AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Adapt or Fail 

The United States Air Force’s Role in

Reconstituting the Iraqi Air Force, 2004–2007

George w. Cully, jd

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Project Editor

Belinda Bazinet

Copy Editor

Sandi Davis

Cover Art, Book Design and Illustrations

Daniel Armstrong

Composition and Prepress Production

Nedra O. Looney

Print Preparation and Distribution

Diane Clark

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Cully, George W., 1946- author. | Air University

 (U.S.). Air Force Research Institute, issuing body. |

 Air University (U.S.). Press, publisher.

Title: Adapt or fail : the USAF’s role in reconstituting

 the Iraqi Air Force 2004-2007 / George W. Cully.

Description: First edition. | Maxwell Air Force Base,

 Alabama : Air University Press, Air Force Research

 Institute, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016043990| ISBN 9781585662692 | 

 ISBN 1585662690

Subjects: LCSH: Air forces—Iraq| Air power—Iraq—

 History. | Coalition Provisional Authority. Coalition

 Military Advisory Transition Team. | Coalition 

 Provisional Authority. CMATT-A. | United States—

 Armed Forces—Stability operations.

Classification: LCC UG635.I72 C85 2016 | DDC

 956.7044/348–dc23 | SUDOC D 301.26/6:IR 1

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016043990

Published by Air University Press in February 2017

Disclaimer

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or implied within are solely those of the author and do 

not necessarily represent the official policy or position of 

the organizations with which they are associated or the 

views of the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, 

United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or any 

other US government agency. This publication is cleared 

for public release and unlimited distribution.

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iii

Contents

Foreword v

About the Author ix

Abstract xi

Acknowledgments xiii

 1 Introduction 1

 2 A Brief History of the Iraqi Air Force, 1931–2003 3

 3 The Rebirth of the Iraqi Air Force 7

 4 The Introduction of USAF Advisory Support Teams 25

 5 The Mishap of 30 May 2005 41

 6 Moment of Truth: The Iraqi Air Force Asks 

for Expanded USAF Participation in Its Training

and Procurement Efforts 49

 7 With a Little Help from Its Friends: The Iraqi

Air Force Begins to Reshape Its Future 59

 8 AETC Steps Up to the Iraqi Air Force Training Plate 89

 9 The Foundation Has Been Laid 117

 10 Conclusion 127

 Abbreviations 129

 Bibliography 133

 Index 151

v

Foreword

It was an extremely hot and humid day at Arlington National 

Cemetery on 11 August 2005. I didn’t really notice the weather since 

all of my attention was focused on the group burial ceremony taking 

place. As an advisor to the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF), I was escorting 

their chief of staff and the family of the Iraqi pilot who was killed a 

few months earlier—on Memorial Day. As neatly folded American 

and Iraqi flags were presented to the family members, I knew this was 

a historic event. Not only was this the first time an Iraqi citizen had 

been interred at Arlington Cemetery, it was also one of the first tangible signs of the United States Air Force (USAF) stepping up to support the new IqAF. During this trip, many senior USAF leaders met 

with Maj Gen Kamal Abdul-Sattar Barzanjy, the IqAF commander, to 

discuss ways they could better support him. Reflecting back, the team 

of advisors faced a lot of challenges during that year, but this event 

and the Memorial Day crash were key turning points.

Memorial Day 2005 provides several excellent examples of the 

challenges the USAF faced in standing up the new IqAF. I was at Taji 

AB and had just returned from a trip to Amman, Jordan, the previous 

day. While in Jordan, we concluded that the UH-1 helicopters being 

overhauled for the Iraqis were not suitable for combat operations in 

the high-temperature environment of Iraq. We could potentially 

scrap all 16 helicopters. We had also inspected a C-130 that was being 

considered as an addition to the Iraqi inventory. Unfortunately, the 

aircraft, a 1959-era B-model, was in pieces and collecting dust in the 

corner of a hangar. It would have been expensive to bring it back to 

flight-worthy status.

The purpose of the trip to Taji was for the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) commanding general (CG) to clarify 

the reporting chain for my team of advisors at Taji. The team leader 

had not been effectively coordinating with his Army and Air Force 

special operations team members and on several occasions had bypassed the CMATT chain of command. The situation had finally gotten to the point that it required general officer intervention. After the 

CG set everyone straight, he explained that the team’s top priority was 

not setting up an operational Iraqi air force. Instead, the top priority was 

to simply help the Iraqis set up processes and procedures. This came 

as quite a surprise.
foreword

It was the next event that completely changed the course of our 

efforts. Just before boarding an HH-60 helicopter to return to Baghdad, 

I received a call from another member of the CMATT air cell. One of 

the Iraqi Comp Air 7 light reconnaissance aircraft had gone down 

during a mission; there were no survivors. As soon as our helicopter 

landed at Phoenix Base, I had to pass the bad news to the CG. The 

crash was caused by mechanical issues, and a team of experts from 

the Air Force Flight Test Center later deemed the Comp Air 7 fleet to 

be unsuitable for flight.

Since the inception of the CMATT air cell (affectionately known as 

“four lieutenant colonels in a closet,” due to the tiny office we shared 

in a former Iraqi elementary school), the team faced obstacles and 

challenges. As far back as 2003, during the Coalition Provisional 

Authority’s reign, there were conflicting discussions on whether the 

coalition intended to help rebuild the Iraqi air force and what type of 

aircraft should be in their inventory. The air cell, created about eight 

months after Pres. George W. Bush declared an end to major combat 

operations, was initially composed of a few Airmen deploying on 

three-month rotations. The deployment length slowly increased over 

time, ultimately reaching one year.

When I volunteered for the deployment, the request contained no 

special requirements or prerequisites for filling the position. 

An e-mail had gone to our base to provide a body; I was the only 

person to volunteer. Expecting to go through extensive training before my deployment, I was shocked to discover I was not required to 

go through any training on Iraqi culture and customs, Arabic language, survival skills, combat skills, or convoy operations. Fortunately, I’ve always been interested in language and culture, so I read 

several books before deploying and immersed myself in the language 

and customs during my daily interactions with Iraqis. In addition to 

the lack of training, I discovered my assigned responsibilities would 

greatly exceed my current skills and experience as a logistician and 

program management officer. My duties included a variety of tasks—

pilot training, air traffic control, flight medicine, combat mission 

analysis, manpower analysis, organizational planning, foreign military sales, and national defense strategy planning.

Upon arriving in Iraq, I quickly discovered the formation of the 

IqAF was a low priority for the coalition; historical record keeping on 

vi
vii

the subject was even lower in priority. Realizing the historical significance of the task, I set out to collect as many documents as possible, 

in hopes they would someday be useful to a professional historian. 

My collection included decision briefings presented to the IqAF chief 

of staff, e-mails, aircraft accident reports, diplomatic communications 

regarding the gifting of aircraft to Iraq, internal memos documenting 

challenges, and daily situational reports. Some of these documents 

were likely the only copy available. When I got the call from the 

author, I was excited to hand over this collection to someone willing 

to take on the daunting task of researching, analyzing, and documenting the events.

“But the most curious neglect of all is the failure of the USAF, the 

world’s greatest air force, to effectively tutor and support the fledgling 

Iraqi Air Force until the former was shocked and embarrassed into 

doing so.” This powerful statement, from this book’s conclusion, sets 

the stage for the challenges the coalition initially faced in standing up 

the new IqAF. George Cully’s Adapt or Fail, clearly the authoritative 

source on this subject, is a must-have addition to any history buff ’s 

library. It is an exceptional reference that chronicles the events of the 

past, while also providing an in-depth analysis of the actions and 

decisions made by the team of advisors that ultimately helped Iraq 

form their new air force. Mr. Cully, a long-time historian and former 

member of the Air Force Historical Research Agency, has written and 

contributed to numerous books and articles on airpower history. He 

has spent the last several years researching and writing about topics 

related to the new Iraqi Air Force. It is sad to admit, but the unfortunate accident that led to the deaths of one Iraqi and four American 

Airmen was a pivotal event that finally nudged the US Air Force to 

step up and take a leadership role in forming this new air force. This 

accident, described in chapter 5, highlights the potential consequences if we don’t do a better job next time. While it was a solemn 

honor to escort the Iraqi family and dignitaries to Arlington National 

Cemetery, it is an honor I don’t wish upon anyone. In light of the 

recent turmoil in Iraq, the United States could potentially provide 

similar assistance again. Commanders, military strategists, government leaders, and academics should be encouraged to read this book, 

as we strategize our support to Iraq, Jordan, and other countries 

fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terror 

FOREWORD
network. It is important that the readers understand the sacrifices 

made by Maj Brian Downs, Capt Ali Husam Abass, Capt Jeremy 

Fresques, Capt Derek Argel, and SSgt Casey Crate—and ensure we 

don’t make the same mistakes again.

Charles J. Westgate III

Former advisor to the Iraqi Air Force

February 2015

fOREWORD

viii
ix

About the Author

George Cully is a retired USAF officer and an independent research 

professional. His post-retirement research efforts have assisted historians and biographers, veterans benefit claimants, aircraft restorers, 

and aircraft crash site archaeologists. Before retiring from federal 

civil service in late 2010, he served as the director of Air University’s 

Office of History at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He joined the USAF History and Museums Program in 1984 and held positions at multiple 

levels, including the USAF headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command headquarters, the Air Force Research Laboratory, and the Air 

Force Historical Research Agency. Cully retired from active duty in 

1991, after serving 12 years in the USAF and 10 years in the US Navy. 

He received a juris doctorate from the University of Virginia’s School 

of Law in 1979.

Cully coauthored the Handbook for Researching Missing-in-Action 

Cases, 1941–1960 (1994), Active Air Force Wings as of 1 October 1995 

(1998), and USAF Active Flying, Space, and Missile Squadrons as of 1 

October 1995 (1998). He has also published in Air Force Magazine,

Air Power Journal (now Air and Space Power Journal), and Air Power 

History.

xi

Abstract

Prior to its involvement with the Iraqi air force in 2004, the US Air 

Force (USAF) was relatively inexperienced in helping to create an air 

force for a partner nation. Usually the partner nation would already 

have an air force and the requisite infrastructure—only needing better 

airplanes, more training, or additional spare parts for the equipment 

already on hand. None of those conditions were present in Iraq when 

the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) was 

tasked to create an air corps for what the Coalition Provisional 

Authority called the New Iraqi Army. Nor were the handful of USAF 

personnel assigned to the CMATT air cell (CMATT-A) given any 

special preparations or high-level support and oversight after that 

task had morphed into the creation of a full-fledged Iraqi air force—

and all that must accompany such an undertaking—in 2005.

The resulting ad hoc nature of CMATT-A’s operations combined 

with other factors to produce an untenable situation for the USAF, 

USAF Reserve, and other Department of Defense component advisors 

involved. Unfortunately, that increasingly serious situation did not 

garner the attention of the USAF’s senior leadership until such 

neglect was found to be a contributing factor in an aircraft accident 

that took the lives of five dedicated Airmen—four USAF members 

and an Iraqi Air Force officer—on 30 May 2005.

This study summarizes the events that led up to that accident and 

the consequences that followed, including the decision to replace 

CMATT-A with a larger, better-resourced organization led by a 

USAF general officer, the recognition of the need to deploy significantly greater numbers of suitably trained USAF instructor/advisor 

Airmen to Iraq, and the concerted action to assist the Iraqi Air Force 

in obtaining more capable aircraft. These improvements took the better 

part of two years’ analyses, preparations, investment, and adjustments. This study summarizes the essentials of that complex sequence 

of events. It is a story about accomplishing a demanding, unheralded 

mission under harrowing conditions in a foreign land.

xiii

Acknowledgments

This study was originally written to satisfy a much narrower requirement in 2008. Tom Manning, then the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) command historian, wanted to host a set of 

“what we are doing” presentations during that year’s semiannual 

AETC historian conference. In preparation for the event, he encouraged various AETC historians to produce papers to deliver at the 

conference. The topic list included AETC’s activities in Iraq; I was 

then the chief historian for Air University (AU), so I was in a good 

position to address that particular issue. AU was deeply involved in 

crafting the training syllabi adopted by the Iraqi Air Force officer 

schoolhouse in 2006. Thus, without Tom Manning’s nudge, this study 

would most likely never have happened.

If it’s probable that it takes a village to properly raise a child, then 

it’s almost certain that accurate historical narratives cannot be written unless relevant records are available. In this instance, I benefitted 

from a series of improbable coincidences. The first was the result of 

Col Charles Westgate’s assignment to the CMATT-A cell in 2005. 

Colonel Westgate, an operator with the heart of a historian, went out 

of his way to collect records and assemble a detailed chronology of 

CMATT-A’s development and activities from its inception through 

the end of his tour. Later, and again entirely by chance, Colonel Westgate and I crossed paths. Upon learning that I was writing a study on 

the efforts to resurrect the Iraqi air force, he was most generous in 

sharing the unique cache of materials that he had collected and 

preserved.

Yet another beneficial coincidence came about as the result of a 

deployment by Dr. Silvano Wueschner, one of the staff historians assigned to the AU history directorate. While he was in theater in early 

2010, Dr. Wueschner discovered a drawer full of abandoned files that 

shed considerable light on the planning and preparations made in 

late 2006 and 2007 regarding the USAF’s support for the Iraqi Air 

Force. Knowing that I would be interested, Dr. Wueschner brought 

the files back with him when he returned to our office that spring.

I also need to acknowledge the support and encouragement received from my boss, Col Ben Hulsey, AU director of staff. It was with 

his permission (and temporary duty money) that I was able to interview participants and gather documents at Wright-Patterson AFB, 

Ohio; Randolph AFB, Texas; and Hurlburt Field, Florida. He also 
gave permission for me to focus exclusively on the writing during 

that last two-week sprint to finish the manuscript in August 2010. I 

also need to sincerely thank the many participants who spoke about 

their time in Iraq or their support of those who deployed; they are too 

numerous to name here. 

Although Tom Manning instigated this project, it was Dave Byrd 

who motivated me to significantly expand its scope. Then assigned to 

the Air Force History Support Office, Byrd worked to persuade various 

Air Force historians to contribute to an ambitious, multivolume work 

intended to describe the USAF’s quasi-combat operations conducted 

without respite since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The 

working title of the project was Airmen at War; in a chance conversation with Byrd in early 2010, I learned that there were still several 

topics that lacked for authors. One was the USAF’s role in reconstituting the Iraqi air force. I’m still not sure whether it was Dave’s persuasiveness or simply my own vanity that led me to volunteer, but I 

am truly grateful for the opportunity. Dave Byrd liked the resulting 

manuscript enough to nominate it for the Robert F. Futrell Award, a 

USAF-level prize given annually to recognize excellence in Air Force 

historical publications. Thanks, at least in part to Dave’s advocacy, my 

study was a Futrell Award recipient in 2011.

Of course, I would be far more than remiss if I didn’t acknowledge 

the single most important influence in my life over the last 25 years—

my wife. She’s the one who is kind enough to bring me something 

when I’m so absorbed in writing that I forget to eat, the one who is 

wise enough to tell me when it’s time to quit for the night, and the one 

who is honest enough to tell me when the words aren’t working. I owe 

her everything.

acknowledgment

xiv
Chapter 1

Introduction

The US Air Force (USAF) has not had much recent experience in 

helping a partner nation create an air arm from nothing. Historically, 

much of the USAF’s participation in the Department of Defense 

(DOD) foreign military sales (FMS) program—the activity responsible 

for such matters—had been structured around the presumption that 

the partner nation would already have an air force and the requisite 

infrastructure. It just needed better airplanes, more training, or additional spare parts for the equipment already on hand.

Ordinarily, that framework has satisfied the needs of both the 

United States and its foreign partners. The United States benefits by 

having friendly nations and potential allies equipped with capable air 

forces, and American suppliers profit from the work generated by 

FMS. Moreover, FMS has helped partner nations by validating their 

needs within the strictures of US technology and arms export laws, 

by matching partners with qualified American suppliers, and by facilitating the partners’ payments for their purchases. In addition, 

depending upon the circumstances and guidance from the US Department of State, the DOD’s military assistance program (MAP) can 

also further US foreign policy goals by funding some (or most) of a 

partner’s military needs through MAP grants. Both programs have 

been successful on many occasions in the past.1

But what happens when no fully functioning national government 

is able to coordinate the establishment of an air force, or when the 

nascent partner nation acquires some airplanes without first having a 

realistic, well-financed roadmap for its operation and sustainment? 

What if the requisite infrastructure has been severely crippled and a 

raging insurgency hampers every effort to repair it? What is to be 

done when partner-nation volunteers risk their lives and their families’ 

safety by stepping forward for training, only to discover that, for lack 

of money and planning, there are no airplanes to fly? And what is the 

likely result if other priorities, a lack of suitable doctrine and training 

structures, constant turnover due to short-term deployments, and 

command inattentiveness combine in a ground-centric environment 

dominated by the US Army?
2 │INTRODUCTION

The aforementioned conditions faced the handful of USAF advisors deployed to help the Iraqi government reconstitute its air force 

beginning in January 2004. It was only after a tragic mishap in May 

2005 that took the lives of five exceptionally dedicated Airmen—four 

Americans and an Iraqi—that the USAF’s senior leaders began paying serious attention to a mission they had accepted without serious, 

visible deliberation some 17 months earlier. Even with that essential 

reengagement, it still took the better part of two more years’ analyses, 

preparations, and adjustments to begin to set things right.

This study summarizes the essentials of that complex sequence of 

events. Although it includes many elements of a cautionary tale, this 

is a story about the ingenuity, flexibility, and perseverance of the 

USAF Airman-advisors who deployed to Iraq and the Iraqi patriots 

they trained, mentored, and befriended. It is a story about accomplishing a demanding, unheralded mission under harrowing conditions in a foreign land. This is a story that should be preserved, if only 

to remind future USAF Airmen of some of the extraordinary challenges their predecessors received, accepted, and overcame.

Notes

Notes will appear in full form only in their first iteration. Thereafter, they will appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.

1. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Introduction to Security Cooperation Management,” in The Management of Security Cooperation (Wright-Patterson AFB, 

OH: DSCA, 2010), http://www.disam.dsca.mil/Research!Presentations/2%20introsc.ppt.
Chapter 2

A Brief History of the Iraqi Air Force,

1931–2003

The British government established the Royal Iraqi Air Force 

(RIqAF) on 22 April 1931, the last year of its direct control of Iraq 

under a 1920 League of Nations mandate.1

 The RIqAF, consisting initially of just five pilots and 32 ground crew, was equipped with modest 

numbers of British-built aircraft in the 1930s, and it continued to follow Royal Air Force (RAF) practices for decades thereafter. In fact, 

Great Britain continued to be Iraq’s principle source of military aviation training and combat aircraft procurement until the late 1950s.2

Iraq’s rulers generally followed British advice prior to World War 

II, but rising Iraqi nationalist and anticolonialist sentiments led to a 

pro-fascist coup d’état in April 1941. This resulted in a month-long 

Anglo–Iraqi War in May, during which the RIqAF flew its first combat 

sorties. However, even with aviation contingents provided by fascist 

Italy and Nazi Germany, the Iraqi insurgents were soon overwhelmed.3

 The coup leaders fled the country, and British forces 

occupied Iraq for the next six years.4

Iraq regained its sovereignty in January 1948, and RIqAF pilots 

flew bombing missions in the first Arab–Israeli War later that same 

year.5

 A pro-communist revolution toppled Iraq’s monarchy on 14 

July 1958, but Iraq continued to maintain an air arm. The renamed 

Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) bombed Israeli targets during the Six-Day War 

in 1967 and again in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973.6

Soviet air doctrine heavily influenced the IqAF in the 1970s, and 

the Air Force was largely outfitted with Russian-built combat aircraft 

when the Iran–Iraq War began in 1980.7

 Its effectiveness was limited 

for much of that eight-year conflict—even though Iraq also bought 

over 130 French-built Dassault Mirage fighters between 1977 and 

1990.8

 When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the IqAF could 

boast of having over 1,000 aircraft, but expensive equipage notwithstanding, the IqAF failed as a fighting force during the Persian Gulf 

War of 1990–91.9

 Indeed, the coalition’s onslaught during Operation 

Desert Storm (17 January–28 February 1991) caused many Iraqi airmen to seek asylum in Iran. At least 146 aircraft, valued at $2.5 billion, were interned there. Iran later declared the aircraft to be state 
4 │A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE, 1931-2003

property in partial reparation for the losses it had suffered during the 

Iran–Iraq War.10

In the decade following the Persian Gulf War, the IqAF mainly 

stayed within the boundaries defined by two coalition-imposed “no-fly” 

zones, but its remaining fighters occasionally tried to lure coalition 

aircraft within range of Iraqi ground defenses.11 During the run-up to 

the 2003 Iraq War, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein ordered his air 

force to conserve its remaining 300 aircraft by avoiding combat, and 

there were no aerial engagements reported during that conflict.12

Those planes not destroyed on the ground by coalition air power 

between the opening of hostilities on 20 March and the cessation of 

combat operations on 1 May 2003 were found dismantled and stored 

or hidden quite literally in the desert.13 Initially, there were suggestions that some of those aircraft might be refurbished and returned to 

service in an air force to be fielded by a rehabilitated Iraq, but political 

and economic realities quickly overwhelmed any such possibility.14

On 23 May the newly installed Coalition Provisional Authority officially disbanded the IqAF, along with the other branches of Iraq’s 

armed forces.15

Notes

1. Iraq has traditionally celebrated 22 April as “Air Force Day” in commemoration 

of the event. Lorie Jewell, “Iraqi Air Force Celebrates 74 Years,” Advisor 2, no. 7 (12 

February 2005): 6.

2. The Iraqi government moved away from the West and toward the Soviet Union 

following the communist-backed revolution that abolished Iraq’s monarchy on 14 

July 1958, but the IqAF continued to take delivery of British-built Hawker Hunter jet 

fighters as late as May 1967. See Ahmad Sadik and Tom Cooper, Iraqi Fighters, 1953–2003: 

Camouflage & Markings (Houston, TX: Harpia Publishing, 2008); Tom Cooper and 

David Nicolle, Arab MiGs, vol. 1, MiG-15s and MiG-17s, 1955–1967 (Houston, TX: 

Harpia Publishing, 2009), 96–99; and Cooper and Nicolle, Arab MiGs, vol. 2, Supersonic Fighters: 1956–1967 (Houston, TX: Harpia Publishing, 2011).

3. For fascist Italy’s efforts to provide the Iraqis with military aircraft, especially 

in the period immediately preceding World War II, see Giancarlo Garello, “Italian 

Wings over Iraq (1937–1941),” Small Air Forces Observer 32, no. 4 (April 2009): 114–17; 

and Garello, “Italian Wings over Iraq (1937–1941),” Small Air Forces Observer 33, no. 

1 (July 2009): 21–23.

4. AVM A. G. Dudgeon, RAF, The War That Never Was (Shrewsbury, England: 

Airlife, 1991); and Kevin Lyman, Iraq 1941: The Battles for Basra, Habbaniya, Fallujah 

and Baghdad (Oxford, England: Osprey Press, 2006).

5. Shlomo Aloni, Arab-Israeli Air Wars, 1947–1982 (Oxford, England: Osprey 

Press, 2001), 9.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE, 1931-2003 │ 5

6. Ibid., 51; David Nicolle and Tom Cooper, Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 Units in 

Combat (Oxford, England: Osprey Press, 2004): 21 and 65–70; and Tom Cooper, 

David Nicolle, and Patricia Salti, Arab MiGs, vol. 3, The June 1967 War (Houston, TX: 

Harpia Publishing, 2012); Tom Cooper and David Nicolle, et al., Arab Migs, vol. 5,

October 1973 War, Part 1 (Houston, TX: Harpia Publishing, 2014); and Tom Cooper 

and David Nicolle, et al., Arab MiGs, vol. 6, October 1973 War, Part 2 (Houston, TX: 

Harpia Publishing, 2015).

7. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Indian air force also dispatched significant 

numbers of flight instructors to Iraq; IqAF pilots trained in India as well. See Nicolle 

and Cooper, Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 Units, 78. For general coverage of the Iran–Iraq 

air war, see Maj Ronald E. Berquist, The Role of Airpower in the Iran–Iraq War (Maxwell 

AFB, AL: Air University Press, December 1988; Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop, 

Iran–Iraq War in the Air (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2003); Bishop and Cooper, 

Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat (Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing, 2003); 

and Cooper and Bishop, Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat (Oxford, England: 

Osprey Publishing, 2004).

8. Sadik and Cooper, Iraqi Fighters, chap. 9.

9. Rene Francillon, “Mirage at War: Iraqi and Kuwaiti Mirage F1s,” World Air 

Power Journal 4 (Winter 1990–91): 22–25; and Sadik and Cooper, Iraqi Fighters, 

chap. 9 For a detailed account of the IqAF’s performance at the outset of the Persian 

Gulf War, see Ahmad Sadik and Tom Cooper, “The First Night: Iraqi Air Force in 

Combat—17 January 1991,” International Air Power Review 26 (Winter 2009): 114–29.

More generally, see Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Airpower Survey, 6 vols (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1993); Stan Morse, ed., Gulf War Debrief (London: 

Aerospace Publishing, 1991); Richard Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the 

Gulf War (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992); and Christopher 

Chant, Air War in the Gulf 1991 (Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing, 2001).

10. The total encompassed both military aircraft and civil jet transports, including 

some airliners taken from Kuwait as war booty. See “Iraq to Iran: Minders Keepers,” 

Time, 8 April 1991, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,972677,00.html; 

“Iran Hoards Iraqi Aircraft,” Flight International, 24–30 April 1991, 9; and Babek 

Taghvaee, “Race to Iran!” AirForces Monthly, June 2010, 44–47.

11. Steve Davies, F-15C/E Eagle Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing, 2004): 12–21; Steve Davies and Doug Dildy, F-16 Fighting 

Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing, 2004): 

13–16; “Operation Southern Watch,” Air Force Historical Support Division, 18 September 

2012, http://www.afhso.af.mil/topics/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=19816; and Terry 

Boyd, “Operation Northern Watch: Mission Complete,” Stars & Stripes (European 

Edition), 31 March 2003, http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=1

3614&archive=true.

12. Dr Daniel L. Haulman, “What Happened to the Iraqi Air Force?” Air Force 

Historical Research Agency, 3 November 2009, http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews

/archive/2010/0516/0516Articles/Haulman30514.pdf.

13. Between late June and late July 2003, USAF engineers excavated over 30 IqAF 

jet aircraft that had been intentionally buried at Al-Taqaddum Air Base west of 

Baghdad, including some Mach 3–capable MiG-25R Foxbat reconnaissance planes. 

Their concealment, and the fact that US forces had been operating in the immediate 
6 │A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE, 1931-2003

vicinity for several months before learning of their presence, became a point of argument in the ongoing search for hidden caches of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). During a 5 August press conference, US Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld said this discovery bolstered the Bush administration’s expectation that 

stockpiles of Iraqi WMD would eventually be found. Kathleen T. Rhem, “American 

Forces Pull Hidden MiG Fighters Out of Iraqi Desert,” American Forces Press Service, 

6 August 2003, accessed 28 December 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/news

/Aug2003/n08062003_200308063.html; and Charles R. Smith, “Iraqi ‘Mach 3’ MiG 

Buried in Sand,” Newsmax.com, 6 August 2003, accessed 28 December 2009, http://

archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/203/8/6/105528.shtml. One of the recovered 

Foxbats was later acquired by the National Museum of the USAF. Bill Reinke, “Soviet 

MiG-25 Being Restored at Wright-Pat,” Dayton Daily News, 30 November 2006, accessed 1 January 2010, http://projects.daytondailynews.com/cache/galleries/News

/Local/113006mig/.

14. Don Woolford, “Iraqi MiG Cache to Become New Nation’s Air Force,” Australian Associated Press Financial News Wire, 22 April 2003; and Robert Burns, “U.S. 

Joint Chiefs Chairman Says Rebuilding an Iraqi Military Will Start with Dismantling 

Special Security Organs,” Associated Press Worldstream, 10 May 2003.

15. L. Paul Bremer, “Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2: Creation of a 

New Iraqi Army,” Sec. 1, 18 August 2003, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations

/20030818_CPAORD_22_Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf.
Chapter 3

The Rebirth of the Iraqi Air Force

Chartered to oversee a transitional period pending the formal 

return of sovereignty to the Iraqi people, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) re-created the national institutions deemed essential to 

that purpose, including a defense force called the New Iraqi Army 

(NIA).1

 In mid-June 2003, the CPA activated the Coalition Military 

Assistance Training Team (CMATT) to oversee the mobilization of the 

NIA. CMATT, led by Maj Gen Paul D. Eaton, US Army, was initially 

staffed with just five officers on short-term loan from US Central Command (USCENTCOM). Neither the CPA nor USCENTCOM provided 

any special preparation for their role, and General Eaton had only just 

been informed of his assignment in early May.2

 When he arrived in 

Baghdad, the new CMATT commander found that his organizational 

assets consisted of little more than “a 24-page PowerPoint briefing and 

a budget of $173 million.”3

The CPA directed CMATT to mobilize and equip an NIA force—

to be fielded by September 2006—consisting of about 40,000 soldiers 

grouped in three divisions (27 battalions) of light or motorized infantry. 

The CPA’s policy was that Iraq should not be rearmed to the point 

that it would present a credible military threat to its neighbors, and 

the NIA was to be structured and outfitted accordingly. Denying the 

ability to project national power by air was an essential corollary to 

that intent. Walter Slocombe, then the senior CPA advisor for security and defense, emphasized at a 23 June 2003 press conference that 

the NIA “would operate without an air force.”4

In spite of all the difficulties it faced, CMATT already had about 

1,000 Iraqi soldiers training at Kirkuk when CPA administrator L. 

Paul Bremer III signed Order Number 22 on 7 August 2003.5

 This 

directive formally established the NIA as “the first step toward the 

creation of the national defense force of the new Iraq.” It remained a 

matter of interpretation as to whether the language of Order Number 

22 also resurrected the IqAF, if only on paper. The order made no 

specific mention of an air arm, but it did define the NIA to include 

“all components of the national armed forces of Iraq.”6
8 │THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

The New Iraqi Army Air Corps

While CPA Order Number 22 may have implied the potential for 

an Iraqi air force, CMATT’s initial mobilization and training budget 

included no funds for aviation. But the situation was changing. On 5 

September 2003, with Iraq beginning to descend into chaos, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved General Eaton’s proposal to compress the NIA mobilization schedule by 24 months.7

Now, all three NIA divisions would have to be equipped, trained, and 

fielded by September 2004. The accelerated mobilization plan, which 

General Eaton called Phase II, was budgeted at just over $2.2 billion 

and included significant allocations for military equipment and infrastructure construction. Phase II also acknowledged the need for 

an NIA air element to conduct troop and logistics movements and 

casualty evacuation.8

General Eaton assigned the job of structuring the NIA’s air element 

to his CMATT future plans officer, Lt Col John M. Pioli, US Marine 

Corps. The NIA released funding for the air arm but “with the proviso that the air component fell under the aegis of the army and thus 

became an army air corps” rather than an independent air force.9

Over the next few months, Colonel Pioli’s preliminary planning 

efforts focused on generating very modest rotary-winged and light 

transport capabilities for the New Iraqi Army Air Corps (NIAAC). At 

the time, his vision was for a small, ground support-oriented force 

that could be equipped and made operational before the end of 2004. 

This goal seemed plausible because there were thought to be large 

numbers of former IqAF aircrew both qualified and willing to meet 

the need. Offers were soon made to bring some of those aircrew back 

on active duty.

Regardless of the Iraqi airmen’s readiness to serve, CPA policy still 

excluded an offensive air capability, and the NIAAC’s early recruiting 

efforts remained at least nominally fitted to that position. In an interview published on 24 March, Colonel Pioli said that there would be 

no near-term openings for former IqAF fighter pilots, even though 

during the Saddam era they were reputed to have been the IqAF’s 

best-trained airmen. “We are not bringing the jet guys back,” explained Colonel Pioli, “while there are already qualified Iraqi transport pilots still willing and able to fly.”10
THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE │ 9

Finding a Training Site

A sufficient supply of volunteers raised the next obvious question: 

where to train them? Egypt, Hungary, or perhaps even Iraq were all 

possibilities, but given Jordan’s willingness to host NIA officer training, it only made sense to ask if CMATT’s “Jordan Training Initiative” 

might be extended to the NIAAC. An accomplished military helicopter 

pilot, Jordan’s King Abdullah II readily agreed to invite the Iraqi airmen to his country. Better yet, the king offered to provide them with 

12 Bell UH-1 Huey helicopters (soon increased to 16) and two Lockheed C-130B Hercules transports.11 This was a chivalrous offer, to be 

sure, but all of the aircraft needed refurbishment and equipment upgrades. In response, the CPA agreed to pay for the work and to use a 

favored Jordanian contractor or, in the case of the Huey helicopters, 

Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) technicians.12 Delivery of the first 

C-130B was promised by 1 August; all of the Hueys were to be handed 

over by 1 September.13

As to the training program, the principals agreed that while RJAF 

instructors would do the actual teaching, CMATT would retain control of the NIAAC’s training formats and course syllabi. For its part, 

CMATT would fund the overall training effort, including fuel costs, 

until the Iraqis could assume responsibility in mid-2005. CMATT 

also agreed to reimburse the RJAF for any training-related aircraft 

parts expended in the first six months. This arrangement offered 

some special advantages from General Eaton’s perspective. Beyond 

the early acquisition of mission-appropriate, US-built airplanes at a 

reasonable cost, it meant that the NIAAC airmen could become type 

qualified far more quickly thanks to experienced instructors who 

spoke the same language and shared the same cultural perspectives.14

But there was another, more subtle advantage in the bargain. General 

Eaton’s experience working with the Jordanians in the fall of 2003 had 

convinced him that the Western democracies’ military leadership 

philosophy influenced Jordan to a greater degree than it did for many 

of Jordan’s more authoritarian neighbors. He expected that influence 

to be embedded within the Jordanians’ teaching methods, and this 

expectation nested easily with the CPA’s overall goal of encouraging 

the Iraqis to replace Saddam-era totalitarianism with democratic attitudes, principles, and practices.15 General Eaton’s views were echoed 

by Col Kim Smith, the British army officer assigned to CMATT as 

chief liaison officer in early 2004. “It was no accident,” said Colonel 
10 │THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

Smith, “that the training of both the air and the land component was 

taking place in Jordan. . . . The Jordanians represented the ethos that 

was sought for the Iraqis.”16

In January 2004 the NIAAC’s first 14 pilots entered UH-1 helicopter 

transition training in Amman, Jordan. They were accompanied by 18 

aircrew (including five pilots) programmed for C-130B training, 

along with 28 UH-1 maintenance technicians and 31 C-130B maintainers. An additional 29 ground support trainees reported in midMarch. This second cohort included logistics supervisors, weather 

forecasters, air traffic controllers, life support technicians, clerks, and 

equipment operators. Of greater long-term import, the Jordanians 

also hosted six NIA staff colonels who were expected to become the 

NIAAC’s initial senior leadership cadre.17

While the rotary-wing and transport training programs appeared 

to be on track in Jordan, the growing insurgent threat pushed the 

CPA to accept the need for broader NIACC capabilities. During a 21 

January press briefing, General Eaton acknowledged that CMATT 

was “also investigating the use of reconnaissance aircraft in order to 

effectively monitor the miles of Iraqi border, and infrastructure such 

as pipelines and electrical transmission facilities.”18

As to the future, General Eaton suggested that the NIA might 

eventually grow to become a force of eight to 12 divisions “backed up 

by attack helicopter aircraft, lift aircraft, and the wherewithal to 

secure the air above—air defense artillery and the interceptor aircraft 

that you need to defend the skies.” But he admitted that was only “a 

soldier’s theoretical construct,” and even with a large-scale deferral of 

other important Iraqi social needs and “prodigious contributions 

from donor nations,” it would still be at least three to five years before 

such a force could be built.19

CMATT Forms an Air Cell

Long-term expectations notwithstanding, CMATT faced a shortterm need to orchestrate the process of acquiring, integrating, and 

sustaining the aircraft the NIAAC expected to receive later in the 

year. In January 2004 the CMATT commander addressed that need 

by forming an internal air cell, commonly referred to as CMATT-A.20

Given the modest number of Iraqi airmen and aircraft involved, the 

CMATT-A staff remained quite small throughout its existence. Until 

its replacement in November 2005, the cell’s entire complement consisted 
THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE │ 11

of just four officer positions and (after January 2005) an Iraqi civilian 

contractor—leading CMATT-A’s incumbents to wryly refer to their 

office as “four [lieutenant] colonels in a closet.”21

In view of Britain’s important role in the coalition (and perhaps 

reflecting its Royal Air Force’s [RAF] long tradition of training and 

advising IqAF officers), the CMATT-A leadership position was “earmarked” for an RAF officer—occasionally a group captain (equivalent 

to a USAF colonel) but generally a wing commander (comparable to 

a USAF lieutenant colonel). The remaining three positions—also 

posited at the level of lieutenant colonel—were allocated along functional lines: one for helicopters and maintenance issues, one for 

C-130 transport matters, and one for reconnaissance/surveillance 

aircraft requirements. In 2004 these positions were generally filled by 

USAF or Air Force Reserve officers assigned on a 90-day rotational 

basis, but occasionally by US Marine Corps officers and, in one instance late in the year, by a major in the Italian air force.22

From Air Corps to Air Force

From its inception in May 2003, the CPA had always operated with 

the understanding that it was only a caretaker, and that its most important goal was to return sovereignty to the Iraqis as soon as practicable.23 By March 2004, with the publicly announced time for that 

transfer only a few months away, it was imperative that Iraq begin 

addressing its self-defense needs in a truly independent manner. On 

21 March CPA administrator Bremer signed Order Number 67, 

establishing a new Iraqi Ministry of Defense (IqMoD) and initiating 

the process through which the ministry would take control of Iraq’s 

security forces. The order renamed the NIA as the Iraqi armed forces, 

and section 2 of the order expressly stated that those armed forces 

included an Iraqi air force. By that action, the IqAF regained its independence as an institutional coequal—at least in theory—with the 

Iraqi army.24

Four weeks later, in a news release issued on 17 April, the CPA and 

Iraqi defense ministry officials jointly announced that the IqAF already had over 100 airmen undergoing instruction in Jordan and that 

recruiting stations were open in Baghdad and Mosul. They anticipated that Iraq’s air force would be nearly 500 strong by October. 

They also expected a squadron of six UH-1H Huey helicopters to be 
12 │THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

operational at Taji Air Base (AB) by July, a squadron of light reconnaissance aircraft positioned at Basrah “later this summer,” and the 

two ex-RJAF Hercules turboprop transports to be operational in October.

Since most of the initial pilot trainees were former IqAF members, 

they were presumed to need only some “difference” instruction to 

obtain currency in their new equipment. The news release also mentioned that the officers would be schooled in “the philosophy of a 

democratically-controlled military,” but it did not elaborate on what 

that education might include. As to the coalition’s role, the release 

explained that “mentoring teams from appropriate specialist areas 

will assist the [IqAF] in the establishment of the squadrons and bases. 

In particular they will develop safety procedures and standard operating procedures as well as aiding the interface with coalition forces.”25

The IqAF Gets Its First Commander and Its First Airmen

During the joint CPA–IqMoD press conference held on 17 April 

2004, Iraqi defense ministry spokesmen announced that “the Air 

Force will be commanded by a Major General (yet to be appointed), 

who will . . . act as the Chief of the Defense Staff ’s senior air advisor.”26

Soon thereafter, the defense ministry named Kamal Abdul-Sattar 

Barzanjy to serve in that position. An Iraqi Kurd born in Baghdad in 

1944, General Barzanjy became an IqAF jet fighter pilot after finishing 

undergraduate studies at the Iraqi Air Force College in 1968. In 1983 

he earned a master of military science degree after attending the Iraqi 

Military Staff College. General Barzanjy also graduated from Iraq’s 

National Defense College in 1986. Decorated for heroism during the 

Iran–Iraq War, he retired from active duty in 1995 as an IqAF staff 

major general with over 3,200 flying hours recorded in his official 

logbooks. After leaving active duty, General Barzanjy lived as a private citizen until being asked to accept this new post.27

On 27 May the IqAF held graduation exercises in Amman, Jordan, 

for its first 14 rated airmen—all former regime officer pilots—as they 

completed UH-1H helicopter flight training. The first 28 UH-1H 

maintainers finished their studies on 9 May, and 19 more logistics 

supervisors and ground support personnel graduated on 31 May. 

They joined the 10 operations support airmen who had finished in 

April. Eighteen C-130 aircrew and 31 Hercules maintenance technicians were scheduled to complete their studies by 15 July, and follow-on 

classes of about the same size would begin training shortly thereafter.28
THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE │ 13

The CMATT-supervised UH-1H syllabus had been structured in 

two phases for this initial class. The initial three-week phase assessed 

the students’ overall aviation skills—a necessary step, given that most 

of them had logged very few flying hours since the end of the Gulf 

War in 1991.29 The 16-week second phase—a ground school and instruction in basic flying, basic instruments, and advanced instrument 

flying—transitioned the students into the Huey helicopter. The graduates were scheduled to return to Iraq on 18 June, where they were to 

“assist the coalition with the recruitment, design and development of 

the new Iraqi air force as they await aircraft assignments.”30 And 

therein lay the next hurdle: the new graduates were ready to fly, but 

what were they to use for aircraft?

Early Aircraft Acquisition Problems

In his seminal work, Ideas and Weapons, noted airpower historian I. 

B. Holley explored the relationship between military doctrine and aircraft procurement. His thesis was that careful analysis and thoughtful 

estimation based upon sound doctrinal principles were essential predicates in the acquisition process. Put more simply, Holley showed that 

if you don’t plan wisely—if you don’t first think thoroughly about what 

you intend, and therefore what you need—then you won’t buy wisely.31

Given the many challenges facing the Iraqi interim government 

(IIG) and its coalition partners, it should come as no surprise that, with 

one noteworthy exception, there was little or no focused, high-level attention given to the IqAF’s mission, structure, and equipage requirements in 2004. The desperate need to forge a working polity while trying 

to suppress its mortal enemies left little time for the IIG to consider the 

needs of an air force that offered no real short-term military value. The 

sole exception—three ex-USAF C-130E transports delivered just before the first national elections held in early 2005—came about because 

of intense interest by officials at the very highest levels in both Baghdad 

and Washington, DC. In most other respects, the Iraqi air force’s acquisition processes in 2004 and early 2005 presented a textbook case for 

learning how not to equip an air arm.

Aerial Surveillance Platform Issues

On 19 April 2004, just two days after announcing the new service’s 

expansive intentions, the CPA formally invited potential vendors to 

submit their proposals for the aircraft needed to equip the proposed 
14 │THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

reconnaissance squadron. The requirement for what the CPA called 

an aerial surveillance platform (ASP) envisioned eight lightweight, 

two-seat aircraft outfitted with infrared/electro-optical sensor 

suites.32 The solicitation—or request for proposals—also included 

aircrew training and maintenance support requirements, along with 

an option to buy eight additional aircraft if the initial delivery proved 

successful. That said, bidders were given only three weeks to reply. 

Moreover, they had to deliver their first article within 30 days of contract 

award, and all eight aircraft had to be in Iraqi hands within six months.33

Much of this urgency was driven by the need to regain control over 

Iraq’s 3,800-mile border and to protect its oil production and delivery 

infrastructure against increasing levels of violence. There was also an 

implicit acknowledgment that the CPA’s mandate and money were 

both running out, and that denouement came about even sooner 

than expected. The transition had been announced for the last day of 

June, but in a surprise move Iraqi prime minister Ayad Allawi’s interim government took charge two days early, resulting in the CPA’s 

dissolution on 28 June.34 Thereafter, funding for the Iraqi air force 

would have to be negotiated among multiple branches and agencies 

of the US government.35

The winner of the surveillance aircraft competition, Seabird Aviation Jordan, delivered its first two SB7L-360 Seeker light observation 

aircraft (IqAF Serials YI-101 and 102) on 29 July 2004.36 Both began 

flying with newly activated Squadron 70 at Basrah in September, but 

they soon proved to be less than fully suitable for the mission. The 

Seeker lacked crew protection from ground fire, and it was underpowered, which made it a marginal performer even in favorable conditions. Moreover, its piston engine required high-octane aviation 

gasoline, a comparatively expensive fuel that was difficult to find in 

Iraq. Although the two planes continued to fly intermittently thereafter, 

the rest of the order was cancelled.37

Given the inadequacies of the Seeker, the Iraqi government asked 

the US Army for help in finding an appropriate replacement.38 On 28 

September, the Army’s Aviation and Missile Command awarded 

Transatlantic Traders, Inc., a $5.818 million firm, fixed-price contract 

for eight SAMA CH2000-MTSA light surveillance aircraft and supporting services.39 Based upon the two-seat Alarus general aviation 

trainer designed by a US-based firm called Aircraft Manufacturing 

and Design but produced by Jordan Aerospace Industries in Amman, 

Jordan, the first two examples (IqAF serials YI-103 and 104) were to 
THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE │ 15

have been delivered to Squadron 70 at the end of October 2004. As it 

turned out, fuel supply and engine problems delayed their turnover 

until mid-January 2005.40 The contract called for a delivery rate of two 

airplanes per month. Instead, the Iraqis received four airplanes in August 2005, and the last two were not received until September 2006.41

Unfortunately, these aircraft also proved to be unsatisfactory as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Like the 

Seeker, the CH2000 lacked cockpit armor, and its piston engine also 

burned scarce high-octane aviation gasoline. Moreover, the CH2000 

was essentially ineffective in ambient temperatures above 104 degrees 

Fahrenheit (40 degrees Celsius)—a common circumstance during 

Iraqi summers—and it was prone to cracks in its engine exhaust system, 

which introduced unacceptable levels of carbon monoxide into the 

cockpit.42

As an alternative to the Seeker and the CH2000, the Iraqi air force 

also accepted seven single-engine, six-passenger Comp Air 7SLX 

light transports as a gift from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Designed by AeroComp, Inc., of Merritt Island, Florida, as a propellerdriven, gas turbine-powered kit airplane marketed to hobbyist builders, 

these particular 7SLX aircraft were modified during their assembly in 

the UAE.43 When delivered, they included revisions to the nose gear 

and fuel systems, reduced engine intake baffling, and a belly-mounted, 

forward looking infrared (FLIR) turret and panel display. The Iraqis 

expected that up to four of the Comp Airs could be outfitted for ISR 

missions using the electro-optical sensor balls already in hand; the 

remainder were to serve as utility and liaison aircraft until more FLIR 

equipment could be acquired.

The first four Comp Airs arrived at Basrah in mid-November 2004, 

and the remaining three were delivered in the second week of December.44

All seven aircraft were assigned to Squadron 3 when it was activated 

in early January 2005. Soon thereafter, the unit moved to Kirkuk.45

From the beginning, the Comp Airs displayed evidence of their 

nonstandardized construction features and undocumented performance characteristics. On 25 January 2005 a Squadron 3 aircraft had 

to make a forced landing on a highway about 28 miles southeast of 

Kirkuk because its fuel-supply system had been improperly wired 

during assembly in the UAE.46 On 10 May while returning from 

Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) to Kirkuk, a Comp Air callsigned “Tiger 71” suffered an engine flameout due to fuel starvation 

and was forced to make an emergency landing on a dirt road about 18 
16 │THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

miles northeast of the airfield. The incident was attributed to an incorrectly installed shut-off fuel valve; the aircrew had become accustomed to following the words “open” and “closed” handwritten with a 

felt pen on the plane’s cockpit wall, but they were misled in part because the handles were installed differently on each aircraft.47 Just 20 

days later, a Squadron 3 Comp Air was lost with all five men aboard—

four of them USAF Airmen—in a crash near Jalulah, about 80 miles 

northeast of Baghdad. Subsequent investigations suggested that the 

undocumented (and uncertified) modifications made during that 

airplane’s construction may have contributed to the mishap. A second 

Comp Air mishap on 29 January 2006 involved an abrupt loss of control immediately after takeoff at Kirkuk. The Iraqi pilot was able to 

put the aircraft back down on the runway, but it was damaged beyond 

economical repair and had to be written off. Fortunately, that incident did not involve any fatalities or serious injuries, but it confirmed 

previous concerns regarding the airplane’s unforgiving nature under 

certain flying conditions.48

Helicopter Issues

Usable rotary-winged aircraft proved to be just as difficult to acquire and deploy as suitable fixed-wing aircraft—but for different 

reasons. The process of fielding Jordan’s October 2003 offer of 16 Bell 

Huey helicopters, for example, proved to be both lengthy and expensive. In May 2004 the CPA had expected to pay the Jordanians about 

$700,000 for each of the UH-1H helicopters to be taken out of storage, refurbished, and outfitted with improved avionics. With six 

months’ spare parts and maintenance support, the total cost of the 

project was then estimated at about $16 million.49 Before spending 

any money, however, it seemed prudent to assess the condition of the 

aircraft, especially given that by June CMATT-A was already having 

doubts about the suitability of using a single-engine version of the 

Huey in Iraq’s harsh summer environment.50

On 4 August 2004 Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated (ARINC), 

based in Annapolis, Maryland, received a $5.9 million “Phase I” contract to evaluate the 16 gift UH-1H helicopters (along with the two 

C-130Bs), then in Jordanian storage. If the aircraft were found to be 

worth refurbishing, then ARINC would be given an additional $12.9 

million to renovate them using a Jordanian subcontractor (Phase II) 

and another $16.1 million to support the helicopters after their delivery 
THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE │ 17

to Squadron 2 at Taji AB (Phase III). In all, this was slightly more than 

double what the CPA’s cost estimate had been just a few months earlier.51

ARINC and its Jordanian partner began to examine some of the 

mothballed UH-1Hs in late September, and by mid-December they 

had made sufficient progress for ARINC to be awarded both follow-on 

phases of the contract.52 The first two refurbished UH-1Hs (IqAF serials 

YI-201 and YI-202) were delivered to Taji AB on 4 February 2005; the 

second pair (IqAF serials YI-203 and YI-204) were turned over to 

CMATT-A at BIAP on 26 February. At that point, the expectation 

was that the first eight refurbished Hueys would be allocated to 

Squadron 2, which was set for formal activation at Taji on 22 April, 

the IqAF’s 74th birthday.53 The remaining eight UH-1Hs would be 

issued to a second battlefield mobility helicopter unit as they arrived 

from Jordan over the second half of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006. 

That unit, to be designated as Squadron 4, would also be based at Taji 

AB beginning in late summer.54 At least, that was the expectation.

In the meantime, the Iraqis were exploring other alternatives. In 

September 2004, they persuaded UAE officials to donate five Bell 

Model 206B Jet Ranger helicopters, and delivery was initially promised for November. After some delay, the five aircraft moved to Iraq 

in two shipments, arriving in late March and early April of 2005. The 

intent was that they should be used as training aircraft for the IqAF’s 

helicopter aircrews.55 The five Jet Rangers were assigned to Squadron 

12, which was activated in April at Taji AB. Unfortunately, the UAE’s 

gift did not include any provision for the helicopters’ sustainment, 

and their serviceability rates quickly began to decline. By mid-2005, 

all but one of Squadron 12’s aircraft were inoperable.

The Iraqis also pursued opportunities in the former Warsaw Pact. 

In December 2004 the Iraqi defense ministry used an intermediary to 

negotiate two contracts with Bumar, a Polish state arms conglomerate, 

for the delivery of 20 new Polish-built PZL W-3 Sokol helicopters and 

34 Russian-built Mil Mi-17 helicopters (10 new aircraft and 24 used 

aircraft to be refurbished by Bumar’s Russian subcontractor).56 The 

Polish manufacturer’s failure to produce airframes quickly enough 

and the poor quality of the reworked Mi-17s combined to force Bumar’s 

renegotiation of both agreements in early 2005.57
18 │THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

The Transports Get Priority

While the availability—or more accurately, the unavailability—of 

ISR aircraft and helicopters was a matter of concern, it was Iraq’s lack 

of a large, tactical airlifter that raised the defense ministry’s acquisition problems to the level of national politics. When Allawi took office 

in June 2004, his authority came with a short-term time constraint—

his government was publicly committed to holding nationwide elections no later than 30 January 2005. The prime minister’s official duties 

required that he and other senior officials be in near-constant motion 

around the country. The security situation was such that movement 

by air was the preferred means of travel to all but the nearest of destinations.

In late 2004 the Iraqis finally abandoned hope that Jordan’s previous 

promise of two C-130B transports would bear fruit. This came after 

much delay, and perhaps only then because the defense ministry had 

realized just how much their refurbishment would cost and that there 

might very well be cheaper alternatives. On 1 November the director 

general of the defense minister’s office, Ayad Raouf, put an end to the 

matter in a letter to the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. His instructions 

were definitive, if a little blunt. “The minister approved to exclude 

these two Aircrafts [sic] in the Iraqi army,” Raouf wrote, “because 

they are old and useless.”58

This left the prime minister in something of a quandary. The coalition certainly had lots of airplanes, but the problem with borrowing 

one of them was not logistical. It was psychological and therefore political. Allawi’s chief task and greatest challenge was to forge a unified 

nation, and moving about his country in an airplane bearing the flag 

of a foreign occupier would surely put the wrong foot forward. To be 

his own man, Allawi needed his own airplane.59

Notes

1. In its most preliminary planning stage, the NIA had been called the New Iraqi 

Corps. When USCENTCOM staffers began using the resulting acronym as a shorthand reference word, they soon learned that “NIC” sounds very much like an Arabic 

expletive, and they adopted NIA instead. Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 155.

2. General Eaton was commander of the US Army’s Infantry Center and School 

at Fort Benning, Georgia, when he was advised of his new assignment on 9 May. The 

transfer was very much unanticipated. In an interview published after his retirement 
THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE │ 19

in early 2006, General Eaton was reported to have said, “I was very surprised to receive a mission so vital to our exit strategy so late. I would have expected this to have 

been done well before troops crossed the line of departure. That was my first reaction: 

We’re a little late here.” Thom Shanker, “General Faults U.S. on Iraqi Military,” New 

York Times, 10 February 2006, accessed 16 April 2010, http://www.nytimes

.com/2006/02/10/world/Americas/10iht-army.html.

3. Dr. Donald P. Wright, Col Timothy R. Reese, and the Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign; The United States 

Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003–January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008): 433.

4. Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S.–British Project: To Build a Postwar Iraqi Armed Force 

of 40,000 Soldiers in 3 Years,” New York Times, 24 June, 2003, http://www.nytimes

.com/2003/06/24/world/after-war-new-army-us-british-project-build-postwar

-iraqi-armed-force-40000.html.

5. Wright, Reese, and the Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II, 435. 

See also Maj Timothy Childress, “Improving US Air Force Performance in Irregular 

Conflict: Reestablishing a USAF Special Air Warfare Center (master’s thesis, School of 

Advanced Air and Space Studies, June 2007), chap. 3; and Senate Democratic Policy 

Committee Hearing, “An Oversight Hearing on the Planning and Conduct of the War in 

Iraq,” Paul D. Eaton, Major General, US Army, Retired, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 25 

September 2006, http://dpc.senate.gov/hearings/hearing38/eaton.pdf. 

6. L. Paul Bremer, “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 22: Creation 

of a New Iraqi Army,” sec. 1, 18 August 2003, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations 

20030818_CPAORD_22_Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf.

7. In September 2006 General Eaton testified before a Senate democratic policy 

committee: 

I briefed this plan, essentially a second phase in my operation based upon a 

requirement to adapt, to [Secretary of Defense] Rumsfeld on September 5, 

2003, and got his approval to proceed with an accelerated adapted plan that 

would produce an army of 27 battalions and associated command and control, from national to squad [level] in the first year, and start the Navy and Air 

Force, with a budget of $2.2 billion. . . . At one point, the Secretary stuck his 

finger at me and said, ‘Just don’t make this look like the American Army.’ [I] 

Still don’t know what that meant. He also stated that we were to be his last 

priority, behind [Iraq’s] Police, Border troops, Iraqi National Guard, or Iraqi 

Civil Defense Corps and Facilities Protection Service.

Eaton, “An Oversight Hearing.”

8. Wright, Reese, and the Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II, 

441–42.

9. Robin Hughes, “Air Corps Evolves from Jordan to Back Army in Iraq,” Jane’s 

Defense Weekly, 24 March 2004, 14–15.

10. Ibid. Note, however, that former IqAF jet fighter pilots were being recruited 

for service soon thereafter. In an interview conducted in 2007, Maj Keith Belmear, a 

USAF officer who had been assigned to CMATT in 2004, said, “of the initial eight 

pilots I trained, one was a new recruit, one was a former airlift pilot (IL-76), and the 
20 │THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

rest were former fighter pilots.” Childress, “Improving US Air Force Performance,” 

37, note 1.

11. The gift offer came wrapped in a tangle of legal issues, since all 18 aircraft had 

previously been provided to Jordan under a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreement. 

This meant that the Department of State would have to approve the gift, as federal 

law required that department to oversee FMS transfers under the Arms Export Control Act (including advance congressional notification in certain cases). The Department of State initially balked because of questions about the CPA’s authority to legally 

bind future Iraqi government decisions regarding potential out-year transfers to 

other nations. It took until mid-February to resolve the issue in favor of the gift. 

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Department of State (DoS)/PM, to John Bolton, DoS/T, memorandum, subject: Third Party Transfer of FMS-Origin Aircraft—Jordan to the Coalition Provisional Authority, ca. 17 February 2004.

12. Bremer’s letter bore a contracting officer’s cautionary addendum noting that 

the agreement was “subject to the availability of funds.” Col Kathryn Sommerkamp, 

CPA/JA, to Lt Col John E. Lindsey, CMATT/C-9, e-mail, subject: Planes from Jordan, 

25 February 2004; Maj Gen Paul D. Eaton to Maj Gen HRH Faisel al-Hussein, RJAF/CC, 

letter, subject: Acknowledgement of Jordanian Offer, 5 May 2004; CPA/OGC to CPA 

administrator, memorandum, subject: Acceptance of Offer of Aircraft from the 

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 28 May 2004; and L. Paul Bremer to Lt Gen Khalid 

Elsarayreh, Royal Jordanian Air Force, letter, subject: Formal Acceptance, 11 July 

2004. (From records provided by Col Charles Westgate, CMATT-A, 2004–2005, 

hereafter cited as Westgate files.)

13. Hughes, “Air Corps Evolves.”

14. bid., 15.

15. Wright, Reese, and the Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II, 

436–37.

16. Hughes, “Air Corps Evolves.” To some degree, the Jordanians’ acceptance of a 

Western military leadership philosophy—and their willingness to support the CPA’s 

“Jordan Training Initiative”—was a consequence of the Western education and military service of King Abdullah II (1962–) and the long-term Western influence upon 

Jordanian society during the reign of his father, King Hussein (1935–99). King Abdullah 

studied in British preparatory schools and private US secondary schools before attending the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. After his commissioning in 1981, 

then-Prince Abdulla accepted command appointments in various British armored 

units at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. In the process, he attended command and staff courses in the United States and the United Kingdom, rose to the 

rank of lieutenant colonel, and became qualified as a helicopter pilot and helicopter 

antitank tactics instructor. As a major general in the Royal Jordanian Army, he commanded Jordan’s Special Forces Command prior to assuming the throne upon the 

death of King Hussein. “His Majesty King Abdullah II, King of the Hashemite Kingdom 

of Jordan,” biography, n.d., accessed 12 April 2010, http://www.kingabdullah.jo

/main.php?main_page=0&lang_hmka1=1.

17. Hughes, “Air Corps Evolves”; and Col Charles Westgate, “Chronology,” ca. 

August 2005.

18. “Coalition Provision Authority Briefing with Major General Paul Eaton, 

Commander, Coalition Military Assistance and Training Team, Re: Rebuilding Iraqi 
THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE │ 21

Forces,” press release, 21 January 2004, 3, accessed 5 March 2010, http://www.cpa

-iraq.org/transcripts/Jan21_Eaton.html.

19. Ibid., 5.

20. Maj John S. Pesapane, “Istikbarat: Rebuilding Intelligence Capabilities of the 

Iraqi Air Force” (research report, Air Command and Staff College, April 2007), 2; 

and Col Charles Westgate, discussion with the author, 20 May 2010.

21. Westgate, “Chronology.”

22. Ibid., air cell staff tab (2004–6). Tour lengths were increased from four to six 

months in mid-2005.

23. Wright, Reese, and the Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II, 

25–27.

24. L. Paul Bremer, “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 67: Ministry of 

Defense,” sec. 2, 21 March 2004, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030818

_CPAORD_22_Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf.

25. “Development of the Iraqi Air Force,” press release, 17 April 2004, accessed 8 

April 2008, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases/20040417_air_force.html. See 

also, “New Iraqi Air Force Being Formed,” AirForces Monthly, June 2004, 16.

26. “Development of the Iraqi Air Force.”

27. Biography [Maj Gen Kamal Abdul-Sattar Barzanjy], Headquarters Coalition 

Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT), n.d.; and Col Michael Byrne, briefing, subject: 

Iraqi Air Force Development Update, ca. February 2006, slide 31. [General Stephen 

Hoog in-brief folder] The precise date of General Barzanjy’s appointment remains 

elusive. Two Air Force Historical Research Agency staffers deployed to Iraq at the 

time both remember it as “late April.”

28. Westgate, “Chronology,” miscellaneous tab.

29. A British aviation magazine reported that “their skills had been considerably 

eroded due to the lack of flying time in the 12 years since the first Gulf War. Most [of 

the students] averaged only 32 hours per year during that period, whereas many pilots 

in the West expect to clock up a similar number of hours in a month.” See “New Iraqi 

Air Force Being Formed,” 16.

30. Del McMullen, “Iraqi Chopper Pilots Graduate,” press release, 26 May 2004.

31. Irving B. Holley, Ideas and Weapons (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953).

32. The ASP procurement process was convoluted. On 7 March 2004 the US 

Army Aviation and Missile Command issued a presolicitation announcement for an 

open competition to procure eight new, fixed wing aircraft, along with associated 

pilot upgrade training and maintenance support for one year (Federal Business Opportunity [FBO] announcement W914NS-04-R-0129). This drew a flurry of inquiries 

and clarification requests, resulting in an interim cancellation of the requirement on 

25 March (FBO #0852, 27 March 2004). A “Combined Synopsis/Solicitation View” 

(FBO announcement W58RGZ04R0547) was formally published on 19 April, only 

to be modified four times; the third change was released on 29 April (FBO #0887, 1 

May 2004) and the fourth on 6 May (FBO #0895, 9 May 2004). These were followed 

by another cancellation issued on 8 June (FBO #0927, 10 June 2004) because “all 

proposals received in response to this solicitation were technically unacceptable.” 

Notwithstanding that conclusion, on 15 June a CPA official announced the purchase 

of two Seabird Aviation Jordan SB7L-360 Seeker aircraft. Seabird Aviation Jordan 

was reported to be a joint venture between Seabird Aviation Australia and a Jordanian 
22 │THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

entity called the King Abdulah II Design and Development Bureau. “Iraqi Air Force 

to Get Seabird Seekers,” AirForces Monthly, August 2004, 19.

33. Dave Allport, “After Saddam,” AirForces Monthly, February 2008, 52–57.

34. L. Paul Bremer, “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 100: Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Coalition Provisional 

Authority,” 28 June 2004. As to the circumstances of the accelerated date change, see 

Dexter Filkins, “Extent of Government’s Control Unclear as It Formally Steps In,” 

New York Times, 28 June 2004, accessed 16 April 2008, http://www.nytimes

.com/2004/06/28/international/28CND-IRAQ.html.

35. After its dissolution, the responsibilities previously held by the CPA were redistributed among elements of the US Departments of State and Defense; this included 

the creation of new offices under both departments. See National Security Presidential 

Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” 11 May 2004.

36. Unsuccessful bidders included the Raytheon Company, Schweizer Aircraft 

Corporation, and Cessna Aircraft Company. See “More on New Iraqi Air Force Surveillance Aircraft Plans,” AirForces Monthly, July 2004, 15. The Seeker contract was 

reportedly valued at $2.3 million and included aircrew training, maintenance, and 

support. See “Iraqi Air Force to Get Seabird Seekers”; Allport, “After Saddam”; “Airborne Surveillance Isn’t Just a Military Role,” AMEinfo, accessed 14 April 2010, 

http://www.ameinfo.com/53684.html; and “Iraq Air Force to Get First New Aircraft,” 

Jordan Times, 29 July 2004, accessed 14 April 2010, http://www.jordanembassyus

.org/07292004003.htm. For additional background on the Seeker aircraft, see “Seabird Seeker Surveillance Aircraft Bids for Iraqi Order,” International Defense Review, 

19 May 2004.

37. The two aircraft were finally grounded in late 2007. Allport, “After Saddam”; 

“Iraqi Air Force,” accessed 17 April 2008, http://www.milavia.net/airforces/iraq

/IqAF.htm; and Headquarters IqAF, “Iraqi Air Force Capability Requirement and 

Development Plan,” report (Baghdad: HQ IqAF, 20 July 2005), 11. [English translation provided by 9AF/HO].

38. Ron Laurenzo, “Army Awaits New Proposals for Iraq Scout Planes,” Defense 

Daily, 7 July 2004, accessed on 10 April 2010, http://www.defencedaily.com/articles

/dt/2004/dt07070403.htm.

39. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, “Contracts” (press release, 1 October 2004), accessed 1 January 2010, http://www.defense

.gov/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract

.aspx?contractid=2859.

40. Mahmoud Al Abed, “Jordan Aerospace Industries Wins Iraqi Tender for 16 

Surveillance Aircraft,” Jordan Times, 30 September 2004, accessed 14 April 2010, 

http://www.jordanembassyus.org/09302004003.htm; and “Iraqi Air Force to Receive 

Eight Additional Aircraft,” Headquarters USCENTCOM press release, 14 October 

2004. For manufacturer’s performance data, see Aircraft Manufacturing & Development Corporation, “SAMA CH2000–Military Tactical Surveillance Aircraft (SAMA 

CH2000–MTSA),” accessed 4 January 2010. http://www.newplane.com/amd/amd

/sama/sama.html.

41. Maj Jeremy Brown, “CH2000 Aircraft History with the Coalition Air Force 

Transition Team,” bullet background paper, 25 March 2007; and Westgate, “Chronology.” 

[CAFTT files; General Allardice briefing book]. See also “SAMA CH2000.”
THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE │ 23

42. RAF Grp Capt M. W. Leaming, memorandum, subject: Brief for BGen 

Eidsaune and BGen Peck for Meeting with Head IqAF on 17 July 2005: IqAF—Unresolved 

Aircraft Issues, 15 July 2005. For manufacturer’s corrective action regarding exhaust 

leaks, see Aircraft Manufacturing & Development Service Bulletin March 2006, Rev. 

#0, accessed 4 January 2010, http://www.newplane.com/Service_Letters_Bulletines

/Service%20Bulletin%20March%202006.pdf.

43. Norm Goyer, “AeroComp’s Climb to the Top,” Private Pilot Magazine, February 

2001, 44–53, http://www.aerocompinc.com/press/reviews/privatepilot/feb2001/index

.htm.

44. Westgate, “Chronology.”

45. Ibid.; and TSgt Andrew Hughan, “Iraqi Air Force Provides Watchful Eyes for 

Elections,” Advisor 2, no. 5 (29 January 2005): 5. AeroComp, Inc. continues to offer 

the Comp Air 7SLX to kit builders; the manufacturer’s website references problems 

resulting from the airframe modifications made in the UAE prior to delivery to the 

IqAF. See the company’s web site at http://www.aerocompinc.com.

46. CMATT-A, “Informal Report on Forced Landing by Iraqi Air Force Comp Air 

Aircraft, 25 Jan 05,” Report (Baghdad: CMATT-A Headquarters, n.d.). [CAFTT files]

47. CMATT-A, “Report on Forced Landing by Tiger 71 Iraqi Air Force Comp Air 

Aircraft, 10 May 2005,” Report (Baghdad: CMATT-A Headquarters, n.d.). [Westgate files]

48. See chap. 5, this work; BBP, Maj Gary Lyles, CAFTT, “Comp Air History with 

the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT),” February 3, 2007. [General Allardice 

briefing book]

49. CPA, memorandum for record, subject: Project Description—C130/UH1-H 

[sic] Acquisition for the Iraqi Air Force, ca. 12 May 2004. [Westgate files]

50. Westgate, “Chronology.”

51. “Contracts.” Refer to Contract DAAB07-03-D-B006; and Westgate, “Chronology.” Phase I also included the cost of assessing the condition of the two C130Bs 

then in storage in Jordan. Phase III “deliverables” included specialized tools, ground 

handling and ground support equipment, initial spare parts stocks, and technical 

assistance. Tommy Hixon, “Phase Two/Three Funding,” briefing, 26 November 2004.

52. RAF Grp Capt Neal Jagger to Hon. Edward W. Gnehm, US Ambassador to 

Jordan, letter, subject: ARINC Support Request, 14 September 2004. [Westgate files] 

The “Chronology” gives the ARINC Phase II/III award date as 14 December 2004. 

This was Amendment 1 to the basic contract. Three additional amendments, apparently administrative in nature, were authorized in January 2005. On 15 February, the 

completion date of Phase I was extended to 3 February 2006. [Westgate, “Chronology.”]

53. Jewell, “Iraqi Air Force Celebrates,” 6.

54. Capt Tim Jeffers, “‘Hueys’ Touch Down at Taji Military Training Base,” Advisor

2, no. 6 (5 February 2005): 3. [The delivery date of the second pair of UH-1Hs is from 

the Westgate Chronology, citing DD 1149s and a memo from ARINC to CMATT.]

55. Westgate, “Chronology.”

56. The $167.04 million contract was signed on 23 December 2004. It called for 

delivery within 18 months of four Sokols outfitted to carry casualties, four Sokols to 

be equipped as very important persons (VIP) transports, and the remainder to be 

armed for “near air support.” Headquarters IqMoD, letter, subject: A Contract of 

Supplying Sokol Helicopters, 23 December 2004.
24 │THE REBIRTH OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE

57. The negotiation of these contracts and the details of their subsequent revision became a matter of contention. The agreement for the 34 Mi-17s included a 

payment of $113 million for the 24 used aircraft. Eight of the 10 new Mi-17 aircraft 

were delivered in two batches in February 2006, albeit without the mission-specific 

equipment required by the original contract. They were accepted, but the IqMoD 

refused the last two of the 10 new aircraft for lack of suitable engines, and those two 

were later replaced. The 24 used Mi-17s were rejected after the IqMoD learned that 

Bumar’s subcontractor was attempting to rehabilitate 27-year-old airframes that had 

been in long-term storage. The Iraqi defense minister, Saadoun al-Dulaimi, was 

quoted in early 2006 as saying, “our technicians went to Russia to inspect them, and 

they were shown to be junk.” Simon Ostrovsky, “Iraq Air Force Needs More Than 

New Coat of Paint,” Agence France-Presse, 25 April 2006, accessed 31 December 

2009, http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm. A smaller replacement shipment was 

agreed upon thereafter. See RAF Grp Capt J. Q. Hallwood, CAFTT/DD, memorandum, 

subject: The IqAF Mi17 Procurement (Version 3), 15 March 2006; and James Glanz, 

“Rebuilding Iraq’s Sir Force a Challenge for U.S. Trainers,” New York Times, 5 February 

2007, accessed 10 January 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/05/world/africa/05iht

-airforce.4474337.html.

58. Ayad Raouf, Iraqi Ministry of Defense, to Joint Headquarters, letter, subject: 

Subject/Aircraft C-130-B, 1 November 2004. [English translation, Westgate files] Of 

the two C-130B airframes, one was reported to have accumulated around 12,000 flying hours prior to being put in long-term storage, and the other had flown about 

9,000 hours. Neal McFeeters, Aeronautical Radio, Inc., to RAF Wing Cdr Stephen 

Shell, CMATT-A, letter, subject: The Way Ahead, 27 October 2004. [Westgate files]

59. Col John M. McCain, “Genesis of the New Iraqi Air Force: Security Assistance in Action,” DISAM Journal, Fall 2005, 25–26, http://www.disam.dsca.mil

/pubs/Archives/Journal28-1.pdf.” 
Chapter 4

The Introduction of USAF

Advisory Support Teams

In mid-October 2004 the Iraqi government asked the United States 

for a small number of aircraft to use as executive transports; for multiple 

reasons, the four-engine Lockheed C-130 Hercules was the Iraqis’ 

preferred choice. This request posed considerable difficulty for the 

DOD. Not only was the proposed delivery timeline extraordinarily 

short (given that the election was just over three months away), but 

also the IqAF had only limited experience in operating or maintaining transport aircraft of that complexity—ordinarily a prerequisite 

for equipment transfers made via the FMS case process. Nonetheless, 

a multiagency action group, assembled under the aegis of the Office 

of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, negotiated a series of creative solutions. The Air Force identified 

three older, but still serviceable, C-130Es that could be transferred to 

Iraq under the DOD’s Excess Defense Articles program.1

As it turned out, legally reassigning the C-130s’ ownership to the 

IqAF was the least difficult aspect of the transfer. Nor was it especially 

problematic to teach a small number of Iraqi aircrew to fly them. The 

RJAF was equipped with C-130Hs and was willing to provide the 

necessary instruction—as it had been doing for most of the modest 

number of Iraqi aircrew, technicians, and ground support personnel 

returned to active service since early 2004. Accordingly, four fourman Iraqi aircrews received C-130 familiarization training from Arabicspeaking instructors at the RJAF base at Amman, Jordan.2

The Hercules’ maintenance and logistics requirements had no 

such ready solution. In the long term, Iraq could use the normal FMS 

case process to purchase C-130 spare parts and support equipment 

from US suppliers through DOD channels. For the short term, the 

transfer team turned to the Multi-National Security Transition 

Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I), since its mission was to “organize, 

train, equip, and mentor Iraqi security forces.”3

 MNSTC–I had an initial 

budget of $5.8 billion for that purpose. Inasmuch as the transfer 

involved security forces training, MNSTC–I agreed to provide $45 

million for the C-130s’ support, and this would carry the program’s 
26 │THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS

logistics costs until the Iraqi defense ministry could take on that responsibility in late 2005.4

USCENTCOM’s Air Force component (USCENTAF) also provided a key element for the transfer’s success by agreeing to colocate 

Iraq’s C-130 unit—to be designated as Squadron 23—with the USAF’s 

777th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (EAS) and 777th Expeditionary 

Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (EAMS). At the time, both USAF 

units were stationed at Ali AB, Iraq, near Talil.

Early Efforts

This effort was not the first instructional support provided to Iraq 

by USAF and US Air Force Reserve (USAFR) personnel. In June 2004 

CMATT-A had requested 90-day assignments of what it called 

“squadron mentors” for the three Iraqi units expected to be operational in the second half of that year: four aircrew and a flight line 

maintenance noncommissioned officer (NCO) for the C-130 unit; a 

pilot, sensor operator, and flight line maintenance NCO for the ISR 

squadron; and a pilot, crewman, and flight line maintenance NCO 

for the battlefield mobility helicopter unit. The C-130 mentorship requirement became moot when the Jordanians’ C-130B offer fell 

through. The ISR requirement began to be filled in late summer 2004, 

but the helicopter requirement continued to languish.5

Generally speaking, the very small USAF contingent assigned as 

advisors in fall and early winter 2004, including the members of 

CMATT-A, had not received any specialized preparation for their 

tours in Iraq. They certainly had not been trained in what the USAF 

called foreign internal defense (FID) advisor duties.6

 That specialty 

was the purview of the Air Force Special Operations Command’s 

(AFSOC) 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), and it was not until 

December that CMATT-A staffers began to ask for that unit’s assistance.7

 Even then, CMATT-A expected that the 6th SOS’s FID specialists would only be assigned to Iraqi squadrons as small advisory 

support teams (AST), and not to the IqAF headquarters, where they 

might have been more effective in the short term.8

Aircraft deliveries in 2004—or, more accurately, delays in aircraft 

deliveries in 2004—played an obvious role in the IqAF’s modest results. But so did the new service’s indecisiveness in providing funding 

and facilitating aircraft sustainment arrangements in 2005, particularly 
THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS │ 27

as to the helicopters based at Taji. A small stream of Iraqi aircrew and 

maintenance technicians had been graduating from Huey training 

courses in Jordan since spring 2004, but they had nothing to fly or 

repair. When the 6th SOS’s first two rotary wing-qualified ASTs 

arrived at Taji AB on 22 February 2005, the initial pair of Aeronautical 

Radio, Incorporated (ARINC)-refurbished UH-1Hs had been there 

for only three weeks. Although ARINC delivered two more Hueys a 

week later, there were still no provisions for spare parts or other 

essential supplies. In the meantime, the rehabilitation of the other 12 

UH-1Hs in Jordan stalled while General Barzanjy and his superiors 

pondered whether to field something else instead.9

The C-130 ASTs Deploy

The C-130 requirement was different; it involved hands-on training using current USAF equipment and involved far larger numbers 

of USAF Airmen. Perhaps more to the point, it was initiated (and 

monitored thereafter) at the highest levels in both Baghdad and 

Washington, DC.

USCENTAF selected the 777th EAS to serve as sponsor for the effort 

because that squadron was outfitted with the same approximate vintage of C-130Es as those being provided to the Iraqis. Moreover, the 

squadron’s experienced aircrew could provide backup to the C-130 

AST flight instructors and loadmasters who would be assigned to the 

IqAF’s new transport unit. As the 777th EAS’s principal support organization, the 777th EAMS could offer the Iraqis access to its spare 

parts stocks and specialized support equipment inventories. However, its chief value would be providing knowledgeable advice to 

Squadron 23’s technicians. The point was to show the Iraqis that the 

Americans had confidence in the C-130E—even though many stillserving USAF Hercules transports had been built as much as four 

decades earlier—precisely because those aircraft had been properly 

maintained.10

Providing Iraq with three transport aircraft and their related materiel 

needs was important, but such did not address the equally critical 

need to “missionize” the aircrew flying those planes into or through 

high-threat areas and training the maintenance specialists and 

ground support staff needed to keep them in safe operating condition. Since Iraq had no prior experience with this particular aircraft, 
28 │THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS

it would be necessary to not only provide a group of USAF advisors 

who could fly the C-130s to support near-term Iraqi airlift requirements but also to advise and mentor the Iraqis until they became 

self-sufficient enough to train their own countrymen.

After reviewing the projected mission requirements and conferring 

with authorities within the USAF’s C-130 community, the transfer 

team identified 35 skill positions deemed essential to form an adequate 

AST for that aircraft type. Volunteers were solicited from qualified instructor aircrew and maintainers in Air Mobility Command (AMC) 

and Air Education and Training Command (AETC). Rigorous standards and experience were essential; overall, the selectees averaged 

more than 16 years of service.11 This ensured a high level of practical 

expertise but did not mean selectees were qualified to advise foreign 

airmen. In particular, the C-130 AST members lacked Arabic language skills, and the short-notice nature of their assignment only left 

time for them to attend a three-day Middle East orientation course 

taught by the USAF Special Operations School, located at Hurlburt 

Field, Florida. The course provided a brief review of Iraqi history (including the origins and differences between Shiite and Sunni Muslims), 

Arabic naming conventions, and an introduction to Iraqi cultural 

norms and sensitivities.12

The Activation of Squadron 23

The C-130 ASTs and the Squadron 23 airmen conducted a formal 

turnover ceremony at Ali AB on 14 January 2005.13 The three refurbished Hercules aircraft (IqAF serials YI-301 through 303) bore a 

fresh coat of standard USAF gray camouflage paint but with the 

markings changed to reflect Iraqi ownership. Iraqi prime minister 

Allawi was most appreciative of the gesture. In a 16 January letter that 

began with the words “Dear George” (in hand-written English), the 

Iraqi leader expressed his delight to the president of the United States:

I was taken aback this morning as I looked at a few pictures that made be [sic] 

quite proud. The pictures where [sic] of an Iraqi Air Force base, with Iraqi Air 

Force personnel standing around the first 3 Iraqi Air Force C-130 planes with the 

Iraqi Air Force logo on the side and the Iraqi flag on the tail of the aircrafts [sic].

These pictures reminded me of our previous phone conversation where you 

had promised me you would send me a few aircrafts [sic]. You have fulfilled 

your promise and for that I am sincerely grateful. I only hope that this is the 
THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS │ 29

start of an ongoing process of strengthening the Iraqi Air Force, and making 

the people of Iraq proud that they have an Air Force that can protect their 

skies and defend their country.14

On 12 February, two days after their first AST-monitored training 

flight, an all-Iraqi crew flew Allawi from Baghdad to an airport near 

Kirkuk and back. That event was an important milestone—and not 

just to the IqAF aircrew or the accompanying AST advisors who 

monitored their performance. A media report quoted AST instructor 

pilot Maj Mike Frame as saying “the crews are much better than we 

expected. They just need some time to get acquainted with the new 

plane and new flying procedures.” As to the Iraqi officer designated to 

fly Allawi on that first official executive flight—unidentified at his 

own request for security reasons—Major Frame said that “they were 

randomly picked. . . . He’s their best pilot, though.”15 Major Frame 

also described the closeness that had developed between the C-130 

AST instructors and their Iraqi students. “Their tent was right next to 

ours,” he recalled. “They’re like us, and it was pretty rewarding when 

my student began to show me pictures of his son. . . . That’s when you 

know he’s a friend.”16

IqAF Headquarters Relocation

and Operations Integration

Although the IqAF became operational in early October 2004, its 

size and structure continued to limit its effectiveness. Only in April 

2005 were there enough qualified senior staff officers to man an 

administrative defense ministry-level headquarters and a subordinate operations headquarters. At that point, both headquarters were 

still located in the defense ministry compound in Baghdad, where a 

new Iraqi armed forces joint operations center was set to open in 

mid-May.17 Be that as it may, the operations headquarters staff needed 

better access to its four subordinate bases, and that meant movement 

by air. In late April, CMATT-A recommended that the operational 

headquarters move to New al-Muthana AB (NAMAB), colocated on 

the outskirts of Baghdad with the BIAP. General Barzanjy agreed, and 

he ordered the transfer to be accomplished by the end of July.18

Shifting the operational headquarters to an active airfield would 

help, but that still left a critical operating issue unaddressed. How 

were Iraqi and coalition air operations to be coordinated or at least 
30 │THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS

conducted to not result in false alerts, conflicted airspace, or worse? 

That need was underscored in the last week of January by two unrelated 

but revealing events.

On 24 January a Squadron 3 Comp Air was forced to make an 

emergency landing on a highway about 28 miles southeast of Kirkuk. 

No one was injured, and the aircraft was undamaged. However, because IqAF flights were not included in the coalition’s daily air tasking 

order (ATO), the incident investigators found (among other things) 

that it would have been difficult for coalition forces to mount a timely, 

coordinated combat search and rescue (CSAR) effort. Even if a rescue 

was possible, the downed aircrew did not have the CSAR communication plans and the radio code words needed to talk to any would-be 

rescuers. Fortunately, the AST pilot (a US naval aviator) contacted 

Kirkuk Center by radio, and an escorted tanker truck was dispatched 

to refuel the airplane. All involved were safely recovered, but that 

story could have had a much sadder ending.19

Three days later, during an inspection visit to Basrah, USCENTAF 

commander Lt Gen Walter “Buck” Buchanan learned that the AST 

assigned to Squadron 70 was advising the Iraqi airmen to always “fly 

lower than 3,000 feet to avoid reporting into controlled airspace.”20

While the resulting “invisibility” gave them greater freedom of action 

for their ISR and training efforts, it also prevented them from supporting any coalition air operations, no matter how beneficial that 

participation might have been. Whether or not this information resulted in the USCENTAF commander’s personal intervention is 

unclear, but on 31 January a combined air operations center (CAOC) 

planner sent an advisory note to the combined force air component 

commander (CFACC) and the CAOC director informing them that 

“all [IqAF] aircraft training, administrative flights, and tasked missions will be reflected in the ATO.” That inclusion became effective 

the next day.21

While it was an important step forward, being included in the 

ATO was not the same as being included in coalition air operations 

planning, let alone performing missions in response to ATO-published 

taskings. As a CAOC analyst wrote in mid-February, “the [IqAF] is 

part of a sovereign government and they can fly where they wish.”22 It 

was important that the coalition be aware of Iraqi flights, but becoming 

a full partner in coalition air operations would take considerably 

more preparation, negotiation, and coordination.
THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS │ 31

IqAF Personnel Recruiting and Retention Challenges

As of July 2005, the Iraqi air force consisted of about 400 IqAF 

personnel, but its leadership expected to reach an authorized strength 

of 449 by year’s end and to expand to 1,146 by December 2006.23

Nonetheless, there were significant hurdles to overcome. Because of 

the insurgency, recruiting was difficult, and it was especially hard to 

find volunteers with the skills and abilities needed to supervise, operate, 

and maintain a modern air force. Virtually all of the fixed-wing officer 

aircrew who stepped forward to join the IqAF had learned to fly prior 

to the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91, and most had flown very little 

thereafter. They were well-educated, and many were experienced 

pilots, but they were no longer young men—almost all were in their 

mid-to-late 40s. Ground crew recruits, while younger, were generally 

less well-educated—in fact, many were illiterate—and finding candidates 

with the technical expertise and leadership skills needed to serve as 

warrant officers or senior NCOs was a special challenge.24

The language barrier was especially daunting. During an interview 

conducted in July 2005, MSgt Tommy Lee, an AST flight engineer of 

the 314th Airlift Wing, said, “One time I had to explain in six different 

ways why the instrument panel wasn’t lit up. . . . It took me 30 minutes 

to explain what it would have taken less than 30 seconds to explain to 

a U.S. Airman.”25 Although many Iraqi officers spoke some English, 

very few enlisted recruits spoke any English at all; so attempting to 

train them at US facilities would be unprofitable. Instead, reliable 

Iraqi interpreters had to be hired, which entailed further problems 

and delays. The interpreters’ work was supplemented with English 

language course instructors provided by contractors and the DOD’s 

Defense Language Institute, but even so, the language barrier created 

substantial, hard-to-resolve delays in the students’ training schedules.26

Working conditions were also a factor in the new air force’s retention, training, and operational efforts. Even if equipage and maintenance materials were on hand—which often they were not—electrical 

power supplies were intermittent, and insurgent attacks could come 

at any moment. Insurgent reprisals and threats of reprisals were all 

too common, and even the most routine ways of doing business were 

challenges in Iraq. For example, the simple act of getting paid involved a laborious, time-consuming, multistep process for Iraqi airmen. There was no functioning banking system, at least not in the 

Western sense; so all pay transactions had to be conducted in cash. 
32 │THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS

This meant that a team of trusted officers had to travel to central 

Baghdad, sign for large quantities of Iraqi currency, and then return 

safely to base to distribute the money to the waiting recipients. Once 

the airmen had been paid, they had to carry the precious currency to 

their families. Depending upon the circumstances, doing so might 

take the airmen off base for a few hours, a day or two, or perhaps a 

week or more. It was a hard way to run an air force.27

Progress at Ali and Kirkuk

As spring 2005 turned into summer, the Iraqi transport crews continued to gain experience with their C-130s. Squadron 23 made the 

new air force’s first C-130 flight outside of Iraqi airspace during the 

first week of February when, under AST mentorship, a five-man crew 

flew from Ali AB to Amman, Jordan.28 On 1 April a Squadron 23 

crew transported 51 Iraqi soldiers back to Iraq from an Emirati training site. This sortie established an administrative milestone of sorts 

because, in addition to flying the mission on their own, the crew was 

able to complete all the clearance forms, customs declarations, transit 

route applications, and other paperwork needed to travel through 

international airspace and land in a foreign country.29

In July Squadron 23 airmen conducted Operation Iraqi Power, the 

first operational airlift mission flown since the fall of the Hussein regime. This effort, mounted at the request of the ministry of electricity, 

was needed to protect Iraqi government power generation stations 

and distribution networks. The squadron had to palletize and move 

2,700 assault rifles and a million rounds of ammunition from Baghdad 

to Basrah. After five days’ preparation, the squadron delivered the 

shipment in five “chalks” without incident.30 The operation also 

chalked up some other firsts, including the first time Iraqi loadmasters 

prepared airlift cargo without significant AST assistance and the first 

time that NAMAB was used to stage an operational IqAF mission. 

This was a significant event, as NAMAB had already been proposed 

as Squadron 23’s new operating location once its facilities were in 

better repair and stocked with sufficient supplies and support equipment. Operation Iraqi Power would be the first in a series of familiarization movements designed to introduce the squadron and the base 

to one another over the next six months.31
THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS │ 33

C-130 flight training reached a significant milestone that same 

month with the graduation of the first six “mission qualified” C-130E 

aircrew at Ali AB on 12 July. All graduates were members of the initial 

cadre of 19 students sent to Jordan for flight training in October 2004; 

they had then attended the USAF Basic C-130E Conversion Course 

at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas, in January 2005. Before receiving their 

qualification certificates, the students had returned to Ali AB in February and undergone an intensive regimen of ground and flight training, English language training, and aircraft systems academics.32

Things were also looking up at Kirkuk. On 10 April the Comp Airequipped ISR unit, Squadron 3, was declared operational after its first 

six pilots and eight maintenance engineers graduated in a ceremony 

held at the base. Over the previous three months, the pilots had completed a 23-flight basic training syllabus under the tutelage of the two 

AST pilots (one USAF and one US Navy) assigned to the squadron. 

Two of the new graduates would make an additional 22 flights to become qualified as aircraft commanders.33

Problems at Basrah and Taji

In a way, the successes of Squadron 23 only served to highlight the 

less satisfactory situations in Basrah and Taji, the home stations for, 

respectively, Squadron 70’s four ISR aircraft and the IqAF’s rotarywing operations. Although the ISR effort continued to make some 

advances—including Squadron 3’s becoming operational at Kirkuk 

in April—it remained a halting process. On 17 January Squadron 70 

augmented its two-plane Seeker force at Basrah with the addition of 

the first two SAMA CH2000s.34 The new aircraft were soon engaged 

in familiarization and training missions, some of which included 

“real-world” incident surveillance and reporting.35 Unfortunately, 

both CH2000s experienced engine exhaust leaks as early as mid-February. 

Combined with other shortcomings, this forced a reevaluation of the 

SAMA contract. In mid-April CMATT-A abandoned the follow-on 

purchase option for a second block of eight CH2000s and gave serious 

consideration to canceling any further acceptances. In July, after 

weighing the options, CMATT-A decided to continue with the original 

eight-unit agreement. Four of the remaining six deliverables were 

turned over to Squadron 70 during the first week of August—more 

than half a year after their originally programmed delivery dates.36
34 │THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS

Basrah’s problem was a lack of airplanes, but Taji lacked spare 

parts. Four of the 16 Jordanian-donated UH-1Hs had been delivered 

in February, but that transfer did not include any maintenance support. Instead, the Hueys’ maintenance needs were to be met by the 

sustainment contract signed with ARINC in December 2004. Unfortunately, ARINC’s initial UH-1H restoration and support work 

proved to be less than satisfactory, resulting in a complaint to ARINC’s 

corporate offices from Lt Gen David Petraeus, US Army, the MNSTC–I 

commander. This appeared to have the desired effect, at least as to the 

quality of the remaining refurbishments. ARINC’s third UH-1H delivery (IqAF serials YI-205 and 206) arrived at Taji in late May, and 

the two new helicopters’ workmanship was much improved. Nonetheless, the Hueys’ sustainment situation still languished, and the 

Iraqis’ reluctance to buy more UH-1Hs did not help matters. The 

problem was that IqAF commander General Barzanjy preferred 

something else, even if he was not entirely sure what that alternative 

should be.37

CMATT-A—mindful of the need to get something into the air 

sooner rather than later—believed that the Iraqis should make use of 

what was available, rather than wait for something better. Even so, 

CMATT-A’s position would require more near-term sustainment 

funding, or at least better use of the money already allocated. On 21 

May the CMATT-A director pleaded his case to General Petraeus. A 

$9.5 million “earmark” had been set aside to buy new ISR aircraft. 

Instead, would MNSTC–I reprogram that sum for maintaining and 

improving the aircraft already on hand? General Petraeus agreed, and 

the money was reallocated: $4.5 million for the Bell 206 JetRangers of 

Squadron 12, $3 million for Squadron 3’s Comp Airs, $1 million for 

the UH-1Hs of Squadron 2, and $1 million for Squadron 70’s Seekers.38

It would take time for that reallocation to be translated into contract specifications, for the contracts to be negotiated and awarded, 

for parts to be located or made and supplies delivered, and for operations to then resume. In the meantime, the sustained lack of attention 

and support was taking its toll, both on the morale of the ASTs and on 

the resolve of the Iraqi airmen who risked their lives and the safety of 

their families daily to carry out their mission.

The mix of ASTs and the working command and control situation 

made the situation at Taji somewhat complicated. The two ASTs assigned to advise Squadron 12 and its JetRanger operators, for example, 

were members of the Arizona National Guard. Because of its past 
THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS │ 35

experience with UH-1Hs, the 6th SOS provided the five ASTs (two 

pilots, two NCO flight crewmen, and a maintainer) assigned to 

Squadron 2 and to Squadron 4—the latter a second Huey unit that 

had been activated at Taji earlier in the year but not yet equipped. 

Ordinarily, the 6th SOS would have deployed its ASTs in integrated 

teams, which would remain under the squadron’s direct control no 

matter the assignment. That was not the case in Iraq, however. There 

the ASTs operated individually and under the direct control of 

CMATT-A—which is to say, under the operational control of the 

US Army.39

By late May the situation at Taji was fast approaching unacceptable. Squadron 12’s five JetRangers remained in sound condition 

overall, but the spares situation had reduced their operability rate to, 

at best, about 60 percent—and that was unsustainable. The lack of 

logistical support had effectively grounded Squadron 2’s UH-1Hs, 

and its junior officers were so disgusted with the situation that they 

attempted—unsuccessfully—to resign en masse.40 These circumstances placed a strain upon the working relationship between the 

American advisors and their Iraqi hosts, but cultural differences and 

the ASTs’ living conditions probably played a role as well.41 Inevitably, 

the blue-suited ASTs lodged complaints with multiple recipients via 

back-channel means, and word of the complaints soon reached Brig 

Gen James Schwitters, US Army, the CMATT commander.42 On 30 

May he traveled to Taji to review the situation firsthand and to remind CMATT-A’s grousing Airmen-advisors of the sacrosanct nature 

of the chain of command; they answered to him regardless of what 

color uniform they wore.43

Unfortunately, there were no immediate means available to correct 

the situation at Taji; that would not change until either more UH-1Hs 

were delivered and made sustainable or the Iraqis made a concerted 

effort to field something else. Given the inability to conduct flight 

operations, the 6th SOS decided there was no point in keeping scarce, 

Huey-qualified ASTs in place. On 27 June it withdrew its advisors 

from Taji.44

The mission failure at Taji should have come as no surprise, if only 

because it happened in slow motion and in full view. Its immediate 

cause was a lack of spares, but that shortage was only the latest in a 

lengthy series of neglects. In a detailed end-of-tour analysis submitted 

in late June, departing 6th SOS advisor Maj William Denehan pulled 

no punches. He wrote, “IqAF 2nd Squadron is currently non-functional. . . . 
36 │THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS

Aircraft acquisition was poorly managed, unplanned, and unsupported . . . 

[and] overall IqAF development has been severely neglected and poorly 

managed” [emphasis in the original].45 His blunt conclusions were 

shared—and voiced—by others in Iraq, including the CMATT-A advisor and coordinator for rotary-wing aircraft, Lt Col Charles Westgate, 

USAF. But it seemed as if no one above them was listening—not in 

Baghdad, not in the theater of operations, and certainly not in the 

Pentagon.46

Notes

1. McCain, “New Iraqi Air Force,” 25–26. The aircraft involved were ex-USAF 

serial numbers 62-1839, 63-7826, and 63-7848. The transaction was valued at 

$11,807,052, of which $10,448,881 was for the aircraft. The remainder included missionsupport equipment and spare parts.

2. A fifth crew was sent to Little Rock AFB, Arkansas, for similar training; each 

crew consisted of a pilot, navigator, flight engineer, and loadmaster. Lori Jewell, 

“Iraqi Pilots Fly Prime Minister,” Advisor 2, no. 7 (12 February 2005): 6.

3. MNSTC–I was subordinated to Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I), which 

had replaced the previous coalition command organization, Combined Joint Task 

Force 7, on 15 May 2004. MNSTC–I, established the following month, was initially 

commanded by then–lieutenant general David H. Petraeus. In September 2005 he 

returned to the United States and was replaced by Army lieutenant general Martin E. 

Dempsey. General Petraeus returned to Iraq to take command of MNF–I on 10 February 2007, following the selection of the previous MNF–I commander, Gen George 

W. Casey, Jr., to become the US Army chief of staff. Wright, Reese, and the Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II, 42; Larry George, “MNSTC–I Commander Nominated for Leavenworth Command,” Advisor 2, no. 31 (30 July 2005): 9; 

and Fred W. Baker III, “Bush Says Baghdad Security Plan on Track.” Advisor 4, no. 7 

(17 February 2007): 2 and 7.

4. Michael Bauer, Training the Iraqi Air Force: Lessons from a U.S. C-130 Advisory 

Mission, Policy Focus 73 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 

August 2007): 4–5. Follow-on support for the C-130s was managed by the Air Force 

Security Assistance Center, an Air Force Materiel Command-controlled organization sited at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Donald R. Pugh, director, Case Ops, letter, 

subject: United States of America Letter of Offer and Acceptance, [case] Y7-D-AAA, 

13 January 2005.

5. Westgate, “Chronology,” miscellaneous tab.

6. For an in-depth discussion of FID, see Maj Thomas D. McCarthy, “National 

Security for the 21st Century: The Air Force and Foreign Internal Defense” (master’s 

thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies [SAASS], June 2004). For a case 

study comparison of USAF efforts to build national air forces, including those in 

South Vietnam, El Salvador, and Iraq, see Maj Patrick Daley, “Exporting Airpower: 

The Challenges of Building Partner Nation Air Capacity for Irregular War” (master’s 

thesis, SAASS, June 2008).
THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS │ 37

7. The 6th SOS is home-based at Hurlburt Field, Florida; its mission is to “assess, 

train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment 

and force integration. Squadron advisors help friendly and allied forces employ and 

sustain their own airpower resources and, when necessary, integrate those resources 

into joint and combined (multinational) operations.” “6th Special Operations Squadron,” 

fact sheet, accessed 19 June 2010, http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets

/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=3496&page=1.

8. Childress, “Improving US Air Force Performance,” 45–46.

9. Westgate, “Chronology.”

10. Bauer, Training the Iraqi Air Force, 8; and McCain, “New Iraqi Air Force,” 25–26.

11. All C-130 AST volunteers were asked to serve a six-month tour of duty; an 

exception was made for the AST flight commander and the AST maintenance officer, 

who both served one-year tours for improved continuity. AMC provided 25 of the 

C-130 AST members; AETC provided the remaining 10. Bauer, Training the Iraqi Air 

Force, 5–6.

12. Ibid., 7.

13. Capt Tim Jeffers, “Iraqi Air Force Takes Off with Aircraft Delivery.” Advisor

2, no. 3 (15 January 2005): 6. Its political ramifications aside, the event also underscored some of the deep cultural differences between the typical American Airman 

and Iraqi counterpart. During the ceremony, the Iraqis produced a live goat, slit its 

throat, and collected its still-warm blood in a large bowl. To the Americans’ astonishment, the Iraqis dipped their hands into the bowl and then proceeded to mark the 

sides of their new aircraft with bloody handprints as a sign of personal ownership. 

Bruce Rolfsen, “Iraqi Air Force Squadron Reactivated,” Air Force Times, 17 January 

2005; Col John M. McCain AU/DS, discussion with the author, March 2008; and 

Dwyer Stringer, AFSAT/XF, discussion with the author, 22 August 2009. 

14. Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, to Pres. George W. Bush, letter, 16 January 2005. 

Copy provided by Dwyer Stringer, AFSAT/XF.

15. Jewell, “Iraqi Pilots Fly,” 6. The IqAF crew flew most of the mission, but the 

student pilot was the only Iraqi airman aboard who spoke a useful amount of English. 

The rugged terrain and low clouds combined to make the flight increasingly hazardous. 

Major Frame made the approach and landed the aircraft at Sulaymaniyah on a runway still under construction, in threatening weather, and without the support of 

ground-based approach aids. At the time, he had only been in theater for two weeks. 

The airmanship shown by Major Frame and his USAF crew resulted in their receiving 

the National Aeronautic Association’s 2005 Mackay Trophy for “the most meritorious 

flight of the year conducted by a member or members of the United States Air Force.” 

George C. Larson, “Iraq Air Force One,” Air & Space Magazine, July 2006, 80.

16. Maj Michael Frame, interview with the author, 15 September 2009. For additional contemporary observations by USAF AST instructors and IqAF 23 Squadron 

students, see TSgt Melissa Phillips, “Airmen to Teach C-130 Ops to Iraqis,” Advisor 2, 

no. 30 (23 July 2005): 7.

17. Lori Jewell, “Joint Operations Center to Track Iraqi Forces,” Advisor 2, no. 18 

(30 April 2005): 7.

18. Westgate, “Chronology.”

19. CMATT-A, “Informal Report on Forced Landing.”

20. Childress, “Improving US Air Force Performance,” 46–47.
38 │THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS

21. Maj Jaime Santos, CAOC Combat Plans Division, Guidance and Targeting 

[Team]/MAAP, memorandum, subject: Item of Interest, 31 January 2005. [CAFTT files]

22. William Pontes, Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), memorandum, 

subject: Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) Information and Thoughts, ca. 13 February 2005, 1. 

[CAFTT files] [n.b. The memo is unsigned and undated; the source information was 

taken from the document properties embedded in the electronic file.]

23. Martin Matishak, “U.S., Coalition Partners Work to Stand Up Iraqi Air 

Force,” Inside the Air Force, 29 July 2005, 3–4; and Headquarters IqAF, “Capability 

Requirement and Development Plan,” 9.

24. Bauer, Training the Iraqi Air Force, 11–15.

25. Phillips, “C-130 Ops to Iraqis,” 7.

26. Bauer, Training the Iraqi Air Force, 11–15; Sgt David Foley, “U.S. Air Force 

Trains Iraqi C-130 Pilots,” Advisor 2, no. 18 (30 April 2005): 6; and Phillips, “C-130 

Ops to Iraqis,” 7. Beginning in January 2005, the Defense Language Institute’s English 

Language Center began to deploy modest numbers of civilian employees to Iraq to 

instruct IqAF members. See “English Language Training-Iraq,” Foundations 3, no. 1 

(June 2007).

27. Childress, “Improving US Air Force Performance,” 47.

28. Jewell, “Iraqi Pilots Fly,” 6.

29. “Iraqi Air Force Begins C-130 Training,” Middle East Newsline [reprinted in 

USAF AIM Points], 7 March 2005, accessed 15 January 2010, http://aimpoints.hq

.af.mil/display.cfm?id=1644&printer=yes; and “Milestone Iraqi Air Force Flight 

Takes Off,” Advisor 2, no. 14 (2 April 2005): 10.

30. The term “chalk” is used by the airlift community to describe one aircraft’s assigned load in terms of a number of passengers and their equipage or in bulk cargo 

weight. It originated in World War II, when US Army Air Forces’ loadmasters designated the number of paratroopers to be taken aboard their transport by having the 

soldiers stand within marks made with chalk on the airfield tarmac. See US Army Field 

Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 30 September 1997, chap. 1, C.

31. TSgt Brian Davidson, “New Iraqi Airmen Stage First Operational Airlift 

Mission,” Advisor 2, no. 29 (16 July 2005): 8; and Westgate, “Chronology.”

32. Lt Col Herb Phillips, “First Qualified Iraqi C-130 Aircrew Graduates,” Advisor

2, no. 30 (23 July 2005): 6; and “Iraqi Air Force Assumes Control of Its C-130 Operations,” Air Force Print News, 20 October 2009, accessed 15 January 2010, http://www

.littlerock.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id=123173563.

33. Lorie Jewell, “Graduation Puts Iraqi Air Force Squadron into Operation,” Advisor

2, no. 16 (16 April 2005): 4.

34. CH2000 Aircraft Delivered to Basrah,” Advisor 2, no. 4 (22 January 2005): 6.

35. Untitled Note [Oil Pipeline Fire Reported], Advisor 2, no. 12 (19 March 2005): 10.

36. CMATT-A had considered terminating the contract “for the convenience of 

the government,” but USCENTCOM contracting officers advised that option would 

cost more than simply proceeding “as is” with the remaining six deliveries. Given the 

performance limitations of the CH2000, the consensus at the time was that they might 

be used as flight training aircraft, rather than ISR platforms. Westgate, “Chronology.”

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Westgate, discussion with the author, 20 May 2010.
THE INTRODUCTION OF USAF ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS │ 39

40. Maj William F. Denehan, “Recommendations for Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) RotaryWing Aviation Program,” report (Baghdad: 6th Special Operations Squadron, ca. 

June 2005). [n.b. This report exists in at least two versions. The later available version, 

marked “Not Releasable Outside Coalition Channels,” is in the Westgate Collection. 

An earlier, slightly different version, marked “FOUO/NOFORN” [for official use 

only/not releasable to foreigner nationals] is in the CAFTT files. Neither bears the 

author’s name, but Colonel Westgate confirmed that Major Denehan was the author 

of both versions; he had asked Major Denehan to write the report.]

41. Childress, “Improving US Air Force Performance,” 48.

42. General Schwitters replaced Maj Gen Paul Eaton as CMATT commander in 

June 2004. He was replaced in turn by Brig Gen Daniel P. Bolger in June 2005. In 

December 2006 the Army’s Combat Studies Institute conducted a post-tour interview with General Schwitters, during which he expressly acknowledged the sacrifices 

made by “our great soldiers, Marines, Seabees and corpsmen.” Whether his failure to 

mention the Airmen assigned to his command was intentional or simply an oversight is unknown. Combat Studies Institute, “Interview with BG James Schwitters,” 

Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CSI, 13 December 2006, 7, http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4

/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll13&CISOPTR=338&CISOBOX=1

&REC=9. 

43. Westgate, “Chronology.”

44. Ibid.

45. Denehan, “Recommendations for Iraqi Air Force,” 1.

46. In his SAASS thesis, Maj Tim Childress named three participant sources to 

support his conclusion that “although there had been an official [US]CENTAF representative team at CMATT’s higher headquarters, MNF–I, this group never provided 

significant assistance to CMATT’s Air Cell until [the mishap of May 30].” Childress, 

“Improving US Air Force Performance,” 45–46.

Chapter 5

The Mishap of 30 May 2005

With apologies to Thomas Kuhn, let us suppose that in addition to 

paradigm shifts, there are great flashes of shared insight in which, 

after a period of significant neglect, the previously enshrined value of 

a time-proven way of doing things is abruptly and forcefully reaffirmed and restored in all of its authority.1 If the term “retrodigm 

shift” seems too contrived, then instead call such an impulse an urgent, overwhelming desire to remake things as they were supposed to 

be.2 That realization, or something very much like it, describes the 

USAF’s reaction to a fatal aircraft accident that occurred in Iraq on 30 

May 2005.

The Accident

With the limited exception of the C-130Es assigned to Squadron 

23, the Iraqis’ aircraft fleet continued to present significant difficulties 

in terms of performance, reliability, and operational readiness in 

early summer 2005.3 Nonetheless, the airmen of the IqAF’s two ISR 

units and their AST advisors went aloft as often as they could to patrol Iraq’s borders and oil pipeline systems. During those missions 

they trained and reported pipeline ruptures and oil fires, identified 

likely cross-border smugglers, and watched for suspected insurgent 

activities—and sometimes confirmed them by receiving enemy 

ground fire. In such cases, there was no choice but to evade and withdraw, since their aircraft were unarmed and unarmored.

But never mind the hazards of wartime flying. With its lift-killing 

high temperatures and horizon-obscuring clouds of fine, abrasive 

dust whirled up by the slightest breeze, the operating environment in 

Iraq was already harsh enough. That there could be consequences for 

operating ill-maintained or unsuitable airplanes in such circumstances was underscored by the deaths of Maj William Brian Downs, 

his IqAF Squadron 3 copilot, Capt Ali Hussam Abass Alrubaeye, and 

three USAF special operations personnel on 30 May 2005. Their 

Comp Air 7SLX crashed at about 10:30 a.m. local time, while conducting an aerial survey of potential landing sites in Diyala province, 

about 50 miles northeast of Baqubah.4
42 │THE MISHAP OF 30 MAY 2005

The aircraft had departed from Kirkuk an hour earlier; Iraqi witnesses said it was either conducting a very low-altitude pass over a 

road or attempting to land on the road when the crash occurred. 

Trees obscured the actual impact, but the witnesses reported seeing a 

fireball shortly after the aircraft disappeared from view. Iraqi security 

guards from a nearby refinery arrived at the scene within minutes of 

the crash. The wreckage was already ablaze, and they attempted to 

put out the fire with hand extinguishers, but the intensity of the 

flames forced them to retreat. A US Army ground unit received notice of the crash by radio at 12:05 p.m. Its vehicles arrived at about 

12:30 p.m., and two more unsuccessful attempts were made to extinguish the fire, which finally burned itself out. An Army Special Forces 

team took charge of the site that afternoon, and recovery operations 

began immediately. The remains of all five Airmen were first taken to 

Balad AB and then flown to the Air Force Mortuary Affairs Operations Center at Dover AFB, Delaware. Those remains that could be 

specifically identified were later returned to the five families for interment.5

Major Downs, age 40, was assigned to the 6th SOS and stationed at 

Hurlburt Field, Florida. The Winchester, Virginia, native had served 

in the 6th in the late 1990s but left the service to fly for an airline. The 

terror attacks of September 2001 compelled him to return to active 

duty, and in early 2002 he rejoined the squadron. Thereafter, he completed deployments in seven countries before going to Iraq. At the 

time of the crash, he had been an IqAF advisor for just under four 

months.6 A keen advocate of counterinsurgency (COIN) aviation 

and FID operations, Major Downs had recently published an article 

in a USAF professional journal arguing the merits of specialized 

COIN aircraft.7

The other three USAF members were Capt Jeremy Fresques, age 

26, of Clarkdale, Arizona; Capt Derek Argel, age 28, of Lompoc, California; and Staff Sgt Casey Crate, age 26, of Spanway, Washington. 

All were assigned to the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron, also based at 

Hurlburt Field.8

On 11 August the individually unidentifiable remains of the five 

Airmen were laid to rest as a group in a solemn ceremony held at 

Arlington National Cemetery. USAF Chief of Staff (CSAF) Gen John 

P. Jumper, Iraqi air force chief of staff General Barzanjy, the USCENTCOM vice commander, and the commander of AFSOC attended. General Barzanjy presented an Iraqi flag to Captain Abass’s 
THE MISHAP OF 30 MAY 2005 │ 43

father, a retired Iraqi army brigadier general. Captain Abbas was the 

first Iraqi citizen to be buried at Arlington National Cemetery.9

The Investigation

A thorough analysis of the accident was essential, and General 

Barzanjy asked USCENTAF commander General Buchanan for assistance. The request posed something of a conundrum. General Barzanjy had promised that any release of information by Iraq regarding 

the accident and its possible causes would be “determined in accordance with United States rules and regulations.”10 Nonetheless, the 

aircraft was not US government property, so any sensitive information gathered by USAF accident investigators would not be entitled 

to all of the protections that it might otherwise receive under US 

law—a situation tending to discourage a full and frank discussion by 

those most knowledgeable of the circumstances.11 In the end, because the four Airmen had been assigned to AFSOC units, AFSOC 

commander Lt Gen Michael W. Wooley obtained the consent of General Barzanjy and USCENTCOM to treat the mishap investigation as 

a matter to be undertaken “under the inherent authority of a commander to investigate matters or incidents under his or her jurisdiction or command.”12

Conducted by a team of 11 specialists (including two Iraqi air 

force representatives) and led by Brig Gen Clay T. McCutchan, USAFR, the investigation opened at Hurlburt Field, Florida, on 5 July 

2005.13 General McCutchan’s team subsequently conducted on-site 

inquiries in Iraq, took the testimony of more than a dozen witnesses, 

and had technical analyses conducted by multiple subject-matter experts. General McKutchan submitted the report to General Wooley 

on 30 August. Because its purpose was expressly limited to determining the facts surrounding the loss, the report offered no opinion as 

the cause of the accident.14

Contributing Factors

In mid-November, the USAF released a brief statement regarding 

some of AFSOC’s findings: there was no evidence of hostile action, 

and no mechanical failures or major systems malfunctions appeared 

to have been involved.15 What was left unsaid was that the Comp Air 
44 │THE MISHAP OF 30 MAY 2005

7SLX aircraft flown by Major Downs and his crew had not been properly flight-tested after being modified during its assembly in the UAE. 

Those alterations may have led to the airplane’s penchant for abruptly 

departing controlled flight in power-on stall conditions, especially 

when fully loaded—a deadly hazard at low altitude.16 In fact, the accident investigators learned that the aircraft had taken off weighing 

510 pounds more than its published maximum gross weight.17

The accident investigation also revealed problems beyond the performance of the airplane and its destruction. These problems raised 

doubts about the command-and-control arrangements between 

CMATT-A and its ASTs in the field, for example, and how mission 

priorities were being set by the 6th SOS Airmen embedded with 

Squadron 3. The clear implication was that mission goals (and risks) 

might not have been fully and objectively assessed in every instance.

Unfamiliar manning arrangements may have also played a role. 

Upon receiving a request for forces (RFF), the 6th SOS normally deployed advisors in two segments. The first segment, called an Operational Aviation Detachment (OAD)-Alpha, typically consisted of 13 

advisors. The second supporting segment was called an OAD-Bravo; 

it usually called for a five-member command-and-control element. 

These figures were nominal: both teams could be tailored to support 

the RFF as required.

In this case, the RFF had been limited to a mix of three fixed-wing 

and five rotary-wing pilots and maintenance personnel, who were 

parceled out to fill AST requirements at Basrah, Kirkuk, and Taji. 

One was also tapped to serve as a combat aviation advisor to the 

CMATT commander.18 This meant that the deployed advisors were 

left to their own devices to a much greater extent than the 6th SOS’s 

standard operating procedures typically allowed. The CMATT-A director, Wing Commander Peter Allen, RAF, acknowledged as much 

when the mishap investigators interviewed him in July: 

There is no tasking function from CMATT air cell, in terms of sorties and 

what they do at the squadron. . . . In the ideal world, the Iraqi air headquarters 

would task their squadrons. There is nothing in place at the moment, so actually the tasking at the squadron is found almost at the squadron level. . . . They 

would probably work for the Ministry of Oil at the local level, oil protection 

battalions, they were looking to them.19

Although Wing Commander Allen found “nothing wrong with that 

intrinsically,” the resulting lack of higher headquarters oversight and 

direction was a surely contributing factor.
THE MISHAP OF 30 MAY 2005 │ 45

Major Downs’s eagerness to “grapple with the mission” may have 

also played a role. Those who worked with him saw that intensity 

very clearly, and they admired him for it. His USAF roommate at 

Kirkuk described Major Downs as a “warrior who worked overtime 

coming up with plans and ideas for defeating the enemy.”20 A close 

friend and former 6th SOS commander later said that “Brian was not 

in the Air Force to get promoted. He was in the Air Force to fly.”21

Such men will push themselves and their aircraft in ways that a more 

cautious man will not. But cautious men do not aspire to be warriors.

In the end, there is no way to know exactly what happened that 

day. The only certainty of it is that five good men were dead and that 

one of Iraq’s few operable ISR aircraft had been destroyed. But more 

to the point, because of those losses, senior USAF leaders were 

made—at long last—to take a critical look at CMATT-A and its mission.

A Catalytic Event

The loss on 30 May was a tragic but valuable event—a tragedy in 

that it took the lives of five exceptionally dedicated Airmen, but valuable in that it brought close, high-level attention to a mission that had 

thus far been ill-focused, underfunded, and overlooked. On the fifth 

anniversary of the crash, Lt Gen-select Robert Kane, then commander of the USAF advisory mission in Iraq, spoke of its catalytic 

effect at a Baghdad remembrance ceremony. Because of that accident, 

said General Kane, “significant changes were made to our efforts here 

in Iraq—changes that strengthened our commitment to the mission 

of rebuilding the Iraqi air force, and to ensure that we do this as safely 

as possible.”22

Notes

1. Thomas S. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of 

Chicago Press, 1962).

2. “Retrodigm shifts” occur more often than paradigm shifts. Three months to 

the day after this accident in Iraq, for example, there was an intense, immediate need 

to conduct search and rescue (SAR), reconnaissance, and reconstitution missions in 

and around New Orleans, Louisiana, and the other affected areas of the US Gulf 

Coast after Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the night of 29 August. The “area of 

responsibility” encompassed over 800 square miles of devastation. Within 72 hours, 
46 │THE MISHAP OF 30 MAY 2005

flying units assigned to five USAF major commands, the Air National Guard, the US 

Navy, and the US Coast Guard were each separately conducting SAR and humanitarian 

relief operations within the same airspace. In many cases, the operators were flying 

within visual range of one another, but they did so without the benefit of a CAOC or 

equivalent Joint Coordination Center to deconflict air traffic at the few local airports 

still operable, to prevent duplication of effort during SAR operations, or even to determine which aircraft were going where and doing what. Such was the urgency of 

the moment that routinely used procedures were simply ignored in the face of overwhelming humanitarian priorities. Finally, seven days after the storm had passed—

and after some near-collisions had occurred at overburdened airfields—the USAF 

vice chief of staff sent out an urgent “get back to doctrine!” directive reminding the 

participants to make use of well-established but temporarily neglected means for 

coordinating such operations. Patti Wilson and George Cully, “USAF Action in the 

Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,” unpublished study (Washington, DC: Air Force 

History Support Office, May 2006).

3. In April 2005 the IqMoD signed a $109 million C-130E FMS contract to provide two years’ follow-on support, but its continued inability to fund that agreement 

had flight safety implications. All three aircraft were due for isochronal inspections, 

and one of the C-130s had to be returned to the United States in June for repair of a 

cracked structural member. The IqMoD could not process the necessary paperwork 

in time; that aircraft was temporarily repainted in US markings to meet its scheduled 

transit date without violating international law. The inspections for the other two 

aircraft were deferred until October in order to give the IqMoD more time to cover 

the costs of its contractual commitment. Westgate, “Chronology.”

4. “Five Airmen Killed in Iraqi Crash,” Maxwell-Gunter Dispatch [Maxwell AFB, 

Alabama], 3 June 2005; “4 Americans, 1 Iraqi Killed in Plane Crash,” Baltimore Sun, 

31 May 2005; and Lorie Jewell, “Pilots Hailed as Heroes Who Died for a Free Iraq,” 

Advisor 2, no. 23 (4 June 2005): 6–7.

5. AFSOC, “USAF Accident Investigation Report, Comp Air 7SL, Aircraft Number 

2245,” report (Hurlburt AFB, FL: AFSOC, n.d.), 4–6. [Hereafter cited as AFSOC 

Accident Report.]

6. Jewell, “Pilots Hailed as Heroes,” 6–7. 

7. Maj William Bryan Downs, “Unconventional Airpower,” Air and Space Power 

Journal 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 20–25.

8. “DOD Identifies Air Force Casualties,” DOD news release 543-05, 1 June 2005. 

In August 2005 the Argel family successfully challenged an activist group called Veterans 

for Peace over the unauthorized use of Captain Argel’s name in an antiwar memorial. 

Nora K. Wallace, “Capt. Argel Marker to Be Removed,” News Press [Santa Barbara, 

California], 18 August 2005, accessed 17 May 2010, http://news.newspress.com

/topsports/081805argel.htm?now=85761&tref=1.

9. SSgt C. Todd Lopez, “Five Brothers in Fight for Freedom Buried Together,” 

Advisor 2, no. 33 (13 August 2005): 3–4.

10. Maj Gen Kamal Abid Al-Sattar Barzanjy, IqAF/CC, to Lt Gen Walter E. Buchanan, 

USCENTAF/CC, letter, subject: Request for Assistance, n.d. [Westgate files]

11. For statutory protections provided to USAF accident investigation reportage, 

see 10 US Code sec. 2254(d), Treatment of Reports of Aircraft Accident Investigation; 
THE MISHAP OF 30 MAY 2005 │ 47

and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-204, Safety Investigations and Reports: Use of Information in Civil Proceedings, chap. 2.

12. AFSOC Accident Report, 4–6. Although command-directed, the investigation 

was structured under the provisions of AFI 51-503, Aerospace Accident Investigations, 16 July 2004.

13. At the time, General McCutchan was the senior individual mobilization augmentee assigned to the commandant of the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 

See “Major General Clay T. McCutchan,” biography, accessed 27 January 2010, http://

www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/108186/major-general

-clay-t-mccutchan.aspx.

14. This report was “separate and apart from the previous safety investigation, 

which was conducted pursuant to AFI 91-204.” Reports generated under that instruction (which provide opinions as to causality) are exempt from release under the 

Freedom of Information Act as provided in 5 US Code, sec. 552, Public Information: 

Agency Rules, Opinions, Orders, Records, and Proceedings.

15. “Accident Report Out on Iraqi Comp Air 7SL,” Air Force Print News, 14 November 

2005, accessed 12 January 2010, http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223

/Article/132777/accident-report-out-on-iraqi-comp-air-7sl.aspx.

16. Lt Col Mark Stucky and Maj Vincent Sei, “Iraqi Test Acceleration—the Saga of 

the Comp Air 7SLX,” report (Edwards AFB, CA: USAF TPS, n.d.) [AFFTC/HO files]

17. AFSOC Accident Report, 4.

18. Ibid., 2.

19. Ibid., V-3.1.

20. Jewell, “Pilots Hailed as Heroes,” 7.

21. Eric Huppert (former 6 SOS/CC), interview with the author, 18 August 2009.

22. Van Williams, “Building the Iraqi Air Force: Learning from Tragedy.” Advisor

6, no. 7 (July 2009): 6.

Chapter 6

Moment of Truth

The Iraqi Air Force Asks for Expanded USAF 

Participation in Its Training and Procurement Efforts

The accumulating challenges involved in recruiting and training 

new airmen, activating units and bases, identifying and acquiring 

suitable equipment, and operating that equipment safely and effectively—

all while trying to contribute to Iraq’s COIN efforts—combined to 

persuade General Barzanjy to ask for greater assistance from the 

IqMoD and the coalition.1

 On 29 June he conferred with USCENTAF 

commander General Buchanan after officiating at a USAF change of 

command ceremony at Balad AB. The Iraqi air commander cataloged 

the problems he faced, among them the need for additional transport 

aircraft, the failings plaguing his ISR platforms, and the difficulties 

encountered in obtaining reliable helicopters. Although the missions 

flown by his C-130 squadron had been included in the coalition’s 

ATO since March, General Barzanjy wanted his airmen to tackle 

more of the coalition’s airborne requirements (especially COIN missions), and he praised the successful partnering of Squadron 23 and 

its USAF AST mentors. Might that be a model for further cooperation? Although General Buchanan could not promise any immediate 

financial support, he empathized with General Barzanjy’s needs and 

aspirations. As a possible solution General Buchanan suggested convening a coalition air conference “to discuss the organization, structure, logistics support and budget of the IqAF.”2

The USCENTAF commander’s proposal was most welcome, but 

what General Barzanjy envisioned required generous resourcing that 

could only be had with the support of the USAF’s senior-most commander. Armed with a capability and requirements study generated 

in mid-July, Barzanjy traveled to Washington, DC, to meet with his 

American counterpart, General Jumper, on 11 August.3

 The solemn 

interment ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery for the Iraqi 

airman and the four US Airmen lost on 30 May fostered their meeting.4

General Barzanjy’s request was understandable. The situation in 

Iraq was dire, and without the expertise and wherewithal of the 

USAF, it would be impossible for his airmen to help fight the insurgency that was tearing their nation apart. Iraqi ground forces had 
50 │MOMENT OF TRUTH

expanded from their originally envisioned strength of three divisions 

to 10, General Barzanjy said, but his air force still could not field even 

the minimal strength originally envisioned by the CPA. Could the 

CSAF assist in a substantive way?5

General Jumper suggested that the two air forces should devise a 

joint plan based upon clearly articulated short- and long-term requirements. General Barzanjy readily agreed and offered to meet 

with General Buchanan either in Baghdad or Qatar to set up a planning conference. However, without a fully qualified headquarters 

staff, General Barzanjy admitted that he would have to be “the main 

IqAF participant at the planning conference.”6

 Soon thereafter General 

Jumper directed General Buchanan to “assume [the] lead role in assisting the development of an effective, independent Iraqi Air Force.”7

USCENTAF Takes the Lead

The first step in solving a problem is to gauge its dimensions. On 

25 August 2005 General Buchanan convened a working group comprised of the Air Force stakeholders deemed essential in dealing with 

the problem.8

 The teleconference attendees—soon known as the 

“board of directors”—included general officers representing the four 

major USAF commands then working most directly with the Iraqi air 

force, two key senior civilian officials in the Air Force secretariat, and 

the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) Air Component Coordination 

Element (ACCE) director, Brig Gen David W. Eidsaune, USAF.9

 After 

reviewing the current situation and examining General Barzanjy’s 

near-term requirement projections, the working group agreed upon a 

four-phased approach.10

The first phase entailed a mission analysis couched at the strategic 

level. The second phase involved the development of an institutional 

concept of operations (CONOPS) for the IqAF. Phase three called for 

a four-team, on-site assessment of the IqAF’s capabilities and limitations, including the status and suitability of its facilities, equipment, 

and logistics arrangements. The team’s findings would be used to 

fine-tune the CONOPS’s assumptions and expectations. In particular, 

phase three included an Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC)-conducted 

evaluation of the Comp Air 7SLX’s airworthiness—a test to determine its usefulness as an ISR platform to be sure, but also reflecting 

the USAF’s obligation to learn what role the airplane’s characteristics 
MOMENT OF TRUTH │ 51

and performance may have played in the tragedy of 30 May. The 

fourth phase, and potentially most contentious, would be to secure a 

“buy in” from General Barzanjy and his superiors for the CONOPS as 

revised in light of the assessment’s findings and recommendations.11

The IqAF Mission Analysis

The Mission Analysis Working Group was comprised of 16 officers 

and civilians representing 15 USAF agencies; it met from 29 August 

through 1 September. After analyzing the mission list contained in 

the 20 July Capability Requirement and Development Plan, the working group used a checklist-like approach called DOTMLPF (doctrine, 

organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, 

and facilities) to identify two strategic motivators for energizing development, along with four interrelated critical requirements for developing the new Iraqi air force.12 The two strategic motivators were 

interrelated, and the group summarized them accordingly:

• Iraq’s COIN strategy could not be realized until the IqAF had 

the capacity and capability to operate and integrate with the 

other components of their security strategy.

• The US desire to transition security responsibilities from coalition to Iraqi institutions would be limited until the IqAF had the 

capacity and capability to conduct operations effectively.13

The working group defined its four critical requirements as “essential 

to any and all IqAF developmental efforts; without due attention to 

them, those efforts will fail.” The first requirement was command and 

control and doctrine, including the corpus of regulations and the 

subordinate administrative processes needed to “enable a clear understanding of policy, change of command, responsibility, accountability 

and authority.” The second requirement was product support and 

sustainment—those sequential “cradle to grave” logistical measures 

that must accompany every system from design to disposition. The 

third requirement, training, was predicated upon drawing in and 

retaining sufficient recruits with the requisite education and motivation to become competent airmen. The fourth requirement was resourcing. Without an adequate, stable funding stream, the working 

group recognized that the Iraqi airmen could not “plan, field and sustain an effective force.”14
52 │MOMENT OF TRUTH

In its discussions, the working group also considered what it called 

“major factors” in developing a viable IqAF. The group noted that “in 

the short term, effectiveness is more important than efficiency” and 

that using off-the-shelf systems would facilitate the IqAF’s effectiveness. The service’s existing body of trained and experienced people 

was its most valuable resource, but “delegation of authority and . . . 

decentralized execution are not native to current Iraqi culture,” implying that those individuals might not be allowed to maximize their 

potential within the existing cultural construct. Nonetheless, in spite 

of the challenges, the working group recommended that USCENTAF 

should establish a task force “with the mission of facilitating the development of an independent Iraqi Air Force.”15

A CONOPS for the IqAF

The CONOPS development conference attendees met in USCENTAF 

headquarters at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, on 12–16 September 

2005. Their goal was to complete a first draft of the primary source 

CONOPS for IqAF development. That document would describe the 

guiding architecture for USCENTAF’s support, along with a proposed roadmap for the IqAF’s employment and expansion. It would 

also identify a standing USAF organizational structure—led by 

USCENTAF’s board of directors overseeing various approval boards 

and working groups—and a process to ensure near-term CONOP 

implementation. Sustaining current capabilities was also critical, and 

the CONOPS developers were expected to develop a set of realistic 

courses of action (COA), along with a schedule of significant milestones for accomplishing those COAs approved by the board of directors.16

The CONOPS writers chose a two-tracked approach. One track 

involved the identification of cost-effective, near-term actions designed to ensure the viability of the air force’s existing capabilities, 

including its ability to conduct airlift and reconnaissance missions, 

however limited those capabilities might be. The second track called 

for laying the foundations needed to support the IqAF’s mid- and 

long-term improvement and expansion. The COAs included replacing 

the ASTs with larger, better-prepared military transition teams 

(MiTT) and tying them more closely to a restructured CMATT–A or 

directly to the MNF–I ACCE but operating under the direct supervision 

of a USAF general officer.17
MOMENT OF TRUTH │ 53

The IqAF Capabilities Assessment

Although the mission analysis and CONOPS were essential institutional underpinnings, they could serve only insofar as they were 

rooted in facts on the ground. The third phase provided that validation by sending handpicked USAF officers and civilians to Iraq, where 

they evaluated the Iraqis’ capabilities and needs, along with the requirements (and challenges) of CMATT–A and its embedded ASTs.

Conducted from 3–19 October, the assessment effort consisted of 

28 people divided into four teams under the overall command of Brig 

Gen Frank J. Padilla, USAFR, then the senior individual mobilization 

augmentee (IMA) assigned to AFSOC.18 His teams visited the IqAF’s 

air operations headquarters and all five of its operating bases; these 

reviews included command-and-control arrangements, training programs, and logistics support and spare parts availability. Team members 

from the AFFTC also assessed the suitability and airworthiness of the 

IqAF’s three reconnaissance aircraft types, including the Comp Air 7SLX.19

The capabilities assessment reported some critical findings and 

recommendations. Operationally, the assessors found that the ASTs 

were “generally not manned or trained for success,” and General Padilla 

recommended that all six ASTs be restructured as MiTTs. Modeled in 

part upon the US Army’s transition training apparatus adopted for 

Iraq in early 2005, the USAF’s MiTTs would require additional manpower, better predeployment preparation, and longer tours to maximize team effectiveness.20 They would also need a more influential 

and accountable chain of command. CMATT–A’s four-member office 

was not adequately staffed for that role, nor was it led by a USAF 

officer of sufficient rank to champion the advisors’ needs in such a 

soldier-dominated environment.21

The capabilities assessment rated the existing IqAF’s ISR aircraft as 

marginal at best, mainly because the CPA had procured those airplanes without any realistic consideration of the IqAF’s operational 

needs or sustainment capabilities.22 In particular, the AFFTC team 

members declared Squadron 3’s Comp Air 7SLX airplanes to be 

“barely adequate for the mission.” They recommended that until corrective action could be taken, those aircraft should not be flown at 

night, in poor weather, or in near-stall conditions.23 In response, 

USCENTAF asked Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) to develop 

a plan to “modify, repair and flight test all six [Comp Airs] and return 

them to safe operations no later than 1 April 2006.”24
54 │MOMENT OF TRUTH

There were other issues as well. A lack of reliable communications 

plagued all of the ASTs, especially as to e-mail and Internet access. 

Those needs had to be met through whatever facilities and bandwidth 

that coalition ground forces could spare. The supply chain was illfunded, and thus ill-provisioned, and Iraqi squadron commanders 

had to seek approval from the IqMoD for even the most minor expenditure. Not everything was broken, however. On-site English language 

training was valued, and all agreed that it should be expanded. The 

strong partnership between Squadron 23 and the 777th EAS received 

especially good marks, and the IqAf had been promised $24 million 

for C-130 spares acquisition in January 2006. That said, the overall 

recruiting effort continued to lag, and the security situation was making 

retention difficult. Significant changes had to be made, and the board 

of directors collectively agreed that it was time to put things right.25

The Creation of CAFTT

General Padilla’s assessment had clearly established the need to replace CMATT–A with a larger, more-capable organization, and General 

Buchanan concurred. In October USCENTAF made a persuasive 

case to the MNSTC–I commander, Lt Gen Martin E. Dempsey, US 

Army, for restructuring and enlarging CMATT–A.26 General 

Dempsey approved CMATT–A’s replacement with an expanded organization called the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT), 

which activated in the second half of November.

CAFTT was to be structured in full accord with General Padilla’s 

proposal.27 This action paved the way for a critically needed increment of airminded expertise and manpower within the MNSTC–I 

staff. Equally important—from operational and doctrinal perspectives—

it put a sufficiently senior USAF officer in the best possible position 

to assist the IqAF in becoming a capable, independent service within 

the Iraqi defense establishment.28

Given General Padilla’s key role in CAFTT’s creation, it seemed 

only logical that he should become its first commander. He could not 

hold the position for long, however, as he was a reservist serving on a 

limited term of active duty. General Padilla returned to AFSOC to 

resume his IMA responsibilities in February 2006. General Eidsaune, 

the MNF–I ACCE director, took charge of CAFTT’s operations upon 

General Padilla’s departure. Two months later, General Eidsaune left 
MOMENT OF TRUTH │ 55

Iraq to take command of the Air Force Security Assistance Center. 

His replacement, Brig Gen Stephen L. Hoog, USAF, was also “dualhatted” as the commander of both ACCE and CAFTT.29

Notes

1. RAF Grp Capt M. W. Leaming, memorandum, subject: [Iraqi] Air Force 

Command Agenda. [Translation with rephrasing of a briefing delivered by General 

Barzanjy to the Iraqi Defense Council in May 2005.] [Westgate files]

2. RAF Grp Capt M. W. Leaming to Brig Gen William E. Eidsaune, memorandum, 

subject: Record of Meeting between LTG Buchanan and MG Kamal—29 June 2005, 29 

June 2005. See also Leaming, memorandum, subject: Brief for BGen Eidsaune and 

BGen Peck. [CAFTT files]

3. Headquarters IqAF, “Iraqi Air Force Capability Requirement and Development 

Plan” (Baghdad: HQ IqAF, 20 July 2005), 11. General Jumper had been chief of staff 

since 6 September 2001. “General John P. Jumper,” biography, accessed 5 January 2010, 

http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/104697/general

-john-p-jumper.aspx. His successor, Gen T. Michael Moseley, was appointed on 2 September 2005. “General T. Michael Moseley,” biography, accessed 5 January 2010, http://

www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/104651/general-t-michael

-moseley.aspx. General Buchanan was USCENTAF commander from August 2003 until his retirement in April 2006. “Lieutenant General Walter E. Buchanan III,” biography, 

accessed 5 January 2010, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225

/Article/107609/lieutenant-general-walter-e-buchanan-iii.aspx. General Buchanan’s 

replacement was Lt Gen Gary L. North. “General Gary L. North,” biography, accessed 5 January 2010, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225

/Article/104909/general-gary-l-north.aspx.

4. Associated Press, “Iraqi Pilot Buried with 4 U.S. Airmen at Arlington,” Los 

Angeles Times, 12 August, 2005, accessed 28 March 2010, http://articles.latimes

.com/2005/aug/12/nation/na-arlington12; and Lopez, “Five Brothers in Fight,” 3–4.

5. RAF Grp Capt M. W. Leaming, memorandum, subject: Office Call—Kamal/

Jumper—11 August 2005, n.d.; and Col Michael Byrne, briefing, subject: Stand-Up 

of the Iraqi Air Force, ca. November 2005.

6. Leaming, memorandum, subject: Office Call.

7. Message, COMCENTAF to Headquarters AF/AXO et al., “CENTAF Iraqi Air 

Force (IqAF) Site Assessment Support Request,” 23 September 2005.

8. For USCENTOM’s preparations see Lt Gen Walter E. Buchanan, briefing, subject: New Iraqi Air Force, 25 August 2005 VTC (predecision working paper version 

3.5), n.d. (Info used is not FOUO.) [CAFTT files].

9. The MAJCOMs involved included AETC, ACC, AFMC, and AFSOC. Air 

Force Secretariat participation included representatives from the offices of the Deputy 

Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, the Deputy Undersecretary 

of the Air Force for Installations and Logistics, and the Air Warfare Center. General 

Eidsaune held the MNF–I ACCE director’s position from April 2005 until April 

2006. “Major General David W. Eidsaune,” biography, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs

/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/104844/major-general-david-w-eidsaune
56 │MOMENT OF TRUTH

.aspx. His predecessor was then-Brig Gen Robert P. Steel, who had held the position 

since its creation in April 2004. “Major General Robert P. Steel,” biography, accessed 

10 May 2010, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/104671

/major-general-robert-p-steel.aspx.

10. Headquarters IqAF, “Iraqi Air Force Capability,” 11; and message, COMCENTAF to Headquarters AF/AXO.

11. Ibid.

12. Headquarters IqAF, “Iraqi Air Force Capability,” 11.

13. Lt Col Jeffrey Henry, “Building the New Iraqi Air Force: Mission Analysis 

Working Group Executive Summary,” point paper, 1 September 2005. (Info extracted 

is not FOUO.)

14. Ibid., 2. See also “Iraqi Air Force Development: Mission Analysis Working Group 

(Version 1.0),” working paper, n.d. [CENTAF files] (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

15. Henry, “Building the New Iraqi Air Force,” 2.

16. CENTAF/DOOC, briefing, subject: Iraqi Air Force CONOPS Development 

Conference, ca. 9 September 2005. See also Kathi R. Jones, 9AF/HO, notes, subject: 

Preconference Meeting, 9 September 2005.

17. Byrne, briefing, subject: Stand-Up of the Iraqi Air Force.

18. “Major General Frank J. Padilla,” biography, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs

/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/108194/major-general-frank-j-padilla.aspx. 

Team members were provided by AFSOC, USCENTAF, AFMC, and US Air Forces 

in Europe.

19. Byrne, briefing, subject: Stand-Up of the Iraqi Air Force. One of the AFFTC 

pilots, Lt Col Mark “Forger” Stucky, came under ground fire from Iraqi insurgents 

while test-flying a Comp Air 7SLX. For this and related accomplishments made during 

the deployment, he received AFMC’s Lieutenant General Bobby Bond Memorial 

Aviator Award for 2005. A1C Julius Delos Reyes, “Testing Airworthiness ‘Under 

Line of Fire’ Earns Accolade,” Desert News [Edwards AFB, California], 26 May 2006.

20. The US Army had transitioned its ASTs to MiTTs in February and March 

2005 as a part of MNF–I commander Lt Gen George W. Casey, Jr.’s efforts to improve 

security transition training for the Iraqi Army. Wright, Reese, and the Contemporary 

Operations Study Team, On Point II, 126; and Mark Reardon, Army Center of Military History, to the author, e-mail, subject: Historical Information on CMATT-A and 

the Activation of CAFTT, 22 January 2010. For IqAF AST data as of October 2005 

and projected MiTT requirements, see Headquarters USCENTAF, briefing, subject: 

IqAF Advisory Support Team Assessment. [CAFTT files]

21. Byrne, briefing, subject: Stand-Up of the Iraqi Air Force. (Info extracted is 

not FOUO); and Headquarters USCENTAF, briefing, subject: IqAF Advisory Support 

Team Assessment, 3–19 October 2005.

22. AFFTC Flight Test Assessment Team, briefing, subject: SAMA CH-2000, October 

2005; and AFFTC Flight Test Team, briefing, subject: Seabird Seeker, October 2005.

23. Brig Gen Frank Padilla, briefing, subject: Comp Air 7SL Decision Brief to Lt 

Gen Buchanan, 20 October 2005. (Info extracted is not FOUO.) [CAFTT files] See 

also Stucky and Sei, “Iraqi Test Acceleration”; Lt Col Mark Stucky, USAF Test Pilot 

School (TPS)/ED, briefing, subject: Comp Air Briefing, 17 October 2005; Lt Col 

James L. Wertz, 412 OG/CD, to Lt Col Mark P. Stuckey, USAF TPS/ED, et al., e-mail, 

subject: “Re: Iraqi Test Accel Reports,” 17 October 2005; and CMSgt William A. Ludwig, 
MOMENT OF TRUTH │ 57

“Operation Iraqi Freedom Trip Report, 3 October 2005–19 October 2005,” report, 

ca. 7 November 2005. [AFFTC/HO files]

24. AFMC was responsible for almost all of the USAF’s equipment requirements—

determination, acquisition, evaluation, and sustainment. As an AFMC subordinate, 

AFFTC conducted flight tests and evaluations of aircraft proposed for USAF service. 

Col Mark A. Atkinson, AFMC/A4, to AFMC/CC, “AFMC Course of Action to Support Re-establishment of Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) Comp Air 7SLX (CA-7) Aircraft,” 

staff summary sheet, December 2005.

25. Byrne, briefing, subject: IqAF Assessment Outbrief, ca. 15 October 2005.

26. General Dempsey had replaced then-Lt Gen David H. Petraeus as commander of MNSTC–I in September 2005; in June 2007 General Dempsey left that 

position to become deputy commander under USCENTCOM’s Adm William J. Fallon, 

who had been appointed three months earlier following the retirement of Gen John 

Abizaid, US Army. General Dempsey’s relief, Lt Gen James M. Dubik, US Army, 

commanded MNSTC–I until being replaced by Lt Gen Frank Helmick, US Army, in 

early July 2008. See http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-National_Security_Transition

Command_Iraq; and “Helmick Takes the Helm at MNSTC-I and NTM-I,” MNSTC-I 

press release, 3 July 2008.

27. Announcement of the action was initially limited to internal notice via a 

Fragmentary Order issued by USCENTAF. Wesley W. Long, 9AF/AFCENT/A3T, 

discussion with the author, 18 March 2010.

28. Bauer, Training the Iraqi Air Force, 8–9.

29. General Hoog led CAFTT until March 2007, when he was replaced by Brig 

Gen Robert R. Allardice, USAF. See “Brigadier General Stephen L. Hoog, USAF,” biography, accessed 21 April 2008, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225

/Article/105063/lieutenant-general-stephen-l-hoog.aspx.

Chapter 7

With a Little Help from Its Friends

The Iraqi Air Force Begins to Reshape Its Future

The Iraqi air force was still struggling to increase its size and presence at the end of 2005. In July the DOD reported that there were 

over 100 airmen in IqAF service; by mid-October that number had 

risen to “more than 200 trained and equipped personnel,” and the 

prospects were good that it would double again within a few months.1

More to the point, the increasing operations tempo showed that 

the new air force was determined to “get into the fight,” albeit within 

the limits of its resources. For example, in September Squadron 23’s 

three C-130s moved more than 330 Iraqi special police commandos 

from Irbil to Tal Afar in support of COIN operations in Ninewa province.2

 The squadron also “filled a critical role” by flying 23 airlift sorties between 1 and 9 October in support of Operation Iron Fist, a US 

Marine Corps-led COIN action in western Anbar province.3

 Squadron 23 successfully completed a series of exercises called “Independent Action” in mid-October, mid-November, and again in midDecember.4

 These exercises were designed to measure the unit’s 

ability to operate independently of its supporting USAF units—the 

777th EAS and 777th EAMS—at Ali AB. As a result, the squadron 

received authorization to conduct its first operational mission flown 

entirely without AST assistance; that early December sortie was a 

source of considerable pride to everyone involved. “Seeing your students 

go out, taking the steps on their own for the first time—it’s like seeing 

your kids or somebody in your family do great things,” said TSgt John 

Furber, a Squadron 23 AST advisor.5

The exercises also proved the ability of NAMAB to host flying 

operations, even though many of the base’s facilities were still under 

construction.6

 NAMAB, colocated with the BIAP, was set to become 

the home of Squadron 23 early in 2006. The move had been planned 

for months—the shift to be done in increments—and was seen as 

much more than simply providing a less-vulnerable location. Transferring to NAMAB would also significantly improve the quality of life 

for the airmen assigned to Squadron 23, as it meant that they could 

be housed in better quarters. More important, for many it meant 
60 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

additional time spent with their families living in the metropolitan 

Baghdad area.7

The performance of the IqAF’s airlifters was encouraging, but the 

progress of its rotary-winged aircraft units continued to disappoint. 

Since May 2005, Squadron 12 only had one of its five Bell 206B 

JetRanger helicopters available for training. Although the US Army 

Security Assistance Command had opened an FMS case for a $1 million logistics support agreement in July, it would take time for that 

process to deliver anything.8

 By October the JetRangers were completely grounded for lack of spare parts. Only after a concerted effort 

by CAFTT and MNSTC–I’s security assistance office did Squadron 

12 receive enough spares to resume training on 11 December—and 

even then with just two aircraft. The Squadron 12 commander flew 

solo for the first time soon thereafter. He and another Squadron 12 

pilot were the first Iraqi airmen to become flight-qualified in the Bell 

206B; both soon received additional specialized training to qualify as 

flight instructors.9

The six Jordanian-gifted UH-1H helicopters in service with Squadron 2 had also been grounded for months because of multiple maintenance problems. In July, after lengthy discussions, General Barzanjy 

decided to accept CMATT–A’s proposal to upgrade all of the UH-1Hs 

(including the 10 unrefurbished machines still in Jordan) to meet 

Huey II specifications.10 The improvements were significant. The 

Huey II program included a reinforced airframe, a newer engine providing about 30 percent more power, new rotor blades and tail booms, 

new wiring, and upgraded avionics. Given the extent of the conversion effort—and the fact that it would cost about $3.5 million per 

aircraft—the IqAF commander was willing to proceed—but only on 

the condition that the work was not to be done in Jordan. He preferred that a US-based contractor take on the project, even though 

this would add significant transportation costs to the bill.11

With this in mind, in August ARINC submitted cost proposals for 

the conversion work; the estimates included the use of a subcontractor, 

US Helicopter, Inc., of Dothan, Alabama. Completion of the project 

was expected to require about a year. It took several months to determine how the effort would be paid for, and in the end CAFTT and 

MNSTC–I decided to split the cost. In early December CAFTT 

announced that all 16 UH-1Hs (including the 10 unrefurbished machines in Jordan) would be shipped to the United States for reconstruction early the next year.12
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 61

The performance of all three ISR aircraft types remained problematic 

at best. The two Seekers and six Comp Airs were of limited use, but 

they would continue to contribute as and where they could. In the 

meantime, all six CH2000s remained grounded for the reasons identified in the capability assessment. It would take time and money to 

correct all of the three aircraft types’ faults.13

In sum, General Barzanjy and his new CAFTT support team 

agreed that his air force could not satisfactorily perform its existing 

mission, let alone expand upon the requirement. Although more 

Iraqi airmen were being recruited and trained, their service would be 

without purpose unless they had suitable aircraft in sufficient quantity. The Iraqi air force was prepared to purchase those aircraft—especially 

ISR-capable platforms and light transports—but it needed honest, 

reliable advice on what kind, how many, and when to buy them.

The Comparative Aircraft Study

With the results of the mission analysis, CONOPS, and capability 

assessment in hand, General Buchanan was better prepared to respond to the Iraqis’ desire for additional aircraft. One of the more 

important conclusions emerging was that, at least in the short term, 

the Iraqi air force should give priority to supporting COIN air operations. Given that there were multiple COIN operations-capable aircraft on the market, the USAF could assist by recommending which 

aircraft types (and quantities) might be best suited to Iraq’s circumstances. This suggested a comparative evaluation as the next step.

In late October, General Buchanan directed the formation of a 

Comparative Aircraft Working Group (CAWG), and its members 

convened in AFSOC headquarters at Hurlburt Field, Florida, from 6 

November through 6 December 2005. Comprised of 15 subject-matter 

experts working under the direction of General McCutchan, the 

CAWG was to conduct a “strategy-to-task evaluation” of the Iraqis’ 

COIN-related, air operations capability gaps and identify the aircraft 

(by type and quantity) best suited to fill those gaps.14 Using a time 

horizon of five years, the CAWG undertook four tasks:

•  to validate (and expand, if necessary) the existing IqAF mission

requirements,
62 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

•  to establish key performance parameters for aerial platforms

conducting COIN air operations in Iraq,

•  to establish cost and availability of the aerial platforms best

suited for COIN air operations in Iraq, and

•  to recommend procurement options that would meet the IqAF’s

needs.15

While conducting its mission, task, and platform analyses, the 

working group also reviewed open-source, market research materials. 

This parallel effort was used to develop three requests for information—

regarding COIN/ISR, rotary winged, and light, fixed-wing transports—

to be published on the US government’s Federal Business Operations 

website in mid-November.16 The resulting vendor inputs were combined with additional market research and interviews to develop a 

comparative model for evaluating the vendors’ submissions, including an analysis of overall capability versus estimated costs for each 

solution.

Overall, the working group concluded that an Iraqi air force optimized for COIN air operations would consist of 164 turbine-powered 

aircraft, with the highest priority given to acquiring 50 light transports commonly configured so that they could be adapted for ISR, 

command and control, VIP transport, or utility airlift missions. The 

proposal also included eight dedicated ISR aircraft, 45 battlefield 

mobility helicopters, 24 light-attack aircraft, and three additional 

C-130 Hercules transports. Depending upon the specific aircraft and 

equipment choices involved, the total cost projections ranged from 

$466 million to $2.58 billion.17

General McCutchan presented the working group’s report to 

USCENTAF in mid-December. After describing the analysis process 

and cost-benefit comparisons for each of the platform categories, he 

moved on to the aircraft procurement strategy. That involved the issuance of requests for proposals, followed by source selection—a 

painstaking process, but necessary to buy the best platforms at the 

best price. General McCutchan posed two options for funding: an 

expenditure-intensive two-year plan and a more leanly resourced 

five-year plan—with the latter keeping its near-term focus on the ISR, 

command and control, VIP and utility transport, and battlefield 

mobility missions. General McCutchan concluded that regardless of 
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 63

the choice, it was critical that training and doctrinal development 

stay apace with the increase in aircraft strength.18

The ASTs Are Replaced with MiTTs

As important as it might be for the IqAF to acquire more capable 

aircraft, that investment would be wasted unless its airmen were 

properly trained. This put a spotlight on the ASTs. The capability assessment acknowledged that the ASTs had deployed without adequate training for their specialized work and had been left thereafter 

to struggle without adequate support. It was undeniable that both 

factors had played a role in the ASTs’ mixed results. What was needed 

were MiTT members who would be trained appropriately (including 

cultural instruction and weapons proficiency), committed to serving 

a tour of sufficient length (preferably 365 days), and deployed as a unit.19

The situation demanded high-level intervention. When General 

Buchanan established CAFTT, he also took functional control of the 

manning process used to populate its subordinate instructor positions.20 But improving the quality and capabilities of the USAF personnel tapped to become advisors would take time, and there was 

training to be accomplished. When the capability assessment teams 

visited Iraq in September, the five ASTs had a combined total of 68 

people (along with an additional 30 maintenance augmentees assigned to Ali AB to support Squadron 23’s C-130s). The assessors recommended that the teams’ overall authorized strength be increased 

to a total of 91 advisors (all serving on 365-day tours), along with an 

additional 20 C-130 maintenance augmentees.21 That increase was 

not likely to occur until at least late summer 2006. If the training effort 

was to become more effective in the near term, it would need a 

prompt infusion of manpower, preferably with experienced Airmen 

already in theater and willing to serve the extra time involved. Various 

sources were tapped for a temporary “fix,” including the flying and 

maintenance units of the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing, then headquartered at Balad AB.

The Board of Directors Considers the Way Ahead

On 5 January 2006 General Buchanan presented the senior USAF 

leaders responsible for reconstituting Iraq’s air force—the board of 
64 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

directors—with the results of USCENTAF’s efforts over the previous 

four months. The capability assessment, the creation of CAFTT, and 

the results of the Comparative Aircraft Study had all produced information 

not available to the CONOPS writers. The study needed significant 

revision before it could be presented to General Barzanjy and his superiors. The rotary-wing programs were badly broken, but there were 

corrections in progress: the Huey II conversions and JetRanger sustainment cases had both been funded, and Iraq had negotiated the 

purchase of 10 new Russian-built Mil Mi-17 helicopters through Bumar. 

That said, General Buchanan’s two principal concerns were Iraq’s 

continued lack of truly capable ISR aircraft and the situation facing 

the USAF advisors embedded with IqAF units.22

The ISR Equipment Problem

USCENTAF would stand by the ISR airplanes that the Iraqis already 

had—but with reservations, and preferably only as long as it took to 

buy something better. For the time being, the two Seekers would continue to fly. The CH2000s remained on the ground, but the manufacturer was correcting their faults, and they were expected to resume 

flying within a few months.23

The Comp Airs continued to present nothing but hard choices. In 

early December, General Buchanan had asked AFMC for disposition 

recommendations. At the direction of AFMC commander Gen Bruce 

Carlson, an AFMC Integrated Product Team (IPT) evaluated four 

possible COAs. Each called for the modification, repair, and flight 

testing of the six remaining aircraft but with different schedules and 

cost estimates:

•  COA 1 moved one aircraft to Edwards AFB, California. The parts

fabricated for its modifications would be used as patterns to 

build repair kits, which AFMC technicians could then install on 

the other five aircraft still at Kirkuk AB. This alternative was estimated to require 143 days and would cost $1.41 million.

•  COA 2 moved all six aircraft to Edwards AFB, where they would

be rebuilt and then returned to Iraq. This option would require 

134 days and $1.87 million.
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 65

•  COA 3 moved three Comp Airs to Edwards AFB for reconstruction; the remainder would be rebuilt in Iraq. This COA 

required 123 days and had a price tag of $1.99 million.

•  COA 4 called for the technicians to make the necessary corrections to all six aircraft at Kirkuk AB. This option would take 157 

days at a cost $1.98 million.24

While the reconstruction and flight-test costs were relatively modest 

for all four options, the IPT acknowledged that moving any or all of 

the Comp Airs to and from Iraq—along with the requisite technician 

teams, equipment, and repair parts—would be “very expensive.” In 

fact, the IPT determined that each load carried by a C-17 jet transport—

the customary mode for such movements—would cost $314,000. 

This meant that if USCENTAF were to select COA 3, for example, the 

airlift bill alone could constitute as much as two-thirds of that option’s 

budget.25

Although not yet formally notified of AFMC’s final position at the 

time of the briefing, USCENTAF advised the board of directors that 

the “most likely COA” would be to transport three of the six Comp 

Airs to the United States for testing and repairs. That said, General 

Buchanan was quick to acknowledge that “airlift is a critical factor.”26

The MiTT Training Options

In regard to the MiTTs, General Buchanan told the board of directors that his “top concern [was] training our own transition teams so 

that they have all the tools they need to achieve the mission.”27 CAFTT 

had wheedled some temporary assistance for its hard-pressed instructors, but the situation called for a long-term solution, which 

meant devising a durable training plan. USCENTAF presented the 

board of directors with three options:

•  Leverage existing organizations to supply the MiTTs’ needs. For

example, AETC might provide additional MiTT-oriented instruction by enlarging its course catalog, or AFSOC could expand the 

training schedule currently offered by its 6th SOS and Air Force 

Special Operations School (AFSOS).

•  Review the plans for existing organizational change proposals to

see if they could be shaped along similar lines, for example, by 
66 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

realigning security assistance under the Special Warfare Center 

concept or encouraging AFSOC to increase its combat aviation 

advisory capability.

•  Establish an entirely new organization, for example, the proposed

Coalition Air Training Center (CATC) that was being offered in 

some quarters as the best means of ensuring effective MiTT development and deployment on a permanent, worldwide basis. If 

authorized, CATC would become the USAF’s “one-stop shop” 

for training MiTT members, harvesting the deployers’ lessons 

learned, coordinating with security assistance organizations, 

and offering specialized instruction to coalition and host nation 

partners.28

The Situation in the First Half of 2006

While the board of directors was pondering the Air Force’s options 

as presented by USCENTAF in early January, the IqAF reexamined 

its own present and future needs. At that point, it had nearly 500 airmen. In a mid-February report to the Congress, the DOD noted that 

the coalition had trained “nearly seventy personnel, including twentyfive pilots, forty-one aircraft maintenance engineers, and three 

administrators.”29 The latest IqAF service plan, released in draft form 

on 14 January 2006, continued to identify pilot recruitment as the 

“most critical priority.” That need was driven in turn by the air 

force’s accompanying operational priority—to develop its existing 

forces so that it could make “an independent and viable contribution” 

to the nation’s defense.30

The service plan openly acknowledged some significant failings. 

There was still no doctrinal development underway, for example. Nor 

could the air force conduct basic military training for newly recruited 

airmen. The supply chain was admittedly “slow, lacks resources and is 

unable to forecast future requirements,” although the Iraqis saw that 

challenge to be “understandable and not insurmountable. The structure exists and the chain is not broken, it is just slow to achieve its 

aims.” That it succeeded was largely due to the level of support being 

provided by coalition-funded FMS sustainment contracts.31

The service plan predicted that some elements of the logistics 

situation should begin to show real—if not necessarily immediate—
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 67

improvement in the following months; that improvement did indeed 

occur. At Taji, helicopter pilots, flying the five Bell JetRangers of 

Squadron 12, were produced, albeit at a modest pace.32 As agreed in 

the previous quarter, AMC C-17 transports airlifted 16 UH-1H helicopters to the United States for reconstruction as improved Huey IIs; 

those airframes arrived in two shipments flown on 29 January and 1 

February 2006. The movement involved nonstandard loads of six machines per flight (as opposed to a customary load of four), and that 

procedure required consent from both AMC’s operations directorate 

and AFMC’s Air Transportability Test Load Agency. Their approval

avoided a third flight, resulting in a net savings of $400,000. However, 

even with this expedited delivery, the reconstruction process would 

still require eight to nine months per airframe. Assuming no unexpected delays, those helicopters could not be returned to Taji and 

made mission ready again until early 2007.33

In the meantime, the Iraqis began to look elsewhere. On 17 February 

they took delivery of eight new Russian-built Mil Mi-17 battlefield 

mobility helicopters from Bumar; two more were to follow several 

months later. After the aircraft received some modifications at 

NAMAB, all 10 would be assigned to Taji. Better yet, the contract 

included 12 months’ maintenance and instruction by Polish and Russian 

technicians. Although the helicopters and their aircrews would not 

be fully mission capable for almost a year, this marked a major milestone for the IqAF because the Mi-17 was its first air weapon system 

to be successfully procured and funded without direct coalition involvement. A variety of factors favored that choice; they were best 

summarized by saying that the Mi-17 was “simple, capable, and had 

been flown by Iraq in the past.”34

The airmen of Squadron 23 were also gaining steadily in experience with their three C-130s. On 20 January they completed their 

first mission in which they transported supplies other than their own. 

The squadron handled every respect of the transit from Baghdad to 

Basrah. The mission, called a “validation flight,” included flight planning, filing flight clearances, loading cargo, and flying the aircraft.35

In early February the squadron ferried the interior minister and his 

staff to an Arab League–sponsored conference in Tunisia, marking

the first time since the war’s end that an all-Iraqi air force crew 

planned and flew an operational mission to a destination outside of 

Iraq.36 Several weeks later, a Squadron 23 crew transported five Iraqi 

children to Turkey for eye surgery—the air force’s first cross-border 
68 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

humanitarian mission.37 On 7 March the squadron joined in the 

celebrations marking the official opening of NAMAB. Although 

much of the base’s infrastructure was still under construction—a 

project budgeted at $40 million—there had been sufficient progress for 

the squadron to complete its move from Ali Base early in the new year.38

Evaluating the ISR Platform Problem

Notwithstanding the IqAF’s modest progress in other spheres, the 

disappointing performance of its ISR aircraft still restricted its ability 

to patrol Iraq’s borders and oil production infrastructure, thus visibly 

supporting Iraqi army and coalition units on the ground.

In early January General Buchanan had told the board of directors 

that he expected AFMC would recommend shipping three Comp Air 

aircraft back to the United States for evaluation and reconstruction, 

followed by upgrades in Iraq for the remaining airplanes. In his 11 

January reply, General Carlson recommended that only one Comp 

Air should make the journey and that the others could be modified in 

theater thereafter. He, too, was mindful of the significant airlift expense. The AFMC commander also took pains to address the equally 

important need to sustain the rebuilt aircraft after they had been returned to service:

The courses of action we outline assume a commitment for CENTAF-fenced 

funding and a follow-on sustainment support package through a formal Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. Even with our best efforts to modify and repair the aircraft without an FMS sustainment package, we estimate the aircraft 

will be unsafe to fly again within two to six months.39

On 27 January 2006 AFMC headquarters advised AFFTC that USCENTAF was making arrangements to airlift one of Squadron 3’s 

Comp Airs to Edwards AFB for reconstruction and flight test.40 Two 

days later, the seriousness of the ISR situation was further underscored by the loss of a second Comp Air (IqAF Ser. YI-123) at Kirkuk 

AB. The Iraqi pilot and his two passengers suffered only minor injuries during the mishap—apparently caused by a loss of control at low 

level—but the aircraft was damaged beyond economical repair. Under the circumstances, there was no choice but to ground the remaining Comp Airs pending the results of the evaluation in California.41

Even as steps were being taken to identify, prepare, and move a 

representative Comp Air to the United States, General Buchanan 
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 69

wrote to General Carlson to express his gratitude for the support that 

AFMC had provided thus far: 

Please accept my sincere thanks for the outstanding support we received regarding our ongoing efforts to revitalize the Iraqi Air Force. Your test team . . . 

made history with their first-ever test and evaluation flights of aircraft within 

an active combat zone. We owe you and them a round of applause for the 

critical role they played in providing us the data necessary to move forward.42

In early February AMC airlifted the exemplar aircraft (IqAF Ser. 

YI-121) to California, where it was immediately handed over to a 

20-member team ofAFMC master craftsmen led by Lt Col Michael Pelletier, deputy commander of AFFTC’s 412th Maintenance Group. The 

first order of business was to completely dismantle the Comp Air and carefully examine its components. The UAE-installed modifications were set 

aside, and the aircraft was rebuilt to its original kit design specifications 

using replacement parts or new component assemblies where needed. 

That effort included fabricating a new pair of wings, replacing the engine 

and propeller, and installing a prototype air conditioning system.43

One of the biggest challenges facing the technicians was the lack of 

construction and modification documentation. “What we’re doing is 

figuring out what procedures need to be in place,” said TSgt Rick Fujimoto, 

a team participant, “[and then] involving engineers who look at the 

proposed procedures and approve them.” Since the Comp Air was 

designed to be built by hobbyist builders, it incorporated construction materials not ordinarily encountered by USAF technicians, testing their ingenuity. “The best person for this job would probably be a 

surfboard builder,” Sergeant Fujimoto explained. “But I’ve got four 

sheet metal guys who, with a four-day crash course [in fiberglass repair] and the ability to draw upon their varied experience . . . came 

together, and there’s nothing they can’t do.”44

The Comp Air Flight Test

The exemplar aircraft made its first postreconstruction flight on 25 

April, and it immediately entered an accelerated test program. Budgeted 

at just over $207,000 (including an uncertainty factor of 30 percent), the 

syllabus test plan called for roughly 40 hours of airborne evaluation 

staged over the course of a month.45

Between 25 April and 26 May the Comp Air made 23 flights, accumulating over 45 hours of test activity. The goals of the test were to 

determine the aircraft’s forward and aft center-of-gravity flying qualities—
70 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

including stalls, trim characteristics, engine torque and power effects, 

and static and dynamic stability—and to quantify its recommended performance parameters, including best climb speed and best glide speed.

The airplane, as modified by the AFMC technical team, had satisfactory flying qualities “to perform the day, visual [flight conditions], 

oil pipeline patrol and utility transport mission.”46 The potential for 

abrupt, high (60–90 degree) bank angle excursions in power-on stall 

conditions remained essentially unchanged, but the AFMC-added 

stall warning system helped reduce that risk to a tolerable level. Directional stability was low but acceptable. The Comp Air’s throttle 

responses were still marginal, and the team noted that this was likely 

to complicate landings at night or under instrument flight conditions—

something the examiners continued to recommend against until additional flight tests could be made to evaluate the aircraft in such conditions.

The test report also added an important caveat. Because all of the 

Iraqi Comp Airs had been hand-built, “potential differences between 

the aircraft may result in varying flying qualities.” Moreover, the test 

team noted that “no systems engineering review, or air worthiness 

certification has been accomplished” for those aircraft, nor had their 

suitability—something quite different from airworthiness—been 

evaluated with regard to “the intended pipeline surveillance and light 

utility mission.” If the Iraqis expected to continue using the Comp 

Air fleet in the long term—to mean anything more than two years—

then those studies needed to be done.47

The Repair Team Deploys

On 9 June 2006 AFMC deployed a 16-member technical team to 

Kirkuk AB; their charge was to use the results of the Edwards AFB 

test program to reconstruct the other four Comp Air airplanes still in 

service with Squadron 3. When the team arrived, the Iraqi squadron 

was undergoing a rigorous schedule of academics. “There [had been] 

no hierarchy. . . . We were able to set up the squadron to mirror the 

structure of a squadron in the USAF, and to assign section and duty 

chiefs who are given authority to make decisions,” said Capt Anthony 

Brim, a CAFTT advisor recently assigned to the squadron.48

The team’s highly skilled technicians completely disassembled all 

four aircraft and rebuilt them using the insights gained (and parts 

fabricated) while working with the exemplar airplane at Edwards 

AFB. The lack of commonality among the aircraft proved to be their 
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 71

greatest challenge. Although the Comp Airs had been assembled 

from manufacturer-provided kit materials, the team quickly appreciated that no two airframes were exactly alike.49 “If we found something on one aircraft, we wouldn’t find it on any of the others . . . [or] 

you’d have the same parts, but they would be in different places on 

each aircraft,” said team commander Colonel Pelletier. Nonetheless, 

the team members completed their work in remarkable time. The 

reconstruction schedule had projected a temporary duty requirement of about 130 days, and they finished the job in only 41.50

What made their accomplishment even more praiseworthy was 

that insurgent attacks frequently interrupted the team’s efforts. Nor 

did their tight work schedule allow them much rest. In early July one 

member summarized a night’s events:

We went to Alarm Yellow last night (Thursday) around 2100, then Alarm Red at 

2300. After coming out of Red and going into Alarm Black for a while, we went 

back to Alarm Yellow at 0030, just as we were getting ready to go to work . . . (We 

usually work 0100–1000 to stay out of the heat of the day.). . . All base personnel 

were directed to remain in quarters until 0600 Friday morning. . . . We essentially lost a night’s work. . . . Yesterday during his flight [a team test pilot] said he 

saw a gun battle going on beneath him.51

Spooling up the MiTTs

In early January 2006 General Buchanan asked the board of directors for assistance in putting the IqAF training mission on a surer 

footing. He believed that one of CAFTT’s highest priorities should be 

the earliest possible deployment of qualified advisor/instructors. 

Soon, USCENTAF staffers began coordinating with AFSOC and the 

USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS) to develop a “surge” 

training curriculum for MiTT members scheduled to deploy to 

CAFTT-controlled advisor assignments later that summer.

Designed to parallel the US Army’s 45-day MiTT training in many 

respects (and thereby satisfying USCENTCOM’s predeployment 

training requirements), the Aviation MiTT academic course was to 

be conducted by USAFSOS faculty at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The 

course combined elements from the Middle Eastern Orientation 

course, the Contemporary Insurgents Warfare course, and the 

Dynamics of International Terrorism course. The Defense Language

Institute also provided Arabic language instructors. The resulting 
72 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

syllabus consisted of 30 days’ instruction, emphasizing three major 

areas of study:

•  Mission training, including MNSTC–I/CAFTT command and

control, Iraqi air force organization, coalition air/ground and 

combat aviation advisory operations, COIN theory, the security 

assistance process, and MiTT lessons learned;

•  Cultural training, including Arabic language and Iraqi culture

familiarization, with the latter offering the Iraqis’ view of Iraq, 

the United States, and its coalition partners;

•  Combat skills, including DOD force protection (Level I), AK-47

weapon familiarization, level-C hostage survival skills, forward 

operating base operations and convoy procedures, and “shoot 

and move” skills.52

Since the course was developed outside USAFSOS’ normal scheduling process, there could only be one offering for the 83 students programmed to attend. Other means would have to be found to present 

the material—or a refinement of it—to future MiTT members. Opening ceremonies for the class were set for 19 July, and the course would 

end with a “Hell Week” survival, evasion, resistance, and escape exercise. The graduation ceremony was set for 19 August.53

General Hoog Delivers a Situation Report

By mid-2006 an effective Iraqi air force was becoming more plausible. That said, no one expected that Iraqi airmen would supplant 

coalition Airmen any time soon, even if coalition ground forces began to withdraw in the near term. In a press interview given in late 

June 2006, the CAFTT commander summarized the new air force’s 

circumstances and prospects. “The overall goal right now in 2006 and 

2007 is to transition capability,” General Hoog said.54 At that point, 

the IqAF had 749 people assigned, of which 155 were pilots. The rest 

were working as aircraft maintainers, air traffic controllers, logistics 

staffers, and air base security troops.

CAFTT had also grown from just four Airmen to nearly 100. 

Headquartered adjacent to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s facilities at 

Phoenix Base in Baghdad’s International Zone, it supported MiTTs at 

IqAF headquarters and the four IqAF bases sited at Kirkuk, Basrah, 
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 73

Taji, and NAMAB.55 By all expectations, CAFTT would be in Iraq for 

some time, perhaps even after coalition ground forces began to withdraw. As General Hoog observed, “I don’t see the air presence leading 

the reduction. I see it lagging the reduction of the ground forces, a 

certain amount of time, months, years or so, so that it all consolidates 

in a well thought-out, carefully orchestrated manner.”56

Progress in the Second Half of 2006

The fatal mishap that took place near Kirkuk on 30 May 2005 galvanized the USAF into action. However, even though a fierce impetus 

for improvement had been brought to bear, it took the greater part of 

another year for the USAF to generate potential courses of action, 

identify the most promising alternatives, abandon dead ends, and 

find the wherewithal to pursue the most urgently needed corrections. 

It was only in the second half of 2006 that the first real results began 

to appear, especially in the procurement of more suitable aircraft and 

in the improved training provided to the MiTTs deploying to Iraq.

For its part, the IqAF also achieved some important advances, 

most notably by becoming an acknowledged operational arm of the 

IqMoD in early September. Now, the IqAF no longer simply took orders 

from the coalition, as had been the case since January 2004.

Procuring a Suitable ISR Platform

By the end of June 2006, the AFMC repair team had finished rebuilding two of the four Comp Airs in Iraq. In spite of their “herculean efforts” to make the aircraft more airworthy, incidents continued 

to occur, including an instance in which a Comp Air fell into an upright spin during power-on stall testing.57 Although the pilot was able 

to regain control and return to base, “subsequent investigations, citing 

manufacturing concerns, drove the Edwards test team to declare the 

Comp Air platform unsuitable for flight.” On 10 August General Barzanjy 

and General Hoog jointly agreed to permanently ground Squadron 

3’s Comp Air fleet. The five aircraft were dismantled, and all but 

$166,911 of the $1.95 million that had been set aside to modify and 

sustain them for two years was returned to the Iraqis.58

It was unfortunate that so much time and effort had been spent in 

trying to return the remaining five Comp Airs to service. When all 
74 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

was said and done, however, the aircraft remained inadequate in both 

numbers and performance, and there was no way to make them any 

more suitable than when the Iraqis had first accepted them in late 

2004. Countering the mounting insurgency demanded an ISR platform with better performance and endurance, more load-carrying 

capacity, greater reliability, and vastly improved sustainability.

The Advanced ISR Platform Program

The grounding of the Comp Airs left the Iraqis with only the 

Squadron 70’s two Seekers and six CH2000s for the ISR mission. Fortunately, the CH2000 contractor had corrected many of that airplane’s 

faults, and the last two CH2000s (of a total buy of eight) were scheduled 

for delivery in September. In the meantime, IqAF headquarters instructed Squadron 70 to transfer four of its aircraft from Basrah to 

Squadron 3 so that surveillance operations could continue at Kirkuk.59

That mid-summer realignment was only a stop-gap measure, as 

neither aircraft type could make much more than a nominal contribution to the Iraqis’ needs. Fortunately, corrective action was already 

underway. In May and June various aerospace contractors, including 

US-based Raytheon and UK-based Britten-Norman Aviation, presented proposals intended to meet the Iraqi’s ISR requirement. 

Raytheon offered a specialized version of its twin-engine Beechcraft 

King Air 350ER (extended range), a very successful executive and 

light transport aircraft.60

In August a team of Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC) 

acquisition experts and the Iraqi and CAFTT staffs evaluated the offerings, and the Raytheon entry won. Funded entirely by the Iraqis 

and code-named Peace Dragon by AFMC, the six-airplane, $143 million 

sole-source award used an FMS case vehicle called an undefinitized 

contract to expedite processing.61 The delivery schedule called for the 

first aircraft (a light transport/training aircraft) to arrive in Iraq in 

November 2007 and the five ISR platforms to follow between December 

2007 and February 2008. The contract included pilot and mission 

systems operator training, maintenance training (for the aircraft and 

its ISR systems), up to nine ground stations to receive ISR data, onboard defensive systems, and 12 months’ maintenance and spares.62

On 27 September, as required by the Arms Control Export Act, the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) formally notified 

Congress of a possible sale of military equipment to the government 
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 75

of Iraq (GOI). The posting announced that the Iraqis might ask to 

buy up to 24 ISR-capable King Air 350ERs and as many as 24 more 

King Air 350ERs (or, alternatively, Polish-built PZL M-18 Skytrucks)

to be used as light transports, along with an equal number of countermeasure equipment sets and global positioning system navigation 

devices. Although the GOI had no immediate intent (or funds) to 

buy that much equipment, the total potential value of the sale was set 

at $900 million.63

Following congressional approval, the FMS letter of offer and acceptance (LO&A)was prepared for delivery and signed by an official in the

Air Force Secretariat’s International Affairs Directorate (SAF/IA) on 30 

November 2006. The letter was then countersigned by a member of 

the Iraqi embassy staff—meaning that Baghdad had accepted the 

agreement’s terms and deposited full payment in a US government 

account—on 29 December 2006.64

The Interim ISR Platform Program

Although the purchase of the King Airs promised a significantly 

improved ISR capability, it would be nearly a year and a half before 

those aircraft could be on the ramp and mission ready. The Iraqis 

needed something sooner, even if that meant buying an additional 

number of aircraft that were smaller, more modestly equipped, and 

had less endurance than the King Air 350ER.

In August 2006 General Barzanjy asked for CAFTT’s assistance in 

obtaining an interim ISR platform. He wanted something like the 

Cessna C208 Caravan, a US-built, single turboprop-engine aircraft 

widely used as a light transport.65 Could General Hoog do anything 

to expedite the purchase of a small number of C208s for the ISR unit 

at Kirkuk? General Hoog answered with a personal promise to see 

those aircraft delivered before he left Iraq in mid-2007.66 Under ordinary circumstances, it would have been virtually impossible for him 

to make good on such a guarantee, but in this instance he had an ace 

up his sleeve. General Hoog knew someone at “Big Safari.”

This AFMC-controlled organization—officially designated as the 

645th Aeronautical Systems Group but more commonly known by its 

long-time project name, “Big Safari”—was the USAF’s equivalent of 

the famed Lockheed Skunk Works, a secretive corporate facility that

specialized in designing and building small numbers of exotic, highperformance military aircraft and other highly classified “black 
76 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

world” systems.67 The Skunk Works’ unofficial motto was “be quick, 

be quiet, be on time,” and Big Safari had mirrored that approach in its 

own work since its inception in 1952.68 Big Safari’s long record of success in working closely with defense contractors to modify USAF aircraft and other systems for special, urgent projects meant that it had 

also developed considerable expertise in crafting unusual requirement 

contracts that employed specialized, highly streamlined acquisition 

procedures. Those capabilities made it possible for Big Safari’s contracting officers to obtain goods and services within time schedules 

that were simply unimaginable in the larger, more bureaucratic world 

of government procurement. It was that capability that General Hoog 

called upon to make good on his promise to General Barzanjy.69

The 645th Aeronautical Systems Group received General Hoog’s 

request on 31 August and certain sorts of classified contractual magic 

occurred immediately thereafter. AFSAC’s 555th International Group 

completed its portion of the LO&A on 27 November. The $26 million

award included the purchase of three Cessna C208 aircraft (at a cost 

of $2.165 million each), their conversion to ISR platforms (at a cost of 

$4.85 million each), four ground stations to process the resulting ISR 

data via downlink, the installation of aircraft defensive systems, and a 

year’s maintenance and spares.70 This process was called a pseudo 

case, meaning that DOD funds were being used to pay for the purchase due to its “urgent and compelling need.”71

The contract was awarded to Alliant Technology Systems on 1 December, and like the King Air agreement, it was left undefinitized in 

order to accelerate the work. The first Caravan arrived at the contractor’s 

facility in Fort Worth, Texas, on 8 December, and modifications began 

immediately. The other two aircraft followed in short order. Thanks 

to the expertise of Big Safari’s contracting officers and the skills of Alliant’s 

engineers and technicians, the departing CAFTT commander was 

able to keep his word. The first C208 arrived in Iraq on 30 March 

2007—just seven months after General Hoog’s request.72

Rotary-Wing Program Status

The situation at Taji continued to be something of a curate’s egg: it 

was good but only in parts. The sustainment funding for Squadron 

12’s five JetRangers ran out at the end of fiscal year (FY) 2006. That 

was especially disappointing because about $325,000 of the $2.6 mil-
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 77

lion provided by the US Army’s Security Assistance Command was 

wasted when a shipment of parts was mistakenly delivered to a salvage 

yard. Another $675,000 went unspent because the contractor could 

not get all the required parts on order—and thus obligate the money—

before the fiscal year closed out on 30 September. A new FY 2007 

FMS agreement allowed the squadron to resume pilot training in 

October, and five Iraqi airmen soloed over the next six months.73

The 16 UH-1Hs were being rebuilt to Huey IIstandards in Alabama, 

and delivery of the first five was expected early in the new year. In the 

meantime, five MiTT pilots were receiving initial and functional 

check flight qualification training; they would serve as the initial advisor cadre for Squadron 2 when it received its rebuilt aircraft.74

The 10 Mi-17 helicopters, delivered in February and March by the 

Polish arms conglomerate Bumar, took a year being prepared for 

operational use, including the installation of defensive systems. Only 

at the very end of the year were any of them turned over to Squadron 4.75

Nine were to be used for battlefield mobility and medical evacuation, 

and the tenth was outfitted as a VIP transport. To help support 

Squadron 4, USCENTAF agreed to fund Mi-17 familiarization training in the Ukraine for four MiTT pilots, along with three flight engineers and three crew chiefs. They left in September and returned to 

Iraq in December, even as the first Mi-17s were about to enter squadron 

service at Taji.76

In the meantime, the Iraqis were preparing to expand their helicopter fleet in a significant way. On 19 September the DSCA notified 

Congress of Iraq’s desire to make an arms purchase amounting to as 

much as $500 million if all the options were exercised. Those options 

included 20 additional Mi-17 troop transport helicopters, along with 

logistics services for the rotary-winged aircraft already in Iraqi possession.77 The Iraqis bought an additional 18 Mi-17s; two of the new 

helicopters would be added to Squadron 4’s VIP branch. The rest 

would join the 10 already programmed for battlefield mobility and 

medical services. Deliveries were expected to begin in the second half 

of 2007.78

Iraq Assumes Operational Control of Its Air Force

Of course, all developments came within the evolution of the IqAF 

as an independent service making an increasingly effective contribu-
78 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

tion to Iraqi sovereignty and security. By general agreement, in 2006 

the air force was at least a year or more behind the army in terms of 

organizational development and operational readiness, but that was 

probably appropriate, given the overwhelming need for “boots on 

the ground” in the numbers required to conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign.79

The Iraqi army’s ability to impose control over an increasing 

number of provinces encouraged the coalition to begin turning responsibility for the military situation over to the GOI. The first 

handoff, at a 7 September ceremony in Baghdad, included control 

of the Iraqi army’s Eighth Division, along with the Iraqi navy and 

air force. Further turnovers were anticipated, as six of 10 Iraqi army 

divisions were reported to be “in the lead in [their] areas of operation.” Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was effusive, noting that it 

was “a great and happy day in the history of the Iraqis.” The MNF–I 

commander, Gen George F. Casey, US Army, was more circumspect. 

“Today is an important milestone,” he said in remarks delivered 

during the official ceremony, “but we still have a way to go.”80

Within its own sphere, the IqAF was also gaining a greater degree 

of self-governance. In September its maintainers at NAMAB took 

charge of all first-line maintenance for Squadron 23’s C-130s, assuming the authority to determine if the aircraft were safe, reliable, 

and mission ready. “They’ve gone from a point where everyone was 

working only in a classroom environment . . . to taking overall responsibility for the launch, recovery and servicing of the aircraft—

they do all of the daily executions,” a CAFTT maintenance team chief 

proudly observed.81

Squadron 3 aircrews began performing ISR missions over Baghdad 

during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which began on 25 

September and ended in late October. This meant deploying elements of the squadron from Kirkuk to NAMAB. The move required 

Squadron 3 to coordinate its support requirements with host base 

maintainers, the first time an Iraqi squadron had performed this 

fundamental maneuver. The ISR flights made during the deployment 

also marked the first time the IqAF provided direct support to ground 

forces operating in Baghdad itself.82
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 79

Establishing an Iraqi-Controllable Airspace

The IqAF now operated under the direct control of Iraqi joint military headquarters, but this did not mean that Iraq’s airspace necessarily 

came under its own surveillance. Put simply, the Iraqis still had no 

direct means of knowing what was flying over their own territory. 

The Iraqi civil aviation authority (ICAA) had the authority over commercial air travel clearance procedures, but coalition air traffic controllers still directed aircraft operating in Iraqi skies.83 In the northern 

third of Iraq, for example, that function was ably performed by the 

506th Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron’s combined en 

route radar approach (CERAP) air traffic control facility, sited at 

Kirkuk AB and call-signed “King Pin.”84

In his 5 July 2006 status update, General Hoog noted that MNSTC–I 

had been ordered to develop an airspace transition plan for Iraq. This 

plan would need to contain “dual use” features so that “we don’t give 

away [the] authority CFACC needs to conduct [the] strategic overwatch mission.”85 At that point, the expectation was that the IqAF 

would pursue an FMS request for US-made, export-permissible air 

traffic control radars and that CAFTT would seek to “team with Balad 

[AB] and CERAP for [a] fuzed IqAF and ICAA radar picture.”86

CAFTT was willing to consider a transfer of the Kirkuk-based 

CERAP to the Iraqis once the equipment issue had been resolved.

In late August, Iraqi officials asked to purchase a national airspace 

system (NAS) and the air traffic management equipment needed to 

support it via FMS. Unfortunately, the net price came to $54 million—

a sum the Iraqis were not prepared to pay. Moreover, some of the requested equipment was technically subject to US Arms Export Control 

Act restrictions. After considerable negotiation, the Iraqi government 

reached an agreement that deleted the restricted items from its “shopping list.” The addition of some communications installations at Taji 

somewhat offset that cost saving, resulting in an aggregate price of 

just over $28 million. AFSAC produced a LO&A for the purchase on

20 November 2006, and an Iraqi representative countersigned it on 

24 December.87

CAFTT anticipated that some of the export-restricted items (for 

example, long-range radars and command-and-control systems) 

could be obtained later by pseudo case transfers. That would take 

time and additional funding.88 When all was said and done, the NAS’s 
80 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

essential equipment deliveries were not expected to arrive at Kirkuk 

until sometime in early 2008.89

The “Board of Directors” Gets an Update

On 2 October 2006 USCENTAF commander Lt Gen Gary L.

North presented a status report to the board of directors. This briefing 

provided an update on the progress made since the report delivered 

in early January by General North’s predecessor, General Buchanan.90

General North summarized the existing situation—the IqAF had 

748 officers and enlisted men on active duty.91 CAFTT had 122 personnel in theater, of which 103 were apportioned among the four 

Iraqi air bases. Of the remainder, 10 were assigned to IqAF headquarters 

as command advisors, and nine comprised the CAFTT staff. As to 

the Iraqis’ equipment, the Comp Airs were gone but the 10 remaining 

ISR aircraft were performing reasonably well, given their limited capabilities. There were 15 helicopters assigned; 10 were still being readied 

for operational work, and the other five were training aircraft. In 

summary, the procurement process was maturing, and more aircraft 

were on the way.

The 30-day MiTT course had been very successful, but it needed 

to be “normalized” into a permanent offering. In the meantime, the 

course’s 105 graduates were already deployed, and some were getting 

additional specialized training for the Iraqi aircraft they would fly. 

The briefing slides spoke of “building an Objective Force capable of 

conducting air operations across the entire spectrum of the COIN 

fight,” but General North was more succinct: “Get them off top dead 

center and into the fight.”92

In the meantime, something had to be done about recruitment 

and training, especially as to pilots. The existing requirement already 

exceeded the available inventory, and if the Iraqi air force was to expand 

as projected, it would have to train between 450 and 650 pilots over 

the next five years. The Iraqis had no flight school, although planning 

and preparations were already in progress for a flying training center 

at Taji.93 The military academies’ curricula could adjust to provide for 

new officers, but the IqAF needed to establish better ways of recruiting 

and then training enlisted airmen.

For CAFTT to help the Iraqis meet these goals, it needed more 

manpower, longer deployment tours, or some mixture of both. 
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 81

Experience had repeatedly shown that the constant turnover associated with four-month tours was hamstringing advisor performance, 

especially in the CMATT–A/CAFTT headquarters, where continuity 

was particularly important for program oversight and control. General 

North proposed that the Airmen-advisors assigned to CAFTT headquarters should deploy for a year, and that the advisors providing 

direct support to Iraqi units should serve up to six months in theater.94

Naturally, all of this would cost a lot of money, and it was vital to 

establish secure funding lines for the next five years. At MNSTC–I’s 

direction, CAFTT had developed two budget options.95 The more expensive option, set at $600 million, assumed that the IqAF would 

achieve all the capability goals set forth in its latest service plan by the 

end of 2012.96 The lesser option, set at $350 million, anticipated that 

the Iraqis would satisfy their ISR and battlefield mobility requirements in full, but pilot production would be lowered and efforts to 

develop an air defense capability would be deferred until after 2014. 

CAFTT expected that its share of MNSTC–I’s FY 2007 supplemental 

budget request would come to $430 million, of which $115 million 

could be for used for sustainment, $170 million for buying new aircraft (including $120 million for COIN airplanes), and $30 million 

for training and operations.97

General North was optimistic about the coming year. The Flight 

Training Center was close to approval, and technical training was expected to start in April 2007. Iraqi personnel numbers were up, and the 

aircraft fleet was about to undergo both a substantial expansion and a 

qualitative improvement. In short, General North said that “calendar 

year 2007 [is] shaping up to be the year of the Air Force in Iraq.”98

As welcome as CAFTT’s projections were, the ability of the IqAF 

to take its place as an effective service required more than simply acquiring additional people and planes. To be successful, it needed an 

organizational structure that could bring those elements to bear in 

full coordination with Iraq’s other armed forces. The air force also 

needed a more efficient system of logistics and supply so that its 

COIN operations could be sustained and extended. Most of all, the 

Iraqi air force needed smoothly functioning accessions, indoctrination, 

training, and technical education programs to make effective officers, 

NCOs, and enlisted airmen out of the volunteers joining its ranks. In 

short, it needed a reliable, well-structured education and training 

establishment.
82 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

Notes

1. DOD, “Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” report, 

July 2005, 17, https://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050721secstab.pdf; 

and DOD, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” report, 17 February 2006, 36, 

http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/docs/2006-02-Report.pdf.

2. The Iraqi soldiers were assigned to the IqA’s 2nd Division. “Iraqi Air Force 

Gives Army a Lift,” Advisor 2, no. 36 (3 September 2005): 9.

3.  Lt Col Herb Phillips,“IAF Supports Combat Operations,” Advisor 2, no. 44 (15 

October 2005): 7.

4. Phillips, “Exercise Begins Iraqi Air Force Squadron’s Move,” Advisor 2, no. 51 

(17 December 2005): 4; and Phillips, “Iraqi Air Force Squadron Wraps up Second 

Exercise,” Advisor 2, no. 49 (19 November 2005): 5.

5. TSgt Paul Dean, “Iraqi Air Force Squadron Flies First Solo Mission,” Advisor

2, no. 51 (3 December 2005): 3; and Phillips, “Exercises Test Air Force Squadron’s 

Independence,” Advisor 2, no. 51 (17 December 2005): 6.

6. NAMAB was used as an operational staging area for the first time since the 

Iraq War’s end on 16 June 2005, when Squadron 23 transshipped five chalks of cargo 

from Baghdad to Basrah for the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity as a part of “Operation 

Iraqi Power.” This mission also marked the first time the squadron’s aerial port specialists 

had prepared a cargo mission largely without assistance from their US advisors. TSgt 

Brian Davidson, “New Iraqi Airmen Stage First Operational Airlift Mission,” Advisor 2, 

no. 29 (16 July 2005): 8.

7. Phillips, “Iraqi Air Force Squadron Wraps up,” 5.

8. The sustainment case was Y9-B-AAO; a $300,000 parallel case (Y9-B-AAQ) 

was opened at the same time for a site survey of both rotary-winged programs at Taji. 

Westgate, “Chronology.”

9.  Lt Col John Bukowinski, “Iraqi Air Force Squadron Resumes Helicopter

Training,” Advisor 2, no. 50 (10 December 2005): 7. See also SrA Mark Woodbury, 

“Helicopter Pilots Make Iraqi Air Force History,” Advisor 3, no. 2 (14 January 2006): 

6; and DOD, “Measuring Stability and Security,” 45.

10. Jeff Schogol, “U.S. to Upgrade Helicopters for Iraqi Forces,” Stars and Stripes 

(Mideast ed.), 3 December 2005; Bukowinski, “Donated Helicopters Headed for U.S. 

for Upgrades,” Advisor 2, no. 50 (10 December 2005): 5; “US Helicopter Plays Role in 

Development of Iraqi Air Force,” Air Force News, 24 July 2006; and Claudia Parsons, 

“Iraqi Air Force Shows Off Rebuilt Huey Helicopters,” Reuters, 3 March 3, 2007, accessed 

28 January 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSPAR347933.

11. Westgate, “Chronology.”

12. Bukowinski, “Donated Helicopters Headed to U.S.,” 5; “Update,” Flug Revue, 6 May 

2006, accessed 31 December 2009, http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FRNews1/FRNews06

/FR060507.htm#News7; and “US Helicopter Plays Role in Development of Iraqi Air Force.”

13. Padilla, briefing. [Info used is not FOUO.]

14. General McCutchan had led the accident investigation team tasked to examine 

the fatal crash of an IqAF Comp Air on 30 May 2005. Brig Gen Clay McCutchan, 

“CENTAF Comparative Aircraft Study, [version 4.0],” report, ca. 10 December 2005. 

(Info extracted is not FOUO.) 
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 83

15. Headquarters USCENTAF, “Comparative Aircraft Study for Iraq Air Force 

Counter Insurgency Operations,” report (MacDill AFB, FL: HQ US Central Command,

10 December 2005), i. (Info extracted is not sensitive but unclassified [SBU]-NOFORN

/FOUO.) 

16. Ibid., annex 2. The website is http://www.fedbizops.gov.

17. Ibid., 38–40.

18. McCutchan, “CENTAF Comparative Aircraft Study.” (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

19. The contemporary USAF practice of deploying unit leaders for up to a year 

while only deploying more junior Airmen for 90–120 days (as compared to the US 

Army’s imposition of one-year tours for everyone) had been a source of continued 

criticism for several years and would remain a cause for complaint in 2006. See, for 

example, Douglas E. Lee, “Stabilizing Critical Infrastructure Tour Lengths,” CADRE 

Quick-Look 04-10 (Maxwell AFB, AL: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and

Education, 2004); Lisa Burgess, “Air Force Seeks Volunteers for Iraq Duty,” Stars and 

Stripes (Pacific ed.), 10 March 2005; and Jim Garamone, “Pace Says Differing Tour 

Lengths Affect Deployment Morale,” American Forces Press Service, 5 October 2006.

20.  Col Michael Byrne to Lt Col Jack R. Rickman and Kathi Jones, e-mail, subject:

IqAF Assessment Outbrief to Lt Gen Buchanan, 1 November 2005. (Body appears to

be extracted from an e-mail from Lt Col Wes Long, 609 COS/DOS, to “all concerned,”

ca. late October 2005.) [9AF/HO files]

21. Headquarters USCENTAF, briefing, subject: IqAF Advisory Support Team 

Assessment, slide 22; and Byrne, briefing, subject: Stand-Up of the Iraqi Air Force. 

AST strength figures varied in 2005 but tended to show a significant deficit in the rate 

of filled (versus authorized) positions. In mid-summer, the five ASTs were reported 

to have an aggregate total of 117 officer and NCO billets, but they actually had only 

a total of 50 people in place. See Brig Gen David Eidsaune, briefing, subject: Iraqi Air 

Force Transition Team Concept of Operations, ca. June 2005.

22. Buchanan, briefing. (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

23. Ibid., slides 7 and 17. (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

24. “AFMC Proposal and Recommendations to Modify, Repair and Flight Test 

Iraqi Air Force Comp Air SA-7 Aircraft,” report (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Headquarters AFMC, 19 December 2005).

25. Ibid.

26. Buchanan, briefing, slide 16. (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

27. Ibid., slide 19. (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

28. Ibid., slides 19–25. (Info extracted is not FOUO.) Among the unanswered questions regarding the CATC proposal was “to which USAF deity should CATC pray?” The 

problem was that under existing doctrine and practice, USCENTAF, AFSOC, AETC, 

and ACC all had colorable claims to owning at least a part of the CATC’s putative 

mission. For a more detailed description of the CATC proposal, see USCENTAF, 

briefing, subject: Coalition Air Training Center Concept, ca. January 2006.

29. DOD, “Measuring Stability and Security,” 45–46.

30. Headquarters IqAF, “Draft Service Plan,” plan (Baghdad: HQ IqAF, 14 January 

2006), 1-1. [IqAF Service Plan folder, CAFTT files.]

31. Ibid., A1-1 and A1-3. For example, the Ministry of Defense had entered into 

a $108.9 million FMS sustainment contract for its three C-130s in April 2005 but 

failed to fund that agreement until late December. As a result, the contract was executed 
84 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

in January 2006 but only for $88 million, meaning that the coalition had been forced 

to carry the C-130s’ expenses in the interim, including the return of one C-130 to the 

United States for repairs. Letter of Agreement, Case IQ-D-QAC, 11 April 2005; Ron

Oswalt, AFSAT/DOM, to Ken Smith, AETC/IAO, e-mail, subject: Re: Iraq C-130 

Urgent Issue, 28 February 2007; and Jeff Scohy, 555 IMATS/IARB, discussion with 

the author, 22 July 2009.

32. DOD, “Measuring Stability and Security,” 45. See also Woodbury, “Helicopter 

Pilot is Role Model to Iraqi, Coalition Airmen,” Advisor 3, no. 7 (25 February 2006): 7.

33. Bukowinski, “Iraqi Hueys Bound for the United States for IqModifications.” 

Advisor 3, no. 4 (4 February 2006): 8.

34. Capt Russ Cook, “Iraqi Air Force Gets Mi-17 ‘Hip’ Helicopters,” Advisor 3, 

no. 7 (25 February 2006): 6. See also Hallwood, memorandum. [CAFTT files] There 

were reportedly over 900 Iraqi pilots and technicians who had become familiar with 

the Mi-17 when it served in the IqAF during the Saddam era, and it was believed that 

reintroducing the type into the new IqAF would be an inducement to their rejoining 

the service. Allport, “After Saddam,” 55.

35. JO2 John J. Pistone, “Iraqi Air Force Completes First ‘Validation Flight,’” Advisor 3, 

no. 2 (28 January 2006): 9.

36. Woodbury, “Iraq Air Force Completes First All-Iraqi Aircrew Mission,” Advisor 3, 

no. 5 (11 February 2006): 6.

37. “Iraqi Children Get Medical Help,” Advisor 3, no. 9 (11 March 2006): 3.

38. Spc Rick Czepka, “Iraqi Air Force Stands up New Al Muthana Air Base,” Air 

Force Information Service, 7 March 7, 2006; and Pistone, “Iraqi Air Force Opens First 

Air Base,” Advisor 3, no. 9 (11 March 2006): 4.

39. General Carlson took a more direct position in a handwritten annotation added 

to the letter. “By far the best course of action,” he wrote, “would be to scrap these aircraft 

and get something a little more suitable.” Gen Bruce Carlson, AFMC/CC, to Lt Gen

William Buchanan, USCENTAF/CC, memorandum, Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) CompAir 7SLX(CA-7)Courses ofAction, 11 January 2006.[Long community of practice (CoP)]

40. AFMC/A4 to AFFTC/CC et al, e-mail, subject: Tasking to Design, Modify and 

Repair Six Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) Comp-Air 7SLX (CA-7) Aircraft, 27 January 2006.

41. Byrne, briefing, subject: Iraqi Air Force Development Update, slide 33; SSgt 

Kristina Barrett, “Iraqi Pilots Get Help from Airmen,” Advisor 3, no. 17 (6 May 2006): 

7; and Maj Gary Lyles, “Comp Air Aircraft History with the Coalition Air Force

Transition Team (CAFTT),” background bullet paper (BBP), 3 February 2007 

[CAFTT files, Brig Gen Allardice briefing book].

42.  Buchanan to Carlson, memorandum,subject: Letter ofAppreciation, 2 February

2006. [Long CoP] General Buchanan’s comment regarding the “first-ever test and

evaluation flights . . . within a combat zone” was an oblique reference to the frequent 

insurgent attacks made on Kirkuk AB while the AFFTC test team was conducting its work 

there in October. See Ludwig,“Operation Iraqi Freedom Trip Report.” [AFFTC files]

43. SSgt Stacy Fowler, “Mission Accomplished for Airmen on Iraqi Comp Air 

Team,” Desert Wings [Edwards AFB, California], 25 August 2006.

44.  SrA Francesca Carrano, “AF Test Team Launches ‘Overhauled’ Iraqi Aircraft,” Air Force Print News, 27 April 2006.

45.  Ibid.; 1st Lt Michael McGee, 412 Training Wing/DR et al, to Col Mark A.

Atkinson, AFMC/A4, memorandum, subject: AFFTC Statement of Capability (SOC) 
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 85

for the Iraqi Air Force Comp Air 7SL Project, Job Order Number (JON) A06CA700,

24 March 2006; and Headquarters AFTTC, “Limited Flight Evaluation of a Modified

Iraqi Air Force Comp Air 7SL,” test plan, April 2006.

46.  Fred Webster, “Limited Flight Evaluation of an Iraqi Air Force Modified

Comp Air 7SLX (PRR-06-12),” report (Edwards AFB, CA: USAF Flight Test Center,

June 2006), draft 3, slide 10 (unclassified/sensitive information [U/SINFO], info 

extracted is not U/SINFO).

47. Ibid.

48. Barrett, “Iraqi Pilots Get Help,” 7.

49. The lack of standardized construction and its attendant quality assurances 

may have been contributing factors in two IqAF Comp Air incidents that resulted in 

forced landings—both, fortunately, without adverse consequences. On 24 January 

2005 a US Navy AST pilot assigned to Squadron 3 had to land on a paved highway 

about 28 miles southeast of Kirkuk because of engine power loss due to fuel starvation. 

Although not proven, miswiring of the fuel pumps during the original construction 

was suspected as the cause; an examination of the other Comp Air aircraft found no 

similar faults. On 10 May 2005 a USAF AST pilot and his IqAF copilot were forced 

down on a dirt road about 18 miles south of Kirkuk. Again, the immediate cause was 

fuel starvation. A subsequent investigation showed that the fuel shutoff valves were 

not installed in a uniform way throughout the Comp Air fleet. Pilots were left to rely 

upon “open-closed” indicator markings handwritten on each cockpit wall. CMATT–A, 

“Informal Report on Forced Landing”; and CMATT–A,“Report on Forced Landing.”

[Westgate files]

50. Fowler, “Mission Accomplished.”

51. Maj Gen Curtis M. Bedke, AFFTC/CC, to AFFTC/all, memorandum, subject: 

What I’m Thinking—Calm in the Eye of the Storm, 10 July 2006.

52.  Message, 131347ZJUL 06,HeadquartersUSCENTAF toAFSOC/CC,“CENTAF

Aviation Military Transition Team (MiTT) Academic Course Support Request,” 13 

July 2006.

53. AFSOC, “AFSOC/USAFSOS Iraqi FID Program, 19 July–19 August 2006,” 

schedule, 27 June 2006.

54. Martin Matishak, “What Should Fly in the Iraqi Air Force?” Inside the Air 

Force, 24 June 2006, accessed 12 April 2008, http://www.military.com/features

/ 0,15240,102607,00.html.

55. Headquarters CAFTT, briefing, subject: Coalition Air Force Training Team 

(CAFTT) Organization Charts, 20 April 2006; and Headquarters CAFTT, “Coalition 

Air Force Transition Team,” brochure, ca. September 2007.

56. Matishak, “What Should Fly?” 1.

57.  Lt Gen Gary North, briefing, subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team

Update (Version 2.1), ca. 2 October 2006, slide 5.

58.  Lyles, “Comp Air Aircraft History.”

59. Brown, “CH2000 Aircraft History.” [General Allardice briefing book]

60. Beech Aviation, the maker of the Beechcraft Model 350ER, had been absorbed 

by Raytheon, Inc. in September 1994. Powered by two Pratt & Whitney Canada

PT6A-60 turboprop engines, the King Air 350ER could operate at gross takeoff 

weights of up to 16,500 pounds. It had extended endurance because of additional 

fuel contained in its overwing engine nacelle tanks. The 350ER had a range of about 
86 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

2,400 nautical miles, allowing it to fly out 100 nautical miles, conduct low altitude 

reconnaissance operations for up to eight hours, and then return with over 45 minutes’ 

fuel reserve still remaining. It could accommodate two pilots and up to five sensor 

operators in its pressurized and heated cabin. The USAF subsequently ordered 30 

examples of the ISR-specialized variant of the King Air 350ER, which it designated 

as the MC-12W Liberty. “Standing up the IqAF: King Air 350s,” Defense Industry 

Daily, 29 August 29, 2009, accessed 30 August 2009, http://www.defenseindustry

daily.com/Standing-Up-the-IqAF-King-Air-350s-05101/; and Tamir Eschel, “U.S. Air 

Force Deploys the Last MC-12 to Afghanistan,” Defense-update.net, 13 July 2010, accessed 

25 September 2011, http://www.defence-update.net/wordpress/20100713_mc-12_afghan

istan.html.

61. Although Raytheon was to be the prime contractor for Peace Dragon, the 

integration of the ISR suite, including its electro-optical systems and ground station 

links, would be subcontracted to General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., because 

of its specialized experience in those technologies. Tom Shroyer, 659 AESS/SYIA, 

interview with the author, 22 July 2009. See also Raytheon Aircraft Co., “Iraq Air 

Force Orders Beechcraft King Air 350ERs,” press release, 6 March 2007.

62.  Lyles, “King Air Aircraft History with the Coalition Air Force Transition

Team (CAFTT),” BBP, 10 February 2007. [General Allardice briefing book]

63. DSCA, “Iraq—King Air 350ER for Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance 

(Transmittal No. 06-73),” press release, 27 September 2006.

64.  SAF/IA, “IQ-D-SAA,” LO&A, 30 November 2006. [555 IMATTS files]; and

Shroyer, interview.

65. The Cessna C208 Caravan first flew in 1982 and was sold worldwide thereafter 

as a light transport capable of carrying up to a dozen passengers or a comparable 

weight in cargo. Cessna began marketing a modified model C208 as a low-cost reconnaissance/COIN aircraft in the late 1980s. Although DOD designated that variant 

as the U-27, no examples were procured for US military use. Mike Gaines and Janice 

Lowe, “Cessna Cameravan,” Flight International, January 1989, 28–29.

66. Col R. Kevin “Duckie” Hoffman, 645 AESG/CC, interview with the author, 

22 July 2009.

67. Jay Miller, Lockheed’s Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1993).

68.  Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at 

Lockheed (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1994), 9.

69. Bill Grimes, The History of Big Safari (Richmond, BC: Archway Publishing, 

30 January 2014).

70.  555 IG, “B3-D-SAB,” LO&A, 27 November 2006.

71. Ibid., 4.

72.  The last of the three deliveries arrived in Iraq in June. Lyles, “Cessna Caravan

Aircraft History with the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT),” BBP, 3 

February 2007; and Hoffman, interview.

73.  Lt Col Steven Hardy, “CAFTT Rotary Wing Support for Jet Ranger, Huey II,

and Mi-17,” BBP, 1 February 2007. [General Allardice briefing book]

74. Ibid.
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS│ 87

75. The first operational Mi-17 arrived at Camp Taji on 1 January 2007. See “Iraqi 

Helos Arrive,” Advisor 4, no. 1 (6 January 2007): 8; and Hallwood, memorandum. 

[CAFTT files]

76. Ibid.; and North, briefing, subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team Update (Version 2.1), slides 6 and 8.

77. DSCA, “Iraq–Helicopters, Vehicles, Weapons and Support,” press release, 9 

September 2006.

78. Hardy, “CAFTT Rotary Wing Support”; and North, briefing, subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team Update (Version 2.1).

79. Matishak, “What Should Fly?”

80. Although the formal change took place on 7 September, it had been announced on 28 August. See “News Briefs,” AirForces Monthly, November 2006, 24. 

For more details, see Pistone, “Iraq Assumes Operational Control of Military,” Advisor 3, 

no. 34 (9 September 2006): 3; and “Iraq Gains Operational Control of its Air Force,” 

AirForces Monthly, November 2006, 22.

81.  SSgt Lucia Newman, “Iraqi Air Force Takes over First-Line Maintenance,”

Advisor 3, no. 37 (30 September 2006): 3 and 5.

82. Newman, “Keeping an Eye in the Sky during Ramadan,” Advisor 3, no. 38 (7 

October 2006): 4 and 5.

83. In March 2003 the coalition expanded the role of the regional air movement 

control center (RAMCC) to include scheduling military and humanitarian aid flights 

into Iraqi airfields. In August 2003 the CPA opened Iraqi airspace to commercial 

carriers, and RAMCC set up a dedicated overflights section to deal with those transits. 

Humanitarian cargo flights into Baghdad and Basrah began soon thereafter under 

RAMCC control. In 2006 RAMCC began to return national airspace control to the 

ICAA. See SrA Alyssa C. Miles, “Teaches Iraqis to Touch the Sky,” CENTAF News, 23 

August 2009, accessed 30 June 2010, http://www.centaf.af.mil/news/sotry_print

.asp?id=123164548; and “Iraqi Airspace Now Fully Back to Iraqi Control,” accessed 

30 June 2010, http://www.airliners.29266net/aviation-forums/general_aviatio/read

.main/45/. For example, according to a March 2005 contract, the BIAP air traffic 

control system was to have been operated by Iraqi controllers trained by Dyncorp, 

Inc. That effort was apparently unsuccessful, as the first tower-certified Iraqi air traffic 

controllers did not finish their training until May 2008. Combined Airspace Planning Group, “Executive Summary—CAPG Executive Steering Committee Meeting 

[Bahrain],” 3 March 2005; and “US DOT and Iraq’s CAA Designate Baghdad’s First 

Tower-Certified Air Traffic Controllers,” US Department of Transportation news release, 

30 May 2008, accessed 26 June 2010, http://www.traveldailynews.com/pages/show

_page/25972. [CAFTT files]

84. In addition to the aircraft operating in and out of Kirkuk, the 506th CERAP 

controlled the air traffic using six satellite airports and two major airways. SSgt Stacey 

Fowler, “CERAP: Making Safe, Expeditious Travel Possible for All over Skies of Iraq,” 

Krab Kronickle [Kirkuk AB] 4, no. 17 (14 August 2006): 6–7.

85.  Brig Gen Stephen L. Hoog, CAFTT/CC, memorandum for record, subject:

ACCE/CAFTT, 5 July 2006. [CAFTT files]

86. Ibid., 2.

87.  Marie E. Tinka, “IQ-D-QAA,” LO&A, 20 November 2006. [AFSAC files]
88 │WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM ITS FRIENDS

88. A pseudo case for ASR-11 radar systems was negotiated in June 2007; the 

$24.9 million cost was paid by the US government; Tinka, “B7-D-QAH,” LO&A, 7

June 2007. [AFSAC files]

89. Maj Jesse Acevedo, “National Air Space and Air Traffic Control Systems 

(CAFTT),” BBP, 11 March 2007. [General Allardice briefing book]

90. North, briefing, subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team Update (Version 

2.1). General North had replaced General Buchanan as USCENTAF commander in 

February 2006. “General Gary L. North,” biography, accessed 9 January 2010, http://

www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/104909/general-gary

-l-north.aspx.

91. In its report to Congress one month later, the DOD gave this number as 

“about 900.” See DOD, “Measuring Stability and Security.”

92. North, briefing, subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team Update (Version 2.1), 

slide 9.

93. Ibid., slides 13–19.

94. Ibid., slide 20.

95. Ibid., slide 27.

96. IqAF, “Draft Service Plan,” 1-1.

97. North, briefing, subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team Update (Version 2.1), 

slides 26–29.

98. Ibid., slide 30.
Chapter 8

AETC Steps Up to the

Iraqi Air Force Training Plate

As the Air Education and Training Command’s name suggests, its 

mission is to provide USAF, USAFR, and Air National Guard personnel 

with education and training. AETC qualifies and commissions new 

officers through its Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) 

and direct accessions programs. Its Air University (AU) centers, colleges, and schools provide those officers with professional and continuing education throughout their careers. AETC’s flying training 

wings produce the USAF’s aircrews. AETC’s basic military training 

(BMT) center brings new recruits into the enlisted force, and its technical training wings give those men and women the skills needed to 

master the latest air, space, and cyberspace technologies. Thereafter, 

AETC’s NCO, senior NCO, and first sergeant academies qualify the 

most promising for greater leadership responsibilities as they advance 

in rank and seniority. Furthermore, AETC fosters civilian leadership 

skills and good citizenship through its Air Force Junior ROTC and 

Civil Air Patrol cadet programs. Taken as a whole, this structure 

forms the “constellation of learning” required to field, operate, and 

sustain a modern air force.1

Except for courses offered by the ground force-oriented Iraqi Military Academy at Camp Rustamiyah (IMAR), a few squadron-level 

“on-the-job” training programs, and a limited number of contractoroperated or donated instruction programs (conducted mostly outside the country), the IqAF had no requisite structure for inducting 

enlisted airmen or producing junior officers and warrant officers 

qualified to lead them. In 2006 the Iraqis did not yet have a fixedwing flight school, nor did they have the means in-country to train 

critical aviation support personnel such as air traffic controllers or 

aircraft mechanics. In sum, they lacked most of the key components 

of that “constellation of learning” needed for a functioning air force. 

The IqAF would have to expand in order to meet the national need, 

and it could not continue to function, let alone expand, until these 

deficits were addressed.
90 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

The Assignment

In September 2006 USCENTCOM instructed CAFTT to establish 

an IqAF training school (AFTS). MNSTC-I had already created an 

overarching (but largely ground-force-oriented) training architecture 

for the Ministry of Defense; the AFTS would address the air force’s 

specialized needs within that structure.2

 Those needs were limited to 

aircrew production, IqAF-specific BMT, and training in selected enlisted specialties. The AFTS would be located at Taji AB but would 

also support a fixed-wing flight training school (FTS) at Kirkuk AB.3

In early November CAFTT revised and expanded the AFTS’s 

CONOPS to include a Taji-based officer training school (OTS). In 

addition to producing new junior officers, OTS would conduct preflight screening to identify suitable candidates for flight training. The 

new CONOPS also concentrated all aircrew training—both fixed and 

rotary wing—at Kirkuk. This early planning effort anticipated a combined officer and enlisted enrollment of roughly 1,000 students per 

year, of which about 100 officers would attend the FTS.4

The second CONOPS draft gave more specific attention to an issue 

that every previous coalition mentoring effort had raised as a significant problem: the language barrier. The CONOPS planners predicated their work on the expectation that all IqAF officers would receive 

comprehensive English language training. This projection consisted 

of a two-phased effort—initial language instruction provided while 

they were still cadets (either at the IMAR or the AFTS’s OTS) and a 

comprehensive six-month program after commissioning. The officers 

would receive any specialized follow-on training after completing 

both instructions. Warrant officers would receive six months’ language instruction in the period between their commissioning and 

any follow-on specialty training.5

As in the initial October edition, the November revision called for 

near-immediate execution, with USAF instructors/advisors arriving 

in January 2007 and courses beginning by April. Formal activation of 

the AFTS and FTS would follow as student pipelines began to fill. 

Given the tight timetable and AETC’s expertise in such matters, General 

Hoog wasted no time in asking for assistance. By the third week of 

November, AETC had assembled a working group under the direction of Col P. Michael “Dog” Senna of the operations directorate 

(AETC/A3). The team included action officers from AETC’s three 

major components: Second Air Force (specializing in technical training, 
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 91

headquartered at Keesler AFB, Mississippi), Nineteenth Air Force 

(specializing in flight training, headquartered at Randolph AFB, 

Texas), and AU (specializing in officer and enlisted professional and 

continuing education, headquartered at Maxwell AFB, Alabama), 

along with representatives from six other offices and agencies, including 

the Defense Language Institute and AETC’s Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron (AFSATS).6

Because the preparation period was so compressed, it made sense 

to adapt—insofar as possible—any available applicable USAF curricula. 

Nonetheless, the compressed timetable posed a significant challenge, 

with OTS and enlisted BMT scheduled to open in April and the technical training and flight training schools to follow in October. Dr. 

Charles Nath, director of curriculum for AU’s Air Force Officer 

Accessions and Training Schools (AFOATS), described the writing 

process.7

 “It took seventy-nine days from beginning to end. We 

worked through Christmas. . . . The syllabus included lesson plans, 

slides, reading materials—everything that [the Iraqis] would need to 

conduct an initial officer training course.”8

The working group’s OTS curricula called for 454 hours of instruction. There were 10 academic areas involved, including field leadership (90 hours), communications studies (41 hours), and drill and 

ceremonies (40 hours). The section on military studies (28 hours) 

included, among other topics, a guided discussion of the role of the 

military in a democracy and the importance of subscribing to the 

Iraqi Patriot Oath, while the profession of arms section (20 hours) 

contained presentations on the law of armed conflict, standards of 

behavior and etiquette, and respect for others.9

Although IMAR had traditionally been the Iraqi army’s principal 

source of officers, some of its graduates would join the IqAF and 

would need additional specialized preparation. The AETC curricula 

team called this “top-off ” training and planned for a 350-hour instruction schedule. Similar in many respects to the OTS course, the 

top-off course was structured to supplement IMAR’s offerings as 

much as possible.10

Enlisted training was to follow the same top-off principle, with initial 

training battalion graduates—for example, all enlisted recruits—

receiving instruction in the basic skills required of an Iraqi airman. 

That said, the language barrier would be a major challenge, as would 

the lack of literacy among so many of the recruits.
92 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

Setting Up “the Alamo”

Small teams of AETC instructors began to prepare for deployment 

in December. Like the C-130 AST members two years earlier, the 

instructors were to attend the same abbreviated Middle East Orientation Course. This five-day offering included a brief history of Iraq and 

the differences between Sunni and Shiite Islam, a smattering of Arabic 

words and phrases, and familiarization with Iraqi customs and sensitivities. The three officer advisors assigned to activate OTS and officer 

top-off programs arrived at Taji at the end of January 2007, moving to 

Camp Rustamiyah several weeks later. The first contingents of 

instructor/advisors for technical training, BMT, and fixed-wing 

flight training followed similar paths.11

In all, 11 instructor/advisors made up the initial cadre at Taji; their 

leader was Lt Col Kim “Felix” Hawthorne. Upon arrival, Colonel 

Hawthorne contacted the USAF rotary-wing flight instructor/advisors 

working with Squadron 2, only to discover that no beddown preparations had been made prior to their arrival. The immediate priority 

was to find quarters, dining facilities, and a means of moving between 

them. Setting up the schoolhouse came next. After negotiating the 

use of an abandoned, near-windowless warehouse previously used to 

store medical supplies, the instructors quickly realized that it had 

served more recently as an impromptu latrine. The waste was removed; 

some air conditioners were scrounged and installed to counter the 

suffocating heat; and office furniture was located and taken “on loan.” 

The dilapidated condition of the building, its relative isolation, and 

the way the AFTS cadre was forced to improvise or fail soon led to an 

appropriate nickname for the schoolhouse—“the Alamo.”12

Having a schoolhouse was important, but only if there were enrolled 

students. Textbooks and teaching aids would have to be provided, 

and student quarters and provisions had to be addressed. To make 

matters even more uncertain, there was no way to know how many 

attendees would actually report for instruction. “The projected number 

of students was wildly variable at first. We only knew that it would be 

‘less than 90 and more than 5,’ ” one cadre member said.13 Nonetheless, they pressed on. Student dormitory spaces were arranged with a 

Taji-based military intelligence academy run by the US Marine 

Corps; teaching materials were given last-minute adjustments; and 

the officer candidates—primarily degreed engineers or engineering 

students—began to arrive.
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 93

In the meantime, preparations for the summer opening of a basic 

technical training school were making headway. Courses initially 

offered on an ad hoc, as-needed basis were soon put on a more formal 

footing through the formation of a training integration working 

group. Progress was also being made at Camp Rustamiyah, where the 

top-off course began in March. In May a team of military training 

instructors from the USAF’s BMT center at Lackland AFB, Texas, 

took charge of 62 janood, or junior enlisted men; they would become 

the first students to complete the new BMT course at Taji.14 Air traffic 

control instruction began there in July, with preparations under way 

to start a radar course in September.15 It was by no means a complete 

solution, but it was at least a good beginning.

From “Ad Hockery” to Formalization: Restructuring for

Mission Success

In a July 2009 interview, an AFSATS civilian proudly recalled the 

role that he and other AFSATS members had played in helping the 

Iraqis to obtain three C-130s in 2005. He also acknowledged the travails that followed thereafter in trying to sustain those aircraft via 

temporary measures and the difficulties that accompanied so many 

other halting efforts to train and supply the IqAF. Reflecting upon 

their experience, he said that his colleagues had invented a name for 

that kind of make-do, seat-of-the-pants effort. They called it “ad 

hockery.”16

Temporary fixes applied in 2006 could not fully reverse the neglects 

(and their consequences) of 2004–5. For example, using special, 

expedited means to procure three ISR airplanes was helpful. So was 

the mounting of a one-time MiTT training course. That said, neither 

were sufficient. Marshaling the resources needed to rebuild the IqAF 

was a systemic challenge that needed systematic solutions, and the 

USAF finally began to apply those measures in 2007. The time of ad 

hockery had come to an end.

The January 2007 Situation Report

On 10 January General North convened a meeting of the board of 

directors for his latest quarterly update. The teleconference included 

the current CAFTT commander’s last presentation to the board—

General Hoog was scheduled to be reassigned in March—and for the 

first time, the board also received an equally detailed briefing on the 
94 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

status of the Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC). That briefing was presented by General Padilla, the same action officer sent to 

Iraq by General North’s predecessor to evaluate the effectiveness of 

CMATT-A in the aftermath of the fatal mishap of May 2005.17

General North had several goals in mind when he gave the two 

officer-presenters equal billing. Having both briefings delivered in 

the same format would prompt the board to consider the commonalities in both countries’ needs, thereby potentially improving the 

USAF’s return on investment. It also encouraged the board to better 

synchronize its efforts in the two countries, thereby offering some 

possible opportunities for synergy.18

General Hoog summarized the situation before moving on to new 

developments in his area of responsibility (AOR). CAFTT had 123 

Airmen assigned as of January, and he expected that number to reach 

350 by year’s end. The Iraqis had 915 personnel on strength, of which 

184 were assigned to their air operations directorate at NAMAB. The 

Taji training school would open in April. The first 17 officers had just 

graduated from IMAR, and January’s incoming class had 65 cadets 

enrolled.19 The five Jet Rangers continued to train small numbers of 

rotary-wing pilots at Taji, and two of the 10 Mi-17s were operational. 

Some of the 16 rebuilt Huey IIs were due to arrive soon, and the first 

C208 Caravan would be delivered within a few months. In the meantime, Iraq’s 10 long-serving ISR aircraft would continue on at Kirkuk 

and Basrah.20

As to future acquisitions, the Iraq-funded LO&As had been completed for the King Air 350ER advanced ISR aircraft ($143 million), 

the air traffic control system at Kirkuk ($28 million), and the C-130E 

sustainment program ($81.5 million). A $70 million request had 

been submitted for air force training, including the purchase of flight 

training aircraft, sustainment for the training helicopters already on 

hand, and for AFTS operation. Request packages were being prepared to buy COIN aircraft ($120 million), transport aircraft ($30 

million), additional air traffic control systems ($45 million), and a 

national airspace/battlespace management system ($85 million).21

General Hoog also alerted the board to problems looming on the 

near horizon. The Iraqis had asked for three more C-130s, a request 

that would be hard to satisfy because of congressionally imposed limits 

on how soon aging (but still serviceable) USAF C-130s could be retired.22

Providing Iraqi aircraft with a defensive missile warning system was 

critical if they were to operate freely in areas where enemy ground-
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 95

launched antiaircraft missiles might be a risk. However, employing 

that equipment (the ALE-47/AAR-47 missile approach warning system) 

was difficult because some of the technology involved was exportrestricted.23 Fortunately, there were workarounds (for example, sealing 

the system’s “black boxes” in tamper-proof containers to prevent unauthorized access). Permission would also be needed to mount certain 

weapons on US-funded aircraft serving in the IqAF; this requirement 

affected the Iraqis’ prospects for obtaining AGM-114 Hellfire missiles 

for their C208 Caravans or for mounting 2.75-inch rocket pods on 

their Huey IIs.24

Aside from those issues, the CAFTT commander suggested that a 

larger procurement point was to be made—the need to coordinate 

the acquisition requirements of both the IqAF and the ANAAC to the 

greatest possible extent. For example, it might be conceivable for both 

countries to use the same COIN aircraft, given their comparable 

operating environments. Similarly, the light airlift and ISR specifications contained in both countries’ requests might be satisfied by a 

common platform. These requests suggested that the two purchasers 

could use similar contracts or perhaps even consolidate their purchases 

to save costs—a decidedly attractive possibility given how much 

money was already being spent to outfit the Iraqis.25

However, the situation facing the USAF’s advisors in Iraq gave 

General Hoog the most concern, particularly their selection and 

training; moreover, he was apprehensive about the effect that lengthening 

deployments might have on the advisors and their families. General 

North wanted to substantially increase the number of USAF Airmenadvisors in Iraq and Afghanistan—to about 530 by late 2008, of which 

400 would be assigned to CAFTT. Between June and November 2007 

alone, over 120 USAF Airmen-advisors were scheduled to deploy to 

Iraq for periods of up to a year, leading General Hoog to ask if a 

deliberate development plan existed for these Airmen.26 The CAFTT 

commander said that advisor predeployment training should be a 

“top priority,” noting that the US Army gave its advisors special identifiers and incentive packages. Given the special skills required, the 

arduous duties involved, and the long absences from home, should 

not the USAF do the same for its advisors? This was certainly not the 

first time such questions had been asked, but the level at which they 

were now being raised was significant.27

The board members left the January meeting with a good sense of 

the way ahead. The MiTTs would be substantially expanded, but their 
96 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

members needed adequate training—something they had lacked 

thus far. AETC was willing to accept that task, but it needed assistance from the other major commands involved. The acquisition 

process was facing some hurdles: making heavy use of sole-source 

contracts for exigency’s sake carried risks, and matching needs and 

resources to budget cycles presented scheduling problems. The Secretariat’s Office of International Affairs, the Air Staff ’s budgeteers, and 

AFSAC would all need to watch those issues very closely. For its part, 

USCENTAF was prepared to establish a full-time team to oversee the 

coming buildup.28

High-Level Responses

The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan in late 2006 and early 2007 

contributed to a conviction among the USAF leadership that the way 

ahead lay in strengthening the air arms of the two partner nations so 

that they could function on their own. That process would take considerable investment and years to achieve, but its success would surely 

depend upon the USAF’s ability to identify, train, and deploy capable, 

culturally aware Airmen-advisors. Providing a partner nation’s air 

force with equipment was only the beginning. In the end, it was the 

USAF’s Airmen-advisors who would work side by side with that 

nation’s airmen to get their aircraft into the air.

The board’s January meeting had suggested the importance and 

urgency of getting more advisors into the Iraqi and Afghani AORs. It 

also brought renewed high-level attention to the problems that 

USCENTAF faced—problems that could be solved only at still-higher 

levels within the Air Force.

The Secretariat Forms an Integrated Process Team 

On 22 January Bruce S. Lemkin, the deputy undersecretary of the 

Air Force for international affairs (SAF/IA), convened an “Integrated 

Process Team (IPT) on Building Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan.”29

The team’s mission was to apply “AF and MAJCOM expertise to help 

implement the USCENTAF plan and determine USAF costs of building 

airpower and partner capacity” in both countries, and its membership 

included representatives from the secretariat, multiple Air Staff offices, 

major commands, CAFTT, AFSAC, and other organizations.30

During the team’s second teleconference on 9 February, General 

North received an interim report on the members’ progress. The IPT 
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 97

had been tasked to focus on five specific areas: formalizing predeployment advisor training, technical and flying training in the AORs, 

acquisition strategy, financial commitments, and personnel requirements.31

The team was to develop a plan to “institutionalize a CONUS 

[continental United States]-based Air Force Advisor Training 

Center” for predeployment advisor training. The team also had to 

find ways to support the deploying advisors’ immediate needs. The 

short-term answer appeared to be a two-week course scheduled for 

late February at Camp Anderson-Peters, located near Lackland AFB, 

Texas.32 The course could accommodate up to 50 advisors facing deployment dates in April. For the longer term, the team drafted a sixweek course syllabus for a notional schoolhouse near Hurlburt Field, 

Florida. Assuming a 600-student annual enrollment, the school 

would cost about $5 million to open and around $10 million per year 

to operate.33

Iraq’s technical and flying training schools needed courseware and 

training syllabi, and AETC was already working on both requirements. CAFTT reported that the Iraqis envisioned up to 2,900 accessions per year. That sum included 1,600 enlisted recruits and over 500 

officers, of which about 100 would become pilots. The officers would 

need leadership training, and the enlisted personnel would need 

selected technical instruction in maintenance, intelligence, fuel and 

lubricant handling, fire and rescue work, air traffic control, and so 

forth. English-language training had always been and would continue to be the “long pole in the tent.” AETC planned to open a technical school in April and a flying training school by July.34

Acquisition specialists focused upon operating “within legal 

boundaries to expedite delivery of desired platforms, combining efforts 

where feasible, to maximize efficiency and interoperability between 

theaters.”35 That meant using pseudo-case FMS rules wherever possible because the rules offered greater flexibility in satisfying the “unusual and compelling requirements” threshold demanded by US procurement laws. Consolidating and synchronizing contracts would 

also help meet tight schedules and reduce duplication of effort. Regarding Iraq’s latest equipment requests, the IPT found that some 

creative security measures could be applied to allow the Iraqis largely 

unrestricted use of US defensive systems on nonweaponized aircraft. 

Putting those systems on weaponized aircraft was a different matter, 

requiring DOD approval for an “Exception to National Disclosure 
98 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

Policy” (ENDP). SAF/IA’s Foreign Disclosure and Technology Transfer 

Division worked the issue.

Iraq’s request for three more C-130Es was an especially thorny 

problem. The multiyear retirement schedule for the older C-130s in 

USAF and USAFR service had to be carefully choreographed. Sending three aircraft overseas ahead of their previously identified end-ofservice dates could be very expensive—perhaps as high as $38 million, depending upon which aircraft were selected and which others 

had to be reprogrammed to take their place. The transfers would require permission from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the 

IPT felt that USCENTCOM rather than the Air Force should pursue 

the transfers.36

The team’s manpower analysis was based upon USCENTAF’s expectation that, by mid-2008, over 500 USAF Airmen-advisors would 

be performing one-year tours and perhaps another 100 Airmen 

would be engaged in 179-day rotations. Although the RFF process 

was reportedly going well thus far, one-year deployments would continue to need Air Staff approval because of the additional pay and 

allowance entitlements involved. The IPT also recognized that the 

deployment burden was not shared equally among all USAF career 

fields. USCENTAF’s proposal, if fully implemented, would impose 

especially hard demands upon some career fields already under considerable stress, including security forces, civil engineers, intelligence 

and logistics specialists, and communicators. The Air Staff ’s manpower and personnel representative committed to making a full assessment, and the IPT was to present that finding to the USAF chief 

of staff by 25 February.37

Finally, there was the matter of paying for the proposal. Thus far, 

the IPT had identified a one-time $130,000 cost for immediate predeployment training, another $15 million in FY 2008 for that year’s predeployment training and the activation an Expeditionary Air Advisor 

Training Center, and an unknown amount in FY 2008 and beyond 

for the additional money entitlements accrued by those deploying to 

Iraq or Afghanistan for a year. The Air Force Secretariat’s director of 

budget operations confirmed that the FY 2007 global war on terrorism 

(GWOT) supplemental fund had enough flexibility to cover the IPT’s 

FY 2008 estimates. Nonetheless, only the CSAF could decide whether 

this funding might be used.38

On 20 February Secretary Lemkin dispatched a staff summary sheet 

to the IPT principals for their approval; it presented brief, affirmative 
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 99

arguments for the three key issues requiring a CSAF decision.39 The 

jointly coordinated package was returned to Secretary Lemkin’s office 

within about a week.40

The Air Force Chief of Staff Gives the Go-Ahead

The IPT’s analyses had identified three decisions that would need 

CSAF Gen T. Michael Moseley’s personal attention before USCENTAF’s 

proposed expansion program could go forward. First, because the 

existing FID advisor course offerings at Hurlburt Field and elsewhere 

were already saturated, AETC wanted to create a new predeployment 

advisor training detachment large enough to process 600 or more 

USAF advisors and contractor personnel per year.41 Would the chief 

authorize AETC to make the necessary commitments—finding 

facilities, writing and vetting curricula, assigning (or hiring) qualified faculty, and so forth—for that program to proceed?

Second, the costs related to AETC’s proposal were not included in 

the FY 2007 budget. Meeting that request would mean finding an additional $15 million.42 Was General Moseley willing to use GWOT 

supplemental money to fund the shortfall even though doing so 

might mean that some other pressing need would have to be refused?

Finally, increasing the number of USAF advisors in Iraq and 

Afghanistan to over 530 by July 2008—many of them serving oneyear tours—would create additional manpower shortages in some 

already-overstretched career fields.43 Did the chief want to commit 

the USAF to expanding this mission in spite of the effects it would 

impose on Airmen deployed elsewhere? More to the point, was he 

willing to accept this additional burden on behalf of those hardpressed Airmen and their families?

General Moseley weighed the project’s deployment demands and 

potentially escalating costs against the importance of what was at 

stake, and his succinct answer was the same to all three questions: 

“Yes.”44

US Central Command Air Forces Creates an

Air Advisory Division

As General Moseley considered the IPT’s analyses and recommendations, USCENTAF was moving forward with its own preparations 

for managing the soon-to-be expanded MiTTs and introducing the 

aircraft that were to be delivered to the Iraqis. On 1 February 
100 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

USCENTAF announced the formation of an Air Advisory Division 

whose mission was to 

assume the lead role in coordinating all CONUS efforts supporting the coalition air force transition teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. Once fully developed, 

the division will consist of the functional experts needed to support a broad 

spectrum of Air Force advisory issues related to the USCENTCOM theater of 

operations. Organizational development is ongoing. A second message will 

follow detailing the Division concept of operations once the specific construct 

is approved.45

Naturally, the division was a long way from being “fully developed.” Even though General Moseley had approved some key requirements, there were still too many details left adrift in that riskfilled void called “TBD” [to be determined]. In addition to manpower 

and a budget, the division needed to know USCENTAF’s requirements about mentoring the Iraqis in 2007 and beyond. Fortunately, 

the IPT was well positioned—in fact, had been specifically assembled—

to provide those details for the new division’s subsequent use.46

The Integrated Process Team’s Final Report

On 9 March Secretary Lemkin convened a teleconference to ratify 

the IPT’s final report. As they had during the two previous meetings, the team members focused upon five issues: formalizing predeployment advisor training; technical and flying training in the 

AORs; acquisition strategy; financial commitments; and personnel 

requirements.47

The IPT had been especially successful in working the immediate 

predeployment issue. The 44 advisors due to report to the two AORs 

in March through June completed their two weeks’ training as scheduled 

at Camp Anderson-Peters. Beginning in December 2007, the IPT 

planned to use the camp’s Common Battlefield Airmen Training 

(CBAT) initiative to provide the advisors with a one-week “bridge 

course,” along with specialized FID instruction and other mentoring 

offered on a brief, temporary duty basis.48 The advisors’ CBAT instruction was to be expanded to three weeks, beginning in October 2010.49

Preparations for technical and flying training instruction were 

generally on schedule within the Iraqi AOR although the technical 

training school still needed training aids and the flying training 

school’s initial cadre of instructor pilots and maintenance advisors 

had yet to be named and trained. The training aircraft were on order. 
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 101

The syllabi for the initial training course had been delivered, and the 

training school’s initial cadre had arrived at Taji. Comprehensive 

English-language instruction had started at both Camp Rustamiyah 

and NAMAB.50

The equipment acquisition LO&As were also nearing completion. 

Deliveries were scheduled for both interim and advanced ISR systems, 

training aircraft, and accompanying flight simulators (an important 

training adjunct since instructional flying “outside the wire” at low 

altitudes was risky). The defensive systems issue was almost resolved 

for the C-130s, ISR and training aircraft, and Huey IIs, but the ENDP 

for the weaponized aircraft was still being considered. Acquisition 

budget scheduling continued to be a problem, and both SAF/IA and 

the Air Force comptroller were working with DSCA to create a supplemental request that would address the rest of the year’s needs.51

The IPT’s financial experts had refined their out-year training and 

deployment cost estimates since the meeting of 9 February. General 

Moseley’s approval of the $15 million budget increase made it possible 

to proceed with USCENTAF’s plans for FY 2007 (including the AETC 

advisor school and up to three two-week offerings at Camp AndersonPeters), but FY 2008 still needed to be addressed. That year’s projected predeployment training costs for an advisor force of more than 

530 Airmen came to $12 million (including $3 million for the training detachment’s operations). Costs for the deployers’ entitlements 

had also become clearer: in FY 2007 an additional $1.2 million would 

be needed for the Airmen-advisors to spend up to 179 days in the 

Iraqi AOR. Moreover, in FY 2008 and thereafter, the USAF would 

have to find $13 million annually for the additional entitlements 

earned by advisors serving on 365-day tours. Those sums could be 

taken from GWOT funds for FY 2007 and FY 2008, but later costs 

would have to be included in longer-range spending plans.52

Finally, the IPT’s manpower specialists had worked with the 

CAFTT-Iraq and CAFTT-Afghanistan staffs to refine personnel requirements for the expansion. Advisor manning in Iraq was programmed at 398 by July 2008, and training operations in Afghanistan 

required the deployment of 139 advisors by October 2007. This additional burden to some already-stressed career fields was of serious 

concern, and the Air Staff ’s Manpower and Personnel Directorate 

promised to work with USCENTAF to find trade-offs among the affected career specialties wherever possible.53
102 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

The IPT closed out its last meeting by announcing that the members’ 

contributions would continue. However, as of 21 March the USCENTAF 

Air Advisory Division would have responsibility for the process.54

The Air Advisory Division Has Teething Troubles

Although the IPT had announced that it would transition much of 

its effort to the new USCENTAF Air Advisory Division in late March, 

it was soon apparent that the division was not yet ready to take on 

that workload. On 4 May the Ninth Air Force deputy director of staff 

e-mailed the headquarters staff to announce 

the revitalization and expansion of the former CENTAF Iraqi Air Force Development Working Group into a standing [IPT] to support the CENTAF advisory mission in both Iraq and Afghanistan. . . . The CENTAF Air Advisory 

Division was formed to provide support to both elements; however, manning 

and organizational development is taking longer than expected and a standing IPT is urgently needed to streamline the staffing process and fully support 

the needs of [CAFTT-Iraq and CAFTT-Afghanistan].55

The standing IPT (SIPT) began meeting on 7 May and would continue to do so on a regular basis until the Air Advisory Division could 

become fully functional—a process that would take until midsummer. 

The SIPT included representatives from virtually every directorate in 

Headquarters Ninth Air Force, and its members focused upon force 

planning and facilitating predeployment training. As the situation in 

Iraq became more settled, sorting out the requirements for the 

ANAAC absorbed most of the team’s attention. That said, some factors 

were common to both AORs.56

The SIPT acknowledged that finding suitable advisor candidates 

was not easy. In fact, it could take up to nine months to find, train, 

and deploy a qualified advisor. Because of that lag time, it was especially hard to give deployed commanders a “right of refusal” for advisor 

nominees—a potential issue for filling key leadership positions. Mismatches between candidates’ skill codes and the skills desired of an 

advisor were a routine occurrence. The need to meet fast-approaching 

production quotas was hanging over everyone: between 1 July and 30 

September 180 Airmen-advisors would have to be sent to Iraq, and 

36 more needed to arrive in Afghanistan between July and August.57
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 103

US Air Force Organizational Changes in Iraq

Rapid expansion of the USAF advisor force in Iraq required more 

than increased preparation and training before deployment. It also 

called for a more formalized organizational structure within the AOR 

itself since numerous Airmen were about to be deployed.

On 29 March Headquarters ACC issued a special order activating seven 

new organizations in Iraq. From that point forward, Airmen assigned to 

CAFTT’s headquarters at Phoenix Base would report to the Air Force Element (AFELM), CAFTT, or CAFTT’s subordinate establishment—the 

370th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group (AEAG)—also at Phoenix Base 

and initially commanded by Col Daniel Groeschen. Both organizations 

would answer to the 9th Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force.58

The MiTTs assigned to Iraqi bases and squadrons were similarly 

reorganized into more familiar “standard” USAF units. NAMAB 

would host the 370th Air Expeditionary Advisory Squadron (AEAS). 

Taji would become home for the 770th AEAS and the 370th Expeditionary Training Squadron, and Kirkuk was to host the 870th AEAS 

and the 52nd Expeditionary Flying Training Squadron. The latter 

unit would support the Iraqis’ Flying Training School when it opened 

later that year. The smaller ISR MiTT operation at Basrah became 

Operating Location A, 370th AEAG.59

The Coalition Air Force Transition Team

Gets Its First Full-Time Commander

Although it would take a little time for the new units to begin 

functioning smoothly, a major change had already occurred within 

CAFTT headquarters. On 25 March Brig Gen Robert R. Allardice 

replaced General Hoog as CAFTT commander.60 General Allardice’s 

experience made him a good fit for the position. From October 1998 

to May 2000, he had been chief of the Expeditionary Air Force Implementation Division at Headquarters USAF. In the two years immediately before deploying to Iraq, General Allardice was assigned at 

Headquarters USAF as director of airman development and sustainment.61 But this new appointment was particularly significant because, for the first time, the CAFTT commander was not also serving 

as MNF–I’s ACCE.62 In other words, the position was no longer “dual 

hatted,” recognizing the growing size and importance of the USAF 
104 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

advisory program in Iraq. It meant that the USAF had now acknowledged 

the CAFTT commander’s need to focus all of his attention upon just 

one mission—helping the IqAF to become a viable combat organization.

Flying in the Present, the Iraqi

Air Force Plans for the Future

With the exception of several Mi-17 helicopters that were entering 

service with Squadron 4 in January, the IqAF began flying the same 

missions with the same aircraft in 2007—minus the Comp Airs—that 

it had been using since 2005. That practice was about to change.

A year after a number of Huey IIs were delivered to an Alabamabased contractor, the first shipment of five rebuilt helicopters returned to Iraq on 16 February.63 Following several days’ reassembly 

and flight testing at NAMAB, they were turned over to Squadron 2 at 

Taji. Over the next few months, several were occasionally flown back 

to NAMAB, Phoenix Base, and Baghdad’s Green Zone to take Iraqi 

defense officials aloft for the benefit of the press; these excursions 

were moments of considerable pride for the IqAF.64 Otherwise, the 

Hueys were used to train Iraqi airmen. Although the rebuilt aircraft 

had been factory equipped with protective armor, they remained 

within Taji’s airspace for the first several months. This restriction was 

not imposed from an excess of caution: between 20 January and 3 

March, Iraqi insurgents had shot down or damaged eight US helicopters.65

As a result, it was not until 10 April that two Iraqi pilots made Squadron 

2’s first flights outside Taji’s perimeter. Those sorties included live-fire 

exercises using externally mounted machine guns.66 Five more aircraft arrived at NAMAB on 2 May, and the final six were airlifted in 

from the United States on 29 July, by which time Squadron 2 had accumulated about 1,300 flying hours in training missions, passenger 

movement, and infrastructure protection and assessment.67

Squadron 23, the transport unit, had long since become the brightest 

jewel in the new air force’s crown. The service’s largest and most 

experienced squadron had about 45 aircrews, 120 maintainers, and 

130 other airmen assigned in early 2007. Although equipped with 

only three C-130Es, the squadron had earned a solid reputation over 

the previous two years—not only for its demonstrated ability to move 

important passengers and cargo safely but also for the training 

opportunities that the unit had provided to the IqAF. Many of the 
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 105

squadron’s maintainers, for example, had become equivalent to USAF 

five-level (journeyman) or seven-level (master) technicians. In keeping with the USAF advisors’ “train the trainers” mantra, they were 

instructing new three-level (apprentice) Iraqi maintenance specialists 

in turn.68

Squadron 23 was also helping other IqAF specialists. To cite a 

timely example, 11 flight medical officers completed the first offering 

of the Iraqi armed forces’ Flight Surgeon Primary Course on 31 January. 

Their training syllabus required participation in medical evacuation 

and airborne patient treatment exercises, and the NAMAB-based 

squadron’s Hercules transports had served as training platforms for 

the physician-airmen to practice their skills in a truly realistic setting.69 On 4 March this training was put to practical use when the 

squadron made its first intratheater air medical evacuation by transporting a badly wounded Iraqi policeman.70

But it was the IqAF’s ISR operations that accumulated the most 

“firsts” in 2007. In February, following the activation of the air operations center, both Squadron 3 and Squadron 70 began supporting 

Iraqi army requests for ISR support, including convoy surveillance. 

CH2000 flights resumed over Baghdad that same month as part of 

Operation Fard al Qanoon, an element of the “surge” operations being 

conducted in and around the capital.71 The first of three Cessna C208 

Interim ISR Caravans arrived on 30 March; the last arrived in June. 

All three aircraft were assigned to Squadron 3 at Kirkuk, and its aircrews began conducting some very successful infrastructure surveillance flights in July in conjunction with Squadron 12’s Huey IIs.

These flights were particularly significant for the effect they had 

upon IqAF esprit de corps and recruiting. During a press conference 

held in early September, CAFTT commander General Allardice 

noted that “the morale of the air force has picked up as they have gotten involved in real operations. . . . About six weeks ago they stopped 

a pirating operation down in southern Iraq.” He noted that both 

squadrons’ participating pilots had been personally thanked by the 

Iraqi minister of oil and added “that was a complexity of mission . . . 

that I just didn’t think they would be able to do until the end of the 

year.”72

Squadron 3’s interim ISR operations progressed to full initial operating capability (IOC) the following month, allowing the retirement 

of its two long-serving but unarmored and underpowered SB7L-360 

Seeker surveillance aircraft.73
106 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

Counterinsurgency and Procurement

of Counterterrorism Aircraft 

Looking to the future meant gaining the ability to conduct COIN 

and counterterrorism (CT) operations. COIN aircraft had been on 

the Iraqis’ want list for some time, and General Barzanjy anticipated 

using $120 million in Iraqi security forces funding for that purpose.74

For its part, the DOD included the requirement in the FY 2007 

GWOT supplemental budget request submitted for congressional 

approval in early February 2007, and Congress agreed.75

On 3 May AFMC’s 337th Aeronautical Systems Group issued a 

solicitation seeking “potential sources to provide both a [COIN] Aircraft and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) for the Government of 

Iraq.”76 The request envisioned a buy of eight aircraft (with an option 

for six more) and their logistical needs for a year. It also included 

provisos that the contract-winning aircraft must already be in widespread use and that it must use a Pratt & Whitney PT-6-based turboprop engine. These limits would make the winner compatible with 

the PT-6-powered ISR aircraft already in IqAF service, but they 

would also limit the competition to a very few well-marketed aircraft 

types. The latter included principally the Hawker Beechcraft T-6—already 

serving in significant numbers in the USAF and US Navy as a primary training aircraft—and the Brazilian-built Embraer EMB-314 

Super Tucano light strike/trainer aircraft.77

In the meantime, the insurgency gave greater impetus to the need 

to conduct CT operations. Because of the lengthening time involved 

in mounting a COIN competition (and thus the winning design’s delivery dates), in September Iraqi officials asked for a replay of the 

means used to acquire the three Interim ISR aircraft in the fall of 

2006. Could the 645th AESG—better known as Big Safari—work its 

special acquisition magic once again? It could, and on 11 December 

AFSAC’s 555th International Support Squadron issued an LO&A for 

three “Iraqi Armed Caravan (IAC) aircraft.” These were to be commercial off-the-shelf Cessna C208B Grand Caravans modified as ISR 

platforms. When operating in CT mode, they were able to launch 

AGM-114 Hellfire missiles from two wing-mounted pylons. The total 

cost of the IAC contract was just over $42.5 million.78 As before, Alliant Technology (since renamed ATK, Inc.) agreed to undertake the 

work, and the contractor’s conversion efforts began in early 2008. De-
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 107

livery of the first AC-208B Combat Caravan was expected by the end 

of that year.79

Basic Trainer and Light Transport Procurement

Fielding a combat capability was highly desirable, but the new air 

force’s most immediate needs were to train pilots and rapidly move 

important passengers and light high-value cargo, including Iraqi currency, about the country. Fortunately, aircraft suitable for both purposes were comparatively inexpensive and readily available from active production lines in the United States. The anticipated October 

opening of the FTS made it especially important to take early action, 

and US government funds were made available for that purpose.

On 6 June 2007 AFSAC’s 555th International Group issued an 

LO&A to provide Iraq with 12 Cessna C-172 Skyhawk basic trainer 

aircraft and five Cessna 208B Caravan light transports, along with 15 

months’ CLS and 12 months’ spare parts. The Skyhawks were priced 

at $330,890 each; the cost of the Caravan transports and their associated defensive systems, along with spares and support for all 17 aircraft, brought the total cost to just over $26 million.80 The first two 

Skyhawks arrived at Kirkuk on 19 October, and two more were delivered 

soon thereafter.81

The first King Air 350ER aircraft, outfitted as a light transport, was 

presented to General Barzanjy in a ceremony at NAMAB on 28 December. 

Delivery of the remaining four ISR-equipped King Airs was to begin 

in April 2008.82

Rotary-Wing Procurement

The 2004 helicopter purchase negotiations with Bumar, the Polish 

arms export conglomerate, had been a source of embarrassment to 

the Iraqis because of the poor quality and high cost of the equipment 

that Bumar had proposed (and failed) to deliver. Corruption charges 

had also emerged regarding that original $400 million purchase. Bumar 

made a partial settlement offer in 2005 that would provide Iraq with 

10 new Mi-17s, and they were delivered in early 2006. In the last few 

months of that year, the Iraqis reached a new understanding with 

Bumar to receive an additional 18 Mi-17s as final settlement of the 

original contract.83 Four of them were delivered in early 2007, and the 

remaining aircraft were expected to arrive in two deliveries in late 

2007 and mid-2008. In a separate FMS contract negotiated in De-
108 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

cember 2007, the US Army arranged for the Iraqis to buy an additional 22 Mi-17s, equipped for the CT mission, at a cost of $322 

million.84

In August 2007 the DSCA informed Congress that the Iraqis were 

considering a $150 million agreement to convert an additional 16 

UH-1H helicopters to Huey II standards. A month later, another 

DSCA announcement noted that the IqAF wanted approval for a 

further purchase of 32 Huey II conversions; both proposals were reportedly cancelled because of cost overrun concerns.85

Long-Range Planning

One principal challenge facing the Iraqis and CAFTT was the need 

to establish a realistic set of joint plans, goals, and milestones for the 

IqAF’s future. USCENTAF had made a valuable but preliminary effort in the form of the Comparative Aircraft Study, which it completed in late 2005.86 The IqAF had also published five-year service 

plans, initially in January 2005 and later in July 2006, but a lack of 

funds, manpower, and equipment made them both something less 

than realistic.87 That said, by mid-2007 the situation was improving, 

and General Barzanjy and CAFTT commander General Allardice 

were prepared to move beyond those earlier efforts.

In early June General Allardice convened a teleconference to update key USAF and US Army participants about the status of the 

Iraqis’ training efforts and to present his vision of how they might 

achieve an objective force mission capability by the end of 2012. The 

graphic he presented arrayed eight mission capabilities against notional 

manpower totals for each year of the analysis. CT, training, and COIN 

IOCs were indicated and accompanied with explanatory notes.88

The Coalition Air Force Transition Team Campaign Plan. By 

August that vision had become much more structured and specific. 

In what General Allardice called his “CAFTT Campaign Plan (2007–

2015),” he proposed three lines of operation that would proceed in 

parallel in three sequential, multiyear phases: 2007–9, 2009–11, and 

2011–14. Each line pursued different objectives, but all supported the 

overall mission of building an IqAF “capable of conducting sustained 

operations, focused on the COIN fight in the near-term, in order to 

defeat terrorism and create a stable environment, while setting the 

conditions for achieving air sovereignty.”89
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 109

The first line, “build, train, educate, and sustain,” was the immediate priority. It had two objectives—“organize, train, equip, and sustain air operations” and “exhibit military professionalism”—and it 

was already well-flagged with achieved and pending IOC dates for 

the schools in operation or set open in 2007, along with their projected full operational capability dates in 2008 and 2009. The second 

line, “conduct COIN operations,” had as its objective the ability to 

“conduct day/night/all-weather operations,” but it projected IOCs 

only for a “COIN nonkinetic capability” (January 2008) and a “COIN 

kinetic capability” (January 2009). The third line, “provide homeland 

defense,” addressed the need to “provide homeland defense capabilities.” For obvious reasons it was the least developed, with only a notional “airspace control capability” IOC projected for January 2011, 

the initial receipt of an air-defense-capable aircraft in 2013, and 

“homeland defense capability IOC” in 2014.90

As a part of making CAFTT’s mission more widely known and 

appreciated, a simplified version of the campaign plan graphic was 

included in a brochure released later that fall.91 The plan (and its accompanying rationale) also played a central role in an article cowritten 

by General Allardice and published in an Air Force professional journal 

in December 2007.92

The Iraqi Air Force Service Plan. While CAFTT was formulating 

its campaign plan, General Barzanjy’s headquarters staffers were revising and expanding the latest edition of their service plan; an English language version was issued on 1 July. Covering the period 2007–

12, it set mission priorities, identified assumptions, and acknowledged 

shortfalls. The plan also contained detailed annexes assessing current 

and future capabilities, growth expectations for the following five 

years, and an analysis of the relative strengths of its likely adversaries, 

of which Iran was identified as the most serious. Although the plan 

projected optimistic manpower growth and equipment acquisitions 

over the five-year period—in 2012 the air force was to have 10,000 

airmen and 532 aircraft—it included neither budget figures nor programmed expenditures.93

Some of the differences between the two plans were instructive. 

For example, the CAFTT campaign plan stressed the need to expand 

the IqAF in measured, sequential steps. From the Americans’ perspective, training, support, and infrastructure were all equally essential 

requirements for creating and sustaining combat capability. For the 

Iraqis, achieving combat capability in the shortest possible time was 
110 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

more important. General Barzanjy noted in the plan’s introduction 

that “we must fight insurgency as our main role. We will continue to 

grow our capability to support the joint forces with unique air functions such as surveillance flights, air movement of ground forces, and 

ground attack of enemy positions. . . . Concurrent with our primary 

mission, we must focus on training.”94

Similarly, the Iraqis’ limitation list gave first importance to a lack 

of close air support aircraft. The second entry noted that the air force 

could not “provide air defense duties because of [the] unavailability 

of air defense aircrafts [sic], surveillance systems and radars.”95

These differences in perspective influenced the interaction between 

USAF Airmen-advisors and Iraqi airmen in disguised, and sometimes less subtle, ways. The Americans were trying to build a new air 

force. The Iraqis were trying to fight a war. General Allardice referenced this tension in his December USAF journal article. “As the 

IqAF develops operational capacity, it becomes increasingly difficult 

to manage the balance between continuing training and conducting 

real-real world operational missions,” the CAFTT commander 

wrote.96 It was a balancing act that his Airmen-advisors—and their 

successors—would have to perform every day.

Notes

1. “Air Education and Training Command,” fact sheet, 22 March 2009. http://

www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=138&page=1.

2. The IqAF had had its own officer-producing academy during the Ba’athist era, 

and it was anticipated that the IqAF would eventually seek to reconstitute that facility.

3. HQ CAFTT, “Training School Operational Requirements Document (Draft 

Version 1),” report (Randolph AFB, TX: AETC, 30 October 2006).

4. HQ CAFTT, “Iraqi Air Force Training School, Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 

(Draft Version 2),” report (Randolph AFB, TX: Headquarters AETC, 10 November 2006).

5. Ibid. USAF advisors were to assist in training fixed-wing students; CAFTT expected that rotary-wing training would be conducted by IqAF and US Army instructors.

6. Col Philip M. Senna, AETC/A3R, briefing, subject: IqAF Training School 

(IqAFTS) AETC Support Update, 22 November 2006; and Senna to AETC/A2&3 and 

AETC/IA, memorandum, subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) inCountry Visit, 22 November 2006.

7. AFOATS was redesignated as the Jeanne M. Holm Officer Accession and Citizen 

Development Center on 2 June 2008.

8. Christine Harrison, “AU Provides Curriculum, Manpower for Iraqi Officer 

Training,” Wright Stuff 2, no. 14 (20 July 2007, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews

/archive/0214/ArticlesAUprovidescurriculum.html.
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 111

9. The oath states, “I am a patriot. I voluntarily serve in the cause of freedom to 

fight oppression for my country, Iraq. I am prepared to give my life for this ideal. I will 

never concede defeat. I will never do anything for pleasure, profit, or personal safety 

that will disgrace my uniform, my unit, or my country. I will always act with great 

honor and comply with the Geneva Convention and the laws of war. I will treat others 

with dignity and respect at all times. Of my own free will I voluntarily choose the path 

of a patriot. I am dedicated to establishing a united Iraq, free of tyranny and oppression 

for its entire people.” Quoted in HQ AFOATS, “IqAF Officer Training School: IqAF 

Officer Training,” report (Maxwell AFB, AL: AFOATS, January 2007).

10. Kevin Lynn, briefing, subject: IqAF Training School (IqAFTS) OTS and TOPOFF Update, ca. January 2007.

11. Maj Dale Kolomaznik, Maj Scott Bergren, and Capt Mike Powell, interview 

with the author, 9 April 2008.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Maj Gen-select Robert R. Allardice and Maj Kyle “Brad” Head, “Coalition 

Air Force Transition Team: Rebuilding Iraq’s Air Force,” Air and Space Power Journal

21, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 5–14.

15. Susan Griggs, “Back to the Future: Keesler Prepares to Train Iraqi Air Traffic 

Controllers,” Keesler News [Keesler AFB, MS], 31 May 2007, 4.

16. Dwyer Stringer, AFSATS/XF, interview with the author, 22 July 2009.

17. The October 2006 briefing contained 33 slides; only 1 focused on Afghanistan. 

It reported that General Padilla was leading a team tasked to assess the status of the 

Afghanistan air corps but provided no additional details. General Padilla was the presenter for the slide’s accompanying remarks. North, briefing, subject: Coalition Air 

Force Transition Team Update (Version 2.1).

18. North, briefing, subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team: Building Airpower Capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan (Version 1.4), ca. 10 January 2007. (Information extracted is not FOUO.)

19. IMAR’s incoming January class consisted of 300 cadets. Another source reported that the induction ceremony “formally recognized the beginning of formal air 

force training at IMAR” and put the number of IqAF cadets at 63. “Iraq’s Future Officers,” 

Advisor 4, no. 4 (27 January 2007): 8.

20. See SFC Kimberly A. Green, “Air Force Squadron 70 Seeks to Secure Iraq.” 

Advisor 4, no. 8 (24 February 2007): 5.

21. North, briefing, subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team, slide 25. (Information extracted is not FOUO.)

22. As of 30 September 2006, 307 C-130s were in the active inventory, of which 

245 were more than 24 years old. The average age of the fleet was 33.4 years. “Equipment, 2007 USAF Almanac,” Air Force Magazine 90, no. 5 (May 2007): 63.

23. The ALE-47/AAR-47 missile approach warning system combined the ALE-47, a 

suite of infrared sensors mounted at various points on the aircraft to detect incoming 

rocket motor signatures, with the AAR-47, which automatically triggers decoy flares to 

misdirect the missile. The ALE/ALR-47 system is suitable for helicopters and transport 

aircraft. It has been installed on DOD aircraft as a standard defensive system since the late 

1990s. Federation of American Scientists, “AN/AAR-47 Missile Approach Warning 

System,” 8 January 2000, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/equip/an-aar-47.htm.
112 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

24. North, briefing, subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team, slide 30. (Info 

extracted is not FOUO.)

25. Ibid., slide 32. (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

26. Ibid., slide 31. (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

27. Arguments for enlarging the USAF’s advisory capabilities had been made in 

various forums in recent years. See, for example, Downs, “Unconventional Airpower,” 20–25; Lt Col Norman J. Brozenick, “Another Way to Fight: Combat Aviation 

Advisory Missions,” research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, June 2002); 

Maj Ioannis Koskinas, “The Combat Aviation Advisory Mission in Iraq,” Air and 

Space Power Journal 19, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 107–8; and Alan Vick, Air Power in the New 

Counterinsurgency Era: the Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance 

Missions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2006).

28. Brig Gen David Gillett, Air Combat Command (ACC)/A4, to Brig Gen Mark 

T. Matthews, ACC/A5 et al., e-mail, subject: Coalition AF Transition Team (Iraq and 

Afghanistan), 10 January 2007.

29. Mr. Lemkin was named to head SAF/IA in 2003. A career naval officer prior to 

his retirement from active duty in 1997, he had commanded several nuclear submarines, 

including the USS Michigan (SSBN-727). After returning to civilian life, Mr. Lemkin held 

several executive and senior advisor positions in the private sector before becoming 

principal deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for financial management in 2002. 

“Bruce S. Lemkin,” biography, February 2010, http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio

_print.asp?bioID=6179&page=1.

30. Bruce S. Lemkin, secretary of the Air Force (SAF)/IA, to chief of staff, US Air 

Force et al., “Increasing USAF Role in Building Iraq Air Force (IqAF) and Afghanistan 

National Army Air Corps (ANAAC),” staff summary sheet, 20 February 2007.

31. Bruce S. Lemkin and Col Sharon Holmes, SAF/IARM, briefing, subject: 

Building Air Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan: Integrated Product Team Interim 

Report, ca. 9 February 2007.

32. The 28,000-acre facility opened as Camp Bullis in 1994. Much of its infrastructure was dedicated to convoy escort training; it was renamed to honor two Airmen who had lost their lives in Iraq while performing convoy escort duties in October 

2005. Donna Miles, “Camp Bullis Provides Example in Joint, Cooperative Training,” 

American Forces Press Service, 17 February 2005, http://www.defense.gov/news

/newsarticle.aspx?id=25868; James Coburn, “Camp Dedication Honors Two Airmen,” Talespinner [Lackland AFB, TX], 17 October 2005, http://www.aetc.af.mil

/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/136/Article/263509/camp-dedication-honors-two-airmen

.aspx; and TSgt Mike Hammond, “Combat Convoy—The Air Force Targets Tactical 

Transportation So the Enemy Has Less Chance of Doing So,” Air Force Print News, 

accessed 4 July 2010, http://www.torch.aetc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123065085.

33. Lemkin and Holmes, briefing, subject: Interim Report, slide 9.

34. Ibid., slides 10–12.

35. Ibid., slides 13–18. 

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., slide 21.

38. Ibid., slides 19–20.

39. Inexplicably, the staff summary routing sheet did not include ACC as a coordinating organization, and the package was presented to the CSAF in late February 
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 113

or early March without formal COMACC concurrence. The ACC commander’s staff 

subsequently assured him that there were no “show-stoppers” involved, and he initialed the package without objection on 19 March. Maj Gen-select Douglas L. 

Raaberg, ACC/A3, to ACC/CC et al., e-mail, subject: PKG-DS700469: Increasing 

USAF Role in Building Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) and Afghanistan National Army Air 

Corps (ANAAC), 19 March 2007; and 1st Lt Paul K. McKinney III, ACC/CCA, to Lt 

Col Robert C. Troisi, ACC/A3X et al., e-mail, subject: PKG-DS700469: Increasing 

USAF Role in Building Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) and Afghanistan National Army Air 

Corps (ANAAC), 19 March 2007.

40. Lemkin, “Increasing USAF Role.” The available record does not show exactly 

when the CSAF received or answered SAF/IA’s three propositions, but the fact that he 

approved them is confirmed in the slides prepared for the IPT’s final report briefing. 

SAF/IA sent the slides out to the IPT membership in the late afternoon of 7 March.

41. Maj Leif Eckholm, “Background Paper on Iraq/Afghanistan Pre-Deployment 

Training,” ca. 15 February 2007.

42. Lemkin and Holmes, briefing, subject: Interim Report, slides 19–20.

43. Eckholm, “Background Paper on Increased USAF Personnel Requirements 

in Iraq and Afghanistan,” ca. 15 February 2007.

44. Lemkin, “Increasing USAF Role.”

45. Message, 011822Z Feb 07, COMCENTAF to HQ USAF et al., “CENTAF Air 

Advisory Division,” 1 February 2007.

46. Lemkin and Holmes, briefing, subject: Building Air Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan: Integrated Product Team Final Report, ca. 9 March 2007, slide 25. 

47. Ibid.

48. For a description of the “Bridge Course,” see Patrick Wilson, “A Crash Course 

in Combat,” Air Force Times, 27 November 2007, http://www.airforcetimes.com

/news/2007/11/airforce_combat_course_071126w/.

49. Lemkin and Holmes, briefing, subject: Final Report, slides 9–11.

50. Ibid., slides 12–14. For reporting on English language instruction at NAMAB in 

early 2007, see SSgt Zachary Wilson, “Overcoming Language Barrier First Step for Iraq’s 

New Air Force Officers,” Advisor 4, no. 7 (17 February 2007): 5 and 7; and SFC Ronda 

Jordan, “English Language Training Takes Flight,” Advisor 4, no. 15 (14 April 2007): 9.

51. Lemkin and Holmes, briefing, subject: Final Report, slides 15–19.

52. Ibid., slides 20–21.

53. Ibid., slides 22–23.

54. Ibid., slide 25.

55. Maj Jeff Fallesen, 9AF/DDS, to 9AF/A1 et al., e-mail, subject: CENTAF Iraqi 

Air Force/ANAAC Development Integrated Product Team Kickoff Meeting, 4 May 

2007. [9AF files]

56. HQ 9AF, briefing, subject: CENTAF Partner Nation Airpower Development 

Standing Integrated Product Team (Version 1.0), 7 May 2007. [9AF Files] (Information 

extracted is not FOUO.)

57. Ibid., slides 25 and 27. (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

58. HQ ACC, Special Order (SO) GB-82, 29 March 2007. See also Erik Holmes, 

“New Name for Unit Building Iraqi Air Force,” Air Force Times, 9 April 2007, http://

aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=17877&printer=yes.

59. Ibid.
114 │ AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE

60. General Allardice’s official title was Air Force element commander, CAFFT-Iraq. 

HQ 9 AETF, SO G-08-05, 8 November 2007. [nb: The retroactive date is correct.]

61. “Major General Robert R. Allardice,” biography, March 2008, http://www.af

.mil.bios/bio_print.asp?bioID=7912&page=1.

62. General Hoog would continue to serve as the MNF-I ACCE for another four 

months; he was replaced in July by Maj Gen David Edgington.

63. “Special Delivery,” Advisor 4, no. 8 (24 February 2007): 7.

64. “Huey II,” Advisor 4, no. 9 (3 March 2007): 11; MC2 Elisandro Diaz, “Iraqi Air 

Force Celebrates 76 years,” Advisor 4, no. 17 (28 April 2007): 4 and 5; and “First Five 

Iraqi Huey IIs Delivered,” Air International, April 2007, 8.

65. Jordan, “Iraqi Air Force Opens Training Center, Advisor 4, no 15 (14 April 

2007): 6; and Claudia Parsons, “Iraqi Air Force Shows Off Rebuilt Huey Helicopters,” 

Reuters, 3 March 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSPAR347933.

66. Erik Holmes, “Iraqis Fly First Helicopter Training Sortie,” Air Force Times, 11 April 

2007, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2007/04/airforce_iraqi_airforce_070411/.

67. Diaz, “Helicopters Land in Baghdad,” Advisor 4, no. 18 (5 May 2007): 3–4; Diaz, 

“Final Huey II Shipment Arrives at BIAP,” Advisor 4, no. 27 (4 August 2007): 9–10; and 

SrA Christie Putz, “Air Force Helps Keep Country’s Lifelines Flowing,” Advisor 4, no. 22 

(19 August 2007): 8 and 10.

68. TSgt Kevin Williams, “Iraqi Air Force Takes Flight with Help from U.S. Airmen,” Air Force Print News, 29 March 2007, http://www.af.mil/news/story_print

.asp?id=123046584.

69. Diaz, “Flight Surgeons Go Hi-Flying,” Advisor 4, no. 4 (27 January 2007): 3 and 5; 

and Diaz, “Squadron 23 Takes to the Skies,” Advisor 4, no. 6 (10 February 2008): 3 and 6.

70. Cpl Jess Kent, “Iraqi Air Force Performs First MEDEVAC,” 22 March 2007, 

http://www.amc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123046014.

71. SPC Lajuan Hickman, “CAFTT Preparing Iraqi Air Force,” 13 March 2007, 

http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=10574&Ite

mid=128; and Zehner, briefing, slides 7 and 8.

72. “DoD Bloggers Roundtable with Brigadier General Robert Allardice, Commanding General, Coalition Air Force Transition Team,” transcript, 6 September 2007, 

http://www.defense.gov/home/blog/docs/Allardice%20transcript.pdf.

73. Col Greg Zehner, CAFTT/A5, briefing, subject: Building a Credible Iraqi Air 

Force: A History, 25 August 2007, slides 7 and 8.

74. Maj Jeremy Brown, “CAFTT Counterinsurgency (COIN) Aircraft (A/C) 

Plan,” BBP, 25 March 2007.

75. “Future Iraqi AF Development Plans,” AirForces Monthly, April 2007, 21.

76. 337 AESG, “Iraq Counterinsurgency (COIN) Aircraft, solicitation no. 

FA8617-07-R-0001,” solicitation, 3 May 2007.

77. “US Air Force Starts Bidding for Iraqi Counter-Insurgency Aircraft Fleet,” 

Flight International, 4 May 2007, http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/article.aspx?li

ArticleID=213671&PrinterFriendly=true. The T-6A Texan II Primary Trainer entered 

USAF service in May 2000. The DOD planned to acquire up to 454 aircraft by FY 

2010; these were to be apportioned among the training commands of both the USAF 

and the US Navy. “T-6A Texan II,” fact sheet, accessed 6 July 2010, http//www.af.mil

/information/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=124&page=1.

78. Nancy P. Donnell-Ivy, “B7-D-SAR,” LO&A, 11 December 2007. [AFSAC files]
AETC STEPS UP TO THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TRAINING PLATE │ 115

79. ATK, Inc., “ATK Delivers Third AC-208 ‘Combat Caravan’ Aircraft to Iraqi 

Air Force,” press release, 16 November 2009.

80. Tinka, “B7-D-SAG.” [AFSAC files]

81. SSgt Jared Marquis, “Wright-Patt Plays a Part in Training Future Iraqi Pilots,” Air 

Force Print News, accessed 16 July 2008, http://www.wpafb.af.mil/news/story_print

.asp?id=123074106.

82. DSCA, “Iraqi Air Force Receives New Aircraft,” press release, 29 December 2007, 

http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/by-date/2008/122907_Iraqi-Air-Force-Aircraft

.html; and Frost, “Taking over the Skies,” 9–10.

83. Few details of the settlement were announced, perhaps because of the embarrassment caused by the initial contract awards’ questionable circumstances and poor results. 

See James Glanz, “Rebuilding Iraq’s Air Force a Challenge for U.S. Trainers,” New York 

Times, 5 February 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/05/world/africa/05iht-airforce

 .4474337.html.

84. The Army’s sole-source award to Arinc, Inc., later became plagued with delays, 

cost overruns, and other problems. Sharon Weinberger, “Helo Holdup: Problems Dog 

U.S. Decision to Buy Russian Helicopters for Iraq,” Defense Technology International, 

June 2009, 40 and 42.

85. “Iraqi AF Seeks 32 More Huey IIs, Opens Flying Training School,” AirForces 

Monthly, November 2007, 7; DSCA, “FMS: Iraq Requests Upgrade to Huey II Helicopter 

Configuration,” press release, 17 August 2007, http://www.deagel.com/news/FMS-Iraq

-Requests-Upgrade-to-Huey-II-Helicopter-Configuration_n000002598.aspx; and D. J. 

Elliott, “Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle: November 2007 Update,” Long War Journal, 

8 November 2007, http://longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/11/iraqi_security _force_5

.php#ixzz0e7duLOJG.

86. HQ USCENTAF, “Comparative Aircraft Study.” (Information used is not 

FOUO.)

87. See HQ Iraqi AF, “Iraqi Air Force Capability,” 11; and HQ IqAF, “Draft Service 

Plan,” 1-1.

88. Allardice, briefing, subject: VTC on IqAF Training, 6 June 2007. (Info extracted 

is not FOUO.)

89. Allardice, briefing, subject: VTC on IqAF Training, 1 August 2007. (Info extracted 

is not FOUO.)

90. Ibid., slide 4. [nb: This particular slide is labeled “Ver. 4.1, 29 Jul 07.”] (Info extracted 

is not FOUO.)

91. HQ CAFTT, “Coalition Air Force Transition Team.” See also North, briefing, 

subject: Building Airpower Capacity, slide 9.

92. Allardice and Head, “Coalition Air Force,” 5–14.

93. HQ IqAF, “Service Plan.” [CAFTT files]

94. Ibid., 3.

95. Ibid., 10.

96. Allardice and Head, “Coalition Air Force,” 9.

Chapter 9

The Foundation Has Been Laid

By the second half of 2007, many of the pieces needed for the IqAF 

to become an effective COIN air force were starting to come together. 

Its officer accession programs, technical training courses, and basic 

training facilities produced their first trickle of graduates. Those production flows would become a steady stream over the next 12 months, 

as would the output of the flying training school after it opened later 

that year.

Operating tempos also increased. The ISR aircraft of Squadron 3 

began conducting coordinated operations with Squadron 2’s helicopters 

in July, and that success provided the Iraqi airmen with a significant 

improvement in morale at an especially opportune time. The USAF 

had committed to fielding a substantially larger number of Airmenadvisors and to training them better before they deployed. Those processes, too, were beginning to accelerate.

However, some elements were still missing. The IqAF’s near-term 

and midterm mission was to conduct a COIN campaign, but (among 

other things) it lacked the intellectual infrastructure—a working 

doctrine—to shape that campaign. Oddly enough, the Iraqis’ American mentors did not have one either, and it was only in the fall of 2007 

that the USAF finally addressed that long-standing need.

In the meantime, the halting, tentative nature of the coalition’s 

progress in Iraq—and the accompanying cost in blood and treasure—

had drawn increasing notice within the US electorate and thus among 

its congressional representatives. In the late spring of 2007, Congress 

created an independent commission to assess the state of Iraq’s security 

forces, including its air force. That group of experts spent most of the 

summer in Iraq.

Form Belatedly Follows Function:

USAF Doctrine Updates

In 2004 two thoughtful airpower analysts, James S. Corum and 

Wray R. Johnson, considered the status of COIN doctrine in the US 

military and in the USAF in particular. They found it to be wanting.
118 │ THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID

Considering that the US military has extensive experience in using 

airpower against insurgents, and that the United States will almost 

certainly be involved in fighting insurgents and terrorists and will no 

doubt assist other nations in their own fights against irregular opponents in the future, the lack of attention in military colleges and in 

doctrine regarding this subject is scandalous. The US Air Force, in 

particular, has tended to ignore and downplay air operations in small 

wars in its education system and in its doctrine.1

If the USAF’s Airmen-advisors were to succeed in helping the 

Iraqis build an effective COIN air force, then they would need to have 

a solid grounding in COIN airpower theory and its applications—if 

only to know how not to use airpower in such a campaign. Nonetheless, no officially sanctioned body of doctrine was applicable to COIN 

operations for most of the first four years of the USAF’s mentoring 

efforts in Iraq. Outside AFSOC circles, the last time that subject had 

received systematic thought was during the Vietnam War.2

This neglect was finally addressed with the publication of Air Force 

Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, on 1 August 

2007. The doctrine defined irregular war (IW) as “a violent struggle 

among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence. . . . IW 

favors indirect approaches . . . in order to erode an adversary’s power, 

influence, and will.”3 One of the benefits of the new doctrine lay in its 

ability to clarify “what effects airpower and space power can and 

should have, leading to [selection of] the types of people and training 

needed for COIN,” along with the manner of weaponry best suited 

for that form of conflict.4

 Although it might take time for the new 

doctrine to gain traction elsewhere in the Air Force, the need was 

already quite clear to the CAFTT commander. “Given that their role 

involves helping the IqAF [to] build an effective COIN force,” General 

Allardice wrote in the fall of 2007, “advisors must know and understand the general principles and specific airpower applications in a 

COIN environment.”5

In mid-September, the Air Force Doctrine Development and Education Center supplemented AFDD 2-3 with a significantly revised 

edition of AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense. Replacing an edition published in May 2004, it described the USAF’s FID effort as “a 

key Air Force contribution to US support for COIN operations, combating terrorism, and counter-narcotics.”6 The new guidance noted 

that “FID efforts are most successful when they preclude the need to 

deploy large numbers of US military personnel,” given that the resulting 
THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID │ 119

logistic (and cultural) footprint tended to be counterproductive.7 It 

also acknowledged, if somewhat obliquely, the difficulties involved in 

trying to balance a systematic, evolutionary approach to force construction against the urgent demands of an ongoing COIN campaign, 

as was the case in Iraq. The doctrine stated that “commanders should 

seek opportunities to elevate Air Force training and advisory efforts 

to higher levels of [host nation] military leadership and address such 

issues as basic air force infrastructure, organization, training, command and control, logistics, and procurement processes.”8

The Last Schoolhouse Comes Online

IqAF schools had made considerable progress since the beginning 

of the year. The first AFTS class began at Taji in mid-April, and the 

first students entered the initial offering of the maintenance supervisor 

course that same week. The first technical training courses began the 

following month, as did basic enlisted training. The enlisted students 

graduated in mid-June, and the first IqAF officer course graduates 

received their commissions a week later. The interim Air Force Academy 

held its first graduation in late July, and by mid-August the 370 Expeditionary Training Squadron could boast of having graduated over 

100 Iraqi officers and airmen.9

On 12 September General Barzanjy attended the formal dedication of the AFTS at its new quarters—once a Ba ́ath Party headquarters 

building previously used by Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard. 

Although “the Alamo” had served its purpose, the new facilities were 

better suited for technical training and future expansion. The dedication ceremony also honored the graduation and commissioning of 11 

new officers; three of them would receive flight training at Kirkuk.10

Another major educational milestone followed when the FTS was 

formally opened for training operations at Camp Taji on 1 October 

2007. The Airmen of the 52nd Expeditionary Flying Training Squadron, 

under the command of Lt Col Mark Bennett, had spent months in 

preparation for the event. That morning four student pilots participated in the school’s first training sortie. To mark the occasion, each 

took a brief turn at the controls of their Cessna Caravan—one of 

three previously delivered for use as interim ISR platforms but doubling as a light transport.11 Three weeks later, the FTS received its first 

two Cessna 172 Skyhawk basic trainers. Two more arrived before 
120 │ THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID

year’s end; the other 14 would follow as soon as they could be delivered 

and reassembled. In November the FTS graduated its first pilots. The 

last critical piece of the IqAF’s education establishment had been put 

in place.12

September Situation Reports

In September the USCENTAF commander provided an update on 

Iraq and Afghanistan to USAF leaders assembled in Washington, 

DC, for the 2007 Global Air Chiefs Conference. General North told 

the group that his CAFTT personnel complement stood at 336 and 

was projected to reach 419 by the midsummer of 2008. The IqAF’s 

equipment situation was improving: 45 aircraft were on hand, and 15 

more were to be delivered by year’s end. Although the IqAF’s overall 

manning rate was low (32 percent), the pilot pipeline was beginning 

to fill. General North expected that the air force would be meeting its 

annual quota of 130 pilots by June. Operational capabilities had also 

continued to expand: sortie rates for the ISR fleet were approaching 

30 per week; the three airlifters were conducting over 15 sorties per 

week; and the battlefield mobility helicopters were logging over 60 

sorties per week.13

The USCENTAF commander summarized the update by noting 

that his air advisor operations were “a major element of the Combatant 

Commander’s strategy for long-term theater posturing,” but he added 

a cautionary note. “While flexibility is the key to airpower,” said General 

North, “patience is the key to developing it.”14

The Jones Commission

General North’s progress report was largely encouraging, and the 

audience was both familiar with the topic and supportive of the presenter’s intentions. That same month, a very different team delivered 

a significantly longer report of far greater consequence to a much 

more skeptical audience: the Congress of the United States.

On 25 May Pres. George W. Bush signed new legislation creating a 

commission “made up of individuals with credentials and expertise 

in military and law enforcement matters to conduct an independent 

assessment of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).”15 Chaired by retired 

Marine Corps general James J. Jones, Jr., and composed of 20 members, 
THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID │ 121

the “Jones Commission” took on a four-part assignment: gauge the 

readiness of the ISF to (1) take responsibility for their country’s territorial 

integrity; (2) deny safe haven to international terrorists; (3) bring 

greater security to Iraq within the next 12 to 18 months; and (4) achieve 

national reconciliation by ending sectarian violence.16 The commission also reviewed the ISF’s capabilities in some key functional areas, 

including training, equipage, command and control, intelligence, and 

logistics. Eight key congressional committees were to receive the 

report within 120 days.17

The commissioners spent three weeks in Iraq, visiting more than 

70 sites and interviewing over 150 people, including senior Iraqi military and civilian leaders, along with US, coalition, and NATO officials. More specifically, those Iraqi leaders included “virtually all of 

the Iraqi Air Force general officers” and many field and company 

grade air force officers, warrant officers, and enlisted airmen. The 

inquiry was thorough: one commission member flew with Iraqi aircrews on four different missions in four different aircraft types.18

Overall, the commission found that the ISF has “made uneven 

progress, but that there should be increasing improvement” over the 

next 12 to 18 months. The Ministry of Defense was “one of the better 

functioning agencies of the Iraqi government,” but its ability to execute a budget “requires significant improvement.” Moreover, the ministry’s 

“bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and overcentralization hamper its capacity . . . [and] reduce the operational readiness, 

capability, and effectiveness of the Iraqi military.”19 Three of the commission’s 50 findings singled out the IqAF.

Commission Finding Number 21 noted that the IqAF had a recruiting and retention problem. The commissioners recommended that 

“together with its Coalition partners, the [IqAF] must increase the 

quality of its recruits and the capacity of current and planned training 

programs, while also increasing the manpower authorizations to 

compensate for chronic absenteeism. Emphasis on the value of training must be relentless” (emphasis in original).20

The real issue was that while the number of inductees was satisfactory, 

their abilities were often inadequate. Much of the problem lay in the 

fact that air forces are inherently technical and that young men willing 

to consider air force careers tend to be of middle class origins. Unfortunately, much of Iraq’s middle class had fled the country. Many of 

those left behind lacked the essential twin traits of a potential airman: 

technical inclination and educability. But there was an additional, 
122 │ THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID

underlying subtlety. The new Iraq was to be more democratic than 

the old, and the commission was emphatic on this point. It declared 

that the air force’s future depended upon “recruiting quality candidates who can absorb high standards of training and also adapt to a 

new culture of responsibility and choice unknown during the Saddam 

era.” Such candidates would be harder to find, and thus only “relentless” search efforts could suffice.21

Finding Number 22 concluded that, while aircraft procurement 

had been adequate, sustainment lagged far behind. The commission 

urged the coalition to act: “[MNSTC-I] must redouble its efforts to 

inculcate the value of quality maintenance and support into the culture 

of the MoD in general, and of the [IqAF] in particular” (emphasis in 

original).22

The commissioners noted that “the enthusiasm to buy more and 

better platforms far exceeds the desire to purchase spare parts or perform maintenance.” The IqAF’s apparent perception that contract 

logistics support was “a ruse to get Iraqis to give their money to US 

firms” was equally troublesome. Maintenance training and the timely 

provision of spares and supplies in sufficient quantity are the “very 

foundation upon which a capable new IqAF” must be built, the commissioners said, and “even with success in this area, the [IqAF] will 

likely require Coalition assistance for the next two or three years.”23

Lastly, Finding Number 23 acknowledged that, even with its late 

start (as compared to the Iraqi army), the IqAF appeared to be on the 

right track and moving ahead: “Given its good progress to date, the 

new [IqAF] should stay its present course of developing a [COIN] air 

force with a view toward establishing quality operations and maintenance 

capability for integration into the joint fight. As these skills are refined, 

reliance on Coalition support can diminish” (emphasis in original).24

The commissioners noted that although the air force’s “overall 

capacity is still very small . . . and it has almost no lethal capability,” 

the defense ministry’s procurement program was addressing the 

problem. Once some easily maintained close support aircraft had 

been added to the existing mix, “a balanced air force will emerge fully 

capable of supporting the military’s [COIN] mission.” But a balanced 

air force was not enough. The IqAF’s command and control structure 

was still largely undeveloped and lacked “a demonstrable ability to 

operate jointly” with the Iraqi army forces that it was supposed to 

support. The commissioners attributed at least some of that lack to 
THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID │ 123

“traditional independence and cultural habits” which tempted air 

force members to think “primarily of their own family or tribe.” The 

report noted, perhaps somewhat primly, that the commissioners had 

“discerned some faint progress in this area, but a considerable distance needs to be traveled.”25

The commission’s overall conclusion was that the IqAF was well 

designed as a COIN air force but that its “relatively late establishment 

hampers its ability” to support ground operations. The difficulty in 

finding suitable airmen and “the inclination to value force size and 

acquisition over operational effectiveness” were continuing challenges, but, taken as a whole, the service was “progressing at a promising rate.”26

The Situation at the End of 2007

In its March 2008 report to Congress, the DOD summarized the 

IqAF’s accomplishments during the previous year.27 By the end of 

December 2007, air force personnel strength had risen to about 1,300, 

of which 146 were pilots. The Iraqis had more than 56 aircraft on 

hand and 41 more on order. The capacity for producing technicians 

had risen to 960 graduates per year, and annual pilot production 

capacity had increased to 135. The IqAF commissioned 74 officers in 

December 2007, and the AFTS graduated 116 warrant officers—its 

first class—in January 2008.

Increases in trained personnel and the fielding of better aircraft 

meant more operations. In January 2007 the Iraqis had flown a total 

of 120 sorties; in December of that year, they flew 1,205. Most noteworthy was the IqAF’s growing ability to “get in the fight.” With everincreasing frequency, Iraqis were flying patrols over oil pipelines, 

highways, and border checkpoints; reporting suspect activities to 

ground forces; and improving the Iraqi government’s standing by 

“showing the flag” in an especially effective way. On 12–14 November 

the air force demonstrated its ability to conduct ISR and nonkinetic 

counterinsurgency missions in Exercise First Star, the first such event 

entirely planned and executed by Iraqis since the fall of Saddam. The 

exercise provided proof that the service could exert effective operational command and control over its forces. Slowly, but surely, the 

IqAF was regaining its status as a modern air force.
124 │ THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID

Notes

1. James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents 

and Terrorists, Modern War Studies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 4.

2. Lt Col David J. Dean, The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict (Maxwell AFB, 

AL: Air University Press, October 1986); and Maj Kenneth Beebe, “The Air Force’s 

Missing Doctrine,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 27–34.

3. AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, https://www.fas.org/irp/doddor

/usaf/afdd2-3.pdf 1.

4. Beebee, “Air Force’s Missing Doctrine,” 30.

5. Allardice and Head, “Coalition Air Force,” 12.

6. AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense, 15 September 2007, http://www.dtic

.mil/dosctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_3_1.pdf.

7. Ibid., 1.

8. Ibid., 58.

9. Zehner, briefing; and SFC Nicholas Connor, 15th Sustainment Brig., “New CAFTT 

Squadron; Training the Iraqi Air Force,” Defense Video and Imagery Distribution Center, 

11 August 2007, http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=news/news_show.php&id=11763.

10. Maj Edwina Walton, “Symbol of Tyranny Replaced with School for Iraq Air 

Force,” Air Force News, 14 September 2007, http://www/af/mil/news/story_print

.asp?id=123068109.

11. SSgt Jared Marquis, “Iraqi Air Force Flying Training School Opens at Kirkuk,” 

Air Force News, 5 October 2007, http://balad.afnews.af.mil/news/story_print

.asp?id=123070092; and “Iraqi AF Seeks,” 7.

12. “News in Brief: Up to 28 Cessna 172s Ordered for Iraqi Air Force,” AirForces 

Monthly, September 2007, 9; SSgt Trevor Tiernan, “Airmen Help Establish Iraqi Air 

Force,” Air Force Press News, 26 November 2007; and Lauren Frayer, “U.S. Opens 

Flight School to Help Iraqis Get Airborne Again,” Aim Points, 3 December 2007, 

http:www.aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=22755@printer=yes.

13. North, briefing, subject: Building Airpower Capacity.

14. Ibid., slide 16.

15. Gen James L. Jones, USMC, retired, chairman, Report of the Independent 

Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies; Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 6 

September 2007), 1.

16. General Jones entered the US Marine Corps in 1967. On 1 July 1999 he became 

the Corps’s 32nd commandant; in January 2003, General Jones was appointed commander of US European Command. After retiring from active duty in February 2007, 

he served the US secretary of state as special envoy for Middle East security. On 20 

January 2009 General Jones was appointed US national security advisor by newly inaugurated president Barack H. Obama. “James L. Jones,” Defense.gov, accessed 8 July 

2010, http://www.defense.gov/Bios/BiographyDetail.aspx?BiographyID=66. 

17. “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” 6 

September 2007, http://media.csis.org/isf.pdf.

18. Ibid., 74.

19. Ibid., 9.

20. Ibid., 15.
THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID │ 125

21. Ibid., 75.

22. Ibid., 15.

23. Ibid., 76.

24. Ibid., 15.

25. Ibid., 77.

26. Ibid.

27. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” DefenseLink, March 2008, http://

defenselink.mil/pubs/Pdfs/Master%20%20Mar08%20-%20final%signed.pdf.

Chapter 10

Conclusion

The commitment to assist the Iraqis in reconstituting their air 

force was made without visible, substantive USAF deliberation in 

January 2004; the handful of Airmen-advisors appointed to perform 

that task struggled on thereafter without meaningful support from 

the USAF’s senior leadership. It was not until five exceptionally dedicated Airmen—four Americans and an Iraqi—died in an aircraft accident in Diyala Province on 30 May 2005 that high-level attention 

was finally paid to the complex, expensive, and difficult task that the 

USAF had accepted almost absentmindedly 16 months earlier. Even 

with that high level of attention—and a considerable investment of 

money and effort—it still took the better part of another two years to 

begin to put matters right. That, in a nutshell, is the story of the USAF’s 

performance in its role as the IqAF’s chief advisor-instructor and 

supplier before the latter part of 2007.

Any number of explanations account for why events played out the 

way they did. The Iraq War was largely a ground war, and the principal 

decision makers in that theater were either senior Army officers or 

civilian officials working to support them. By their nature, neither 

group contained very many airpower advocates. Even MNSTC–I, the 

coalition arm nominally responsible for rebuilding the ISFs’ capabilities, 

was disinclined to commit resources for Iraqi aviation. One observer 

noted that “out of a list of 184 MNSTC–I funding priorities for the Iraqi 

military in 2006, the highest priority IqAF item was [ranked at] 171st.”1

Surely the Iraqis must also take responsibility for not fully appreciating the contributions that a properly manned and equipped air 

force could bring to their government’s COIN operations—at least, 

not until well after the need to undertake such operations had become apparent. The failure of the Iraqis to make an earlier, more 

effective effort to restore their air force is curious, given the many 

years of loyal service that the IqAF had previously provided to the 

state. But the most curious neglect of all is the failure of the USAF, the 

world’s greatest air force, to effectively tutor and support the fledgling 

IqAF until the former was shocked and embarrassed into doing so. 

Many observers have noted the USAF’s institutional reluctance to 

engage in COIN warfare and FID operations, and it is at least suggestive 
128 │CONCLUSION

of that reluctance that the USAF issued a formal statement of COIN 

doctrine only in the fall of 2007—some four years after the Iraqi insurgency had begun.2

To be sure, the USAF was not in a position of strong influence regarding the course of governance in Iraq under the CPA. Moreover, it faced 

an unusually complicated tangle of issues—political, financial, legal, institutional, and cultural—in dealing with the IqAF, the IqMoD, and the 

continually shifting roster of political appointees, operatives, and functionaries who controlled Iraq’s defense planning and finances. Those 

factors certainly played a role as well.

After the mishap of May 2005, the USAF chief of staff clearly recognized the need for a course correction, but it took time to determine precisely what that new heading should be. The actions of 2006 

were necessarily ad hoc and temporary. For example, the emergency 

employment of a one-time advisor training course allowed CAFTT 

to mount a “surge” of its own in Iraq that fall; still, no permanent 

arrangement was in place for satisfying future advisor manpower 

needs. Not until early 2007 did the integrated process teams assembled 

by Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force Bruce S. Lemkin and 

Headquarters Ninth Air Force begin to take full measure of the problem 

and generate fundable solutions.

The appointment in March 2007 of a CAFTT commander whose 

attention was not diverted by other responsibilities was also a clear 

turning point. The joint planning efforts of the summer of 2007 paralleled 

a series of tactical successes by the IqAF at a time when recruiting and 

retention had emerged as its most crucial problems. Those small but 

significant triumphs provided Iraqi airmen with a boost in morale and 

new volunteers at a time when both were greatly needed.

By the end of 2007, the progress made in Iraq by the USAF’s Airmenadvisors had become established and measurable, as the Jones Commission confirmed. Did challenges remain? Of course. Was the outcome 

certain? By no means. But both air forces were now firmly in the game, 

and both were playing to win.

Notes

1. David E. Thaler et al., Future U.S. Security Relationships with Iraq and Afghanistan: 

US Air Force Roles (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2008), 95.

2. Childress, “Performance in Irregular Conflict”; Corum and Johnson, Airpower 

in Small Wars; Beebe, “Air Force’s Missing Doctrine”; and Dean, Low-Intensity Conflict.
Abbreviations

AB air base

ACCE air component coordination element

AEAG air expeditionary advisory group

AEAS air expeditionary advisory squadron

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AFELM Air Force element

AFFTC Air Force flight test center

AFI Air Force instruction

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command

AFOATS Air Force Officer Accessions and Training Schools

AFSAC Air Forec Security Assistance Center

AFSATS Air Force security assistance training squadron

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSOS Air Force Special Operations School

AFTS Air Force training school

AMC Air Mobility Command

ANAAC Afghan National Army Air Corps

AOR area of responsibility

ARINC Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated

ASP aerial surveillance platform

AST advisory support team

ATO air tasking order

AU Air University

BIAP Baghdad International Airport

BMT basic military training

CAFTT Coalition Air Force Transition Team

CAOC combined air operations center

CATC Coalition Air Training Center

CAWG Comparative Aircraft Working Group

CBAT Common Battlefield Airmen Training
130 │ ABBREVIATIONS

CERAP combined en route radar approach

CFACC combined force air component commander

CG commanding general

CLS contractor logistics support

CMATT Coalition Military Assistance Training Team

COA course of action

COIN counterinsurgency

CONOPS concept of operations

CONUS continental United States

CoP community of practice 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CSAF chief of staff of the Air Force

CSAR combat search and rescue

CT counterterrorism

DOD Department of Defense

DoS Department of State

DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership

 and education, personnel, and facilities 

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

EAMS Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron

EAS Expeditionary Airlift Squadron

ENDP Exception to National Disclosure Policy

FBO federal business opportunity

FID foreign internal defense

FLIR forward-looking infrared

FMS foreign military sales

FOUO for official use only 

FTS flight training school 

FY fiscal year

GOI government of Iraq

GWOT global war on terrorism

IAC Iraqi armed caravan
ABBREVIATIONS │ 131

ICAA Iraqi civil aviation authority

IIG Iraqi interim government

IMA individual mobilization augmentee

IMAR Iraqi Military Academy at Camp Rustamiyah

IOC initial operational capability

IPT Integrated Product Team

IqAF Iraqi air force

IqMoD Iraqi Ministry of Defense

ISF Iraqi security forces

ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

LO&A letter of offer and acceptance

MAP military assistance program

MiTT military transition teams

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

NAMAB New al-Muthana Air Base

NAS national airspace system

NCO noncommissioned officer

NIA New Iraqi Army 

NIAAC New Iraqi Army Air Corps

NOFORN not releasable to foreign nationals

OAD Operational Aviation Detachment

OTS Officer Training School

RAF Royal Air Force

RAMCC regional air movement control center

RFF request for forces

RIqAF Royal Iraqi Air Force

RJAF Royal Jordanian Air Force

ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps

SAASS School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
132 │ ABBREVIATIONS

SAF/IA deputy undersecretary of the Air Force for international 

 affairs

SAR search and rescue

SIPT standing IPT

SOC statement of capability

SOS Special Operations Squadron

TBD to be determined

UAE United Arab Emirates

USAF US Air Force

USAFR US Air Force Reserve

USAFSOS USAF Special Operations School

USCENTAF US Central Command Air Forces

USCENTCOM US Central Command

U/SINFO unclassified/sensitive information

VIP very important persons

WMD weapons of mass destruction
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Cooper, Tom, David Nicolle, Lon Nordeen, Patricia Salti, and Martin 

Smisek. Arab MiGs. Vol. 4, Transition and War of Attrition, 1967–1973. 

Houston, TX: Harpia Publishing, 2013.

Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: 

Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists. Modern War Studies. Lawrence: 

University Press of Kansas, 2003.

Daley, Maj Patrick. “Exporting Airpower: The Challenges of Building 

Partner Nation Air Capacity for Irregular War.” Master’s thesis, 

SAASS: June 2008.
138 │ BIBLIOGRAPHY

Davidson, TSgt Brian. “New Iraqi Airmen Stage First Operational 

Airlift Mission.” Advisor 2, no. 29 (16 July 2005): 8.

Davies, Steve. F-15C/E Eagle Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing, 2004.

Davies, Steve, and Doug Dildy. F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing, 2006.

Dean, Lt Col David J. The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict. 

Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, October 1986.

Dean, TSgt Paul. “Iraqi Air Force Squadron Flies First Solo Mission.” 

Advisor 2, no. 51 (3 December 2005): 3.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). “Introduction to 

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Cooperation. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: DSCA, 2010. http://

www.disam.dsca.mil/Research!Presentations/2%20introsc.ppt.

Denehan, Maj William F. “Recommendations for Iraqi Air Force 

(IqAF) Rotary-Wing Aviation Program.” Report. Baghdad: 6th 

Special Operations Squadron, ca. June 2005.

Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” 

Report, 17 February 2006. http://www.defenselink.mil/home

/features/Iraq_Reports/docs/2006-02-Report.pdf.

———. “Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and Security in 

Iraq.” Report, July 2005. https://www.defenselink.mil/news

/Jul2005/d20050721secstab.pdf.

Deputy undersecretary of the Air Force for international affairs. “IQD-SAA.” LO&A, 30 November 2006.

Diaz, MC2 Elisandro. “Final Huey II Shipment Arrives at BIAP.” Advisor 4, no. 27 (4 August 2007): 9–10.

———. “Flight Surgeons Go Hi-Flying.” Advisor 4, no. 4 (27 January 

2007): 3 and 5.

———. “Helicopters Land in Baghdad.” Advisor 4, no. 18 (5 May 

2007): 3–4.

———. “Iraqi Air Force Celebrates 76 years.” Advisor 4, no. 17 (28 

April 2007): 4–5.

———. “Squadron 23 Takes to the Skies.” Advisor 4, no. 6 (10 February 

2008): 3 and 6.

Donnell-Ivy, Nancy P. “B7-D-SAR.” LO&A, 11 December 2007.

“DoD Bloggers Roundtable with Brigadier General Robert Allardice, 

Commanding General, Coalition Air Force Transition Team.” 

Transcript, 6 September 2007. http://www.defense.gov/home

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BIBLIOGRAPHY │ 139

Downs, Maj William Bryan. “Unconventional Airpower.” Air and 

Space Power Journal 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 20–25.

Dudgeon, AVM A. G., RAF. The War That Never Was. Shrewsbury, 

England: Airlife, 1991.

Eaton, Maj Gen Paul D. To Maj Gen HRH Faisel al-Hussein, RJAF/CC. 

Letter. Subject: Acknowledgement of Jordanian Offer, 5 May 2004.

Eckholm, Maj Leif. “Background Paper on Increased USAF Personnel 

Requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.” BBP, ca. 15 February 2007.

———. “Background Paper on Iraq/Afghanistan Pre-Deployment 

Training,” BBP, ca. 15 February 2007.

Eidsaune, Brig Gen David. Briefing. Subject: Iraqi Air Force Transition Team Concept of Operations, ca. June 2005.

Elliott, D. J. “Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle: November 2007 Update.” Long War Journal, 8 November 2007. http://longwarjournal

.org/archives/2007/11/iraqi_security _force_5.php#ixzz0e7duLOJG.

“English Language Training-Iraq.” Foundations 3, no. 1 (June 2007). 

[nb: Foundations is published by AETC/IA].

“Equipment, 2007 USAF Almanac.” Air Force Magazine 90, no. 5 

(May 2007): 63.

Fallesen, Maj Jeff, 9AF/DDS. To 9AF/A1 et al. E-mail. Subject: CENTAF 

Iraqi Air Force/ANAAC Development Integrated Product Team 

Kickoff Meeting, 4 May 2007.

Federation of American Scientists. “AN/AAR-47 Missile Approach 

Warning System,” 8 January 2000. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101

/sys/ac/equip/an-aar-47.htm.

“First Five Iraqi Huey IIs Delivered.” Air International, April 2007, 8.

Foley, Sgt David. “U.S. Air Force Trains Iraqi C-130 Pilots.” Advisor 2, 

no. 18 (30 April 2005): 6.

Fowler, SSgt Stacey. “CERAP: Making Safe, Expeditious Travel Possible 

for All over Skies of Iraq.” Krab Kronickle [Kirkuk AB] 4, no. 17 (14 

August 2006): 6–7.

Francillon, Rene. “Mirage at War: Iraqi and Kuwaiti Mirage F1s.” 

World Air Power Journal 4 (Winter 1990–91): 22–25.

Freedom of Information Act. Public Law 89-554. 80 Stat. 383. 

Amended 1996, 2002, 2007.

Frost, Christopher. “Taking Over the Skies.” Advisor 5, no. 1 (5 January 

2008): 9–10.

“Future Iraqi AF Development Plans.” AirForces Monthly, April 2007, 21.

Gaines, Mike, and Janice Lowe. “Cessna Cameravan.” Flight International, January 1989, 28–29.
140 │ BIBLIOGRAPHY

Garello, Giancarlo. “Italian Wings over Iraq (1937–1941).” Small Air 

Forces Observer 32, no. 4 (April 2009): 114–17.

———. “Italian Wings over Iraq (1937–1941).” Small Air Forces Observer

33, no. 1 (July 2009): 21–23.

George, Larry. “MNSTC-I Commander Nominated for Leavenworth 

Command.” Advisor 2, no. 31 (30 July 2005): 9.

Gillett, Brig Gen David, Air Combat Command (ACC)/A4. To Brig 

Gen Mark T. Matthews, ACC/A5 et al. E-mail. Subject: Coalition 

AF Transition Team (Iraq and Afghanistan), 10 January 2007.

Goyer, Norm. “AeroComp’s Climb to the Top.” Private Pilot Magazine, February 2001, 44–53. http://www.aerocompinc.com/press

/reviews/privatepilot/feb2001/index.htm.

Green, SFC Kimberly A. “Air Force Squadron 70 Seeks to Secure 

Iraq.” Advisor 4, no. 8 (24 February 2007): 5.

Grimes, Bill. The History of Big Safari. Richmond, BC: Archway Publishing, 30 January 2014.

Hallion, Richard. Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992.

Hallwood, RAF Grp Capt J. Q., CAFTT/DD. Memorandum. Subject: 

The IqAF Mi17 Procurement (Version 3), 15 March 2006.

Hardy, Lt Col Steven. “CAFTT Rotary Wing Support for Jet Ranger, 

Huey II, and Mi-17.” BBP, 1 February 2007.

Harrison, Christine. “AU Provides Curriculum, Manpower for Iraqi 

Officer Training.” Wright Stuff 2, no. 14 (20 July 2007). http://

www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/0214/ArticlesAUprovidescurriculum.html.

Haulman, Dr. Daniel L. “What Happened to the Iraqi Air Force?” Air 

Force Historical Research Agency, 3 November 2009. http://

www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/2010/0516/0516Articles

/Haulman30514.pdf.

Headquarters ACC. Special Order GB-82, 29 March 2007.

Headquarters Air Force Flight Test Center. “Limited Flight Evaluation 

of a Modified Iraqi Air Force Comp Air 7SL.” Test plan, April 2006.

Headquarters Air Force Officer Accession and Training Schools 

(AFOATS). “IqAF Officer Training School: IaAF Officer Training.” 

Report. Maxwell AFB, AL: AFOATS, January 2007.

Headquarters CAFTT. Briefing. Subject: Coalition Air Force Training 

Team (CAFTT) Organization Charts, 20 April 2006.

———. Coalition Air Force Transition Team.” Brochure, ca. September 

2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY │ 141

———. “Iraqi Air Force Training School, Concept of Operations 

(CONOPS) (Draft Version 2).” Report. Randolph AFB, TX: 

Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (AETC), 

10 November 2006.

———. “Iraq Air Force Training School Operational Requirements 

Document (Draft Version 1).” Report. Randolph AFB, TX: 

AETC, 30 October 2006.

Headquarters USCENTAF. Briefing. Subject: Coalition Air Training 

Center Concept, ca. January 2006.

———. Briefing. Subject: IqAF Advisory Support Team Assessment, 

3–19 October 2005.

———. “Comparative Aircraft Study for Iraq Air Force Counter Insurgency Operations.” Report. MacDill AFB, FL: HQ US Central 

Command, 10 December 2005. (Info extracted is not sensitive 

but unclassified [SBU]-NOFORN/FOUO.)

Headquarters IqAF. “Capability Requirement and Development 

Plan.” Report. Baghdad: HQ IqAF, 20 July 2005.

———. “Draft Service Plan.” Baghdad: HQ IqAF, 14 January 2006.

———. “Iraqi Air Force Capability Requirement and Development 

Plan.” Baghdad: HQ IqAF, 20 July 2005.

Headquarters Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Letter. Subject: A Contract 

of Supplying Sokol Helicopters, 23 December 2004.

Headquarters Ninth Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force. Special 

Order G-08-05, 8 November 2007.

Headquarters Ninth Air Force. Briefing. Subject: CENTAF Partner 

Nation Airpower Development Standing Integrated Product 

Team (Version 1.0), 7 May 2007. (Information extracted is not 

FOUO.)

Henry, Lt Col Jeffrey. “Building the New Iraqi Air Force: Mission 

Analysis Working Group Executive Summary.” Point paper, 1 

September 2005. (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

Hixon, Tommy. “Phase Two/Three Funding.” Briefing, 26 November 

2004.

Holley, Irving B. Ideas and Weapons. New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 1953.

Hoog, Brig Gen Stephen L., CAFTT/CC. Memorandum for record. 

Subject: ACCE/CAFTT, 5 July 2006.

“Huey II.” Advisor 4, no. 9 (3 March 2007): 11.

Hughan, TSgt Andrew. “Iraqi Air Force Provides Watchful Eyes for 

Elections.” Advisor 2, no. 5 (29 January 2005): 5.
142 │ BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hughes, Robin. “Air Corps Evolves from Jordan to Back Army in 

Iraq.” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 24 March 2004, 14–15.

“Iran Hoards Iraqi Aircraft.” Flight International, 24–30 April 1991, 9.

“Iraq Gains Operational Control of Its Air Force.” AirForces Monthly, 

November 2006, 22.

“Iraqi AF Seeks 32 More Huey IIs, Opens Flying Training School.” 

AirForces Monthly, November 2007, 7.

“Iraqi Air Force.” Accessed 17 April 2008. http://www.milavia.net

/airforces/iraq/IqAF.htm.

“Iraqi Air Force Development: Mission Analysis Working Group 

(Version 1.0).” Working Paper, n.d. (Info extracted is not FOUO.)

“Iraqi Air Force Gives Army a Lift.” Advisor 2, no. 36 (3 September 

2005): 9.

“Iraqi Air Force to Get Seabird Seekers.” AirForces Monthly, August 

2004, 19.

“Iraqi Children Get Medical Help.” Advisor 3, no. 9 (11 March 2006): 3. 

“Iraqi Helos Arrive.” Advisor 4, no. 1 (6 January 2007): 8.

“Iraq’s Future Officers.” Advisor 4, no. 4 (27 January 2007): 8.

“Iraq to Iran: Minders Keepers.” Time, 8 April 1991. http://www.time

.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,972677,00.html.

Jagger, RAF Grp Capt Neal. To Hon. Edward W. Gnehm, US Ambassador 

to Jordan. Letter. Subject: ARINC Support Request, 14 September 2004.

Jeffers, Capt Tim. “‘Hueys’ Touch Down at Taji Military Training 

Base.” Advisor 2, no. 6 (5 February 2005): 3.

———. “Iraqi Air Force Takes Off with Aircraft Delivery.” Advisor 2, 

no. 3 (15 January 2005): 3.

Jewell, Lorie. “Graduation Puts Iraqi Air Force Squadron into Operation.” Advisor 2, no. 16 (16 April 2005): 4.

———. “Iraqi Air Force Celebrates 74 Years.” Advisor 2, no. 17 (23 

April 2005): 6.

———. “Iraqi Pilots Fly Prime Minister,” Advisor 2, no. 7 (12 February 

2005): 6.

———. “Joint Operations Center to Track Iraqi Forces,” Advisor 2, no. 

18 (30 April 2005): 7.

———. “Pilots Hailed as Heroes Who Died for a Free Iraq.” Advisor 2, 

no. 23 (4 June 2005): 6–7.

Jones, Gen James L., USMC, retired, chairman. Report of the Independent 

Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq. Washington, DC: Center 
BIBLIOGRAPHY │ 143

for Strategic and International Studies; Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 6 September 2007.

Jones, Kathi R., 9AF/HO. Notes. Subject: Preconference Meeting, 9 

September 2005.

Jordan, SFC Ronda. “English Language Training Takes Flight.” Advisor 4, 

no. 15 (14 April 2007): 9.

———. “Iraqi Air Force Opens Training Center.” Advisor 4, no 15 (14 

April 2007): 6.

Koskinas, Maj Ioannis. “The Combat Aviation Advisory Mission in 

Iraq.” Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 107–8.

Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Larson, George C. “Iraq Air Force One.” Air & Space Magazine, July 

2006, 80.

Leaming, RAF Grp Capt M. W. Memorandum. Subject: Brief for 

BGen Eidsaune and BGen Peck for Meeting with Head IqAF on 

17 July 2005: IqAF—Unresolved Aircraft Issues, 15 July 2005.

———. Memorandum. Subject: [Iraqi] Air Force Command Agenda 

for the Next Three Months (June–September 2005), n.d.

———. Memorandum. Subject: Office Call—Kamal/Jumper—11 August 

2005, n.d.

———. To Brig Gen William E. Eidsaune. Memorandum. Subject: Record 

of Meeting between LTG Buchanan and MG Kamal—29 June 

2005, 29 June 2005.

Lee, Douglas E. “Stabilizing Critical Infrastructure Tour Lengths.” 

CADRE Quick-Look 04-10. Maxwell AFB, AL: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, 2004.

Lemkin, Bruce S., secretary of the Air Force (SAF)/IA. To chief of 

staff, US Air Force et al. “Increasing USAF Role in Building Iraq 

Air Force (IqAF) and Afghanistan National Army Air Corps 

(ANAAC).” Staff summary sheet, 20 February 2007.

Lemkin, Bruce S., and Col Sharon Holmes, SAF/IARM. Briefing. 

Subject: Building Air Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan: Integrated 

Product Team Final Report, ca. 9 March 2007.

———. Briefing. Subject: Building Air Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan: 

Integrated Product Team Interim Report, ca. 9 February 2007.

Letter of Agreement. Case IQ-D-QAC, 11 April 2005.

Lopez, SSgt C. Todd. “Five Brothers in Fight for Freedom Buried Together.” Advisor 2, no. 33 (13 August 2005): 3–4.
144 │ BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ludwig, CMSgt William A. “Operation Iraqi Freedom Trip Report, 3 

October 2005–19 October 2005.” Report, ca. 7 November 2005.

Lyles, Maj Gary. “Cessna Caravan Aircraft History with the Coalition 

Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT).” BBP, 3 February 2007.

———. “Comp Air Aircraft History with the Coalition Air Force 

Transition Team (CAFTT).” BBP, 3 February 2007.

———. “King Air Aircraft History with the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT).” BBP, 10 February 2007.

Lyman, Robert. Iraq 1941: The Battles for Basra, Habbaniya, Fallujah 

and Baghdad. Oxford, England: Osprey Press, 2006.

Lynn, Kevin. Briefing. Subject: IqAF Training School (IqAFTS) OTS 

and TOP-OFF Update, ca. January 2007.

Matishak, Martin. “U.S., Coalition Partners Work to Stand Up Iraqi 

Air Force.” Inside the Air Force, 29 July 2005, 3–4.

———. “What Should Fly in the Iraqi Air Force?” Inside the Air Force, 

24 June 2006. http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,102607,00

.html.

McCain, Col John M. “Genesis of the New Iraqi Air Force: Security 

Assistance in Action.” DISAM Journal, Fall 2005, 25–26. http://

www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Archives/Journal28-1.pdf. 

McCarthy, Maj Thomas D. “National Security for the 21st Century: 

The Air Force and Foreign Internal Defense.” Master’s thesis, 

SAASS, June 2004.

McCutchan, Brig Gen Clay. “CENTAF Comparative Aircraft Study 

[Version 4.0].” Report, ca. 10 December 2005. (Info extracted is 

not FOUO.)

McFeeters, Neal, Aeronautical Radio, Inc. To RAF Wing Cdr Stephen 

Shell, CMATT-A. Letter. Subject: The Way Ahead, 27 October 

2004.

McGee, 1st Lt Michael, 412 Training Wing/DR et al. To Col Mark A. 

Atkinson, AFMC/A4. Memorandum. Subject: AFFTC Statement 

of Capability (SOC) for the Iraqi Air Force Comp Air 7SL Project, 

Job Order Number (JON) A06CA700, 24 March 2006.

McKinney, 1st Lt Paul K. III, ACC/CCA. To Lt Col Robert C. Troisi, 

ACC/A3X et al. E-mail. Subject: PKG-DS700469: Increasing 

USAF Role in Building Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) and Afghanistan 

National Army Air Corps (ANAAC), 19 March 2007.

Message. 011822Z Feb 07. COMCENTAF. To Headquarters USAF et 

al. “CENTAF Air Advisory Division,” 1 February 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY │ 145

———. 131347Z JUL 06. Headquarters USCENTAF. To AFSOC/CC. 

“CENTAF Aviation Military Transition Team (MiTT) Academic 

Course Support Request,” 13 July 2006.

———. COMCENTAF. To Headquarters AF/AXO et al. “CENTAF 

Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) Site Assessment Support Request,” 23 September 2005.

———. Miller, Jay. Lockheed’s Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years. Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1993.

“Milestone Iraqi Air Force Flight Takes Off.” Advisor 2, no. 14 (2 April 

2005): 10.

“More on New Iraqi Air Force Surveillance Aircraft Plans.” AirForces 

Monthly, July 2004, 15.

Morse, Stan, ed. Gulf War Debrief. London: Aerospace Publishing, 1991.

National Security Presidential Directive 36. “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” 11 May 2004.

“New Iraqi Air Force Being Formed.” AirForces Monthly, June 2004, 16.

Newman, SSgt Lucia. “Iraqi Air Force Takes Over First-Line Maintenance.” Advisor 3, no. 37 (30 September 2006): 3 and 5.

———. “Keeping an Eye in the Sky during Ramadan.” Advisor 3, no. 

38 (7 October 2006): 4–5.

“News Briefs.” AirForces Monthly, November 2006, 22.

“News in Brief: Up to 28 Cessna 172s Ordered for Iraqi Air Force.” 

AirForces Monthly, September 2007, 9.

Nicolle, David, and Tom Cooper. Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 Units in 

Combat. Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing, 2004.

North, Lt Gen Gary. Briefing. Subject: Building Airpower Capacity in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, ca. 24 September 2007.

———. Briefing. Subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team: Building 

Airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan (Version 1.4), ca. 10 January 

2007. (Information extracted is not FOUO.)

———. Briefing. Subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team Update 

(Version 1.2), ca. 2 October 2006. (Information extracted is not 

FOUO.)

———. Briefing. Subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team Update 

(Version 2.1), ca. 2 October 2006. (Information extracted is not 

FOUO.)

“Operation Southern Watch.” Air Force Link, n.d. http://www.af.mil/

information/heritage/spotlight_print.asp?storyID=123112876.

Oswalt, Ron, AFSAT/DOM. To Ken Smith, AETC/IAO et al. E-mail. 

Subject: Re: Iraq C-130 Urgent Issue, 28 February 2007.
146 │ BIBLIOGRAPHY

Padilla, Brig Gen Frank. Briefing. Subject: Comp Air 7SL Decision 

Brief to Lt Gen Buchanan, 20 October 2005. (Info extracted is not 

FOUO.)

Pesapane, Maj John S. “Istikbarat: Rebuilding Intelligence Capabilities 

of the Iraqi Air Force.” Research report. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 

Command and Staff College, April 2007.

Phillips, Lt Col Herb. “Exercise Begins Iraqi Air Force Squadron’s 

Move.” Advisor 2, no. 45 (22 October 2005): 4.

———. “Exercises Test Air Force Squadron’s Independence.” Advisor

2, no. 51 (17 December 2005): 6.

———. “First Qualified Iraqi C-130 Aircrew Graduates.” Advisor 2, 

no. 30 (23 July 2005): 6.

———. “IAF Supports Combat Operations.” Advisor 2, no. 44 (15 October 

2005): 7.

———. “Iraqi Air Force Squadron Wraps Up Second Exercise.” Advisor

2, no. 49 (19 November 2005): 5.

Phillips, TSgt Melissa. “Airmen Teach C-130 Ops to Iraqis.” Advisor

2, no. 30 (23 July 2005): 7.

Pistone, JO2 John J. “Iraq Assumes Operational Control of Military.” 

Advisor 3, no. 34 (9 September 2006): 3. 

———. “Iraqi Air Force Opens First Air Base.” Advisor 3, no. 9 (11 

March 2006): 4.

———. “Iraqi Air Force Completes First ‘Validation Flight.’ ” Advisor 3, 

no. 2 (28 January 2006): 9. 

Pontes, William, Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Memorandum. Subject: Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) Information and 

Thoughts, ca. 13 February 2005.

Pugh, Donald R., director, Case Ops. Letter. Subject: United States of 

America Letter of Offer and Acceptance, [case] Y7-D-AAA, 13 

January 2005.

Putz, SrA Christie. “Air Force Helps Keep Country’s Lifelines Flowing.” 

Advisor 4, no. 22 (19 August 2007): 8 and 10.

Raaberg, Maj Gen-select Douglas L., ACC/A3. To ACC/CC et al. E-mail. 

Subject: PKG-DS700469: Increasing USAF Role in Building Iraqi 

Air Force (IqAF) and Afghanistan National Army Air Corps 

(ANAAC), 19 March 2007.

Raouf, Ayad, Iraqi Ministry of Defense. To Joint Headquarters. Letter. 

Subject: Subject/Aircraft C-130-B, 1 November 2004.
BIBLIOGRAPHY │ 147

Reardon, Mark, Army Center of Military History. To the author. E-mail. 

Subject: Historical Information on CMATT-A and the Activation of CAFTT, 22 January 2010.

“Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of 

Iraq,” 6 September 2007. http://media.csis.org/isf.pdf.

Rich, Ben R., and Leo Janos. Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My 

Years at Lockheed. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1994.

Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. 

New York: Penguin Press, 2006.

Sadik, Ahmad, and Tom Cooper. Iraqi Fighters, 1953–2003: Camouflage & Markings. Houston, TX: Harpia Publishing, 2008.

———. “The First Night: Iraqi Air Force in Combat—17 January 

1991.” International Air Power Review 26 (Winter 2009): 114–29.

Santos, Maj Jaime, CAOC Combat Plans Division, Guidance and Targeting [Team]/MAAP. Memorandum. Subject: Item of Interest, 31 

January 2005.

“Seabird Seeker Surveillance Aircraft Bids for Iraqi Order.” International 

Defense Review, 19 May 2004. Senate. Senate Democratic Policy 

Committee Hearing, “An Oversight Hearing on the Planning and 

Conduct of the War in Iraq,” Paul D. Eaton, Major General, US 

Army, Retired. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 25 September 2006. Http”//

dpc.senate.gov/hearings/hearing38/eaton.pdf.

Senna, Col Philip M., AETC/A3R. Briefing. Subject: IqAF Training 

School (IqAFTS) AETC Support Update, 22 November 2006.

———. To AETC/A2&3 and AETC/IA. Memorandum. Subject: Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) in-Country Visit, 22 

November 2006.

“6th Special Operations Squadron.” Fact sheet. Accessed 19 June 

2010. http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet_print 

.asp?fsID=3496&page=1.

Sommerkamp, Col Kathryn, CPA/JA. To Lt Col John E. Lindsey, 

CMATT/C-9. E-mail. Subject: Planes from Jordan, 25 February 

2004.

“Special Delivery.” Advisor 4, no. 8 (24 February 2007): 7.

Stucky, Lt Col Mark, USAF Test Pilot School (TPS)/ED. Briefing. 

Subject: Comp Air Briefing, 17 October 2005.

Stucky, Lt Col Mark, and Maj Vincent Sei. “Iraqi Test Acceleration—

the Saga of the Comp Air 7SLX.” Report. Edwards AFB, CA: 

USAF TPS, n.d.
148 │ BIBLIOGRAPHY

“T-6A Texan II.” Fact Sheet. Accessed 6 July 2010. http//www.af.mil

/information/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=124&page=1.

Taghvaee, Babak. “Race to Iran!” AirForces Monthly, June 2010, 44–47.

Thaler, David E., Theodore W. Karasik, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Jennifer D. 

L. Moroney, Frederic Wehrey, Obaid Younossi, Farhana Ali, and 

Robert A. Guffey. Future U.S. Security Relationships with Iraq and 

Afghanistan: US Air Force Roles. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corp., 2008.

Tinka, Marie E. “B7-D-QAH.” LO&A, 7 June 2007.

———. “IQ-D-QAA.” LO&A, 20 November 2006.

Untitled Note [Oil Pipeline Fire Reported]. Advisor 2, no. 12 (19 

March 2005): 10.

“US Air Force Starts Bidding for Iraqi Counter-Insurgency Aircraft Fleet.” 

Flight International, 4 May 2007. http://www.flightglobal.com/articles

/article.aspx?liArticleID=213671&PrinterFriendly=true.

US Army. Field Manual 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Graphics, 30 

September 1997.

US Central Command Air Force/DOOC. Briefing. Subject: Iraqi Air 

Force CONOPS Development Conference, ca. 9 September 2005.

Vick, Alan. Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: the Strategic 

Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions. Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2006.

Webster, Fred. “Limited Flight Evaluation of an Iraqi Air Force Modified 

Comp Air 7SLX (PRR-06-12).” Report. Edwards AFB, CA: USAF 

Flight Test Center, June 2006. (unclassified/sensitive information 

[U/SINFO], info extracted is not U/SINFO).

Weinberger, Sharon. “Helo Holdup: Problems Dog U.S. Decision to 

Buy Russian Helicopters for Iraq.” Defense Technology International, 

June 2009, 40 and 42.

Wertz, Lt Col James L. To Lt Col Mark P. Stuckey et al. E-mail. Subject: 

Re: Iraqi Test Accel Reports, 17 October 2005.

Westgate, Col Charles. “Chronology,” ca. August 2005.

Williams, Van. “Building the Iraqi Air Force: Learning from Tragedy.” 

Advisor 6, no. 7 (July 2009): 6.

Wilson, Patti, and George Cully. “USAF Action in the Aftermath of 

Hurricane Katrina.” Unpublished study. Washington, DC: Air 

Force History Support Office, May 2006.
BIBLIOGRAPHY │ 149

Wilson, SSgt Zachary. “Overcoming Language Barrier First Step for 

Iraq’s New Air Force Officers.” Advisor 4, no. 7 (17 February 

2007): 5 and 7.

Woodbury, SrA Mark. “Helicopter Pilot Is Role Model to Iraqi, Coalition Airmen.” Advisor 3, no. 7 (25 February 2006): 7.

———. “Helicopter Pilots Make Iraqi Air Force History.” Advisor 3, 

no. 2 (14 January 2006): 6.

———. “Iraq Air Force Completes First All-Iraqi Aircrew Mission.” 

Advisor 3, no. 5 (11 February 2006): 6.

Wright, Dr. Donald P., Col Timothy R. Reese, and the Contemporary 

Operations Study Team. On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign; 

The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 

2003–January 2005. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2008.

Zehner, Col Greg, CAFTT/A5. Briefing. Subject: Building a Credible 

Iraqi Air Force: A History, 25 August 2007.

Air Force Special Operations Command 

(AFSOC), 26, 42-43, 46-47, 53-54, 

61, 65-66, 71, 118

Airmen-advisor, 35, 81, 95-96, 98, 101, 

102, 110, 118, 127

Allardice, Gen Robert R., 103, 105, 

108-110, 118

Barzanjy, Gen Kamal, 12, 27, 29, 34, 

42, 43, 49-51, 60-61, 64, 73, 75-76, 

106-110, 119

Big Safari, 75, 76, 106

Bremer, Paul, 7, 11

Camp Rustamiyah, 89, 92, 93, 101

coalition, 3, 4, 7, 11-13, 18, 29-30, 49, 

51, 54, 66-68, 72-73, 78-79, 90, 100, 

103, 108, 117, 121-122, 127

Coalition Military Assistance Training 

Team (CMATT), 7-10, 35, 44, 52-54, 

60, 81

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 

4, 7-14, 16-17, 50, 53, 128

Comp Air, 15, 16, 30, 41, 43, 46-47, 50, 

53, 68-70, 73

concept of operations (CONOPS), 

50-53, 61, 64, 90, 100

counterinsurgency (COIN) 42, 49, 51, 

59, 61-62, 72, 78, 80-81, 86, 94-95, 

106, 109, 114, 118,-119,122-123, 

127-128, 130, 133

Eaton, Gen Paul D., 7-10

foreign internal defense (FID), 26, 42, 

99, 100, 118, 127

foreign military sales (FMS), 1, 25, 46, 

60, 66, 68, 74, 75, 77, 79, 97, 107

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 15, 18, 26, 30, 33, 

34, 41, 45, 49, 50, 53, 61-62, 64, 68, 

73-76, 78, 80-81, 93-95, 101, 103, 

105-106, 117, 119, 120, 123

Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) 3, 4, 7-8, 11-15, 

17, 25-36, 41-43, 45-47, 49-54, 59-64, 

66, 68-69, 71-74, 77-81, 89-91, 93, 

95, 102, 104-106, 108-110, 117-123, 

127-128

Iraqi Military Academy at Camp 

Rustamiyah (IMAR), 89-91, 94

Iraqi Ministry of Defense (IqMoD) 11, 

12, 46, 49, 54, 72-73, 128

JetRanger, 34, 60, 64

Jones Commission, 120-121, 128

Jordan, 9-12, 14, 16-18, 25, 27, 32-33, 60

King Airs, 75, 107

Kirkuk, 7, 15, 16, 29, 30, 32-33, 42, 44, 

45, 64-65, 68, 70, 72-75, 78-80, 90, 

94, 103, 105, 107, 119

military transition teams (MiTT), 52, 

63, 65, 66, 71, 72, 77, 80, 93, 103

Multi-National Security Transition 

Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I), 25, 

90, 122

New al-Muthana AB (NAMAB), 29, 

32, 59, 67, 68, 73, 78, 94, 101, 103, 

104, 107

New Iraqi Army, 7, 8, 11

New Iraqi Army Air Corps (NIAAC), 

8-10

Persian Gulf War, 3, 4, 31

Special Operations Squadron (SOS), 

23, 26, 27, 35, 42, 44, 45, 47, 65

US Central Command (USCENTCOM), 

7, 19, 22, 42, 43, 77, 83, 99, 102

US Central Command Air Force 

(USCENTAF), 26, 27, 30, 43, 46, 

49, 50, 52-54, 62, 64-66, 68, 71, 77, 

80, 96, 98-102, 108, 120

Index