No. 03-14-00473-CR 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF THE THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

____________________________________________ 

SHAWN MICHAEL WALKER, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF TEXAS 

____________________________________________ 

Appeal in Cause No. 72029 

in the 264th District Court of 

Bell County, Texas 

_____________________________________________ 

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT SHAWN MICHAEL WALKER 

_____________________________________________ 

 

JOHN A. KUCHERA 

 210 N. 6th St. 

 Waco, Texas 76701 

 (254) 754-3075 

 (254) 756-2193 (facsimile) 

 SBN 00792137 

 johnkuchera@210law.com 

 Attorney for Appellant 

ACCEPTED

03-14-00473-CR

4146323

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

2/13/2015 1:51:41 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 2/13/2015 1:51:41 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
ii 

Table of Contents 

 Page 

Table of Contents ii 

Table of Authorities iii-v 

Walker never said that the pink methamphetamine was his and that he 1-5 

believed it to be only “cut” 

To separately analyze each individual location where methamphetamine 5-7 

was found (to determine if an inference of possession is warranted) is not 

the same as addressing each “affirmative link” separately 

It is not within the province of the jury to determine whether inferences 8-19 

it makes are reasonable. And the inferences the State asks this Court 

to make are not reasonable because they are not supported by 

a “chain of factual evidentiary antecedents.” 

 (i) Rules for determining whether an inference is reasonable 9-11 

 (ii) Instructive cases – inference of possession was not reasonable 11-13 

 (iii) Instructive cases – inference of possession was reasonable 13-15 

 (iv) The State’s inferences are not reasonable 15-19 

Certificate of Service 19 

Certificate of Compliance 20 

 
iii 

Table of Authorities 

Page(s) 

Cases 

Brewer v. State, 

126 S.W.3d 295, 297 Tex.App. .......................................................................... 10 

Brown v. State, 

911 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ............................................................. 6 

County Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen, 

442 U.S. 140 (1979) .............................................................................................. 9 

Evans v. State, 

202 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ........................................... 5, 6, 7, 8, 14 

Evans v. State, 

98 So. 440 (Miss. 1924) ...................................................................................... 15 

Fisher v. State, 

121 S.W.3d 38 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. ref’d) ................................ 11 

Franco v. State, 

82 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref'd) ......................................... 10 

Grant v. State, 

989 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) .... 9, 14, 15, 17 

H & R Block E. Enterprises, Inc. v. Swenson, 

2008 WI App 3, 307 Wis. 2d 390, 745 N.W.2d 421 ............................................ 8 

Luke v. State, 

No. 14-99-01358, 2001 WL 82934 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (unpublished) ............................................................... 17, 18 

Mahaffey v. State, 

364 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ........................................................... 10 

Marquez v. State, 

921 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ........................................................... 10 
iv 

Moreno v. State, 

821 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.App.-Waco 1991, pet. ref'd) .............................................. 6 

Nguyen v. State, 

222 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd) ................ 11 

Paulman v. State, 

No. 2-07-291-CR, 2008 WL 4531707 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth Oct. 

9, 2008, pet. dism’d) (unpublished) ...................................................................... 6 

People v. Davis, 

663 N.E.2d 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) ..................................................................... 10 

Peters v. Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety, 

404 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ............................. 8 

State v. Guinn, 

242 S.W.3d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) ................................................................ 13

State v. McClain, 

968 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) ...................................................... 6, 12, 13 

State v. Moiser, 

738 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) .................................................................. 6 

Tot v. United States, 

319 U.S. 463 (1943) .............................................................................................. 9 

United States v. Hernandez-Beltran, 

867 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1989) ................................................................................ 6 

United States v. Longoria, 

569 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1978) .............................................................................. 18 

United States v. Stewart, 

145 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................ 4, 5 

United States v. Townsend, 

474 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1973) .................................................................... 9, 11, 12 

Young v. Wainwright, 

439 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1972) .............................................................................. 12 
v 

Other Authorities 

Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) .................................................................... 10 

New Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language (1971).................................. 10 

 

 
1 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS 

OF THE THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

_____________________________________________________________ 

SHAWN MICHAEL WALKER, 

 Appellant, 

v. No. 03-14-00473-CR 

STATE OF TEXAS 

____________________________________________________________ 

Appeal in Cause No. 72029 

in the 264th District Court of 

Bell County, Texas 

____________________________________________________________ 

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT SHAWN MICHAEL WALKER 

____________________________________________________________ 

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS: 

 NOW COMES SHAWN MICHAEL WALKER, Appellant, by and through 

undersigned counsel, and submits this reply brief pursuant to the provisions of the 

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant raised two issues in his principal 

brief. The State has filed its Brief. This Reply Brief is a response to several 

assertions made by the State regarding Walker’s first issue. Appellant otherwise 

rests on his principal brief.

 
2 

Regarding Walker’s first issue: Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain 

Walker’s possession with intent conviction as a principal. 

1. The State repeatedly states that there was evidence that Walker actually said that 

the pink methamphetamine was his but that he believed it to be only “cut”: 

The appellant stated that the pink substance was his, but insisted that it 

was not methamphetamine but only “cut”, apparently referring to 

MSM. (RR5 – 13, 21, 23). He identified the picture of that pink 

substance recovered from the van. (State’s Exhibit 10). (RR5 – 11). 

State’s Brief, pg. 7. 

[Appellant] admitted that [the pink methamphetamine] belonged to him 

but insisted that it was “cut” instead of methamphetamine itself. 

State’s Brief, pg. 14. 

Appellant . . . admitted ownership of the “pink” methamphetamine, 

while claiming that it was only “cut.” 

State’s Brief, pg. 15. 

The fact that [Appellant] admitted possession of what tested as more 

than 5 grams of methamphetamine while claiming that it was only a 

substance dealers used to dilute and add weight to the controlled 

substance surely supports an inference that he was aware of the 

contraband in the van and exercised care, custody, control, or 

management of it. 

State’s Brief, pgs. 15-16. 

Appellant admitted that the “pink” methamphetamine belonged to him, 

while denying its identity. 

State’s Brief, pg. 19. 

The Appellant claimed ownership of the “pink” methamphetamine 
3 

found near a major quantity, expressing the mistaken belief that it was 

only “cut.” There was nothing in the evidence to show why he would 

possess “cut” except as part of the distribution of the 

methamphetamine. 

State’s Brief, pg. 22. 

Appellant’s reply 

Walker never said the pink methamphetamine was his and he never said it was 

“cut.” Walker did not testify at trial. The State did introduce a videotaped interview 

of Walker - State’s Exhibit 24. It is worth noting that the State’s brief does not cite 

to the interview itself. This is because nowhere in that interview did Walker ever 

say the pink methamphetamine was his and nowhere in the interview did he ever say 

he thought it was cut.1 The State instead cites to the trial testimony of what others 

said about the interview: 

 Vol. 5, pg. 13: 

State: Now, the pink methamphetamine, the stuff that the defendant said was his 

and that you had the conversation with him about? 

Defense Counsel: Objection. Misstatement of the evidence. 

Here, the “testimony” is actually a question posed by the State to which Walker 

objected as being a misstatement of the evidence. 

 Vol. 5, pg. 21: 

 

1

 Walker did say at one point “I don’t know how she got it pink.” Ex. 24, 4:10:01. 
4 

State: In the interview, the defendant talks about MSM, correct? 

Detective Mallow: Yes, sir. 

 Vol. 5, pgs. 22-23: 

State: Now, in this case, in your interview, you talked to the defendant about the 

pink dope, correct? 

Detective Mallow: Yes, sir. 

State: And that’s what he was primarily focused on, on testing it and making 

sure that it is dope? 

Detective Mallow: Right. Because he told me it was MSM. 

But in the actual interview, Walker never says the words “cut” or MSM.” 

 “We have seen the tape.” This quote comes from United States v. Stewart, 

145 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 1998) wherein the Fifth Circuit reversed appellant’s aiding 

and abetting possession with intent to deliver cocaine conviction. Stewart was 

driving a vehicle (that belonged to the passenger) and was stopped for a traffic 

violation. Stewart hesitated when asked for consent to the search the vehicle but the 

passenger gave consent to search and two weapons were found. As officers were 

searching the passenger incident to arrest, they found 96 grams of crack cocaine in 

his underwear. Id. at 275. The government relied on the arresting officer’s 

testimony regarding Stewart’s conduct. The Fifth Circuit relied instead on the 

videotape of the incident:

[T]he government offers evidence from Garney [arresting officer] that 

Stewart appeared nervous during the traffic stop. Having reviewed the 
5 

videotape recording of the entire stop, we find no support for the 

proposition that Stewart was unusually nervous or fidgety. Stewart was 

no more nervous during the stop than any other citizen who has been 

stopped on the side of the road by a police officer and required to stand 

outside his vehicle for more than forty minutes. . . . The government 

contends that Stewart hesitated before giving consent to search the 

vehicle, and then shrugged non-committally. The government cites this 

conduct as evidence of guilty knowledge. We have seen the tape. Once 

again, there is nothing surprising about Stewart’s conduct. The car was 

not his. (emphasis added) 

Id. at 278. 

 Likewise in the instant case, this Court need not defer to the trial testimony of 

the State’s witnesses as to what said Walker supposedly said in the interview – this 

Court can simply listen to the interview to hear what he actually did say – and did 

not say.

>>>>>>> 

2. The State takes Walker to task for analyzing the “evidentiary links” separately 

instead of as a whole, citing Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006): 

The Appellant attempts to take these evidentiary links and separately 

consider them, arguing in essence that each link alone is insufficient to 

prove possession. That, however, is not the test, but rather the question 

is whether all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, when combined 

establishes a link with the contraband. 

State’s Brief, pg. 15. 

Appellant’s reply 
6 

 The State confuses multiple evidentiary links with multiple locations of a 

controlled substance. As Walker pointed out in his principal brief (pages 6-7), 

possession is “location specific”; i.e. when a controlled substance is found in 

multiple locations, each location must be analyzed separately to determine whether 

there is evidence tending to tie the defendant to that location. In support of this 

argument, Walker specifically cited as authority Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Moreno v. State, 821 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.App.-Waco 1991, 

pet. ref'd); United States v. Hernandez-Beltran, 867 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1989) and 

Paulman v. State, No. 2-07-291-CR, 2008 WL 4531707 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 

Oct. 9, 2008, pet. dism’d) (unpublished). The State’s brief makes to attempt to 

address these cases.2

 The State’s reliance on Evans v. State is inapposite. The 

controlled substance at issue in Evans (cocaine) was all found in one place – not in 

multiple locations: 

Immediately in front of appellant—within one foot of his arm—was a 

coffee table with numerous baggies of cocaine and pill bottles, also 

containing cocaine.

 

2

 Other instructive cases include State v. McClain, 968 S.W.2d 225, 226-227 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 

(finding that the defendant's possession of methamphetamine was insufficient evidence to connect 

him to bag containing items consistent with “meth lab equipment” that was found in a garage 

closet, despite the fact the defendant was at the garage and he told the police that he saw another 

person bring the bag into the garage and where the bag was located) and State v. Moiser, 738 

S.W.2d 549, 558–59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that despite the fact there was sufficient 

evidence to prove defendant possessed psilocybin mushrooms located in a box in the dining room, 

the state provided insufficient evidence that the defendant possessed marijuana located in various 

other locations in the house). 
7 

Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 160. 

 The State’s failure to recognize the need to consider the location of each of 

the items of methamphetamine on its own merits is evidenced by the fact that the 

State continues to treat all five items of methamphetamine as a single unit: 

When all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, is considered in the 

light most favorable to the verdict, the combined logical force of that 

evidence is sufficient for a rational jury to conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the Appellant possessed the methamphetamine

with the intent to deliver as charged in the indictment either 

individually, or as a party, or both. 

State’s Brief, pg. 10. 

While in this case it is reasonable that the quantity alone is sufficient to 

support a finding of intent to deliver, other circumstances include the 

presence of the material used to dilute or increase the weight of 

methamphetamine that is sold. The only logical inference from that is 

that the accompanying methamphetamine was intended for delivery as 

no mere user would dilute or increase the weight of his drug. 

State’s Brief, pg. 19. 

The Appellant and Tiffany Pierce were together in the van with a very 

large and valuable quantity of methamphetamine and the items used to 

process it for sale. They both had methamphetamine on their person. 

Clearly, . . . a rational jury could have found from the evidence and 

rational inferences based upon that evidence, beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the Appellant possessed the methamphetamine with intent to 

deliver either by his own conduct, [or] as a party with Tiffany Pierce[.] 

State’s Brief, pg. 23. 

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 

 
8 

3. The State appears to cite Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) 

for the proposition that the reasonableness of inferences made by jurors in support 

of the verdict is a question of fact, and therefore “cannot be erroneous:

Courts reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict 

must assume that jurors made all inferences in favor of their verdict so 

long as reasonable minds could disregard all other inferences. Where 

the parties may disagree about the logical inferences from undisputed 

facts, the choice made by the fact finder cannot be erroneous. 

State’s Brief, pg. 13. 

Appellant’s reply 

 The State cites Evans for a proposition for which it does not stand. The issue 

of whether or not an inference is reasonable is a question of law. H & R Block E. 

Enterprises, Inc. v. Swenson, 2008 WI App 3, 307 Wis. 2d 390, 398-99, 745 N.W.2d 

421, 425. What Evans says is that if there are multiple logical inferences that can 

be made from undisputed facts, and those inferences are in conflict, a jury can 

properly choose between the reasonable inferences:

Although the parties may disagree about the logical inferences that flow 

from undisputed facts, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the 

evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 

erroneous.”

Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162-63. It is not up to the jury to decide whether an inference 

is reasonable. That is a job for the Court. See Peters v. Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety, 
9 

404 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“Although it is 

certainly true that a fact-finder can draw reasonable inferences from the record, the 

types of inferences that DPS argues are not ‘inferences’ at all – just mere speculation 

and conjecture.”); Grant v. State, 989 S.W.2d 428, 434 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“[I]t is not a reasonable inference that another person placed a 

large and valuable amount of marijuana in appellant’s car. Such an alternative 

explanation for the presence of the marijuana is incredible.”); United States v. 

Townsend, 474 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1973) (“A jury may draw the reasonable

inferences which the evidence warrants.”). 

(i) Rules for determining whether an inference is reasonable 

 “It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of an 

element of the crime – that is an ‘ultimate’ or ‘elemental’ fact – from the existence 

of one of more ‘evidentiary’ or ‘basic’ facts.” County Court of Ulster County, N.Y. 

v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979). To do so is to make an inference. Id. However, 

for an inference to be reasonable there must be a rational connection between the 

facts proved and the fact inferred. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943). 

“A reasonable inference within the purview of the law must have a chain of factual 

evidentiary antecedents. If an alleged inference does not have a chain of factual 

antecedents, then within the purview of the law it is not a reasonable inference but 
10 

is instead mere speculation.” People v. Davis, 663 N.E.2d 39, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) 

“[W]ithout a single factual evidentiary antecedent to support it the State’s alleged 

inference that Davis had the opportunity to commit the homicide cannot bear water.” 

Id. at 45. 

 As Walker noted in his principal brief: 

“In the law of evidence, an inference . . . is a logical consequence flowing 

from a proven fact.” Brewer v. State, 126 S.W.3d 295, 297 Tex.App.—

Beaumont 2004, pet. ref’d). “Logic” is “the apparently unavoidable cause and 

effect relationship of events leading to a particular conclusion.” New 

Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language 562 (1971). “Logical 

relevancy” is defined thusly: 

Existence of such a relationship in logic between the fact of which 

evidence is offered and a fact in issue that the existence of the former 

renders probable or improbable the existence of the latter. Black's Law 

Dictionary 942 (6th ed. 1990). 

(Appellant’s Brief, pg. 15). Examples: Mahaffey v. State, 364 S.W.3d 908, 913 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“Here, the record reveals that the highway on which 

appellant was driving was comprised of ‘clearly marked lanes for vehicular travel’ 

and, therefore, was a ‘laned roadway’ as described in the definitions statute. . . . It 

logically follows that once the clear markings on that highway terminated, so, too, 

did the corresponding ‘lane.’”); Marquez v. State, 921 S.W.2d 217, 224 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1996) (Because a defendant has a right to a jury trial, it logically follows that 

he has the right to waive his right to a jury trial); Franco v. State, 82 S.W.3d 425, 

428 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref'd) (“If Franco was willing to take a breath 
11 

test after being told that he would lose his driver's license for ninety days if he 

refused, it logically follows that he would have been willing to take the test if he had 

also been told that a refusal would result in the additional loss of his commercial 

license for one year.”); Fisher v. State, 121 S.W.3d 38, 40-41 (Tex.App.—San 

Antonio 2003, pet. ref’d) (Given that it is improper for an expert witness to offer a 

direct opinion as to the truthfulness of another witness, “it logically follows that a 

lay witness is not permitted to offer an opinion that another witness is truthful.”); 

Nguyen v. State, 222 S.W.3d 537, 541 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. 

ref'd) (“If the defendant can waive his right to object that no PSI was prepared, it 

logically follows that a defendant can waive the right to complain about a part of the 

PSI being left out.”). 

(ii) Instructive cases – inference of possession was not reasonable 

 In United States v. Townsend, 474 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1973), wherein the 

defendant was convicted of theft of equipment from a military reservation (the 

federal offense charged required proof that the theft actually took place on a military 

reservation), the question addressed was “whether possession of the property off the 

military base can give rise to the inference that the property was received or 

concealed on the base.” Id. at 211. Under the evidence adduced, the Fifth Circuit 

answered the question in the negative: 
12 

There is an important difference between the inference from possession 

to theft and the inference from possession outside the jurisdiction of the 

United States to possession inside the jurisdiction of the United States. 

It comes down, not to a question of law as such, but to a question of 

geography. The difference is simply this, if possession would, as we 

have held, support the inference of theft it must support the inference 

of the location of the theft, because this theft could occur at only one 

single location. That is, the theft had to occur at the Officers' Club. On 

the other hand, the receiving and concealing of the stolen property

could have occurred for the first time at any number of locations which 

were not within the special jurisdiction of the United States. In fact, the 

only evidence on the question first places Appellant in possession of the 

stolen equipment at Lubbock, Texas-ten miles from the scene of the 

crime. (emphasis added) 

Id. at 214. The Fifth Circuit went on to contrast this set of facts from the facts in 

Young v. Wainwright, 439 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1972) wherein an inference of breaking 

and entering was reasonable based on possession of stolen property: 

[P]ossession of recently stolen property would support an inference of 

breaking and entering with intent to steal [where the] crime . . . could 

occur only in a single location, i. e., the location where the property was 

stolen during a burglary.

Townsend, 474 F.2d at 214. 

 In State v. McClain, 968 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), wherein the 

appellant was convicted of attempted to manufacture methamphetamine, the relevant 

facts were as follows. Appellant was detained in the service area of an auto repair 

garage. In the closet of the garage office, a blue bag containing items “consistent 

with meth lab equipment” were found. Appellant was searched and found to be in 

possession of a pouch containing powder that tested positive for methamphetamine. 
13 

When questioned, Appellant stated that the blue bag had been behind the garage 

when he got there and another individual brought it inside. Id. at 226. The State 

argued on appeal that the pouch with powder found on Appellant’s person “indicates 

that Appellant had a familiarity with methamphetamine.” The Court of Appeals 

disagreed: 

Although Appellant told [the officer] that the blue bag was behind he 

garage when “they” got there, nothing in the evidence indicates the bag 

was then unzipped. However, even if it was, there is no evidence that 

Appellant was close enough to the bag to see what was in it. 

Furthermore, even if he saw the contents, and even if he recognized 

them as items used to manufacture methamphetamine, such knowledge 

alone does not support a finding that Appellant had possession of the 

items. 

 

Id. at 227. 

In State v. Guinn, 242 S.W.3d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008), the evidence showed 

only that the defendant had walked out of a room in which there was 

methamphetamine on a scale. Id. at 483. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that 

it was not reasonable to infer that because he was walking out of the otherwise 

unoccupied room, he had been the person measuring the methamphetamine: “[T]he 

mere possibility that Guinn saw the methamphetamine on the scale and was the 

closest person to it when he was arrested” did not create a reasonable inference that 

he possessed it. Id. at 484. 

(iii) Instructive cases – inference of possession was reasonable 
14 

 Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006): 

The State argues that the single most important link or connection 

between appellant and the fourteen grams of cocaine rocks is the simple 

fact that he was sitting directly in front of them. They were within arm's 

reach; the coffee table was less than a foot away. This evidence 

constitutes two extremely strong “presence” and “proximity” links. 

Appellant was not merely present in a house with drugs cached away 

somewhere, they were right under his nose. The drugs were in plain 

view—a third link. He was alone in the house—a fourth link. He 

immediately admitted that he knew why the police had walked in the 

door—“Drugs.” That is a fifth link. He received mail at 923 Lombrano, 

thus raising a reasonable inference that he lived there, which, in turn, 

raises a reasonable inference that he had actual care, custody, and 

control of items found in plain view on the coffee table. This is a sixth 

link. He had $160 in twenties in his pocket, but he was apparently 

unemployed. This is a seventh, albeit weak, link. The State argues that 

the sum total of this circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a 

rational jury's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant 

exercised actual care, custody, control, or management of the fourteen 

grams of cocaine on the coffee table. We agree. (emphasis added) 

Id. at 163. 

 In Grant v. State, 989 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no 

pet.), the Fourteenth Court held that the jury could reasonably infer possession: 

[A]ppellant was the sole occupant and driver of the car; appellant had 

been driving the car for a couple of days as part of his job; the 

marijuana was under the driver's seat, and thus close to appellant; 

appellant had the only set of keys to the car; the closed bag containing 

the marijuana could be readily seen by anyone opening the rear 

passenger door and looking inside the car; the marijuana was wrapped 

securely enough that its odor did not spread throughout the car; and the 

drugs were not in a secret compartment of the car.
15 

Id. at 434; see also Evans v. State, 98 So. 440, 442 (Miss. 1924) (two buckets of 

whiskey, along with mash, found at recently operated still, and defendant coming 

and going therefrom allowed for reasonable inference that defendant manufactured 

or assisted in the manufacture of the two buckets of whiskey). 

(iv) The State’s inferences are not reasonable 

 The State says that all that can be inferred about Pierce’s relationship to the 

van is that she was driving the van: 

Ms. Pierce, who had no relationship to the van belonging to the 

Appellant’s girlfriend but was driving the van occupied by the 

Appellant[.] 

State’s Brief, pg. 23. The State is ignoring the additional facts that the van was full 

of women’s clothes (no mention of men’s clothes) and it “[a]ppeared like somebody 

might have been living in the vehicle.” 4 RR 49, 60, 68, 71. The large items of 

methamphetamine were found in a bag containing women’s clothing (“bag behind 

the driver’s seat” – 40.58 grams) and inside a laundry bag wrapped in a pair of 

women’s pants (“frisbee methamphetamine” – 56.92 grams). 4 RR 51-52, 58-60, 

88, 103. These facts would allow an inference of more than that Pierce was simply 

driving the van. They would also allow the reasonable inferences that she had been 
16 

living out of the van and that she had cached the large quantities of 

methamphetamine. 

 The State argues that because there was evidence that the van belonged to 

Walker’s girlfriend or wife, he therefore had the sole right to control the van. 

Appellant told both the arresting officer and the detective that the van 

belonged to his girlfriend or wife. He stated that Ms. Pierce was not 

the person in question and that the other two people in the van were 

recently arrived passengers. The jury could reasonably find from that 

Appellant had the right to control that van. . . . Someone had control 

over it or the right to control it. 

State’s Brief, pg. 16. 

No one else in the van had any right to control the van except the 

Appellant. 

State’s Brief, pg. 22. But does the “chain of factual evidentiary antecedents” allow 

one to reasonably infer this? When Walker was asked to consent to a search of the 

van, he said the van didn’t belong to him and thus he couldn’t give permission for a 

search. 4 RR 25-26. As noted above, it appeared that a woman had been living out 

of the van. And a woman was driving the van. While it cannot reasonably be 

inferred that Pierce owned the van, it can certainly be inferred that she did exercise 

some control over the van. Even if some control of the van by Walker can be 

inferred, he was not the only person who had control. However, the “ultimate” 

“elemental” facts that State had to prove were possession of methamphetamine with 

intent to distribute – not control of the vehicle. As noted above, given that the large 
17 

quantities of methamphetamine were cached with women’s clothing allows for the 

reasonable inference that Pierce possessed them – not Walker. Unlike the defendant 

in Grant, who had been driving the vehicle as the sole occupant for two days, there 

is no “factual evidentiary antecedent” in this case establishing (1) that Walker had 

been in the van for more than a short period of time, or (2) that he had ever been in 

the van as the sole occupant. 

 The State cites Luke v. State, No. 14-99-01358, 2001 WL 82934 (Tex.App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (unpublished) in support of its argument that 

Walker’s “close relationship” with the van’s owner somehow “linked” him to the 

methamphetamine found therein. State’s Brief, pg. 16. The State fails to point out 

the other “chain of factual evidentiary antecedents” present in Luke (wherein the 

defendant was essentially caught with a small bag of cocaine in his hand): 

Luke argues that his mere proximity to the crack cocaine is the only 

evidence linking him to the possession of it, and that such evidence is 

legally and factually insufficient to support this conviction. Luke, 

however, overlooks the fact that mere proximity is not the only 

evidence linking him to the possession of the substance. In fact, Luke 

exercised sole possession over the vehicle where the crack cocaine was 

found until just minutes before the traffic stop, not to mention the fact 

that he is “closely related” to the owner of the vehicle. At the time of 

the traffic stop, Luke sat in the passenger side of the vehicle, which is 

where Officer Johnson found the 5.5 gram crack cocaine cookie. 

Moreover, once the officers pulled over the vehicle, Johnson observed 

Luke making a furtive gesture in an apparent attempt to hide the crack 

cocaine. Johnson found the crack cocaine in the vehicle partly because 

of this furtive gesture and partly because when he looked in the car he 

saw a bit of a plastic bag and a corner of the cookie. (emphasis added)
18 

Luke, 2001 WL 82934, at *3. 

 The State also suggests that it is reasonable to infer that no mere user would 

be in possession of material (MSM) used to increase the weight of the 

methamphetamine: 

While in this case it is reasonable that the quantity alone is sufficient to 

support a finding of intent to deliver, other circumstances include the 

presence of the material used to dilute or increase the weight of 

methamphetamine that is sold. The only logical inference from that is 

that the accompanying methamphetamine was intended for delivery as 

no mere user would dilute or increase the weight of his drug.

State’s Brief, pg. 19. The State’s inference, as a general proposition, is certainly 

reasonable. But it begs the question – who possessed the MSM? Just as the 

defendant in McLain, there is no evidence that Walker ever saw the MSM, let alone 

possessed it. For the reasons set forth above, the reasonable inference is that Pierce 

possessed the MSM – not Walker. 

 That State also makes the gigantic (and unwarranted) leap of inferring that 

because Walker had a user amount of methamphetamine on his person, he was 

therefore also in possession of the large amounts found in the van: 

The Appellant and Tiffany Pierce were together in the van with a very 

large and valuable quantity of methamphetamine and the items used to 

process it for sale. They both had methamphetamine on their person. 

State’s Brief, pg. 23. Walker would ask this court to note United States v. Longoria, 

569 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1978), summarized in Appellant’s principal brief at pages 32-
19 

33, wherein the Fifth Circuit reversed appellant’s conviction, holding inter alia, that 

the fact that appellant had traces of marijuana in her pocket book did not establish 

knowledge of or an intent to distribute the 176 pounds of marijuana found in 

suitcases located in the trunk of the vehicle. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/ John A. Kuchera 

 John A. Kuchera 

 210 N. 6th St. 

 Waco, Texas 76701 

 (254) 754-3075 

 (254) 756-2193 (facsimile) 

 SBN 00792137 

 johnkuchera@210law.com 

 Attorney for Appellant 

Certificate of Service

 This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 

Appellant’s Reply Brief has this day been mailed to the office of Mr. Bob D. Odom, 

Assistant District Attorney, P.O. Box 540, Belton, Texas 76513. 

 SIGNED this 13th day of February, 2015. 

 /s/ John A. Kuchera 

 John A. Kuchera, 

 Attorney for Shawn Michael Walker 

 
20 

Certificate of Compliance with Rule 9.4 

1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i) 

because the brief contains 4,717 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by 

Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1). 

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) and 

the type style requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because the brief has been 

prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2013 in Times 

New Roman, size 14 font. 

 /s/ John A. Kuchera 

 John A. Kuchera, 

 Attorney for Shawn Michael Walker 

Dated: February 13, 2015