance. Rather, both sides should be free 

to advance until contact was made. He 

suggested that thereafter, subject to operational needs, either the Red Army or 

SHAEF could request the other to withdraw behind the interzonal boundaries set 

up by the European Advisory Commission. 

The British Chiefs of Staff opposed on both 

political and military grounds any mention of the interzonal boundary for purposes of defining areas while hostilities 

were still in progress. They suggested instead that the armies should stand in 

place until they were ordered to withdraw 

by their governments. 19 

The British suggestion immediately 

evoked objections from the U.S. War and 

State Departments. Officials of the European and Russian Affairs Divisions of the 

Department of State were said to believe 

"that for governments to direct movement 

of troops definitely indicated political action and that such movements should remain 

a military consideration at least until SHAEF 

is dissolved and the ACC (Allied Control 

Commission) is set up [italics in original]." 

The British proposal, they feared, might 

inspire the Russians to race for remainingGerman areas in order to acquire as many 

sq uare miles as possi ble before the war 

ended. This interpretation, members of 

the War Department believed, meant that 

the Department of State preferred "a 

straight military solution to the problem. 

That is, for General Eisenhower to plan to 

move American and British troops when 

the operations allowed to respective 

American and British zones, co-ordinating 

such movements with the local Russian 

17 Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 101-02, 

126-27,129; Mosely, op. cit., p. 599. 

l' For earlier views of General Eisenhower on the 

division of Germany, see above, Ch. XIX, pp. 349-50. 

'" Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 264, 5 Apr 45; Br 

COS to JSM, COS (W) 748, 11 Apr 45. Both in 

SHAEF SGS 373.5 Bomb-line. Liaison, and Co-or· 

dination of Fronts, I. 
466 

commanders or, if necessary with Marshal 

Stalin through General Deane and Admiral Archer." 20 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had 

already directed General Eisenhower to 

restate his proposal to the effect that, since 

it did not seem practicable during hostilities to restrict operations or areas by a demarcation line prepared in advance, both 

fronts should be allowed to advance until 

contact was imminent. Thereafter, the 

division of responsi bility would be agreed 

upon by army group commanders. General Eisenhower, who as late as 11 April 

had cited five new encounters between 

U.S. and Russian planes as evidence that 

some arrangement was needed to prevent 

serious incidents, hastened to send the revised message to Moscow. 21 General Antonov questioned the proposal on the 

ground that it seemed to change the occupation zones already agreed upon by the 

governments. Although reassured by representatives of the military missions that it 

referred only to tactical areas, he insisted 

on confirmation from General Eisenhower. Antonov said it was his understanding that upon completion of tactical 

operations the Anglo-American forces 

would withdraw from the Soviet zone of 

occupation previously assigned. This assurance was given by the Supreme Commander on 15 April.22 

The Combined Chiefs of Staff spelled 

out their policy more completely on 21 

April when they suggested that both sides 

halt as and where they met, the line being 

subject to adjustments made by local commanders to deal with any remaining 

enemy opposition. After the cessation of 

hostilities, the Western forces were to be 

disposed in accordance with military requirements regardless of zonal boundaries. 

So far as permitted by the urgency of the 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

situation, the Supreme Commander was 

to obtain approval of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff before making major adjustments 

in boundaries. Within these limits he was 

free to negotiate directly with the Soviet 

General Staff through the Allied missions 

to Moscow. In case political and military 

problems of high importance to the British 

and U.S. Governments arose during the 

progress of the campaign, he was to consult the Combined Chiefs of Staff before 

reference to the Russians, unless he felt the 

delay was unacceptable "on vital military 

grounds." These instructions were repeated to the army group commande~s by 

General Eisenhower on the day of their 

receipt. 23 

The decision to permit units to continue 

to advance until contact was imminent 

still left open the question of how they 

were to recognize each other. It was recalled in Washington that clashes had 

arisen in Poland in 1939 when the advance forces of the German and Soviet 

armies had met, and that the situation was 

ironed out only when the Germans withdrew. 24 General Eisenhower, who had 

been aware since Normandy days of how 

difficult it was to keep in touch with flying 

20 Memo, G.A.L. (Brig Gen George A. Lincoln) for 

Gen Hull, 13 Apr 45, sub: Military Contacts With the 

Russians, CCS 805/7 and CCS 805/8, OPD 381, 

Sec V. 

21 CCS to SHAEF, F ACS 176, 12 Apr 45; Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 274, 11 Apr 45; Eisenhower to 

Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 275. All in SHAEF SGS 

373.5 Bomb-line, Liaison, and Co-ordination of 

Fronts, I. 

22 Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-23875, 

14 Apr 45; Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, 

SCAF 282, 15 Apr 45. Both in SHAEF SGS 373.5 

Bomb-line, Liaison, and Co-ordination of Fronts, I. 

23 CCS to Eisenhower, FACS 191, 21 Apr 45; 

Eisenhower to Comdrs, 21, 12th, 6th A Gps, 21 Apr 

45. Both in SHAEF SGS 373.5 Bomb-line, Liaison, 

and Co-ordination of Fronts, I. 

24 WD Memo, with covering note by Maj Gen 

Clayton L. Bissell, G-2, German Line of Demarca-
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE (CONTINUED) 467 

armored columns as they raced ahead of 

virtually all communications, attempted 

to work out in mid-April a system ofsignals and markings whereby the various 

forces could identify themselves and avoid 

firing on each other. 25 

On 21 and 22 April, General Eisenhower took more specific steps to avoid 

clashes with the Red Army. Besides outlining the procedure laid down by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff for the Western 

forces to follow when they approached 

Soviet units, he also added details of his 

future plans and asked the Red commanders for theirs. He repeated previous 

statements about his intention to stop his 

central forces on the EI be and to turn his 

armies to the north and south to clear out 

enemy pockets there. It was clear that the 

northern forces would cross the Elbe and 

hit at the enemy at the base of the Jutland 

peninsula, and that his forces in the south 

would drive through the Danube valley 

into Austria. Eisenhower did not explain, 

but it was apparent, that these would continue to advance until they met the Red 

forces. On the central front, where initial 

contact seemed most likely, he had chosen 

the Elbe-Mulde line as one easily identified and desirable between the two forces. 

This could be changed, he added, if the 

Russians wished him to push on to Dresden. He believed that after making the 

first contact the principal purpose should 

be to establish a firm link between the two 

armies, preferably along "a well-defined 

geographical feature," before a firm mution Between Anglo-American and Soviet Operations, 

22 Mar 45, OPD 381, Sec IV. This memorandum, 

which apparently was never passed on to General 

Eisenhower, was interesting in that it suggested a line 

of demarcation closely resembling the one along the 

Elbe later drawn by General Eisenhower. The Saale 

was used south of the Elbe rather than the Mulde, 

however. 

tual adjustment on the basis of the local 

tactical situation. He proposed, therefore, 

that necessary adjustments and the definition of operational boundary lines be 

made between the Russian and Allied 

army group commanders most concerned. 26 

In an unusually prompt reply, the 

Soviet command indicated on 23 April 

that orders had already been issued in 

conformity with the procedure suggested 

by the Western powers for making contact. 

The Soviets also accepted the line of the 

Elbe and the Mulde as a common border. 

Moscow declared the following day that 

the Soviet command contemplated 'both 

the occupation of Berlin and the clearing 

of German forces from the east of the Elbe 

north and south of Berlin and from the 

Vltava (Moldau) valley. This answer 

bothered the British Chiefs of Staff. Fearing that the Russians might be trying to 

apply the line of the Elbe to the north as 

well as the center of the SHAEF line, they 

asked the Supreme Commander to make 

the distinction clear to the Russians. 27 

After the formal link-up of Allied and 

Soviet units on 26 April, numerous other 

meetings followed rapidly along the entire front. From the announcement of the 

first contact, SHAE F made a special effort to establish close liaison with the 

2[, Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 284, 

17 Apr 45; Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX23!J92, 21 Apr 45. Both in SHAEF SGS 373.5 Bombline, Liaison and Co-ordination of Fronts, I. 

"" CCS to Eisenhower, FACS 191, 21 Apr 45; 

Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 292, 21 

Apr 45; Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 

298,22 Apr 45. All in SHAEF SGS 373.5 Bomb-line, 

Liaison, and Co-ordination of Fronts, I. 

U Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 299, 

23 Apr 45; Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX24032,24 Apr 45; Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-24055, 25 Apr 45; Br COS toJSM, 

COS (W) 801,25 Apr 45. All in SHAEF SGS 373.5 

Bomb-line, Liaison, and Co-ordination of Fronts, I. 
468 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Soviet forces, carefully checking on tanks 

and troops in forward areas before permitting air strikes to be made. 28 

General Eisenhower’s efforts to stop on 

a well-defined geographical line ran into 

certain political objections by the British 

Chiefs of Staff. Near the end of April they 

pointed out that the Western powers could 

derive remarkable political advantages by 

liberating Prague and as much of the rest 

of Czechoslovakia as possible. They agreed 

that this effort should not be allowed to 

detract from the force of the drives toward 

the Baltic and into Austria, but proposed 

that the Supreme Commander take advantage of any improvement in his logistical situation to advance into Czechoslovakia. General Marshall, in passing these 

views on to General Eisenhower for his 

comments, declared: “Personally and 

aside from all logistic, tactical or strategical implications I would be loath to hazard 

American lives for purely political purposes.” 29 

This statement, startling as it may have 

seemed later, was in accord with the policy 

followed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

throughout the war: to place everything 

behind those offensives which would most 

quickly bring military victory. The war 

was now virtually at an end in Europe—at 

a place where the Russian advance would 

soon clean out the remaining Germans. If 

the war in Europe and the Pacific was intended solely for the purpose of defeating 

the Germans and the Japanese, then there 

was no point in continuing to use U.S. 

forces to seize objectives that could easily 

be taken by the Red Army. Especially was 

this true at a time when it still seemed 

necessary to send troops from the European theater to the Pacific theater and 

when it appeared that Soviet aid might be 

needed to crush the enemy in the Far 

East. This observation, of course, raises the 

question of what should have been the 

war aims of the Western Allies in 1945 and 

enters a realm of strategy and politics beyond the province of the Supreme Commander. His directive as given by the U.S. 

and British Chiefs of Staff was to “undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed 

forces.” At no time did his military and 

political superiors define his mission as the 

maintenance or restoration of the balance 

of power in central and eastern Europe. 

General Eisenhower showed that he understood General Marshall’s meaning in 

his reply. He said that the first priority of 

his offensive should go to the northern 

thrust toward Luebeck and Kiel, a move 

he had already said was intended to forestall the Russians, and to the southern 

drive toward Linz and the Austrian Redoubt. If additional means were available, 

he planned to attack enemy forces that 

were still holding out in Czechoslovakia, 

Denmark, and Norway. He thought that 

the Western powers should deal with the 

enemy in Denmark and Norway, but concluded that the Red Army was in perfect 

position to clean out Czechoslovakia and 

would certainly reach Prague before the 

U.S. forces. He assured General Marshall: 

“I shall not attempt any move I deem 

militarily unwise merely to gain a political 

prize unless I receive specific orders from 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” 30 Such 

orders were never given and, according to 

Admiral Leahy’s notes on meetings of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, the matter, like 

28 Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 317, 

27 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS 373.5 Bomb-line, Liaison, 

and Co-ordination of Fronts, I. 

29 Marshall to Eisenhower, W–74256, 28 Apr 45, 

SHAEF cbl log. 

30 Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD 20225, 29 Apr 

45, SHAEF cbl log. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE (CONTINUED) 469 

the question of whether to take Berlin, was 

never considered by them. When, a short 

time later, the Prime Minister discussed a 

slightly different phase of the questionthe one involving readjustment of occupation zones-President Truman made clear 

that matters of that nature should be left 

to the commander in the field. 31 

The Supreme Commander on 30 April 

informed the Russians fully of his plans to 

advance to the east. He explained that, 

while operational positions were being adjusted along the Elbe and Mulde in the 

center, he would launch an operation 

across the lower Elbe to establish a firm 

operational east flank on the approximate 

line Wismar-Schwerin-Doemitz, the exact 

position to be adjusted locally by the commanders on the spot. From the headwaters of the Mulde southward, he intended to hold a line approximately along 

the 1937 frontiers of Czechoslovakia in the 

Erz Gebirge and Boehmer Waldo Later, 

the Allied forces could advance to Karlsbad, Pilzen, and Ceske Budejovice. On the 

southern flank, he proposed an advance 

to the general area of Linz, from which 

forces would be sent to clear out any resistance to the south. He thought a suitable line on this front would be the main 

north-south highway line east of Linz and 

thence along the valley of the Enns. If at 

any time the situation required his forces 

to advance farther, he would take such action as permitted by the situation. 

The USSR indicated its full agreement 

with these proposals. On 4 May, however, 

when General Eisenhower again spoke of 

his willingness to move forward after the 

occupation of Ceske Budejovice, Pilzen, 

and Karlsbad to the line of the Elbe and 

the Moldau to clear the west bank ofthese 

rivers, General Antonov expressed strong 

dissent. To avoid "a possible confusion of 

forces," he asked General Eisenhower 

specifically "not to move the Allied forces 

in Czechoslovakia east of the originally intended line, that is, Ceski-Budejovice, Pilzen, Karlsbad." He added significantly 

that the Soviet forces had stopped their 

advance to the lower Elbe east of the line 

Wismar, Schwerin, and Doemitz at the 

Supreme Commander's request, and that 

he hoped General Eisenhower would comply with Russian wishes relative to the advance of U.S. forces in Czechoslovakia. 

General Eisenhower assured the Soviet 

commander that he would not move beyond the line suggested. 32 By this action he 

left Prague and most of Czechoslovakia to 

be Ii berated by the Red forces. Except for 

minor adjustments of boundaries and the 

closing up to lines of demarcation, operations of the Western Allies were at an end. 

The End of Hitler 

The month of April, which saw the 

Wester"n Allies drive from the Rhine to the 

Elbe and complete a junction with advance elements of the Red Army in central Germany, also witnessed the fall of 

Berlin and the suicide of Hitler. Before 

these last two- events had been consummated, however, the Fuehrer had attempted to provide for the continuance of 

his government, first,. in the event that 

part of the Reich was cut off from his 

headquarters and, second, in the event 

that death claimed him. He tried also to 

31 Leahy, I Was There, pp. 349, 350, 382. 

32 Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 349, 

6 May 45; Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 

323,30 Apr 45; Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, 

MX-24166,4 May 45; Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-24193, 5 May 45. All in SHAEF SGS 

373.5 Bomb-line, Liaison, and Co-ordination of 

Fronts, I and II. 
470 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

direct the defense of Berlin and to arrange 

for punishment of those former trusted 

colleagues and servants whom he now accused of treason. 

The precise moment when Hitler 

realized that he had no prospect of avoiding complete defeat at the hands of the 

Allies is not clear. Orders throughout the 

early part of April indicate that he was 

still determined to hold to every foot of 

ground and insisted on fighting to the last 

at a time when a number of his commanders and political associates were contemplating surrender. Apparently hoping 

that the death of President Roosevelt in 

mid-April might help his cause, he issued 

an order of the day asking for resistance to 

the “deadly Jewish-Bolshevist enemy” 

and declared, “At the moment when fate 

has removed the greatest war criminal of 

all times from this earth the turning point 

of this war will be decided.” 33 

Hitler was sufficiently aware of ominous 

developments to know that his forces 

might soon be divided by a link-up of his 

enemies which would make it impossible 

for him to keep close control of all sections 

of Germany. He decided that if he was in 

the southern zone when this occurred Admiral Doenitz would command in the 

north. If the Fuehrer was in the northern 

zone, then Field Marshal Kesselring was 

to command in the south. Hitler reserved 

to himself the right to announce the time 

when this arrangement would go into 

effect. 34 

He recognized the difficulty of holding 

Berlin indefinitely and apparently planned 

to send his ministers and their staffs to various points in southern Germany where he 

would join them for a final defense of the 

Reich. The bulk of the ministerial staffs 

had left for the south by mid-April, and 

only the ministers and a few of their aides 

remained in Berlin. Hitler continued to 

postpone a definite decision on evacuating 

the capital until Russian advances made it 

too dangerous for the chief ministers to 

leave by the highways south of Berlin. It 

was decided instead that they should go to 

some safe place north of the city and fly 

south from there. During the evening of 

20-21 April and throughout the following 

day, ministers and their staffs slipped out 

of Berlin to Eutin, about halfway between 

Luebeck and Kiel, and near the site of 

Doenitz’ future headquarters. 35 

Marshal Hermann Goering, heir designate to Hitler’s post, discussed the matter 

of a shift south with the Fuehrer on 20 

April, Hitler’s birthday. In what proved to 

be the last conference of the two Nazi 

leaders, Goering said that he or the Luftwaffe chief of staff, General der Flieger 

Karl Koller, should be in southern Germany to provide unified command for the 

almost defunct Luftwaffe. Upon Hitler’s 

reply that Koller was to remain and that 

Goering could leave, the Reichsmarschall 

hastened to his string of cars, loaded and 

33 Hitler’s order of 15 Apr 45 (Chef Genst.d.H./B. 

Nr. 3064/45). ONI Fuehrer Directives. 

34 For general information on the period from 20 

April to 20 May 1945 the author has made use of 

Entwurf Weissbuch (May 1945) and annexes in file 

OKW, Politische Angelegenheiten (referred to hereafter 

as German White Book 1945). Intended as a defense 

of Doenitz’ interim government, the unsigned paper is 

accompanied by numerous documents and comports 

in most particulars with other accounts of this period. 

Despite its possible bias, it is nonetheless valuable for 

the period. The author is indebted to Mr. Detmar 

Finke of Foreign Studies Branch, OCMH, for research in and translation of German documents used 

in this and the remaining chapters of the book. Hitler’s order naming Doenitz and Kesselring was apparently drawn up about 10 April and issued 15 April 

1945. See Extract from the Naval War Diary, Part A, 

20 Apr 45. ONI Fuehrer Directives, 15 Apr 45. 

35 Memo, Vermerk ueber die Absetzung der Fuehrungsstaebe der Obersten Reichsbehoerden, late Apr 45, by 

Staatssekretaer Kritzinger. Annex to German White 

Book 1945. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE (CONTINUED) 471 

waiting, and departed for Berchtesgaden.36 

The growing exodus from the capital 

now gained momentum. The Soviet advance had forced 0 K W to leave its wartime offices at Zossen and move to Wannsee, a western suburb ofthe capital, on the 

night of 20-21 April. The headquarters 

immediately began to leave for Strub near 

Berchtesgaden. Keitel,Jodl, and a small 

staff remained behind. 37 

Admiral Doenitz was the next to go. He 

had been told on the 20th that he was to 

organize the defense in the northern sector. 

At the suggestion of Keitel, who was 

worried about the deterioration of the 

situation around Berlin, Doenitz discussed 

the matter with Hitler on the 21st and was 

told that he should leave very shortly. The 

admiral and his staff departed from Berlin 

in the early morning of 22 April and 

reached their new headquarters in Ploen 

the same day.38 

run the danger of falling into the hands of 

his opponents when only wounded. He 

added that he was not the man to carry on 

negotiations with the Allies-a task, he 

said, for which Goering was far better 

fitted than he. Keitel,Jodl, Martin Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellery, 

and later Doenitz and Himmler, all tried 

to get Hitler to change his mind, but he refused. Instead he told Keitel, JodI, and 

Bormann to go south and conduct operations from there. They, in turn, declined. 39 

Jodi now proposed that some of the 

troops fighting against the Western Allies 

be thrown into the fight for Berlin· and 

that OKW conduct the operation. Hitler 

agreed, and Keitel went to the headquarters of the Twelfth Army, fighting near the 

Elbe, to oversee the planned shift of forces 

from west to east. The remaining members 

of the 0 K W in Berlin now moved a few 

miles north of the city to Krampnitz. On 

23 April, Keitel and JodI attended the 

situation conference at the Reichskanzlei, 

where they saw Hitler for the last time. 

Thereafter, being cut off from Berlin, they 

and the small OK W staff with them 

moved north by stages to a point near 

Flensburg on 3 May 1945.40 

While attempts were being made to establish elements of the government in 

other parts of the Reich, Hitler was trying 

to save Berlin. Reports on the 21 st indicated that the attack he had previously 

ordered Obergruppenfuehrer und General der Waffen SS Felix Steiner to launch 

from points' north of Berlin toward the 

h h d L'. '1 d 36 Rpt by KoUer, A.D.I. (K), Rpt No. 349/1945, 

sout a fa} e to materialize. All efforts 12Ju145, British Air Ministry (referred to hereafter 

in that direction succeeded only in draw- as Koller Rpt). This account. based on his personal 

ing German strength from the north diary, was dictated by General Koller while he was 

h h R d a prisoner of war in Britain. A later, slightly different, 

were tee Army had broken through. version was published as Der Let::;te Monat (MannThe failure of Steiner's corps to attack on heim, 1949). 

the 22d and reports of other reverses ap- 37 MS # C-020 (Schramm); OKW, KTB 20.IV.-

1 L'. d H 1 J9.V.45, 20, 21 Apr 45. The OKW KTB, which 

parent y force it er for the first time to recorded the last days of the OKW, was kept by Maj. 

admit that prolongation of the war was . Joachim Schultz, a disabled officer assigned to that 

hopeless. Hitler's decision, as reported by headquarters in the spring of 1945. The official acJ dl K II count plus his own recollections of the events of that 

o to 0 er, was to remain in the city, period formed the basis for his book Die Let::;ten30 

take over its defenses, and shoot himself at Tage (Stuttgart, 1951). 

the last moment. The German leader said 3. German White Book 1945. 

h 39 Koller Rpt; Schultz, Die Let::;ten 30 Tage, pp. t at he could not take part in the fighting 21-23. 

for physical reasons and that he could not 40 Ibid. 
472 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Informed by General Koller on 23 April 

that Hitler had made up his mind to stay 

and die in Berlin, Goering asked the Chief 

of the Reich Chancellery, who was also at 

Berchtesgaden, if he should assume control of the government under the circumstances. It was decided that he should 

radio Berlin for instructions, saying that if 

he received no answer by the late evening 

of that day he would take charge of the affairs of the Reich. Goering also radioed 

Keitel and Reichsminister Joachim von 

Ribbentrop asking that they join him unless they received orders to the contrary 

from Hitler. The Fuehrer, considering 

these actions treasonable, now had Goering and his entourage arrested and ordered Generaloberst Hans Juergen 

Stumpff, head of Air Force Reich, to close all 

airports in the northern area in order to 

prevent any further moves of personnel to 

the south. Hitler next demanded Goering's 

resignation as head of the Air Force and 

appointed in his place Generalfeldmarschall Robert Ritter von Greim. 41 

Jodl on 24 April gave the armed forces 

their first indication of the policy to be followed during the remaining days of the 

war. Senior commanders in the west, 

southwest, and southeast were told that 

the fight against Bolshevism was the only 

thing that now mattered and that loss of 

territory to the Western Allies was of secondary importance. 42 Other directives issued on the 24th and 25th regulated the 

over-all chain of command. OKW, which 

absorbed the Army General Staff (Operations 

Group), became responsible for the conduct of operations on all fronts. Keitel personally reserved for himself the control of 

all army units in the northern area, 43 and 

also of Army Groups South and Center on the 

Eastern Front. General der Gebirgstruppen August Winter was to organize all the 

resources of the southern area for further 

resistance 44 and Field Marshal Kesselring, 

Commander in Chief West, was to take or 

retain control of OB SUED WEST (Italy), 

OB SUEDOST (the Balkans), Army Group 

G, and the Nineteenth Army. The primary 

mission of the armed forces was defined as 

the re-establishment of a connection with 

Berlin to defeat the Soviet troops in that 

area. 45 

These efforts at reorganization were 

taking place on paper while the Red 

Army was bypassing Berlin to the north 

and the south and starting to encircle the 

Ninth Army southeast of Berlin. On 25 

April, the Twelfth Army, which was holding 

the Elbe against the U.S. thrust, was 

ordered to join the Ninth Army and attack 

northward to break the Soviet hold on 

41 Interrogation of Goering, CCPWC # 32/DI-7, 

15 Jun 45; Koller Rpt; Hist Div Interrogation of Dr. 

Hans Heinrich Lammers, chief of the Reich Chancellery, 17 Jul 45; German White Book 1945. According to Goering, he and his family were imprisoned at Mauterndorf on 26 April. On 30 April a 

radiogram from Martin Bormann ordered the SS 

guards to execute all of the traitors of 23 April. The 

officer in charge did not recognize Bormann's authority and refused to carry out the order. Goering was 

released on Kesselring’s order on 5 May and on 7 

May surrendered to U.S. troops. 

42 Rad, Jodl to Kesselring and others, 24 Apr 45. 

OKW, Befehle an die Truppe (Kapitulation) 13.W-20.V. 

45 (referred to hereafter as OKW, Befehle 13.W.- 

20.V.45). This file is exceedingly valuable on the 

period from mid-April to mid-May inasmuch as most 

of the messages were personally initialed by Keitel 

and Jodi and frequently have their corrections, 

changes, and comments. 

43 Units under Keitel's control were Armed Forces 

Commander Denmark; Armed Forces Commander Norway; 

OB NORD WEST (formerly Army Group H); Twelfth 

Army; Army Group Weichsel; Army Group Kurland; and 

Army Ostpreussen. For style of designating German 

theater commands, see above, Ch. X, n. 7. 

44 Winter, Deputy Chief Armed Forces Operations 

Staff (OKW/WFSt), arrived in the southern area on 

24 April and took control of OKW, Operations Staff 

B (Fuehrungsstab B), the same day. 

45 Dir sgd Hitler. 24 Apr 45; Dir sgd Keitel, 26 

Apr 45. Both in OKW, Befehle 13.IV.-20.V.45. 
THE DRIVE TO THE ELBE (CONTINUED) 473 

that city. Despite a beliefthat U.S. forces 

might seize this opportunity to drive toward Berlin, the T welflh Army commander 

ordered attacks on American forces 

stopped and said that shooting would be 

resumed only in case of an attack by them. 

Only small forces were left to guard the 

Ninth U.S. Army bridgehead south of 

Magdeburg. 46 

OKW also ordered the Commander in 

Chief Northwest to bring as many troops 

as possible from the 21 Army Group front 

to a point east of Hamburg. To the southeast of Berlin, Arrrry Group Center was directed to aid the Ninth and T welflh Armies' 

attacks toward the north. Many of these 

orders had little connection with reality, 

since the forces involved were too badly 

scattered to be organized for an attack. 

Hitler, after some qualms about weakening the area in the northwest, approved 

the measures being taken to help Berlin 

and on 26 April expressed satisfaction over 

the results achieved by his forces. 47 

Any pleasure that Hitler may have felt 

on 26 April was certainly dissipated by the 

news that came on the 28th. General 

Winter sent gloomy tidings of an uprising 

in upper Italy, a report of Mussolini's 

arrest by the Partisans, and an attempted 

coup in Munich. There was also the distressing rumor that armistice negotiations 

were being initiated by commanders in 

Italy. Worse still was the report that the 

Ninth A rmy's attack toward Berlin had 

failed and that its units had not held firm. 

A state of nerves was possibly responsible 

for Keitel's decision on that day to remove 

Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici from the 

command of Arrrry Group Weichsel because 

Heinrici had independently ordered withdrawals on his front.48 

By 30 April, Keitel had to admit that 

the relief of Berlin had failed and that the 

city was facing its final fight. He ordered 

all units in the northern area to be concentrated so that connections could be 

maintained with Denmark. The armies in 

the south were directed to close all their 

fronts in a big ring and to undertake the 

task of saving as many men and as much 

land as possible from the Red Army. 

When they could no longer get instructions from the north, they were to fight to 

save time and to beat down all tendencies 

toward political and military disintegration. To co-ordinate activities in the south, 

Keitel now subordinated Arrrry Group South 

to Army Group Center. Doenitz at this point 

was setting on foot plans to save the forces 

facing the Soviet troops east of Berlin by 

removing them to the west by sea. 49 

These efforts to retrieve something from 

the ruins were, of course, carried on independently of Hitler, who was cut off from 

his armies and chief commanders and 

waited in Berlin for the Red Army. During the evening of 28 April and the early 

hours of the following day, he discussed 

with his advisers in the command post in 

Berlin the naming of a successor. He expelled Goering and Himmler from the 

Nazi party and stripped them of any claim 

46 MS # B-606, The Last Rally: Battles Fought by 

the German Twelfth Army in the Heart of Germany, 

Between East and West, 13 Apr-7 May 45 (Col 

Guenther Reichhelm, Chief of Staff of Twelfth Army). 

41 OKW Communiques, 25, 26 Apr 45. OKW, 

Wehrmachtbtrichte, J.IV.-9. V.45; Tel, Jodi to OB 

NORD WEST, 26 Apr 45; Tel, Hitler toJodl, 26 Apr 

45; Tel, Jodi to Hitler, 26 Apr 45; Sitrep, Konteradmiral Hans Voss to Doenitz, 26 Apr 45; Dir,Jodl 

to Winter, 27 Apr 45; Rad,Jodl to Twelfth Army, 

Army Group Weichsel, and Ninth Army, 27 Apr 45. All 

in OKW, Be/ehle J3.IV.-20. V.45. 

48 Tel, Winter to OKWjWFSt, 27 Apr 45; Rad, 

Winter toJodl, 28 Apr 45; Sitrep Ninth Army, 28 

Apr 45; Rad,Jodl to Reichskan?,lei, 29 Apr 45; Tel, 

Keitel to Heinrici, 28 Apr 45; Rad, Keitel to Krebs, 

30 Apr 45. All in OKW, Befthle J3.lV.-20. V.45. 

49 Rad, Keitel to Winter, 30 Apr 45. OKW, BefeMe 

J3.IV.-20. V.45; German White Book 1945. 
474 

they had to the succession. 50 On the 29th 

he drew a will in which he appointed 

Grand Admiral Doenitz as head of the 

German state and Supreme Commander 

of the Armed Forces. On 30 April, when it 

became clear that no German defense 

against the Red advance was possible, 

Hitler committed suicide. 51 

Later in the evening, Bormann notified 

Admiral Doenitz that the latter had been 

appointed Hitler's successor and was to 

take all measures necessary to meet the existing situation. Bormann had planned to 

go to Doenitz' headquarters, but for some 

reason he did not notify the admiral at 

that time of Hitler's death. Not until 

1 May was Doenitz finally told that Hitler 

was dead. He was notified that copies of 

the will were on the way to him and to 

Generalfeldmarschall Ferdinand Schoerner, commander of Army Group Center, and 

that Bormann would come to Doenitz' 

headquarters at Ploen to give him full details ofthe existing situation. Doenitz was 

to choose the form and time of communicating to the public and troops the news of 

Hitler's death and the grand admiral's 

succession. 52 

Doenitz announced Hitler's death to 

the armed forces and the German people 

in the late evening of 1 May. On the following day he called a conference of his 

chief military and political advisers to 

choose between two courses-surrenderTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

ing at once or continuing the attempt to 

save what they could from the Russians. 53 

50 Hitler was apparently aware of Himmler's effons 

to negotiate a surrender with the Western Allies. For 

Himmler's activities, see below, pp. 476- 77. 

" H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (N ew 

York, 1947), Chs. VI, VII. Much of the volume is 

based on interrogations made by Trevor-Roper of individuals who were with Hitler shortly before his 

death. Trevor-Roper describes efforts made during 

the afternoon and evening of 30 April to arrange an 

armistice or truce with Marshal Zhukov, who was 

notified of Hitler's death. The Soviet commander is 

said to have terminated the conference with demands 

for unconditional surrender of the German forces 

and of the individuals who were in Hitler's final command post. See also Hitler, il1ein politisches Tfsiameni, 

29 Apr 45. The original of Hitler's political testament 

is filed in Record Grou p 218, Records of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, National Archives. 

52 When no copy of the will arrived, Doenitz tock 

steps to establish the authenticity of the messages informing him of his appointment as Hitler's successor 

and of the instructions in the will. A group headed by 

Flottenrichter (Fleet Judge Advocate) Doctor Schattenberg interrogated all personnel on duty in the communications and coding rooms at Ploen who saw or 

handled the messages of 30 April and I May and had 

them declare under oath that these were the exact 

messages they saw. The texts and testimony are in 

Minutes of the Hearing Relative to Messages Dealing With Hitler's Successor, 6 May 45. OKW, HItler's Tod-Doenit::; Nachfolger, Funksprueche, 28 IV.-

6. VA5. 

53 The three top advisers suggested by HitlerBormann as Party Minister, Seyss-Inquart as Foreign 

Minister, and Goebbels as Chancellor-were of 

course unavailable. Bormann disappeared, Seyss-Inquart was prevented by the British from leaving the 

Netherlands, and Goebbels imitated his master by 

committing suicide. Doenit"z appointed Reichsminister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk as Foreign Minister 

on 2 May and left thll other posts unfilled at the time. 
CHAPTER XXV 

The German Surrender 

At the beginning of May, the Western 

Allies and the USSR had virtually destroyed the German fighting machine and 

were engaged in the task of mopping up 

the disorganized elements remaining in 

central Germany. In the week of fighting 

that remained, while Hitler's successor debated his best course of action and sent 

representatives to sound out the Western 

Allies, individual enemy commanders 

made piecemeal surrenders along a wide 

front. 

Early Peace Feelers 

Informal steps toward peace had been 

taken in mid-J anuary 1945 when Foreign 

Minister von Ribbentrop on his own initiative sent Dr. Werner von Schmieden to 

Bern and Dr. F. Hesse to Stockholm to 

make contact with Allied representatives 

for the purpose of discussing a negotiated 

settlement. Von Schmieden found it impossible to establish proper connections, 

and Hesse reported that his efforts were 

ruined because of publicity concerning his 

mission. ' 

More substantial overtures, looking to 

final surrender of German forces in Italy, 

were made in early February by representatives of the German command in 

northern Italy, who arranged for meetings 

in Switzerland with Allied agents. Allied 

authorities in Italy promptly informed the 

Russians of these talks and asked them to 

nominate officers to attend future peace 

conferences if they should be arranged. 

Despite this frank approach, Marshal 

Stalin became disturbed as the talks in 

Switzerland progressed. As his suspicions 

deepened, he became worried over a-possible peace settlement between the Western powers and Germany which would 

leave the enemy free to continue the war 

against the Red Army. He protested 

strongly to Mr. Roosevelt and, when the 

latter assured him that nothing was being 

done against the USSR's interest, declared 

that the President was not being kept informed by his generals. Mr. Roosevelt 

characterized the statements given Stalin 

by his informants as "vile misrepresentations." So strong were the feelings engendered that some Allied leaders wondered 

at the time if the purpose of the German 

negotiators was to split the anti-Nazi 

forces. Delays in the negotiations ultimately postponed any final action in Italy 

until the last week of the war, with the result that the surrender activities had no 

direct effect on the war in northwest 

Europe. However, the suspicion aroused 

in the mind of Marshal Stalin and his ad1 Interrogation of Dr. Werner von Schmieden, 

Secretary of Legation in German Foreign Office, 16 

Aug 45, WD G-2 file; testimony of Fraeulein Margarete Blank, Ribbentrop's secretary, International 

Military Tribunal Nuremberg (Nuremberg, 1947), X, 

193-94. 
476 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

visers created an atmosphere of distrust 

which was to surround most of the peace 

negotiations in northwest Europe. 2 

The first important overtures in northwest Europe were made by members of 

Himmler’s staff. On 2 April Brigadefuehrer Walter Schellenberg of Himmler’s 

Intelligence Service, apparently speaking 

only for himself and without Himmler’s 

authority, approached Count Folke Bernadotte, head of the Swedish Red Cross. 

Bernadotte, who was in Germany attempting to get Norwegian and Danish prisoners 

released into the custody of Sweden, was 

asked if he would discuss with General 

Eisenhower the possibility of arranging a 

capitulation. The count refused to act in 

this capacity, insisting that Himmler 

would have to take the initiative. Schellenberg pointed to possible developments in 

Germany which might shake Hitler’s position, and said that in such a case Himmler 

wanted Bernadotte to go to General Eisenhower and ask for the negotiation of a 

surrender. The Swedish nobleman declared that he would go to the Supreme 

Commander only after Himmler announced: (1) that he had been chosen as 

German leader by Hitler; (2) that the 

Nazi party was dissolved; (3) that the 

Werewolf organization had been disbanded; and (4) that all Danish and Norwegian prisoners had been sent to 

Sweden. 3 

Count Bernadotte’s conditions were not 

met and the Schellenberg suggestion was 

not passed on to SHAEF. Not until midApril were peace feelers concerning the 

surrender of forces in northwest Europe 

communicated to the Supreme Commander. At this time, reports came from 

agents in Denmark that Generaloberst 

Georg Lindemann, German armed forces 

commander in Denmark (Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Daenemark), was willing to surrender the army there, but would not 

include SS and police units. Although the 

Supreme Commander authorized efforts 

through unofficial channels to get additional details of the proposal, he forbade 

Allied officers to be present at the conversations. In reporting this action to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, he suggested 

that the USSR be informed. Later information indicated that General Lindemann would continue fighting, but that 

commanders in Norway and in northern 

German cities such as Bremen would consider surrender. The Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, therefore, on 21 April informed the 

Soviet Government that unconditional 

surrender of large-scale enemy forces was 

a growing possibility and suggested that 

accredited representatives of all three allies 

be made available to the headquarters on 

each front for the purpose of observing 

negotiations for surrender. The USSR was 

asked to designate such representatives 

both at SHAEF and at AFHQ. General 

Deane and Admiral Archer were authorized to represent the United States and 

Great Britain at Soviet headquarters. The 

Soviet high command readily agreed to 

the suggestion, saying that the names of 

2 General Eisenhower was kept informed of the 

progress of negotiations in Italy through messages 

from AFHQ and CCS. They are outlined in messages 

between 27 February and 2 May 1945 in SHAEF 

SGS 387/1 Germany. Two articles by Forrest Davis, 

“The Secret History of a Surrender.” The Saturday 

Evening Post, September 22 and 29, 1945, were based 

on an unpublished OSS story of the negotiations. For 

the Russian reaction see Stettinius, Roosevelt and the 

Russians, pp. 315-16; James F. Byrnes, Speaking 

Frankly (New York, 1947), pp. 56-58; and Leahy, 

I Was There, pp. 329–35. 

3 Count Folke Bernadotte, The Curtain Falls: Last 

Days of the Reich (New York, 1945), pp. 86–94. 
THE GERMAN SURRENDER 

their appointees would be submitted 

later. 4 

Himmler again entered the picture on 

the evening of 23 April in a conference, 

arranged by Schellenberg, with Count 

Bernadotte at the Swedish consulate in 

Luebeck. Himmler began the conference 

by saying that the Germans were defeated, 

that Hitler would soon be dead, and that 

he (Himmler) was ready to order a capitulation on the Western Front. Count 

Bernadotte doubted that an offer to surrender on one front only would be acceptable to the Allies, but he agreed to 

forward the proposal if Himmler would 

promise to surrender forces in Denmark 

and Norway. The SS leader approved this 

suggestion and wrote the Swedish Foreign 

Minister that he wished to act through the 

count. The Swedish Foreign Minister, who 

shared his fellow countryman's skepticism 

concerning the acceptability of a surrender 

on the Western Front alone, nonetheless 

arranged a meeting between Bernadotte 

and the British and U.S. ministers in 

Sweden, Sir Victor Mallet and Mr. 

Herschel Johnson, who dispatched Himmler's offer to their governments. Mr. 

Churchill relayed the information by 

transatlantic telephone to President Truman and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the 

afternoon of 25 April, the day that Soviet 

and U.S. patrols met near Torgau. The 

President, while emphasizing his desire to 

end the war quickly, declared he could accept only an unconditional surrender on 

all fronts and one made in agreement with 

the Soviet Union and Great Britain. This 

information was relayed to Marshal 

Stalin. 5 General Eisenhower expressed his 

satisfaction with the reply and informed 

General Marshall that the Prime Minister 

had agreed that the peace overture was an 

477 

attempt by the enemy to create a schism 

between the Allies. "In every move we 

make these days," said the Supreme Commander, making his position clear, "we are 

trying to be meticulously careful in these 

regards." 6 

During the discussion of Himmler's 

offer, reports of the possibility of a separate 

surrender in Norway and Denmark continued to be received in Supreme Headquarters, and an arrangement was discussed in Sweden for removing German 

soldiers to that country where they could 

be held for the Allies until the end of the 

war. SHAEF informed army group c;ommanders that they could receive surrenders 

of forces facing their fronts but that anything more extensive had to be submitted 

to the Supreme Commander. It will be remembered that at the close of April General Smith, while discussing with SeyssInquart a truce which would permit the 

Dutch population to be fed, had also suggested that the Reich Commissioner surrender the forces in the Netherlands. 

While peace negotiations were still in 

the talking stage in northwest Europe, the 

long-drawn-out negotiations in Italy were 

brought to a close. After a comic-opera 

interlude in which Kesselring removed the 

Commander in Chief Southwest and his 

chief of staff and ordered their arrest, and 

4 SFHQ to EXFOR (21 A Gp), RLB 629, n.d.; 

EXFOR to SFHQ, n.d.; SHAEF to SFHQ, FWD 

19147,14 Apr 45; WO to SHAEF, MI-14/33/17/45, 

19 Apr 45; Troopers to SHAEF, 86992-MI-14, 21 

Apr 45; ces to Mil Mission Moscow, FACS 190,21 

Apr 45; Troopers to SHAEF, 872B9-MI-14, 21 Apr 

45; SHAEF to Mil Mission Moscow (draft approved 

22 Apr 45); Mil Mission Moscow to ees, MX-24031, 

24 Apr 45. All in SHAEF SGS 387/1 Germany, I. 

5 Bernadotte, The Curtain Falls, pp. 104-16; TrevorRoper, Last Days of Hitler, pp. 133-36, Leahy, I Was 

There, pp. 354-55. 

6 Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD 20032, 27 Apr 45, 

Eisenhower personal file. 
478 

in which the deposed officers brought 

about the arrest of their successors, the 

German forces in Italy signed surrender 

agreements on 29 April. Representatives 

of Generaloberst Heinrich-Gottfried von 

Vietinghof genannt Scheel, Commander 

in Chief Southwest, who had been restored to his position by Kesselring, and 

Obergruppenfuehrer und General der 

Waffen SS Karl Friedrich Wolff agreed to 

terminate hostilities at 1200, 2 May 1945. 

Their surrender affected part of Carinthia, the provinces of Vorarlberg, lirol, 

and Salzburg, as well as all of Italy except that part of Venezia Giulia which is 

east of the Isonzo. The surrender removed the last threat from General Eisenhower's southern front and spelled the 

doom of German forces remaining in the 

Balkans. 7 

Doenitz Appraises the Situation 

Admiral Doenitz and his advisers canvassed the German position completely on 

2 May. Agreeing that the military situation was hopeless, they decided that their 

main effort should be to save as many Germans as possible from the Red armies. 

They said they would continue to fight on 

against the British and U.S. forces only to 

the extent that they interfered with German efforts to elude the Soviets. Otherwise, the German armies would attempt to 

avoid combat on the Western Front and 

strive to escape further bombing attacks. 

It was recognized that the goal of capitulation on one front only was difficult to 

achieve at the highest levels because of 

agreements which existed between the 

Western powers and the USSR, but efforts 

were to be made to arrange surrender at 

army group levels and below. In view of 

Seyss-Inquart's report that General 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Smith, at discussions on the same day 

relative to the truce in Holland, had left 

the way open for armistice negotiations, 

Doenitz authorized the Reich Commissioner for the occupied portion of the 

Netherlands to examine the situation. One 

of the main problems was that of taking 

necessary measures to save the forces of 

Schoerner and Generaloberst Dr. Lothar 

Rendulic in the Bohemian area. The military situation there was said to be good, 

inasm uch as the area could be held 

another three weeks if supply and ammunition could be brought in. Doenitz 

was uncertain as to the wisdom of ordering an immediate withdrawal, since he 

believed there would be considerable 

losses in the process. He thought Bohemia 

might make a good bargaining point, and 

he desired to explore the possibilities of 

making a political arrangement with the 

Allies. The Reich Protector of Bohemia 

and Moravia, Staats minister Karl Hermann Frank, and Schoerner's chief of staff 

were ordered to come to Doenitz' headquarters for discussions before a final 

decision should be made. 8 

The German military situation in the 

north was worsened on 2 May by the 

break-through of the British from Lauenburg to Luebeck and of the U.S. forces to 

Wismar. These actions closed "the last 

gate" through which the Germans could 

be brought back from the MecklenburgPomerania area. Doenitz held that further 

fighting in northwest Europe against the 

Allied powers had now lost its purpose. 

Making use of a British offer to spare 

Hamburg as an opening for negotiations, 

7 For a brief outline of the surrender in Italy, see 

Eisenhower to A Gp Comdrs et at., FWD 20479, 3 

May 45, SHAEF SGS 387/1 Germany. The Commander in Chief Southwest had been placed under 

Kesselring's command on 25 April 1945. 

a German White Book 1945. 
THE GERMAN SURRENDER 

he announced that the city would not be 

defended. He offered to send a delegation 

headed by Generaladmiral Hans Georg 

von Friedeburg, who had succeeded 

Doenitz as head of the Navy, and Generalleutnant Eberhardt Kinzel, chief of staff to 

Generalfeldmarschall Ernst Busch, Commander in Chief Northwest, to discuss 

peace negotiations with Field Marshal 

Montgomery on the following day. On the 

evening of 2 May, Doenitz moved his 

headquarters from Ploen to Flensburg, just 

south of the Danish border.9 

On 3 May, Doenitz again reviewed the 

German military situation. Staatsminister 

Frank, present from Bohemia, was not 

sanguine about the Czechoslovak situation, since he felt that a revolt, which 

might occur at any time, would make it 

difficult to hold the protectorate. As possible solutions for strengthening the situation there until the Germans in Bohemia 

could be saved, he suggested that (1) 

Prague be declared an open city, (2) possibilities be explored of sending German and 

Czechoslovak emissaries to General Eisenhower to get favorable capitulation terms 

in that area, and (3) the Reich government be moved to Bohemia. The third 

course had been previously considered, but 

Doenitz opposed it, believing the situation 

too uncertain. Instead orders were sent to 

Prague to prepare a plan for defense. 10 

The situation in southern Germany and 

Austria was reported as being much worse 

than in Bohemia. Staatssekretaer Franz 

Hayler declared that only in upper Austria was there any true control by the 

government. Troops and administration in 

the south showed signs of disintegration 

and there were numerous indications of 

opposi tion by the pu blic to the Army. 

Hayler noted that the old Bavarian flags 

were reappearing in the south and that 

479 

there were evidences of an Austrian freedom movement among the Tyrolean 

VollcsSlurm. He characterized a putsch 

which had been attempted in Munich as 

symptomatic of feeling in the south. On 

top of these pessimistic reports Doenitz received on 3 May a request from Field 

Marshal Kesselring that he be permitted 

to treat with the U.S. forces in his sector. 

Doenitz at once empowered the field 

marshal to conclude with the 6th Army 

Group an armistice applying to German 

forces between the Boehmer Wald and 

the upper Inn, and asked him to determine how far the U.S. f~rces intended to 

advance eastward. Doenitz said he felt the 

Germans should be pleased every time 

U.S. and British forces, rather than Soviet 

forces, occupied a part of Germany. He 

agreed that the over-all situation demanded capitulation on all fronts, but 

held that the Germans should not consider it at the moment since it would 

mean delivering most of the forces east of 

the Elbe to the Russians.ll 

True to his determination to surrender 

only to the Western Allies,Doenitz explored further the situation in northwest 

Europe, in the hope of finding something 

to offer the British and U.S. commanders. 

He found some encouragement in Norway and· Denmark. Since both those 

countries wished, now that liberation was 

near, to avoid any action which would 

bring reprisals, Doenitz considered there 

would be no revolt there. Therefore, he 

ordered his commanders to present a 

9 Other members of the German delegation were 

Konteradmiral Gerhard Wagner and Maj. Hans 

Jochen Friedel. See OKW, Kapitulationsverhandlungen 

2.V.-11.V.45; German White Book 1945; Schultz, 

Die Let<:ten 30 Tage. 

10 German White Book 1945. 

11 German White Book 1945: Rad, Doenitz to Kesselring, 3 May 45. OKW, Be/ehle J3.IV.-20. VA5. 
480 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

strong front in these countries and directed 

that efforts be continued to resolve the 

Norwegian question through Swedish 

mediation. He approved Seyss-Inquart's 

efforts to explore peace possibilities in the 

Netherlands, but directed the continuance 

of the combat mission. He gave specific instructions that the Netherlands should not 

be flooded further. The Commander in 

Chief Northwest was informed that a 

delegation was on its way to British headquarters to discuss an armistice and that 

he should prevent a fast Allied breakthrough to and over the Kiel Canal before 

negotiations could be concluded. Armeegruppe Mueller was set up on 4 May to 

protect this area. 12 

Piecemeal Surrenders 

Meanwhile discussions with Field Marshal Montgomery had begun. Admiral 

Friedeburg and his party had been instructed to promise that Hamburg would 

not be defended, and they were to try to 

secure the 21 Army Group commander's 

permission for German troops, including 

the Third Panzer, Twelfth, and Twenty-first 

Armies, to retire west of the Elbe. They 

also wanted permission to pass German 

civilian refugees through the British lines 

to Schleswig-Holstein. Such terms the 

army group commanders were not allowed 

to grant. As early as August 1944, the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff had issued a 

short document which outlined instructions to cover possible capitulations by 

German forces surrendering as units 

through their commanders. This document, apparently the basis of the surrender 

instruments used by the 2 1 and 6th Army 

Groups, rested on three main principles: 

(1) terms of capitulation were unconditional and had to be clearly and expressly 

limited to the immediate military objects 

of local surrender; (2) no commitment of 

any kind was to be made to the enemy; 

and (3) capitulation was to be made without prejudice to and was to be superseded 

by any general instrument of surrender 

which might be imposed by the United 

States, the United Kingdom and the 

USSR. 13 Therefore, when Field Marshal 

Montgomery indicated to General Eisenhower that overtures for negotiations were 

being made, the Supreme Commander declared that only unconditional surrender 

would be accepted. He added that an offer 

to give up Denmark, the Netherlands, the 

Frisian Islands, Helgoland, and SchleswigHolstein could be considered as a tactical 

matter and the surrender accepted. Any 

larger offer, such as a proposal to give up 

Norway or forces on another front, would 

have to be handled at Supreme Headquarters. One element in this decision was 

the fact that General Susloparoff had been 

informed of peace developments and had 

been told that in the event of the larger 

surrender Soviet representatives would be 

present. 14 

In accordance with these instructions, 

Field Marshal Montgomery refused to accept the withdrawal into his zone of German troops then on the Soviet front, 

although he said that individual soldiers 

would be accepted as prisoners of war. 

The field marshal added that he personally would not turn over these prisoners to 

the USSR. The enemy emissaries, lacking 

12 German White Book 1945; Schultz, Die Letzten 

30 Tage; Tel, Keitel to OB NORDWEST, 4 May 45. 

OKW, Beƒehle 13.IV.–20. V.45. 

13 CCS to Eisenhower and Wilson, FACS 57 (FAN 

395), 16 AUg 44, SHAEF SGS 387/1 Germany, I. 

14 Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 327, 2 May 45; Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 333, 3 May 45. Both in SHAEF 

SGS 387/1 Germany, Policy and Incidents of Local 

German Surrender. 
THE GERMAN SURRENDER 

any power to negotiate further, reported 

to Doenitz that only unconditional surrender would be accepted and that fleeing 

civilian refugees could not be admitted. 

Doenitz, in the belief that further fighting 

in northwest Europe was useless and that 

a partial capitulation in the west would 

gain time against the Red armies, agreed 

to the surrender of forces on Montgomery's front on his terms. Further, the admiral instructed von Friedeburg to get in 

touch with General Eisenhower with the 

hope of negotiating for further partial 

capitulation. He was to explain to the 

Supreme Commander why surrender on 

all fronts was not possible. As evidence of 

good faith toward the West, Doenitz told 

U-boat commanders to halt their activities, forbade any incidents in Norway, and 

ordered the release of King Leopold of the 

Belgians. 15 

On the afternoon of 4 May, German 

representatives appeared at the 21 Army 

Group headquarters at Lueneburg Heath 

with authority from Doenitz and Keitel to 

capitulate unconditionally on the British 

front. They signed an instrument of surrender to become effective at 0800, 5 May, 

which provi ded for the "s urrender of all 

German armed forces in Holland, in 

northwest Germany including the Frisian 

Islands and Heligoland and all other 

islands, in Schleswig- Holstein, and in 

Denmark, to the C.-in-C. 21 Army Group. 

This to include all naval ships in these 

areas. These forces to lay down their arms 

and surrender unconditionally." The 

terms stipulated that the capitulation was 

independent of and would be superseded 

by any general instrument of surrender to 

be imposed on behalf of the Allied powers 

and applicable to the German armed 

forces as a whole. 16 

The same day, 4 May, also saw the end 

481 

of operations of the Twelfth and Ninth 

Armies at the Elbe. The Red drive south of 

Berlin had threatened the extinction of the 

Ninth Army, but some 25,000 to 30,000 of 

its troops, without weapons and almost 

totally demoralized, made their way to the 

Twelfth Army about 1 May. Strong Soviet 

thrusts near the Elbe now made clear that 

the overrunning of the forces east of the 

river was a matter of a few days. On the 

morning of 3 May, General der Panzertruppen Walter Wenck instructed one of 

his corps commanders, General der Panzertruppen Maximilian Reichsfreiherr 

von Edelsheim, to discuss with representatives of the Ninth U. S. Army the surrender of the Twelfth Army and the remaining 

elements of the Ninth Army. General 

Wenck's 100,000 troops, now about 40 

percent unarmed, were accompanied by 

many women and children fleeing from 

the Soviet zone. General von Edelsheim 

opened negotiations on 4 May at Stendal, 

asking that the Ninth Army permit the 

peaceful crossing of the Elbe by noncombatant personnel and civilians and the 

honorable surrender of other troops. The 

Ninth Army representatives, pointing to 

U.S. obligations to the USSR, refused to 

accept a mass surrender and forbade the 

civilians to cross the river. They agreed 

that individual soldiers. might come over 

and surrender to U.S. units, and they apparently did not enforce too sternly the 

ban against civilians. Although they denied permission to build a bridge across 

the Elbe or to repair the damaged structure at Tangermuende, they did allow the 

use of damaged bridges. These and ferries 

15 German White Book 1945. 

16 See Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 347-

49; de Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 453-55. Terms 

of treaty in SHAEF SGS 387.4-4 Surrender Orders 

GeT. 
482 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

were quickly pressed into service. By the 

close of hostilities on 7 May, the main 

body of General Wenck's forces and elements of the Ninth Army had crossed the 

Elbe and surrendered individually to U.S. 

forces. German estimates of the number 

who thus gave themselves up to the Ninth 

U.S. Army vary from 70,000 to 100,000. 17 

There is no evidence that this action on 

the part of Ninth Army or similar actions 

by other forces later was based on any 

policy or directive prescribed by higher 

headquarters. So far as SHAEF was concerned, the heads of the British and U.S. 

Governments and the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff had laid down the policy that any 

mass surrenders must be made simultaneously on both fronts. The way had been 

left open to commanders at lower levels to 

accept the surrender of units immediately 

opposing them or of individuals who came 

into British and United States lines to give 

themselves up. 

In southern Germany and western Austria also, the war was moving swiftly to a 

close. Under Admiral Doenitz’ authority 

to conclude a truce with the 6th Army 

Group for the area between the Boehmer 

Wald and the upper Inn, Field Marshal 

Kesselring on 4 May notified SHAEF of 

his readiness to send his chief of staff to 

Salzburg to discuss surrender terms. General Eisenhower declared that unless the 

offer included all enemy forces in Army 

Groups Center, south, E, and G, and all outlying garrisons, and all forces facing the 

Red Army, the Germans should send their 

representative not to SHAEF but to the 

6th Army Group. Accordingly, General 

Schultz, commander of Army Group G,sent 

forward a delenation headed bv General 

der Infanterie Hermann Foertsch, commander of the First Army. The Germans 

were brought to the Thorak estate at Haar 

near Munich. There they met Generals 

Devers, Patch, and Haislip and on 5 May 

signed an instrument of surrender to become effective at 1200, 6 May. Included 

in the unconditional surrender were all 

elements under Army Group G. In spite of 

this surrender, some SS troops fought on, 

and one minor engagement ensued near 

Woergl when SS men attempted to retake 

Itter Castle, where important French prisoners had been held, after the original 

German garrison had surrendered it to the 

Americans. The original garrison helped 

to beat off the SS attack, and the garrison 

commander was killed in the process: 18 

General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger, commander of the Nineteenth 

Army, came to Innsbruck where on 5 May 

he signed an instrument of surrender 

handing over those parts of the provinces 

of Tirol, Vorarlberg, and Allgaeu up to the 

Italian frontier which were under the 

jurisdiction of the Nineteenth Army commander. Hostilities were to cease by 1800, 

5 May. Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks, commander of the VI U.S. Corps, representing General Devers and General Patch, 

signed for the United States Army, and 

Col. T. Demetz (Chief of Staff), representing General de Lattre, signed for the First 

French Army. Complications arose, how17 MS # B–220, Capitulation Negotiations between the Twelfth (German) Army and the Ninth 

(American) Army, which took place at Stendal on 4 

May 1945 (Edelsheim); MS # B–606 (Reichhelm); 

Conquer: The Story of Ninth Army, p. 329. 

18 Tel, Doenitz to Kesselring, 4 May 45, ONI 

Fuehrer Directives; Alexander to 6th Army Group, 

FX–6979 I, 3 May 45; Eisenhower to Alexander, 3 

May 45; Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow and 

CCS, FWD 20635, 5 May 45; Eisenhower to CCS, 

FWD 20674. 5 May 45. All in SHAEF SGS 387/1 

Germany. SHAEF SGS 387.4-4 SHAEF/21542/2 

Surrender Orders GCT contains one of the original 

copies of the surrender specification signed by 

Foertsch. See also 6th Army Group diary. 
THE GERMAN SURRENDER 

ever, because General der Infanterie Hans 

Schmidt of the T wenty-fourth Army had previously made contact with the First 

French Army and arranged to negotiate 

the surrender of his forces. Just before the 

interview was to take place, his army was 

attached to General Brandenberger's and 

his forces were surrendered with those of 

the latter. Holding that the capitulation of 

the T wenty-fourth Army had not been made, 

General de Lattre ordered hostilities continued against General Schmidt's forces. 

He demanded that General Brandenberger take immediate measures required 

for the Twenty-fourth Army to surrender directly to the French. Fighting continued 

between French forces and General 

Schmidt's units until 7 May, when General Devers issued a cease fire order. The 

Seventh Army completed its activities on 

8 May with the seizure of von Rundstedt, 

Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von 

Leeb, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List, 

Kesselring, and Goering, and the liberation of King Leopold. 19 

After Brandenberger capitulated, Keitel 

had instructed Kesselring to assume command of OB SUED. With OKW, Operations Staff B, he was to take over Army 

Groups Cm,ter, South, and OB SUEDOST. 

Army Group South, which lay between 

Schoerner (Center) and Generaloberst 

Alexander Loehr (OB SUEDOST). and 

was renamed A rmy Group Ostmark (Austria). 

Kesselring and his subordinates were ordered to conduct operations so that time 

could be won in order to save as much of 

the civilian population as possible from 

the Soviet forces. If the Bohemian front 

could not be held against superior enemy 

attacks, forces in the east were to retreat 

in a southwesterly direction with the goal 

of bringing the "valuable human material" of the army groups out of the Rus483 

sian zone. 20 On 6 May, Kesselring was 

ordered to make no further resistance to 

any penetration of U.S. forces eastward 

into the Protectorate of Bohemia and further south. 21 

General Schulz's surrender of 5 May 

was followed on the same day by a request 

from General Loehr, Commander in Chief 

Southeast, for permission to surrender his 

forces in the Balkans to Field Marshal 

Alexander. Loehr held that he could thus 

save Austria from Bolshevism, but he 

added that Austria's separation from Germany must be taken for granted. Doenitz 

on 5 May banned the Werewolf organization and warned Air Group Reich, which 

threatened to go underground, that such 

an action would harm the Reich more 

than it would help. He forbade the destruction offactories, land and water communications, railroads, bridges, and supplies except where combat made it necessary.22 

Preliminary Talks With SHAEF 

Meanwhile, arrangements had been 

made for Admiral von Friedeburg to pro19 Typewritten copy of surrender document and of 

General de Lattre's Special .Order 2 to General 

Brandenberger of 6 May 1945 in SHAEF SGS 

387.4-4 SHAEF /21542/2 Surrender Orders Ger. 

See also discussion in SUSA Rpt of Opns, Vol. III, for 

the Seventh Army's story of the surrender. 

20 Rad,Jodl to Fuehrungsstab B, H.Gr. Mitte, Chef 

des Generalstabes H.Gr. Mitte, 4 May 45. OKW, Befthle 

13.IV.-20. VA5. 

21 Rad, Keitel to Kesselring, 6 May 45. OKW, 

Kapitulationsverhandlungen 2. V.-l I. V./5. 

22 Copies oftels, Loehr to Doenitz, 2 and 5 May 45. 

OKW, Befthle 13.IV.-20. V.45; German White Book 

1945. Rad, Kinzel toJodl and note by Jodi, 5 May 

45; Tel, Keitel to Luftjiotte Reich and others, 5 May 45. 

Both in OKW, Befthle J3.IV.-20. VA5. Loehr intimated 

that as the senior German officer coming from Austria 

he might be able to aid in the organization of Austria. 
484 

ceed to Supreme Headquarters at Reims 

on 5 May to open negotiations for the surrender of the remaining forces in the west. 

The Germans still hoped to gain time in 

which to bring their troops facing the Russians into the western zone. Realizing this, 

General Eisenhower cabled Moscow of his 

intention to inform the German emissaries 

that they must surrender all forces facing 

the Red Army to the Russians. The surrender was to be purely military and entirely independent of political and economic terms which would be imposed on 

Germany by the heads of the Allied governments. The Supreme Commander believed it highly desirable for the surrender 

on the Eastern and Western Fronts to be 

made simultaneously, and indicated that 

he would invite General Susloparoffto attend negotiations looking toward surrender of the enemy in the west. As an alternative he suggested that the Soviets send 

a party to Supreme Headquarters empowered to act for them. General Antonov 

replied, "The Soviet Command does not 

object to the plan of surrender set forth in 

the letter in the event that Doenitz accepts 

the condition of sim ultaneous surrender to 

the Soviet forces of those German troops 

which face them." In the event that Doenitz refused this condition, the Russians 

considered it desirable to discontinue negotiations with his representative. General 

Antonov added, "General Suslaparoffis 

authorized to take part in the surrender 

negotiations with the representative of 

Doenitz since it is not possible to send 

other officers in view of the shortness of 

time." In informing the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff of this arrangement, General 

Eisenhower said that a paragraph would 

be added by which the enemy agreed to 

make the surrender on both fronts simulaneously.:!3 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

When proposals for surrender first began to be discussed at the end of April, the 

question arose as to the nature of the surrender terms to be used. Details of a surrender instrument had been worked out 

by the European Advisory Commission 

and approved by the representatives of the 

United States, Great Britain, and the 

USSR in lateJuly 1944. The document 

had been sent to SHAEF, but it was apparently viewed as a draft and not as a 

final proposal. Several things intervened 

before May 1945 to confuse its status. One 

was the fact that when the French were invited to join the European Advisory Commission near the end of 1944 they asked 

that the protocol for the instrument of surrender be changed to include them as a 

signatory. This step was delayed until 

shortly before the final surrender. The 

second complicating factor came at the 

Yalta Conference when the three great 

powers, without informing France, added 

the word "dismemberment" to provisions 

for complete disarmament and demobilization as possible steps in the pacification 

of Germany. Although French representatives learned indirectly of the change, they 

had not been notified officially of the 

amendment at the beginning of surrender 

negotiations. The European Advisory 

Commission on 1 May 1945 changed the 

protocol of the original surrender instrument to include France as a signatory, but 

did not make clear which set of surrender 

terms was to be used. When, therefore, 

SHAEF looked about for terms of capitu-

'" Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, FWD 

20614, 4 May 45; Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, M-24184, 5 May 45. Both in Eisenhower personal file. Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 340, 5 May 45, 

SHAEF SGS 387/1 Germany, Policy and Incidents 

of Local German Surrenders, I. 
THE GERMAN SURRENDER 485 

lation to present to the Germans, it found 

not one set but two. 24 

On 4 May, General Smith told Ambassador Winant that no authoritative copy 

of the surrender instrument had been sent 

to SHAEF by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff nor had the four governments delegated SHAEF power to sign that instrument. The Ambassador agreed that the 

authority had not been given but said that 

copies of the documents prepared by the 

European Advisory Commission were 

available for SHAEF’s use. On 5 May, 

Mr. Winant was notified that SHAEF had 

decided to use a briefer form of unconditional surrender which had been drawn 

up at that headquarters. SHAEF believed, 

the Ambassador gathered, that it could 

obtain an acknowledgment by the enemy 

of complete defeat with the least controversy and delay by this means. Both the 

Prime Minister and General Smith, to 

whom Winant appealed when he found 

that the new draft had omitted certain important points contained in the older 

document, assured the Ambassador that 

SHAEF’s terms did not preclude the later 

use of the surrender instrument or declaration which the European Advisory Commission had drawn up. At the Ambassador’s suggestion, article four was added to 

the SHAEF instrument to make that point 

clear. SHAEF received no other objections 

to the use of its draft, and it was presented 

to the Germans for their signature at 

Reims. 25 

Surrender at Reims 

General Eisenhower was informed on 

the evening of 4 May that German representatives would be flown to Reims from 

21 Army Group headquarters the following morning. In preparation for the negotiations, he told General Smith that there 

would be no bargaining with the Germans 

and stipulated that he would not see them 

until after the surrender terms were 

signed. General Smith and General 

Strong, who had handled the Italian surrender in 1943, were chosen to discuss 

terms with the Germans. To assure the 

Soviets that nothing underhanded was being done, General Eisenhower gave instructions that General Susloparoff and 

Lt. Col. Zenkovitch be called to Supreme 

Headquarters before the Germans arrived. 26 

In addition to notifying General Susloparoff of approaching negotiations, General Eisenhower kept Moscow informed of 

the developments at Reims and asked if 

24 A valuable summary of this background is given 

in Philip E. Mosely, “Dismemberment of Germany: 

The Allied Negotiation from Yalta to Potsdam,” 

Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (April, 1950), 487–98. See 

also Winant to Secy State, 10 Jun 44; EAC Mtg, 25 

Jul 44; Gen Vincent Meyer, Military Adviser EAC, 

to Gens Hilldring and Strong, 14 Oct 44; Winant to 

Secy State, 7 Nov 44; Memo, French delegation for 

EAC, 29 Dec 44, CAD 334 EAC, Sec II. 

25 A message conveyed by Mr. Robert Murphy 

to General Smith on 12 May 1945 reviewed the discussions and actions relative to the surrender terms 

between 4 and 6 May 1945. It may be found in 

SHAEF SGS 381/7 Germany, Policy and Incidents of 

Local German Surrenders, II. A similar account is 

given in Professor Mosely’s article, “The Occupation 

of Germany,” pp. 495–97. This differs from an account given by General Smith in his My Three Years in 

Moscow (Philadelphia and New York, 1950), p. 20. 

The author in dealing with the instrument of surrender received helpful suggestions from Mr. Denys 

Myers of the State Department who made a special 

study of the subject, and from Mr. Richard Welling, 

formerly of the Civil Affairs Division, who made 

available his unpublished study on the subject. 

26 The fullest account of the surrender negotiations 

is given in Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, 

pp. 821–26. General Smith has given his recollections 

in “Eisenhower’s Six Great Decisions,” The Saturday 

Evening Post, July 13, 1946. General Eisenhower has 

a brief account in Crusade in Europe, pp. 425–26. See 

also Gen. François Sevez, “Reims 1945,” Revue Historique de l’Armée, September 1948, pp. 75–78. 
486 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

the Soviets wished to add to or modify the 

demands which had been presented. Further, General Eisenhower asked whether 

they desired “the formality of signing to 

be repeated before any other Russian representatives” at any other place they 

might care to designate, and whether they 

wished to participate in the more formal 

ratification meeting to follow. This message was handed to Soviet liaison representatives in Moscow by members of the 

Allied military missions, but no direct 

contact could be established with authorized members of the Red General Staff, 

who were said to be absent in the country 

as a result of the Russian Easter week end. 

This meant a delay in any reply Moscow 

might make, and was possibly responsible 

for the fact that General Antonov’s request 

that the surrender ceremony be held in 

Berlin was not made until after the signing 

at Reims. 27 

Bad weather on the morning of 5 May 

interfered with the landing of Admiral 

Friedeburg and his party at Reims. They 

had to be landed at Brussels and driven 

by car to Supreme Headquarters. Shortly 

after 1700, the Germans arrived at Reims 

and were taken to General Smith’s office. 

On coming before the SHAEF chief of 

staff, Admiral Friedeburg proposed to surrender the remaining German forces on 

the Western Front. General Smith informed him of General Eisenhower’s refusal to continue discussions unless the 

Eastern Front was also included in the surrender offer. To make clear the hopelessness of the enemy situation, the SHAEF 

chief of staff displayed maps of the existing 

enemy situation as well as special maps on 

which some imaginary attacks had been 

projected. The German emissary was impressed, but he declared that he lacked 

authority to surrender on both fronts. 

After studying a copy of the proposed Allied terms, Friedeburg cabled Admiral 

Doenitz asking that he be given permission to sign an unconditional and simultaneous surrender in all theaters of operations or that the chief of OKW and the 

commanders of the air and naval forces be 

sent to Reims for that purpose. 

General Eisenhower’s strong stand 

shocked the members of the German high 

command when they received Friedeburg’s report. Doenitz found the demands 

unacceptable and decided to send Jodl, 

strong opponent of surrender in the east, 

to explain why over-all capitulation was 

impossible. His resolution was strengthened on the morning of 6 May by news of 

an uprising in Prague, which ended any 

hope of a political solution of the problem 

in Czechoslovakia and made virtually impossible the withdrawal of Schoerner’s 

forces. Doenitz directed his staff to continue to try to save as many Germans as 

possible from the Soviets, while keeping 

rigidly to the terms of any armistice concluded with the Western powers. 

General de Guingand and Brigadier 

Williams of Field Marshal Montgomery’s 

staff brought General Jodl from their 

headquarters to Reims on Sunday evening, 6 May. After being briefed by Admiral Friedeburg, he opened negotiations 

with General Smith and General Strong. 

Concluding after more than an hour of 

discussion that the Germans were merely 

dragging out the talks to gain time for 

their forces in the east, the Allied officers 

27 Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 345, 

5 May 45; Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 346, 5 May 

45; Msgs from Friedeburg cited in Eisenhower to CCS, 

SCAF 347,5 May 45; Eisenhower to Mil Mission 

MOSCOW, SCAF 348, 0031 hours, 6 May 45; Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, M–24197, 6 May 45. All 

in SHAEF SGS 387/1 Germany, Policy and Incidents 

of Local German Surrenders, I. 
THE GERMAN SURRENDER 

put the problem before the Supreme Commander. His reaction was that unless the 

Germans speedily agreed to the terms of 

surrender "he would break off all negotiations and seal the Western Front preventing by force any further westward movement of German soldiers and civilians." 

This answer was also reported to General 

Susloparoff, who was not sitting in on the 

meetings with the Germans. GeneralJodl, 

faced with General Eisenhower's threat, 

wired Admiral Doenitz for authority to 

make a final and complete surrender on 

all fronts, saying that he saw no other alternative except chaos. 28 

Admiral Doenitz characterized the 

Supreme Commander's demands as "sheer 

extortion." He felt impelled nonetheless to 

accede to them because JodI, who only the 

day before had strongly opposed surrender 

of the forces in the east, now insisted that 

this was the only way out for the Reich. 

The grand admiral was consoled somewhat by the reflection that he could save 

many ofthe troops in the east during the 

forty-eight-hour period before the capitulation went into effect. Shortly after midnight he instructed Keitel to wire: "Full 

power to sign in accordance with conditions as gi ven has been granted by Grand 

Admiral Doenitz." 29 When this message 

arrived at Reims, activities were transferred from General Smith's office to the 

War Room, where the final signing was to 

take place. 

Sentimental newspapermen gave the 

American public a misleading picture of 

the building in which the peace terms 

were signed with their dispatches saying 

that the capitulation ceremonies took 

place in the "little red schoolhouse of 

Reims." Actually, the Ecole Professionelle 

et Technique de Gar<$ons-a modern, 

three-storied, red brick building-had 

487 

more floor space than the Hotel Trianon 

Palace which had housed the General 

Staff of SHAEF at Versailles. The War 

Room, it is true, was not very large. Approximately thirty feet square,30 it was a 

small recreation hall where the students 

had played ping-pong and chess. Huge 

maps covered the walls, showing the location of all Allied divisions and supply 

units, the main airfields, results of air operation, data on transportation and supply, weather conditions, progress of daily 

operations, casualties, and the like. For 

the signing, the room had been filled with 

the equipment ofthe seventeen photographers and newsmen who had been 

chosen to represent the Allied press at the 

ceremony. A large table, which teachers 

had used in grading their papers, stood in 

the center of the room. Here about 0200, 

7 May, General JodI, Admiral Friedeburg, and the former's aide, Maj. Friedrich Wilhelm Oxeni us, were brought 

before Generals Smith, Morgan, Bull, 

Sevez,31 Spaatz, Strong, and Susloparoff, 

28 Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 354, 2144 hours, 6 

May 45;Jod1 to Doenitz, 6 May 45. Both in SHAEF 

SGS 387.1 Germany, Policy and Incidents of Local 

German Surrenders, I. Copy of Rad, Jodi to Keitel, 

6.V.45. OKW, Kapitulationsverhandlungen 2. V.-ll. V.45. 

29 German White Book 1945; Rad, Keitel to.Jodl 

and others, 7 May 45. OKW, Kapitulationsverhandlungen 

2. V.-ll. V,45. 

3. Actually 27 feet 10 inches by 32 feet except for 

a small offset in one corner. 

31 After negotiations with the Germans began, 

General Eisenhower asked the French to send a representative to attend the signing. General de Gaulle 

had already named General de Lattre on 4 May to 

sign for France when a capitulation should be made, 

but he found that there was not sufficient time to get 

de Lattre to Reims. He therefore named Maj. Gen. 

Fran<;ois Sevez to act in the place of General J uin, 

chief of the French General Staff of National Defense, 

who was then attending the United Nations conference at San Francisco. Sevez, op. cit., p. 75. 
488 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Admiral Burrough. Air Marshal Robb. 

Colonel Zenkovitch, and Lieutenant 

Cherniaev. 32 When asked by General 

Smith if they were ready to sign, the Germans replied in the affirmative. General 

Jodl affixed his signature to the two documents placed before him, and they were 

then signed by General Smith for the Supreme Allied Commander and by General 

Susloparoff for the Soviet high command. 

General Sevez of the French Army signed 

as witness. The time was noted as 0241, 

7 May 1945. At this point General Jodl 

rose and said: “General: With this signature the German people and German 

armed forces are, for better or worse, delivered into the victor’s hands. In this war, 

which has lasted more than five years, 

both have achieved and suffered perhaps 

more than any other people in the world. 

In this hour I can only express the hope 

that the victor will treat them with 

generosity.” 33 

The text of the Act of Military Surrender signed by General Jodl follows: 

1. We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby 

surrender unconditionally to the Supreme 

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force 

and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command all forces on land, sea, and in the air 

who are at this date under German control. 

2. The German High Command will at 

once issue orders to all German military, 

naval and air authorities and to all forces 

under German control to cease active operations at 2301 hours Central European time 

on 8 May and to remain in the positions occupied at that time. No ship, vessel, or aircraft is to be scuttled, or any damage done to 

their hull, machinery or equipment. 

3. The German High Command will at 

once issue to the appropriate commanders, 

and ensure the carrying out of any further 

orders issued by the Supreme Commander, 

Allied Expeditionary Force and by the Soviet 

High Command. 

4. This act of military surrender is without 

prejudice to, and will be superseded by any 

general instrument of surrender imposed by, 

or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to GERMANY and the German 

armed forces as a whole. 

5. In the event of the German High Command or any of the forces under their control 

failing to act in accordance with this Act of 

Surrender, the Supreme Commander, Allied 

Expeditionary Force and the Soviet High 

Command will take such punitive or other 

action as they deem appropriate. 

Signed at Rheims at 0241 on the 7th day 

of May, 1945. 

On behalf of the German High Command. 

JODL. 

IN THE PRESENCE OF 

On behalf of the Supreme Commander, 

Allied Expeditionary Force 

W. B. SMITH 

On behalf of the Soviet High Command 

SUSLOPAROFF 

F. SEVEZ 

Major General, French Army 

(Witness) 

General Jodl also signed the following 

statement: 

It is agreed by the German emissaries 

undersigned that the following German officers will arrive at a place and time designated by the Supreme Commander, Allied 

Expeditionary Force, and the Soviet High 

Command prepared with plenary powers, to 

32 These were the members of the delegation at the 

table. In addition, Captain Butcher and several other 

members of the SHAEF staff were present. Most 

photographs of the group omit General Strong, who 

acted as interpreter for the Germans during the 

ceremony. 

33 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 832- 

33. Information as to the building and War Rooin is 

based in part on an interrogation of a member of the 

faculty of the school and on measurements of the 

room made by the author in 1946. Detailed specifications of the War Room and its maps have been made 

by the Historical Properties Branch of the Department of the Army. 
THE GERMAN SURRENDER 489 

SURRENDER AT REI MS. In the War Room of SHAEF headquarters the Allies accept 

the unconditional surrender of the German high command. General Jodl (center foreground) prepares to sign the surrender documents. He is shown accompanied by Admiral Friedeburg of the 

German Navy, and Major Oxen ius. Allied officers shown receiving the surrender are (lift to right) 

General Morgan, General Sevez, Admiral Burrough, General Smith, General Susloparoff and 

General Spaatz. 

execute a formal ratification on behalf ofthe 

German High Command ofthis act of Unconditional Surrender of the German armed 

forces. 

Chief of the High Command 

Commander-in-Chief of the Army 

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy 

Commander-in-Chief ofthe Air Forces 34 

After signing, General JodI was taken to 

General Eisenhower, who asked if the German officer thoroughly understood all the 

provisions of the document. When JodI 

replied affirmatively, the Supreme Commander warned him that he would be 

held accountable officially if the terms of 

the surrender were violated. JodI was also 

made responsible for seeing that the German commanders appeared in Berlin to 

accomplish the formal surrender to the 

Western Allies and to the USSR.35 

3. Photostatic copies of the original documents in 

SHAEF SGS 387/1 Germany, Policy and Incidents 

of Local German Surrenders, I. The originals are at 

the time of writing on exhibit at the U.S. National 

Archives building in Washington. The original battle 

map from the SHAEF War Room may also be found 

there. 

35 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 426. 
490 

At 0324 General Eisenhower cabled the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, "The Mission of 

this Allied Force was fulfilled at 0241, 

local time, May 7th, 1945, Eisenhower." 

He followed this with an official notification to the Soviet high command, 

emphasizing the agreement of the Germans to send representatives to a place 

chosen by General Eisenhower and the 

Soviets to execute a formal ratification. A 

delay of two hours in the handing of the 

latter message to the Russians ensued because they refused to meet the British and 

U.S. representatives sooner. 36 

Ceremony at Berlin 

In answering General Eisenhower's 

telegram of 6 May which asked if the 

Soviet authorities wished to send representatives to a place other than Reims or 

make other arrangements, General Antonov declared that Admiral Doenitz, 

despite his offers to surrender, was still 

ordering German troops to fight against 

Red forces in the east. The note called attention to changes in the language of the 

proposed instrument of surrender which 

had been made at Reims before the final 

signing. In wiring Moscow on 6 May, 

General Eisenhower had spoken of a 

truce, a term stricken out several hours 

later when the Germans agreed to unconditional surrender. Another Soviet request-for the enemy to send emissaries to 

ratify the terms of surrender-had already 

been complied with. The USSR also asked 

that certain phrases from the European 

Advisory Commission draft be added. 

Finally, General Antonov, the Red Army 

Chief of Staff, asked that the signing of the 

act of military surrender take place in Berlin and indicated that Marshal Zhukov 

would represent the Red Army. 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

This message, dated 6 May but not 

handed to General Deane in Moscow for 

transmittal until 7 May, declared that the 

Soviets desired only one signing of the 

document and did not concur with the 

suggestion that preliminary signing be 

held with Susloparoff representing the 

Russians. General Deane and Admiral 

Archer expressed the belief that General 

Eisenhower would not agree to any delays 

which would unnecessarily risk the loss of 

more lives. They might have added that 

any delay granted the Germans would 

have helped them in their desire to remove 

troops from the Soviet front.- General 

Eisenhower quickly replied that the 

Western powers had adhered scrupulously 

to their agreement of no separate truce. 

He had offered to keep pushing toward the 

Red forces, and had restrained his forces 

only at their request. While a brief instrument of surrender had been signed at 

Reims before the arrival of the Russian 

note, provision had been made for the 

representatives of the German high command to report for a more formal signing. 

He indicated his willingness to go to Berlin 

on 8 May at a time specified by Marshal 

Zhukov for this ceremony, but added that 

if bad weather prevented his arrival the 

British and U.S. heads of the missions in 

Moscow were to go to Berlin to represent 

him.37 

General Eisenhower's initial intention 

to go to Berlin was questioned by some 

,. Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 359, 

7 May 45; Eisenhower to CCS Br COS, and Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 357, 7 May 45; Mil Mission 

Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-24202, 7 May 45. All 

in Eisenhower personal file. 

37 Mil Mission Moscow to Eisenhower, MX-24200, 

7 May 45; Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, SCAF 

361,7 May 45. Both in Eisenhower personal file. 

See also Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 16B-69. 
THE GERMAN SURRENDER 

members of his staff who saw no necessity 

of repeating the signing. When Mr. 

Churchill also raised objections, the Supreme Commander appointed as his 

representative Air Chief Marshal Tedder, 

who was accompanied by a delegation 

that included Generals Spaatz, Strong, 

Bull, and de Lattre, and Admiral Burrough. General Deane and Admiral 

Archer traveled from Moscow to sign for 

the Supreme Commander ifhis party was 

unable to arrive. The German representatives were Field Marshal Keitel, Admiral 

von Friedeburg, and General Stumpff. as 

The parties from the west arrived in Berlin 

before noon and were taken to the grounds 

of the Military Engineering College at 

Karlshorst, a suburb about ten miles 

southeast of the city'S center. A meeting 

between Tedder and the Russian representative was delayed until four in the 

afternoon since Zhukov had to wait for the 

arrival of Andrei Y. Vishinsky from Moscow before starting discussions. 

Even before the formal meeting, difficulties arose over the matter of protocol. 

General de Lattre had discovered shortly 

after his arrival that the French flag had 

been omitted from the group displayed in 

the surrender hall and demanded that one 

be added. Since no French flag was available, the Russians made one, erring initially in designing a Dutch instead of a 

French banner. The proper flag was ultimately completed in time fur the final 

ceremony. Another matter, that of the 

signing of the surrender instrument, was 

not so easily arranged. General de Gaulle 

in directing General de Lattre to sign for 

France had said that he would sign as a 

witness in case the document was signed 

by General Eisenhower. If the Supreme 

Commander was not present, then de 

Lattre was to insist on being treated in the 

491 

same way as the British representative, 

unless the latter signed in the place of 

General Eisenhower. General de Lattre, 

on explaining his instructions to Tedder 

during the afternoon, was told that he and 

General Spaatz would sign as witnessesa proposal to which Zhukov apparently 

agreed. The arrangement was upset, however, when Vishinsky arrived and said 

that de Lattre could sign, since his signature would publicly acknowledge the 

resurrection of France, but that Spaatz 

could not participate inasmuch as Air 

Marshal Tedder represented both the U.S. 

and British forces. General Spaatz insisted 

on signing if the French general was included, while General de Lattre stood on 

his instructions and declared that if he 

went back to France without having 

signed the capitulation of the Reich he 

would deserve to hang. Air Marshal Tedder promised to support his right to sign 

and returned to argue the matter with the 

Soviets. For several hours the question was 

debated, Zhukov holding there was no 

logical need for the witnesses. Tedder replied that it was not a matter of logic but 

that there had to be a name to represent 

40,000,000 Frenchmen and another name 

to represent 140,000,000 Americans. He 

added that SHAEF had to represent three 

flags while the Russians had to consider 

only one. Near the end of the discussion, 

when Vishinsky looked at his watch, Tedder took advantage of the situation to say, 

"Yes, we aren't getting any vodka and 

food are we?" The Russian representative 

left the room shortly afterward and returned with a suggestion that the names of 

:IS Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 427-28; 

Butcher, My Three rears With Eisenhower, p. 835; Tedder to author, 13 Feb 47. 
492 

the witnesses be placed on a slightly lower 

line than those ofthe principals. This arrangement, promptly accepted, ended a 

discussion which had lasted from the afternoon until nearly midnight. 39 

With the settlement of the matter of 

protocol, the representatives of the \Vestern powers and the USSR were ready to 

receive the Germans. The Act of Military 

Surrender to be presented to the Germans 

differed from that signed at Reims in only 

a few particulars, and these had been 

settled fairly quickly during the afternoon. 

Where the Reims document spoke of the 

Russian party as "the Soviet High Command," the Berlin document used "the 

Supreme High Command of the Red 

Army." To paragraph two, which enjoined 

the Germans to cease active operations on 

8 May and remain in the positions occupied at that time, the new document 

added: "and to disarm completely, handing over their weapons and equipment to 

the local allied commanders or officers 

designated by the Representatives of the 

Allied Supreme Command." To the injunction that no damage was to be done to 

naval, marine, and air craft, the Berlin 

Act added: "and also to machines of all 

kinds, armament, apparatus, and all the 

technical means of prosecution of war in 

general." 40 

In preparation for the final signing, the 

representatives of the victorious armies 

approached their places at the main table. 

Marshal Zhukov sat in the center, placing 

Air Marshal Tedder to his immediate left. 

General Spaatz and then General de 

Lattre sat at Tedder's left. When Admiral 

Burrough started to take the seat at 

Zhukov's right, he found it taken by someone he did not recognize. It was Vishinsky, 

at whose right the admiral sat during the 

ceremonies.'! Toward midnight, Marshal 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Zhukov called the meeting to order and 

asked that the German representatives be 

brought in. Field Marshal Keitel, Admiral 

Friedeburg, and General Stumpff, together with their aides, now came forward 

and were questioned as to their understanding of the document and their powers to capitulate. Air Chief Marshal 

Tedder then asked if they were ready to 

sign. On answering that they were, they 

were handed copies of the Act of Military 

Surrender. General de Lattre noted with 

pleasure the change in seating which 

placed himjust at Keitel's elbow when the 

field marshal wrote his name. When the 

Germans completed signing at approximately 2330 hours, Marshal Zhukov and 

Air Marshal Tedder penned their names 

on behalf of their respective commands, 

and General Spaatz and de Lattre were 

called forward to sign as witnesses. A 

comic touch was added when it appeared 

that despite the long dispute over their 

right to sign neither had a pen. The ceremony was completed at approximately 

2345, and Marshal Zhukov gave orders 

for the Germans to depart. Keitel, bemonocled and carrying his marshal's 

baton, strode out of the hall, keeping the 

air of arrogance which had unfavorably 

39 De Lattre, Hisloire de la Premiere Armee Franfaise, 

pp. 600-603; Air Chief Marshal Tedder to author, 

13 Feb 47. Deane, The Strange Alliance, p. 177, says 

that Tedder initially objected to de Lattre's signing. 

However, both Tedder and de Laure indicate that 

Tedder backed de Lattre's demand. 

40 Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 175-76. Photostat 

of signed Act of Military Surrender given in SHAEF 

SGS 387/1 Germany, I. 

<1 It is interesting to note that neither Butcher nor 

de Lattre mentions Burrough's presence, and that 

Deane says that the naval representative was Admiral 

Ramsay-Burrough's predecessor, who had been 

killed five months before. Admiral Burrough, in a 

letter of 6 February 1951, gave the author the above 

details. 
THE GERMAN SURRENDER 493 

SURRENDER AT BERLIN. Field Marshal Keitel prepares to sign unconditional surrender 

documents. He is shown with General Stumpff (lift) and Admiral Friedeburg (right) as German 

staff officers observe the proceedings. 

impressed the delegations throughout the 

proceedings. 42 

Before the signing of the surrender 

document at Berlin, President Truman 

and Prime Minister Churchill had announced the surrender at Reims. Their 

statement had been preceded by a series 

of frantic cables between London, Washington, and Moscow relative to the proper 

procedure to be followed in making the 

announcements, and by a breach of 

SHAEF censorship which led to the suspension of the Associated Press correspondent who represented his group at the 

surrender in Reims. 43 In announcing the 

Reims capitulation to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, General Eisenhower had 

recommended a simultaneous statement 

from the three capitals at 1500 on Tuesday,8 May, proclaiming 9 Mayas V-E 

.2 The author has used for these details the accounts 

of Deane, The Strange Alliance, Ch. X ; Butcher, My 

Three rears With Eisenhower, pp. 836-44; and de 

Lattre, Histoire de la Premiere Armee Franfaise, pp. 597-

606. The accounts while not always corroborative are 

in agreement on most points. In the case of the time 

of surrender, the author has followed that set by Air 

Chief Marshal Tedder in his official notification to 

General Eisenhower. In his cable sent at 0122, 9 May 

1945, Air Marshal Tedder declared that the surrender was signed between 2315 and 2345. De Laure 

and Deane both place the surrender one hour later. 

Newspaper accounts for the most part agree with the 

later time. 

43 See Appendix A. 
494 

Day. He warned that, while no release of 

any kind would be made from the European theater until after the announcement 

by the three powers, most of the orders to 

troops would go in the clear, and it would 

be impossible to prevent millions of individuals in France and neutral countries 

from learning the facts. "It is believed 

hopeless," he said, "to keep this secret 

until Tuesday." He suggested that the 

governments might consider it well to 

announce the surrender as soon as they 

could agree among themselves. 44 When 

the Soviets indicated their desire to have a 

signing in Berlin, however, he changed his 

original recommendations, "since manifestly it would be extremely unwise to 

make any announcement until the Russians are thoroughly satisfied." 45 

On the evening of 7 May, President 

Truman notified Marshal Stalin that if 

the time was acceptable to everyone he 

would make the announcement in Washington at 0900, 8 May, corresponding to 

the 1500 hour, Greenwich time, which 

General Eisenhower had suggested. General Antonov, not convinced that the Germans intend~d to surrender, held that a 

premature announcement would prove 

embarrassing and asked that the announcement be postponed until after the 

signing at Berlin or until 1900 Moscow 

time, 9 May. No word came officially from 

Marshal Stalin to President Truman. 

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Churchill had 

pressed for an announcement at 1800, 

7 May, London time, or noon at WashingTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

ton and 2000 in Moscow. President Truman, feeling that he had committed himself to 8 May, declined to go along unless 

Marshal Stalin consented to a change. 

Then followed a series of long-distance 

communications between the three capitals as efforts were made to get changes in 

the arrangements. When the Soviets 

finally declared that they could not advance the hour, the British and U.S. Governments decided to make the announcements on 8 May at the time initially 

suggested by General Eisenhower. The 

USSR waited until 0200 on 9 May, after 

the signing at Berlin, before making the 

surrender public. 46 

To the man in the street and the soldier 

on the battlefield the question of how the 

announcement of the signing at Reims 

and Berlin reached the world did not matter. For them the significant things were 

that the war which had started in Europe 

in the fall of 1939 was ended, and that the 

final offensive against Japan could now 

get under way. The time was not far off 

when they could return to the pursuits of 

peace. 

.. Eisenhower -l9 CCS, SCAF 358, 7 May 45, 

SHAEF SGS 387/1 Germany, I. In an earlier message (Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 356,7 May 45) the 

Supreme Commander had urged an announcement 

at the earliest hour co-ordination could be arranged. 

45 Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 360, 7 May 45, 

SHAEF SGS 387/l Germany, Policy and Incidents 

of Local German Surrenders, I. 

<6 Deane, The Strange Alliance, pp. 171-73; Leahy, 

[Was There, pp. 357-64. Admiral Leahy gives the text 

of the telephone conversation between himself and 

Mr. Churchill concerning arrangements. 
CHAPTER XXVI 

The Last Phase 

The last phase, marking the period 

between the German surrender at Reims 

on 7 May and the dissolution of Supreme 

Headquarters on 14 July 1945, falls into 

two periods. The first, which saw the 

closing out of the former enemy commands, was ended on 5 June when representatives of France, Britain, the Soviet 

Union, and the United States met at Berlin to assume joint authority in Germany 

for their governments. The second, prolonged until 14 July, consisted of winding 

up the loose ends of combined responsibilities and preparing the way for a 

change-over from the Supreme Command 

to separate national headquarters in 

western Germany. 

During both periods, General Eisenhower found it necessary to play several 

roles. As U.S. theater commander, he was 

occupied with the redeployment of U.S. 

forces to the United States and the Pacific 

theater. As leader of the victorious armies 

in the west, he was called on to make 

numerous appearances in European capitals and at home (he left for the United 

States on 16 June and did not return until 

mid-July just before the formal dissolution 

of SHAEF). As Supreme Commander, he 

had the task of separating the U.S. and 

British elements of his combined staff so 

that an easy transition might be made 

from an integrated headquarters to separate national forces. Finally, as the representative of his country on the Allied 

Control Council in Berlin and as commander of U.S. Forces in Germany, he 

was occupied with tasks of Allied military 

government, an assignment he delegated 

in the period covered by this volume to 

his deputy for military government, Lt. 

Gen. Lucius D. Clay. 

Initial Measures 

The Supreme Commander's task in the 

first weeks after the German surrender 

consisted of instituting immediate disarmament and control of German forces 

to prevent the renewal of hostilities, enforcing the terms of surrender by maintaining a strategic air threat and occupying strategic areas on the Continent, 

establishing law and order as far as possible, and initiating measures to complete 

the disarmament and control of the German forces. At the same time, he took 

preliminary steps for the. relief and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons and gave such aid to programs for the relief and rehabilitation of 

liberated countries as did not interfere 

with military objectives. 1 These tasks continued until control passed from the Su1 The task of returning the forces of the Western 

powers to their respective zones was also listed for 

performance in the early weeks but had not been 

completed when SHAEF was dissolved. 
496 

preme Commander to the quadripartite 

military government at Berlin or until 

they were turned over to the national commanders in the French, British, or U.S. 

zones of occupation. 2 

In its initial planning for the occupation 

of Germany, SHAEF had prepared a number of detailed orders to be presented to 

the high-level headquarters of the German Army, Navy, and Air Force at the 

time of surrender. On finding a few days 

before the German surrender that the 

enemy's Army and Air Force headquarters either were powerless or had 

ceased to exist, General Eisenhower decided to present the Germans with only 

that part of the surrender orders which 

dealt with naval units. He then handed 

over to his army group commanders the 

task of issuing detailed orders to German 

commanders for the disarmament of their 

forces. Admiral Burrough, at the time of 

the signing at Reims, issued a detailed 

order to Admiral Friedeburg concerning 

the German Navy, and General Smith 

gave a briefer order to GeneralJodl to the 

effect that local German Army and Air 

Force commanders on the Western Front, 

in Norway, the Channel Islands, and in 

pockets that might still exist were to hold 

themselves in readiness to receive detailed 

instructions from the Allied commanders 

opposite their fronts.3 

One of the chief means of insuring the 

prompt surrender and disarmament of 

German forces was, obviously, to establish 

firm control over the government of Admiral Doenitz. Less than seven hours after 

the surrender at Reims, members of the 

SHAEF staff had met with the German 

group at Reims and arranged for the exchange of liaison parties between Supreme 

Headquarters and the German headquarters at Flensburg. The SHAEF repreTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

sentatives accepted General JodI's proposal to reunite the southern and northern 

sections ofOKW which had been divided 

in late April, and agreed to permit reliable 

elements of the Wehrmacht to keep their 

arms for a short period to maintain order 

and safeguard property.4 

On the return ofJpdl and Friedeburg to 

Flensburg, Admiral Doenitz and his advisers thoroughly explored with them the 

question of whether or not they should remain in power as agents of the Allied 

forces. The argumerits for ending the 

regime immediately were strong. The 

government was manifestly impoten~, and 

it was unlikely that the victors would allow 

it any additional control. Worse still, 

many of the German people were indifferent to it, and it was not even known to 

what extent they knew of the government's 

existence. To some of the German leaders, 

a dignified abdication seemed to be the 

answer. On the other hand, there was the 

obvious importance of having some type of 

government to guarantee the preservation 

of order. Doenitz and his advisers also believed that the \Vestern powers might be 

willing to accept the continuance of the 

government not only because they counted 

on it to keep order and take some of the 

responsibility for coming events, but also 

because it might occur to them that a 

situation might develop in which a strong 

2 Operation ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline 

Plan, 10 Nov 44, and Amendments, 17 Apr 45, 

SHAEF SGS 381 ECLIPSE (Case 2), I, and ECLIPSE 

(envelope). 

SHAEF to A~CXF, 21 A Gp el al., FWD 2063f1, 

5 May 45, SHAEF SGS 3f17/1 Germany, Policy and 

Incidents of Local Surrenders, I. The same file contains copies of all documents and orders presented 

to the enemy representatives at Reims. . 

• ~otes on conf, 1000 hours, 7 May 45, at SHAEF, 

SHAEF SGS 322.01/28 OKW Liaison Detachment 

to SHAEF, I. 
THE LAST PHASE 

Germany would be desirable. After much 

discussion, the German leaders decided 

that while abdication was inevitable it 

should not be made too early." 

In his address to the German people on 

8 May, Admiral Doenitz declared that 

the foundation on which the German 

Empire had been built was a thing of the 

past, and that unity of state and party no 

longer existed. All power in Germany had 

now passed into the hands of the occupying powers, who would decide whether he 

and his government were to continue.6 

Events of the next few weeks were to show 

conclusively that Doenitz' government 

had no real standing and that SHAEF was 

interested in dealing with the admiral only 

as head of the armed forces. 

Disarming the German Forces 

Controlling OKW 

Four days after the surrender at Reims, 

General Eisenhower ordered General 

Rooks, a deputy G-3 of SHAEF, to establish a control party at Flensburg for the 

purpose of imposing the will of the Supreme Commander on OKW in the areas 

of Germany occupied by the Western 

Allies. To carry out his mission, Generai 

Rooks was to issue the necessary orders, 

supervise their transmission through German command channels, and compile information about the German command 

system through the collection and safeguarding of all OKW documents at Flensburg. The Soviets were informed of this 

order and invited to send a party to 

Doenitz' headquarters. The German commander in chief was ordered, in turn, to 

send liaison parties to Reims and to Soviet 

headquarters in Berlin. Headed by Gen497 

eral der Infanterie Friedrich Fangohr, the 

party that was assigned to SHAEF had 

little to do inasmuch as General Rooks's 

mission was used as the chief channel of 

communication.' 

General Rooks acted quickly to assert 

SHAEF's authority. In his first interview 

with Doenitz on 13 May, he ordered the 

arrest of Field Marshal Keitel and his replacement by General JodI. He explained 

that all subsequent instructions to the 

German forces would be in the name of 

the Supreme Commander and that complete access to the offices and files of 

OKW for the control party was requjred. 

SHAEF, he said, would leave to its army 

group commanders the control of affairs 

in their zones and would deal with OKW 

only on matters common to all three 

armed services and to all Allied zones. 

General Jodi assured the Allied general 

that he would undertake to carry out 

SHAEF directives in the interests of maintaining order and saving the German 

people from catastrophe. Doenitz declared 

that the German armed forces had taken 

an oath to him personally and would obey 

his orders. He grasped the opportunity to 

mention severe problems such as food, currency, and fuel which beset the German 

people, and emphasized the need of a central German authority to keep order. 

General Rooks brushed aside this suggestion, making clear that the Western powers 

'Conf,8 May 45, Doenitz,Jodl, and other members 

of stf at Flensburg, German White Book 1945. 

6 German White Book 1945. 

1 Order, SHAEF to Gen Rooks, 11 May 45, 

SHAEF G-3 387-7 SHAEF Control Mission (OKW); 

Memo, G-3 SHAEF, 13 May 45, sub: Liaison Detachment From OKW; SHAEF to EXFOR, FWD 

21656,16 May 45; SCOFOR Main to SHAEF, DAF, 

19 May 45; SHAEF to SHAEF Control Party, AEF 

510, 13 May 45. All in SHARF SGS 322.01/29 

SHAEF Liaison Detachment to OK W, L 
498 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

intended to function through Allied 

military government. 8 

At General Rooks’s request, Doenitz 

drew up a statement to the German armed 

forces which the SHAEF representative 

approved with minor changes on 17 May. 

This statement removed any doubt that 

the enemy had surrendered in the face of 

superior force and included the following: 

“The German Reich has had to capitulate 

because it was at the end of its power of 

resistance. The first consequence that we 

have to draw is the most loyal fulfillment 

of the demands made on us. There must 

be no officer and no soldier, who would 

try by illegal means to evade the consequences which have arisen out of the last 

war and an unconditional surrender.” All 

records were to be shown the Allies. In the 

event that burdens imposed by the Allies 

proved too heavy, the Germans might emphasize the possible serious consequences 

of the orders, but were to make no other 

protest. Doenitz required every soldier 

and officer to behave correctly toward the 

occupying forces. 9 

Despite these evidences of co-operation, 

there were several incidents which led to 

demands in the United States and Great 

Britain for the termination of the Doenitz 

regime and the taking of stricter measures 

against enemy commanders. Angry questions were asked in the House of Commons 

as the result of a broadcast from Flensburg 

on 11 May by Field Marshal Busch, Commander in Chief Northwest. Busch declared that with the agreement of the 

British he had taken command of Schleswig-Holstein and the area occupied by the 

21 Army Group and that all German military and civil authorities in the sphere had 

been subordinated to him. He was referring to an arrangement made on 5 May by 

which the 21 Army Group established a 

German chain of command through which 

it could carry out the initial steps of disbanding the enemy forces, but the broadcast gave offense because it was sent from 

a transmitter in the OKW enclave at 

Flensburg which British troops were not 

able to enter. General Eisenhower 

promptly ordered firm control over the 

Flensburg radio and censorship of all future transmissions. The British closed the 

station, and General Rooks forbade the 

Germans to reopen it. Other criticism 

arose when senior Allied officers were 

photographed in friendly poses with highlevel German commanders and when reports were printed that enemy‘ leaders 

were receiving special treatment. The 

Supreme Commander condemned such 

actions and directed that steps be taken to 

stop their recurrence. 10 

The outcry over these incidents stemmed 

from a fear in some quarters that the Allies 

were not going to be firm enough with the 

8 Ewart, EXFOR TAC (21 A Gp), to SHAEF Fwd 

for Strong, 1/103, 9 May 45; Intervs, Gen Rooks and 

Brig Foord with Jodl, 13 May 45; Interv, Rooks and 

Foord with Doenitz, 13 May 45. All in SHAEF SGS 

322 OKW, Organization and Personnel OKWOKM–OKH. 

9 Instructions [Jodl for Doenitz] Regarding Conduct Toward the Occupying Powers, 17 May 45, 

SHAEF G–3 387-1 1 Clearance of OKW Messages. 

A notation of 22 May 1945 indicates that these were 

cleared by the SHAEF control party with the exception of a finai sentence in which Doenitz said that he 

hoped that the demands of the Allies would not 

exceed the limits of international law which the 

Wehrmacht had respected throughout the war save 

in individual instances which might occur in any war 

and in any force. 

10 Morgan to Whiteley, 13 May 45; de Guingand to 

SHAEF for Whiteley, COS 116, 13 May 45; SAC to 

SHAEF control party, FWD 21475, 14 May 45; 

Rooks to SHAEF Fwd, 29, 15 May 45. All in SHAEF 

G–3 387-9 OKW Misc. New York Times, May 12-14, 

1945; Eisenhower to U.S. comdrs, FWD 21421, 14 

May 45, SHAEF G–3 387-8 Ops (C) OKW Mission 

to SHAEF. For investigation of treatment of OKW 

liaison detachment at SHAEF see SHAEF SGS 

322.01/38 OKW Liaison Detachment to SHAEF, I. 
THE LAST PHASE 499 

enemy commanders and that some members of the old regime might be perpetuated in power. The Supreme Commander’s statement of his aims at this time 

indicated that his main desire was to disband the German Army quickly in order 

to alleviate the growing problem of feeding enemy forces. He hoped that Doenitz’ 

headquarters would be useful in controlling the enemy forces and in speeding up 

the disarmament process. 

Members of the SHAEF control party 

at Flensburg and the SHAEF Political 

Officers had already come to a different 

conclusion. On 17 May, they agreed to 

recommend that General Eisenhower immediately abolish the “so-called government” of Doenitz and arrest the grand admiral and the members of his staff. SHAEF 

on the following day pointed out that this 

action would have to be cleared with the 

Russians, but ordered all steps short of arrest to assure that Doenitz and his staff 

ceased their executive functions. On 19 

May, the Supreme Commander directed 

the 21 Army Group to consult with the 

SHAEF control party at Flensburg and 

then to arrest the members of Doenitz’ 

“so-called government” and of OKW. The 

archives were to be seized and secured. 

Members of the high-level Navy headquarters were for the moment exempted 

from the order. 11 

On the morning of 23 May, General 

Rooks summoned Doenitz, Jodl, and 

Friedeburg to his office and informed 

them of the Supreme Commander’s order. 

The officers were then put under guard, 

but, despite all precautions, Admiral 

Friedeburg killed himself by taking poison. 

The other two leaders were flown from 

Flensburg to a German prison camp that 

afternoon. In a Statement approving the 

arrests, the Department of State said it 

could not understand why Doenitz and his 

group had been permitted to continue 

their pretense of action as a German government for so long, and asked that all 

German General Staff officers of whatever 

rank be arrested on the ground that their 

training and experience would be useful 

in reviving German militarism. 12 

With the arrest of Doenitz and members 

of his staff, the main work of the SHAEF 

Control Party at Flensburg was ended. 

General Rooks indicated his intention of 

leaving the area about 27 May and 

handed over local control to a small joint 

U.S.-British Ministerial Control Party. 

However, he retained general policy control of the southern branch of OKW 

which was still in existence and made attempts to disband German forces in that 

sector. 

SHAEF’s effort to work through the 

southern section of OKW was complicated 

by the confusion in command which followed the arrest on 10 May of Field Marshal Kesselring, who was commanding all 

forces in the southern area when the war 

ended. Since the two next senior commanders, Schoerner and Loehr, were 

somewhere on the Eastern Front and not 

available to take control, the command 

devolved on the next in line, Generaloberst Otto Dessloch, an airman. Busy 

with his own affairs, he appointed General 

der Kavallerie Siegfried Westphal, formerly Kesselring’s chief of staff, as his representative at OB WEST This arrange11 SHAEF control party (OKW) to SHAEF Fwd, 

37, 17 May 45; SHAEF Fwd to SHAEF Control 

Party, 2 1847, 18 May 45; Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 

398, 19 May 45; SCAEF to EXFOR Fwd, 21924, 19 

May 45. All in SHAEF G–3 387–9 OKW Misc. 

12 Memo, Gen Nevins for G–3 SHAEF, 23 May 45, 

sub: Telephone Call From Gen Rooks, SHAEF G–3 

387–3 OKW Misc; Murphy to Smith, 25 May 45, 

SHAEF G–3 387–7 SHAEF Control Mission (OKW). 
500 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

ment was satisfactory to the 6th Army 

Group and the Seventh Army, which were 

dealing at that time with OB WEST in the 

disbandment of enemy forces, but it was 

displeasing to General Winter, the commander of the southern section of OKW. 

Winter felt that his headquarters was the 

proper channel through which orders 

should be passed on to subordinate units. 

The matter was clarified on 19 May when 

the 6th Army Group named General 

Westphal Commander in Chief South and 

subordinated to him virtually all Army 

and Air Force headquarters in General 

Devers’ area, including the southern section of OKW. While the action represented a victory for Westphal, it made no 

basic difference since, as General Jodl 

wired so prophetically shortly before his 

own arrest, “All of us are expected to lay 

some eggs and then be put into the 

chicken soup.” 13 

While this argument was in progress, 

SHAEF on 18 May directed Maj. Gen. 

Robert W. Harper to establish a SHAEF 

control party at the high-level air headquarters (OKL) in Berchtesgaden. He was 

to get as much intelligence information as 

possible, impose the will of SHAEF on the 

high command of the air forces, and close 

down OKL as an operating force as soon 

as he could do so without prejudicing 

Allied interests. Soviet forces were invited 

to accompany the SHAEF party. Discov- 

:ring that the air headquarters was a 

policy staff only and of no value for 

SHAEF’s purposes, General Harper 

promptly dissolved it. General Dessloch, 

commander of the Sixth Air Force and the 

senior airman in the area, was appointed 

to work with the Ninth Air Force in the 

disarmament and disbandment of the 

German Air Force, thus paralleling work 

being done by General Stumpff and his 

air headquarters in the north. Toward the 

end of May the task had been nearly 

enough completed for General Harper’s 

party to be replaced by a group interested 

mainly in exploiting the files of the air 

headquarters. 14 

Disbanding the German Navy 

The high command headquarters of the 

German Navy (OKM) was retained 

longer by the Allies than either the OKW 

or OKL headquarters because of the difficulties faced in disbanding the enemy’s 

naval forces. 15 Many of the ships were still 

at sea when the war ended and had to be 

brought back to home ports. In addition, 

the German naval forces had the task of locating and helping to remove mines which 

had been sowed in European waters. 

The task of dealing with the German 

Navy was handed over by General Eisenhower to the Allied Naval Commander, 

Admiral Burrough, at the time of the German surrender. The extremely detailed 

orders for the disarmament and disbandment of the enemy fleet given to Admiral 

Friedeburg by Admiral Burrough at 

Reims required the Germans to submit, 

within forty-eight hours after they received 

the orders, charts of all minefields in western European waters, information as to 

German minesweeping activities, and lists 

13 Tel. Dessloch to Army Group G and others, 15 May 

45; Tel, Winter to Jodl, Nr. 047/45,20 May 45. Both 

in OKW, Demob. Abt. 10. V.-15.V.45. Rad, Winter to 

Jodl, Nr. 010/45, 15 May 45; Tel, Winter to OB 

WEST, Nr. 09/45, 15 May 45. Both in OKW, SuedFuehrungsabt. 28.W-23.V.45. Rad, Jodl to OB SUED, 

20 May 45. OKW, Nach der Kapitulation, Chef OKW, 

WFSt., Grossadm. Doenitz 4.-23. v.45. 

14 Dir, SHAEF to Gen Harper, 19 May 45, SHAEF 

G–3 387-10 OKW South; SHAEF Fwd to Comds, 

FWD 22735, 30 May 45, SHAEF SGS 322 OKW, 

Organization and Personnel OKW–OKM–OKH. 

15 OKH had disappeared before the war’s end. 
THE LAST PHASE 501 

of minesweeping vessels available. Within 

fourteen days, the enemy was to furnish 

the location of all ships and craft, locations 

of all naval establishments, the approximate number and the location of naval 

personnel, lists of stocks of fuel and locations of the principal naval depots, full details of all German minefields in the northern waters, full details of the enemy minesweeping organization, and copies of all 

coding and ciphering systems. 16 

While the Navy was compiling these 

various lists, Doenitz was instructed to order all enemy ships and craft at sea to report their positions to the nearest Allied 

wireless telegraph station and to proceed 

to the nearest German, Allied, or other 

port selected by the Allies. He was also to 

forbid the scuttling or damaging of any 

naval ship or naval aircraft and the damaging of any harbor works or port facilities. Minesweeping and salvaging vessels 

were to be prepared to begin work at once. 

Doenitz and OKM promptly began to 

comply with these demands. 17 

To see that his orders were carried out, 

Admiral Burrough appointed Rear Adm. 

H. T. Baillie-Grohman as commander of 

the naval forces east of the Elbe to the 

Soviet zone, and Rear Adm. G. C. Muirhead-Could as commander of the forces 

west of the Elbe and in Hamburg. On 16 

May, the Allied Naval Commander appointed Capt. G. O. Maund, RN, as his 

representative in charge of the naval element at OKW and OKM. Maund was 

later succeeded by Capt. E. Hale, RN. 18 

The Allied naval parties moved rapidly 

to collect intelligence from German records 

which might have a vital bearing on the 

war against Japan, and pressed activities 

to open the sea routes to the north German ports. In gathering information, the 

Allied Naval Commander relied heavily 

on British and U.S. intelligence and technical parties which had been exploiting 

records uncovered during the past several 

months as the enemy had been forced 

back. As for clearance of the sea routes, 

the minesweeping that had begun in the 

North Sea before surrender was steadily 

increased. Urgent traffic was first admitted to Hamburg on 9 May, and by midMay Bremerhaven, Emden, and Kiel (via 

the canal) were open to urgent traffic. 

Normal traffic began to flow to Hamburg 

and Kiel (via the canal) on 1 June and to 

Bremerhaven by the middle of that 

month. 19 

The Allied Naval Commander, while 

anxious to use OKM as long as it could be 

of aid, arranged in late May to start closing it out. By the end of June it was possible to make plans for its termination. Orders were issued on 12 July to dissolve it 

and to form a new organization, known as 

the German Minesweeping Administration, which was to supervise the clearance 

of sea lanes. Under the control of the British Naval Commander in Chief, Germany, the new organization came into 

existence on 21 July1945. 20 

16 Photostat, Instr, Burrough to Friedeburg, at 

Reims, 8 May 45, SHAEF SGS 387/1 Germany, 

Policy and Incidents of Local German Surrenders, I. 

17 Instr, Burrough to Friedeburg, 7 May 45; 

ANCXF Main to Admiralty and C-in-C East Indies, 

12 May 45. Both in SHAEF SGS 387.4–4 SHAEF 

2 1542/2 Surrender Orders GCT. 

18 Rpt, Admiral Burrough to SAC, The Final 

Stages of the Naval War in North-West Europe, 13 

Jul 45, OCMH files. Muirhead-Gould was in charge 

of the party which landed at Helgoland on 11 May 

and took its surrender. 

19 Rpt, Admiral Burrough to SAC, 13 Jul 45, 

OCMH. 

20 ANCXF to Capt Maund, OKM, 29 May 45, 

SHAEF SGS 322 OKW, OKW–OKM–OKH. Admiral Burrough in his report says that this message 

was handed to Maund on 6 June. ANCXF Main to 

SHAEF Main, 12 Jul45, SHAEF SGS 322 OKW, 

Organization and Personnel OKW–OKM–OKH. 
502 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

The Final German Surrenders 

While the main headquarters were being dissolved and naval ships and craft 

were being brought into port for surrender, the Allied army groups and tactical 

air forces were busy completing the disarmament of the enemy air and ground 

forces. Their task, as opposed to the 

Navy’s, was greatly simplified because 

most of the air and land personnel and the 

bulk of the equipment had been surrendered or overrun before the signing at 

Reims. The SHAEF control parties in the 

north and south attempted to get lists of 

personnel and commanders and locations 

of units from the German high command, 

but they frequently found that the Allied 

commanders were much better informed 

about the enemy order of battle than the 

Germans. 

The chief German units which had not 

been overwhelmed in battle in the zone of 

the Supreme Commander by 7 May were 

those in the Channel Islands, Dunkerque, 

the western Netherlands, the fortresses of 

the French Atlantic coast, and those in 

Denmark, Norway, and Czechoslovakia. 

Except in Norway, the tasks of disarming 

these units were completed by the time 

SHAEF was dissolved. 

Early Capitulations in Western Europe 

In compliance with Allied demands 

presented to General Jodl at Reims, German garrisons in the Channel Islands and 

the ports along the French coast held 

themselves in readiness to capitulate to 

Allied representatives. Enemy forces in the 

Bordeaux area and along the coast directly 

to the north had been in the process of 

surrendering to French units since midApril. Royan had surrendered on 18 April, 

Ile d’Oléron on 1 May, and La Rochelle, 

which had virtually been taken on 4 May, 

made its formal capitulation on 9 May. 

German forces still held Lorient, St. Nazaire, the Channel Islands, and Dunkerque. 

Negotiations for the surrender of the 

Lorient and St. Nazaire area began shortly 

after the surrender at Reims. Representatives of the commanders of these two garrisons signed surrender terms on 7 and 8 

May. General der Artillerie Wilhelm 

Fahrmbacker formally surrendered the 

Lorient fortress, the Quiberon peninsula, 

Ile de Groix and Belle Isle to Maj. Gen. 

Herman F. Kramer of the 66th U.S. Division on 10 May, and Generalleutnant 

Hans Junck handed over St. Nazaire the 

following day. 21 

The Channel Islands, which the Allies 

had expected to collapse or surrender during 1944–45, still held out at the war’s 

end. Far from surrendering, the garrison 

of the islands had staged a raid against 

Granville in early March 1945, startling 

the U.S. rear echelons and prompting 

them to ask for infantry protection. Plans 

for a greater raid scheduled for 7 May 

were canceled by Jodl and Keitel during 

the negotiations for the surrender at 

Reims. On 4 May, SHAEF rescinded arrangements which had been in effect since 

the previous September for the occupation 

of the Channel Islands in case of German 

collapse or surrender (Operation NEST 

EGG) and gave the task of taking the 

capitulation to the commander in chief of 

the British Southern Command. Arrangements were made on 8 May and the for21 Copies of the surrender documents may be found 

in SHAEF SGS 387.4-4 SHAEF 21542/2 Surrender 

Orders GCT. Details of the surrender may be found 

in History of the Fifteenth Army, p. 39, and Siinto S. 

Wessman, 66th Division in World War II (Baton Rouge, 

La., 1946), pp. 109-40. 
THE LAST PHASE 503 

mal surrender was signed on board HMS 

Bulldog the following morning by Generalmajor Siegfried Heine. Brigadier A. E. 

Snow accepted the capitulation on behalf 

of the Supreme Commander. 22 

Shortly afterward on the same morning, 

another long-held prize of the GermansDunkerque—had given up. The garrison, 

sealed off by the British advance in early 

September, had been invested for months 

by the Czech Independent Armored 

Brigade Group, which was attached to the 

21 Army Group. The one-hundredsquare-mile area held by the enemy was 

reduced in the course of the year and a 

number of Germans were killed and 

wounded, but Allied strength was not sufficient to capture the city. Negotiations 

were opened on the subject of capitulation 

on 7 May shortly after the signing at 

Reims. Viceadmiral Friedrich Frisius, 

commander of the Dunkerque garrison, 

surrendered formally on the morning of 

the 9th to Maj. Gen. A. Liska, commander 

of the Dunkerque forces. 23 

In the western Netherlands, the problem was less one of arranging a formal surrender, which was technically covered by 

the capitulation of the Germans to Field 

Marshal Montgomery at Lueneburg 

Heath on 4 May, than of carrying out the 

final disarmament and evacuation of the 

enemy. As a result of the truce that had 

been in effect in the western Netherlands 

since 1 May in order to allow the dropping 

of food supplies for relief of the Dutch population, the enemy forces, unlike those 

withdrawing across central Germany, 

were still in prepared defensive positions 

and were capable of further resistance. To 

arrange for the orderly disarmament and 

withdrawal of these elements, Lt. Gen. C. 

Foulkes of the lst Canadian Corps met on 

the afternoon of 5 May with General 

Blaskowitz, commander of the enemy 

forces in the Netherlands. Terms of local 

surrender were signed that day; two days 

later, elements of the Canadian corps began to occupy the area west of the Grebbe 

line. Inasmuch as the members of the 

German army in the Netherlands, the 

Twenty-fifth, had the status of capitulated 

troops, they were not given the status of 

prisoners of war nor were their units 

broken up. Instead the army was kept intact and was made responsible for the 

maintenance of its move and the building 

of its own staging camps during the operation. The movement began on 25 May 

under Canadian supervision and was virtually completed by 12 June 1945. 24 

Czechoslovakia 

The chief problem faced in Czechoslovakia was not simply to persuade the Germans there to surrender. It was rather to 

get them to lay down their arms to the 

Soviets instead of fighting their way across 

Bohemia in an attempt to capitulate to the 

armies of the Western powers. The problem was complicated further by the question of what to do about Prague. Various 

persons wanted General Eisenhower to 

enter the city ahead of the Russians, but, 

although it would have been relatively 

easy for U.S. forces to move into the 

22 General H. Adeline, La Libiration du Sud-ouest 

(Algiers, 1948); Msgs by Jodl, 5 May 45, and Keitel, 

6 May 45, Fuehrer Directives, pp. 230-31; Eisenhower 

to Southern Comd, CinC Plymouth, and 11 Gp RAF, 

FWD 20609, 4 May 45, Eisenhower personal file; 

Rpt, Brig A. E. Snow to C-in-C Southern Comd, with 

copy of surrender instrument, 11 May 45, SHAEF 

SGS 387.4–4 SHAEF 21542/2 Surrender Orders 

GCT. 

23 Hq Line of Communications Periodical Intel Review 1, Dunkerque, 22 May 45, OCMH files. 

24 Brief Historical Outline of the Occupation of N. 

W. Holland by 1 Canadian Corps, pars. 1-30, OCMH 

files. 
504 

Czech capital, the Red Army wanted this 

task for itself. 

The Supreme Commander's attention 

was directed to Prague on 5 May when 

optimistic reports were received at SHAEF 

saying that Partisan forces had risen 

against the Germans in that city and that 

the Czechoslovak flag was flying over the 

capital. A few hours later, however, German armor converged on the city, and on 

the following day the Czechoslovaks 

asked for help. In London a Czechoslovak representative, Minister Hubert 

Ripka, asked Allied diplomatic representatives and officials of SHAEF for the 

promptest aid by ground and air forces to 

stop an enemy advance which was reported to be about twenty miles southwest 

of the city. In order to be able to give instructions to leaders inside Prague, Ripka 

asked whether the Third Army, then in 

Czechoslovakia, had been ordered to advance to the capital. He also asked that 

forces of his country then operating with 

the Allied forces be sent to the aid of their 

beleaguered city. Gen. Stanislav Bosy, recently appointed chief of the Czechoslovak Military Mission, appealed directly to 

General Patton in an effort to get aid. 

By the time a number of Czech appeals 

were transmitted to Col. Anthony J. D. 

Biddle of the European Allied Contact 

Section of SHAEF, the surrender terms at 

Reims had already been signed. His natural reply was that since hostilities had 

ceased no action on the matter was required. Later in the day, however, Prime 

Minister Churchill expressed to General 

Eisenhower the hope that the Supreme 

Commander's statements on Allied intentions would not prevent an advance to 

Prague ifforces were available and if they 

did not meet the Russians before reaching 

the Czechoslovak capital. 25 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Throughout 7 and 8 May, other urgent 

requests came from various Czechoslovak 

representatives, who said that the Germans were committing atrocItIes in 

Prague. Minister Ripka appealed personally to Mr. Churchill on 8 May. On being 

informed of this action, SHAEF representatives, taking the view that the matter was 

one for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to decide, informed General Bosy that the 

Czechoslovaks had been correct in approaching Churchill inasmuch as the 

British Prime Minister had facilities for 

obtaining U.S. agreement to any changes 

in current military plans. "I think you can 

rest assured that if Mr. Churchill feels 

that something can be done to relieve the 

tragic situation in Prague, he will already 

have taken action, and that no good purpose would be served by a direct approach to SHAEF." 26 

SHAEF's policy concerning an advance 

to Prague was based on the Soviet request 

of 5 May that the Western forces not move 

east of the Budejovice-Pilzen-Karlsbad 

line into Czechoslovakia. Holding fast to 

this boundary, the Supreme Commander 

nonetheless kept Moscow informed of reports from Prague in case the Soviet 

leaders wanted the U.S. forces to continue 

their advance. Thus on 8 May, when the 

Czechoslovaks appealed for dive bombers 

to be sent to the Prague area to stop an 

25 Maj V. Pan to Col Biddle, 6 May 45; Memo, 

Maj Phillips, EACS, for SHAEF, 6 May 45, sub: Request for Help by Prague; Ripka toJ. Nicolls, Br Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 6 May 45; Ripka to 

Rudolf Schoenfeld, U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia, 

6 May 45. All in SHAEF EACS SHj9 Czechoslovak. 

Churchill to Eisenhower, 2920, 7 May 45, Eisenhower 

personal file. 

2G Maj Pan to Biddle, 8 May 45; Ltr to Gen Bosy, 

9 May 45 (unsigned but apparently fro\" Colonel 

McFie to EACS); Note, Nevins to liaison officer, 10 

May 45, on transmittal slip of request from Czechoslovak Military Mission of 9 May 1945. All in SHAEF 

EACS SHj9 Czechoslovak. 
THE LAST PHASE 

enemy attack, SHAEF forwarded the message to the Soviets with the comment that 

SHAEF was taking no action. Members of 

the Czechoslovak Military Mission were 

informed that SHAEF forces, including 

attached Czech units, had stopped their 

advance at the request of the USSR and 

that all appeals for help had been passed 

on to Moscow.27 

Meanwhile, the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, SHAEF, and the Poenitz government were endeavoring to stop the fighting in Czechoslovakia. The Combined 

Chiefs, possibly in the desire to remove any 

Soviet suspicions that the Western powers 

were permitting the Germans to continue 

fighting on the Eastern Front, notified the 

USSR as early as 8 May that Germany 

had surrendered jointly to the Red Army 

and the forces under SHAEF and that 

continuation of hostilities for even an hour 

after the time set for the cease-fire would 

be considered an offense against all the 

Allied forces. If any sizable bodies of troops 

continued to fight, they would cease to 

have the status of soldiers. "We do not accept," the Combined Chiefs continued, 

"that any German forces may continue to 

fight the Red Army without, in effect, 

fighting our forces also." 28 To make certain that there was no misunderstanding 

of his position, General Eisenhower on 10 

May ordered Doenitz to take immediate 

steps "to insure prompt compliance of 

these commanders to cease fire." To reinforce his action, Eisenhower directed all 

troops under his command to imprison 

German soldiers coming from the fighting 

area and hand them over to the Russians 

as violators of the Act of Capitulation. U.S. 

forces were to set up road blocks and to 

direct retreating Germans into areas forward of the U.S. lines to await capture by 

the Red Army. The Supreme Commander 

505 

stipulated that, in case certain officersField Marshal Schoerner for one-were 

taken, they were to be handed over to the 

Soviets.29 

Doenitz' efforts to stop the fighting in 

Czechoslovakia were complicated by the 

fact that, before the surrender at Reims, he 

had ordered his commanders to do everything possible short of violating truce 

terms to reach the lines of the Western 

powers. They were to take advantage of 

every second left them between the signing of terms of surrender and the time the 

capitulation was to go into effect. Now 

that it was clear that his scheme could no 

longer work, Doenitz had to convince his 

commanders that they should lay down 

their arms. His task was made the more 

difficult because the first news of the surrender had reached the German forces in 

Czechoslovakia from the Prague radio 

station, which had been captured by the 

Partisans shortly before the capitulation at 

Reims. Many of the commanders either 

tended to believe that the announcement 

was propaganda or, at least, thought that 

such an assumption could excuse their 

failure to surrender. In order to make certain that Field Marshal Schoerner was informed of the capitulation, Doenitz on the 

evening of 7 May sent a member of his 

staff, accompanied by a U.S. escort, to 

27 Czechoslovak Military Mission to SHAEF, RR17731,6 May 45; 12th A Gp to SHAEF, QX-31923, 

7 May 45; SHAEF to Mil Mission Moscow, FWD 

21001,8 May 45. All in SHAEF SGS 370.64 Czechoslovakian Resistance Groups. Eisenhower to Mil Mission Moscow, 8 May 45, Eisenhower personal file. 

28 CCS to Mil Mission Moscow, F ACS 216, 8 May 

45, Eisenhower personal file. 

29 Eisenhower to OKW, 10 May 45; Eisenhower to 

Mil Mission Moscow, 10 May 45. Both in Eisenhower 

personal file. V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 458, 

gives details of the road blocks and the handling of the 

disarming of the enemy. Field Marshal Schoerner was 

captured on 18 May and handed over four days later 

to the Red Army. 
506 

find the German commander and instruct 

him to surrender. Schoerner, who was located near the Silesian border in northeast 

Czechoslovakia, indicated that he had 

already attempted to reach his troops with 

the surrender order, but that he would 

now go to western Czechoslovakia to seek 

out his commanders personally and see to 

it that the capitulation terms were carried 

out. At this time, there still remained a 

short period of grace before fighting had to 

stop and there appeared to be every disposition to continue the withdrawal until 

the surrender formally went into effect. 

Schoerner warned that virtually no order 

would make his troops leave their comrades behind or voluntarily surrender to 

the Red forces and that it would also be 

difficult to control them if they were attacked by Czechoslovak Partisans. 3o 

By 12 May, Czechoslovak and Soviet 

troops had entered Prague and the Red 

Army was pressing westward to link up 

with the SHAEF forces. General Eisenhower's next consideration was how to 

move the Czech forces under Western 

command back to their own country. 

Czechoslovak units had been organized in 

the United Kingdom after the fall of 

France and in 1943 had been placed 

under British control with the understanding that they would be used against 

the Germans and ultimately concentrated 

in Czechoslovakia. In discussing these 

agreements with officers of SHAEF in 

February 1944, the Czechoslovak representatives had stressed that it was important for these troops to participate in the 

liberation of their country. The Czechoslovak brigade that had been given the 

task of investing Dunkerque in September 

1944 was still engaged in that mission 

when the Allied forces neared the Czechoslovakian border in April 1945. As a 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

result, the Supreme Commander had to 

postpone shifting it to the 12th Army 

Group front until after the surrender of 

Dunkerque on 9 May. He then moved the 

brigade to the Czechoslovak border, but 

held up its advance at the Pilzen-Karlsbad line. 

When the Czechoslovaks in London 

pressed for permission to move east of the 

line, SHAEF proposed that they settle the 

matter by direct negotiation with the 

Soviet Government and directed General 

Bradley to permit the Czechoslovak 

brigade to move when he was satisfied 

that the USSR had given its authorization. Units were allowed to go to Prague 

on 28 May for a liberation parade, but 

three days later they were returned to the 

U.S. zone. As late as the first week in July, 

the Soviets had not yet given their approval. The Czechoslovak Government in 

Prague thereupon took the position that 

such assent was not necessary. Air Chief 

Marshal Tedder, then acting Supreme 

Commander, indicated that SHAEF had 

no objections to the move but considered 

it wise for the government to "formalize 

their arrangements with the Russians before entry is made." He noted that the 

shift might be simplified by arrangements 

which would leave Czechoslovak forces on 

their own soil when the U.S. forces withdrew from the section west of Pilzen. The 

shift had still not been made four days 

30 German White Book 1945; Copy of Rad, Schoerner to OKWjWFSt-Doenitz, 8 May 45, in Msg,Jodl 

to Friedel for Eisenhower, 8 May 45. OKW, Kapitulationsverhandlungen 2. V-II. V.45; Report of Col Wilhelm 

Meyer-Detring, OKW officer who was sent by 

Doenitz to Schoerner, 10 May 45. OKW, Einsatzabteilung Heer 2. V.-22. V.45. The broad details of the 

report are confirmed by V Corps Operations in the ETO, 

p. 454, which is based on the report of Lt. Col. Robert 

H. Pratt, the V Corps officer who -led the escort that 

accompanied Meyer-Detring during the trip from 

Pilzen to Prague and Velichovky and back. 
THE LAST PHASE 507 

later, the last day of SHAEF’s existence, 

although one of the messages sent from 

that headquarters on 13 July indicated 

that the Supreme Commander had no objection when the Czechoslovaks requested 

that their brigade be released from its attachment to the Third Army. 31 

SHAEF’s insistence that the officials in 

Prague come to an agreement with the 

Soviets may have been prompted to a degree by recent manifestations of a proMoscow orientation by the Czechoslovak 

Government. Nearly a month’ before the 

war’s end, for example, the U.S. and British Ambassadors to Czechoslovakia, preparing to join that government at Košice, 

where it was located temporarily, were 

told that because of inadequate accommodations they could not be received. 

When it became clear that President 

Eduard Beneš had held several meetings 

with the Soviet Ambassador, the Allied 

diplomats protested to Vice-premier Jan 

Masaryk, who promised to look into the 

situation but left for San Francisco for the 

United Nations meeting before doing anything to clarify the situation. The month 

of April also saw the resignation of many 

of the chief Czechoslovak officials in London, leading SHAEF officials to conclude 

that a housecleaning aimed at individuals 

who had been close to the Western Allies 

was in progress. The chief SHAEF liaison 

officer with the Czechoslovaks also concluded that SHAEF would meet a number of delays in the future when it tried to 

deal with the new government. His prediction proved accurate in the case of a 

SHAEF proposal to arm two Czechoslovak battalions to be used in the U.S. zone. 

This project, once acceptable to the 

Czechoslovaks, was allowed to die when 

SHAEF found that no reply on the subject would be received from the government in Košice. 32 There was thus a lack 

of close liaison with the government at 

Kosice when the war ended. 

By mid-June, however, there was evidence that the Beneš government, which 

by then was established in Prague, was 

somewhat worried about the continued 

presence of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak 

soil. Beneš was reported to want both U.S. 

and Soviet forces to leave the country. He 

was said, however, to desire that U.S. 

forces remain for the moment and that 

they synchronize their eventual withdrawal with that of the Soviets. The War 

Department, faced with problems of redeployment, the occupation of Germany, 

and an offensive against the Japanese, 

wanted to withdraw as quickly as possible 

regardless of Soviet action, but the State 

Department was reported to favor holding 

the current line until the Red Army forces 

began to pull out. In response to the War 

Department’s request for his opinion, 

General Eisenhower declared in mid-June 

that “if Czechoslovak independence is to 

be maintained it seems undesirable that 

Russia be left in sole occupation. More: 

over, our withdrawal now might hamper 

Czechoslovak efforts to secure early Russian withdrawal.” On 4 July, the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff decided to withdraw their 

forces simultaneously with and in propor31 Brief for mtg with Czechoslovak military authorities, 16 Feb 44; Memo, Col McFie for Gen Morgan, 

16 Feb 44; SHAEF to EACS for Czechoslovak Military Mission and 12th A Gp, FWD 2 1298, 12 May 45; 

SHAEF to 12th A Gp, FWD 22079, 21 May 45; 

SHAEF to Air Ministry, FWD 22587, 29 May 45; Air 

Ministry to SHAEF, AX-741, 7 Jul 45; SHAEF to 

U.S. Military Attaché. Czechoslovakia, for United 

States Ambassador, S–96228, 9 Jul 45; SHAEF (sgd 

Tedder) to Air Ministry, S–96640, 11 Jul 45. All in 

SHAEF SGS 091 Czechoslovakia Misc, I; Eisenhower 

to Military Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Prague, S–97316, 

13 Jul 45, SHAEF G–3 370–62 Czechoslovakia. 

32 Memo, Biddle for Bull, 4 May 45, SHAEF 

EACS SH/9 Czechoslovak. 
508 

tion to the forces taken out by the Red 

Army. On the basis of an estimate that the 

initial Soviet contingents had been reduced two-thirds, General Eisenhower 

was told to withdraw a similar percentage 

of his forces. 33 

Disarming the Enemy in Denmark and Norway 

The disbandment of enemy forces in 

Denmark and Norway differed in several 

particulars from similar efforts in other 

countries occupied by the Germans. For 

one thing, the forces had not been defeated in the field and were inclined to demand special treatment. For another, the 

large number of German wounded and 

refugees and non-German displaced persons threw a heavy burden on the occupied countries and the Allied units 

responsible for evacuating them. Moreover, the enemy forces in the two countries 

greatly outnumbered the Allied contingents sent to those areas. In both Denmark and Norway, the SHAEF representati ves had difficulties with Soviet 

authorities. The task of disarming the 

Germans in the two countries was entrusted by the Supreme Commander to 

SHAEF missions which had been established in 1944 and to which forces had 

been attached in case of German collapse 

or surrender. The mission to Denmark 

had virtually completed its job at the time 

of the dissolution ofSHAEF, but the mission to Norway did not wind up its affairs 

until the fall of 1945. 

SHAEF Mission Denmark 

Maj. Gen. Richard H. Dewing, head of 

the SHAEF mission to Denmark,34 accompanied by his staff and a parachute 

company, flew to Copenhagen on 5 May 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

1945, shortly after the German surrender 

at Lueneburg, and issued orders to govern 

the evacuation of enemy forces from that 

country. He informed a representative of 

General Lindemann, commander in chief 

of German armed forces in Denmark, that 

he was to march his units back to the 

Reich under their own officers and with 

their usual weapons. Hungarian and 

Soviet troops who had served with the 

Germans were to march out with them. 

Hospitals, their patients, and staffs were 

to be allowed to remain for a time. General Lindemann was directed to arrest SD 

and Gestapo members in Denmark and 

send lists of them to the British.35 Dewing 

forbade ships lying off Copenhagen with 

German soldiers and refugees to land and 

denied the use of Danish ports to ships 

that were in the process of evacuating 

troops from Kurland and East Prussia, 

but he promised to seek further orders on 

the matter. 36 

To handle German effectives, estimated 

at some 206,000, plus 80,000 sick and 

wounded and 48,000 soldiers and refugees 

in Danish ports or off Copenhagen, General Dewing had his original parachute 

company plus the 1 Royal Dragoons and 

a parachute battalion. These were aug33 Murphy to Smith, 17 May 45; AGWAR to 

SHAEF Fwd, W-16162, 13 Jun 45; Memo, Bull for 

CofS, 16Jun 45; Eisenhower to Marshall, S-91011, 

16 Jun 45; JCS to Eisenhower, W-26489, 4 Ju145; 

Memo, Bull for CofS, 6 Jul 45. All in SHAEF G-3 

370-62 Czechoslovakia . 

. H Col. Ford Trimble was deputy head of the 

mission. 

35 SD-Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuehrers SS, the 

Party Security Service; Gestapo-Geheime Staatspolizei, 

the Secret State Police. 

36 Rpt 15, Dewing to SHAEF, 14 May 45, SHAEF 

Mission (Denmark) file; Report of Generalmajor Hellmuth Reinhardt on talk with Gen Fewing [Dewing], 

5 May 45. OKW, Befehle 13.IV.-20. V.45, 6 May 45. 

For Montgomery's earlier orders· concerning Denmark, see Msg, Kinzel to OKW, 5 May 45. OKW, 

Kapitulationsverhandlungen 2. V.-II. V.45. 
THE LAST PHASE 

mented by 6,000-9,000 Danish police. 

The number of Germans was increased 

shortly after the surrender at Reims when 

General Dewing ruled that wounded 

aboard the ships that had come from Kurland to Copenhagen could be unloaded 

there. B' 

A problem that concerned General 

Dewing indirectly was the disarming of 

Germans on the Danish island of Bornholm. Although the island was well east of 

the general line to be occupied by the 

Soviets, it was surrendered with other 

Danish territory to Field Marshal Montgomery on 4 May. Aware oftms, OKWon 

8 May ordered its forces on the island to 

oppose a Soviet landing before the formal 

surrender went into effect. The 21 Army 

Group proposed sending an Allied detachment to the island, but before this step 

could be taken the Red forces had acted. 

SHAEF ruled that, while the island was 

clearly included in the surrender to the 21 

Army Group, it was also covered by the 

over-all capitulations at Reims and 

Berlin. 38 The Danes complained later in 

the year when the Soviet troops lingered 

after the Germans were evacuated from 

the island, but the Red Army forces did 

not finally withdraw until the spring of 

1946. 

The main difficulties in evacuating the 

enemy forces from Denmark arose when 

Danish resistance forces attempted to disarm the Germans. Already touchy on the 

subject of being disarmed though they 

had not been defeated in the field, the 

enemy commanders protested frequently 

that they had not surrendered to the 

Danes. In spite of British assurance that 

these incidents would not be repeated, 

enemy representatives concluded that it 

would probably be impossible to prevent 

the Danes from playing cowboys and In509 

dians ('Indianerspieler")' 39 These troubles 

notwithstanding, the withdrawal of German forces proceeded rapidly. Some 

43,000 had left the country by the end of 

the first week of liberation, and the number had nearly doubled at the end ofthe 

second week. By the close of the first week 

of June, General Dewing concluded that 

he could dispense with the services of General Lindemann and ordered his arrest. 

Fewer than 50,000 Germans remained in 

Denmark when SHAEF was dissolved. 

Since the task of the SHAEF mission was 

not finally completed, it was divided into 

its British and U.S. components with the 

troops in the country remaining under the 

British commander. 4U 

The SHAEF Mission in Norway 

Disarming German forces in Norway 

required much more elaborate planning 

and more extensive activities than in Denmark because of the extent of the country, 

the difficulty of access to parts of it, and 

the size of the forces involved. Spread out 

through Norway was a force of some 

400,000 Germans, including Organization 

to SHAEF, 14 May 45, SHAEF 

German estimates made to 

OKW on 5 May show 230,000 armed forces, 

police, Organization Todt personnel (60,000 

wounded), and 207,000 refugees. OKW, Befthle 

J3.IV.-20. V,45. The number of refugees, increased by 

the arrival of ships after the surrender, was finally 

estimated at 300,000. 

Tel, OKWjWFStjOp (M) to OKM and others, 

8 May 45; Rad, OKWjWFStjOp (M) to Commander 

of Bornholm, 10 May 45; Note on Bornholm incident, Vorfaelle Bornholm, JO May 45; Rad, Jodi to 

Commander of Bornholm, 11 May 45. All in OKW, 

Befthle J3.IV.-20. V,45. 

3S Note for the record in WFStjOp (H) files (report 

by Lt Col Konrad Benzel, 9 May 45. OKW, Bifehle 

J3.lV.-20. V.45. 

'0 Rpt 18, Dewing to SHAEF, SHAEF Mission 

(Denmark) file. 
510 

Todt workers, plus 90,000 Russian prisoners and displaced persons as well as some 

30,000 displaced persons of other nationalities. These forces under General der 

Gebirgstruppen Franz Boehme, commander of the Twentieth Mountain Army 

and of the German armed forces in Norway, like those in Denmark, had not been 

defeated and were disinclined to surrender 

unless proper deference was paid to their 

dignity.41 

The task of clearing the Germans from 

Norway was undertaken at General 

Eisenhower's direction by the SHAEF 

Mission (Norway) headed by Gen. Sir 

Andrew Thorne. 42 This officer, who had 

held the Scottish Command at Edinburgh 

since 1941 and who had been named commander of the Allied Land Forces (Norway) in 1944, was also asked to serve as 

head ofthe SHAEF mission late in 1944. 

Since the fall of 1943, he had been engaged in detailed planning for a return to 

Norway in case of German collapse or surrender. When the Germans surrendered 

at Reims, they were instructed to send 

Army representatives to Edinburgh to 

sign final surrender papers pertaining to 

their forces in Norway and were also told 

to expect the arrival of General Thorne's 

representatives shortly in Os10.43 

Representatives of General Thorne flew 

to Norway on 8 May to deliver his orders 

to General Boehme. During the next three 

days, airborne forces were flown in to aid 

the mission in its task of evacuating the 

Germans. British destroyers then entered 

all of the ports of entry, bringing naval 

and military disarmament parties, and 

pushed into northern waters when the 

Soviets seemed unduly interested there. 

The Allied forces were augmented at the 

beginning of June by a reinforced U.S. 

regiment. At most, fewer than 40,000 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Allied troops were brought in to deal with 

some 400,000 Germans. 44 

During his stay in Norway, General 

Thorne found that some of his chiefproblems included persuading the Soviets to 

accept back into their occupation zone 

Germans from that area, handling Yugoslav displaced persons, and evacuating 

Russian displaced persons. The N orwegians, furthermore, resented the destruction of armaments in their country, an 

understandable reaction, but General 

Thorne felt that he was permitted no discretion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

directive on' the subject. In the case of 

both Yugoslav and Russian displaced persons, trouble arose when some of them expressed unwillingness to return home and 

the SHAEF representatives refused to 

force them to do so. Relations with the 

Soviets were worsened when General 

Thorne commuted the death sentence of 

41 These forces were variously estimated. General 

Boehme spoke at one time of 500,000 Germans who 

would have no more rights when they were disarmed. Tel, Boehme to OKW/WFSt, 10 May 45. 

OKW, Bejehle /3./V.-20. VA5. General Thorne at one 

time spoke of 415,000 Germans including the Todt 

workers and at another time of nearly 400.,000. Text 

of farewell press conf, 30 Oct 45; Hq Allied Land 

Forces (Norway) AAR, 1944-45. Both from Gen 

Thorne's file, now in OCMH files. 

.2 Col. Charles H. Wilson was deputy head of the 

mission. 

43 For plans, see documents in SHAEF G-3 files 

under the code names RANKIN Case C (Norway), 

ApOSTLE I, ApOSTLE II, and ALAIJDlN. On the appointment of General Thorne as head of the SHAEF 

Mission, see Morgan to Thorne, 3 Nov 44; Thorne to 

Morgan, II Nov 44; Dir, SAC to Gen Thorne, 31-Dec 

44. All in SHAEF SGS 322.01.10 SHAEF Mission 

(Norway). For orders to German commanders, see 

Keitel to General Boehme, commander of Twentieth 

Mountain Am!)" 7 May 45. OKW, Befehle J3.IV.-

20. VA5; SCOFOR to G-3 SHAEF Fwd, DA 5, 12 

May 45, SHAEF SGS 387.1 Germany, II. 

" Fortnightly Rpt 8, SHAEF Mission (Norway), 

for fortnight ending 26 May 45, SHAEF Mission 

(Norway) file; SHAEF Mission (Norway) AAR, 

OCMH files. 
THE LAST PHASE 

a German officer who had killed a citizen 

ofthe USSR.45 

Initial emphasis was placed by the 

SHAEF mission on evacuating Allied 

prisoners of war and Soviet displaced persons. In agreement with the Swedish Government, this movement was carried on 

through Sweden to Soviet ports on the 

Baltic. Before SHAEF was dissolved, some 

42,000 Russians had been moved from the 

country while a similar number still remained. The task of taking enemy forces 

out of the country had scarcely been 

begun in mid-July when SHAEF's control 

came to an end and the SHAEF mission 

was split into separate U.S. and British 

components, with General Thorne continuing as commander in chief of Allied 

Land Forces (Norway).46 

Closing Out Supreme Headquarters 

It will be recalled that the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff had not accepted General 

Eisenhower's proposal of 1944 for retaining a combined headquarters for the occupation of western Germany. It was clear 

by the time of the German surrender, 

therefore, that Supreme Headquarters 

would soon cease to exist. General Eisenhower proposed, however, on 10 May, 

that his headquarters remain in existence 

until all organized resistance had ceased 

in Europe, the Allied forces were established in their zones of occupation, and 

the machinery was established to assume 

the functions of the separate national units 

in western Germany.47 Meanwhile he 

ordered his staff to make plans for the termination of SHAEF and defined the 

duties of the occupying forces so as to reduce the amount of time needed to fulfill 

the conditions noted on 10 May. 

He reminded the army group com511 

manders on 11 May that they were not to 

assume the responsibilities of government 

but rather to establish control over the remaining German authority in order to 

insure that the government would be carried on according to the Allied will and 

that Nazis would be excluded from power. 

He directed the commanders to activate 

military government regional teams at 

once. These teams were to re-establish the 

German administrative machinery at a 

regional level to handle such immediate 

problems as the distribution of food, the 

effective use o( available transport, and 

the reconstitution of enough industrial 

facilities to meet military needs and provide minimum essential civil requirements 

in Germany. The German administrative 

machinery, said the Supreme Commander, was so to be arranged that it 

could be separated when the armies withdrew to their various spheres of occupation. The army group commanders were 

to make their military boundaries conform as fully as possible to the regional administrative boundaries for military government. Insofar as military security 

permitted, restrictions on interarea travel 

and communications were to be removed. 4B 

In a series of moves, whose story belongs 

to the opening chapter of military government in Germany rather than to the con45 Hq Allied Land Forces (Norway) AAR, OCMH; 

Interv with Gen Thorne, 28 Jan 47. 

46 Rpt 11, SHAEF Mission (Norway), SHAEF Mission (Norway) file. Hq Allied Land Forces (Norway) 

AAR; Text of farewell press conf, 30 Oct 45; Rpts 

7 -16, Gen Thorne to Field Marshal Brooke. All in 

OCMH files. 

47 Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 382, 10 May 45, 

SHAEF G-3 Ops C GCT 387-21 Termination of 

Combined Command. 

48 See SHAEF G-3 Ops C GCT 387-21 Termination of Combined Command. 
512 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

VICTORY SPEECH being delivered by General Eisenhower at the conclusion of hostilities. 

Air Chief Marshal Tedder is shown at right. 

cluding phase of SHAEF, 49 the Allied 

commanders started the governmental 

machinery functioning again in their various areas. Following a pattern which had 

been laid down when the first Allied forces 

reached German soil west of the Rhine in 

the fall of 1944, they installed under military control and supervision the administrative organization necessary to keep 

order, start the flow of foodstuffs to the 

civilian population, reopen means of communications, and provide military security. At the same time they suspended Nazi 

executive, legislative, and judicial machinery, and seized influential Nazi leaders and their records. These actions were 

intended merely as groundwork for the 

Allied military government activities that 

were to go into effect on the dissolution of 

SHAEF. With matters left largely to the 

separate armies, some of which would be 

likely to remain in occupation as the enforcement agencies of military government, there was some assurance that no 

important change-over would have to be 

made. 

General Eisenhower was relieved of his 

responsibilities for disbanding and disarming enemy forces in western Europe on 5 

June when the commanders of the U.S., 

British, Soviet, and French forces in Europe, meeting in Berlin as the Allied Control Council, assumed control of Germany 

in the names of their governments. Thereafter, the SHAEF staff concentrated on 

the task of shifting to unilateral control 

those functions which had been conducted 

at Supreme Headquarters on a combined 

basis. These included activities of dozens 

of combined committees and commissions 

dealing with such matters as fuel, transportation, equipment of troops in liberated countries, civil affairs, displaced 

49 See the volumes on civil affairs and military 

government in preparation for the UNITED STATES 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series. 
THE LAST PHASE 513 

I. G. FARBENINDUSTRIE BUILDING in Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany. 

persons, war criminals, psychological warfare, censorship, intelligence, communications, and prisoners of war. Further, the 

staff had the tasks of separating the U.S. 

and British components of the SHAEF 

missions in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway without 

interfering with their work, and of making 

certain that combined agreements with 

the liberated countries would still apply 

after the change to national control. 

While the Supreme Commander and 

many members of his staff were preparing 

to dissolve the combined headquarters, 

outlining the work of occupation authorities, and putting in appearances at victory celebrations, Supreme Headquarters 

moved from Reims and Versailles to the I. 

G. Farbenindustrie building in Frankfurt 

am Main, Germany. Shortly afterward, 

numerous new international <?rganizations 

founded to deal with postwar problems 

began to pour their representatives into 

Frankfurt and near-by cities, and the U.S. 

contingent of SHAEF was augmented in 

preparation for the day when it would become Headquarters, U.S. Forces in the 

European Theater (USFET). The Allied 

compound in Frankfurt took on a boomtown appearance as the number of personnel assigned or attached to SHAEF 

passed the 16,000 mark, and the addition 

of air, naval, UNRRA, special missions, 

military government, and other agencies 

swelled the total to 30,000 military or 

civilian personnel associated with Supreme 

Headquarters.5o 

Throughout western Europe, the redeployment of U.S. and Allied forces was 

under way, and units only recently in the 

line were made ready to return home for 

discharge or shipment to the Far Eastern 

theater of the war. Elsewhere, special 

Allied security parties were rounding up 

50 See below, Appendix B, on size of headquarters. 
514 

members of the German General Staff, 

German commanders, Nazi leaders, suspected war criminals, scientists with special knowledge of German weapons, and 

the like and bringing them to western 

Europe for interrogation. Along the Elbe, 

the Western powers prepared to move 

back into their own zones as soon as final 

arrangements could be reached with the 

USSR. Civil affairs agencies were restoring the local committees to order, stamping out potential sources of trouble, 

completing disarmament oftroops, caring 

for displaced persons, and starting up the 

economic and administrative machinery 

of Germany. 

Amidst all this bustle, there was also a 

certain festive air aS,passes for soldiers became more plentiful and as recreational 

and educational centers were set up for 

soldiers confronted with months of waiting 

before their return home. From the 

United States, the United Kingdom, and 

many other parts of the world, a steadily 

increasing number of notables and experts 

flocked to Paris and Frankfurt to have a 

look at the wreckage of Hitler's Reich and 

to suggest measures for the future. For the 

moment, past dreads were forgotten and 

some hope was entertained for an era of 

peace, although there were indications 

that the Soviets would be difficult to deal 

with. The reserved attitude which the 

USSR had maintained toward the Western powers in such matters as liaison and 

the drawing oflines of demarcation had 

become tinged with suspicion during the 

surrender negotiations. 

On 29 June, the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff took steps leading directly to the termination ·of Supreme Headquarters as 

they ordered the Supreme Commander to 

begin withdrawing U.S. and British troops 

from the Soviet zone on 1 July. They also 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

directed him to send British and U.S. garrisons and a French token force to Berlin. 

Air Chief Marshal Tedder, now acting Supreme Commander, was also asked to outlin~ steps to terminate S HAEF on 1 July 

or as soon thereafter as practicable. In 

preparation for the dissolution of the combined command, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

named General Eisenhower commanding 

general of U.S. Forces in the European 

Theater, commander in chief of U.S. 

Forces of Occupation in Germany, and 

represe~tative ofthe United States on the 

Allied Control Council of Germany. The 

British named Field Marshal Montgomery as their representative on the council, 

and his army group became the British 

Army of the Rhine. General Koenig was 

appointed chief of the French occupation 

forces and representative of France in Berlin, while Marshal Zhukov filled a similar 

post for the Soviets. 51 

Plans for separating British and U.S. 

elements of Supreme Headquarters were 

announced on 6July. Air Chief Marshal 

Tedder at that time transferred all U.S. 

units under SHAEF and the U.S. elements of ANCXF and the SHAEF missions to the Commanding General, 

USFET, the 21 Army Group and its naval 

and air elements to the control of the War 

Office, Admiralty~ or Air Ministry, and 

the First French Army to the direct control of the French high command. U.S. 

members ofSHAEF became the staff of 

the new Headquarters, USFET, and remained in the I. G. Farbenindustrie building in Frankfurt. The British elements 

were transferred to Headquarters, British 

Army of the Rhine. The various national 

51 GGS to SHAEF, FAGS 253, 2·9 Jun 45, SHAEF 

G-3 Ops A GGT 322-2 Dissolution and Disbandment 

ofSHAEF and SHAEF Divs. 
THE LAST PHASE 

missions accredited to SHAEF were instructed to terminate their relationship 

with Supreme Headquarters and to make 

separate accreditations to the British, U.S. 

and French commands. To speed the dissolution of any joint or combined machinery which could not be transferred to 

British and U.S. agencies, a Combined 

Administrative Liquidating Agency under 

General Gale was established. Its Documents Section, established at Headquarters, USFET, was given the special task of 

collecting, cataloguing, screening, and 

microfilming all documents belonging to 

Supreme Headquarters. 52 

Final disbandment of the headquarters 

was delayed at the request of General 

Eisenhower until he could return from the 

United States to bid farewell to the members of his staff. On 13 July, shortly after 

his return, he asked them to assemble in 

the Kasino of the 1. G. Farbenindustrie 

building where he expressed his appreciation for their work. The headquarters was 

formally dissolved at 0001, 14July.53 

In recognition of the work of the Allied 

Expeditionary Force, the Supreme Commander issued this final Order of the 

Day: 54 

On this occasion, the termination of Com515 

bined Command, I welcome the opportunity 

to express my gratitude and admiration to 

the people of the Allied Nations in Europe 

whose fiighting forces and nationals have 

contributed so effectively to victory. 

United in a common cause, the men and 

women of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands 

and Norway joined with the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States 

of America to form a truly Allied team, which 

in corijunction with the mighty Red Army 

smashed and obliterated the Nazi aggressors. 

I pay tribute to every individual who gave so 

freely and unselfishly to the limit of his or her 

ability. Their achievements in the cause for 

which they fought will be indelibly inscribed 

in the pages of history and cherished in the 

hearts of all freedom-loving people. 

It is my fervent hope and prayer that the 

unparalleled unity which has been achieved 

among the Allied Nations in war will be a 

source of inspiration for, and point the way 

to, a permanent and lasting peace. 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. 

52 SHAEF to all comds, SCAF 474, 6 Jul 45, 

SHAEF G-3 Ops A GCT 322-3 Dissolution and Disbandment ofSHAEF and SHAEF Divs. SHAEF SGS 

320.3 War Establishment CALA. 

53 Eisenhower to all comds, SCAF 478, SHAEF G-3 

Ops A GCT 322-3 Dissolution and Disbandment of 

SHAEF and SHAEF Divs. 

54 General Eisenhower's Orders of the Day are 

reproduced below, Appendix F. 

&uoulbtr <tbt 3Jn~ignia 

g;uprtmt "tabquarttr~ 

~llitb (fxptbitionar!' jf orct 

Upon a field of heraldic sable (BLACK), representing the darkness of 

Nazi oppression, is shown the sword of liberation in the form of a crusader's 

sword, the flames arising from the hilt and leaping up the blade. This represents 

avenging justice by which the enemy power will be broken in Nazi,dominated 

Europe. Above the sword is a rainbow emblematic of hope containing all the 

colors of which the National Flags of the Allies are composed. 

The heraldic chief of azure (BLUE) above the rainbow is emblematic of 

a state of peace and tranquillity the restoration of which to the enslaved people 

is the objective of the United Nations. 

Appendix A 

SHAEF and the Press, 

June 1944-May 1945 

The story of public relations in the 

European Theater of Operations, 1944-

45, is that of an attempt by SHAEF and 

its subordinate headquarters to keep the 

public informed of operational developments without compromising the security 

of operations. A brief ~ummary of SHAEF's 

efforts in that direction makes clear the 

difficulties confronting any agency which 

tries to reconcile these opposing interests. 

To inform the Allied peoples of the 

D-Day landing, SHAEF began preparations weeks in advance to facilitate maximum coverage of the story. Col. Joseph B. 

Phillips and Col. (later Brig. Gen.) David 

Sarnoff installed special communications 

for the rapid transmission of news from 

northern France. In addition, the Press 

Signal Center was established at the Ministry of Information in London with direct 

teleprinter circuits to SHAEF (Main) and 

the air, ground, and naval advance headquarters. Teletype and radio links from 

London to Washington permitted quick 

transmission to the War Department. Before D Day, correspondents were permitted to file "color" stories which were censored and ready for transmission when the 

assault began. Early on 6June, newsmen 

met at Macmillan Hall, University of 

London, where they were locked in the 

Press Room and furnished maps and background material on the attack. At 0830 

Col. R. Ernest Dupuy, an American member of the SHAEF Public Relations Division (PRD), read the brief official communique which had been written several 

days previously and carefully censored to 

prevent the enemy from learning anything 

of the Allies' future plans. The correspondents then wrote their stories, had 

them censored, and were ready to send 

their copy when G-3 flashed the code word 

TOPFLIGHT which was the signal for release of information. Teams of censors at 

the Ministry of Information, at the beachhead, and on naval assault craft passed 

more than 700,000 words on D Day.1 

Naturally, in the initial period of the 

invasion, the press coverage of D Day 

could not be maintained. Like everything 

else in the beachhead, press communications were limited and many newsmen 

were unable to file all their copy for transmission to the United States and the 

United Kingdom. The opening of new 

transmitters in late June and early July 

improved the situation, but the breakthrough and rapid pursuit which followed 

1 SHAEF PRD, Communications Section History; 

SHAEF PRD Press Censorship History; SHAEF 

Signals Division History. 
520 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

put additional burdens on SHAEF, the 

army groups, and the armies, with the result that not until the Allies reached Paris 

were sufficient facilities available to meet 

the need of correspondents in the field. 

Besides attempting to equalize opportunities for transmitting copy dealing with 

the various armies in Normandy, SHAEF 

also took steps during the first week of the 

invasion to avoid invidious comparisons 

between national armies. On 13 June, the 

authors of SHAEF communiqués were informed that the Supreme Commander desired “that in the future references to 

American and British troops, as such, be 

held to the very minimum and the term 

‘Allied troops’ be used instead.” As an example, they were told that a previous 

reference to “American” troops liberating Carentan should have read “Allied.” 

Thus, in August, on the eve of the drive to 

Paris, Colonel Dupuy warned General 

Smith that unless the approaching American breakout was summarized and depicted as part of an integrated assault, “the 

importance of the British-Canadian offensive in its zone may be minimized, with 

resultant embarrassment to Anglo-American relations, as well as distortion of the 

over-all picture.” He urged the chief of 

staff to give an interview which would put 

the contributions of the various armies 

into the proper perspective. 2 

Holding the view that democratic peoples must be told as much as possible concerning the accomplishments of their 

armies, the Supreme Commander went as 

far as he could, consistent with security, toward announcing full details of his forces’ 

activities. He attempted to maintain the 

same policy for both British and U.S. 

armies, but found that the War Office was 

more conservative than the War Department in releasing names of units and commanding officers. In mid-July, he notified 

Montgomery that so far as U.S. units were 

concerned SHAEF would follow War Department practice. 3 He acceded, however, 

to a British request that senior British officers be reminded that they were not adhering to a directive of 7 February 1944 

regarding interviews. This forbade statements on policy and future conduct of the 

war without approval of the British Government, and required senior officers to 

get approval of the service department 

concerned before granting interviews. 4 

Despite curbs on interviews by senior 

officers, the way was left open for frank 

comments in the form of “off-the-record” 

statements which were not attributable to 

the commander concerned. These were 

used, in particular, for guidance to correspondents on matters which had to be kept 

secret but on which they wished to be able 

to comment intelligently once the ban of 

secrecy was removed. The device was also 

exceedingly valuable in dealing with 

questions of military policy which might 

otherwise be misunderstood. In the latter 

case, an interesting example was shown in 

the handling of reports on the reception 

given Allied troops in Normandy by the 

French. After the enthusiasm of the first 

week of the invasion had passed, correspondents began to report stories of French 

unfriendliness. Evidence of well-filled 

shops in Bayeux was interpreted as meaning that the French had prospered under 

German rule. French citizens were 

2 Memo, SGS (for Gen Eisenhower) for G–3, 13 

Jun 44; Col DUPUY to Cofs SHAEF, 13 Aug 44. Both 

in SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info to 

the Press, II. 

3 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 17 Jul 44, Eisenhower personal file. 

4 British COS to Eisenhower, COS(44) 237, 15 Jul 

44, SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info to the 

Press, I. 
APPENDIX A 

charged with sniping at Allied troops and 

giving aid to German troops. General 

Eisenhower found it necessary in lateJune 

to issue a special press release declaring 

that investigation had shown "no authenticated use of French civilian snipers." He 

emphasized on the contrary that French 

Resistance had been "a great contribution 

in support of Allied operations." 

General Koenig, aroused at what he 

considered a campaign in the British press 

to underline unfriendly gestures on the 

part of the French, wrote to· ask the Supreme Commander for information of 

such incidents. Before the letter arrived, 

General Smith had called a meeting of the 

Public Relations Council of SHAEF, 

which included representatives ofSHAEF, 

ETOUSA, the Department of State, the 

Foreign Office, and the British and U.S. 

information agencies, to consider press 

trends regarding the French. This meeting 

led to other conferences with the newsmen 

in which they were given detailed information on the situation in Normandy and 

fuller details on the constructive contributions of the French to the Allied advance. 

By the beginning of July, General 

McCI ure of the Psychological Warfare 

Division was able to report a changed 

tone in newspaper accounts of the situation in France. 5 

Unfavorable reactions from the Allied 

governments to certain types of stories 

were responsible for changes in SHAEF 

censorship rules during the early weeks of 

invasion. The public relations director was 

reminded officially of Mr. Churchill's 

earlier reaction to reports of the chivalrous 

treatment by Germans of U.S. wounded. 

The Prime Minister had felt that, since 

for one good deed they committed four 

hundred bad ones, there was no need of 

singling out the unique experience for 

521 

publicity. Foreign Secretary Anthony 

Eden, equally certain of the need of curbing statements which might invite reprisals, pleaded for a stop to statements 

such as the one in which a U.S. officer was 

quoted as saying that Allied paratroopers 

did not take prisoners. 

A strong official protest was made by 

the Soviet Embassy to the State Department in mid-July concerning a statement, 

attributed to SHAEF, which reflected on 

the fighting qualities of Russian troops in 

the German Army in Normandy. The 

Russian charge described the remark as 

one "defaming the Soviet people and 

casting a shade on Soviet citizens in military service who found themselves in German captivity." After extensive correspondence between the War and State 

Departments and SHAEF, General Eisenhower denied that SHAEF officials had 

made any remarks on the subject to the 

Allied press. He agreed that statements 

similar to the ones mentioned had been included in dispatches filed by reputable 

correspondents, and that these had been 

passed by the SHAEF censors since no 

security question was involved. The War 

Department passed on this answer to the 

State Department, expressing its willingness to look further into the matter if such 

action was desired. One of the chief effects 

of this exchange of correspondence seems 

to have been the issuance of a memorandum by Headquarters, USSTAF, warning 

U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe of the 

danger of statements offensive to the 

Soviets which might be made to correspondents by airmen returning from Soviet 

5 Public Relations Council Mtg, at WIDEWING, 21 

Jun 44; SHAEF Press Release 46, 26Jun 44; Koenig 

to Smith, 30Jun 44; Smith to Koenig, 7 Ju144. All in 

SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info to the 

Press, I. 
522 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

bases, and directing that all officers and 

men be impressed with the fact “that they 

are to say nothing critical of the Russians 

which might endanger our present relations with them.” While the War Department apparently took no similar action, 

Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy 

Chief of Staff, regretted that Allied press 

representatives had not seen fit “voluntarily to limit their news dispatches, so as 

to avoid causing resentment on the part of 

the Government of a nation that is contributing so greatly to the defeat of the 

common enemy.” 6 

With the liberation of Paris, the SHAEF 

Public Relations Division entered a new 

phase. Until that time, the number of correspondents permitted on the Continent 

had been limited, and a rotation system 

had been imposed on all correspondents 

except those from news agencies and 

major independent newspapers. Correspondents were subject to recall to the 

United Kingdom after thirty days in the 

combat zone. The main offices of the PRD 

remained in London during this period 

with the result that it was somewhat out 

of touch with the situation on the Continent. In late August the division was able 

to get General Smith to withdraw his usual 

opposition to placing SHAEF agencies in 

Paris and approve the establishment of 

PRD in the French capital, where it was 

possible to receive a greater number of 

newsmen. The Hotel Scribe, near the 

Opera, was reserved for billets, messing, 

and accommodations for Allied correspondents in addition to SHAEF censorship, briefing, and information services. 

The number of correspondents accredited to SHAEF for the European Theater 

of Operations grew steadily after the invasion. From 530 on 7 June the number 

rose to 924 on 1 January 1945 and to 996 

shortly before the war’s end. 7 Although 

the vast majority of this group was attached to units in the field, the task of furnishing censorship guidance, providing 

communications for copy filed at SHAEF, 

the accreditation of all correspondents for 

the ETO, and the outlining of broad policy 

for public relations throughout the theater 

imposed a heavy burden on SHAEF PRD. 

The growing responsibilities of the division threw a heavy strain on its chief, General Davis, who had been ill for a number 

of weeks. He had asked in the summer to 

be relieved of his duties, but at the urging 

of General Eisenhower remained at his 

task while a search was made for a satisfactory replacement. One was finally 

found in September in the person of Brig. 

Gen. Frank A. Allen, Jr., then chief of intelligence of 6th Army Group. 8 He assumed his post on 28 September. General 

Davis later improved in health and returned to the less strenuous position of adjutant general of SHAEF which he had 

held earlier in the year. 9 

6 Chief Military Adviser (Br) to Press Censorship 

(Br) to PRD, 28 Jul 44; Dupuy to CofS SHAEF, 27 

Jul 44; Eden to Smith, 5 Aug 44; Smith to Eden, 6 

Aug 44; Ltr, Hull to Actg Secy Robert P. Patterson, 

18 JuI 44, with Incl, Ltr, Russian Chargé A. Kapustin 

to Hull; Ltr, McNarney to Eisenhower, 22 Jul 44; Ltr, 

Eisenhower to McNarney, 27 Jul 44; Dupuy to Eisenhower, 27 Jul 44; USSTAF Memo, 2 Aug 44, sub: 

Intervs regarding Russia; Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 2 

Aug 44; Ltr, McNarney to Eisenhower, 2 Aug 44. 

All in SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info 

to the Press, I and II. 

7 Of the 996, 362 were Americans, 349 British, 126 

French, 61 Canadian, 38 Dominion, and 60 from 

other Allied newspapers. See lists of war correspondents accredited to SHAEF, 1 January 1945 and 25 

April 1945, SHAEF SGS 000.74, Press Correspondents, II. 

8 In the period during General Davis’ illness, 

Colonel Dupuy acted as chief of PRD. On General 

Allen, see 1st Lt. John J. Briscoe, The Kennedy 

Affair (unpublished thesis, 1949, University of Missouri), and Ltr, Gen Allen to author, 23 Jun 50. 

9 Surles to Smith, W–80405, 14 Aug 44; SHAEF 

GO 20, 24 Sep 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 322.01 PRD, 

Org and Personnel PRD. Butcher, My Three Years 

With Eisenhower, pp. 614, 640, 650. 
APPENDIX A 

The shift of the Public Relations Division from London to Paris was made gradually, and it was not until 10 October 

that the first briefing conference was held 

in Paris. By this time three commercial 

transmitters, Radio France, Press Wireless, and MacKay Radio, were in operation between Paris and the United States. 

One commercial and two Army links were 

open to the United Kingdom. These facilities were augmented and improved to the 

extent that by the end of the month an 

average of nearly 60,000 words per day 

was being handled by the radio transmitters. In addition, air courier service took 

a daily average of 3-,729 words to the 

United States and 8,120 words to the 

United Kingdom (part of these also went 

to the United States). An Army broadcasting line which connected Paris with the 

British Broadcasting Corporation was replaced by a BBC transmitter in the Hotel 

Scribe. By the end of November the daily 

average of copy sent from Paris to the 

United States and United Kingdom had 

risen to about 108,000 words. More facilities were added in December with the laying of a BBC submarine cable, initiation 

of voice casts from the city of Luxembourg, 

and the installation of an additional teleprinter line to the United Kingdom. The 

Public Relations Division, besides sending 

copy to the United States by mail, also 

provided means for making records of interviews to be sent to broadcasting stations 

in the United States.10 

Censorship problems arose for the Public Relations Division even before its 

movement to the Continent. An advance 

party of SHAEF censors, going into Paris 

shortly after the first Allied forces had entered the city, reported that six American 

and British correspondents had broadcast 

details of the liberation of the French capital without submitting their copy to Allied 

523 

censors. SHAEF suspended for sixty days 

the right of the correspondents to remain 

on the Continent, but permitted them to 

carry out their normal duties in the 

United Kingdom. l1 

A particularly difficult assignment for 

PRD was that of providing censorship for 

the French press. France, unlike Belgium, 

the Netherlands, and Norway, had not 

adopted the voluntary system of censorship. Instead, it had signed an agreement 

permitting the Supreme Commander to 

exercise strict military censorship of press, 

radio, cinema, and, in general, all publications in the forward zone. In the zone of 

interior the French authorities were required to consult SHAEF censors on all 

news pertaining to military operations and 

to carry out auxiliary censorship instructions communicated by SHAEF. French 

publicity services were to facilitate the task 

of the Supreme Commander. Forty-five 

SHAEF censors were allocated as liaison 

officers with censors in liberated countries. 

Of these, twenty-four were assigned to 

cover the French press. The first four of 

the group had come to France at the beginning of July, and the group steadily increased after the liberation of Paris.12 

Press activities declined slightly during 

the period of the German counteroffensive 

in the Ardennes as security blackouts were 

imposed. For the first time since D Day the 

10 SHAEF Public Relations Division War Diary, 

Oct, Nov, Dec 44. 

11 Dupuy to Hq Comd SHAEF, FWD S-59828, 15 

Sep 44; Dupuy to CotS SHAEF, 4 Sep 44; SHAEF to 

WD, S-59223, 6 Sep 44. All in SHAEF SGS 000.74, 

Press Correspondents, I. 

12 Press Censorship Detachment, SHAEF, History 

of United States and Supreme Headquarters, AEF, 

Press Censorship in the European Theater of Operations, 1942-1945 (hereafter cited as History of U.S. 

and SHAEF Press Censorship), July 1945, pp. 147-75. 

For French agreement see Memo 4 in CCS Directive 

for Civil Affairs Administration in Continental 

France, 26 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 014 France, Civil 

Affairs Dir for France, I. 
524 

number of words sent in a given month 

dropped below that of the previous month. 

After mid-January the volume of words 

began to rise and continued to increase 

until the end of the war. The Public Relations Division expanded its censorship 

services and telecommunication facilities 

to take care of new demands. The army 

groups had their own teleprinter connections to Paris and London, and by the beginning of February the Ninth Air Force 

and army press camps had set up five commercial mobile transmitters. The BBC had 

its own mobile transmitters with the British and Canadian armies, and regular 

Army sets with the American armies. A 

special short-wave transmitter was opened 

at Luxembourg on Christmas Day for 

press voicecasting and direct broadcasting 

to the United States. To provide for a sudden news development, such as the entry 

into Berlin, the Public Relations Division 

built flying radio stations into two flying 

fortresses for use to the United States and 

the United Kingdom. 

Through the Communications Zone 

SHAEF also had the use of the world's 

largest mobile radio station, housed in seventeen vans. Under construction by a 

French firm for the Luftwaffe, the apparatus had been seized by American forces 

and completed by them. The 60-kilowatt 

transmitter was capable of communicating 

with Washington over three teletype channels, which could be used simultaneously 

with a fourth channel that provided voice 

or picture transmission. General Eisenhower's train was also fitted up with radio 

equipment in case it should be needed for 

surrender negotiations. Near the end of 

the war it was estimated that the facilities 

in Paris could send an average of 250,000 

words per day. An average of nearly one 

million words were sent weekly by teleTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

graph, plus an uncounted amount by 

courier, and an average of 150 broadcasts 

a week by Paris studios. During the last 

week of the war, two million words were 

telegraphed, and 200 broadcasts made 

from Paris. 13 

SHAEF continued also to send an impressive amount of-material from London. 

Some concept of the Public Relations Division's task may be seen in a breakdown 

of the words censored in the two cities during the last four months ofthe war. 

Words of Copy Submitted for Censorship 

Month Paris London 

January 1945.... 2,917,435 2,307,750 

February. . . . . .. 3,445,676 2,639,250 

March . . . . . . . .. 4,948,042 2,894,500 

April.. . . . . . . . .. 4,281,475 2,138,000 

Photographs Submitted for Censorship 

January 1945. . . . 16,133 224,103 

February. . . . . . . 22,886 226,765 

March. . . . . . . . . 36,691 339,537 

April. . . . . . . . . . . 27,861 148,599 

These statistics do not tell the entire 

story, since censors were also on duty at 

army groups and armies, while others 

dealt with copy in liberated newspapers, 

and with amateur photographers' film. An 

example may be found in a busy, but not 

a peak, month such as February 1945 in 

which copy handled by censors at SHAEF 

and the three army groups totaled 

13,075,600 words, public relations officer 

copy to be mailed home 9,529,345 words, 

scrutiny of domestic press 44,221,377 

words, still pictures 208,965 feet, and amateur film 1,128,155 feet (still pictures 

1,089,155 and movie 39,000 feet).14 

SHAEF's Public Relations Division had 

the task not only of censoring stories to 

13 SHAEF Public Relations Diyision War Diary, 

Oct, Nov, Dec 44. 

14 PRD diary. 
APPENDIX A 525 

prevent breaches of security and the disturbance of good relations between Allies, 

but also of publicizing the exploits of 

various units to aid morale. This became 

difficult when commanders like General 

Patton by their personal color and their 

slashing advances overshadowed the hard 

work of other commanders and armies. 

SHAEF was concerned less by the disparity in coverage than by the possible harm 

done to the morale of units whose efforts 

had not been adequately recognized. General Smith reminded the Public Relations 

Division of this problem in early September and asked that briefing officers call 

especial attention to the work of General 

Hodges’ First Army. “In other words,” he 

said, “try to attract a little more attention 

to Hodges and Bradley as against Patton’s 

colorful appeal to the press. This without 

detriment to Patton.” 15 These efforts did 

not succeed in gaining additional recognition for the First Army, although they may 

have been responsible for growing Third 

Army suspicion of SHAEF. 

In February 1945, the director of the 

Public Relations Division, General Allen, 

suggested that the morale of armies and 

corps could be developed better if there 

was more equitable coverage of their activities. To achieve this, he proposed that 

briefing officers no longer refer to armies 

by the names of their commanders, but 

merely call them by their official names. 

After a month of experiment, the Public 

Relations Division admitted that the plan 

did not work and that the colorful commanders were still getting most of the 

space. The less well known commanders, 

now that they were not being specifically 

identified, were no longer being written 

about. Colonel Dupuy, deputy director of 

PRD, proposed that the old method of referring to the commander and his army be 

restored. 16 A similar problem existed in 

the First French Army because the press 

tended to play up the exploits of the 

French Forces of the Interior. So strong 

did feeling on the subject become in late 

September 1944 that SHAEF had to order 

that communiqués and press briefings 

emphasize the contributions of the First 

French Army and “soft pedal FFI.” “Emphasis placed on FFI by French press and 

radio to the exclusion of the French Army 

is producing serious situation, political and 

otherwise.” 17 

From time to time the Allied correspondents protested to SHAEF because of 

news blackouts, delays in passing stories, 

failure of censors at various headquarters 

to follow a consistent pattern, release of information at SHAEF which army headquarters were not allowed to release, use 

of censorship for political rather than security purposes, and refusals to release 

“horrifics” and stories of reverses. Of this 

group of complaints, the one most frequently voiced was the lack of consistency 

in clearing stories. Most correspondents 

agreed that the news blackouts during 

major attacks were necessary. The complaints concerned the way in which the 

lifting of these blackouts was timed. Frequently, by accident, an army censor 

would release part of the story. As soon as 

this was known, the correspondents at 

other headquarters would demand that 

they be allowed to use the same material. 

The other censors were still bound by their 

15 Smith to SHAEF Main, FWD 14009, 6 Sep 44, 

SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info to the 

Press, II. 

16 Director PRD to CofS SHAEF, 6 Feb 45; Allen 

to A Gps et al., S–78199, 7 Feb 45; Dupuy to CofS 

SHAEF, 9 Mar 45; SHAEF to A Gps et al., S–81730, 

12 Mar 45, SHAEF cbl log. 

17 SHAEF Fwd to SHAEF Main, FWD 1556, 23 

Sep 44. SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info 

to the Press, II. 
526 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

instructions to continue the blackout until 

official clearance was given. Thus, sometimes a correspondent covering an action 

at one of the armies would find himself 

“scooped” by a correspondent at SHAEF 

and still be told by the army censor that he 

could not release the story. The censors 

struggled constantly to find a standard 

which all of them could use in passing 

copy. Considerable use of BBC broadcasts 

was made, since it was found that they 

normally contained all news released at 

the various headquarters. So far as delays 

in clearing copy were concerned, the censors were supposed to explain reasons for 

delays to the correspondents and to advise 

them of any changes in copy so that they 

could discuss the matter with the chief 

censor or carry the matter higher. 18 

On the question of “horrifics” and reverses, the censors acted in accord with the 

policy followed by both the War Department and Supreme Headquarters of passing any story which did not give information to the enemy. Statistics on casualties 

were issued rather regularly, although a 

time lag was maintained to prevent the 

enemy from determining the effectiveness 

of any current defense the Allies might be 

making. SHAEF applied a temporary stop 

to the report of more than 8,600 casualties 

in the 106th Division at the outset of the 

German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

but after a protest from the War Depart-, 

ment agreed that the action of the censor 

was a mistake. 19 

SHAEF censors discovered that radio 

broadcasting, in particular, created a 

number of special censorship problems. 

Especially serious were premature releases 

of information on coming attacks. In several cases the chief difficulty came not so 

much from actual broadcasts as from preliminary statements made by the radio reporter to his home office before his 

censored broadcast began. The enemy 

could monitor the information thus sent 

and be forewarned. In other cases the British Broadcasting Corporation used uncensored information in its news announcements. On the eve of a First Army attack 

in early January 1945, Mr. Cyril Ray of 

BBC announced from the Third Army 

headquarters that an action was shortly to 

take place. His accreditation was withdrawn. Shortly afterward General Devers 

protested strongly a BBC announcement 

that a number of divisions were being 

withdrawn from the Allied right flank, 

leaving the Seventh Army with an extended front. This gave information to the 

Germans of the attack, and alarmed the 

French population of the area. General 

Devers suggested that, if the directors of 

BBC could not be controlled on the basis 

of military security, they should be warned 

that they were endangering Allied relations. The censors were particularly upset 

because they found themselves attacked in 

the first instance by correspondents at the 

First Army headquarters who had been 

“scooped.” The SHAEF censors finally released as much of the story as had been 

announced by BBC. 20 

Because of the speed with which information from a BBC broadcast could be 

picked up, breaches of security by it were 

more helpful to the enemy than similar 

statements in the press. It was charged 

that enemy fire fell on Allied troops in seventeen minutes after a casual newscast indicated that they were entering the factory 

district of Aachen. As a result of this type 

18 History of U.S. and SHAEF Press Censorship, 

Ch. 19. 

19 Smith to Marshall, 12 Jan 45, SHAEF cbl log. 

20 Statement by PRD SHAEF, 11 Jan 45, SHAEF 

SGS 000.73, Policy and Infractions of Press Censorship, I; Devers to SHAEF, 7 Jan 45, SHAEF cbl log. 
APPENDIX A 

of incident, field commanders and troops 

sometimes overlooked the very great services which the British Broadcasting Corporation was rendering the Allied cause in 

its services to American and British radio 

programs, its propaganda work, its key 

contribution to Resistance activities, and 

the tremendous achievements in the field 

of morale building in liberated and occupied countries. 

Partly because of their mistrust ofBBC, 

there seems to have been a readiness on 

the part of many American troops and 

correspondents to accept as genuine a fake 

German broadcast which purported to be 

a BBC attack on General Eisenhower during the battle of the Ardennes. The reaction was sufficiently strong that Mr. Brendan Bracken, British Minister of Information, felt. it necessary to disavow the 

program and affirm the complete confidence of the British people and the BBC in 

General Eisenhower and the American 

forces. 

A particularly embarrassing episode for 

SHAEF came in late April when the BBC 

made a premature announcement of the 

link-up of the Russians and Americans 

near Torgau despite elaborate precautions 

to have the announcement made simultaneously in Moscow, Washington, and 

London. In this instance, a French news 

agency had sent out by radio the announcement to be held for a release date. 

The information was monitored by BBC, 

which interrupted a scheduled program to 

announce the news. SHAEF officials submitted sharp protests to the governors of 

BBC as a result ofthis action. 21 

The most widely publicized breach of 

censorship involved an American newsman who prematurely announced the 

signing of the instrument of surrender at 

Reims. One of the seventeen correspond527 

ents to witness the signature, Mr. Edward 

Kennedy, chief of the Associated Press 

bureau in Paris, made use of an open wire 

from the Hotel Scribe to give the story of 

the surrender to the Associated Press bureau in London. Una ware that the story 

had not been released, the London bureau 

flashed it to the United States. Kennedy, 

who had been in difficulties with SHAEF 

as recently as February 1945 over a story 

that President Roosevelt was coming to 

Paris to investigate scandals in the Army's 

handling of the relief program for French 

civilians, held that the story had been 

broken by the German radio which was 

broadcasting Admiral Doenitz' orders to 

his forces to cease fighting. 22 Since the German high command was supposedly acting under the orders of SHAEF, he felt 

that this action absolved him from his 

promise not to release the story until it had 

been released by SHAEF. Such an interpretation was not followed by the other 

sixteen correspondents at Reims nor by 

the other newspapermen in Europe, all of 

whom were aware of the surrender story. 

The story was branded as unofficial, and 

the Associated Press and its representatives 

in London and Paris were suspended until 

an investigation could be held. The Associated Press protested the suspension of its 

entire organization, and the War Department ruled that, since all agreements relative to censorship were made between correspondents and SHAEF, responsibility 

had to be placed on the individual newsman. The ban against the Associated 

Press ·was lifted despite the bitter protests 

21 History of U.S. and SHAEF Press Censorship, 

Ch. 20. Brendan Bracken to Gen Smith, RR-15I03, 

10Jan 45; SHAEF to PRD, S-74607, 11 Jan 45. Both 

in SHAEF cbllog. . 

22 Reichsminister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk announced the capitulation to the German people on 7 

May. 
528 

of more than fifty correspondents at an indignation meeting in Paris on 8 May in 

which they attacked General Allen and 

the Public Relations Division of Supreme 

Headquarters. The G-l, SHAEF, and the 

Judge Advocate, ETOUSA, appointed to 

investigate the incident, announced on 12 

May that there were no grounds for court 

martial proceedings but recommended 

that the credentials of Mr. Kennedy and 

his assistant, Mr. Morton Gudebrod, be 

withdrawn and that the two correspondents be returned to the United States. This 

action was carried out on 14 May, the AsTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

sociated Press expressed its regrets, and on 

the following day SHAEF, in a statement 

praising the other correspondents for not 

releasing the story, declared the incident 

closed. 23 

23 For full details of the incident see folder on 

Kennedy case in SHAEF PRD files. See also 1st Lt. 

John J. Briscoe, The Kennedy Affair (unpublished 

thesis, 1949, University of Missouri). Mr. Kennedy's 

side of the story is given in his article, "I'd Do It 

Again," Atlantic Monthly, CLXXXII (August, 1948), 

36-41. In 1948, through the aid of Senator Sheridan 

Downey, Mr. Kennedy's case was presented to General Eisenhower, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, who 

restored the newsman's credentials as war correspondent. 
Appendix B 

SHAEF Personnel 

In the early organization of COSSAC, 

its British members were supplied by the 

Home Forces Command, while its U.S. 

members were provided under a plan by 

which the War Department allotted additional grades and ratings to Headquarters, 

ETOUSA, which in turn supplied officers 

and men to COSSAC. On 8 December 

1943, the U.S. contingent at COSSAC 

consisted of 215 officers and 204 enlisted 

men and the British group consisted of274 

officers and 410 other ranks. 1 

The first Tables of Organization and 

War Establishments planned for SHAEF 

proper were set up in mid-January 1944 in 

accordance with the COSSAC form of 

organization and did not include personnel for G-1 or Headquarters Command. 

The U.S. portion was to consist of 291 

officers and 459 men, and the British portion was to consist of 277 officers and 470 

men for a total of 1,497. 

With the formal appointment of a Supreme Commander in February 1944, 

steps were taken to get new allotments for 

his headquarters. Efforts were made to 

maintain a fairly equal proportion between U.S. and British personnel, although it differed sharply in the various 

divisions. The proportion depended in 

most cases on the nationality of the chief of 

division and the nature of the work to be 

performed. Thus, in G-2, headed by a 

British officer, the personnel was almost 

two to one British, whereas in the Adjutant 

General Division, organized completely 

along U.S. lines, there was only one British officer and the enlisted personnel was 

two to one American. 

In March 1944, the British amended 

their existing War Establishments for 

COSSAC to provide more personnel for 

SHAEF (eight amended War Establishments were issued between the organization of COS SAC and the end of the war), 

and the War Department announced a 

Table of Organization for SHAEF (only 

one other U.S. Table of Organization was 

issued for Supreme Headquarters during 

the war). 

The divisions of Supreme Headquarters 

grew rapidly as plans were pushed for the 

invasion, but Headquarters Command 

and special detachments made the chief 

demands for personnel. Americans constituted the greater part of the security 

forces, while the British provided a large 

1 This appendix was written by the author in 1946 

as a part of a short History of SHAEF. It was based 

on the following files: SHAEF SGS 320.3 T /0 and 

WE for SHAEF; SHAEF SGS 322 Organization and 

Personnel (Fwd); SHAEF SGS 322 Organization 

and Personnel (Rear); and files for each general and 

special staff division of SHAEF under the title Organization and Personnel. Additional information 

was furnished the author in 1945 by Brig. Gen. 

Robert Q. Brown, Headquarters Commandant, and 

in 1946 by Lt. Col. H. J. Roth well, his British assistant. This section was checked as· to accuracy by the 

Office of the Headquarters Commandant in 1946. 
530 

percentage of signal troops. By 12 July 

1944, Supreme Headquarters (less special 

detachments) numbered 1,185 officers, 

101 warrant officers, and 3,628 enlisted 

personnel. (Table 4 p The non-T /0 increments had been added, in the case of the 

British, by constant amendments to the 

War Establishments and, in the case of the 

Americans, by additions from the theater 

non-T /0 allotment granted to Headquarters, ETOUSA. 

In July 1944, the War Office announced 

that the existing manpower shortage in the 

British Army made it necessary to limit 

the number of British personnel in Supreme Headquarters. A proposal was 

made to set 7,000 as the maximum British 

allotment to SHAEF. This number was to 

be cut 10 percent initially and then built 

up as needed to the maximum. No effort 

was made to discuss a similar limitation on 

U.S. personnel, since the Allies recognized 

that no limits could be set until it was 

known how large a staff would be needed 

to advise General Eisenhower in his 

capacity of theater commander of U.S. 

forces. 

In early March 1944, the War Department, in issuing a non-T /0 allotment for 

SHAEF, warned of the lack of U.S. personnel and said that the non -T / 0 overhead requirement then issued would be 

final for the theater unless additional functions were assigned by the War Department. Any increase requested for a unit, 

installation, or activity in the theater 

would have to be compensated for by decreases elsewhere. Mindful of this fact, and 

aware of the activities of the British to limit 

personnel in SHAEF, General Smith in 

October 1944 asked the G-1 to see ifthe 

U.S. staff of Supreme Headquarters could 

be reduced. 

Instead of finding ways to reduce the 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

U.S. contingent of SHAEF, the G-1 discovered a need for more men. Pointing to 

the inadequacy of the March 1944 allotment, General Barker indicated that 

whereas the British had issued several War 

Establishments the Americans had merely 

authorized overstrength. The result was a 

lack of ratings for many divisions. Americans remained for several months in 

grade, while their British opposites were 

being promoted one or more times. In 

sending this report to the War Department, the SHAEF chief of staff explained 

that initial personnel estimates for Supreme Headquarters failed to anticipate 

the growth of SHAEF and its activities. 

Part of the increase had become necessary 

when the G-6 Division was divided into 

the Psychological Warfare and Public 

Relations Divisions. A second increase had 

followed the formation ofnon-T /0 operational field units which were required to 

aid field units. These included psychological warfare groups a.nd units that handled 

Allied prisoners of war. Since these 

SHAEF -sponsored activities could not be 

transferred elsewhere, they had to remain 

a charge on Supreme Headquarters. 

General Smith pointed out that SHAEF 

had been unable to solve the problem by 

reductions in staff and by reorganization. 

Instead of improving, the situation was 

growing worse as new demands were made 

for the U.S. Group Control Council, missions to liberated countries, and staffs for 

the control, disarmament, and demobilization of German ground forces. 

SHAEF's requests for more personnel 

were granted in December 1944 although 

fewer high grades were made available 

than had been requested. Meanwhile, the 

British were attempting to cut their allot2 See below, p. 533. 
APPENDIX B 531 

ment to Supreme Headquarters. In September 1944 the ceiling of 7,000 British 

personnel for SHAEF had been reduced to 

5,245 after more than a thousand air 

troops had been transferred to the 21 

Army Group. On 15 December British officers at SHAEF were told that any requests for an increase of personnel in one 

section would be granted only if it was 

clear that a corresponding reduction could 

be made elsewhere. 

When the German counteroffensive in 

the Ardennes threatened to prolong the 

war and thus impose additional strains on 

Allied manpower, the War Office asked 

that the British contingent of SHAEF consider further reductions of personnel 

“irrespective of present approved establishments and with recognition of the fact 

that standards of performance may fall.” 

The possibility of making increased use of 

local sources of manpower and of reducing 

security units on duty in nonoperational 

areas was suggested. In passing this information on to British officers in late December, General Morgan indicated that a 

minimum reduction of 5 percent should be 

kept in mind in making the survey. 

After studying the situation, General 

Whiteley, deputy G–3 of SHAEF, concluded that there was little chance of reducing the British contingent. In reviewing 

the numbers of special troops at Supreme 

Headquarters, he showed that in the 

groups included under Headquarters 

Command the British furnished only 

seventeen officers and 268 other ranks in 

contrast to the 150 officers and 2,000 enlisted men provided by the Americans. 

The British security group at the headquarters, he continued, consisted of 

thirty-six men as opposed to 3,000 U.S. 

military police and a U.S. defense battalion of 1,000. Furthermore, in SHAEF 

proper a 5 percent reduction would result 

in a saving of only twenty-two officers and 

fifty-seven other ranks. He noted that it 

was not feasible to reduce the personnel in 

SHAEF by substituting liberated or co-operationist manpower since in the Car 

Company, one of the few places where 

such personnel could be used on a wide 

scale, there was already a dilution of up to 

60 percent. 

General Whiteley made clear that the 

initial intention of the SHAEF planners to 

preserve a balance between British and 

U.S. personnel had been changed and that 

any further reduction in the British contingent would upset the balance even 

more. He added that this was not considered to be a material factor. 

General Morgan in mid-January indicated that two problems were involved in 

the matter of staff reduction: (1) reducing 

personnel on the basis that the headquarters was overstaffed; and (2) releasing 

high-category young men who could give 

better service in more active employment. 

He asked, therefore, for further review of 

the possibilities of reducing the British staff 

and suggested a survey of U.S. personnel 

with the same end in mind. On 1 February, he pressed the point still further and 

asked that an effort be made to cut the 

staff by 10 percent and that young officers 

and men be replaced by limited service 

and ATS personnel. Under this directive, 

the divisions made reductions in their 

British members, with the result that General Whiteley on 26 April was able to report an 8.4 percent cut. 

U.S. efforts to cut the number of military personnel in the headquarters were 

prompted by General Eisenhower’s order 

of 31 December 1944 that drastic reductions be made to release every available 

man for combat or purely military duty. 
532 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

On 7 January 1945, in a report to the the announcement that SHAEF would 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, he announced consist of three principal components: (1) 

that a reserve was to be created for use Supreme Headquarters staff-Office of 

against further German counterattacks, the Supreme Commander, Office of the 

by means of an order: "( 1) to comb out Chief of Staff, general and special staff secpersonnel from the Communications Zone, tions, EAC Section, and political advisers; 

Line of Communications units, and Army (2) special troops-Headquarters ComAir Forces and to train these personnel as mand, British Local Administrative Apreplacements for combat units; (2) to con- pointments, and operational agencies 

vert units which are the least essential to functioning under Supreme Headquarters 

our requirements; (3) to make the maxi- control; (3) liaison agencies-SHAEF 

mum use of liberated manpower both for missions to France, Belgium, the Nethercombat and rear area duties." lands, Denmark, and Norway. 

Under this policy, headquarters and The pyramiding of special units asservice troops were screened for men who signed, attached, or located near SHAEF 

could be replaced or who were fitted for went on so rapidly that it is difficult to 

combat duty. When suitable limited serv- make any accurate estimate of the U.S. 

ice or female replacements were found, contingent at the end of the war. As addichanges were made in the existing organ- tional officers and men were added in 

ization. The U.S. policy established for of- preparation for the activation of USFET 

ficers during this period was to avoid if at Frankfurt, the total number of Amerpossible the use in headquarters of officers ican troops passed the 18,000 mark. The 

under thirty-five years of age who were in addition of air, naval, UNRRA, special 

Medical Category A. Headquarters, missions, military government, and British 

SHAEF, was reduced by approximately personnel gave an estimated force of more 

2,300 overall in the period between 1 Feb- than 30,000 military or Allied civilian perruary and 1 April. (Tables 5 and 6)3 The sonnel associated with Supreme Headreductions came, however, in special quarters. This number in turn was swelled 

troops, since there was actually an increase by displaced persons, German civilians, 

of about 100 in the general and special and prisoners of war who were used by the 

staff sections. thousands in construction work and as 

After 1 April, there were no more great drivers, clerks, housekeepers, cooks, waitefforts to cut personnel. As the war resses, and janitors (six months after the 

reached its climax and the fall of Germany dissolution of SHAEF this group employed 

grew near, dozens of agencies had to be by Headquarters Command, USFET, 

activated to deal with censorship, psycho- numbered 23,000, of whom 14,000 were 

logical warfare, prisoner of war exchange, civilians). 

civil affairs activities, and signal commu- On the following pages are tables shownications. The result was a mushrooming ing the size of SHAEF inJuly 1944 shortly 

of units attached to or located near Su- before SHAEF elements moved to the 

preme Headquarters. As early as 5 Continent, in February 1945 when efforts 

January 1945, the chief of staff had at- were made to reduce the size ofheadquartempted to separate these agencies from ters, and again in April 1945 when 

the general and special staff divisions. On 

19 April 1945, this goal was achieved with 3 See below, pp. 534-35. 
APPENDIX B 

SHAEF was preparing the last great offensive. In interpreting these statistics it is 

essential to remember that many of the 

agencies and detachments carried on 

SHAEF rolls were never located at Supreme Headquarters but were attached to 

lower units. Press censorship detachments, 

psychological warfare consolidation teams, 

wireless sections, technical maintenance 

sections, and cipher sections are examples 

of these groups. The SHAEF missions to 

France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway were also located elsewhere. 

533 

Housekeeping and security detachments 

were considerably augmented because of 

the number of agencies located at or near 

SHAEF which had to be furnished communications and protection. 

While it is almost impossible to arrive at 

the exact number of personnel at SHAEF 

at a given time, because of constant shifts 

in agencies and the separation of the headquarters into advance, forward, and rear 

echelons, one can approach an accurate 

figure by counting the officers and men 

assigned to the general and special staff 

sections and the Headquarters Command. 

TABLE 4--AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCE, 12 JULY 1944 

TOTAL OFFICERS v.,' ARRANT OFFICERS! ENLISTED 

ORGANIZATION 

, I i I TOTAL I~! BRlTJS~ ~_ BRITISH ~ BRITISH;~ BRITISH 

TotaL ________ . I 1 I I .. ... . _4,91'-13 • 476 ~!_764L42~ _~_ ~:_~, 660 _ ~ 

upreme Commander, Chief of i :' I 

Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, 

S 

Secretary General Staff __ ' ___ . --

G eneral Eisenhower's Personal 

E 

A 

A 

A 

A 

A 

A 

Sta ff _______________________ ... 

uropean Allied Contact Section ___ , 

djutant General Division ________ I 

ssistant Chief of Staff, G-L _____ ! 

ssistant Chief of Staff, G-2 ______ 

ssistant Chief of Staff, G-3 ____ ._ 

ssistant Chief of Staff, G--4 _____ 

ssistant Chief of Staff, G-5 ___ . __ 

Psychological \Varfare Division ____ , 

Pu blic Relations Division _______ --I 

Air Defense Division _____________ I 

Engineer Division _______________ 

Signal Division __________________ 

Medical Division ________________ 

Local Administrative Appoint- menU _____________________ 

Headquarters Command----------i 

193 I, 

, 

24 I 

I 

19 I 

115 i 

143 

563 

282 

439 

351 I 

428 : 

116 1 

48 

97 

167 

13 

342 

1,574 

156 I 37 

24 0 

10 9 

92 23 

63 flO 

336 227 

156 126 

266 173 

189 162 

361 67 

67 49 

26 I 22 

51 , 46 

99 68 

6 7 

0 342 

1,574 0 

S01l.1((: SHAEF SGS 320.3 T/O and WE for SHAEF. 

27 13 

11 0 

4 4 

14 1 

24 28 

128 83 

61 53 

97 64 

69 59 

118 25 

28 25 

6 6 

20 18 

40 32 

3 3 

0 7 

114 0 

7 2 122 22 

1 0 12 0 

0 0, 6 5 

10 2 68 20 

1 3 38 49 

4 6 204 138 

2 3 93 70 

7 10 162 99 

5 8 115 95 

2 1 241 41 

1 2 38 22 

0 1 20 15 

1 2 30 26 

3 3 56 33 

0 1 3 3 

0 5 0 330 

8 0 1,452 0 
534 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

TABLE 5-AuTHORIZED STRENGTH OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCE, 1 FEBRUARY 1945 

TOTAL OFFICERS WARRANT OFFICERS ENLISTED 

ORGANIZATION '~-------c------l------c---~- - .. - ._--

TOTAL U.S. BRITISH U.S. BRITISH __ ~I BRITISH ~I BRITISH 

---------------_._--- ----_. ------

TotaL..... . ....... 16,312 9,992 6,320 1,581 1,229 67 88 8,344 5,00 

General Staff TotaL ....... ~. ~ 841 I 404 --3-11- 29 35 730 49 

Supreme Commander, Chief of 

Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, 

Secretary General Staff ....... . 

European Allied Contact Section .. 

Political Advisors ............... . 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-L .... . 

As,;stant Chief of Staff, G-2 .... . 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 .... . 

Assi~tant Chief of Staff, G-4 ..... . 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-S ... . 

Special Staff-Total ..... . 

Hq Commandant (U.S.) Camp 

Commandant (Br.) .......... . 

Adjutant General Division ....... . 

Engineer Division .............. . 

Signal Division ................. . 

Medical Division ............... . 

Psychological Warfare Division ... . 

Public Relatiom Division ......... . 

Air Defense Division ............ . 

216 157 

14 5 

4 2 

142 71 

494 287 

284 156 

500 297 

350 188 

59 

9 

2 

71 

207 

128 

203 

162 

27 

3 

26 

112 

60 

106 

69 

14 

4 

1 

26 

77 

54 

76 

59 

7 

o 

o 

1 

4 

3 

9 

5 

o 

o 

4 

5 

12 

8 

123 

2 

1 

44 

171 

93 

182 

114 ----_ .. -----------------------------

722 464 

2 

125 

87 

167 

13 

90 

180 

58 

102 

41 

99 

6 

S3 

134 

28 

258 

1 

23 

46 

68 

7 

37 

46 

30 

144 

1 

18 

16 

40 

3 

16 

42 

8 

107 

1 

1 

IS 

32 

3 

18 

23 

11 

20 

o 

10 

1 

3 

o 

1 

5 

o 

12 

o 

2 

2 

3 

1 

1 

2 

300 

o 

74 

24 

56 

3 

36 

87 

20 

42 

5 

4 

12 

7 

11 

9 

139 

o 

20 

26 

33 

3 

18 

21 

18 

Special Troops-TotaL .... 13,100 8,170 4,930 973 719 17 39 7,180 4,172 

Local Administrative Appointments 

Headquarters Command (U.S.) .. . 

G-l Agencies .................. . 

G-2 Agencies .................. . 

G-3 Agencies. ............... ' .. 

G-4 Agencies .................. . 

G-5 Agencies. ................. . 

Psychological Warfare Division ... . 

Pu blic Relations Division ........ . 

Signal Agencies. ............... . 

Air Defense Division ............ . 

European Allied Contact Section .. 

Liaison Agencies-TotaL ... 

763 0 

4,635 4,635 

500 293 

939 49 

229 0 

285 156 

532 236 

1,128 878 

456 346 

2,692 1,577 

941 0 

o 0 

763 

o 

207 

890 

229 

129 

296 

250 

110 

1,115 

941 

o 

o 

215 

97 

16 

o 

58 

79 

219 

164 

125 

o 

o 

17 

o 

65 

226 

12 

49 

80 

8·1 

40 

69 

80 

o 

o 

R 

5 

o 

o 

1 

2 

1 

o 

o 

o 

o 

6 

o 

1 

17 

o 

2 

3 

1 

o 

o 

9 

o 

o 

4,412 

191 

33 

o 

97 

155 

658 

182 

1,452 

o 

o --------------------------- ------- 486 195 291 60 92 2 134 

740 

o 

141 

647 

217 

78 

213 

168 

70 

1,046 

852 

o 

197 

French Mission .................. 199 129 70 39 23 1 0 89 47 

Belgian Mission ................. 85 26 59 8 30 0 0 18 29 

Netherlands Mission...... ......... 1 168 26 142 8 28 0 2 18 112 

Danish Mission. 34 14 20 5 11 0 0 9 9 ---~~-~~~~~~.~-~~-~~-~----~-~~--------~----~---

SOllm: SHAEF SGS 320.3 T/O and WE for SHAEF. 
APPENDIX B 535 

TABLE 6-AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCE. 1 APRIL 1945 , 

TOTAL OFFICERS \VARRANT OFFICERS I ENLISTED 

ORGANIZATION ~~---- ~--

________ ~I--T-O-T-AL-I-U-'.s-·-I~~~ ~-,-'! BR~TlSH ,--==--i BRITISH i~1 BRITISH 

TotaL _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ I 14, 028 

General Staff~TotaL______ 1,952 

Supreme Commander, Chief of 

Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, 

Secretary General Sta ff ________ _ 

European Allied Contact Section __ 

Political Advisors _________ . _____ _ 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-L ____ _ 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 _____ _ 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 _____ _ 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 _____ _ 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 _____ _ 

204 

15 

4 

150 

495 

261 

472 

351 

i 

8,374 5,654 1,495 1, 07~ 61 99 6,818 i 4,478 

1,102 850 378 314 29 35 695 501 

------1--1--1------ I I 

I 

148 56 24 13 7 117 40 

5 10 3 4 0 0 2 6 

2 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 

52 98 22 40 4 29 54 

296 199 112 75 4 5 180 119 

141 120 51 46 3 3 87 71 

269 203 96 76 9 12 164 115 

189 162 69 59 5 8 115 95 

Special Staff~TotaL _____ ! =m=~ 297 - 201 115 20 13 359 i 169 
Appendix C 

Roster of Key Officers, SHAEF 

Supreme Commander 

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower (U.S.) 

Deputy Supreme Commander 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder 

(Br.) 

Chief of Staff 

Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith (U.S.) 

Deputies Chief of Staff 

Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E. Morgan (Br.) 

Lt. Gen. Humfrey M. Gale (Br.), Chief 

Administrative Officer 

Air Marshal James M. Robb (Br.), Deputy 

Chief of Staff (Air) 

Air Vice Marshal C. R. Carr (Br.), Deputy 

Chief of Staff (Air) 

Allied Naval Commander 

Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay (Br.) 

Vice Adm. Alan G. Kirk (U.S.) 

Admiral Harold M. Burrough (Br.) 

Rear Adm. George E. Creasy (Br.), Chief 

of Staff 

Commodore H. W. Faulkner (Br.), Chief 

of Staff 

Capt. L. A. Thackrey (U.S.), Assistant 

Chief of Staff in Charge of U.S. Forces 

Air Commander-in- Chief 

Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford LeighMallory (Br.), Commander, AEAF 

Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg (U.S.), 

Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief 

Air Chief Marshal James M. Robb (Br.), 

Air Chief of Staff 

Air Vice Marshal C. R. Carr (Br.), Air 

Chief of Staff 

Maj. Gen. William O. Butler (U.S.), 

Deputy Air Commander-inchief 

Secretary, General Staff 

Col. Dan Gilmer (US.) 

Col. Ford Trimble (U.S.) 

Col. Carter Burgess (U.S.) 

Col. J. B. Moore, III (U.S.) 

G–1 Division 

Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker (U.S.) 

Brigadier R. F. R. Brecher (Br.), Deputy 

Brigadier T. J. B. Bosvile (Br.), Deputy 

G–2 Division 

Maj. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley (Br.), G–2 

Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. D. Strong (Br.), 

G–2 

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts (U.S.), Deputy 

G–3 Division 

Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull (U.S.), G–3 

Maj. Gen. Charles A. West (Br.), Deputy 

Maj. Gen. J. F. M. W'hiteley (Br.), Deputy 

Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks (U.S.), 

Deputy 

G–4 Division 

Maj. Gen. Robert W. Crawford (U.S.), 

G–4 

Maj. Gen. N. C. D. Brownjohn (Br.), 

Deputy 
APPENDIX C 537 

Maj. Gen. C. M. Smith (Br.), Deputy 

Maj. Gen. Charles S. Napier (Br.), 

Deputy, Movements and Transportation 

Brigadier Douglas H. Bond (Br.), Deputy, 

Petroleum and Fuel 

Col. Howard A. Malin (U.S.), Deputy, 

Movement and Transportation 

Col. Wilbur S. Elliott (U.S.), Deputy, 

Movement and Transportation 

Col. Walter C. Pew (U.S.), Deputy, Petroleum and Fuel 

Brig.Gen John A. Appleton (U,S.), Director General, Military Railways 

Col. E. K. Clark (U.S.), Deputy 

Brig. Gen. Theron D. Weaver (U.S.), 

Deputy, Chief of Petroleum Branch 

G–5 Division 

Maj. Gen. Sir Roger Lumley (Br.), G–5 

Lt. Gen. A. E. Grasett (Br.), G–5 

Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes (U.S.), 

Deputy 

Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry (U.S.), 

Deputy 

Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Adcock (U.S.), 

Deputy 

Adjutant Division 

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Davis (U.S.), Adjutant General 

Col. Emil C. Boehnke (U.S.), Adjutant 

General 

Signal Division 

Maj. Gen. C. H. H. Vulliamy (Br.), Chief 

Signal Officer 

Maj. Gen. Francis H. Lanahan, Jr. (U.S.), 

Deputy; Chief Signal Officer 

Maj. Gen. L. B. Nicholls (Br.), Deputy 

Engineer Division 

Maj. Gen. H. B. W. Hughes (Br.), Chief 

Engineer 

Brig. Gen. Beverly C. Dunn (U.S.), Deputy; Chief Engineer 

Brigadier R. Briggs (Br.), Deputy 

Medical Division 

Maj. Gen. Albert W. Kenner (U.S.) 

Brigadier E. A. Sutton (Br.), Deputy 

Brigadier R. W. Galloway (Br.), Deputy 

Brigadier H. L. Garson (Br.), Deputy 

Public Relations Division 

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Davis (U.S.) 

Brig. Gen. Frank A. Allen, Jr. (U.S.) 

Psychological Warfare Division 

Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure (U.S.) 

Air Defense Division 

Maj. Gen. A. M. Cameron (Br.), Chief 

Brig. Gen. Samuel L. McCroskey (U.S.), 

Deputy 

Headquarters Command 

Brig. Gen. Robert Q. Brown (U.S.) 

Lt. Col. H. J. Rothwell (Br.), Camp Commandant in Charge of British Personnel 

Col. Alan B.Jacobs (U.S.), Assistant Commandant in Charge of U.S. Personnel 

European Allied Contact Section 

Lt. Gen. A. E. Grasett (Br.), Chief 

Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham 

(U.S.), Deputy 

British Control Commission Military Section 

Maj. Gen. S. W. Kirby, Deputy Commissioner Military Section 

United States Group Control Council 

Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Head Deputy 

Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham, Assistant Deputy 

Political Officers 

Ambassador William Phillips (U.S.) 

Mr. Charles B. P. Peake (Br.) 
538 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Mr. Christopher Steel (Br.) 

Mr. Samuel Reber (U.S.) 

Ambassador Robert Murphy (U.S.) 

SHAEF Mission (France) 

Maj. Gen. John T. Lewis (U.S.), Head 

Maj. Gen. Harold Redman (Br.), Deputy 

SHAEF Mission (Netherlands) 

Maj. Gen. J. K. Edwards (Br.), Head 

Maj. Gen. J. G. W. Clark (Br.), Head 

Brig. Gen. George P. Howell (U.S.), 

Deputy 

SHAEF Mission (Belgium and Luxembourg) 

Maj. Gen. G. W. E. J. Erskine (Br.), Head 

Col. John B. Sherman (U.S.), Deputy for 

Belgium 

Col. F. E. Fraser (U.S.), Deputy for Luxembourg 

SHAEF Mission (Denmark) 

Maj. Gen. R. H. Dewing (Br.), Head 

Col. Ford Trimble (U.S.), Deputy 

SHAEF Mission (Norway) 

Gen.Sir Andrew Thorne (Br.),Head 

Col. Charles H. Wilson (U.S.), Deputy 
Appendix D 

Forces Under SHAEF, 1944–45 

British 

21 Army Group Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery 

Second Army Gen. Sir Miles C. Dempsey 

1 Corps Lt. Gen. Sir J. T. Crocker 

8 Corps Lt. Gen. Sir Richard N. O’Connor 

Lt. Gen. E. H. Barker 

12 Corps Lt. Gen. N. M. Ritchie 

30 Corps Lt. Gen. Gerard C. Bucknall 

Lt. Gen. B. G. Horrocks 

1 Airborne Corps Maj. Gen. R. N. Gale 

Bomber Command Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris 

2d Tactical Air Force Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham 

Eastern Task Force 1 Rear Adm. Philip L. Vian 

Divisions: 3d Infantry, 5th Infantry, 15th Infantry, 43d Infantry, 49th Infantry, 

51st Infantry, 52d Infantry, 53d Infantry, 1st Polish Armored, 7th Armored, 

1 1th Armored, 79th Armored, Guards Armored, 1st Airborne, 6th Airborne 

Canadian 

First Army Gen. Henry D. G. Crerar 

1st Corps Lt. Gen. C. Foulkes 

2d Corps Lt. Gen. G. G. Simonds 

Divisions: 1st Infantry, 2d Infantry, 3d Infantry, 4th Armored, 5th Armored 

French 

First Army Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny 

I Corps Lt. Gen. Emile Béthouart 

II Corps Lt. Gen. de Goislard de Monsabert 

Detachment of the Army of 

the Alps 

Lt. Gen. Paul Doyen 

Detachment of the Army of 

the Atlantic 

Lt. Gen. Edgar de Larminat 

1 This Allied unit is included in the British list because its commander was a British officer. 
540 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Divisions activated under North African rearmament program: 1st DMI (1re Division 

de Marche d’Infanterie), 2d DIM (2e Division de l’Infanterie Marocaine), 3d 

DIA (3e Division de l’Infanterie Algérienne), 4th DMM (4e Division Marocaine 

de Montagne), 9th DIC (9e Division d’Infanterie Coloniale), 1st DB (1re Division Blindée), 2d DB (2e Division Blindbée), 5th DB (5e Division Blindbe) 

Divisions activated under Metropolitan program and assigned to First French Army: 10th 

DI (10e Division), 2 27th DIA (27e Division d’Infanterie Alpine), 14th DI (14e 

Division d’Infanterie), 1st DI (1re Division d’Infanterie) 3 

United States 

12th Army Group Gen. Omar N. Bradley 

6th Army Group Gen. Jacob L. Devers 

First Army Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley 

Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges 

Third Army Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. 

Seventh Army Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch 

Ninth Army Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson 

Fifteenth Army Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow 

First Allied Airborne Army 4 Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton 

III Corps Maj. Gen. John Millikin 

Maj. Gen. James A. Van Fleet 

V Corps Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow 

Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner 

VI Corps Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott 

Maj. Gen. Edward H. Brooks 

VII Corps Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins 

VIII Corps Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton 

XII Corps Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy 

Maj. Gen. Stafford LeR. Irwin 

XIII Corps Maj. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. 

XV Corps Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip 

XVI Corps Maj. Gen. John B. Anderson 

XIX Corps Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett 

Maj. Gen. Raymond S. McLain 

XX Corps Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker 

XXI Corps Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn 

XXII Corps Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon 

XXIII Corps Maj. Gen. James A. Van Fleet 

Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey 

XVIII Corps (Airborne) Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway 

2 The 10th DI, initially equipped with old French equipment, had been withdrawn at the close 

of the war to be re-equipped with U.S. armament. 

3 The 1st DI was activated in February 1945, but had not become operational at the war’s end. 

4 This Allied unit Is included in the U.S. list because its commander was an American. 
APPENDIX D 54 1 

U.S. Strategic Air Forces in 

Europe 

Gen. Carl Spaatz 

Eighth Air Force Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle 

Ninth Air Force Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton 

Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg 

IX Tactical Air Command Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada 

XIX Tactical Air Command Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland 

XXIX Tactical Air Command Brig. Gen. Richard E. Nugent 

Western Task Force 5 Rear Adm. Alan G. Kirk 

Infantry Divisions: 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 35th, 

36th, 42d, 44th, 45th, 63d, 65th, 66th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 75th, 76th, 78th, 79th, 

80th, 83d, 84th, 86th, 87th, 89th, 90th, 94th, 95th, 97th, 99th, 100th, 102d, 

103d, 104th, 106th 

Armored Divisions: 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 

14th, 16th, 20th 

Airborne Divisions: 13th, 17th, 82d, 101st 

5 This Allied unit is included in the U.S. list because its commander was an American. 
Appendix E 

Strength and Casualty Figures 

TABLE 7-ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF U.S. ARMY FORCES IN EUROPEAN THEATER OF 

OPERATIONS, JULY 1944–JUNE 1945 a 

a Excludes Strength in Italy for July 1944 through June 1945 and in Southern France for August 1944 through November 1944 assigned 

to Mediterranean Theater of Operations. 

b Theater overhead. replacements, patients in hospitals and personnel in process of transfer out of the theater. 

Sources: Location, AGO, Machine Records Branch, “Strength of the Army, STM–30”; Type, Office, Chief of Staff USA. SARO report, 

“Strength of the Army”; respective months. 
APPENDIX E 543 

TABLE 8—BATTLE CASUALTIES OF U.S. ARMY IN EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, 

JUNE 1944–MAY 1945 

a Excludes those initially reported as missing in action but subsequently determined to have been killed in action, wounded in action, captured or interned. Such determinations were deleted from Missing and added to the appropriate category. 

Source: AGO, Staristical and Accounting Branch, “Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in WW II. Final Report.” 1953. 

TABLE 9—BRITISH AND CANADIAN STRENGTHS, NORTHWEST EUROPE, 1944–45 

a Includes RAF and Royal Navy personnel. The totals under this column, broken down only in the 31 October 1944 report and the 

16 June 1945 report, show for the former 82,902 RAF and 8,142 RN personnel; for the 1944 date they show 93,013 RAF and 20,856 RN 

personnel. The RAF figure of 93.013 is quite near the figure of 96,078 (plus 1,308 WAAF) for 1 May 1945 given in a statement furnished 

to OCMH by the Air Ministry, London. 

b Because the strength reports for the other three dates do not include personnel in hospitals, this figure does nor include the 13,893 

listed in hospitals in the report of 31 October 1944. It does include 2,815 women. 

c Does not include women. 

Source: Cabinet Office, Historical Section, London. 

Note. These statistics must be used with the warning that they cannot be the basis of comparison between the U.S. and British air 

efforts. U.S. air strengths listed in Table 7 include the air forcer both in the United Kingdom and on the Continent. The British forces 

in this table include only those on the Continent. Total British air force strength (including WAAF) amounted to 819.578 on 1 May 1945. 

Needless to say a considerable part of this force was used in the preinvasion period and during the campaigns in northwest Europe in support 

of the Allied campaigns. 
544 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

TABLE 10-BATTLE CASUALTIES OF THE BRITISH 21 ARMY GROUP, D DAY TO V-E DAY a 

a Including firm figures to 0600 hours, 1 April 1945 

b Breakdown not furnished. 

Source: 21 Army Group “A” SITREP No. 337, compiled by Q(AE) STATS (Quartermaster [Army Equipment] Statistics), 14 May 

1945. 

Note. The figures in this table, supplied by British authorities, are presented in the absence of any more definitive report and must 

be used with the understanding that they are subject to considerable error. They do not include air casualties, and they were compiled 

too soon to have the Missing total corrected. A revised British figure would probably show a sizable Captured total as well as a higher 

Killed total and smaller Missing total than the ones above. A comparison of the Missing figure above with the corrected figure given for 

U.S. forces in Table 8 will give some idea of the difference. The British figures are likely to be less accurate than the U.S. casualty figures 

of Table 8. inasmuch as the latter tabulation was prepared in 1953 on the basis of later data. The statistics of this table are useful for 

purposes of indicating the size of the British and Canadian casualties but not for purposes of exact comparison with U.S. statistics. As an 

example of variations in casualty figures one may note that a different casualty report (known as AG Hot Spot Casualties-Northwest 

Europe), which summarizes British, Canadian, and Royal Marine losses from D Day to 30 April 1945 shows a casualty total of 196,980 

as compared to the 14 May 1945 cumulative figure above of 191,219. 

TABLE 11—BATTLE CASUALTIES OF FRENCH ARMY, 8 NOVEMBER 1942–8 MAY 1945 

Source: Office, Chief of Staff, Ministry of National Defense, France. 

TABLE 11—BATTLE CASUALTIES OFFRENCH ARMY, 8 NOVEMBER 1942-8 MAY 1945 
Appendix F 

The Supreme Commander’s Orders 

of the Day* 

I 

Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied 

Expeditionary Force: 

You are about to embark upon the 

Great Crusade, toward which we have 

striven these many months. The eyes of 

the world are upon you. The hopes and 

prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with 

our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on 

other Fronts you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the 

elimination of Nazi tyranny over oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for 

ourselves in a free world. 

Your task will not be an easy one. Your 

enemy is well trained, well equipped and 

battle-hardened. He will fight savagely. 

But this is the year 1944! Much has 

happened since the Nazi triumphs of 

1940–41. The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats, in 

open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously reduced their strength in 

the air and their capacity to wage war on 

the ground. Our Home Fronts have given 

us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war, and placed at 

our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men. The tide has turned! The free 

men of the world are marching together to 

Victory! 

I have full confidence in your courage, 

devotion to duty and skill in battle. We 

will accept nothing less than full victory! 

Good luck! And let us all beseech the 

blessing of Almighty God upon this great 

and noble undertaking. 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

6 June 1944 

II 

This message was distributed to the troops 

with the D-Day statement. 

You are soon to be engaged in a great 

undertaking—the invasion of Europe. Our 

purpose is to bring about, in company with 

our Allies, and our comrades on other 

fronts, the total defeat of Germany. Only 

by such a complete victory can we free 

ourselves and our homelands from the fear 

and threat of the Nazi tyranny. 

A further element of our mission is the 

liberation of those people of Western 

Europe now suffering under German 

oppression. 

* The term, Order of the Day, is used far more frequently by foreign armies than in the United States. 

Since SHAEF was a coalition command, the name 

was applied to certain documents of more than ordinary significance. An arbitrary numbering system 

has been used in this appendix. 
546 

Before embarking on this operation, I 

have a personal message for you as to your 

own individual responsibility, in relation 

to the inhabitants of our Allied countries. 

As a representative of your country, you 

will be welcomed with deep gratitude by 

the liberated peoples, who for years have 

longed for this deliverance. It is of the utmost importance that this feeling of friendliness and goodwill be in no way impaired 

by careless or indifferent behavior on your 

part. By a courteous and considerate demeanor, you can on the other hand do 

much to strengthen that feeling. 

The inhabitants of Nazi-occupied 

Europe have suffered great privations, and 

you will find that many of them lack even 

the barest necessities. You, on the other 

hand, have been, and will continue to be, 

provided adequate food, clothes and other 

necessities. You must not deplete the already meager local stocks of food and 

other supplies by indiscriminate buying, 

thereby fostering the "Black Market", 

which can only increase the hardship of 

the inhabitants. 

The rights of individuals, as to their persons and property, must be scrupulously 

respected, as though in your own country. 

You must remember, always, that these 

people are our friends and Allies. 

I urge each of you to bear constantly in 

mind that by your actions not only you as 

an individual, but your country as well, 

will be judged. By establishing a relationship with the liberated peoples, based on 

mutual understanding and respect, we 

shall enlist their wholehearted assistance 

in the defeat of our common enemy. Thus 

shall we lay the foundation for a lasting 

peace, without which our great effort will 

have been in vain. 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

III 

This message was not included in the SGS file 

if Supreme Commander's Messages to AEF, but 

it was broadcast by the Supreme Commander. It 

was issued to Communications Zone troops in 

mimeographedform by their commanding general, who indicated that he received a personal 

copy if the message at the Supreme Commander's 

field headquarters. This is included in the A G file 

335.18, "Messages to the Troops if the A.E.F.," 

with the notation, "This is the only copy furnished A G." The writer personally received one 

if these copies in Normandy. 

Allied Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen: 

Through your combined skill, valor and 

fortitude you have created in France a 

fleeting but definite opportunity for a 

major Allied victory, one whose realization will mean notable progress toward the 

final downfall of our enemy. In the past, I 

have, in moments of unusual significance, 

made special appeals to the Allied Forces 

it has been my honor to command. Without exception the response has been unstinted and the results beyond my 

expectations. 

Because the victory we can now achieve 

is infinitely greater than any it has so far 

been possible to accomplish in the west, 

and because the opportunity may be 

graspcd only through the utmost in zeal, 

determination and speedy action, I make 

my present appeal to you more urgent 

than ever before. 

I request every airman to make it his 

direct responsibility that the enemy is 

blasted unceasingly by day and by night, 

and is denied safety either in fight or flight. 

I request every sailor to make sure that 

no part of the hostile forces can either 

escape or be reinforced by sea, and that 

our comrades on the land want for nothing 
APPENDIX F 547 

that guns and ships and ships’ companies 

can bring to them. 

I request every soldier to go forward to 

his assigned objective with the determination that the enemy can survive only 

through surrender; let no foot of ground 

once gained be relinquished nor a single 

German escape through a line once established. 

With all of us resolutely performing our 

special tasks we can make this week a 

momentous one in the history of this 

war—a brilliant and fruitful week for us, 

a fateful one for the ambitions of the Nazi 

tyrants. 

14 August 1944 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

IV 

To Every Member of the A.E.F.: 

The enemy is making his supreme effort 

to break out of the desperate plight into 

which you forced him by your brilliant 

victories of the summer and fall. He is 

fighting savagely to take back all that you 

have won and is using every treacherous 

trick to deceive and kill you. He is gambling everything, but already, in this 

battle, your gallantry has done much to 

foil his plans. In the face of your proven 

bravery and fortitude, he will completely 

fail. 

But we cannot be content with his mere 

repulse. 

By rushing out from his fixed defenses 

the enemy may give us the chance to turn 

his great gamble into his worst defeat. So 

I call upon every man, of all the Allies, to 

rise now to new heights of courage, of resolution and of effort. Let everyone hold before him a single thought-to destroy the 

enemy on the ground, in the air, everywhere-destroy him! United in this determination and with unshakable faith in the 

cause for which we fight, we will, with 

God’s help, go forward to our greatest 

victory. 

22 December 1944 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

V 

To Every Member of the A.E.F.: 

The encirclement of the Ruhr by a wide 

pincer movement has cut off the whole of 

Army Group B and parts of Army Group 

H, thus forming a large pocket of enemy 

troops whose fate is sealed and who are 

ripe for annihilation. The most vital industrial area is denied to the German war 

potential. This magnificent feat of arms 

will bring the war more rapidly to a close. 

It will long be remembered in history as 

an outstanding battle—the Battle of the 

Ruhr. 

3 April 1945 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

VI 

To Every Member of the A.E.F.: 

The battle of the Ruhr has ended with 

complete success. Following hard upon the 

final destruction of the German forces west 

of the Rhine, the 2 1st Army Group thrust 

powerfully across that river with the U.S. 

Ninth Army under command. Simultaneously, rapid drives across the Rhine and 

from the Remagen bridgehead by 12th 

and 6th Army Groups provided the 

southern arm of a great double envelopment which completely encircled the entire German Army Group “B” and two 

Corps of Army Group “H”, whose 

mobility was rendered almost zero by our 

magnificent and tireless air forces. There- 
548 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

after, in the pocket thus created the 12th 

Army Group eliminated 21 enemy divisions, including 3 panzer, 1 panzer grenadier and 3 parachute divisions. Over 

317,000 prisoners of war were captured 

including 24 generals and 1 admiral. 

Many tanks and more than 750 guns were 

destroyed or taken. Booty is immense and 

still being counted. The enemy’s total 

losses in killed and wounded will never be 

accurately known. 

The rapidity and determination with 

which this brilliant action was executed 

tore asunder the divisions of Field Marshal Model, and enabled all Army Groups 

without pause to continue their drive eastwards into the heart of Germany. 

This victory of Allied armies is a fitting 

prelude to the final battles to crush the 

ragged remnants of Hitler’s armies of the 

west, now tottering on the threshold of 

defeat. 

20 April 1945 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

VII 

The whole Allied expeditionary force 

congratulates the Seventh Army on the 

seizure of Munich, the cradle of the Nazi 

beast. 

30 April 1945 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

VIII 

VICTORY ORDER OF THE DAY 

Men and women of the Allied Expeditionary Forces: 

The crusade on which we embarked in 

the early summer of 1944 has reached its 

glorious conclusion. It is my special privilege, in the name of all Nations represented in this Theater of War, to commend 

each of you for valiant performance of 

duty. Though these words are feeble they 

come from the bottom of a heart overflowing with pride in your loyal service and 

admiration for you as warriors. 

Your accomplishments at sea, in the air, 

on the ground and in the field of supply, 

have astonished the world. Even before 

the final week of the conflict, you had put 

5,000,000 of the enemy permanently out 

of the war. You have taken in stride military tasks so difficult as to be classed by 

many doubters as impossible. You have 

confused, defeated and destroyed your 

savagely fighting foe. On the road to victory you have endured every discomfort 

and privation and have surmounted every 

obstacle ingenuity and desperation could 

throw in your path. You did not pause 

until our front was firmly joined up with 

the great Red Army coming from the East, 

and other Allied Forces, coming from the 

South. 

Full victory in Europe has been 

attained. 

Working and fighting together in a 

single and indestructible partnership you 

have achieved a perfection in unification 

of air, ground and naval power that will 

stand as a model in our time. 

The route you have travelled through 

hundreds of miles is marked by the graves 

of former comrades. From them has been 

exacted the ultimate sacrifice; blood of 

many nations—American, British, Canadian, French, Polish and others—has 

helped to gain the victory. Each of the 

fallen died as a member of the team to 

which you belong, bound together by a 

common love of liberty and a refusal to 

submit to enslavement. No monument of 

stone, no memorial of whatever magnitude 

could so well express our respect and ven- 
APPENDIX F 549 

eration for their sacrifice as would perpetuation of the spirit of comradeship in 

which they died. As we celebrate Victory 

in Europe let us remind ourselves that 

our common problems of the immediate 

and distant future can best be solved in 

the same conception of cooperation and 

devotion to the cause of human freedom 

as have made this Expeditionary Force 

such a mighty engine of righteous destruction. 

Let us have no part in the profitless 

quarrels in which other men will inevitably engage as to what country, what 

service, won the European War. Every 

man, every woman, of every nation here 

represented, has served according to his or 

her ability, and the efforts of each have 

contributed to the outcome. This we shall 

remember—and in doing so we shall be 

revering each honored grave, and be sending comfort to the loved ones of comrades 

who could not live to see this day. 

8 May 1945 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

IX 

To All Members of the Allied Expeditionary Force: 

The task which we set ourselves is finished, and the time has come for me to relinquish Combined Command. 

In the name of the United States and 

the British Commonwealth, from whom 

my authority is derived, I should like to 

convey to you the gratitude and admiration of our two nations for the manner in 

which you have responded to every demand that has been made upon you. At 

times, conditions have been hard and the 

tasks to be performed arduous. No praise 

is too high for the manner in which you 

have surmounted every obstacle. 

I should like, also, to add my own personal word of thanks to each one of you for 

the part you have played, and the contribution you have made to our joint victory. 

Now that you are about to pass into 

other spheres of activity, I say Good-bye 

to you and wish you Good Luck and GodSpeed. 

13 July 1945 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

X 

On this occasion, the termination of 

Combined Command, I welcome the opportunity to express my gratitude and admiration to the people of the Allied 

Nations in Europe whose fighting forces 

and nationals have contributed so effectively to victory. 

United in a common cause, the men 

and women of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 

Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Norway joined with the British 

Commonwealth of Nations and the United 

States of America to form a truly AIlied 

team, which in conjunction with the 

mighty Red Army smashed and obliterated the Nazi aggressors. I pay tribute to 

every individual who gave so freely and 

unselfishly to the limit of his or her ability. 

Their achievements in the cause for which 

they fought will be indelibly inscribed in 

the pages of history and cherished in the 

hearts of all freedom-loving people. 

It is my fervent hope and prayer that 

the unparalleled unity which has been 

achieved among the Allied Nations in war 

will be a source of inspiration for, and 

point the way to, a permanent and lasting 

peace. 

14 July 1945 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
Appendix G 

Table of Equivalent Ranks 

u.s. Army German Army and Air Force German Waffen-SS 

None Reichsmarschall None 

General of the Army Generalfeldmarschall Reichsfuehrer-SS 

General Generaloberst Oberstgruppenfuehrer 

Lieutenant General General der Infanterie Obergru ppenfuehrer 

Artillerie 

Gebirgstruppen 

Kavallerie 

Nachrichtentruppen 

Panzertruppen 

Pioniere 

Luftwaffe 

Flieger 

Fallschirmtruppen 

Flakartillerie 

Luftnachrichtentruppen 

Major General Generalleutnant Gruppenfuehrer 

Brigadier General Generalmajor Brigadefuehrer 

None None Oberfuehrer 

Colonel Oberst Standartenfuehrer 

Lieutenant Colonel Oberstleutnant Obersturmbannfuehrer 

Major Major Sturmbannfuehrer 

Captain Hauptmann Hauptsturmfuehrer 

Captain (Cavalry) Rittmeister 

First Lieutenant Oberleutnant Obersturmfuehrer 

Second Lieutenant Leutnant U ntersturmfuehrer 
Glossary 

AAR After action report 

Abn Airborne 

AEAF Allied Expeditionary Air Force 

AEF Allied Expeditionary Force 

AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters 

A Gp Army group 

AIS Allied Information Service 

ANCXF Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force 

Anlage Appendix or annex 

ASW Assistant Secretary of War 

ATS (Women’s) Auxiliary Territorial Service 

Br British 

Br COS British Chiefs of Staff Committee 

CAD Civil Affairs Division 

CCAC Combined Civil Affairs Committee 

CinC Commander in Chief 

CNO Chief of Naval Operations 

Comdr Commander 

COMZ Communications Zone 

Conf Conference 

COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander 

(Designate) 

Dir Directive, director 

EACS European Allied Contact Section 

ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 

Exec Executive 

FAAA First Allied Airborne Army 

FFI Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (French Forces of the 

Interior ) 

FO Field order 

Fuehrungsgruppe Operations group 

Fuehrungsstab Operations staff 

FUSA First U.S. Army 

FUSAG First U.S. Army Group 

G–1 Personnel section of divisional or higher staff 

G–2 Intelligence section 

G–3 Operations section 

G–4 Supply section 
552 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

G–5 Civil Affairs Division of SHAEF 

G–6 Short-lived division of SHAEF which dealt with public 

relations and psychological warfare 

Gen. St. d. H. Generalstab des Heeres (General Staff of the Army) 

Gp Group 

GO General order 

Heeresgruppe Army group 

Hq Headquarters 

Intel Intelligence 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JIC Joint Intelligence Committee 

JPS Joint Staff Planners 

JS M Joint Staff Mission (British mission to Washington) 

Kampfgruppe German combat group of variable size 

Kanalkueste Portion of the French coast generally coinciding with 

the Fifteenth Army sector. It included the Pas-de-Calais 

area and the Somme–Seine coast. 

KTB Kriegstagebuch (war diary) 

LCT Landing craft, tank 

LST Landing ship, tank 

Ltr of Instr Letter of instructions 

Luftwaffe German Air Force 

Mil Mission Moscow U.S. Military Mission to Moscow 

MOI Ministry of Information (British) 

NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations 

NUSA Ninth U.S. Army 

Ob. d. H. Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Commander in Chief of the 

Army) 

OB NORD WEST Oberbefehlshaber Nordwest (Headquarters, Commander in 

in Chief Northwest [northwest Germany, Denmark, 

and the Netherlands]) 

OB SUED Oberbefehlshaber Sued (Headquarters, Commander in 

Chief South [southern Germany and several army 

groups on the Eastern front]) 

OB SUEDOST Oberbefehlshaber Suedost (Headquarters, Commander in 

Chief Southeast [the Balkans]) 

OB SUED WEST Oberbefehlshaber Suedwest (Headquarters, Commander in 

Chief Southwest [Italy]) 

OB WEST Oberbefehlshaber West (Headquarters, Commander in 

Chief West [France, Belgium, and the Netherlands]), 

highest German ground headquarters of the Western 

Front until May 1945 

Oberkommando Headquarters of an army or higher military organization 

OCMH Office, Chief of Military History 
GLOSSARY 553 

OKH Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command) 

OKL Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe High Command) 

OKM Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (Navy High Command) 

Op. (H) operations A bteilung (H) (Operations Branch [Army]) 

Org. Abt. Organisations Abteilung (staff section in charge of organization) 

Organization Todt Paramilitary construction organization of the Nazi 

party, auxiliary to the Wehrmacht. Named after its 

founder, Dr. Todt. 

OSS Office of Strategic Services 

Ost battalions Non-German volunteer troops from east-European 

countries 

OWI Office of War Information 

POL Petrol (gasoline), oil, and lubricants 

PRD Public Relations Division, SHAEF 

PWE Political Warfare Executive 

RAF Royal Air Force 

Rec Records 

Reichskanzlei Reich Chancellory 

SAC Supreme Allied Commander 

SACMED Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater 

SCAEF Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force 

SFHQ Special Force Headquarters 

SGS Secretary, General Staff 

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force 

Sitrep Situation report 

SO Special Operations 

SOE Special Operations Executive 

SOP Standing operating procedure 

SS Schutzstaffel (Elite Guard) 

Tel Telegram, teletype 

TIS Theater Intelligence Section 

UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 

USAFBI U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles 

USFET U.S. Forces in the European Theater 

USSBS U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey 

USSTAF U.S. Strategic Air Forces 

Volkssturm A people’s militia, partially organized in one of the last 

steps of German mobilization for total war 

WD War Department 

Wehrmacht German Armed Forces 

Wehrmachtbefehlsha ber Armed Forces Commander 

WFSt Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Armed Forces Operations Staff) 

WO War Office 
Code Names 

ANVIL The planned 1944 Allied invasion of southern France 

in the Toulon–Marseille area 

ARCADIA U.S.-British staff conference at Washington, December 

1941 -January 1942 

BIGOT Special security procedure for OVERLORD 

ARGONAUT Yalta Conference, February 1945 

BENEFICIARY Plan for breaking out of the Normandy lodgment by 

means of a combined airborne-amphibious attack 

on St. Malo 

BOLERO Build-up of troops and supplies in the United Kingdom in preparation for a cross-Channel attack 

BRADDOCK II Dropping of small fuze incendiaries to European 

workers for use in sabotage operations 

COBRA Operation launched by First U.S. Army on 25 July 

1944, designed to break out of the Normandy 

lodgment 

COCKADE Diversionary operations in 1943 to pin down German 

forces in the west 

COMET British plan, not carried out, for an air drop on 7 

September 1944 in the Arnhem–Nijmegen area 

CROSSBOW A general term used by the Allies to refer to the German long-range weapons program and to Allied 

countermeasures against it 

ECLIPSE Name given in November 1944 to posthostilities plans 

for Germany 

EUREKA Tehran Conference, November–December 1943 

GARDEN See MARKET-GARDEN 

GOODWOOD British attack to break out of the Normandy lodgment, 

late July 1944, coinciding with U.S. Operation 

COBRA 

GREIF German deception operation in support of the Ardennes counteroffensive 

GRENADE Ninth Army supporting attack for Operation VERITABLE 

GYMNAST 1941 plan for invasion of North Africa 

HANDS UP Plan for breaking out of the Normandy lodgment by 

means of a combined airborne-amphibious attack 

on Quiberon Bay 

HUSKY Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 
CODE NAMES 555 

INDEPENDENCE Plan for First French Army attack against German 

garrisons on French coasts, December 1944 

LINNET I Planned airborne drop at Tournai, Belgium, September 1944 

LINNET II Planned airborne drop at Aachen–Maastricht Gap, 

September 1944 

LUCKY STRIKE 21 Army Group plan calling for an eastward drive and 

the capture of the Seine ports as an alternative to 

plans for the earlier capture of Brittany, considered 

in May and June 1944 

MARKET-GARDEN Airborne operation intended to establish a bridgehead 

across the Rhine in the Netherlands, September 

1944. Operation MARKET involved seizure of bridges 

in the Nijmegen–Arnhem area, and Operation 

GARDEN was to open a corridor from Eindhoven. 

northward toward Germany. 

NEST EGG Plan for occupation of Channel Islands in case of German collapse or surrender 

NOBALL Term used by the air forces in referring to target sites 

in their attacks on long-range weapons 

NORDWIND German counterattack in Alsace, January 1945 

OCTAGON Second Quebec Conference, September 1944 

OVERLORD Plan for the invasion of northwest Europe, spring 1944 

PLUNDER Montgomery’s northern crossing of the Rhine, March 

1945 

POINTBLANK The Combined Bomber Offensive from the United 

Kingdom against Germany 

QUADRANT First Quebec Conference, August 1943 

RANKIN I, II, III Plans for return to the Continent in the event of 

deterioration of the German position 

REDLINE Radio circuits set up in September 1944 for messages 

to and from the Supreme Commander 

ROUNDUP Various 1941–43 plans for a cross-Channel attack in 

the final phases of the war 

SEXTANT Cairo Conference, 22–26 November 1943 

SHARPENER Supreme Commander’s advance command post at 

Portsmouth, May 1944 

SHELLBURST SHAEF advance headquarters at Tournières, France, 

near Bayeux, established August 1944 

SHIPMATE Enlarged SHAEF forward headquarters near Portsmouth, replacing SHARPENER 

SLEDGEHAMMER Plan for a limited-objective attack across the Channel 

in 1942 designed either to take advantage of a crack 

in German morale or as a “sacrifice” operation to 

aid the Russians 
556 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

SPRING Canadian attack, July 1944, coinciding with Operation COBRA 

STARKEY Threat directed in 1943 against the Pas-de-Calais 

SWORDHILT Plan for a combined airborne-amphibious operation 

to seize the area east of Brest, August 1944 

SYMBOL Casablanca Conference, January 1943 

TALISMAN Early name for posthostilities plans for Germany 

TERMINAL Potsdam Conference, July 1945 

TINDALL Threat directed against Norway in 1943 

TOPFLIGHT Signal for release of press information on D-Day 

assault 

TORCH Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, 1942 

TOTALIZE Post-COBRA attack in France 

TRACTABLE Post-COBRA attack in France 

TRANSFIGURE Plan for airborne operation to capture and control 

important road nets in Paris–Orléans area, 16–17 

August 1944 

TRIDENT Washington Conference, May 1943 

UNDERTONE Seventh Army operation to breach West Wall and 

establish bridgehead over Rhine in Worms area, 

March–April 1945 

VARSITY FAAA operation in support of Operation PLUNDER 

VERITABLE 21 Army Group plan for a Canadian attack between 

the Maas and the Rhine, January–February 1945 

WADHAM Threat directed against the Cotentin in 1943 

WIDEWING SHAEF headquarters at Bushy Park, near London 
Bibliographical Note 

The Supreme Command is based in large 

part on Allied and German documents in 

the possession of the Department of the 

Army, on Allied documents made available by French and British sources, and on 

private papers of General Eisenhower and 

key members of his staff. These sources 

have been supplemented by numerous interviews with various Allied leaders, by 

published memoirs and histories, and by 

detailed comments on the manuscript by 

persons mentioned in the volume. 

Primary Sources 

I 

The most important single collection of 

documents used in this volume is that of 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. In addition to letters, 

cables, memorandums, reports, records of 

conferences, plans, drafts of plans and 

messages, interoffice communications, and 

other papers normally kept in the files of 

any military headquarters, the SHAEF 

collection includes the records of its predecessors-Combined Commanders and 

COSSAC. The SHAEF file also contains 

a number of memorandums by the British 

Chiefs of Staff as well as extracts from 

the minutes of their meetings in which 

the campaigns in northwest Europe were 

discussed. 

The SHAEF records have been supplemented by min utes of the meetings of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, including minutes of 

the great conferences attended by Mr. 

Churchill and President Roosevelt and 

their advisers. War Department records 

contain message files of cables and letters 

between the President and the Prime Minister (these include information copies, 

paraphrases which were sent by the War 

Department to General Eisenhower, and 

drafts of cables prepared by the War Department for the President's signature). 

They contain similar records of communications between the Combined and Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commander, paraphrases of messages sent by 

the British Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Staff 

Mission for delivery to the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff, and the correspondence between 

Allied commanders and Allied planners. 

Supplementing these are private letter files 

of the Supreme Commander and private 

papers furnished the author by Lt. Gen. 

Sir Frederick E. Morgan, Air Chief Marshal Sir James M. Robb, Brig. Gen. 

Robert A. McClure, Maj. Gen. Ray W. 

Barker, Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Lord Tedder, Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith, 

and Gen. Sir Andrew Thorne. 

Details of the operations have come 

mainly from such secondary sources as 

after action reports, dispatches, and sem.iofficial army group and army histories. A 

number of these accounts have been 

checked against primary sources found in 

the army group and army files. The book 

has also drawn on combat interviews con-

. ducted during the war by War Department historians. 
558 

In some cases photostatic or typewritten 

copies of British and Canadian documents 

have been furnished the author by the 

Historical Section, Cabinet Office, and by 

the Canadian Historical Section. 

The sources have been supplemented by 

interviews conducted by the author with 

nearly 100 British, French, and U.S. 

officers and civilians in the period 1946-51 

(see list at end of bibliographical note). 

II 

The collections of German primary 

sources vary greatly in completeness. For 

periods of disaster, such as the envelopments in the Falaise Gap and in the Ruhr 

Pocket, many papers of the field headquarters were destroyed. Many records 

were also destroyed at OKW. For highlevel material, the author has drawn 

on OKW/WFSt KTB Ausarbeitung, "Der 

Westen" J.IV.-J6.XI1.44. This draft War 

Diary (KTB) is based on the detailed 

daily working notes of Major Percy 

Schramm in his capacity as historian at 

the headquarters ofOKW. Until the end 

of 1943 the diary consisted of a chronological listing of events supplemented by 

information from participants in operations. After 1943 the diary was arranged 

according to subject matter and fronts and 

was supplemented by a Merkbuch kept by 

Schramm, with notes of discussions at the 

situation meetings he attended and notes 

obtained from special interviews with the 

deputy chief ofWFSt, General Warlimont. 

From 1 January 1945 the chronological 

order was reintroduced. In view of the 

subsequent destruction ofOKW records, 

the copies of the Ausarbeitungen for 1944 

and the personal notes of Schramm present a unique and valuable source. The 

original diary, as well as a copy designated 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

as MS#B-034 (Schramm), is in OCMH 

files. 

For information on battles, I have also 

relied on manuscript histories prepared 

after the war by more than two hundred 

German generals working under the direction of CoL Harold A. Potter and later 

under Col. Wil bur S. N yeo I was aided in 

assessing the general value of this material by Capt. Frank C. Mahin, Jr., and 

Capt. James F. Scoggin, who worked with 

the German generals for more than two 

years (1946-48). While the German accounts are weakened at times by a subjective approach and by lack of source·material, they are of value in filling in the broad 

outlines of the German story of the war. 

An im portant source for the last chapters 

of the book is the file 0 KW Politische Angelegenheiten, which contains a draft for a German White Book.'Intended as a defense of 

Admiral Doenitz' interim government in 

May 1945 the unsigned paper is accompanied by numerous documents which are 

of great val ue. The collection of German 

documents available to the Office of the 

Chief of Military History also contains a 

large file ofOKW papers received or sent 

out by Field Marshal Keitel and General 

JodI. 

III. 

The following notes are intended as a 

convenient guide to the primary sources 

used in this volume. 

AAF files. Army Air Force files containing records of Eighth and Ninth Air 

Forces, which were formerly in the Pentagon, are now located at the Air University, 

Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Ala. 

ABCfiles. A collection kept by the Strategy and Policy Group of OPD (q.v.). 

Barker files. Personal papers of Maj. Gen. 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 559 

Ray W. Barker (ret.), deputy chief of 

COSSAC and G–1 of SHAEF. Located in 

OCMH files. 

CAD. Civil affairs papers collected by 

the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. They include papers of the 

Combined Civil Affairs Committee. Now 

in Departmental Records Branch, AGO. 

COS. British Chiefs of Staff papers and 

minutes of conferences. Extracts pertinent 

to SHAEF operations were forwarded to 

the Supreme Commander for information. 

These are filed with the SHAEF SGS 

papers, and bound separately by year 

under the titles “Papers” and “Minutes.” 

CCS. Combined Chiefs of Staff papers 

and minutes of meetings. All of these may 

be found in the OPD collection (q.v.). The 

papers include reports, reprints of cables 

and letters, and memorandums prepared 

by the British or U.S. Chiefs of Staff or 

their planners. No stenographic notes of 

the meetings were kept, but British and 

U.S. secretaries kept a general statement 

of the main points advanced and the conclusions reached. These records in final 

form were specifically and individually 

approved by each of the Combined Chiefs. 

Note. The reader is reminded that quotations from CCS minutes are taken from 

the printed summaries and are not necessarily the exact words of the conferees. It 

should also be noted that, because no 

exact copy of a highly classified cable can 

be made because of security regulations, 

the language in War Department cables 

concerning classified matters may differ 

slightly from the minutes and from the 

cable which is on file in the SHAEF cable 

log. The paraphrases reflect the exact intent of the author, but vary in paragraph 

arrangement and wording. This reminder 

applies to every quotation from a highly 

classified cable used in this volume. 

C/S file. Contains documents from wartime files of the Office of the Chief of Staff, 

War Department. Now a separate collection in the Departmental Records Branch, 

AGO. On these records see bibliographical 

note in Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, 

1951), UNITED STATES ARMY IN 

WORLD WAR II, pp. 520–23. 

COSSAC. Papers of the COSSAC (Chief 

of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander) headquarters and minutes of 

COSSAC staff meetings. These are separately bound and contained in the 

SHAEF SGS files. 

Diary Office CinC. Diary kept in General 

Eisenhower’s office for him by his naval 

aide, Capt. Harry C. Butcher. It was 

started in July 1942 and continued until 

the end of the war. It is less complete on 

General Eisenhower’s activities after August 1944 when Butcher took up a job in 

the Public Relations Division of SHAEF. 

He was still a frequent visitor to General 

Eisenhower’s office, but did not continue 

to have daily contact with the Supreme 

Commander. The collection includes daily 

entries dictated by Captain Butcher, summaries of conversations, reactions by the 

Supreme Commander or Butcher to events 

of the day, and items of human interest 

concerning the Supreme-Commander and 

many of his staff. The diary was kept as a 

journal and not as a historical narrative 

and therefore tends to set down uncritically snatches of conversation as the narrator heard them. On the documentary 

side, Captain Butcher attempted to keep 

copies of all the high-level cables and letters sent or received by the Supreme 

Commander. Other important papers, 

such as intelligence estimates, situation 

summaries, and special reports, were also 

included. Of great value are the memo- 
560 

randums which Captain Butcher at 

irregular intervals persuaded General 

Eisenhower to write concerning major decisions and problems. Captain Butcher in 

My Three Years With Eisenhower (New York, 

1946) printed edited excerpts from the 

diary. Many are printed as originally written, while others are edited slightly. These 

changes were usuall y made to eliminate 

information later found to be incorrect. It 

should be noted that Captain Butcher was 

careful to repeat his guesses that had been 

proved incorrect by later events. Several 

of the entries were edited for security 

reasons, and others in order to remove 

comments by Captain Butcher which 

might be deemed offensive by living persons. In quite a few cases the original entry 

has been summarized. 

The diary varies in value to the historian because Captain Butcher, often unable to dictate his entries daily, would 

sometimes write an entry covering several 

days at one sitting. In such an entry the 

dates of events are occasionall y confused. 

Unfortunately, no daily list of appointments was included. Captain Butcher, in 

his book, has failed in some cases to differentiate sufficiently between items based on 

conversations with General Eisenhower 

and those which are merely summaries of 

official documents. For example, an entry, 

"Ike says," published under 10 August, 

may have come from a table conversation 

that day or it may have been a summary 

of a paper signed by General Eisenhower 

several days earlier which happened to be 

included in the loose-leaf notebook along 

with the 10 August entry. These differences are apparent in the original. On a 

few occasions when the typist misdated a 

letter (an error perhaps corrected later in 

the SGS file copy, but not in the one preserved in the diary), the letter has apTHE SUPREME COMMAND 

peared under the incorrect date in Captain Butcher's published book. At least one 

notable mix-up occurred as a result. A 

letter of 14 September, incorrectly dated 

14 August, appears under the August date 

in the diary. Captain Butcher in writing of 

the letter, which actually refers to the Arnhem operation, assumed that it meant the 

landing in southern France and so interpreted it. As a result the book represents 

General Eisenhower as having discussed 

General Montgomery's plan for crossing 

the Rhine before the plan was actually 

presented to the Supreme Commander. 

For the most part, the diary-especially in 

the manuscript state-is extremely valuable for a study of the Supreme Commander and his headquarters. 

At the time the author used this diary 

( 1946), it was in the personal possession of 

General Eisenhower and kept in his office 

at the Pentagon. 

Eisenhower personal file. For purposes of 

convenience and security several collections of letters and cables were kept in 

General Eisenhower's personal file. These 

included the following: personal letters between General Eisenhower and General 

Marshall (a collection of considerable 

value since the Supreme Commander was 

in the habit of outlining his future plans in 

these i nfor mal messages); a special file of 

letters between Generals Eisenhower and 

Montgomery; a file of cables and letters 

between the Supreme Commander and 

important political and military figures 

such as the Prime Minister, General 

de Gaulle, General J uin, Air Marshal 

Tedder, and General Bradley; and a file 

of "Eyes Only" cables which were delivered only to the Supreme Commander 

and his chief of staff. The Diary, Office 

Commander in Chief, described above, 

was also in this collection. The SHAEF 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

Cable Log (q.v.), which was physically 

kept in the Secretary of the General Staff 

files, might well be included with this collection. With the exception of the Cable 

Log, these papers at the time they were 

consulted by the author (1946-47) were 

in the personal possession of General 

Eisenhower. 

Inasmuch as the file may well be consolidated when finally indexed, the author 

has referred to the entire collection under 

the general title of Eisenhower personal 

file. It is the richest single file for the purposes of this volume. Because the papers 

were selected for their importance and because each item was seen personally by the 

Supreme Commander, the file simplified 

the author's task of searching through the 

voluminous SHAEF records for the most 

important pieces of correspondence. 

ETO file. Files of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 

(ETOUSA). Now held by Organizational 

Records Branch, Records Administration 

Center, AGO. 

Fifteenth Am!)' file. Official journals and 

papers of the Fifteenth Army. This file also 

contained some of the 12th Army Group 

papers at the time the author used it. In 

Departmental Records Branch, AGO. 

FUSA file. Official journals and papers 

of the First U.S. Army. In Departmental 

Records Branch, AGO. 

]CS. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff papers 

and minutes of their conferences. Located 

in G-3 Records, Department of the Army. 

NUSAfile. Official journals and papers 

of the Ninth U.S. Army. In Departmental 

Records Branch, AGO. 

OCMHfiles. Documents containing material prepared by or collected by the 

author or members of the Office of the 

Chief of Military History staff. Much of 

the material so cited in this volume con561 

sists of answers by former members of the 

SHAEF staff to the author's questionnaires, British and French documents, 

and special studies collected by the author. 

OPD files. Collection of cables and papers of the Operations Division, War Department. The division was known at various times in the period 1941-51 as the War 

Plans Division, Operations Division, and 

Plans and Operations Division. It is at 

present a part of the G-3 Division. A detailed bibliographical note on these papers 

may be found in Ray S. Cline, Washington 

Command Post: The Operations Division, 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 

WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp. 382-85. 

SHAEF files. Records of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. 

These are, naturally, the basic source for 

this volume. It consists of separate files for 

each of the general and special staff divisions, the SHAEF missions, and the Secretary of the General Staff (SGS), SHAEF. 

They will be designated in footnotes as 

SHAEF G-1, SHAEF PWD, SHAEF Mission (France), SHAEF SGS, and so on. 

The originals of these SHAEF papers are 

in the Departmental Records Branch, 

AGO, and microfilmed copies may be 

found in the British Historical Records. 

The richest file of the SHAEF collection, apart from the Eisenhower personal 

file described elsewhere, is that of the 

SHAEF secretary of the general staff, 

which was kept for the personal use of the 

Supreme Commander and the Chief of 

Staff, SHAEF. It contains nearly all papers brought to the immediate attention 

of General Smith and/or General Eisenhower and all those which it was thought 

that they might wish to consult. The result 

has been a process of selection which puts 

before the historian the most important 

papers of the entire SHAEF collection. To 
562 

copies of plans and final letters are usually 

attached the penciled notes and early 

drafts together with the final approval or 

disapproval of the Supreme Commander 

and the chief of staff. It is often possible to 

follow a paper from the stage of its first 

draft to a copy of the message which was 

dispatched. These copies are usually those 

containing changes made by Generals 

Eisenhower and Smith. Often, in order to 

make all pertinent papers available for 

examination, the secretary of the general 

staff had extracts or copies made from papers in other files. This not only provides 

a useful check on the completeness of other 

files but also makes it possible for the historian to see what information was laid 

before the Supreme Commander when he 

made his decision. A careful cross-reference system indicates the location of pertinent papers. 

This collection formerly included the 

SHAEF Cable Log, which was brought up 

to date daily by the secretary of the general staff. It contained typewritten paraphrases of all cables (except those marked 

Eyes Only) addressed to the Supreme 

Commander or sent in his name which his 

subordinates felt that he should see. Copies 

of Eyes Only cables were sometimes included in this collection but were usually 

kept in a special Eyes Only file. The messages in the Cable Log were usually examined daily and initialed by the Supreme 

Commander. Occasionally one finds his 

notes asking for comments or suggesting 

possible answers. The Cable Log when 

used by the author (1945 and 1946) was in 

a group of files belonging to General 

Smith. This file was initially in the CALA 

collection at Headquarters, USFET, 

Frankfurt, Germany, and later in the Department of the Army Library at the 

Pentagon. 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Smith papers. Collection of documents 

and books belonging to Lt. Gen. Walter B. 

Smith. These were deposited in the War 

Department library in 1946 and were consulted by special permission of General 

Smith. With these papers were the SHAEF 

Cable Log and some Eyes Only files which 

could not be as readily found in the 

SHAEF collection. 

S USA file. Contains journals and papers 

of the Seventh Army. In the Departmental 

Records Branch, AGO. 

TUSAfile. Official journals and papers 

of the Third U.S. Army. Held by Departmental Records Branch, AGO. 

12th A Gp file. Operational files of the 

12th Army Group. Now in the Departmental Records Branch, AGO. 

Secondary Sources 

Many unpublished preliminary historical studies by Army, Navy, and Air Force 

historians are available to the official historian. Studies used to a considerable degree by the author include some of the 

eleven volumes of a series called the Administrative and Logistical History of the 

European Theater of Operations prepared 

in 1945-46 under the direction of Maj. 

Roland G. Ruppenthal, Assistant Theater 

Historian, USFET. The. 1500-page history 

of the French Forces of the Interior, prepared by Capt. Lucien Galimand, Capt. 

Marcel Vigneras, and Maj. R. A. BournePatterson is based on basic documents of 

the French Resistance and the Allied 

agencies dealing with these forces. 

The author's attention was directed to 

some of the sources for this volume by a 

104-page typewritten History of SHAEF 

written by Maj. Duncan Emrich and Maj. 

F. D. Price, the SHAEF historians in 

1944-45. Since they were mainly occupied 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

until the end of the war with the preparation of a History of COSSAC (unpublished) and the Supreme Commander's 

report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 

they had not carried their story beyond 

the D-Day period at the time they left 

Supreme Headquarters. Many of the important papers of the Supreme Commander were not available to them at the 

time the manuscript was prepared. In 

1945 the author of the present volume was 

employed to rewrite and complete this 

earlier study. This assignment was finished 

in 1946 before the present ·volume was 

begun. Virtually nothing of the original 

draft has been used in these pages except 

several useful charts. The short (fortythree-page) History of COSSAC mentioned above was valuable for its story of 

the administrative organization of 

SHAEF's predecessor. 

Among the published sources, the 

author has made considerable use of 

official dispatches and reports, official histories, and memoirs. Three particularly 

important official reports are: Report by the 

Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs qf 

Staff on the Operations in Europe qf the Allied 

Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 

1945 (Washington, 1945); Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Despatch 

to the Supreme Commander, AEF, November 1944, Supplement to The London 

Gazette, December 31, 1946; and Report by 

Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation NEPTUNE (London, 

1944), 3 vols. 

The author has profited greatly from the 

use of the volumes written by his collegues 

in the European Section of the Office of 

the Chief of Military History. Two of the 

published volumes-Hugh M. Cole, The 

Lorraine Campaign (Washington, 1950) and 

Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack 

563 

(Washington, 1951 )-were especially helpful on German forces and tactical details 

concerning the U.S. forces. Other manuscripts now in preparation were made 

available. Volumes II and III of Wesley 

Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., 

The A rmy A ir Forces in World War II 

(Chicago, 1949 and 1951), were used for 

details relating to air operations in Europe 

in 1942-45. For Canadian Army activities 

in Europe, the author depended on Col. 

C. P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: 

An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa, 

1948), which is a preliminary study of 

Canadian operations. 

Because of the impossibility of checking 

unit journals for all of the operational details needed for this volume, it has been 

necessary to rely on the semiofficial histories of the army groups and armies. 

While subject to error in details, the 

volumes are of considerable value for 

giving the broad outlines of campaigns. 

All of them have drawn heavily on the 

daily operational reports and intelligence 

summaries of their headquarters. Even 

where incorrect they are valuable for 

giving the operational picture as it was 

seen at the time by the field commanders 

and the Supreme Commander. These volumes include: 12th Army Group, Report qf 

Operations. (Final Aft~r Action Report) 

(printed in Europe, 1945), 14 vols.; 6th 

Army Group Operations Report (mimeographed report, by months); First U.S. 

Army, Report qf Operations (printed in 

Europe, 1946), consisting of seven volumes 

on the period 20 October 1943-1 August 

1944, four volumes on the period 1 August 

1944-22 February 1945, and three volumes on the period 22 February 1945-

8 May 1945; After Action Report, Third U.S. 

Army, 1 August 1944-9 May 1945 (printed in 

Europe, 1945), 2 vols.; The Seventh United 
564 

States Army in France and Germany 1944-

1945: Report of Operations (Heidelberg, 

1946), 3 vols.; Conquer: The Story of Ninth 

Amry, 1944-45 (Washington, 1947); History 

of the Fifteenth United States Army, 21 August 

1944 to 11 July 1945 (apparently printed in 

Germany, 1946). Most of these volumes 

have only a limited distribution, but are 

available in the OCMH or the Department of the Army Library. 

Field Marshal Montgomery, Normandy 

to the Baltic (New York, 1948) has been 

consulted. This volume, which was prepared in part by members of ~he 21 Army 

Group staff from official files and personal 

papers ofField Marshal Montgomery, was 

circulated in printed form to U.S. and 

British military headquarters shortly after 

the war, before its public appearance in 

Great Britain in 1947 and in the United 

States in 1948. In form it is an official 

dispatch rather than personal memoirs, in 

many cases being little more than a paraphrase of letters of instruction and situation reports. It is nonetheless a valuable 

summary of British operations. The author 

made use of the volume for an outline of 

Montgomery's operations and then submitted his narrative for the correction of 

operational details to the British Historical Section, Cabinet Office, and the Canadian Historical Section. In addition to 

checking the accuracy of the account, 

these sections have also made available 

documents, charts, casualty data, and 

other information from their files. 

Special mention must be made of the 

memoirs of key figures in the SHAEF 

story. In addition to the Montgomery volume, which can be included in this category only with qualification, Gen. Dwight 

D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New 

York, 1948), and Gen. Omar N. Bradley, 

A Soldier's Story (New York, 1951), have 

THE SUPREME COMMAND 

been used. General Eisenhower's volume 

was dictated by him over a period of 

months and then checked against his personal papers and official documents. Since 

all documents and papers cited in his volume were made available to the author of 

The Supreme Command, the general's book 

has been used mostly for judgments of men 

and events which are not available in his 

papers. General Bradley's volume was 

based on dictated material and on recordings of discussions of various phases of the 

book between himself and his aide. The 

statements were checked against private 

papers, official documents, and the.memories of many participants. Some of the 

papers were not available to the author of 

The Supreme Command. Most valuable have 

been some of the frank appraisals of Allied 

commanders contained in General Bradley's book. The author was allowed to see 

both of these volumes in manuscript 

form. 

An important volume for the study of 

the Supreme Commander and SHAEF is 

Capt. Harry C. Butcher, My Three rears 

With Eisenhower (New York, 1946). As 

noted earlier, I was given free access to 

the Diary, Office of the Commander in 

Chief, which is the basis for Captain 

Butcher's book. 

Lt. Gen. Sir Freder:ick E. Morgan, 

Overture to Overlord (New York, 1950), 

which the author was allowed to see in 

manuscript, is valuable for showing the 

problems of the planner of OVERLORD and 

for his personal recollections. The 

COSSAC documents and many of General Morgan's private papers were made 

available to the author. 

Other memoirs which were used include: Gen. George S. Patton,Jr., War as I 

Knew It (Boston, 1947); Maj. Gen. Sir 

Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

(New York, 1947); and Gen. Henry H. 

Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949). 

Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton's The Brereton 

Diaries (New York, 1946) supplied some 

details on airborne command and operations. Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith's articles on "Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions," The Saturday Evening Post, Vols. 218-

19, issues for June 8, 15,22,29, and July 6 

and 13, 1946, were of value. 

On high-level policy relating to operations in Europe, books of great value to the 

author were: Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt 

and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 

1948); Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge 

Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War 

(New York, 1948); Cordell Hull, The 

Memoirs if Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), 

2 vols.; Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge if 

Fate (Boston, 1950); Edward R. Stettinius, 

Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The ralta Conference (Garden City, N. Y., 1949); and 

Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There 

(New York, 1950). The author was permitted to examine the Leahy volume in 

manuscript form. 

Two secondary sources on enemy actions 

and command organization should be 

noted. These are The War in the West, prepared by Dr. Wilhelm Scheidt, principal assistant to Generalmajor Walther 

Scherff, chief of the military history section 

ofOKW. Dr. Scheidt indicates that a great 

part of his study was based on his own 

notes, but a comparison with the KTB 

Ausarbeitung, "Der Westen," (see above) 

shows that he has relied heavily on 

Schramm's work. Another work is Geschichte des Oberbifehlshaber West, edited by 

Generalleutnant Bodo Zimmermann, 

formerly Ia (G-3) of OB WEST. The 

manuscript was prepared under the auspices of the Historical Division of the Department of the Army between 1946 and 

565 

1948 and includes contributions by a number of general and general staff officers of 

the Wehrmacht. All information of this 

nature must be used with the caution that 

the authors had to rely in many cases entirely on their memories. Many of them 

have a tendency to overemphasize the 

superiority of Allied manpower and equipment and their own disadvantages. Most 

of them also develop the thesis that all 

would have gone well had the views of the 

General Staff, rather than those of Hitler, 

prevailed. 

For the last days of the Reich, two books 

are of considerable importance:. Count 

Folke Bernadotte's The Curtain Falls: Last 

Days if the Reich (New York, 1945), which 

tells of Bernadotte's role in the surrender 

negotiations, and H. R. Trevor-Roper, The 

Last Days if Hitler (New York, 1947), which 

is an account by a British intelligence 

officer of his investigations into the details 

of the Fuehrer's final hours. 

Interviews 

The author is greatly indebted to nearly 

a hundred Allied military and political 

leaders for interviews granted to him in 

the period 1945-51. The number of interviews with the individuals named varies 

from one to ten. Nearly all of them spoke 

freely, although a few asked that they not 

be quoted. Several of them read to the 

author from private diaries or papers, but 

were unwilling to have the material cited. 

For that reason some controversial matters 

have been left without footnotes or with 

only a general reference to information 

supplied by Allied leaders. In the case of 

some thirty or forty persons named, the 

original interview material was supplemented by later detailed comments on the 

author's manuscript. 
566 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

References in the list are to positions 

held by individuals in the 1943–45 period. 

Their titles and ranks are those they had 

when interviewed. 

Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Viscount, 

Chief of the Imperial General Staff 

Allen, Brig. Gen. Frank A., Chief of 

Public Relations Division, SHAEF 

Barker, Maj. Gen. Ray W., Deputy 

Chief of COSSAC and G–1 , SHAEF 

(Bechtolsheim. See Mauchenheim.) 

Belchem, Brigadier R. F. K., Chief of 

Operations, 21 Army Group 

Betts, Brig. Gen. Thomas J., Deputy 

G–2 of SHAEF 

Biddle, Col. Anthony J. D., Deputy 

Head of EACS 

Bingham, Barry, Public Information 

Officer 

Bonesteel, Col. Charles H., III, Member 

of G–3 Division, 12th Army Group 

Bradley, Gen. Omar N., Commander of 

FUSA and later of 12th Army Group 

Briggs, Maj. Ruth, Secretary to Gen. 

W. B. Smith 

Broad, Wing Commander H. P., Member of Planning Staff of SHAEF 

(Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan. See 

above, Alanbrooke.) 

Brown, Brig. Gen. Robert Q., Headquarters Commandant, SHAEF 

Brownjohn, Maj. Gen. N. C. D., G–4 of 

COSSAC and Assistant G–4 of SHAEF 

Bull, Lt. Gen. Harold R., G–3 SHAEF 

Butler, Maj. Gordon, Member of 

SHAEF SGS Staff 

Caffery, Ambassador Jefferson, Ambassador to France 

Cameron, Maj. Gen. A. M., Chief of 

the Air Defense Division of SHAEF 

Carter, Col. Henry, Chief of Planning 

Coordination Section, Office of the Political Officer, SHAEF 

Coningham, Air Chief Marshal Sir 

Arthur, Commander of Second Tactical 

Air Force 

Crawford, Maj. Gen. Robert W., G–4 of 

SHAEF 

Creasy, Rear Adm. George E., Chief of 

Staff of the Allied Naval Expeditionary 

Force 

Cunningham of Hyndhope, Admiral of 

the Fleet Viscount, First Sea Lord 

Curtis, Col. J. O., Member of SHAEF 

G–2 Division 

Davis, Brig. Gen. Thomas J., Adjutant 

General and Public Relations Chief at 

SHAEF 

Dempsey, Gen. Sir Miles C.; Commander of Second British Army 

Dickson, Col. B. A., G–2 of First Army 

Eisenhower, Gen Dwight D., Supreme 

Allied Commander 

Gale, Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey M., Deputy 

Chief of Staff, SHAEF, Chief Administrative Officer 

Gaulle, Gen. Charles de, Head of the 

French Committee of National Liberation 

and later of the French Provisional Government 

Gault, Col. James, Personal Assistant to 

General Eisenhower 

Gleave, Group Captain T. P., Air Member of SHAEF Planning Staff 

Grasett, Lt. Gen. Sir A. E., G–5 of 

SHAEF 

Helfers, Lt. Col. M. C., Special Intelligence Officer, Third Army 

Hesketh, Lt. Col. R. F., Member of 

SHAEF G–3 Staff 

Hickman, Maj. R. E., Member of 

SHAEF AG Staff and Officer in Charge of 

CALA Records 

Hodges, Gen. Courtney H., Commander of First U.S. Army 

Holmes, Brig. Gen. Julius C., Deputy 

G–5 of SHAEF 

Huebner, Lt. Gen. Clarence R., Com- 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

mander of 1st Division and V Corps 

Hughes, Maj. Gen. H. B. W., Chiefof 

Engineers of SHAEF 

Hughes-Hallett, Capt. John, Naval 

Chief of Staff, COS SAC 

Ismay, Gen. Sir Hastings L., Chief of 

Staff, Ministry of Defence 

Jackson, W. D., Member of 12th Army 

Group Intelligence Staff 

Johnson, Alan Campbell, Personal Assistant to Lord Mountbatten 

Juin, Gen. Alphonse-Pierre, Chief of the 

French Bureau of National Defense 

Keating, Maj. Gen. F. A., Commander 

of 102d Division 

Kenner, Maj. Gen. Albert W., Chief 

Medical Officer, SHAEF 

King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J., Chief of 

Operations, U.S. Navy 

Kirk, Admiral Alan G., Commander of 

U.S. Naval Forces in the Invasion of 

Northwest Europe, Later Head of U.S. 

Naval Mission, SHAEF 

Lambe, Rear Adm. C. E., Naval Member of Joint Planning Staff (British) 

Laux, Lt. Col. Ray j., Executive Officer 

of War Department Civil Affairs Division 

Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D., Chief 

of Staff to the Commander in Chief 

Lear, Lt. Gen. Ben, Deputy Theater 

Commander, ETOUSA 

Lee, Lt. Gen.John C. H., Commander 

of Headquarters, Communications Zone 

Lewis, Maj. Gen. John T., Head of 

SHAEF Mission (France) 

Lockhart, Sir Robert Bruce, Head of 

the British Political Committee 

Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot, Chief of 

the Liaison Section of 6th Army Group 

McClure, Brig. Gen. Robert A., Chief 

of Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF 

McLean, Maj. Gen. Kenneth G., Head 

of SHAEF Planning Staff 

McSherry, Brig. Gen. FrankJ., Deputy 

567 

Chief ofG-5, SHAEF 

Mauchenheim genannt Bechtolsheim, 

General der Artillerie Anton Freiherr von, 

Representative of General Boehme in surrender in Norway 

Moorehead, Alan, Newspaper Correspondent; Author of Montgomery, a Biography (London, 1946) 

Morgan, Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E., 

Head of COSSAC and Deputy Chief of 

Staff, SHAEF 

Morgan, Gen. Sir W. D., Chief of Staff 

of21 Army Group under General Paget 

Mountbatten of Burma, Rear Adm. 

Viscount, Chief of Combined Op.erations 

Headquarters 

Nevins, Brig. Gen. Arthur S., Head of 

Operations Section, G-3 Division, SHAEF 

Nugent, Maj. Gen. R. E., Deputy Chief 

of Operations, Ninth Air Force, and Commanding General, XXIX Tactical Air 

Corps 

Paget, Gen. Sir Bernard, Commander 

of21 Army Group before Montgomery 

Peterson, Col. L. 0., Member of AEAF 

Staff 

Pinette, Miss Mattie, Member of General Eisenhower's Personal Staff 

Portal of Hungerford, Marshal of the 

Royal Air Force Viscount, Chief of the Air 

Staff, RAF 

Reinhardt, Fred, Member of Staff of 

Political Officer, SHAEF 

Robb, Air Chief Marshal Sir James M., 

Chief of the Air Staff, SHAEF 

Rosengarten, Adolph G.,Jr., Formerly 

a Member ofG-2 Section, First U.S. Army 

Rothwell, Lt. Col. H.j., Deputy Headquarters Commandant, SHAEF 

Scarman, . Wing Commander Leslie, 

Personal Assistant to Lord Tedder 

Schlatter, Maj. Gen. David, Deputy 

Senior Air Staff Officer and Chief of Operations Headquarters, U.S. Component, 
568 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

AEAF, and, later, Deputy Chief of Air 

Staff, SHAEF 

Schultes, Col. Ernst, Chief of Staff of 

15th SS Mountain Corps 

Sibert, Brig. Gen. E. L., G–2 of 12th 

Army Group 

Simonds, Lt. Gen. G. G., Commander of 

2d Canadian Corps 

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H., Commander of Ninth U.S. Army 

Sinclair, Maj. Gen. J. A., One of the 

Combined Commanders’ Planners 

Smith, Maj. Gen. Frederic H., Jr., 

Deputy Chief of Operations, AEAF 

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter B., Chief of Staff 

of SHAEF 

Strong, Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. D., G–2 

of SHAEF 

Tedder, Marshal of the Royal Air Force 

Lord, Deputy Supreme Commander 

Thorne, Gen. Sir Andrew M., Chief of 

SHAEF Mission (Norway) 

Trimble, Col. Ford, Onetime Secretary 

of the General Staff, SHAEF, and Deputy 

Chief of SHAEF Mission (Denmark) 

Vulliamy, Maj. Gen. C. H. H., Chiefof 

Signal Division, SHAEF 

West, Maj. Gen. Charles A., G–3 of 

COSSAC 

Whiteley, Maj. Gen. J. F. M., Deputy 

Chief of Staff, SHAEF 

Wigglesworth, Air Marshal Sir Philip, 

Senior Air Staff Officer, AEAF 

Williams, Brig. E. .T., Chief of Intelligence, 21 Army Group 

In addition to the interviews obtained 

by the author in person, information was 

obtained by him- in telephone conversations with former Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Lt. Col. R. H. Merrick, 

Censorship Section, SHAEF Public Relations Division. Other information was 

obtained from answers to questions submitted by the author through other individuals who conducted interviews with 

Maj. Gen. Sir Francis de Guingand, Chief 

of Staff, 21 Army Group (Dr. Gordon A. 

Harrison), and with Brig. Gen. Cornelius 

W. Wickersham (Mr. Richard Welling). 

Specific questionnaires of the author 

were answered by the following: 

Bare, Maj. George S., Member of 

Headquarters Commandant Staff, SHAEF 

Burrough, Admiral Harold M., Commander in Chief, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force 

Erskine, Maj. Gen. G. W. E. J., Chiefof 

SHAEF Mission (Belgium) 

Lincoln, Col. George A., Member of 

OPD Staff 

Murphy, Ambassador Robert D., Political Officer of SHAEF 

Phillips, Ambassador William, Political 

Officer of SHAEF 

Reber, Mr. Samuel, Political Officer of 

SHAEF 

The following individuals, in addition 

to a number already listed in the interview 

group, submitted comments or new material after reading the manuscript of this 

volume: Maj. Gen. A. Franklin Kibler, 

G–3 of 12th Army Group; Capt. Tracy B. 

Kittredge, USNR, aide of Admiral Stark 

who was present at many of the important 

meetings between U.S. representatives 

and important French leaders. 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The following volumes have been published or are in press: 

The War Department 

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations 

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division 

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942 

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944 

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943 

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945 

The Army and Economic Mobilization 

The Army and Industrial Manpower 

The Army Ground Forces 

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops 

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops 

The Army Service Forces 

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces 

The Western Hemisphere 

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense 

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts 

The War in the Pacific 

The Fall of the PhiIippines 

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive 

Victory in Papua 

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul 

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls 

Campaign in the Marianas 

The Approach to the Philippines 

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines 

Triumph in the Philippines 

Okinawa: The Last Battle 

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years 

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West 

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy 

Salerno to Cassino 

Cassino to the Alps 

The European Theater of Operations 

Cross-Channel Attack 

Breakout and Pursuit 

The Lorraine Campaign 

The Siegfried Line Campaign 

The Ardennes: Battle of the BuIge 

The Last Offensive 
570 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

The Supreme Command 

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I 

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II 

The Middle East Theater 

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia 

The China-Burma-India Theater 

Stilwell's Mission to China 

Stilwells. Command Problems 

Time Runs Out in CBI 

The Technical Services 

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War 

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field 

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat 

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment 

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan 

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany 

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States 

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior 

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters 

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War 

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply 

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and battlefront 

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I 

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II 

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan 

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany 

The Signal Corps: The Emergency 

The Signal Corps: The Test 

The Signal Corps: The Outcome 

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations 

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply 

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas 

Special Studies 

Chronology: 1941-1945 

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945 

Rearming the French 

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt 

The Women's Army Corps 

Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors 

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces 

The Employment of Negro Troops 

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb 

Pictorial Record 

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas 

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas 

The War Against Japan 
Index 

Aachen, Germany, 246, 249, 295, 303, 306, 310, 526 

and airborne planning, 280 

capture of, 305 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 359, 

360, 363, 364, 366, 367n, 368, 370, 372, 376, 377, 

384 

Aachener Nachrichten, 344 

Act of Military Surrender, 488, 492, 505 

Adjutant General's Division, SHAEF, 91-92, 522, 529 

Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee, 

71, 78 

Admiralty, British. See British Admiralty. 

Advance Conference Establishments, 419, 419n 

AEAF. See Allied Expeditionary Air Force. 

AEAF plan. See Railway bombing plan. 

Air Defense of Great Britain, 48, 48n, 126 

Air Defense Division, SHAEF, 93-95 

Air Division, SHAEF Mission (France), 32 In 

Air Force Service Command, IX, 163 

Air forces, Allied strategic, 278, 427, 461. See also 

Eighth Air Force, U.S.; Fifteenth Air Force, U.S.; 

Royal Air Force Bomber Command; U.S. Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF). 

bombing of Caen, 185, 185n, 187-89 

command of, 32, 44-45, 52, 123-27, 261, 272-74 

and CROSSBOW, 134-37 

and planning for end of war with Germany in 1944, 

307-09, 307n 

and railway bombing plan, 127-34, 160 

Air forces, Allied tactical, 278, 431. See also Allied Expeditionary Air Force; Ninth Air Force, U.S.; 

Tactical Air Commands, U.S.; Tactical Air 

Force, 2d (British). 

command of, 44, 45, 73, 124, 126, 261, 266, 273-75 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378n 

and CROSSBOW, 136, 137 

Twelfth Air Force units transferred to support of 

6th Army Group, 266, 416 

Air Forces, British. See Royal Air Force; Tactical Air 

Force, 2d (British). 

Air Forces, German. See Luftwaffe. 

Air Forces, Soviet, 462-63 

Air Forces, U.S. See Eighth Air Force, U.S.; Ninth Air 

Force, U.S.; Twelfth Air Force. U.S.: Fifteenth 

Air Force, U.S.; U.S. Strategic Air Forces 

(USSTAF). 

Air Ministry, British. See British Air Ministry. 

Air offensive. See POINTBLANK; Strategic bombing. 

Air Operations Planning Staff, SHAEF, 126 

Air Staff, British, 273. See also Portal, Marshal of the 

Royal Air Force Sir Charles. 

Air Staff, SHAEF, 62, 65, 215, 211. See also Air Operations Planning Staff, SHAEF; Robb, Air Marshal 

James M. 

Air superiority, Allied, 61, 105, 131, 137, 169, 178, 

193, 203, 246, 448 

Air supply, 204, 210, 254, 258, 271, 280, 281, 283, 

284n, 286, 335 

and Dutch food shortage, 458 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 384 

Air Transport Command, 258 

Airborne Army. See First Allied Airborne Army. 

Airborne Divisions, Allied, 118-19, 120, 122, 182, 

369n 

airborne assault on D Day, 171-73 

for COMET operation, 281 

and MARKET operation, 281-82, 284-88 

in Normandy, 192-93 

and VARSITY operation, 431 

Airborne Divisions, British. See British units. 

Airborne Divisions, U.S. 

82d, 120-21, 171, 171n, 282, 284-88, 289n, 374, 

382, 451n 

101st, 120, 171-73, 171n, 282, 284-88, 287n, 374 

Airborne doctrine, 120 

Airborne planning, 111, 118-22, 204, 209-10, 223, 

250-51, 254, 255, 258, 269-72, 279-84, 425, 429 

Aircraft, 204, 247, 258, 269, 286 

for ANVIL, 223 

for French Resistance activities, 155-56 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 384 

jet, 315, 427, 433 

for OVERLORD assault, 118, 120 

troopcarrier, 111, 120, 279-81 

Airfields, 183, 250, 258, 413 

Air-ground co-operation, 200, 311 

ALADDIN, 510n 

Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Viscount. See Brooke, 

Field Marshal Sir Alan. 

Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G., 27n, 

68, 225 

and ANVIL, 222 

appointed SACMED, 415 

and Balkan operations, 406, 406n 

directive to, for transfer of forces to northwest 

Europe, 4 16 

on Italian operations, 2 19, 415-16 

Eisenhower requests, as 21 Army Group commander, 49 

and landing craft for Mediterranean operations, 115 

proposed as deputy supreme commander, 390-91 

at Salerno, 44 

surrender of German forces to, 483 
572 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Algiers, Algeria, 97, 108, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 152, 

234, 237, 240, 241 

BCRA in, 152, 152n 

conference on French troops at, 151 

French officers moved to Paris from, 321 

Allen, Brig. Gen. Frank A,, Jr., 1, 522, 525, 528 

Allied Air Bombing Committee, 128 

Allied Control Council, 465, 495. See also US. Group 

Control Council. 

Eisenhower represents US. on, 514 

establishment in Berlin, 352, 512 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 57, 68, 70, 97, 118, 

120, 273, 276. See also Leigh-Mallory, Air Chief 

Marshal Sir Trafford. 

abolition of, 274-75 

Advanced Headquarters at Uxbridge, 126-27 

bombing in Normandy, 188-89, 199, 199n 

and Combined Signal Committee, 92 

and CROSSBOW, 126, 136-37 

directive to, 44-45, 50, 107 

and First Allied Airborne Army, 269-72 

Leigh-Mallory commands, 48, 73 

and Meteorological Committee, SHAEF, 169 

and Ninth Air Force, 48, 73 

and OVERLORD planning, 66, 121, 126-27 

and RAF units, 48 

and railway bombing plan, 127-34, 134n, 160 

Royce appointed Deputy Air Commander-inChief, 271n 

sorties flown 1 April-5 June 1944, 160 

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQJ, 29, 62, 68, 71, 

73, 81, 84, 86, 91, 106, 239, 390. See also Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G.; 

Mediterranean Theater; North Africa; Wilson, 

Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland. 

air defense organization, 93 

and ANVIL planning, 103, 110-11, 223, 266 

civil affairs administration, 75, 76, 147 

command of ANVIL/DRAGOON forces transferred 

to SHAEF, 266 

contributions to SHAEF organization, 56-58, 59, 

60, 64-65, 96 

and surrender of German forces in Italy, 475, 

475n, 476 

Allied Information Service (AIS), 336-37 

Allied Land Forces (Norway), 139, 5 10, 51 1 

Allied Military Government, Italy, 80, 81 

Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary 

Force (ANCXF). See also Allied Naval Expeditionary Force; Burrough, Admiral Harold M.; 

Ramsay, Admiral Bertram H. 

Burrough named as, 275, 429, 429n 

disbandment of German Navy, 500-501 

and dissolution of SHAEF, 514 

Little named as, 46 

and OVERLORD planning, 66, 121 

Ramsay named as, 46-47, 275 

Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, 45, 57, 68, 70, 97, 

276. See also Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief,. 

Expeditionary Force (ANCXF). 

Allied Naval Expeditionary Force-Continued 

and Combined Signal Committee, 92 

and D-Day decision, 169 

and Meteorological Committee, SHAEF, 169 

operational control of US. naval forces assumed by, 

47 

and OVERLORD planning, 107 

planning for Rhine River crossings, 429 

role of, 275 

Alsace, 196, 368, 412 

Belfort Gap operations, 312 

clearing of Colmar Pocket, 318, 402-04 

German counteroffensive, 395, 397-402, 401n, 425- 

26 

American Broadcasting Station in Europe (ABSIE), 

161, 345 

Ammunition, 286, 293n, 296 

Allied shortage, 268, 295, 305, 306, 415 

German shortage, 4 18- 19 

ANCXF. See Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force (ANCXF). 

Anderson, Lt. Gen. K. A. N., British directive to, 42 

Andrews, Lt. Gen. Frank M., 58n 

ANFA. See Casablanca Conference. 

Antonov, Gen. Alexei, 444, 462 

and bomb lines, 463 

and German surrender at Reims, 484, 486, 490, 494 

and German surrender ceremony at Berlin, 490 

and plans for Soviet-Allied link-up, 466, 469 

Antwerp, Belgium, 95, 302, 391 

capture, 254, 254n, 256 

clearing of approaches to, 254-56, 256n, 275, 288, 

289-90, 292, 294-95, 296-301, 306, 307, 308, 309 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 359, 

360, 372 

planning for capture, 250-51, 252, 260 

V-bomb attack on, 332 

ANVIL, 227-30, 259, 323. See also France, southern. 

and Anzio campaign, 111-12 

and civil affairs, 223, 266 

command for, 223, 227, 265-66 

divisionsfor, 110-11, 114, 115, 116, 219, 223, 224 

junction Of OVERLORD forces with units of, 228-29, 

228n, 275 

landing craft for, 109, 111-12, 223 

objectives of operation, 223 

and OVERLORD planning, 109-17, 120, 415 

postponement, 112-1 7 

SHAEF assumes control of forces, 229, 266 

target date, 116-17, 219, 220-23 

versus extension of Italian campaign, 2 18-26 

Anzio Campaign, 111-13, 117, 119, 164 

APOSTLE I, 510n 

APOSTLE II, 510n 

ARCADIA, 39n 

Archer, Admiral E. R., 462, 466, 476, 490-91. See also 

British Military Mission in Moscow. 

Archives, German military, 497-99, 500, 501 

Ardennes, 244, 250, 252, 253n, 255, 255n, 288, 312, 

313, 316, 317, 329, 417 
INDEX 573 

Ardennes—Continued 

Allied estimate of German capabilities in, 361-72 

casualties in German counteroffensive, 396-97, 

397n, 402, 526 

command shift during German counteroffensive, 

378-81, 385-86, 386n, 388-89, 395 

German counteroffensive, 304, 317, 318, 323, 325, 

332, 333, 337, 346, 359-61, 372-97, 403, 404, 405, 

407, 409, 410, 411, 412, 416, 419, 425, 427, 523, 

526, 527, 531 

Resistance activities, 238 

Argenlieu, Admiral George Thierry d’, 47 

ARGONAUT. See Yalta Conference. 

Armée Secéte, L’, 152 

Armies, Allied. See First Allied Airborne Army. 

Armies, Belgian. See Belgian Army. 

Armies, British. See Second British Army; British 

units. 

Armies, Canadian. See First Canadian Army; Canadian units. 

Armies, French. See First French Army; French Army; 

French units. 

Armies, German. See German Army; German units. 

Armies, Soviet. See Red Army. 

Armies, U.S. See First US. Army; Third US. Army; 

Fifth U.S. Army; Seventh U.S. Army: Ninth U.S. 

Army; Fifteenth U.S. Army. 

Armistice with Germany, 257, 326, 475-94 

Armored Divisions, U.S. 

7th, 387 

9th, 370, 371, 423n 

10th, 374 

Armored Divisions, German. See Panzer divisions. 

Armored forces, Allied, 98, 150, 182, 247, 258 

in battle for Caen, 183, 184, 185, 187, 187n, 189, 

190 

Third Army advance in Brittany, 205-06 

Army Air Forces, U.S. See Air Forces, U.S.; Arnold, 

General of the Army Henry H. 

Army Group, British. See 21 Army Group, British. 

Army Groups, U.S. See 1st U.S. Army Group; 6th 

Army Group, U.S.; 12th Army Group, U.S. 

Army of Occupation, 355. See also British Army of the 

Rhine; U.S. Forces of Occupation. 

Arnhem, Netherlands, 295, 302, 305, 334, 427, 429, 

434, 450, 451, 457 

airborne operations, 255, 284-88, 290, 300 

planning for operations, 255, 255n, 256, 28 1-84, 297 

Arnold, General of the Army Henry H., 315, 415n 

on abolition of AEAF, 274 

on airborne operations, 119, 269, 279-80, 281 

and ANVIL planning, 220 

biographical sketch, 1 

and command of strategic air forces, 273 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 375 

member CCS, 39 

Artificial harbors, 173-75 

Associated Press, 493, 527 

Astier de la Vigerie, Gen. François d’, 153, 239n 

ATS, 531 

Austria, 154, 435, 442 

Allied drive into, 441, 452, 454-56, 467, 468 

German National Redoubt in, 448, 452, 468 

presurrender directive for military government for, 

347-48 

proposal for link-up with Red Army in, 406, 406n 

surrender of German forces in, 479, 482-83, 483n 

Baillie-Grohman, Rear Adm. H. T., 501 

Balck, General der Panzertruppen Hermann, 1, 230, 

304 

Balkans, 164, 202, 249, 314, 472, 478 

bomb lines in, 462-63 

occupation, 349, 350 

planning for operations in, 219-22, 225, 406, 406n, 

414-16, 414n, 444-45 

surrender of German forces in, 483 

Barker, Maj. Gen. Ray W. See also G–1 Division, 

SHAEF. 

biographical sketch, 1-2 

chief G–1 Division, SHAEF, 60, 73 

and civil affairs agreement with France, 142 

on collapse of Germany, 105 

on command of ground forces in OVERLORD assault, 

44 

Deputy Chief of Staff, COSSAC, 58-59, 73 

and manpower crisis, 392 

and personnel for SHAEF, 530 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340 

Bastogne, Belgium, 359, 360, 372, 374, 374n, 378, 381, 

383, 384, 385, 387, 395 

BCRA. See Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action 

(Militaire) (BCRA). 

BCRAA. See Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action 

(Militaire) (BCRA). 

BCRAL. See Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action 

(Militaire) (BCRA) . Becher, Brigadier R. F. R., 73 

Belgian Army, 138, 329, 330 

Belgian Independent Company, 155 

Belgian Ministry of National Defense, 330, 331 

Belgian Parliament, 329, 330 

Belgium, 154, 161, 177, 195; 279, 282, 283, 288, 299, 

302, 314, 319, 336, 523 

and Allied manpower crisis, 391 

Allied pursuit through, 244, 249, 250-51 

bombing targets in, 127, 160 

civil affairs, 79, 80, 83, 138, 139, 328-34, 348, 350. 

See also SHAEF Mission (Belgium). 

civil affairs agreement with, 139-40, 234, 235, 320 

German counteroffsensive in the Ardennes, 359-61, 

372-85, 406 

prediction of date for reaching, 257 

release of King Leopld, 481, 483 

Resistance forces, 238, 329-32 

V-bomb attacks on, 332 

Bendetsen, Col. Karl R., 80, 81 

BENEFICIARY, 197n 

Benes, Eduard, 507 
574 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Berlin, Germany, 164, 176, 193, 359, 447, 449, 450, 

459, 463, 464, 524 

Allied Control Council in, 352, 495, 512, 514 

Allied garrison for, 514 

German defense, 469-74 

German evacuation, 470-71 

as military objective, 434, 441-47, 445n, 452, 469 

occupation, 349, 351, 445n, 467 

planning for advance to, 249, 253-54, 255n, 290-91, 

293-94, 298, 413, 434 

Red Army advance to, 418, 434, 446, 470-71, 

472-74, 481 

Soviet headquarters in, 497 

surrender ceremony at, 486, 490-94, 509 

Berlin District, 436n 

Bernadotte, Count Folke, 476-77 

Bernhard, Prince, 458 

Btthouart, Gen. Emile, 235 

Betts, Brig. Gen. Thomas J., 60n, 71, 73, 376n, 406 

Biddle, Col. Anthony J. Drexel, Jr., 138, 504 

BIGOT, 162 

Blaskowitz, Generaloberst Johannes, 178–79, 179n, 

248n, 302, 429 

biographical sketch, 2 

commands Army Croup H, 419n 

and operations in southern France, 227, 229 

replaced as commander Army Group G, 304, 419n 

surrender of German forces in Netherlands, 503 

Bocage country, 173, 183, 187, 192, 197 

BODYLINE. See CROSSBOW. 

Boehme, General der Gebirgstruppen Franz, 5 10, 

510n 

Boehnke, Col. Emil C., 92 

BOLERO, 100-101 

Bolté, Brig. Gen. Charles L., 141n 

Bomb lines, 461, 463 . Bombardment Division, 9th (U.S.), 384n 

Bomber Command, VIII (U.S.), 99 

Bomber Command, British. See Royal Air Force 

Bomber Command. 

Bormann, Martin, 213n, 471-72, 472n, 474, 474n 

Bornholm, 509 

Bosville, Brigadier T. J. N., 73 

Bosy, Gen. Stanislav, 504 

Bottomley, Air Marshal Sir Norman H., 273, 309 

Boundaries, interarmy. See Zones of action, Allied. 

Boundary, Soviet-Allied, 454, 457, 465-69, 504-05, 

506, 511 

Bracken, Brendan, 89, 388, 527 

BRADDOCK II, 346 

Bradley, Gen. Omar N., 41, 71, 190, 244, 289, 292, 

293, 293n, 314, 387, 456, 525. See also 12th Army 

Group, U.S. 

and airborne planning, 209, 280, 282n 

and battle for Caen, 183-84, 186, 188 

biographical sketch, 2 

and British drive on Luebeck, 451 

and broad front strategy, 250-55, 253n, 291-92, 

294-95, 296, 312, 409, 410-12, 433, 435-36 

on capture of Berlin, 445, 445n, 452 

Bradley, Gen. Omar N.-Continued 

and COBRA operation, 188n, 197-201, 203 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378-81, 386, 386n, 388-89, 

391, 395-409, 443 

at commanders’ conferences, 3 10, 316, 422 

commands First U.S. Army, 49 

commands 1st U.S. Army Group, 49, 261n 

commands 12th Army Group, 204, 261-65 

and Czech Brigade’s movement to Prague, 506 

and D-Day operations, 166, 173 

drive to the Elbe, 452, 454 

drive to the Rhine, 311, 417-18, 418n, 422-25, 432 

drive on Roer and Urft dams, 317, 420 

Eisenhower praises, 435 

estimate of German capabilities in the Ardennes, 

361, 362, 365, 365n, 370n, 371-72 

and Falaise Gap operations, 208- 1 0, 2 14, 2 17 

and German counterattack at Mortain, 208 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

372-84, 376n, 380n, 383n, 395 

on landing US. forces in Cotentin, 118, 120 

and liberation of Paris, 240n, 241, 242, 258 

main offensive east of Rhine assigned to, 436, 446, 

446n 

and military government for Germany, 356 

and Montgomery’s press conference after Ardennes 

fighting, 387-88, 435 

Montgomery’s relationship with, 198, 214n, 217, 

261-64, 295-96, 312, 383, 387-88, 395, 435 

promotion recommended by Eisenhower, 379 

on reduction of Brest, 259 

and Remagen bridge capture, 424 

and Ruhr envelopment, 291, 440 

and Soviet-Allied boundary, 454 

and Third Army operations, 2 14, 2 14n, 255, 303, 

454 

visits troops before D Day, 158 

BRAL. See Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action 

(Militaire) (BCRA). 

Brandenberger, General der Panzertruppen Erich, 

482, 483 

Breakout. See Normandy, breakout. 

Brereton, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. See also First Allied Airborne Army. 

on Advanced Headquarters, AEAF, 126 

on airborne operations, 209-10 

and airborne planning, 280-81, 282n, 429 

biographical sketch, 2-3 

commands First Allied Airborne Army, 271, 279 

commands Ninth Air Force, 48 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

369n 

and MARKET operation, 282n, 287 

Brest peninsula, 43, 268 

and COCKADE planning, 105-06 

and OVERLORD planning, 109 

Briggs, Brigadier R., 93 

British Admiralty, 85n, 93, 152, 169, 514 

British Air Ministry, 93, I3 I 
INDEX 575 

British Air Ministry-Continued 

and dissolution of SHAEF, 514 

and Meteorological Committee, SHAEF, 169 

and reassignment of Leigh-Mallory, 274 

and strategic bombing priorities, 309 

British Air Staff, 273. See also Portal, Marshal of the 

Royal Air Force Sir Charles. 

British Airborne Corps. See British units. 

British Airborne Troops Command, 271-72 

British Army. See British units. 

British Army of the Rhine, 514. See also 21 Army 

Group, British. 

British Bomber Command. See Royal Air Force 

Bomber Command. 

British Broadcasting Corporation, 84, 157, 345, 523, 

524, 526, 527 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 388, 388n 

and propaganda before D Day, 161 

British Chiefs of Staff, 24n, 37, 57, 62, 63. 289, 292, 

468. See also Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan; 

Cunningham, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew 

B.; Portal, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir 

Charles. 

and Air Defence of Great Britain, 48n, 124 

and ANVIL controversy, 109-17, 218-19, 221-22, 

224, 225-26 

and Balkan operations, 219, 221-22, 414 

on capture of Berlin, 441-42, 444, 446 

and CCS meetings, 39-41, 39n 

and censorship of communications, 147 

and civil affairs, 75, 76, 77, 79, 138 

and command of air forces in OVERLORD, 44-45, 48, 

124-25 

and command organization for OVERLORD, 43-44 

and CROSSBOW, 135, 136 

and directive to Supreme Commander, 49-52, 52n 

and drive to Luebeck, 451 

and drive to the Rhine, 310 

and Dutch food shortage, 335 

final briefing before D Day, 166 

and French Resistance, 153 

and London Coordinating Committee for Political 

Warfare, 85 

at Malta Conference, 413 

membership of, 39 

and military government for Germany, 346, 354, 

355, 357 

and planning for cross-Channel attack, 98-100, 

101, 103, 109-17 

and planning to end war with Germany in 1944, 

307-08 

and plans for Soviet-Allied link-up, 465, 467-68 

and press and propaganda organization of SHAEF, 

86 

and proposal to bomb Vlissingen, Netherlands, 334 

and railway bombing plan, 128 

relationship with Churchill, 37 

release of OVERLORD information to French, 148 

and reports from battle commanders, 37 

British Chiefs of Staff-Continued 

and security of OVERLORD plan, 89 

on single ground force commander, 387, 389-90 

on single thrust versus broad front strategy, 409-11, 

413-14 

and unconditional surrender formula, 343 

and unified command, 37, 42 

British Chiefs of Staff Committee. See British Chiefs of 

Staff. 

British Combined Commanders. See Combined Commanders, British. 

British Combined Operations Headquarters. See Combined Operations Headquarters. 

British Control Commission Military Section, 346, 

351-52, 353, 354 

British Defence Committee, 131 

British Foreign Office, 78, 84, 85, 85n 

and censorship of foreign communications, 163 

and governments-in-exile, 138, 231, 233, 334 

and London Coordinating Committee for Political 

Warfare, 85 

and military government for Germany, 347, 354 

and political officers for SHAEF, 95 

and SHAEF press relations, 521 

British Home Forces, 72, 98, 99, 102, 529 

British Home Office, 162 

British House of Commons, 332, 341, 389, 498 

British Imperial General Staff, Chief of. See Brooke, 

Field Marshal Sir Alan. 

British Joint Planning Staff, 99 

on ANVIL plan, 11O 

on ending war with Germany in 1944, 307-08 

British Joint Staff Mission, 37-39 

and CCS meetings, 39 

membershipof, 39n, 415, 415n 

British Military Mission in Moscow. See also Archer, 

Admiral E. R. 

and Allied plans for drive to Leipzig, 441 

and German surrender, 486, 490 

liaison with USSR, 462 

and plans for Soviet-Allied link-up, 466 

British Minister of Defence. See Churchill, Winston S. 

British Ministry of Economic Warfare, 152, 155 

British Ministry of Information., 85n, 89, 527 

and censorship, 90, 91, 519 

and propaganda, 84-85, 87 

British Naval Commander in Chief, Germany, 501 

British Navy. See Royal Navy. 

British Operations Research Group, 208n 

British Political Intelligence Department, Foreign 

Office, 84 

British Post Hostilities Planning Sub-committee, 346 

British Secretary of State for Air, 131, 274 

British Secretary of State for War, 131, 232 

British Southern Command, 502 

British units 

Army, First, 42 

Army, Second. See Second British Army. 

Army, Eighth, 33, 49, 388 

Army Group, 21. See 21 Army Group, British. 
5 76 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

British units-Continued 

Corps, 1, 173, 185, 186, 201, 300 

Corps, 8, 181, 186, 188, 189, 282, 294 

Corps, 12, 282 

Corps, 30, 173, 282, 284, 288, 377, 389, 396, 397n 

Corps, Airborne, 271, 282, 283, 286 

Division, 1st Airborne, 283: 286, 287, 288 

Division, 6th Airborne, 120, 171 

Division, 43d, 282, 287 

Division, 50th, 282 

Division, 51st, 383 

Division, 52d (Lowland), 138, 282 

Division, Guards Armored, 282, 286, 287 

Royal Dragoons, I, 508 

Signals, 5 Headquarters, 97 

British War Cabinet, 37, 104, 118, 166, 233 

and ban on entry to coastal areas of England, 163 

and censorship of foreign communications, 163 

and railway bombing plan, 127, 128, 131, 132 

and unconditional surrender formula, 341, 343 

British War Establishments, 529, 530 

British War Office, 42, 71, 73, 78n, 85n, 91, 272, 275 

and ban on entry to coastal areas of England, 162 

and dissolution of SHAEF, 514 

and equipment for Belgian units, 330 

French military liaison with, 138 

and French Resistance, 152 

and invasion currency, 232 

and Medical Division, SHAEF, 93 

and Netherlands Government-in-exile, 334 

and personnel for SHAEF, 530, 531 

and railway bombing plan, 129 

and SHAEF press relations, 520 

Brittany, 98, 109, 179, 185, 187, 191, 193, 196, 197, 

208, 209, 224, 225 

clearing of ports, 251, 252, 254, 257, 259, 303 

French Resistance activities, 236, 237-38, 328 

psychological warfare teams in, 344 

Simpson commands forces in, 265, 303 

Third U.S. Army advance into, 198, 204-07, 211, 

244 

Broad front policy. See Strategy, Allied 

Broadcasts. See American Broadcasting Station in 

Europe (ABSIE); British Broadcasting Corporation; Radio Luxembourg; Voice of SHAEF. 

Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan, 28n, 39, 41, 60, 64, 

289. See also British Chiefs of Staff. 

on ANVIL plan, 110, 116, 219 

biographical sketch, 3 

and BOLERO plan, 100 

Churchill promises supreme command to, 24 

and defense of Strasbourg, 401 

and deputy supreme commander, 390 

on extension of Italian campaign, 219 

on port of Antwerp, 297 

and railway bombing plan, 128, 130 

on single thrust versus broad front strategy, 256n, 

410, 433, 433n 

and transfer of divisions from Italy to northwest 

Europe, 4 16 

Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan-Continued 

and 21 Army Group commander, 49 

visits Rhine bridgehead, 431 

and zones of occupation, 464 

Brooks, Lt. Gen. Edward H., 482 

Brown, Brig. Gen. Robert Q,, 97n, 264, 529n 

Browning, Lt. Gen. F. A. M., 154, 271, 280-81, 282, 

288 

Brownjohn, Maj. Gen. N. C. D., 73 

Brussels, Belgium, 251, 252, 284, 314, 330, 331, 486 

Belgium Government re-established at, 328 

commanders’ conference at, 255, 256, 310 

Eisenhower’s speech before Parliament at, 330 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

359, 360, 372 

SHAEF meeting on Dutch food shortage at, 457 

SHAEF mission to Netherlands established at, 334, 

334n 

Bulge, Battle of. See Ardennes, German counteroffensive in. 

Bull, Maj. Gen. Harold R. See also G–3 Division, 

SHAEF. 

biographical sketch, 3 

chief of G–3 Division, SHAEF, 68-71 

conference with Stalin in Moscow, 406 

and D-Day decision, 169, 170n 

and German surrender, 487,491 

at Malta Conference, 4 13 

and Remagen bridge capture, 424 

and SHAEF strategy for defeat of Germany, 253n, 

413 

and single ground force commander, 390 

Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action (Militaire) 

, (BCRA). 152. 152n .153 

Burrough, Admiral Harold M. 

biographical sketch, 3 

commands Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, 275, 

429, 429n 

disbandment of German Navy, 496, 500-501, 501n 

and German surrender 488, 491, 492, 492n 

Burrows, Lt. Gen. M. B., 3, 462 

Busch, Generalfeldmarschall Ernst, 4, 479, 480, 498 

Butcher, Capt, Harry C., 25n, 27n, 31n, 350n, 492n 

Cadran, 337 

Caen, France, 106, 108, 111, 118, 120, 173, 180, 181- 

82, 192, 194, 196, 201, 204, 207, 208, 209, 244, 

442 

battle for, 183-91, 198 

bombing of, 185,185n, 187-89, 190, 199n 

Caffery, Jefferson, 325, 400n 

Cairo Conference, 39, 73, 143 

and ANVIL planning, 105, 111, 112 

and OVERLORD planning, 105 

and strategic air forces in Europe and Mediterranean, 32, 48 

and supreme commander for OVERLORD, 28-32, 

32n, 105 

and zones ofoccupation, 349 

Cameron, Maj. Gen. A. M., 4, 93 
INDEX 577 

Canadian units 

Army, First. See First Canadian Army. 

Corps, lst, 503 

Corps, 2d, 200, 201, 215, 216, 300n 

Division, 4th Armored, 193n, 215 

Carter, Col. W. S. J., 95 

Casablanca Conference, 23n, 39 

and French rearmament, 150 

and HUSKY operation, 103 

and OVERLORD planning, 103 

and POINTBLANK, 103, 104 

and supreme commander for OVERLORD, 23, 58, 

103 

and unconditional surrender formula, 339 

Casualties, 187, 451n 

in battle for St. Lô, 192 

British, 192, 248n, 287n, 301n, 389, 396-97, 397n, 

423, 431, 544 

Canadian, 192, 200, 248n, 301, 301n, 423, 544 

in clearing Schelde estuary, 301 

in COBRA operation, 199 

D-Day, 171, 171n, 173, 175, 181 

and drive to Berlin, 445 

French, 228, 544 

German, 194, 247, 303, 306, 312, 396-97, 422, 427, 

508 

in German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 396- 

97, 397n, 402, 526 

in invasion of southern France, 228 

in Italian campaign, 115 

in MARKET-GARDEN operation, 287, 287n 

in OVERLORD rehearsals, 166 

and railway bombing plan, 128, 131, 132 

release of statistics to press, 526 

in Rhine crossing at Oppenheim, 426 

United States, 171n, 182, 192, 228, 248n, 287n, 

301n, 303, 317, 389, 396-97, 397n, 422, 431, 454, 

526, 543 

from V-bomb attacks, 252, 252n, 332 

CATOR, 271 

Censorship, 90-91, 519, 521-22, 523-24, 525, 526 

and civil affairs agreement for France, 320 

of foreign communications before D Day, 147, 162- 

63 

of German broadcasts from Flensburg, 498 

and German surrender at Reims, 493, 527-28 

Central Europe Campaign, 434-40, 447-56 

Central Group of Armies, 265, 452. See also 12th Army 

Group. 

Chambers, Brig. Gen. William E., 108 

Chaney, Maj. Gen. James E., 99 

Cherbourg, France, 93, 106, 109, 118, 120, 173, 180, 

202, 222, 223, 242, 256, 257, 322, 336, 337 

capture, 181-82, 183, 184, 185, 186, 193 

and rocket launching sites, 134-35 

Chevallerie, General der Infanterie Kurt von der, 

179n, 248 

Chevigne, Col. Pierre de, 234 

Chief Administrative Officer, SHAEF, 57, 64. See also 

Gale, Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey M. 

Chief of the Air Staff, British. See Portal, Marshal of 

the Royal Air Force Sir Charles. 

Chief of the Imperial General Staff. See Brooke, Field 

Marshal Sir Alan. 

Chief Meteorological Officer, SHAEF, 169 

Chief of Staff, SHAEF, 57, 62-63, 326, 486. See also 

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell. 

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See Marshall, General of the 

Army George C. 

Chief of Staff (Air), SHAEF, 275. See also Robb, Air 

Marshal James M. 

Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander 

(COSSAC), 39, 63, 68, 72, 96. See also Morgan, 

Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E. 

and air problems, 123 

and BIGOT procedure, 162 

and civil affairs, 75, 76, 79-81, 82, 138, 142, 347, 

348-49 

and command of ground forces in OVERLORD assault, 43-45, 49 

contribution to SHAEF organization, 56, 58-60 

and CROSSBOW, 134-35 

and directive to AEAF, 45 

and directive to Supreme Commander, 52 

and French Resistance, 153 

and G–1 and G–4 Divisions of SHAEF, 73 

Morgan selected as, 23, 103 

organization, 24, 58-59, 529 

and planning for cross-Channel attack, 58, 66, 103- 

06, 107-09, 111, 122, 196 

and planning for diversionary attacks, 105-06 

and political officers, 95 

and press and propaganda organization, 86 

and RANKIN planning, 104-05, 106 

and security ofOVERLORD plan, 162 

Chiefs of Staff Committee. See British Chiefs of Staff. 

Choltitz, Generalleutnant Dietrich von, 213, 240, 241 

Churchill, Winston S., 33, 39, 39n, 62, 521 

on airborne divisions for OVERLORD assault, 118 

on Allied failure to reach Rhine, 3 14 

and ANVIL planning, 111-13, 115, 116-17, 218, 

221-22, 224-27, 228, 415 

and Balkan operations, 221-22, 406n, 414-15, 414n 

and ban on entry to coastal areas of England, 162 

and British drive to Luebeck, 443, 451 

on capture of Berlin, 442-44 

on capture of Prague, 504 

and civil affairs, 77, 79-80 

and civil affairs agreement with France, 144, 146, 

147-48, 233 

and command of armed forces, 36-37, 41, 42 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378, 381, 387, 389 

and commander, Allied Naval Expeditionary 

Force, 46 

and defense of Strasbourg, 400-401, 401n 

and de Gaulle’s message to French on D Day, 149 

and Dutch food shortage, 334, 457 

Eisenhower’s relationship with, 41, 218, 222, 225- 

27, 228, 381, 387, 389, 401, 401n, 442-44 
578 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Churchill, Winston S.—Continued 

and final briefing before D Day, 166 

and French Committee of National Liberation, 141, 

233-34 

and German surrender, 477, 485, 491, 493-94, 494n 

at international conferences with CCS, 29, 39, 102 

and invasion currency, 233 

and manpower crisis, 38 I, 391-92 

on Montgomery’s promotion to field marshal, 253n 

on OVERLORD at Cairo Conference, 29 

and planning for cross-Channel attack, 98, 100, 103 

and psychological warfare, 84 

and railway bombing plan, 127, 131-32 

and release of OVERLORD information to French, 

149 

and reports from battle commanders, 36-37 

and security of OVERLORD plan, 89 

and SHAEF Mission (Belgium), 332 

and single ground force commander, 390-91 

Smith’s relationship with, 41, 63 

on Soviet operations on Eastern Front, 247 

and strategic air forces for OVERLORD, 124 

on strengthening OVERLORD assault, 108, 109, 110 

on supreme commander for OVERLORD, 23-24, 28, 

28n, 29, 30-31, 32n, 33 

and TORCH operation, 100, 101 

and 21 Army Group commander, 49 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340-43 

and V-bomb damage in United Kingdom, 252n 

visits Moscow, 406 

visits Rhine bridgehead, 431 

visits Versailles, 400-401, 401n 

and zones of occupation, 139, 350, 351, 469 

Civil affairs, 260, 338. See also individual countries. 

agreements with governments-in-exile, 78-79, 138, 

139-40, 142-50, 234, 235, 319-20, 325, 326, 513 

and ANVIL/DRAGOON, 223, 266 

CCAC presurrender directive on Germany, 347-48, 

353, 355, 357-58 

invasion currency, 231-33, 235, 320 

liaison missions with SHAEF, 138-39, 32 I, 5 15. See 

also French Military Mission. 

and military government, 75-76 

military government for Germany, 83, 96, 260, 345, 

346-58, 459, 461, 498, 511-15 

and OVERLORD directive, 55 

political officers for SHAEF, 95-96 

SHAEF handbooks on, 81, 82n, 82-83, 347, 353, 

354-56 

SHAEF interim directive for military government 

of Germany, 356 

SHAEF missions to liberated countries, 139, 320-2 I, 

508-11, 513, 514, 530, 532. See also SHAEF Mission (Belgium); SHAEF Mission (Denmark); 

SHAEF Mission (France); SHAEF Mission 

(Luxembourg); SHAEF Mission (Netherlands); 

SHAEF Mission (Norway). 

supplies for Paris, 257, 258 

21 Army Group responsibility for, 82-83, 138, 139, 

150, 231, 233, 356 

Civil affairs-Continued 

unconditional surrender formula. See Unconditional 

surrender formula. 

in World War I. 75-76 

zones of occupation. See Zones of occupation. 

Civil Affairs Branch, COSSAC, 80, 81 

Civil Affairs Division. SHAEF. See G–5 Division. 

SHAEF. 

Civil Affairs Division. War Department. 78. 81. 85. 

485n. See also Hilidring, Maj. Gen. John H. 

and civil affairs agreement with France, 144-45 

and military government for Germany, 346, 353-54 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340 

and zones of occupation, 464 

Civil Affairs Section, ETOUSA, 80 

Clark, Brig. Gen. E. K., 74n 

Clark, Maj. Gen. John G. W., 4, 334n 

Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W., 414n 

Clay, Lt. Gen. Lucius D., 81, 495 

COBRA, 187-88, 188n, 197, 197n, 199-201, 203 

COCKADE, 58, 105 

Collège Moderne et Technique de Garçons, Ecole 

Superieur de Commerce, 4 19 

Collins, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton. See also Corps, U.S., VII. 

biographical sketch, 4 

on COBRA operation, 199 

and command shift during German counteroffen-, 

sive in the Ardennes, 380, 383, 395 

Colmar, France, 305, 3 12, 425 

clearing of pocket, 318, 369, 402-04, 412 

and German counteroffensive in Alsace, 397 

Cologne, Germany, 254, 259, 286, 305, 310, 423, 430 

in broad front strategy, 291, 294, 295, 313, 410 

capture, 423 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 359, 

360, 364, 366, 367, 367n, 369, 372, 376 

COMAC. See French Military Resistance Committee. 

Combined Administrative Liquidating Agency 

(CALA), 515 

Combined Air Transport Operations Room 

(CATOR), 271 

Combined Airborne Headquarters. See First Allied 

Airborne Army. 

Combined Bomber Offensive. See POINTBLANK. 

Combined Chiefs of staff, 25, 27, 28, 28n, 30, 31, 31n, 

35, 62, 73, 107, 121, 139, 191, 289, 301, 386, 424, 

532. See also British Chiefs of Staff Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. 

and ANVIL planning, 105, 111-12, 115, 117, 218, 

219-22, 226 

and Balkan operations, 406, 406n, 414-16 

and Belgian food shortage, 333 

and bomb lines, 463 

on capture of Berlin, 441-43, 444, 446, 446n 

and capture of Prague, 468-69, 504-05 

and CCAC, 77, 78,80 

and CCAC presurrender directive on Germany, 

347, 355 

and channels of communication with USSR, 444, 

445n, 462 
INDEX 579 

Combined Chiefs of Staff-Continued 

and civil affairs agreements, 78-79, 144, 147, 232, 

319 

and command of French forces, 151 

and command of around forces in OVERLORD assault, 44 

and command of European operations, 36-41 

and commander, AEAF, 48 

and commander. Allied Naval Expeditionary 

Force, 46 

conferences of. 23. 23n, 30-31. 31n, 39, 39n, 58, 

102-03, 104, 105, 256, 272-73, 413-16, 436n 

and COSSAC, 23, 58, 103 

on de Gaulle’s visit to Paris, 241 

directive to SACMED for transfer of forces to 

northwest Europe, 41 6 

and directive to commander, AEAF, 45 

directive to Supreme Commander, 49-55, 468 

and dissolution of SHAEF, 349, 511, 5 14 

and French rearmament, 324, 324n, 392, 460 

and German surrender, 476, 476n, 480, 482, 484, 

49 3 

and HUSKY operation, 103 

and liberation of Paris, 239 

meeting in London, 11 June 1944, 2 19 

and military government for Germany, 352, 353-58 

organization of, 37-41, 39n 

and OVERLORD planning, 100, 103, 105, 1 11-12 

and planning to end war with Germany in 1944, 

307-08, 309 

and planning for Soviet-Allied link-up, 406, 466, 

467 

and POINTBLANK, 48-49, 48n, 104, 125 

and press and propaganda organization for SHAEF, 

86 

and psychological warfare, 85, 87 

and RANKIN planning, 104 

and release of OVERLORD information to French, 

148 

and SHAEF’s strategy for defeat of Germany, 256, 

409, 410, 413-16, 436, 436n, 441-43 

and 6th Army Group, 266 

and Soviet conference with SHAEF representatives, 

405, 406 

and strategic air forces, 32, 45, 123, 124-25, 131, 

272-73 

and Stuttgart incident, 460 

and supreme commander for OVERLORD, 23-3 1, 

32n, 105 

and surrender of German forces in Norway, 5 10 

and target date for OVERLORD, 167,170 

and unconditional surrender formula, 343 

and Vlissingen bombing proposal, 334 

Wavell appointed supreme commander of ABDA 

by, 41 

and zones of occupation, 349-5 1, 464-65 

Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), 339 

and Belgian food shortage, 333 

and civil affairs agreement with Norway, 78 

and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 77, 80 

Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC)—Cont. 

establishment of, 77-78 

and military government for Germany, 354-57 

presurrender directive on Germany, 347-48, 

354-58 

Combined Civil Affairs Committee (London), 78, 352, 

354 

Combined Commanders, British, 99, 99n, 100, 101, 

109, 196 

Combined Control Center, 127 

Combined Intelligence Committee, 245 

Combined Operations Headquarters, 98, 99 

Combined Operations Room, 127 

Combined Reconnaissance Center, 127 

Combined Signal Committee, 92 

COMET, 281 

Command 

of air forces in OVERLORD assault, 44-45, 48 

of air forces, reorganization, 26 1, 269-75 

of ANVIL/DRAGOON operations, 223, 227, 229, 

265-66 

British system, 24, 36-37, 42-43, 72, 73 

Eisenhower assumes direct control on Continent, 

26 1-65 

of French forces, 150-52, 227, 229, 318 

of French Resistance forces, 152-57, 223, 236-37, 

328 

German system, 175-80 

of ground forces on Continent, 180-83, 198, 203-04, 

229, 261-68 

of ground forces in OVERLORD assault, 43-45, 49, 

52, 109, 180, 198 

of naval forces in OVERLORD, 46-47. See also Allied 

Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary 

Force (ANCXF). 

Ninth Army returned to 12th Army Group, 439 

organization of integrated Allied, at SHAEF, 56-65 

relationship between 21 Army Group and First 

U.S. Army, 294, 295-96 

relationship between 21 Army Group and 12th 

Army Group, 203-04, 261-65, 294-96, 297-98, 

312-13, 316, 378-81, 385-86, 387-89, 395, 409, 

434, 436, 439, 443 

SHAEF assumes control of ANVIL/DRAGOON forces, 

229, 266 

shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378-81, 385-86, 388-89, 395, 409, 434, 

436, 443 

single ground force commander proposed, 385-86, 

413 

of strategic air forces, 32, 44-45, 52, 123-27, 272-74 

unified, 37, 41-42, 43n 

Command posts. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Expeditionary Force, Advance command posts. 

Communications, 322, 352 

censorship of, 147, 162-63 

facilities for OVERLORD assault, 44, 92, 5 19 

facilities for SHAEF at Bushy Park, 97 

facilities for SHAEF on Continent, 264-65, 276-78, 

523 
580 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Communications-Continued 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 372 

in MARKET-GARDEN operations, 288 

Communications Zone, Headquarters, 64, 258, 303, 

524, 532. See also Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H. 

and extension of French zone of interior, 326 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 382 

Lee commands, 74 

and manpower crisis, 392-93 

move to Paris, 322-23 

relationship with SHAEF and ETOUSA, 74, 

267-68 

and signal communications, 92 

Somervell’s inspection of supply system of, 393 

Conferences, Allied. See Cairo Conference; Casablanca 

Conference; Malta Conference; Potsdam Conference; Quebec Conference (August 1943); Quebec 

Conference (September 1944); Tehran Conference; Washington Conference; Yalta Conference. 

Conferences, SHAEF morning, 62, 63, 400, 400n 

Coningham, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur. See also 

Tactical Air Force, 2d (British). 

biographical sketch, 4 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378n 

commands Advanced Headquarters, AEAF, 126 

and D-Day decision, 170n 

and supply planning, 257n 

Conseil National de la Résistance, 143, 152 

Control Commission Military Section, British. See 

British Control Commission Military Section. 

Cooke, Rear Adm. Charles M. Jr., 1 13 

Cooper, Duff, 146, 325 

Corps, U.S. 

III, 68, 423n 

V, 99, 171-73, 171n, 215, 241, 267, 311, 371, 374n, 

382, 506n. See also Gerow, Lt. Gen. Leonard T. 

VI, 229, 401, 482 

VII, 171-73, 171n, 182, 197, 199, 364, 382. See also 

Collins, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton. 

VIII, 303, 365, 368, 369, 370-71, 370n, 374, 376, 

377 

XV, 2 1 1, 2 13. See also Haislip, Maj. Gen. Wade H 

XVIII (Airborne), 210, 271, 374, 451 

XX, 395 

Correspondence procedures at SHAEF, 63, 65, 91 

COSSAC. See Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied 

Commander (COSSAC). 

Cotentin peninsula, 171, 180, 181, 182, 184, 187, 196, 

197, 198, 205, 206, 207, 208, 261, 264 

and COCKADE, 106 

in OVERLORD planning, 106, 109, 11 1, 118, 120, 122 

Coulet, François, 234, 323 

Counterattack, definition, 359n 

Counteroffensive, definition, 359n 

Crawford, Maj. Gen. Robert W., 4-5, 73, 267-68. See 

also G–4 Division, SHAEF. 

Creasy, Rear Adm. George E., 5, 169, 170n. See also 

Allied Naval Expeditionary Force. 

Crerar, Gen. Henry D. G., 300, 30 1n. See also First 

Canadian Army. 

biographical sketch, 5 

commands First Canadian Army, 49, 58, 200 

drive to the Elbe, 450 

drive to the Rhine, 421, 422-23, 430 

and Normandy operations, 206, 208, 2 16 

CRICKET. See Malta Conference. 

CROSSBOW, 134-37, 134n, 252n 

Crossman, R. H. S., 87 

Cunningham, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B., 

28n, 29n 

on ANVIL, 109, 111n, 225 

biographical sketch, 5 

member British Chiefs of Staff Committee, 39 

member British Joint Staff Mission, 39n 

Currency, invasion 

for France, 231-33, 235, 320 

for Germany, 260n 

Czech Independent Armored Brigade Group, 503, 

506-07 

Czechoslovak Military Mission, 505 

Czechoslovakia 

Allied drive into, 441, 454, 468 

Czech brigade moved to, 506-07 

government-in-mile, 138, 139, 504, 506, 507 

and Soviet-Allied boundary, 469 

surrender of German forces in, 479, 486, 502, 

503-08 

21 Army Group liaison with units of, 138, 503 

withdrawal of Allied troops, 507-08 

D Day, 109, 166-70, 336, 519 

Danube River, 433, 436, 454, 456, 467 

Darlan, Admiral Jean François, 35, 77, 141 

Davis, Brig. Gen. Thomas J., 57, 90 

biographical sketch, 5 

heads Adjutant General’s Division, SHAEF, 9 I, 52 2 

heads Public Relations Division, SHAEF, 84, 9 1 

Deane, Maj. Gen. John R., 40611, 462, 466. See also 

Military Mission to Moscow, U.S. 

biographical sketch, 5-6 

and bomb lines, 463 

and German surrender, 476, 490, 491, 492n, 493n 

De Gaulle, Gen. Charles. See Gaulle, Gen. Charles de. 

De Guingand, Maj. Gen. Francis, 7 1, 169, 385n 

and airfields southeast of Caen, 183 

and airborne planning, 280 

biographical sketch, 6 

at commanders’ conference at Versailles, 294 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 369 

and German surrender at Reims, 486 

on Montgomery’s press conference after Ardennes 

fighting, 387-88 

negotiations with Seyss-Inquart, 458 

and OVERLORD plan, 107, 108 

and planning for Rhineland offensive, 385n 

and single ground force commander, 386-87 
INDEX 581 

De Guingand, Maj. Gen. Francis-Continued 

on supply for drive to open approaches to Antwerp, 

254 

and supply planning, 257-58 

Dempsey, Gen. Miles C., 198. See also Second British 

Army. 

biographical sketch, 6 

commands Second British Army, 49 

drive to the Elbe, 450 

and Normandy operations, 189, 190, 201, 206, 216, 

217 

and Rhine River crossings, 430 

Denmark, 154, 446, 447, 450, 468, 473 

civil affairs, 83, 139, 140, 348 

prisoners of war, 476 

and propaganda broadcasts, 161, 336 

Resistance forces, 509 

SHAEF mission to, 139, 508-09. See also SHAEF 

Mission (Denmark). 

surrender of German forces in, 476-77, 479, 480-81, 

502, 508-09, 510 

Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAEF, 60-65 

Deputy Chief of Staff (Air), SHAEF, 65, 13 1, 275. See 

also Robb, Air Marshal James M. 

Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary 

Force, 27, 57. See also Tedder, Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Arthur W. 

ground force officer proposed as, 389-91 

selection of, 60-62 

Dessloch, Generaloberst Otto, 499, 500 

Devers, Gen. Jacob L., 48, 59, 142n, 289, 314, 391, 

416, 526. See also 6th Army Group, U.S. 

biographical sketch, 6 

and civil affairs agreement with Norway, 78 

and clearing of Colmar Pocket, 369 

on command of ground forces in OVERLORD assault, 

43, 49 

commands 6th Army Group, 229, 266 

drive into Austria, 454-56 

drive to the Rhine, 3 10, 425, 426-27, 432 

and French crossing of the Rhine, 432 

and German counteroffensive in Alsace, 397, 398, 

40 1 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

376-77 

and Giraud, 146 

proposal for Red Army link-,up with forces of, 406, 

406n, 436 

and Stuttgart incident, 454, 459 

surrender of German forces to, 482-83, 500 

Dewing, Maj. Gen. Richard H., 6, 39n, 508-09 

DeWitt, Lt. Gen. John L., 199, 261n 

Dickson, Col. Benjamin A., 245, 364, 366-69, 367n, 

370, 370n 

Dill, Field Marshal Sir John 

biographical sketch, 6 

death, 39n, 415n 

Marshall's relationship with, 39 

member of CCS, 39 

Dill, Field Marshal Sir John-Continued 

and planning for cross-Channel attack, 98 

Displaced persons. See Refugees. 

Divisions, U.S. See Airborne Divisions, U.S.; Armored 

Divisions, US.; Infantry Divisions, U.S. 

Documents, SHAEF, 63,9 1, 5 15 

Documents Section, Combined Administrative Liquidating Agency. 515 

Dody, Maj. Gen. André, 382 

Doenitz, Grossadmiral Karl, 176, 527 

address to German people, 8 May 1945, 497 

arrest, 499 

biographical sketch, 7 

and disarmament of German Navy, 501 

and evacuation of German troops from Berlin area 

by water, 473 

headquarters moved to Flensburg, 479 

headquarters moved to Ploen, 471 

postsurrender government, 496-99 

succeeds Hitler, 457, 470-74, 470n, 474n 

and surrender of German forces in Czechoslovakia, 

505-06, 506n 

surrender negotiations, 478-80, 481, 482, 483, 484, 

486-87, 490 

Dollmann, Generaloberst Friedrich, 179n, 248 

Doolittle, Lt. Gen. James H., 7, 316 

DRAGOON, 224-26, 224n, 227-30, 265-66. See also 

ANVIL. 

Dunn, Brig. Gen. Beverly C., 7, 93 

Dupuy, Col. R. Ernest, 519-20, 522n, 525 

Eaker, Maj. Gen. Ira C., 48n, 99, 462-63 

Eastern Front, 99, 100, 176, 182, 202, 230, 306, 433, 

463, 472, 480, 484, 486, 490, 499, 505. See also 

Red Army. 

German casualties, 247 

German troops transferred to, 396, 419n, 471 

operations, 104, 246-47 

Soviet winter offensive, 396, 405-07, 4 1 I, 41 2, 416, 

418 

and timing of OVERLORD, 53, 111 

Eastern Task Force, 47, 17 1 

Eberbach, General der Panzertruppen Heinrich, 194, 

207, 211, 211n, 212, 215, 248 

ECLIPSE, 347, 347n, 496n 

Ecole Pratique de Commerce et d’Industrie, 419n 

Ecole Professionelle et Technique de Garçons, 4 19n, 

48 7 

Economic and Relief Guide for Germany, 348 

Edelsheim, General der Panzertruppen Maximilian 

Reichsfreiherr von, 48 1 

Eden, Anthony, 149, 464, 521 

Edwards, Maj. Gen. J. K., 334, 334n 

Eighth Air Force, U.S., 58, 97 

bombing of Caen, 189, 199n 

bombing of Dueren, Germany, 311n 

and COBRA operation, 199 

and CROSSBOW, 135, 136 
582 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Eighth Air Force, U.S.-Continued 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

384n 

and POINTBLANK, 104 

and propaganda leaflets, 161, 161n 

and railway bombing plan, 134, I34n 

and strategic bombing priorities, 308-09, 316 

and TORCH, 101 

USSTAF responsibility for, 48 

VIII Corps, U.S. See Corps, U.S. 

Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D. See also 

Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary 

Force. 

on abolition of AEAF, 274 

advance command posts, 97, 171, 173, 181, 198, 

275-78, 419-20 

on air support of ground troops. 123 

on airborne divisions for OVERLORD assault, 118, 

119-20, 121, 269 

and airborne planning, 210, 279, 281-82 

on ANVIL operation, 110-11, 112, 113, 115, 116, 

218-23, 225-26, 228 

appointed supreme commander OVERLORD, 23,3 2 

appointed U.S. representative on Allied Control 

Council, 514 

assigns main offensive east of Rhine to 12th Army 

Group, 436, 446 

assumes command of ANVIL/DRAGOON forces, 229 

assumes command of SHAEF, 49 

assumes direct command on Continent, 264-65 

and Belgian food shortage, 333 

and Belgian Resistance forces, 329 

biographical sketch, 7-8, 33-34 

and boundary for Soviet-Allied link-up, 466-69, 

504 

and British battle reports to Churchill, 37 

and British drive to Luebeck, 443, 45 I 

British influence on, 34,41, 113, 113n, 390 

broad front strategy, 249-56, 288-98, 310, 312-17, 

389, 407-14, 433, 434-36, 436n, 441-42 

at Cairo Conference, 31, 31n 

and capture of Berlin, 441-47,445n, 452 

and capture of Prague, 468-69, 503-05 

CCAC presurrender directive on Germany to, 

347-48, 353, 354, 355, 357-58 

and channels of communication with USSR, 444, 

444n, 465-66 

Churchill’s relationship with, 41, 218, 222, 225-27, 

228, 381, 387, 401, 401n, 442-44 

on civil affairs, 83-84 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378, 81, 386, 386n, 388-89, 

409, 434, 436 

commands ETOUSA, 34, 73, 74, 101,267,495 

commands US. Forces of Occupation in Germany, 

495,5 14 

commands USFET, 5 14 

and Communications Zone headquarters move to 

Paris, 322-23 

conferences with commanders, 252-53, 255, 256, 

294-95, 296, 310, 316, 376, 385, 422, 426 

Eisenhower—Continued 

conference with Marshall at Marseille, 41 3 

conferences in Washington, January 1944, 33, 107, 

144 

and D-Day decision, 166–70 

and D-Day operations, 171–73 

and defense of Strasbourg, 398-402, 400n, 40 In 

directive to, as Supreme Commander, 49-55, 468 

and dissolution of SHAEF, 349, 511-15 

and Doenitz government, 499 

and Dutch food shortage, 335,458 

and First Allied Airborne Army, 269-72, 279 

and French Provisional Government, 325 

and French rearmament, 324-25, 402, 403 

and French Resistance activities, 238 

and German counteroffensive in Alsace, 397, 

398-403 

and German counteroffensive in Ardennes, 361, 

362-63,365,365n, 369, 370n, 374-82 

German estimate of, 34 

and German surrender negotiations, 476,476n,477, 

480, 484, 485-87, 487n 

and German surrender at Reims, 489, 490, 493-94 

and invasion currency, 231-32 

and liberation of Paris, 240-43 

and manpower crisis, 391-92 

Marshall’s relationship with, 35, 41, 120, 307, 381, 

386, 390, 391, 439, 451n 

and military government for Germany, 353-58 

and Montgomery’s conduct of battle for Caen, 

184-9 1 

Montgomery’s relationship with, 198, 289-90, 

293-94, 297-98, 312-14, 3l6-17, 386-91 

and Ninth Army’s Rhine crossing, 431 

and operations in Falaise-Argentan pocket, 208-10, 

21 1 

and OVERLORD assault plan, 108, II1, 113 

and Patton episode, 164–66 

and planning for advance into Germany, 434, 

441-47, 469 

and planning to end war with Germany in 1944, 

307-09 

and planning for operations in Bay of Biscay, 2 I9 

and planning for Soviet-Atlied link-up, 454, 465-69, 

466n 

praise of Bradley and Hodges, 435 

press conference before D Day, 89-90 

and Ruhr industrial facilities, 439 

on security for OVERLORD, 163 

and selection of First U.S. Army commander, 49n 

and selection of 2 1 Army Group commander, 49 

and SHAEF strategic reserve, 53 1-32 

on SHAEF’s retention after defeat of Germany, 

349-50, 350n, 511 

and single ground force commander, 386-91 

and 6th Army Group’s activation, 265-66 

and Soviet conference with SHAEF representatives, 

405-06 

speech before Belgian Parliament, 330 

strategy memorandum of 28 February 1942, 99 

and Stuttgart incident, 459-61 
INDEX 583 

Eisenhower-Continued 

and supply organization, 267-68 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340-4 1 

on unity of command, 37, 41-42, 297-98 

visits troops, 158, 310, 315 

and Vlissingen bombing proposal, 334 

and withdrawal of Allied troops from Czechoslovakia, 507-08 

on zones of occupation, 349-50, 350n 

Elbe River, 471, 472, 479, 480, 481, 482, 501, 514 

Allied drive to, 434-36, 440, 441-54, 457, 469 

and Soviet-Allied boundary, 465, 466n, 467, 469 

and zones of occupation, 445, 463-64, 465 

Elster, Generalmajor Botho, 239 

Engineer Command, IX, 258 

Engineer Division, SHAEF, 92-93 

Erskine, Maj. Gen. George W. E. See also SHAEF 

Mission (Belgium). 

and Belgian food shortage, 332-33 

and Belgian Resistance forces, 330-32 

biographical sketch, 8 

heads SHAEF Mission (Belgium), 328 

and SHAEF Mission (Luxembourg), 333 

EUREKA. See Tehran Conference. 

European Advisory Commission, 339, 339n, 347, 351, 

353, 354 

and CCAC presurrender directive on Germany, 

34 7 

France joins, 484 

and German surrender instrument, 484-85, 490 

organization of, 78, 462 

and zones of occupation, 350-51, 462, 463-65 

European Allied Contact Section, SHAEF, 82, 139, 

147, 504, 532 

European Civil Affairs Training Center, 83 

European Theater of Operations, US. Army 

(ETOUSA), 58n, 59, 77, 80, 163, 307. See also 

US. Forces European Theater (USFET). 

and civil affairs, 347 

and Combined Commanders, 99n, 10 1 

and Combined Signal Committee, 92 

and control of troops and supplies for OVERLORD, 73

Eisenhower commands, 34, 73, 74, 101 

establishment of, 101 

and French Committee of National Liberation, 

141n 

Hartle commands, in absence of Eisenhower, 102n 

Lear appointed deputy theater commander, 392 

and manpower crisis, 392-93 

and Medical Division, SHAEF, 93 

personnel allotments to, 529, 530 

press relations, 5 2 1, 5 28 

relationship with SHAEF and Communications 

Zone, 267-68 

Smith as chief of staff of, 62, 74 

SOS consolidated with headquarters of, 74, 267 

Fahrmbacker, General der Artillerie Wilhelm, 502 

Falaise, France, 186, 187, 191, 192, 198, 200, 218, 240, 

244, 245, 250, 353 

bombing, 199n 

Falaise, France-Continued 

operations to close gap, 208-17 

Fangohr, General der Infanterie Friedrich, 497 

FFI. See French Forces of the Interior. 

Fifteenth Air Force, U.S., 48, 134n 

Fifteenth US. Army, 266, 436, 436n, 440 

Fifth U.S. Army, 68, 414n,415-16,456 

Fighter Command, British. See Royal Air Force 

Fighter Command. 

FILA. See French Forces of the Interior and Administrative Liaison (FILA). 

Financial Guide for Germany, 348 

First Allied Airborne Army, 254, 260. See also Brereton, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. 

airborne planning, 280-84, 425, 429 

MARKET-GARDEN operation, 279-80, 28 1, 288,302 

organization of, 269-72 

and Rhine River crossings, 425,429, 43 1 

First Canadian Army, 334, 429, 443, 447. See also 

Crerar, Gen. Henry D. G. 

activation of headquarters, 49n 

becomes operational, 200-201 

casualties, 192, 200, 248n, 301 

clearing of Schelde estuary, 290, 295-96, 298,300- 

301, 301n, 310, 313 

Crerar commands, 49, 58, 200-201 

drive to the Elbe, 450 

drive to the Rhine, 417, 421, 422-23 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378 

Normandy operations, 185, 197n, 199n, 200-201, 

208,209, 211, 215-16 

and Pas-de-Calais, 244, 25 1, 290 

Simonds commands in absence of Crerar, 300 

strength in Normandy, 192 

First' French Army, 304, 305, 310, 328, 447, 525. See 

also Lattre de Tassigny, Gen. Jean de. 

and ANVIL/DRAGOON, 227,229 

clearing of Colmar Pocket, 3 18,402-04 

controlled by 6th Army Group, 229, 266 

and dissolution of SHAEF, 5 14 

drive into Austria, 454-56 

drive to the Rhine, 426-27 

and French Resistance activities, 238 

and German counteroffensive in Alsace, 397 

and INDEPENDENCE operation, 3 18, 369 

operations in Alsace, 3 12 

Rhine River crossing, 425, 432-33 

and Stuttgart incident, 454-56, 459-61 

surrender of German forces to, 482-83 

First US. Army, 120. 187, 244, 245. 262, 303, 432, 

435, 447, 450, 525, 526. See also Hodges, Gen. 

Courtney H. 

activation, 49 

advanced headquarters in city of Luxembourg, 378 

assigned to 12th Army Group, 204 

attack on Schmidt, 3 1 1 

Bradley commands, 49 

capture of Aachen, 304-05 

casualties, 303, 317. 396-97, 397n 

and clearing of Schelde estuary, 300, 302 

drive to the Elbe, 452-53 
584 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

First U.S. Army-Continued 

drive to the Rhine,311-12, 313, 417, 422, 423-24, 

433 

drive on Roer dams, 317-18, 420-2 1 

envelopment of the Ruhr, 436-40 

estimate of German capabilities in the Ardennes, 

363, 364-65, 366-72, 366n, 367n, 370n 

and German counterattack at Mortain, 207 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 372- 

75, 377-85, 383n, 386n, 388, 393, 395, 397,409 

gasoline allocations to, 25 1, 258, 260 

headquarters ordered to U.S., 454, 454n 

Hodges commands, 204 

junction with Red Army, 453, 477 

Normandy operations, 181-82, 183-90, 192, 196- 

201, 205, 206, 207, 209, 211, 214, 216, 217 

and OSS detachments, 361 n 

and OVERLORD assault, 45, 109, 181 

and planning for advance into Germany, 250-53, 

254, 255n, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 298, 310, 409, 

436 

psychological warfare teams of, 336-37 

Remagen bridge capture, 423-24,423n 

strength, 182 

and 2 1 Army Group, 294, 295-96 

1st U.S. Army Group. See also 12th Army Group, U.S. 

activation, 49 

Bradley commands, 49, 26 1 n 

and civil affairs, 80, 139, 147 

DeWitt commands, 199, 261n 

McNair commands, 183, 261n 

and OVERLORD assault, 45 

and psychological warfare, 87 

renamed 12th Army Group, 183,261n 

Flensburg, Germany, 471, 479, 496,497-99 

Foertsch, General der Infanterie Hermann, 482 

Foord, Brigadier E. J., 73 

Foreign Office, British. See British Foreign Office. 

Foreign Office, French. See French Foreign Office. 

Forward Zone, French. See French Forward Zone. 

Foulkes, Lt. Gen. C., 300n, 503 

Four Party Committee, 96 

France, 99, 122, 154, 160, 275, 279, 282, 283, 288, 303, 

307,314, 335, 336, 337, 361, 431,435,519, 521. 

See also France, southern; Normandy; Northern 

France Campaign. 

and Allied Control Council, 5 12, 5 14 

censorship of French press, 523 

civil affairs, 76, 80, 83, 95-96, 138-57, 223, 231-35, 

266,3 19-28, 348-49, 350. See also French Committee of National Liberation: SHAEF Mission 

(France). 

civil affairs agreement with, 142-50, 234, 235,319- 

20, 325, 326 

command of forces of. 150-52, 227. 229 

and defense of Strasbourg, 397, 398-401,401n 

and European Advisory Commission, 484 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes. 

382 

German forces in, 176-80 

France-Continued 

German garrisons on Atlantic coast, 318,369,4361-1, 

502-03 

and German surrender at Reims, 484,487n, 493-94 

and German surrender ceremony at Berlin, 49 1-92 

invasion of. See Normandy Campaign; OVERLORD. 

liberation of Paris, 239-43 

and military government for Germany, 339, 352, 

495 

participation of French forces in liberation, 63, 110, 

150-51, 221, 227, 323-24 

and propaganda broadcasts, 16 1, 336 

and railway bombing plan, 127-28, 130-32, 134, 

309 

rearmament of forces, 102, 150-51. 152, 323-25, 

391-92, 402-03, 411, 460 

Resistance forces. See French Resistance. 

and Stuttgart incident, 459-61 

token force for occupation of Berlin, 5 14 

and zones of occupation, 351,432,457,459-61,465, 

496 

France, southern, 102, 179, 193n, 195, 196, 201, 211, 

213, 215, 244, 246, 248, 254, 283, 314, 403 

bombing targets, 128 

commander for invasion, 3 1 n 

and French Resistance, 154, 154n, 223, 237-39 

German forces in, 178, 179, 179n, 227-30 

invasion, 55, 103, 105, 227-30, 275, 324, 429. See 

also ANVIL. 

and railway bombing plan, 134n 

role of French forces in invasion, 150, 227 

SHAEF assumes control of ANVIL/DRAGOON forces 

in, 229, 266 

U.S. naval forces in, 47 

Francs Tireurs et Parttsans, 15 2 

Frank, Karl Hermann, 478, 479 

Frankfurt, Germany, 424, 426,447 

in broad front strategy, 252, 260, 290, 291, 316,410, 

412-13 

capture, 432 

military government offices in, 5 13 

SHAEF moves to, 5 13 

strength of Supreme Headquarters at, 51 3 

USFET headquarters established at, 5 14, 532 

Fraser, Col. F. E., 333-34 

French Army, 236, 327-28, 402, 411, 461, 488. See also 

Supreme Command of French Forces. 

French Army of the Rhine and the Danube, 328 

French Committee of National Liberation, 34, 36, 

149, 150. See also French Provisional Government; Gaulle, Gen. Charles de. 

and censorship of French communications, 147, 163 

and civil administration of France, 139, 141-50, 

231-35 

and civil affairs agreement, 142-45, 234, 235, 319- 

20, 325-26 

and command of French forces, 150-52 

and dissolution of French Resistance forces, 327-28 

and French forces for Italian camDaien. 150 

and French Resistance, 152, 153, 236-37 
INDEX 5 85 

French Committee of National Liberation—Cont. 

and invasion currency, 231-33,320 

and liberation of Paris, 239, 241 

and railway bombing plan, 132 

and role of French forces in invasion, 15 1 

French Council of Resistance, 143, 152 

French Forces of the Interior, 153, 229, 305, 525. See 

also French Resistance. 

activities June-August 1944, 237-39 

and defense of Strasbourg, 398 

dissolution, 327-28 

and enemy forces on southwest coast of France, 303 

Koenig commands, 236-37 

and liberation of Paris, 240-41 

French Forces of the Interior and Administrative 

Liaison (FILA), 153 

French Foreign Office, 144, 235 

French Forward Zone, 320, 326 

French Military Mission, 142, 147, 153, 232 

French Military Resistance Committee, 327 

French Ministry of the Interior, 143, 326 

French Ministry of National Defense, 398, 487n 

French Ministry of War, 326 

French National Committee, 138, 140 

French Navy, 47 

French Provisional Consultative Assembly, 145, 146, 

234. See also French Committee of National Liberation; Gaulle, Gen. Charles de. 

French Provisional Government, 325-27. See also 

France; French Committee of National Liberation. 

French Provisional Representative Assembly, 146 

French PTT system, 278 

French Resistance, 70, 72, 102, 138, 140, 142-43, 

146n, 158, 205, 233, 521, 527. See also French 

Forces of the Interior. 

activities June-August 1944, 237-39 

and aircraft allocations, 155-56 

and ANVIL operation, 220, 223 

command reorganization, 23 1, 236-37 

dissolution of forces, 327-28 

and liberation of Paris, 240-41 

SHAEF co-ordination of activities of, 152-57, 223 

French units 

Army, B, 227, 229. See also First French Army. 

Army, First. See First French Army. 

Battalion, 4th Parachute, 238 

Corps, I, 229,3 12 

Corps, 11, 227, 229,312 

Division, 2d Armored, 239, 241-42, 304, 3 11 

Division, 9th Colonial Infantry, 150 

French Zone of Interior, 320,326-27,382,523 

Friedeburg, Generaladmiral Hans Georg von, 479, 

480-81 

biographical sketch, 8 

and disarmament of German Navy, 496,500 

suicide, 499 

and surrender at Reims, 483-84, 486-87 

and surrender ceremony at Berlin, 49 1,492 

Frisius, Viceadmiral Friedrich, 503 

Front de l’lndépendence, 330, 332 

Front National, 152 

Future Operational Planning Section, GHQ (British), 

98 

G–1 Division, SHAEF, 64, 70, 340, 528. See also 

Barker, Maj. Gen. Ray W. 

and Handbook for Unit Commanders (Germany), 

353 

and manpower crisis, 392 

organization and functions, 73-74 

personnel, 529 

G–2 Division, SHAEF, 68, 70, 73, 244, 275, 306,425n, 

427-29, 447-48, 529. See also Strong, Maj. Gen. 

Kenneth W. D. 

estimate of German strength, 282-83 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 363- 

64, 365,366n, 375, 376n, 378 

organization and functions, 7 1-73 

and railway bombing plan, 13 1 

on Ruhr's importance to Germany, 309, 435 

and Soviet winter offensive, 434 

and strategic bombing priorities, 309 

G–2 Division, War Department, 73, 85 

G–3 Division, SHAEF, 62, 73, 210, 253n, 275, 279, 

369,447, 531. See also Bull, Maj. Gen. Harold R. 

and channels of communication with USSR, 444n 

and disarmament of German forces, 497 

and extension of French zone of interior, 326 

and French Resistance activities, 153 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

374n, 378 

and military government for Germany, 347,352 

organization and functions, 68-7 1 

and railway bombing plan, 13 1 

Rooks assigned to, 390 

G–3 Division, War Department, 68 

G–4 Division, COSSAC, 73 

G–4 Division, SHAEF, 64, 70, 92 , 321n. See alsoCrawford, Maj. Gen. Robert W. 

organization and functions, 73-74 

relationship with ETOUSA and Communications 

Zone, 267-68 

G–5 Division, SHAEF, 64, 324. See also Grasett, Lt. 

Gen. Sir A. E. 

and military government for Germany, 347, 353, 

356 

organization and functions, 75, 81-83 

G–5 Section, SHAEF Mission (France), 321n 

G–6 Division, SHAEF, 84-86, 87, 530 

Gale, Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey M., 8, 64, 169, 170n, 255, 

515 

Galloway, Maj. Gen. A., 458 

Galloway, Brigadier R. W., 93 

GARDEN, 279, 281, 282, 283, 284-88 

Garson, Brigadier H. L., 93 

Gasoline, 210, 273, 292, 293n 

Allied shortage, 251, 254, 258, 268, 304, 322 

factor in halt short of Rhine, 256. 258 

German shortage, 364, 364n, 372,418 
586 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Gaulle, Gen. Charles de, 34, 152, 233, 234, 241, 242, 

349. See also French Committee of National Liberation; French Provisional Government. 

and aircraft for Resistance activities, 156 

and censorship of French communications, 147 

and civil administration of France, 143-46, 23 1-35 

and clearing of Colmar Pocket, 402-03 

and conference on use of French units, 15 1 

and defense of Strasbourg, 400-401,400n, 401n 

and dissolution of French Resistance forces, 327-2 8 

establishes French Provisional Government, 325 

and First French Army's Rhine crossing, 432 

and French Committee of National Liberation, 141, 

142 

French National Committee organized by, 138, 140 

and French rearmament, 402, 403 

and French zone of occupation, 432 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 382 

and German surrender, 487n, 491 

and invasion currency, 232-33 

invitation to London, 148-49, 232 

invitation to Washington, 232-33, 235, 319, 324 

and liberation of Paris, 239, 240-43, 242n 

message to French on D Day, 149-50 

and military government for Germany, 352 

and movement of personnel from Algiers to Paris, 

32 1 

and OVERLORD information, 148-49 

and replacements for First French Army, 3 18 

and SHAEF Mission (France), 32 1 

and Stuttgart incident, 459-61 

Generalstab des Heeres (Gen.St.d.H.), 176,472, 499, 51 4 

Gerard, Maj. Gen. Yvan Gerard, 329 

Gerbrandy, P. S., 334,335 

German Air Force. See Luftwaffe; Oberkommando der 

Luftwaffe (OKL). 

German Armed Forces High Command. See Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). 

German Armed Forces Operations Staff. See Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (WFSt) 

German Army, 53, 58, 87, 88, 99, 245, 247, 254, 307, 

344,345,353,442,445,44511,447,448,478,521, 

See also German units; Oberkommando des Heeres 

(OKH). 

casualties, 194-95, 247, 303, 312, 396-97 

command organization, 175-80 

counteroffensive in Hungary, 4 18 

defense against invasion of Continent, 176-80 

disarmament, 496, 497-500, 530 

policy on operations at end of war, 472 

strength in west, 248, 282-83, 411, 427-29 

troop transfers, 396,405, 419n, 47 1 

German Army General Staff. See Generalstab des Heeres 

(Gen.St.d.H.). 

German Army General Staff, Operations Group, 472 

German Minesweeping Administration, 50 1 

German Ministry of Propaganda, 249 

German Navy, 175-76, 496, 500-501. See also Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM). 

German Replacement Army, 203, 246, 303 

German units 

Armed Forces Commander Denmark, 472n, 476, 508 

Armed Forces Commander Netherlanh, 177, 179n, 360n 

Armed Forces Commander Norway, 472n, 5 10 

Army, First, 177, 179n, 208, 211, 211n, 228, 230, 

230n, 397, 425, 433,482 

Army, First Parachute, 284, 286n, 360n, 419, 419n, 

429,438 

Army, Third Panzer, 480 

Army, Fourth Panzer, 230 

Army, Fifth Panzer, 207n, 210, 21 1, 211n, 212, 

213-15, 230, 230n, 304, 361, 363, 364, 372, 375, 

382, 384,438. See also Panzer Group West. 

Army, Sixth Panzer, 359, 359n, 361, 363, 364, 366, 

367n, 368, 372, 375, 378, 382, 384, 395, 396 

Army, Sixth SS Panzer, 359n. See also Army, Sixth 

Panzer. 

Army, Seventh, 177, 179, 179n, 194n, 195, 195n, 206, 

207, 207n, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 363, 372, 

375, 382, 384, 425, 425q 426, 429, 433 

Army, Ninth, 472-73, 481-82 

Army, Twelfth, 452,471,472-73,472n, 480,481 

Army, Fifteenth, 177, 179n, 180, 182, 193-94, 286, 

299,360,372,375,384,423,438 

Army, Nineteenth, 177, 17911, 215, 228, 230, 397, 

397n,425,433,472,482 

Army, Twentieth Mountain, 5 10 

Army, Twenty-first, 480 

Army, Twenty-fourth, 483 

Army, Twenty-fifth, 429, 503 

Army Ostpreussen, 472n 

Army Group B, 177, 179, 194, 194n, 207, 211n, 213, 

213n, 230n, 245-46, 248, 286, 286n,360, 360n, 

363, 369, 372, 384, 19, 425n, 429, 438, 439, 440 

Army Group D, 177. See also Oberbefehlshaber West 

(OB WEST). 

Army Group E, 482 

Army Group G, 178, 179, 21 In, 228, 229,230, 230n, 

246, 304, 360, 363, 372, 375, 384, 395, 397, 397n, 

419, 419n, 425, 425n, 426, 427, 429, 433, 438, 

472, 482 

Army Group H, 360, 360n, 372, 375, 384,419,419n, 

42 1,429,438,47211. See also Oberbefehlshaber Nordwest (OB NORD WEST). 

Army Group Center, 472, 473, 474, 482, 483 

Army Group Kurland, 472n 

Army Group Mueller, 480 

Army Group Oberrhezn, 360, 372, 396, 397, 397n, 

419n. See also Army Group Wezchsel. 

Army Group Ostmark, 483. See also Army Group South. 

Army Group South, 472,473,482, 483 

Army Group for Special Employment, 17 7. See also Army 

Group B 

Army Group Student, 360n. See also Army Group H. 

Army Group Weichsel, 396, 419n, 472n, 473. See also 

Army Group Oberrhein. 

Brigade, 150th Panzer, 367n 

Corps, II Parachute, 284 

Corps, II SS Panzer, 206, 284, 288 

Corps, XLVII Panzer, 207 
INDEX 587 

German units-Continued 

Corps, LXIV, 228 

Division, 2d Punter, 182n, 368 

Division, 3d Punter Grenadier, 366 

Division, 3d Parachute, 366 

Division, 9th SS Punter, 182, 283 

Division. 10th SS Punter, 182, 283 

Division, 116th Panzer, 366, 368 

Division, 159th, 229 

Division, 212th Volks Grenadier, 370 

Division, 265th, 182n 

Division, 275th, 182n 

Division, 319th, 179n 

Division, 326th, 3 74 

Division, 338th, 228 

Division, 352d, 17 1 

Division, Punter Grossdeutschland, 367 

Division, Punter Lehr, 367 

Group Elster, 229 

Punter Group Eberbach, 211n. See also Army, Fifth 

Paneer; Panzer Group West. 

Punter Group West, 179, 194, 194n, 195, 207, 207n. 

See also Army, Fifth Panzer. 

Germany, 144, 154, 202, 217,218, 221, 228, 229, 244, 

253n, 258, 259, 260, 261, 282, 283, 288, 303, 321, 

329, 330, 359, 361, 362, 364, 367, 368, 372, 393, 

395, 430, 433, 448, 458, 459, 497, 532 

Allied Control Council established in Berlin, 512, 

514 

Allied strategy for defeating, 50-52, 99, 468 

bombing targets in, 128, 130 

CCAC presurrender directive on, 347-48, 353, 355, 

357 

disarmament of forces, 497-501 

Doenitz government, 457, 469-74,470n, 499 

and Dutch food shortage, 335 

estimate of situation of, 104-05, 244-45,306, 425n, 

427-29,447-48 

junction of Soviet and Western Allied forces in, 

453,469 

military government for, 83,96, 260, 339, 345,346- 

58, 459, 495-96, 498, 511-15 

Morgenthau plan, 341n, 342 

occupation, 5 11 

occupation currency, 260n 

planning for advance into, 249-56, 258-59, 281, 

288-98, 312-17, 389, 405, 406, 407-14, 434-36, 

441-47,469 

planning for ending war with, in 1944, 307-09 

prediction of date for reaching border, 257 

psychological warfare against, 339-46 

SHAEF interim directive for military government, 

355-56 

surrender, 257, 326, 334n, 339, 407, 474n,475-90, 

495,502-08, 5 1 1,5 14 

surrender ceremony at Berlin, 490-94 

terrain, 447 

and unconditional surrender formula, 339-43, 344, 

357.457 

war crimes, 341, 342 

Germany -Continued 

zones of occupation, 139, 348-51, 432, 445, 445n, 

459-61, 462, 464-65, 496 

Gerow, Lt. Gen. Leonard T., 9, 34, 241, 242, 266, 

395, 436n. See also Corps, U.S., V; Fifteenth 

U.S. Army. 

Geyr von Schweppenburg, General der Panzertruppen Leo Freiherr, 179, 194 

Gilmer, Col. Dan, 62, 63n 

Giraud, Gen. Henri Honoré, 35, 140-43, 146, 150, 

151, 152 

Glider forces, Allied, 118, 119, 120-21, 269 

Goering, Reichsmarschall Hermann, 9, 175-76, 470- 

72, 472n, 483. See also Luftwaffe. 

GOLD Beach, 17 1 

GOODWOOD, 187, 188n, 197n 

Grasett, Lt. Gen. Sir A.E. See also G–5 Division, 

SHAEF. 

biographical sketch, 9 

on civil affairs administration, 82-83 

and civil affairs agreement for France, 147 

and liaison missions of governments-in-exile, 139 

and rearmament of French forces, 324 

and SHAEF missions, 139 

Great Britain, 344, 431, 459, 471n, 515, 520. See also 

Churchill, Winston S. 

and Allied Control Council, 512, 514. See also 

British Control Commission Military Section. 

and Balkan area, 414n 

civil affairs agreement with France, 3 19 

and Doenitz government of Germany, 498 

and French Committee of National Liberation, 141, 

143-50, 231-34 

and French rearmament, 323 

and German surrender negotiations, 476-77, 480. 

482,484 

and governments-in-exile. 138-39. 334, 463, 506. 

507 

liaison with Soviet Union, 461 

and manpower crisis in Europe, 38 1, 39 1 

and military government for Germany, 339, 346. 

348, 352, 495 

recognizes French Provisional Government. 325 

and unconditional surrender formula. 340 

and V-E Day, 494 

and zones of occupation, 349-51,463-65,466,496 

Grebbe Line, 451+503 

GREIF, 360 

Greim, Generalfeldmarschall Robert Ritter von, 47 2 

GRENADE, 4 17 

Grigg, Sir James, 232 

Groupe de l’Armée, 152 

Gubbins, Maj. Gen. Colin, 152 

Guderian. Generaloberst Heinz, 9, 176 

Guided missiles, 134-37 

Guingand, Maj. Gen. Francis de. See De Guingand, 

Maj. Gen. Francis. 

H Hour, 169 
588 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Haislip, Maj. Gen. Wade H., 213, 482. See also Corps, 

U.S.. xv. 

Halder, Generaloberst Franz, 176 

Hall, Rear Adm. John L., 173 

Hamburg, Germany, 434, 450, 473 

capture, 45 1 

command of German naval forces in, 50 1 

and German surrender negotiations, 478, 480 

Handbook, Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in Northwest 

Europe, 81, 82-83, 82n 

Handbook for Military Government in Germany. 

347, 353, 354-56 

Handbook for Unit Commanders (Germany), 353, 

354-55 

HANDS UP, 197n 

Harper, Maj. Gen. Robert W., 500 

Harriman, Averell, 29n, 405, 406 

Harris, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur T., 

274. See also Royal Air Force Bomber Command. 

biographical sketch, 9 

and bombing of Caen. 185 

commands RAF Bomber Command. 124 

on defeat of Germany by airpower, 127n 

member British Joint Staff Mission, 39n 

and railway bombing plan, 127, 130 

Haskell, Col. Joseph F., 153, 155, 237 

Hausser, Generaloberst der Waffen SS Paul, 207, 

207n, 215, 248 

biographical sketch. 10 

commands Army Group B, 2 12 

commands Army Group G, 419n 

and German withdrawal east of the Rhine, 425 

Headquarters Command, SHAEF, 529,53 1, 532,53 3 

Headquarters Command, USFET, 532 

Headquarters Commandant, SHAEF. See Brown, 

Brig. Gen. Robert Q. 

Heine, Generalmajor Siegfried, 503 

Heinrici. Generaloberst Gotthard, 473 

Hesse, Dr. F., 475 

Hilldring, Maj. Gen. John H., 142n. See also Civil 

Affairs Division, War Department. 

on civil affairs administration, 78 

and military government for Germany, 353.357 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340, 342 

Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich, 194, 419n, 429, 

47 1 

biographical sketch, 10 

commands Army Group Oberrhein, 360n 

commands Army Group Wezchsel, 396 

negotiations for surrender, 473, 473n, 476-77 

Hitler, Adolf, 75, 114, 247, 259, 302, 305, 407, 429, 

448,475,476,477,514 

and Allied drive into southern Germany, 433 

and Allied encirclement of the Ruhr, 438 

attempt on life, 194, 201, 345 

conference with military advisers, 201 -03 

and counterattack at Mortain, 207-08 

and counteroffensive in Alsace, 397,403-04 

Hitler, Adolf—Continued 

and counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 346, 359-60, 

363, 375, 376n, 384, 395, 396 

and defense of Berlin, 47 1-74 

and defense of West Wall, 246-47, 248 

demands Goering’s resignation, 472 

estimate of Allied intentions, 180, 182, 193-94 

expels Goering and Himmler from Nazi party, 47 3 

and formation of new divisions, 302-03 

and German command organization, 175-76, 178 

and German withdrawal east of the Rhine, 42 1 

and operations in Normandy, 201, 208, 210- 13, 215 

and operations in southwestern France, 304 

replaces Army Group G commander, 304 

suicide, 457, 469, 474,474n 

and 319th Division, 179n 

and transfer of government to Doenitz, 469-74, 

470n 

von Kluge removed as Commander in Chief West 

by, 212-13 

Hodges, Gen. Courtney H., 165, 294, 525. See also 

First U.S. Army. 

biographical sketch, 10 

and capture of Aachen, 305 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 380, 395 

commands First U.S. Army, 204 

drive to the Elbe, 453 

drive to the Rhine, 310, 41 7,423-24 

drive to the Roer, 3 17 

Eisenhower’s praise of, 435 

and envelopment of the Ruhr, 437,440 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 367, 

370n, 371, 372, 377, 381, 383, 385 

and Normandy operations, 206, 209, 2 1 1,2 15 

ordered to the Pacific, 454 

and planning for advance into Germany, 253, 255 

and Remagen bridge capture, 424 

Hoge, Brig. Gen. William M., 424 

Holmes, Brig. Gen. Julius C., 57, 82n, 3 19n 

and civil affairs agreement with France, 145 

Deputy Chief, G–5 Division, SHAEF, 81-82 

and handbook on civil affairs, 82 

Home Office, British. See British Home Office. 

Hopkins, Harry L., 31n, 36,464 

and ANVIL planning, 224 

and BOLERO plan, 100, 101 

on strengthening OVERLORD assault, 108 

and supreme commander for OVERLORD, 24,28, 29, 

31-32 

Howell, Brig. Gen. George P., 334, 334n 

Huertgen Forest, 244,3 11, 3 17 

Hughes, Maj. Gen. H. B. W., 10,93 

Hull, Cordell. See also State Department. 

and civil affairs agreements, 79, 142, 146-48 

and defense of Strasbourg, 40 1 

and French Committee of National Liberation, 141, 

146-48 

and Morgenthau plan for Germany, 342 
INDEX 589 

Hull, Cordell-Continued 

and political officer for SHAEF, 95 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340, 34 1 

Hungary, 202, 220, 405, 508 

German counteroffensive in, 418 

Soviet offensive in, 427 

HUSKY, 103. See also Sicily. 

I. G. Farbenindustrie Building, 51 3, 5 14, 515 

Imperial Defence Committee, British. See British Imperial Defence Committee. 

Imperial General Staff, Chief of. See Brooke, Field 

Marshal Sir Alan. 

INDEPENDENCE, 318369 

Infantry divisions, German, 179. 182, 194-95, 246, 

248, 303. See also German units. 

Infantry Divisions, U.S. 

lst, 387 

4th, 241 

9th, 387 

26th, 284 

28th, 242 

30th, 207 

66th, 502 

94th, 303 

95th, 284 

99th, 374n 

104th, 284 

106th, 526 

Infantry Replacements. See Replacements, Infantry. 

Initial Joint Plan. See NEPTUNE, Initial Joint Plan. 

Intelligence, Allied, 17 1 

estimate on French Resistance, 156 

estimate of German strength in west, 282-83, 306 

estimate of importance of Ruhr to Germany, 309, 

434-35 

estimate of probable collapse of Germany, 104-05, 

244-45, 427-29, 447-48 

estimate on railway bombing plan, 130 

and German counteroffensive in Alsace, 397 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

361-72 

and German records, 500, 501 

and Soviet winter offensive, 434 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340 

and withdrawal of German forces east of the Rhine, 

425, 425n 

Intelligence, German 

and Allied drive to the Rhine, 429 

and Allied offensive in the Ardennes, 393n 

estimate of Allied forces in United Kingdom, 180, 

180n 

estimate of Allied strength on Continent, 248 

estimate of Eisenhower, 34 

estimate of Tedder, 61 

and OVERLORD plan, 164 

Intelligence Division, SHAEF. See G–2 Division, 

SHAEF. 

Interim Directive for Military Government of Germany, 356 

Internal security troops, 324-25 

International Red Cross, 334 

Inter-Services Security Board, 162 

Ismay, Gen. Sir Hastings L., 24n, 28n, 37, 39, 42n, 

85n 

Italy, 34,49, 58, 61, 102, 202, 231, 314, 323, 392, 403, 

411, 414n, 429, 435, 441, 451, 454, 472 

bombingofrailways in, 127, 128 

campaign in, 32, 101, 104, 111-17, 164, 218-19, 

220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 306, 406n, 415, 416 

civil affairs administration, 75, 76, 80-81 

junction of Seventh and Fifth Army units in, 456 

9th Colonial Infantry Division ordered to, 150 

occupation, 349, 350 

proposal to transfer Allied troops to Balkans from, 

406, 406n 

surrender of German forces in, 473, 475,476n,477- 

78, 482 

transfer of Allied units to northwest Europe from, 

415-16 

unconditional surrender, 104, 485 

Jackson, C. D., 87 

Japan, 101,445,494,501,507 

Jaujard, Rear Adm. Robert, 47 

Jedburgh, team, 155 

Jet aircraft, 315,427,433 

Jodl, Generaloberst Alfred, 176 

arrest, 499-500 

biographical sketch, 11 

and defense of Berlin, 47 1-72 

and disarmament of German forces, 496-97 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

359-60,375n 

and German surrender at Reims, 486-89,502 

and Normandy operations, 194, 201-03, 210, 213 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24n, 33, 35, 37, 233, 289, 292, 

468. See also Arnold, General of the Army Henry 

H.; King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J.; Leahy, Fleet 

Admiral William D.; Marshall, General of the 

Army George C. 

and ANVIL planning, 111–17, 1 13n, 2 18-23, 224, 

226 

and Balkan operations, 414-I5 

and BOLERO plan, 100-101, 102 

and British battle reports to Churchill, 37 

and British drive to Luebeck, 45 1 

on capture of Berlin, 441-45 

and CCS meetings, 39-41, 39n 

and channels of communication with USSR, 444 

and civil affairs administration, 75, 76, 77, 78-79 

and command organization for OVERLORD, 43-45 

and commander, AEAF, 48 

directive to McNarney in Mediterranean, 42n 

and directive to Supreme Commander, 49-53 

and dissolution of SHAEF, 514 

and Dutch food shortage, 457 
590 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Joint Chiefs of Staff-Continued 

and French Resistance, 153 

and German surrender negotiations, 477 

on invasion currency, 233 

and London Coordinating Committee for Political 

Warfare, 85 

at Malta Conference, 4 13 

and manpower crisis in Europe, 392 

membership, 39, 39n 

and military government for Germany, 357-58 

and military victory, 468 

and OVERLORD planning, 99, 100, 102, 11 1, 113 

and planning to end war with Germany in 1944, 

308 

and press and propaganda organization for SHAEF, 

86 

and recognition of French Provisional Government, 

325 

and Roosevelt's policies, 36-37 

and SHAEF strategy for defeat of Germany, 409, 

413-14 

and strategic air forces, 32n,44-45, 48, 124-25 

and supreme commander for OVERLORD, 25, 29-30 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340,457 

and U.S. attack on Soviet column, 462 

U.S. Group Control Council established by, 35 1 

USSTAF in Europe established by, 48 

withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia, 507-08 

Joint Intelligence Committee (London), 72, 72n 

Joint Intelligence Committee (SHAEF), 72, 95 

Joint Intelligence Sub-committee, War Cabinet, 104, 

130. 156 

Joint Planning Staff, British. See British Joint Planning 

Staff. 

Joint Press Censorship Group, 90 

Joint Rearmament Commission, 324. See also Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission (France). 

Joint Staff Planners, U.S., 99,414n 

Jones, Brigadier S. O., 333 

Juin, Gen. Alphonse-Pierre, 63, 487n 

biographical sketch, 11 

and clearing of Colmar Pocket, 402-03 

and defense of Strasbourg, 398-401 

and French zone of interior, 326 

Jullouville, France, 264-65, 276 

Junck, Generalleutnant Hans, 502 

JUNO Beach, 17 1 

Kanalkueste, 179n, 180, 183 

Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm, 175. See also 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). 

arrest, 497 

biographical sketch, 11 

and control of army units in north, 472-73,472n 

and defense of Berlin, 47 1-72, 473 

on German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 360 

and German surrender, 481,483,486-87,491,492- 

93,502 

Kennedy, Edward, 527-28, 528n 

Kenner, Maj. Gen. Albert W., 11,93 

Kesselring, Generalfeldmarschall Albert, 2 12,4 15 

arrest, 499 

biographical sketch, 11 

defense of Rhine River line, 429 

named commander in south, 470,470n, 472,478n, 

483 

orders release of Goering, 472n 

replaces Rundstedt as Commander in Chief West, 

429 

surrender of German forces, 478,479,482-83 

King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J., 27n, 28n, 39n,415n. See 

also Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

biographical sketch, 12 

and BOLERO plan, 10 1 

member CCS, 39 

and naval planning for OVERLORD, 46

and Pacific alternative, 10 1 

and Ruhr industrial facilities, 439 

on supreme commander for OVERLORD, 29 

and zones of occupation, 35 1 

Kinzel, Generalleutnant Eberhardt, 479 

Kirk, Vice Adm. Alan G., 

biographical sketch, 12 

commands U.S. naval elements on Continent, 275 

commands U.S. naval forces in OVERLORD, 47 

and D Day, 169, 173 

and SHAEF Mission (France), 321n 

Kluge, Generalfeldmarschall Guenther von, 

appointed Commander in Chief West, 194 

biographical sketch, 12 

and counterattack at Mortain, 206-08, 207n 

death, 2 13,2 13n,248 

and operations in Normandy, 194, 201-03,206-08, 

210-13 

Knox, Frank, 29n, 36 

Koblenz, Germany, 252, 253,254,366,423,425 

capture, 426 

and zones of occupation, 35 1 

Koch, Col. Oscar, 206, 245 

Koeltz, Lt. Gen. Louis, 321 

Koenig, Gen. Pierre Joseph, 63, 163, 234, 521 

biographical sketch, 12 

on bombing targets in France, 132 

and civil affairs agreement with France, 146-48, 

235,319,319n 

commands French Forces of the Interior, 236-37 

commands French occupation forces, 5 14 

and French Resistance, 153, 156, 327, 328 

and invasion currency, 235 

and liberation of Paris, 240-4 1, 242 

military governor of Paris, 240-4 1 

and movement of Communications Zone headquarters to Paris, 322 

and OVERLORD information, 148 

and SHAEF Mission (France), 321 

Koller, General der Flieger Karl, 470-72, 47 In 

Konev, Marshal Ivan S., 418 

Kramer, Maj. Gen. Herman F., 502 

Krancke, Admiral Theodor, 177 
INDEX 591 

Krebs, General der Infanterie Hans, 13, 1 76 

Krosigk, Graf Schwerin von, 474n, 527n 

Lanahan, Maj. Gen. Francis H., Jr., 13, 92 

Landingcraft, 120, 122, 167, 301 

for ANVIL, 223 

in ANVIL-OVERLORD debate, 109-1 7,218 

British program for production, 98 

diversion from Pacific to Mediterranean, 1 16-1 7 

and Rhine River crossings, 429 

Lattre de Tassigny, Gen. Jean de. See also First French 

Army. 

biographical sketch, 13 

and clearing of Colmar Pocket, 305, 3 12, 3 18, 397, 

402,404 

commands First French Army, 227, 229 

and defense of Strasbourg, 400 

and dissolution of French Resistance-forces, 328 

drive into Austria, 456 

drive to the Rhine, 426-27 

and German surrender ceremony at Berlin, 491-92, 

492n, 493n 

and German surrender at Reims, 487n 

and Rhine River crossings, 432-33 

surrender of German forces to, 482-83 

and Stuttgart incident, 459-60 

LCT's, 1 1 1, 116. See also Landing craft. 

Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D., 27n, 28n, 30, 36, 

114. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

biographical sketch, 13 

on capture of Berlin, 446 

on drive into Czechoslovakia, 468-69 

and German surrender at Reims, 494n 

member CCS, 39 

and Ruhr industrial facilities, 439 

and zones of occupation, 35 1 

Lear, Lt. Gen. Ben, 392 

Leclerc, Brig. Gen. Jacques-Philippe, 239, 24 1-42 

Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H. See also Communications 

Zone, Headquarters. 

commands Communications Zone, 74 

commands Services of Supply in ETO, 74, 267 

as deputy theater commander, ETOUSA, 74, 267 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 382 

and manpower crisis, 392-93 

moves Communications Zone headquarters to 

Paris, 322-23 

and supply controversy, 267-68 

Leeb, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von, 483 

Leigh-Mallory, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford, 45n, 

50, 99n, 114, 160, 197. See also Allied Expeditionary Air Force. 

Advanced Headquarters, AEAF, established by, 

126-27 

and air attacks in Normandy, 188, 199n 

and Air Defence of Great Britain, 48n 

on airborne divisions for OVERLORD assault, 118, 

120-21 

on aircraft for Resistance activities, 155 

Leigh-Mallory—Continued 

and ANVIL-OVERLORD planning, 109 

assigned to southeastern Asia air command. 274 

biographical sketch, 13-14 

commands AEAF, 48,73, 123-24, 127 

and CROSSBOW, 136 

and D Day, 166, 169-70 

death, 275n 

and First Allied Airborne Army, 27 1 

and Initial Joint Plan, 12 1 

and railway bombing plan, 127, 128, 131, 132 

Leipzig, Germany 

capture, 452 

as military objective, 413, 434, 436, 441, 444, 446 

Lend-lease, 99, 162, 247,247n,460,462 

Lewis, Maj. Gen. John T. See also SHAEF Mission 

(France). 

biographical sketch, 14 

and French Resistance forces, 328 

heads SHAEF Mission (France), 320 

Liége, Belgium, 250, 303, 346, 372, 376, 377, 382,419 

Lindemann, Generaloberst Georg, 476, 508, 509 

Lines of communications, troops for, 324, 392, 532 

LINNET I, 280 

LINNET II, 280 

Liska, Maj. Gen. A,, 503 

List, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm, 483 

Little, Admiral Sir Charles, 

and Combined Commanders, 99n 

member British Joint Staff Mission, 39n 

and naval planning for OVERLORD, 46 

Lockhart, Sir Robert Bruce, 85n, 131, 149 

Lodgment on Continent, 171-91 

Loehr, Generaloberst Alexander, 483, 483n, 499 

Logistics. See Supply. 

London Coordinating Committee for Political Warfare, 85, 85n, 131, 132 

London Emergency Propaganda Committee. See 

London Coordinating Committee for Political 

Warfare. 

London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee. 

See London Coordinating Committee for Political 

Warfare. 

London Propaganda Coordinating Committee. See 

London Coordinating Committee for Political 

Warfare. 

Loomis, Brig. Gen. Harold F., 321n, 324 

Lorraine campaign, 244, 250-51, 254-55, 258-59, 

284, 303-04 

LST's, 111, 115, 116, 117, 166. See also Landingcraft. 

LUCKY STRIKE, 196n, 197n 

Luebeck, Germany, 443, 446, 447, 470 

capture, 45 1 

Second British Army drive to, 451, 468, 478 

surrender negotiations at, 477 

Lueneburg Heath, 48 1,503, 508 

Luftwaffe, 87, 99, 126, 129, 130, 137, 175, 273, 315, 

396n, 424, 427, 431,448, 524. See also Luftwaffe 

units; Oberkommando der Lufttwaffe (OKL). 

and command in southern Germany, 470 
592 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Luftwaffe—Continued 

disarmament, 496,500 

Goering replaced by von Greim as head, 472 

Luftwaffe units 

Air Force, Third, 177 

Air Force, Sixth, 500 

Air Force Reich, 472,483 

Lumley, Maj. Gen. Sir Roger, 80, 81, 82 

Luxembourg, 154, 337, 363,389 

Allied pursuit through, 244, 250 

civil affairs, 83 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 385 

government-in-exile established, 138 

SHAEF mission to, 139, 333-34 

Luxembourg, city of, 378, 419, 523, 524. See also Radio 

Luxembourg. 

Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment, 333 

Maastricht, Netherlands, 259, 305 

and airborne planning, 280 

commanders’ conference at, 3 16 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 37 2 

McClure, Brig. Gen. Robert A,, 57, 86, 87. See also 

Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF 

on abolition of G–6 Division, SHAEF, 86 

biographical sketch, 14 

and de Gaulle’s message to French on D Day, 14 9 

heads G–6 Division, SHAEF, 84, 86 

heads Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, 84 

and press censorship, 89-90, 52 1 

and propaganda for Germany, 340, 341, 342-43, 

344-45 

and psychological warfare organization in army 

groups, 87 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340, 341, 

342-43 

McCroskey, Brig. Gen. Samuel L., 95 

McLaren, Maj. Martin, 62,98n 

McLean, Brigadier Kenneth G., 14, 68, 109n 

MacMillan, Harold, 15 1 

McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J., 102, 183, 199, 261n 

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 42n,415n, 522 

McSherry, Brig. Gen. Frank J., 81-82 

Malta Conference, 

and Balkan operations proposal, 4 14- 16 

and SHAEF strategy for defeat of Germany, 413- 

14,436n,443 

and zones of occupation, 464 

Manpower shortage, 391-97, 530, 531. See also Replacements, infantry. 

Manteuffel, General der Panzertruppen Hasso von, 

304 

Maquis, 152, 315 

MARKET-GARDEN operation, 279, 28 1-88, 287n,303. 

See also Arnhem, Netherlands. 

Marseille, France, 239, 256, 3 14 

in ANVIL planning, 2 19-23 

capture, 227-28 

Marshall’s conference with Eisenhower at, 413, 

413n 

Marshall, General of the Army George C., 110, 115, 

121, 143, 151, 156, 209, 234, 251, 274, 310, 315, 

375, 380, 401n, 433. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

War Department. 

on airborne operations, 1 19-20, 269-7 1, 279 

ANVIL, 112-13, 116,220 

biographical sketch, 14 

and BOLERO plan, 100-101 

and bomb lines, 463 

and command in OVERLORD assault, 44-45 

conference with Eisenhower at Marseille, 4 13 

and de Gaulle, 234 

Dill’s relationship with, 39 

and directive to Supreme Commander, 52 

on drive into Czechoslovakia, 468 

on drive into southern Germany, 435 

Eisenhower’s relationship with, 35, 41, 307, 381, 

386, 390, 391, 439, 451n 

on Eisenhower’s taking direct command on Continent, 264 

and 1st Army Group commander, 49n 

and French rearmament, 324 

and German surrender negotiations, 477 

and HUSKY operation, 102-03 

and manpower crisis in Europe, 392-93 

member CCS, 39 

Morgan invited to Washington by, 28 

on organization of SHAEF, 59, 86 

and Pacific alternative, 101 

and Patton episode, 165 

and planning to end war with Germany in 1944, 

307-09,308n 

policy on military operations, 468 

on port of Antwerp, 297 

on press coverage of Bradley and Hodges, 435 

and proposal for link-up with Red Army in Austria, 

406n 

and Ruhr industrial facilities, 439 

and SHAEF strategy for defeat of Germany, 409, 

413-14 

on single ground force commander, 386, 390,4 13 

and Somervell’s inspection of supply system in Europe, 393 

and Soviet conference with SHAEF representatives, 

406n, 407n 

and strategic air forces in Europe, 29 

and strategy in Europe, 99-101, 102-03, 112-13, 

29 2 

on strengthening OVERLORD assault, 108 

and supreme commander for OVERLORD, 24-33, 

32n, 44n 

and TORCH operation, 100- 10 1 

on unity of command, 41, 44-45, 86 

on use of 82d Airborne Division, 45 1n 

and zones of occupation, 464 

Martel, Lt. Gen. G. LeQ., 462 

Massigli, René, 144, 151 

Maund, Capt. G. O., 501,501n 

Medical Division, SHAEF, 93 

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, 61, 462-63 
INDEX 593 

Mediterranean theater, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 46-47, 

49, 51,62, 68, 71, 73, 93, 107, 111, 120, 122, 123, 

151, 153, 164, 178, 179n, 193,266,278,292,308 

See also Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ). 

AFHQ's contribution to SHAEF organization, 56- 

58 

civil affairs administration, 75, 77, 80-81, 82, 83 

command of ANVIL/DRAGOON forces transferred to 

SHAEF, 229 

decision for HUSKY operation, 103 

directive to McNarney as commander in, 42n 

Fifth Army use, 414n, 415-16 

and French forces, 150 

Italian campaign. See Italy, campaign in. 

and landing craft, 1 16- 17,4 15 

North African campaign. See North Africa, campaign in. 

and planning for Balkan operations, 219-22, 225, 

406,414-16 

planning for operations in, as aid to OVERLORD, 

109-17,218-27 

and railway bombing plan, 128, 134n 

Sicilian campaign. See Sicily, campaign in. 

strategic air forces, 32,45, 48 

supremecommander for, 27, 3111, 32, 41-42. See also 

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean 

Theater. 

Merrick, Lt. Col. Richard H., 90 

Messages 

of CCS to Eisenhower channeled through WD, 41 

Supreme Commander's log of, 63 

Meteorological Committee, SHAEF, 169 

Meteorological Section, SFHQ, 70 

Metz, France, 3 14,419, 460 

Allied drive toward, 244, 249-52, 255, 258, 284, 

305 

capture, 311, 318 

Meuse River, 246, 282, 284, 286, 295, 436n 

crossing, 303, 304 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 364, 

372, 375-77, 380, 382, 384, 385, 388 

Middleton, Drew, 189 

Middleton, Lt. Gen. Troy H., 371. See also Corps, 

U.S., VIII. 

Military government. See Civil affairs. 

Military Mission to Moscow, US., 406n. See also 

Deane, Maj. Gen. John R. 

and Allied plans for drive to Leipzig, 44 1 

and channels of communication with USSR, 462 

and German surrender, 486, 490 

and plans for Soviet-Western-Allied link-up, 466 

Military Railways Branch, G–4 Division, SHAEF, 

321n 

Minister of Defence, British. See Churchill, Winston S. 

Ministerial Control Party, U.S.-British, 499 

Ministry of Economic Warfare, British. See British 

Ministry of Economic Warfare. 

Ministry of Information, British. See British Ministry 

of Information. 

Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative (MMLA), 153 

Mockler-Ferryman, Brigadier E. F., 153 

Model, Generalfeldmarschall Walter, 2 15, 302 

and Allied encirclement of the Ruhr, 438-39, 440 

appointed Commander in Chief West, 212-1 3

biographical sketch, 14- 15 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 360, 

369 

and MARKET-GARDEN operation, 286 

removed as Commander in Chief West, 245-46, 

248 

Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L., 42n, 61, 

71, 89, 214n, 231, 275, 317,426, 486, 520. See also 

21 Army Group. 

and air support in OVERLORD assault, 126 

and airborne planning, 209-10, 280-84, 282n 

and Allied Control Council, 5 14 

and ANVIL planning, 11 3-14 

and ban on entry to coastal areas of England, 163 

biographical sketch, 15 

bombing of plane of, 385n 

Bradley’s relationship with, 198, 214n, 217, 261- 

64, 295-96, 312, 383, 387-88, 395, 435 

and clearing of approaches to Antwerp and Rotterdam, 256 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378-81, 385-86, 386n, 387- 

89, 395, 409, 436, 443 

and commander, Second British Army, 49 

at commanders' conferences, 255, 3 10, 3 16 

commands ground operations in Northern France, 

180-91, 197-98,203-04, 261-64 

commands OVERLORD assault, 49, 180, 198 

commands 21 Army Group, 33,49,265 

criticism of, in battle for Caen, 183-91 

and D Day, 166, 169-70, 171, 173-75 

drive to the Elbe, 442, 445-46, 445n, 446n, 450-51 

drive on Luebeck, 45 1 

drive to the Rhine, 417-18, 421,422, 429-31 

Eisenhower's relationship with, 198, 289-90, 292- 

94, 297-98, 312-14, 316-17, 386-91 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 369, 

370n, 376-83, 383n, 387-88,393 

and German surrender negotiations, 479,480-81, 

503,509 

and liberation of Paris, 240, 242 

and MARKET-GARDEN operation, 256,287-88 

and military government for Germany, 356 

and Normandy operations, 200-20 1, 206,209-10, 

213, 214, 215, 216, 217 

and planning for advance into Germany, 443 

and planning for OVERLORD assault, 66, 107, 108- 

09, 113-14, 118, 120, 121 

planning for Rhineland offensive, 385-86, 385n 

and planning for the breakout, 197-98 

press conference on Ardennes fighting, 387-89,435 

promotion to field marshal, 253n 

and Rhine River crossings, 429-31 

on single ground force commander, 385-89,390-91 
594 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L.—Cont. 

and single thrust strategy, 250-56, 259, 260, 281, 

289-98, 293n, 310, 310n, 312-17, 318,409-10, 

413,414,434-36,436n, 442 

on 12th Army Group’s drive to the Elbe, 436n 

visits troops before D Day, 158 

Moorehead, Alan, 88 

Morgan, Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E., 62n, 105, 107. See 

also Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC). 

and ANVIL, 103 

appointed COSSAC, 23, 103 

appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAEF, 60, 63-64 

and ban on entry to coastal areas of England, 16 2 

biographical sketch, 15 

and civil affairs agreement for France, 147 

on civil affairs organization for SHAEF, 76, 77, 79- 

80 

on COCKADE, 106 

and command of ground forces in OVERLORD assault, 43-45,43n, 49 

and CROSSBOW, 134-35 

and directive to AEAF, 45 

and directive to Supreme Commander, 52, 52n 

and extension of French zone of interior, 326 

and French Resistance, 153 

and German surrender at Reims, 487 

and liaison missions of governments-in-exile, 138 

and liberation of Paris, 239 

and movement of an embassy staff to Paris, 322 

on organizing an integrated Allied command, 58- 

59 

and personnel for SHAEF, 53 1 

and planning for cross-Channel attack, 58, 103-04, 

109 

and press and propaganda organization for SHAEF, 

86 

on supreme commander for OVERLORD, 24,28 

visits Washington, October-November 1943, 28, 

44, 108 

Morgenthau, Henry J., Jr., 36,341n, 342 

Morning conferences, SHAEF. See Conferences, 

SHAEF morning. 

Mortain, France, 187, 197, 206-08, 209, 21 1, 250, 304 

Moscow, USSR, 62,441,442,444,458,462,466,467, 

484,485,486,490,491,493,494,505,527 

Churchill’s visit, 406 

confeeence of SHAEF representatives with Stalin 

in, 406-07,406n 

Moscow Conference (October 1943), 78n, 142, 144 

Moselle River, 229, 246, 252, 303, 304, 317, 418, 422, 

423,425,427 

crossings, 255, 304 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 368, 

376,377,383n 

and Rhineland offensive planning, 409, 4 12,414 

Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, 29n, 98n, 99, 274 

Muirhead-Gould, Rear Adm. G. C., 501,501n 

MULBERRIES, 173-75 

Munich, Germany, 291,434, 435, 482 

attempted coup in, 4.73,479 

capture, 454-56 

Murphy, Robert D., 15-16, 95, 95n, 485n. See also 

Political Officers, SHAEF. 

Mussolini, Benito, 75,85, 104,473 

Nachrichten fuer die Truppe, 16 1, 16 1 n 

Nation Belge, La, 330 

National Redoubt, German, 435, 447, 448, 452, 456, 

468 

Naval Command, Allied. See Allied Naval Expeditionary Force. 

Naval Division, SHAEF Mission (France), 321n 

Naval Planning Branch, COSSAC, 46 

Navy, British. See Royal Navy. 

Navy, French, participation in OVERLORD, 47 

Navy, U.S., 51, 53, 72 

and planning for OVERLORD, 46-47 

Navy Group West, 177 

NEPTUNE, 107-22, 129, 162. See also OVERLORD. 

NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan, 121-22 

NEST EGG, 502 

Netherlands, 154, 158, 177, 195, 244, 278, 295, 298, 

319,333,374,438,450,47411,523 

civil affairs, 79, 80, 138, 139, 334-36, 348, 350. See 

also SHAEF Mission (Netherlands). 

civil affairs agreement with, 139-40, 235, 320 

food shortage, 334-36,457-59,477,503 

MARKET-GARDEN operation, 279-88 

and propaganda broadcasts, 16 1,336 

surrender of German forces in, 450-5 1, 478,480- 

81, 502,503 

21 Army Group liaison with units of, 138 

Vlissingen bombing proposal, 334 

Netherlands Red Cross, 335 

Nevins, Brig. Gen. Arthur S., 16, 68 

Nicholls, Maj. Gen. L. B., 92 

Nijmegen, Netherlands, 295, 301n, 306, 310n, 376, 

42 1 

airborne operations, 284-88, 300 

planning for operations, 281-83, 297 

Ninth Air Force, U.S., 93, 524 

assigned to AEAF, 48, 126-27 

bombing of Caen, 189 

and COBRA operation, 199 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378n 

and disarmament of German forces, 500 

and First Allied Airborne Army, 27 1 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

384n 

and XII Tactical Air Command, 266 

USSTAF responsibility for, 48 

Vandenberg commands, 271n 

Ninth U.S. Army, 447, 452, 454n. See also Simpson, 

Lt. Gen. William H. 

becomes operational, 265 

casualties, 303, 3 17,422, 43 1 
INDEX 595 

Ninth US. Army-Continued 

clearing of Brest peninsula, 265, 303 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 380, 391, 395, 409, 434, 436, 

44 3 

drive to the Elbe, 452-53, 472-73 

drive to the Rhine, 311-12, 313, 417-18,421-23, 

430-31,434 

drive to the Roer, 317,318 

VIII Corps transferred to, 303 

envelopment of the Ruhr, 437-40 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 363, 

364, 367, 367n, 378, 380, 382-83 

ordered into line between First and Third Armies, 

303 

and OSS detachments, 361n 

and planning for advance into Germany, 3 10, 3 16, 

318, 434, 436 

returned to command of 12th Army Group, 439, 

450, 45 1 

Rhine crossing, 430-31 

surrender of German forces to, 229, 481-82 

NOBALL, 134n, 135 

N O R D W I N D , 397 

Norfolk House, St. James’s Square, London, 

COSSAC organized at, 58 

SHAEF opens at, 96 

Normandy, 98, 117, 119, 134, 150, 154n, 179, 180, 

183, 184, 190, 218, 219, 224, 227, 228, 246, 250, 

254, 257, 264, 266, 276, 297, 306, 312, 313, 314, 

336, 345, 353, 370, 384n, 424, 466, 520 

advance command post established in, 18 1 

air attacks, 185, 188-89, 199n 

breakout, 192-217, 261 

civil affairs administration, 23 1, 234, 235-36 

French Resistance activities, 236, 238 

German forces, 195-96 

German reaction to Allied advance, 201-03 

strength of Allied forces, 23 July 1944, 192-93 

Normandy Campaign, 17 1-9 1 

North Africa, 33, 35, 60, 61, 70, 76, 77, 86, 95, 96, 141, 

152, 155, 178. See also Mediterranean theater. 

campaign in, 34, 35, 36, 101-02 

directive to First British Army commander in, 42 

planning for invasion, 100-101 

rearmament of French units, 102, 150-52, 323-24 

2d French Armored Division transferred from, 239 

North African Theater of Operations, US. Army 

(NATOUSA), 266 

Northern France Campaign, 192-21 7, 244-60 

Northern Group of Armies, 265, 288, 41 7, 442. See also 

21 Army Group. 

Northwest African Air Forces, 48, 61, 65 

Norway, 68, 138, 154,336,348,411,468,523 

civil affairs agreement with, 78-79, 80, 83, 139-40, 

235,320 

and COCKADE planning, 106 

liaison with Allied Land Forces (Norway), 139 

liaison with SHAEF, 138 

Norway—Continued 

prisoners of war, 476 

and propaganda broadcasts, 16 1 

SHAEF mission to, 139, 509-11. See also SHAEF 

Mission (Norway). 

strength of German forces, 5 10, 5 10n 

surrender of German forces, 476-77, 479, 480, 496, 

502, 509-11 

Oberbefehlshaber Nordwest (OB NORD WEST), 472n, 

479, 480, 498. See also German units, Army 

Group H. 

Oberbefehlshaber Sued (OB SUED), 483, 500 

Oberbefehlshaber Suedost (OB SUEDOST),472, 483 

Oberbefehlshaber Suedwest (OB SUED WEST), 472, 478, 

478n 

Oberbefehlshaber West (OB WEST), 177, 177n, 194n, 

47 2. See also Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschal 

Gerd von. 

counterattack at Mortain, 207 

defense of West Wall, 248 

and disarmament of German forces, 499 

Fifth Punzer Army attached to, 230n 

in German command organization, 177 

Kesselring commands, 429 

Kluge commands, 194 

Model commmands, 2 12- 13 

and Nineteenth Army, 425, 433 

and operations in Normandy, 194, 201, 207 

and operations in southwestern France, 304 

Rundstedt commands, 177, 245-46, 248 

Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), 175, 176, 176n, 177, 

359n,500n 

Oberkommando der Krzegsmarine (OKM), 175-76, 499, 

500-501 

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL), 175, 500 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), 175-76, 176n, 

180, 486, 506n. See also Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm. 

and Allied drive to the Elbe, 452 

and Allied drive into southern Germany, 433 

and Allied encirclement of the Ruhr, 438, 439,440 

archives, 497-99 

arrest of members, 499 

and control of operations at end of war, 472-74 

defense of Berlin, 47 1 

and disarmament of German forces, 497-500, 501 

estimate of Allied intentions, 193 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 384 

headquarters moved to Strub, 471,471n 

and mobile reserve, 179 

northern and southern sections reunited, 496 

and operations in Normandy, 20 1, 203, 2 10 

and operations in southern France, 227-28 

radio broadcast from Flensburg, 498 

replaces Army Group G commander, 433 

Rommel responsible to, 177 

and strength of German farces evacuated from 

Denmark, 509n 
596 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) -Continued 

and surrender of German forces on Bornholm, 509 

and von Kluge’s removal as Commander in Chief 

West, 2 12- 13 

and West Wall defenses, 248 

Winter takes control of Operations Staff B, 472n,483 

Occupation of Germany. See British Army of the 

Rhine; U.S. Forces of Occupation in Germany. 

O’Connor, Lt. Gen. Sir Richard, 188 

OCTAGON. See Quebec Conference (September 1944). 

Oechsner, Fred, 87 

Office of Strategic Services, 72, 476n 

and French Resistance, 153-57 

and German counteroffensive in Ardennes, 361, 

361n 

and psychological warfare, 84-85, 87 

Office of War Information 

and London Coordinating Committee for Political 

Warfare, 85 

and psychological warfare, 84-85, 87, 161 

and unconditional surrender formula, 342 

Oil 

German shortage, 364, 364n, 372, 418, 429 

as target for strategic bombing, 129, 130, 136, 273, 

308-09, 316,429 

OKH. See Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH). 

OKL. See Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL). 

OKM. See Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM). 

OKW. See Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). 

OMAHA Beach, 171, 175, 192 

Operations Division, SHAEF. See G–3 Division, 

SHAEF. 

Operations Division, War Department, 27, 34, 62,99 

Operations Staff B, OKW, 472n, 483 

Organization Todt, 203,509-10,509n, 510n 

Orne River, 106, 109, 122, 171, 173, 180, 181, 183, 

185, 186, 187, 189, 196, 201, 208, 211, 213 

Ost battalions, 205, 205n 

OVERLORD, 58,62, 138, 153, 156, 158, 254, 259, 266, 

292, 304, 323. See also NEPTUNE. 

airborne planning, 118-22 

and ANVIL operation, 55, 109-17, 120, 218-23,228 

assault planning, 66, 107-22 

command of air forces, 43-45,48, 123-27,272-75. 

See also Allied Expeditionary Air Forces. 

command of ground forces in assault, 43-45, 49, 52, 

109, 180-83, 198, 203-04 

command of naval forces, 46-47 

directive to Supreme Commander, 49-55 

divisionsfor, 103, 106, 108, 111, 122, 171 

early planning, 98-106, 339 

final preparations for D Day. 158-70 

junction of ANVIL forces with units of, 228-29, 228n, 

275 

landing craft for, 109, 111-13 

logistics planning, 73-74, 257, 267-68 

railway bombing plan, 127-34 

rehearsals, 166 

release of information to French, 148-49 

OVERLORD—continued 

role of French forces, 150-51 

security of plan, 88-99, 162-64 

and Soviet offensive on Eastern Front, 53, 11 1 

supreme commander for, 23-33, 31n, 40, 44n, 105 

target date, 31, 53, 103, 106, 11 1, 167-70 

OVERLORD Security Sub-committee, 162 

Pacific theater 

First U.S. Army headquarters ordered to, 454 

and landing craft, 1 16- 17, 4 15 

redeployment of U.S. forces to, 495 

Soviet assistance in, 445, 468 

strategy for, 99, 101 

Paget. Gen. Sir Bernard, 102 

biographical sketch, 16 

commands 21 Army Group, 33,45,49 

and planning for cross-Channel attack, 98-99 

Panzer divisions, 179, 181, 182, 189, 194, 195, 201, 

207, 208, 210, 217, 246, 248, 283 

Parachute troops, Allied, 120, 269. See also Airborne 

divisions, Allied. 

Paris, France, 68, 151, 152, 173, 179, 191, 192, 196, 

202, 206, 208, 209, 215, 217, 222, 228, 231, 235, 

238, 244, 250, 251, 259, 260, 276, 319, 336, 337, 

370, 370n, 397, 401n, 514, 527 

bombing of Eisenhower’s train in, 385n 

civil affairs supplies for, 257, 258 

communication facilities, 520, 524 

French Provisional Government established at, 325 

Joint Rearmament Commission moved to, 324 

liberation, 96, 239-43, 327, 353, 523 

movement of Communications Zone headquarters 

to, 322-23 

movement of French officers from Algiers to, 321 

policy on transportation of civilians to, 321-22 

Public Relations Division, SHAEF, established in, 

522-23 

SHAEF Mission (France) established in, 320 

Partisans. See also French Resistance. 

Austrian, 456 

Czechoslovak, 454, 504, 505-06 

Italian, 473 

Yugoslav, 4 15 

Pas-de-Calais, 179-80, 182, 193, 201, 207, 263, 299 

and COCKADE planning, 106 

defined, 180n 

planning for capture, 250-52, 254, 260 

and rocket launching sites, 134, 244, 250 

Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M. See also Seventh U.S. 

Army. 

and ANVIL/DRAGOON, 227, 229 

biographical sketch, 16 

commands Seventh U.S. Army, 227 

drive to the Rhine, 425-27, 432 

drive into southern Germany, 456 

and operations in Alsace, 305, 318,397,400 

and Stuttgart incident, 456, 459 

surrender of German forces to, 482 
INDEX 597 

Patton, Gen. George S., Jr., 35, 187, 245, 265, 292, 

293, 314, 316, 380n, 387, 460, 525. See also Third 

U.S. Army. 

biographical sketch, 16- 1 7 

commands Third Army, 183, 204, 261-63 

and Czech Partisan uprising in Prague, 504 

drive into Austria, 453-54 

drive into Brittany, 205-06 

drive to the Rhine, 418, 422, 424-26 

drive on the Saar, 31 1,318,410,426 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

376-77, 376n, 378n, 381-83, 383n, 385, 395 

and liberation of Paris, 240n 

and Lorraine campaign, 304 

and Moselle River crossing, 255 

and Normandy operations, 209-10, 211, 213- 14 

and planning for advance into Germany, 250-51, 

252-53, 253n, 254, 255n, 258-59, 310, 410-11 

policy on Third Army operations, 293n 

on reduction of Brest, 259 

and 2d French Armored Division, 239 

speech episode, 164-66 

Peake, Charles B. P., 17, 95, 146n. See also Political 

Officers, SHAEF. 

Personnel Division, SHAEF. See G–1 Division, 

SHAEF. 

Pétain, Marshal Henri Philippe, 141 

Philip, André, 143 

Phillips, Col. Joseph B., 519 

Phillips, William, 79, 95, 95n. See also Political Officers, SHAEF. 

and aircraft for French Resistance activities, 155 

biographical sketch, 17 

and security of OVERLORD plan, 89 

and unconditional surrender formula, 341 

Pierlot, Hubert, 328, 329, 330, 331 

Pilotless aircraft, 126, 134, 135, 136, 168. See also V 

weapons. 

Planning Staff, SHAEF, 68, 72 

Plans Branch, G–3 Division, SHAEF, 347 

PLUNDER, 430n 

POINTBLANK, 136, 155, 158 

directive for, 103, 104 

effectiveness, 105 

Portal agent for CCS in, 48-49, 48n, 125 

and railway bombing plan, 127, 128-29 

and strategic bombing for OVERLORD, 123-27 

POL, 66, 96, 284 

Poland, 138, 246, 447, 466 

and bomb lines, 463 

and manpower crisis in Europe, 391 

Soviet drive through, 418 

21 Army Group liaison with units of, 138 

Polish Armored Division, 193n, 215 

Polish Government-in-exile, 463 

Polish Parachute Brigade, lst, 271, 282, 286, 287, 

287n 

Political Officers, SHAEF, 72, 95-96 

and Doenitz government, 499 

Political Officers, SHAEF—Continued 

and recognition of French Provisional Government, 325 

and unconditional surrender formula, 34 1 

Political Warfare Executive, 72 

and French Resistance, 154 

and London Coordinating Committee for Political 

Warfare, 85 

and propaganda for northwest Europe, 85, 87 

Portal, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles, 

27n, 28n. See also British Chiefs of Staff. 

agent of CCS in POINTBLANK, 48-49, 48n. 125 

on airborne divisions for OVERLORD assault, 118 

on ANVIL, 109, 219 

biographical sketch, 17 

on command of air forces in OVERLORD, 48, 124- 

25 

and command of strategic air forces, 273 

member British Chiefs of Staff Committee, 39 

on operations in Istria, 2 19 

on POINTBLANK, 105 

and railway bombing plan, 128, 130, 132 

Portsmouth, England, 167 

advance command post at, 96-97, 171, 173, 198, 

275, 276 

and D-Day decision, 169 

Post Hostilities Planning Sub-committee, 346 

Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-section, G–3 Division, 

SHAEF, 347 

Potsdam Conference, 39 

Pound, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley, 39 

Prague, Czechoslovakia, 449 

Partisan uprising, 486, 503-04, 505 

SHAEF’s policy on advance to, 468-69, 503-08 

and surrender of German forces, 479, 504-08, 506n 

Press relations, 84, 86, 88-91, 223, 435, 519-28 

Eisenhower’s press conference before D Day, 89- 

90 

and German surrender at Reims, 493-94 

in liberated countries, 336-37 

Montgomery’s press conference after Ardennes 

fighting, 387-89 

Prisoners of war, 503, 521 

captured by Allies, 182, 189, 228, 292, 300, 301, 

301n, 303, 305, 306, 312, 335,367, 370,396,422, 

423, 427, 440, 449, 454, 480, 530 

captured by Germans, 348,476,482,495, 510, 51 I 

Propaganda. See Psychological warfare. 

Provisional Government of the French Republic. See 

French Provisional Government. 

Psychological warfare, 84-88, 102, 155, 161, 308, 336- 

37,449 

and ANVIL operation, 223 

propaganda for Germany, 339-46 

propaganda leaflets, 16 1, 345-46 

safe-conduct pass, 344 

Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, 70, 149, 52 1, 

530. See also McClure, Brig, Gen. Robert A. 

McClure heads, 84 
598 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF—Continued 

organization and functions, 84, 86-88 

and propaganda for Germany, 343-46 

and public information activities in liberated 

countries, 336-37 

Psychological Warfare Section, 12th Army Group, 

344 

Public Relations Council, SHAEF, 521 

Public Relations Division, SHAEF, 530 

activities, 519-28 

Allen heads, 522 

Davis heads, 84,91 

organization and functions, 84, 88-91 

and transportation of civilians to Paris, 322 

Publicity and Psychological Branch, COSSAC, 86 

Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division, 

SHAEF. See G–6 Division, SHAEF. 

Pyle, Ernie, 88 

QUADRANT. See Quebec Conference (August 1943). 

Quebec Conference (August 1943), 39, 73, 107 

and ANVIL planning, 103 

and civil affairs, 79 

and commander, AEAF, 48 

and commander, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, 

46 

and OVERLORD planning, 103, 108 

and RANKIN planning, 104 

and supreme commander for OVERLORD, 24,28 

Quebec Conference (September 1944), 39, 256 

and Morgenthau plan for Germany, 342 

and Southeast Asia Command, 274 

and strategic air forces, 272-73 

and zones of occupation, 349, 35 1, 464 

Quesada, Maj. Gen. Elwood R., 199, 200 

Radio Communications. See Communications; Messages. 

Radio France, 523 

Radio Luxembourg, 337, 345,523,524 

Raeder, Grossadmiral Erich, 17, 176 

Raids, planning for, 98, 100 

Railway bombing plan, 126, 127-34, 136, 155. See also 

Strategic bombing, priorities for. 

Railway Research Service, 13 1 

Ramsay, Admiral Sir Bertram H., 492n. See also Allied 

Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary 

Force (ANCXF). 

and ANVIL, 109, 114, 115, 225 

biographical sketch, 17 

commands Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, 46- 

47, 275 

and D Day, 166, 169-70, 17 1, 173 

death, 275,429n 

and Initial Joint Plan, 12 1 

operational control of U.S. naval forces assumed by, 

47 

RANKIN, 58, 104-05, 106, 143, 153,339, 510n 

Ray, Cyril, 526 

Rearmament, French. See France, rearmament of 

forces. 

Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission (France), 

321n, 324, 324n 

Reber, Samuel, 18, 95-96, 95n, 325. See also Political 

Officers, SHAEF. 

Records, German, 497-99, 500, 515 

Red Air Force, 462-63 

Red Army, 218, 219,247,247n, 273, 302, 315,340, 

343,432,436,441,448,449,451,452,475 

advance to Berlin, 418, 434, 442, 446, 470-71, 472- 

74,481 

and bomb lines, 462-63 

drive into Czechoslovakia, 468 

and German surrender negotiations, 474n,478, 479, 

481,483,484,486,490 

junction with Western Allied forces, 453-54, 467, 

469,477,527 

liaison with, 461-69 

occupation of Bornholm, 508-09 

operations on Eastern Front, 246-47, 392, 396 

proposal for link-up in Austria, 406, 406n 

and Schleswig-Holstein, 446, 450 

and Soviet-Western Allied boundary, 454, 465-69, 

504-05 

and surrender ceremony at Berlin, 490-93 

and surrender of German forces in Czechoslovakia, 

503-08 

Western Allied plans for link-up with, 465-69 

winter offensive on Eastern Front, 396,405-07,411, 

412,416,418,427,434 

withdrawal of forces from Czechoslovakia, 507-08 

Red Ball Express, 258, 284 

Red Cross, 322, 334, 335, 457, 476 

Red Lion Route, 284 

REDLINE, 278 

Redman, Maj. Gen. Harold, 18, 237, 320 

Refugees, 508,509n,510, 51 1 

Reims, France, 258,277, 304,374 

German liaison party at, 497 

German surrender at, 358,454,483-90,492,493- 

94, 495, 496, 497, 500, 502, 503, 504, 505, 509, 

510,527 

SHAEF Forward moves to, 4 19-20 

SHAEF moves to Frankfurt from. 5 13 

Remagen, Germany, 367n,423-24,423n, 429,435, 

436n, 438 

Rendulic, Generaloberst Dr. Lothar. 478 

Replacement Army. German. See German Replacement Army. 

Replacements, infantry, 306,325,383, 391, 392,416 

Reserve, SHAEF. S ee Strategic reserve, SHAEF. 

Resistance forces. See French Resistance. 

Rhine River, 193, 204, 279, 287, 291, 292, 295, 304, 

305,309,310,310n, 318,334,335,436,438,439, 

440,445,447,449,452,456,469, 5 12 

airborne operation in crossing, 43 1 

Allied crossings, 275, 423-33,434-35 

Allied drive to, 310-11, 312, 417,418,419,420-33, 

436n 
INDEX 599 

Rhine River-Continued 

Allied pursuit stopped short of. 244-60 

and German attack in Alsace, 397,401,404 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 359, 

360n, 361-62,363,364, 365, 367, 367n, 368-69, 

376,377,395,396 

Remagen bridge capture, 423-24.435 

and Rhineland offensive planning, 249-56, 253n, 

281,284,291-92, 294 295-96,298,302,312-17, 

405,409-10,411-14,434 

and zones of occupation, 351 

Rhineland Campaign, 279-301, 302-18, 385-93, 417- 

18,420-33,442 

RhBne River, 219, 223, 228, 229, 238, 244, 324 

Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 472, 475 

Ridgway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B., 395 

Ripka, Hubert, 504 

Robb, Air Marshal James M., 62n, 128n, 383n 

appointed Chief of Staff (Air), SHAEF, 275 

biographical sketch, 18 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 386n 

and D-Day decision, 169. 170n 

as Deputy Chief of Staff (Air), SHAEF, 65 

and German surrender at Reims. 488 

and railway bombing plan, 13 1 

Robbins, Brigadier T., 82 

Rocket launching sites, 250, 252 

bombing of, 123, 125, 126, 134-37, 135n, 160, 

252n 

Canadian forces overrun, 244 

Roer River, 244,3 1 1,3 17 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

364,366,368,369-70,370n, 372,396 

operations against dams, 317-18, 368,417,420-22 

Rokossovski, Marshal Konstantin K.. 4 18 

Rommel, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin, 6 1, 194, 248, 

388 

biographical sketch, 18 

and command authority in west, 177-80 

death, 194 

forces available to, on D Day, 179n 

Rooks, Maj. Gen. Lowell W.. 

biographical sketch, 19 

deputy chief G–3 Division, SHAEF, 68, 390 

and disarmament of German forces, 497-99 

Roosevelt, Col. Elliott, 31n, 32n 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 109, 131, 387, 527 

on Allied failure to reach Rhine, 3 15 

on ANVIL, 114-15,221-22,224-25 

and Balkan operations, 415 

and capture of Berlin, 441,442, 443,445 

and civil affairs administration, 77, 79, 141, 143-45, 

146-49 

and command of armed forces, 36-37 

and cross-Channel attack, 101 

death, 445,452,470 

and defense of Strasbourg, 400-401 

de Gaulle invited to Washington by, 232-33, 235 

and Dutch food shortage, 334 

Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continued 

and French Committee of National Liberation, 141, 

143-45, 146-49, 151, 231, 232-33, 234, 235, 

325 

and French rearmament, 150 

and German surrender negotiations, 475 

at international conferences with CCS, 39, 39n, 

102 

and invasion currency, 233 

and liberation of Paris, 239 

and manpower crisis, 392 

and military government for Germany, 354-55 

and Morgenthau plan for Germany, 342 

and Pacific alternative, 101 

and political officer at SHAEF, 95 

and psychological warfare, 84-85 

and RANKIN, 143 

and release of OVERLORD information to French, 

148-49 

and Soviet conference with SHAEF representatives, 

406 

and supreme commander for OVERLORD, 23-33, 

31n, 32n, 34 

and TORCH operation, 10 1 

unconditional surrender formula, 339-43 

and zones of occupation, 139,349-5 1,464-65 

Rothwell, Lt. Col. H. J., 529n 

ROUNDUP, 100-101, 103 

Routh, Dennis, 87 

Royal Air Force. See also Portal, Marshal of the Royal 

Air Force Sir Charles. 

and abolition of AEAF, 274-75 

and command organization for OVERLORD, 43 

and command of strategic air forces, 273-74 

and First Allied Airborne Army, 27 1 

and propaganda leaflets, 16 1, 16 1 n 

Royal Air Force Bomber Command, 45, 48n, 70, 

188n, 274. See also Harris, Marshal of the Royal 

Air Force Sir Arthur T. 

bombing of Caen, 185, 189,199n 

bombing of Caumont, 199n 

bombing of Dueren, Germany, 3 1 In 

bombing of Falaise, 199n 

and CROSSBOW, 134 

and POINTBLANK, 104 

and railway bombing plan, 130, 131, 132-34, 134n 

and strategic bombing for OVERLORD, 124-26,309 

Royal Air Force Coastal Command, 123, 124 

Royal Air Force Fighter Command, 48,48n, 99, 123 

Royal Air Force Malta Air Command, 6 1 

Royal Air Force Middle East, 6 1 

Royal Air Force North Africa, 65 

Royal Air Force Tactical Air Force, 48 

Royal Navy, 46, 169, 296, 300 

Royce, Maj. Gen. Ralph, 271n 

Ruhr Valley, 221, 282, 290, 300, 389, 396, 407, 418, 

429,441,449,452 

Allied drive to the Rhine north of, 430, 434-35, 

436n 

bombing, 308, 309, 439 
600 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Ruhr Valley-Continued 

in broad front strategy, 249-50, 253-54, 259, 291- 

98, 312-13, 316, 318, 386, 409-10, 412, 413, 

414,434-36 

double envelopment of, 291,3 10,436-40,436n 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

359, 363-64 ,372 

industrial importance to Germany, 309,434-35 

and zones of occupation, 35 1 

Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von, 303, 304, 

418. See also Oberbefehlshaber West (OB WEST). 

appointed Commander in Chief West, 177, 246, 

248 

Army Group G established by, 178 

biographical sketch, 19 

capture, 483 

control of armored units, 178-79 

and defense of West Wall, 248 

forces available to, on D Day, 179 

and German counteroffensive in Alsace, 404 

and German counteroffensive in Ardennes, 359-60, 

364,367, 368, 369, 372,375, 384, 385, 387-88, 

395,396 

replaced by Kesselring, 429 

replaced by von Kluge, 194 

Rommel’s relationship with, 177-78 

Ryan, Brig. Gen. Cornelius E., 80 

Saar Basin, 418,422,425 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 377, 

38 1,383 

offensiveagainst, 311,317-18,376n, 410,426,427 

planning for drive to, 252, 254, 258, 260, 290, 413 

and zones of occupation, 35 1 

St. L6,France, 173, 182, 190, 196, 197, 197n, 198, 199, 

200,244 

battle for, 183, 184, 186, 188, 192 

bombing, 199n 

Salmuth, Generaloberst Hans von, 179n, 299 

Sargent, Sir Orme, 85n 

Sarnoff, Brig. Gen. David, 5 19 

SCAEF. See Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. 

Schelde Estuary, 254, 254n, 256, 282, 295, 296, 298- 

301,306,310,313,334 

Schellenberg, Brigadefuehrer Walter, 476-77 

Schleswig-Holstein, 446,450, 480, 48 1,498 

Schmidt, General der Infanterie Hans, 483 

Schmieden, Dr. Werner von, 475 

Schoerner, Generalfeldmarschall Ferdinand, 474,49 9 

biographical sketch, 19 

and surrender of German forces in Bohemia, 478, 

483,486,505-06, 505n 

Schulz, General der Infanterie Friedrich, 433, 482, 

483 

Schwartz, General, 400 

Scottish Command, 5 10 

SD (Sicherheztsdienst des Reichfuhrers SS), 508, 508n 

Second British Army, 198, 290, 295, 304,447. See also 

Dempsey, Gen.Miles C. 

Second British Army-Continued 

activation, 49n 

and advance into Belgium, 251-52 

clearing of Schelde estuary, 298, 299-300 

Dempsey commands, 49 

drive to the Elbe, 450,451 

drive to the Rhine, 42 1 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 367, 

367n, 378 

and MARKET-GARDEN operation, 282,287 

operations in the Netherlands, 298, 299-300, 31 1 

operations in Normandy, 18 1-9 1, 200-201, 209, 

216, 217 

and planning for advance into Germany, 255n, 291, 

295 

Rhine River crossing, 430-3 1 

strength, 182, 182n 

2d Tactical Air Force. See Tactical Air Force, 2d 

(British). 

Secretary, General Staff, SHAEF, 62-63, 63n, 91,275, 

444n 

Secretary, General Staff, War Department, 62 

Secretary of the Navy. See Knox, Frank. 

Secretary of the Treasury. See Morgenthau, Henry J., 

Jr. 

Secretary of War. See Stimson, Henry L. 

Security troops, 324, 392 

Seine Base Section, 277n, 323 

Seine River, 68, 132, 179, 179n, 194n, 218, 228, 238, 

239, 244, 245, 249, 250, 252, 259, 260, 276, 277, 

283,304 

Allied advance to, 192, 193, 193n, 196, 197, 204, 

206,209-1 7 

planning for airborne operation at, 209-10, 279 

prediction of date for reaching, 257 

Selborne, Lord, 155 

Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, 

74, 267. See also Communications Zone, Headquarters. 

Seventh U.S. Army, 403, 447, 526. See also Patch, Lt. 

Gen. Alexander M. 

controlled by 6th Army Group, 266 

drive to the Rhine, 3 18, 425-27 

drive to the Saar, 317-18,425-27 

drive into southern Germany, 454-56 

drive on Strasbourg, 3 1 1 

and French Resistance activities, 238 

and German counteroffensive in Alsace, 397-98, 

401, 403-04 

invasion of southern France, 227 

junction with Fifth Army, 456 

junction with Third Army, 228-29, 304 

Moselle River crossing, 304 

Patch commands, 227 

Rhine River crossing, 432-33 

and Stuttgart incident, 454-56, 459-60 

surrender of German forces to, 482-83,500 

Sevez, Maj. Gen. François, 487,487n, 488 

SEXTANT. See Cairo Conference. 

Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, 336n, 474n 
INDEX 60 1 

Seyss-Inquart, Arthur-Continued 

and Canadian operations in the Netherlands, 451, 

457-58 

negotiations with Allies, 457-59,477, 478, 480 

SFHQ. See Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ). 

SHAEF. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. 

SHAEF Forward, 275-78,419-20 

SHAEF Main, 275-78,519 

SHAEF Mission (Belgium), 139, 532, 533 

and Belgian food shortage, 332-33 

and Belgian Resistance forces, 330-32 

and civil affairs in Luxembourg, 333-34 

dissolution, 5 13 

establishment, 328-29 

SHAEF Mission (Denmark), 532,533 

dissolution, 5 13 

establishment, 139 

and surrender of German forces, 508-09 

SHAEF Mission (France), 139, 323, 532, 533. See also 

Lewis, Maj. Gen. John T. 

dissolution, 5 13 

establishment, 320-21, 321 n 

and French Provisional Government, 325 

and French rearmament, 324 

SHAEF Mission (Luxembourg), 333-34 

SHAEF Mission (Netherlands), 532, 533 

dissolution, 5 13 

and Dutch food shortage, 335 

establishmment, 334, 334n 

SHAEF Mission (Norway), 508, 532, 533 

dissolution, 5 13 

establishment, 139, 510 

and surrender of German forces in Norway, 509-11 

SHARPENER, 97,275 

SHELLBURST, 276 

SHIPMATE, 275n 

Sibert, Brig. Gen. Edwin L., 369n, 37 1 

Sibley, Col. Alden K., 320 

Sicily, 34, 49, 68 

campaign in, 61, 101, 104, 108, 120 

civil affairs administration, 80-81 

decision for invasion, 103, 112 

Siegfried Line, 246, 253, 254, 255, 257, 282, 283, 294, 

311,417. See also West Wall. 

Signal Division, SHAEF, 92, 264, 277 

Signal Service Battalion, 3 118th, 97 

Simonds, Lt. Gen. G. G., 300n 

commands 2d Canadian Corps, 200 

and clearing of Schelde estuary, 300, 30 1 n 

and operations in Falaise-Argentan Pocket, 2 15 

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H., 446, 452. See also Ninth 

U.S. Army. 

and attack on Brest, 303 

biographical sketch, 19-20 

commands Ninth Army, 265 

conference with Eisenhower and Bradley, 422 

drive to the Elbe, 452 

drive to the Rhine, 310,417,421-22 

drive to the Roer, 3 17 

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H.—Continued 

and envelopment of the Ruhr, 437, 439, 440 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 380, 

381,395 

and Ninth Army crossing of the Rhine, 430-31 

and surrender of Group Elster, 229 

Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 274 

6th Army Group, U.S., 248n, 256, 302, 304, 305, 389, 

522. See also Devers, Gen. Jacob L. 

becomes operational, 229, 266 

command of ANVIL/DRAGOON forces assumed by, 

229,266 

controls operations of First French Army, 229 

counterattack in Alsace, 402-04 

Devers commands, 229, 266 

drive into Austria, 454-56 

drive to the Rhine, 425-27 

drive on Strasbourg, 3 1 1 

and French military government teams, 353 

and German counteroffensive in Alsace, 397-98 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 37 6 

and German withdrawal east of the Rhine, 425 

and planning for advance into Germany, 294, 434, 

436 

Rhine River crossings, 432-33 

and Stuttgart incident, 459-60 

surrender of German forces to, 479, 480, 482-83, 

500 

Twelfth Air Force transferred to support of, 4 16 

Ski sites. See Rocket launching sites. 

Skorzeny, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Otto, 367,367n, 

380,385n 

SLEDGEHAMMER, 100- 10 1 

Smith, Maj. Gen. C. M., 73 

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell, 29, 29n, 33, 41, 62n, 

71, 108, 279, 326 

and ANVIL plan, 109, 1 15 

biographical sketch, 20 

and Chief Administrative Officer, SHAEF, 64 

as chief of staff of ETOUSA, 62, 74 

as chief of staff of SHAEF, 62-63 

Churchill’s relationship with, 41, 63 

on civil affairs, 81, 82n, 144, 145, 232, 235 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378, 386,386n 

and COSSAC chief, 63-64 

and D-Day decision, 169-70 

and defense of Strasbourg, 400,401 

and de Gaulle’s message to French on D Day, 149 

on Eisenhower’s taking direct command on Continent, 264 

and French participation in ANVIL, 15 1 

and French participation in OVERLORD, 63, 151 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 364, 

365n, 374, 374n, 375n, 378,381,383n 

and German surrender, 485-89,485n, 496 

and invasion currency, 232, 235 

and Joint Intelligence Committee (SHAEF), 72 

at Malta Conference, 413-14 

and MARKET-GARDEN operation, 284 
602 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell-Continued 

and military government for Germany, 353,355 

and movement of organizations into Paris, 321-23 

negotiations with Seyss-Inquart, 458-59,477,478 

and organization of SHAEF, 59-60,62-64 

and OVERLORD plan, 107-09 

on personnel for SHAEF, 530,532 

and political officers for SHAEF, 95 

and press relations, 520, 521, 522, 525 

and railway bombing plan, 132 

and SHAEF missions, 139 

and SHAEF strategy for defeat of Germany, 4 13- 

14 

and single ground force commander, 390 

and supply controversy, 267-68 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340 

Snow, Brigadier A. E., 503 

Somewell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 27n, 393 

Southeast Asia Command, 274,275n 

Southern France. See France, southern. 

Southern Group of Armies, 452. See also 6th Army 

Group, US. 

Soviet Air Force, 462-63 

Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

Spaatz, Gen. Carl, 65, 197. See also U.S. Strafegic Air 

Forces (USSTAF). 

on aircraft for Resistance activities, 155 

biographical sketch, 20 

and bomb lines, 463 

commands USSTAF, 48-49, 124, 273-74 

on defeat of Germany by airpower, 127, 127n 

on German air strength, 3 15- 16 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 37 5 

and German surrender, 487,49 1,492 

and oil bombing plan, 129-30 

promotion recommended by Eisenhower, 379 

and railway bombing plan, 127, 130 

and strategic bombing priorities, 309,429 

Special Air Service, 154, 155, 238, 329,450 

Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ 

estimate of French Resistance strength, 238 

and French Resistance, 153-57, 236-38 

Special Intelligence Services, 155 

Special Operations Branch, OSS, 153-57 

Special Operations Executive (SOE), 152-57 

Special Staff Divisions, SHAEF, 9 1-96 

Speidel, Generalleutnant Hans, 2 13n 

Sperrle, Generalfeldmarschall Hugo, 17 7 

SPRING, 197n 

Stagg, Group Captain J. M., 168, 169 

Stalin, Marshal Joseph. See also Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics. 

and Allied plans for advance into Germany, 441, 

444 

on Balkan operations, 406-07 

channels of communication with, 462 

conference with SHAEF representatives, 405-07, 

445n 

on defense of Strasbourg, 407 

Stalin, Marshal Joseph-Continued 

and German surrender negotiations, 475-76,477 

on link-up of forces in Austria, 406,406n 

proposal for an Allied advance through Switzerland, 406 

and Soviet winter offensive, 405-07,406n, 434 

and supreme commander for OVERLORD, 30-3 1, 

31n 

and unconditional surrender formula, 343 

and V-E Day, 494 

at Yalta Conference, 343,413 

and zones of occupation, 464-66 

Stark, Admiral Harold R., 39n, 152n 

and French Committee of National Liberation, 

141n 

and London Coordinating Committee for Political 

Warfare, 85n 

and naval planning for OVERLORD, 46-47 

STARKEY, 106 

State Department, 13 1, 485n. See also Hull, Cordell; 

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr. 

and aircraft for Resistance activities, 156 

and civil affairs administration, 75 

and civil affairs agreements, 79, 142, 143-44, 235 

and defense of Strasbourg, 401 

and Doenitz government of Germany, 499 

and French Committee of National Liberation, 23 2 

and interzonal boundaries, 465 

and London Coordinating Committee for Political 

Warfare, 85 

and military government for Germany, 347,353 

and political officers for SHAEF, 95,96 

and propaganda for Germany, 344 

and psychological warfare, 85, 87 

and recognition of French Provisional Government, 

325 

and SHAEF press relations, 52 1 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340-42 

and withdrawal of Allied troops from Czechoslovakia, 507 

and zones of occupation, 350 

Stearns, Col. Cuthbert P., 83 

Steel, Christopher, 96 

Steiner, Obergruppenfuehrer und General der 

Waffen SS Felix, 471 

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 340, 464 

Stewart, Sir Findlater, 162 

Stimson, Henry L., 36, 144. See also War Department. 

on Eisenhower’s taking direct command on Continent, 264 

and military government for Germany, 354 

and Morgenthau plan for Germany, 342 

and Patton episode, 166 

on Ruhr industrial facilities, 439 

on supreme commander for OVERLORD, 24-25 

and unconditional surrender formula, 340 

Strasbourg, France, 258,294,314, 318, 365,393 

capture, 311 

question of defense, 397, 398-402, 401n, 407 
INDEX 603 

Strategic air forces. See Air forces, Allied strategic; 

Eighth Air Force, U.S.; Fifteenth Air Force, 

U.S.; Royal Air Force Bomber Command; U.S. 

Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF). 

Strategic bombing, 103, 104, 105, 123-34, 136, 155, 

158, 275, 427-29. See also POINTBLANK; Railway 

bombing plan. 

attack on Dueren, Germany, 3 1 1 

bombing of Caen, 185, 187-89 

priorities for, 273, 308-09, 316, 429 

Strategic reserve, SHAEF, 397, 398, 402, 407, 436n, 

53 2 

Strategy, Allied, 50-52, 99, 249-56, 281, 288-98, 312- 

17,407-16,433,434-36.441247 

Strength, Allied, 180, 180n, 182, 192-93, 192n, 248, 

248n, 41 1,427,510,542,543 

Strength, German, 182, 182n, 205, 248, 282-83, 306, 

411, 427, 508-09, 509n, 510, 510n 

Strong, Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. D., 57, 283. See also 

G–2 Division, SHAEF. 

biographical sketch, 20 

as chief, G–2 Division, SHAEF, 71-73 

and D-Day decision, 169, 170n 

and defense of Strasbourg, 401 

estimate of German situation, October 1944, 306 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 363, 

365,365n, 369,37ln,374n, 386n 

and German surrender, 485-87,488n, 491 

negotiations with Seyss-Inquart, 458 

and strategic bombing targets, 309 

Student, Generaloberst Kurt, 20-21, 284, 360n, 419n 

Stumpff, Generaloberst Hans Juergen, 472,491, 492, 

500 

Supply, 304, 307, 309, 314, 322 

allocation of gasoline, 251, 254, 256, 258 

and attack on Schmidt, 3 1 1 

and battles of attrition, 305,306 

civil affairs requirements, 257, 332-33 

and drive to the Elbe, 452 

as factor in halt of pursuit short of Rhine, 256-60 

for French forces, 323 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 384, 

392 

and MARKET-GARDEN operation, 283-84 

organization for OVERLORD, 73-74, 267-68. See also 

Communications Zone, Headquarters; European 

Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA); 

G–4 Division, SHAEF. 

and planning for advance into Germany, 251, 253- 

56, 92, 294, 296, 297,315 

situation in Normandy, 193 

Somervell's inspection of system in Europe, 393 

and Stuttgart incident, 459-6 1 

Supply Division, SHAEF. See G–4 Division, SHAEF. 

Supreme Allied Commander (SAC). See Supreme 

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. 

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater 

(SACMED), 60, 248, 328. See also Mediterranean 

theater. 

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean—Cont. 

Alexander appointed, 4 15 

and ANVIL planning, 53-55, 112, 115, 116-17, 218- 

25 

and civil affairs, 223 

directive to, for operations in support of OVERLORD, 

116-17, 222-23, 225-26 

directive to, for transfer of forces to Northwest 

Europe, 4 16 

and French Resistance, 154, 154n 

and planning to end war with Germany in 1944, 

307 

and transfer of command of ANVIL forces to 

SHAEF, 229,266 

Wilson appointed, 32 

Supreme Command of French Forces, 153, 276, 514. 

See also French Army. 

Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 

32n, 60n,307. See also Eisenhower, General of the 

Army Dwight D. 

assumes command of ANVIL/DRAGOON forces, 229 

assumes command at SHAEF, 55 

assumes direct command on Continent, 261-65 

CCS directive to, 49-55, 468 

and command during OVERLORD assault, 43-45, 

52,66 

selection of, 23-33,44n 

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. 

advance command posts, 96-97, 171, 173, 181, 198, 

275-78,419-20 

AFHQs contribution to, 56-58 

dissolution, 495, 495n, 502, 508, 509, 51 1-15 

Eisenhower assumes command, 55 

and inter-Allied committees, 96 

location, 96-97, 264-65, 275-78, 322, 419-20, 513 

organization, 66-96 

personnel, 529-33 

strength of headquarters at Frankfurt, Germany, 

513 

Supreme Headquarters Advance Conference Establishments, 419, 419n 

Surrender of Germany. See Act of Military Surrender; 

Germany, surrender of. 

Susloparoff, Maj. Gen. Ivan 

and German surrender negotiations, 480,484,485, 

487 

and German surrender at Reims, 487-88,490 

negotiations with Seyss-Inquart, 458 

Sutton, Brigadier E. A., 93 

Sweden 

and Dutch food shortage, 334-35,457 

and evacuation of Soviet displaced persons from 

Norway, 5 1 1 

and German surrender negotiations, 47 7, 480 

negotiations for release of Norwegian and Danish 

prisoners to, 476 

Swedish Red Cross, 334,457,476 

Switzerland, 230, 244, 246, 296, 297, 302, 360n, 427, 

454 
604 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Switzerland—Continued 

and Dutch food shortage, 457 

and negotiations for surrender of German forces in 

Italy, 475 

Stalin’s proposal for an advance through, 406 

SWORD Beach, 17 1 

SWORDHILT, 204 

SYMBOL. See Casablanca Conference. 

Tables of Organization for SHAEF, 529 

Tactical Air Commands. U.S. 

IX, 199,305 

XII, 266,425 

XIX, 229,259,304,395n 

XXIX. 421, 43 1 

Tactical Air Force, 2d (British), 275 

and air support in OVERLORD assault, 126-27 

and Rhine River crossings, 43 1 

Tactical air forces. See Air forces, Allied tactical; 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force; Ninth Air Force, 

U.S.; Tactical Air Commands, U.S.; Tactical Air 

Force, 2d (British). 

TALISMAN, 347n 

Tanks, 247. See also Armored forces, Allied. 

in European operations, 98 

German, 208n, 246, 283,292,304,306 

Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W., 63, 197, 

273 

and air support in battle for Caen, 184, 188 

and airborne planning, 210, 279, 280 

on aircraft for Resistance activities, 155 

biographical sketch, 21 

at commanders’ conferences, 255, 3 16 

conference with Stalin in Moscow. 62, 406-07 

and co-ordination of strategic and tactical air forces, 

124-25, 126-27, 275 

and CROSSBOW, 136, 252n 

and Czech Brigade’s movement into Czechoslo-, 

vakia, 506 

and D-Day decision, 169-70, 170n 

and defense of Strasbourg, 398 

as Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 60-62, 123, 389-91 

and dissolution of SHAEF, 5 14 

on Eisenhower’s taking direct command on Continent, 264 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 375 

German estimate of, 61 

and German surrender ceremony at Berlin, 491- 

92, 492n, 493n 

ground officer proposed as replacement for, 389-91 

on organizing an integrated Allied command, 56 

and planning for advance into Germany, 3 16 

and strategic bombing-priorities, 127, 128-30, 131- 

32, 309 

Tedder plan. See Railway bombing plan. 

Tehran Conference, 28, 29, 39 

and ANVIL planning, 111, 114, 2 18 

and supreme commander for OVERLORD. 30-31 

and target date for OVERLORD, 167 

Tennant, Admiral William G., 225 

TERMINAL. See Potsdam Conference. 

Theater Intelligence Section (TIS), 72 

Third U.S. Army, 165-66, 183, 187, 201, 230, 245, 

292, 293, 379n, 447, 525, 526. See also Patton, 

Gen. George S., Jr. 

assigned to 12th Army Group, 204, 261-63 

becomes operational, 261 -63 

casualties, 396, 396n, 426, 454 

and Czech Partisan uprising in Prague, 504 

detachment of Czech Brigade from, 507 

drive into Austria, 453-54, 456 

drive into Brittany, 198, 204-06, 244, 252, 259-60, 

303 

drive into Czechoslovakia. 453-54. 456 

drive to the Rhine, 404, 417- 18, 4 18n, 422, 424, 

425, 426,432,433 

drive to the Saar, 317-18, 426 

VIII Corps transferred to Ninth Army from, 303 

and French Resistance activities, 238 

gasoline allocation to, 254, 258 

and German counterattack at Mortain, 208 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

365-66, 376, 377, 378-85, 383n, 393, 395 

and German withdrawal east of the Rhine, 425n 

junction with ANVIL/DRAGOON units, 228-29, 304 

junction with Red Army, 454 

and liberation of Paris, 24 1 

Moselle River crossing, 255 

operations in Falaise-Argentan Pocket, 209-1 1, 

213-14,216 

operations in Lorraine, 244, 249-51, 254-56, 258- 

59, 284, 303-05, 311, 317-18 

and OSS detachments, 36 In 

Patton’s policy on operations for, 293n 

and planning for advance into Germany, 250-53, 

254-55,258-60,294,310,409 

reaches Seine, 257 

Rhine crossing at Oppenheim, 426 

2d French Armored Division attached to, 239 

Thorne, Gen. Sir Andrew, 139,510-11, 510n 

TINDALL, 106 

Todt organization. See Organization Todt. 

TOPFLIGHT, 5 19 

TORCH, 100-101 

TOTALIZE, 197n 

TRACTABLE, 197n 

TRANSFIGURE, 209 

Transportation bombing plan. See Railway bombing 

plan. 

Treasury Department. See also Morgenthau, Henry 

J., Jr. 

and civil affairs agreement with France, 235 

and military government for Germany, 353, 354 

TRIDENT. See Washington Conference (May 1943). 

Trimble, Col. Ford, 62, 63n, 508n 

Troop Carrier Command, IX, 204, 27 1, 280 

Truman, Harry S., 358 

and German surrender at Reims, 477, 493-94 

and Stuttgart incident, 460-61 

and zones of occupation, 469 

Truscott, Lt. Gen. Lucian K., 229 
INDEX 605 

Twelfth Air Force, U.S., 266, 416 

12th Army Group, U.S., 181, 201, 228, 244, 249, 287, 

302, 303, 380n, 389, 436n, 506. See also Bradley, 

Gen. Omar N. 

becomes operational, 204, 261-63 

and Belgian Army units, 330 

Bradley commands, 204, 261-65 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378-81,409,436 

drive to the Elbe, 451-54 

drive to the Rhine, 417- 18,4 18n, 425 

envelopment of the Ruhr, 29 1, 298, 436-40 

and First Allied Airborne Army, 269 

1st Army Group renamed as, 183,261n 

and French Resistance, 154 

gasoline allocations, 25 1, 254 

and German counteroffensive in Ardennes. 359. 

363-65, 365n, 366, 366n, 369, 369n, 370n, 371: 

374,376,377, 383 

and liberation of Paris, 240, 242, 258 

main offensive east of the Rhine assigned to, 436 

and main thrust to Rhine, 310-11 

and MARKET-GARDEN operation, 281 

and military government for Germany, 356 

and Montgomery’s command of operations, 203-04, 

261-64 

and Montgomery’s press conference after Ardennes 

fighting, 387-88 

and Ninth Army mission, 303 

Ninth Army returned to control of, 439, 443, 45 1 

operations in Falaise-Argentan Pocket, 214, 214n, 

215-16, 217 

and OSS detachments, 361n 

and planning for advance into Germany, 250-53, 

254, 255, 291, 293,294,296, 298, 310, 312-17, 

434-36 

psychological warfare teams, 343-44 

and Radio Luxembourg, 337 

and reduction of Brest, 256 

and Remagen Bridge capture, 424 

supply responsibility, 267 

and Supreme Headquarters’ move to Versailles, 276 

21 Army Group. British, 64, 70, 71, 97, 120, 204, 

208n, 209, 213,268,305,350,389,443,444,485, 

53 1. See also British Army of the Rhine; Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. 

activation, 49n 

and air support in OVERLORD assault, 126 

and airborne planning, 210, 280-84, 287-88 

arrest of members of Doenitz government and 

OKW, 499 

casualties, 301n 

and civil affairs, 82-83, 138-39, 147, 150, 231, 233, 

335 

clearing of Schelde estuary, 256, 298-301 

and command of operations in Northern France, 

197-98, 204, 261-64 

and command of OVERLORD assault, 109, 180-83, 

198, 204 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378-81, 378n, 386, 388, 

389, 391, 395, 409, 436 

21 Army Group, British—Continued 

and criticism of Montgomery in battle for Caen, 

183-91 

Czech Independent Armored Brigade attached to, 

503 

directive to, for OVERLORD assault, 45, 66, 107 

disarmament of German forces in Schleswig-Holstein, 498 

and dissolution of SHAEF. 5 14 

drive to the Elbe, 450-51,452, 473 

drive to Luebeck, 45 1 

drive to the Rhine, 423 

and First Allied Airborne Army, 269, 272 

and First U.S. Army, 294, 295-96 

and French Resistance, 154 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

363, 366n, 369, 376, 383 

and German surrender negotiations, 480-81 

and Initial Joint Plan, 12 1 

and invasion currency, 233 

liaison with governments-in-exile, 138-39 

LUCKY STRIKE operation, 197n 

and MARKET-GARDEN operation, 302 

and military government for Germany, 356 

Montgomery commands, 33,49,57 

negotiations with Seyss-Inquart, 458 

and operations in Falaise-Argentan Pocket, 214, 

216,217 

and OVERLORD plan, 107, 108-09, 12 1 

Paget commands, 49 

and planning for advance into Germany, 434,436, 

441, 442 

and planning for the breakout, 196-98, 197n 

and psychological warfare, 87 

and railway bombing plan, 127 

Rhine River crossings, 429-31 

and single thrust versus broad front strategy, 250- 

52, 259, 260, 289-98, 310, 312-17, 318, 410,411 

and Soviet occupation of Bornholm, 509 

and supply planning, 73, 257, 257n 

and 12th Army Group, 204,380n 

Unconditional surrender formula, 36, 95, 339-43, 344, 

357,457,474n 476,477,480,481,482,485,486, 

490 

UNDERTONE, 425n 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 220, 249, 302, 

339, 365n. See also Red Army; Stalin, Marshal 

Joseph. 

and abolition of Doenitz government, 499 

and Allied Control Council, 512, 5 14 

Allied military missions to, 461-62 

and Allied planning for cross-Channel attack, 53, 

99, 100, 101, 11 1 

and Allied plans for advance into Germany, 441, 

444, 469 

and ANVIL planning, 1 1 1, 1 14 

and boundary for junction of Soviet and Western 

Allied forces, 454, 465-69, 504-05 

and capture of Berlin, 441,442,444-45 

and CCAC presurrender directive for Germany, 

34 7 
606 THE SUPREME COMMAND 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Continued 

and censorship of communications before D Day, 

147, 163 

channels of communication with, 444,444n, 465-66 

and civil affairs agreements, 79, 140 

conference with SHAEF representatives, 405-07 

and Dutch food shortage, 457-58 

and European Advisory Commission, 78 

and German surrender ceremony at Berlin, 485-86, 

489,490-94 

and German surrender negotiations, 475, 476, 477, 

478,480,481,484 

and German surrender at Reims, 485-87,489-90 

lend-lease aid to, 247, 247n 

and military government for Germany, 352,495 

and occupation of Berlin, 445n 

participation in Japanese war, 445, 468 

recognizes French Provisional Government, 325 

and SHAEF control parties, 497, 500 

and SHAEF press relations, 52 1-22 

and surrender of German forces in Czechoslovakia, 

503-08 

and surrender of German forces in Denmark, 508- 

09 

and surrender of German forces in Norway, 508, 

510 

and target date for OVERLORD, 167

and unconditional surrender formula, 341, 343 

withdrawal of forces into zones of occupation, 5 14 

withdrawal of Red Army forces from Czechoslovakia, 507-08 

and zones of occupation, 349-51, 445, 461,463-65, 

510, 514 

United Nations, San Francisco conference of, 487n, 

507 

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 348, 348n, 513, 532 

United Services Organization (USO), 89 

Unity of command. See Command, unified. 

UNRRA. See United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. 

U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), 99 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff. See Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

US. Forces European Theater (USFET), 513, 514- 

15,532. See also European Theater of Operations, 

U.S. Army (ETOUSA). 

U.S. Forces of Occupation in Germany, 358, 495, 5 14 

U.S. Group Control Council, 96, 351, 352, 354, 530. 

See also Allied Control Council. 

U.S. Military Mission to Moscow. See Military Mission to Moscow, U.S. 

U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 39n, 46-47, 141n 

USSR. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

U.S. Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF), 30, 31n, 32, 32n, 

70, 276, 52 1. See also Spaatz, Gen. Carl. 

and abolition of AEAF, 275 

administrative control of Ninth Air Force, 48, 73 

and command shift during German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 378n 

and command of strategic air forces, 273 

establishment, 48 

U.S. Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF)—Continued 

and oil plan for strategic bombing, 129, 130, 136 

and railway bombing plan, 127, 130, 131, 132-34 

and strategic bombing for OVERLORD, 124-26 

and strategic bombing priorities, 309 

strategic direction under Portal, 48n 

and supply responsibility, 267 

U.S. Weather Services, 169 

UTAH Beach, 171, 192 

V weapons, 134-37, 134n, l60,250,252n, 332 

Vandenberg, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S., 21, 271n 

VARSITY, 43 1 

V-E Day, 257, 326,493-94 

VERITABLE, 4 17 

Versailles, France, 487 

Churchill’s visit, 400-40 1 

commanders’ conference at, 294-95, 296 

SHAEF Forward moves to Reims from, 419 

Supreme Headquarters moves to, 276-78 

Supreme Headquarters moves to Frankfurt from, 

513 

Vian, Rear Adm. Sir Philip L., 47, 173 

Vienna, Austria, 414n, 442 

air raids, 104 

proposal for link-up of Soviet-Allied forces at, 406 

Vietinghof genannt Scheel, Generaloberst HeinrichGottfried von, 478, 478n 

Vishinsky, Andrei Y., 491, 492 

Voice of SHAEF, 161, 336, 336n, 344 

Voir, 33 7 

Volks Grenadier divisions, 303, 368, 370 

Volkssturm, 346, 375, 404, 425, 448, 479 

Vosges Mountains, 238,244, 246, 258, 305 

and German counteroffensive in Alsace, 397-98, 

400,40 1,403 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

365n, 383n,393 

Vulliamy, Maj. Gen. C. H. H., 21, 92, 264, 277 

WADHAM, 106 

Wagner, Konteradmiral Gerhard, 479n 

Walcheren Island, 254, 254n, 299-301, 301n 

War Cabinet, British. See British War Cabinet. 

War crimes, 341, 342, 514 

War Department, 25, 27, 34, 42, 53, 62, 70, 72, 74, 

120, 170, 199, 225, 275, 380n, 407n, 444. See also 

Marshall, General of the Army George C.; Stimson, Henry L. 

and airborne operations, 269 

and capture of Berlin, 447 

CCS channel of communication with Eisenhower, 

41 

and civil affairs, 78, 8 1, 85, 144, 235, 346 

and Fifteenth U. S. Army, 266 

and interzonal boundaries, 465 

and manpower crisis in Europe, 392 

and military government for Germany, 353, 355, 

35 7 

and Patton episode, 165-66 

personnel allotments to SHAEF, 529-30 
INDEX 607 

War Department-Continued 

and planning for OVERLORD, 99

and press criticism of Montgomery, 190 

and propaganda for Germany, 344 

and psychological warfare, 85 

and SHAEF press relations, 520, 521-22,526, 527 

and single ground force commander, 386 

and 6th Army Group, 266 

and Soviet conference with SHAEF representatives, 

406 

and unconditional surrender formula, 342 

and withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia, 507 

and zones of occupation, 349 

War Office, British. See British War Office. 

War Plans Division, War Department. See Operations 

Division, War Department. 

War Room, SHAEF, 70, 487, 488, 488n, 489n 

Warlimont, General der Artillerie Walter, 203 

Washington Conference (December 1941 -January 

1942), 39n 

Washington Conference (May 1943), 39, 73 

and liberation of Paris, 239 

and OVERLORD planning, 103,112 

Weather, 297,305, 315,402,403,486 

and COBRA operation, 198, 199 

and COMET operation, 281 

and D Day, 168-70 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 36 1, 

364,365n,371,375,384,395 

and MARKET operation, 282,284,286,287-88 

and November offensive, 310-11 

and Soviet winter offensive, 405,407 

and strategic bombing, 309 

Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (WFSt), 176, 472n. See also 

Jodl, Generaloberst Alfred. 

Wenck, General der Panzertruppen Walter, 481 

Werewolf organization, 476, 483 

West, Maj. Gen. Charles A., 68, 346, 35 1 

West Wall, 203, 244, 260, 288, 295,302, 303, 305, 318, 

368, 369, 370, 397, 398, 406, 409, 417,418, 422, 

425,426,427. See also Siegfried Line. 

West Wall, German defense of, 246, 248, 250, 253n, 

283,302,3 11 

Western Task Force, 47, 17 1 

Westphal, General der Kavellerie Siegfried, 499, 500 

Whiteley, Maj. Gen. J. F. M., 57 

and airborne planning, 210,279 

biographical sketch, 2 1 

as chief, G–2 Division, SHAEF, 68, 71 

and command of French Forces of the Interior, 236 

and defense of Strasbourg, 401 

as deputy chief G–3 Division, SHAEF, 68, 71 

and French zone of interior, 326 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 

374n, 378, 386n 

and personnel for SHAEF, 53 1 

and single ground force commander, 390 

Wickersham, Brig. Gen. Cornelius W., 96, 351 

WIDEWING, 97, 198 

Wigglesworth, Air Vice Marshal Horace Ernest 

Philip, 169 

Wilhelmina, Queen of Netherlands, 334 

Williams, Brigadier E. T., 17 In, 458, 486 

Wilson, Edwin C., 145, 151 

Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland. See also 

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean 

Theater (SACMED). 

and ANVIL planning, 1 15- 17, 2 18-26 

appointed SACMED, 32-33 

and civil affairs, 223 

and command of French forces, 15 1 

directive to, for operations in support of OVERLORD, 

116-17, 222, 225-26 

heads British Joint Staff Mission, 4 15, 4 15n 

and invasion of southern France, 227 

member of CCS, 39n, 415 

and operations in Italy, 117, 224, 406n, 415 

and planning for operations in the Balkans, 219, 

222, 415-16 

and planning for operations at Sète and Istria, 219, 

221-22 

transfer of command of ANVIL forces to SHAEF, 

229,266 

Winant, John G., 339n, 464,485 

Winter, General der Gebirgstruppen August, 472, 

472n, 473,500 

Wolff. Obergruppenfuehrer und General der Waffen 

SS Karl Friedrich, 478 

Y Day, 167 

Yalta Conference, 39,445 

and bomb lines, 463 

and German surrender instrument, 484 

and SHAEF strategy for defeat of Germany, 4 13 

and unconditional surrender formula, 343 

and zones of occupation, 351, 464-65 

Yugoslavia, 138, 510 

planning for Allied operations in, 415 

U.S. fighter attack on Soviet column in, 462-63 

Zangen, General der Infanterie Gustav von, 299 

Zeitzler Generaloberst Kurt, 2 1, 176 

Zenkovitch, Lt. Col. 485,488 

Zhukov, Marshal Georgi K., 418,434 

and German surrender, 474n, 490-92 

Soviet representative on Allied Control Council, 

514 

Zone of Interior, French, See French Zone of Interior. 

Zonesofaction, Allied, 43, 43n, 109, 181, 209, 213-14, 

216, 217, 252, 295-96, 313, 316, 318, 376, 378, 

380, 427, 430, 431, 439, 443, 453, 454, 456,459 

and German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, 376, 

378,379 

Zones ofoccupation, 139, 348-51, 462, 469, 496, 497, 

501,510,511 

agreement on, 463-65 

and plans for Soviet-Allied link-up, 465-67 

and Stuttgart incident, 459-61 

withdrawal of Allied forces into, 514 

Zuckerman, S., 127 

Zuckerman plan. See Railway bombing plan. 

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