Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1709-CR-2092 | April 5, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Anthony C. Lawrence

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Gregory Rader,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 5, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A05-1709-CR-2092

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Thomas Newman, 

Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C03-1505-F5-735 & 48C03-

1603-F5-428

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1709-CR-2092 | April 5, 2018 Page 2 of 7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Plaintiff, Gregory Rader, appeals the trial court’s imposition of a 

sentence after being found ineligible to participate in Drug Court. 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Rader presents us with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the

trial court violated the plea agreement by imposing a sentence after Rader 

became ineligible to participate in Drug Court. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On May 18, 2015, the State filed an Information, charging Rader with a Level 5 

felony operating a vehicle after forfeited for life; a Class A misdemeanor 

operating a vehicle with a BAC over .15; and a Class C misdemeanor operating 

a vehicle while intoxicated under Cause Number 48C03-1505-F5-735 (F5-735). 

On December 21, 2015, Rader pled guilty as charged, but sentencing was 

stayed pending a referral to the Madison County Drug Court. At the time of 

the referral, Rader was serving a sentence on home detention out of Hamilton 

County. Under the terms of the plea agreement entered into in F5-735, he was 

to report to the Madison County Drug Court for evaluation after he completed

serving the Hamilton County sentence. Pursuant to the terms of the plea:

Sentencing shall be stayed and the Defendant referred to the 

Madison County Drug Court Program. If the Defendant 

successfully completes (graduates) Drug Court, the charges 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1709-CR-2092 | April 5, 2018 Page 3 of 7

herein shall be dismissed. If the Defendant fails to graduate from 

Drug Court for any reason, sentencing shall be open to the [c]ourt. 

The Defendant shall start Drug Court after serving his current 

home detention in Hamilton County. 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 38-39) (emphasis added). 

[5] On March 2, 2016, the State filed another Information, charging Rader with a 

Level 5 felony operating a vehicle after forfeited for life under Cause Number 

48C03-1603-F5-428 (F5-428). On August 24, 2016, Rader entered into the 

same plea agreement with the State to resolve the F5-428 case: he pled guilty as 

charged in exchange for a stayed sentenced and a referral to the Madison 

County Drug Court. Again, the agreement specified that “If the Defendant 

successfully completes (graduates) Drug Court, the charges herein shall be 

dismissed. If the Defendant fails to graduate from Drug Court for any reason, 

sentencing shall be open to the [c]ourt.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 83-84) 

(emphasis added). Rader was scheduled to complete his Hamilton County 

sentence in December 2016, at which point he was to report to the Drug Court.

[6] On December 22, 2016, the Drug Court notified the trial court that Rader was 

ineligible for participation in its program because he did not reside in the 

county. Rader refused to move to Madison County, informing the Drug Court 

that it would present an undue hardship on him. On January 30, 2017, the trial 

court conducted a sentencing hearing at which Rader failed to appear and a 

warrant was issued for his arrest. Rader remained at large for the next eight 

months.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1709-CR-2092 | April 5, 2018 Page 4 of 7

[7] During the sentencing hearing on August 14, 2017, Rader requested the trial 

court for another opportunity to participate in the Drug Court program. The 

trial court noted that it was “just totally unbelievable” that Rader had refused to 

comply with the eligibility requirements of the program, and that he “has been 

out running around for eight (8) months after thumbing his nose at the [c]ourt 

and his opportunity to do Drug Court.” (Transcript pp. 62-63). The trial court 

imposed an aggregate sentencing of six years in F5-735, and a six-year sentence 

in F5-428, with the sentences in the two causes to run consecutively.

[8] Rader now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[9] Rader contends that the trial court violated the plea agreement by imposing a 

sentence where the language of the plea agreement was ambiguous. Initially we 

note that Rader never asserted the ambiguity of the plea agreement’s terms as a 

basis for his request to give him a second opportunity to comply with the 

requirements of the Drug Court. “[A] trial court cannot be found to have erred 

as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity to consider.” 

Washington v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004). Therefore, as a general 

rule, a party may not present an argument or issue on appeal unless the party 

raised that argument or issue for the trial court. Id. In such circumstances the 

argument is waived. Id. 

[10] Waiver notwithstanding, we will address Rader’s argument on its merits. Our 

courts have long held that plea agreements are in the nature of contracts entered 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1709-CR-2092 | April 5, 2018 Page 5 of 7

into between the defendant and the State. Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 

2004). That is:

[a] plea agreement is contractual in nature, binding the 

defendant, the state, and the trial court. The prosecutor and the 

defendant are the contracting parties, and the trial court’s role 

with respect to their agreement is described by statute: if the 

court accepts the plea agreement, it shall be bound by its terms.

Id. As such, we will look to principles of contract law when construing plea 

agreements to determine what is reasonably due to the defendant. Id. The 

primary goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ intent. 

Valenzuela v. State, 898 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. 

When the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they are conclusive of 

that intent, and the court will not construe the contract or look to extrinsic 

evidence. Id. at 483. Rather, we will apply the contractual provisions. Id. 

Terms of a contract are not ambiguous merely because a controversy exists 

between the parties concerning the proper interpretation of terms. Id. Instead 

ambiguity will be found in a contract only if reasonable people would find the 

contract subject to more than one construction. Id. We construe any contract 

ambiguity against the party who drafted it, which, in the case of plea 

agreements, is the State. Id. 

[11] Rader’s plea agreement required him to enter the Madison County Drug Court 

program and, upon successful completion of the program, all charges in the 

plea agreement would be dismissed. However, if Rader failed “to graduate 

from Drug Court for any reason, sentencing shall be open to the court.” 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1709-CR-2092 | April 5, 2018 Page 6 of 7

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 38-39, 83-84) (emphasis added). Rader now 

posits that “[t]he plea agreement lacked precision and is silent as to what is to 

happen if Rader is not accepted into the program or deemed ineligible.” 

(Appellant’s Br. p. 13). Because of this perceived ambiguity and lack of 

specifics, Rader requests the parties to be returned “to their former positions 

and have an opportunity to negotiate a new plea agreement.” (Appellant’s Br. 

p. 14). We disagree.

[12] The plea agreement clearly states that if Rader fails to graduate from the Drug 

Court program for any reason, sentencing shall be open to the trial court. As 

such, acceptance into the program is a precondition to graduate. At this point, 

Rader’s failure to graduate is definite as he refused to relocate and thus he is no 

longer eligible to participate in the program. Under the terms of the plea 

agreement, the reason for Rader’s failure to graduate is immaterial as “any 

reason” is sufficient to trigger the trial court’s sentencing discretion. 

Furthermore, due to his refusal to relocate, Rader was the only one responsible 

for his failure to graduate from the program. Rader never presented any 

evidence that he misunderstood that his refusal to relocate would make him 

ineligible for participation in the Drug Court, had requested additional time to 

relocate, or presented circumstances outside of his control that prevented him 

from accepting the Drug Court’s eligibility requirements. Moreover, rather 

than presenting himself to the trial court upon his refusal to comport to the 

requirements of the Drug Court, Rader absconded and failed to appear for his 

sentencing hearing, spending the next eight months at large while the record 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1709-CR-2092 | April 5, 2018 Page 7 of 7

reflects that he was aware that a warrant had been issued for his arrest. Rader’s 

argument that “the [t]rial [c]ourt knew at the time of [p]lea [a]greement [] that 

Rader was living in another county” is unavailing as Rader himself negotiated 

the terms of the plea and the trial court merely accepted the bargain he struck 

with the State. (Appellant’s Br. p. 14). Equally without merit is Rader’s claim 

that he was not afforded due process “when facing termination of participation 

in a drug court program.” Gosha v. State, 931 N.E.2d 432, 434-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010). These rights apply when there has been a “violation of at least one of the 

conditions of the participation agreement.” See Ind. Code § 33-23-16-14.5. 

However, here, Rader, by his own refusal, never entered into a participation 

agreement with the Drug Court, let alone violated one of the conditions of the 

participation agreement. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court 

violated the terms of the plea agreement by sentencing Rader. 

CONCLUSION

[13] Based on the foregoing, we hold that trial court did not violate the terms of the 

plea agreement by imposing a sentence after Rader became ineligible for Drug 

Court.

[14] Affirmed.

[15] May, J. and Mathias, J. concur