Co n g e r h a d tw o p r io r D WI o f f e n s e s , o n e o c c u r

r in g o n Ju ly 3 1 , 1 9 8 7 , an d th e other on 1 Marc h 21, 2006. I n 1994, he was also convicte d of involuntary manslaug hter re sulting fr om another DWI incident. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 12.42(a) (2) ( West S upp. 2007). I n this case , J udg e J on N. W isser presided over the g uilt/i nnocenc e and se ntencingportions 2 of the tri al , b u t t h e judgment was sig ned by J udg e B aird, who took the be nch following Judg e Wiss e r’ s r e tir e me nt. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00278 -CR

G e r ald Jo hn C ong e r , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-06 -20 4445 , HO NORAB LE CHARLES F . BAI RD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Th e State c ha

rg e d a pp e lla nt, Ger a ld Joh n Co ng e r, wi th f e lony dr ivi ngwh ile intox icated ( DWI ). See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 49.04(a) (West 2003), § 49.09(b)( 2) (West Supp. 20 07 ). Con g e r p le a de d n ot guil ty to t he of fe ns e , s tip ulate d to the pr ior c on vic tio ns , and wa ived a

1 jury trial. After

hear ing the evidenc e and te stimony , the t rial j udg e found Conge r guilty of sec ondde g re e fe lony

DWI and sent e nc e d h im t o thre e y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt. I n his sole point of error , 2 Conge r a rgues that the evidence is factua lly insufficient to support his conviction. In particula r, Conge r cla ims that the evidenc e failed to show that he lac ked contr ol over his phy sical and me ntalThompson testified that this “particular intersec tion is probably the larg est open-a ir drug 3 marke t in the Cit y

of Austin.” He further stated, whe n asked w hether he had spe cific know ledg e that this woman had bee n in v o l v ed in drug transac tions before , “I haven’ t met a prostitute that is not addicted to c ra ck co ca i n e. I have se en numer ous prostitutes arre sted for de livery of a controlled substanc e.” The tra nsportation code pr ovides that “a n operator shall use t he sig nal authorized by 4 Section 545.106 [hand, arm, or sig nal lamp] to indicate an intention to turn, chang e lane s, or start from a pa rked position.” Te x . Transp. Code A nn. § 54 5
. 1 0 4 (a ) (West 1999). Conge r does not challeng e the testimony

that he wa s starting from a pa rked position on Chicon Street. 2 fa c ult ie s, that hi s bloo d- a lc oh ol co nc e ntr a tio n wa s abo ve the le g a l limit, or that th e tr a ff

ic of fe ns e he committed, fa iling to sig nal when pulling out from a pa rked position, was indicative of imp a ir me nt. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND Ar ound mid nig ht o n Augus t 15, 200 6, Au sti n Polic e Of fi c e rs Th omp so n a

nd Tr ujo
wer e patr olling the a

rea of 12th and Chicon Streets. The of fice rs observe d a truc k pull up to the curb in the 1200 block of Chicon. A fema le, who Thompson re cog nized as a prostitute, approa ched the
ve hic le and g ot in the pa sse ng e r se a t. Af te r dr ivi ngon e blo c k o n Ch ic on Str e e t, t he ve hic le a g a in pulled up to the curb, a

nd the fe male g ot out of t he truc k. Thompson testified that he believe d that
a dr ugtr ans a c tio n h a d ju st t a ke n p la c e in t he ve hic le , b a se d on his expe ri e nc e a s a po lic e of fi c e r i n that are a and his kn ow le dg e tha

t pr os tit ute s are of

te n dru g a dd ic ts an d tha t th e y of te n d e a l dr

ug s in
or de r t o s up po rt

the ir a dd ic tio ns . After the woman g ot out of the truc k, the offic ers sa w the truc k 3 pull away from the c urb without signa ling a nd initiated a traf

fic stop. 4 Thompson stated that he a pproac hed the dr iver of the truck in order to issue a c itation
and ide nti fi e d th e dr ive r a s Co ng e r. Con c e rn e d th a t Co ng e r m ig ht be c on ceal in g na rc oti c s o n h isThompson wanted “ to make sure that he didn’t have any thing – any

narc otics conce aled 5 in his mout h due to the fa ct that that’s 90 per cent of the time is wher e som ebody that has purc hased cra ck is kee ping it nowa day s.” Thompson testified that he ha d seen suspects swallow drugs in order to avoid being char g ed with possession and that he wanted to pr event Cong er f rom attempting to do thi s b e c a us e ing e sti ngc ra c k- c oc a ine is p ote nti a lly le tha l. 3 pe rs on , T ho mps on

a sk e d Co ng e r to o pe n h is m ou th s o th a t he c ou ld c he c k f or dr ug s. I ns o d o i n g, 5 Thompson noticed a strongodor of a lcohol on Conge r’s bre ath.

Wit hin a fe w minutes, Au s t in Poli ce O ffice r Aspenle iter ar rived on the sc ene a s backup. T hompson, who was nea ring the end of his shift, told Aspe nleiter that he suspec ted Cong er had been drivi ng while i ntox icated, and Aspenleiter t ook over the DWI investigation. Aspenleiter observe d at least two ope n container s throug h the window of Conge r’s truc k. Aspenleiter direc ted Conge r to the fr ont of his patrol ca r for an intervie w and notice d that when Conger walked, “ he had a little sway

to him; I could smell the odor of a lcohol o n h is breath; his ey es we re g lassy and blo o d s h o t and watery ; and when he talked, his speec h was a littl e slurre d.” Aspe nleiter’s observations led him t o believe that Conge r wa s a ca ndidate for

the standar d field-sobrie ty tests. Con g e r p e rf

or me d th e ho ri z on tal gaze n y st agmus (HGN ) and vert ica l n y st agmus tests but refuse d to do the walk-a nd-turn test and the one-le g stand test. Aspenleiter observe d all six clues of intox ication durin g C o ng er’ s HGN test. Aspe nleiter testified that, based on the totality of the circ u m s t an ces—his obser vations of Cong er’ s behavior, the result of the H GN test, the odor of
a lc oh ol on Con g e r’ s b re a th, and the op e n c on ta ine rs —h e be lie ve d th a t Co ng e r w a s im pa ir e d a nd did not have the me ntal or phy sical fac ulties to safe ly operate a vehic le. Ther efor e, Aspe nleiter plac ed Con g e r u nd e r a rr e st a nd re a d h im the sta

nd ard DI C- 24 statut or

y wa rn ingre qu ir e d f

or DWI arr e sts
. See Te x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann. § 7 24 .0 15 (We st Su pp . 2 00 7) . Cong e r re fu se d to subm it to a bre a th t e st.4 At trial, Conge r’s attorney cross-e x amined Aspe nleiter re g ardinghis investigation tactics a nd sug g ested that Aspe nleiter ha d been ove rly ag g ressive in an eff

ort to intimi date Cong er into ag ree ing to perf

orm the sobriety

tests. Aspenleiter te stified that Conge r wa s not cooperative and that he wa s try ing to make Conge r listen so t h at Conge r would have “an oppor tunity to refuse at
ever y step of the wa

y .” While Aspenleiter a cknowledg ed that Cong er w as not a “ fall-down” drunk, he testified that in his opinion, Conger was impaire d. I n a dd iti on

to t he te sti mony

of Th omp so n a

nd As pe nle ite r, the c ourt

a dmi tted int o evidenc e a D VD re cordingof Cong er’ s detention and a rre st, including Aspe n l ei t er ’s re peate d reque sts for Cong er to pa

y attention while he e x plained th e fie ld-sobriety tests and Cong er’ s repe ated
re fu sa ls t o p e rf

or m th e m. Wh e n a sk e d w he the r h e ha d h a d a ny thi ngto d ri nk , Co ng e r a dmi tte d to having about three beer s since five o’cloc k that evening . The re cordingalso indicates that Cong er
was unc ooperative and had to be asked severa l times before he would follow dire ctions; Aspenleiter repe atedly

had to ask Conge r to ke ep his ha nds by his side and stand with his fee t tog ether . When Aspenleiter

was pe rfor

ming the H GN test, duringwhich Cong er w as aske d to keep his head still and
no t to sp e a k, Con g e r c on tin ue d tal ki ng, an d h is s pe e c h thro ug ho ut t he e nc ounte r w a s n oti c e a bly slurred. In its closing ar g ument, the State conc eded that the arr est was p er h ap s n o t the “idea l cop/citizen situation,” but arg ued that the e vidence nonetheless showed that, under the totality of the
c ir c ums tanc e s, Con g e r w a s g uil ty of dr ivi ngwh ile int oxic a te d. Th e tr ia l jud g e fo un d Con g e r guil ty of dr ivi ngwh ile int oxic a te d, and Con g e r a pp e a ls.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW I n h is s ole po int

of e rr or , Co ng e r c laim s the e vid e nc e wa s f a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o support his conviction. We beg in a fa ctual-suf ficienc y rev i ew wi t h t he pre sumption t hat the5

evidenc e supporting the judg men t i s l eg ally sufficie nt. Cle wis v . S

tat e , 922 S.W .2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We view all of the e vidence in a neutra l light and will re verse only if the evidenc e supporting g uilt is so obviously weak as to rend er t h e convic tion clear ly wrongand manifestly

unjust, or if that evidenc e, althoug h adequate when taken a lone, is so gr eatly outweig hed by the over whelming weig ht of contra ry eviden ce as t o rende r the c onviction clear ly wrongand manifestly

unjust. W

atson v . S

tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006); Va sq ue z v . S tat e , 67 S.W. 3d 22 9, 23 6 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 23 S.W .3d 1, 10-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An appellate court must be appropriate ly defe rential to the ve rdict, in order to avoid substitut ing its own judg ment for that of the fa ct-finde r. Vasquez , 67 S.W .3d at 236. Our
e va luatio n ma

y no t in tr ud e up on the fa c t- fi nd e r’ s r ole a s th e so le jud g e of the we ig ht a

nd c re dib ili ty
acc orded any witness’s testimony
. Cai n v . S tat e , 958 S.W .2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The weig ht to be given contradictory testimonial evidenc e is within the sole province of the fa ct-finde r beca use it turns on an e v al u at i o n o f cr edibility and deme anor. Id. at 407-09. In a benc h trial, the trial judg e is t h e sole fa ct-finde r, and his cr edibility and we ight de terminations are entitled to the same de fer ence as that g iven to a jury ’s deter minations. Se e W

ill iam s v . S

tat e , 692 S.W .2d 671, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
DI SCU SSIO N

Un de r the pe na l c od e , a

pe rs on c omm its the of

fe ns e of dr ivi ngwh ile int oxic a te d “ if the per son is intoxi cate d while operating a motor vehicle in a public place .” Te x . Penal Code Ann. § 49.04 (West 2003). I ntox ication means “ not having the normal use of mental or phy sical fa culties by rea son of the introduction of alcohol,” or “having an alcohol conce ntration of 0.08 or m ore.” Id.6

§ 49.01(2)( A), (B ). I ntox ication may be prove d under e ither the impairment or the per se def inition. See State v . Mec hler , 153 S.W .3d 435, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

I n c ha lle ng ingthe fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , Co ng e r c la ims that th e State failed to prove that he lac ked control of his phy sical and mental fa culties at the time he w as pulled
over on a “pre text ” tra ffic stop for a possible drugo ff

en s e. As the St ate c orre ctly points out, t he
o ff i ce r’s subjec tive intent or “pre text ” does not make an other wise leg al stop unlawful. See State v. Gray , 158 S.W .3d 465, 469-70 (Te x . Crim. App. 2005) (off icer entitled to searc h driver’ s person a nd passeng er compar

tment of vehicle afte r making valid arr est for offe nse of turning without signa ling, d es p i t e f

ac tt h at o ff

i ce r “ m ay h av e h adan o t h er

s u b j ec t i v e m o t i v e” fo r i n i t i at i n g d et en t ion);

se e als o Ca str o v . S

tat e , 227 S.W. 3d 73 7, 73 9, 74 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ) (f a ilure to sig na l is va lid basis for tra ffic stop and subsequent search for narcotics). W hile Thompson initi ally believed that
a dr ugtr ans a c tio n h a d ta

ke n p la c e , p ro mpt inghim

to s e arc h insi de Con g e r’ s mouth f or hid de n d ru g s, there was nothing unlawful in stopping Conge r for failure to use his turn signa l in violation of the transportation code.

As e vid e nc e tha

t Conger’ s p hy sic a l and

me nta l f a c ult ie s w e re imp a ir e d at th e tim e of the sto p, Th omp so n an d Asp e nle ite r bot h tes tif ie d tha t Cong e r h a d a

str on g od or

of a lc oh ol o n h is breath. I n addition, Aspenleiter sa w multiple ope n alcoholic be vera g e conta iners inside Cong er’ s vehicle. A spenleiter te stified that when he had Conge r walk over to his ve hicle in orde r to perf orm the sobriety

test, Conge r “ha d a li ttle sway to his walk.” Aspenleiter f urther te stified that Conge r’s ey es we re bloodshot an d t h at his speec h was slig htly slurred. A ccor ding to Aspe nleiter, Cong er fa ile d th e HG

N t e st b y sh ow ingsix out of

six in dic a tor s f

or int oxica ti on and

re fu se d to su

bmi t a bre ath test.7 The unc orrobor at edt es t i m o n y o f a nex p er i en ce d

arre s ting of

fice r is sufficie nt to prove t h e element of

intox ication. Annis v. State, 5 7 8 S. W. 2 d 4 0 6 , 4 0 7 ( T e x. Cr im
. App. 1979); Du ma s v . S

tate , 812 S.W .2d 611, 615 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pe t. ref’ d). The rec ord shows that Aspenleiter

was a n experience d office r: he ha d been in law enfor ceme nt for appr ox ima t el y five y ear s, had re ceive d specific training relating to D WI arr ests, and had investigated “a littl e over 200” DWI s. Ba sed on his experience and obser vations, he conc luded that Cong er w as intox icated. Fur thermore , Conge r’s re fusal to submit to a breath or blood test is an ad d i t ional fac tor that the fa ct-finde r may consider in de termining whether he was intox icated at the time of the alleg ed off

ense. See Te x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann. § 72 4. 06 1 ( Wes t 20 03 ); Gr iff ith v . S tat e , 55 S.W .3d 598, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (re fusal to take blood- al co h o l t est was re levant as e vidence of int oxic a tio n) ; Ga dd

is v . S tat e , 7 53 S.W. 2d

39 6, 39 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ) (i nto xicatio n is leg itimate deduction from de fenda nt’s ref usal to take bre ath test). B ased on thi s re fu s al an d the office rs’ testimony

reg ardingConge r’s appear ance and behavior at the time of the stop, we conc lude that the evidenc e of Conge r’s impairment is not so weak as to rende r the c onviction clear ly wrong
and manif e stl y un jus t. Nor do we think that the evidenc e in suppor t of the verdic t is g reatly outweig hed by contra ry evide n ce s h o wi n g that Conge r wa s not intox icated. See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 414-15. Under a fac tual-suffic iency revie w, we do not vie w ea ch piec e of e vidence in isolation. R ather , we must view all the evidenc e, both for a nd ag ainst the finding of g uilt, in a ne utral lig ht. Sim s v . S tat e , 99 S.W .3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The evidenc e Conge r cites as we ighingin his favor includes (1) the vi deotape , which shows that he was not a “f all-down” drunk; (2) the lack of bloodAs noted above , ref usal is a fac tor the fac t-finder is pe rmitted to consider in dete rmining 6 whether a per son may

have be en intox icated at the time of the alleg ed off ense. See Tex. Transp. Cod e Ann. § 7 24 .0 61 (We st 2 00 3) ; Gr iff ith v . S tat e , 55 S.W .3d 598, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Ga dd is v . S tate , 753 S.W .2d 396, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 8 or bre ath test results indicating intox ication; and (3) the lack of err atic driving or any ty

pe of driving which indicate d intox ication.

We a g re e that th e vi deo tap e sh ow s th a t Co ng e r w a s a ble to s tand , b ut i t a lso
corr oborate s Aspenleiter ’s testimony that Conge r wa lked with “a slig ht swa y ” a n d s p o k e w it h slurred sp e e c h. Re g ard le ss, the fa c t th a t th e vid e ota pe sh ow s th a t Co ng e r w a s n ot c omp le te ly imp a ir e d to the p o in t th a t h e w a s u n a b le to s ta n d d o e s n o t g r e a tl y o u tw e ig h o th e r e v id e n c e th a t Co ng er w as intox icated, suc h as the testimony that his breath smelled strong ly of alc ohol and that he f

ailed the HGN test by

exhibi ting a ll six clues of intoxication. Wit h respe ct t o the lack of blood or breath test evidence , Conge r asse rts that there was no evidenc e showing that his blood-alcohol level wa s over the le g al limit, an d t h at there fore the evidenc e is insufficient to esta b l i s h his guilt. I mplicit in t his argument is the sugg estion that the State was re quired to submit evidence that Conge r’s blood-a lcohol conce ntration was .08 or g reater, despite the fa ct that Cong er r efuse d to provide a br eath spe cimen. Howeve r, in this case, Cong er 6 was not cha

rg ed with DWIon the theory that his blood-alcohol level wa s over the le g al limit under the per se standar d of intox ication containe d in the penal c ode. S e e T ex . P en al C ode Ann. § 49.01(2)( B)
. Rather, he was indicted, char g ed, and convicted of DWI u n d er t h e i m pairment definition, requiringthat the State prove bey ond a re asonable doubt that Conge r d i d not have the normal use of

his mental or phy sical fa culties by rea son of the i n t ro d u ct i on of alc ohol. Id. § 49.01(2)( A). Cong er is ther efor e incor rec t to arg ue that the State wa s require d to sh ow thatI n a sse ssi ng Con g e r’ s punis hme nt, the tr ia l c ourt no te d th a t w hil e Con g e r w a s in de e d guil ty 7 of dr ivi ngwh ile int oxic a te d, “ the e vid e nc e was n’ t a s st ro nga s [he ] wo uld

have lik e d f

or [him ] to impose a sentenc e of the mag nitude that the State desire s.” 9 Conge r’s blood-a l co hol level was a bove .08 whe n he wa s instead cha rg ed under

the impairment definition.

F ina lly , Co ng e r a

rgue s th a t th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e su g g e sti ngthat th e tr a ff ic of fe ns e he c omm itt e d w a s in dic a tiv e of his imp a ir

me nt. There is n o r e qu ir e me nt t hat th e of

fi c e r m us t observe signs of

intox ication while Cong er w as driving his vehicle. The traff ic offe nse that ser

ves as a pr edicate for the initial detention need not s how impairment in order for Cong er to be arr ested
and c on vic te d o f D WI . H e re , A sp e nle ite r c on c lud e d th a t Co ng e r w a s in toxi cat ed bas e d o n h is
a pp e ara nc e and c on du c t im me diate ly

a ft e r b e ingsto pp e d f

or his fa ilu re to sig na l. T he of fi c e rs ’ observations of Conge r af ter Cong er exit ed the vehicle are sufficie nt to support a deter mination of intox ication. Se e Ro dr igu e z v . S tat e , 31 S.W .3d 359, 361 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. ref ’d) (holding that investigating of fice r’s testimo n y t h at he thoug ht appellant wa s intox icated ba sed entirely on conduct a fter a

ppellant exited vehicle, ra t h er t han how a ppellant drove vehicle, w as fac tually sufficie nt to support DWI conviction). The State’s a lleg ation that Conge r’s mental and phy sical fa culties wer e impaire d was based on evidenc e that Conge r’s breath ha d a strongodor of a lcoholic beve rag e, that he f ailed the HG N t e st, that hi s sp e e c h w a s sl ig htl y slurr e d a nd his e y e s we re wate ry , and that he re fu se d to su bmi t a bre ath spec imen. The e vidence prese nted i n this case to support a determination that Conge r wa s driving while intox icated is not so obviously wea k as to rende r the c onviction clear ly wrongor unjust. Although the trial court observe d that it was a “close case ,” we hold that there was suff icient evidenc e to deter

mine that Conge r wa s driving while intox icated. 710 We overrule Conge r’s point of er ror a nd aff irm the judg ment of convic tion.
CO NC LU SION Be cause the evidenc e is f

actua lly sufficie nt to support the trial court’s judg ment, we aff irm the judg ment of convic tion.

_____________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: August 1, 2008 Do Not Publish