RESEARCH STUDIES SERIES

CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF LAND-BASED AERIAL FORCES

IN MARITIME OPERATIONS, 1939-1990

By

William S. Hanable

Air Force History & Museums Program

Washington, D.C. September 1998

iii

PREFACE

This is the fourth in a series of research studies—historical works that were not

published for various reasons. Yet, the material contained therein was deemed to be of

enduring value to Air Force members and scholars. These were minimally edited and printed

in a limited edition to reach a small audience that may find them useful. We invite readers

to provide feedback to the Air Force History and Museums Program.

The author, contract historian William S. Hanable, president of Research North, based

in Westport, Washington, completed the final draft manuscript two years ago, in December

1996. Through a series of case studies, spanning a period of more than fifty years, he

examines in detail the development and employment of land-based air power in maritime

operations. Although the emphasis is on World War II, modern examples of land-based air

power, through the end of the Cold War, are also examined.

His conclusions are that historically land-based air forces seldom received priority in

operations against maritime targets, nor—despite their demonstrated achievements in the

crucible of battle—have the land-based forces been "optimally organized, equipped, and

trained for air-sea warfare when hostilities began." Nonetheless, over the period covered in

this volume, land-based air power has clearly transformed the nature of naval warfare. The

influence of that change in the years ahead remains to be seen.

Jacob Neufeld, General Editor

August 1998

v

Table of Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Chapter I

Introduction .................................................... 1

Notes .................................................... 9

Chapter II

The Battle of the Atlantic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Organizing Land-based Aerial Forces for the Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

The Trans-Atlantic Sea Lane Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Combating Surface Raiders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Arctic Convoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Chapter III

Coastal and Mediterranean Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Coastal Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

The Battle of Dunkirk, May-June 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Coastal Campaign Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

The Mediterranean Maritime Air Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Chapter IV

The North Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Preparing for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Aleutian Invasion and Recapture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Attacking Northern Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Chapter V

Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

The Sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

The Southwest Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Chapter VI

The Falklands War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Great Britain Orders a Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

First Contest of Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Contesting the Invasion Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Terminal Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Chapter VII

The Tanker War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
vi

Chapter VIII

Cold War Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Soviet Land-Based Maritime Aerial Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

American Land-Based Maritime Aerial Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Chapter IX

Reflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Bibliographic Essay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Historians have written much about naval aviation in general and carrier aviation in

particular. But they have said relatively little about the role of land-based aerial forces

employed in maritime operations. Proponents of various air doctrines have acknowledged,

discussed, and even trumpeted that usage since Louis Blériot flew across the English

Channel in 1909. Long overdue for synthesis and historical analysis, it is the subject of this

book.

Many factors affected maritime applications of land-based aerial forces between the

first air war that began in 1914 and the world's last major conflict, the Gulf War, that ended

in 1991. They included inter-service rivalry, evolving doctrine, aircrew skills, available

aircraft and related technology, operational requirements, and the nature of targets. The

beliefs and concerns of strong personalities also played an important role. The case studies

in this book address each of these influences as they affected the employment of land-based

aircraft in maritime operations. Understanding them is important. Certainly, between 1918

and the present, as events unfolded the threat or application of land-based air power has to

some degree influenced nearly every naval plan and action.

Land-based aerial forces for the purpose of these case studies are defined as heavierthan-air and lighter-than-air craft operating from land bases. They include amphibian planes,

float planes, and flying boats (each sometimes called sea planes) operating from shore bases.

They do not include aircraft on wheels or skids launched from vessels, or sea planes operating

with tender support. In many of the case studies presented, however, land and sea-based

aerial forces cooperated and, in certain cases, it is not always possible to entirely segregate

one from the other.

These case studies also treat numerous issues common to the employment of landbased aerial forces in maritime operations. World War II campaigns include the Battle of the

Atlantic (1939-1943); European Coastal and Mediterranean Operations (1940-1943); North

Pacific Operations (1942-1945); and Southwest Pacific Operations (1941-1945). Post World

War II case studies presented include operations in the Falklands War (1982); the Iran-Iraq

War (1980-1988), and the Cold War (1947-1991).

The Battle of the Atlantic may be the most significant instance of land-based air power

applied to maritime operations. These aircraft became a vital element protecting convoys

between North America and Britain that ensured Britain continued in the war. Strictly

interpreted, Arctic convoys were not a part of the Battle of the Atlantic. I have included them

in this section because of the impact the Arctic convoys destined for the Soviet Union had on

resources allocated to the Battle of the Atlantic.

Allied and Axis air power disrupted Mediterranean naval operations and supply

convoys. It interdicted supply convoys and hampered operations of naval combatants. Axis

air power in Europe, which was entirely land-based, attacked Allied convoys in the

Mediterranean that supplied forces operating in North Africa and on Malta, and restricted

operations of Allied surface combatants during the first years of the war.

Application of land-based air power to North Pacific maritime operations was solely

an Allied activity. Although occurring in a near-forgotten and ultimately a strategically

unimportant theater, in this theater Allied army and navy land-based aircraft opposed an

invading fleet, interdicted supply convoys, threatened enemy naval combatant operations, and

struck at coastal shipping. These operations encountered many of the difficulties and
2

opportunities that occurred in more important theaters. They also highlighted the importance

of air power even in what has been described as the worst flying environment in the world.

World War II application of land-based air power in maritime operations in other

Pacific theaters ranged from the sinking of the Royal Navy's Prince of Wales and Repulse in

early December 1941 to the aerial mining of Japanese home waters in 1945. In the years

between 1941 and 1945, American and Japanese land-based aerial forces played important

roles in attacking naval combatants and merchant shipping. The need to protect or secure

bases for land-based air power also impelled several of the Pacific campaigns.

Post-World War II employment of aircraft operating from land bases in maritime

operations never again occurred on so large a scale as it did between 1939 and 1945. The only

possible exception was the Cold War, which became a near half-century-long worldwide

minuet between two superpowers. During that dance, American and Soviet air and naval

forces conducted training, reconnaissance, and “presence” missions that frequently exposed

aircrews to warlike conditions. While the Cold War continued, other nations applied landbased air power in several "hot" wars. These ranged from suppression of insurrections to fullblown conflicts that involved coalitions of nations.

These smaller hot wars again showed the effectiveness of land-based air forces in

interdicting water supply routes. The Falklands War of 1982 involved the first intensive use

of new technologies in employment of land-based aircraft in naval combat. The advances

included vertical take off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft, air and surfaced launched missiles,

and satellite reconnaissance.

Cold War dimensions of the use of land-based aerial forces in maritime operations

became worldwide as the Soviet Union developed a blue-water navy in the 1970s. Real-world

maritime electronic intelligence collection, reconnaissance and patrol, and simulated strikes

against naval forces became daily endeavors for land-based air forces of NATO and the Soviet

Union. Aerial refueling, pioneered prior to World War II, became an integral part of these

post-World War II air operations. So too did the use of air-based command and control. Large

land planes again proved to be effective over-water platforms for such functions. The

technological evolution and military effects of these activities significantly influenced events

in the Cold War.

Almost eighty years elapsed between this most recent instance of land-based aerial

forces affecting maritime operations and World War I (1914-1918), the world's first air war.

Fragile, guy-wired and fabric-covered aircraft developed quickly into more aerodynamic

instruments of destruction. Opposing aviators passed almost immediately from exchanging

rude gestures to exchanging machine gun bursts and to bombarding enemy forces ashore and

afloat. By the time the first air war ended, combat aircraft went to sea on and took off from

ships. Combat aircraft also took off from land bases for aerial reconnaissance of ocean waters,

searching for enemy ships and submarines, and for strikes against them when found.

Organizing for aerial warfare came quickly after Blériot's cross-channel flight and

spurred development of military and naval aviation organizations. In 1912, Britain

established the Naval Wing of the Royal Flying Corps. That same year France established

the Aviation Maritime and the German and United States navies purchased their first

aircraft. Italy in 1913 established the Aeronautica delia Regia Marina.1

When World War I began in the summer of 1914, the major belligerents possessed air
*

On the side of the Central Powers this included the Austro-Hungarian Empire and

Germany. On the side of the Triple Entente (later the Allies) this included Britain,

France, and Russia. Nations that would later join the conflict such as Turkey on the side

of the Central Powers and Italy, Japan, and the United States on the Allied side also

developed aerial forces.

3

arms.* Most people involved believed at the outset of the war that aerial forces would be

employed in land and naval combat in similar fashion. Aircraft would locate enemy forces and

direct the fire of army artillery and naval guns. "Spotting" for artillery and naval guns via

aircraft seemed very promising. So too did aerial strikes with bombs and torpedoes. Both

functions depended for success on improved communications and weapons technology.2

British, French, and German naval exercises in 1913 supported theories about

potential employment of aircraft in maritime operations. Observation aircraft could extend

a fleet's horizon from twelve to sixty miles. Tests indicated that aviators might be able to

locate submerged submarines and mines as well as surface ships. Wartime operations proved

that aviators could spot submerged submarines and mines at shallow depths only in

relatively calm and clear waters. War experience also showed that five miles was the average

distance at which aviators could see and identify a surfaced submarine. Lookouts on surfaced

submarines usually spotted aircraft before being seen.3

The potential of air power, even in 1914, raised issues that became significant in

determining the missions of aerial forces. Writing in that year, Rear Admiral Paul Behncke,

deputy chief of Germany's naval staff, urged that the German Navy's Zeppelins bomb London.

Like some strategic air power advocates to follow, he suggested that bombing civilian

population centers would spread panic and break the enemy's will to resist. Implicit in his

suggestion was a strategic bombardment mission that would compete with the mission that

employed land-based aerial forces in maritime operations.4

The competition for air resources between strategic and tactical missions became

obvious in 1918. By then, advances in technology had made long-range strategic bombing

missions feasible. When the British Admiralty developed a requirement for 1,180 aircraft for

antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in 1918, only 557 aircraft were made available, largely because

the Royal Air Force’s new Independent Air Force, assigned a long-range bombing mission,

claimed priority in aircraft allocation.5

Throughout the war, aircraft were employed effectively against submarines, in

reconnaissance, and in strikes against minor enemy naval forces and merchant shipping.

Aerial strikes against major combatants were limited and unsuccessful. Even the German

cruiser Goeben, grounded in the Dardanelles in January 1918, survived six days of air attack.

During that episode, British aircraft flew more than 200 sorties against the ship, dropped

fifteen tons of bombs, but struck the cruiser only twice. Those bombs that did hit the ship

caused only minor damage.6 Britain began using non-rigid lighter-than-air craft (blimps) for

antisubmarine patrols in 1915. In 1916, shore-based Austrian sea planes operating over the

clear waters of the Adriatic Sea bombed the French submarine Foucault. When the bombs

forced the submarine to the surface, its crew scuttled the boat.

In 1917, shore-based British flying boats began patrols over the North Sea. They

proved effective in forcing German U-boats en route to operational areas to stay submerged

and exhaust their batteries. By the last six months of the war (February-November 1918),

the Allies had an average of 310 (mostly British and American) aircraft available each day

for antisubmarine patrol in waters off the United Kingdom.
4

The Allies also used aircraft over American waters for antisubmarine work. When Uboats attacked coastal shipping off America's Atlantic coast in the spring of 1918, sea and air

ASW patrols began immediately. The air patrols claimed no U-boat sinkings, but on August

14, 1918, aircraft and sub chasers forced U117 to submerge before the U-boat could attack

a passing tanker.

The U-boats' vulnerability to air attack prevented most attempts to torpedo ships in

air-escorted convoys. During the last year of the war, U-boats made more and more attacks

at night when they were less likely to be spotted from the air. From May to July 1918, a

significant number of U-boat operations also moved farther away from land, where they

might be outside the range of aerial ASW escorts and patrols.7 During the year, German

submarines sank only two ships sailing in convoys escorted by both aircraft and surface

ships.8

Aircraft also proved effective in strikes on enemy light naval forces. One of the most

dramatic examples of air power as a new dimension of sea power occurred in the summer of

1917. On August 11, German sea planes flying from a naval air station on Borkum Island at

the mouth of the Elbe River put a flotilla of British coastal motor boats out of action. The sea

planes sank three of the six craft, which were en route to attack German minesweepers, and

badly damaged the remaining three. The surviving boats drifted or were towed into neutral

Dutch territory.9

By 1917 aircraft had also improved enough to deliver larger bombs and torpedoes.

German single-engine Gotha biplanes used torpedoes to sink several ships in the English

Channel that year. In the Mediterranean, an RAF Handley-Page twin-engine bomber sank

the Turkish destroyer Yadighair-I-Milet. This was the largest warship to be sunk by air

attack during World War I.10

These increasing uses of aerial forces in maritime operations led to over water air-toair combat. Armament, flying skill, and luck influenced the result of aerial combat between

sea planes, but the superior performance of land planes unencumbered by floats or pontoons

usually determined the outcome of aerial combat with land planes. Consequently, land planes

increasingly became involved in maritime operations, which aggravated competition between

army and navy air arms for scarce airframes and power plants.11

When World War I ended in November of 1918, air and sea power advocates knew

that aircraft had added a new dimension to naval warfare. They also knew that air power,

to be effective, had to be within range of enemy fleets. To that end, aircraft could be carried

on and launched from ships, or long-range land planes, lighter-than-air craft, or sea planes

could be based on land, at the ocean’s edge. All of these alternatives were realities by 1918.

During the next two decades military theorists argued about the relationship of air

power and sea power. Others disputed the merits of strategic versus tactical applications of

air power. Attempts to implement the emergent doctrines resulted in the acquisition and

allocation of various aircraft among military services. Doctrinal decisions and their outcomes

influenced the capability and readiness of land-based aerial forces for maritime operations

in another war.

Land-based aerial forces capable of maritime strike operations often became involved

in the tension between advocates of “air power” as a decisive force alone and vested tactical

air interests of ground and naval forces. Within the air power communities of nations such

as Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, decision makers most often gave maritime

operations low priority in comparison with strategic bombing.

Strategic air power advocates argued for procurement of large, long-range heavy

bombers, and that these aerial forces had to be concentrated to be effective. They further
5

claimed that concentrated, unescorted bombers could be effectively employed in destroying

an enemy's will and ability to make war. For most, this meant precision daylight bombing

of enemy production and utility centers rather than attacking enemy air, ground, and naval

forces. These arguments became particularly vocal among the military in Britain and the

United States.

National air forces evolved in differing fashions between World War I and World War

II, based on national threat assessments, economic capabilities, and military preferences.

Service doctrines took into account geographic position and perceived threats and national

capabilities. The development of these doctrines occurred as newly-formed air arms struggled

to establish their identities and missions in the face of opposition from tradition-bound

proponents of ground and sea forces. The air arms and independent air forces often defined

threats, capabilities, and doctrines in different ways. In all nations that developed significant

air forces between World War I and World War II, these struggles influenced the disposition

and capability of land-based aerial forces to participate in maritime operations. This was of

particular importance in Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States.

In Great Britain, the RAF embraced strategic bombardment, while its leaders

continued to argue with naval authorities over the ability of aircraft to destroy battleships.

Neither the RAF nor Royal Navy encouraged joint exercises or joint planning. Britain's First

Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff between 1933 and 1938 said of the air danger, immediately

after his appointment, "All rubbish. What we want are battleships."12

Despite parochial attitudes and the Royal Navy's confidence in its armor and

antiaircraft weapons, during the interwar years British admirals in the Mediterranean found

themselves worrying about Italian air attacks. When Britain and Italy clashed over the

latter's adventures in Abyssinia in 1935, Britain's Mediterranean fleet withdrew from the

island of Malta to Alexandria, Egypt. Intelligence reports warned that the Italians

contemplated attacking the British fleet in the western Mediterranean with aircraft based

in Italy and Libya.13

After the Abyssinian crisis faded, the Royal Navy again discounted the threat of land

or sea-based air power. Naval officials relied on thickened armor and new antiaircraft guns

for defense of their ships. Gunnery trials with eighty-mile-per-hour radio-controlled target

drones that took no evasive action convinced the Royal Navy’s leaders that they were

navigating on the right course. Few, if any, British naval officers carefully evaluated the role

or potential threat of land-based aircraft employed in maritime operations.14

At the same time, RAF leaders ashore gave maritime aerial operations little attention

or priority. In 1936, Group Captain Arthur Harris (later Air Chief Marshal and Commanderin-Chief, RAF Bomber Command) said that reconnaissance of enemy naval bases was the

only way to locate opposing naval forces. Flying aircraft over the sea was, he said, a waste

of time. Moreover, according to Harris, the Air Staff reserved the right to withdraw aircraft

from naval support at any time for the RAF's primary mission of strategic bombing.15

In the United States, post-World War I development of land-based aerial forces that

could engage in maritime operations became involved in a three-way struggle among

proponents of different approaches to organizing air arms. Participants in the debate included

air power advocates for either an independent air force, or an Army air force that controlled

all aviation, and those who did not advocate major organizational change. The latter did want

better allocation of resources to, and integration of, aerial forces into ground and naval

strategies and tactics.
**The Joint Board of Aeronautics was a subcommittee of the Army-Navy Joint Board.

6

In 1919, the Joint Board of Aeronautics** declared that Army aviation should support

all phases of ground warfare, while naval aviation should use carrier and land-based aircraft

to support all phases of a naval campaign. Land-based naval aviation, according to the board,

would be needed particularly for convoy escort, reconnaissance, and attacks on enemy naval

bases. Both Army and Navy aviation, the joint staff concluded, would need to cooperate in

coastal defense.16

Some air power advocates, most notably Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell,

opposed such a division of labor. They argued that air power, a new and important dimension

of warfare, all by itself would prove an effective substitute for sea power. Appointed to the

position of Assistant Chief of the Army Air Service after his return from France, Mitchell

became an outspoken air power advocate. He asserted in articles, books, and speeches that

air power could and should replace sea power as the principal means of defending the United

States.

In July 1921 Mitchell tested his theories in bombings of surrendered German

warships. Flying low, and after a number of bomb runs, Mitchell's bombers sank the

anchored destroyer G-102, cruiser Frankfurt, and battleship Ostfriesland. Navy officials

complained that Mitchell’s airplanes did not pause between bombing runs to allow damage

assessment. They also said that bombing tethered ships was hardly a realistic test. But the

sinkings, followed by similar results in bombings of the obsolete American battleships

Alabama, New Jersey, and Virginia in 1921 and 1923, provided support for Mitchell's

arguments. After the tests, Mitchell said that an air force could establish air superiority over

a fleet, neutralize its antiaircraft guns, and then sink combatants and auxiliary vessels. Air

power alone, he pronounced, could defeat any fleet threatening America.17 In the

United States, airmen advocated long-range bombers as the best means to destroy an enemy

fleet threatening American coasts. The Air Corps, they claimed, could replace the Navy as

America's first line of defense. The air doctrine taught at the Air Corps Tactical School in the

1930s acknowledged that:

Aviation alone cannot protect our merchant marine or our troop movements by sea,

but it can unaided accomplish the other functions of sea power -- defense of the nation

against waterborne invasion and reduction or elimination of enemy merchant

shipping.18

More traditional military and naval thinkers did not, of course, agree with so

optimistic an assessment. A “Joint Action of the Army and Navy” (the paperwork format for

inter-service agreements at the time) in 1934 defined the Air Corps role as that of an arm

of the Army. The Air Corps’ purpose was to support land operations and directly defend the

American coast. A 1931 agreement between General Douglas MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff,

and Admiral William V. Pratt, the Chief of Naval Operations, had limited the Army Air

Corps to operations no further than 100 miles from the coast. The Navy was to operate

aircraft from carriers and land bases for operations farther out to sea and to protect shipping

even within the 100-mile zone. After MacArthur and Pratt retired, the agreement was

abrogated in the mid-1930s. A situation followed in which the Army Air Corps had little

interest in using its land-based aircraft for any maritime operations and the Navy was

prohibited from operating land-based aircraft.19

Air Corps thinking diverged from published doctrine by the late 1930s. Air Corps

Tactical School training emphasized an air force's strategic role. The B-17, accepted for Air
7

Corps use in 1937, was justified and authorized for its role in coast defense. Tactical exercises

conducted with the Norden bombsight, adopted in 1933, suggested that high altitude bombing

could hit moving ships as well as stationary targets. Air Corps leaders, however, came to see

the B-17 and the Norden bombsight as the principal tools of daylight offensive strategic

bombardment. As a result, at the end of the inter-war period, the Army Air Corps had longrange aircraft capable of operating at great distances over the oceans but little interest in or

preparation for maritime operations.20

Germany, a continental power, emerged from World War I with no overseas colonies

and surrounded by potentially hostile nations. German air planners, hidden in the army staff,

faced defense challenges different from those of maritime nations. No oceans, or even narrow

seas such as the English Channel, protected most German borders from its likeliest

opponents, the other continental powers of Europe. German forces had to be prepared for

immediate land combat in the event of war. As a result, Germany gave priority to creating

a tactical air force ready for land warfare.21

German efforts to rebuild an air force became public only after 1933 when Adolf Hitler

became chancellor and head of the German armed forces. In 1935 published German doctrine

said that the Luftwaffe's tasks were air superiority, support of the army and navy, attacks

on enemy industry, and interdiction. At the same time, lectures at the German Air War

College at Gatow nearly all addressed strategic application of air power, while the German

aircraft industry proved slow to develop long-range heavy bombers. Nevertheless, by 1938 the

Luftwaffe had grown to a force of 15,000 officers and 370,000 enlisted personnel operating

a large number of fighters, dive bombers, and medium bombers.22

In the 1930s, air power doctrine also evolved in the island nation of Japan. By this

time the Japanese Navy had long since determined that the United States was its most likely

opponent. Because the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 limited Japan's tonnage in aircraft

carriers, the Japanese Navy turned to land-based aircraft for fleet protection and naval air

strikes. Admiral Issoruku Yamamoto, while chief of the Technical Bureau of Naval Aviation

in the 1930s, decided the Navy should develop long-range, land-based medium bombers.23

The Japanese naval air arm had reorganized in 1921 with the assistance of RAF

experts. The Japanese army air arm focused solely on tactical support of army ground forces.

The Japanese navy air arm focused on fleet support, coastal defense, convoy protection, and

sea and antisubmarine patrols. By the time Japan's carrier aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor

in December 1941, Japan had about 2,700 army and navy aircraft. About 3,500 pilots, 50

percent of whom had combat experience, flew army planes and 2,500 pilots, 10 percent of

whom had combat experience, flew navy planes.24

Japan trained only about 100 naval pilots each year in the 1930s. Their rigorous fiveyear training program included advanced study of flight and aircraft design as well as

extended flight training. Enlisted pilots arrived at their squadrons with as much as 100 hours

of solo time while officer pilots might have twice that number of hours.25

Pre-World War II Japanese naval strategy envisioned the Japanese fleet destroying

the American fleet in a single engagement, similar to Admiral Heikachiro Togo’s victory over

the Russian Fleet in 1904 at the Battle of Tsushima Strait. As the American fleet steamed

west, Japanese air, destroyer, and submarine attacks were to weaken their opponent’s

initially stronger navy. By the late 1930s, this "Zengen Sakusen" or slashing strategy

depended on carrier-launched air strikes and land-launched air strikes from bases in the

Mandate Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands.26

Commander Minoru Genda, an experienced Japanese naval aviator who would later

plan the Pearl Harbor attack, studied at the Japanese Naval War College in 1936. While
8

there, he wrote:

Naval power should be mainly divided into the surface force, the land-based

air force and the submarine force....Naval land-based air forces will be made up with

two and more land-based flotillas, which, in turn, will consist of two or three air

groups, and each air group will comprise thirty-six Type 96 land-based medium

bombers and the same number of carrier fighters.27

More traditional naval thinkers reacted in Japan to Genda's proposals as their

counterparts in Britain and the United States might have. They attacked his ideas and

questioned his mental competence. Japan, however, came to the end of the 1930s well

prepared to use land-based aircraft for naval purposes.28

When World War II began in September 1939, most belligerents that would use landbased aerial forces at sea found themselves ill-prepared. In Britain, the RAF reserved to itself

the use of land-based aircraft. But the RAF was unabashedly devoted to strategic bombing.

In Germany, the Luftwaffe reserved to itself all aircraft. Although doctrinally committed to

support naval operations, the Luftwaffe was ill-equipped for long-range over-water operations.

In Japan, the Army air arm was devoted exclusively to army support while the Navy air arm

was well equipped, organized, and trained for use of both carrier and land-based aircraft in

maritime operations. In the United States, the Army air arm was organized and equipped

to use its land-based aircraft in maritime operations, but had little inclination to do so. Fiat

limited the Navy air arm to operation of carrier aircraft and sea planes. The demands of war

would reveal flaws in all of these forces.
9

Endnotes to Chapter I

1. Lee Kennett, The First Air War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 188.

2. Ibid., pp. 189-90, p. 197.

3. Ibid., pp. 196-97.

4. Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe (Baltimore, Md.: Nautical & Aviation Press of America,

1985), p. 4.

5. Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1994), p. 425.

6. R. D. Laymen, Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influence (Annapolis,

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996), p. 58; Kennett, The First Air War, p. 191.

7. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I, p. 168, pp. 425-31.

8. Terry Hughes and John Costello, The Battle of the Atlantic (New York: The Dial Press,

1977), pp. 33-34.

9. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I, pp. 443-44.

10. Layman, Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influence, p. 210.

11. Kennett, The First Air War, p. 203-4.

12. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Liddell Hart Memoirs 1895-1938, Volume I (New York: G. P.

Putnam’s Sons, 1965), p. 325.

13. Ibid., p. 329-30.

14. Ibid., p. 331.

15. Murray, Luftwaffe, pp. 306-8.

16. Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowksi, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the

United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1984), p. 369.

17. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol.

I, Plans and Early Operations January 1939 to August 1942, 1948 (Washington, D.C.: Office

of Air Force History, reprint ed., 1975), p. 39.

18. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 51-52.

19. Ibid., pp. 67-69.

20. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States

of America, pp. 384-85.

21. Murray, Luftwaffe, p. 1.

22. Ibid., p. 7-12.

23. Len Deighton, Blood, Tears and Folly: an Objective Look at World War II (New York:

Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 524.

24. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I, Plans and Early

Operations January 1939 to August 1942, p. 77, p. 80.

25. Deighton, Blood, Tears and Folly: an Objective Look at World War II, p. 421.

26. Minoru Genda and Masataka Chihaya, "How the Japanese Task Force Idea Materialized,"

in The Pearl Harbor Papers, Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillion, eds.,

(Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1993), p. 3.

27. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

28. Ibid., p. 7.

11

CHAPTER II

THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

The Battle of the Atlantic, usually defined as the total fight for Atlantic sea lanes

between 1939 and 1945, stretched from the Antarctic to the Arctic Ocean, and from Europe's

western edge to America's eastern rim. Germany lost that battle. The Luftwaffe’s failure to

support the Kriegsmarine caused the defeat according to some participants and some

historians.1 As Admiral Karl Dönitz, Flag Officer, U–boats, wrote to Hitler when he withdrew

his submarines from the North Atlantic convoy routes at the end of 1943:

it is simply incomprehensible that the Germans fought the war at sea without air

reconnaissance or a naval air force, as if—in the 20th century, the century of

flight—aircraft did not exist.2

Dönitz underscored that point while reviewing the U–boat war for Germany's senior naval

commanders in June 1943. The crisis, he said, had occurred because Germany had built a

strong submarine force but not developed a matching maritime air capability. This

astounding conclusion came from a man who, as late as August 1942, proclaimed "The

U–boat has no more to fear from aircraft than a mole from a crow."3

Despite what Dönitz believed to be inadequate maritime air support, Germany came

close to winning the battle. Only a combination of increasingly strong Allied air and naval

forces, newly-developed superior technology and weapons, and the incomparable contribution

of signals intelligence overcame Nazi interdiction of Allied sea lines of communication. Fifty

years later analysts argued over the significance of land-based air power in the battle. This

chapter examines three phases of the Battle of the Atlantic: the contest for control of transAtlantic sea lanes, Allied air efforts to combat German surface raiders, and Arctic convoy

battles.

Organizing Land-Based Aerial Forces for the Battle

Each belligerent in the Battle of the Atlantic organized and engaged its land-based

aerial forces in maritime operations differently. In each case, inter-service struggles for

control of air power, rather than efficiency, governed the organizational schemes.

Command of the German aircraft used in reconnaissance and combat over the sea

reflected the outcome of several years' jockeying between the Luftwaffe and the

Kriegsmarine. Hermann Göring, Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), enjoyed Hitler's

personal confidence while Admiral Erich Raeder, Kreigsmarine C-in-C did not. This

preordained the outcome of the competition.

In January of 1939 Hitler created the position of "General of the Luftwaffe with the

Commander-in-Chief of the Kreigsmarine." This officer, reporting directly to the Commanderin-Chief of the Luftwaffe and the Commander-in-Chief of

the Kreigsmarine, was in wartime to control all air units assigned to the German Navy. After

Germany launched its attack on Poland in September, the Luftwaffe gradually reassigned

squadrons previously designated for sea combat to its own air fleets. In March of 1941 the

Luftwaffe general officer with Commander-in-Chief of the Kreigsmarine recommended

abolition of his own position as unnecessary. Despite this recommendation, the position
12

existed until March 1944, collecting information on maritime-related air operations, because

Raeder hoped in vain to regain some control over maritime air formations.

Göring exercised control over flying units engaged in maritime operations by

establishing "fleigerführers" responsible for them. These officers, assigned geographic areas

of responsibility, reported to general officers commanding air fleets and deployed aircraft

engaged in reconnaissance and combat over the sea. Lt. Col. Martin Harlinghausen became

Fliegerfürher Atlantik. He reported to the general commanding Luftflotte 3. His command

included two bomber Gruppen and one bomber Staffel flying two and four-engine land-based

bombers supplemented by a coastal air Gruppe (Küstenfliegergruppen) flying float plane

fighter-bombers and flying boats. Fliegerfürher Nord reported to the commander of Luftflotte

5 and directed German air operations over Arctic waters. Other Luftwaffe commands had

responsibility for air operations over the North Sea, the approaches to the Baltic Sea, and

waters immediately adjacent to German and German-occupied territory in Western Europe.4

British organization for maritime air operations also reflected the outcome of interservice rivalries. By the time the Battle of the Atlantic began, the Royal Air Force (RAF) had

firmly established its responsibility for all land-based aerial forces. The RAF’s Coastal

Command operated all aircraft engaged in maritime patrol and convoy escort. This command

also had the principal role in anti-shipping strikes and offensive operations against U–boats

although Bomber Command and Fighter Command sometimes participated in these activities.

The Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm (FAA) operated only carrier and ship-based aircraft. In

practice, however, some of these would go into combat from land bases rather than from

afloat platforms.

Coastal Command was ill-prepared in 1939 to fight U–boats. Asdic (sonar) equipped

surface ships, the Royal Navy believed, could deal with the submarine threat. As a result,

Coastal Command's aircrews trained primarily for reconnaissance and strikes against surface

ships.5 The command included ten general reconnaissance squadrons equipped with shortrange twin-engine Ansons; one general reconnaissance squadron equipped with Hudsons,

which were military conversions of Lockheed’s Super Electra airliners, but able to carry more

bombs and machine guns that the Ansons; one attack squadron operating Vildebeest torpedo

bomber biplanes, and four long-range flying boat squadrons. Two of the latter flew obsolete

twin-engine Londons and Straners and two flew four-engine Sunderlands.6

The RAF took until January 1940 to equip Coastal Command aircraft with radar.

Twelve of the primitive ASV (Air-Surface Vessel) I devices then available went into the

command's Hudsons. Pilots had to fly at 200 feet to avoid backscatter clutter on the ASV I

receivers. At that altitude, the small sets could locate surfaced submarines at a maximum

distance of two and one-half to three miles under optimum conditions. Bigger radars later

installed in the large Sunderlands could detect U–boats on the surface at a distance of about

twenty-five miles. Better radars still required good operators and good maintenance to work

well. A review of seventy-seven U–boat sightings made between August and September of

1941 showed only fifteen achieved by radar. Analysts attributed this dismal record to poor

equipment, poor servicing, and poorly trained operators. Despite accounting for only 20

percent of the sightings analyzed in the review, radar was very important. Only with it could

aircraft counter U–boats' preferred method of night surface attacks.7

German submarines, even when located by RAF aircraft in the first months of the

war, had little to fear from the air. The twin-engine Ansons could carry only four 100-pound

bombs. When a No. 233 Squadron Anson made the first Coastal Command attack on a

submarine off the coast of Scotland on September 5, 1939, its fuzed bombs bounced off the

water, exploded in midair, and brought down the airplane. They did not damage the
13

submarine, which turned out to be a Royal Navy boat.8 In the following year aircraft help to

destroy only four of twenty-nine U–boats sunk. Of these four, U31 fell victim solely to a

Bomber Command twin-engine Blenheim off Germany’s coast on March 11, 1940, and three

others to Royal Navy ships and Royal Air Force planes working in concert.9

A year after the war began, in September 1940, Coastal Command's original fifteen

squadrons had more than doubled to thirty-one. These included more Hudsons plus twinengine Whitley and Wellington bombers. By this time 450-pound naval depth charges had

been modified so that they could be dropped from aircraft. They proved more effective

antisubmarine weapons conventional bombs. But it was not until well into 1941 that the

command received its first long-range Catalina twin-engine flying boats and four-engine

Liberator bombers. By then both the Allies and Axis had conducted combined air, sea, and

ground operations to capture Norway. That campaign demonstrated the powerful influence

land-based air power could exercise on amphibious operations. Its outcome also significantly

affected the later use of land-based aerial forces in the Atlantic theater.

The Trans-Atlantic Sea Lane Campaign

The contest for trans-Atlantic sea lanes began immediately in September 1939. Allied

and Axis forces regarded enemy warships and merchant ships as legitimate targets. Both

sides initially restricted attacks on neutral ships even though suspected of carrying goods for

one of the warring parties. Belligerent nation ships caught at sea or in foreign ports when

war broke out were at greater risk from surface raiders or submarines. Aerial forces, whether

sea or land-based, were heavily engaged closer to the European continent. They only

gradually became involved in the battle for control of transoceanic sea lanes.

Britain dispatched its first convoys from the English Channel to Gibraltar on

September 7, 1939. Trans-Atlantic convoys began with sailings from Kingston, Jamaica, and

Halifax, Nova Scotia, to the United Kingdom between September 15-23. Coastal Command

aircraft escorted westbound convoys to the limits of their range when possible. Poor training

and poor equipment led to ludicrous reports. One aircraft reported a convoy in the middle of

Paris' Place de la Concorde. Other planes dutifully reported a convoy's progress westward for

two days before its ships were discovered still at anchor off Liverpool.10

Sunderland "Y" of No. 228 Squadron was probably the first RAF land-based aircraft

to participate in sinking a U–boat during World War II's fight for Atlantic sea lanes. On

January 30, 1940, depth charges from the Royal Navy sloop Fowey damaged U55 after the

submarine attacked Convoy OA.80G. When the flying boat brought up two destroyers to

finish off a surfaced U55, the U–boat’s crew scuttled their craft.11

Once Germany was victorious in Norway and France, both Axis and Allied air forces

devoted more attention to the trans-Atlantic battle. On July 1, 1940, a Royal Australian Air

Force (RAAF) No. 10 Squadron Sunderland, based near Plymouth in southwest England,

cooperated with a Royal Navy corvette to sink U26 in the North Atlantic. About 6:00 a.m.,

the flying boat and the cruiser Rochester almost simultaneously discovered the surfaced

submarine, which had been damaged by depth charges while attacking a convoy on the night

of June 30-July 1. A salvo of four 250-pound bombs from the Sunderland dropped just ahead

of U26. The German boat tried to submerge, failed, and lurched to the surface as four more

bombs fell forty yards away. By this time the Rochester had closed to a thousand yards and

opened fire with its deck guns while the U–boat commander was ordering his crew to scuttle

U26 and abandon ship. No. 10 Squadron and the corvette Gladiolus, which had depthcharged U–26 during the night shared credit for the kill.12
14

Coastal Command Fairey Battles began operating from an air base in Iceland on

August 27, 1940. In the Central Atlantic, a No. 202 Squadron London flying boat damaged

the Italian submarine Bianchi. In addition to new bases, better RAF antisubmarine

equipment appeared. By the fall of 1940, most Coastal Command aircraft had Mark II ASV

radar installed. Experiments also began with the use of aircraft-mounted searchlights. The

RAF called Leigh Lights after their inventor, Squadron-Leader H. de V. Leigh. The lights

proved invaluable during night attacks on surfaced U–boats, but only five experimentallyequipped Leigh Light aircraft were available as late as May 1942.

Captain Bernhard Jope of I/KG 40 struck the Luftwaffe's first significant early blow

in the transoceanic battle on October 26, 1940. Flying a I/KG 40 Fw 200 on patrol from

Bordeaux, France to Stavanger, Norway, Jope sighted the 42,348-ton Empress of Britain

seventy miles north of Ireland's Bay of Donegal. Jope's bombs set the liner, which was

carrying servicemen and their families home, on fire. U32 then torpedoed the ship. Another

British passenger ship, the Windsor Castle, suffered severe damage when bombed by a I/KG

40 plane west of Ireland nine days later.

Between November 7 and 30 Convoy HX.84 became the focus both for Luftwaffe

attacks and RAF defense. A II/KG 40 Fw 200 bombing set afire one of the convoy's ships, the

2,734-ton Swedish freighter Vingaland on November 7. The following day the Italian

submarine Marconi torpedoed the burning freighter. On November 18, an RAF Sunderland

employed ASV radar to locate either U47 or U100 when they approached the convoy. This

marked the first time in actual operations that the ASV radar located a submarine.

Both sides reaffirmed their recognition of the importance of the air-sea battle for

control of the Atlantic as 1941 began. Germany and Britain reorganized and reallocated

forces early in the year.

Winston Churchill labeled the struggle for control of the Atlantic "The Battle of the

Atlantic" on March 6, 1941. During 1940, Allied shipping losses in the North Atlantic had

totaled nearly 1.8 million tons. U–boats accounted for the bulk of these sinkings. Churchill

formed a Battle of the Atlantic Committee to coordinate all aspects of British efforts in the

contest. Coastal Command headquarters moved from Plymouth to Liverpool. The British

Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Admiralty should exercise operational control of Coastal

Command. Churchill directed the reallocation of squadrons of Whitleys and Wellingtons from

Bomber Command to Coastal Command. Coastal Command also gained priority for

installation of ASV radars. A joint RAF-Royal Navy committee decided with difficulty that

Coastal Command would have first choice in delivery of new long-range B–24s being

produced in American factories.13

The decision in favor of Coastal Command generated strong protests from senior Royal

Air Force officers. Their complaints highlighted contrasting views of air and naval leaders

that continued throughout the war in British and American councils. Air force authorities

defined success in the fight against submarines in terms of boats sunk. Naval authorities

defined that success in terms of convoys safely escorted. Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Harris

of Bomber Command argued particularly vehemently. He complained that over a six-month

period one squadron had flown 144 sorties. During them, the squadron's aircraft had sighted

only six submarines, attacked only four, and sunk only one. He emphatically rejected the safe

arrival of ships as a measure of the effectiveness of aerial ocean patrols and convoy escort.14

Germany reorganized its aerial and naval forces for the Battle of the Atlantic about

the same time England did. On January 7, 1941, the Flag Officer, U–Boats, assumed

operational command of I/KG 40 with its Fw 200 Condor long-range reconnaissance aircraft.

These were conversions of four-engine airliners that were capable of trans-Atlantic flights.
15

In addition to flying in reconnaissance roles, the planes could also be used as horizontal

bombers with up to 4,000-pounds of bombs stored in gondolas under their fuselages and in

wing racks. German Navy operational control of the Fw 200s permitted better control of joint

U–boat and Fw 200 operations. It solved coordination problems such as the ones that

occurred because Luftwaffe map grids did not correspond to those used by the Kreigsmarine.

Dönitz regarded aircraft as an essential complement to the U–boat weapon. Enemy ships had

to be located before they could be destroyed. Their low silhouette made submarines the worst

possible point from which to locate other ships. Aircraft, he said, were far superior to any sort

of ship for this purpose.

Under naval operational control, I/KG 40 aircraft stationed in France shuttled between

Bordeaux and Stavanger, Norway on regular maritime patrols. The Fw 200s located and

trailed Allied convoys while the U–boat commander positioned his submarines to intercept

them. Concurrently the Fw 200s bombed the convoys to sink or damage ships, distract convoy

escorts, and otherwise slow down the convoys, which took evasive action. The Condors also

reported data critical to weather forecasts. U–boats sighting convoys in turn directed Fw 200s

to them.

An Fw 200 reconnoitering the North Atlantic on January 8, 1941 sighted and sank one

Allied merchant vessel. Three days later another Fw 200 located a convoy en route to

Gibraltar. This enabled a U–boat to destroy one of the convoy's ships. On January 16 an Fw

200 sighted and bombed an outbound North Atlantic convoy, sinking two ships. Between

January 21 and 23, Fw 200s sank more Allied seven ships. On January 28 after aerial

reconnaissance located outbound convoy SC.19, five Fw 200s attacked. Each aircraft damaged

or sank two ships while U–boats brought to the scene sank two additional ships.

Flying over the North Atlantic to attack convoys, I/KG 40 Fw 200s destroyed fifteen

ships, damaged two ships later sunk by U–boats, and damaged three additional ships

between January 7 and February 4. Aerial attacks on ships sailing independently or

straggling behind convoys about the same time accounted for an additional three ships

destroyed and two damaged. Fw 200s also assisted U–boats in sinking seven other ships.

Similar combined air and submarine patrol and attacks throughout 1941 continued to

devastate Allied convoys, stragglers, and independent sailers en route to or from Gibraltar

or crossing the Atlantic.

Strikes against Allied shipping became more difficult and dangerous as convoy

defenses improved. Axis aircraft abandoned most direct attacks on ships as antiaircraft fire

improved. They bombed and strafed only when cloud cover and weather made surprise runs

on ships possible. Most often, the Fw 200s just reported convoy sightings to U–boats

command. This often frustrated aircrews. U–boats sometimes could not close with the convoys

because of communications difficulty or their original positioning.

Better air coverage and escort in the Eastern Atlantic forced U–boat operations farther

west as early as April 1941. For the Allies, this increased Iceland's importance as a base for

air patrols. When Coastal Command aircraft began flying from Icelandic bases, they covered

an area of the Atlantic in which U–boats had previously been safe from air attack. For the

Axis, redirection of U–boat operations to the mid-Atlantic meant that only convoys to and

from Gibraltar steamed within the Luftwaffe's reach.

Allied mid-Atlantic ASW patrols increased in effectiveness as Catalina flying boats

and Hudson land planes replaced the Fairey Battles initially sent to Iceland. The lumbering

Catalinas, although called "tired bumble bees" by U–boat crews, could fly to a distance of 800

miles from shore. The faster Hudsons first arrived in Iceland in June 1941. One aircraft could
16

search 100 square miles of ocean for submarines in four hours. It took five fast warships six

days to complete the same task.

A tremendous breakthrough in signals intelligence also aided in the war against

U–boats. In the same month that the Hudsons arrived in Iceland, Britain’s Government Code

and Cypher School (GCGS), located at Bletchley Park outside London, and the listening

stations that fed it information proved able to intercept and decode radio messages sent by

the German Navy headquarters controlling U–boats. The messages detailed U–boat patrol

areas, transit routes, and much other valuable information. Although there were occasional

interruptions due to poor intercept conditions and changing code systems, the usual flood of

information enabled the British Admiralty to maintain an Atlantic chart showing on a daily

basis the position of each German submarine on patrol. The United States Navy set up a

similar “Operational Information Section” within the Commander-in-Chief, United States

Fleet (COMINCH) headquarters in early 1942. It received information garnered from

intercepted U–boat communications intercepted by USN cryptologic activities and from USN

direction-finding stations. The British and American tracking rooms shared information via

a secure communications link.15

Careful study of the experiences of two years antisubmarine air warfare also improved

Coastal Command capability in the U–boat war. The command’s aircraft received new white

paint on their under and side surfaces to make them more difficult to see from ships. Tactical

instructions specified the most effective method of attack on U–boats. Although Allied shorebased aircraft had sunk no submarines in 1939, in 1940 they accounted for three by

themselves, and four in cooperation with ships out of a total of forty-two U–boats sunk by

various means. In 1941, Allied shore-based aircraft accounted for four enemy submarines

(three German and one Italian) by themselves, and cooperated with ships to sink two

others.16

While the RAF, RCAF, and RAAF fought the German submarines, American Army

and Navy air arms prepared to join the Battle of the Atlantic from eighteen air bases strung

along the United States’ coast from Maine to Florida. The Navy positioned eighty-three PBYs,

or Catalinas as the British called them, and Hudsons at its installations and the Army moved

aircraft to coastal bases. When the United States joined the war in December 1941, the

United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) had 103 planes near the Atlantic coast. These

included fifty-one trainers, eighteen scouts, fourteen utility aircraft, seven transports, six

patrol planes, three torpedo planes, three fighters, and one bomber. None, according to the

Army Air Forces command operating them, were suitable for offshore patrol. The Army

aircraft came under Navy tactical control in June 1941. Although the Army Air Forces

administered, supplied, and trained USAAF antisubmarine forces, the Navy scheduled their

missions and dispatched them on combat operations.17

Once again, naval and air force philosophies collided. Navy doctrine prescribed that

the aircraft be stationed in geographically defined naval districts and controlled by district

commandants. Air force commanders believed that the land-based aerial forces should be

employed as mobile striking forces. The planes, they said, should be able to move at will

across the naval district boundaries. Two years later these differing views resulted in the

Navy taking over operation of all land-based antisubmarine aircraft.18

American land-based aerial forces first joined the Atlantic sea lane fight in July 1941.

Though not a declared belligerent, United States naval surface ships and flying boats began

escorting convoys through the Western Atlantic. An April 1941 agreement between the

United States and Denmark also permitted American construction and use of air bases in

Greenland. A similar agreement with Iceland followed in July. American air bases also
17

opened on British territory in the Western Hemisphere as a result of the 1941 Lend-Lease

program.

On July 1, Patrol Wing 7 started reconnaissance flights from Argentia, Newfoundland.

Five days later USN flights started to supplement RAF reconnaissance from Iceland. Patrol

Squadron 73 began operating PBYs from Reykjavik. Patrol Squadron 74 began operating

twin-engine, twin-tail Mariner flying boats from Hvalfjord. American surface warships and

aircraft shared the results of their reconnaissance with their British counterparts while their

presence deterred U–boat attacks on ships they had under escort. American warships and

aerial forces quickly became engaged in an undeclared war with the German U–boats.

Luftwaffe attacks on Convoy SL.81 in the North Atlantic at the beginning of August

encountered a new defensive technique. The convoy, located by German radio intelligence and

under U–boat attack since August 2, included the catapult merchant ship (CAM) Maplin. A

single-engine Hurricane catapulted from the Maplin on a flight from which there could be no

return shot down an Fw 200 of I/KG 40 on August 3. The fighter’s pilot, beyond the range of

land, then had to ditch in the icy sea where hypothermia could kill him within minutes.

Despite the desperate countermeasure, additional Fw 200s of I/KG 40 successfully bombed

two merchantmen sailing with the convoy. Another Fw 200 of I/KG 40 also had more luck on

August 11 when it attacked and sank a 2,852-ton freighter from Convoy HG.69 west of

Gibraltar.

There were few air-to-air encounters between the long-range Allied and Axis aerial

forces. Occasionally the Fw 200s and their Allied counterparts engaged in elephantine

dogfights. Generally, the RAF maritime forces sought out and attacked U–boats just as the

Luftwaffe maritime forces sought out and attacked surface vessels. The limited number of

aircraft available, the range limitations of those involved, the difficulty of locating

submarines, and the vastness of the Atlantic meant air attacks on U–boats could never be

more than sporadic.

The RAF did score twice on August 26, 1941. A RAF plane forced U143 to submerge

west of Ireland thus preventing it from attacking Convoy OS.4. On the same day, Catalina

"J" of No. 209 Squadron cooperated with the trawler Vascama to sink U452.

One of the most dramatic air versus U–boat encounters happened the next day. No.

269 Squadron Hudson "S" sortied from Iceland piloted by Squadron Leader J. Thompson. He

depth charged and strafed U570. Depth charge shock waves caused sea water to reach the

submarine's batteries. This generated chlorine gas that forced the crew out of the boat. The

German commander surrendered with a white flag. The Hudson circled over its prize until

a No. 209 Squadron Catalina and surface ships arrived to take off the German crew and tow

the U–boat to Iceland. Communications codes found on U570 helped significantly in the radio

intelligence war so important in the battle for control of the Atlantic sea lanes. The boat itself

became HMS Graph in September 1941.

Successes such as the capture of U570 came rarely to Allied and Axis aircraft

participating in the fight for sea lanes. More often, excruciatingly long flights with no enemy

contact engendered boredom for aircrews on both sides. Successful air attacks were not

always necessary to enhance convoy safety. Surfaced, U–boats could use their diesel

engines to plow ahead at seventeen knots. They usually chose to submerge at just a threat

of bombing and strafing. Underwater, the U–boats had to run on electric motors and could

maintain only two to three knots for limited periods of time. Convoys could leave them behind

at this speed. The submarines also had difficulty escaping underwater if antisubmarine

surface ships were within striking distance.19
18

When an I/KG 40 Fw 200 sighted convoy OG.73 on September 1, a U–boat group

positioned itself to intercept. On September 10, a No. 209 Squadron Catalina forced U501

down south of Iceland. British surface warships soon arrived to finish off the sub. The

following day, No. 209 and No. 269 planes provided air cover for convoy SC.42 sailing south

of Iceland. I/KG 40 Fw 200s sighted and reported several convoys over the next several days

while RAF aircraft dropped depth charges on U561 and U65 in the North Atlantic.

In late September a convoy bound for Gibraltar from England became the focus of a

running air-sea battle. On September 21, an I/KG 40 Fw 200 fatally damaged the 906-ton

rescue ship Walmer steaming behind Convoy OG.74 southwest of Ireland. Another Fw 200

shadowing the convoy went into the sea after attack by a Martlet fighter from the escort

carrier Audacity. A Fulmar fighter flown off the CAM Springbank then drove off a second Fw

200 approaching the convoy on September 24. Two days later, the Springbank and two other

ships fell victim to three U–boats brought to the convoy by I/KG 40 Fw 200s. An RAF aircraft

based in Cornwall then damaged U205. In all, cooperation between U–boats and land-based

aircraft cost Convoy OG.74 six ships. During the battle a carrier fighter shot down one

Luftwaffe plane and an RAF land plane damaged one submarine.

September 1941 also saw the arrival of a new and significant player in the

antisubmarine war. American-built and designed B–24 Liberator aircraft began to take part.

The four-engine planes could carry up to twenty-four depth charges in their bomb bays and

patrol to a distance of 700 miles. Their high wings facilitated visual lookout for surfaced

U–boats.

A Coastal Command squadron began flying Liberators in mid-September 1941 but lost

half of them almost immediately to RAF's Ferry Command. Instead of hunting submarines,

the Liberators transported senior officials back and forth across the Atlantic. Competition for

Liberators being produced then became even more intense as bomber commands discovered

their usefulness.20

Convoy OG.75 came under sporadic Luftwaffe surveillance beginning on October 2.

Aerial reconnaissance aircraft between October 5 and 7 found and sank only a small steamer.

On October 10, a Fw 200 relocated the convoy so that three U–boats could intercept it on

October 12. U83 torpedoed a 2,044-ton Portuguese freighter and a floating crane in the

convoy but a convoy escort aircraft forced U563 to submerge before it could attack. After

another Fw 200 regained contact with OG.75 on October 24, British aircraft and surface

vessels drove responding U–boats and Italian submarines away. In this encounter the Royal

Navy destroyer Lamerton and an RAF No. 202 Squadron London flying boat operating from

Gibraltar cooperated to sink the Italian sub Ferraris on October 25, 1941.21

There was little dramatic action over Atlantic sea lanes in November 1941. Planes of

I/KG 40 planes continued to search for convoys so that they could bring U–boats to them.

They relocated Convoy OS.10 on November 2 so that U–boat attacks on it could continue. The

RAF achieved a notable success at the end of the month when Whitley "B" of No. 502

Squadron destroyed U206 in the Bay of Biscay on November 30.

The last month of 1941 saw a replay of earlier running air-sea battles over convoys.

U–boats and Fw 200s assaulted Convoy HG.76 in the North Atlantic after aerial

reconnaissance reported its location on three successive days. Escorting surface ships drove

off the U–boats. On December 18, Martlets (as the Fleet Air Arm designated its Americanbuilt Grumman F-4F-3 radial engine fighters) flew off the escort carrier Audacity to shoot

down two Fw 200s assisting the submarine. Martlets tallied similar scores the next day but

U–boat attacks on the convoy continued until December 23.
19

Despite the Allies’ improving efforts at antisubmarine warfare, the struggle for control

of trans-Atlantic sea lanes in 1941 had been expensive and violent. At a cost of twenty

German and three Italian submarines sunk in the North Atlantic, Axis undersea naval forces

had sunk 2.4 million tons of Allies shipping in the North Atlantic during 1941. British

aircraft had assisted in three of the U–boat kills and were solely responsible for one.

Although the Kriegsmarine had lost about 40 percent of its average operational submarine

strength during the year, the commissioning of sixty-nine new U–boats in the last quarter

of 1941 promised an even bloodier shipping war in the North Atlantic during 1942.22

United States Army Air Forces land planes joined United States Navy aircraft in the

Atlantic battle on the day following Japan's December 7 raid on Pearl Harbor. The USAAF's

First Air Force launched offshore patrols from Dow Field, Maine; Westover Field,

Massachusetts; and Langley Field, Virginia on the afternoon of December 8. Army-Navy

peacetime efforts had created a situation in which American planes “carried bombs useful

against anything but submarines, navigators who had theretofore been prohibited from flying

offshore, and pilots who were as ignorant of the Navy as the Navy was of them.”23 Sent to

war against submarines, USAAF fliers became involved in fiascos that equaled RAF Coastal

Command's first experiences. In one instance, the pilot of a twin-engine B–25 Mitchell

medium bomber pilot mistook recognition signals frantically sent by an American destroyer

as the blinking of antiaircraft fire. His bomb run on the ship missed it by 400 yards.24

American naval air strength was not much greater than that of the Army Air Forces.

At this time the Navy had twelve-plane PBY units at Argentia and Norfolk. There were also

half-squadron detachments split between Jacksonville and Key West plus San Juan and

Trinidad. In addition, a squadron of Mariner flying boats (PBMs) was at Argentia and a

squadron of single-engine Kingfisher float planes was at Bermuda.25

Allied wrangling about air assets devoted to the antisubmarine campaign became

heated early in the year. When Britain’s First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, asked

for assignment of more land-based heavy bombers to Coastal Command, senior RAF officers

resisted. According to the head of Bomber Command, Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Harris,

“The naval employment of aircraft consists of picking at the fringes of enemy power . . . of

looking for needles in a haystack.”26

Harris and his superior, RAF Chief of Staff Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, advocated

bombing the U–boat construction facilities and bases in France and Germany would be more

effective in combating the U–boat menace than convoy escort or maritime air patrols.

At this stage of the war, however, the Allies did not have enough long-range aircraft

or the technical means to make this a valid option. The RAF could not conduct precision

daylight bombing and the bombs in use could not penetrate the thick concrete shelters that

protected submarines in port. Nonetheless, Churchill supported Portal and Harris in the

argument. Over the next twelve months Allied air forces dropped 33,000 tons of bombs on

U–boat building yards and pens. In that effort, they lost 882 bombers with their valuable

aircrews in the process but did no significant damage. The bombings made the communities

in which the U–boats homeported unlivable but did little to interfere with submarine

operations.27

United States Army Air Forces squadrons gradually entered the battle for Atlantic sea

lanes after December 1941. Although the Eastern Sea Frontier had 167 Army aircraft

assigned by March 1942, only half were twin-engine medium bombers suitable for

antisubmarine warfare. None of the Army crews at this point had the ocean navigation

training essential to their task.28
20

RAF aircraft began the first offensive air attacks on U–boats at sea in 1942. These

occurred in the Bay of Biscay, which five out of six U–boats crossed on their way from home

ports to patrol lines in the Atlantic. Whitley "F" from No. 502 Squadron damaged U129 as

the boat crossed the bay on April 1. "F's" squadron mate "M" likewise interfered with U590's

crossing of the bay on April 14. These attacks marked a situation in which enough Allied

aircraft were available to escort convoys and to mount offensive operations against the

U–boats beyond the convoy routes.

Additional air patrols over the Bay of Biscay in June 1941 brought additional positive

results. The first success came as one of four Wellingtons experimentally fitted with Leigh

Lights encountered the Italian submarine Luigi Torelli. After Squadron-Leader J. Greswell's

first run in No. 172 Squadron's Wellington "F" failed because of a bad altimeter setting in the

aircraft, he got an unusual second chance. The Italian skipper, misled because the aircraft

illuminated his boat, did not submerge. He fired recognition flares instead. Greswell

responded with another Leigh Light bath and four 250-pound depth charges released from

an altitude of fifty feet. Subsequent attacks on the Torelli by Royal Australian Air Force No.

10 Squadron Sunderlands "X" and "A" forced the Italians to beach the boat on June 11. That

same day another No. 10 Squadron Sunderland, "F," inflicted enough damage to force U105

to return to port. Less serious damage occurred on June 23 when RAF No. 58 Squadron

Whitley "C" bombed U753 as she crossed the bay returning from a Western Atlantic patrol.

In further Biscay action, No. 172 Squadron Wellington "M" sank U502 on July 6 and

damaged U159 on July 12, 1942. On July 17, No. 502 Squadron Whitley "H" and No. 61

Squadron Lancaster "F" destroyed U751. Then on July 27 an attack by No. 311 (Czech)

Squadron Wellington "A" on U106 forced the boat back to port. During continued air

interdiction of submarine transit routes in the bay, RAF No. 113 Squadron Wellington "H"

sank U578 on August 10. The Italian submarine Morosini and her crew probably went to the

bottom as a result of Allied air attack on August 11.

At the end of August 1942, Biscay air patrols damaged several Axis submarines and

sank one. RAF No. 502 Squadron Whitleys "B" and "O" damaged U256 on August 31. RAAF

No. 10 Squadron Sunderlands "U" and "R" damaged the Italian submarine Giuliani on

September 1 and No. 304 Squadron (Polish) Wellington "A" further damaged the Giuliani on

September 2. No. 77 Squadron Whitley "P" sank U705 on September 3.

As land-based air power interfered with Axis submarine transits to the open ocean,

Allied air escort of convoys and Axis air attack on them continued. A USN VP-74 Mariner

aided by radio direction finding located and sank U158 off Bermuda toward the end of May

1942. The Condors by this time were focusing on Gibraltar-bound convoys. Most of the

U–boats with which the Luftwaffe cooperated on trans-Atlantic sea lane interdiction had

switched their operations to mid-Atlantic areas, beyond the range of Allied land-based

aircraft and beyond Condor range.

On June 11, 1942, a I/KG 40 Fw 200 located convoy HG.84 as it steamed south from

England and managed to escape a Hurricane launched from the catapult ship Empire Moon.

A second Condor relocated HG.84 on June 14 and led U552 to it. Other U–boats followed and

sank several of the convoy's ships. Similar air-naval cooperation followed on June 16 when

U571 and two Fw 200s again found HG.84. The next day a KFlGr 106 attack badly damaged

the Royal Navy destroyer Wild Swan which had arrived on-scene as a part of a surface

warship group coming to aid the HG.84. At the end of 1942, most Condors previously used

against Gibraltar convoys were relocated to the Mediterranean and to the Russian front.

On the other side of the Atlantic, American and Canadian antisubmarine air patrols

began to have a few successes. On June 13, 1942, American naval and army aircraft
21

cooperated with the USN patrol craft PC458 to damage U153 off the Panama Canal. The

USN destroyer Lansdowne then sank the submarine. Almost a month elapsed before Allied

air forces in North America could claim additional victories in the air war against the

submarines. On July 7, a U.S. Army Air Forces 396th Bomb Squadron plane patrolling off

the American east coast sank U701. Then on July 31, a Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)

No. 113 Squadron Hudson sank U458 off Nova Scotia. The next day a U.S. Coast Guard

plane sent U166 to the bottom outside the mouth of the Mississippi River. RCAF Hudsons

from No. 113 Squadron then damaged U754 in the waters off Nova Scotia on August 2.

Action in the air war against U–boats shifted again to the mid-Atlantic on August 9,

1942, when RAF No. 120 Squadron Liberators based in Northern Ireland assisted Convoy

SC.94, which U–boats had been attacking since August 5. The Liberators accounted for no

submarines, but forced them away from the convoy or facilitated surface ship action against

them.

Other British Liberators flying from Cornwall provided similar assistance to Convoy

SL.118. No. 120 Squadron Liberator "F" damaged U89 on August 16 and U653 on August 18.

USN VP-73 Catalina "R" on North Atlantic air patrol from Iceland sank U464 on August 20,

1942.

Air attacks on U–boats in the last months of 1942 reflected the increasing availability

of air power for the task, although by this time the number of operational U–boats had

increased from 121 in April 1942 to 196 in October 1942. Of these, about twenty-four were

operating in the North Atlantic with another twenty lurking in North American coastal

waters.29

Land-Based Aircraft Operating Against U–Boats, September 194230

Date Unit/Aircraft U–Boat/Area Results

Sep 15 No. 58 Sq Whitley "Q" U261 (North Atlantic) Sunk

Sep 16 343rd Bomb Sq B–24 U156 (Western Atlantic) None*

Sep 23 No. 210 Sq Catalina "U" U255 (North Atlantic) Sunk

Sep 28 No. 48 Sq Hudsons "A" and "Z" U262 (North Atlantic) Damaged

*U156 was trying to rescue survivors, including Italian POWs, from the torpedoed liner Laconia and

the attack drove her away.

Land-Based Aircraft Operating Against U–Boats, October 1942

Date Unit/Aircraft U–boat/Area Result

Oct 2 99th Bomb Gp B–18 U512 (Western Atlantic) Sunk

Oct 5-6 VP 73 Catalina "I" and No. 269

Sq Hudson "N"

U582, U619, U257 (North

Atlantic)

U562, U619

sunk, U257

damaged

Oct 12 No. 120 Sq Liberator U597 (North Atlantic) Sunk

Oct 15 No. 120 Sq Liberator "H" U615, U437 Thwarted*
22

Oct 16 No. 120 Sq Liberators, VP-84

Catalinas

U–boats attacking Convoy

SC.104 (North Atlantic)

Thwarted

Oct 20 No. 224 Sq Liberator "H" U216 (North Atlantic) Sunk

Oct 22 No. 179 Sq Liberator "B" U412 (North Atlantic) Sunk

Oct 27 VP-84 Catalina "A" U664 (North Atlantic) Sunk

Oct 27 No. 120 Squadron Liberators

No. 206 Sq Fortress "F"

U–boats attacking Convoy

HX.212 (North Atlantic)

U627 (North Atlantic)

Thwarted

Sunk

Oct 30 RCAF No. 145 Sq Hudson

RCAF No. 10 Sq Digby

U658 (Western Atlantic)

U520 (Western Atlantic)

Sunk

Sunk

Oct 31 RAF No. 120 Sq Liberators U521 (North Atlantic) near

Convoy EG.4

Thwarted

*”Thwarted” indicates an attacking submarine driven away by aircraft.

Land-Based Aircraft Operating Against U–Boats, November 1942

Date Unit/Aircraft U–boat/Area Result

Nov 1 VP-84 Catalina "A" U664 (North Atlantic) Sunk

Nov 5 No. 120 Sq Liberators

Liberator "H"

VP-84 Catalina "H"

U–boats attacking Convoy

SL.145 (North Atlantic)

U89 (North Atlantic)

U408 (N. of Iceland)

Thwarted

Damaged

Sunk

Nov 10 USAAF aircraft from Trinidad U505 (Western Atlantic) Damaged

(aircraft

downed by

own bomb)

Nov 13 No. 500 Sq Hudson "D" U411 (Central Atlantic) Sunk

Nov 18 No. 608 Sq Hudson "V" U613, U91 (Central Atlantic) Damaged

Nov 19 No. 608 Sq Hudson "D"

No. 608 Sq Hudson "G"

U413 (Central Atlantic)

U98 (Central Atlantic)

Damaged

Sunk

Nov 24 No. 233 Sq Hudson "Q"

No. 405 Sq Hudson "J"

U263 (Central Atlantic)

U263 (Bay of Biscay)

Damaged

Damaged

Land-Based Aircraft Operating Against U–Boats, December 1942

Date Unit/Aircraft U–Boat/Area Result

Dec 7 No. 120 Sq Liberator "H" U–boats attacking Convoy

ONS.148 (North Atlantic)

Thwarted

Dec 8 No. 120 Sq Liberators "B" and

"M"

U–boats attacking Convoy

ONS.148 (North Atlantic)

Thwarted
23

Dec 11 VP-84 Catalina "H" U611 near Convoy ONS.148

(North Atlantic)

Sunk

Historians generally acknowledge that 1943 marked the victory of Allied air and naval

efforts against Axis submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic. The victory came in the face of

an all-out U–boat effort, which was repulsed by a combination of land and sea-based air

power, surface ships, and radio and radar warfare. Allied operational research also played

an important part in the battle. Scientists analyzed combat records and then recommended

significant changes. They proposed such innovations as fewer, larger convoys; revised fusing

on depth charges; and revised interval patterns in depth charge drops. Locations of wolf pack

assembly and refueling points were being decoded and this was instrumental in the victory.31

Better aircraft and more of them combined with the other factors to win the victory.

By February 1943, RAF Coastal Command had thirty-four antisubmarine squadrons and

sixteen other flying units. Of the antisubmarine squadrons, eight flew Sunderland and four

Catalina flying boats. The remaining squadrons operated a mix of mostly Hudsons,

Wellingtons, Halifaxes, Flying Fortresses, and Liberators.

New models of Liberators available in late 1942 or early 1943 could be equipped for

very long range patrols by placing extra fuel tanks in one of their bomb bays. This meant

reducing their loads from twenty-four to eight depth charges. Armor plate, liners for selfsealing fuel tanks, bottom turrets, and engine turbo-superchargers also came off.32

That made Very Long Range (VLR) Liberators lethal antisubmarine aircraft. One

spent more than seven hours above a convoy 800 miles from its home base on December 7,

1942. Coastal Command estimated that just twenty-four of these VLR planes could close the

mid-Atlantic "gap" outside the range of existing aircraft.33 It had only fourteen available to

operate over the North Atlantic in February 1943. In part this resulted because many

Liberators went to strategic bombing commands. But it was also a consequence of Coastal

Command allocating aircraft suitable for very long range conversion to Bay of Biscay

offensive patrols.34 Relief came only after March 1943 when participants in an Atlantic

Convoy Conference decided to establish Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and USAAF

Liberator squadrons in Newfoundland.35

The new VLR aircraft became so important that top Allied leaders discussed them at

the January 1943 Casablanca conference. The modified Liberators combined the best

available combination of speed, range, and weapons load for fighting U–boats in mid-ocean.

The British came to the conference with statistics showing that four more Atlantic gap air

patrols launched each day would reduce shipping losses by 65 percent.

Despite their own statistics, the British allocated their share of new Liberators first

to Bomber Command for its strategic campaign. They did the same with ten-centimeter radar

sets. The American allocation of the VLR Liberators went to General Eisenhower in North

Africa. They operated against submarines only from bases in Morocco. Churchill, however,

was willing to use American resources in lieu of British. He appealed directly to President

Roosevelt in the matter. As a result, the USAAF 6th Antisubmarine Squadron moved to

Newfoundland in April 1943.36

In the interim, Coastal Command Hudsons tried unsuccessfully to make-up for the

lack of long-range aircraft. When they flew from Bluie West airfield in Greenland to close the

mid-Atlantic gap, high operational losses caused by flying in bad weather over mountainous

terrain stopped the attempt. At this time Coastal Command had only about 200 aircraft
24

assigned to Atlantic convoy escort and patrol. Of these, only two-thirds were available for

operations on any given day.37

The American Navy possessed 112 VLR Liberators compared with Coastal Command's

twenty-four, and might have helped close the mid-Atlantic gap. Instead, Admiral Ernest J.

King, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet (INCHCOM) in 1943 sent seventy of

the long-range planes to the Pacific theater for against the Japanese. Other USN Liberator

squadrons operated from California and Caribbean bases.

Although not present in the maximum numbers possible, the Liberators joined Flying

Fortresses and other aircraft previously allocated to patrol the sea lanes and played an

important part in the triumph over U–boats. The Britons believed the B–17s carried too

small a weapons load to be effective in strategic bombing. The American-built bombers could

carry only 1,750-pound of bombs compared to 3,000 to 5,000-pound bomb loads in Britishmanufactured four-engine Halifax and Lancaster bombers. Unlike the American Army Air

Forces, the British did not hesitate to use the Fortresses in antisubmarine warfare.38

Land-based air's 1943 contribution to the victory began on January 15 when Fortress

"G" of RAF No. 206 Squadron sank U337 near Convoy ONS.160 in the North Atlantic.

Further successes followed in February. Liberator "X" of No. 120 Squadron bombed U465 and

drove other U–boats away from Convoy SC.118 in the North Atlantic on February 6. The

following day Fortress "J" of No. 220 Squadron sank U624 and cooperated with the U.S.

Coast Guard cutter Bibb to drive other submarines away from this same convoy.

On March 18, 1943, RAF No. 120 Squadron VLR Liberator "G" risked a 900-mile flight

from Castle Archdale in Northern Ireland to cover Convoy SC.122. When the plane arrived

over the convoy, it broke up a U–boat attack before it had to fly back to its base. No. 86

Squadron Liberator "M" then relieved the first aircraft and continued to thwart U–boats

attempting to torpedo the convoy's ships. On the same day in the Central Atlantic a USAAF

Liberator from the 1st Antisubmarine Squadron sank U524.

Three days later RAF No. 220 Squadron Fortress "B" sank U384 and Fortress "G"

damaged U666 while escorting Convoys HX.229 and SC.122 in the North Atlantic. No. 206

Squadron Fortress "L" sank U469 on March 25 and U169 on March 27, also in the North

Atlantic.

In late March, the RAF intensified its Biscay interdiction efforts. Operation Enclose

I sent 182 sorties over the bay between March 21 and March 28. Few U–boats were sighted.

They surfaced to travel and charge batteries only at night. During daylight hours the boats

sacrificed speed for stealth by submerging. Despite these tactics, RAF No. 172 Wellington "I"

aided by a Leigh Light damaged U332 on March 21. No. 172 Wellington "G," also aided by

a Leigh Light and using radar sank U665. Air attacks on U–boats were hazardous. U338

proved that by shooting down an RAF No. 58 Squadron Halifax.

Operation Enclose II continued the Biscay offensive. Between March 28 and April 11,

1943, U376 sank and U465 suffered casualties as a result of night air attacks. The losses

incurred in Operations Enclose I and II caused Dönitz to order a change in submarine tactics.

It was clear that the German Metox radar detector was not effective against a new model

Allied radar. German submarines henceforth traveled submerged at night. In daytime, they

traveled on the surface and relied on their antiaircraft fire to repulse air attacks. Initial

successes seemed to indicate that U–boats traveling in groups on the surface might effectively

oppose bombing and strafing runs.

Aircrews sortieing to the Bay of Biscay on Operation Derange, between April 13 and

June 6, 1943, encountered the new U–boat tactics. The operation produced ninety-eight

U–boat sightings, sixty-four attacks on them, and seven sinkings.
25

Operation Derange, April 13-June 6, 1943

Date Unit/Aircraft Result

Apr 26 No. 172 Wellington "R" U566 Damaged

Apr 29 No. 224 Liberator "H"

RCAF No. 224 Liberator "D"

U437 Damaged

U332 Sunk

May 1 No. 172 Wellington "N," RAAF No.

61 Sunderland "M"," No. 612

Whitley "E"

U415 Damaged

May 2 RAAF No. 461 Sunderland "M" U465 Sunk

May 5 No. 58 Halifax "S" U663 Sunk

May 6 No. 10 OTU Whitley "K" U214 Damaged

May 15 No. 58 Halifax "M"

No. 10 OTU Whitley "M"

U463 Sunk

U591 Damaged

May 16 No. 58 Halifax "R" Tazzoli Sunk

May 25 No. 10 OTU Whitley "J"

Sunderland attacks

U523 Damaged

U441 Damaged, aircraft downed;

U666, U594, U648, U662, U459

down aircraft

May 31 No. 58 Halifax "R," No. 228

Sunderland "X," and RAAF No. 10

Sunderland "E"

No. 224 Liberator "Q"

No. 336 Beaufighter "B"

U563 Sunk

U621 Damaged

U418 Sunk (with rockets)

The 1943 convoy battles also introduced very effective new airborne antisubmarine

weapons and supporting activities. Air-launched torpedoes with acoustic homing heads went

into action for the first time On May 12. Loran (long range navigation) began service over

most of the North Atlantic. It allowed navigators to plot extremely accurate fixes at distances

of 600 miles during the day and 1200 miles at night regardless of weather. Magnetic Airborne

Detector (MAD) equipment enabled its operators to detect submarines at depths of 200 feet

or more and determine their position relative to an airplane. Sonobuoys used in connection

with MAD could pick up submarine sound waves at a distance of two miles and transmit that

identification about seventeen miles to a height of 500 to 1,000 feet. These new technologies

added to the decimation of U–boats by Allied ships and aircraft.39

May 1943 was probably the turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Germans

lost twenty-eight U–boats in the North Atlantic. Surface vessels sank eleven of them, while

aircraft and surface vessels combined to share credit for two. Land-based aircraft alone

destroyed nine, while carrier aircraft accounted for three. Three more sank as a result of

collision or unknown causes. In actions in the Bay of Biscay, the Mediterranean, and North
26

American coastal waters during the month, twenty-one more U–boats went to the bottom.

Aircraft accounted for sixteen of these. Germany's shipyards and training program for

submariners could not replace such losses.40

On November 7, 1943, Admiral Dönitz ordered his boats to withdraw from the main

North Atlantic convoy routes. In doing so he conceded victory in the contest for Atlantic sea

lanes to the Allies. Of the more than 700 German U–boats destroyed in the Atlantic and

Arctic Oceans, and in the immediate vicinity of the British Isles between 1939 and 1945, 305

U–boats fell victim to Allied land-based aerial forces while another twenty-eight went to the

bottom because of combined land-based aircraft and surface ship action.41

Combating Surface Raiders

Allied land-based aircraft also played a major role in preventing heavy German

warships from entering the sea lane contest more than occasionally. Winston Churchill

probably had the most comprehensive grasp of what it took to defeat Nazi Germany. Writing

after victory, he noted that fear of the RAF kept Germany's battleships and battlecruisers in

port for most of the war.42

Nazi Germany's navy was not, relative to Allied navies, as powerful as that of Kaiser

Wilhelm. The Kreigsmarine did not have the strength to challenge the Royal Navy in a fleet

engagement. But one or two of its major surface combatants could destroy any convoy escort

and obliterate any merchant shipping they encountered. Because of this capability, prewar

British plans called for the RAF to bombard German capital ships in their harbors. The Royal

Navy was to engage them when they put to sea.43

When war came On September 3, 1939, the RAF set out within forty-eight minutes

after Britain issued a declaration of war with Germany to find the Kreigsmarine’s ships. A

reconnaissance aircraft photographed them where the Kiel Canal empties into the North Sea,

at Wilhelmshaven, and in Schillig Roads. The latter embayment of the North Sea has

Wilhelmshaven on its western shore and Bremerhaven on its eastern shore. Fifty-four

Blenheim and Wellington bombers took off on September 4 for a major raid in flight-strength

increments.44

Flight Lt. K. C. Doran, in one of No. 110 Squadron's Blenheims, and flying at fifty to

100 feet in and out of heavy clouds, came upon the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer in

Schillig Roads. Three of the Blenheims in his flight made bomb runs on the surprised

Germans from 500 feet. Doran's 500-pound general purpose bombs hit the Scheer's armored

deck amidships and bounced off into the sea. A second Blenheim's bombs fell into the sea.

Other aircraft in the flight could not complete their attacks. One crashed into the training

cruiser Emden, killing the aircrew and several sailors. The remaining aircraft participating

in the raid suffered heavy casualties from antiaircraft and fighter opposition but inflicted no

damage. Several were unable to find the target. At the mouth of the Elbe, Wellingtons found

the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau anchored. But horizontal bombing from high

altitude did no damage to the stationary vessels.45

In subsequent weeks, Bomber Command sent its airplanes out on daylight squadronstrength reconnaissance hoping to find German warships at sea in clear weather. One lesson

of the September 4 raid was that the ships, if found, should be approached from bow or stern.

The armed reconnaissance flights discovered that the RAF dictum that three bombers in

formation could fight off fighters was flawed. Instead, the bombers usually went down in

flames. The reconnaissance in force continued through the end of 1939 and inflicted little

serious damaged. Wellingtons, as a part of a policy to "conserve the bomber force," were
27

ordered not to go below 2,000 feet. Aircraft and aircrew losses were high, in some cases as

much as 50 percent.46

RAF Attacks on Major German Warships in Port47

Date Location Results

Jul 19-20, 40 Wilhelmshaven Tirpitz & Scheer unharmed

Mar 30-31, 41 Brest Gneisenau & Scharnhorst

unharmed

Apr 3-4, 41 Brest Gneisenau & Scharnhorst

unharmed

Apr 6, 41 Brest Gneisenau torpedoed by

Beaufort, damaged enough to

require dry dock repairs

Apr 10-11, 41 Brest Gneisenau in dock after hit by

RAF aerial torpedo, hit by four

bombs further damaged

Apr 12-13, 41 Brest Gneisenau & Scharnhorst

unharmed

May 4-7, 41 Brest Gneisenau & Scharnhorst

unharmed

Jun 13-14, 41 Brest Gneisenau & Scharnhorst

unharmed

Jul 24, 41 Brest Scharnhorst hit five times,

suffered serious electrical

system damage

Sep 13-14, 41 Brest Gneisenau & Scharnhorst

unharmed

Dec 17-18, 41 Brest Gneisenau slightly damaged,

Scharnhorst unharmed

Feb 26-27, 42 Kiel Gneisenau damaged, remains

under repair until laid up in

1943

Mar 30, 42 Trondheim Tirpitz unharmed

Apr 27-28, 42 Trondheim Tirpitz unharmed

Nov 12, 1944 Trömso Tirpitz capsized and sunk

On January 23, 1941, the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst sailed from Kiel to raid Allied

shipping in the Atlantic. They evaded surface and air patrols to embark on a two-month long
28

voyage. Aircraft sighted them only three times as they sank twenty-two ships. Ship-borne

planes made two of the sightings. A Coastal Command Hudson reported them 200 miles from

Brest, where they arrived on March 22. Repeated air raids on them in port thereafter cost

the RAF heavily, but kept the two ships out of action for the rest of the war.48

The sinking of the Bismarck, a story told often, involved land-based air only briefly,

but importantly. As the battleship attempted to reach the safety of Brest after being seriously

damaged in encounters with Royal Navy ships and carrier aircraft, British forces lost contact

with her. A No. 209 Squadron Catalina, piloted by an American Navy ensign giving an RAF

flier a check ride, spotted the Bismarck 700 miles west of Brest. This quickly led to her final

dispatch by British ships and planes on May 27, 1941.

Other German heavy warships sunk in harbor by RAF bombing included the

battlecruiser Admiral Scheer in 1944 and the cruisers Emden, Koln, and Lützow in 1945. All

had either been relegated to the role of floating artillery to support ground action or laid up

in 1943 to make men and materials available for the U–boat war.49

Armored warships lying in harbor, tied up to docks, or in dry docks proved to be tough

targets. High altitude precision horizontal bombing proved generally ineffective against these

tethered targets. Low-level horizontal bombing brought better results but cost the attackers

dearly. RAF efforts to destroy German heavy surface combatants before they could break out

to raid Allied shipping at times required as much as 10 percent of Bomber Command's

efforts. When ships such as the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were under repair and not at sea

threatening critical Allied merchant tonnage making trans-Atlantic voyages, Britain's navy

did not have to allocate its own battleships and their escorts to defend against them.

Arctic Convoys

Allied supply convoys to the Soviet ports of Murmansk and Archangel in the Arctic

began on August 21, 1941. The first one sailed only sixty days after Hitler turned on his

Soviet ally and constituted a significant demonstration of support for the newest Ally, the

Soviet Union. The beleaguered British enthusiastically embraced their former enemy.

America followed Britain's lead. British and American aircraft, tanks, trucks and other war

supplies were soon loaded aboard freighters that steamed from ports in Britain, Canada, and

the United States to Soviet ports in the Arctic. By the time the war ended these convoys had

moved 25.2 percent of all war supplies sent by the Allies to the Soviet Union. Combined with

the 47.1 percent of these supplies sent to the USSR across the Pacific, and the 23.8 percent

sent through Persia, Arctic convoy deliveries proved critical in the war against Germany.50

Allied shipping in the Arctic risked attack from German air power, surface naval

forces, and submarines. Although British (later both British and American) warships escorted

the merchant ships, the convoys sailed beyond the reach of land-based Allied aircraft. On

occasion they had the protection of aircraft carriers, merchant aircraft carriers, or merchant

ships able to catapult single aircraft into the sky. On rare occasion, the convoys received

protection of land-based aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. This aerial support, however, only

came in the vicinity of Soviet bases east of Norway.

The convoys, whether originating in the United Kingdom or North America, sailed as

far as possible from the reach of German land-based air power. They steamed northwest of

Iceland, thereafter skirting the edge of drifting Arctic ice but within the range of German

long-range reconnaissance aircraft. East of Iceland and north of Jan Mayen Island, the

convoys came within range of German attack aircraft.
29

Hitler dispatched substantial Luftwaffe forces plus Kreigsmarine capital ships and

their escorts and U–boats to the Arctic to oppose the convoys. Fliegerführer Nord established

his headquarters at Oslo, Norway, where he could cooperate with the admiral in charge of

Marinegruppe Nord. The fliegerführer directed all air reconnaissance, air escort of ships, and

anti-shipping strikes north of 58 ̊ North. In 1943, the Marinegruppe war diary would record

that cooperation with the northern air command was good, but hampered by a limit on

bombers made available by the Luftwaffe High Command and by a shortage of aviation fuel.51

Luftwaffe formations opposing Allied Arctic convoys operated from bases in occupied

Norway. New air bases opened just south of North Cape at the extreme northern tip of

mainland Norway. German land-based aerial forces threatening the convoys included

bombers, dive-bombers, and the Luftwaffe's only torpedo-carrying aircraft. Torpedo pilots,

trained at the Luftwaffe's three-week torpedo school in Grosetto, Italy, usually used the

"Golden Comb" attack. This low-level line-abreast approach to targeted vessels provided the

maximum spread of torpedoes. When possible, the approach came at twilight so that the

aircraft were obscured by a darkened sea while the ships they attacked were silhouetted

against the sky. The most successful raids proved to be those that combined horizontal and

dive-bombing with torpedo attacks. High and medium-altitude horizontal bombing, while not

too effective against moving targets, often distracted defensive efforts and permitted the dive

bombers and torpedo-carrying aircraft to deliver devastating blows.

Luftwaffe Order of Battle in Norway52

Base Organization Maximum # Acft Type Aircraft

Banak Luftflotte 5

KG 30

I and II/KG 26

1(F)/22

1(F)/124

Westa 6

Headquarters

Ju 88

He 111

Ju 88(LR)

Ju 88(LR)

Bardufoss I and II/KG 26

1(F)/22

1(F)/124

He 111

Ju 88(LR)

Ju 88(LR)

Kirkenes I/StG 5

1(F)/22

1(F)/124

Ju 87

Ju 88(LR)

Ju 88(LR)

Stavanger Coastal

Gruppen 406

Coastal

Gruppen 906

He 115

Bv 138

He 115

Bv 138
30

Tromsö Coastal

Gruppen 406

Coastal

Gruppen 906

He 115

Bv 138

He 115

Bv 138

Trondheim I/KG 40 Fw 200

Various JG 5 Me 109

The number of aircraft of any particular type at a given location fluctuated with

operational demands, losses, and maintenance programs. In February 1942, at the beginning

of the campaign against the Arctic convoys, the German anti-shipping forces in Norway

consisted of sixty long-range bombers, thirty dive-bombers, thirty single-engine fighters of the

Luftwaffe and fifteen German Navy float planes. In addition to attacking Allied convoys to

the Soviet Arctic, these anti-shipping aircraft protected nickel mines, interdicted shipping in

the White Sea, and bombed Russian ports and communications in their operations area. They

also supported army operations on the Finnish front.53

Allied Convoy PQ.12 became the first in the Arctic to suffer Luftwaffe attack. On

March 5, 1942, a German reconnaissance aircraft reported the convoy's location south of Jan

Mayen Island. Although bad weather prevented air strikes from being launched against the

convoy, the battleship Tïrpitz and three escorting destroyers sailed to intercept it. They

located and sank only Ijora, a Soviet freighter straggling behind the main convoy.

A few weeks later, on March 27, a 2/KFlGr 406 Bv 138 sighted Convoy PQ.13. The

convoy, dispersed by bad weather, soon lost two freighters to air attack and three others to

destroyer and U–boat attack. Ju 88s from III/KG 30 led by Captain Hajo Herrmann bombed

and sank the freighters Raceland (4,815 tons) and Empire Ranger (7,007 tons) while

destroyers and U–boats sent three other Allied merchantmen to the bottom. When Convoy

PQ.13 did reach Murmansk, German bombers sank the 6,850-ton Empire Straight and 4,747-

ton New Winminster City in the harbor. Southbound return convoys also came under

Luftwaffe attack. On April 13, III/KG 30 Ju 88s sank the 7,164-ton Empire Cowper and 5,486-

ton Harpalion in Convoy QP.10. Subsequent air attacks on the convoy did no serious damage.

In early May 1942, the first twelve torpedo-equipped aircraft of I/KG 26 arrived in

Norway. The dive bomber strength of KG 30 had reached about sixty Ju 88s by this time. In

addition to dropping conventional bombs, the Ju 88s also could drop circling torpedoes that

descended into the ocean on parachutes, but because these torpedoes ran in erratic circles

they posed little danger to ships. On May 2, I/KG 26 He 111s torpedoed and sank the 5,848-

ton Botavon and 3,807-ton Cape Corso in Convoy QP.11. They also damaged the 6,153-ton

Jutland, which U251 finished off. Convoy PQ.15, sailing north between April 26 and May 7,

lost three ships to torpedo aircraft.

A week later, Luftwaffe reconnaissance located British cruisers and destroyers

returning from escorting merchant ships to Murmansk. Torpedo and bombing attacks by

II/KG 26 and III/KG set the cruiser Trinidad afire. After the uncontrollable fire drove the

crew off their ship, other British vessels used gunfire to sink it on May 15.

Luftwaffe flights on May 25, 1942, located Convoy PQ.16 sailing from Iceland to

Murmansk. II/KG 26 He 111s and III/KG 30 He 111s and Ju 88s attacked immediately. They

damaged the freighter Carlton while losing one torpedo aircraft and two bombers to antiaircraft fire. On May 27, more than 100 aircraft from KG/30 and I/KG 26 returned to the
31

convoy. Bombing sank the freighters Alamar, Mormacsul, Empire Lawrence, and Empire

Purcell while a torpedo attack sank the Lowther Castle. The intensive assault accounted for

more than 30,000 tons of badly-needed Allied shipping. The raid also damaged four freighters

and the escorting destroyer Garland. Only three German aircraft were lost.

On May 30, 1942, as the surviving ships of the convoy entered the White Sea, they

faced Ju 87 dive-bombers. When aerial reconnaissance indicated that none of the ships had

reached a Russian port, the Luftwaffe concluded that it had destroyed the entire convoy. The

dive-bombing, however, had failed to sink or seriously damage any other ships. When the

convoy came within range of Soviet land-based fighters, Soviet Northern Fleet interceptors

opposed the Luftwaffe attack aircraft.

The Luftwaffe also interdicted the convoys by airdropping mines at the entrance to

Kola Inlet. In addition, German air raids struck at the ships even after they had reached an

Arctic port. On June 1-2, 1942, I/St G Ju 87s destroyed the 6,850-ton British freighter Empire

Starlight and damaged the Soviet submarine Shch-404 at Murmansk. Sea mines airdropped

into Kola Inlet sank two American freighters, the 5,686-ton Steel Worker on June 3 and

4,823-ton Alcoa Cadet on June 21. On June 24, I/St G Ju 87s sank the British minesweeper

Gossamer in Kola Inlet.

In early July 1942, 1/KFlGr 906 He 115s attacked Convoy QP.13 with no success.

Convoy PQ.17 did not escape air assault despite a heavy escort. The convoy included thirtysix merchant ships, two rescue vessels, and a tanker to refuel escorting warships. The convoy

escort included two antiaircraft cruisers, six destroyers, four corvettes, seven minesweepers

and trawlers, and two submarines.

After the effort against Convoy PQ.16, most of the Luftwaffe formations in Norway

had gone to the Finnish front. Only the torpedo-equipped formations had remained in Norway

because of the difficulty of relocating their stocks of torpedoes and ground crews. By the time

Convoy PQ.17 had left Iceland for Archangel on June 27, however, German naval authorities

had decided to interdict the sea lane to northern Russia with all the forces at their disposal:

land-based aircraft, surface combatants, and U–boats. The surface combatants available

included the battleship Tirpitz, cruiser Hipper, and four destroyers at Trondheim and the

battlecruisers Scheer, Lützow, and six destroyers at Narvik.54

During the last two weeks of June 1942, I/KG 40 Fw 200s from Trondheim had

reported the assembly of Convoy PQ.17 in the harbor at Reykjavik, Iceland. German spies

at the harbor and radio intercepts confirmed the aerial reconnaissance. As the convoy left

Reykjavik on June 27, a Fw 200 flying low to get beneath fog cover nearly crashed into the

escorting cruiser London.

With Convoy PQ.17 revealed, the Luftwaffe rebuilt its strength in northern Norway.

A total of 264 aircraft threatened the convoy.
32

Luftwaffe Strength in Norway, Late June 1942 55

Type of Aircraft Number

Ju 88 (LR bombers) 103

He 111 (torpedo-bombers) 42

He 115 (torpedo float-planes) 15

Ju 87 (dive-bombers) 30

Fw 200 (LR reconnaissance) 8

Ju 88 (LR reconnaissance) 22

Bv 138 (LR reconnaissance) 44

When the fog cleared on June 30, aerial reconnaissance and trailing U–boats relocated

the convoy steaming north. It would remain beyond the reach of Luftwaffe strike aircraft

until it changed course north of Bear Island and steamed east. That course took it within

reach of air bases in Norway at Bardufoss, Banak, and Kirkenes.

Convoy PQ.17's strong escort drove four U–boats away when they attempted to attack

the convoy on July 2. An air raid by eight Gruppe 406 He 115s sortieing from their base at

Sörreisa near Trömso, Norway, also failed to score any kills when heavy antiaircraft thwarted

the attack.

Successful air attacks on Convoy QP.17 began on July 4 when the fog cleared and the

convoy was located north of Bear Island in the Barents Sea. An He 115 from 1/FlGr 906

torpedoed the 7,191-ton freighter Christopher Newport. The attack so severely damaged the

ship that her escorts later had to sink her. On the evening of July 4 when the convoy was

still in the Barents Sea about 800 miles northwest of Archangel, I/KG 26 torpedo attacks by

twenty-five He 111s with Captain Bernot Eicke in command sank the 4,841-ton freighter

Navarino and damaged the 7,177-ton William Hooper. U334 later finished off the Hooper.

Aerial torpedoes also sent the 6,144-ton Soviet tanker Azerbaidzhan to the bottom. In

destroying the three ships, the Luftwaffe lost three aircraft. The Germans’ after action review

concluded that poor coordination between bomber and torpedo aircraft limited the

effectiveness of the strikes.

On July 5, 1942, the British Admiralty, fearing attack by heavy German surface ships,

ordered the ships in Convoy PQ.17 to scatter. Germany surface combatants, however, sortied

only briefly, leaving Altenford, Norway, on the morning of July 5 and retiring later that day

because of an anticipated threat from British carrier aircraft.56

German air raids that followed the scattering of Convoy PQ.17 devastated the fleeing

merchantmen. KG 30's three groups led by Captains Konrad Kahl, Erich Stoffregen, and Hajo

Herrmann took turns attacking. Lieutenant Clausener's Ju 88 dive-bombing quickly sank the

6,476-ton Peter Kerr. Other bombs sank the 5,564-ton Washington, the 5,203-ton Bolton

Castle, the 5,644-ton Pan Kraft, and the 1,559-ton rescue ship Zaafaran. Ships damaged by

air attack on July 5 included the 7,168-ton Paulus Potter, the 7,195-ton Earlston, the 6,645-

ton Empire Bryon, and the fleet tanker Alderdale. The Potter, abandoned, drifted for a week

until sunk by U255.
33

Further air attacks by II/KG 30's Captain Dohne and Lieutenant Bühler sank the

5,411-ton tanker Pan American on July 6 and damaged the 5,060-ton Hoosier, the 5,255-ton

El Capitan, and Samuel Chase on July 10. U–boats later finished off the Hoosier and El

Capitan.

In all, Luftwaffe raids on Convoy PQ.17 over a period of five days sank eight ships

totaling 48,218 tons and damaged eight other vessels totaling 54,093 tons which U–boats

subsequently sank. During the 202 sorties required, Luftwaffe units expended sixty-one

torpedoes and 212 tons of bombs. They lost five aircraft.

The convoy also lost nine ships directly to U–boats. Only eleven of Convoy PQ.17's

thirty-six merchant ships finally reached their destination port of Archangel. Allied war

matériel lost as a result of the Convoy PQ.17 sinkings included 3,350 military vehicles, 430

tanks, and 210 aircraft.57

Despite its success, the destruction of Convoy PQ.17 highlighted continuing

coordination problems between the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine. General Major Stumpf,

commanding officer of Luftflotte 5, claimed credit for destruction of the whole convoy. U–boat

commanders complained that they had been endangered by the bombing attacks. The

German naval staff claimed sole credit for shadowing the convoy.

Convoy PQ.18, located by Luftwaffe Bv 138 flying boat on September 8, 1942, near Jan

Mayen Island, proved more challenging. The convoy consisted of thirty-nine freighters and

a tanker plus two Royal Navy tankers and a rescue ship. The British aircraft carrier Avenger

augmented the convoy's large escort of antisubmarine and antiaircraft vessels. Hurricanes

from the carrier immediately forced the Kreigsmarine Bv 138 flying boats to shadow the

convoy from maximum range.

German air attacks on Convoy PQ.18 began on September 13. KG 30 Ju 88 divebombing was immediately followed by I and III/KG 26 torpedo attacks. Prior to the attack,

the arrival of III/KG 26 had increased the Luftwaffe torpedo forces by thirty-five Ju 88s,

which could be adapted to either dive or torpedo bombing. Twenty-four I/KG 26 He 111s from

Bardufoss approached the convoy in two waves flying low to minimize radar warning. Major

Werner Klümper, former chief instructor of the Luftwaffe torpedo school at Grosseto, Italy,

commanded them. A third wave of 16 Ju 88s of III/KG 26 from Banak under Captain Klaus

Nocken followed.

Despite heavy antiaircraft fire, the He 111s and Ju 88s launched thirty torpedoes

toward Convoy PQ.18's starboard column. Fortunately for these attacking aircraft, the

Avenger's Hurricanes were not on the scene but still in pursuit of KG 30's Ju 88s. No torpedo

planes went down, although six were so badly damaged that they never flew again. The air

assaults destroyed the 5,432-ton Wacosta, the 4,826-ton Oregonia, the 6,131-ton Macbeth, the

5,441-ton Africander, the 6,209-ton Empire Stevenson, and the 3,124-ton Sukhona. In

addition, U–boats sank three other ships in the convoy totaling 19,742 tons.

Interference from Hermann Göering himself minimized further damage to Convoy

PQ.18's merchant ships. The Luftwaffe commander-in-chief ordered that KG 26 concentrate

on the Avenger during September 14 raids. When Klümper led twenty-two He 111's back to

the convoy to attack the carrier, misidentification of a large merchantman as the carrier

endangered Klümper's group. After aborting off an initial attack, the He 111s flew over the

convoy at low altitude to reach the carrier, exposing themselves to the guns of the merchant

ships and their escorts. Ten Hurricanes from the Avenger attacked the German torpedo

bombers when they were outside the curtain of anti-aircraft fire. The combination of fighter

interception and AA fire destroyed five of the He 111s. Nine others suffered such heavy

damage that they had to be written off after returning to base. The fighters and flak made
34

an effective attack on the convoy impossible. Only Klümper and one other pilot succeeded in

dropping their torpedoes. These had to be launched at a too-acute angle and the Avenger

easily took evasive action. After September 14, fog and low clouds precluded further air

attacks on Convoy PQ.18.

For most of the rest of 1942 unfavorable weather and strong escorts prevented further

significant attacks by aircraft on the Arctic convoys. Between October 29 and November 9,

however, KFlGr 406 located freighters steaming between Iceland and Murmansk. II/KG 30

Ju 88s sank the 7,363-ton Dekabrist and damaged two other ships which U–boats later

eliminated. Between December 15 and December 25, 1942, Luftwaffe attacks destroyed five

ships of Convoy JW.51A in Kola Inlet, off Murmansk. Luftwaffe reconnaissance also located

Convoy JW.51B sailing from Loch Ewe, Scotland, to Murmansk, triggering Kriegsmarine

interception of the convoy.

Scattered Luftwaffe attacks on Arctic convoys in 1943 never repeated the successes

achieved in 1942 raids. He 115 torpedo aircraft from 1/KFlGr 406 unsuccessfully attacked

Convoy JW.52/RA.52 on January 24, 1943, losing two aircraft in the process. After Luftwaffe

reconnaissance located Convoy JW.53 on February 23, I/KG 30 Ju 88s damaged one 7,058-ton

ship on February 25. Subsequent raids on the convoy while it was at sea produced no results.

When the convoy reached Murmansk, I/St G 5 dive-bombers between February 27 and 28

damaged three ships totaling 11,341 tons. On March 6 and March 13, I/St G 5 Ju 87s and

I/KG 30 Ju 88s destroyed the 7,173-ton Ocean Freedom and damaged a 6,744-ton merchant

ship. In the meantime, intense AA fire drove twelve I/KG 30 Ju 88s away from Convoy

RA.53.

As 1943 continued, Luftwaffe attacks on Arctic convoys decreased as did the frequency

of the convoys. All torpedo aircraft devoted to air interdiction of the Arctic convoys began

moving to the Mediterranean after the Allied invasion of North Africa on November 7, 1942.

Only He 115 float planes, dive bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft remained at

Norway’s Arctic bases. They faced strong opposition from convoy escorts. They also received

counter-air strikes against their home bases by Soviet Naval Air units.

In 1944, stronger convoy escort groups included small aircraft carriers. Carrier aircraft

succeeded in blocking most Luftwaffe reconnaissance and strike efforts. They also cooperated

effectively with the convoys' surface escorts to drive off or sink attacking U–boats. Eighteen

more convoys sailed from Loch Ewe to Soviet Arctic ports after 1943. The Allies lost only nine

of 537 vessels making the passage.

Luftwaffe interdiction of Allied convoys to the Soviet Arctic illustrated several

principles for successful use of land-based air power in maritime operations that became

evident in other campaigns. These principles demanded: (1) concentration of forces, for a

single strong air attack was more effect that a series of weak attacks; (2) aerial forces trained

and equipped for maritime operations; (3) coordination between air and naval forces. Since

little more than twenty years had passed between the November 11, 1918, Armistice that

ended World War I and the German invasion of Poland that inaugurated World War II, it is

surprising that these same principles required some time to be put into practice by British

aviators who, at the end of the 1914-1918 war, had directed strong land-based aerial

maritime forces. Although part of the RAF’s unreadiness for maritime war can be attributed

to the Royal Navy’s prewar belief that sonar would eliminate the U–boat menace, the leaders

of the aerial forces of a great seafaring nation should have devoted more thought and effort

to the requirements of naval warfare during the 1920s and 1930s. As it was, the Allies won

the critical struggle for control of trans-Atlantic sea lanes by the narrowest of margins.

Effective air attacks on the German Navy’s capital ships at the onset of the war might have
35

freed many of the battleships and cruisers of Britain’s Home Fleet for duty elsewhere with

resulting significant effects in the Far East.

37

Endnotes to Chapter II

1. Horst Boog, "Luftwaffe Support of the German Navy," in The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-

1945, Stephen Howarth and Derek Law, eds. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994),

pp. 306.

2. Adm Karl Dönitz, quoted in Horst Boog, "Luftwaffe Support of the German Navy," p. 317.

3. Quoted in Eberhard Rössler, "U–boat Development and Building," in Howard and Law, The

Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945, and David Syrett, The Defeat of the German U–Boats: The

Battle of the Atlantic (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), p. 13.

4. Boog, "Luftwaffe Support of the German Navy," pp. 306-11.

5. John Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945

(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985), p. 225.

6. Ibid., p. 713.

7. Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945, p. 239;

Deighton, Len, Blood, Tears, and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II (New York:

Harper Perennial, 1994), p. 73.

8. Deighton, Blood, Tears, and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II, p. 67.

9. Ibid.; Capt S. W. Roskill, RN, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume I, The Defensive (London:

Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954), p. 599.

10. Terry Hughes and John Costello, The Battle of the Atlantic (New York: Dial Press, 1977),

p. 48, p. 133.

11. J. Rohwer and G. Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945, The Naval

History of World War Two (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992), p. 11.

12. John Herington, Air War Against Germany and Italy 1939-1945 (Canberra: Australian

War Memorial, 1954), pp. 25-26.

13. Hughes and Costello, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 130-31; Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-

1945, Volume I, The Defensive, pp. 615-16.

14. Deighton, Blood, Tears, and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II, pp. 104-5.

15. Cdr Jerry C. Russell, USN, Ultra and the Campaign Against The U–Boats in World War

II, Studies in Cryptology, NSA [National Security Agency], Document SRH-142 (Carlisle

Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, May 1980), p. 8; John Winton, Ultra at Sea (New

York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1988), pp. 94-95.

16. Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume I, The Defensive, p. 602; Terraine, A Time for Courage:

The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945, p. 403.

17. Headquarters First Air Force, Antisubmarine Command, 7 December 1941 to 15 October

1942, Vol. I: Text, Microfilm 00199294, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

18. Henry L. Stimson, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers,

1948), pp. 511-13.

19. Syrett, The Defeat of the German U–Boats: The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 13.

20. Hughes and Costello, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 167.

21. Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume I, The Defensive, p. 601.

22. Ibid., pp. 599-601, p. 614, p. 618.

23. Headquarters First Air Force, Antisubmarine Command, 7 December 1941 to 15 October

1942, Vol. I: Text, p. 58.

24. Ibid. p. 59.

25. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic September 1939-May 1943, Volume I in

History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and

Company, 1975), p. 240.
38

26. Quoted in Hughes and Costello, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 220.

27. Ibid., pp. 230-31.

28. Robert W. Love Jr., History of the U.S. Navy, Volume Two, 1942-1991 (Harrisburg:

Stackpole, 1992), pp. 80-82.

29. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume II, The Period of Balance, p. 202.

30. Information in this and the following tables is summarized from Rohwer and

Hummelschen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945, The Naval History of World War

Two, pp. 155-83.

31. Paul M. Sutcliffe, "Operational Research in the Battle of the Atlantic," in Howard and

Law, The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945, pp. 419-29.

32. Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945, p.

432.

33. Hughes and Costello, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 231.

34. Syrett, The Defeat of the German U–Boats: The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 15-16.

35. Henry Probert, "Allied Land-Based Anti-Submarine Warfare," in Howard and Law, The

Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945, p. 379.

36. Hughes and Costello, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 240, pp. 260-61.

37. Ibid., p. 252.

38. Denis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Volume 2,

The Fight Avails (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1974), p. 373, p. 375.

39. Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945, p.

446; "Antisubmarine Activities of the Army Air Forces Through I Bomber Command and

AAFAC," "SADU [Submarine Air Defense Unit]," ms. draft report in File 424.04C.057,

AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

40. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume II, The Period of Balance, pp. 470-71;

Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945, p. 450.

41. Probert, "Allied Land-Based Anti-Submarine Warfare," p. 385.

42. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 150.

43. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Company Books, 1948), p. 412-13.

44. Denis Richards, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Volume 1, The Fight at Odds (London: Her

Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1974), p. 39.

45. Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945,

pp. 98-100; Clajus Bekker, Hitler's Naval War, Frank Zeigler, trans. and ed. (New York:

Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 35-36.

46. Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945, pp.

101-3.

47. Information extracted from Rohwer and Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-

1945, pp. 28-317.

48. Vice Adm. Sir Arthur Hezlet, RN, Aircraft and Seapower (New York: Stein and Day,

1970), p. 186.

49. Bekker, Hitler's Naval War, pp. 384-85.

50. Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power (New York: The Free Press, 1992), pp. 242-43.

51. Quoted in Horst Boog,"Luftwaffe Support of the German Navy," p. 314.

52. Bekker, The Luftwaffe Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II, p. 267.
39

53. Air Ministry [U.K.], The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1939-1945), Air Ministry

Pamphlet No. 248 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), reprint of 1948 edition issued in

London, p. 113.

54. Capt S. W. Roskill, RN, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume II, The Period of Balance

(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 135-37.

55. Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1939-1945), p. 114.

56. See Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Volume II, The Period of Balance, pp. 139-42, on

the decision to scatter Convoy PQ.17.

57. Bekker, The Luftwaffe Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II, p. 270.

41

CHAPTER III

COASTAL AND MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS

During World War II land-based air power not only reached out into the vast Atlantic

in the naval battles of the Western hemisphere. It also became a vital element in the

destruction of coastwise trade, fishing fleets, and warships. Even before the war, these were

integral parts of the economic and naval strength of Allied and Axis countries, and the onset

of the conflict emphasized the significance of coastal waters. Vessels ranging from small

patrol boats to cruisers patrolled their own coasts and conducted offensive operations in

enemy waters. Coastal shipping assumed greater importance as wartime requirements

pushed road and rail transport to their limits. During the war western Europeans imported

less food and the harvests from coastal fisheries became more valuable to them.

Both sides identified the destruction or protection of coastwise maritime traffic as

military objectives of air and naval power. In addition to bombing and strafing, air forces

joined surface ships and submarines in mining coastal waters. Throughout the war, opposing

air arms also raided enemy air and naval bases.

Coastal Operations

The Royal Air Force (RAF) and Luftwaffe were the air arms most heavily engaged in

the coastal fight after hostilities began in 1939. British and German air roles reversed as the

war continued. During the first three years of the war RAF squadrons frequently found

themselves fully occupied elsewhere. Beginning in 1941, ever-smaller Luftwaffe resources

went from maritime operations to higher priority assignments.

Land-based air forces found it hard to fit smoothly into the fighting in restricted seas.

When they did participate, aviators on both sides often mistook their own ships for enemy

craft. Some in Britain and Germany questioned whether the cost in highly trained aircrews

and specially modified aircraft engaged in this campaign was not too high. Pilots and

navigators skilled in ocean navigation and critically needed elsewhere often died within sight

of land. Enemy action often destroyed scarce long-range aircraft capable of operating

hundreds of miles from land sometimes only an hour or two from their home airfields.

The coastal air campaign started almost as soon as the war broke out. Hermann

Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, established the 10th Fliegerdivison

on September 3, 1939. The new formation's purpose was to attack British shipping. That

same day the RAF sent fifty-four twin-engine Blenheim and single-engine Wellington

bombers over the North Sea in an unsuccessful effort to attack German shipping. The British

launched four more, much smaller, daylight bombing raids against the German fleet at Kiel

and Wilhelmshaven in 1939. They achieved little, suffered immense losses between 25 and

50 percent, and at first operated with political restrictions that denied any attacks German

ships if they were tied up to a dock. British leaders feared that if their bombs fell on German

soil it would provoke retaliatory terror bombing. Luftwaffe attacks on the British fleet at its

Forsyth and Scapa Flow anchorages likewise accomplished little.1 Aerial mining and

counter-air attacks began in November 1939. On the twentieth of that month, German sea

planes dropped forty-one mines off Britain's East Coast. The RAF retaliated a week later by

sending twelve Blenheim bombers against the sea planes' base Borkum Island, twenty-six

miles off German’s North Sea coast. A similar sequence of events took place in early

December. December also saw the first intensive raids on small merchant vessels sailing in
42

coastal waters. Fliegerkorps X grew out of an expanded 10th Fliegerdivision. Its bombers

attacked and sank ten small vessels, mostly trawlers, east of Britain between December 17

and 19. Raids between January 9 and 30 accounted for twelve freighters and one more

trawler. The first month of 1940 concluded with a large sweep of thirty-five twin-engine He

(Heinkel) 111s sinking two ships and damaging eight in a January 30 shipping strike over

the North Sea off Britain’s east coast.2

Land-based aircraft, actual and threatened, checked proposals for naval operations in

restricted waters. Concentrated Allied naval strength could easily overwhelm German surface

combatants. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the British Admiralty, suggested naval

intervention in the Baltic, but the threat of German air attacks caused rejection of the plan.3

The Luftwaffe first attacked Allied shipping in the narrow English Channel in March

1940. A KG (Kampfgruppe) 26 aircraft set the 8,441-ton passenger steamer Domala on fire

off the Isle of Wight on the night of March first. A subsequent attack on March 20 sank the

5,439-ton freighter Barn Hill near Beachy Head. In the Domala sinking, the RAF failed to

respond to repeated naval requests for assistance during and after the attack.4

Increased German Air Force activity over the Channel included airdropping sea mines.

Sea planes dropped twenty-four mines in Edinburgh Channel and the Downs on April 17.

They sank the 5,380-ton Hawnby and 1,037-ton Mersey. Sixty more aerial mines dropped on

April 21 and 22 sent five ships to the bottom.

When mine-dropping aircraft got the opportunity, they also attacked convoys. A destroyer

escorting Convoy FN52 engaged an He 115 twin-engine sea plane on its way to lay mines.

Three hours later the same aircraft returned to strafe the convoy but did not inflict serious

damage. Antiaircraft fire from the convoy failed to down the plane, although one destroyer

skipper thought his ship might have killed the sea plane's gunner.5

On May 10, 1940, Germany's blitzkrieg against Belgium, France, and Holland ended

the quiet which had settled over Western Europe that had lasted since September 1939.

Luftwaffe mining of Dutch ports supplemented ongoing mining of British and French harbors.

Nearly 600 airdropped mines threatened by mid-May to halt Allied shipping in the English

Channel and the North Sea. Air attacks on ships also increased. KG 4 He 111s sank a Dutch

destroyer plus the passenger ships Van Galen (28,291 tons) and Veendam (15,450 tons) at

Rotterdam.6

As the war in Western Europe intensified, air attacks did too. On May 10, the

destroyer Whitshed steamed out of Dover carrying a demolition party and explosives intended

to destroy Belgian and Dutch port facilities. Coordinated German medium altitude and divebombing hit the destroyer three miles off the Dutch coast. After several near misses, one

bomb exploded in midair near a gun mount. This detonated a second bomb also still in the

air. Blast and shrapnel killed or wounded many of the ship's crew and damaged the gun

mount, bridge, and superstructure. The bombs also ignited cordite stacked around the gun

mount which burned surviving crew members in the vicinity. Despite the damage and

casualties, the Whitshed completed her mission. After temporary repairs at Dover she sailed

again carrying munitions for Allied ships operating near Dunkirk.7

The Whitshed was lucky. Further Luftwaffe activity over the English Channel

underscored the vulnerability of ships operating without air cover. Six British destroyers sent

to aid the French at Dunkirk specifically because of their antiaircraft batteries demonstrated

this as they operated near the French coast between May 10 and May 19. The Valentine,

escorting a passenger ferry in the Scheldt on May 15, fell victim to two direct hits from

German dive bombers. One bomb penetrated to the boiler room. Its denotation caused one

boiler to explode. The combination of bomb and boiler blast killed twenty of the crew,
43

wounded twenty more, tore a large hole in the hull, and broke the ship's back.8 A second

destroyer, the Winchester, suffered extensive damage from near misses during bombing and

had to return to England for repairs. Near misses often caused casualties, damaged ships and

sometimes sank them. In many cases near misses were more destructive than direct hits.

On May 19 gull-winged single-engine Junkers Ju 87 Stukas re-attacked the Whitley.

With her boilers flooded and back broken, the destroyer ended up beached on the French

coast. Air attacks accounted for 50 percent of the destroyers sent to operate off the

Continent’s coast because of their anti-air armament, although two would rejoin the war at

sea after repairs.9

The Ju 87s proved to be excellent ship busters. When sufficient aircraft were available,

the number of dive bombers used in an attack depended on the type of target. German air

tacticians preferred a Staffel of nine planes for bombing warships up to the size of a light

cruiser. For larger ships they preferred a three-Staffel Gruppe of thirty aircraft. The Stukas

usually approached merchant ships from port or starboard, and attacked heavy warships

from several different directions at once. But they came at destroyers from astern so that

they could follow their high-speed evasive actions. Dives ideally began at 13,000-feet, with

bomb release at 1,600-feet and pull-out at 700 feet. Staffel attack formation was based on the

Luftwaffe's basic Kette formation of a leader and two wingmen astern. In Staffel-level

assaults, Kettes took the place of individual aircraft in a three-plane formation.10

The Battle of Dunkirk, May-June 1940

Luftwaffe sorties seriously hindered the reinforcement and resupply of the British

Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium. Constant raids forced the French Navy to

withdraw its large ships from Dunkirk and hampered British ships clearing mines and

patrolling sea lanes. A second group of French vessels leaving Dunkirk on May 20

experienced heavy casualties. Ju 87s flying from east of St. Quetin brushed aside a small

RAF patrol and their strikes forced abandonment of the tanker Salomé. The Pavon, carrying

1,500 Dutch soldiers, had to be beached after bombing. The minesweeper Niger burned and

went to the bottom. The destroyer L'Adroit also sank.11

British ships attacked by German aircraft included the trawler Rifsness, sunk; and the

destroyer Malcom, which was damaged and suffered casualties. Enemy air operations

interfered with other Allied vessels, driving them from their ports and operations areas. Five

French destroyers took refuge in English waters after days of dodging the relentless bombing

at Dunkirk.12

The air threat intensified when German army forces fought their way through to the

French coast. Luftwaffe planes operating from captured airfields were now only minutes away

from Channel waters. When Allied naval forces began to evacuate soldiers from Boulogne on

May 23-24, 1940, Ju 87s damaged the British destroyer Keith at the quay with a near miss.

At the same time, a near miss on the destroyer Whitshed outside the harbor damaged the

ship's gun mounts, killed her gunnery officer, and wounded another officer and several

sailors. During this attack other aircraft damaged the French destroyer Frondeur and sank

her sister ship, the Orage. The Luftwaffe did not interfere in a subsequent attempt to

evacuate troops that was covered by fifty of Britain’s premier fighter plane, the single-engine

Spitfire.13

Ju 87s also took a heavy toll of ships when the British decided to evacuate their forces

at Calais on May 24. Twenty-one dive bombers attacked the destroyers Wessex, Vimiera, and

Burza as the moved close to shore to provide covering bombardment. The third in a series of
44

passes put three bombs into the Wessex. They wrecked both of the destroyer's boilers, caused

engine room flooding, and blasted away her boats and forward funnel. She sank quickly. Two

other bombs hit and damaged the Burza and forced her return to Dover. Near misses slowed

the Vimiera but she was able to rescue Wessex survivors.14

The German pilots, most attacking ships for the first time, found them difficult

targets. "Staircase" dives, in which the pilots dove until they lost sight of their targets, pulled

out and re-sighted, then dove again provided an answer. But ships once in bomb sights

usually took evasive action at high speed.15

Just before 7:00 p.m. on May 26, 1940, the British Admiralty ordered Admiral Ramsay

at Dover to begin Operation Dynamo. Taking its name from the former dynamo room

tunneled into Dover Cliffs in which Ramsay had his operations center, the undertaking was

to evacuate Allied troops from Dunkirk on the other side of the English Channel. By the time

he received his orders, Ramsay had already dispatched the first evacuation ships toward

France. The most optimistic estimates were than 45,000 of the 338,000 British troops trapped

at Dunkirk could be rescued.16

To those below, it appeared that the Royal Air Force was unable to provide much air

cover. Luftwaffe planes seemed to operate almost at will over Allied war and merchant ships.

But the RAF was intercepting formations en route to or returning from Dunkirk and

destroying many bombers. All but three of Fighter Command's squadrons joined in the air

battle over Dunkirk at one time or another. Approximately 200 sturdy single-engine

Hurricanes and the faster, more maneuverable Spitfires were available for the contest. With

his forces outnumbered, Fighter Command's chief, Air Marshal Hugh Dowding and No. 11

Group's commander Air Vice Marshal Keith Park elected to provide strong, but not

continuous, air cover at Dunkirk. British air's intermittent appearance over the beaches led

Army and Navy personnel below to conclude that the RAF was doing little to assist the

evacuation.17

A few Hurricanes operating from Rouen, seventy-one miles northwest of Paris, helped

to cover the Dunkirk evacuation. The bulk of the RAF fighters could remain at Dunkirk for

a maximum of forty minutes before having to return to their bases, which were fifty to sixty

miles from Dunkirk. In all, Britain had about 200 fighters available to oppose Luftwaffe

efforts at Dunkirk. Because no radar information was available, Fighter Command had to

maintain standing patrols over the French port and the adjoining ten miles of beaches. It

could not do so on a continuous basis. The limited number of aircraft available meant that

the RAF could initially mount these air umbrellas only in squadron strength. As a result,

German bombers and their escorts usually outnumbered defending fighters by margins of

two-to-one or better. Poor intelligence also hindered RAF missions to Dunkirk. Information

on both friendly and enemy forces was inadequate. Intelligence that was available was based

on debriefing of returning aircrews and intercepted radio traffic. The RAF could obtain no

information on the German ground forces investing Dunkirk after the combined RAF/Army

Reconnaissance Mission left for England on May 27.18

Coastal Command patrolled with its own and borrowed Fleet Air Arm (FAA) aircraft

during daylight hours to intercept German ships that might interfere with the evacuation.

Coastal Command planes available included RAF Blenheim and twin-engine Hudson bombers

and FAA two-seater Skua and Roc attack aircraft. RAF No. 2 Group Blenheims provided

daytime close air support for Allied troops fighting a rearguard action while Bomber

Command flew at night to destroy German supply lines and communications.19

During Operation Dynamo, RAF sorties concerned with the evacuation tallied Fighter

Command 2,739; Bomber Command 651; and Coastal Command 171. Fighter Command alone
45

lost ninety-nine aircraft while Bomber and Coastal Commands lost forty-six more, not

including borrowed Fleet Air Arm planes.20

To interdict the evacuation ships, the Luftwaffe had 300 bombers and 550 fighters

available. The bombers, however, flew from western Germany and Holland while most of the

fighters were at forward airfields in France. In general, the Luftwaffe aircraft could remain

over Dunkirk for even shorter periods of time than RAF planes. By the time Operation

Dynamo began on May 27, 1940 Ju 87s could reach the port from newly captured airfields.

Because of their precision, the Stukas were the Luftwaffe's most effective ship-killers. When

they were not engaged elsewhere, twin-engine Ju 88 dive bombers, He 111s, and Do (Dornier)

17 twin-engine medium bombers seriously interfered with evacuation operations.21

On May 26, 1940, Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 received orders to mount maximum

effort against Dunkirk. Dornier 17s of KGs 1, 2, and 4 arrived from fields in Holland and

Germany over the port around dawn on May 27. Horizontal bombing soon wrecked Dunkirk's

harbor, set port oil storage tanks ablaze, ruined adjacent rail yards, and sank ships alongside

the docks. The largest to sink on May 27 was the 8,000-ton French ship Aden, which went

down at Dunkirk’s eastern breakwater. After 7:00 a.m., Ju 87s began attacking shipping the

harbor with 500 and 1,000-pound bombs released from an altitude of 1,500 feet. The dive

bombers then destroyed the lock gates leading to the inner harbor. Around 12:00 p.m., British

troops began leaving the town for the beaches outside Dunkirk. Simultaneous dive-bombing

of ships offshore damaged several and sent the French steamer Côte d'Azur to the bottom.

German air power made Dunkirk's inner harbor unusable. This forced the evacuation to be

made from moles and quays in the outer harbor and over nearby beaches. These were to the

east of Dunkirk and in order were Malo, Bray, and La Panne. This more difficult and slower

process cost many lives. It also destroyed or forced abandonment of much war matériel.22

Ships taking personnel out of Dunkirk and carrying them to England also risked air

attack while at sea. The normal, direct, sea passage from Dunkirk to Dover is only thirtynine miles but it passed close to Calais and exposed ships to fire from German artillery there.

On May 27, Allied minesweepers cleared a new, more northerly route of eighty-seven miles

that avoided German artillery but left ships exposed to air attack for longer periods. Finally

a central route, of only fifty-five miles, went into use.23

Mona’s Queen, a combined passenger and freight ship that normally plied the waters

between the Isle of Man in the English Channel and Dover, was the first ship to evacuate

troops from Dover on May 27. Although riddled by shrapnel from German artillery along the

coast and strafed by Luftwaffe planes, the packet took 1,420 troops back to Dover. The Queen

of the Channel, with 200 men aboard, sank after bombing on May 27. Other ships suffered

personnel casualties and damage from air raids, but no more sank that day. Up to midnight

May 27-28, 7,669 men left Dunkirk on evacuation ships. The Germans lost sixty-four aircrew

and twenty-three aircraft over Dunkirk on the first day of Operation Dynamo.24

Fortunately for the Allies, weather over Luftwaffe-occupied airfields in France used

deteriorated on May 28. This combined with low hanging clouds, dusk, and smoke at Dunkirk

to frustrate most Luftwaffe interference with the evacuation on that day. Bombers did sight

some ships as they neared England. The destroyer Windsor, carrying hundreds of troops, had

boiler damage and casualties as a result of near misses by bombs. Another Royal Navy

destroyer, the Grenade, succumbed to bombs while along Dunkirk’s east pier. Abandoned

around 6:00 p.m. because of uncontrollable fires, the warship blew up several hours later.25

On the evening of May 28 seven passenger ships, three hospital carriers, and two

destroyers embarked men from the east breakwater of Dunkirk’s Harbor. At the same time,

some twenty destroyers, nineteen minesweepers, seventeen fishing boats, from twenty to forty
46

small Dutch coastal craft of 200 tons each (called “schuts”) five coasting vessels, and a

number of small boats took men off the beaches. The difficulty of moving men from the

beaches to larger ships in small boats during the night was reflected by the fact that of the

more than 17,000 troops evacuated that night, only 6,000 came off the beaches despite the

large number of ships and boats involved in the effort.26

Good weather allowed German dive bombers to renew their operations over Dunkirk

on May 29. They faced more intense, but less frequent opposition from the Royal Air Force.

The British Air Ministry changed its previous orders for continuous air coverage and allowed

the RAF to concentrate its strength in fewer patrols. This enabled Fighter Command to send

sorties of up to four squadrons to Dunkirk at a time. During eleven of seventeen daylight

hours the British air umbrella was stronger, but for the six remaining hours of daylight no

RAF planes covered the evacuation area at Dunkirk. Despite Royal Air Force claims to have

established air superiority over the evacuation, many ships succumbed to air attack or lost

many killed and wounded to bombing and strafing by three Geschwader (three Gruppen) of

Ju 87s and one Geschwader of Ju 88s.27 A near miss slowed the destroyer Gallant but she

was able to reach Dover. The Jaguar, laden with troops, took a bomb that left her holed and

dead in the water but other ships took off the soldiers and towed the destroyer back to

England. A bomb exploding on the quay devastated the nearby French destroyer Mistral.

Another bomb penetrated the deck of the paddle steamer Fenella to kill or wound many of

the troops she was attempting to rescue. Then a near miss that caved in her hull sank her.

A second paddle steamer, the Crested Eagle, took off Fenella survivors only to be dive-bombed

into a burning wreck herself. Precision bombing also sank three other ships, the

minesweeping trawlers Calvin and Polly Johnson and the transport King Orry at this time.

Luftwaffe activity continued to exact a toll from evacuation ships until the end of the day.

The paddle minesweeper Gracie Fields sank while being towed into port after bomb damage.

The destroyer Intrepid did make it home but sustained serious damage from bombs. Bombs

caused the sloop Bideford to be beached and sent the destroyer Saladin back into Dover. Ju

87s also set the 6,900-ton merchant ship Clan MacAlister afire and forced her abandonment.

Later on May 29, bombs damaged the transport St. Julian and the destroyer Sabre. The

Luftwaffe then finished off the French destroyer Sirocco, which E-boats had previously

torpedoed. German surface ships and submarines added to the toll of Allied casualties on

May 29. E-boat S-30 torpedoed the Royal Navy destroyer Wakeful as it headed back to Dover

with 640 troops embarked. Only those personnel on deck at the time the torpedo struck

survived. The Royal Navy trawler Comfort was also a casualty of the action. She was close

enough to the Wakeful to start sinking a result of the S-30's torpedoes and then was fired

upon by the destroyer Grafton, which mistook her for an enemy ship. When Comfort

survivors tried to climb aboard the Grafton, the destroyer’s crew shot them down in the belief

that they were a German boarding party. When the Grafton closed in to rescue Wakeful

survivors, she fell victim to a torpedo fired by the Nazi submarine U62. Loss of so many of

the Royal Navy's badly-needed escort ships led First Sea Lord Dudley Pound to withdraw his

modern destroyers from the evacuation for two days, until June 1.28

Rain and fog prevented Luftwaffe bombers from operating on May 30. Then German

air attacks at Dunkirk decreased in intensity on May 31, 1940, as other missions in France

drew the Luftwaffe's attention. Allied naval losses to bombing and strafing continued

nonetheless. The Luftwaffe raided Dunkirk about every thirty minutes and German artillery

fire made use of Dunkirk Harbor even more hazardous. Nevertheless, evacuation continued

from the harbor and the beaches. Operation Dynamo lifted more than 22,000 men from the

beaches east of Dunkirk and another 45,000 men from Dunkirk harbor. The destroyers
47

Gallant, Greyhound, and Jaguar steamed home for repairs necessitated by bombs. Near

misses forced another destroyer, the Harvester, to withdraw. Bombing also affected the

operating capacities of the corvette Kingfisher and the destroyer Anthony. High-speed evasive

action taken by Allied ships in restricted water to avoid bombs also led collisions that

damaged several ships. The passenger ships Brighton Queen and Scotia sank during bombing

and the Prague, with 3,000 French troops on board, was seriously damaged.29

Clear weather on June 1 again brought air-delivered devastation to the Allied ships

off Dunkirk. German air attacks sank more than thirty ships on this day alone. In the face

of light, sporadic RAF fighter cover, single-engine Luftwaffe Me (Messerschmitt) 109 and

twin-engine Me 110 fighters escorted Ju 87s and Ju 88s over the evacuation area. A shortage

of antiaircraft ammunition on the ships below also facilitated German dive and level

bombing.30

Stukas reached the evacuation area at 7:30 a.m. on June 1, between RAF air cover

scheduled at 6:00 a.m. and at 9:00 a.m. A bomb from a Ju 87 blew away a boiler room

bulkhead and severed steam and fuel supply lines on the destroyer Basilisk soon after the

ship arrived. This killed all the engine and boiler room personnel and immobilized the ship.

Subsequent near misses by dive bombers caused extensive flooding and cracked her upper

deck and sides. After an ineffective horizontal bombing attack, more Ju 87s dive bombed and

sank the Basilisk.

31

While the Luftwaffe attacked the Basilisk, it also made a target of the destroyer Keith,

down to her last thirty rounds of antiaircraft ammunition. The Keith avoided direct hits by

taking violent evasive action. Near misses jammed her rudder. A second dive-bombing assault

put a bomb down her aft funnel. Its explosion wrecked the destroyer's boiler room and caused

severe flooding. Then a third attack delivered a bomb under the destroyer's bridge that

caused her to capsize. A small Belgian fishing boat rescued some of the survivors. They died

soon after when Ju 88 dive-bombing sank that vessel.32

The Luftwaffe destroyed or damaged other Allied ships at Dunkirk in the morning of

June 1 including the minesweepers Skipjack and Salamander, the destroyers Ivanhoe,

Vivacious, and Havant, the gunboat Mosquito, and the passenger ship Prague. Of these the

Havant and Mosquito went to the bottom, the Prague had to be beached, and the others

sustained serious damage.33

Another wave of dive bombers arrived at Dunkirk around noon. These capsized the

French destroyer Foudroyant. Then they bombed and machine-gunned many of the small

craft trying to rescue surviving crew and soldiers the destroyer had been trying to evacuate.

Near simultaneous Ju 87 runs at the troop transport Scotia scored several hits, including one

bomb down her funnel. These blows caused the ship, which had 2,000 French soldiers aboard,

to sink quickly. Other troop transports sunk or damaged by this wave of Stukas included the

Brighton Queen and the Maid of Orleans. The Stukas also sank many smaller vessels such

as the drifter Lord Cavan and the French naval auxiliaries Denis, Papin, Venus, and

Moussaillon.

34

The Luftwaffe scored heavily on June 1 and by then the Germans had heavy artillery

in place on the French coast to threaten the evacuation routes from the beaches. This forced

the Allies to totally abandon daylight evacuation attempts after that date. The Luftwaffe did

not attempt night bombing of the evacuation area. Troops waiting to be rescued remained on

the beach exposed to bombing, shelling, and machine-gunning during daylight hours. Troops

going safely aboard ships at night returned to risk when daylight came. Luftwaffe attacks on

ships still at sea on the morning of June 2 accounted for the personnel ship Mona's Isle and

the hospital ship Paris. Bombing damaged the former and forced abandonment of the latter.
48

Another hospital ship, the Worthington, suffered bomb damage en route to Dunkirk and had

to return to England.35

By the evening of June 2, the Allies had evacuated a major part of the British

Expeditionary Force and many French and Polish soldiers from Dunkirk, despite fierce air

attacks, E-boat and U-boat activity, and artillery fire. Allied navies then continued their

efforts to rescue the French troops who had been fighting a rearguard action against

advancing German forces. On the night of June 2-3, the destroyers Venomous, Windsor, and

Winchester plus the passenger ships King George, St. Helier, Royal Sovereign, and Rouen took

more than 50,000 evacuees off the beaches and out of Dunkirk Harbor. Another 26,176 troops

left Dunkirk by sea on the night of June 3-4 but when German troops were only three miles

from Dunkirk Harbor, evacuation had to be stopped. In all, 338,000 Allied troops made it to

England although without their vehicles and heavy weapons. This included almost all of the

British soldiers and over 100,000 French troops surrounded at Dunkirk. The Allies lost six

British and three French destroyers in Operation Dynamo and had nineteen other of the

much-needed light combatants damaged. Of the forty-five personnel ships involved, nine were

sunk and eight were so badly damaged they had to be withdrawn from service. The Royal

Navy also implemented plans to sink blockships in Dunkirk harbor. Luftwaffe aircraft by this

time were preparing to join in fighting further south so there was little air opposition to the

last Allied evacuation activity at Dunkirk.36

The Luftwaffe significantly helped the German forces interfere with Allied vessels

while they extricated another 191,800 troops from other French ports. At LeHavre,

continuous bombing forced a halt to evacuation efforts and destroyed the personnel ship

Bruges and Train Ferry No. 2. Also at LeHavre the destroyers Bulldog and Boadicea ran

afoul of Ju 87s. Six Stukas dived at the Bulldog, three from either side. Several near misses

shook the ship. Then a bomb penetrated the deck to the engine room and bounced out of the

hull just above the waterline. Another bomb blew out the side of the Bulldog's port boiler

while a third bomb lodged in the starboard boiler without exploding. After the crippled ship

was towed into Portsmouth for repairs, a demolitions expert defused the bomb. The Ju 87s

had released their bombs from such low altitudes that impact had damaged fuzes on the two

bombs that did not explode.37

Dive bombers also damaged Boadicea while she rescued soldiers and refugees from the

French coast. Swooping in toward the ship in flights of three aircraft, the Ju 87s dropped

some near misses on the ship's starboard side before sending three bombs into her engine

room and after boiler room. The explosions killed or wounded most of the engine room and

boiler room personnel, caused flooding that threatened the ship, and put her radios out of

commission. Only the chance arrival of the British destroyer Ambuscade, which gave her a

tow, saved the Boadicea.

38

The Luftwaffe did not attack Allied troops evacuating through Biscay ports until June

17. On that day, air raids began on a large number of ships assembled for the evacuation. A

Do 17 set the 16,243-ton liner Lancastria, which had thousands of troops aboard, afire. At

least 5,000 died. 39

Over 100 Royal Navy warships, a smaller number of French Navy ships, and many

naval auxiliaries took troops off Dunkirk's moles, quays, and beaches. Many of the same

ships rescued Allied troops from other ports. Bombing and strafing destroyed twenty-two of

the warships and a large number of civilian ships involved. Many others suffered damaged

that took months to repair.

The evacuation once again demonstrated the vulnerability of ships to air attack. It

also proved that the Luftwaffe alone could not completely thwart Allied maritime operations.
49

Germany's air force did not have enough pilots and planes to do this while concurrently

providing close air support for the Wermacht on other battlefields. Luftwaffe losses over

Dunkirk totaled 240 aircraft between May 26 and June 3, while the RAF lost 177 planes

supporting Operation Dynamo.40

Coastal Campaign, Part II

Once the naval forces evacuated all of the Allied troops from the Continent, the

fighting in the waters between Britain and Europe entered a new phase. Royal Navy ships

and small craft countered German E-boats, destroyers, and minelayers. The RAF, recovering

from heavy losses incurred during the fighting in France and rebuilding in anticipation of

what became the Battle of Britain, could contribute little. The Luftwaffe, rebuilding after the

campaign across France, also had limited resources to devote to the fighting. Colonel

Johannes Fink, Channel-zone bomber commander, received orders to close the English

Channel to enemy shipping. For this he could use KG 2's bombers, two Stuka Gruppen, and

the fighters of JG (Jagdeschwader) 51.41

Ten days after the evacuation was over, Me 109s strafed Dover and an He 111

attacked the destroyer Codrington patrolling off the English coast. Then on July 2 the

steamer Aeneas was abandoned outside Portland with the loss of twenty-one crew members

after being hit by two bombs. These incidents preceded strong raids that established German

air mastery over the English Channel during daylight hours.

On July 4 Convoy OA178, with fourteen merchant ships and two escorting destroyers

was on its way to the Atlantic when the Germans subjected it to heavy air assault. Two

Gruppen of Stukas, each carrying one 550-pound and two 110-pound bombs, attacked after

radar tracked the convoy and determined it was without air cover. Four freighters: the 5,255-

ton Britsum, the 4,952-tons Dallas City, 1,796-ton Deucalion, and the 3,526-ton Kalga from

Convoy OA178 went to the bottom, as did the auxiliary Antiaircraft ship Foyle Bank. Six

other vessels in the convoy took heavy damage. Other ships assembled in Portland Harbor

and waiting to join the convoy then became targets for the dive bombers. This cost the Allies

the anti-aircraft ship Foyle Bank and one tug sunk plus three merchantmen damaged. The

devastation of British shipping led Winston Churchill to order that all Channel convoys

should have six-plane escorts. He additionally directed that no more big ships should be

risked in the restricted waters between England and the continent. This forced serious

difficulty in the loading and unloading of convoys bringing supplies into Britain or moving

them to other theaters of the war.42

Coastwise convoys of smaller ships carrying coal which was critical to Britain's war

effort continued to provide lucrative targets for the Luftwaffe. In addition to destruction

wreaked on the convoy's valuable cargoes, threats to them drew RAF fighters and Royal Navy

escorts into a war of attrition with the Luftwaffe.

Twenty Do 17s escorted by twenty fighters drew out the RAF to defend a coastal

convoy traveling west on July 10, 1940. The air defense caused hasty, high altitude bombing

that sank only one small coaster. The next day, Ju 87s raided Portland Harbor. They sank

the patrol ship Warrior II, the tanker Kylemount, and the steamer Eleanor Brooke. The dive

bombers also damaged the City of Melbourne and the Peru while He 111s bombed Portsmouth

itself. This began a series of air raids that ranged along England's eastern coast over the next

several days.

On July 19, Do 17s sank the oiler War Sepoy at Dover, sent the destroyer Griffin into

dock for repairs, and badly damaged the drifter Golden Gift and the tug Simla. On July 20
50

a force of about thirty Stukas and thirty fighters assaulted Convoy CW7. Despite substantial

RAF air cover, the convoy lost the destroyer Brazen and the coaster Pulborough. Another

destroyer and another freighter had damage. On July 21 Stukas sank two more steamers in

a westbound channel convoy.43

Hermann Göring boasted to Hitler that he could make possible a cross-channel

invasion. On July 22 he ordered the Luftwaffe to close England's channel ports with minelaying and bombing. Three days later Convoy CW8 received one of the heaviest air assaults

to date. Ninety Ju 87s and Ju 88s with a fighter escort brushed aside an RAF patrol to sink

five and damage five of the twenty-one ships in the convoy while it was at sea. Later attacks

sank more of the convoy's ships once they had anchored in Dover's harbor. When British

destroyers sortied to intercept E-boats sent to finish off the convoy's stragglers, Luftwaffe

planes sent the Boreas and Brillant back to Dover under tow.44

The Stukas plus bomb-carrying Me 109s that could launch high-speed low-level

attacks quickly drove the Royal Navy's destroyers from Dover, which was the most likely

point for a cross-channel invasion. Me 109s carrying a single 550-pound bomb first appeared

on July 27 flying low enough to prevent radar warning of their approach. Speeding over

Dover harbor from the landward side early in the afternoon, four of the German fighters

dropped two near misses that wrecked the destroyer Walpole's propulsion plant. Late in the

afternoon eight Me 109s plus twelve Me 110s carrying 500 and 1,000-pound bombs broke the

destroyer Codrington's back and sank the depot ship Sandhurst. On the same day, bombs

sent the destroyer Wren to the bottom off the Suffolk coast. Luftwaffe bombers returned on

July 29 to finish off the ships remaining at Dover while the destroyer Delight was caught at

sea and sunk.

Göring's air force had cleared the way for a daylight invasion at Dover, but the

invasion force was not ready. The Luftwaffe continued for a short while to create heavy losses

in Britain's coastwise convoys but at increasing cost. Convoy CW9 of twenty-five ships

received heavy E-boat and Stuka attacks. Bombing sank or damaged several of the convoy's

ships but the Germans lost thirty-one aircraft to RAF interceptors and antiaircraft fire.45

German fighter squadrons found it impossible to protect the Stukas during their dives

and reassembly. The Me 109s, without dive brakes, could not follow the Ju 87s down and it

was not possible to provide fighter protection at all levels between the start of a Stuka's dive

and its pull-out. The same problems prevented RAF fighters from attacking the Ju 87s during

their dives, but they found them easy targets as the individual aircraft pulled up to

reassemble.46

Attacking the coastal convoys, the Luftwaffe sank or damaged one ship in three in the

coastal convoys and sent about 24,000 tons of shipping to the bottom during the summer of

1940. But on August 13, Göring began to divert Germany's bombers to targeting naval bases,

airfields, and radar stations. He believed it was time to move on to the next stage of aerial

preparation of the invasion: destruction of Britain's defensive facilities.47

Germany almost won this second phase of the Battle of Britain. Other sources describe

that battle fully. The Luftwaffe's diversion to terror bombing of Britain's cities cut short a

near successful campaign to destroy the Royal Air Force. Allied vessels risked air attack in

waters east of the British Isles for sometime to come but the Luftwaffe never reestablished

its air superiority there. Increasing RAF opposition plus dispersion of German air strength

precluded a return to the conditions prevailing in the early summer of 1940.

The Germans redirected some of their aircraft flying maritime missions to the

bombing of British population centers. Many of the Stukas withdrew from shipping attacks

and prepared to support German army troop assembling for the invasion of England. Others
51

assaulted Britain's airfields, incurring heavy losses. When the invasion did not take place,

the surviving dive-bomber units went to the Russian front or to the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean Maritime Air Campaign

For Italy, the Mediterranean Sea was the only link to the African colonies which its

leaders saw as her natural right. For Germany, the Mediterranean was a peripheral concern

until Mussolini's activities there provoked a British reaction that endangered its weaker ally.

For Britain, the Mediterranean provided access to its Egyptian protectorate, to Middle

Eastern oil fields, and to the Suez Canal. The canal cut 3,500 miles from the sea route to the

British empire's colonies in India and the Far East. It was also the avenue to what Winston

Churchill described as Nazi-conquered Europe's "soft underbelly."

The British-dominated Straits of Gibraltar separated the Mediterranean Sea from the

Atlantic Ocean. The sea’s eastern and western basins of are demarked by the boot of Italy,

Sicily, and Malta in the north and by Tunisia in the south. Stretching from east to west for

a maximum of 2,300 miles, the Mediterranean never exceeds 500 miles on a north-to-south

axis. It is studded with islands suitable for airfields. In World War II, land-based air power

changed forever the sea's centuries-old tradition of sea warfare.

Mussolini, anxious to take advantage of Hitler's conquest of France and likely defeat

of Great Britain, declared Italy at war with those two countries on June 11, 1940. He stated

his intent to be a parallel war, alongside Germany but for Italy.

Land-based air made its first significant contribution in the Mediterranean in late

June and early July 1940. Aircraft on both sides began to inflict losses and influence sea

battles. As was the case in the Battle of the Atlantic, interception and decryption of enemy

radio traffic played an important part. The opposing sides often knew the schedules of their

enemies' convoys, when their fleets were at sea, and what missions their aircraft were on.48

Radio traffic analysis and code-breaking between 1941 and 1943 provided the Allies with

almost daily notice about routes and sailing times of Axis ships setting out to supply German

and Italian forces fighting in North Africa.49

RAF maritime patrols from Malta soon demonstrated the island's significance as an

air base. RAF No. 230 Squadron Sunderlands four-engine flying boats based there sank the

Italian submarines Anfrite, Argonauta, Rubino, and Sirena, all in the last days of June.50

Britain's war cabinet approved placing more air and sea strike forces on the island, but

planners said that not until April 1941 could these become fully operational.51 Italian naval

authorities had recommended occupation of the island in the event of war with Britain.

Fortunately, Italy's supreme command dismissed the idea, believing that the Italian Air Force

(Regia Aeronautica) could neutralize Malta without the cost of a sea-borne invasion.52

On June 28, 1940, another RAF Sunderland located an Italian force of three

destroyers and two torpedo boats, which were making an experimental supply run between

Taranto and Tobruk. The latter port was much closer to the front between British and Italian

armies fighting in North Africa. One Italian destroyer fell victim to British salvoes but the

remaining ships reached Tobruk. On July 5, nine of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm

Swordfish biplanes took off from an airfield at Sidi Barrani on Egypt’s northwest coast to

make a torpedo attack on the Italian ships at Tobruk. They sank the destroyer Zeffro and

caused her sister ship, the Euro, heavy damage. The Swordfish also damaged the 15,000-ton

Italian liner Liguria, finished off the 3,955-ton freighter Manzoni, and damaged another

merchant ship they found in the port. During the raid RAF fighters prevented defending

Italian aircraft at Tobruk from interfering.53
52

Two days later, large British and Italian naval formations put to sea. Admiral Sir

Andrew Cunningham, commander-in-chief of Britain's Mediterranean Fleet, led the British

ships out of Alexandria harbor on July 7. His force, composed of three battleships, an old

carrier, five cruisers, and fifteen destroyers sailed in three elements. Its mission was to

protect two convoys evacuating servicemen and dependents from Malta to Egypt. The Italian

fleet simultaneously and coincidentally sent two battleships and five cruiser divisions out to

protect a five-ship convoy en route from Naples to Benghazi. When air reconnaissance from

Malta discovered the Italian warships, the British convoys were delayed while the British

fleet moved to intercept the Italian vessels on their return from Benghazi.54

Using more than 200 aircraft, the Italian Air Force subjected the British ships to

continuous high altitude daylight bombing. A Fleet Air Arm pilot later commented that the

Italian pilots always flew at the same altitude and maintained perfect formation despite

fighter opposition.55 In this particular attack the Italians scored only one hit, on the cruiser

Gloucester. That bomb, exploding on the bridge, killed the ship's captain and seventeen crew

members. Italian planes also occasionally attacked their own ships during the engagement

but caused no losses. Neither Fleet Air Arm fighters from the carrier Eagle nor antiaircraft

fire from Cunningham's other ships harmed the bombers. The surface engagement that

followed, called Punta Stilo by the Italians and Calabria by the British, off the boot of Italy

ended inconclusively. The Italians retired into Messina Strait. The British ships turned

toward Malta to pick up the convoys56

Cunningham took the convoys safely to Alexandria despite a renewal of high-level

bombing. Over two-thousand 100 and 250kg bombs splattered among the British ships, doing

some damage with near misses. The Italian air raids reinforced Cunningham's concern for

the threat of land-based air attack. He requested two or three of the newer Queen Elizabeth

battleships with high-angle armament and an armored deck carrier. While ineffective, the

Regia Aeronautica's participation in the sea battle forced the British to consider sending

major warships badly needed elsewhere into the Mediterranean. The meager results of this

air assault and others like it led the Italians between 1941 and 1943 to convert most of their

high-altitude bomber groups to torpedo-bomber conversions of S 79 (Savoia-Marchetti) threeengine bombers, or to adopt Ju 87s provided by Germany.57

In late September 1940 Britain urgently began building up Malta's defenses. Escorts

of two convoys easily dealt with torpedo boat and submarine attacks. An air-launched torpedo

blew the bow off the cruiser Liverpool as she returned to Alexandria on October 14.58

When Mussolini invaded Greece on October 28, 1940, British troops landed the next

day to assist the Greeks. Efforts to support them further exposed British naval forces to landbased air attack. Mussolini's rash action did give the British access to Greek airfields from

which they might have threatened Germany's access to Romanian oil or bombed Italy.

This infuriated Hitler and he sent Fliegerkorps X from Norway to the Mediterranean.

The angry Führer predicted that the formation, specially trained in maritime work, would

make the Mediterranean "the grave of the British Fleet."

General der Fleiger Geisler’s Fleigerkorps X reported directly to the German Air

Ministry. Geisler controlled 120 Ju 88 and He 111s, 150 Ju 87s, twenty reconnaissance

aircraft, and forty Me 110 long-range fighters. His pilots trained intensively in the tactics

necessary to sink an armored deck aircraft carrier. They practiced on a floating simulation

of a carrier such as the ones the British operated in the Mediterranean. German aerial

tacticians estimated that four direct hits could sink one of the British flattops.59

The Luftwaffe force could harass the British fleet from bases in southern Italy, Sicily,

and Tripoli. In addition its maritime mission, Hitler charged Fleigerkorps X with support of
53

German armored units sent to North Africa to aid the Italians. The German dictator also told

Mussolini to return Italy's bomber squadrons, which were raiding England from Belgian

airfields, to the Mediterranean.60

Another inconclusive surface engagement between the British and Italians in late

November 1940 generated more high-level bombing by the Regia Aeronautica. It did little

harm. But it reinforced the Italian Navy's lack of faith in its air support. Despite a lack of

aggressiveness, the Italian Navy nevertheless managed to deliver 50,000 to 80,000 tons of

supplies to Axis forces in Africa each month with a loss of only 3 to 8 percent of the ships

involved. The RAF laid many of the mines that accounted for a quarter of the ships Italy

ships lost in this effort.61

Axis land-based aircraft also contributed to the fight for the Mediterranean. Two S 79s

from the Regia Aeronautica put torpedoes into the cruiser Glasgow on December 3 as she lay

in Suda Bay off Crete. Then on January 8, 1941, Italian aircraft attacked a British force at

sea on convoy escort duty only to be driven off by fighters from the carrier Ark Royal.

Two days later, on January 10, some of Fleigerkorps X's Stukas flying from Sicily dove

at the convoy while it fended off Italian torpedo planes. The Italians brought the carrier

Illustrious' Fulmar fighters down low over the sea. The fighters’ descent to low altitude left

the carrier exposed to the Ju 87s above. Forty-three Stukas attacked in the first wave. Ten

attacked other ships to divert their antiaircraft fire. The remaining dive bombers hit the

flattop with six bombs while three near misses also damaged the ship. One bomb struck a

port side antiaircraft position and plunged through the ship's hull before exploding at water

level. Splinters flew through the hull. A second bomb ignited the carrier's paint locker.

Controlled flooding put out the fire. Then a third bomb blew up over a starboard antiaircraft

gun and caused many casualties. A 1,100-pound armored-piercing projectile followed. It

toppled over the aft aircraft elevator as it descended with a two-seater Fulmar fighter and

crew. This created a large number of killed and wounded and destroyed thirteen fighters in

the hangar. A second large bomb plunged after the first in the hangar. Its explosion killed

most of the damage control party and set off stored ammunition and aviation fuel. About the

same time yet another bomb exploded near the forward elevator and sent it upward, while

adding to the inferno below decks. One plane in a second wave of Stukas dropped a 1,000-

pound bomb on the after flight deck. The bomb penetrated the armored deck to wipe out offduty officers in the wardroom before wrecking the carrier's ammunition conveyor. New fires

started but heroic efforts got them under control. Temporary repairs at Malta enabled the

stricken ship to reach Alexandria. Although subjected to incessant bombing there, the carrier

eventually got underway for an American shipyard where she remained out of the war for

a year.62

On July 11 a small British force that had been detached to see a crippled destroyer

into port received a twelve-plane Stuka attack. The aircraft involved were those that had

earlier bombed the Illustrious. Since the Ju 87s were operating at the extreme limit of their

range, an He 111 served as their pathfinder. One of the Stuka’s bombs hit the cruiser

Gloucester's fire control tower and wrecked the bridge. Two others severely damaged the

cruiser Southampton. The first bomb hit the wardroom and the second exploded in the petty

officers' mess, killing and wounding many of the crew. Uncontrollable fires started in the

engine room and the Southampton went dead in the water. The British deemed her

unsalvageable and sank her with their own gunfire. The Luftwaffe, it was clear, presented

a new and real danger to Allied ships in the Mediterranean.63

On January 20, 1941, the Luftwaffe's II/KG 26 reinforced Rhodes with seventeen He

111s. A few Ju 88s configured for reconnaissance and Ju 52 corrugated-metal twin-engine
54

transports supported the bombers. By February 8, when German units designated as the

Afrika Korps sailed from Naples for North Africa, the Luftwaffe had driven the Royal Navy's

surface ships from Malta to Alexandria. Only a few submarines remained to interfere with

German tanks and troops rushing to aid the Italians.

The Afrika Korps quickly isolated the British garrison at Tobruk, which depended on

the city's port for re-supply and for evacuation of casualties. Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica

interdiction made destroyers and fast minesweepers the preferred ships for this effort. They

alone had speed to sail under cover of winter darkness; reach Tobruk, unload and load; and

steam to safety before daylight brought Stukas over the harbor again. Larger ships necessary

to bring fuel and vehicles into Tobruk had to remain throughout the day and survived with

difficulty.64

One of Italy's newly-converted Ju 87 units, 239 Squadriagle, moved to North Africa

in May 1941. The ten-aircraft squadron concentrated on disrupting British shipping going

into Tobruk. On May 25 its dive-bombers sank the 3,470-ton transport Hekla in Tobruk

harbor and the Royal Navy sloop Grimsby outside. Thirty days later the 239th destroyed the

antiaircraft sloop Auckland off Tobruk. Then on June 29, seven Ju 87s from the Squadriagle

hit the destroyer Waterhen as she carried troops to Tobruk. Most of the troops survived, but

the 1918-vintage ship sank early on June 30. Less than two weeks passed before the Italian

unit's bombers managed to sink the destroyer Defender, which had rescued the Waterhen's

crew and passengers.65

Each side in the Mediterranean air-sea fight now focused on safely escorting supplies

and reinforcements to its own forces fighting in North Africa and in Greece. At the same

time, the opposing navies and air forces worked to deny similar opportunity to their

opponents. Island and coastal bases from which to do this were of vital importance to both

sides.

A typical engagement took place on February 21, 1941. The old carrier Eagle with

Fulmar and Sea Gladiator biplane fighters aboard met the merchant ships Clan Macauley

and Breconshsire en route to Alexandria. When five He 111s from II/KG 26 on Rhodes

attacked late in the afternoon, the fighters took off to intercept them. They shot down one

Heinkel and damaged another. Despite the fighters one German plane sent a bomb down the

Clan Macaulay's funnel but it went out through the ship's hull without exploding.66

Malta remained a major concern to Italy and Germany. Increased bombing in early

March 1941 forced a temporary withdrawal of the RAF's few remaining bombers and flying

boats to Egypt. This left British air strength on the island down to less than ten Hurricanes.67

Allied aircraft operating from Crete likewise impinged on Axis naval operations. Fleet

Air Arm Swordfish (“Stringbag”) biplane torpedo planes plus Fulmar and Buffalo monoplane

fighters from No. 805 and 806 Squadrons constituted British air strength on the island. RAF

photo reconnaissance and bomber aircraft also staged from the island for particular missions.

On April 5, 1941, six Blenheims of RAF No. 30 Squadron were added to the island's air

strength.68

When a strong Italian force sortied to intercept a British convoy in late March, British

warships from Alexandria steamed out to meet it. In the resulting engagement, the Italian

ships retired when Fleigerkorps X air cover failed to materialize. As the Mussolini's warships

retreated, Fleet Air Arm Swordfish and RAF Blenheims based on Crete attacked. Planes from

the Royal Navy carrier Formidable joined them.

A series of sorties against the Italian fleet during the afternoon of March 28, 1941

climaxed just after three o'clock. Five torpedo planes flew low over the water to approach the

battleship Vittorio Veneto from astern. As they neared the ship, the British aircraft separated
55

to make torpedo runs from different directions. At the same time Fulmar fighters strafed the

battleship's bridge and gun mounts. The Veneto's guns sent one plane into the sea, but

another's torpedo hit the ship's port side. The explosion disabled the battleship's port screws,

shut down its engines temporarily, and caused extensive flooding. The Veneto regained power

with a few minutes and limped home at nineteen knots. Two hours later, the Luftwaffe gave

its answer to what had been a frantic Italian call for air cover. Because location of the British

naval force was unknown, said the German aviators, they might attack Italian rather than

Allied ships. The Italian fleet suffered a last blow from the air when one of nine carrier

aircraft attacking put a torpedo into the heavy cruiser Pola at dusk.69

A surface engagement waged at night, the Battle of Matapan, followed. Italy lost three

heavy cruisers, two destroyers, and 2,400 naval personnel. The Luftwaffe arrived over the

scene only on the following day in the form of a Ju 88 reconnaissance aircraft. It came just

in time to discourage Royal Navy ships from rescuing Italian survivors.

Fleigerkorps X's late appearance led to bitter recriminations between the Italians and

Germans. It also made the Mussolini's navy skeptical of support from either the Italian or

German air forces. Italian naval commanders became increasingly reluctant to challenge the

British fleet. Shortly after the battle, the Italian Supreme Command directed Italy's

battleships not to operate beyond the range of fighter protection. Matapan also led Mussolini

to reverse a previous decision. He permitted the Italian Navy to begin building aircraft

carriers. Construction began on two, although neither reached completion before Italy

capitulated in 1943.70

The Luftwaffe, while failing in this instance to give adequate support to Italy's navy,

had better success in interdicting British convoys en route to Greek harbors. Even before

Germany officially entered the war against Greece on April 6, 1941, her air attacks had

destroyed twenty-five badly needed Allied merchant ships.

On March 18 the British dispatched the thirteen ships of Convoy AN-21 from

Alexandria to Greece. A four-ship convoy (MW-6) bound for Malta left Alexandria two days

later. Ju 88s attacked both convoys. Fighter cover drove one bomber away from MW-6 and

sent the other into the sea. Four more Ju 88s, from II/LG 1 raided Convoy AN-21. One placed

a bomb on the bridge of the Danish tanker Marie Maersk, which caught fire and had to be

abandoned. The next day II/KG 26 He 111 torpedo bombers left the 3,798-ton Greek freighter

Embiricos Nicolaos and Norwegian tanker Solheim sinking.

Other typical convoy actions occurred on April 2 and 3 with Convoys AN/ANF-22 and

ANF-24 bound from Alexandria to Greece. On April 2 II/KG 26 He 111s damaged the

freighter Cyprian Prince in Convoy ANF-24. On the following day, nine Ju 88s made two hits

on the ammunition-laden Northern Prince. They started fires that eventually set off the ship's

cargo.

During the same period AN/ANF-22, consisting of seven empty troopships and nine

empty freighters, came under attack by Italian bombers and torpedo aircraft on the afternoon

of April 2 but remained undamaged. Late in the day to the east of Crete, six Ju 88s divebombed the convoy. Bombs hit the Koulouros Xenos and Homefield, forcing their crews to

abandon ship. A near miss shook the Teti so badly that she had to anchor near the coast of

Crete. Thirty minutes after the Ju 88s, three Italian S 81s set the 6,054-ton Devis afire and

caused a number of casualties.71

A subsequent combined high-level bombing and torpedo assault on Convoy AN-27

resulted in torpedo damage to the oiler British Science. Two S 79 torpedo-bombers from the

Italian Air Force's 281 Squadriglia participated with three S 79 level-bombers from 34
56

Gruppo. An RAF No. 30 Squadron Blenheim countered the Italian attack, shooting down one

torpedo plane and damaging three bombers.72

On April 6, 1941, Hitler declared war on Greece and Fleigerkorps X quickly destroyed

the port of Piraeus. Air attacks blew up the ammunition ship Clan Fraser and another

42,000-tons of shipping in the process.73

The weight of German land and air forces, added to that of Italy, overwhelmed the

Greeks and their allies. Greece surrendered to the Axis on April 24. This left the British with

the problem of evacuating their expeditionary force from the Greek mainland. As at Dunkirk

and Tobruk, Luftwaffe bombing meant that British ships had to arrive at beaches and ports

after dark and leave before dawn.

At Piraeus, Luftwaffe bombing destroyed Allied twenty-three ships in two days. Ju 87s

quickly demolished the Greek battleship Kilkis and destroyers Psara and Ydra, the hospital

ship Ellenis, and a number of small freighters and tankers.74

The Luftwaffe caught three ships carrying ammunition, explosives, and mules at the

Greek port of Naupila during the day on April 24. The 4,665-ton Santa Clara Valley, carrying

500 of the unfortunate animals, went down with most of her cargo aboard after four direct

hits during an 11:00 a.m. air raid. The 2,269-ton Cavallo followed her to the bottom an hour

later while the 4,108-ton Nicolaou Georgiios blew up at three o'clock. Other ships lost

elsewhere to air attack on April 24 included the hospital ships Andros and Policos, the lighter

A-1, and the yacht Hellas.

75

On the night of April 24-25, the evacuation ship Ulster Prince ran aground at Nauplia.

When bomb-carrying Me 109s, Ju 87s, and Ju 88s found the ship at daylight, they destroyed

her. Daylight also caught two passenger ships, the Slamat and Khedive Ismail, in port

because of slow loading. Four bombs set the Slamat afire. Two destroyers, the Diamond and

Wrybeck, rescued her crew and passengers. Then they too suffered bombing and strafing by

Ju 88s and Me 109s. In the end, all three ships were destroyed and most of their crews and

passengers died.76

In mid-afternoon on April 28, 1941, Ju 88s spotted an evacuation convoy made up of

the antiaircraft cruiser Conventry, three destroyers, and the merchant ships Pennland and

Thurland Castle. An initial attack put the Pennland's bridge, wheelhouse, and steering out

of commission. At half-past four, another bomb run sank her. This forced the Royal Navy to

allocate five more destroyers to evacuation assignments in place of the 16,082-ton liner.77

The Luftwaffe continued to sink and damage ships until British authorities called off

the evacuation on April 28. Despite the German Air Force's opposition, the Royal Navy

managed to extricate over 50,000 British troops from Greece although they had to abandon

8,000 vehicles and the force's heavy weapons. After the campaign in Greece, the Luftwaffe's

Deputy Chief of Staff visited and evaluated German air efforts in the Mediterranean. His

recommendations led to substantial Luftwaffe reinforcement in the theater. Fleigerkorps IV

arrived just in time to support an airborne invasion of Crete. The Luftwaffe's capture of Crete

was not in itself a maritime air operation. But some Royal Navy ships opposing the invasion

fell victim to German land-based air power as did many of the ships carrying supplies to the

island.

During May 1941 the German Air Force launched counter-air sorties against RAF

fields on Crete while simultaneously conducting shipping strikes. When British cruisers and

destroyers aided Crete's defenders by bombarding an Axis airfield on the island of Scarpanto

east of Crete, high-level bombing at dawn on May 21 damaged the cruiser Ajax and sank the

destroyer Juno. Two bombs destroyed the destroyer's engine room and a third bomb reached

her aft magazine. The resulting explosion sent the Juno down in less than two minutes.
57

British ships tried to intercept part of a sea-borne invasion headed for Crete, but two

Luftwaffe groups attacked and drove them to retire on May 21. Luftwaffe pilots damaged two

cruisers. They also sank the cruisers Fiji and Gloucester and the destroyer Greyhound

northwest of Crete.

The Greyhound, detached to destroy a small craft, came to grief first. Eight Ju 87s

made several runs at the destroyer as she returned to the main body of the British fleet.

They finally planted a 550-pound bomb and two 100-pound bombs despite the ship's evasive

action. Four minutes after the bombs struck, the Greyhound was under water. Vice Admiral

E.L.S. King, commanding Greyhound’s main force, ordered two other destroyers to rescue its

survivors. He sent two cruisers, the Fiji and Gloucester, to support the Kandahar and

Kingston. Only after they left did he learn that the two cruisers were low on antiaircraft

ammunition.

Masses of German aircraft rushed to demolish the four ships. The Gloucester went

dead in the water, with fierce fires raging, around three-thirty in the afternoon. Her

companions turned back toward the main force, the Fiji out of antiaircraft ammunition and

the destroyers low on fuel. Less than two hours after the Gloucester was put out of action,

the Fiji, immobilized by a bomb from a Me 109, succumbed to another bomb. The Khandhar

and Kingston, themselves under attack, tossed off rafts for the cruiser's survivors and raced

back to King's force.78

On May 23 bombs sank the destroyers Kelly and Kashmir as they were steaming

about forty miles south of Crete. They, like the Greyhound, Gloucester, and Fiji, had departed

the main force on detached duty. The destroyers were returning from bombarding an airfield

on the northern coast of Crete that was being used by the Luftwaffe. Do 17s attacked at

dawn but scored no hits. Twenty-four Stukas followed the Dorniers. The Kashmir went to the

bottom two minutes after being struck by a heavy bomb. The Kelly capsized when struck by

a 1,100-pound bomb while making a turn at thirty knots. The destroyer Kipling, which had

arrived at the scene during the attack, rescued nearly 300 survivors from the two ships

despite high-level bombing over the next three hours. She then headed for Alexandria,

arriving safely although she had to be towed in the last fifty miles after running out of fuel.79

The high losses of warships led Admiral Cunningham to inform the British Chiefs of

Staff that his ships could no longer operate near Crete or in the Aegean Sea during daylight

hours. The Chiefs replied that both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force should accept

"any risk" to defend Crete.80 Chastened, Cunningham sent the carrier Formidable to launch

a counter-air strike against the Luftwaffe's Ju 87 base on Scarpanto, an island about fifty

miles northeast of Crete. A feeble raid on May 26 by four single-engine Albacore torpedo

bombers and five Fulmars destroyed two bombers on the ground, but otherwise did little

damage. As the carrier and her escorts returned to Alexandria they encountered twenty Ju

87s that had sortied from Libya. The Formidable's two remaining Fulmar fighters didn't get

off before the Germans attacked. Nine Stuka's exacted a high toll for the two bombers the

carrier strike had destroyed. Two 550-pound bombs blew out several watertight bulkheads,

destroyed a gun turret, and damaged the carrier's launching apparatus. Although the

Formidable was able to recover her strike aircraft, she was no longer operational.

Cunningham had to send her to the United States for repair, where she was out of the war

for six months.

The other eleven dive bombers had flown down against the two battleships and eight

destroyers escorting the carrier. They did no damage to the battleships, but nearly sank the

destroyer Nubian. A bomb landed on her depth charges. An immense explosion blew off her

after gun mounts but she managed to limp back to Alexandria.81
58

The combined air and sea assault drove the British from Crete on May 27, 1941. The

Royal Navy engineered yet another evacuation, but suffered heavy losses to air attack in the

process. Operating from Scarpanto, the Luftwaffe bombed three cruisers and six destroyers

on their way to rescue troops at Heraklion. Most of the ships arrived safely at Crete, but

rattled by near misses. These did enough harm to force the cruiser Ajax to turn back and

probably led to mechanical difficulties that forced abandonment of the destroyer Imperial. As

the British ships withdrew on May 28 laden with troops, an Italian torpedo plane sank the

destroyer Hereward while Stukas heavily damaged the cruisers Dido and Orion. The air

attacks also inflicted high casualties on the ships' crews and passengers.82

During the invasion, the Luftwaffe mistakenly struck Axis ships. Stukas attacked the

Italian destroyer Sagittario as it escorted ships carrying German troops bound for Crete.

They also bombed five other Italian destroyers loaded with Nazi soldiers. Of the five, the

destroyer Q. Sella suffered heavy damage. Göring's aviators also bombed two Italian torpedo

boats, which they mistook for British submarines. Fleigerkorps IV had warned that its air

crews had never flown missions over the sea. They could not, the commanding officer said,

tell the difference between friend and foe. This may also have been why Luftwaffe pilots,

despite their ubiquitous presence over the waters near Crete, failed to warn German and

Italian naval units when they sighted British ships.83

On the last day of the evacuation of Crete, the RAF sent fighters with long-range fuel

tanks to provide air cover. No major naval units were lost. The Royal Navy had managed to

evacuate over half of the British troops on the island. It did so at a cost of three cruisers and

six destroyers. His majesty's fleet also temporarily lost use of several major combatants, such

as the Formidable. German air activity had cost the Royal Navy 2,000 casualties, nearly half

of whom were killed.84

The conquest of Crete left only Malta to be occupied or suppressed by Axis forces. High

casualties to the Luftwaffe's parachute and glider assault troops precluded an airborne

invasion. The German Air Force's bombers received the assignment to make the island

unusable as an Allied air or naval base.

The German invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941 diverted Luftwaffe resources to that

theater. The Axis supply situation in North Africa quickly became critical due to Allied air

and naval interdiction. Admiral Erich Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, and

the German Army staff in Rome convinced Hitler to return the Luftwaffe to the

Mediterranean in strength.85

In November Field Marshal Albert Kesselring arrived in Italy with Luftflotte 2 to

control German air operations in the Mediterranean. Kesselring assigned Fleigerkorps II in

Sicily responsibility for the central Mediterranean and Fleigerkorps X in North Africa

responsibility for the eastern Mediterranean. By the end of 1941 Kesselring had 425 aircraft

positioned to devastate Malta.86

Meanwhile, Allied air power continued to interdict enemy shipping. Wellington and

Blenheim bombers had been withdrawn from Malta to Egypt because of heavy losses. But in

early 1942 No. 39 Squadron became operational at Alexandria with Beaufort torpedobombers. When reconnaissance located a large Italian convoy steaming from Italy to Libya

on January 23, Blenheims, twin-engine Beaufort torpedo bombers, and Albacore biplane

torpedo bombers assembled at Benghazi. Albacores from Malta also prepared to strike the

Italian ships. A torpedo from one of the three Beauforts crippled the 14,000-ton liner Victoria.

Albacores then finished off the ship, drowning 300 of the 400 troops aboard.87

A few months later, another Axis convoy encountered the torpedo-carrying Beauforts

in mid-April 1942. Italian naval authorities decided that it was safe to run the convoy past
59

Malta to Benghazi. Malta, they knew, had no strike aircraft left and the convoy route should

be out of range of Allied aircraft in North Africa. The Beauforts, however, could take off from

an airfield near Tobruk, attack the convoy, and go on to Malta.

A reconnaissance aircraft from RAF No. 22 Squadron located the convoy, reported its

location, and flew on to Malta. As it landed, an Me 109 followed it in and killed the pilot and

navigator with machine gun fire. At noon a strike formation left Bu Amud airfield in Egypt.

A twin-engine Maryland light bomber preceded to provide up-to-date information on convoy

location. Four Beaufighters escorted nine torpedo-carrying Beauforts.

The Maryland located the convoy, reported its position, but was shot down by a Ju 88.

The torpedo planes' fighter escort eliminated two Ju 88s that crossed their path before

heading to Malta because of low fuel. The Beauforts continued, locating the enemy ships and

their escort of Me 109s, Me 110s, and Ju 88s. The convoy was steaming north, away from the

Beauforts.

More than twenty aircraft threw an umbrella over the Axis ships and prevented the

torpedo planes from circling the convoy to obtain a better position. The Beauforts made their

torpedo runs from astern of the convoy under German air attack. The RAF aircrews observed

three torpedo hits on two vessels as they fled from the swarming German interceptors. One

Beaufort went down near the convoy, a second on its way to Malta. Another of the British

torpedo bombers hit the water six miles from Malta. Me 109s splashed a fourth as it lined

up on a Malta runway. The RAF lost seventeen of thirty-six aircrew and four of nine

Beauforts plus the Maryland and its crew. It was true that over water, as over land, bombers

needed fighter escort to function successfully.88

German air raids quickly made Malta unsafe for surface ships, although at a

significant cost in Luftwaffe aircraft. Between early April and May 10, Luftflotte 2, based in

Sicily, sent 11,000 sorties against the island. On April 5 alone Kesselring's bombers sank

three British destroyers at Malta. Axis convoy losses fell from a high of 77 percent in

November 1941 to a rate of 20 to 30 percent in early 1942.89

The Royal Navy persisted in supplying the island, which continued as an air and

submarine base. In mid-June 1942 two critical and heavily escorted convoys approached the

island: Convoy Harpoon from Gibraltar and Convoy Vigorous from Alexandria. They

triggered running air-sea battles. Axis air and naval forces attacked the convoys and their

escorts. Allied air and naval forces countered the attackers.

Harpoon consisted of six ships escorted by the battleship Malaya, the carriers Eagle

and Argus, three cruisers, and eight destroyers. Vigorous consisted of eleven freighters

escorted by eight cruisers and twenty-seven destroyers.

Counter-air strikes against the Luftwaffe by RAF bombers from Malta and Egypt

preceded the convoys. Two torpedo Beauforts and six twin-engine Wellington long-range

bombers adapted to carry and launch torpedoes remained on alert at Malta in case the

Italian fleet sailed to intercept the convoys. When a Royal Navy submarine reported two

Italian cruisers and three destroyers northwest of Sicily, four Wellingtons took off from Malta

at night on the night of June 13-14. They found the Italian ships but returned with their

weapons when plans to illuminate the enemy vessels with flares or moonlight had failed.90

Regia Aeronautica aircraft based on the island of Sardinia attacked Harpoon on June

14. Fighter-escorted fighter-bombers plus torpedo and medium bombers joined in the assault.

The scores of Italian aircraft quickly overwhelmed the convoy's ten air defense fighters.

Despite their strength, the Axis planes managed only to torpedo and seriously damage the

cruiser Liverpool and to bomb and sink the freighter Tanimbar. Subsequent air raids when

the convoy came within range of Stukas based in Sicily, surface ship attacks, and mines
60

airdropped in the convoy's path accounted for three more of the convoy's freighters. Only two

merchant ships of Convoy Harpoon survived to reach Malta.91

The Vigorous convoy, which had sailed from Alexandria on the evening of June 13,

received attacks by Luftwaffe units from Crete, Greece, and Libya. The freighter Aagtekirk

and her escorting destroyer Tetcott got caught off Tobruk after detaching from the convoy.

Forty Stukas quickly accounted for the merchantman but the destroyer survived. On June

15 and 16, German air units attacked the main element of Convoy Vigorous, as did E-boats

and submarines. Bombs sank the cruiser Hermione and destroyer Nestor, badly damaged the

cruiser Birmingham, and demolished two more freighters. The Luftwaffe lost only one Ju 87

and one Ju 88. The Axis' combined air, surface, and sub-surface efforts prevented any of the

convoy's ships from reaching Malta. Allied land-based aerial forces had, however, strived to

counter them.92

RAF No. 217 Squadron, flying torpedo Beauforts, arrived at Malta a few days earlier

on June 10. Planners intended the unit to be the RAF's main strike force threatening the

Italian fleet. When intelligence indicated that the fleet was out to intercept Convoys Harpoon

and Vigorous, No. 217 quickly mounted a mission, although only one man in the squadron

had ever dropped a torpedo in combat. Few of the pilots had night operations experience.

Nine Beauforts, just declared operational after a flight from the United Kingdom, took

off before dawn on June 15. Their target was the Italian naval force 200 miles distant. Only

five of the Beauforts managed to rendezvous after takeoff, so four of the nine aircraft

proceeded independently. One of these found the Italian ships 200 miles due east of Malta

at dawn.

The first aircraft to find the Italian fleet successfully torpedoed the lead cruiser

Trento, after circling to get ahead and west of the formation of ships. The other Beauforts,

thirty-five miles away, sighted the smoke from the injured cruiser and sped to the scene.

Three of the RAF planes ran in at the second ship in the formation from her port side. Two

others came in from the starboard. None of their torpedoes struck home, but the Italian ships

broke out of formation in violent evasive actions. A final Beaufort, one of those that had not

made the rendezvous, then arrived and dropped a torpedo toward the stricken Trento. This

too missed. The pilot had used a half a ship's length deflection, not knowing that the cruiser

was no longer underway. The Trento was doomed, however. Within minutes the British

submarine Umbra, which had watched the entire air-sea action, finished her off with a

torpedo.93

Undeterred, the Italian fleet pressed on toward Convoys Harpoon and Vigorous while

additional Allied aircraft prepared to attack it. Rommel's recapture of the Bu Amud airfield

had forced No. 39 Squadron back to Sidi Barrani. Its Beauforts had barely enough range to

fly from there to Malta, attacking the Italians en route. American four-engine Liberator

heavy bombers based at the Suez Canal, new to the theater, also scheduled a mission against

Mussolini's ships.

Twelve Beauforts took off from Sidi Barrani just after six in the morning. The

squadron commander had briefed his pilots to target the Italian battleships rather than the

accompanying cruisers and destroyers. Ships in the target group included the battleships

Vittorio Veneto and Littorio, the cruisers Gorizia, Garibaldi and Aosta, and ten destroyers.

They had sailed from Sardinia, stopped at Palermo in Sicily, and were between Sicily and

Tunisia on the morning of June 15.94

The RAF planes paralleled the North African coast until reaching northernmost

Cyrenaica. There they turned north out over the Mediterranean. A Maryland flew ahead of

them to relocate the Italian ships. At this point the Beauforts encountered five Me 109s on
61

their way to provide fighter cover for German bombers headed toward Convoy Vigorous. The

German fighters surprised the Beauforts. The other RAF fliers first became aware of their

danger when the Beaufort on the extreme left of their formation fell into the sea in flames.

Then the Beaufort on the extreme right of the formation went down. The No. 39 Squadron

formation, a mix of Mark I and Mark II Beauforts, returned fire but the Mark II aircrafts'

waist and tail guns quickly jammed. Finally the Me 109s, their ammunition exhausted,

turned away. One damaged Beaufort headed inland to crash behind German lines. Another

turned back to Sidi Barrani. Two more had jettisoned their torpedoes to facilitate evasive

action. Others, with their fuel depleted in the engagement, also aborted. Only five of the

strike aircraft continued.

The Maryland located the Italian fleet fifty miles ahead of the approaching strike

aircraft and radioed its location back to the remaining Beauforts. As the remaining strike

aircraft approached, the reconnaissance aircraft fired a flare in the direction of the enemy.

The reduced formation of Beauforts approached the nearest battleship bows on. Their

intention was that three planes would run in from port and two from starboard. Just as they

separated, the battleship started a sharp turn that presented its length. Instead of

separating, all five aircraft targeted the battleship's broad side. Two aircraft hit by flak from

escorting destroyers dropped their torpedoes too soon. The other pilots also dropped their

weapons from more than a mile away and the battleship steamed away unharmed.95

Seven American and two British Liberators had arrived over the enemy fleet as the

torpedo planes attacked. One placed a 500-pound bomb on the forward turret of the Littorio.

It exploded on impact but did no damage.96 The Italian fleet took minimal damage but, led

by an easily discouraged admiral, headed north toward its base at Taranto, inside the “heel”

of the boot of Italy. Convoy Vigorous, with its escorts short of fuel and antiaircraft

ammunition, returned to Alexandria.

The RAF still sought to injure the Italian naval force. The Wellingtons involved in the

unsuccessful raid on the night of June 14 took off from Malta on the next day. Radar directed

the five aircraft through night and low cloud to the Italian ships. One pilot managed a

torpedo run. Flying through murk, he suddenly found the Littorio straight ahead. Pilot

Officer Hawes quickly dropped both his torpedoes. One missed while the other struck home.

But the heavily armored ship shrugged off the hit and steamed home and the Wellingtons

returned safely to their base.97

As opposing ships and planes parried over the westbound British Convoy Vigorous,

Italian warships threatened the eastbound Convoy Harpoon, which also became engaged in

an air-sea struggle. Discovery of two Italian cruisers and two destroyers headed toward the

convoy generated calls for an air strike on June 15. Only Malta-based aircraft could reach

them. When the call came, the British forces on the island had only two Beauforts and four

Fleet Air Arm Albacores available. They took off at nine-thirty in the morning with an escort

of sixteen Spitfires. While the Spitfires engaged Me 109s from Pantellaria, the strike aircraft

descended on the Italian ships. The two Beauforts dropped their torpedoes toward the leading

cruiser at ranges of 800 and 300 yards. The first appeared to hit while the second, launched

too late, passed under the ship. The four Albacores followed with their torpedoes but did no

damage.98

The Pedestal convoy in August 1942, like Harpoon and Vigorous, also received

thorough attention from Kesselring's air fleet. The convoy's two battleships, three carriers,

seven cruisers, and thirty-plus destroyers and fourteen merchant ships entered the

Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar on the night of August 9, 1942.
62

From August 10 on the convoy and its escorts steamed east under air attack. Italian

planes based on the island of Pantelleria and German planes in Sicily and Sardinia launched

coordinated dive-bomber, bomber, and torpedo bomber sorties against the convoy. The first

attacks on the 10 and 11th achieved little, but late in the afternoon of August 12, forty Ju

87s and Ju 88s dive-bombed the convoy while Regia Aeronautica planes initiated torpedo

runs. One torpedo sank a destroyer in return for two aircraft shot down. As the Italian Air

Force planes completed their attack, the German bombers focused on the carrier Indomitable.

Two direct hits and three near misses forced the flattop to turn back, no longer able to fly her

aircraft. Air attacks on the 12th also damaged one merchant ship and sank two others.99

The following morning, after the convoy had lost several ships to submarine and Eboat attacks, Italian aircraft returned. The tanker Ohio survived a 550-pound bomb and a

stricken Ju 87 crashing on board to eventually reach Malta. She numbered among only five

of the original fourteen supply ships to make it into port.100

The assault on Convoy Pedestal during August 1942 marked the apex of Axis antishipping missions in the Mediterranean. Aircraft and personnel losses in Luftflotte 2's antishipping squadrons were not replaced as casualties mounted. Units supporting the Wermacht

in Russia and North Africa received higher priority allocation of air assets. By the time the

Allies invaded French North Africa with Operation Torch in November 1942, both the

Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica were on the defensive.

Reinforced British air forces on Malta allowed the RAF to respond to a final series of

Luftwaffe raids in strength. Radar-guided Spitfires achieved a two-to-one loss rate with

Kesselring's bombers and their escort. By the beginning of 1943, newly-captured airfields in

North Africa and the Malta bases enabled the Allies to dominate shipping routes between

Italy and the few ports remaining available to the Afrika Korps. The early phases of major

maritime operations in the Mediterranean involving land-based aircraft were at an end.

The employment of land-based aircraft significantly influenced maritime operations

of all belligerents in the Mediterranean and demonstrated the effectiveness of such forces in

a maritime role. Those forces had only to be properly equipped and in sufficient strength to

accomplish their missions. Germany's Ju 87s and Ju 88s proved to be excellent ship-killers.

The Regia Aeronautica had quickly adopted the dive bomber to compliment its torpedocarrying aircraft. This was something the RAF never attempted, while the Royal Navy's Fleet

Air Arm was too weak at this stage of the war to make much of a contribution. Allied fighters

were also inadequate with regard to number and range in most instances to protect strike

aircraft engaged in maritime air missions. This meant that British strike aircraft suffered

such high losses that they were often ineffective.

British air and naval forces proved unable to stop the flow of supplies from Italy to

Axis ground and air forces fighting in North Africa. Axis land-based air and naval forces in

opposition could not prevent the Allies from evacuating their defeated armies in Greece and

on Crete, but they did succeed in making Malta temporarily unusable. If the Germans and

Italians had not been forced to send their air assets to other theaters, this temporary success

probably would have become permanent.
63

Endnotes to Chapter III

1. Sir Arthur Tedder, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Air Power in War (London: Hodder

and Stoughton, [1947?]), p. 33.

2. J. Rohwer and G. Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945 (Annapolis:

Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp. 7-12.

3. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton

Mifflin Company, 1948), pp. 580-581.

4. Peter C. Smith, Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), pp. 14-15.

5. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

6. Ibid., p. 23.

7. Ibid., p. 26.

8. Ibid., p. 27.

9. Ibid., p. 27.

10. Peter C. Smith, The Stuka at War (New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1971), p. 66.

11. Ibid., p. 30.

12. Smith, Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945, p. 29.

13. Capt S. W. Roskill, RN, The War at Sea, Volume I, The Defensive (London: Her Majesty’s

Stationery Office, 1954), pp. 213-214; Smith, Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the

English Channel 1939-1945, p. 33.

14. Smith, Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945, p. 36.

15. Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II (New

York: Da Capo Press, 1994), p. 124.

16. Nathan Miller, War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute

Press, 1995), p. 83.

17. John Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-

1945 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985), p. 156.

18. Walter J. Boyne, Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air (New York: Simon & Schuster,

1994), p. 64; Denis Richards, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Volume I, The Fight at Odds

(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1974), p. 131, pp. 135-136.

19. Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945 p.

154.

20. Ibid., p. 157.

21. Boyne, Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air, p. 64.

22. Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II, p. 127;

Smith, Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945, p. 43.

23. Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume I, The Defensive (London: Her

Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954), p. 219.

24. Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II, p. 128;

Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume I, The Defensive, p. 84.

25. Smith, Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945, p. 44;

David Brown, Warship Losses of World War Two (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990),

p. 33.

26. Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume I, The Defensive, p. 222.

27. Richards, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Volume I, The Fight at Odds, p. 138.
64

28. Miller, War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II, pp. 86-87; Smith, Hold the Narrow

Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945, pp. 47-48; p. 51; Smith, Stuka at

War, p. 33.

29. Smith, Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945, 1984,

p. 53; Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume I, The Defensive, p. 225.

30. Smith, Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945, pp. 55-

56.

31. Ibid., pp. 56-57.

32. Ibid., p. 58.

33. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

34. Ibid., p. 60.

35. Ibid., p. 62.

36. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Volume I, The Defensive, pp. 226-228.

37. Smith, Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945, p. 69,

p. 71.

38. Ibid., pp. 73-74.

39. Ibid., p. 77.

40. Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company

of America, 1993), p. 42.

41. Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II, p. 133.

42. Rohwer and Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945, p. 27; Smith, Hold

the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945 pp. 84-85.

43. Ibid., p. 94.

44. Ibid., pp. 95-96.

45. Ibid., 1984, p. 103.

46. Adolf Galland, The First and the Last (London: Methuen, ?), quoted in Smith, Stuka at

War, p. 42, and Smith, Stuka at War, p. 42.

47. Smith, Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945, p. 103.

48. John L. Winton, Ultra at Sea (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1988), pp. 164-

180, summarizes Allied use of radio intercept, cryptanalysis, and radio traffic analysis in the

Mediterranean in 1941 and 1942.

49. Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy (New York: William Morrow and

Company, Inc., 1989), p. 24.

50. Rohwer and Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945, p. 26.

51. Bernard Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943 (London: Arms & Armour

Press, 1993), p. 39.

52. Marc’ Antonio Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II (Annapolis: United States

Naval Institute, 1957), p. 20.

53. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, p. 34.

54. Ibid., pp. 35-36.

55. Smith, Stuka at War, p. 46.

56. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, p. 37.

57. Ibid., p. 37.

58. Ibid., p. 48.

59. Smith, Stuka at War, p. 47.

60. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, pp. 48-49, 55.

61. Ibid., p. 55.
65

62. Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume I, The Defensive, pp. 421-422; Christopher Shores with

Brian Cull and Nicola Malzia, Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete 1940-41 (London:

Grubb Street, 1987), p. 130; Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, p. 63; Smith,

Stuka at War, pp. 49-50.

63. Smith, Stuka at War, pp. 51-53.

64. Shores et al., Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete 1940-41, p. 131; Ireland, The War

in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, p. 68.

65. Smith, Stuka at War, p. 79.

66. Shores et al., Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete 1940-41, pp. 136-137.

67. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, p. 74.

68. Shores et al., Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete 1940-41, p. 145.

69. Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II, pp. 89-91, 99.

70. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, pp. 78-79.

71. Rohwer and Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945, p. 57; Shores et al.,

Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete 1940-41, pp. 164-165.

72. Ibid., pp. 137-138.

73. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, p. 80.

74. Shores et al., Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete 1940-41, p. 277.

75. Ibid., p. 289.

76. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, pp. 81-82.

77. Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume I, The Defensive, p. 236; Shores et al., Air War for

Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete 1940-41, p. 294.

78. Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries, pp. 198-199; Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume I, The

Defensive, p. 442; Smith, Stuka at War, p. 57-58.

79. Bekker, Luftwaffe War Diaries, p. 199; Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume I, The Defensive,

p. 442; Smith, Stuka at War, pp. 58-59.

80. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, p. 84-86.

81. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, p. 86; Smith, Stuka at War, p. 60.

82. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, pp. 87-88.

83. Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II, pp. 105-108.

84. Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, p. 88.

85. Ralph Barker, The Ship Busters: the Story of the R.A.F. Torpedo-Bombers (London:

Chatto & Windus, 1957), p. 94.

86. Smith, Stuka at War, p. 80.

87. Barker, The Ship Busters: the Story of the R.A.F. Torpedo-Bombers p. 169.

88. Ibid., pp. 174-175.

89. Murray, Luftwaffe, p. 124.

90. Barker, The Ship Busters: the Story of the R.A.F. Torpedo-Bombers p. 177.

91. Air Ministry [Great Britain], The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (New York: St.

Martin's Press, 1983) [reissue with new introduction of 1948 publication], p. 136; Roskill, The

War at Sea, Volume II, The Period of Balance (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,

1956), pp. 63-65.

92. Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume II, The Period of Balance, pp. 69-70; Smith, Stuka at

War, p. 84.

93. Barker, The Ship Busters: the Story of the R.A.F. Torpedo-Bombers, pp. 180-181; Denis

Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Volume 2, The Fight

Avails (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1953), p. 205; Roskill, The War at Sea,

Volume II, The Period of Balance, pp. 68-70.
66

94. Roskill, The War at Sea, Volume II, The Period of Balance, Map 9 (between pp. 64-65).

95. John Herington, Air War Against Germany and Italy 1939-1943 (Canberra: Australian

War Memorial, 1954), pp. 238-239; Richards and Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945,

Volume II, The Period of Balance, pp. 205-206.

96. Barker, The Ship Busters: the Story of the R.A.F. Torpedo-Bombers, pp. 185-187;

Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II, p. 175.

97. Barker, The Ship Busters: the Story of the R.A.F. Torpedo-Bombers, p. 189; Bragadin, The

Italian Navy in World War II, p. 176.

98. Barker, The Ship Busters: the Story of the R.A.F. Torpedo-Bombers pp. 191-192.

99. Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, p. 137.

100. Smith, Stuka at War, pp. 84-85.
67

CHAPTER IV

THE NORTH PACIFIC

The North Pacific campaign of World War II took place in a remote corner of the

world, ill-suited to any type of military operation and historians have concluded that the

theater would have been better left alone by both sides.1 Warranted or not, many Aleutian

battles were air-sea fights. Because the Navy usually had higher priority uses for its aircraft

carriers, American aerial forces used in the North Pacific were mostly Army and Navy landbased aircraft. Navy aircraft consisted mostly of patrol bombers; those that were amphibians

operated occasionally and for short periods from sea plane tenders. This North Pacific

campaign, which involved joint service application of land-based aerial forces in maritime

operations, took place in three phases: defense of Alaska; elimination of Japanese outposts

in the Aleutians; and strikes from the Aleutians against shipping in Japan's northern waters.

Prewar Army and Navy planners examined the Aleutian Islands stretching almost

from North America to Asia and the Great Circle route that paralleled them as a possible

avenue between the two continents. Their remoteness, rugged terrain, and fog and cloud

shrouded environment made them a difficult route. Strategists in both Japan and the United

States concluded that mainland Alaska and the Aleutian Islands themselves would be of little

military use.2

Despite this conclusion, the United States could not leave its northernmost territory

entirely undefended. Army Air Corps staffers requested funds for air bases at Anchorage, on

the coast, and, far inland, at Fairbanks. Naval authorities envisioned flying boat, submarine,

and patrol craft bases at Amaknak and Kodiak Islands. These were to supplement a sea

plane facility developed in 1937 in Southeast Alaska at Sitka on the site of a defunct naval

coaling and radio station. The Navy's plans also called for some of its amphibious patrol

bombers to operate from tenders sheltered in Aleutian harbors.3

The Aleutian chain is made up of some 120 islands of volcanic origin that stretch

nearly 1,000 miles from the Alaska Peninsula, which is the westernmost projection of the

Alaska mainland, to within 750 miles of Japan's Kurile Islands. Unimak Island is the

easternmost and largest of the Aleutians, just off the tip of the Alaska Peninsula. Southwest

of Unimak, 155 air miles away, lies Unalaska Island. Adjacent to Unalaska is Amaknak

Island with a small port called Dutch Harbor. The United States Navy had operated a radio

station there since early in the twentieth century. Some of the islands west of Unalaska and

Amaknak islands that became important in World War II are, in order, Umnak, Adak,

Amchitka, Kiska, Shemya, and Attu.

With the frigid Bering Sea to their north and the warmer Pacific Ocean to their south,

the Aleutian Islands are one of the world's worst flying areas. Winds and fogs occur

simultaneously for days at a time. Low-lying clouds are the rule rather than the exception.

Dry, flat landing areas are rare. Sharp localized gusts of wind called "willawaws," which are

characterized by simultaneous counter-rotating air currents, occur frequently. They can reach

velocities in excess of 100 miles per hour and easily slam aircraft into the ground.4

Preparing for War

When the Japanese raided Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the American military air

facilities projected for Alaska were well underway. An Army aviation advance party arrived

at Anchorage on August 12, 1940. It started preparing for combat units scheduled to land at
68

Elmendorf Field at Fort Richardson outside Anchorage. Two B–17s, intended for cold weather

testing, arrived at Ladd Air Base outside Fairbanks. In early 1941 two bomb squadrons and

one pursuit squadron arrived at Elmendorf Field. The 18th Pursuit Squadron, equipped with

obsolete P–36 "Hawk" fighters, arrived first. The bombing units, the 36th and 73d

Bombardment Squadrons, arrived with twin-engine B–18 bombers. Like the P–36s, the B–18s

were 1930s technology that wartime requirements soon proved obsolete. After the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Air Corps re-equipped the pursuit squadron

with P–40 Warhawk fighters, the 73rd with twin-engine B–26 Marauder medium bombers,

and the 36th with four-engine B–17 Flying Fortresses. The P–40s, which mounted an in-line

liquid-cooled engine without turbo charger, started the war as fighter-interceptors but were

outclassed by German and Japanese fighters. They remained in service in Alaska throughout

the war, as did the high-winged B–26s. The Flying Fortresses were gradually withdrawn in

favor of four-engine B–24 Liberator heavy bombers.5 The B–24s had a range almost twice

that of the B–17s although they could not cruise at as great an altitude. They had an

operational range of 2,100 miles, could carry up to 5,000-pounds of bombs, and achieve a top

speed of 290 miles-per-hour. The B–26s had an operational range of 1,100-plus miles, could

carry up to 3,000-pounds of bombs, and achieved a top speed of 305 mph.6

Also early in 1941, twin-engine Consolidated PBY-5A Catalina flying boats of Patrol

Squadrons VP–41 and VP–42 from Sand Point Naval Air Station, Seattle, began broader

Alaskan operations. The bulbous-nosed amphibians could carry either bombs or torpedoes.

The PBYs cruised at about 100 mph but had an operational range of 3,100 miles. In rotation,

the Catalina squadrons operated from Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor to fly missions over

the Gulf of Alaska and as far west over the Aleutians as Attu Island, 740 miles from Dutch

Harbor.7

From these beginnings, substantial Army and Navy land-based aerial forces played

important roles in the defense of Alaska. Later, they cut off sea routes to Japanese outposts

in the Aleutians and assisted in the recapture of Japanese-occupied islands in the Aleutian

chain. Afterward, they harassed shipping in waters off northern Japan.

During World War II the North Pacific fell within Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's Pacific

Ocean Areas command. In May of 1942 Nimitz sent Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald to

Alaska to assume command of the North Pacific Force (sometimes called Task Force 8).

Nimitz knew from intercepts of Japanese radio traffic that the Japanese would make a

diversionary raid in Alaska while attempting to provoke a fleet engagement with the

American Navy near Midway Island.8

Theobald's new command included Alaskan Army Air Forces and Navy air, surface,

and submarine units. Lead Army air elements had arrived earlier, in 1940, while Patrol Wing

4 moved its headquarters from Seattle to Kodiak Island late in May 1942 to become a part

of the North Pacific Force.9 Theobald went north with instructions to place the air component

of his joint service force under the command of Brigadier General William O. Butler,

commander of the Army's Eleventh Air Force. He chose not to do so until Admiral Ernest J.

King, Chief of Naval Operations, and Nimitz reminded him of his orders.

If the Japanese attacked the Aleutians, a "State of Fleet Opposed Invasion" would be

declared, with the Navy in charge of defense. Army Air Corps Brigadier General William O.

Butler, at the Navy's direction, would command the air task group in the North Pacific Force.

He concurrently reported as commander of Alaskan Defense Command air elements to Major

General Simon Bolivar Buckner, the commanding officer of that Army formation. Navy

directives setting up the air task group said that, under Butler, Captain Lewis E. Gehres

would command Patrol Wing 4, the Navy air element of the North Pacific Force. Colonel
69

William O. Eareckson, also under Butler, would command the Army air element of the joint

air formation. In theory, Nimitz had in place all the requirements for a unified air command

in the North Pacific.10

Communications intelligence revealed Japanese plans to attack Midway Island and

the Aleutian Islands in May or June of 1942. Admiral King declared a "State of Fleet

Opposed Invasion" to exist in the North Pacific Ocean on May 21, 1942. This meant that

Theobald had responsibility for directing the defense of Alaska and that Buckner was to play

a supporting role.11

Theobald started for Alaska on May 22, 1942. He had been at sea only two days when

he radioed Nimitz that air power was the key to the defense of Alaska. Theobald called for

"maximum concentration of available mainland-based Navy planes and large concentration

of similar Army planes."12

Immediately after arriving at the newly-established Kodiak Naval Base on May 27,

Theobald conferred with Buckner, Butler, and Gehres. The four officers discussed Theobald's

"estimate of the situation, functions of command, and material matters." Theobald later

recorded that during the meeting Buckner and Butler thought the main Japanese attack

would be on Anchorage. Because of this, and because Butler did not want to concentrate his

aircraft at Cold Bay, on the southwest tip of the Alaska Peninsula, and on Umnak Island

where there were no revetments, the Army commanders resisted Theobald's wish to locate

his air striking force as far to the west as possible. The admiral agreed with them about the

inadequacy of the westward airfields. But he still considered it preferable that the Army

aircraft be sent to Cold Bay and Umnak.13

Although it was clear in the State of Fleet Opposed Invasion that Theobald could order

disposition of the Army aircraft, he remained reluctant to do so. An assertion of his authority

at this point, he believed, might prejudice Butler's cooperation in the future.14

This meeting was Theobald's first with the Army commander with whom he was to

cooperate and with the air officers who were to command the North Pacific Force's air

components. After the meeting he again advised Nimitz (and also Admiral King) that air

power was the key to the defense of Alaska and the Aleutians. "In absence of a naval force,"

Theobald radioed, "adequate in all types the answer to Alaska defense is adequate land-based

air."15

Theobald still chose not to follow the instructions given to him by King and Nimitz

regarding consolidation of the Army and Navy air elements of his task force. Queried later

by King and Nimitz as to why he failed to follow instructions, Theobald cited three

justifications: (1) that a single air manager would have served no useful purpose; (2) that the

Army airmen had pushed for a single air manager so that they could claim credit for actions

attributable to naval aviation; (3) that Butler and Gehres would not have been able to work

together.

Theobald's high level quibbling probably encouraged some staff subordinates in both

services to continue inter-service bickering, even in the face of imminent contact with the

enemy. Army aircraft were moved onto the naval air station at Kodiak as part of the program

to defend the station. They also flew patrols from the Kodiak station over the Gulf of Alaska.

Control of the aircraft remained with Headquarters Eleventh Air Force at Elmendorf Field

outside Anchorage. While this was in accordance with Army Air Forces doctrine, it created

the potential for delay in responding to enemy contacts.16

Conferences among General Buckner, Captain Parker (Commander of the Alaskan Sea

Frontier), and Commander Perry (naval air base commander at Kodiak) resulted in the Navy

being given operational control of Army bombers for sea search and as a strike force.
70

Complete unity of command apparently did not result because there was no specific removal

of the limitations on Navy control of Army aircraft.17

At the operational level, Army-Navy cooperation worked better. As early as February

26, 1942, Lieutenant Commander James S. Russell, commanding officer of VP–42, Captain

Russell A. Cone, commanding officer of the 36th Bomb Squadron, and First Lieutenant J. C.

Bowen, commanding officer of the 18th Pursuit Squadron, worked out a detailed agreement

for joint operations. Commander J. Perry, the senior naval aviator present approved the

agreement.18 It stated that when one or more enemy ships were sighted, all available aircraft

would take off for attack. It further specified separate directions of attack, altitude

separations, communications channels, and called for concentrated attack. In the event of

attack by carrier aircraft the agreement said that interceptor aircraft would concentrate on

destroying enemy aircraft. Army and Navy bombers would concentrate on destruction of the

enemy carriers.19

Aleutian Invasion and Recapture

The first critical test of land-based Army and Navy air elements in Alaska came on

June 2, 1942. Although expected and searched for, an attacking Japanese force approached

Dutch Harbor under the cover of weather. The raiding ships included the carriers Junyo and

Ryujo plus escorting cruisers and destroyers. Garbled transmissions from one Navy patrol

aircraft that sighted them prevented any warning at all. Zeros, the monoplane Japanese

naval fighters, riddled Lieutenant Lucius Campbell's PBY with machine gun bullets just after

his radio operator got out a sighting report. When empty fuel tanks caused Campbell to make

a forced landing at sea fifty miles from Akutan, he had the contact report re-transmitted.

Problems in encryption or decryption kept it from being fully deciphered both at Kodiak and

Dutch Harbor. Japanese fighters shot down three other searching PBYs before they could

report enemy carrier aircraft.20

On the morning of June 3, Japanese aircraft from the carriers Junyo and Ryujo, which

were about 180 miles southwest of the American installations, bombed Dutch Harbor and

Unalaska. Fourteen single-engine Kate horizontal bombers and six Zero fighters from the

Ryujo and thirteen two-seat single-engine Val dive bombers and thirteen Zero fighters from

the Junyo made the raid.21 The Americans had little warning. A U.S. Army air search radar

set sent to Unalaska was not yet operating. A radar operator on the Navy seaplane tender

Gillis, tied up at Dutch Harbor, spotted the attacking aircraft five minutes before the

Japanese planes began bombing and strafing. When Dutch Harbor reported the bombing,

Army P–40s and B–26s at Cold Bay to the east scrambled. Army fighters at Otter Point

airfield on Umnak Island , about fifty miles southwest of Dutch Harbor and Unalaska, did

not receive word of the attack in progress owing to poor communications.

A second raid of seventeen horizontal bombers, fifteen dive bombers, and fifteen

fighters launched later on June 3 targeted five American destroyers lurking in Makushin Bay

on the other side of Unalaska Island, about twenty miles west of Dutch Harbor. Theobald had

positioned the ships there for an attack on the stronger Japanese fleet if it could be weakened

by land-based air strikes. Theobald himself was at sea with a force of two heavy cruisers,

three light cruisers, and four destroyers. His task force was 400 miles southeast of Kodiak

Island, which lies to the south of the Alaska Peninsula, and nearly 500 miles from the

Japanese fleet. Radio silence put him out of radio contact with the rest of his command. But

his ships were positioned to intercept the Japanese if they headed toward Kodiak or the

Alaskan mainland.22
71

Worsening weather turned back the pilots of the thirty-two Japanese strike aircraft

and their escort of fifteen Zero fighters before they reached Makushin Bay on Unalaska

Island. Four float planes launched from two Japanese cruisers, which had been flying with

the carrier planes, continued on a reconnaissance mission. Two of the reconnoitering twoseater float planes ran into an American air patrol from Otter Point. One of the Japanese

aircraft escaped into a cloud. Two P–40s sent the other into the ocean at the end of the Otter

Point runway.23

The Japanese renewed their attack on Dutch Harbor in the evening on June 4. Twenty

strike aircraft, a mix of dive and horizontal bombers, accompanied by eleven Zeros took off

from the carriers just after six o'clock. Again, falling bombs were the first warning of a raid.

The attack, like the one on June 3, did minor damage, though it killed and wounded a

number of Americans.24

Japanese strike planners were ignorant of the American airfield at Otter Point and

had chosen a post-attack rendezvous point for the carrier aircraft about three miles east of

it. P–40s on combat air patrol sighted and attacked the Japanese planes as they approached

their assembly point. Other P–40s still on the ground took off hurriedly to join in the fight.

Some of the Zeros simultaneously sighted and went after a B–17 returning to the American

airfield after fruitlessly searching for the Japanese fleet. In the ensuing melee, the eight

American fighters involved shot down two Val dive bombers. They so severely damaged two

others that they did not make it back to their carrier. The experienced Japanese Navy pilots,

flying the more agile Zeros, splashed two of the American fighters. As they headed toward

their carrier they chanced upon and strafed the Navy sea plane tender Williamson, causing

light casualties.25

While the Japanese were raiding Dutch Harbor, Navy PBYs from Cold Bay and Dutch

Harbor and Army bombers from Cold Bay and Umnak attempted to find and attack the

Japanese carriers. A VP–42 PBY located and trailed the Japanese task force early on the

morning of June 4. The pilot of the lumbering amphibian attempted to bomb the Japanese

ships before returning to base but was driven off by antiaircraft fire. Then a combat air patrol

from the enemy carriers shot down a second PBY that arrived after the first had left. Two

additional PBYs, one from VP–41 and one from VP–42, located the carriers about eleven

o'clock. The first radioed a position report to American authorities at Cold Bay before making

an abortive torpedo run. Antiaircraft fire damaged one of the amphibian's two engines so it

headed toward Dutch Harbor. The second PBY, from VP–41, which remained in contact with

the Japanese ships, was never heard from again.26

When the PBY's sighting report reached American forces at Cold Bay and Otter Point,

Colonel Thad V. Foster, the senior Air Corps officer at the latter field, refused to allow the

Army and Navy strike aircraft there to attack the Japanese without orders from

Headquarters Eleventh Air Force at Anchorage. According to Lieutenant Junior Grade J. E.

Breeding of Patrol Squadron 41, Foster told him "to stay where he was." Breeding then

radioed Lieutenant Commander Paul J. Foley, skipper of VP–41 that "Six B–26s loaded with

torpedoes here awaiting your orders for take off. PBYs are now loading torpedoes." Foley

immediately ordered the B–26s to take off.27 The PBYs then followed. Breeding later

commented that Foster repeatedly said during conversations that he was taking orders from

the Navy from a person fourteen years his junior.28

The six 77th Bombardment Squadron B–26s from Otter Point could not find the

Japanese fleet and returned to base at 1:55 p.m. Another five B–26s from Cold Bay also failed

to find the Japanese ships and were ordered to land at Otter Point. Two B–26s, each armed

on a makeshift basis with one 2,000-pound torpedo, ignored or missed the direction to land
72

and continued. They found the Japanese. One B–26, flown by Captain Harry S. Taylor,

attempted three torpedo runs. Damage from antiaircraft weapons forced Taylor to head back

to base after jettisoning his torpedo. The second B–26, flown by Captain George

Thornborough, also tried torpedo runs. After the Japanese carriers' evasive actions frustrated

two attacks, he decided to drop his torpedo like a bomb. He knew that the torpedo was

designed to run a certain distance through water before it would arm itself. But

Thornborough hoped that wind would turn the impeller enough to arm his torpedo. This

didn't work. The torpedo hit the deck of the carrier Ryujo and plunged over the side without

exploding. Remarkably, the B–26 escaped unharmed and returned to Cold Bay. On his return

to Cold Bay Thornborough directed ground crews to reload his aircraft with 500-pound armorpiercing bombs. He took off in worsening weather. A Cold Bay radio operator heard him

reporting a position over the socked-in airfield late that night. Attempts to guide

Thornborough into a landing failed. A month later his radio operator's body was found on a

beach north of Cold Bay. No trace was ever found of the B–26 or the rest of the crew.29

While Thornborough made his second attempt to attack the Japanese fleet, five B–17s

and an LB–30, a variant of the B–24, took off from Cold Bay for the same purpose. They too

failed to find the enemy ships but returned safely to Cold Bay after three hours in the air.

A sixth B–17, delayed in takeoff, departed later and joined up with another B–17 that

launched from Otter Point. These two aircraft located the enemy ships.

The Otter Point B–17, which had no radar, made a bomb run at 900 feet and dropped

one 2,000-pound and one 1,000-pound bomb. The Cold Bay B–17 used radar to drop its bombs

through the clouds. The pilot, Lieutenant Thomas F. Mansfield, then took his aircraft down

for a bomb damage assessment. He reported a carrier and cruiser burning before being shot

down by antiaircraft fire from the cruiser Takao.

Three torpedo-carrying B–26s from Otter Point sortied at 8:30 p.m. They found the

Japanese carriers and their escorts about ninety miles south of the airfield just before nine

o'clock. Two of the medium bombers ran in at the Japanese ships one after the other. They

claimed hits on a cruiser. Despite the aircrews' claims, the American air strikes achieved only

near misses that did no damage.30

One historian has concluded that the ineffective American air opposition to the

Japanese raids occurred for three reasons. These were that: (1) the Cold Bay and Otter Point

fields were too far away from Dutch Harbor to permit effective defense; (2) the absence of

early warning radar compounded the problem created by the distance from the air fields to

Dutch Harbor; and (3) inadequate communications, weather forecasting, and ground service

hampered the American aviators.31

After their unsuccessful attacks on the Japanese fleet on June 4, Army and Navy

aircraft continued to search for the enemy fleet. One of the carrier's fighters chased away a

PBY that made contact on June 6. After that the Japanese ships evaded surveillance and

moved to a position 400 miles south of Kiska, an island 600 miles west of the nearest

American air field at Otter Point and 165 miles southeast of Attu.32

As the search for the Japanese task force continued, American air strength in the

western Aleutians increased. The 54th Fighter Squadron, flying P–38 "Lightnings," joined the

P–40s at Cold Bay and Otter Point. The P–38s, with their distinctive twin booms and

gondola, were better suited than the P–40s to the long flights required in the Aleutians. Five

B–24s from the 30th Bombardment Group at March Field, California, headed north. So too

did six PBYs from VP–43 at San Diego. They were to make up for the six amphibians lost

in combat and operations.
73

On June 8 an Eleventh Air Force LB–30 discovered unidentified ships in Kiska

harbor. The ships, at first thought to be American, returned recognition signals with

antiaircraft fire. The LB–30 had discovered a total of twenty Japanese vessels including two

light cruisers, three destroyers, three corvettes, three minesweepers, and four cargo vessels.

A VP–41 PBY then confirmed the finding. The patrol bomber also spotted Japanese at Attu

Island, more than 150 miles further west, and unsuccessfully bombed a cruiser and destroyer

steaming between the two islands.33

Nimitz directed Theobald to drive the Japanese off the islands with air strikes before

they entrenched. A bombing campaign began on June 11. Interdiction of enemy supply ships

en route to Kiska and Attu plus destruction of shipping found in the islands' harbors were

important parts of the campaign. Captain Gehres is said to have ordered his pilots to raid

Kiska until no ships were left in the harbor or until all the ships there were sunk.34

Bomber pilots on the first sorties to Kiska and Attu encountered heavy antiaircraft

fire but claimed hits on several ships. These later proved erroneous. As was true in other

theaters, ships proved difficult targets for horizontal bombing even when conducted from low

altitudes. Three B–17s and four B–24s exposed themselves to heavy gunfire to drop their

bombs from 700 feet, but without result, on June 14.35

The Navy patrol bomber squadrons joined the effort to bomb the Japanese off the two

small islands at the end of the Aleutian chain. Captain Gehres sent the seaplane tender

Gillis into Nazan Bay on Atka Island, 360 miles east of Kiska, to support the operations of

about twenty amphibians. The PBY crews conducted normal maritime reconnaissance patrols.

At the end of each they raided Kiska before returning to their temporary base. P–38s from

the 54th Fighter Squadron flew the more than 400 miles from Otter Point to Atka Island in

relays to provide a combat air patrol over the seaplane tender servicing the PBYs. A bomber

accompanied each fighter mission to provide navigational assistance. While providing air

cover for the tender, the P–38s shot down two four-engine Mavis flying boats. The slow

American amphibians also proved extremely vulnerable. Over Kiska they suffered extensively

from Japanese flak but did heavily damage the destroyer Hibiki with near bomb misses off

the bow. This removed the destroyer from the campaign, and she went back to Japan escorted

by another destroyer, the Akatsuki. After three days of bombing, the loss of one aircraft, and

a lot of damage to many others, use of the lumbering PBYs as strike aircraft stopped on June

14, 1942.36

This combined Army-Navy air assault on Kiska sank no ships. It did interfere to some

extent with Japanese efforts to fortify Kiska and forced them to withdraw their ships from

Kiska Harbor. Henceforth Japanese warships stayed outside the harbor while transports

remained at Kiska only long enough to discharge cargo. In addition, the appearance of the

long-range P–38s caused the Japanese to stop using their flying boat bombers in offensive

air operations.

The air strip at Otter Point on Umnak Island, named Cape Field in honor of an Army

pilot who had gone down, became the principal base for raids on Kiska. Army engineers

expanded the runways and facilities. On July 20, Eleventh Air Force headquarters moved

from Elmendorf Army air base outside Anchorage to Cape Field. From there, B–17s and

B–24s escorted by P–38s could make the 1,234-mile round trip to Kiska but carry only half

their maximum bomb load.37

Colonel Eareckson, commanding officer of the 28th Composite Group, sent the first

bombing raid to Kiska from Cape Field on June 18. An LB–30 scouted ahead to report

weather conditions. Three B–17s and four B–24s followed. Aiming from 14,000 feet, one of

the B–17 bombardiers managed to hit the freighter Nissan Maru. His bomb set the 6,537-ton
74

ship, laden with coal, fuel oil, and gasoline, afire. She burned for several days before sinking.

The B–24s then made a low-level attack without result. As the raiders returned to Cape Field

one of the B–24s ran out of gas and had to ditch in the Bering Sea.38

The first American raid on Attu took place on July 2, 1942. A B–17 weather

reconnaissance aircraft preceded seven B–24s. It reported Japanese ships at Attu and at

Aggatu Island, thirty miles southeast of Attu. The B–24s could find no targets at Attu and

diverted to the smaller island. Near misses damaged two freighters and an oil tanker. The

bombers did no harm to six Japanese destroyers also sheltering at the smaller island.39

American air strength in the Aleutians increased with the arrival of additional bomber

and fighter squadrons, but miserable weather allowed only eleven missions to Kiska and Attu

throughout July 1942. Increasingly heavy antiaircraft fire, Rufe fighters that were float-plane

versions of the Zero, and terrible flying conditions cost the Americans a number of personnel

casualties, one B–17, and one RB–17.40

General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Commanding General of the United States Army Air

Forces, believed the Aleutians were unsuitable for air operations. It was, he wrote in July of

1942, "a primary theater for surface naval craft, supported when weather permits by long

range bombers." He decided against any additions to American air strength in Alaska beyond

an initial allocation of two heavy bomber squadrons, two medium bomber squadrons, a fighter

group, a transport squadron, and a few observation planes.41 Arnold was pressed by needs

for aircraft in other theaters and right about the difficulty of air operations in the Aleutians.

But the Navy too was pressed by requirements for its forces in other theaters. All but two

cruisers and four destroyers departed for other theaters by November 1943. Submarines and

aircraft bore the principal burden of offensive operations in the Aleutians.42

The Japanese, who had originally intended to withdraw from their Aleutians feint

after a temporary occupation, decided to remain. They concluded that an Aleutian outpost

diverted American forces at small cost to themselves. It might also prevent Aleutian bases

from being used as launch points for raids on the home islands and would boost morale at

home. The Japanese flag, they could say, now flew on North American soil. Kiska became

their principal Aleutian garrison with more than 5,000 Army and Navy personnel there by

the end of 1942. Attu, which the Japanese abandoned in mid-September, was re-occupied late

October because they feared United States' construction of an air base there. They knew from

experience in the South Pacific that American engineers could quickly build an air strip

despite the roughest terrain.43

With the additional personnel came an increase in Japanese air strength on Kiska.

They began but never completed air strips on Kiska and on Attu. American reconnaissance

flights discovered them on January 19, 1943. While waiting for completion of an air field, the

Japanese Navy brought in more float-plane fighters and reconnaissance-bomber aircraft to

join the Rufes and Mavis flying boats already there. The mix of single-engine monoplanes and

biplanes took off from sheltered lagoons. Tractors dragged them ashore for maintenance and

during storms. Six Mavis patrol bombers were serviced by the seaplane tender Kamikawa

Maru until it was ordered back to Japan at the end of July. Shore bombardment from an

American Navy surface task force accounted for three more Mavises on August 7. Weather

destroyed another. The surviving ungainly but effective Japanese counterparts to the PBYs

left the Aleutians in mid-August. Despite the difficulties of operating from an advanced base

in the stormy Aleutians, the Japanese float-plane fighters accounted for six American

bombers during the summer of 1942.44

That same season the Americans had six B–17s, fifteen B–24s, two LB–30s, and

twenty-one P–38s available to attack the Japanese outposts in the Aleutians and the shipping
75

that supplied them. Although the Eleventh Air Force had nearly 200 additional aircraft, they

were transports, short-range fighters, and medium bombers useless for long-range bombing

and escort missions.

On August 30, 1942, American forces landed on Adak, a forty-mile-long by twentymile-wide island 400 miles west of Dutch Harbor, to begin building an air strip. Kiska lay

only 250-Miles further west. The Eleventh Air Force now organized into the XI Bomber

Command and XI Fighter Command, could step up the pace of bombing and strafing the

enemy island garrisons. B–26s, P–39s, and P–40s would be able to join the longer-range

aircraft previously engaged when the Adak airfield became operational. The P–39 Aircobras

had already demonstrated their ineffectiveness as fighters, but enjoyed some success in a

close air support role.

The first raid launched from Adak went to Kiska on September 14. Twelve B–24s and

a B–17 equipped to photograph bomb damage took off first. Half of the B–24s carried 1,000-

pound general purpose bombs with eleven-second delay fuzes for shipping attacks. The others

carried demolition and incendiary bombs for use against ground installations and the

Japanese submarine base on the island. Fourteen P–39s and fourteen P–38s followed. They

arrived at the target first to suppress flak and fighter opposition. This permitted the bombers

to make low-altitude bomb runs.45

The low-altitude approach to Kiska prevented an early warning by Japanese radar and

made for more accurate bombing. American claims for the raid were extensive. Fighter pilots

reported three Japanese submarines damaged and a flying boat destroyed. Post-strike

assessment of bomber accomplishments recorded a transport and several barges damaged,

and a number of small craft sunk.46

Wide-ranging maritime patrols by Gehres' PBYs, and Eareckson's capability for

intensive air strikes, now made it dangerous for Japanese ships to approach Kiska and Attu.

On September 1, 1942, two patrol planes, one from VP–41 and one from VP–42, strafed and

bombed the submarine RO-61. The U.S. Navy destroyer Reid then depth-charged the

submarine, forced it to the surface, and sank it with gunfire. Those Japanese ships that did

reach the islands faced almost certain attack once they anchored to off-load supplies, if

weather permitted American air operations. Miserable flying weather in late September

allowed relocation of the Attu garrison to Kiska without losses.47

On September 25, 1942, a mix of bombers and fighters struck at Kiska. One of the

bombers hit the 7,190-ton transport Nozima Maru, which had to be beached. A few days later

American planes damaged the submarine RO-65 severely enough so that she later sank. On

October 6 another raid set the 3,110-ton transport Borneo Maru afire. Subsequent attempts

to sink the damaged ship with torpedoes from B–26s failed. After two missions Eareckson

canceled efforts to adapt the medium bombers as torpedo planes.48

An October 15 mission against the Borneo Maru by three B–26s resulted in several

near misses. The planes made their bomb runs at 100 to 150 feet to drop twenty 300-pound

bombs. One of the unescorted bombers crashed after anti-aircraft fire tore off its right wing.

The following day the Japanese destroyers Oboro and Hatsuharu approached Kiska with

supplies for the garrison. A PBY attack was unsuccessful, but the Navy plane alerted XI

Bomber Command about the destroyers. Six B–26s armed with 300-pound bombs arrived

from Adak at 5:40 p.m. Captain Richard Salter planted bombs from stern to bow on the

Oboro that quickly sank the ship, leaving only seventeen survivors. Direct hits and near

misses from the other B–26s destroyed the Hatsuharu's rudder, killed four of the ship's crew,

and injured fourteen more Japanese sailors. The destroyer was able to return to Japan under
76

its own power. Gunfire from the ships shot down one B–26 and inflicted damage and

personnel casualties on some of the others.49

November brought winter storms to the western Aleutians, grounding both American

and Japanese aircraft for most of November and December. They also frustrated naval

operations. Two Japanese attempts to land troops on Shemya Island, 137 miles northwest

of Kiska, were prevented by a fierce storm. The island's relatively flat terrain would have

facilitated air field construction.

On November 27 the weather cleared enough for an Eleventh Air Force reconnaissance

flight to see the Cherryboune Maru being unloaded at Attu. Four B–26s and four P–38s

headed west after Adak received the report of the ship's presence. Using 500-pound armorpiercing bombs with delayed fuzes, the bombers started the freighter burning. It continued

burning over the next month as it settled to the bottom of Holtz Bay.50

Weather conditions allowed only intermittent missions against Kiska in the last month

of 1942. Most that did occur produced few results. In the meantime, Theobald's relations with

the officer commanding the air component of the North Pacific Force worsened. The admiral

tended to give minute instructions even on matters in which he was not expert.

Theobald ordered Butler to send bombers to attack two Japanese freighters reported

at Attu. When Butler responded that weather conditions made it impossible to attack on

December 7 as ordered, Theobald ordered a second attack to take off at 10:00 a.m. on

December 8. Butler answered this by advising that an 11:00 a.m. take off would permit

reports from a weather reconnaissance aircraft that would be in the Attu area at 10:00 a.m.

A ten o'clock departure time, he added, would be too dark for a large formation of aircraft to

take off and assemble.51

What ensued was a series of messages in which Butler indicated he had scheduled an

attack mission as ordered, but pointing out icing and other weather difficulties. Theobald

consolidated the various exchanges, added comments, and may have intended them as

support for relieving Butler.52 Theobald's comments justified the change to a 10:00 a.m.

departure to fool the Japanese, who were accustomed to bombers arriving from Adak after

an 11:00 a.m. departure from Adak. He dismissed Butler's advice regarding weather. In the

comments Theobald elaborated on theories of unity of command and concluded that Butler's

recommendations for changes in his orders were due to the Air Corps general's desire to

"conduct his operation and not that of the Task Force Commander."53

The December attack proved the last that Theobald ordered. On December 8, 1942,

Admiral Chester Nimitz, CINCPAC, relieved him of command. From Alaska Theobald went

to the Boston Navy Yard where, beached, he served as Commandant, First Naval District.

Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, who had experience fighting the Japanese in the Solomon

Islands, arrived to replace Theobald. Kinkaid got along well with his Army counterpart,

General Buckner, and with the Army officers under his command.54

On December 30, 1942, a mission with a mix of five B–24s, four B–25s, four B–26s,

and eight P–38s set out for Kiska from Adak. The twin-engine B–25 Mitchell medium

bombers had arrived in Alaska with the 406th Bombardment Squadron. They had a top speed

of 315 mph and could carry up to 3,000-pounds of bombs. Modified to carry as many as six

forward-firing machine guns, they also demonstrated their lethality in an anti-shipping role.

The B–24s, which had taken off a few minutes before the medium bombers, dropped their

500-pound general purpose bombs from an altitude of 7,000 to 8,500 feet over Kiska Harbor

two hours after leaving Adak. Two of the bomber pilots claimed hits on transports below. The

medium bombers followed, using 300-pound bombs in a low-level attack. One of the enemy
77

ships, the Urajio Maru, received so much damage that the Japanese beached her at Kiska.

The second ship, the Nichiyu Maru, escaped serious injury and was able to return to Japan.55

Kiska and Attu remained beyond comfortable reach of single-engine fighters located

250 miles away on Adak. In the frequently cloudy and foggy Aleutians that distance was also

sometimes a stretch even for two-engine fighters and medium bombers. In mid-December the

Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered construction of an air base on Amchitka Island, only sixty miles

east of Kiska and 178 miles from Attu. The chiefs also authorized planning for amphibious

assaults to recapture Kiska and Attu.

In the meantime, Eleventh Air Force bombers kept after Japanese shipping which

either was spotted by Fleet Air Wing Four patrols or was encountered by chance. On January

5, 1943, three B–25s responded to a Navy reconnaissance report. They sank the 6,500-ton

Kotohira Maru off Attu, as it attempted to deliver ashore a cargo of food, fuel, and building

materials. The same day a B–24 flying west on weather reconnaissance spotted the Montreal

Maru. One bomb on the ship's deck and two near-misses sank the freighter. Infantry and

engineers on board who were bound for Kiska drowned. This deprived the Japanese of badlyneeded airfield construction workers and materials.56

Between November 1942 and January 1943, eighteen of twenty-one vessels, however,

successfully made voyages to resupply the Japanese garrisons in the Aleutians. In some cases

they were able to evade air interdiction because Japanese radio units intercepted American

air-to-ground traffic and could advise the ships as to which patrol sectors were not covered

by aerial surveillance. When the ships steamed into Attu or Kiska they did so during evening

hours, unloaded, and departed before daylight. Japanese radar units on Attu and Kiska

suggested departure routes designed to avoid aerial surveillance of the waters surrounding

the islands.57

Two-thousand-one hundred Americans landed on Amchitka Island on the morning of

January 12, 1943. The 813th Engineer Aviation Battalion began construction of a 10,000-foot

runway and other airfield facilities. As soon as P–40 and P–38 fighter-bombers could operate

from the island, Japanese re-supply of Kiska with surface ships would become extremely

hazardous. Only a few minutes had to elapse between the spotting of supply ships and the

dispatch of an anti-shipping strike. Only convoys with heavy naval and air escorts or sailing

in weather that precluded air operations could make it through.58

A bombing mission launched from Adak on the same day that the engineers landed

on Amchitka demonstrated the hazards of Aleutian flying. Six B–24s, four B–26s, and six

P–38s headed to Attu on the morning of January 12. Their targets were two Japanese ships

reported by a weather reconnaissance aircraft to be in Kiska Harbor. Mechanical difficulties

forced two B–26s and one B–24 to abort soon after takeoff. The remaining B–26s and P–38s

decided to return to Adak because of bad weather. One B–24 also managed to return to base

before the weather closed in and a second flew safely back to Cold Bay to land. A third crash

landed on a small island near Adak with only one serious injury to its crew. The three

remaining B–24s disappeared.59

On March 26, 1943, American surface ships encountered a heavily escorted Japanese

convoy en route to Attu. The U.S. Navy task force of one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and

four destroyers took on two Japanese heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and four destroyers

180 miles west of Attu. Despite a running battle that began at 8:00 a.m. and lasted more

than three hours, the ships inflicted little damage on each other. Finally the Japanese

admiral, his ships low on ammunition and fuel, retired when the Japanese radar station on

Kiska sent an alarming, but false, report that an American air strike was headed toward his

ships.60
78

Although Eleventh Air Force bombers at Adak and Amchitka began preparing for an

air strike against the Japanese warships, they never made it. At Amchitka, mechanics had

to install bomb bay fuel tanks on B–25s so the planes didn't get off the ground until the

surface action was over. Even with the bomb bay tanks, eight B–25s accompanied by eight

P–38s that sortied at 1:30 p.m. had to turn back before reaching the last reported position

of the Japanese ships. A B–24 mission from Adak came to nothing when ground crews

attempted to replace general purpose bombs with armor-piercing bombs. They discovered the

latter frozen to the ground. The ensuing delay, compounded by worsening weather, caused

six hours to elapse before the B–24s were airborne. By then the Japanese task force was well

beyond their reach. The only American aircraft to spot the Japanese ships were two Fleet Air

Wing Four PBYs diverted from routine patrol. But they carried no bombs and could only

report the position of the retreating Japanese ships. The Battle of the Komandorski Islands

ended without air support from either side.

After the difficulties experienced in attempting to intervene in the sea fight, the

Eleventh Air Force kept six B–25s on anti-shipping alert. The combined threat from

American air, surface, and submarine forces did persuade the Japanese to abandon efforts

to supply and reinforce their Aleutian garrisons except by submarine. Among other effects,

this ended Japanese ability to replace float-plane fighters at Attu and Kiska lost in combat

and to operational accidents. By mid-March there was no Japanese air opposition to steppedup Eleventh Air Force raids on the Attu and Kiska garrisons.61

Admiral Kinkaid commanded the North Pacific Force as it supported an amphibious

operation to retake Attu that began on May 11, 1943. An assault force under Rear Admiral

F. W. Rockwell, USN, delivered a landing force under Major General Albert Brown, USA, and

later Major General Eugene M. Landrum, USA, to Attu beaches that recaptured the island.62

In preparation for increased activity in the Aleutians, the Navy added two squadrons

of its PV-1 Ventura patrol bombers to Fleet Air Wing Four. The Ventura, a twin-engine land

plane developed from the civilian Lockheed Vega, had a range of 1,600 miles and could carry

a 3,000-pound bomb load. The twin-tailed aircraft had a top speed in excess of 322 mph.

Defensive machine guns mounted in a top turret and firing aft from a ventral tunnel

supplemented forward-firing .50 caliber machine guns in the nose. Its radar could sweep an

area 240 degrees wide ahead of the plane. When the landings on Attu took place, the Navy

had three PBY squadrons and one PV-1 squadron at Adak and one PBY squadron and one

PV-1 squadron at Amchitka.63

Eleventh Air Force, Fleet Air Wing Four, and Navy fighter bombers from the carrier

Nassau helped to suppress Japanese surface opposition to American forces assaulting Attu.

Recapture of the island took from May 11 to May 30, 1943. On May 12 a PBY from VP–61

alerted the battleship Pennsylvania to the presence of a Japanese submarine. The amphibian

then assisted two destroyers driving I-61 away from Attu.

Despite the presence of American land-based and carrier fighters, twelve Japanese

Navy twin-engine Betty medium bombers flying 750 miles from the island of Paramushiro,

raided the American invasion fleet on May 22. Paramushiro, just south of the tip of the

Kamchatka Peninsula, and other islands in the Kurile group were home to Japanese naval

and air bases. The Bettys' torpedo attacks on the destroyer Phelps and gunboat Charleston

were unsuccessful, but they did drop some supplies to the beleaguered Japanese ground

troops before heading home unscathed. Sixteen Bettys attempting to hit the American ships

at Attu the following day were not so lucky. They encountered a P–38 combat air patrol. The

Lightnings shot down five of the Japanese bombers and damaged seven others. This was the

last attempt by Japanese aerial forces to oppose the American recapture of Attu.64
79

Once Attu was in American hands again, Eleventh Air Force and Fleet Air Wing Four

cooperated in bombing attacks against nearby Kiska. Even before the Japanese on Attu had

been finally eliminated on May 29, work had begun on building air strips on the island. The

Americans also began construction of another field on Shemya Island. By mid-August, in

addition to fighters at all of the Aleutian fields, B–24s operated from Shemya and PV-1s from

Attu.65

In June 1943, the American aerial forces initiated an intensive bombing campaign

against Kiska, supplemented by naval gunfire bombardments. At the same time, a Kiska

invasion force assembled. Consisting of more than 100 warships and nearly 35,000 ground

troops, the force assaulted Kiska on August 15, 1943, only to find that Japan had covertly

evacuated its forces from the island.66

American planes watched Kiska Island and surrounding waters, through all but the

worst weather. But heavy fog prevented surveillance of Kiska for many consecutive days.

During June and July the Japanese ran submarines and finally surface ships into Kiska to

withdraw their troops there. After three submarines fell victim to American patrol vessels,

a task force of two cruisers and ten destroyers accompanied by an oiler started final rescue

efforts from Paramushiro. Several sorties made in June and early July ended without result.

In each case improving weather conditions forced the Japanese to return to harbor rather

than face American bombers.67

On July 10 the weather cleared enough for a PBY to spot Japanese transports south

of Kiska. Five B–25s on anti-shipping alert at Amchitka sortied and were joined by eight

B–24s that had been prepared for a raid on the Kurile Islands. The B–25s arrived first to

sink two enemy transports with low-level attacks. The B–24s then appeared. Two could not

find the remaining Japanese ships. The other six heavy bombers flew in under low clouds to

make bomb runs but the Japanese evaded them. The surviving transports did not continue

toward Kiska.68

In late July a heavy fog foiled American aerial surveillance and, combined with

misinterpreted radar images, allowed the Japanese to slip through the forces surrounding

Kiska. On July 23 a Fleet Air Wing 4 PBY erroneously reported radar contact with seven

ships 200 nautical miles southwest of Kiska. American battleships and cruisers dispatched

to intercept the enemy ships expended almost 1,000 rounds of large-caliber ammunition due

to another misinterpreted radar identification. In fact, there had been no enemy ships sighted

or engaged.69

As the American ships retired to refuel and rearm, the Japanese rescue fleet slipped

into Kiska Harbor. In a mere fifty-five minutes all 5,183 troops of the remaining garrison got

aboard the Japanese destroyers, which then slipped away into the fog.70

The aerial forces that drove the Japanese from the Aleutians were land-based, except

for the carrier fighters that supported the amphibious landings on Attu and Kiska. Even

Fleet Air Wing Four's amphibian PBYs operated from shore bases whenever possible. The

Army and Navy land-based aircraft had mounted a year-long campaign that included

increasingly successful interdiction of ships used to resupply and reinforce the Japanese

outposts on the Aleutians. Construction of advanced air bases closed the distances and

permitted American surveillance of surrounding waters and attacks on shipping to intensify.

During the campaign, air attacks by the Eleventh Air Force and Fleet Air Wing Four sank

nine transports, one destroyer, and two submarines. They also damaged several other

warships and transports. Although not statistically impressive when compared to actions in

European and other Pacific waters, these land-based air achievements were vital elements
80

of the war in the North Pacific. Only the Aleutians' notorious clouds and fog saved the final

Japanese effort to rescue its surviving troops.

Attacking Northern Japan

Even before the Japanese were driven from the Aleutians, the land-based aerial forces

had begun their final contribution to the war in the North Pacific. Once bases on Attu,

Amchitka, and Shemya were in place, the northern Japanese home islands and the waters

around them were within reach of long-range American bombers. It was 750-miles one way

between Attu and Japan's Kurile Islands. In addition to military facilities, the islands were

also the base for substantial fishing activity important to the Japanese economy.

North Pacific Force orders arrived in early July 1943, for the first bombing mission

from an Aleutian base against Japanese army and navy facilities in the Kuriles. One mission

by eight B–25s on July 10 used radar to drop its bombs through heavy clouds. Three PBYs

from VP–45 also bombed the Kuriles on the same day and in the same manner. This was the

first bombing of the Japanese home islands since the Doolittle raid of April 1942. A second

mission by six B–24s loaded with 500-pound bombs on July 18 met better conditions. Half

of the heavy bombers targeted the Kataoka naval base on Shimushu Island, about 300 miles

south of Paramushiro. The other half of the mission bombed shipping off Paramushiro Island.

They reported near misses but no direct hits. A third mission against the Kuriles on August

10 again went to the Kataoka naval base. The nine B–24s involved also added the

Kashiwabara army staging area adjacent to the naval facility as a target. An estimated forty

opposing fighters and intense flak shot down two of the heavy bombers and damaged three

more.71

Subsequent raids on the Kuriles were postponed until September 1943, after the Kiska

campaign was finished. On the third of the month, twelve B–25s from Attu caused slight

damage to the 2,742-ton Teisho Shima Maru and a larger freighter of about 4,000 tons near

Paramushiro. Eight days later seven B–24s and 12 B–25s took off from Attu for the Kuriles.

The B–24s targeted Japanese land installations while the B–25s went after shipping. The

latter attacked vessels in the strait between Paramushiro and nearby Shumushu Island. The

pilots claimed one large transport sunk and two smaller ships damaged. Japanese fighters

caught the B–25s coming out of their bomb run and made the mission disastrous. They shot

down two B–25s and damaged five others so severely that they landed on Russian territory.

The Russians, who had not yet joined the war against Japan, interned the crews and

confiscated the aircraft. The Japanese fighters also sent one B–24 down and inflicted enough

injury to cause two more of the heavy bombers to head toward the nearest Russian air field.

This was the last Eleventh Air Force mission against the Kuriles in 1943.72

Fleet Air Wing Four, whose PBYs and PV-1s had previously flown reconnaissance near

the Japanese islands, sent PBYs on bombing missions against shipping there on December

20, 1943. PV-1s made offensive sweeps west of Attu searching for Japanese naval bombers.

Bettys usually fled from the heavily-armed high-speed Venturas.73

Eleventh Air Force B–25s resumed shipping strikes near the Kuriles in January and

February of 1944, before PV-1s supplanted the PBYs. Army Air Forces heavy bombers and

some of the Navy PV-1s took on the job of attacking Japanese shore installations on the

Kuriles. The 73rd Bomber Squadron, flying B–25s, and other PV-1s focused on anti-shipping.

In May of 1944 the B–25s went after picket boats that alerted the Japanese to approaching

air raids. On the 18th and 19th, the medium bombers sank two picket boats west of Attu. On

May 22 they blew apart another picket boat off the Kurile Islands. They then destroyed the
81

Japanese patrol boats Shinyo Maru and No. 3 Showa Maru at sea east of the Kuriles on May

29.74

Weather conditions prevented a regular schedule of missions to Kurile Island waters

until August. In the interim, a PV-1 weather reconnaissance on June 11, 1944, discovered a

new airfield on Shimushu. Twin-engine Mitsubishi Betty torpedo bombers were there in

strength. Since an American shore bombardment task force was in the area, a counter-air

strike against the newly-discovered air strip was critical. The next day a six-plane mission

raided the Shimushu field. A high-speed, extremely low-level approach allowed the Venturas

to bore in from the ocean undetected. They devastated the Japanese aircraft on the ground.

Two of the PV-1s also found a second new airfield, which they strafed. This mission removed

a significant threat to the American surface ships nearby. In addition, it demonstrated the

feasibility of daylight raids on Kurile Islands installations that continued until the end of the

war.75

Thereafter Venturas and B–25s also drove the Japanese fishing fleet out of the

Kuriles. Venturas of VPB–131, equipped with rockets and five forward-firing .50 caliber

machine guns, joined the 73rd's medium bombers in a campaign to destroy Japan's "Fish

Basket." On July 23, 1944, a PV-1 from VPB–135 sank an armed picket boat off Shimushu

but had to land at Valdivostok. Subsequent raids resulted in a B–25 sinking one ship

sheltering in a Paramushiro Island harbor on September 1. On September 9 another B–25

crashed when it ran into the masts of a ship it had targeted.

Fleet Air Wing 4 Operations Order 44-5, dated November 5, 1944, established antishipping missions as the first priority of its squadrons in the Aleutians. Land installations

became secondary. They were to be attacked only in the absence of shipping targets and only

if not heavily defended. To carry out the order, the wing had a mix of attack and patrol

aircraft scattered from Kodiak to Attu. Its strike force consisted of two squadrons (VPB–131

and VPB–136) at Attu equipped with PV-1 Venturas. Patrol Squadron 43's PBYs assisted

with maritime patrol but did not join strike packages. VS-48, equipped with SBD divebombers, did not have aircraft suitable for long-range raids.76

The PV-1s flew armed only with machine guns and rockets. Bombs were eliminated

from their weapons load to conserve fuel. The Ventura pilots, new to air-to-ground rockets,

practiced on a small island near Attu before employing 3.5-inch rockets on a January 24,

1945, mission. Two previous machine gun-only raids on December 16 and January 2 had

failed to find any shipping targets. The same was true on January 24. The four-plane

missions instead struck maritime support facilities including a lighthouse, radio station, and

canneries and fishery buildings. In general the rockets proved incapable of inflicting serious

damaged on structures. The lighthouse sustained eighteen rocket hits but remained standing.

An air strike on February 2 targeted a Japanese radar on the Kuriles, and put it out of

action. This permitted an American naval task force to approach the Kuriles undetected to

deliver a shore bombardment. The PV-1s also cooperated with Eleventh Air Force in

providing air cover for surface ship bombardments of the Kuriles on January 5 and February

18, 1945.77

VPB–139, flying PV-2 Harpoons, relieved VP–136 in March 1945. The PV-2s could

carry both bombs and rockets on the long flights between Attu and the Kuriles. Previous

attacks had been so effective that enemy naval craft or fishing boats at sea were encountered

in only two out of fourteen missions. Those occurred on May 14 and 26. On the former date

two Harpoons rocketed and strafed two armed trawlers northwest of Kataoka harbor, scoring

hits on one of the boats.78 VP–131, sortieing with similar objectives, destroyed fishing boats

close to shore. On March 17 a four-plane mission started from Attu. Three turned back
82

because of radio and mechanical problems. The fourth rocketed and strafed fisheries buildings

and nearby fishing boats, scoring eight hits with eight rockets. In a similar raid on March

19, all four Venturas dispatched reached their targets.79

In 1945, Army and Navy anti-shipping missions quickly cleared the waters around the

Kuriles. Missions in early June bombed and strafed a number of trawlers, most of which were

armed. Four Harpoons attacked four trawlers on June 9, receiving minor damage. The next

day four PV-2s found a Japanese freighter off the east coast of Paramushiro. They left it

burning and out of control. On June 5 VP–131 conducted one of its last anti-shipping sweeps.

Two PV-1s searching Paramushiro Straits found and strafed a tug towing several barges.80

On June 12, 1945, four B–25s on an anti-shipping sweep damaged two freighters and

two barges, at a cost of one B–25. The anti-shipping mission was hazardous. Some B–25s,

operating at the extreme limit of their range, failed to return to base because of bad weather.

Others fell victim to antiaircraft fire or Japanese fighters, as did B–24s occasionally pressed

into maritime operations. One, after ships off Suribachi Bay, crashed while attacking a small

ship. Flak from a ship under attack on July 12 blew the wing off one of the medium bombers.

On July 17, 1945, two more B–25s were lost in combat.81

North Pacific Force land-based aircraft flew their last mission against the Kuriles on

August 12, 1945. Japan surrendered two days later. The war's end brought to a conclusion

American operations in the North Pacific that had been conducted primarily with Army and

Navy land-based aircraft. Admiral Theobald when assigned to command the North Pacific

Force in 1942 had immediately noted that land-based air was critical for the defense of

Alaska. As General Arnold said, airplanes may not have been the best weapons possible for

use there. They turned out to be the most flexible and available offensive weapon.

When the Japanese began their Aleutian adventure in June of 1942, land-based air

power made several contacts with the Japanese task force sent to raid Dutch Harbor. Three

factors probably kept these contacts from being effective. These were the newness of the

American forces to combat; the lack of later modifications and new equipment that made the

planes used effective ship killers; and the relatively undeveloped Army and Navy tactics for

air strikes against shipping. In the event, land-based air power was the only American

military arm that attacked the Japanese carriers and their escorts. Just the discovery of

American land-based air power west of Dutch Harbor at Otter Point was sufficient to keep

the Japanese from occupying Adak. With Adak, they might well have driven the Americans

from the western Aleutians.

Land-based air power and submarines conducted almost all of the American effort to

cut off sea-borne supplies to the Japanese garrisons on Kiska and Attu. In doing so, the

United States Army Air Forces dropped 4,000 tons of bombs in 297 missions at a cost of 35

aircraft lost in combat and another 150 lost to other causes. Fleet Air Wing Four lost six

aircraft to enemy action and thirty-four to other causes while conducting twelve bombing

missions. The 80 percent or more of the total losses assigned to "other causes" can be

attributed to the Aleutians' notoriously bad flying weather and the long distances between

strike aircraft's bases and their targets. American air attacks in the Aleutians destroyed

three Japanese destroyers, five submarines, and nine transports. The Army and Navy air

effort also damaged a number of other ships and sank several small craft such as tugs and

barges.82

The land-based air power campaign to strangle the Japanese on Attu and Kiska

proved so successful that these garrisons might have been left to starve. There was no

military reason to recapture the islands once American air attacks had eliminated the

Japanese ability to replenish their air strength on the islands and destroyed the planes
83

already there. It was political, rather than military necessity, that led to the invasion of Attu

and the fruitless invasion of Kiska.

After Attu's recapture it was used as a base for some of the harassing raids on the

Kurile Islands. It could have easily been supplanted for that purpose by Amchitka, from

which many land-based aircraft departed to bomb and strafe military and naval installations

in the Kuriles and shipping in adjacent waters. Those missions were sporadic but

accomplished their chief purposes of tying up Japanese forces. They contributed to a strategic

deception campaign designed to convince Japan that the Allies might launch an attack from

the north.83 The Japanese could never be sure that the continuing attacks did not presage an

invasion of the home islands via the Aleutians. Between 400 and 500 Japanese aircraft,

nearly one-sixth of the empire's total air strength late in the war, were kept on airfields in

the Kuriles and northern Japan at one time for this reason as were up to 80,000 troops.84 In

the summer of 1944 these deployments included eighteen single-engine Oscars from the

Japanese Army's 54th Fighter Group plus seventy-two Zeros, six Gekko single-engine night

fighters, eighteen Bettys, six Emily flying boats, and six Jake floatplanes from the Japanese

Navy's Twelfth Air Fleet.85 Deployment of troops in the northern islands and their resupply

offered opportunities for American submarines, which sank thirteen of the ships involved and

killed about ten percent of the personnel being deployed to the islands.86 Raids on the Kuriles

by American land-based aerial forces also struck at northern fishing fleet and related

facilities important in feeding Japan's civilian and military population. Postwar analysis

indicated that although American air forces in the North Pacific dropped only sixty-eight tons

of bombs on shipping targets between 1943 and 1945, the destruction that bombs, rockets,

and machine gun fire wrought was significant at a time when Japanese food supplies and

shipping were in short supply. It pales, however, in comparison to the daily pounding that

the Japanese home islands received in the spring of 1945 from both carrier and land-based

American aerial forces.87

United States submarines sank their share of ships in the effort to interdict Japan's

sea lanes to the Aleutians. Allied ground forces and surface combatants that assaulted Attu

fought a tough battle to obliterate the enemy units there. It does not detract from the

contributions of other arms to conclude that land-based air power, both Army and Navy,

proved the decisive American weapon in the North Pacific.

85

Endnotes to Chapter IV

1. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. VII,

Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls June 1942-April 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

1951), p. 1; John Haile Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet

Air Wing 4 (Anchorage: Anchorage Chapter-Air Force Association and Pictorial Histories

Publishing Company, Inc., 1990), p. 323.

2. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 92-

93; Hisashi Takahashi, "The Japanese Campaign in Alaska as Seen from the Strategic

Perspective," in Fern Chandonnet, ed., Alaska at War, 1941-1945, The Forgotten War

Remembered (Anchorage: Alaska at War Committee, 1995), p. 33.

3. Rear Adm. Arthur J. Hepburn, USN, "Report of the Board to Investigate and Report Upon

the Need, for Purposes of National Defense, for the Establishment of Additional Submarine,

Destroyer, Mine, and Naval Air Bases on the Coasts of the United States, its Territories and

Possessions," United States Congress, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.,

Document No. 65, pp. 20-22; Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, Bryon Fairchild, U.S. Army

in World War II-Western Hemisphere, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964),

pp. 228-29.

4. Lt. Cmdr. John Tatom, Summer Fogs and Winter Winds of The Aleutian Islands, reprinted

as Appendix A in Naval Historical Center, U.S. Naval Experience in the North Pacific During

World War II, Selected Documents (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1989), pp. 76-

94.

5. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, pp. 19-23,

67.

6. Peter Young, ed., The World Almanac of World War II (New York: World Almanac, 1981),

pp. 492-94.

7. Young, The World Almanac of World War II, p. 508; Rear Adm. Julius Augustus Furer,

USN, U.S. Navy Administrative History of World War II, Volume 156, North Pacific Force

and Area (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1959)p. 52; Adm. James S. Rusell,

USN-Ret, "World War in the Aleutians, 1942," June 1980, script for slide program, provided

to author by Adm. Russell. Distances cited between the Aleutian bases are from U.S. Navy,

Building the Navy's Bases in World War II, Volume II,

History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps 1940-1946

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947).

8. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), p. 68, pp. 450-

51.

9. Conn, Engleman, and Fairchild, U.S. Army in World War II-Western Hemisphere, Guarding

the United States and Its Outposts, pp. 247-48.

10. Msg, COMINCH (Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet) to Commander-in-Chief

Pacific), no subject, May 21, 1942, copy in files of the Office of History, 11th Air Force,

Elmendorf AFB, AK.

11. George McGinnis, "COMNORPAC Radio Intelligence Unit (RIU) Support," Cryptolog 12(5)

(Special Edition 1991), p. 12; COMINCH, May 21, 1942.

12. War Diary, Commander North Pacific Force, Task Force Eight, United States Pacific

Fleet, May 22-May 31, 1942, in Box 7, Theobald Papers.

13. War Diary, May 27, 1942; Ltr, June 16, 1942, Theobald to Nimitz, in Theobald Papers.

14. Theobald to Nimitz, June 16, 1942.
86

15. Radio to CINCUSPACFLT, information copy to CINCUSFLT, quoted in War Diary, May

30, 1942.

16. Furer, North Pacific Force and Area, p. 62, citing a report from Lt Col Robert O. Cork to

Commanding General, Fort Greely, Alaska, "Employment of Air Forces Based at Kodiak,"

May 11, 1942.

17. Cork, "Employment of Air Forces Based at Kodiak," May 11, 1942.

18. Notes for Joint Employment of Army and Navy Aviation at Naval Air Station, Kodiak,

Feb. 26, 1942, in files of the Office of History, 11th Air Force, Elmendorf AFB, AK.

19. Ibid.

20. Elmer A. Freeman, Those Navy Guys and Their PBYs: The Aleutian Solution (Spokane,

Wash.: Kedging Publishing Company, 1992), p. xi.

21. Ltr, Rear Adm. Hirochi Samejima, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, March 5, 1969,

to Adm James S. Russel, USN-Ret, copy provided to author by Adm. Russell. Samejima

participated in the Dutch Harbor raid, leading a flight of bombers from the Ryujo.

22. Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of The Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) (Annapolis,

Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1978), p. 170; Office of Naval Intelligence, The Aleutians

Campaign June 1942-August 1943 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1993), p. 9.

This is the republication of a "Combat Narrative" first issued in 1945 by the Navy

Department; Samejima, March 5, 1969.

23. Capt. Mitsuo Fuchida, IJN, and Cmdr Masatake Okumiya, IJN, Midway: The Battle That

Doomed Japan's Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1955), pp. 137-41. Okumiya,

who retired as a Lieutenant General from Japan's Air Self Defense Force, was a staff officer

on the Ryujo during the raid on Dutch Harbor. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the

11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 119.

24. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, pp. 120-

26.

25. Ibid., pp. 126-27.

26. Ibid., pp. 130-31.

27. Foley was also "Staff Advanced Operations Officer," assigned to coordinate forward

operations of PBYs and their tenders. Commanding officers in the aviation units were

directed "to take their orders from Foley." (see Rear Adm Paul Foley Jr., USN-Ret, "VP

Squadron Forty-One in the Aleutians (1941-1942)," in Amme, Carl H., ed., Aleutian Airdales

(Plains, Mont.: Patrol Wing Four Reunion Committee), 1987, p. 76. Reported to be highly

eccentric, Foster carried an infantry field pack, canteen, .45 caliber pistol, Thompson

submachine gun, and live grenades as he went about his garrison duties first at Anchorage

and then at Umnak according to a pilot who was there (Maj. William O. Butler), USAF-Ret.,

letter to author, Feb. 24, 1993).

28. "Report from HQ 11th Air Force Striking Group File," in Box 10, Theobald Papers.

29. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 132.

30. Ibid., pp. 132-133; Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), p.

171.

31. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 133.

32. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington,

D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 79.

33. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 152;

Office of Naval Intelligence, The Aleutians Campaign June 1942-August 1943, p. 18.

34. Amme, Aleutian Airdales, p. 90.

35. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 156.
87

36. Ibid., pp. 159-60; 199-201; Adm. James S. Russell, USN-Ret, "Floatplanes and Flying

Boats, Naval Aviation Museum Foundation Quarterly 5(2) (Fall 1984), p. 28; United States

Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 92.

37. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 162.

38. Ibid., p. 163.

39. Ibid., p. 164.

40. Ibid., p. 169.

41. Quoted in Craven, Wesley Frank and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in

World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944, 1950

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983, reprint ed.), p. 368.

42. Office of Naval Intelligence, The Aleutians Campaign June 1942-August 1943, p. 30. See

Theodore Roscoe, U.S. Submarine Operations in World War II (Annapolis, Md.: United States

Naval Institute, 1949) Chapter 12, "The Aleutian Malestrom," pp. 134-43 and Chapter 19,

Chapter 19, "Aleutian Conclusion and Atlantic Tidal Turn," pp. 243-45 for information on

operation of U.S. Navy submarines in Aleutian waters.

43. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, pp. 169-

70; Masatake Chihaya, "Mysterious Withdrawal from Kiska," Proceedings of the United States

Naval Institute 84(2)(February 1958), p. 52.

44. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4 , pp. 173-

76.

45. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal

to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944, p. 370.

46. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 214-

16.

47. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 80, 92.

48. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 234;

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 90.

49. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 237;

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 93.

50. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, pp. 243-

44.

51. Theobald to Butler, radio, 080100 December 1942; Butler to Theobald, radio, 080215

December 1942; Theobald to Butler, radio, 071825 December 1942, in Box 9, Theobald

Papers.

52. Radios are quoted from, summarized, and commented on in a December 1942 memo

signed by Theobald and found in Box 9, Theobald Papers.

53. Theobald, December 14, 1942, comments on radios between himself and Butler, in Box

10, Theobald Papers.

54. Naval History Division, "Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, U.S. Navy, Deceased," June

6, 1957, biography in files of Biographies Branch.

55. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4 The

Aleutian Warriors, pp. 248-49.

56. Ibid., p. 253.

57. James McIntire, "Radio Intelligence in North Pacific Naval and Air Operations," Cryptolog

12(5) (Special Edition 1991), p. 29.

58. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944, p. 376.

59. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 257.
88

60. John A. Lorelli, The Battle of the Komandorski Islands, March 1943 (Annapolis, Md.:

Naval Institute Press, 1984), pp. 138-139.

61. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, pp. 259-

60.

62. Ibid., pp. 276-93.

63. Charles L. Scrivner, The Empire Express (Temple City, Calif.: Historical Aviation Album,

1976), pp. 6-7.

64. Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, p. 287.

65. Ibid., pp. 296-97.

66. Ibid., pp. 296, 320.

67. Masataka Chihaya, "Mysterious Withdrawal from Kiska," United States Naval Institute

Proceedings 84(2) (February 1958): 38-40.

68. Ibid., pp. 41-44, Cloe, The Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air

Wing 4, pp. 303-4.

69. Rear Adm. Bruce McCandless, USN-Ret, "The Battle of the Pips," United States Naval

Institute Proceedings Vol. 84, No. 2 (February 1958): 49-56.

70. Dull, A Battle History of The Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) p. 265; Cloe, The

Aleutian Warriors: A History of the 11th Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4, pp. 313-14.

71. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal

to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944, pp. 389, 390; Freeman, Those Navy Guys and Their

PBYs: The Aleutian Solution, p. 241.

72. John Haile Cloe with Michael F. Monaghan, Top Cover for America: The Air Force in

Alaska 1920-1983 (Anchorage: Anchorage Chapter, Air Force Association and Pictorial

Histories Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 125-26; United States Strategic Bombing Survey,

The Campaigns of the Pacific War, p 95.

73. Scrivner, The Empire Express, 1976), p. 22.

74. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal

to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944, p. 398; Cloe and Monaghan, Top Cover for America: The

Air Force in Alaska 1920-1983, p. 131.

75. Scrivner, The Empire Express, p. 9.

76. Naval Historical Center, U.S. Naval Experience in the North Pacific During World War

II: Selected Documents, p. 62.

77. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

78. Naval Historical Center, U.S. Naval Experience in the North Pacific During World War

II: Selected Documents, p. 64; Scrivner, The Empire Express, p. 32.

79. Scrivner, The Empire Express, p. 38.

80. Ibid., p. 32, p. 40.

81. Cloe and Monaghan, Top Cover for America: The Air Force in Alaska 1920-1983, pp. 137-

38.

82. Ibid., 1984, pp. 118-19.

83. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Cake Before Breakfast," ms., August 30, 1949, Declassified

October 1, 1963, pp. 107-19, copy in author's files.

84. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal

to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944, p. 401; Katherine L. Herbig, "American Strategic

Deception in the Pacific, 1942-1944," in Michael I. Handel, ed., Strategic and Deception

Operations in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1987), pp. 264-481; Adm.

James S. Russell, USN-Ret., "The Aleutian Campaign," in Ferndonnet, Alaska at War, p. 72,

states that Japanese air strength in Hokkaido and the Kuriles rose from 263 airplanes in
89

1943 to about 500 in the summer of 1944, then declined a mere thirty in the Kuriles

themselves in 1945. Russel gives Army troop strength in the Kuriles as 14,200 in 1943,

41,000 in 1944, and 27,000 in 1945. Military Analysis

Division, The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War Against Japan (United States

Strategic Bombing Survey, May 1947), p. 45.

85. James McIntire, "Radio Intelligence in North Pacific Naval and Air Operations: Japanese

and American," p. 32.

86. Russell, "The Aleutian Campaign," p. 72; United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The

Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 97.

87. Military Analysis Division, The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War Against

Japan, p. 49.

91

CHAPTER V

INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC OPERATIONS

The Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific areas of operations during World War II, like

the North Pacific area discussed in Chapter IV, afford opportunities to examine extensive use

of land-based aerial forces in maritime operations. The Indian Ocean area included the seas

from the east coast of Africa to Indochina (now Vietnam). The Southwestern Pacific area ran

from the west coast of Indochina west to an artificial line dividing the Solomon Islands. It

included Australia, the islands north of that continent necessary to secure a route for the

recapture of the Philippine Islands, and those islands.

The Japanese relied on land-based air to cover their December 1941 invasion of

British Malaya, which fell within in the Indian Ocean area and to defend sea lanes necessary

for supply of territories they had conquered in the Southwest Pacific. Allied commanders in

that region counted mostly on land planes to interrupt those sea supply lanes and cover

amphibious invasions to recapture the conquered territories. The Japanese, likewise,

employed land-based aerial forces to cover amphibious invasions and sink allied shipping.

The Sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse

The Japanese attacked Malaya on December 7-8, 1941, with simultaneous assaults

on the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines. While one Japanese fleet including aircraft

carriers steamed undetected across the North Pacific toward Pearl Harbor, British authorities

in Singapore reported another Japanese fleet including battleships, cruisers, and transports

in Southeast Asia waters. Naval historian Frank Uhlig Jr. has judged the accomplishment

of this fleet, "carried out chiefly by soldiers borne in troops ships under the protection of

shore-based naval aircraft," as a "conquest, throughout the history of warfare unmatched in

speed and scope."1 Successive landings that secured air bases from which shore-based naval

air fleets could cover further advances afloat and ashore characterized the conquest Malaya.

The Japanese Navy, which had committed its aircraft carriers elsewhere, opened

three air bases in French Indochina in November 1941. The 22d Air Flotilla divided a force

of six reconnaissance aircraft, thirty-nine fighters, and ninety-nine twin-engine long-range

Nell bombers among the bases. More than 350 planes from the Japanese Army's Third Air

Division joined them. From them, these aircraft could easily support Japanese ships

operating in waters off the east coast of the Malayan Peninsula. The radial-engine monoplane

fighters and Japanese Army and Navy land-based bombers operated from air bases in French

Indochina with the acquiescence of the French Vichy government.2

The Japanese troop transports assembled at a former French naval base on Cam Rahn

Bay, on the east coast of what is now Vietnam. British and American flying boats located the

Japanese ships there on December 2, 1941. Additional aerial reconnaissance on December

4 revealed that the transports had put to sea. On December 6, an RAF No. 205 Squadron

Catalina reported the ships’ position off the Malayan coast before being shot down. The flying

boat fell victim to an Indochina-based Japanese Army Nakajima-Ki 27 Nate fighter.3

Japanese amphibious forces made seven landings throughout the Malaya Peninsula

at midnight local time on the night of December 6-7. Six went ashore at various points in

Thailand. A seventh assaulted Khota Bharu, on the east coast of Malaya, about 300 miles

north of Singapore. Japanese Army Air Force planes covered the landings while Japanese
92

Naval Air Force bombers flew from Indochina to strike British military installations in

Singapore.4

Then a British colony, Malaya produced 35 percent of the world's tin supply and 38

percent of its rubber. In 1941, the 250-square-mile island of Singapore, separated from the

Malaya Peninsula by the narrow Johore Strait, was home to the British Navy's largest Far

Eastern base and an essential target.

Britain tasked its Royal Air Force (RAF) to defend Malaya against attacks from the

air and sea. The British Chiefs of Staff in London decided that a force of 336 aircraft could

accomplish this mission. Air planners in Malaya produced a considerably higher estimate of

582 aircraft. Overwhelmed by demands for aircraft in the European theater, however, the

British sent a division of Australian troops to Singapore to make up for the needed aircraft

they were unable to send.5

When war came, the RAF Command in Malaya and Singapore included Royal Air

Force and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadrons. They had a total of 164 first-line

aircraft with an additional 88, many unserviceable, in reserve. The first-line aircraft included

62 Brewster Buffalo fighters, 35 Blenheim bombers plus 12 additional Blenheims configured

as night fighters, 24 Hudsons, 24 Vildebeeste biplane torpedo bombers, and 34 Catalinas. The

reserve aircraft included 15 Blenheim bombers, 52 Buffaloes (21 unserviceable), 7 Hudsons,

12 Vildebeestes, and 2 Catalinas.6

The stubby-winged, short-range Buffaloes, originally designed as United States Navy

carrier aircraft, had entered service in 1938. The Royal Air Force replaced the Buffalo's

original .50-caliber machine guns with .303 caliber weapons in an effort to lighten the aircraft

and increase its performance. Even so, the Buffalo could only attain a speed of 270 miles-perhour at 10,000 feet versus the Japanese Zero's 315 mph at the same altitude. The Blenheims,

twin-engine aircraft designed as tactical bombers with a top speed of about 260-mph, could

carry a bomb load of 1,000-pounds but mounted only two defensive small-caliber machine

guns. The Hudsons, also twin-engine, were modifications of the Lockheed Model 14 airliner.

Able to carry a 1,500-pound bomb load and equipped with five defensive machine guns, the

Hudsons were among the more effective bombers available to the British in the Far East. The

low-speed, vulnerable, twin-engine Catalina flying boats could fly long-range maritime

patrols. These assorted British aircraft were not consolidated at one or two air bases, but

scattered among nine bases strung out from Malaya's northern border south to Singapore.

The island's defense, in turn, rested on fixed coastal artillery facing its ocean approaches. No

fortifications protected it against assault from the north should air defense of Malaya fail and

the Japanese occupy Malaya.7

British air defense failed. The Buffaloes proved inadequate to deal with Nakajima Ki21 Sally twin-engine bombers that flew from Indochina to raid the RAF bases on the Malaya

Peninsula. Japanese bombers destroyed many RAF planes on the ground. RAF Blenheims,

sent from Singapore to oppose the invasion fleet, suffered heavy losses but did little damage.

A few of the Hudsons, each carrying 250-pound bombs, survived the Japanese air raids to

sink one Japanese landing ship and severely damage two others on December 8. The RAAF

lost two Hudsons in the encounter.8

Japanese Army troops came ashore at Khota Baru and also moved south from

Thailand. By the evening of December 8, the Japanese Army's Third Air Division had sixty

planes operating from a captured airfield at Singora, Thailand, just above the Thai-Malay

border. The Japanese then seized all of the RAF air bases in Malaya as they drove British

ground forces south. The one at Khota Baru fell on December 8. The rest of the Third Air

Division's 354 planes flew to them from Indochina. They began operating from the captured
93

fields to provide close air support for the Japanese ground forces advancing down the Malay

Peninsula.9

To oppose the anticipated Japanese invasion more effectively, the Royal Navy had sent

two of its large warships, the modern battleship Prince of Wales and the older battlecruiser

Repulse to Singapore. They arrived only a few days before the outbreak of war. Winston

Churchill, despite contrary advice from his senior naval advisors, had insisted on dispatching

them in hopes of deterring the Japanese from initiating hostilities. The aircraft carrier

Indomitable, intended to accompany them, was thousands of miles away at Kingston,

Jamaica, undergoing repairs after running aground.

The Prince of Wales was one of the newest and most powerful battleships in the Royal

Navy. Although heavily armored, it possessed a top speed of twenty-eight knots. Its modern

antiaircraft armament included fifteen 5.25" guns, sixty-four 2-pounder pom-poms, ten 40-mm

Bofors, and ten 20-mm Okerlikons. The Royal Navy's antiaircraft gun laying system,

however, gave the battleship less protection against air attack than the large number of

antiaircraft guns indicated. Its archaic "High Angle" method used estimated data regarding

aircraft course and speed, unlike the procedures used by the American and German navies,

which used measured data. Indeed, in a 1937 combat test, Royal Navy Home Fleet ships

equipped with the High Angle system had failed to score a single hit on a radio-controlled

target drone that circled the fleet for two and one-half hours.10

Ineffective antiaircraft fire control had made no difference on the Prince of Wales' first

combat mission, in May 1941. Steaming into the North Atlantic, beyond the reach of the

Luftwaffe, the newly-commissioned ship's ten 14-inch guns had helped to destroy the German

battleship Bismarck. Afterward, the battleship had carried British Prime Minister Winston

Churchill to his landmark August 1941 Atlantic Charter conference with President Franklin

D. Roosevelt at Argentia Bay, Newfoundland. Participation in the sinking of the Bismarck

and ferrying Churchill to North America had, however, left the ship's antiaircraft gun crews

little time to sharpen their skills. Nonetheless, when the Prince of Wales sailed from the

Atlantic to Singapore in November 1941, Churchill confidently cabled Roosevelt "There is

nothing like having something that can catch and kill anything."11

The battlecruiser Repulse was a hybrid design built in 1916, designed to prey on or

protect commerce routes. It carried a battleship's armament in the form of six 15-inch guns

but was lightly armored. In theory, the hybrids were able to out-gun cruisers and outrun

battleships. In practice, battlecruisers struck by enemy shells exploded and sank with

distressing regularity in World War I sea battles. Although given more armor in 1919-20 and

more antiaircraft guns in 1934, the Repulse mounted only eight 4-inch high-angle antiaircraft

guns and two eight-barrel 2-pounder pom-pom batteries and remained vulnerable to air

attack.12

On the evening of December 8, 1941, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, the two

capital ships steamed out of Singapore accompanied by the destroyers Electra, Express,

Vampire, and Tenedos. Identified as "Force Z, " its commander, Vice Admiral Tom Spencer

Vaughn Phillips, requested land-based air cover that the RAF was unable to provide. Phillips

asked for aerial reconnaissance 100 miles to the north of Force Z beginning at dawn on

December 9. He also wanted reconnaissance to Singora and beyond ten miles from the coast

starting at first light on December 10 and fighter protection off Singora at daylight on

December 10.13

RAF Air Vice-Marshal C. W. H. Pulford, Air Officer in Command, Far East, tentatively

told Phillips that he could provide air reconnaissance on December 9 but not on the next day,

nor air cover either. Then Pulford radioed Phillips after he was at sea that the RAF
94

Command could provide neither air reconnaissance north of Phillip's ships on December 9 nor

fighter protection on December 10 when he expected to engage the Japanese. The airfields

in northern Malaya were either captured or too damaged for use and the RAF-modified

Buffalo fighters too short-ranged to provide air cover from bases to the south.14 Pulford did

keep RAAF No. 453 Squadron's sixteen Buffalo fighters at Sembawang air field, about twelve

miles north of the city of Singapore, in readiness to answer a call for help. Warned that a

force of Japanese torpedo bombers was assembling near Saigon, in Indochina, Phillips

probably assumed that the invasion beaches and his ships were beyond their range.15

A more prudent admiral might have withdrawn when it became clear that he would

operate in enemy waters without air cover. But Phillips believed that courage, resolution, and

seamanship could overcome aerial attacks on warships. He had served as the Deputy, then

Vice, Chief of Naval Staff in London since the European war began in 1939. Although he had

no seagoing combat experience, in arguments with his staff he insisted that more resolute

commanding officers were all warships needed to defeat dive bombers. To be sure, he had

been briefed on the Luftwaffe's attacks on Royal Navy ships off Norway but Phillips refused

to accept the heretical notion that it was (in the words of the briefing officer), "suicidal to

send warships to operate off an enemy-held coast without air cover." After the briefing,

Phillips told Winston Churchill that officers of the Royal Navy's "ships were much too

frightened of air attack."16

The Japanese Navy submarine I-65 and a float plane from the cruiser Kumano spotted

Force Z at sea nearly 300 miles east of the Malay coast and about 150 miles south of Poulo

Condore Island early on December 9. Thereafter, enemy aircraft and submarines tracked the

British. When he became aware that his ships had been discovered by Japanese aircraft,

Phillips turned most of his command back toward Singapore on the evening of December 9.

He had earlier sent the Tenedos, which was low on fuel, into port.

Phillips changed course again, just after midnight on December 10, after when he

received a radio report, which later proved erroneous, that Japanese forces were landing at

Kuantan, halfway between Khota Baru and Singapore. When Phillips discovered no Japanese

ships at Kuantan after sunup, he again turned toward Singapore.17

Meanwhile, the Japanese assembled a surface force of two battleships and four

cruisers to attack the British ships as they steamed off the coast of Malaya. Japanese Navy

bombers and torpedo bombers simultaneously took off from bases at Cam Rahn Bay and

Saigon to attack the Prince of Wales and Repulse. Their night missions on December 9 failed

to find the British ships.

While the Prince of Wales and the Repulse proceeded south toward Singapore, the 22d

Air Flotilla launched additional sorties targeting the British ships early on December 10. Five

aircraft left Cam Rahn Bay at 2:20 a.m., refueled at Poulo Condore Island south of Saigon

in the South China Sea, and took off again at 4:30 a.m. Ninety-three additional aircraft took

off from a Saigon airfield between 5:25 a.m. and 7:30 a.m.

Japanese reconnaissance aircraft relocated Force Z about sixty miles east of Kuantan at

11:20 a.m. Shortly afterward, over eighty twin-engine bombers and torpedo bombers

converged on Force Z. At this time the British force included the Prince of Wales, the Repulse,

and the destroyers Electra, Express, and Vampire. The two "E" class destroyers, both built

in 1934, had four 4.7" guns. The Australian Navy ship Vampire, built in 1917, had four 4"

guns and one 3" antiaircraft gun. Twenty-six G4M1 Betty bombers and sixty Mitsubishi Type

96 G3M2 Nell torpedo bombers made up the attacking aerial force. Radar on the Prince of

Wales and the Repulse alerted the ships to the impending raid. The bombers attacked first

through heavy but inaccurate antiaircraft fire. The British ships did not lay down a smoke
95

screen, as had the German battleship Tirpitz when successfully escaping Royal Navy torpedobombers in the North Atlantic. Britain's First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, later told

Churchill that Phillips probably did not use smoke in order to leave his antiaircraft guns

clear fields of fire.

About 11:20 a.m., a stick of bombs straddled the Repulse. A 550-pounder landed

amidships, starting a small fire. The torpedo bombers followed, boring in less than onehundred feet above the water to release their torpedoes at ranges of 1,000 to 2,000 yards.

Each torpedo carried a warhead packed with 1,760-pounds of explosive. The Repulse turned

head-on to the attackers to "comb" the torpedo tracks, but other Japanese aircraft approached

from other directions. The multiple attacks sent fourteen torpedoes toward the Repulse. Ten

hit the port side and four hit the starboard side. The ravaged battlecruiser sank less than

fifteen minutes after the air attack began. Four-hundred and forty-four of the ship's crew died

in the attack and subsequent sinking.18

About the time the first bombs fell on the Repulse, a torpedo struck the Prince of

Wales and bent one of the battleship's propeller shafts. Engine room oil and fuel lines cracked

and bulkheads gave way, damaging its steering mechanism. The Prince of Wales began

steaming in circles. Phillips radioed Singapore to send tugs to his assistance, but did not

request air support. Five additional torpedoes struck the warship, one forward and five on

the starboard side further damaged the battleship. Two 1,100-pound bombs landing aft and

a third bomb making a near miss on the starboard side put an end to the helpless vessel,

which capsized and sank at 1:20 p.m. with the loss of 215 members of the 1,285-man crew.19

Although radar warned of the impending attack, the British ships shot down only

three of the Japanese aircraft. Captain William Tennant, skipper of the Repulse, requested

air support at 11:50 a.m. when he realized Phillips would not do so. Eleven Buffaloes took

off from Sembawang in response to Tennant's request, but they arrived on the scene only

after the two ships had sunk to find oil slicks and struggling survivors. The 22d Air Flotilla

aircraft, low on fuel and needing to return to their bases in Indochina, did not attack the

destroyers which had been escorting the Prince of Wales and Repulse.

20 The Express survived

the war but the Electra went to the bottom after a gun duel with a Japanese destroyer in

February 1942. The Vampire survived the air attack off Malaya only to be sunk by Japanese

dive bombers near Ceylon on April 9, 1942.21

Destruction of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse ended any hope the British had of

ejecting the Japanese from Malaya or keeping them from reaching Singapore. It also

eliminated any possibility of evacuating the 130,000 British troops from Malaya and

Singapore. The Japanese campaign ended a few weeks later with the fall of Singapore on

February 15, 1942. That opened the way for the Japanese to invade resource-rich British

Borneo and the Dutch East Indies. Destruction of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse also

marked the first time that aircraft, unassisted by other combat arms, sank major combatants

at sea. Loss of these two capital ships, General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial

General Staff, exaggeratedly (in view of the American aircraft carriers still extant) declared

meant that the Allies had lost control of the sea from "Africa eastwards to America."22

The Southwest Pacific

In the Southwest Pacific area, land-based aerial forces frequently participated in

World War II maritime operations. First, the area's geography of island chains meant that

the nearby seas were within reach of land-based aircraft. Second, on the American side, the

United States Navy adamantly refused to place its aircraft carriers under the control of
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General Douglas MacArthur, the Allied Supreme Commander in this theater. Consequently,

Allied carrier aircraft seldom operated in the Southwest Pacific, and MacArthur relied

primarily on land-based aircraft to oppose or cover amphibious invasions and to interdict or

protect sea lines of communication. This reliance created several situations in which

applications of land-based air power to maritime operations were tactically or strategically

decisive.

Japanese forces enjoyed unexpected successes in destroying the battleships of the

American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The ease with which they demolished Allied

opposition in the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and the Philippines also surprised the Japanese.

By January of 1942, Japanese Army and Navy planners could argue the relative merits of

invading Australia or occupying Ceylon. At the same time, the Japanese Combined Fleet

moved to assure the security of its main fleet anchorage at Truk in the Caroline Islands. To

guard Truk from an expected Allied counterattack launched from the southeast, Imperial

Japanese Navy (IJN) commanders determined to occupy the island of Rabaul, 450 miles north

of Port Moresby, plus Lae and Salamaua on the northern coast of New Guinea. The IJN's

South Seas Force commanded by Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue secured Rabaul on January

23 with the aid of four carriers from the Combined Fleet.23

The Japanese allocated two air groups from the IJN's 24th Air Flotilla of the Eleventh

Air Fleet to the defense of Rabaul. The intended air strength at Rabaul was at first twentyfour long-range flying boats to be used on reconnaissance patrols plus twenty-seven fighters

and thirty-six bombers for defense and attack. In practice, only eighteen Betty bombers were

available because of operational losses and lagging aircraft production. Other production

problems prevented the delivery of any aerial torpedoes to the naval air groups at Rabaul.

While Japan's plan to establish a defensive perimeter of island air bases was theoretically

feasible, Japan did not have enough land-based aircraft to concentrate decisive air power at

the many island bases.24

When the United States Navy launched a series of spoiling carrier strikes against

Japanese-held islands in early 1942, Rabaul numbered among the American targets. While

the Enterprise struck at the Marshall Islands and the Yorktown sent its aircraft against the

Gilbert Islands, the Lexington steamed toward Rabaul. When flying boats from Rabaul

discovered the Lexington on February 20, 1942, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown in command of

the one-carrier task force decided not to risk the ship to air attack and withdrew without

launching his strike aircraft.

The IJN air commanders on Rabaul were unwilling to allow the American carrier to

escape. Despite being under strength, they sent all of the available eighteen bomb-equipped

Betty's against the Lexington. Japanese aircrews originally called these bombers "Cigars"

because of their slim shape. A few months of combat resulted in a new nickname of "Flying

Lighters" because these bombers did not have self-sealing gas tanks and often burst into

flames when machine-gunned. Arriving over the Lexington on February 20, the plodding

Bettys fell victim to the carrier's swarming F4F Wildcats. The single-engine fighters quickly

destroyed all but three of the Japanese bombers.25 This allowed one of only three operational

American carriers in the Pacific to escape. This implied that, in the long-term, Japan did not

have enough of the right kind of aircraft to support its island perimeter.

The Japanese soon regretted the Lexington's survival. Amphibious forces appearing

off the northern coast of New Guinea at Lae and Salamaua to occupy Australian outposts

there sustained significant losses from air attack. The Lexington and Yorktown flew eighteen

Wildcats, sixty Dauntless dive bombers, and twenty-five Devastator torpedo bombers from

the Gulf of Papua across the Owen Stanley Mountains to oppose the invasion fleet. Eight
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B–17s from Townsville on Australia's northeast coast followed the carrier aircraft. The

combination of carrier and land-based aircraft sank the sea plane tender Kongomaru, the

auxiliary minesweeper Tamamaru No. 2, and the transports Tenyomaru and Yokohamamaru.

They also severely damaged the light cruiser Yubari, the destroyer Asanagi, the minesweeper

Tsugaru, the auxiliary minesweeper Tamamaru, and the transport Kokaimaru. The American

raid also slightly damaged three other ships. These vessels were the destroyer Oite, the sea

plane tender Kiyokawamaru, and the transport Chinamaru. The most effective attacking

aircraft were the dive bombers and the thirteen Devastators armed with torpedoes. The

twelve Devastators and the B–17s armed with bombs damaged only one transport from

medium and high altitudes. This again showed the ineffectiveness of this method of attack

against ships underway at sea.26

Their naval losses to the American air raids at Lae and Salamaua on March 10, 1942,

constituted one of the most severe blows received by the Japanese thus far in the war. But

they did not prevent occupation of the Australian outposts on New Guinea. The airfields the

Japanese established there later required considerable attention from Allied air forces. The

March 10, 1942, air attacks did preclude Japan's South Seas Force from using the lost and

damaged vessels as transports for troops that were to occupy Tulagi Island and Port Moresby,

New Guinea. The latter location was important because it was the last Allied foothold in New

Guinea. This was the first instances in World War II in which combat losses prevented

Japanese forces from continuing with their planned operations.27

Reorganization of the Allied command structure in the Pacific in April 1942

established a Southwest Pacific Area with General Douglas MacArthur at its head. Admiral

Chester W. Nimitz assumed responsibility for the rest of the Pacific theater. Nimitz's

jurisdiction included the South Pacific Area adjacent to MacArthur's command. Within the

Southwest Pacific Area, Lieutenant General George H. Brett became Commander of Allied

Air Forces. His authority extended to command of all U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF)

elements in Australia plus operational control of RAAF and Royal Netherlands East Indies

Army Air Force units in the theater.28

After the May 4-8, 1942, Battle of the Coral Sea, which resulted in American loss of

the Lexington and Japanese loss of the carrier Shoho, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff

(JCS) issued a July 2 directive defining three tasks for its Pacific commanders. Task One

directed Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, commander of the South Pacific Area under

Nimitz, to occupy the islands of Santa Cruz and Tulagi with such air and naval support as

could be obtained from MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area. Task Two directed General

MacArthur to seize the Solomon Islands north of Guadalcanal plus Lae and Salamaua and

the northeast coast of New Guinea. Task Three, to be implemented later upon instructions

from the JCS, required MacArthur to take Rabaul and adjacent areas of New Britain and

New Ireland. To clarify responsibilities, the boundary between the South Pacific Area and the

Southwest Pacific Area was moved west to the 159th meridian.29

The Joint Chiefs' Task Two created two maritime operation missions for the landbased Allied Air Forces under MacArthur. They had to stop Japanese seaborne supply and

reinforcement efforts for their northern New Guinea outposts. They also had to cover Allied

efforts to seize control of the northern coast of New Guinea and recapture Lae and Salamaua.

The Allied air elements in the Southwest Pacific Area were ill-equipped in mid-1942

to support the maritime operations incidental to Task Two. A-24s (Army Air Forces versions

of the Navy's single-engine SBD Dauntless dive bomber), with a range of about 500 miles,

could not reach Japanese shipping lanes north of New Guinea from bases in Australia. The

A-24s were relatively slow, with a top speed of 245 mph. They were also lightly armed, with
98

two .50 caliber machines in the nose and two .30 caliber machines in the rear cockpit. As a

result, the A-24 required fighter escort to survive when it faced fighter opposition. B–17s of

the command had the necessary range to reach Japanese maritime targets, but counter-air

and reconnaissance missions left few aircraft available for anti-shipping strikes. In any case,

there were not enough of the Flying Fortresses to make up the large formations USAAF

doctrine prescribed for high altitude bombing against naval targets. A few aircrews trained

in new torpedo-equipped B–26s, but these aircraft never went into combat. Most of the Allied

Air Forces B–26 squadrons flew repeated long-range bombing missions from their bases in

northern Australia against the Japanese at Rabaul during the summer of 1942. They usually

carried 2,000 pounds of bombs on the 1,200-mile round-trip. Each mission required a stop at

Port Moresby en route and returning for refueling even though the B–26s had an additional

250-gallon bomb bay fuel tank. The exhausting round trips wore out both aircrew and

aircraft. They were soon withdrawn from combat to recuperate.30

This was the situation United States Army Air Forces Major General George C.

Kenney found when he arrived in Australia in August 1942 to take command of the Allied

Air Forces there. Kenney had flown seventy combat missions as a World War I fighter pilot.

In the inter-war years he had specialized in attack aviation and technological development

of aircraft. A 1943 Time magazine article credited him with being the first, in 1922, to install

machine guns in the wing of an airplane. Time also recognized his 1928 invention of the lowlevel parachute bomb, which he later had his aircrews in the Southwest Pacific use to good

effect. In the 1920s Kenney also attended the Air Corps Tactical School, where he later

taught, and the Army Command and General Staff College. In the 1930s Kenney headed the

Army Air Corps Plans Division and then served as Chief, Operations and Training, General

Headquarters Air Force. His duties from 1939 to 1942 included tours as Air Corps Observer

with the Navy, Assistant Attache for Air in France, and Commanding Officer, Air Corps

Experimental Division and Engineering School. Kenney, in sum, was an innovative,

technically-oriented combat veteran professionally interested in adapting air power as needed

to destroy targets in the air, on the ground, and at sea.31

By 1942 Kenney was commander of the Fourth Air Force based in San Francisco,

charged with defending America's West Coast. On July 11, 1942, Kenney learned that he

would report to General MacArthur in Australia, to command the air component of

MacArthur's multinational forces. His journey to his new command took him through Hawaii

and via the chain of island airfields that linked America with Australia.

Kenney realized his new command would be heavily involved in anti-shipping strikes.

During a stopover in the Fiji Islands Kenney and his aide, Major William Benn, borrowed a

B–26 and they experimented with "skip bombing." This experimental technique involved

dropping a bomb into the sea while in level flight at low altitude. The number of bombs

dropped depended on the type of vessel attacked, with merchant ships requiring three bombs

from each plane in a three-aircraft element. Properly launched, the bombs would skip like

stones across the water and plunge into a ship's side. Delayed tail fuzes kept them from

exploding when they hit the water. The RAF had developed this procedure in the European

theater. After Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Commanding General of the USAAF, had visited

England in April 1941, he brought word of this innovation back to the United States. At

Arnold's direction, American airmen tested the method at Eglin Field, Florida.32 Kenney

found that a bomb dropped about 400 yards from a target might work. He and Benn agreed

that such hazardous close run-ins against enemy ships at low level would require additional

forward-firing machine guns or cannon in attacking aircraft to suppress antiaircraft fire.33
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Shortly after arriving in Australia, Kenney halted all bomber missions pending

reorganization and refitting. He specified that reconnaissance aircraft should keep searching

for Japanese shipping, which should be attacked at every opportunity. He wanted, he said,

"aviators who could fly, shoot down Jap[anese]s, and sink Jap[anese] ships."34 But the first

bombing mission Kenney dispatched to sink Japanese ships failed. Air reconnaissance spotted

a convoy consisting of a light cruiser, two destroyers, two sub chasers, and two transports en

route from Rabaul, New Britain, to Buna, New Guinea, on August 13, 1942. Kenney sent

twenty-two B–17s and six B–26s to make four raids on the Japanese convoy. The raid failed.

The American bombers attacked from high altitude as doctrine prescribed, but no bombs

hit any ships. The attacking aircraft did encounter heavy fighter opposition. From this

experience Kenney determined that to attack Japanese ships successfully fighter opposition

had to be eliminated. He also discovered that bombsights were in such short supply that only

the lead aircraft in each flight of three had one. As a result, if the first bombardier made a

mistake, the following two aircraft made the same one.35 Subsequent high altitude air attacks

on Japanese shipping also proved indecisive.

Buna, the northern New Guinea terminus of an overland trail to Port Moresby,

became a Japanese target when their amphibious invasion failed. From Buna, the Japanese

planned to trek across the 13,000-foot Owen Stanley Mountains to seize the strategically

important Allied airfield and harbor at Port Moresby.

On July 19, 1942, a B–17 reconnaissance mission spotted a Japanese convoy heading

south from Rabaul toward New Guinea. The convoy consisted of the light cruisers Tenryu and

Tatsuta, three destroyers, and three transports. On July 20, Japanese bombers and fighters

raided Port Moresby. On July 21, a Japanese naval float plane made a reconnaissance and

strafing mission over the beach at Buna. The Japanese convoy was now off Buna and the

cruisers and destroyers in the force shelled the village.

The first of several Allied aerial missions against the Japanese amphibious force took

place late in the afternoon on July 21. One B–17 and five B–26s made a bomb run over the

ships at a relatively low altitude of 6,000 feet. They reported that a B–26 bomb made a direct

hit on a transport. Five more B–26s followed, but it was too dark for them to find the enemy

ships. Under cover of darkness the Japanese put about 2,000 combat troops ashore at Gona,

about ten miles north of Buna. Early on July 22 American bombers and fighters, accompanied

by an RAAF No. 32 Squadron Hudson, again sortied to attack the Japanese ships. Although

no Japanese fighters appeared, antiaircraft fire from the Japanese warships kept ten

attacking B–17s at 25,000 feet and their bombing was ineffective. An eleventh B–17 made

a low-level bomb run and claimed two direct hits on a transport. Five B–25s, six B–26s, and

the Hudson also attacked the ships, but only one, a B–26, claimed a hit. Fighter pilots in

sleek, bubble-canopied P-39 Aircobras strafed Japanese landing barges. The Japanese

invasion fleet withdrew northward at midday on July 22, its mission completed.36

Allied aerial reconnaissance located another invasion force 120 miles north of Milne

Bay, New Guinea, on August 25. It included the cruisers Tenryu and Tatsuta; the destroyers

Tanikaze, Urakaze, and Hamakaze; the submarine chasers SC-22 and SC-24. The warships

were escorting the transports Kinai Maru and Nankai Maru. Repeated air attacks did not

prevent the Japanese from landing at Milne Bay later in the day. Australian infantry and

American aviation engineers had previously occupied Milne Bay, at the southern end of New

Guinea at the end of June 1942. They built three air fields there, from which two RAAF

fighter squadrons began to operate. From Milne Bay, the land-based aircraft could dominate

the Solomon Sea. When Allied aircraft moved in, aerial missions to the Solomon Islands and

New Britain would be shorter. The anchorage at Milne Bay could also serve as a base for sea
100

operations along New Guinea's northern coast. Controlling Milne Bay became important to

both Japanese and American commanders.37

Foul weather prevented B–17s from locating the enemy convoy that was approaching

Milne Bay on August 25. All available B–25s and B–26s were flown from their bases in Port

Moresby. Six RAAF No. 75 Squadron Kittyhawks (P-40s) from Milne Bay, each carrying a

300-pound bomb, attacked the Japanese ships in late afternoon. They did no damage,

although an RAAF Hudson flying in a pathfinder role with the Kittyhawks made a mast-top

attack on a small craft, probably a submarine chaser. A near miss caused the vessel to lose

speed. Then between 4:40 and 5:30 p.m., six Kittyhawks from No. 76 Squadron armed with

300-pound bombs and three Kittyhawks from No. 75 Squadron armed with 250-pound bombs

attacked again. They scored two near misses on a transport and a direct hit on a small ship,

thought to be the sub chaser damaged earlier. They strafed the rest of the vessels. At 6:00

p.m., two Hudsons, one from No. 6 Squadron and one from No. 32 Squadron attacked the

convoy at an altitude of 100 feet. The first Hudson dropped seven bombs, one of which landed

ten feet from the side of an 8,000-ton transport.38

Nine other Kitty Hawks from No. 75 Squadron had more luck when they attacked

seven Japanese troop barges reported by a coast watcher as they moved down New Guinea's

northern coast toward Milne Bay. The troops intended to go overland to attack the Allied

force at Milne Bay from the rear. The RAAF mission found the barges beached on the

western coast of Goodenough Island. While three of the Kittyhawks flew top cover, the other

three machine-gunned the barges. They left all seven of the equipment-laden ten-by-fifty-foot

craft ablaze. The troops from the barges found themselves stranded on Goodenough Island,

where they remained until Australian infantry rooted them out in late October 1942.39

Despite the Allied air raids on August 25, the Japanese at Milne Bay used fifteen steel

barges to land between 1,500 and 2,000 troops from transports offshore during the night of

August 25-26. They went ashore on the north side of the bay. The Japanese ships withdrew

under the cover of low clouds once the troops had landed. On August 26, RAAF Kittyhawks

and Hudsons attacked the Japanese barges tied-up just off the beach and the Japanese troops

who had landed. USAAF B–17s, B–26s, and P-40s pushed through bad weather to bomb the

Japanese ships and troops. The B–17s reported sinking one transport and damaging a

minesweeper. In fact, they badly damaged the Nanki Maru and drove the other transport and

the escorts out to sea. The B–26s and P-40s sank several landing barges.40

On August 29 the Japanese decided to focus their efforts in support of Japanese forces

on Guadalcanal, to the north. They evacuated 450 members of their Milne Bay landing force.

Another fifty of the Emperor's soldiers struggled north through the jungle to Buna.

Australian infantry tracked down and exterminated other Japanese survivors over the next

several months. Allied air missions had aided in repulsing the Japanese, but had not proved

decisive except in destruction of the landing barges that had been carrying troops south for

a flank attack on Milne Bay.41

Non-aviators at all levels in the American and Australian forces criticized the poor

record of Southwest Pacific Allied land-based aerial forces in maritime operations. In

response, Allied aviators strove to improve the situation. The A-24 dive-bomber seemed an

obvious solution to the problem, but Fifth Air Force planners concluded that they could not

be sent across New Guinea without fighter escort. Torpedoes, another obvious solution, never

seemed to do the job when launched from American Army Air Forces aircraft. In the end the

USAAF transferred its stock of torpedoes to the RAAF for use with its twin-engine Beauforts,

which could be used either as light bombers or torpedo bombers. Rather than use dive
101

bombers or torpedo bombers, American airmen in the Southwest Pacific experimented with

new bombing techniques and with modified bombs.

American Army Air Forces doctrine called for high altitude pattern bombing by nineplane formations against shipping targets. Aircraft shortages usually meant that American

and Australian squadrons in the Southwest Pacific could seldom muster enough planes to

meet the requirements of doctrine. In addition, low clouds frequently interfered with bombing

patterns. Review of the situation resulted in suggestions that low-level bombing was an

alternative, one that the British had successfully used in other theaters. These proposals led

to discussions of this radical departure from Army Air Forces' bombing doctrine in

Washington, D.C. and in the Southwest Pacific and South Pacific theaters during the late

summer and fall of 1942. Kenney, commanding Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific,

had taught "attack" aviation at the Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s and became a

proponent of low-level bombing.42

William Benn, now commanding officer of the 63rd Bombardment Squadron, used his

own B–17 to develop low-level bombing tactics with heavy bombers. He made repeated

practice runs on a hulk in Port Moresby harbor during August and September 1942. Benn

tried skip bombing and planting bombs directly on the wreck. His tests revealed that bomb

fuzing was critically important. Southwest Pacific experience indicated that fuzes with eight

to eleven-second delays worked best in bombs dropped at low level against merchant

shipping. The delayed fuzing allowed the bombers to escape blast damage from the

detonating bombs. Allied Air Forces armorers used RAAF detonators to modify American

bomb fuses to produce the desired results until standard fuzes became available in 1943.

Benn tried out the newly-developed techniques and weapons in an October 23 raid on

shipping in Rabaul harbor.

Benn, killed in combat on January 18, 1943, described skip-bombing with a B–17 in

detail before his death. "The sight used," he explained, "is an X on the co-pilot's window six

and three quarter inches from the top. The forward point of reference is the outline of the

nose." When the sights lined up, Benn concluded, "in level flight indicating approximately 220

mph a bomb will fall from 60 to 100 feet short of the vessel, skip into the air and hit 60 to

100 feet beyond."43

Several planes in the October 23 attack on Rabaul dropped their bombs at 250 feet

or less and reported resulting explosions and debris. Post-raid damage assessment, however,

revealed that no enemy ships were sunk. Subsequent experience caused Fifth Air Force

bombers to revert to impact fuzes for anti-shipping attacks in December 1942.44

Successful shipping strikes remained an important Allied need. The Japanese tried

six times in November and December of 1942 to send reinforcement and supplies by sea to

their troops fighting on New Guinea. Kenney gave top priority to attacking these convoys.

Poor weather and Japanese fighter escorts made these attacks difficult and hazardous.

Despite increasingly determined efforts by Allied aircrews, the Japanese succeeded in their

reinforcement efforts through the beginning of December.

December began well for the Japanese convoys to Buna. Despite attempted air

interdiction, four destroyers landed 800 troops on the night of December 1-2. Five B–17s and

six B–25s bombed and strafed the destroyer convoy as it steamed toward Buna. The ships

then diverted to the mouths of the Kumusi and Mambare rivers, which are forty miles

northwest of Buna. Additional Allied aircraft machine-gunned the Japanese troops as they

unloaded but 800 of an estimated 1,000 to 1,200 reinforcements got ashore.45 On December

9 Allied bombers drove away six destroyers bring more reinforcements. Six days later one of

the high-winged four-engine B–24s beginning to be used in the Southwest Pacific reported
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two cruisers and three destroyers heading for Buna. B–17s attacked them through clouds and

thunderstorms in an afternoon raid. Despite the opposition, the Japanese ships anchored off

Buna and disembarked reinforcements and supplies on the night of December 15-16. When

the IJN vessels withdrew, RAAF Catalinas and USAAF B–17s, B–24s, and B–25s bombed

and strafed the ships without sinking any of them.46

December 1942 marked the month that the Fifth Air Force modified the B–25 to

become a remarkable anti-shipping weapon. Kenney directed Major Paul I. "Pappy" Gunn,

at Brisbane, to load an experimental B–25 with as many forward-firing .50-caliber machine

guns as possible. This armament, he believed, would allow B–25s making low-level bomb

runs to suppress antiaircraft fire from Japanese ships. Gunn replaced the bombardier's nose

station and bomb sight with four machine guns, put a pair on either side of the fuselage just

under the pilot's window, and strapped three more underneath the fuselage. To compensate

for increased weight, the lower turret and tail guns were removed. The first innovativelyarmed aircraft was ready at the end of December. When the guns blazed away in tests on the

ground, vibration shook rivets out of the airframe. Gunns' solution was to put longer blast

tubes on the machine guns and to stiffen the gun mounts with steel plates. Finally he used

sponge rubber pads to lessen the shock of the guns firing and moved those mounted on the

sides of the fuselage farther back. In the end, the three bottom guns had to be deleted. The

B–25 had a door on the bottom of the fuselage that closed after the nose wheel retracted.

When the guns fired, the door kept falling off. In lieu of the belly guns, Kenney told Gunn

to lock the twin .50-calibers mounted in the top turret in a forward-firing position. Kenney

had a squadron of his B–25s modified with the forward-firing machine guns. Captain Ed

Larner took command of the 90th Squadron of the 3d Attack Group. His orders directed him

to train it to use the modified aircraft for skip-bombing and strafing missions.47

The modified B–25s, later designated B–25C-1s, could project a cone of fire five-to-sixfeet wide and two-to-three-feet high. Ammunition cans provided 480 rounds for each gun. The

480 rounds were belt-loaded in sequences of two tracer, four incendiary, and five armorpiercing shells. The massed impact of the guns could also devastate targets other than ships.

They proved fatal to Japanese fighters that blundered into their field of fire since the .50-

calibers outranged Japanese .303-caliber machine guns and 20mm cannon by 300-to-400

yards.48

Larner's pilots did not practice skip-bombing. Instead, they perfected the technique

of throwing bombs with five-second delay fuzes into ships from masthead height. The bombs,

traveling at the speed of the aircraft from which released, would arc into a vessel and plunge

through its deck or hull before detonating. Each pilot dropped thirty to forty practice bombs,

one bomb to a run, on the same shipwreck that Benn had used to test skip-bombing from a

B–17. A mark painted on the noses of their B–25s gave them a reference point to use as a

bomb sight. By June 1943, Kenney's pilots were able to tell him that "mast height" bombing

was more effective than skip bombing.49 Meanwhile, American and Australian infantry and

tanks, supplied by air transport and aided by close air support, eliminated the Japanese at

Buna. They did so with hard fighting by January 22, 1943.

Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura, commanding officer of Japan's Eighteenth

Army, moved to reinforce his outposts at Lae and Salamaua to the north as the Allies drove

his troops out of Buna. The first convoy sent to accomplish this and its aerial escort faced

formidable difficulties. Slow-moving Japanese transports, averaging eight knots, needed fifty

hours to move the 400 nautical miles from Rabaul to Lae. Pilots of Japan's 6th Army Air

Force Division needed to fly two eight-hour missions each day to provide air cover. Although

the IJN's Eleventh Air Fleet promised to bomb Port Moresby before the convoy sailed in order
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to suppress Allied air activity, it was unable to do so. Despite this omission, the convoy sailed

on schedule on January 6.50

Isolation of the Japanese garrisons was the responsibility of the Fifth Air Force. On

December 30, 1942, photo reconnaissance had revealed ninety-one enemy vessels assembled

in Rabaul harbor. Other surveillance identified Japanese float planes, usually an indicator

of antisubmarine sweeps in advance of a convoy, near Lae. On January 6, 1943, Allied

aircraft spotted a Japanese convoy heading from Rabaul toward Lae. This confirmed signals

intelligence that had warned of an impending attempt to reinforce Lae.

The convoy consisted of two light cruisers, four destroyers, and four transports. Allied

aircraft attacked the convoy and its IJN fighter escorts on January 7 and 8. Allied aircraft

involved twenty-eight heavy bombers, twenty-two medium bombers, and thirty-two light and

fighter bombers. The latter included nineteen Australian Beaufighters, twin-engine

adaptations of the Beaufort bomber. In fighter configuration they had four 20mm cannon in

the nose and six .303-caliber machine guns in the wings. Thirty-five American fighters

provided cover for the bombers.

The convoy ships withdrew on the morning of January 9, leaving behind one beached

transport. Allied airmen had sunk the transports Nichiryu Maru and Myoko Maru, killed 600

of the reinforcements, and destroyed more than fifty enemy aircraft at a cost of ten Allied

planes. The 6th Air Division lost 20 percent of its pilots in defense of the convoy. But more

than 4,000 Japanese troops had unloaded from their transports. The Japanese had put

enough reinforcements ashore so that they could take offensive action against the Australian

base at Wau, about 150 miles northwest of Buna. Wau had to be captured. In Allied hands,

Wau could serve as a base for air power that would make Lae and Salamua untenable.51

On January 19, the Japanese also put 9,400 troops ashore at another northern New

Guinea outpost, Wewak, 382 miles northwest of Lae. A convoy of eight transports covered by

two light cruisers and five destroyers came and went unmolested by Allied air forces. The

Triton, a U.S. Pacific Fleet submarine, tipped off by radio intercepts, sank one transport and

damaged another.52

Rushed in by air, Allied artillery and infantry contained the Japanese assault on Wau.

In consequence, Japanese commanders at Rabaul decided to send 6,900 Eighteenth Army

soldiers assembled there into Lae. Japan did not have an airlift capability comparable to

that of the Allies.53 The reinforcements had to go by ship, despite the danger of air attack

while at sea. The only alternative to delivering them directly to Lae was to send them to

Madang on the northwestern coast of New Guinea. This was beyond the reach of Allied air

power. Troops landed there, however, would have to trek through nearly 300 miles of jungle

to reach Lae or travel down the coast in barges. Either route would be safer, but would not

put them ashore when and where needed.

General Imamura and Admiral Jin'ichi Kusaka, commander of the Eleventh Air Fleet,

recognized the hazards incurred by sending a convoy direct to Lae. War gaming indicated

that 40 percent of the ships involved and 33 to 50 percent of covering aircraft could be lost.

They planned to ameliorate the danger by providing the convoy with an extensive fighter

escort. Imamura and Kusaka also believed that the convoy could take advantage of weather

to hide itself from enemy observation and attack. One three-ship convoy sailed from Rabaul

to Wewak, arriving there without incident on February 19. For the Lae convoy they were

planning, the Japanese added to the odds by scheduling heavy air raids on Allied airfields

within range of the convoy's route to diminish the Allied Air Forces' ability to strike at the

ships.54
104

The convoy would consist of eight transports escorted by eight destroyers. Destroyers

assigned include the Tokitsukaze, Yukikaze, Arashio, Asashio, Shirayuki, Uranami,

Shikinami, and Asagumo. Antiaircraft armament on each warship included six dual-purpose

5-inch guns, ten or more 25-mm antiaircraft weapons, and supplementary machine guns.

Transports included the Naval Special Service ship Nojima, 8,251 tons; the Aiyo Maru, 2,746

tons; Kembu Maru, 953 tons; Kyokusei Maru, 5,493 tons; Oigawa Maru, 6,493 tons; Taimei

Maru, 2,883 tons; Teiyo Maru, 6,869 tons; and Shin-Ai Maru, 3,793 tons. Each transport had

its own anti-air armament to supplement those of the escorting destroyers and the Nojima.

These totaled ten antiaircraft guns, six pom-poms, five Army field guns, and four machine

guns distributed among the seven civilian ships. Rear Admiral Masanori Kimura, head of the

3rd Destroyer Flotilla, commanded the convoy from the Shirayuki.

55

The eight transports loaded 6,004 troops. Other cargo included twelve antiaircraft

guns, twenty-one artillery pieces, seven mortars, and 138 motor vehicles. The ships also

carried thirty-eight large motorized landing craft. Cargo handlers stowed 2,400 drums of fuel

and large quantities of ammunition so that they would be readily accessible when the ships

arrived at Lae. The Kembu Maru was one of the small new "sea trucks" the Japanese were

building. It carried no munitions, but loaders crammed it with 1,000 drums of aviation

gasoline and 650 drums of lower-octane fuel. In addition to the personnel and cargo on the

transports, the destroyers also embarked motorized landing craft, collapsible boats, and

nearly 1,000 Army personnel. Careful loading insured that all vital material or critical

personnel would not be lost if the Allies sank a particular ship.56

The convoy's defense measures were to include evasive action, antiaircraft fire, and

smoke screens to be generated by the escorts. The Japanese Army Air Force and Naval Air

Force shared responsibility for fighter cover.

Planned Japanese Air Cover, Rabaul-Lae Convoy57

Date Time Period Air Cover

March 1 0500-1800 Army

March 2 0500-1200

1100-1800

Navy

Army

March 3 0500-1200

1100-1800

Navy

Army

March 4 0500-1200

1100-1800

Navy

Army

March 5 0500-1200

1100-1800

Navy

Army

March 6 0500-1200

1100-1200

Army

Navy

March 7 0500-1800 Navy

To meet this schedule, forty Navy and sixty Army fighters were available. Army air units also

scheduled attacks on Wau and Buna while the convoy was at sea. Navy air units planned

attacks on Port Moresby and Milne Bay for the same time period.58
105

As early as February 19 MacArthur's headquarters knew from intercepted radio traffic

that the Japanese intended to send a convoy to Lae in early March. This communications

intelligence confirmed other indicators that a convoy was imminent. A February 7 sighting

of a float plane off New Britain signified the typical sign of antisubmarine surveillance in

advance of a convoy. February 22 reconnaissance photography revealed a shipping buildup

at Rabaul.59

The Southwest Pacific Area intelligence staff alerted Kenney to the impending convoy

on February 25, 1943. Brigadier General Ennis Whitehead was in charge of the Fifth Air

Force's Bomber Command and of the Air Force's advance headquarters in New Guinea. A

World War I veteran like Kenney, Whitehead had participated in the 1921 American test

bombings of tethered German warships and some of the record-setting distance flights of the

inter-war years. After arriving in Australia in July 1942 Whitehead became a key figure in

the rebuilding, reorganization, and increased combat effectiveness of the USAAF in the

Southwest Pacific.60

Kenney directed Whitehead to move his P-38s and B–25s from Port Moresby to

Dobodura, an air field a few miles inland from Buna. Kenney didn't want bad weather at Port

Moresby to interfere with air strikes on the convoy. When MacArthur discussed the planned

Japanese convoy with Kenney, he assigned the highest priority to its destruction.61

Allied meteorologists forecast bad weather north of New Britain and conditions south

of the Japanese-held island. Kenney and Whitehead reviewed the routes of previous enemy

convoys. They concluded that the Japanese would route the Lae reinforcements under the bad

weather. The Fifth Air Force commander ordered increased reconnaissance over the Bismarck

Sea, which lies north of New Britain, west of New Guinea, and south of the Admiralty

Islands.62

While the convoy traveled along New Britain's northern coast it would be within range

of only the Allied Air Forces' heaviest bombers, the B–17s and B–24s. When it passed

through the straits connecting the Bismarck and Solomon Seas and separating New Guinea

and New Britain, the convoy would be within range of Kenney's medium bombers and longrange fighters. While they, and the heavy bombers pounded the convoy, he planned to send

some of his A-20s, P-40s, and all of his shorter-ranged P-39s to destroy Japanese fighters on

the ground at Lae. The heavies would bomb the convoy from eight to ten-thousand feet. When

they finished, his medium bombers would start skip and mast height bombing. A-20s and

Beaufighters would follow the specially-armed B–25 anti-shipping aircraft. P-38s would

provide fighter cover. The total mix of combat aircraft available for convoy strikes included

sixty P-40s, thirty-six P-38s, twenty-eight B–25s, twenty-eight B–17s, nine B–24s, fifteen A20s, six Bostons (as the British and Australians designated A-20s), nine Beauforts, and nine

Beaufighters. American air units involved included the 35th and 49th Fighter Groups; the

13th, 89th, and 90th Squadrons of the 3rd Attack Group; the 38th Bombardment Group; the

43d Bombardment Group; and the 90th Bombardment Group. Australian aircraft available

came from RAAF No. 30 and No. 75 Squadrons in No. 9 Operational Group. In addition, some

Australian airmen plugged gaps in the personnel-short American squadrons. The early

intelligence tipoff about the convoy even allowed Kenney's airmen the luxury of a rehearsal

for the attack.63

The Japanese convoy left Rabaul on the night of February 28. Although weather

conditions prevented preemptive strikes against Allied air bases, the Japanese Army and

Navy commanders had decided that the reinforcement of Lae could not wait. On March 1,

1943, George Sellmer, the navigator of a B–24 from the 321st Squadron, 90th Bomb Group,

spotted the Japanese convoy in the Bismarck Sea about 150 miles from Rabaul. Sellmer's
106

pilot, Lieutenant Walter Higgins, reported to Port Moresby the sighting of six destroyers and

eight transports heading west. The Japanese ships below intercepted the contact report and

its receipt by Port Moresby. Despite being discovered, the convoy continued.64

Bad weather prevented further sightings of the convoy until the morning of March 2.

In the interim, American B–17s and B–24s tried unsuccessfully to bomb the ships through

heavy clouds. On the morning of March 2, the weather cleared enough for Allied aircraft to

bomb Japanese airfields at Lae and Gasmata and to relocate the convoy. A Fifth Air Force

B–24 radioed that it had located a convoy of fourteen vessels about fifteen miles north of

Cape Gloucester, at the opposite end of New Britain from Rabaul. The ships were steaming

south toward the strait between New Britain and New Guinea. The B–24, from the 320th

Squadron, 90th Bomb Group, circled the convoy until Allied bombers arrived.65

Before the B–17s and B–24s appeared over the convoy, sixteen P-38s from the 39th

Fighter Squadron arrived to provide air cover. Although they did not sight the convoy, they

encountered three Japanese fighters. The P-38s shot down two of the Japanese aircraft and

reported a third as a probable kill. Japanese files record the loss of three Imperial Japanese

Navy aircraft over the convoy on March 2.66

Twenty minutes after the P-38s splashed the Japanese fighters, Major Ed Scott of the

63d Squadron, 43d Bomb Group, arrived over the convoy with seven B–17s. Scott and his two

wingmen made a bomb run on the transport Kyokusei Maru at an altitude of 6,500 feet while

under attack by eight Japanese fighters and receiving antiaircraft fire from the ships below.

Five bombs hit the Kyokusei Maru. Secondary explosions from the ship's munitions and fuel

cargo added to the holocaust created by the bombs. At 10:30 a.m. the ship's captain ordered

his crew to abandon ship. The destroyers Asagumo and Tokitsukaze stood by as rescue

vessels. In addition to surviving crew and troops, two mountain artillery guns were salvaged

from the burning hulk which eventually exploded and sank.67

The four other B–17's in Scott's raid attacked ships individually. One, piloted by

Lieutenant Jim Murphy, first went after a destroyer but was frustrated by the warship's

violent evasive actions. Then Murphy bombed a transport, which may have been the Kyokusei

Maru. He reported that his bomb blew out of the sides of the target vessel which quickly

broke in two and sank. The other B–17s, hampered by bomb sight and bomb rack

malfunctions, also attacked ships but without results.68

Eleven B–17s from the 64th and 403d Bomb Squadrons followed Scott's raid on the

ships. Bombing from lower altitudes between 4,700 and 5,600 feet, they reported one direct

hit and several near misses on the Japanese ships. Their aerial gunners claimed three

Japanese fighters shot down and five probably destroyed. While these B–17s attacked, two

321st Bomb Squadron B–24s at 7,000 feet dropped twelve bombs on a large destroyer and a

transport but achieved no hits. They reported that the B–17s had sunk one cargo vessel and

set another on fire.69

From 2:00 p.m. on, a B–17 shadowed the convoy. Just before six o'clock a single B–17

from the 403d Bomb Squadron appeared, dropped two 1,000-pound bombs without effect, and

suffered some battle damage inflicted by twelve attacking IJN fighters. At 6:20 p.m., nine

B–17s from the 64th and 403d Bomb Squadrons brushed aside Japanese fighters to send

bombs plunging toward the ships below. They reported two direct hits on one transport and

four near misses on two others. Heavy opposition, mounted by eighteen Japanese Army and

Navy fighters and antiaircraft fire, damaged four B–17s and wounded seven aircrew.70

When Allied reconnaissance aircraft sighted the convoy for the last time on March 2

at 6:40 p.m., only twelve ships were sailing in company. Two of the destroyers, Asagumo and

Yukikaze had rushed away at high speed to convey survivors from the Kyokusei Maru to Lae.
107

When this mission was completed, they returned to the convoy. Two of the ships remaining

with the convoy, the Teiyo Maru and the Nojima, had suffered some casualties and damage

from near misses. As the convoy steamed south toward Vitiaz Strait, Admiral Kimura decided

to delay its arrival at Lae until morning.71

Kimura took his convoy south through Vitiaz Strait just before daybreak. The strait

is a thirty-five-mile-wide, 150-mile-long channel between New Guinea and the offshore

islands of Long and Umboi Islands. Dampier Strait, in turn, separates the islands from New

Britain. An RAAF Catalina used its Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) radar to locate the convoy

at 11:00 p.m. The Australian aircrew kept the Japanese ships under surveillance throughout

the night and occasionally caused it to scatter by dropping flares and twice dropping single

bombs. The Catalina pilot, Flight Lieutenant Terry Duigan, reported the convoy's turn south

when it began. The flying boat left the convoy just before dawn after unloading its remaining

four 250-pound bombs from 2,000 feet over a destroyer. A Fifth Air Force B–17 took over its

shadowing role.72

Allied aircraft renewed their assaults on the convoy in the Huon Gulf about 100 miles

east Lae. Seven Beaufort torpedo bombers from No. 100 Squadron set out from Milne Bay

to attack the convoy. Bad weather kept all but three from finding the Japanese ships.

Squadron Leader J. A. Smibert, found the convoy and dropped flares to guide following

aircraft to it. Pilot Officer Ken Waters initiated the attacks. He made a 6:30 a.m. run against

a destroyer at an altitude of 100 feet and dropped his torpedo at 1,000 yards without result.

A second Beaufort, piloted by Flying Officer Lew Hall, attacked the Shin-Ai Maru about 7:00

a.m. but its torpedo would not release. Frustrated, Hall strafed the ship before turning

away.73

While the Beauforts attempted to torpedo the Japanese ships, other Allied squadrons

received mission instructions. Beaufighters, B–17s, B–25s, A-20s, and P-38s were to

rendezvous at 9:30 a.m. over Cape Ward Hunt, 160 miles north of Port Moresby, to form a

strike force. When assembled, they would assail the convoy using the tactics they had

rehearsed.74

Thirteen Beaufighters from RAAF No. 30 Squadron went first, to suppress antiaircraft

fire. They strafed the convoy in line-abreast 220-knot runs made below 500 feet. The

Japanese expected more torpedo attacks. To counter them, they concentrated their heavy

guns on the bombers at high altitude while depending on their lighter weapons and violent

evasive maneuvers to defend against the low-altitude aircraft. When the Australian attack

planes approached, the Japanese warships on that side of the convoy turned toward them to

comb the tracks of the anticipated torpedoes. This presented the destroyers as smaller targets

but limited the number antiaircraft guns that the ships could bring to bear on the attacking

aircraft. It also unmasked the less-well-armed transports. The Beaufighters' .303-caliber

machine guns and 20-mm cannon wreaked havoc among the exposed Japanese antiaircraft

gunners and ignited some of the transports' volatile deck cargoes. While No. 30 Squadron

aircraft pounded the ships, thirteen B–17s began dropping 1,000-pound bombs from an

altitude of 7,000 feet. Thirteen B–25s followed the B–17s, also bombing from medium

altitude. As the bombs fell from above, twelve of the B–25s modified with additional forwardfiring machine guns swept in at 500 feet. Their concentrated .50 caliber bullets did their own

substantial damage as the Allied aircrews flew even lower to drop thirty-seven 500-pound

bombs at masthead height. One bomb started a fire that exploded the after magazine of the

destroyer Shirayuki, Admiral Kimura's flagship. The explosion blew off the ship's stern and

sank the ship. Other ships severely damaged by the 90th Squadron attack included the

destroyers Arashio, Asagumo and Tokitsukaze, the merchant transports Teiyo Maru, Aiyo
108

Maru, Oigawa Maru, and the naval transport Nojima. The Arashio, with its bridge destroyed

and rudder jammed, crashed at high speed into the Nojima, which began to sink. Twelve

skip-bombing A-20s followed the low-level B–25s. They loosed twenty more 500-pound bombs.

One of the bombs caused the small Kembu Maru to sink immediately. A-20 aircrews also

claimed ten other direct hits. Then six more B–25s concluded the midmorning raid. Despite

the sequenced attack, the strafing and bombing had occurred so rapidly that Beaufighters

were still hammering ships as the last B–25 bombs fell.75

Twenty-eight P-38s had provided cover while the bombers struck at the convoy.

Fighter opposition was heavy, with thirty aircraft present, but ineffectual. To the detriment

of the ships below, most of the Japanese pilots focused their attention on the B–17s. This

allowed the low-level Allied bombers to make their run with little interference. In all, Allied

aerial forces over the convoy lost three P-38s and one B–17 while destroying twenty Japanese

aircraft. An Allied air raid by thirty-eight fighters on the Japanese field at Lae concurrent

with the attack on the convoy kept additional Japanese fighters from rushing to aid the

convoy. Pilots making the raid reported destroying six more Japanese fighters, probably

destroying another two, damaging four, and setting a small Japanese cargo vessel in Lae

Harbor on fire.76

Allied aircraft returned to attack the convoy in mid-afternoon. Bad weather had closed

in over the Owen Stanley Mountains. Many of the strike aircraft could not navigate over or

through the peaks. None of the Beaufighters managed to cross the range nor did twelve of

the seventeen A-20s dispatched. Some of the aircraft that did find their way from Port

Moresby to the northern coast of New Guinea had difficulty finding the remnants of the

enemy convoy. Six of twenty-nine B–25s could not find the Japanese ships. The other B–25s

found two destroyers and four or five merchant ships, the latter all burning. Eleven P-38s

covered a bombing force of sixteen B–17s, twelve unmodified B–25s, ten specially-equipped

B–25s from USAAF squadrons and five RAAF Boston bombers. The raiders headed for the

convoy with B–17s from the 65th Bombardment Squadron first, followed in turn by B–25s

from the 90th, 71st, and 405th Squadrons, B–17s from the 64th Squadron, and Bostons from

RAAF No. 22 Squadron.77

The B–17s struck first, at 3:15 p.m. They claimed two direct hits on a destroyer. B–25s

followed. Eight came in just over the water and were followed by fifteen more at low and

medium altitudes. The Asashio received attacks from all types of aircraft over a period of

seven minutes. B–25s from 90th Squadron flying at 7,000 feet showered 1,000-pound bombs

on the hapless ship and brought it to a halt in the water. Other B–25s attacked it with skip

and masthead height bombing. The Bostons, loaded with 250- and 500-pound bombs,

simultaneously attacked the destroyer Tokitsukaze. Diving individually from altitudes of

4,000 to 1,500 feet, the Bostons scored at least two direct hits. B–25s followed with low-level

attacks on the destroyer. At the same time, more B–17s rained bombs down through the

B–25s and Bostons. When the bombers had emptied their bomb bays, they strafed the

burning and sinking ships. The Allied aircraft left both Japanese destroyers on fire, one of

them sinking. Three of the Japanese transports remained afloat but sinking. When debriefed,

the attacking pilots stated that too many Allied aircraft were over the target at the same

time.78

Japanese fighters, which rotated over the battle area in formations of twelve to fifteen

aircraft during the bombing, confronted the P-38s and the heavily armed B–25s and B–17s.

Despite skillful flying the Japanese Army and Navy pilots could not prevent devastation to

the ships below. Japanese documents recorded the loss of twelve fighters on March 3.79
109

While daylight lasted on March 3, additional Allied aircraft visited the battle area to

strafe survivors in the water and assure that none of the stricken vessels could get away. The

last attack of the day was by a 321st Bomb Squadron B–24 that dropped six 500-pound

bombs on the stationary Tokitsukaze but missed.80

During the night of March 3-4, eight American motor torpedo boats (PTs) came from

Tufi, south of Buna on New Guinea's northern coast, to search for ships that had survived

the previous day's air strikes. Two, PT–143 and PT–150, found the burning and abandoned

Oigawa Maru. Each boat launched a torpedo. Both struck home and quickly sank the hulk.

Allied aircraft found two damaged Japanese destroyers in Huon Gulf on the morning of

March 4. The first, the Arashio, went to the bottom after a B–17 dropped a 500-pound bomb

into her forward stack. Low-level bombers destroyed the second, probably the Asashio, in late

afternoon on March 4. Nine modified B–25s from the 90th Squadron reported finding a ship,

later believed to be the Asahio, about fifty miles east of Cape Ward Hunt. Three dropped six

bombs that achieved two hits and three near misses, after which the destroyer quickly sank.81

When the battle ended, air power had sunk all eight of the transports and four of the

eight destroyers in the convoy from Rabaul to Lae. The warships Asagumo, Shikinami,

Uranami, and Yukikaze escaped to fight again, although the first three sank in combat in

1944. The Yukikaze survived until July 1945, when it ran aground. Japanese destroyers

managed to rescue 2,734 of the troops originally embarked on ships that went to the bottom.

Several hundred more troops made their way ashore in lifeboats, barges, or by swimming

only to be killed or captured over the next several months. Fifth Air Force statistics reported

Japanese air losses of sixty planes definitely destroyed, twenty-five probably destroyed, and

ten damaged. Allied losses totaled thirteen killed, twelve wounded, four airplanes shot down,

and two airplanes demolished on landing.82

Allied fighters and light bombers came back to the area for several days following the

battle. Their mission was to kill surviving Japanese troops in lifeboats or in the water so that

they could not go ashore and fight again. Japanese fighters several times intercepted the

strafers, with casualties resulting on both sides. On March 5, PTs 143 and 150 encountered

a Japanese submarine which was rescuing survivors from three landing craft. The PTs

launched torpedoes that missed but forced the submarine to submerge. Then they used depth

charges and machine guns to sink the barges and kill their occupants.83

Kenney woke up MacArthur at 3:00 a.m. on March 4 to report his aircrews' success

in devastating the Japanese convoy. According to Kenney, he "had never seen him so

jubilant." The Allied Supreme Commander quickly wired his congratulations to the airmen

in New Guinea. In postwar reflection, MacArthur described the Battle of the Bismarck Sea

as "the decisive aerial engagement" in the Southwest Pacific Area.84

Victory in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea was decisive. Allied Air Forces achieved the

victory with a combination of effective leadership plus specially trained and equipped forces.

After-action analysis vindicated the technique of low altitude bombing. A report issued in

June 1943 found that during the action seventy-two B–17 sorties dropped 253 bombs and

scored nineteen direct hits. Although the average altitude for this bomb runs was 6,000 to

7,000 feet, altitudes varied from 4,500 to 14,500 feet. B–25s conducted sixty-two minimum

altitude (from masthead height to 300 feet) sorties against the convoy. The medium bombers

reported forty-nine direct hits out of 215 500-pound bombs released. A-20s also operated at

minimum altitude, dropping ten 250-pound and ten 500-pound bombs with twelve hits

claimed.85 Kenney's aviators gained remarkable advantage gained through intelligence

collection and analysis. Fortuitous weather permitted them to exploit the intelligence almost

to its fullest extent.
110

In the aftermath of the Rabaul to Lae convoy's destruction, Japan's Imperial General

Headquarters decided to shift priority in the Southwest Pacific from defense of the Solomon

Islands to defense of their forward bases in New Guinea. Japanese Army Air Force

formations in the area were restricted principally to New Guinea operations. Naval Air Force

units supported New Guinea operations, had primary responsibility for air defense of the

Bismarck Archipelago, and sole responsibility for air operations in the Solomon Islands.86

The shift in priorities involved Japanese aerial forces in costly air battles with the

Fifth Air Force that drained away their trained pilots and destroyed many of their aircraft.

Japanese ground forces also continued to reach New Guinea, where they could not be

adequately supplied. They all came by night and by barge or submarine. Once ashore they

suffered tremendously because Allied air power interdicted most supplies shipped to Japanese

outposts. Despite suffering from malnutrition and disease, the Japanese troops remained

formidable foes. Severe fighting was required to drive them out of Lae and Salamaua in

September 1943 and Finschafen to the north in October. Months of bloody mopping up,

mostly by Australian troops, followed. Capture of Lae, Salamaua, and Finschafen, however,

effectively cleared the northern New Guinea coast. This, together with the seizure of

Guadalcanal by American forces from the South Pacific Area, isolated Japanese forces at

Rabaul and assured the safety of air and sea routes from North America to Australia.

Conquest of New Guinea and Guadalcanal also opened the way for the Allies' further advance

toward the Philippines.87
111

Endnotes to Chapter V

1. Frank Uhlig, Jr., How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies (Annapolis, Md.: Naval

Institute Press, 1994), p. 195.

2. Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) (Annapolis, Md.:

United States Naval Institute, 1978), p. 36; Arthur Hezlet, Aircraft and Sea Power (New

York: Stein and Day, 1970), p. 202. Hezlet's figures on 22d Air Flotilla strength differ from

those presented by Dull. Hezlet states that the flotilla included 36 fighters, 6 reconnaissance

aircraft, and 138 bombers and was supported by 3 seaplane tenders with 30 seaplanes.

3. Len Deighton, Blood, Tears, and Folly: an Objective Look at World War II (New York:

Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), p. 573.

4. United States Army, comp., Reports of General MacArthur, Volume II—Part I, Japanese

Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government

Printing Office, 1966 reprint), p. 75.

5. Hezlet, Aircraft and Sea Power, p. 204; H. P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese

and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p.

105.

6. Douglas Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942 (Canberra: Australian War

Memorial, 1962), pp. 204-5.

7. Dennis Richards and Hillary St. George Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol. 2, The

Fight Avails (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1974), pp. 7-10.

8. Ibid., p. 20.

9. Deighton, Blood, Tears, and Folly: an Objective Look at World War II, p. 5; Hezlet,

Aircraft and Sea Power, p. 204; Richards and Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol. 2,

The Fight Avails, p. 21.

10. E. E. H. Archibald, The Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy 1897 - 1984 (New York:

Military Press, 1987), pp. 176-77; Deighton, Blood, Tears, and Folly: An Objective Look at

World War II, p. 579-80; Stephen Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals (New York: William

Morrow and Company, Inc., 1978), p. 181.

11. Quoted in Edwin T. Layton with Roger Pineau and John Costello, "And I was There,”

Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (New York: William Morrow and Company,

Inc., 1985), p. 178.

12. Archibald, The Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy 1897—1984 pp. 181-82.

13. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942, p. 250.

14. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), p. 38; Hezlet, Aircraft

and Sea Power, p. 205; Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942, p. 251.

15. Nathan Miller, The Naval Air War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 55.

16. Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, 1978, pp. 119, 199. Roskill, a Royal Navy officer,

came back from Norway and discussed the bombing with Phillips in April 1940.

17. Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume I, The Defensive (London: Her

Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), pp. 564-65.

18. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), p. 40; Roskill,

Churchill and the Admirals, p. 200, says that Adm. Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord,

told Churchill this was probably the reason that the Prince of Wales and Repulse did not

attempt to create a smokescreen.

19. Deighton, Blood, Tears, and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II, pp. 581-82; Dull,

A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), p. 40; Richards and Saunders,

Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol. 2, The Fight Avails, pp. 28-29.
112

20. Hezlet, Aircraft and Sea Power, p. 206.

21. David Brown, Warship Losses of World War Two (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1995), pp. 58, 61, 161, 173.

22. Quoted in Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun (New York: The Free Press, 1985),

p. 128.

23. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942,

pp. 54-56.

24. Ibid., p. 57-58.

25. Ibid., p. 58.

26. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942,

pp. 59-61; Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World

War II, Vol. I, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, 1948 (Washington,

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, reprint ed., 1983), p. 417. The inability of B–17s at high

altitudes to hit ships underway was again demonstrated in early May when they attempted

to bomb Japanese transports in an invasion fleet steaming toward Port Moresby (Craven and

Cate, Vol. I, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, p. 449).

27. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, (1939-1945), p. 101; Willmott,

Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942, p. 61.

28. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I, Plans and Early

Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, pp. 419-20.

29. Ibid., pp. 473-74.

30. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I, Plans and Early

Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, p. 460, pp. 480-81; Assistant Chief of Air Staff,

Intelligence, United States Army Air Forces, "The B–26 in the Southwest Pacific," Special

Informational Intelligence Report, No. 43-10, June 16, 1943, Declassified per EO 11652, File

142.034-2, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala, p. 3.

31. Herman S. Wolk, "George C. Kenney," pp. 88-114, in We Shall Return! MacArthur's

Commanders and the Defeat of Japan, William M. Leary, ed. (Lexington: University of

Kentucky, 1988), pp. 88-91; Gen. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal

History of the Pacific War, 1949 (Washington, D.C., Office of Air Force History reprint, 1987),

pp. xi-xiv.

32. Fifteenth Air Force, "Digest Report of Skip Bombing," Apr. 16, 1943, in File K-23454,

AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; Gen. H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper &

Brothers, Publishers, 1949), pp. 230-31.

33. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War, pp. 21-22, 55.

34. Ibid., pp. 44-45, 50.

35. Ibid., pp. 66-67.

36. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942, pp. 566-67.

37. Ibid., pp. 604-6.

38. Ibid., pp. 609-10.

39. Ibid., pp. 609, 629.

40. Samuel Eliot Morrison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol.

VI, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968 reprint),

pp. 37-38.

41. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War, pp. 83-89.

42. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1942, pp. 106-107. See pp. 63-70 for a discussion

of South Pacific army air commander Maj. Gen. Millard Harmon's approach to this issue.
113

43. Quoted in Steve Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers, The Illustrated History of Kenney's Fifth Air

Force (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977), p. 26.

44. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II,

Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, 1950 (Washington,

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), p. 107, p. 112; Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A

Personal History of the Pacific War p. 140.

45. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War, p. 158.

46. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p. 122.

47. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War, pp. 144, 155,

164, 173.

48. "Exchange of Information Between Groups in Active Theaters and Groups in Training,"

memo with unidentified author, Jun. 15, 1943, to Commanding General, 5th AF, Microfilm

0258184, AFHRA, p. 3. The memo states that "a squadron of this group...is flying a modified

B–25...designated the B–25C-1." This indicates the memo originated from the 3rd Attack

Group.

49. "Exchange of Information Between Groups in Active Theaters and Groups in Training,"

15 June 1943, pp. 3-4.

50. Edward J. Drea, MacArthur's Ultra: Code-Breaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-

1945 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992), p. 64.

51. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p. 136; Kenney, General Kenney Reports:

A Personal History of the Pacific War, p. 177; Drea, MacArthur's Ultra: Code-Breaking and

the War Against Japan, p. 66; Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-

1945), p. 268.

52. Morison, United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. IV, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, p. 52; Drea, MacArthur's Ultra: Code-Breaking and the War Against

Japan, p. 66.

53. Gerhard Krebs, "The Japanese Air Forces," pp. 228-34, in The Conduct of the Air War

in the Second World War, An International Comparison, Horst Boog, ed. (New York: Berg

Publishers Limited, 1992), p. 231.

54. Morison, United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. IV, Breaking the

Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 54-55; Drea, MacArthur's Ultra: Code-Breaking and the War Against

Japan, p. 67; Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), pp. 268-69.

55. Ibid., p. 269; Lex McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea (New York: St. Martin's Press,

1991), p. 36. McAulay, p. 37, gives Kimura's given name as Shofuku while Morison, United

States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. IV, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 55,

reports Kimura's given name as Masatomi. Dan van der Vat, The Pacific Campaign, World

War II, The U.S. Japanese Naval War, 1941-1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991),

states that Masatomi Kimura was the admiral involved with the Lae to Rabaul convoy (pp.

258-59) and that Shofuku Kimura was the admiral involved in the evacuation of Japanese

troops from Kiska in the North Pacific in August 1943 (p. 276).

56. McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, pp. 36-37.

57. Ibid., p. 38.

58. Ibid.

59. Drea, MacArthur's Ultra: Code-Breaking and the War Against Japan, pp. 68-69.

60. Donald M. Goldstein, "Ennis C. Whitehead," pp. 178-207, in McLeary, We Shall Return!

MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat
114

of Japan, pp. 178-84.

61. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War, pp. 197-98.

62. Ibid., p. 199.

63. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p. 142; Kenney, General Kenney Reports:

A Personal History of the Pacific War, p. 199-200.

64. United States Army, Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. II - Part I, Japanese Operations

in the Southwest Pacific Area, pp. 201-2; McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, pp. 44-45.

65. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p. 143; Kenney, General Kenney Reports:

A Personal History of the Pacific War, p. 202; McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, p. 46.

66. McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, pp. 46-47.

67. Ibid., p. 48.

68. Ibid., p. 49.

69. Ibid., p. 51.

70. Ibid., p. 52.

71. Ibid., p. 54.

72. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p. 143; Kenney, General Kenney Reports:

A Personal History of the Pacific War, p. 203.

73. McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, pp. 61-62.

74. Ibid., p. 65.

75. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p. 144; Kenney, General Kenney Reports:

A Personal History of the Pacific War, p. 203; McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, pp. 63-

111. McAulay gives a detailed account of the battle, include recollections of survivors.

76. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944,

p. 144; Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War, p. 204.

Kenney states that twenty-two Japanese fighters were destroyed, two probably destroyed, and

four damaged.

77. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p. 145; Kenney, General Kenney Reports:

A Personal History of the Pacific War, p. 204; McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, p. 116.

78. McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, p. 117, p. 119, p. 123.

79. Ibid., p. 131.

80. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p. 145; Kenney, General Kenney Reports:

A Personal History of the Pacific War, pp. 204-5.

81. Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers, The Illustrated History of Kenney's Fifth Air Force, pp. 132-

33; Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. VI, Breaking

the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 61. McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, p. 136, cites information

from Japanese survivors that the Arashio sank during the night of Mar. 3-4. According to

Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War, p. 205, on the

morning of Mar. 4 an American B–25 returned to the scene where it found a single Japanese

destroyer dead in the water. The B–25 used skip bombing to administer the coup de grace

to the dying ship. MacAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea, reproduces a photo (between pp.

154-55) that is identified as the abandoned Tokitsukaze being bombed by the 65th Squadron,
115

43d Bomb Group, at 8:45 a.m., March 4. David Brown, in Warship Losses of World War Two

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 82, states that the Shirayuki and

Tokitsukaze fell victim to Allied bombers on March 3 and the Arashio and Asashio on March

4.

82. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, pp. 146-49, discuss post-battle attempts

to reconcile conflicting data regarding type and size of ships sunk and damaged in various

after action reports. The figures presented of four destroyers and eight transports sunk seems

conclusive. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. VI,

Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 62. On pp. 63-64 Morison discusses the types and sizes

of ships sunk and comes to the same conclusion as Craven and Cate.

83. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal

to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p. 145; Morison, History of United States Naval

Operations in World War II, Vol. VI, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 62.

84. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p. 146; Kenney, General Kenney Reports:

A Personal History of the Pacific War, p. 206.

85. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Army Air Forces,

"Tactics in the Bismarck Sea Battle," Command Informational Intelligence Series, No. 43-110,

Jun. 23, 1943, Declassified per DOD Dir 52009.9, Sep. 27, 1958, File 142.034-3, AFHRA, pp.

4-5.

86. United States Army, Reports of General MacArthur, Volume II, Part I, Japanese

Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, p. 205.

87. John Miller Jr., Cartwheel: the Reduction of Rabaul (Washington, D.C.: Office of the

Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), p. 1; Spector, Eagle Against the

Sun, pp. 240-41; Van der Vat, The Pacific Campaign, World War II, The U.S. Japanese Naval

War, 1941-1945, p. 279.

***British seafarers named the passage between the two main islands in the group

"Falkland Sound" in 1690 to honor Viscount Falkland, Treasurer of the Royal Navy at

that time. British usage subsequently applied the name Falklands to the island group.

Argentina calls the islands the "Malvinas," a name that the Spanish assigned to them

about 1767.

117

CHAPTER VI

THE FALKLANDS WAR

The first post-World War II conflict that engaged land-based aircraft against naval

forces equipped with modern anti-air defenses occurred in 1982 in the Falklands or the

Malvinas.*** The westernmost point of these remote, windswept South Atlantic islands is

about 300 miles east of the Strait of Magellan and Argentina's southern coast. The war

between Argentina and Britain began on April 2, when Argentine marines seized the islands.

The invasion enforced Argentina's claim to them as former Spanish possessions in South

America, although the Falklands had been a British colony since 1833.1 Britain responded

by sending a naval task force to recapture the islands. A short, fierce contest ensued, pitting

Royal Navy (RN) ships and carrier-based Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (VSTOL)

aircraft against Argentine aerial forces operating from distant mainland bases. During the

Falklands War the British lost six major ships and had ten damaged by air attacks, while

the Argentines lost more than 100 fixed wing and rotary aircraft. British forces later claimed

responsibility for seventy-two aircraft "kills." Of these, thirty-five were destroyed in attacks

on naval targets.2

The Falklands were an unlikely prize for so costly a campaign. Two major islands,

East Falkland with an area of 2550 square miles and West Falkland with an area of 1750

square miles are the principal islands in the group. About 200 smaller islands totaling 4700

square miles are satellites about them. Together, the islands supported a population of about

1800 persons and are characterized by rocky hills and boggy, rolling plains, on which sheepraising was in 1982 the only economic activity. About 700 miles to the southeast lie the

Falkland Island Dependencies consisting of South Georgia Island, South Sandwich Island,

and a few islets. These completed the contested territory.3

Great Britain Orders a Fleet

During the first three months of 1982, Britain received several indications that

Argentina might transform their diplomatic dispute into armed conflict. Signals intelligence

revealed on March 31 that several Argentine ships were en route to the islands. A conference

of Britain's civilian and military leadership convened that evening in London. Those present

learned that the Royal Navy was prepared to dispatch a task force to the Falklands. It would

consist of two VSTOL aircraft carriers, surface escorts, landing ships, submarines, and

assault troops. The task force had three components: Task Group 317.8, the carrier battle

group; Task Group 317.0, the amphibious group; and Task Group 317.1, the landing force.

Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse commanded the entire task force from the United Kingdom,

Rear Admiral J. F. "Sandy" Woodward commanded the carrier battle group, Captain M.C.

Clapp commanded the Amphibious Group with the title of Commodore, and Brigadier J. H.

A. Thompson commanded the landing force.4
118

At this time Britain's total combatant fleet consisted of the two carriers, fourteen

destroyers, forty-six frigates, twelve nuclear-powered and sixteen diesel-powered attack

submarines, and four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The 8,000-mile voyage

from the United Kingdom to the South Atlantic islands would take a minimum of three

weeks.5

The aircraft carriers Hermes and the Invincible formed the heart of the British task

force. The Royal Navy classified the Hermes as an antisubmarine warfare (ASW)/commando

carrier. The ship's aircraft could carry out ASW or insert a Royal Marine commando brigade

ashore. The Royal Navy commissioned the 28,000-ton ship as a conventional carrier with

angled flight deck in 1959. A 1971-1973 refit and conversion removed the Hermes' steam

launching catapults and arrester gear. This ended the ship's capability to launch conventional

fixed-wing aircraft. Besides defenses provided by embarked aircraft, the carrier's armament

consisted of two quad launchers for close range surface-to-air or surface-to-surface Sea Cat

missiles. The Sea Cats, with explosive warheads and a maximum range of just under three

miles, could be guided either by joystick or automatic radar from a director unit.6

The ship's small aircraft load consisted of five VSTOL Sea Harrier attack jets and nine

Sea King helicopters. For the Falklands War, this complement was increased to twelve

Harriers. Additional aircraft crammed every inch of available deck space. The Sea Harriers,

easily recognizable by their high wings and large air intakes on either side of the fuselage,

were single-seater ground attack aircraft with a secondary air defense role. Capabilities of

the aircraft included a unique capacity to move vertically, sideways, and backwards as their

pilots varied the direction of the jet thrust. Pilots could also effect rapid changes in speed by

raising or lowering an air brake in the rear of the fuselage. These "jump-jets" could attain

speeds of 597 miles-per-hour at sea level and a maximum speed of 720 miles-per-hour at

1,000 feet. Their method of take off dictated range. Fuel-extravagant vertical takeoffs limited

the Sea Harrier's round-trip range to 228 miles. More conservative short takeoffs using the

Hermes' ski-jump flight deck extended the Sea Harriers' combat radius to 828 miles with

wing tanks. In practice, it proved necessary to launch two Sea Harriers every twenty minutes

to provide a constant Combat Air Patrol (CAP) for the carriers.7

When it reached the battle area, the task force's carriers generally steamed about 150

nautical miles east of the Falklands. Intercept aircraft from the Hermes and Invincible

patrolled west of the missile engagement zones of British radar picket ships stationed closer

to the islands. The carrier crews worked hard to maintain an overall aircraft availability rate

of 80 percent. They attained a 95 percent availability rate at the beginning of each day on

which their ships launched combat missions. Nearly 100 percent of all planned missions were

executed. This required each Sea Harrier with the task force to spend about nine hours aloft

each day. The average sortie time for the Harriers was about ninety minutes.8

A Sea Harrier's normal armament included two 30-mm cannon capable of firing

twenty-two rounds per second and two Sidewinder, AIM-9L, heat-seeking air intercept

missiles. Rocket motors propelled the Sidewinders, which could carry twenty-five-pound high

explosive warheads to a maximum distance of eleven miles. Five hard points on the Harriers

(two on each wing and one under the fuselage) gave them the added capability to carry

cluster bombs, conventional bombs, and rocket pods.9

The square-bodied Sea King helicopters had large cockpits forward of their

cargo/weapons compartment and were amphibious all-weather aircraft, capable of ASW,

search-and-rescue, and attack applications. Powered by two engines, they could attain a

maximum speed of 143 miles-per-hour at sea level and had a maximum range of 764 miles.

In airlift configuration, the Sea Kings could carry twenty-two combat-equipped troops or six
119

stretcher cases and twelve seated wounded. Configured for ASW or attack roles, the

helicopters could carry automatic weapons, rocket pods, missiles, and homing torpedoes.10

The British had built the Invincible, a light aircraft carrier of 19,500 tons, to carry a

mix of Sea Harriers and Sea Kings. Commissioned in June 1980, the Invincible normally

embarked five Sea Harriers and ten Sea Kings. Like the Hermes, the Invincible carried an

increased load of eight jump-jets plus helicopters into the Falklands War. Each operational

Harrier squadron (800 in Hermes and 801 in Invincible) normally had only five aircraft.

Naval authorities rounded up aircraft assigned to a training squadron, aircraft in reserve,

and an aircraft from an aviation experimental station to bring the total number of Sea

Harriers available up to twenty. Eventually the British would ship or fly a total of twentyeight Sea Harriers and fourteen Royal Air Force (RAF) GR3 Harriers to the South Atlantic.11

The Invincible’s defensive armament included one twin Sea Dart launcher. Sea Darts,

surface-to-air or surface-to-surface missiles, carried a high explosive warhead to a maximum

range of twenty-four miles. Their fire control system featured a surveillance radar and a

tracking radar that complemented the missile's own semi-active homing radar. During the

Falklands War, Sea Darts proved able to destroy attacking aircraft and incoming missiles.12

After Argentine forces occupied the Falkland Islands, the two aircraft carriers left

Portsmouth, England, for the South Atlantic in a well-publicized April 5, 1982 departure.

Escorting combatants, oilers, and supply ships slipped quietly out of other British ports.

These included Gibraltar, at which the Royal Navy's 2d Flotilla of destroyers and frigates

happened to be exercising. The flotilla commander, Rear Admiral Sir John "Sandy"

Woodward, assumed command of the carrier battle group on its way to the Falklands. These

unobtrusive departures were intended to prevent the Argentines from knowing the total

strength of the British fleet. One particularly important ship, the Atlantic Conveyor, steamed

south on April 21. This container ship, requisitioned by the Royal Navy for the duration of

the conflict, had quickly been converted into an "aircraft transport ship." One of four on

which conversion was begun, the Conveyor carried a cargo of mixed cargo of twenty-four

Harriers and helicopters intended to replace anticipated losses from aircraft embarked in task

force ships that sailed earlier. Royal Navy planners also hoped to use the Conveyor as an

auxiliary carrier in emergencies. Its shipboard systems were modified so that aircraft could

be refueled, liquid oxygen supplied to Sea Harriers, and fresh water was available to wash

down aircraft. In total, the Royal Navy dispatched a force consisting of two aircraft carriers,

seven destroyers and frigates, and four tankers and supply ships within three days of the

Falklands invasion.13

Surface combatants either sailing from England with the task force or joining it off

the Falklands included one light cruiser, eleven destroyers, and twenty frigates. The light

cruiser Bristol mounted one twin Sea Dart launcher, one 4.5-inch gun, and two 20-mm guns.

The Bristol was the only British warship that did not carry its own helicopters. Two County

class destroyers, the Antrim and the Glamorgan, each mounted four Exocet anti-ship

missiles, one twin Sea Slug and two quad Sea Cat surface-to-air missile launchers, two 4.5-

inch guns, and two 20-mm guns. The Sea Slug missiles, designed as long-range anti-air

weapons, could engage targets at a maximum distance of thirty-six miles and a maximum

height of 47,200 feet.14

Three Type 22 destroyers, Broadsword, Brilliant, and Battleaxe, also accompanied the

task force. The anti-air armament of these ships included two six-tube Sea Wolf missile

launchers and two 40-mm guns. The supersonic Sea Wolfs, with high-explosive warheads and

proximity fuzes, provided close-in defense. Type 42 destroyers also sailed with the task force.

These included the Cardiff, Coventry, Exeter, Glasgow, Sheffield, and Southampton. The
120

4,100-4,700-ton Type 42s mounted one twin Sea Dart missile launcher, six torpedo tubes, one

4.5-inch gun forward, and two 20-mm Oerlikon guns aft. A helicopter on each ship carried

four Sea Skua anti-ship missiles. Contray to press reports made during the campaign,

aluminum had not been used in fabricating the superstructures of the Type 42 destroyers.

Leander-class frigates made up the task force's second largest class of warship. They included

the Andromeda, Argonaut, Ariadne, Aurora, Dido, Euryalus, and Minerva. Each of these

small ships of about 3,000 tons mounted two or three quad Sea Cat launchers and two or

more 40-mm Bofors guns in addition to a varying mix of antisubmarine weapons and surfaceto-surface Exocet missiles.15

Type 21 frigates also joined the task force in large numbers. They were a little larger

than the "Leander" class at 3,250-tons. The Type 21s with the British force were the Active,

Alacrity, Ambuscade, Antelope, Ardent, Arrow, and Avenger. Air defense weapons on each

included one quad Sea Cat launcher, one 4.5-inch gun, and two 20-mm Oerlikon guns. The

ships' other armament included four Exocet launchers and six torpedo tubes. These types

used an aluminum-magnesium alloy in their superstructures to decrease topside weight.

Overall, each vessel had 139.5 tons of alloy to 739.5 tons of steel. The magnesium in the alloy

proved inflammable. When the magnesium ignited, water spray could not extinguish it. Type

12 frigates were the next-to-smallest surface combatants assigned to the British task force.

These were the Berwick, Falmouth, Plymouth, Rhyl, and Yarmouth. The 2,800-ton vessels

each mounted one Sea Cat launcher and two 4.5-inch guns plus an antisubmarine mortar.

A 2,700-ton "Tribal" class frigate, the Tartar, armed with two quad Sea Cat launchers, two

4.5-inch guns, and two 20-mm guns was the smallest combatant in the task force.16

Other Royal Navy ships in the British task force included the assault ships Fearless

and Intrepid and six small landing ships. The latter were the Sir Bedivere, Sir Galahad, Sir

Geraint, Sir Lancelot, Sir Percival, and Sir Tristram. One of the 12,000-ton assault ships

could carry up to 700 troops plus tanks and other vehicles to the scene of an opposed

invasion. They could then put them ashore in assault landing craft launched from davits or

a well deck. Flight decks on each ship provided space for five helicopters. Four quad-mount

Sea Cat launchers and two 40-mm Bofors antiaircraft guns protected the assault ships'

cargoes from air attack. The 5,647-ton "Sir" landing ships had the capacity to carry troops

or vehicles, which they could put directly onto the beach. Two 40-mm Bofors antiaircraft guns

on each of the "Sirs" gave only token protection from air attack.17

Seven Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service Vessels, including helicopter support ships,

replenishment ships, and tanks, accompanied the British task force. Only one, the 22,890-ton

Resource had its own antiaircraft weapons. These were limited to two 40-mm Bofors guns.

The Royal Navy also requisitioned more than forty British civilian ships of various classes

ranging from tugs to ocean liners for task force support. None of these vessels were armed.18

The British task force comprised both the largest naval target and the most extensive

naval air defense complex exposed to air attack since World War II. It suffered nonetheless

from the lack of a full-deck carrier capable of operating high-performance fixed-wing aircraft

and of airborne early warning (AEW) planes. A conventional carrier, interceptors comparable

to the American-built F-14, and AEW capability could have given the Royal Navy's battle

force an additional several hundred miles of air defense coverage. As it was, the Royal Navy’s

air defense system off the Falklands had no way of intercepting Exocet-launching aircraft

before they fired their missiles. The British ships also found that when they operated in

waters bordered by high terrain that their radars had difficulty detecting low-flying aircraft

approaching from landward.19
121

Task Force Air Defense Weapons20

Weapon Number of Aircraft/

Launchers/Guns

Number of barrels

Harriers & Sea Harriers

20 N/A

Sea Cat missiles 50 196

Sea Dart missiles 6 12

Sea Slug missiles 2 4

Sea Wolf missiles 6 36

4.5-inch guns 34 34

40-mm guns 32 32

20-mm guns 38 38

In all, the task force mounted 248 surface-to-air missile tubes and 104 gun barrels

usable for air defense. Many shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and temporarily mounted

machine guns supplemented the permanent armament. Not all of the task force's ships sailed

together at any one time. But in total it numbered thirty-four surface combatants. This

provided the task force commander with an extensive and sophisticated array of anti-air

weapons. Later additions would bring up to fifty-one the total number of British combatants

involved at various times. Peak strength off the Falklands, however, never exceeded the two

aircraft carriers and twenty-three destroyers and frigates.21

Land-based aircraft supported the British task force's first action in the Falklands

area. This occurred when two destroyers, the Antrim and Plymouth, and the tanker

Tidespring detached from the main body on April 7. The ships took a Royal Marine assault

team to South Georgia Island. As they neared the island, the Royal Navy's Endurance, a

3,600-ton ice patrol ship kept in the South Atlantic joined the detached vessels. A Royal Air

Force Victor K2 tanker made a 7,400-mile reconnaissance flight from Ascension Island on

April 20 to make sure that no Argentinean ships lay in the path of the small task group.

Ascension Island is a nine-mile-long by six-mile-wide British possession in the South Atlantic.

Despite its position 3,000 miles northeast of the Falklands, the island served as an air base

for British bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and tankers during the Falklands War.

First Contest of Arms

The invasion task force reached the South Georgia area on April 21. Once there, the

Royal Marines recaptured the Falkland Dependencies after a short skirmish with Argentine

troops.22

The long flight from Ascension to the Falklands required the reconnaissance aircraft

to refuel eight times from other Victors, which also flew from Ascension. The Mark K2

Victors, distinguished by their high tail-planes, were converted bombers. These relics of the

RAF's 1950s strategic bombing force were each capable of carrying 123,000 pounds of fuel.
122

The Victors later played critical roles in support of RAF Vulcan bombers that cratered the

runway at Stanley on East Falkland Island. The Vulcans were also 1950s aircraft. The

needle-nosed delta-wing four-engine jets with their canopies perched atop their fuselages had

a range of 4,600 miles, aerial refueling capability, and could carry as many as twenty-one

1,000-pound bombs. Their attack on the Stanley runway helped prevented the Argentine Air

Force (Fuerza Aerèa Argentina or FAA)and Argentina's naval air command (Commando

Aviacion Naval Argentina or CANA), from basing high performance combat aircraft there to

operate against the British fleet. The 4,000-foot runway consisted of three to four inches of

asphalt laid over solid rock. When undamaged, it was at best marginal for modern combat

jets but might have accommodated some Argentina's Skyhawks. If the A-4s had been able to

operate from Stanley, they would have posed a greater threat to the British task force and

posed a greater challenge to the limited number of Harriers embarked with it.23

Argentine authorities estimated that the British task force should be entering South

Atlantic waters about April 21. On that date, FAA Boeing 707s began flying reconnaissance

missions from Buenos Aires to locate the British ships. The military versions of the venerable

Boeing four-engine jets, with their wings placed at a midpoint on the long fuselage, were very

similar in appearance to the civilian airliner version of the 707. The FAA 707s were

configured to carry military cargo. They had no special sensors making them particularly

suitable for their assigned mission. They had to depend on their commercial weather radars

to locate the British task force. But the three 707s operated by FAA were the only Argentine

military aircraft capable of very extended searches.24

FAA mission planners, hampered by a lack of specific intelligence, drew up a

geometric search plan. They posited an imaginary triangle with a line between the Falkland

Islands and South Georgia Island as its base. Ascension Island was the apex of the triangle.

Reconnaissance flights were to head east from Buenos Aires to the western leg of the

triangle. When they intersected the leg, the planes were to fly north toward Ascension Island.

At a point predetermined by the 707s' range, the FAA aircraft were to turn east again and

fly to the eastern leg of the triangle. On reaching the eastern leg, the 707s were to turn south

and go no further than a point from which they could safely head west for their home base.25

FAA's first 707 mission took off from Buenos Aires at 3:00 a.m. local time on April

21.26 The flight crew included four pilots, a navigator, two engineers, and a loadmaster.

Argentine Navy experts aboard included a pilot advisor, an intelligence specialist, and a

photographer. Most of the flight was made at 40,000 feet to conserve fuel. The 707 reached

the western leg of the triangle four hours after takeoff and changed course to head northeast

toward Ascension Island. The aircraft reached the predetermined point for turning east after

another four hours. Here, remaining fuel made it possible to continue toward Ascension

rather than turning. Almost immediately, the 707's radar picked up a single ship.

Vicecomodoro Jorge Ricardini took the large jet down to 2,000 feet. From this altitude the

Argentinean flight crew could identify the radar blip as a merchant vessel with no connection

to the British task force. Ricardini then headed southeast to intersect the eastern leg of the

triangle at the point from which he had to start for the 707's base. As the FAA plane climbed

to 20,000 feet, its radar picked up images reflecting several ships to the southwest. Just

before 9:00 a.m., the Argentineans visually identified the radar images as six British ships.

These were the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible plus four escorts. They were 1,400

miles east northeast of Rio de Janeiro.27

The British ship's radar had detected the Boeing 707 when it was 150 miles away

from the task force. A Sea Harrier launched from the Hermes when the FAA plane was first

discovered. In response, the shadowing Argentinean aircraft turned away when eighty to 130
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miles from the task force. The Harrier caught up with the FAA plane at 35,000 feet. Flying

a close parallel course, the RN pilot and the Argentineans photographed each other. After a

few minutes, the Sea Harrier broke away. British rules of engagement at this time did not

permit the Sea Harrier to attack the Argentine aircraft. Five hours later, the 707 thus

returned safely to Buenos Aires.28 On April 22, FAA 707s again found the British task force.

Sea Harriers intercepted a morning reconnaissance sixty miles from the carriers and an

afternoon reconnaissance 120 miles from the carriers. In the latter instance, three Sea

Harriers boxed in the Argentinean 707 to emphasize its vulnerability. The pattern repeated

on April 23, but the afternoon reconnaissance aircraft passed not more than five miles north

of the Invincible. On April 24 the 707s made their final close-in reconnaissance flight. On

April 25 the British government modified its rules of engagement to allow attacks on aircraft

or vessels shadowing their fleet. When the Argentineans learned of the change, the 707s

remained out of Harrier range.29

Just after midnight on May 1, 1982, ships of the Royal Navy task force began to enter

the "Total Exclusion Zone." The British government had defined this 200-nautical mile (230

statute mile) circle around the Falkland Islands on April 30. Argentine aircraft and ships

approaching or within that area, they said, risked attack.30

The Hermes and Invincible formed the center of the British formation. The

Broadsword and Brilliant steamed nearby to provide close-in anti-air defense with their Sea

Wolf missiles, while the frigates Alacrity, Arrow, Plymouth, and Yarmouth with Sea Cat

launchers took station farther out. The destroyers Coventry, Glasgow, and Sheffield sailed

in the van. They kept twenty miles ahead of the Hermes and Invincible to provide outlying

air defense with their Sea Dart missiles.31

The British carriers advanced to within one-hundred miles of Stanley, the Falklands'

Argentine-occupied principal settlement. Then just before 8:00 a.m. on May 1, they launched

a combat air patrol of six Harriers. Twelve other Harriers then took off on bombing missions.

Nine went to attack the airfield at Stanley. Three struck at the air strip at Goose Green, a

400,000-acre sheep ranch southwest of Stanley. The raids were the initial thrusts of a twoweek campaign designed to draw out and destroy Argentina's Air Force and Navy.32

Argentina had a small air force, naval air force, and navy with which to oppose the

British task force. FAA strength included a bomber group, an attack group, four fighter

groups, an air transport group, and an aerial photographic group. CANA units included two

attack squadrons, two fighter-attack squadrons, an antisubmarine squadron, a

reconnaissance squadron, two transport squadrons, and two helicopter squadrons. Fighter

and attack plane strength of the Argentine forces included five Super Étendards, eleven

Mirage IIIs, thirty-four Mirage Vs or Daggers (the latter built in Israel), and fifty-seven

Skyhawk A-4s.33

The Daggers and Mirages had no provision for air-to-air refueling. The former could,

when equipped with external fuel tanks, reach Falkland Sound and remain there for up to

ten minutes. In an interceptor role they carried two Shafrir infra-red missiles and in an

attack role could carry a pair of 1000-pound bombs. The Mirages, also limited in range,

carried three air-to-air missiles. The speed of the Daggers and Mirages, theoretically Mach

2.0, decreased by more than half when the planes carried external fuel tanks. The Daggers

lacked navigational radar and had to be led to the Falklands by "pathfinder" aircraft. When

the pathfinders turned back the Dagger pilots had to rely on map, compass, air speed

indicator, and stop watch.34

FAA and CANA A-4s were capable of aerial refueling, but the Argentine Air Force had

only three KC-130 tankers in its inventory. Although they could just reach East Falkland
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Island with a standard load of three 500 or two 1,000 bombs, the Skyhawks needed to refuel

en route to allow for maneuvers in the battle area. The A-4s, with recently installed Omega

navigational systems, were all weather aircraft.35

An Argentine Air Force unit, Argentine Group 2, Air Warning and Control, provided

an important adjunct to the squadrons. The group arrived at Port Stanley with its

Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 radar on April 2 and had it operational four days later. The radar

provided coverage to a distance of 240 miles. It was integrated with an Argentine air defense

system that included seventy automatic anti-aircraft guns. It proved also, by tracking the

activity of British carrier aircraft, to be able to provide rough locational information on the

Royal Navy's carriers.36

The CANA pilots had trained for anti-shipping strikes, but the FAA pilots were

completely unfamiliar with maritime operations. Most came from inland bases. The closest

mainland base to the Falklands was 380 miles distant and the furthest 517 miles away. Navy

fliers had to instruct them in ship recognition and low-level, over-water strike tactics. As the

Royal Navy's historian of the conflict later wrote, "The Air Force pilots had to learn to fly at

less than 30 feet, in formation, and to stay out of one another's way while pressing an attack

on a target which could move its own length while they were covering the last mile, probably

under fire."37

Argentine Navy (Armada Argentina) vessels available to oppose the British included

one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, six destroyers, three corvettes, one patrol craft, one

amphibious landing ship, two submarines, and a number of polar vessels and transports used

to carry cargo and passengers and to serve as hospital ships.38

Argentine Air Force land-based aircraft were the first to respond to the closing British

task force. Briefers instructed the Argentine pilots to spend the limited amount of time they

would have in the battle area attacking British warships. The FAA sorties took off from Rio

Gallegos, on the mainland 495 miles west of the Falklands. This first mission on May 1

included four Skyhawk A-4Bs. Each small, agile single-seat light attack jet carried two 500-

pound bombs. Four delta-winged Mirage IIIE As, each armed with two Matra Magic air-to-air

missiles and two 30-mm cannon, provided escort. Four Daggers, each armed with two Shafrir

air-to-air missiles and two 30-mm cannon, launched from Rio Grande, a mainland base 440

miles southwest of the Falklands. Their purpose was to supplement the raid's fighter

strength.39

FAA air controllers at Stanley began to direct the Argentine aircraft as they

approached the Falklands. The controllers vectored the Skyhawks and their escorts toward

targets northeast of the islands. These turned out to be radar reflections of two airborne Sea

Harriers. One Mirage fired a missile at the British aircraft but missed by fifty feet. The

British pilot mistook the Matra for an Exocet and reported it as such. This caused the British

ships to turn their sterns to the threat and fire off clouds of chaff. Then this first Argentinean

bombing mission, with its fighter escorts nearly out of fuel, returned to its mainland bases.40

Afternoon sorties by land-based Argentinean aircraft began with three Daggers flying

from San Julian, a mainland base 485 miles northeast of the Falklands. The three aircraft

set off in early afternoon. They were to raid the East Falkland Island coast about fifteen

miles north of Stanley. When they reached their intended target they found no British forces.

The Daggers continued south to Stanley. There, at 3:00 p.m., they found the destroyer

Glamorgan and the Type 21 frigates Alacrity and Arrow bombarding Argentinean forces

ashore. As the FAA Daggers sped toward the ships at an altitude of 900 feet, the Argentine

flight commander assigned each aircraft to attack a separate vessel. The Glamorgan and

Alacrity suffered near-misses by Argentine bombs and 30-mm cannon fire. An Argentine pilot
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later described the bombing technique to a London Times reporter: "You dive straight toward

the ship, release the bomb at 150 meters [409 feet], then keep traveling straight, as low as

possible -- preferably clipping the mast, where the missiles can't get you." The Glamorgan

had some of its plates dented by bomb blast. Cannon fire from the fighter-bombers hit both

ships but caused no casualties. Bombs also narrowly missed the Arrow, and one British

seaman was slightly wounded by a bomb splinter. The surprised ships were hesitant in

responding to the raid. The Glamorgan launched one Sea Cat missile, but it found no target.

The Arrow fired got off a few 4.5-inch and 20-mm rounds, but hit nothing. The air attack did

not seriously damage any of the British ships. It did make them break off their bombardment

of the Argentinean positions at Stanley.41

The FAA next sent out six Skyhawk raids, each flown by four aircraft. They launched

from both San Julian and from Rio Gallegos. Only one flight, its strength down to three

aircraft because of mechanical trouble, found a target. This turned out to the Argentine

freighter Formosa. The cargo vessel was off the south coast of East Falkland Island as it

returned from carrying military supplies to Stanley. The Argentine pilots mistook it for a

British tanker. When they attacked, one of their bombs bounced off the freighter. Another

bomb penetrated the ship but did not explode. Strafing that followed caused additional

damage to the Formosa.

42

As the Skyhawks from San Julian and Rio Gallegos searched for British ships to

attack, six FAA Canberra bombers took off from Trelew, a mainland base 670 miles

northwest of the Falklands, in search of similar targets. The obsolete twin-engine jet bombers

found no Royal Navy ships to attack. They did encounter two Sea Harriers, one of which

downed a Canberra with a Sidewinder missile. The Sidewinder penetrated the jet bomber at

its wing root. A few seconds later the FAA plane exploded.43

The FAA also launched a series of two-aircraft fighter missions intended to provide

high altitude cover for its attack aircraft. This led to air-to-air combats. In one instance north

of the Falklands, two Mirages met two Sea Harriers. The British pilots hit both FAA jets

with AIM-9L missiles. One Mirage pilot ejected as his plane went into the sea north of Pebble

Island, at the Northwestern tip of West Falkland Island. As the second Mirage pilot

attempted to land his damaged aircraft at Stanley, Argentine machine gunners shot him

down. In a second encounter over the south coast of East Falkland Island, Sea Harriers used

missiles to destroy a Dagger.44

While Argentina's Air Force attacked, its Navy ships and aircraft threatened the

British task force but the two service branches did not coordinate their efforts. As the fighting

began the Argentine Navy had four task groups at sea and four Super Étendards ashore at

the Rio Grande airfield.45

On May 1 the opposing fleets located each other, but launched no air strikes and

fought no ship-to-ship actions. On May 2 a planned strike by Skyhawks from the carrier 25

de Mayo did not launch. Some accounts attribute cancellation of the mission to wind

conditions. Others indicate that it was terminated when a twin-engine S-2E Tracker

antisubmarine plane shadowing the British fleet lost contact with the enemy carriers. A

Super Étendard strike from Rio Grande aborted because of refueling difficulties. At about

4:00 p.m., the day's first naval combat took place when the British submarine Conqueror

torpedoed the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano. The World War II-vintage ship was

steaming in company with two destroyers about 240 miles southwest of the British task

force.46

Loss of the Argentine Navy's largest surface combatant with over 300 crew members

profoundly influenced subsequent employment of Argentine naval units during the Falklands
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War. Thereafter, Argentina's surface ships, including the Argentine Navy's only aircraft

carrier, remained in shallow waters off the mainland. This put them where they were

unlikely to be attacked by Britain's large nuclear-powered submarines.47 As a result,

Argentine naval aircraft flying against the British fleet had to launch from mainland bases.

Striking targets near the limits of its aircraft's combat range limited the tactics CANA could

employ. This degraded the effectiveness of the swept-wing Super Étendards. These planes

were the most dangerous anti-shipping weapons in the Argentine inventory. The Super

Étendards were new to CANA. The Argentines had accepted the first one on November 17,

1981. Although eighteen were on order, only five had been delivered when the French

government suspended deliveries and technical assistance because of the Falklands War.

CANA also had only five air-to-surface AM.39 Exocet missiles on hand. The fifteen-foot-long

two-stage solid-fuel rockets were designed to penetrate a ship's hull before exploding. Their

range varied from twenty-five to forty miles depending on launch techniques employed. The

French embargoed a second batch of Exocets due to be delivered at the end of April. They did

not withdraw a team of technicians who remained in Argentina to help CANA its missile

launchers and newly-acquired missiles. At the same time, France sent some of its Mirage

fighters to England so that British Harrier pilots could practice air-to-air combat with them.

By the time hostilities began, ten Argentine naval aviators each had about eighty hours

flying time in Super Étendards. CANA pilots were self-trained to use the Super

Étendard/Exocet weapons system in attacks on ships. Consultations with the officers of

Armada Type 42 destroyers gave the pilots an idea of the characteristics and capabilities of

similar British ships. They practiced long over-water flights and aerial refueling in conditions

of radio and other electronic emissions silence. No Exocets could be spared for a live fire

exercise, but the Super Étendard squadron declared itself operationally ready in mid-April

1982.48

The first Super Étendard attack on the British ships clustered around the Falklands

came on May 4. Strike preparations began early on the morning of that day after a CANA

Neptune made radar contact with British ships south of the Falklands. The twin-engine

Neptune was one of four SP-2H models transferred from the U.S. Navy to Argentina in 1977.

Only two were airworthy in 1982. Both had newly installed Very Low Frequency Omega

navigational equipment, but their obsolete search radars could only detect ships within a onehundred-mile range. On May 4 one of Neptunes with a crew of twelve was patrolling in

advance of three FAA C-130s that were to fly to Stanley from the mainland. The four-engine

turbo-prop transports provided vital support for Argentine forces in the Falklands. By chance

the Neptune was southwest of West Falkland Island as Sea Harriers attacked Stanley

airport. This caused the C-130 mission to be canceled. But the Neptune loitered in the area.

Its radar soon identified four warships about eighty-five miles south of Stanley steaming

eastward away from the Falklands. The patrol plane maintained intermittent contact with

the ships for three hours. Its own Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) indicated that British

radars had scanned it. The Neptune simulated a search pattern designed to mislead British

radar operators into thinking it was searching for survivors of the General Belgrano.

Periodically the Argentine pilot would take his plane back up to an altitude from which it

could take fresh bearings on radar emissions emanating from the British ships.49

Two hours after the Neptune had first reported contact with the British vessels, two

Super Étendards armed with Exocets took off from Rio Grande at 9:45 a.m. Forty minutes

later the Neptune climbed to 3,500 feet. Then it transmitted a final contact report that gave

positions for the two British ships most suitable to be attacked. This was the last time any

of CANA's Neptunes participated in the Falklands War. Argentine Navy authorities decided
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that the aged aircraft were too unreliable and vulnerable for further operations. Pilots ferried

the Neptunes back to Buenos Aires for storage on May 15. This decision further degraded

Argentina's already weak aerial reconnaissance capability. CANA compensated to some

extent for the Neptunes' absence by exploiting radar intelligence. After May 15, naval

technicians at radar stations on the Falklands plotted minute-by-minute all aircraft radar

tracks originating and disappearing at sea. This provided the basis for informed estimates

as to the location of the British carriers.50

Two-hundred and sixty miles from Rio Grande, the CANA Super Étendards refueled

from one of the Argentine Air Force's three KC-130 Hercules tankers. Onboard radar alerted

pilots Capitan de Corbeta Augusto Bedacarratz and Teniente de Fragata Armando Mayora

that British search radar was active when the attacking aircraft were 130 miles from their

targets. They quickly took their aircraft to a wave-top altitude through a 300-foot ceiling and

sped toward the retiring British from a position south of the Falklands. At fifty miles out the

Argentineans popped up to 2,000 feet for an unsuccessful three-second radar scan before

again hugging the sea. A similar maneuver at thirty miles out revealed two targets, a large

one to their right and a smaller one to their left. Bedacarratz, the mission commander,

decided that both aircraft should attack the larger target. The Super Étendards made their

500-knot attack through rain squalls at an altitude of 120 feet . Both pilots launched their

missiles at 1104 when twenty miles from the targeted ship. They immediately turned away

and successfully evaded two Sea Harriers. These interceptors had taken off from the

Invincible in response to the Argentineans' radar "pop-up" when fifty miles out.51

The $200,000 Exocet's target proved to be the $50,000,000 destroyer Sheffield. The

warship's own radar and electronic capabilities might have detected either the Super

Étendards or emissions from the Exocets' radar guidance systems in time for it to begin

evasive action. In the event, the destroyer was using its satellite communications system.

This obscured the radar frequencies of the Argentine aircraft and missiles. The missiles

themselves skimmed the ocean's surface and flew too low to be picked up by the Sheffield's

radars. A radar operator on the Glasgow, the westward ship of the British formation,

detected emissions from a Super Étendard radar about the time the missiles were launched.

The commanding officer of the Glasgow had banned daytime use of his ship's satellite

communication system because it could interfere with detection of the Super Étendard

"Handbrake" radar. The Glasgow radar operator's alert caused his own ship to fire chaff and

go to action stations. The Glasgow broadcast a warning to the other Royal Navy ships. But

it was too late. Only two minutes elapsed from the time the Exocets were launched until one

struck the Sheffield. Those aboard the destroyer saw the missile only a few second before it

struck. The second Exocet failed to find a target and fell into the sea when it ran out of fuel.52

The Exocet that found its target entered the Sheffield's starboard side midships, about

six feet above the waterline. Although its warhead did not explode, the 364-pound missile was

traveling at a speed of nearly 700 miles-per-hour. It tore a four-foot-high hole fifteen-feetacross in the destroyer's hull, then penetrated deep into the ship before disintegrating. The

missile's remaining rocket fuel burst into flames. Blast damage from this explosion extended

as far as the ship's bridge. The impact and fire left the ship unable to move under its own

power, unable to pump water to fight fires, and unable to operate computers necessary to fire

its weapons. Some crew members were killed and injured when the missile struck. Many

subsequently died or suffered burn and smoke inhalation injuries while trying to restore the

ship's systems and fighting fires. Four and one-half hours after the Exocet struck, the

Sheffield's captain gave the order to abandon ship. Captain James Salt later recalled: "in

fifteen to twenty seconds the whole working area of the ship filled with black, acrid, pungent
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smoke, mainly from the cable runs and paint." Most of his surviving crew had been forced

to the open upper decks, darkness approached, and raging fires nearing the Sea Dart

magazine. An explosion there would endanger those remaining aboard and perhaps other

ships assisting in rescue and fire fighting. Sheffield casualties included twenty dead and

twenty-four injured out of a total crew of 290. The Sheffield sank while under tow six days

after the attack.53

The Super Étendard attack confirmed to the British task force the danger from air-tosurface missiles. It highlighted the ships' extra vulnerability without the protection that could

be provided by airborne early warning platforms. The Exocet threat influenced the

subsequent deployment of British ships in the battle for the Falklands. It is possible to

speculate that if the Argentine pilots had pushed farther into the British fleet they might

have targeted one of the two Royal Navy aircraft carriers. But it is also possible that the

Britons' air defense system might have destroyed one or both Argentine planes before they

could have launched their missiles at a carrier.54

On May 9, eighteen FAA Skyhawks took off from San Julian to attack the destroyer

Conventry and frigate Broadsword. The ships were bombarding shore targets near Stanley.

They also were attempting to lure Argentine aircraft into a Sea Dart and Sea Wolf missile

trap. Bad weather prevented the Skyhawks from making their attack. Two aircraft and pilots

were lost in operational accidents incidental to the mission to attack the British ships.55

Another incident occurred later on May 9 as the two Royal Navy ships steamed ten

miles off Stanley. When their radars picked up five aircraft approaching the Falklands from

the northwest, the Coventry fired three Sea Darts at the targets when they were forty-miles

away. Subsequent intercepted radio chatter between pilots convinced the British that the Sea

Darts had destroyed two of four Skyhawks escorting a Hercules flying into Stanley. It was

about this time, however, that two Skyhawks flew into a cliff in bad weather. Three hours

later a Sea Dart from the Coventry destroyed an Argentinean helicopter on its way to help

the Narwhal. Royal Marines had earlier captured this small Armada patrol trawler by

descending on it from helicopters.56

The British Navy tried again on May 12 to lure Argentine aircraft into a missile trap.

The destroyers Glasgow and Brillant closed with Stanley to shell shore positions. When

Argentinean troops at Stanley requested help, two flights of four FAA Skyhawks each

launched from Rio Gallegos. The first flight of Skyhawks reached their targets southeast of

Stanley in mid-afternoon. They arrived as air cover for the Royal Navy ships was changing

and no Sea Harriers were present. The Glasgow's fire control radars did not acquire the

Argentine planes until they were too close for Glasgow's Sea Darts to be used. Sea Wolfs from

the Brillant brought down two of the Skyhawks when they were a mile away from the ship.

A third Skyhawk crashed after running into debris from the first two aircraft. Its engine

passed over the Brillant's flight deck. All three pilots died. Bombs from the fourth Skyhawk

in the first flight hit the water and skipped over the Brillant's stern as the aircraft passed

over the ship unharmed. Both aircraft and bombs were so close that the British sailors could

see the markings on them.57

The second flight of Skyhawks fared better. They approached the British ships twenty

minutes after the first flight, at a low altitude from seaward and out of the sun. Three

attacked the Glasgow, which was the leading ship. Only one Skyhawk tried to bomb the

Brillant. The Argentineans pressed their attack closely. The Skyhawks weaved to confuse the

Royal Navy sailors manning their antiaircraft guns. The weaving also confounded the Sea

Wolf missile system, which trained its launchers to their fore-and-aft position. One bomb

which hit the Glasgow failed to explode because it was released from too low an altitude. The
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unexploded bomb penetrated to the engine room and went out the other side of the ship. The

entry and exit holes in the destroyer's hull, each about three feet in diameter, were quickly

repaired. But electrical system damage caused as the bomb passed through the ship

necessitated Glasgow's return to England for dock yard work. The Glasgow's Sea Dart system

again had not locked on to the attacking planes in time. The Brillant's Sea Wolf system in

this instance identified the group of approaching aircraft as "non-missiles" and refused to fire.

An exchange of radio messages with the Sea Wolf manufacturer allowed this fault to be

quickly rectified by an adjustment to the system's fire control computer. Although the FAA

planes suffered no damage from British missiles or cannon in this engagement, Argentinean

gunners on East Falkland Island shot down one of the Skyhawks as it flew back toward Rio

Gallegos.58

British efforts to whittle down Argentine strength with air raids, missile traps, and

shore bombardment ended on the night of May 20-21. British troops began the ground phase

of the campaign to recapture the Falklands by landing on East Falkland Island. This exposed

the British ships involved to light attack aircraft that the Argentineans had stationed on the

Falklands themselves. These were Pucaras of the FAA and Aermacchi MB-339s of the CANA.

The former were Argentine-built close support/counterinsurgency turboprop single-seaters.

The MB-339s were light attack versions of a jet trainer.

The first Aermacchi strike happened coincidentally. A single plane on a reconnaissance

mission from Stanley sighted the frigate Argonaut in Falkland Sound. Lieutenant Gullermo

Crippa, the Argentinean pilot, flew through missile and antiaircraft fire to attack with

cannon and rockets. His low approach from landward brought him too close to be engaged

by the Argonaut's Sea Cat missiles. The ship did respond with Bofors and small arms. Crippa

damaged the frigate's radar aerial and superstructure. The Aermacchi's fire also wounded

three sailors, one seriously. After making his run, Crippa flew back over the sound through

intense fire to count the assembled British invasion fleet. The British were going ashore at

San Carlos Water, a four-mile-long harbor on the west coast of East Falkland Island about

fifty miles from Stanley.59

A series of Argentine air missions against the invasion fleet followed Crippa's lone

raid. The Argentinean Air Force had an estimated thirty-nine Skyhawks and twenty-three

Daggers available for daylight attacks on the British invasion force. The six remaining

Canberras were too vulnerable for anything but night operations. In addition to the FAA's

strength, eight CANA Skyhawks disembarked from the 25 de Mayo had flown to Rio Grande

and were available for anti-shipping strikes. The CANA Super Étendard unit at Rio Grande

still had three Exocets unexpended. But the high-speed jets and their missiles were more

suitable for attacks over the open ocean than in the confines of Falkland Sound and San

Carlos Water.60

Contesting the Invasion Fleet

In midmorning on May 21, FAA jets flying from the mainland made the first of a

series of aerial attacks on the British fleet. Most of the raids focused on Royal Navy warships

operating in Falkland Sound rather than on ships engaged in landing troops. The Argentine

pilots had to fight their way through the ships' anti-air defenses and Sea Harrier combat air

patrols. They also faced a new threat from shoulder and crew-served surface-to-air missiles

(SAMs) manned by British ground troops now ashore at the landing sites. The troops had

what seemed an unlimited supply of visually-sighted, shoulder-launched Blowpipe missiles

that radio commands could guide once they were in the air. They also had several crew-
130

served Rapier missile systems that included a surveillance radar, tracking radar and optical

tracking system.61

An Argentine Air Force formation of eight Daggers and six Skyhawks carried out the

first raid from the mainland on the British ships which were involved in the landings at San

Carlos. The Daggers, each armed with two 30-mm cannon and two 500-pound iron bombs,

led the way. FAA mission planners intended a series of strikes. They were to take place

within a limited time frame to confuse the Royal Navy's anti-air defense system. The first two

Daggers arrived over Falkland Sound at 1025. They bombed and strafed the destroyer Antrim

in a line astern attack. Cannon fire riddled the ship's helicopter, blinded a chief petty officer,

and less seriously wounded seven other crew members.62 Six additional Daggers arrived

at Falkland Sound within a few minutes. One attacked the frigate Broadsword, two attacked

the frigate Argonaut, and three attacked the destroyer Antrim. The Broadsword received

twenty-nine rounds of 30-mm cannon fire, which wounded fourteen men and damaged two

helicopters. The Argonaut also escaped relatively unharmed and brought down one of the

Daggers with a surface-to-air missile. The Antrim suffered more grievously. One bomb

plunged through a flare locker and the ship's Sea Slug magazine and came to rest in a head

without bursting. A second bomb bounced off the forward part of the ship but detonated only

when it hit the water. The presence of a large unexploded bomb below decks forced the ship

to retire to San Carlos Water. There repairs could be made and the bomb disarmed. The

rolling hills and mountains on either side of the long, narrow fiord provided some protection

from air attack.63

The six Skyhawks involved in the first raid were each armed with cannon and a single

1,000-pound bomb. They approached the British ships in pairs, line abreast, running in

toward them over West Falkland Island. This caused the ships to briefly lose radar contact

with the Skyhawks until they were spotted visually. The Argentine aviators chose the frigate

Argonaut at the mouth of San Carlos anchorage as their target. The six planes dropped all

of their bombs. Two went into the ship, but neither exploded. One, which landed in the

vessel's Sea Cat missile magazine, caused two missiles and some antiaircraft ammunition to

explode. The other plunged into the boiler room. Two seamen died during the bombing and

strafing. The damage and defusing to be done effectively put the frigate out of action. All of

the Skyhawks involved returned safely to their mainland base at Rio Gallegos.64

Seven more Skyhawks from the mainland attacked the British naval formation at

about 1:00 p.m. One flight of four of the FAA jets, each armed with a single bomb, took off

from Rio Gallegos. Only three continued when mechanical difficulties forced one to return to

base. As the aircraft approached West Falkland Island, more mechanical difficulties resulted

in still another Skyhawk aborting. The two remaining planes then made an abortive attack

on the Argentine freighter Rio Carcarana, which had been abandoned close to West Falkland

Island several days earlier. By the time the pilots realized their mistake, one of the

Skyhawks had dropped its bomb. A single FAA aircraft continued the raid. This Skyhawk

targeted the frigate Ardent, but achieved no hits. The pilot flew home, unaware that he had

narrowly missed being intercepted by two Sea Harriers.65

Four FAA Skyhawks from the mainland followed-up the preceding attack. They

encountered the Sea Harriers that had been chasing the plane that bombed the Ardent. Two

of the four FAA planes quickly fell victim to air-to-air missiles from the British jump jets.

Neither Argentine pilot survived. Then a Sea Harrier damaged one of the two remaining

Skyhawks with cannon fire. Both surviving Argentine fighter-bombers abandoned their

mission.66
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A raid by eleven FAA Daggers and six CANA Skyhawks constituted the last

Argentinean aerial attack of the day. They arrived in waves at the scene of action. Each

Skyhawk carried four 500-pound bombs under its fuselage. The final aircraft in the strike

package took off from Rio Grande at 3:45 p.m. Rather than depend on aerial refueling, the

planes used drop fuel tanks mounted under their wings. The naval jets' intended target was

a frigate spotted south of the main landing force as a picket ship. This turned out to be

Ardent. The fighter-bombers crossed from the mainland to the Falklands at 30,000 feet. The

first three-plane flight of the mission descended to wave-top height to attack the frigate from

astern at about 4:10 p.m. Two bombs from the lead Skyhawk struck the British warship. The

first bomb went into the ship's hangar and detonated. This caused some of the ship's

torpedoes to explode in turn. It also blew the Ardent's Sea Cat launcher, mounted on top of

the hangar, onto the helicopter pad. The second bomb crashed into the frigate's after

auxiliary machinery room but did not explode. Three Royal Navy officers and one sailor died

as a result of the bombs. Six bombs from the other two Skyhawks participating in the attack

missed the frigate, although one bounced off the water and between the ship's masts.

Antiaircraft fire from the Ardent badly damaged the second Skyhawk in line. As the three

Argentinean jets retired to the south, they encountered two Sea Harriers. A Sidewinder

missile from one Sea Harrier destroyed the Skyhawk that had successfully bombed the

Ardent, although the pilot ejected safely. This Sea Harrier also put cannon fire into the

Argentine plane earlier damaged by the Ardent's antiaircraft weapons. The Skyhawk

remained flyable. When it attempted to make an emergency landing at Stanley, ground

personnel advised the pilot that part of his landing gear had been shot away. The Argentine

aviator ejected safely and was rescued from the sea by a helicopter, but his plane continued

to fly. Argentinean gunners finally shot it down to preclude it crashing in a populated area.

The third Skyhawk disintegrated when struck by a missile from the second Sea Harrier.67

The three Skyhawks in the second flight of the six-plane Argentinean mission made

their attack on the Ardent about fifteen minutes after the first bombing. Antiaircraft fire

damaged two of the three jets, but all returned safely to Rio Grande.68

Six of the eleven FAA Daggers, each of which carried a single 1,000-pound bomb, took

off from San Julian between 1:45 p.m. and 1:55 p.m. The Daggers flew in two separated

flights of three aircraft each. They approached the British landing force and its escorts by

flying low across West Falkland Island. Two of the three Daggers attacked the frigate

Brillant. Their bombs missed. Their cannon fire did sever wiring for the frigate's Sea Wolf

missile system. The 30-mm rounds also made the ship's sonar inoperable and injured three

sailors. The third Dagger in this first flight did little damage in a bombing and strafing run

on a nearby unidentified British warship. Then the flight climbed to 35,000 feet and returned

to San Julian.69

The second flight of Daggers from San Julian ran into trouble. The Brilliant's radar

picked them up as they descended over West Falkland Island. A British fighter director

assigned two Sea Harriers flying combat air patrol to intercept the Daggers. A brief aerial

combat ended in destruction of all three Argentinean aircraft just before 4:00 p.m., but their

pilots successfully ejected.70

Five additional Daggers had launched from Rio Grande at 2:30 p.m. One of these jets

aborted because of mechanical problems. Sea Harriers intercepted the four remaining jets as

they flew low across West Falkland Island toward San Carlos. Three of the Daggers escaped

unscathed. A Sidewinder missile destroyed the fourth. The surviving Rio Grande Daggers

descended in a line astern formation below low-hanging clouds into a ravine to reach West

Falkland Island's east coast. As the FAA pilots left the island's shoreline, they found the
132

frigate Ardent in front of them at about 3:40 p.m. The Daggers attacked from astern. A bomb

from the first Dagger skipped off the water into the after part of the ship but did not explode.

The second Dagger's bomb detonated on impact. It destroyed the ship's helicopter and hangar.

It also rearranged the wreckage of the Sea Cat missile launcher, which had earlier been

demolished by bombs from CANA Skyhawks. The third Dagger dropped its bomb without

effect before all three of the Rio Grande aircraft departed the scene to safely return home.71

The FAA and CANA squadrons which had been involved in the Falklands raids on

May 21 used the following day to recuperate from their intensive efforts and heavy losses.

All units involved had dispatched a total of forty-five aircraft to oppose the first day of the

British landings. Of the forty-five, thirty-six had reached the Falklands. Twenty-six making

it through had attacked British warships. They left one frigate sinking, two out of action, and

two damaged. British air defenses destroyed nine (five Daggers and four Skyhawks) of the

36 aircraft reaching the Falklands. Friendly antiaircraft fire destroyed another Skyhawk,

severely damaged by the British, as it tried to land at Stanley. The 28 percent loss rate was

higher than expected.72

Two of the FAA's 707s narrowly missed disaster on the next day, May 22. One,

making a reconnaissance flight to the north of Falkland Sound around three o'clock in the

morning, approached to within twenty-five miles of the Coventry. Although the destroyer

acquired the jet with its Sea Dart radars, the failure of a flash door prevented missile loading

and the plane escaped. The second 707, flying 1,800 miles to the northeast of the Falklands,

spotted the cruiser Bristol and its escorts on patrol. The frigate Cardiff dropped back from

the formation while ships in the task group altered their positions to cover its leaving. When

the FAA aircraft came within extreme range the Cardiff fired a Sea Dart salvo. One missile

exploded close to the 707, which immediately took evasive action.73

It was only on the evening of May 22 that two CANA Skyhawks from the mainland

reached San Carlos. Their bombs caused no damage and they returned to the mainland

safely.74 FAA squadrons on the mainland made the majority of the subsequent attacks on

the British invasion fleet. They continued to approach the landing beaches from over West

Falkland Island.

On May 23 the FAA sent out the Argentineans' most effective attack missions to date.

Four Skyhawks of Grupo 5 sortied from Rio Gallegos in mid-afternoon. They approached San

Carlos Water from the southwest at 4:50 p.m. The Skyhawks passed north of the mouth of

the bay. Then they turned to put the Verdes Mountains lining the north shore of the harbor

behind them as they made their attack. The Antelope was the first ship they encountered. A

run by the two leading aircraft put a 1,000-pound into the after part of the frigate. The bomb

hit the water off the ship's starboard side, plunged through the hull just below the bridge,

and came to rest in a compartment above the engine rooms. One of the aircraft exploded,

possibly as a result of fire from the Antelope's 20-mm Oerlikon or perhaps because it struck

the mast just forward of the ship's funnel. It was also the target of other weapons on the ship

and on the adjacent destroyer Broadsword, and even a British Army Rapier post ashore. The

surviving Skyhawk turned quickly and put a second bomb into the frigate's port side. This

projectile also failed to explode, but passed through the petty officers' mess before lodging in

a cabin. During its passage the bomb killed one crew member and injured two others. The

intense air defense discouraged the second pair of Skyhawks from pressing home their attack.

When a team of two Royal Engineers and two of the ship's crew later attempted to defuse the

first unexploded bomb, it detonated. One member of the team died, one lost an arm, and two

were less seriously injured. The resulting fires caused the ship's Sea Cat magazines to
133

explode just after the crew abandoned ship. About halfway through the night the second

bomb exploded. The blast broke the Antelope in two and it quickly sank.75

The events of May 23 also temporarily ended participation of CANA's 3rd Naval

Attack and Fighter Squadron in the battle for the Falklands. This unit, already severely hurt

by missions on May 21, sent its four operational Skyhawks from Rio Grande to San Carlos

late in the day on the twenty-third. One aborted because of fuel transfer problems after aerial

refueling 200 miles east of Rio Grande. The remaining jets arrived over Falkland Sound from

the west fifteen minutes after the Grupo 5 mission had bombed the Antelope. The naval jets

attacked three separate enemy ships to no effect and left the battle area unharmed. As one

attempted to land at Rio Grande with four 500-bombs still in place, it ran off the runway.

The pilot ejected and was killed when his parachute did not deploy fully. This left the

squadron with only two operational aircraft and it was withdrawn to refit.76

Aerial action on May 24 began when four FAA Grupo 6 Daggers took off late in the

morning from San Julian, for a raid on the enemy naval force at San Carlos. Two Sea

Harriers vectored to the Daggers by a fighter-controller on the destroyer Broadsword

intercepted the fighter-bombers at 12:15 p.m. British air-to-air missiles destroyed three of the

Argentine planes even before their pilots sighted the Royal Navy ships. The fourth Dagger

retired at high speed. While this combat took place, four more Grupo 6 Daggers from Rio

Grande approached San Carlos Water from the south. They flew low up the harbor in line

abreast formation. The pilots later reported attacking one large ship and in turn receiving

hits from gun fire. Their attack imposed no significant damage. All four aircraft returned

safely to Rio Grande. Four Grupo 4 Skyhawks, also from San Julian, reached the scene of the

landings at midday. They attacked the assembled ships in line-astern formation but caused

no damage. Antiaircraft fire downed one of the fighter-bombers. Ground fire severely

damaged another, A Sea Dart Missile from the destroyer Coventry blew apart a third

Skyhawk as it started back toward the mainland.77 Five Grupo 5 Skyhawks also flying from

Rio Grande attacked the British landing force ships at 1:00 p.m. The planes stirred up a

hornets' net of air defense weapons, including shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles fired

from ships. Neither bombs nor missiles scored hits, although gun fire struck three of the

Argentine aircraft. In a subsequent raid at 2:15 p.m., two bombs from a flight of three Grupo

4 Skyhawks from San Julian went into the landing ships Sir Galahad and Sir Lancelot.

Neither bomb exploded. All three aircraft were damaged by antiaircraft fire. One eventually

crashed into the sea, killing the pilot.78

In an initial gambit on May 25, the FAA tried to eliminate the destroyers Broadsword

and Coventry. These ships, on picket duty about fifteen miles north of Pebble Island between

the mainland and San Carlos Water, were using their radars to detect incoming Argentine

air raids. Early warning radar allowed Sea Harriers to intercept approaching aircraft and

shipboard and land-based antiaircraft weapons to be at the ready.

Grupo 5's first mission on Argentina's national day May 25(which commemorates an

1810 uprising against the Spanish) targeted the two ships. The destroyers had advance

warning of the raid from their own radars and from intercepted radio traffic. A Sea Dart

missile from the Coventry downed the flight commander's Skyhawk at 10:30 a.m. The three

surviving planes aborted. Four more Grupo 5 Skyhawks took off from Rio Gallegos about 3:00

p.m. for another assault on the picket vessels. The ships' relative nearness to the mainland

made it possible for each Skyhawk to carry three 1,000-pound bombs. As was the case earlier

in the day, an FAA C-130 provided reconnaissance in advance of the fighter-bombers. As the

Argentine planes approached the two destroyers, Sea Harriers had the A-4s almost within

Sidewinder range when fighter control sent the British planes away. Instead, the ships
134

depended on the Broadsword's Sea Wolf surface-to-air missile system, which had locked on

to two of the FAA planes. The system, however, lost contact with the Skyhawks as they came

closer. Only gunfire interfered with the Argentines' final attack. Even so, only one bomb

struck the Broadsword. It skipped into the destroyer's starboard side, and crashed up

through the ship's helicopter pad. The bomb demolished the nose of the destroyer's helicopter

before falling into the sea off the ship's port side but did not explode. The bomb, which had

a new impact-sensitive fuze, should have detonated but struck nothing substantial as it

plunged across the ship.

The pilots of the other two FAA Skyhawks on the mission struck at the Coventry as

their colleagues pulled away from the Broadsword. Once again, the Sea Harriers were waved

off and the ship's defense rested on surface-to-air missiles. As they pressed forward with a

wave-top attack at 4:21 p.m., the Argentines successfully evaded a Sea Dart missile fired by

the Coventry. Then the Coventry began evasive maneuvers. This brought the ship between

the Broadsword and the attacking aircraft. As a result, the latter destroyer's Sea Wolf missile

system lost contact with the Argentine planes. The bombs on one of the Skyhawks refused

to release, but three 1,000-pounders from the other planes pierced the ship's port side. All

the bombs exploded, one destroying the ship's computer room. Less than thirty minutes after

the attack, the Conventry's crew abandoned ship. Within sixty minutes of attack the

destroyer capsized.79

Five days after Argentine aircraft sank the Coventry, a CANA Super Étendard sent

an Exocet missile into the Atlantic Conveyor. The Cunard roll-on, roll-off vessel had been with

the task force for six days after bringing a cargo of Harriers, helicopters, and other military

materiel from Britain. Fourteen Harriers on the ship had been flown off to the Hermes and

Invincible, but the Argentineans' constant air attacks had prevented offloading of all but two

of the helicopters and the rest of the Conveyor's cargo.80

When the Hermes and Invincible and their escorts moved closer to San Carlos on May

30 to support the landing ships, two CANA Super Étendards, each carrying an Exocet air-tosurface missile, took off from Rio Grande at 2:28 p.m. After aerial refueling they approached

Falkland Sound from the northeast about 5:00 p.m. The two aircraft descended to thirty feet

above the waves when they were about 150 miles from the British task force. They were in

a line abreast formation with about 200 yards between the two planes. Their first radar

sweep produced two large images and one smaller one. These were the Atlantic Conveyor and

the Hermes. The ships were about two miles apart. Eight miles beyond lay the Invincible. The

pilots selected the largest radar image as their target. This was the cargo ship, which had

containers stacked three-high along its deck edges to protect aircraft being transported from

saltwater damage. The CANA pilots launched their missiles at a range of thirty-one miles

at 5:32 p.m. Despite multiple Sea Dart firings and chaff launchings, one of the Exocets struck

the port side of the Atlantic Conveyor at 5:36 p.m. The other failed to find a target and

disappeared. The Hermes was only two nautical miles away and the Invincible ten miles

away. After the action it was not clear if the missile which struck home had exploded.

Another possibility was that the Exocet's unspent fuel had ignited when it came to rest deep

inside the ship. In any case, the resulting fires proved uncontrollable. They were soon near

200 bombs in the ship's cargo. Ninety minutes after the attack the crew abandoned ship. The

missile killed three sailors as it penetrated the ship. Nine others died while fire fighting or

in escaping the burning vessel. Although the fires were eventually suppressed, the Atlantic

Conveyor sank three days after the attack while being towed.81

An FAA strike intended to follow immediately the CANA Exocet mission ran into

surface-to-air missile crews on the alert. Within minutes of the Exocet strike, four Air Force
135

Skyhawks started bomb runs on the frigate Avenger. They believed it to be the carrier

Invincible. Suddenly, Sea Dart missiles picked two of the planes out of the air. The Exeter,

twenty miles away under low clouds, and invisible to the FAA fliers was responsible. Bombs

from the two remaining Skyhawks missed the Avenger. The surviving pilots sped away from

the action. They were unscathed, shocked by the unexpected disintegration of their

colleagues' planes, and certain they had damaged a British carrier.82

The May 25 sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor proved to be CANA's last significant

achievement during the Falklands War. Although Navy fliers mounted another Exocet attack

on May 30, it achieved nothing. The Argentine Navy's Skyhawk squadron dispatched a

couple of sorties against British troops ashore in early June, but attacked no more maritime

targets.83

Argentine Air Force squadrons continued to fly anti-shipping missions after May 25.

British ships landing troops at Fitzroy, a small settlement southwest of Stanley proved the

most vulnerable targets. FAA planners developed an attack scheme after Argentine lookouts

on a mountain ten miles from the landing site spotted the ships on June 7. The mission

called for eight Skyhawks and six Daggers to bomb the ships on June 8. A Learjet would

precede the strike aircraft to assist in navigation and four Mirages would make a decoy

attack on the north coast of East Falkland Island to lure away British air cover. The

Argentine Navy's destroyer Santisima Trinidad, steaming off the mainland, was to jam

frequencies used by British air controllers.84

On June 8 two flights of four Skyhawks, each loaded with three 500-pound bombs, set

out at 12:00 p.m. from Rio Gallegos for Fitzroy. En route mechanical problems forced three

of the aircraft to abort. The remaining planes approached Fitzroy from the southwest at 1:50

p.m. They increased speed as they flew low through rain squalls. After a pass over the harbor

the FAA pilots turned and saw the landing ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram. No warships

were nearby to protect them. The three leading aircraft attacked the Sir Galahad. Three

bombs went into the ship and exploded, three other bombs narrowly missed the vessel, and

three bombs on one Skyhawk refused to release. The three bombs that hit the Sir Galahad

had devastating effects. One passed through an open hatch to the ship's well deck. It burst

into flames among closely-packed troops, twenty tons of ammunition, and drums of gasoline.

Forty-three British soldiers died and another 150 were wounded. Another bomb penetrated

to the engine room and galley area. The third 500-pounder plunged in officers' quarters.

Surviving crew and troops escaped from the burning ship into nearby small boats and

helicopters that came to evacuate them. Fires in the landing ship were left to burn

themselves out. One of the two Skyhawks following the first flight put two bombs into the

starboard side of the Sir Tristram. One of them rifled through the ship and came out the

other side. The other detonated inside a small below-decks compartment. It killed two

members of the crew and buckled bulkheads inside the ship. More 500-pounders from the last

Skyhawk narrowly missed the Sir Tristram.

85

The FAA followed up the first successful mission to Fitzroy with two later in the day.

One flight of four Skyhawks took off from Rio Gallegos at 3:30 p.m. on an anti-shipping

strike. After passing over Stanley they spotted a landing craft from the assault ship Fearless

about 5:45 p.m.. Two dived to machine gun and bomb the small boat. Struck by a 500-pound

bomb, the small craft quickly sank. Two Sea Harriers on combat air patrol at 10,000 feet had

spotted the Skyhawks. Within minutes, Sidewinder missiles had destroyed two of the

Argentine fighter-bombers. A third flew into the ground trying to evade another missile. The

fourth FAA aircraft involved made it back to base. The Skyhawks from San Julian in the

meantime reached the Fitzroy area, inflicted no damaged, and returned home unharmed.86
136

The six Daggers, also sent out to attack the two landing ships, each carried a 1,000-

pound bomb. One aborted after a 1:00 p.m. takeoff. The others diverted to bomb the frigate

Plymouth, which they sighted as it crossed Falkland Sound on a naval gunfire mission. The

ship turned to regain the protection of San Carlos Water after sighting the aircraft. The

Daggers attacked in line astern formation. They flew at 575 knots through 20-mm gunfire

and evaded a Sea Cat missile to put four bombs into the ship. The antiaircraft fire inflicted

only minor damaged on one of the Daggers. None of the bombs detonated, although one

caused a depth charge on the frigate to explode. This left the ship burning as the Daggers

evaded Sea Harriers and returned to base.87

Terminal Events

The June 8 raids were the last significant anti-shipping operations by land-based

Argentine aerial forces during the Falklands War. Thereafter the focus of the war shifted to

land battle as British troops advanced on Stanley from the landing beaches. This phase of

the conflict and the war itself ended on about midday on June 14 when the Argentine

occupation force surrendered. On June 15, General Mario Menendez, commander of Argentine

forces in the Falklands formally capitulated. Three days later Argentina notified the United

Nations Security Council that hostilities had stopped. Britain received word through its Swiss

representatives in Buenos Aires on July 12 that Argentina did not intend to renew the

fighting. The 1980s were over before Britain and Argentina renewed diplomatic relations.88

Argentina's National Day on May 25, 1982, marked the high point of FAA and CANA

anti-shipping operations during the Falklands War. In actions preceding the concentrated

effort on that day, the Argentines had sunk two British frigates. Unexploded bombs had

substantially damaged three other warships and three landing ships. Strafing had inflicted

lesser damage on a number of other vessels. On May 25, Argentine aviators capped these

achievements. They sank one enemy destroyer and decreased the combat capability of

another. They also destroyed cargo important to the British landing forces and set in motion

the sinking of the large freighter carrying it. But their accomplishments, despite the loss of

twenty-three attack aircraft, did not prevent the British landings from taking place. Several

factors diminished the effectiveness of the Argentine air attacks. The lack of an adequate

airfield in the Falklands meant that CANA and FAA aircraft had to fly long distances to the

scene of battle. This limited the number of sorties that could be launched, the weapons loads

that could be carried, and the use of fuel-demanding maneuvers in air-to-air combat. It also

added navigational and refueling complexities to the missions. Moreover, with strike aircraft

based in the Falklands, the Argentineans might have been able to attack Britain's carriers

in sufficient strength to sink at least one. This probably would have been a "war stopper."

Improper fuzing of bombs or the necessity for flying low to stay under missile envelopes

resulted in a number of bombs that did not explode. Ordnance released from too low an

altitude did not have time to arm before striking. Poor intelligence also hampered the

Argentine pilots. They seldom knew in advance what ships they would find in the battle

areas. When they did arrive over potential targets, the pilots often selected inappropriate

ones. They should have concentrated on the British assault and landing ships rather than

the destroyers and frigates. The June 8 raid on the Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram showed

that successful missions against the landing ships could be devastating. This would have

done more to impede the landings, but been costly since the Argentineans lacked enough

aircraft to suppress the task force's air defense and simultaneously attack the landing ships.
137

As it was, the FAA and CANA pilots sank six modern warships and seriously damaged

another ten.

139

Endnotes to Chapter VI

1. Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands (London: Blackwell, 1988) gives a good

summary of the diplomatic history preceding the outbreak of hostilities in 1982 and of

diplomatic initiatives that followed.

2. John F. Guilmartin Jr., "The South Atlantic War: Lessons and Analytical Guideposts-A

Military Historian's Perspective," in James A. Brown and William P. Snyder, eds., The

Regionalization of Warfare (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 64; Secretary

of State for Defence, The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons (London: Her Majesty’s

Stationery Office, 1982), p. 45; Paul F. Walker, "Smart Weapons in Naval Warfare," in

Scientific American, Vol. 248, No. 5 (May 1983), p. 53.

3. John Laffin, Fight for the Falklands (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 33; Webster's

New Geographical Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: 1988), pp. 389-90.

4. David Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute

Press, 1987), p. 68, pp. 89-90. Hereafter, "task force" is used as a general term to refer to the

British force assembled to retake the Falklands.

5. Martin Middlebrook, Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin

Books, 1987), pp. 65-67.

6. Bryan Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc.,

1982), pp. 21-22, 132.

7. Roy Braybrook, "Reassessing the lessons of the Falklands War," in Asia-Pacific Defence

Reporter, Apr.-May 1992, p. 42; Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 72; Perrett, Weapons, pp. 45, 75;

Eugene Kozicharow, "War Spurs NATO Analysis of Combat," in Aviation Week & Space

Technology, Jul. 19, 1982, p. 20.

8. Braybrook, "Reassessing the lessons of the Falklands War," p. 42; Kozicharow, "War Spurs

NATO Analysis of Combat," p. 20; Dov S. Zakheim, "The South Atlantic War: Evaluating the

Lessons," in Brown and Snyder, The Regionalization of Warfare, p. 50.

9. Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict, pp. 75, 131.

10. Ibid., p. 63.

11. Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, p. 69; Guilmartin, "The South Atlantic

War: Lessons and Analytic Guideposts—A Military Historian's Perspective," p. 64.

12. Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 72; Perrett, Weapons, p. 22, p. 128.

13. Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, p. 94; Middlebrook, Task Force, pp. 73-

74; Samuel L. Morison, "Falklands (Malvinas) Campaign: a Chronology," in Proceedings of

the United States Naval Institute (June 1983), p. 120.

14. Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict, pp. 22-23, 129.

15. Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict, pp. 25-26; Secretary of State for Defence, The

Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, p. 19; Walker, "Smart Weapons in Naval Warfare," p. 56.

16. John Moore, Capt, RN, "Lessons of the Falklands War," Jane's Naval Review (London:

Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd., 1982), p. 20; Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict, pp. 26-

27.

17. Middlebrook, Task Force, pp. 78-79; Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict, pp. 28-29.

18. Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict, pp. 30-32.

19. Damian Housman, "Lessons of Naval Warfare," National Review 34 (July 23, 1982): 894;

Secretary of State for Defence, The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, p. 21.

20. Table information is a summary of Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict, pp. 21-28.

It identifies the maximum potential of the task force but not all ships were present at one

location at any one time.
140

21. Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands," Foreign Affairs Vol. 61, No. 1

(Fall 1982): 202.

22. Morison, "Falklands (Malvinas) Campaign: a Chronology," p. 120.

23. David A. Brown, "Missiles Used in the Falklands Conflict," Aviation Week & Space

Technology (May 10, 1982): 22; Robert W. Duffner, Conflict in the South Atlantic: the Impact

of Air Power," Air University Review Vol. 35, No. 3 (April-May 1984): 84; Middlebrook, Task

Force, pp. 98, 104; Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict, p. 74; Cmdr "Sharkey" Ward,

RN, Sea Harrier (Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1992), p. 129.

24. Rodney A. Burden with Michael I. Draper, Douglas A. Rough, Colin R. Smith, and David

L. Wilton Falklands: The Air War (New

York: Arms and Armour Press, 1986), p. 83.

25. Ibid., pp. 83-84.

26. Local time on Argentinia's east coast is three hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time (or

Zulu Time), and one hour ahead of Falklands' time. Times cited are local times.

27. Burden, et al., The Air War, pp. 84-85.

28. Ibid., p. 85.

29. Burden et al., The Air War, p. 85; Middlebrook, Task Force, pp. 101-2.

30. The area was first designated, from Apr. 12, a "Maritime Exclusion Zone," in which

Argentine ships risked attack. Middlebrook, Task Force, pp. 125-26; Martin Middlebrook, The

Fight for the "Malvinas": The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War (New York: Viking,

1989), pp. 74-75.

31. Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 125.

32. Freedman, Britain and the Falklands, p. 58; Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 126; Victor

Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present (New

York: Facts on File, 1990), pp. 372-73.

33. José O'Dorico, Commo, FAA-Ret., "La Fuerza Aerea Argentina," Air University Review

Vol. 37, No. 5 (July-August 1986): 100; Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", pp. 293-95;

Joseph F. Udemi, Capt., USAF, "Modified to Meet the Need: British Aircraft in the

Falklands," Air Power Journal (Spring 1989): 52. Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands

War, p. 117, notes that one of the five available Super Étendards served as a source of spare

parts.

34. Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, pp. 115-16.

35. Ibid., p. 115.

36. Ibid., p. 59.

37. Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, p. 115; Udemi, "Modified to Meet the

Need: British Aircraft in the Falklands," p. 52.

38. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", pp. 293-95.

39. Laffin, Fight for the Falklands!, p. 95; Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 82.

40. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 83; Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 132.

41. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 87; Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 132; The

Sunday Times of London Insight Team, War In the Falklands (New York: Harper & Row,

Publishers, 1982), p. 216.

42. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 89.

43. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 89; Ward, Sea Harrier, p. 160.

44. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", pp. 90-91.

45. Ibid., pp. 96-97.

46. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", pp. 108-9; see Burden, et al., The Air War, pp.

40-41 for a detailed discussion of reasons for cancellation of the Skyhawk strike.
141

47. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 116.

48. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 34; Braybrook, "Reassessing the Lessons of the Falklands

War," p. 41; Jorge Luis Colombo, Cmdr, ARA, "Falkland Operations I: Super Étendard Naval

Aircraft Operations During the Malvinas War," in Naval War College Review, April-May

1984, p. 15; The Sunday Times of London Insight Team, War in the Falklands, pp. 168-69;

Walker, "Smart Weapons in Naval Warfare," p. 54.

49. Burden, et al., The Air War, pp. 47-48; Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", pp. 122.

50. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 48; Colombo, "Falkland Operations I," p. 19; Middlebrook,

The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 123.

51. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 35; Sub-Lieutenant Armando Mayora, CANA, in

Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", pp. 123-24. Mayora provides a first-hand account

of the raid from refueling to turnaway.

52. Middlebrook, Task Force, pp. 158-59; Martin Streetly, "Ruling the Airwaves: Electronic

Warfare at Sea," Jane's Naval Review, John Moore, Capt, RN, ed. (New York: Jane's

Publishing,

Inc., 1986), p. 101; Walker, "Smart Weapons in Naval Warfare," p. 54; Sandy Woodward with

Patrick Robinson, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group

Commander (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp. 6-14.

53. Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, pp. 141-42; Middlebrook, Task Force, pp.

162-63. Middlebrook's figures in Task Force and The Fight for the "Malvinas" differ slightly.

In Task Force he reports 24 dead, 24 injured, and 242 escaping injury. In The Fight for the

"Malvinas" he reports 20 dead and 236 surviving. Moore, "The Lessons of the Naval War in

the Falklands," p. 20; Salt, quoted in John Brecher with Tony Cliford, "A Naval Postmortem,"

Newsweek (June 7, 1982): 22.

54. Kozicharow, "War Spurs NATO Analysis of Combat," pp. 20-21.

55. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 126.

56. Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 187.

57. Capt John Coward, commanding officer of HMS Brillant, quoted in Middlebrook, Task

Force, p. 189; Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 133.

58. Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, p. 160; Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price,

Air War South Atlantic (New York: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 88-89; Capt [no first name

available] Zelaya, commander of the second Skyhawk, from an oral history interview included

in "Dios y los Halcones," an unpublished ms. compiled by the FAA and quoted in

Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 133.

59. Ethell and Price, Air War South Atlantic, p. 108; Middlebrook, The Fight for the

"Malvinas", p. 151; Capt Kit Layman, RN, commanding officer, HMS Argonaut, quoted in

Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 219.

60. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 162.

61. Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 221; Perret, Weapons, p. 127, p. 131.

62. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 133; Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 221.

63. Ibid., p. 133; Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 221; Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict,

pp. 127, 131.

64. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 119; Capt C. H. Layman, RN, commanding officer, HMS

Argonaut, quoted in Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 223.

65. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 119.

66. Ibid., pp. 111-12.

67. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 41; Comdr Alan West, RN, commanding officer, HMS

Ardent, quoted in Middlebrook, Task Force, pp. 224-25.
142

68. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 42.

69. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 134; Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 224.

70. Burden, et al., The Air War, pp. 134-35.

71. Ibid., pp. 132-33.

72. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", pp. 164-65.

73. Brown, The Royal Navy in the Falklands War, pp. 201-2.

74. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 166.

75. Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, p. 207; Burden, et al., The Air War, p.

120; Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 168; Middlebrook, Task Force, pp. 234-35;

Woodward and Robinson, One Hundred Days, p. 275.

76. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 42.

77. Ibid., pp. 112-13.

78. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 137; Ethell and Price, Air War South Atlantic, pp. 140-41.

79. Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, pp. 221-23; Burden, et al., The Air War,

p. 121; Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 172-73; Capt. David Hart-Dyke, RN,

commanding officer, HMS Coventry, quoted in Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 239; Ward, Sea

Harrier, p. 220; Woodward and Robinson, One Hundred Days, pp. 286-287. According to

Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 241, and Woodward and Robinson, One Hundred Days, p. 299,

some Royal Navy personnel believed that the Argentineans switched to impact fuzes after

learning from British Broadcasting Corporation news programs that their bombs were not

exploding.

80. Middlebrook, Task Force, p. 243-44.

81. Roy Braybrook, "Anti-Ship Missiles: No Let-Up for Defences," p. 119; Brown, The Royal

Navy and the Falklands War, pp. 230-31; Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 36; Middlebrook, The

Fight for the "Malvinas", p. 174; Middlebrook, Task Force, pp. 246-47; Woodward and

Robinson, One Hundred Days, pp. 295-97.

82. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 114.

83. Ibid., pp. 37, 42.

84. Middlebrook, The Fight for the "Malvinas", pp. 211-12.

85. Burden, et al., The Air War, p. 124; Middlebrook, Task Force, pp. 306, 308-9.

86. Burden, et al., The Air War, pp. 124-25.

87. Ibid., p. 138.

88. James Brown and William P. Snyder, eds., The Regionalization of Warfare (New

Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 15; Freedman, "The War of the Falkland

Islands," p. 207; Morison, "Falklands (Malvinas) Campaign: a Chronology," p. 123;

"Argentina, United Kingdom Decide to Re-establish Diplomatic Relations," UN Chronicles

(June 28, 1990): 27.
143

CHAPTER VII

THE TANKER WAR

The "Tanker War," a campaign of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), included the first

sustained use of land-based aerial forces against merchant shipping since World War II. Both

sides used their air forces to attack a variety of merchant and naval vessels, but many

writers have used the term "tanker war" to describe this air-sea campaign. In the course of

the conflict ships bearing oil became the most significant type of vessel targeted. Military

analysts agree that an intense effort against them began in 1984, although a few tankers

were struck earlier in the war. During the ninety-five months of the war the belligerents

attacked between 437 and 500-plus ships.1

The Iran-Iraq War began on September 22, 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran. The

invasion came after nearly 240 border incidents, most initiated by Iran. Iraq had several war

aims. These included Iranian recognition of exclusive Iraqi navigation rights on the Shatt alArab, a 130-mile-long river that forms fifty-five miles of the border between Iran and Iraq;

return of the islands of Abu Musa and Tunb in the southern Persian Gulf, which Iraq claimed

that Iran had occupied in 1971; and self-rule for the predominately Arab population of

Khuzestan, a 25,000-square-mile province in northern Iran. The last could have given Iraq,

an Arab country, effective control of the province's oil fields.2

The two sides did not appear evenly matched. Iraq had a population of 16 million and

territory of about 168,000 square miles. It was taking on Iran, which had a population of

more than 50 million and territory of about 636,000 square miles. Iran's land army and navy

were far larger than Iraq's. The air forces of both countries were about equal in size, but that

of Iran had been equipped and trained by the United States while that of Iraq had been

equipped and trained by the Soviet Union.

Iran's air force appeared far superior to that of Iraq in September 1980. Its inventory

included about 430 American-built air superiority and attack aircraft, more than 200 attack

helicopters, and 300 other assault aircraft. Iranian armed forces were, however, in chaos

caused by purges following the Islamic revolution of the 1970s. This was particularly true of

the Iranian Air Force. The revolutionary government had executed or imprisoned many of the

air force's officers, noncommissioned officers, and technicians following the fall of the Shah.

At the time the war began Iran could field only about 350 of its fixed-wing combat aircraft.3

At the outset of the war, Iraq's aerial forces included a mix of 332 fixed-wing, Sovietbuilt fighters, fighter-bombers, and light bombers. As export models, these fighters and

bombers did not have the full range of electronics and weapons available in similar aircraft

used by the Soviet Air Force. A variety of attack helicopters bolstered the fixed-wing

inventory. Iraqi Air Force training was focused on high-altitude dog fighting. Skills useful in

attack and bombing missions were purposely slighted. This restrained the development of

forces that might assist in a revolt against Iraq's ruler, Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi Air Force

had no long-range reconnaissance capability and operational readiness in its units at the

outset of the war was 50 percent or less.4

Like the Iranian Air Force, the Iraqi aviation branch suffered from political

interference and decimation. In the spring of 1982 Saddam Hussein grounded the entire Iraqi

Air Force for "plots against the regime." He then had the entire senior leadership shot in

September 1983 after an attempted coup.5

Iraq began its air war against Iran with raids on ten Iranian military airfields. These

failed for two reasons. The first was that the Iraqis targeted only the runways at the air
144

bases. The second was that the Iraqis mounted only eighty sorties on the first day of the war.

They were able to mount only fifty sorties on each of the following two days. Postwar analysis

indicated that several hundred sorties over several days would have been required to ground

the Iranian Air Force.6

Iranian fighter-bombers struck back immediately. They forced the Iraqi Air Force to

disperse to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, North Yemen and

Kuwait. Their hosts quickly sent the Iraqis home when they realized the vulnerability of

their own oil installations to Iranian retribution. Shortages of parts, poor maintenance, and

a shortage of trained personnel kept the Iranian Air Force from exploiting its first success.

Iran's Islamic fundamentalist government released a number of pilots and technicians from

jail to meet Iraqi's first onslaught. It later reimprisoned or executed hundreds of them when

the initial danger had passed.7

Iran had greater naval strength than Iraq. With nearly 2,000 miles of coastline

(compared to Iraq's thirty-six miles), Iran had more reason for naval forces. Those forces

included three destroyers, eight frigates, seven large and eighty small patrol boats, five

minesweepers, fourteen hovercraft, and a number of auxiliary vessels. Many of these were

equipped with modern surface-to-air missile systems as well as with anti-aircraft guns. Iraq

had only a training frigate, twenty-four fast attack craft, five large and ten coastal patrol

vessels, eight minesweepers, four landing craft, and some inshore patrol craft.8

Naval engagements quickly followed the outbreak of war. On September 22, 1980,

Iraqi ships destroyed five Iranian craft that had harassed Iraqi-flag vessels on the Shatt alArab. Another naval engagement, with Iraqi land-based artillery participating, followed when

Iran's navy shelled Basra, a port at the head of the river and two oil terminals at Fao, at its

mouth. Iraq claimed to have sunk two Iranian frigates and Iran claimed to have destroyed

four Iraqi combatants. On September 25, Iraqi gunboats and helicopter gun ships met an

Iranian naval attack on Khor Abdulla, an oil port near Fao. Radio Baghdad subsequently told

the world that Hussein's military forces had sunk three frigates and two gunboats of the

Iranian Navy. Iran said it lost two gunboats and a minesweeper while destroying six Iraqi

missile boats and two other craft. Another major naval battle took place between November

29-30 off the city of Fao and near Iraq's offshore oil terminal of Mina al-Bakhr. After this

engagement, Iran claimed to have raised its flag over Mina al-Bakhr and destroyed four

missile boats and seven gunboats of the Iraqi Navy. Iraq, in turn, said it used air and naval

forces to repulse the Iranian attack and had destroyed three Iranian naval vessels including

a frigate.9

If the claims of both sides are taken at face value, these encounters cost Iran seventysix combatants of all types, or 56 percent of its total naval inventory. Iraq, which started with

a much smaller and less effective naval force, lost only forty-two vessels, but this was 66

percent of its naval strength. These figures include craft lost not only in naval battles, but

also those claimed for air strikes, artillery, and in one case, capture by troops. The claimants

possibly exaggerated their successes. It is certain that Iraq's navy ceased to exist as an

effective fighting force before two months of the war had passed. This created a situation in

which, Iraq, if it chose to pursue an anti-shipping campaign, had no choice but to do so with

its land-based aerial forces.10

Each side had pressing motives for an anti-shipping campaign. Both Iran and Iraq

relied on oil exports to provide most of their economic base. Petroleum revenues provided at

least 90 percent of each nation's foreign exchange. Without oil sales, Iran and Iraq would

have been hard pressed to sustain their war efforts.11
145

Immediately after being invaded, Iran announced that the waterways near its coast

were in a war zone. The restricted area ran the length of the Persian Gulf and extended

seaward from the Iranian coast for about forty miles. It would not allow, Iranian officials

said, ships to carry cargo to or from Iraqi ports. Iranian air raids following the Iraqi initiation

of the war and the November 1980 naval clash at Mina al-Bakhr and Fao reduced Iraq's oil

export capacity by one-third. All of Iraq's ports and its two marine oil terminals were shut

down. After that, no commercial vessels sailed to or from Iraq. Iran then persuaded Syria to

block Iraq's access to an overland pipeline running through that country. This left Iraq with

only a less than 700,000 barrel-per-day (bpd) pipeline running through Turkey as a way to

get its oil to market. This contrasted with a prewar export level of 1.5 million bpd.12

Iran, without access to overland pipelines, depended entirely on the sea for exporting

its oil. Nevertheless, Iran still had a functional air force and naval supremacy relative to

Iran. It was able to increase its own oil production to nearly three million bpd and export all

the oil it could sell. More than 80 percent of this oil was picked up by tankers at Kharg

Island off the southwest coast of Iran. Anti-aircraft guns and Hawk surface-to-air missile

batteries protected the forty-mile-long island, which is twenty-miles-wide. Oil flowed to the

island via buried underwater pipelines. On the island pipelines were dispersed, often buried

or sheltered, and redundant. The tanker jetties were the island facilities most vulnerable to

air attack. A large T-shaped jetty on the eastern side of the island could berth fourteen small

to medium tankers. A J-shaped jetty on the western side of the island could accommodate

twenty ships, including three supertankers. The island was designed to load between 1.5 and

two million bpd. Before the war it had actually loaded as much as six million bpd.13

Despite the importance of these oil facilities and the ships they served, neither Iran

nor Iraq initially had the resources to launch a strategic air campaign against them. Both

sides fought fiercely for nearly three years. This resulted in a stalemate in the ground war

and a negotiated suspension of the strategic air and missile war against population centers

that has been called "The War of the Cities." It was only when the latter was abandoned that

Iraq could spare aerial forces for a serious anti-shipping campaign.14

In the interim, there were sporadic assaults on commercial shipping. This early phase

of the "Tanker War" began with an Iraqi air attack on the Panamanian-registered Louise I,

a freighter, on May 21, 1981. Thereafter, Iraq's aerial forces occasionally targeted individual

ships sailing in the northern Persian Gulf. They were usually steaming to or from the Iranian

ports of Bandar Khoemini and Bandar Mahshahr at the head of the gulf. The Iraqis used

Super Frelon helicopters to launch AM.39 Exocet surface-to-air missiles at underway vessels.

They fired from up to thirty miles from their intended targets. The fifteen-foot-long radarguided missiles weighed 1437 pounds, carried a 364-pound high explosive warhead, and had

a maximum range in excess of forty-three miles. Aircraft involved launched the French-made

weapons at altitudes of 200 to 300 feet. The missiles then dipped to ten to fifteen feet above

the sea and raced toward their targets at a speed of Mach 0.93.15

Civilian ships anchored in Iranian ports also suffered in air raids, as when variablewing MiG-23Bs and swept-wing Mirage F-1s bombed two freighters. Four other merchantmen

passing through the channel between the Iranian ports of Bandar Khomeini and Bandar

Mahshahr fell victim to Iraqi sea mines, which had probably been delivered by air.16

Iraq did bomb Kharg Island in April and August 1982, but without much effect. This

occurred despite warnings from other Persian Gulf countries not to destroy the facility. That

same month, Saddam Hussein's regime announced a "Maritime Exclusion Zone." It was that

area of the Persian Gulf above latitude 29 ̊ 30' North. Ships sailing in the zone were on notice
146

that they risked attack without warning. This merely formalized a situation that had existed

since September 1981.17

In 1983 Iraq acquired five transonic Super Étendards (SÉs), the French-manufactured

naval strike planes which Argentina had used so effectively in the Falklands War. France

leased the aircraft to Iraq and provided instruction for the pilots who would fly them. The

pilots completed their training in October 1983. While the Super Étendards were becoming

operational, Iraqi continued shipping attacks with the equipment it had. On November 3, a

Puma helicopter fired an Exocet at a Greek freighter, the Avra. This assault caused only

superficial damage to the ship but killed three crew members. On November 21, another

helicopter-missile raid sank the Antigoni, also a Greek freighter, but there was no loss of

life.18

At this time Iraq also committed to increasing significantly its surface navy strength. The

Hussein regime ordered four frigates, six corvettes, and a large replenishment ship from

Italy. Because Iraq had no functioning ports, however, these ships were never delivered.19

Iran responded to the impending air threat with bluster. It said that if its opponent

used the Super Étendards to deploy anti-ship missiles, then the Iranian Navy would close the

Strait of Hormuz. The United Nations Security Council took note of the situation by affirming

the right of free navigation and commerce in the Persian Gulf. The United States announced

that its national interests required freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. It stepped up

its naval patrols in the area. A nineteen-ship task force centered on the carrier Midway

entered the Persian Gulf. American officials showed which side they favored by pointing out

that while Iraq confined its attacks on shipping to a declared war zone, Iran attacked ships

in international waters. It later was revealed that the United States had begun to selectively

share intelligence collected by its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) platforms

and surveillance satellites with Iraq as early as 1980. From that year forward, four American

multi-engine jet E-3As provided continuous airborne radar surveillance of air and sea areas

of the northern Persian Gulf. U.S. Navy flights from Bahrain by four-engine turboprop P-3

Orions supplemented this coverage. American officials also offered shoulder-fired Stinger

surface-to-air missiles to their Persian Gulf client states so that they could protect their

shipping from air attacks.20

The prospect of a shipping war in the Gulf and perhaps closure of the Strait of

Hormuz between Iran and Quatar intensified international concern over the Iran-Iraq War.

The Persian Gulf area was home to about two-thirds of the world's known oil supplies. Twothirds of the oil, or about eight million bpd, exported by Persian Gulf countries passed

through the strait. This provided about 25 percent of the oil consumed by Western countries

and Japan. Although this total provided only about 6 to 8 percent of United States' oil

imports, it included about 56 percent of Japan's oil supply and 36 percent of France's oil

requirements. The Strait's characteristics made its successful closure unlikely other than by

intense air and naval patrols. Currents, depth, and width decreased the chances of successful

mining. A navigable width of up to twenty miles for supertankers, with a main channel five

to eight miles across and 300 feet deep made infeasible the tactic of sinking ships in the

channel to block commerce.21

Merely stimulating Iran to provoke international concern served Iraq's purposes. The

war begun by Saddam Hussein to gain navigation rights and control of a province's oil

resources had become a war for national survival. Iran's war aims had developed to include

five major points. Removal of Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party from power in Iraq was

the most significant. Other items included an admission of aggression from Iraq, reparations

of up to $150 billion, repatriation of some 100,000 Arabian Iraqis previously deported by
147

Hussein from Khuzestan, and withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian-claimed territory.

Iraq's air and ground forces had proved able to repel but not push aside Iran's artillery,

infantry, and armor. Its strategic air and missile campaign against Iran's population in the

"War of the Cities" had failed to break the Iranian will to resist. Iraq called for a cease-fire

in June 1983, but Iran refused discussions. This situation left Iraq with only two possibilities

for forcing an end to war that it had started but could not win. These were to mount a

strategic air campaign against the petroleum shipping that formed the foundation of Iran's

economy and to "internationalize" the war. The first option could end Iran's capacity to make

war by depriving it of needed foreign exchange. It could also, in concert with Iranian

retaliation against other shipping, threatened the economies of the Western nations and

Japan. This promised to increase world pressure on Iran to negotiate an end to hostilities.

When, in the fall of 1983, the United Nations urged a suspension in fighting, Iraq agreed but

Iran ignored the request.22

By early 1984 Iraq was ready to intensify its interdiction of shipping that carried

Iranian oil and its air raids on the marine terminals where the ships loaded. On February

14, 1984, Iraq declared that it would sink any ships approaching the Iranian ports of Bandar

Khomeini or Busheir. At the time, Iran was exporting three million bpd and was negotiating

with Japan to deliver 200,000 bpd.23

The first in a series of anti-ship strikes occurred on January 31, 1984. The attacks

were seldom, if ever, preceded by reconnaissance. On that date Iraqi aircraft claimed

destruction of five Iranian naval targets near Khor Musa, an island off Quatar. The "naval

targets" probably included some tankers being convoyed by the Iranian Navy. The following

day, the Iraqi Air Force claimed credit for mining the Cypriot tanker City of Rio. It also made

Exocet attacks on the Greek ship Skaros and Cypriot ship Neptune.

24

An Exocet launched by an Iraqi aircraft on February 16, 1984, started a fire that badly

damaged a Liberian bulk carrier. Then on March 1, the Iraqis attacked a convoy of eleven

ships near the Iranian port of Bandar Khomeini. Missile and rocket-firing helicopters and

fixed-wing aircraft sank the Indian cargo ship Apj Ambika. They also caused extensive

damage to the Cypriot-flagged Sema-G and the British Charming. The Charming may have

been hit by a heat-seeking missile rather than an Exocet.25

Air strikes on ships carrying Iranian oil intensified. On March 27 an Exocet

lodged without exploding in the Filikon L., a Yugoslav-crewed Greek bulk carrier loaded with

steel. The freighter sank with the loss of three lives. This was the first ship attack that Iraqi

aircraft made outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone previously announced by Saddam

Hussein's regime. It also marked Iraq's first use of an Exocet-equipped Super Etendard in

a ship strike. The Greek freighter Iapetos was the next victim. A March 29 Iraqi air strike

set fires on the ship that caused serious damage. Then on April 18 an Iraqi-launched Exocet

caused minor damage to the Panamanian tanker Rover Star. On April 25 a Saudi-owned

tanker chartered by a Swedish company suffered an explosion and serious fire because of

Iraqi air attack. This embarrassed Iraq, which was receiving covert Saudi support, because

it illustrated its inept targeting. It also embarrassed Saudi Arabia, because the Safina Al had

just taken on a cargo of oil at Iran's Kharg Island terminal. In early May, however, Saddam

Hussein announced that ships loading at Kharg Island would be attacked even if they

belonged to Iraq's Arab neighbors. This underscored Hussein's hopes for the anti-shipping

campaign as Iraq at this time was receiving about 400,000 bpd of Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian

oil to sell.26

Iran responded to these attacks by using a few of its remaining F-4 Phantom strike

jets to fire Maverick missiles at Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian oil tankers. The first such attack
148

came on May 13, 1984, when F-4 Phantoms rocketed the Umm Casbah, a Kuwaiti Oil Tanker

Company vessel with 76,000 tons of fuel oil on board. A raid on the Saudi flag tanker Yanbu

Pride followed on May 16. While these were not Iraqi ships, Iran hoped that endangering its

opponent's covert supporters would encourage decreased support for Iraq. Kuwait had given

loans to Iraq and permitted the Iraqi Air Force to pass through Kuwaiti air space en route

to shipping attacks. It was also permitting cargo vessels with war supplies to be unloaded at

Kuwaiti ports and transported under seal to Iraq.27

The Iranians usually employed spotter aircraft to locate shipping targets. They sortied

from Lavan Island east of Bandas. Spotter planes used included high-winged C-130E and H

Hercules turboprop transports, P-3s, and a variety of light commercial aircraft. One or two

Phantoms that could fire rockets at short range responded to location reports. There is some

evidence that the Iranian fighter-bombers also used French-manufactured AS-12 anti-ship

missiles but this has not been fully documented. Maverick missiles, definitely used, had

warheads which proved too small to consistently do significant damage to tankers. The heatseeking missiles usually homed in on a ship's "hot spots." These were the funnels,

ventilators, and engine room. When the Mavericks started fires in engine rooms or messing

and berthing areas, resulting blazes could gut ships if not put out quickly. When fires did not

follow missile strikes, structural damage was quickly repaired.28

Iraq's SÉ missions were also not as effective as they could have been. Analysts have

attributed this to the limited number of aircraft available, Iraqi tactics, hitting power of the

Exocets, and characteristics of the tanker targets. Having leased only five Super Étendards,

the Iraqis were reluctant to commit them en masse or expose them to counter-air measures.

When their radars located a potential target within the exclusion zone, the SÉ pilots (like the

Iraqi helicopter fliers) frequently launched their weapons at targets up to 30 miles away. In

most cases, the distance from launch to an intended victim prevented target identification.

This meant that the air-to-surface missiles homed in on the largest radar image present,

without regard to what it might be. The Iranians were thus often able to divert the Exocets

from real targets by using decoy radar targets towed behind small tugs. Large oil-carrying

ships often proved resistant to critical damage even when hit by powerful missiles. This was

a consequence of the relatively small size of the Exocets' explosive charge, the tankers'

extensive compartmentalization, and the dampening effect of crude oil cargoes on explosions.

However, even large ships could be seriously damaged by the missiles. When the Iraqis hit

smaller targets with Exocets, the missiles were more effective. Of thirty-three ships other

than supertankers or very large tankers hit in 1984, seven sank as a result of Exocet strikes.

Another nineteen were heavily damaged. The Iraqi Air Force used its Russian-built light and

medium jet bombers only sporadically in shipping attacks. They usually achieved

unsatisfactory results. Analysts have attributed this to two factors. First, Iraq’s squadrons

of Soviet-built aircraft were used as a source of crews for more modern aircraft being acquired

from France. This left the Tu-16 and Il-28 squadrons with undertrained and inexperienced

crews. Second, the Soviet planes suffered from poor maintenance and a shortage of spare

parts.29

Iran waited two months after the renewed Iraqi attacks on shipping before retaliating.

Between May 13 and May 16, 1984, missiles, rockets, and cannon fire from Iranian Phantoms

inflicted severe damage on three oil tankers. One of these ships was Saudi Arabian and two

were Kuwaiti. All of the strikes occurred south of the previously announced exclusion zone.

At the same time, Iran notified the world that it would stop and search all ships passing

through the Strait of Hormuz.30
149

An Iranian F-4 used rockets to set the Liberian flag tanker Chemical Venture afire on

May 24. The 29,427-ton ship was twenty-one miles north of Al Jubayl on Saudi Arabia's

eastern coast. Iraq announced on May 25 that its air force had destroyed a convoy of eight

vessels in the channel between Khor Musa and the Iranian mainland. Fifteen days later, the

Iranians fired two air-to-surface missiles into the Kuwaiti supertanker Kazimah. Each

Maverick plunged into a separate oil storage compartment. The crew was able to put out the

ensuing fire. Despite a common low level of fire fighting experience, this became a not

unusual accomplishment for the sailors on stricken tankers. In this and other cases, the

crews were able to extinguish fires and sail their ships into the nearest ports for repairs.31

The intensifying tanker war did provoke international response. Shipping insurers

raised their war risk premium from 0.25 to 7.5 percent of a ship's value. This added $1 to

$1.50 to the cost of each barrel of oil exported from the Gulf. The increasing danger to

merchantmen in the Persian Gulf also led the Japanese Shipowners Association to state that

Japanese-crewed tankers would no longer steam into the northern half of the Gulf. American

Secretary of State George Schultz announced that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had a joint

concern over freedom of navigation in the Gulf. The United States flew hundreds of Stinger

missiles to Saudi Arabia and sent tanker aircraft to support the Saudi Air Force. American

officials also proclaimed that the United States Navy would provide air warning and a

defense screen for United States-flag ships under charter to its Military Sealift Command.

This consisted of a radar picket line of two or three destroyers or frigates. It provided a radar

surveillance corridor for tankers transiting the Persian Gulf. The Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) decided to provide air cover for ships coming to or from their ports while the vessels

were in international waters of the Persian Gulf. The council consisted of Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Although they provided air

cover against both Iranian and Iraqi attacks, the GCC members at the same time lent Iraq

some $35 billion during the course of the Iran-Iraq War. They all feared that Iran would

spread its Islamic fundamentalist revolution into their states.32

In June 1984, the Iraqi Air Force shifted the focus of its maritime campaign to Iran's

Kharg Island oil terminal. Super Étendards sent two Exocets into the Turkish tanker Buyuk

Hun on June 3. The ship was at the southern end of the exclusion zone for the terminal.

Resulting explosions and fire killed three crew members, injured several others, and seriously

damaged the oil carrier. A raid on the 24th left the terminal partially closed and limited the

size of tankers that could be served to 300,000 tons or less. Iran's oil export capacity fell

temporarily to 50 percent of its prewar level. These and subsequent attacks led Iran to

provide aerial as well as surface escorts for convoys its navy was shepherding. In fighting

from August 9 to 10, Iraq claimed to have shot down three Iranian F-4s and sunk five

merchant ships.33

The intensification of the tanker war served Iraq well. Its air raids on shipping and

marine terminals hurt Iran's economy. Iraqi and Iranian attacks on vessels in the Persian

Gulf also entangled other gulf nations and world military powers. When an Iraqi aircraft

attempted to attack a target in Saudi waters on June 4, 1984, a Saudi fighter shot it down.

A Saudi Air Force AWACS aircraft with U.S. Air Force crew members on board assisted in

the kill. A June 20, 1984 Saudi Arabian-United States joint announcement followed. In it,

the two nations reporting creating a Saudi Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Within

the ADIZ Saudi Arabian F-15s with United States Air Force AWACS support would intercept

any aircraft threatening shipping.34

The tempo of the Tanker War decreased temporarily in the second half of 1984. A

June 11 end to a renewed "War on Cities" negotiated under United Nations' auspices
150

gradually grew to include oil facilities. Iranian exports from Kharg Island increased to 1.6

million bpd. On June 15, 1984, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament suggested expanding

the ban on attacking population centers to include a cessation of attacks on Persian Gulf

shipping. Iraq responded with a demand that it be allowed to repair its own marine oil

terminals, which had been destroyed at the beginning of the war. As a result, nothing came

of the proposal to halt attacks on shipping.35

Instead, Iraq renewed its air raids on ships in the Gulf. Between June 23 and July 25,

the Iraqi Air Force conducted four shipping attacks. On July 24, the Iraqis also hit the

Iranian oil terminal at Kharg Island again. Iran responded by with a Phantom strike against

the Liberian-flagged, Japanese-owned supertanker Primrose on July 5.36

Delivery of new model Mirage F1-EQ5s and 6s from France in October 1984 expanded

Iraq's capacity to wage naval warfare with its land-based aircraft. Although the F1Bs and Es

already in the Iraqi Air Force inventory could have been modified to launch Exocets, this had

not been done. When the Mirage F1-EQs became operational, they gave Iraq additional

Exocet capability in aircraft also equipped for air-to-air refueling. The Iraqis first used the

faster, better armed, longer-range Mirages F1-EQs in shipping raids in December 1984.37

Although the tempo of Iraqi shipping attacks waned in the latter part of 1984, Iran

began to explore alternatives that would make interdiction of shipping routes to its marine

oil terminals more difficult. It started developing new oil tanker ports at Sirri and Larak

islands in the southern Persian Gulf. Iran used either its own tankers or chartered ships to

shuttle oil from Kharg Island to Sirri and Larak. In relation to Kharg Island, the new

facilities were, respectively, 320 miles and 435 miles further from Iraqi airfields. On

November 24, Iraqi pilots flew their Super Étendards on a 1,560-mile round trip to strike the

oil terminal on Larak Island on the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz. The raid damaged

both tankers and loading facilities. Iran complained that the SÉs must have refueled at a

base in another gulf country in order to reach Larak.38

When 1984 ended, Iran's oil exports had been reduced to one million bpd. This was

due in part to Iraq air strikes, but also to price fluctuation. Ironically, there was never a

shortage of vessel owners and crews willing to risk damage and destruction transporting

Persian Gulf oil. Coincident with increasing dangers was an increasing worldwide surplus

of oil tankers.39

The two belligerents made a total of sixty-seven air strikes on civilian ships during

1984, the first year of the second phase of the Tanker War. This compared to a total of thirtyfive merchantmen subjected to attack between May 1981 and January 1984. The Iraqis had

generally bombed, launched missiles at, or strafed ships steaming between thirty and seventy

miles south of Kharg Island and between ten and sixty miles off the Iranian coast. The

Iranians had assailed freighters and tankers in the southern part of the Persian Gulf.40

The fifth year of the Iran-Iraq War was, for Iraq, the "Year of the Pilot."41 Iraqi Air

Force daily sortie capacity doubled from 150 to 300. Iraqi pilots trained in France and India

were said by their instructors to be, after training, as good as any French or Indian flier.

Saddam Hussein reportedly relented and allowed more aircraft to fly each mission and

allowed those sent to take higher risks. For maritime attacks Iraq could send out groups of

four or six aircraft, once the Mirage F1-EQs acquired from France became fully operational.

The year began with Iraqi Air Force planes making an average of one maritime strike every

three days in January 1985.42

In early May 1985, Iraqi Mirages hit two large tankers. They were the Superior and

the Energy Mobility, which Iran shuttled from Kharg Island to Sirri, an island in the south-
151

central Persian Gulf. In all, Iraq sent nearly ten raids a month during May and June 1985

against the oil terminal at Kharg.43

An F1 attack on a tanker in August 1985 caused sixteen deaths. This was the highest

single-ship casualty count in the war on civilian vessels. Iraq renewed its attacks on Kharg

Island on August 15. Eight raids against the terminal followed between that date and

September 17. These left the T-jetty with only two to four serviceable berths. On September

18 a tenth air strike set a North Korean tanker afire at the J-jetty. After the raid the ship

either sank or was beached in a position blocking the pier. Kharg Island's civilian employees

subsequently evacuated and the terminal was all but closed.44

Also in August 1985, the Iraqi Air Force demonstrated its expanded capability. It

launched the first of a series of "thousand-mile" missions against Sirri and followed in

November with a raid on Larak. To enable the Mirages to reach their targets, the Iraqis

refueled them from turboprop An-12 transports equipped with palletized bladders. At the

time of the first attack almost all of Iran's 1.4 million bpd export was going through the Sirri

Island terminal. In that raid, on August 12, six Mirages used Exocets and laser-guided

bombs. They destroyed the 233,788-ton Iranian supertanker Azarpad. Their attack also set

fires on two other ships and the six-mile-long island that took two days to control. Iran

responded by moving its tanker transfer site about fifteen miles northeast of Sirri where it

was closer to coastal air defenses. The Khomeini government chartered the world's largest

tanker, the 564,730-ton Seawise Giant, to provide a stable transfer platform. Since Iraq had

hit five out of eleven of the tankers it was using in the Kharg-Sirri shuttle by August 8, Iran

chartered nine more vessels and sent three major transfer ships to Larak, 125 miles further

down the gulf. This moved these prime targets further away from Iraqi air bases.45

Achieving an aerial refueling capacity for its Exocet-equipped Mirages enabled Iraq

to strike regularly the Sirri and Larak Island terminals and the ships loading there. At same

time, the Iraqi Air Force retained the ability to strike at closer maritime targets such as the

Kharg Island terminal and Iranian offshore oil platforms. By the end of 1985, Iraq claimed

to have sent seventy-seven missions against Kharg Island. As a result, the island's preferred

export level of 1.6 million bpd dropped to one million bpd. The shuttle from Kharg to Sirri

could move only 300,000 bpd. This impact on Iran's economy was compounded because in the

face of a worldwide oil glut and the difficulties buyers faced in obtaining its oil. Iran had to

offer prices of $25 per barrel compared to an official price of $28. These factors in combination

resulted in Iran receiving only 60 percent of its expected income from oil exports in 1985.46

Iran's initial reply to the devastating Iraqi assault on the foundations of its economy

was to announce that it would diversify its oil export facilities by using terminals south of

Busheir. It also purchased offshore mooring buoys to install northwest of Kharg Island,

announced plans to open at new oil terminal at Ganaveh (northeast of Kharg), and to build

pipelines to Lavan or Jask near the Strait of Hormuz. In June 1985 some of Iran's F-4

Phantoms previously used in shipping attacks relocated to Busheir. This enabled them to

range farther north over the Gulf. The Khomeini regime also began boarding and searching

all ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. If its shipping was interrupted, said Iran,

everyone else's maritime trade in the Gulf would suffer too. President Khomeini threatened

on September 20, 1985, to close the Strait of Hormuz but this was never carried out. During

October 1985 Iranian boarding parties inspected nearly 300 cargo ships. This harassment

proved insufficient to create the international pressure needed to halt Iraq's raids on Iran's

oil terminals and shipping.47

The renewed attacks on Kharg had cut temporarily the island's loading capacity by

30 percent. Iraqi Air Force pressure on the Kharg and Ganaveh terminals, coupled with
152

continued strikes on tankers carrying Iranian oil, reduced Iran's exports to 800,000 bpd. It

also cost the Khomeini regime an estimated $60 million for chartered tankers used to store

oil at various locations and ply the Kharg-Sirri shuttle route. The interdiction effort

additionally demonstrated the versatility of the Exocet-equipped Mirages. In mid-September

1985, Iraq announced that the Mirages met all of its needs and returned its leased Super

Étendards to France.48

Iraq used precision-guided munitions in four large-scale August 1985 air raids on the

Kharg oil terminal. These were probably French ASM-30 laser-guided and radar-homing

missiles. Contemporary reports indicated that the Iraqis attacked in two waves. The first

aircraft to arrive over the island used French and Soviet electronic countermeasures

equipment and anti-radiation missiles to suppress its Hawk batteries and Shilka surface-toair missiles. The AS-30 flies at less than 300 feet above the earth's surface, has a 528-pound

high explosive warhead, and is effective against hardened targets. Iraq had received AS-30s

and their associated laser designator pods in November 1984. Waves of Iraqi fighter-bombers

following the ECM aircraft launched these stand-off missiles at ranges of six to eight

kilometers. Other aircraft each fired up to 144 68mm Brandt pre-fragmented rockets at other

ground targets.49

Iraq struck at Iran's oil terminals and tanker shuttle again in September and October.

By early November, air strikes had reduced oil shipments via the Kharg-Sirri shuttle by 30

to 50 percent. This forced Iran to start shipping oil from its strategic reserve of about fifteen

million barrels held at Sirri and an additional 250,000 barrels held at Larak.50

The coming of 1986 did not ease Iran's situation. Saudi Arabia increased oil production

to increase its own revenues and a crash resulted. The official price of oil plummeted from

$28 to $14 per barrel between January and March of 1986. During the same period Iraqimade air strikes against thirty tankers compared to seven attacked by Iran. On May 30 an

Iraqi air raid against Kharg Island set new fires at the terminal's sixty-mile-square tank

farm. Iraq's long-range air missions against Iran's oil facilities continued with strikes against

Sirri Island on August 12, Lavan on September 7, and Kharg Island on September 16.

Additional raids went to Kharg on September 29 and October 6. The latter mission

temporarily closed the last two functional berths at the island's fourteen-tanker jetty. This

again cut Iran's oil exports to about 800,000 bpd. Shuttle shipments fell so that twenty-five

to thirty long-haul tankers were usually anchored off Larak waiting to load. In addition, Iran

was forced to begin importing about 100,000 to 300,000 bpd of refined petroleum products.

The result of the reinvigorated Iraqi air attacks was that at the end of 1986 Iran had an

estimated oil revenue of $400 million per month versus $1.2 billion per month a year earlier.

Iran began experimenting with tanker passive defense measures such as non-reflective paint.

One ship, converted for oil transloading and with about $500,000 of defensive equipment, was

destroyed even before it reached Larak. Its protective devices included reflective paint, radar

reflectors at either end of the ship, chaff dispensers, and an electronic decoy system. Attacks

on gulf shipping in 1986 totaled 105. This compared to 152 anti-ship strikes during the years

1981 through 1985.51

Iran responded to the Iraqi air attacks in several ways. It mined international waters.

It began mounting night attacks on tankers using its small surface combatants to launch Sea

Killer missiles. These sea skimmers had been sold to Iran before the fall of the Shah and

could be mounted both on helicopters and surface ships. They accounted for several ships in

night attacks made during throughout 1986. Besides its Phantoms and missile boats, Iran

also used helicopters for shipping attacks. These were usually made in daylight by some of

the Iranian Navy's rotary-wing aircraft based on Rostam Island, Abu Musa, and Sassan
153

Island just to the east of the Strait of Hormuz. The Agusta-Bell AB-212 helicopters had a

combat radius of about sixty miles and could be adapted to fire AS-12, Maverick, or Sea

Skimmer missiles. Iran also acquired a limited night air warfare capability in June 1986

when the AB-212 pilots got night vision goggles. This enabled them to fire their short-range

wire-guided AS-12 missiles at maritime targets under the cover of darkness. The helicopters

attacked a Greek freighter off Dubai in August and the British Pawnee in same vicinity on

September 25, 1986. The helicopter threat was limited, however, because of the AB-212s'

short range and endurance. In early November 1986, Kuwait asked Britain, China, France,

the Soviet Union and the United States for help in dealing with this threat. The Kuwaitis

wanted to either charter vessels from these nations or put their own ships under another

country's flag. The Soviets said "yes." Three Soviet tankers began Persian Gulf operations

under charter to Kuwait. Three Soviet minesweepers convoyed them. Earlier, the Soviets had

sent fifty combat aircraft into Iran's airspace after a May 6 Iranian attack on a Soviet-flag

vessel. Britain also chartered three tankers to the Kuwaitis and France said it would

seriously consider Kuwait's request. The Chinese said that they would try to help, but had

no tankers or warships in the Persian Gulf area. Then the United States, to keep Soviet

influence in the Gulf from growing, offered to assist Kuwait. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

declared that they would protect ships under their flags. This effectively put the two

superpowers on Iraq's side, since only Iran was attacking shipping that was not en route to

or from one of the two belligerents' ports.52

In 1987 the Iraqi Air Force continued its campaign against Iran's oil terminals and

the tankers associated with them. On May 17, 1987, Iraqi aircraft attacked two tankers. The

vessels were about thirty to forty miles north of the United States Navy frigate Stark, which

was on radar picket duty in the southern Gulf. A few hours later another Iraqi Mirage

launched two Exocets at the Stark from a distance of ten to twelve miles. A U.S. AWACS

aircraft with a joint American-Saudi crew had tracked the F1-EQ as it flew south along the

western edge of the Gulf toward the destroyer. Its track was not remarkable. During the

previous nine months, more than 330 Iraqi missions had followed the same path before

turning to search for or strike Iranian targets on the eastern side of the gulf. The AWACS

aircraft alerted the Stark to the presence of the Iraqi plane. Standing operating procedures

called for both Iranian and Iraqi aircraft to be considered potentially hostile, but the Stark

did not immediately prepare for anti-air warfare. The frigate's air search radar acquired the

F1 when it was only seventy miles away, although a passive electronic warfare (EW) device

had identified the F1's Cyrano-4 target acquisition radar at about 9:05 p.m. local time. At

this point the ship's Tactical Action Officer (TAO) ordered the Stark's own fire control system

to lock on to the approaching plane but the ship's superstructure blocked the system's

primary radar. The TAO then directed that a secondary radar to be used. When the Watch

Supervisor alerted him that the Mirage had come within Exocet range, the TAO ordered the

ship's Phalanx close-in weapons system, three-inch gun, Standard missile system, and

Harpoon missiles to lock on to the aircraft. After the EW operator reported at 9:11 p.m. that

the Cyrano had switched from search to lock mode, the TAO approved a request to prepare

the ship's chaff launchers. The Cyrano radar switched from lock to search mode and back.

About ten seconds after the Mirage's radar switched back to lock mode, the first Exocet hit

the ship. A lookout spotted the missile. He later recounted seeing a small blue dot that

became a fireball approaching from an angle of ten to thirty degrees to port off the bow. The

sailor screamed "Inbound missile, inbound missile!" and hit the deck. When he did not hear

an explosion, he got to his feet, only to be knocked down by the denotation of an Exocet's

warhead. Both missiles fired on May 17 struck the Stark about 9:12 p.m. The first Exocet
154

entered the hull about six feet above the waterline. It hurtled through the forward berthing

area, barber shop, mail room, radar and Combat Information Center equipment

compartment, and punched its way out through the starboard side of the hull. A majority of

the sailors killed in the missile attack died in the forward berthing compartment. The second

missile hit the ship's superstructure below the bridge about thirty seconds later and exploded.

The blast ruptured a fire main, made it impossible to steer the ship from the bridge, and

threw several crew members overboard. Rescuers retrieved only five from the water. Iraq

claimed that the attack, which left thirty-seven American sailors dead, was unintentional.53

This and Iranian counterattacks on neutral shipping led the United States, in May

1987, to reflag eleven Kuwaiti tankers. The reflagging provided a rationale for active

American Navy protection of the ships as they plied Persian Gulf waters. At this point, Iran

announced that it could make a distinction between the land war, which it would continue

until victorious, and the "tanker war." It would halt the latter, if Iraq would stop assailing

its oil assets. After a lull during which its air force briefly resurrected the "War of the Cities,"

Iraq renewed tanker attacks. On June 19-20 Iraqi aircraft hit the Iranian shuttle tanker

Tenacity with an Exocet. This occurred just as Iranian oil exports had begun to approach

Iran's Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) authorized level of 2.3 million

bpd for the first time and when tanker insurance premiums had been slightly reduced. The

first U.S. Navy close escort of Kuwaiti-flagged tankers began on July 22, 1987. Tankers

carrying Iranian oil continued to suffer. The shipping war intensified in early September.

Iraqi planes struck tankers, oil facilities in the Gulf, and Iranian shore facilities and factories

between August 29 and September 1. In one twenty-four-hour period, Iraq attacked seven

ships while Iran hit two tankers. In all, twenty ships fell victim to air and surface attack

between August 27 and September 3, 1987. On October 5, Iraq began a new series of raids

on tankers loading near Larak. They hit the Seawise Giant, used as a transfer point, and may

have damaged four more tankers. Between October 5-8, Iraq sent out up to fifty sorties a day

in its maritime economic campaign. Both sides continued to attack shipping in November and

December. These raids comprised 60 percent of all vessel attacks conducted by both sides in

1987. A United States Senate report subsequently estimated that a total of 162 ships was

attacked in 1987. Other postwar analyses produced varying estimates of Iranian oil exports

in 1987. The most conservative suggested that Iran was limited to shipping about 800,000

barrels of oil per day. This amount could not produce enough revenue to sustain the nation's

infrastructure, much less finance a war.54

The Tanker War continued into 1988. About ninety ships suffered air attacks between

January 1 and July 20, 1988. A notable one came on March 19 when Iraqi aircraft raided

Kharg, burned two tankers, and killed forty-six sailors. On May 14, 1988, Iraqi aircraft hit

five tankers at Larak. Fifty-three sailors died in the raid. On July 31, 1988, Iraq announced

an end to its attacks on shipping, but a final strike occurred on August 4. Since the beginning

of the "Tanker War" in May 1981, both sides had attacked a total of about 540 ships.55

The eight-year war had exhausted the two belligerents. Both Iraq and Iran probably

welcomed the international pressure that pushed them into a grudging armistice in the

summer of 1988. On August 20, a United Nations-sponsored cease-fire went into effect. A

United Nations observer group took up stations along the Iran-Iraq border. Direct talks

between Iran and Iraq began in Geneva on August 25.56

Neither Iran nor Iraq achieved their war aims. Iraq had anticipated a brief two-week

campaign in 1980 that would take advantage of an Iran in chaos. Instead, its invasion

provoked an exhausting and expensive conflict. At times it threatened Iraq's national

survival. The Hussein regime ended the war with more than $40 billion in war debts, but as
155

one of the strongest military powers in the region. On August 2, 1990, Iraq would move into

Kuwait, trying once again to use its military for invasion of a neighbor. Again, the results

were catastrophic for Iraq. Iran was, at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, more than $650 billion

in debt, absolute poverty had spread to between 65 and 75 percent of its total population, and

40 to 60 percent of its military equipment which it had at the outset of the war was

destroyed, captured, or damaged. Equipment purchased up to 1979 from the United States

by the Shah's government that was not otherwise damaged had become unserviceable and

needed to be replaced. The cost of rebuilding its oil installations alone was estimated to

exceed $25 billion.57

The Iraqi air campaign against Persian Gulf shipping achieved its two goals:

disruption of Iran's economy and internationalization of the war. One analyst described it as

the only instance in which air power alone conducted a successful economic blockade.58

The execution of that blockade, however, must be evaluated in context. One of the

most important factors influencing Iraq's success was attaining air supremacy. By 1984, when

the "Tanker War" was initiated in earnest, the Iranian Air Force no longer had the resources

to contest attacks on marine oil terminals and shipping in the Persian Gulf. Four years of

war also brought Iraq to the point of acquiring at least twenty Mirage F-1s configured for

anti-shipping work and employing them efficiently. The helicopters armed with precision

munitions led the way, but were limited by range and endurance. The five Super Étendards

leased from France in 1983 provided additional role models. They were not present in

sufficient numbers or employed effectively enough to achieve all that was desired. The Iraqis

used the SÉs very conservatively. Students of the conflict give two reasons for this. The first

was political control that inhibited exposing the aircraft to high risks. The second was the

state of training in the Iraqi Air Force. It took an almost concurrent relaxation of political

controls, French and Indian training of Iraqi pilots, and acquisition of new aircraft to provide

Iraq with a potent land-based aerial force that could be consistently effective in a maritime

campaign. Even then, Iraq applied the force in an "on-again, off-again" manner that took into

consideration the sensibilities of its covert supporters in the Arab world. The air-sea

campaign reflected the escalation techniques that had failed the United States so miserably

in the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, it did succeed (in combination with assaults on inland oil

facilities) in devastating Iran's petroleum-based economy. The strategy also drew the world's

strongest military powers into the conflict as covert supporters of Iraq and intensified

international pressure to end the war.

157

Endnotes to Chapter VII

1. Sreedhar Kapil Kaul, Tanker War: Aspect of Iraq-Iran War 1980-1988 (New Delhi, India:

ABC Publishing House, 1989), p. 1. Kaul developed his estimate of the total number of 437

ships attacked from a review of News Review on West Asia and Middle East Economic Survey.

Lloyds Shipping Corporation estimated “more than 500 ships.” Cmdr (JAG) David L. Peace,

USN, "Major Maritime Events in the Persian Gulf War," Proceedings of the 82nd Annual

Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Washington, D.C.: American Society

of International Law, 1990), p. 147.

2. Capt Thomas M. Daly, USN, "The Enduring Gulf War," United States Naval Institute

Proceedings, Naval Review (1985): 152.

3. Tom Baranuskas, "Air Power in the Iran-Iraq War," Asian Defence Journal 3 (March 1987):

52; Victor Flintham, ed., Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the

Present (New York: Facts on File, 1990), p. 171.

4. Baranuskas, "Air Power in the Iran-Iraq War," p. 54; Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), p. 128; Maj. Douglas A.

Kupersmith, USAF, The Failure of Third World Air Power: Iraq and the War with Iran

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1993), p. 20.

5. Kupersmith, USAF, The Failure of Third World Air Power: Iraq and the War with Iran,

p. 2.

6. Ibid., p. 20.

7. Baranuskas, "Air Power in the Iran-Iraq War," p. 54; William O. Staudenmaier, "A

Strategic Analysis," in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Auybi, eds., The Iran-Iraq War: New

Weapons, Old Conflicts (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 42.

8. Robert Gaunt, "War in the Shallow Seas-Maritime Air Operations in the Iran-Iraq War,"

Defense & Foreign Affairs 13 (October 1985): 28-29.

9. Cmdr William L. Dowdy III, USNR, "Naval Warfare in the Gulf: Iraq Versus Iran," United

States Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1981): 114.

10. Ibid., p. 115. Iraq claimed to have destroyed six of Iran's eight frigates, but Iran

subsequently had as many as three patrolling the Strait of Hormuz simultaneously. Iran

claimed to have destroyed 20 Iraqi missile patrol boats, but Iraq started the war with only

14 of these craft. Confusion over the types of vessels engaged and the results of combat, are

not unusual in naval battles, particularly when some of the reporting is provided by aerial

forces not trained for air-sea warfare.

11. Shahram Chubin and Charles Trip, Iran and Iraq at War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview

Press, 1988), p. 134.

12. Raphael Danziger, "The Persian Gulf Tanker War," United States Naval Institute

Proceedings, Naval Review (1985): 163; Dowdy, "Naval Warfare in the Gulf: Iraq Versus

Iran," p. 115; Daly, "The Enduring Gulf War," p. 153; Peace, "Major Maritime Events in the

Persian Gulf War," p. 147; David Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: a Military Analysis," Foreign

Affairs 66 (5) (1988): 959. Middle East politics, however, resulted in Kuwait selling 400,000

bpd of oil on behalf of Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Jordan also allowed cargo bound for Iraq to

pass through their ports.

13. Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: a Military Analysis," p. 959; Anthony H. Cordesman, The IranIraq War and Western Security: Strategic Implications and Policy Options (New York: Jane's

Publishing, Inc., 1987), p. 81.

14. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, pp. 55-65.
158

15. John D. Morocco, "Missile Attack, Kuwait Pact Could Draw U.S. Into Gulf War," Aviation

Week & Space Technology 126(21) (May 25, 1987): 23-24.

16. Danziger, "The Persian Gulf Tanker War," p. 161.

17. Chubin and Trip, Iran and Iraq at War, pp. 292-94; Peace, "Major Maritime Events in the

Persian Gulf War," p. 147.

18. John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, The Gulf War: Its Origins, History, and Consequences

(London: Methuen, 1989), p. 173; Anthony J. Watts, “The Gulf War: Economic War at Sea,”

in A. J. Ambrose, ed., Jane's Merchant Shipping Review (New York: Jane's Publishing, Inc.,

1985), p. 99.

19. A. D. Bartlett III, "Combat Fleets," Naval Institute Proceedings 122 (10/1,112) (October

1996): 94; Military Technology 12 (January 1988): 247. The Italian Navy eventually took over

the four frigates while Italian courts turned over custody of the other vessels to Fincantieri,

the shipbuilder.

20. Watts, “The Gulf War: Economic War at Sea,” pp. 97-98; Chubin and Trip, Iran and Iraq

at War, p. 209; Gaunt, "War in the Shallow Seas-Maritime Air Operations in the Iran-Iraq

War," p. 159; United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign

Affairs, Overview of the Situation in the Persian Gulf: Hearings and Markup on the

Committee on Foreign Affairs

and Its Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security, and Science and on Europe

and on the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1987),

p. 5.

21. Thomas J. Abercrombie, "The Persian Gulf," National Geographic 173 (5) (May 1988): 653;

Daly, "The Enduring Gulf War," pp. 150, 155-56.

22. Daly, "The Enduring Gulf War," p. 152; United States Congress, House of

Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Overview of the Situation in the Persian Gulf,

pp. 1, 5.

23. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, p. 66; Edgar O'Ballance, The Gulf War (London: Brassey's

Defence Publishers, 1988), p. 154.

24. Ambrose, Jane's Merchant Shipping Review, p. 99; Nick Cook, “Iran-Iraq, the Air War,

International Defense Review (November 1984): 1605. Cook explains that translation from

Arabic to English resulted in confusion of terms, as “bahria,” which in Arabic literally means

“of the sea” was usually translated Iraqi State Radio shipping attack reports as “naval,”

which is only one of its meanings.

25. Ambrose, Jane's Merchant Shipping Review, p. 100; Jan S. Breemer, "The Persian Gulf:

The Tanker War," Sea Power 28 (April 15, 1985): 53.

26. Ambrose, Jane's Merchant Shipping Review, pp. 100-1; Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War,

p. 66; Daly, "The Enduring Gulf War," p. 157; Capt John Moore, RN, ed., Jane's Naval

Review (New York: Jane's Publishing, 1985), p. 58. Some accounts state that the Filikon L.

was a tanker, but Jane's, which identifies the ship as a bulk carrier, has been accepted as

authoritative.

27. Kaul, Tanker War: Aspect of Iraq-Iran War 1980-1988, p. 7; United States Congress,

House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Overview of the Situation in the

Persian Gulf, p. 8.

28. Ambrose, Jane's Merchant Shipping Review, pp. 100-1; Baranauskas, "Air Power in the

Iran-Iraq War," p. 55; Breemer, "The Persian Gulf: the Tanker War," p. 53; Cordesman, The

Iran-Iraq War, p. 107; Danziger, "The Persian Gulf Tanker War," p. 165; Gaunt, "War in the

Shallow Seas-Maritime Air Operations in the Iran-Iraq War," p. 30; Moore, Naval Review,

1985, p. 58.
159

29. Baranuskas, "Air Power in the Iran-Iraq War," p. 55; Breemer, "The Persian Gulf: the

Tanker War," pp. 55-56; Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, p. 68; Danziger, "The Persian Gulf

Tanker War," pp. 166-67.

30. Breemer, "The Persian Gulf: the Tanker War," p. 50; Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, p.

66.

31. Breemer, "The Persian Gulf: the Tanker War," pp. 55-56.

32. Ibid., pp. 50, 55; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York:

Routledge, 1988), pp. 129, 166; Lisa Manetti, Iran and Iraq: Nations at War (New York:

Franklin Watts, 1986), p. 50.

33. Ambrose, Jane's Merchant Shipping Review, pp. 101-2.

34. Bullock and Morris, The Gulf War: Its Origins, History, and Consequences, p. 172;

Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, p. 67; Hiro, The Longest War: the Iran-Iraq Military Conflict,

p. 131.

35. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, p. 67.

36. Ibid..

37. Bullock and Morris, The Gulf War: Its Origin, History, and Consequences, p. 176;

Danziger, "The Persian Gulf Tanker War," p. 162.

38. O'Ballance, The Gulf War, pp. 184-85.

39. Chubin and Trip, Iran and Iraq at War, p. 135.

40. Gaunt, "War in the Shallow Seas-Maritime Air Operations in the Iran-Iraq War," p. 30.

41. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, p. 85.

42. Baranuskas, "Air Power in the Iran-Iraq War," p. 55; Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, p.

100; Maj. Stephan C. Pelleiter, USA, and Lt. Col. Douglas V. Johnson III, Lessons Learned

from the Iran-Iraq War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, Strategic Studies

Institute, 1991), p. 108; United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on

Foreign Affairs, Overview of the Situation in the Persian Gulf, p. 6.

43. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, pp. 100-1.

44. G. H. Jansen, "Taking Out Kharg," Middle East International, No. 259 (Sep. 27, 1985),

no page number.

45. Baranuskas, "Air Power in the Iran-Iraq War," p. 59; Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, p.

106; "In Harm's Way; Iraqi Pilots Strike Hard at Iran," Time 128 (Aug. 25, 1986), p. 40.

46. Chubin and Trip, Iran and Iraq at War, p. 135.

47. Ibid.; Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, pp.84-85; O'Ballance, The Gulf War, p. 171.

48. Chubin and Trip, Iran and Iraq at War, p. 136; Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, p.75, p.

81; Gaunt, "War in the Shallow Seas-Maritime Air Operations in the Iran-Iraq War," p. 31.

49. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, pp. 81-82.

50. Ibid., p. 84; Chubin and Trip, Iran and Iraq at War, p. 173; 51. Sharough Akhavi,

"Institutionalizing the New World Order in Iran," Current History 86 (571) (February 1987):

55; Frederick W. Axelgard, "Iraq and the War with Iran," Current History 86 (571) (February

1987): 59; Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, pp. 111-12.

52. Bullock and Morris, The Gulf War: Its Origins, History, and Consequences, pp. xxii-xvii;

Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War, p. 107, p. 132; Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf and the West:

Strategic Relations and Military Realities (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 347;

O'Ballance, The Gulf War, pp. 182-83, 204-5; United States Senate, Subcommittee on

Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Presence in the Persian Gulf: Cost and Policy

Implications (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, January 1988),

pp. 8-9.
160

53. John D. Morocco, "Missile Attack, Kuwait Pack Could Draw U.S. Into Gulf War," p. 24;

United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, War in the Persian Gulf: the U.S.

Takes Sides: A Staff Report (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,

1987), pp. 12-19; United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign

Affairs, Overview of the Situation in the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: United States

Government Printing Office, 1987), pp. 3-13.

54. Cordesman, The Gulf and the West, pp. 395, 410, 421; Pelletiere and Johnson, Lessons

Learned from the Iran-Iraq War, p. 108; United States Senate, Subcommittee on Defense,

U.S. Presence in the Persian Gulf: Cost and Policy Implications, p. 6.

55. Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, eds., Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. XII (1988)

(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 211; Chubin and Trip, Iran and Iraq at War, p. 61,

pp. 299-300; Cordesman, The Gulf and the West, p. 430.

56. "Iran-Iraq Cease-fire: UN Conducts Peace Talks in Geneva, New York," UN Chronicle

25(4) (December 1988): 1.

57. Dariush Zahedi and Ahmad Ghoreishi, "Iran's Security Concerns in the Persian Gulf,"

Naval War College Review XLIX, No. 3 Sequence 355 (Summer 1996): 76, 82; "Inshalla, it's

over," The Economist 308 (7563) (August 13, 1988): 33.

58. Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," p. 960.
161

CHAPTER VIII

COLD WAR APPLICATIONS

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States both ultimately

developed significant applications of land-based aerial forces to maritime operations during

their long and bitter Cold War (1947-1990). They did so in varying ways, for different

purposes and historical reasons. This examination focuses on the development of land-based

aerial forces for surveillance of and strikes against surface ships. Antisubmarine warfare, in

an era of true submersibles, requires coordinated surveillance in three dimensions and lies

beyond the scope of this chapter.

The USSR was a continental power. Its fundamental naval requirement was to

prevent hostile naval forces from approaching close enough to its shores to launch aircraft

that could raid or amphibious forces that could invade the homeland. Soviet naval missions

of force projection and presence were secondary to that basic requirement. These conditions

had existed since the founding of the Soviet Union in 1917. Because of that background, the

USSR historically had little impetus to develop sea-based aviation. There is little evidence

to suggest that this past lack of involvement with sea-based aviation would have prevented

the USSR from developing an aircraft carrier force if it had needed one.

The United States, in contrast to the USSR, was and is a maritime power. Its

fundamental naval requirement is multifaceted. US naval elements have not only to protect

sea lanes of communication that connect it with allies, but also to project force in areas of the

world that are inaccessible to its land-based air and ground units. These geopolitical

conditions have been present for most of the United States' existence. Because of them, the

United States took the lead in developing sea-based aviation almost from the inception of

military aviation. The precedent set by the great carrier battles of World War II in the Pacific

and the postwar struggles to define and establish an independent air force did influence the

composition of US forces during the Cold War. The United States could, if national survival

required it, have developed more extensive land-based aerial forces for maritime operations.

The Cold War rarely involved direct combat between armed forces of the two

superpowers. Instances that occurred were usually limited to destruction of reconnaissance

aircraft that violated national air space. The Cold War did entail included constant search,

surveillance, and simulated strike and defense exercises between land-based air and naval

units. For a variety of reasons, however, the lessons of World War II about the usefulness of

land-based aviation in maritime operations were not immediately applied to the Cold War

by either side.

Soviet Land-Based Maritime Aerial Forces

It was only in the early 1950s, several years after the onset of the Cold War, that

analysis of the nuclear threat posed by U.S. fast carrier groups triggered an expansion of

Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) and the maritime capabilities of Soviet Long Range Aviation

(SLRA). Prior to this time SNA consisted of fighters and light bombers suitable for coastal

defense. In the face of the new nuclear threat, the Soviets searched for alternative defenses.

They decided to rely on long-range cruise missiles launched from small-to-medium size

surface ships, diesel submarines, and land-based aircraft to destroy American carriers. In

1954 Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Marshal Georgii Zhukhov agreed to transfer

several hundred land-based bombers to the Soviet naval air force.1
162

After the U.S. launched its first Forrestal-class carrier in 1955 and assigned carrier

aircraft a nuclear strike mission, the Soviets carried out the Khrushchev-Zhukhov decision.

That year SNA received its first regiment of Tu-16 (Badger) twin-jet medium range bombers

and their aircrews from Long Range Aviation. The slender and graceful Badgers thereafter

became a familiar sight to NATO naval personnel. The Tu-16s initially had the capacity only

to drop free-fall bombs. By 1961, some (Badger Bs) carried AS-1 Kennel anti-ship cruise

missiles with ranges of more than 50 miles. Each Badger B could carry two missiles. Other

Tu-16s (Badger Ds) had electronic gear that enabled them to guide air-to-surface missiles.

The Badgers had a combat radius of about 2,000 miles unrefueled. Four-engine Tu-95 Bear

D turboprop aircraft (range 7,800 miles) and M-4 Bison C turbojet aircraft (range 7,000 miles)

dedicated to maritime reconnaissance complemented the Tu-16 strike force. The huge Bears,

reminiscent of an enlarged World War II-vintage bomber, proved to be an effective and

durable aircraft. The Bison, with two jet engines mounted on each wing, first flew in 1953.

Soviet Naval Aviation received its first Tu-95 Bears in the early 1960s. Although they could

have been armed with AS-2 (Kipper) air-to-surface missiles like the Badger C, the Tu-95s

were not. Instead, the Soviet Union's naval air force focused them on reconnaissance,

surveillance, and mid-course targeting for missiles launched from the Badgers. Other SNA

aircraft included twin-engine Be 10 and 12 amphibians configured for antisubmarine warfare

(ASW), Il-28 light jet bombers equipped to carry torpedoes, helicopters with an ASW role, and

a number of transports. Fighter and light attack aircraft, which had formerly constituted

SNA's main strength, transferred to the Soviet Air Force's air defense command.2

In the 1960s SNA had about 750 aircraft committed to anti-carrier and antisubmarine

warfare. Of these, approximately fifty fixed-wing and 100 helicopters were dedicated to ASW.

Another 100 fixed-wing aircraft had long-range reconnaissance and refueling missions. By

1969, the total number of Soviet naval aircraft had declined to 350, but many were armed

with AS-4 (Kitchen) air-to-surface missiles, which had ranges of up to 285 miles at high

altitude and 185 miles at low altitude. The nearly ten-foot-long Kitchen could carry either a

350-kiloton nuclear warhead or a 2,200-pound high explosive warhead at a maximum speed

of Mach 4.6.3

Soviet naval aviation personnel totaled about 59,000. SNA personnel trained in Soviet

Air Force schools. A year's orientation at Nikolayev Naval Air Base, on the Black Sea,

followed graduation. Naval air units organized as regiments, which reported to an air division

commander. That officer, in turn, reported to a Fleet Commander of Naval Aviation whose

superior was the Fleet Chief of Staff. Most SNA strike aircraft were assigned to the

Northern Fleet and based on the Kola Peninsula. They were primarily a threat to North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in the Norwegian Sea.4

SNA aircraft gradually assumed a worldwide role. Tu-16s flew to Egypt's Cairo West

airfield for the first time in April 1968. Il-38 May ASW aircraft also operated after that from

Cairo West and Mersa Matruh on the Mediterranean coast. The four-engine turboprop Mays

looked much like a civilian airliner except for the large radar dome under the forward

fuselage and a Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) stinger protruding from the tail. Before

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat canceled Soviet basing rights in Egypt in July 1972, the

Soviets used the Egyptian airfields to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance over the

eastern Mediterranean. Guinea, on Africa's west coast, gave Soviet Naval Aviation landing

rights in 1973. Pairs of Tu-95s deployed periodically to Conakry, Guinea's capital, from the

Kola Peninsula. Bears also operated out of Luanda, Angola, beginning in 1977. Luanda was

beyond nonstop range for the Tu-95s, so Bears deploying to Angola after SNA rights in

Guinea were canceled staged through Cuba. A pair of An-12 Cubs carrying spare parts, repair
 U.S. intelligence analysts first designated the Backfire as "Tu-26," but later accepted

the Soviet nomenclature of "Tu-22M" as presented in arms control talks.

163

equipment, and specialist personnel supported the deployed Bears. Doors in the bottom of the

fuselage that allowed loading from trucks on the ground or air dropping of supplies

characterized the four-engine turboprop transport. When the long-range reconnaissance

aircraft flew simultaneously from Olenegorsk, Cuba, and Angola, the Soviets had

comprehensive coverage of NATO naval activity in the North and South Atlantic.5 The SNA

also received basing rights in Somalia, on Africa's east coast. The Somalis asked the Soviets

to leave in 1977. Thereafter Soviet Naval Aviation deployed reconnaissance aircraft to Aden

and Ethiopia for Indian Ocean patrols.6

Soviet Naval Aviation maritime reconnaissance and surveillance also quickly moved

into the Western Hemisphere. In April 1970, a pair of Bear Ds flew nonstop from their

base on the Kola Peninsula above the Arctic Circle to Cuba. This initial deployment to North

America took place in connection with the Soviet Navy's first worldwide exercise, "Okean 70."

The first two Bears landed at Havana's Jose Marti Airport on April 18. A second pair of

Bears landed in Cuba on April 25 and a third pair landed on May 13. Other Bears followed

to establish a reconnaissance route off North America's Atlantic coast. Typical missions

departed Olenegorsk on the Kola Peninsula, flew over the Norwegian Sea and through the

Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. They penetrated the U.S. Atlantic Coastal

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) near Newfoundland. During these flights the Soviet

crews monitored electronic signals and radio transmissions, took photographs, and recorded

radar images. They also noted U.S. response time, type of responding aircraft, and significant

markings and other data of interceptor aircraft. After the initial deployments, OlenegorskCuba reconnaissance flights occurred during times of increased U.S.-USSR tensions or major

U.S. or NATO naval exercises. Once in Cuba, Soviet naval air force planes operated from

San Antonio de los Banos military airfield southwest of Havana. From there they conducted

tactical reconnaissance missions along the east coast of the United States and over the

Caribbean. The tactical flights reflected interest in the activities of U.S. Navy surface ships,

particularly aircraft carriers. In the mid 1970s a possibility arose that Chile might allow

Soviet naval aircraft to stage from there, but it disappeared when a coup overthrew the

Allende regime. Bears began conducting surveillance missions of the U.S. Seventh Fleet from

Vietnam's Cam Rahn Bay and Da Nang airfields in the late 1970s.7

The 1970s saw a significant increase in Soviet Naval Air Force capabilities. In 1973,

SNA received Tu-142 Bear Fs. This updated ASW version of the Tu-95 had a radius of 3,500

miles unrefueled. New submarine detection devices, advanced sonobuoys, and magnetic

anomaly detection (MAD) equipment enhanced its capabilities.8

The Tu-22M** ** Backfire bomber joined the SNA inventory in late 1974. For the first

time, Soviet Naval Aviation received delivery of a new aircraft at the same time as Long

Range Aviation. Aircraft coming off the production line were split equally between SNA and

LRA. By May of 1976, eighty Backfires were operational. Deliveries of Backfires to naval

aviation continued at the rate of about fifteen per year. Those sent to SNA had a primary

anti-ship mission, while those sent to LRA had a collateral anti-ship mission. The swept-wing

twin-engine jets could operate at low altitude, attain transonic dash speed, and reach an

unrefueled range of 3,240 miles. The Backfire's top speed at high altitude was 1150 knots and

600 knots at sea level. Its armament included two AS-4 or AS-6 (Kerry) cruise missiles. The

Kerry had speeds between Mach 2.5 (2,500 miles-per-hour) to 3.5 and a range of at least 300
164

nautical miles. The Kitchen could fly as a drone, skimming across the water, or as a ballistic

missile with a rocket's trajectory. The Kerry had an active radar homing system and could

carry either nuclear or conventional warheads in its anti-ship configuration.9

Air refueling offered the possibility of extending a Backfire's radius by as much as

1,000 miles. This would have permitted interdiction of European sea lanes from northern

Russia via the Denmark Strait. A typical scenario proposed by defense writers of the time

suggested that Backfires could depart bases on the Kola Peninsula and climb to an optimum

cruising altitude and speed of 30,000 feet and about 500 knots. As they approached the gap

between the Faeroes and Iceland, they would drop to 8,000 feet to avoid radar detection. On

reaching a rally point preparatory to launching an attack on a satellite, Badger, or Bearlocated NATO convoy, the Backfires would quickly climb to 45,000 feet and power-up to a

speed of 1,000 knots. At a range of 150 nautical miles, a formation of thirty Backfires could

fire sixty missiles that would quickly overwhelm a convoy's point defense weapons. As the

missiles traveled toward their targets at supersonic speed, the Backfires could reverse course

and outrun any intercept aircraft launched from a convoy's escort carrier. In the Pacific,

Backfires could roam almost at will over the sea lanes between North America and Japan,

beyond the reach of any land-based intercept aircraft.10

Halfway through the 1970s Soviet naval aviation had 1,200 aircraft, 50,000 people,

and a greater combat strength than Britain's Royal Air Force. In "Okean 75," Soviet

commanders used satellites and global communications to move their air and naval units

against simulated naval and land forces worldwide. The exercise involved more than 200

Soviet nuclear submarines, a number of surface ship task groups, and 400 aircraft. The

aircraft operated from bases in the Soviet Union, Cuba, Guinea, and Somalia. While Badgers

flew close to Eurasian shores, Bears conducted long-range reconnaissance missions. Soviet

naval aircraft flew over the North Atlantic, the North Pacific, and the northeastern part of

the Indian Ocean. Soviet Naval Aviation had demonstrated its ability to reach ships almost

anywhere in the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, Norwegian Sea, and North Sea. Tactics used

in its exercises reflected plans for coordinated mass air strikes and submarine attacks against

Allied carrier battle groups. Tu-126 Moss airborne command, control, and communications

(AWACS) aircraft enhanced the capabilities of the SNA aircraft. The AWACS planes belonged

to the Soviet Air Force, but frequently operated over water in maritime reconnaissance

missions.11

The North Atlantic phase of Okean '75 began with aircraft and satellite

reconnaissance. Then Il-38 Mays flew antisubmarine patrols to clear the way for a cruiser

group supported by naval aircraft that entered the Norwegian Sea from the north. Another

Soviet force sailing northeast from Iceland simulated NATO forces. The mock combat ended

when Soviet Naval Aviation strike aircraft launched live missiles that received in-flight

guidance from other planes. In the Pacific, Okean '75 was primarily a command, control, and

communications exercise. Bears, Mays, and satellites communicated data to Berbera,

Somalia, Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean, and Moscow.12

By 1977 Soviet Naval Aviation deployed more than 600 combat aircraft. Of these, 275

to 280 were Badgers configured for strike missions. The majority carried the AS-5 Kelt

missile with a range of 176 nautical miles. About fifty were the new Tu-22M Backfires armed

with AS-4 Kerry missiles. The remainder of SNA's strike planes was a mix of short-range Il28 Beagle and Tu-22 Blinder bombers, long-range Tu-95 Bears, and Su-19 Fencer and Mig-23

Flogger fighter-bombers. The Blinders, of which there were about forty, carried free-fall

bombs. Another 200 Badgers and Bears equipped for tanker, reconnaissance, and electronic

warfare missions supported the attack aircraft. Some 170 fixed wing and 270 rotary wing
165

aircraft fulfilled antisubmarine warfare requirements. The open ocean component of the

Soviet Naval Air Force's ASW effort consisted of about fifteen Tu-95s, fifty-five Il-38s, and

100 Be-12s. About 200 land-based helicopters provided ASW coverage close to Soviet coasts.13

The Soviet Naval Air Force deployed all but a quarter of its attack aircraft and their

supporting cohorts in the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets. The Northern Fleet had 80

strike aircraft; the Baltic Fleet 130 fighter and strike aircraft; the Black Sea Fleet had 110

fighter and strike aircraft; and the Pacific Fleet had 100 strike aircraft.14 Addition of the Su17 Fitter C strengthened SNA's fighter inventory in late 1977 or early 1978. Western analysts

suggested that this swing-wing jet fighter-bomber, able to carry about carry 8,000 pounds of

ordnance and capable of Mach 2-plus speed, might be used for support of Soviet naval

infantry in operations on the Baltic. The Fitters, armed with missiles and rockets, were also

capable of short-range anti-ship strikes. They could carry ten AS-7 air-to-surface missiles, or

thirty-two 57-mm rockets, or bombs, in addition to two 30-mm cannon. Their laser range

finders and automatic fire control systems gave them the capability to operate in conditions

of low ceilings and poor visibility.15

Soviet Naval Aviation's primary mission remained the destruction of NATO carrier

task groups which could threaten its homeland. Secondary missions included destruction of

other enemy surface ships, interdiction of sea lanes, and destruction of maritime facilities

such as ports and naval bases. It was impossible by the end of the 1970s for ships to sail from

the United States to northwestern Europe or Japan without coming within reach of Soviet

Naval Aviation's Backfires and Bears.16

SNA's expanded capabilities enabled it not only to increasingly threaten Western

naval forces and shipping. They provided expanded protection for Soviet Navy vessels as they

maneuvered all over the globe. In the Far East, Japanese Self Defense Force planes

scrambled nearly 650 times between 1976 and 1980 when Soviet planes penetrated the

Japanese Air Defense Identification Zone. Many of these penetrations occurred as SNA

aircraft escorted Soviet Pacific Fleet surface ships and submarines from their bases on the

Kamchatka Peninsula to the open sea.17

The last decade of the Cold War saw even more maritime activity by Soviet land-based

aerial forces. By 1981, Soviet Naval Aviation had about seventy-five Backfire aircraft.

Western defense writer and naval expert Norman Polmar announced that they were the

"major Soviet threat to the US surface fleet." At this time only the U.S. Navy's F-14 Tomcat

coupled with the Phoenix/AWG-9 missile and Aegis shipboard radar/missile system were

considered likely to be effective against the Backfires. But only seven of the Navy's thirteen

carriers had F-14 squadrons and the first Aegis ship was not expected to be completed until

1982. When Aegis cruisers (and later Aegis destroyers) did come on-line in the mid-1980s, a

carrier battle group's defense scenario against Backfires and ALCMs was complex. Aegis

radar operators watched for contacts at a distance of 400 miles from the center of the battle

group. The Backfires had to be detected far enough away for contact information to be

processed, decisions made, orders issued, and, if needed, the launch of additional intercept

planes. F-14 Tomcats flying combat air patrol (CAP), directed by one or two airborne E-2C

Hawkeyes, had to intercept the incoming aircraft before they could launch their missiles at

a distance of 200 miles or more from the battle group. If the intercepting aircraft failed to

prevent the launch of Soviet air-to-surface missiles, the Aegis cruisers and other vessels

escorting the battle group's carrier could fire Standard SM2 anti-aircraft missiles. The SM2s,

with a range of sixty miles, could knock down incoming missiles. Other SNA medium and

long-range aircraft in 1981 included 410 Tu-16 Badgers, 113 Tu-95 Bears, seventy-four M-4

Bisons, sixty Il-38 Mays, and twelve Tu-126 Moss (AWACS).18
166

Western intelligence analysts had predicted that the Soviet Navy would conduct

"Okean 80," an updated worldwide naval exercise which would expand on the activity of

"Okean 75." It did not take place. Instead, in 1981, the Soviets conducted "Zapad 81." This

exercise took place in the Baltic during July and August. It drew participants from all Soviet

fleets and the Soviet Air Force. Air operations involved Backfires, Badgers, and Fitter Cs plus

Forgers from the Soviet VSTOL (Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing) carrier Leningrad. The

maneuvers emphasized inter-service mutual support, amphibious assault, and testing of new

hardware under simulated combat conditions.19

Also in 1981, Bear Ds deployed permanently for the first time to Cuba. This increased

the ease and frequency with which they could conduct electronic-intelligence gathering and

reconnaissance missions along America's Atlantic coast. This was the year, too, that SNA

aircraft flew for the first time to Syria. After an initial deployment in June, Badgers, Mays,

Cubs, and Classics (Il-68 electronic warfare planes) continued to operate from Syrian fields.

Soviet naval air force Badgers and Mays staged from Syria in July 1981 to participate in a

Soviet-Bulgarian air and naval exercise west of Crete. In the same month, two Mays flew

from Syria to Libya, marking SNA's first deployment to that country.20

The Soviet's Union's Pacific Fleet appeared by 1982 to have acquired a regiment of the

capable Backfires.21 A Soviet Naval Aviation training evolution that year involved eight

Backfires that staged two practice attacks on the U.S. carriers Enterprise and Midway as

they steamed across the North Pacific. The Tu-22Ms made a high speed approach to the

carriers and simulated the launch of their air-to-surface missiles at a distance of more than

120 miles.22 On September 14, 1982, Japanese radar located a flight of eleven Backfires over

the Sea of Japan, about 250 miles northwest of Tokyo. Of the eleven, Japanese Air Self

Defense Force fighters managed to intercept five.23

In 1983, Badger C strike aircraft deployed for the first time to Vietnam's Cam Rahn

Bay air base. After that the Soviets maintained a force of sixteen Badgers, eight Bears, and

twelve to sixteen Mig-23s at the base. From there the bombers could threaten the

Philippines, Guam, and far-distant Yap in Micronesia. In a Soviet global readiness evolution

that same year, Backfires operated for the first time from the Kurile Islands. A worldwide

"Homeland Defense" exercise featured integration of aircraft, submarines, and surface ship

operations. As Soviet naval vessels emulating enemy carrier battle groups approached the

Soviet Union, submarines carrying cruise missiles and torpedoes engaged them. Then Soviet

Naval Aviation planes simulated stand-off missile launches. Finally, large surface warships

and missile-firing patrol boats completed the demonstration of a defense in depth.24

Japanese Self Defense Agency analysts concluded that by 1983 the Soviet Naval

Aviation inventory of Backfires in the Far East had increased to ninety aircraft. They

appeared to be based at Komosolmolsk, about 500 miles north of Vladivostok on the

Kamchatka Peninsula. In 1984, Japanese fighters intercepted a flight of at least twenty

Backfires 167 miles off Japan's west coast. Over the North Atlantic, more than fifty Backfires

and Badgers conducted mock attacks on Soviet surface ships. In April 1984, the Soviet Navy

conducted its largest exercise to date in the Atlantic.25

In 1985 training operations the Soviet carrier Novorossiysk assumed the role of an

enemy carrier approaching the Kurile Islands. About twenty Backfires responded with

simulated attacks. Simultaneously, Soviet submarines began torpedo and missile training

runs against the carrier. United States Navy officials described the exercises as "the most

extreme and realistic ever conducted by the Soviet Navy in the Pacific."26

According to two noted air power analysts, the basing of Backfires, Badgers, and Bears

at either end of the Soviet Union meant that "the long reach of the Soviet Naval Air Force
167

has . . . overcome many of the geographical handicaps which have vexed Russian admirals

since the time of Peter the Great." From their bases on the Arctic Ocean, Baltic Sea, Black

Sea, and Pacific Ocean, regiments of strike aircraft working with long-range reconnaissance

planes and airborne command, control, and communication platforms could concentrate naval

air power in a theater faster than surface units or submarines could assemble.27

Soviet Naval Aviation strike tactics seemed to change in the mid-1980s. Soviet

exercises observed by NATO previously suggested that unescorted Badgers and Backfires

would mass for anti-carrier strikes coordinated with missile-firing submarines. Surveillance

of Soviet training missions over the Norwegian Sea in 1987 showed that Su-27 Flanker

fighters had begun to escort Backfires and Badgers practicing anti-ship strikes. The Flankers,

with a range of about 600 miles, appeared capable of escorting the Soviet bombers to points

from which they could launch their cruise missiles against NATO ships or naval bases in

Iceland or on the Shetland or Faeroe Islands. The potential of the Flankers caused

reevaluation of NATO tactics designed to counter the Soviet Naval Aviation strike planes.

Their presence would mean that NATO fighters patrolling the GIUK gap to protect Allied

carrier battle groups, convoys, and surface action groups had first to engage Soviet fighters

before attacking bombers threatening ships. The Flanker threat also caused reevaluation of

plans for Harpoon missile strikes and sea mine-laying by NATO aerial forces operating on

NATO's northern flank. Harpoon missiles could carry a 500-pound conventional warhead and

were effective against ships because of terminal radar guidance.28

At the end of the Cold War, Soviet Naval Aviation had transformed itself from a

combination of fighters and light bombers suitable for inshore coastal defense to a worldwide

strike force. Its inventory at the end of the 1980s was extensive and capable. SNA's 290 long

and medium-range land-based strike aircraft included 130 Backfires, 135 Badgers, and

twenty-two Blinders. Short-range land-based strike aircraft included ninety-five Su-17

Fitters. Land-based combat support aircraft assigned to SNA included forty-eight Tu-16

Badger tankers; 130 Badgers, forty Tu-95 Bear Fs, five Tu-22 Blinders, and ten Su-24 Fencer

Es configured for reconnaissance, second-party targeting, and electronic warfare.

Antisubmarine warfare planes on SNA roles included fifty-five Tu-142 Bear Fs, forty-five Il38 Mays, ninety Be-12 Mays, and nearly 300 helicopters. In 1990, Admiral of the Soviet Fleet

V. N. Chernavin stated "the Navy has considerable firepower, high mobility, and the

capability to conduct combat operations in various areas of the World Ocean. Its main strike

force is submarines and cruise missiles and also missile-armed naval aircraft."29

American Land-Based Maritime Aerial Forces

The B–17 Flying Fortress, the long-awaited tool for delivery of strategic air power, was

in fact the result of a pre-World War II U.S. Army Air Corps design competition for an

offshore anti-shipping bomber. Despite these origins of the Air Corps' premier 1940s bomber,

maritime operations took a back seat to other priorities for the Air Corps and its successors

;the U.S. Army Air Forces and the United States Air Force (USAF).30 Development of United

States long-range land-based aircraft for maritime operations was further complicated by the

USAF-United States Navy (USN) arguments over an independent air force, assignment of

strategic missions, and allocation of resources that had begun prior to, continued through,

and went on after World War II. Although USAF forces had a collateral maritime mission for

many years, it received little attention. Only in the 1970s, when the U.S. Navy determined

that it needed help in meeting the threat of a resurgent Soviet fleet, were formal USAF-USN

agreements on aerial maritime missions drafted. The agreements generally restated the
168

importance of sea lanes of communication to national security. They usually envisioned

expanded joint training in aerial maritime operations. They were always carefully worded to

prevent encroachment on carefully guarded service prerogatives.31

The controversial but visionary Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt

asked the Air Force in 1971 to update its plans for the use of B–52s Buffs in laying sea

mines. The high-winged multi-engine jet bombers had the capacity for long range flights and

large weapons loads that made them attractive candidates for this role. Zumwalt also

proposed that the Air Force install the Navy's Harpoon anti-ship missiles on its bombers and

wanted Air Force tactical air wings to become carrier qualified. The Navy at this time was

modifying its P-3 Orion antisubmarine warfare aircraft to carry Harpoon missiles. The P-3,

a four-engine turboprop similar in appearance to the Lockheed airliner from which it was

developed, had a combat radius of 1,400 miles. When armed, it was supposed to enhance the

Navy's capacity to wage war against the Soviet's powerful surface fleet. By the early 1980s,

the Navy had equipped eighty P-3s, all in its twenty-four active duty squadrons, with

Harpoons. The P-3s, however, did not have the range, speed, or weapons capacity that B–52s

offered. A Fiscal Year 1979 program to give the latest P-3 version, the P-3C, an air-to-air

refueling capacity was terminated in early 1981. Navy opponents said that the program was

unnecessary, impractical, and likely to cause crew fatigue problems. The Air Force responded

favorably to Zumwalt's 1971 request for an update of aerial mine-laying plans, took longer

to adapt its bombers to carry Harpoons, and dismissed the idea of Air Force squadrons

becoming carrier-qualified.32

Both the USAF and USN had long had serious doubts about the capability of Air Force

planes to contribute to maritime operations. Doubts continued in 1975 when the two services

executed another memorandum of agreement. This one set up a concept of "mutual

reinforcement" imposed by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. This theory assigned

each of the services collateral missions in support of sister services. The Air Force received

the collateral mission of training forces to interdict enemy sea power, protect shipping,

conduct antisubmarine warfare, and conduct aerial mine laying operations. The agreement

stipulated that the Air Force would train for "tasks (a) which will complement and

supplement sea control operation, and (b) for which an inherent Air Force capability already

exists."33

Three factors, however, prevented vigorous pursuit of the Air Force's collateral

maritime mission in the 1970s. First, there was a perceived overwhelming superiority of the

U.S. Navy compared with the Soviet Navy. Second, the Air Force was little interested in

diverting resources from its primary mission. Secretary Schlesinger offered a $96 million plan

to buy Harpoons for the Force, but when the Air Force requested $12 million to develop a

B–52 capability to launch the missiles it was turned down. Third, both the Navy and the Air

Force doubted that USAF aircraft and munitions were particularly well suited for maritime

operations. Air Force bombers (the B–52 and FB–111) had been developed for strategic

bombing. Air Force fighter-bombers (the F-4, F-15, F-16, and A-10) had been developed for

battlefield interdiction, close air support, and air superiority missions. Except for a few Air

Force pilots who had completed exchange tours with the Navy, there weren't any Air Force

personnel trained for maritime missions. Defense experts concluded that although the Air

Force had the potential to interdict Soviet naval forces and shipping in the North Atlantic,

Mediterranean, Northwest Pacific, South China Sea, and Bay of Bengal. But, they said, to

be effective in this role the Air Force needed special weapons, equipment, and training. In

particular, Air Force crews needed training in low-level flying over water, navigation over

water, recognition of naval vessels, and target acquisition at sea. Without these, the experts
169

said, "the Air Force role [in maritime operations] would be marginal at best, and, at worst,

counterproductive."34

By the 1970s the Air Force's expertise in maritime operations, earned painfully in

combat with German and Japanese forces from 1941 to 1945, had withered away. In the

period immediately following World War II the Strategic Air Command's 307th Bomb Group

at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, had practiced aerial mine-laying, antisubmarine warfare,

and sea searches in its B–17s. This came to a halt when the 307th deployed to England in

1948 in response to the Berlin crisis. Two years later, the 307th went to Korea. When the

U.S. Navy asked the Air Force for mining support, the Air Force replied that "bombers for

maritime roles could not be counted on in the initial stages of a war, only later."35 When it

returned to the United States in 1954, the group transitioned into the new B–47 medium jet

bomber. The United States was entering the era of massive retaliation and the 307th's

maritime capabilities were not resurrected.36

The Air Force was preoccupied first with developing an intercontinental strategic

bombing and missile force and then with Vietnam. It did not again pay serious attention to

its collateral maritime mission until the mid-1970s. In December of 1974 the Air Force

published its final report on four Busy Harbor flights in which B–52G and H models and

FB–111s tested their capabilities for sea surveillance and naval attack roles.37 With the B–1

bomber expected to assume the manned bomber role in delivery of strategic nuclear weapons,

Air Force leaders planned to rededicate SAC's large B–52 force to conventional bombing, force

projection, and maritime missions. After the 1975 inter-service memorandum of agreement

had been executed, SAC Operations Plan 28-76 started two maritime programs. In Busy

Observer I, B–52 aircrews went on training missions every six months to search for, locate,

and identify designated United States Navy ships. In Busy Observer II, B–52 aircrews

cooperated with the USN's Second Fleet in the Atlantic and Third Fleet in the Pacific to

search for Soviet Navy ships. The scope of the plan required certain B–52 squadrons to fly

four ocean reconnaissance missions every six months.38

Concurrently, the Air Force searched for the right munitions to use in maritime

operations. After Defense officials turned down its request for a Harpoon experiment, the Air

Force selected the GBU-15 glide bomb as its maritime munition. The GBU-15 could lock onto

a target before launch, or be remotely flown into a target. A modular unit, it could be fitted

to various warheads. But the GBU-15's range of only seven miles led to questions about its

effectiveness. Since an aircraft launching the GBU-15 would have to come well within range

of Soviet ships' surface-to-air missiles, there were also questions about the survivability of

any aircraft that launched it. Several B–52s were modified to carry and test the GB–15 in

1976. In 1978, experiments with B–52 aerial laying of sea mines began. The Air Force and

Navy conducted mine-laying tests with a B–52D from Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire.

Although a B–52D unit at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, had a mine-laying plan at this

time, the Pease trials were the first actual use of a B–52 to drop mines.39

In 1979 SAC had a chance to apply its sea surveillance capabilities in a "real world"

situation. The Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increased interest in the

waters off Southwest Asia. The U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet, based in the Philippines and

responsible for the Indian Ocean, asked SAC for assistance with aerial reconnaissance there.

SAC launched B–52 sea surveillance missions from Guam and from Darwin, Australia. These

were the first of what became routine SAC reconnaissance flights for the duration of the

crises.40

An evaluation of SAC's ocean surveillance capabilities in early 1979 concluded that

the Strategic Air Command had great potential in this area, but saw a few problems. An
170

experienced U.S. Navy patrol plane commander flew on a Busy Observer mission with a SAC

B–52 crew in February 1979. He found that few B–52 crew members flew more than two

Busy Observer missions per year. As a result, the level of pertinent training was low. It took

some time into the mission for the B–52's radar operator to become adept at distinguishing

surface ships from rain showers and other weather phenomena. The naval officer also

concluded that the B–52's bomb damage cameras could not be adjusted for external lighting

conditions and that their focal length was not ideal for the altitudes at which ship recognition

and identification flyovers usually needed to be conducted. Hand-held camera photography,

like radar image interpretation, he though would improve with more frequent sea

surveillance training. The evaluator also determined that SAC crews were not receiving all

the support they needed. There was little feedback to them from intelligence analysts on the

information they collected. The SAC crews also had little opportunity for contact with United

States Navy ocean surveillance air crews.41

In addition to SAC's burgeoning role in maritime operations, Tactical Air Command

(TAC) implemented a Sea Flirt ocean surveillance program with its F-111s and RF-4s. TAC

aircrews also participated in joint reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and strike exercises.

Ninth Air Force units worked with Second Fleet, while Twelfth Air Force units worked with

Third Fleet.42

The Air Force's renewed interest in the maritime mission coincided with a United

States Navy effort to deal with its increasingly capable Soviet counterpart. America's joint

service commanders, the commanders-in-chiefs (CINCs) of geographical theaters such as

Atlantic Command and Pacific Command were already asking the air and naval forces they

controlled to work together in joint exercises. Another push came from the Armed Services

Committee of the United States Senate, which was asking how the Air Force could contribute

to maritime operations. In addition, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger issued defense

guidance that ordered the Air Force to equip its B–52s with radar and stand-off weapons

suitable for attacking Soviet warships and naval ports. A resulting Pentagon study

recommended that B–52s be armed first with Harpoon missiles and, when they became

available, with Tomahawk air-to-surface missiles. After the Air Force completed an internal

review of the study, Department of Defense officials approved it in early 1982.43

At a July 1982 luncheon Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr, Secretary of the Navy

John Lehman, Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles A. Gabriel, and Chief of Naval

Operations Admiral James D. Watkins "agreed to agree." This led to Gabriel and Watkins

signing a memorandum of agreement outlining parameters for joint maritime operations.

Gabriel said concerning the signing, "As the Falklands conflict demonstrated, air power is a

critically important part of successful maritime operations." The Air Force Chief of Staff

announced that his service would put more emphasis on collateral roles such as sea lane

protection, aerial mine laying, and ship attack.44

An Air Force test program for Harpoon missiles began in January 1982. The Air

Logistics Test Center in Oklahoma City received responsibility for integrating the B–52 with

the Harpoon. SAC provided a test director, aircraft, and crews. The Air Force provided five

million dollars for a thirty-eight-week test and adaptation program. Two B–52G models, one

from the 2d Bomb Wing and one from the 320th Bomb Wing, became test platforms. In

March 1983, the B–52s successfully fired three Harpoon missiles while over the Navy's

Pacific Missile Test Range. Maritime surveillance radars were temporarily installed in two

E-3A AWACS planes that provided target acquisition services for the B–52s.45

While the test program was going on, the Air Force issued a statement of operational

need for Harpoon-equipped B–52s. The service asked Congress for a $40.4 million
171

appropriation in Fiscal Year 1985 (October 1, 1984-September 30, 1985) to buy fifty Harpoons

based on the Navy's estimated cost of $800,000 per missile. In the event, however, the Air

Force bought eighty-five Harpoons originally ordered by Iran and embargoed. These cost only

about $300,000 each.46

The Navy and Strategic Air Command executed a memorandum of agreement in 1984.

It specified that SAC's B–52s would operate in support of commanders-in-chief worldwide,

presumably under the control of theater air component commanders. SAC's commander-inchief said at this time that B–52s would be used for follow-on forces attack and for maritime

missions.47

Air Force authorities designated two of Strategic Air Command's B–52 squadrons to

train for the maritime mission. B–52Gs were modified to carry the Navy's Harpoon anti-ship

missile. The 60th Bombardment Squadron of fifteen planes at Andersen Air Force Base,

Guam, and the 69th Bombardment Squadron at Loring Air Force Base, Maine, also with

fifteen aircraft, became SAC's maritime specialists. Manufacturers' technical representatives

took about one week working with each aircraft to install missile rails under the wings, a

power distribution box, and a removable data processing computer. The modified B–52Gs

could each carry twelve missiles, six under each wing, and fire them from a stand-off range

of about fifty miles. The 69th Bombardment Squadron achieved limited operational capability

in October 1983 and declared full operational status in December 1984. On June 30, 1985,

SAC declared its new maritime strike aircraft fully operational. In addition, four E-3A

AWACs planes were scheduled for modification to support the B–52Gs in their maritime

role.48

The B–52s seemed to have inherent capabilities for anti-ship attacks. Their 6,500-

mile-plus range and cruising speed of 442 knots gave them the endurance and speed required

for timely intervention over most of the world's oceans. Adaptation of the strategic workhorse

to a new role proved difficult for several reasons. The Navy was supposed to develop tactical

doctrine, which with the Air Force was supposed to agree, for use of the B–52 in an anti-ship

role. As SAC explored that role, limitations became evident. It turned out that the B–52's

radar could not positively identify a sea surface target beyond a range of about fifty miles.

This meant that the B–52s needed either the assistance of target radar on another platform

or a new radar to take advantage of the Harpoon's capabilities. Otherwise, a B–52 would

have to fly within range of a target's air defenses to launch its missiles. An Air Force plan

to develop a new radar for its thirty maritime capable B–52Gs foundered when it seemed that

a new radar could not be ready before all B–52s were to be retired in 1992. Besides radar

problems, the B–52Gs had limited ability to communicate with U.S. Navy and NATO ships.

A Buff had only one high frequency (HF) radio transceiver installed, but the Navy's Tactical

Data System operated on HF channels. Thus the malfunction of a single radio could cause

a B–52 maritime mission to abort. When technical problems did not interfere with USAFUSN tactical communications, long-standing differences in communications procedures

required some getting used to, a process that did not always go smoothly. By 1990, tactical

doctrine development had progressed only to the point of a draft "Joint Chiefs of Staff Test

Publication, Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air)." It had been officially neither

approved nor released.49

Despite the problems in adapting B–52Gs for a sea control role, there were also other

Air Force capabilities applicable to maritime missions. These included bomb–carrying B–52s;

F-16 light attack aircraft; and F-15 interceptors and fighter-bombers. The B–52 bombers

could drop the GBU-15 tactical guided bomb in an anti-ship role or carry up to eighteen

CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) antisubmarine mines. B–52s sea surveillance capability was
172

first demonstrated during the Cuba Missile Crisis of 1962. The Buffs had the capacity to

conduct ocean surveillance of areas of 112,000 square nautical miles in two and one-half

hours. Surveillance missions could last up to seventeen hours. The light attack planes had

potential for anti-ship strikes. The Air Force had developed precision guide munitions with

high single hit probabilities during the Vietnam Conflict. These weapons had shown their

ability to hit moving targets on land, a quality that could be put to good use against naval

targets. The F-15s, working in concert with E-3As to identify aerial targets and KC-135s to

refuel them in long range missions, could enhance organic Navy anti-air warfare capabilities.

The E-3As could also use their radars, in tandem with Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and

satellite observation, to identify naval targets.50

To put these capabilities to use, the Air Force had to solve several problems. In

general, they were similar to the obstacles encountered in adapting the B–52Gs for a

maritime role. The Air Force had limited communications, command, control, and intelligence

(C3

I) operability with the Navy. Some Air Force planes lacked suitable navigation equipment

for long over water flights. The Air Force weapons inventory did not include stand-off antiship missiles or active antisubmarine warfare weapons. There were also no Air Force/Navy

joint doctrine and tactics for conduct of maritime operations.51

The Air Force found it difficult to resolve these problems. In an era of rising costs and

decreasing defense budgets, the service was overcommitted with its primary missions of

strategic air power and battlefield interdiction. It did not have the money to obtain additional

force structure or acquire new equipment for a maritime role. Its maritime role was a

collateral function and Department of Defense policy precluded the services from requesting

new appropriations based on collateral mission requirements.52

By the time the Cold War ended in 1990, Strategic Air Command had developed six

B–52 squadrons with maritime capabilities. As noted above, two of the squadrons were two

equipped with Harpoon anti-ship missiles. All six squadrons were trained in sea surveillance

and aerial laying of sea mines. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), based in Hawaii and responsible

for equipping and training Air Force units in the Pacific theater, was adapting one of its F-16

squadrons to use Harpoons. The end of the Cold War, however, saw the start of a decrease

in the Air Force's capability for maritime operations. In 1990, the B–52 unit at Andersen Air

Force Base, Guam, deactivated. This left only fourteen B–52Gs and their crews at Loring Air

Force Base tasked and trained for maritime missions. Other Air Force reductions left only

thirty-three B–52Gs Air Force-wide capable of delivering conventional weapons.53

The Soviet and American uses of land-based aerial forces for anti-ship warfare during

the Cold War should not be compared directly. They were intended to serve different

purposes. Each can, however, be assessed on its own merits.

The Soviet Navy developed an effective land-based aerial threat to its American and

allied NATO counterparts. Soviet Naval Aviation's aircraft became familiar sights over most

of the world's oceans. Their potent air-to-surface missiles offered Soviet aircrews the

possibility of firing from beyond the effective range of anti-air defenses. The missiles

themselves carried warheads large enough to assure significant damage when they hit their

targets. Even if their warheads did not detonate, the kinetic energy of the large and highspeed ASMs were enough to devastate many modern warships. The size of the Soviet missiles

meant that even large, multi-engine aircraft could carry only two. This increased the number

of planes needed. On the other hand, an increased number of launch platforms might have

meant more weapons being delivered had Soviet Naval Aviation's Tu-16s and Tu-22Ms been

used in combat.
173

Agreements imposed during the struggle for an independent Air Force restricted the

United States Navy as to the uses to which it could put land-based aircraft. As a result, when

the Navy needed land-based planes to supplement sea-based aviation, it turned first to its

own maritime patrol aircraft. Attaching the short-range Harpoon missile with its relatively

small warhead to the slow P-3 Orion provided a capacity to attack unarmed merchant

vessels, but not much else. When the Navy asked the United States Air Force for the

assistance of land-based aerial forces, it encountered what it had feared. The Air Force's

finite resources and priority on strategic missions limited the help it could provide. The

training that selected SAC aircrews received from flying maritime surveillance missions every

six months probably had a short shelf life. The Air Force started to develop a maritime strike

capability only in the face Congressional pressure and Department of Defense directives.

When it did so, the service chose to hang short-range Harpoons on aging 1950s-vintage

airframes. That may have been a good choice because the B–52s had a long combat radius

and huge weapons capacity. The Buffs probably would have been effective in anti-ship

strikes, but had little chance of surviving determined opposition. Soviet naval forces, when

operating within reach of land bases, also had to be prepared for strikes by USAF tactical

units. Aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16 posed a significant threat to warships when

equipped with ASMs and precision guided munitions. Unlike Soviet Naval Aviation, however,

US land-based aircraft never became the principal threat to enemy warships during the Cold

War.

175

Endnotes to Chapter VIII

1. Paul B. Ryan, First Line of Defense: The U.S. Navy Since 1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover

Institute Press, 1981), p. 136; U.S. Congress, Committee on Commerce, 94th Congress, 2d

Sess., Soviet Oceans Development (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp.

60, 81-82.

2. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Soviet Sea Power, Special Report

Series; No. 10 (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, Jun. 1969), p. 51; Floyd D.

Kennedy Jr., "Zapad 81 ;Successor to Okean," in Seapower 25 (January 1982): 4; R. A. Mason

and W. R. Taylor, Aircraft, Strategy, and Operations of the Soviet Air Force (New York:

Jane's, 1986), pp. 102-3; William D. O'Neil, "Backfire ;Long Shadow Over the Sea Lanes," in

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 103 (March 1977): 28; Edward Wegner, The Soviet

Naval Offensive (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 24-25.

3. The Center for Strategic Studies, Soviet Sea Power, p. 51; Robert W. Clawson and

Lawrence S. Kaplan, eds., The Warsaw Pact ;Political Purposes and Military Means

(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1982), p. 117; John W. R. Taylor, "Gallery of

Soviet Aerospace Weapons," in Air Force Magazine (March 1990): 86.

4. The Center for Strategic Studies, Soviet Sea Power, p. 269.

5. U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence and Chief of Information, Soviet Naval

Developments, 2d ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America,

1981), p. 19.

6. Ibid., pp. 20, 250.

7. Mason and Taylor, Aircraft, Strategy, and Operations of the Soviet Air Force, p. 108; U.S.

Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence and Chief of Information, Soviet Naval Developments,

pp. 248-49; Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, USN-Ret., On Watch (New York: Quadrangle, 1976),

pp. 322-23.

8. Mason and Taylor, Aircraft, Strategy, and Operations of the Soviet Air Force, pp. 105-6.

9. Walter Pincus, "Our Carrier Armadas Could Sink the Budget," in The Washington Post,

Mar. 25, 1984, Section C, p. 1.

10. Donald D. Chipman, "The Transformation of Soviet Maritime Air Operations ;Implications

for U.S. Maritime Strategy," in Airpower Journal (Summer 1990): 67; O'Neil, "Backfire: Long

Shadow Over the Sea Lanes," pp. 28, 30-32. Refueling probes were later removed from some

Backfires because the Soviets did not want them

counted as strategic weapons for arms control purposes.

11. Chipman, "The Transformation of Soviet Maritime Air Operations," p. 68; O'Neil,

"Backfire: Long Shadow Over the Sea Lanes," p. 31; Norman Polmar, "Soviet Naval Aviation,"

in Air Force Magazine (Mar. 1976): 70-71; Ryan, First Line of Defense ;the U.S. Navy Since

1945, p. 139; U.S. Congress, Committee on Commerce, Soviet Oceans Development, p. 584.

12. Peter Hertel Rasmussen, "The Soviet Naval Air Force Since 1945," MA Thesis, 1978, Det

Kongelige Garnisonbibliotek, Copenhagen, Denmark, 1978, pp. 12, 22. Document No. 20, Reel

No. 8732, Microform Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

13. Paul Nitze, Leonard Sullivan Jr., and the Atlantic Council Working Group on Securing

the Seas, Securing the Seas (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 105-6; Dov S.

Zakheim, The U.S. Sea Control Mission: Forces, Capabilities, and Requirements (Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, 1977), pp. 7-9.

14. Defense Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Communist Naval Orders of Battle, DDB–1200-

124-79, (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 5.
176

15. Norman Polmar, "Soviet Naval Aviation," in Air Force Magazine (March 1978): 67. Polmar

estimated Soviet Naval Aviation's strength at this time to include 325 missile attack aircraft

(Badgers, Backfires), 50 medium bombers (Badgers, Blinders), 100 reconnaissance planes

(Badgers, Bear Ds), several electronic warfare aircraft (Badgers, An-12 Cub Cs), 150 ASW

planes (Bear Fs, Mays, Mails), 50 attack fighters (Forgers, Fitter Cs), 350 helicopters

(Hormones, Hazes, Hounds), 80 tankers (Badgers), and 150 transports and trainers. Kenneth

Vernoski, "Soviet Naval Aircraft," in Bruce and Susan W. Watson, eds., The Soviet Navy:

Strengths and Liabilities (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 119-20.

16. Nitze, et al., Securing the Seas, p. 106; Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 62.

17. Kenneth Vernoski, "Soviet Naval Air Operations," in The Soviet Navy: Strengths and

Liabilities, p. 251.

18. Quoted in Roger A. Beaumont, "Between Two Stools: Very Long-Range Aircraft in Sea

Control," in Air University Review Vol. 32, No. 6 (September-October 1981): 48. Strength

figures are also those given by Beaumont, p. 48; Pincus, "Our Carrier Armadas Could Sink

the Budget;" Polmar, "Soviet Naval Aviation," March 1978, p. 67.

19. Kennedy, "Zapad 81: Successor to Okean," p. 4; Vernoski, "Soviet Naval Air Operations,"

p. 250.

20. Vernoski, "Soviet Naval Air Operations," p. 250.

21. Clawson and Kaplan, The Warsaw Pact: Political Purposes and Military Means, p. 270.

22. Donald D. Chipman, "Rethinking Forward Strategy and the Forward Blockade," in Armed

Forces Journal International (August 1987): 82; Donald D. Chipman and David Lay, "Sea

Power and the B–52 Stratofortress," in Air University Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Jan.-Feb. 1986):

46.

23. Vernoski, "Soviet Naval Air Operations," p. 252.

24. "Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces," in Air Force Magazine (March 1990): 71;

Geoffrey Till, Modern Seapower: An Introduction (London: Brassey's, 1987), pp. 130-31.

25. John W. R. Taylor,"Gallery of Soviet Aerospace Weapons," in Air Force Magazine (March

1982): 97; Chipman, "Rethinking Forward Strategy and the Distant Blockade," p. 82; Mason

and Taylor, Aircraft, Strategy, and Operations of the Soviet Air Force, pp. 108, 110-12;

Michael L. Ross, "Disarmament at Sea," in Foreign Policy (Winter 89/90): 97.

26. Chipman, "Rethinking Forward Strategy and the Distant Blockade," p. 82; Ross,

"Disarmament at Sea," p. 97.

27. Mason and Taylor, Aircraft, Strategy, and Operations of the Soviet Air Force, p. 112.

28. Chipman, "The Transformation of Soviet Maritime Air Operations," pp. 67-71.

29. "Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces," p. 69; Adm. V. N. Chernavin, quoted in Peter

Haydon, "The Legacy of the Soviet Navy ;Will a Phoenix Rise?" in Canadian Defence

Quarterly (April 1992): 29.

30. Beaumont, "Between Two Stools: Very Long-Range Aircraft in Sea Control," p. 41.

31. Nitze, et al., Securing the Seas, p. 184. The Air Force and Navy executed joint agreements

in 1971, 1974, 1975, and 1979. Bert H. Cooper, Maritime Roles for Land-Based Aviation

(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Aug. 1, 1983) discusses the content of

each agreement and presents the unclassified text of the 1975 agreement in an appendix.

32. Cooper, Maritime Roles for Land-Based Aviation, p. CRS-22; Lt. Col. Thomas L.

Wilkerson, USAF, "Two If By Sea," in United States Naval Institute Proceedings (November

1983): 35; Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 70.

33. Jan S. Breemer and SSgt Todd Hoover, USAF, "SAC Goes to Sea with Harpoon," in

National Defense (February 1987): 42; Maj. Gen. Robert N. Ginsburgh, USAF-Ret., "A New

Look at Control of the Sea," in Strategic Review (Winter 1976): 87.
177

34. Breemer and Hoover, "SAC Goes to Sea," pp. 42-43; Cooper, Maritime Roles for LandBased Aviation, p. CRS-36, p. CRS-47; Ginsburgh, "A New Look at Control of the Sea," pp.

87-88; Nitze, et al., Securing the Seas, pp. 194-85.

35. Quoted in Lt Col V. Frank Vollmar, USAF, The Conventional Bomber Force, War-Horses

for Global Conflicts ;Capabilities, Limitations, and Modernization, Research Report No. AUARI-91-6 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, Oct. 1992), p. 47.

36. Breemer and Hoover, "SAC Goes to Sea," p. 42.

37. Lt. Cmdr. J. R. Thompson, USN, USN-USAF Interaction for Ocean Surveillance Using

Land-Based Aircraft (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, Center for Advanced Research, June

1979), p. 15.

38. Ibid., p. 15.

39. Lt. Col. Donald G. Cook, USAF, Cmdr Charles H. Horne, USN, and Cmdr. Walter W.

Manning, USN, B–52 Maritime Operations: The Anti-Surface Warfare Mission (ASUW), Air

War College Research Report No. AU-AWC-87-043 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, Air

War College, 1987), p. 15; Vollmar, The Conventional Bomber Force, War-Horses for Global

Conflicts: Capabilities, Limitations, and Modernization, p. 48.

40. Vollmar, The Conventional Bomber Force, War-Horses for Global Conflicts ;Capabilities,

Limitations, and Modernization,, pp. 48-49.

41. Thompson, USN-USAF Interaction for Ocean Surveillance Using Land-Based Aircraft, pp.

75-77.

42. Cooper, Maritime Roles for Land-Based Aviation, p. CRS-37.

43. Clifton F. Berry Jr., "A Carrier Aviation Primer," in Air Force Magazine (Nov. 1982): 60;

Breemer and Hoover, "SAC Goes to Sea," pp. 42- 43; Cook, et al., B–52 Maritime Operations

;The Anti-Surface Warfare Mission (ASUW), p. 16; Wilkerson, "Two If By Sea," p. 39.

44. Berry, "A Carrier Aviation Primer," p. 60; Chipman and Lay, "Sea Power and the B–52

Stratofortress," p. 45.

45. Berry, "A Carrier Aviation Primer," p. 61; Breemer and Hoover, "SAC Goes to Sea," p. 43;

Cooper, Maritime Roles for Land-Based Aviation, p. CRS-30.

46. Breemer and Hoover, "SAC Goes to Sea," p. 43.

47. Vollmar, The Conventional Bomber Force, War-Horses for Global Conflicts ;Capabilities,

Limitations, and Modernization, p. 49.

48. Breemer and Hoover, "SAC Goes to Sea," p. 43; Chipman and Lay, "Sea Power and the

B–52 Stratofortress," p. 46; Cook, et al., B–52 Maritime Operations: The Anti-Surface Warfare

Mission (ASUW), pp. 18-19.

49. Breemer and Hoover, "SAC Goes to Sea," p. 44; Cook, et al., B–52 Maritime Operations:

The Anti-Surface Warfare Mission (ASUW), p. 20, p. 32; Lt. Col. Robert C. Kuhlo, Attacking

Ships ;Command and Control of Joint Antiship Operations, Research Report No. AU-ARI-89-3

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, October 1990), p. 4.

50. Ginsburgh, "A New Look at Control of the Sea," pp. 88-89; Wilkerson, "Two If By Sea,"

p. 37.

51. Wilkerson, "Two If By Sea," p. 37.

52. Ibid., p. 38.

53. Kuhlo, Attacking Ships: Command and Control of Joint Antiship Operations, pp. 12-13.

Kuhlo states that even in 1990, Air Force "aerospace maritime operations" terminology and

Navy maritime air operations terminology differed completely. Vollmar, The Conventional

Bomber Force, War-Horses for Global Conflicts; Capabilities, Limitations, and Modernization,,

pp. 49-50.

179

CHAPTER IX

REFLECTIONS

As the preceding case studies show, the employment of land-based air power in

maritime operations was neither always a panacea nor always a failure in the period from

1939 to the end of the Cold War. Air power, both land- or sea-based, has added a new

dimension to naval warfare. It has not, as some enthusiasts predicted, made naval vessels,

whether surface or undersea, and merchant ships obsolete in time of war.

The effectiveness of land-based aerial forces in maritime war has, like the performance

of all air power, depended largely on organization of forces, equipment, training, doctrine,

command decisions, and tactics. The ultimate determinants of effectiveness, however, have

been the courage, dedication, and imagination of the men flying planes into danger.

As one looks back at the case studies in this book, common themes that have retarded

the use of land-based aerial forces in maritime warfare are evident. These include the

following: (1) when other missions are available, only in rare cases have those in control of

land-based air power given priority or even equality to its employment in maritime

operations; and (2), despite more than a half century of experience proving their usefulness

in maritime battle, land-based aerial forces have seldom been optimally organized, equipped,

and trained for air-sea warfare when hostilities began.

The history of military aviation repeatedly illustrates the first point, regarding priority

accorded the use of land-based aerial forces in maritime operations. Examples that can be

cited begin with World War I, when in 1918 Britain’s newly-established Royal Air Force gave

preference in allocation of long-range aircraft to bombing squadrons over aerial

antisubmarine units. This bias has existed even when land-based air forces have sought and

been given maritime missions. Later instances of this trend occurred during World War II

in the competition within and between Allied air and naval forces for assignment of longrange and very long-range aircraft. Most recently, the phenomenon existed in the Cold War,

as United States Air Force multi-engine jet B–52 bombers were stingily assigned to and

scantily trained for maritime work only when other weapons systems assumed the B–52s’

previous missions.

The condition of most belligerents’ air forces at the outset of World War II documents

the second point, regarding the organization, equipment, and training of land-based aerial

forces for maritime missions. Despite the experiences of World War I, during which aircraft

proved to be effective weapons when used against naval surface combatants and submarines,

the 1939-1945 conflict began with the air arms of all major contestants except Japan illprepared in various ways to prosecute war at sea. For numerous reasons, as discussed earlier,

the aircraft and munitions available for naval fighting were initially neither as efficient nor

as adequate in number as similar forces had been at the end of the 1914-1918 conflict. This

theme cropped up again in post World War II air-sea warfare. During the Falklands War of

1982, pilots of Argentina’s land-based aircraft (except those of the naval air arm) opposed the

Royal Navy’s task force with the handicaps of hasty training for over water flights,

inadequate navigational tools, improvised intelligence collection methods, and munitions

intended for land attacks. During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, it was only at the conflict’s

midpoint that Iraq’s Air Force acquired land-based fixed-wing aircraft (first Super Étendards

and later Mirage F-1EQs) capable of decisive action in a campaign to interdict shipping that

carried Iran’s oil to market. Likewise, during the Cold War of 1947-1990, the preponderance

of American land-based aerial forces which focused on maritime operations did so only briefly
*****Hallion also gives impressive summaries for shipping losses caused by sea mines,

but a case study of sea mining by land-based aerial forces has not been possible with the

secondary sources to which this study was limited.

180

in the years immediately following World War II and near the end of the Cold War, when it

appeared that the B–52 bomber had lost most of its other missions because of new

technologies and evolving national security requirements.

Contrasting with the common themes that have retarded the use of land-based air

aerial forces in maritime warfare, are their notable successes. Despite impediments to its

fully effective employment, land-based air power did make unparalleled contributions to

maritime warfare between the outbreak of World War II in 1939 and the end of the Cold War

in 1990. United States Air Force Historian Richard G. Hallion, in a 1995 paper entitled “Left

Dead in the Water: Naval Forces Versus Air Power in the Second World War,” has

synthesized and summarized statistics on the use of aerial forces in maritime operations

during World War II. He reports that, overall, Allied land-based aircraft accounted for 41

percent of all U-boats sunk. Land-based aerial forces likewise exacted heavy tolls by direct

air attack on maritime surface targets: German combatants from minelayers to battleships

sunk (40 percent of all destroyed), Italian warships and merchant ships in the Mediterranean

(37 percent of all destroyed), and Japanese vessels in the Pacific (56 percent of all

destroyed).*****

Land-based air power’s role in the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was,

without a doubt, its the most notable World War II maritime achievement. Whether using

naval authorities’ criterion of ships safely arrived, or air specialists’ measure of U-boats sunk,

the significance of aerial forces in the battle cannot be questioned. Using the first measure,

statisticians have documented that ship losses were minimal in convoys with air escorts.

Using the second measure, those same data analyzers have determined that aircraft

accounted for a plurality of U-boats sunk in the Atlantic. Without the participation of aerial

forces, particularly land-based aerial aircraft, victory might have eluded the Allies in the

contest for the sea lanes between Britain and North America. The successful outcome of that

struggle, in turn assured Britain’s continued participation in the war and the Allies’ ability

to launch an invasion of the European continent from England in 1944.

Equally impressive demonstrations of the utility of land-based aerial forces in naval

warfare occurred in the air-sea battles for control of the English Channel and in Nazi efforts

to interdict Allied convoys traveling to Arctic ports with war materiel for the Soviet Union.

On the Allied side of the fight in European coastal waters, land-based aircraft were generally

successful in keeping Germany’s large surface combatants damaged enough to prevent them

from sortieing into the Atlantic and raiding Allied convoys. When a few Nazi capital ships

did get into the Atlantic, land-based aerial forces cooperated with sea-based aviation, surface

ships, and submarines to track the Kriegsmarine vessels down and destroy them. Conversely,

Luftwaffe planes based in Norway proved able to inflict sufficient losses on British and

American ships bound for the Soviet ports of Murmansk and Archangel so that the Allies

suspended Arctic convoys until they could be accompanied by aircraft carriers.

In the case of air operations over the English Channel, Luftwaffe planes could not

stem the evacuation of British and French troops from Dunkirk, but they did sink sank scores

of ships, inflicted thousands of casualties, and made the withdrawing troops abandon all

weapons but their small arms. The German air effort was conducted in the face of strong

Royal Air Force opposition. Poor weather conditions during several days of the Dunkirk
181

evacuation also hampered the Luftwaffe’s efforts. In subsequent air attacks, German planes

nearly achieved complete interdiction of Britain’s coastal shipping corridors, but many of the

units devoted to this task went on to other duties after only two months of effort.

In the Mediterranean theater, both Allied and Axis land-based aerial forces

significantly influenced the naval war. On the Allied side, planes based at Malta and North

Africa cooperated with submarine and surface naval forces to interrupt the flow of enemy

troops and war supplies, particularly petroleum, flowing from Italy to North Africa. This had

a profound effect on the ability of German and Italian formations in North Africa to conduct

both defensive and offensive operations. On the Axis side, German and Italian aircraft based

in southern Italy, Greece, North Africa, and on Mediterranean islands cost the British badly

needed ships, sailors, and soldiers as they withdrew from Greece and as they attempted to

resupply their strategically critical air and naval forces based on Malta. Once again,

withdrawal of German squadrons to other fronts may have kept Axis land-based air power

from being decisive in this fight as it had in the struggle for control of the English Channel.

North Pacific operations of Allied, predominately American, land-based air formations

illustrated how versatile such forces can be. Although atrocious flying conditions caused

operational losses that exceeded combat tolls, land-based air units in the North Pacific

opposed one invasion and covered another, interdicted sea lanes necessary to resupply

Japanese troops occupying forward outposts on North American soil, and by raiding shipping

in Japan’s home waters played important parts in strategic deception.

In the Indian Ocean in December 1941, the employment of Japanese land-based naval

air units to sink the battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse, two of the Royal

Navy’s most powerful ships, had two important effects. First, it eliminated any possibility

that the British could defend Singapore or evacuate its 100,000-plus defenders to fight again.

Second, it drove home the maxim that warships without air cover sufficient to assure local

air superiority should not operate within range of enemy aircraft. That lesson was repeated

during late 1942 and early 1943 as American and Australian aircraft decimated Japanese

convoys attempting to resupply Japanese forces attempting to secure New Guinea. This

precluded the Japanese from using the world’s largest island as a base from which to invade

Australia and or to block Allied efforts to drive north toward the Philippines.

In the years following World War II, land-based aerial forces failed to achieve their

objective in one war and succeeded in another. In the Falklands War (April-June 1982),

Argentine Air Force and naval air arm planes operated from bases on the South American

continent to oppose a British amphibious task force intent on recapturing the Falkland

Islands. Despite the necessity of operating hundreds of miles from their home bases against

formidably-armed fast moving targets provided with a vigorous sea-based air cover, the

Argentines inflicted serious losses on the Royal Navy. In the end, however, attrition caused

by high operational and combat losses halted the influence of Argentine air units on the

campaign.

In the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iraqi land-based air power achieved two strategic

objectives by raiding shipping that carried Iranian oil. The first objective, that of

internationalizing the war, was achieved by air attacks on neutral flag tankers. These

provoked other Persian Gulf states to pressure Iran into negotiating an armistice in the war

that Iraq had started. The second objective, that of diminishing Iran’s economic base, was

achieved by desultory air raids on marine terminals and shipping. Despite their sporadic

nature, these assaults decreased Iran’s oil revenues by as much as half a billion dollars

annually during some years of the war.
182

The Cold War (1947-1990) saw development of the strongest-ever land-based aerial

force intended for maritime operations. During forty-seven years of confrontation between the

Soviet Union and the United States and their respective allies, the Soviets developed a

missile-carrying, long-range air fleet designed to counter the strongest navy in the world.

Since the prolonged confrontation never escalated into open warfare, the success of the Soviet

effort can only be measured by the fact that American naval planners found Soviet Naval

Aviation and those Soviet Long Range Aviation forces trained for sea attacks to be a credible

threat. This is evidence that the Soviets achieved their purpose. On the American side, the

use of land-based aerial forces for maritime operations was all but ignored (except for United

States Navy antisubmarine squadrons) until the 1980s. Even then, efforts to adapt

obsolescent long-range bombers for air-sea warfare were minimal.

On balance, land-based aerial forces accomplished remarkable achievements in

maritime operations from 1939 to 1990 despite restrictions imposed by limited resources,

doctrine, competing missions for aircraft with appropriate capabilities, and evolving

technology. The question in the late 1990s is “How will the first year of the next naval war

differ from 1939 with regard to capabilities of land-based aerial forces for maritime

operations?”
183

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Internet access, from a small fishing port on the western edge of the United States,

facilitated the initial search for materials relevant to the preceding case studies. This was

particularly the case since the concept for the project envisioned a synthetic work based on

secondary sources. The wonders of cyberspace allowed me to screen the catalogs of libraries

worldwide for likely sources. In practice, however, most of the sources used came from or

through the United States Air Force’s Air University Library at Maxwell Air Force Base,

Alabama, which granted me unusual direct long-distance loan privileges, and the Timberland

Regional Library consortium of Western Washington. In the latter, I am particularly indebted

to reference librarians Kim Mallory, Martha Hill, Emily Popovich, Sandy Lauritzen at

Aberdeen and branch librarian Kathleen Ringenberger at Westport.

Publishers issued a few of the books particularly helpful to me when I was well along

with research and writing. R. D. Layman, Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact

and Influence (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996) falls into this category. Other

works that provide a context helpful in understanding the use of land-based aviation in

maritime operations include Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis,

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994) and Lee Kennett, The First Air War (New York: The Free

Press, 1991) and John H. Morrow Jr., The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909

to 1921 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993).

As was true for the World War I era, new and useful books continued to appear even

when I thought research and writing for later periods had been completed. Clay Blair, Hitler’s

U-Boat War, The Hunters, 1939-1942 (New York: Random House, 1996), has been the last

of these to arrive. Blair, who expects to publish a second volume covering the period 1943-

1945, delved deeply into published and unpublished sources to offer new conclusions about

the seriousness of the U-boat threat and the effectiveness of Allied antisubmarine measures.

Pending publication of the second volume of Blair’s study, his sources are available on the

World Wide Web at http://www.randomhouse.com /uboat /biblio.html. In addition to Blair,

Terry Hughes and John Costello, The Battle of the Atlantic (New York: Dial Press, 1977) and

David Syrett, The Defeat of the German U-Boats: The Battle of the Atlantic (Columbia:

University of South Carolina Press, 1994) give overall perspectives on the German effort to

interdict the trans-Atlantic sea lanes and the Allied response. Horst Boog, “Luftwaffe Support

of the German Navy,” pp. 302-22, in The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945, Stephen Howarth

and Derek Law, eds. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994) provides a critical review

of his topic, while Henry Probert, “Allied Land-Based Anti-Submarine Warfare,” pp. 371-87

in the same publication, offers a summary of Allied air antisubmarine organization and

efforts. The several volumes of Capt. S. W. Roskill, RN, The War at Sea, 1939-1945 (London:

Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, various dates) remain as fundamental works. Volumes of the

official United States Navy history of World War II (History of United States Naval

Operations in World War II) by Rear Adm. Samuel Eliot Morrison, USN, serve the same

purpose, particularly The Battle of the Atlantic September 1939-May 1943 (Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1975). A more recent work, J. Rowher and G. Hummelchen, Chronology

of the War at Sea, 1939-1945: The Naval History of World War Two (Annapolis, Md.: Naval

Institute Press, 1992) gives a day-by-day account of naval warfare during the period covered.

On the air side, Denis Richard and Hilary St. George Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945,

in three volumes (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1953) is the RAF’s official history.

John Herington, Air War Against Germany and Italy 1939-1945 (Canberra: Australian War

Memorial, 1954) focuses on the dominion’s aviators but, perhaps because many of those
184

aviators found their way to Coastal Command, is a rich source on maritime air operations

against the Axis. Many of the earlier histories, however, contain gaps because all of the

contributions of signals intelligence to the Allied victory were not disclosed until sometime

after their publication. John L. Winton, Ultra at Sea (New York: William Morrow and

Company, 1988) fills some of these gaps. John Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal Air

Force in the European War, 1939-1945 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985) is

a more recent synthesis. Len Deighton, Blood, Tears, and Folly: An Objective Look at World

War II (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994) is a scathing commentary from a World War II

veteran writing with the benefit of hindsight. With regard to Axis air activity, Air Ministry

[United Kingdom], The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1939-1945), Air Ministry

Pamphlet No. 248, reprint ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983) offers a brief synthesis.

Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II, Frank

Ziegler, ed. and trans., 1964, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1994) gives detailed accounts of

Luftwaffe campaigns followed by half-page summaries and conclusions for each. Williamson

Murray, Strategy for Defeat 1933-1945 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1983) [also

issued in 1985 at Baltimore by the Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America as

Luftwaffe] traces the development of the Nazi air arm beginning with the Third Reich’s

rearmament in 1933 to its defeat in 1944-1945.

Much material on coastal warfare and air-sea campaigns in the Mediterranean is to

be found in some of the comprehensive sources previously cited. In addition, Peter Smith,

Hold the Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel, 1939-1945 (Annapolis, Md.:

Naval Institute Press, 1984) is valuable, as—to a lesser extent—is his The Stuka at War

(New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1971). Nathan Miller, The War at Sea: A Naval

History of World War II (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995) provides another good

summary of naval warfare in World War II. Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean

Strategy (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1988) gives a geographic focus to

the intelligence war, while Bernard Ireland, The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943

(London: Arms & Armour Press, 1993) provides a similar perspective on the air, ground, and

sea war fought along the coasts of North Africa, Southern Europe, and on the islands in

between. Christopher Shores, et al., Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete 1940-41

(London: Grubb Street, 1987) is another detailed account of great interest. Marc’ Antonio

Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute,

1957) provides some information on a service whose contributions to the Mediterranean war

have been underrated.

With regard to the air-sea campaign in the North Pacific, John Hail Cloe, The Aleutian

Warriors: A History of the Eleventh Air Force & Fleet Air Wing 4 (Anchorage: Alaska Chapter,

Air Force Association, and Pictorial Histories Publishing Co., Inc., 1990) is the most

comprehensive account. A more recent compendium, Alaska at War, Fern Chandonnet, ed.

(Anchorage: Alaska at War Committee, 1995) gives the most recent thinking of a number of

Japanese and American scholars who have studied the North Pacific campaign. Paul S. Dull,

A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945) (Annapolis, Md.: United States

Naval Institute, 1978) puts the campaign in context from the perspective of the Japanese

navy. As is true for all work on World War II, official histories provide a foundation. These

include Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War

II, Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Washington, D.C.:

Office of Air Force History, 1983, reprint ed.), Samuel Eliot Morrison, History of the United

States Navy in World War II, Volume VII, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls June 1942-April

1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engleman, Byron
185

Fairchild, U.S. Army in World War II-Western Hemisphere, Guarding the United States and

Its Outposts (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the

Army, 1964). In addition to the official histories and the scholarly analyses, resources for the

North Pacific campaign include veterans’ memoirs and reprints of World War II era

documents, many of which were compiled or republished in connection with the fifty-year

commemorations of World War II. Notable among these are Charles L. Scrivner, The Empire

Express (Temple City, Calif.: Historical Aviation Album, 1976) and Naval Historical Center,

U.S. Naval Experience in the North Pacific During World War II, Selected Documents

(Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1989). Special interest publications such as

Cryptolog, the periodical of the [U.S.] Naval Cryptologic Veterans’ Association, supplement

more general works on the role of signals intelligence with details such as those provided by

James McIntire, “Radio Intelligence in the North Pacific Naval and Air Operations,” and

George McGinnis, “COMNNORPAC Radio Intelligence Unit (RIU) Support,” in Cryptolog

12(5) (Special Edition, 1991).

As is true for coverage of the air-sea war in the North Pacific, campaigns employing

land-based aerial forces in maritime operations in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific

areas do not enjoy the plethora of sources available on the Battle of the Atlantic. Nonetheless,

good information on the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse is available in

Deighton, Dull, Richards and Saunders, and Roskill previously cited, in Arthur Hezlet,

Aircraft and Sea Power (New York: Stein and Day/Publishers, 1970), and Douglas Gillison,

Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1962). H. P.

Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982) and United States Army, Reports of General

MacArthur, Volume II-Part I, Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1950

(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), are valuable in

understanding motives for these campaigns. Official histories particularly relevant to the

Southwest Pacific campaigns are Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army

Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, reprint ed., 1983), Volume IV, cited above, of

the same series, and Samuel Eliot Morrison, History of United States Naval Operations in

World War II, Volume VI, Breaking the Bismarcks Barriers (Boston: Little, Brown and

Company, 1968 reprint). Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s Ultra: Code-Breaking and the War

Against Japan, 1942-1945 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992) supplements the

official histories with signals intelligence data not available earlier. George C. Kenney,

General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War (Washington, D.C.: Office of

Air Force History, reprint ed., 1987) recounts the efforts of Allied air forces in the Southwest

Pacific to interdict Japanese shipping as one who directed the campaign. Herman Wolk,

“George C. Kenney,” in We Shall Return! MacArthur’s Commanders and the Defeat of Japan,

William M. Leary, ed. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1988) furnishes a

retrospective assessment of Kenney. Gerhard Krebs, “The Japanese Air Forces,” pp. 228-34,

in The Conduct of the Air War in Second World War, An International Comparison, Horst

Boog, ed. (New York: Berg Publishers Limited, 1992) discusses Japanese aerial resources

brought to the fight. Lex McAulay, Battle of the Bismarck Sea (New York: St. Martin’s Press,

1991) provides good background and fulsome detail about the aerial destruction of a specific

Japanese convoy.

A number of sources document Argentine use of land-based aviation to oppose the

Royal Navy’s recapture of the Falkland Islands. Martin Middlebrook, Task Force: The

Falklands War (New York: Penguin Books, rev. ed., 1987) and The Fight for the “Malvinas”:
186

The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War (New York: Viking, 1989) are the most

comprehensive accounts. The latter, in particular, is supported by oral history and access to

documents not granted to other authors. David Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987) is a thorough recounting of the Royal Navy

experience, while Commander “Sharkey” Ward, commanding officer of one of the Navy’s

Harrier squadrons and Rear Adm. Sandy Woodward with Patrick Robinson, One Hundred

Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander (Annapolis, Md.: Naval

Institute Press, 1992) give unique views of the campaign from their respective vantage points.

Roger A. Burden et al., Falklands: The Air War provides another specialized look at the

campaign as is Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic (New York:

Macmillan, 1983). The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, issued by the United Kingdom’s

Secretary of State (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1982) is Britain’s official public

after action report. Bryon Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict (New York: Sterling

Publishing Co., Inc., 1982) focuses on Argentine and British hardware used in the war. Two

articles in James A. Brown and William P. Snyder, eds., The Regionalization of Warfare (New

Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1985) are particularly thoughtful. These are John F.

Guilmartin Jr., “The South Atlantic War: Lessons and Analytical Guideposts-A Military

Historian’s Perspective,” and Dov S. Zakheim, “The South Atlantic War: Evaluating the

Lessons.” Also of value is Robert W. Duffner, “Conflict in the South Atlantic: the Impact of

Air Power,” in Air University Review 35(3) (April-May 1984). Another helpful article is that

of Commodore José O’Dorico, FAA-Ret, “La Fuerza Area Argentina,” in Air University Review

37(5) (July-August 1986).

The confusion of war at sea is evident in accounts of the “Tanker War,” wherein even

the number of ships attacked is not agreed upon. Sreedhar Kapil Kaul, Tanker War: Aspect

of Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 (New Dehli: ABC Publishing House, 1989) has made the most

concerted effort to arrive at a definitive list of ships attacked. Tom Baranuskas, “Air Power

in the Iran-Iraq War,” Asian Defence Journal 3 (March 1987), and Robert Gaunt, “War in the

Shallow Seas - Maritime Air Operations in the Iran-Iraq War,” Defense & Foreign Affairs 13

(October 1985) provide good background as do Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War

and Western Security: Strategic Implications and Policy Options (New York: Jane’s

Publishing, Inc., 1987) and Shahram Chubin and Charles Trip, Iran and Iraq at War

(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988). Maj. Douglas A. Kupersmith, USAF, The Failure of

Third World Air Power: Iraq and the War With Iran (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University

Press, 1993), concentrates on air power applied against armies, but gives some information

useful in understanding the campaign against tankers. The belligerents’ execution of the war

against shipping is discussed in several good pieces. These analyze included Raphael Dandier,

“The Persian Gulf Tanker War,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review

(1985), David Segal, “The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis,” Foreign Affairs 66(5) (1988),

Anthony J. Watts, “The Gulf War: Economic War at Sea,” in A. J. Ambrose, ed., Jane’s

Merchant Shipping Review (New York: Jane’s Publishing, Inc., 1985), and Maj. Stephen C.

Polluter, USA, and Lt. Col. Douglas V. Johnson III, Lessons Learned from the Iran-Iraq War

(Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1991). Three

documents issued by the United States Congress represent the best public U.S. government

effort to understand the Tanker War. These publications are A United States Senate,

Committee on Foreign Relations, War in the Persian Gulf: the U.S. Takes Sides: A Staff

Report (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1987), United States

Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Overview of the Situation

in the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), and
187

United States Senate, Subcommittee on Defense, U.S. Presence in the Persian Gulf: Cost and

Policy Implications (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, January

1988).

Material on the role of land-based aerial forces in the Cold War is available, but in

annual summaries of Soviet and American strength, reports on particular airframes and

weapons systems, and—in the case of American forces—essays touching on how long-range

American aircraft might be useful in naval warfare.

Sources especially worth consulting on Soviet Naval Air include The Center for

Strategic Studies, Soviet Sea Power, Special Report Series: No. 10 (Washington, D.C.:

Georgetown University, June 1969), Norman Polmar, “Soviet Naval Aviation,” Air Force

Magazine (March 1976), Peter Hertel Rasmussen, “The Soviet Naval Air Force Since 1945,”

MA Thesis, 1978 Det Kongelige Garnisonbibliotek, Copenhagen, Denmark, (available as

Document No. 20, Reel No. 8732, Microform Center, University of Wisconsin - Madison), R.

A. Mason and W. R. Taylor, Aircraft, Strategy, and Operations of the Soviet Air Force (New

York: Jane’s, 1986), and Donald W. Chipman, “The Transformation of Soviet Maritime Air

Operations: Implications for US Maritime Strategy,” Airpower Journal (Summer 1990). In

addition, reports on Soviet air and naval orders of battle such as those appearing in Air Force

Magazine and Naval Institute Proceedings give yearly reports on newly-acquired weapons

systems and aircraft inventories.

With regard to American forces during the Cold War for the application of land-based

air power to maritime operations, pieces such as that of Bert H. Cooper, Maritime Roles for

Land-Based Aviation (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 1, 1983),

Donald D. Chipman and David Lay, “Sea Power and the B-52 Stratofortress,” Air University

Review 37(2) (January-February 1986), and Jan S. Breemer and SSgt Todd Hoover, USAF,

“SAC Goes to Sea with Harpoon,” National Defense (February 1987) predict capabilities never

fully realized. Closer looks at the realities of equipment and training are provided by Lt.

Cmdr. J. R. Thompson, USN, USN-USAF Interaction for Ocean Surveillance Using LandBased Aircraft (Newport, R. I.: Naval War College, Center for Advanced Research, June

1979), Lt. Col. Donald G. Cook, USAF, Cmdr. Charles H. Horne, USN, and Cmdr. Walter W.

Manning, USN, B-52 Maritime Operations: The Anti-Surface Warfare Mission (ASUW), Air

War College Research Report No. AU-AWC-87-043 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College,

1987), Lt. Col. Robert C. Kuhlo, Attacking Ships: Command and Control of Joint Antiship

Operations, Research Report No. AU-ARI-89-3 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,

October 1990), and Lt. Col. V. Frank Vollmar, USAF, The Conventional Bomber Force, WarHorses for Global Conflicts: Capabilities, Limitations, and Modernization, Research Report

No. AU-ARI-91-6 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1992).