UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM STAPLES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. CLAUDE CHESTER, Warden, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) HOLLINGSWORTH, Assistant Warden, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) LOFTNESS, Assistant Warden, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) SWANN, Health Administrator, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) DRENNAN, Health Administrator, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) MCCULLUM, Doctor, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) WEBER, Dentist, USP-Leavenworth; S. BOOTH, Counselor, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) WETLANDER, Supervisor, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) MILDNER, Unit Manager, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) RODRICK, Case Manager, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) MCKEE, Staff Member, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) HARRIS, Correctional Officer, USP-Leavenworth; (FNU) CARDINAL, Correctional Officer, USP-Leavenworth; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; (FNU) SPEARS Correctional Officer, USP-Leavenworth, Defendants-Appellees. No. 12-3093 (D.C. No. 5:08-CV-03233-SAC) (D. Kan.) FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 17, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before McKAY , BALDOCK , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.

William Staples brought this pro se prisone r suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq ., and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 1 He challenged the conditions of his confinement, including his diet and medical and dent al care, and also alleged claims for property loss, mail -handling irregularities, and medical malpractice. The district court dismissed most of the claims for failur e to exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissed or granted de fendants summary judgment on the rest. Staples appeals to this cour t for relief. We affirm. 2

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this pane l has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1 We afford Staples’ pro se ma terials a liberal construction. See United States v. Pinson , 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009).
2 Our jurisdiction derive s from 28 U.S.C. § 1291.- 3 - The parties are familiar w ith the facts, and we will not repeat them here. The district court dismis sed all of Staples’ Bivens claims and most of his FTCA claims because he failed to fully exha ust his administra tive remedies. See Porter v. Nussle , 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (requiring exhaustion of Bivens claims); McNeil v. United
States , 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (requiring exhaustion of FT CA claims). Of the remaining FTCA claims, the court dismisse d for lack of jurisd iction the claim for property losses because it fell under an ex emption of the FTCA for losses arising while in federal detention. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (providing an exemption to waiver for “[a]ny claim arising in respect of . . . the dete ntion of any . . . property by any . . . law enforcement officer”). It also granted summary judgment on the negligent mail-handling clai m because the prison mail pr ocedures were governed by and compliant with the policies esta blished by the Bureau of Prisons. See 28 C.F.R. § 540.18(a)-(b) (providing crite ria by which prison staff must open mail in presence of inmate). Additionally, the court entered summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim because, under Kansas law, the tr eatment of his chronic health problems revealed no breach of duty. Finally, it dismissed the claims brought against two dental professionals in their individual capacities, c oncluding they were immune from suit as public health service employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) (designating the remedy against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and § 2672 as the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by public health se rvice employees while acting within the scope of their duties).- 4 - “We review de novo the district c ourt’s finding of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” Jernigan v. Stuchell , 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). The dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo as well. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker , 353 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2004). So is the summary judgment, which “is proper if, vi ewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Peterson v. Martinez , 707 F.3d 1197, 1207 ( 10th Cir. 2013). We have reviewed the parties’ appellate materials, the reco rd on appeal, and the relevant legal authorities, and agree with the district court’s analysis. To the extent Staples suggests his failure to fu lly exhaust may be excused because he substantially complied with the exhaustion requirement, th e Supreme Court has made clear that proper exha ustion is required. See Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). Staples suggests hi s claim for property loss may be brought pursuant to the FTCA because prison staff are not “law enforcement officers” under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), but the Supreme Court has already rejected that argument. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 552 U.S. 214, 218 (2008). St aples’ other arguments are unavailing.
We affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons it articulated in the order dated March 23, 2012. Staples’ motion to file a late reply- 5 - brief is granted. He is reminded to con tinue making partial payments until his filing and docketing fees are paid in full.

Entered for the Court

Terrence L. O’Brien Circuit Judge