U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) 

Tsunami Scenario
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U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–A

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) 

Tsunami Scenario—Executive Summary and Introduction
COVER— Top: maximum current speeds for the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach generated 

during the SAFRR tsunami scenario (in knots). Bottom: damage to boats and docks at Crescent City 

Harbor, California, due to the tsunami generated by the M9.1 Tohoku earthquake in 2011. © 2011 The 

Oregonian. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) 

Tsunami Scenario—Executive Summary and 

Introduction

By Stephanie L. Ross, Lucile M. Jones, Kevin Miller, Keith A. Porter, Anne Wein, Rick I. Wilson, Bohyun 

Bahng, Aggeliki Barberopoulou, Jose C. Borrero, Deborah M. Brosnan, John T. Bwarie, Eric L. Geist, 

Laurie A. Johnson, Stephen H. Kirby, William R. Knight, Kate Long, Patrick Lynett, Carl E. Mortensen, 

Dmitry J. Nicolsky, Suzanne C. Perry, Geoffrey S. Plumlee, Charles R. Real, Kenneth Ryan, Elena 

Suleimani, Hong Kie Thio, Vasily V. Titov, Paul M. Whitmore, and Nathan J. Wood 

Open-File Report 2013–1170-A 

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey 
iii

U.S. Department of the Interior

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2013

For product and ordering information:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov/pubprod

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth,

its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

Suggested citation: 

Ross, S.L., Jones, L.M., Miller, Kevin, P., K.A., Wein, A., Wilson, Ri.I., Bahng, B., Barberopoulou, A., 

Borrero, J.C., Brosnan, D.M., Bwarie, J.T., Geist, E.L., Johnson, L.A., Kirby, S.H., Knight, W.R., Long, 

K., Lynett, P., Mortensen, C.E., Nicolsky, D.J., Perry, S.C., Plumlee, G.S., Real, C.R., Ryan, K., 

Suleimani, E., Thio, H., Titov, V.V., Whitmore, P.M. and Wood, N.J., 2013, SAFRR (Science Application 

for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario—Executive Summary and Introduction: U.S. Geological Survey 

Open-File Report 2013–1170–A, in Ross, S.L., and Jones, L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science Application 

for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170, 17 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/a/.

Any use of trade, product, or firm names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply 

endorsement by the U.S. Government.

Although this information product, for the most part, is in the public domain, it also may contain 

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iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD 

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION

MARK NECHODOM 

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D. 

STATE GEOLOGIST
v 

Contents

Contributors .................................................................................................................................................................... vi

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................................................... 1

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................... 10

Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................................................... 16

References .................................................................................................................................................................... 17
vi

Contributors

The SAFRR Tsunami Scenario was developed by a large team of experts from many 

different disciplines. The coordinating committee is the group who participated in the biweekly 

coordinating committee conference calls and assured that the different working groups 

communicated effectively. 

SAFRR Tsunami Scenario Coordinating Committee

Stephanie L. Ross, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), SAFRR Tsunami Scenario Project Manager 

Lucile M. Jones, USGS, SAFRR Project Chief 

Bohyun Bahng, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, 

West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (NOAA/NWS/WCATWC) 

Aggeliki Barberopoulou, Geological and Nuclear Sciences, New Zealand 

Jose C. Borrero, University of Southern California and eCoast Ltd. 

Deborah M. Brosnan, University of California, Davis 

Erin Burkett, USGS 

John T. Bwarie, USGS 

Eric L. Geist, USGS 

Laurie A. Johnson, Laurie Johnson Consulting 

Stephen H. Kirby, USGS 

William R. Knight, NOAA/NWS/WCATWC 

Kate Long, California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) 

Patrick Lynett, University of Southern California 

Kevin Miller, Cal OES 

Carl E. Mortensen, USGS

Dmitry J. Nicolsky, Alaska Earthquake Information Center (AEIC), Geophysical Institute, 

University of Alaska 

Suzanne C. Perry, USGS 

Geoffrey S. Plumlee, USGS 

Keith A. Porter, University of Colorado, Boulder 

Charles R. Real, California Geological Survey (CGS) 

Kenneth Ryan, University of California at Riverside 

Elena Suleimani, AEIC, Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska 

Hong Kie Thio, URS Corporation 

Vasily V. Titov, NOAA, Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory 

Anne Wein, USGS 

Paul M. Whitmore, NOAA/NWS/WCATWC 

Rick I. Wilson, CGS 

Nathan J. Wood, USGS 
vii

Other Authors

The people listed below are authors of other chapters of this report but were not part of 

the coordinating committee. 

William Byers, Private Consultant 

Dylan Caldwell, Humboldt State University 

Catherine Chagué-Goff, University of New South Wales and Australian Nuclear Science and 

Technology Organisation 

David Dykstra, Moffatt and Nichol Engineers 

James Goff, University of New South Wales 

Nick Graehl, Lettis Consultants International, formerly at Humboldt State University 

Eileen Hemphill-Haley, Humboldt State University 

Don Hoirup, CA Dept. of Water Resources 

Bruce Jaffe, USGS 

Harvey Kelsey, Humboldt State University 

Robert Leeper, USGS 

Amy Lim, Moffatt and Nichol Engineers 

Casey Loofbourrow, Humboldt State University 

Mary McGann, USGS 

Suzette A. Morman, USGS 

David D. Oglesby, University of California at Riverside 

Jeff Peters, USGS 

Robert Peters, USGS 

Jamie Ratliff, USGS 

Bruce Richmond, USGS 

Adam Rose, University of Southern California 

Carma San Juan, USGS 

Charles Scawthorn, SPA Risk LLC. 

David Scholl, USGS 

Kimberley Shoaf, Center for Public Health and Disasters, Fielding School of Public Health, 

University of California, Los Angeles 

Sangyoung Son, University of Southern California 

Costas Synolakis, University of Southern California and Hellenic Centre for Marine Research 

Roland von Huene, USGS 

Steve Watt, USGS 

Dan Wei, University of Southern California 

Ray Wells, USGS 

Ian Sue Wing, Boston University 

Other Contributors

We gratefully acknowledge the following people for providing their expertise; however, they 

bear no responsibility for the contents of the report. 

Robel Afewerki, Port of Los Angeles (POLA) Engineering 

Angus Alexander, Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACoFD) 

Mariana Amatullo, Art Center College of Design (ACCD) 
viii

Susan Asturias, San Diego County Office of Emergency Services (OES) 

Rich Baratta, Port of Long Beach 

Richard Berman, Port of San Francisco (POSF) 

Bob Bertelli, Fisherman, POLA 

Roy Bibbens, California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) 

Rick Blakely, USGS 

Mike Blood, Coronado Fire Department 

Eric Boldt, National Weather Service (NWS) 

Donna Boston, Orange County Emergency Management Division 

Sonia Brown, Cal OES 

Chris Brown, POLA 

Damon Burgett, POSF 

Bob Butchart, Cal OES Ports & Harbors 

Ed Byrne, POSF 

Helen Cahng, ACCD 

Nnenia Campbell, University of Colorado 

Eric Caris, POLA Business Development 

Dale Carnathan, Ventura County OES 

Tom Carter, POSF 

Mo Chang, US Army Corps of Engineers 

Christopher Chase, POLA 

Mike Christensen, POLA 

Douglas Christenson, Geophysical Institute of the University of Alaska at Fairbanks 

Bent Christiansen, POLA 

Ken Chu, POLA 

Tim Clark, POLA 

Larry Collins, LACoFD 

Larry Cottrill, POLB 

Brandon Cowan, POSF 

Dale Cox, USGS 

Greg Crow, HB Marine Safety 

Carrie Cruz, San Bernardino County OES

George Cummings, Los Angeles Port Police 

John Davey, POSF 

Patti David, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LA DWP) 

Amy Draut, USGS 

Sherban Duncan, POSF 

Brooke Duthoy, Orange County OES 

Ron Eguchi, ImageCat, Inc. 

Lauren Eisele, POSF 

David Eisenman, UCLA Center for Public Health and Disasters 

Eric Endersby, Morro Bay Harbor Director 

Peggy Erdner, Orange County OES 

Joann Eres, California Department of Fish and Wildlife 

Terry Erwin, Smithsonian Institution 

Brett Fahning, Fisherman, Crescent City 
ix

Andrienne Fedrick, Port of Los Angeles 

Johanna Fenton, Cal OES, EQ & Tsunami Program 

David Flamm, Santa Barbara County Office of Emergency Management 

Desiree Fox, Caltrans 

Mike Frazier, LACoFD Lifeguards 

Jeff Freymueller, Geophysical Institute of the University of Alaska at Fairbanks 

Stuart Fricke, POLA 

Michael Galvin, POLA 

Rene Garcia, Caltrans 

Al Garcia, LA DWP 

Keith Garcia, Los Angeles Port Police 

Guy Gelfenbaum, USGS 

Tony Gioiello, POLA 

Kenneth Goettel, Goettel and Associates Inc. 

Aaron Golbus, POSF 

Jim Goltz, Cal OES retired 

Mike Graychik, Los Angeles Port Police 

Ed Green, Port of Long Beach 

Scott Grindy, San Mateo Harbor District 

Pastor Guerara, Cal OES 

Zach Hammil, Sonoma County OES 

Roger Hansen, Geophysical Institute of the University of Alaska at Fairbanks 

Anne Hardinger, City of Berkeley 

Stephen Harrison, NOAA/NWS 

Akira Hasegawa, Tohoku University 

Anita Hayden, Los Angeles Port Police 

Lisa Hayes, LA DWP 

Gavin Hayes, USGS 

Darryl Hebert, Oceanside Fire Department 

Jack Hedge, POLA Real Estate 

Cindy Henderson, Del Norte County OES 

Ryota Hino, Tohoku University 

Susan Hocevar, Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey 

Suzie Howser, Port of Humboldt Bay and Woodley Island Marina 

Doug Huls, Cal OES 

Charlie Huyck, ImageCat Inc. 

T. Iinuma, Tohoku University 

Y. Ito, Tohoku University 

Chen Ji, University of California Santa Barbara 

Radiah Jones, US Coast Guard (USCG) 

Dan Kane, POLB 

Kevin Keady, Caltrans 

Michael Keenan, POLA Planning 

Emily Knight, Ocean Science Trust 

Captain Lynn Korwatch, Marine Exchange of the San Francisco Bay Region 

Thorne Lay, University of California Santa Cruz 
x 

Willie Lee, USGS 

Thomas Lefko, USCG Sector San Francisco, Contingency Planning and Force Readiness 

Noli Legaspi, LA DWP 

Jill Lemon, USCG 

Stephen Mahaley, San Mateo OES 

Joe Maldonado, POLA CBM Division 

Caryn Margita, USCG 

Toru Matsuzawa, Tohoku University 

Jay McAmis, Santa Barbara County OES 

Linda McIntyre, Moss Landing Harbor District 

Captain Dick McKenna, Marine Exchange 

Dwayne Meadows, NOAA 

La Mer Walker, ACCD 

Kathy Merkovsky, POLA 

Brevyn Mettler, Huntington Beach Fire Dept. 

Jenny Miller Garmendia, AWARE 

Nancy Miller, LACoFD 

John Miller, USGS 

Sarah Minson, USGS, formerly at California Institute of Technology 

Walter Mooney, USGS 

Alan Nelson, USGS 

Steve Ng, Caltrans 

Leon Nixon III, Los Angeles Port Police 

Mike O'Brien, Port of Oakland, Port Facilities Security Officer 

Debra O’Malia, Oxnard Fire Dept. 

Emile Okal Northwestern University 

Diane Oshima, POSF 

Tom Ostrom, Caltrans 

Karl Pan, POLA 

Pietro Parravano, Fisherman, Half Moon Bay 

Aaron Pfannenstiel, Huntington Beach (RBF Consultant) 

Scott Phemister, POLB 

Eleyne Phillips, USGS 

George Plafker, USGS 

Abbas Pourheidari, Caltrans 

Uday Prasad, POSF 

Cindy Pridmore, CGS 

Stephen Rea, San Diego 

Sidney Reade, Monterey County OES 

Steven Reel, POSF 

Jeffrey Robinson, Area G Disaster Management 

Joe Roger, POSF 

Emily Roland, USGS 

Peter Rudd, LA DWP 

Elisa Ruffino, ACCD 

Monica Ruzich, Orange County ARC 
xi

Holly Ryan, USGS 

Sidonie Sansom, POSF, Director of Homeland Security 

Petty Santos, Los Angeles Port Police 

John Schelling, State of Washington 

Hope Seligson, MMI Consulting 

Shaun Shahrestani, POLA 

Jeri Siegel, Cal OES 

Mark Simons, California Institute of Technology, 

Benjamin Sleeter, USGS 

Tim Smith, LACoFD 

Jessamyn Specht, Oceanside Fire Department 

Keith Stahnke, San Francisco Bay Area Water Emergency Transportation Authority 

Ming Tai, ACCD 

Ian Taneguchi, California Department of Fish and Wildlife 

Alex Tardy, NWS San Diego 

Daryoush Tavatli, Caltrans 

Karen Taylor, POSF 

Jeff Terry, Los Angeles OES 

Doug Thiessen, Port of Long Beach 

Katherine Thompson, Center for Research on Environmental Decisions 

Curtis Thompson, Los Angeles Port Police 

Jen Tucker, San Clemente 

Martin Villa, USCG 

Ronnie Villanueva, Harbor Homeland Security 

Wendy Walsh, Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey 

David Walsh, POLA 

Tim Werle, City of Los Angeles Fire Dept. (LAFD) 

Malcolm Williams, Rand Corporation 

Jennifer Williams, USCG 

Guillaume Wolf, ACCD 

Roger Wu, POLB 

Richard Young, Harbormaster, Crescent City 

Dapeng Zhao, Tohoku University 

Evaluation of the Tsunami Scenario 

The USGS engaged a team from the University of Colorado, Boulder, to document the 

scenario process and provide an external evaluation of its effectiveness in increasing awareness 

and knowledge of the users in the coastal community. Their report will be completed after the 

release of the scenario. Apart from the description of the logic model process in the 

Introduction, they bear no responsibility for the contents of our report. The team included: 

Liesel A. Ritchie 

Kathleen Tierney 

Nnenia Campbell

Courtney Farnham 

Brandi Gilbert 

Jamie Vickery
Executive Summary

The Science Application for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) tsunami scenario depicts a 

hypothetical but plausible tsunami created by an earthquake offshore from the Alaska Peninsula 

and its impacts on the California coast. The tsunami scenario is a collaboration between the U.S. 

Geological Survey (USGS), the California Geological Survey, the California Governor’s Office 

of Emergency Services (Cal OES), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), other Federal, State, County, and local agencies, private companies, and academic and 

other institutions. This document presents evidence for past tsunamis, the scientific basis for the 

source, likely inundation areas, current velocities in key ports and harbors, physical damage and 

repair costs, economic consequences, environmental and ecological impacts, social vulnerability, 

emergency management and evacuation challenges, and policy implications for California 

associated with this hypothetical tsunami. We also discuss ongoing mitigation efforts by the 

State of California and new communication products. The intended users are those who need to 

make mitigation decisions before future tsunamis, and those who will need to make rapid 

decisions during tsunami events. The results of the tsunami scenario will help managers 

understand the context and consequences of their decisions and how they may improve 

preparedness and response. An evaluation component will assess the effectiveness of the 

scenario process for target stakeholders in a separate report to improve similar efforts in the 

future. 

Scenario Design

Several historical distant-source tsunamis, including those generated by the 1946 

magnitude (M) 8.1 Aleutian, 1960 M9.5 Chile, and 1964 M9.2 Alaska earthquakes, caused 

known inundation along portions of the northern and central California coast. Twenty wetland 

sites were evaluated for paleotsunami evidence as part of the most comprehensive tsunamideposit field program ever undertaken in California. Paleotsunami sands, which indicate past 

tsunami inundation, were found in Half Moon Bay and Crescent City stemming from the 1946 

and 1964 Alaskan events, respectively, and showed that evidence for distant-source tsunamis can 

be found in California’s coastal marshes (see fig. 1 for locations). Tsunami sand from the 1700 

Cascadia event was also found in Crescent City. Similar sand units at those sites (older than 1946 

at Half Moon Bay, and between 1700 and 1964 in Crescent City) are pending further analyses to 

determine if they were also deposited by tsunami. In southern California, the potential for 

discovering tsunami deposits is low relative to other parts of the state due to the lower modeled 

wave heights for many tsunami sources and because most coastal wetlands in southern California 

have been disturbed by human activity. 

The source earthquake for the scenario, defined by the USGS Tsunami Source Working 

Group, is set in the Semidi subduction sector, between Kodiak Island and the Shumagin Islands 

off the Pacific coast of the Alaska Peninsula (fig. 1 of the Introduction). The strike of the fault in 

that area tends to focus the waves towards the California coast and especially towards southern 

California and the economically critical Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (fig. 1). The 

Semidi sector’s geology and tectonic setting are similar to the setting of the 2011 Tohoku event, 

so the assumed slip distribution is approximately that of the Tohoku earthquake adapted to the 
2 

fault structure in the Semidi sector. The scenario earthquake has a moment magnitude of 9.1 and 

a fault length of 360 km. 

Contra

Costa

Los Angeles

Del

Norte

Humboldt

Alameda San Francisco

Marin

Mendocino

Monterey

Napa

Orange

San Diego

San Luis Obispo

San Mateo

Santa Barbara

Santa

Clara

Santa Cruz

Solano

Sonoma

Ventura

Malibu

Laguna Beach

Goleta Slough

Del Mar Marsh

Bolinas Lagoon

Ventura

Paci!c

 Ocean

Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach

Half Moon Bay

Crescent City

San Diego

Monterey Bay

Morro Bay

Lompoc

1:5,000,000

0 50 100 km

0 50 100 mi

Figure 1. Map showing the 20 coastal counties in California and locations of features mentioned in the 

text. Digital geographic data from the State of California Spatial Information Library. 
3 

For purposes of making the scenario more tangible, we have simulated an earthquake that 

occurs at 11:57 a.m. PDT on Thursday March 27, 2014, which is the 50th anniversary of the 1964 

Alaska earthquake and tsunami. Travel times to California from the occurrence of the earthquake 

to the arrival of the first tsunami waves range from 4 hours in Crescent City to almost 6 hours in 

San Diego (fig. 1). Thus, tsunami warnings and wave arrivals would occur during a workday 

afternoon. 

Tsunami Modeling

Six independent teams of scientists were engaged to create computer models of the 

tsunami source and tsunami wave propagation field. A coarse model of wave height was run for 

the whole Pacific basin, higher resolution models were run for coastal areas primarily in 

California, and water-current velocity models were analyzed for a few ports and harbors in 

southern California. Overlap between the models shows that the results are consistent, stable, and 

credible. Only one model was chosen to create the inundation maps, but all of the main features 

highlighted here are shared among the models; they all show similar wave amplitudes, current 

velocities, and runup.

The modeled tsunami waveforms are quite different in character at different locations 

along the California coast. The initial waves at each location are among the largest. However, the 

first wave is the largest one in only a few locations such as Monterey Bay and Morro Bay (fig. 

1). In most cases the largest waves arrive several hours—sometimes more than 7 hours—after 

the initial one. Especially in southern California, the tsunami waves attenuate slowly in time. 

The shape of the California coast, bending east near Lompoc (fig. 1), causes the wave 

height of the tsunami (which approaches from the north) to be significantly reduced in southern 

California compared to the wave height in central and northern California. The tsunami hazard 

from this scenario is generally less in southern California than elsewhere along the California 

coast. However, some areas of southern California may be more vulnerable because of low-lying 

topography, larger coastal population, and concentration of maritime assets. 

Inundation and Evacuation

The time of high tide is significant in determining the amount of inundation. By planning 

for the scenario earthquake at a time when high tide coincides with larger wave heights, the area 

inundated increases. Some of the largest Pacific Ocean tsunamis in the twentieth century (for 

example, waves propagating from the 1960 M9.6 Chile, 1964 M9.2 Alaska, and 2011 M9.1 

Tohoku earthquakes) coincided with low tide in southern California, so this scenario is plausibly 

worse than the historic events. For many sections of the California coast, the inundation area for 

the scenario simulated in this report is up to several times the areas for those previous events.

The area of inundation is limited where the coastline is steep. More than half of 

California’s coastline is cliff, which prevents inundation beyond the beach in those areas. In 

other locations, inundation varies from the first few street blocks to completely submerged 

peninsulas and man-made islands. The State of California has developed a map of estimated 

maximum inundation considering a wide range of the largest credible tsunami sources. The 

inundation area in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario extends farther inland than the State’s 

maximum inundation area in only a few places, due to more detailed modeling and higherresolution topographic input used for the SAFRR Scenario, not because of a larger source event. 

The higher resolution modeling of the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario also showed tsunami surges 

and bores traveling several miles inland up coastal rivers. In addition to the State maps, local 
4 

jurisdictions have created evacuation maps which take into account not only modeled inundation, 

but streets and landmarks to guide people to safe, high ground when outside. These evacuation 

lines are the most conservative, drawn further inland than any modeled inundation lines that exist 

for California, as they were produced for both life safety and emergency operations. 

Over the entire California coastline, less than 40 percent of the State’s maximum tsunami 

inundation zone is flooded in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario. Fourteen cities have more than 

1,000 residents in the scenario inundation area, with the largest affected areas in Long Beach and 

San Diego (fig. 1). Other highly impacted areas are low-lying portions of southern Los Angeles 

and northern Orange Counties, along with coastal communities in Northern California including 

Del Norte, Marin, San Francisco, Alameda, and Santa Cruz Counties. Nearly 92,000 people live 

inside the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario inundation zone. An additional 175,000 residents would be 

evacuated if such an order were to be given using the State’s maximum tsunami inundation zone. 

An estimated 81,000 employees would be in the scenario inundation zone with an additional 

88,000 within the State’s maximum tsunami inundation zone. Additionally, more than 260,000 

visitors would be expected on California’s beaches and in parks on the day of the scenario event. 

The visitor numbers would increase to over one million if the same tsunami were to occur during 

summer months, when beach and coastal use is highest. An estimated 8,500 residents in the 

SAFRR tsunami scenario inundation zone would likely need shelter because of damage to their 

homes. Some island and peninsula communities, and low-lying landfill islands within the ports, 

could provide serious evacuation challenges because of limited exit options and short warning 

time prior to expected inundation. Evacuations would also be a challenge for dependent-care 

populations such as patients in hospitals and nursing homes and children in daycare facilities. 

Education and planning tailored to each of these communities would be required to make 

tsunami evacuations successful. 

Currents in Ports and Maritime Issues

In addition to inundation, the scenario tsunami would generate strong, unpredictable 

currents in the ocean close to shore, causing significant damage in harbors and bays. An 

extrapolation of the damage in California from the 2011 Tohoku tsunami predicts that the 

SAFRR scenario tsunami, which produces larger waves and currents in California than did the 

2011 event, will damage or sink one-third of the boats and damage or destroy over one-half of 

the docks in California coastal marinas. Small craft damages would include commercial fishing 

boats. In northern California, the scenario timing in March is considered the off-season and many 

fishermen would be away from their boats, which aggravates the exposure of the fleets to the 

tsunami. Loose boats would become floating debris or sink, posing navigational hazards to other 

vessels. Areas in California that survived the 2011 Tohoku tsunami unscathed could easily be 

damaged in this scenario and other future large tsunamis. 

Boats at sea have lower risks during tsunamis, but the hazards increase in shallow, coastal 

waters. In southern California, March is an active fishing time and fishermen target coastal 

pelagic fish, which live near the surface of coastal waters, and dive for nearshore benthic 

invertebrates, which live near the bottom. The currents from the scenario tsunami would make 

coastal fishing difficult, and dive fishing would be extremely hazardous because of tsunami 

surge. Persistent strong currents and debris would make it difficult for boats to return to port. It 

might be many months before vessels could return to work because of damage to harbor 

infrastructure and fish processing plants. Alerts to take their boats to sea, alerts to remain at sea, 
5

and contingency planning for the possibility that they cannot return to port could improve 

outcomes for the fishing fleets.

Larger vessels that remain in ports might also be vulnerable. For example, given the short 

time between the tsunami warning being issued and the first wave arrival (3.5 hours at the Ports 

of Los Angeles and Long Beach), it may be difficult or impossible to fully execute the Merchant 

Vessel Dispersal Plan for Los Angeles and Long Beach Harbors, and damage to vessels in the 

ports is possible. Other ports in San Francisco Bay and San Diego Bay are also likely to be 

damaged in such a scenario.

Fires would likely start at many sites where fuel and petrochemicals are stored in ports 

and marinas. Many fires during past tsunamis have been caused when flammable liquids were 

released, spread by water, and ignited by mechanisms such as electrical leakage, short circuits, 

and sparks created by pieces of debris colliding. It is difficult to quantify the extent of the 

potential losses because they depend heavily on whether the fires spread.

Impacts to the Environment and Ecosystems

The scenario tsunami has the potential to cause environmental contamination in both 

inundated areas onshore and the coastal marine and estuarine environments. Potential sources for 

contamination are many and varied, and include, for example, debris from damaged piers, ships, 

commercial and industrial facilities, and large numbers of residences; petroleum products 

released from damaged ships and inundated or damaged marine petroleum terminals, petroleum 

storage facilities, marinas, power plants, and airports; raw sewage from inundated wastewater 

treatment plants; household and commercial building contents (lubricants, fuels, paints, 

pesticides, fertilizers, electronics); smoke, ash, and debris from fires; runoff from inundated 

agricultural fields containing pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers; and redistribution of existing 

contaminated sediments in ports, the near-shore marine environment, and in estuaries, sloughs, 

and bays. 

Based on recent past disasters, the cleanup of debris, damaged buildings, contaminated 

sediments, and other potentially hazardous materials in ports, harbors and inundation areas could 

be a long and costly process and add to business interruption. Characterization of debris, tsunami 

sediment deposits, and sands used to replenish beaches for the presence of asbestos, lead paint, 

pesticides, and other potentially hazardous materials would be needed to determine appropriate 

disposal measures (for example, placement in specialized landfills), and the ability to reuse or 

recycle these materials. Such assessments could add significant time and costs to the postdisaster cleanup and recovery. Environmental damage and restoration costs have not been 

thoroughly studied for disasters, so it is difficult to provide reasonable estimates for the total 

environmental costs of the scenario tsunami. This is a topic where future research is needed.

Cleanup and recovery of inundated and damaged areas could take days, months, or years 

depending on the severity of impacts and the available resources for recovery. Improving 

preparedness, mitigation, and continuity planning for tsunamis can reduce damage and economic 

impacts and enhance recovery efforts.

Ecosystems have evolved with tsunamis but their resilience to tsunamis depends on their 

health and abundance. Where heavily impacted by humans, California’s natural resources are no 

longer robust in the face of extreme events. Malibu, Laguna, and other beaches are already 

suffering chronic erosion problems and it is uncertain whether sand eroded by the surge would

return fully or naturally; communities may be faced with expensive and controversial beach 

nourishment challenges.
6 

The strong currents would pick up material so that sediment scour, sediment deposition, 

and environmental contamination would be serious issues and would increase downtime and 

recovery costs in harbors. Coastal pelagic species are unlikely to be significantly impacted but 

benthic invertebrate species and their habitats would be vulnerable. As with many aspects of this 

scenario, we cannot fully quantify all the impacts, but preliminary attempts to model the 

sediment transport in California due to the 2011 Tohoku tsunami show that sediment transport 

and environmental contamination can become major issues. 

As coastal marshes are inundated, they absorb wave energy and slow the speed of 

tsunami surges, preventing damage to human communities. However, marshes adjacent to urban 

or industrial areas, including Goleta Slough and Del Mar Marsh (fig. 1) would likely be 

inundated with urban and or industrial debris and possibly contaminants, both of which have 

proven difficult to clean up. Restoration sites including coastal wetlands, beaches, shellfish beds, 

and low-lying islands would be inundated, and several sites would be at risk from surge, 

sediments, debris and contaminants. Restoration areas at Del Mar and Bolinas Lagoon (fig. 1) 

would be extensively inundated. This is significant because of the high financial, scientific and 

community investment made or being made in restoration. 

Economic Implications

A significant economic impact of the scenario in California may be disruptions of the 

Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. A tsunami warning would advise evacuation of port 

personnel. Strong and dangerous currents would last for two days. Therefore, the ports would be 

shut down for at least that long. There would also be inundation of dry land in the ports resulting 

in approximately $100 million in damages to container and vehicle cargo and related systems, 

and additional downtime at some terminals. The direct exposure of port trade value from 

damages and downtime totals more than $1.2 billion, while associated business interruption 

losses would be more than triple that value. However, resilience in the forms of using excess 

cargo handling capacity, using existing inventories of materials, and working extra shifts could 

reduce these business interruption losses by an order of magnitude. 

Coastal fisheries, particularly invertebrate species such as sea cucumber, sea urchin, 

inshore crab, and spiny lobster are vulnerable to risk from surge, debris or other habitat damage 

and fishery disruptions. Collectively these fisheries are valued at about $78 million per year. 

Shellfish farms and restored shellfish beds along the central and northern California coast and 

San Francisco Bay area are also at risk. Business interruption to commercial fishing at the ports 

would involve lost fishing days, perished catch, and damages to vessels, but in our estimates an 

allowance was made for the industry to make up for lost fishing days. 

Although there is only a small exposure for the agricultural sector, there would be 

damage and impacts to soils, crops, and infrastructure that have not been experienced in recent 

distant-source tsunamis. Repair to agricultural fields and infrastructure could cost $4 million. 

This estimate does not include soil remediation, which could add substantially to costs. 

These and other damages estimated from the scenario are summarized in table 1. Repair 

and replacement of boats and docks in California marinas are estimated to be much greater than 

related business interruption. Property damages include about 69,000 single-family-equivalent 

homes. The business interruption from property damages would be increased by evacuation of an 

area larger than the inundation zone. Highway repairs include potential damage to the OaklandSan Francisco Bay Bridge Toll Plaza, and railroad repairs include tracks, infrastructure, and 

rolling stock. Agricultural damages pertain to crop income losses. We have estimated repair and 
7 

replacement costs of approximately $3.4 billion to California marinas, coastal properties, and the 

Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Collectively, these damages expose approximately $6 

billion of business interruption losses, assuming no resilience in sectors of the California 

economy. These potential losses could be reduced by 80–90 percent with the implementation of 

resilience strategies. Impacts will vary across sectors; those industries dependent on trade 

through the ports (and therefore relatively more affected by business interruption) potentially 

include leather, metals, and motor vehicle manufacturing. Service industries related to marinas 

may gain from price increases outstripping quantity reductions. The fishing sector may suffer 

from business interruption, but fishermen who escape damage to their boats and find places to 

moor and land their catch may benefit from higher revenue and lower competition while others 

may suffer significant economic hardship. Similarly, business interruption will vary across 

communities with local impacts such as those experienced in Crescent City after the 2011 

Tohoku tsunami, for example (Wein and others, 2013). However, reconstruction that would be 

partially funded by disaster funds and insurance (financial forms of resilience) would eventually 

provide a stimulus to the local and State economies. 

Potential economic losses due to physical damage and business interruption in the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario. 

[Figures are in 2010 USD. For 2013 values, add 6 percent]

Assets 

Repair 

cost 

(in millions) 

Business interruption cost (in millions)

Without resilience 

strategies 

With resilience 

strategies *

Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach $100 $4,300 $200-900

Fishing in Port of Los Angeles $2 $0.3

Marinas, docks, and small craft $700 $30

Property $2,600 $1,700 $300

Roads and bridges $80

Railroads $2

Agriculture $4

Total (rounded) $3,500 $6,000 $500-1200

* The estimates are maximum resilience potential, but may not be implemented at that level because of 

administrative and managerial issues

Public Policy Issues

Translating the lessons of the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario into action may depend on 

changes in public policy. The USGS does not make recommendations for specific policy 

decisions but below we list a number of issues that could be considered by policy makers. 

With few modern large tsunami experiences to draw upon, the vast majority of disasterrelated policy reflects learning from other perils and it is not as well developed for tsunamis as it 

is for other hazards and disaster-management policy areas in both California and elsewhere in the 

United States. The lack of experience, risk awareness, planning, and implementation practices 

for tsunami mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery in some communities could amplify 

impacts and losses, even beyond what has been estimated for this scenario. There is an 

overarching challenge to reach the general public as well as special-interest sectors such as the 

maritime community, and to adequately train and prepare the multiple levels and types of 
8 

governments to mitigate tsunami hazards and manage the impacts and consequences of this 

scenario and other potential tsunamis that threaten California. Possible courses of action to 

strengthen tsunami-related policy and to enhance California tsunami resiliency include: 

· Continue the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, TsunamiReady and affiliated 

state and local programs, and recruit and assist all California coastal communities, ports, 

and harbors to become TsunamiReady. 

· Develop a coordinated and sufficiently robust policy framework for tsunami hazard 

assessment and mitigation planning for California coastal communities, ports, and 

harbors. The framework could includes adoption of official state tsunami hazard zones 

under the State Seismic Hazard Mapping Act, better integration of tsunami hazard zones 

in state and local planning and development requirements and tsunami-resilient buildingdesign-code provisions, and consistent guidelines statewide for maritime tsunami 

response and recovery. 

· Advance multihazard mitigation planning along California’s coast and bays to more 

holistically address issues of future tsunami risk, sea level rise, coastal flooding and 

erosion, and earthquake-induced liquefaction. 

· Conduct baseline ecological surveys to take account of potential tsunamis and emergency 

plans that include ecosystems and natural resources; they would help to alleviate damage 

to valuable resources and communities. 

· Encourage responders and government managers at all levels to conduct selfassessments, devise exercises, and utilize tsunami evacuation playbooks and maritime 

mapping and guidelines under development by the State of California. These activities 

could test assumptions embedded in warning and evacuation protocols, emergency 

response and planning, and organizational structures and systems. These approaches 

would also test the abilities of the emergency management systems to scale up and meet 

the demands of large tsunami disasters. 

· To help facilitate recovery following a major tsunami, promote broader participation in 

the National Flood Insurance Program, improved regulatory and permitting processes for 

port dredging and disposal and removal of debris and contaminated soil, and the 

development of other resources and tools to assist coastal communities, ports and 

harbors, and the fishing and agriculture sectors. 

· Enhance tsunami risk awareness by amending California’s natural hazards disclosure law 

to notify real estate purchasers when a property is located in a tsunami hazard zone. 

· Expand California’s annual ShakeOut earthquake exercise and outreach effort to include 

tsunami education and preparedness. 

· Strengthen tsunami education and training for key professionals working in engineering 

as well as land use, hazard mitigation, and response planning along California’s coast. 

· Develop State and local policies that foster both rapid assessment of potential tsunamirelated contamination and rapid decision making for disposal options should hazardous 

debris or sediment be identified. 

Recognizing many of these issues after the 2010 Chile and 2011 Tohoku tsunamis, the 

State of California has begun to improve planning in the evacuation/response, maritime, landuse, and recovery communities. The SAFRR tsunami scenario provides valuable information that 

helps stimulate further improvements at the state and local level. 

This scenario is intended to support local decisionmakers in understanding potential risks 

for a possible future tsunami that may require evacuation and cause damage, and to improve 
9 

coordination, communication, and mitigation before that event. Positive outcomes have already 

resulted from the SAFRR tsunami scenario. For instance, emergency managers in areas where 

the scenario inundation exceeds the State’s maximum inundation zone have been notified and 

evacuation plans have been updated appropriately. The State has also worked with NOAA’s 

West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center to modify future message protocols by moving 

the location of a preset breakpoint between alert zones that would have impeded effective 

evacuations in this scenario. The SAFRR tsunami scenario provides the basis for further 

improvements to the resilience of coastal communities to future large tsunamis. Although our 

specific results pertain to California, the approach and the lessons learned from our scenario can 

be applied to other regions. 

For more detail on these results, please see the other chapters of this report. They are 

available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170
10

Introduction

By Stephanie L. Ross, Lucile M. Jones, Keith A. Porter, Liesel A. Ritchie, and Hong Kie Thio 

The U.S. Geological Survey Science Application for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) project, in 

collaboration with the California Geological Survey (CGS), the California Governor’s Office of 

Emergency Services (Cal OES), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA), other Federal, State, County, and local agencies, private companies, and academic and 

other institutions, have developed the SAFRR tsunami scenario to describe in detail the impacts 

of a tsunami generated by a hypothetical but realistic moment magnitude (M) 9.1 earthquake 

offshore of the Alaska Peninsula (fig. 1). Our target audience includes people who need to plan 

for a potential tsunami such as emergency managers, business continuity planners, maritime 

managers, land use planners, corporate real estate managers, and elected officials. This scenario 

attempts to provide these people more information about what they are planning for. 

The overarching objective of SAFRR and its predecessor, the Multi-Hazards 

Demonstration Project (MHDP), is to foster the use of science in decision making in order to 

help communities reduce losses from natural disasters. As requested by emergency managers and 

other community partners, our primary approach has been to provide comprehensive, 

scientifically credible scenarios that start with a model of a meteorological or geologic event and 

extend it through estimates of damage, casualties, and major social and economic consequences 

at the societal level. The scenarios are based on plausible events that are likely enough to be 

worth planning for and may require multijurisdictional or regional planning. No scientist can 

guarantee that a particular disaster will happen, but a plausible event is one that is consistent with 

our scientific knowledge. An event worth planning for is one that is plausible and would produce 

such significant effects that preparation for this event will improve outcomes for a variety of 

possible occurrences. 

The first MHDP product was the ShakeOut scenario (Jones and others, 2008), addressing 

a hypothetical earthquake on the southern San Andreas Fault. The ShakeOut scenario spawned 

the successful Great California ShakeOut, now an annual event and the nation’s largest 

emergency preparedness exercise. It has also been adopted in other states and abroad with the 

same name, making the ShakeOut an international contribution. The ShakeOut scenario was 

followed by the ARkStorm scenario (Porter and others, 2010), which addresses California winter 

storms that surpass hurricanes in their destructive potential. 

Some of the tsunami scenario’s goals included developing advanced models of currents 

and inundation for the event; spurring research related to Alaskan earthquake sources; engaging 

port, harbor and Coast Guard decision makers; estimating the physical damages and downtimes, 

and examining the economic impacts to the California economy with and without resilience; 

understanding the ecological, environmental, and societal impacts of coastal inundation; creating 

enhanced communication products for decision-making before, during, and after a tsunami; and 

evaluating the scenario-development process. The State of California, through CGS and 

Cal OES, is using the SAFRR tsunami scenario as an opportunity to evaluate policies regarding 

tsunami impact. The scenario will serve as a long-lasting resource to enhance preparedness and 

inform decision makers. 
11

     	









0.00

0.01

0.10

0.20

1.00

5.00

Tsunami Amplitude (Meters)

Alaska

Paci!c Ocean

Earthquake in Semidi Sector

California

Figure 1. Maximum wave heights of the tsunami simulated in the SAFRR (Science Application for Risk 

Reduction) tsunami scenario across the Pacific basin. 
12

To accomplish such a broad set of goals, we needed to engage a wide range of 

disciplines. The SAFRR tsunami scenario was organized by a coordinating committee and 

several working groups, including Earthquake Source, Paleotsunami/Geology Field Work, 

Tsunami Modeling and Mapping, Engineering and Physical Impacts, Ecological Impacts, 

Environmental Impacts, Emergency Management and Education, Social Vulnerability, 

Economic and Business Impacts, Policy, and Evaluators. The coordinating committee included 

the working group leads. To ensure that specialists from a wide range of disciplines stayed on the 

same evolving page, the coordinating committee held biweekly teleconferences. Members of 

individual working groups were invited to join the calls. The tsunami modelers remained 

engaged, participating in the teleconferences to make sure their results were understood and 

appropriately applied. 

The tsunami scenario process is being evaluated by researchers from the Natural Hazards 

Center at the University of Colorado Boulder. This is the first time that a scenario of this scale 

has been formally and systematically evaluated by an external party. As an early step in the 

evaluation process, a logic model (fig. 2) was developed in consultation with key stakeholders to 

illustrate how the scenario is intended to achieve the goal of fostering the use of science in 

decision making. The logic model demonstrates that resource investment and activities in 

working groups produce project outputs that are designed to improve community resilience to 

tsunamis. It helps ensure a common understanding of the way the project is intended to work, 

how activities are monitored, and how outputs and outcomes are evaluated. 

The model presented here is somewhat different from more traditional logic models that 

present detailed inputs such as staff/personnel time, volunteers, partners, money, materials, 

equipment, technology, and so forth. On the far left side of the tsunami scenario logic model are 

the highest level inputs associated with the development of the tsunami scenario—the working 

groups. There are a total of 10 working groups, with an additional committee facilitating the 

coordination and integration of all of these groups. In each box is the name of the working group 

and its fundamental responsibilities. Moving to the center of the model are the outputs expected 

as a result of the combined efforts of the workings groups. This is the “what” component of the 

project—what is being done? Included in those boxes are the various activities associated with 

the tsunami scenario, all of which are conducted in the context of the desired outcomes of the 

project—the next column to the right. The content of these boxes represents the “so what?” of 

the project, or the impacts of the efforts of the working groups and the overall scenario. It is the 

desired project outcomes that frame the working group efforts and the project outputs; they also 

guide evaluation efforts. On the far right of the model is the ultimate goal of the tsunami 

scenario—to foster the use of science in decision-making. Finally, the “ongoing evaluation 

activities” label at the bottom of the graphic represents the notion that reflection and evaluation 

are continuous throughout the life of the project, from its developmental and formative phases 

through the rollout of the scenario. 
13

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Because of the national economic importance of the Ports of Los Angeles and Long 

Beach, the source earthquake was designed to impact southern California. The scenario 

earthquake, defined by the USGS Tsunami Source Working Group, is an earthquake similar to 

the 2011 M9.1 Tohoku event, but set in the Semidi subduction sector (fig. 1) between Kodiak 

Island and the Shumagin Islands off the Pacific coast of the Alaska Peninsula (Kirby and others, 

2013). Comparisons of the geology and tectonic settings between Tohoku and the Semidi sector 

suggest that this location is appropriate and the earthquake plausible. 

Several tsunami-modeling studies were conducted covering a range of methods, 

geographic locations, and model resolutions (SAFRR Tsunami Modeling Working Group, 2013). 

Two studies examined how including different models of the physics of earthquake rupture and 

different characterization of the tsunami generating process affects the tsunami as it strikes 

southern California. Another two studies used the generation of the tsunami as inputs and then 

modeled the propagation of the waves across the ocean, into the near shore environment, and 

onto land. 

Tsunami models are computed by representing the ocean at points on a grid. Coarse grids 

were used to model the tsunami in the open ocean and progressively finer grids were used to 

model the tsunami near shore and in important locations. Tsunamis increase in height as they 
14

approach the shore. In southern California, the tsunami amplitudes would range from 1 to 3 

meters near shore. In central California, from Lompoc through Marin County, they would range 

from 2 to 7 meters in amplitude. And in northern California, the range would be from 3 to 7 

meters. Project modelers assumed high tide conditions, increasing the total tsunami height by 

about a meter. 

Where there was geographic overlap, the results from several modelers are remarkably 

similar even though the modeling methods differ. The similarity between different models 

suggests a degree of scientific consensus that should provide confidence in the scenario results. 

These models were used to draw inundation lines that delimit the area of dry land that is 

flooded during the tsunami. Those inundation lines were adjusted by examining fine-scale 

structures such as steep beaches and levees that may not be well represented in the gridded 

bathymetric and topographic data used in the numerical calculations. These examinations used 

high-resolution topographic data, aerial photography, and site visits by field teams. 

Two other studies modeled the hydrodynamics, including current velocities, in the Ports 

of Los Angeles and Long Beach, San Diego, and in Ventura Harbor. High current velocities 

would occur where the scenario tsunami would be forced through channels and these highly 

localized features could produce jets and whirlpools. Maximum modeled currents in Ventura 

Harbor would exceed 14 knots and have widespread speeds of 8 knots, which is fast enough to 

cause significant damage. In contrast, the Ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach, and San Diego 

would experience widespread currents that are less extreme, reaching 6 to 8 knots in just a few 

locations. But, in those locations, the modeled currents are fast enough to damage mooring 

dolphins, potentially break mooring lines, and impede navigation. 

We determined how often tsunami waves similar to those in the SAFRR tsunami scenario 

would impact different spots along the California coast. Using an aggregate of sources from 

around the Pacific Ocean, waves with the same or larger offshore amplitude as those in the 

scenario would occur, on average, on the order of hundreds of years (fig. 3). 

Earthquakes like the scenario posited here have happened elsewhere under very similar 

geological conditions. When they have happened, tsunamis resulted. Several historical 

transoceanic tsunamis, including those produced by the 1946 M8.1 Aleutian, 1960 M9.5 Chile, 

and 1964 M9.2 Alaska earthquakes, caused known inundation along portions of the northern and 

central California coast. Earthquakes like these will occur in the future and will generate 

tsunamis. The physics of wave motion are well understood, and there is very little uncertainty 

about tsunami travel times. When they impinge on the built environment, even in well 

constructed areas, tsunamis cause damage; they can injure and kill people, and they can disrupt 

the economy. California's experience with tsunamis over the last century is probably far from the 

worst that can happen. A tsunami generated by the scenario source discussed here would be 

bigger and cause much more damage in California than the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, the Chilean 

tsunamis of 2010, 1960, and 1922, and the Alaskan-Aleutians tsunamis of 1964 and 1946. Thus, 

there is strong reason to believe that California faces a tsunami threat that could realistically 

cause billions of dollars in losses and, although we have not discussed it here, substantial loss of 

life. 

There are uncertainties. The degree of inundation in any particular place, and the 

resulting losses, are uncertain for many reasons, having to do with imperfect knowledge about 

the tsunami source, bathymetry and topography, roughness of the sea floor, precise quantities 

and vulnerability of assets, the resourcefulness of emergency responders and the people and 

businesses whose property is affected, and financial responses. The uncertainties operate in both 
15

















10

100

200

500

1000

















100 1000

















100 1000

Paci!c Ocean

Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach

San Francisco

Return Time (years)

Return Time (years)

Figure 3. Map of the California coast, where bars at individual locations show equivalent return times of 

the offshore amplitudes of the tsunami simulated by the SAFRR (Science Application for Risk 

Reduction) scenario when compared to the Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis of Thio and others 

(2010). The probabilistic map is based on a comprehensive analysis of tsunamis from sources around 

the Pacific, their recurrence rates and probabilities, and is an aggregate of thousands of individual 

scenario calculations. The return time gives the average time between tsunami waves, at each site, 

that are as larger or larger than the SAFRR scenario tsunami at that site and is shown by both the 

height and color of each bar. 

directions: the particular earthquake-generated tsunami simulated in this project could produce 

more severe losses than are depicted here, as well as less severe losses. Earth scientists, 

engineers and social scientists will continue to study the processes discussed here in an attempt 

to better understand them and more accurately estimate the outcomes of future tsunamis. When 

tsunamis occur that affect California, there will probably be surprises, effects, or sequences of 

events we did not expect—a bigger earthquake than we imagined possible could occur, or our 
16

engineered facilities and defense structures may not perform as well as we had planned, or 

people could make unexpected mistakes in the response that aggravates the damage and loss of 

life. 

There are also caveats. The scenario describes actions taken by ports where all 

communication and emergency response activities are performed quickly and correctly, largely 

without serious mistakes. But human error, including unanticipated delays in communication or 

decision-making, could lead to greater damage, greater economic losses, or more severe 

environmental outcomes than are posited here. There are also likely unforeseen short- and longterm issues that we may not have considered. And although the scenario was relatively detailed 

in and around the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, other areas of the California coastline 

outside the ports were evaluated with less detail. Some of these areas, especially in central and 

northern California, will experience higher waves than southern California. The evaluation of 

those regions has not been done to the same level of detail as for the Ports of Los Angeles and 

Long Beach. Consequently, we might not fully understand the short- and long-term impacts to 

these other ports and harbors. 

The timing of the tsunami can have a considerable impact on potential exposure to 

damage and risk to life. The scenario is set during March 2014, coinciding with the 50th

anniversary of the 1964 Alaska earthquake and tsunami. Although the outcomes of the scenario 

at that time are significant, greater challenges and impacts might result if the scenario were to 

occur during a summer weekend when beachgoers and recreational boaters are more numerous 

along the California coast. 

The time of high tide is significant in determining inundation. By planning this 

earthquake at a time when high tide coincides with larger wave heights, the area inundated 

increases. Though the highest tides only cover about 4 hours per day, preparing for this 

possibility ensures that we are well prepared, especially when hazardous tsunami conditions can 

last for up to one or two days. In the other direction, long-term sea level rise due to climate 

change will increase the inundation area if an event like the SAFRR tsunami scenario occurs 

later in this century; we have not included that effect in our analysis. 

While our uncertainties and caveats affect the quantities we have estimated, they do not 

change our finding about the qualitative threat to California that is posed by tsunamis from 

distant earthquakes. Because our uncertainties operate in both directions, and because an 

underestimate of loss can be graver than an overestimate, they provide more reason to prepare 

for a severe California tsunami, rather than to wait for scientists to eliminate all uncertainties. 

In a speech to the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference (1957), President 

Eisenhower said, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything. There is a very great 

distinction because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: 

the very definition of "emergency" is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the 

way you are planning.” The SAFRR Tsunami Scenario depicts an event that will not happen 

exactly as presented. However, it provides a useful opportunity for planning. 

Acknowledgments

The authors thank reviewers Ruth Harris, Susan Russell-Robinson and Ross Stein and 

editor Claire Landowski for improving the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario Executive Summary and 

Introduction. The overall SAFRR Tsunami Scenario report owes a large debt of gratitude to 
17

Carolyn Donlin, head of the of the Menlo Park Publishing Service Center, Linda Rogers, head of 

the Tacoma Publishing Service Center and the editors who worked on the various chapters and 

aspects of the report, for their support and dedication; they include Peter Stauffer, John Buursma, 

Mike Diggles, Jeanne DiLeo, Jim Hendley, Cory Hurd, Claire Landowski, Jeffery Suwak, and 

Tracey Suzuki. We also thank Sandra Dedeaux for her excellent logistical support of the project. 

References

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Porter, K., Wein, A., Alpers, C., Baez, A., Barnard, P., Carter, J., Corsi, A., Costner, J., Cox, D., 

Das, T., Dettinger, M., Done, J., Eadie, C., Eymann, M., Ferris, J., Gunturi, P., Hughes, M., 

Jarrett, R., Johnson, L., Le-Griffin, H.D., Mitchell, D., Morman, S., Neiman, P., Olsen, A., 

Perry, S., Plumlee, G., Ralph, M., Reynolds, D., Rose, A., Schaefer, K., Serakos, J., 

Siembieda, W., Stock, J., Strong, D., Wing, I.S., Tang, A., Thomas, P., and Topping, K., 2010, 

Overview of the ARkStorm Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2010–1312, 

183 p. and appendixes, http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1312/.

The SAFRR Tsunami Scenario Modeling Working Group, 2013, Modeling for The SAFRR 

Tsunami Scenario—Generation, Inundation, and Currents in Ports and Harbors, chap. D in

Ross, S.L., and Jones, L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) 

Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170, 127 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/d/.

Thio, H.K., Somerville, P., and Polet, J., 2010, Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard in California: 

Berkeley, Calif., Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center Report 2010/108, 331 p., 

http://peer.berkeley.edu/publications/peer_reports/reports_2010/web_PEER2010_108_THIOet

al.pdf/.

Wein, A., Rose, A., Sue Wing, I., Wei, D., 2013, Economic impacts of the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario in California, chap. H in Ross, S.L., and Jones, L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science 

Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 

2013–1170, 56 p., http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/h/.
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U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–B

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

Alaska Earthquake Source for the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario
COVER: Early map of Alaska Territory (in Gaskell’s New and Complete Family Atlas of the World), 1896
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario

Stephanie Ross and Lucile Jones, Editors

Alaska Earthquake Source for the SAFRR Tsunami 

Scenario

By Stephen Kirby, David Scholl, Roland von Huene, and Ray Wells

Open-File Report 2013–1170–B

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey
iii

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SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2013

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iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION

MARK NECHODOM

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D.

STATE GEOLOGIST
v

Acknowledgments

We are grateful for the help, guidance, and advice provided by the generosity of the 

following colleagues: Contributing U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Tsunami Source Working 

Group members (TSWG): Holly Ryan, Rick Blakely, Stephanie Ross, George Plafker, Eric 

Geist, Willie Lee, Emily Roland, Amy Draut, Guy Gelfenbaum, and Walter Mooney; other 

USGS: Gavin Hayes (Golden, Colo.), Alan Nelson (Golden), and John Miller (Denver, Colo.); 

California Geological Survey: Rick Wilson. We appreciate the support of the following in 

tsunami modeling: Hong Kie Thio (URS Corp.); Roger Hansen, Elena Suleimani, and Dmitri 

Nicolsky (all Geophysical Institute of the University of Alaska at Fairbanks; Aggeliki 

Barberopoulou (University of Southern California); the 2011 Tohoku earthquake slip modelers, 

especially Thorne Lay (University of California Santa Cruz), Chen Ji (University of California 

Santa Barbara), Mark Simons (California Institute of Technology), Sarah Minson (Formerly at 

California Institute of Technology and now at the U.S. Geological Survey in Seattle), Y. Ito and 

T. Iinuma (both at Tohoku University). We are grateful also for advice and discussions in Japan

with Ryota Hino, Dapeng Zhao, Toru Matsuzawa, and Akira Hasegawa (all at Tohoku 

University); Douglas Christenson, Jeff Freymueller, and Roger Hansen (all at the Geophysical 

Institute of the University of Alaska at Fairbanks); Emile Okal (Department of Earth and 

Planetary Sciences, Northwestern University). We thank Eleyne Phillips (USGS) for geographic 

information system construction and images and Peter Stauffer (USGS, Menlo Park) for his 

helpful edit.
vi

Contents

Abstract............................................................................................................................................................................1

Introduction......................................................................................................................................................................2

Tectonic Setting and the Instrumental, Historical, and Prehistoric Seismic and Tsunamic Record of the 

Semidi Sector ..................................................................................................................................................................4

Comparisons Between the Semidi and Tohoku Subduction Sectors ..............................................................................9

Characterizing the Scalar Seismic Moment of the 11 March 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, Slip Models, and 

Development of a Synoptic Slip Distribution Model and Target Range of Model Parameters.........................................9

Creating a Subfault Grid and Applying a Tohoku-Type Slip Distribution to the Semidi Sector......................................10

Scaling of Average Slip During Seismogenic Rupture for Giant Earthquakes with Moment Magnitude: How 

Useful a Guide is it?.......................................................................................................................................................11

Summary .......................................................................................................................................................................12

References Cited...........................................................................................................................................................13

Figures...........................................................................................................................................................................27

Appendix. Supplementary Information...........................................................................................................................40
Alaska Earthquake Source for the SAFRR 

Tsunami Scenario

By Stephen Kirby, David Scholl, Roland von Huene, and Ray Wells 

“What did happen can happen again [elsewhere]”

 – Paraphrased aphorism

“Extreme events can and do happen...”

– Thorne Lay and Hiroo Kanamori, Physics Today, 2011 

“Hope for the best, but prepare for the worst.“

 – An oft-quoted adage.

Abstract

Tsunami modeling has shown that tsunami sources located along the Alaska 

Peninsula segment of the Aleutian-Alaska subduction zone have the greatest impacts on 

southern California shorelines by raising the highest tsunami waves for a given source 

seismic moment. The most probable sector for a Mw ~ 9 source within this subduction 

segment is between Kodiak Island and the Shumagin Islands in what we call the Semidi 

subduction sector; these bounds represent the southwestern limit of the 1964 Mw 9.2 

Alaska earthquake rupture and the northeastern edge of the Shumagin sector that recent 

Global Positioning System (GPS) observations indicate is currently creeping. Geological 

and geophysical features in the Semidi sector that are thought to be relevant to the 

potential for large magnitude, long-rupture-runout interplate thrust earthquakes are 

remarkably similar to those in northeastern Japan, where the destructive Mw 9.1 

tsunamigenic earthquake of 11 March 2011 occurred. 

In this report we propose and justify the selection of a tsunami source seaward of 

the Alaska Peninsula for use in the Tsunami Scenario that is part of the U.S. Geological 

Survey (USGS) Science Application for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) Project. This tsunami 

source should have the potential to raise damaging tsunami waves on the California coast, 

especially at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Accordingly, we have 

summarized and abstracted slip distribution from the source literature on the 2011 event, 

the best characterized for any subduction earthquake, and applied this synoptic slip 

distribution to the similar megathrust geometry of the Semidi sector. The resulting slip 

model has an average slip of 18.6 m and a moment magnitude of Mw = 9.1. The 2011 

Tohoku earthquake was not anticipated, despite Japan having the best seismic and 

geodetic networks in the world and the best historical record in the world over the past 

1,500 years. What was lacking was adequate paleogeologic data on prehistoric 

earthquakes and tsunamis, a data gap that also presently applies to the Alaska Peninsula 
2

and the Aleutian Islands. Quantitative appraisal of potential tsunami sources in Alaska 

requires such investigations.

Introduction

Background 

Tsunami modeling has shown that the most effective subduction earthquakes for 

raising tsunami waves along southern California shorelines are those that occur offshore 

of the Alaska Peninsula (Thio and others, 2010; fig. 1). We review the instrumental and 

preinstrumental record of seismicity in that region and conclude that the previous 

cumulative seismic slip in the instrumental history in the Semidi sector, which we define 

as between Kodiak Island and the Shumagin Islands, is small. Although nearby 

subduction sectors have generated great and giant tsunamigenic earthquakes in 1946 and 

1964, those earthquakes did not cause damaging tsunami waves along southern California 

shorelines, largely because of their different trench azimuths and positions and 

differences in tsunami wave-field directivity and in sea-floor bathymetry between source 

and receiving shoreline. For a giant earthquake (Mw>8.5), the Semidi subduction sector

may therefore be the optimum subduction sector for producing tsunami waves along 

southern and central California shorelines.

The M9.1 Tohoku subduction earthquake of 11 March 2011 changed the way that 

many earthquake scientists think about subduction earthquakes and their tsunami effects. 

First, the 2011 event was not anticipated because of the lack of historical information

about previous earthquakes of this size. Although an earthquake that occurred in the year 

869 produced large runups along Sendai Bay (Minoura and others, 2001), paleotsunamic

evidence is lacking farther north along the Sanriku coast (Sugawara and others, 2011, 

unpublished field guide on the Jogan and 2011 Tohoku tsunami deposits). Based on this 

limited known length of tsunami effects in AD 869, tsunami modeling showed that a 

source magnitude of 8.1 to 8.3 adequately explained the runups and inundations 

suggested by the paleotsunamic record (Satake and others, 2007). Therefore the historical 

record in Japan, even though it is among the longest for any region on Earth, was 

inadequate to have anticipated an earthquake of the magnitude of the 2011 event. More 

prehistoric information on subduction earthquakes and tsunamis was clearly needed, such 

as has been found in Cascadia and the eastern Gulf of Alaska subduction sectors. 

Secondly, on-land Global Positioning System (GPS) data did not have sufficient

resolution to determine that the locking on the Japan Trench subduction margin extended 

to the Japan Trench. Thirdly, Tohoku University and the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth 

Science (JAMSTEC), and other Japanese partners installed sea-floor GPS instruments, 

pressure gages, tsunami wave meters, and cabled sea-floor instruments in the source 

region before the 11 March 2001 earthquake. Analysis of those data indicated that 

extraordinarily high maximum slip occurred during the earthquake rupture near the 

trench, as large as 80 m. Without this sea-floor instrumentation, the true nature of this 

tsunami source would not have been revealed. 

The above considerations indicate that for earthquakes of this moment magnitude, 

events with compact rupture areas and large associated average and peak slip probably 

occur on time scales of thousands of years (Satake, 2011). Historical and instrumental 

information are consequently inadequate to establish the likelihood of the occurrence of 
3

such events. Scientists tasked with considering tsunami hazards and risks must therefore 

ask the question—could such a tsunamigenic earthquake occur in “my” subduction zone 

(McCaffrey, 2007, 2008)?

Our Charge 

The purpose of this report is to summarize briefly and justify the selection of a 

tsunami source seaward of the Alaska Peninsula for use in the Tsunami Scenario that is 

part of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Science Application for Risk Reduction

(SAFRR) Project. Our charge was to propose a tsunami source offshore of the Alaska 

Peninsula that had the potential to raise damaging tsunami waves along California 

coastlines, especially at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. This source needed to 

be credible and plausible in light of the state of knowledge in early 2012, when this 

tsunami source scenario was formulated, and to represent an event that could occur 

sometime in the future. Being the most likely next large tsunami source for southern 

California shorelines was not a requirement. The specific source presented in this report 

was described and discussed on 27 February 2012 at the USGS facilities in Menlo Park, 

California, by participating members of the USGS Tsunami Source Working Group—

Stephanie Ross, Scenario Manager for SAFRR, David Scholl, Ray Wells, Rick Blakely, 

Roland von Huene, Willie Lee, Walter Mooney, Amy Draut, and Tracy Vallier (all 

USGS); Rick Wilson (California Geological Survey); and Roger Hansen (Geophysical 

Institute at the University of Alaska at Fairbanks, GI/UAF). Other participants on 

conference call for this meeting were Hong Kie Thio (URS Corporation), George Choy 

(USGS, Golden, Colo.), Elena Suleimani and Dmitry Nicolsky (GI/UAF), Lucy Jones 

(USGS, Pasadena), Kenny Ryan (University of California Riverside), David Lockner and 

Tom Brocher (both USGS Earthquake Science Center) and Dale Cox (USGS, Pasadena). 

After discussion of the proposed source, the participants offered no alternatives and, 

when specifically asked, there were no objections to the scenario being put forward as the 

official USGS SAFRR Tsunami Scenario model. The model was also discussed in 

presentations by Kirby at Tohoku University in May 2012 and at the University of Alaska 

Geophysical Institute in February 2012, where opportunities for questions and comments 

were both offered and exercised.

In this source selection, we chose to apply a Tohoku-type tsunami source because 

of strong similarities in the geologic and geophysical frameworks of the Semidi and 

Tohoku subduction sectors, similarities that we summarize in this report. We do not

claim that this source has the highest probability among possible future great and giant 

tsunamigenic earthquakes. Such probability cannot be assessed without comprehensive 

paleoseismic and paleotsunamic surveys in the Semidi sector. Lacking such information, 

our goal is to posit a Mw~9 tsunami source that could plausibly occur at some time in the 

future based on the similarities in framework geology and geophysics between the Semidi 

and Tohoku subduction segments. Put another way, is such a source plausible given our 

present state of knowledge or lack of knowledge? We not only lack sufficient prehistoric 

data on the Semidi sector on average recurrence times, but we also do not know how late 

we are in the average giant earthquake return time and how much stored slip has 

accumulated. It cannot be claimed with any confidence that the probability of a compact, 
4

high-average-slip tsunamigenic earthquake is impossibly low in the Semidi segment. The 

same could have been said, but was not, about the likelihood of a giant subduction 

earthquake in the southern Tohoku subduction margin on 10 March 2011, just prior to the 

catastrophe that occurred one day later. 

Plan of This Report

Our plan for this report is to first review the tectonic setting and the history of 

seismicity and tsunami generation on the subduction zone in the Pacific offshore the 

Alaska Peninsula. Secondly, we compare the geological and geophysical frameworks of 

the Tohoku and Semidi subduction segments and evaluate whether their similarities 

outweigh their differences. Thirdly, we abstract from the numerous slip models for the 

2011 Tohoku earthquake a simplified synoptic slip model that we apply to a threedimensional (3-D) model for the geometry of the Semidi-segment of the megathrust

boundary, which was found very similar to that of the Tohoku segment. We explain 

briefly how the geometrical subfault model was constructed and how we populated that

array with coseismic slip. Fourthly, we discuss the subject of scaling of rupture sizes and 

average slip with scalar seismic moment and moment magnitude for subduction 

earthquakes in light of the inadequacy of the existing seismic record for giant subduction 

earthquakes (Mw>8.5), and we discuss challenges in using a scaling law as a guide to 

earthquake sources in this seismic moment range. Finally, the 3-D slip distribution for the 

tsunami scenario source will be provided in a spreadsheet that may be found in an 

appendix as supplemental information. In the interest of making this report as brief as 

possible, we summarize relevant information as much as is practical in tables. The 

information sources that we used in producing the Semidi sector slip model were largely 

limited to those available as of 25 January 2012, but they include final publication 

citations that were previously available only in abstract.

Tectonic Setting and the Instrumental, Historical, and Prehistoric 

Seismic and Tsunamic Record of the Semidi Sector

The following account includes events in the Semidi sector and nearby segments

of the Aleutian-Alaska subduction zone (table 1). It also reviews the maximum tsunami 

wave heights produced by earthquakes in this segment at key Pacific coastal locations, 

especially in California (National Geophysical Data Center, 2012; Novosibirsk Tsunami 

Laboratory, 2012). 

The Mw 8.2 to 8.3 Subduction Earthquake of 10 November 1938

The instrumental history of the Semidi sector for events with M>7 and of great 

earthquakes in nearby segments is summarized in table 2 and illustrated in figures 2a, 3b, 

and 4a. The 1938 main-shock epicenter places it near the Slab 1.0 interface at depths

between 20 and 40 km (table 1). (Slab 1.0 is a global 3-D slab geometry model based on 

the hypocenters of interplate thrust earthquakes and subduction plate boundary 

information from seismic reflection profiles—see Hayes and others, 2012). The relocated 

1-month aftershocks of the 1938 event (Emile Okal, written commun., 2010) cover most 
5

of the Semidi sector, nearly out to the trench. Although the 10 November 1938 

earthquake was an Mw 8.2–8.3 event, recorded wave heights are all less than 0.3 m and 

tsunami modeling of its small regional and far-field tsunami waves indicate that its three 

slip patches had an average slip of about 1.1 to 2.1 m and a maximum slip of 3.3 m in the 

easternmost subfault (Johnson and Satake, 1994, 1995). An independent seismic 

waveform analysis also indicates that average slip was about 2 m (Estabrook and others, 

1994). These are very small slips in light of cumulative relative plate motion in the 

Semidi sector since 1938 (about 4.5 m) and the potential for large stored slip prior to the 

instrumental era. 

All told, the small number of other large instrumentally documented earthquakes 

(figs. 2a, 3b, and 4) indicates that a very small release of accumulated slip has occurred in 

the century plus of plate motion since the beginning of global seismology in about 1899.

During this period more than 6.8 m of plate motion occurred. None of the great 

earthquakes in adjoining sectors or the 1938 event have produced recorded tsunami 

waves in southern California greater than 1.1 m (table 1).

Gulf of Alaska Sector

The M 9.2 to 9.3 earthquake of 28 March 1964 was the largest instrumentally 

recorded earthquake in Alaska and the second largest in the global instrumental record 

(International Seismological Center, 2013). The four published inversions of geodetic and 

seismic data for slip-accumulation distribution, although differing in data selection, 

methodology, and details of the resultant slip inversion, all recognize two patches of large 

slip, one under the Prince William Sound area and one trenchward of Kodiak Island and 

the pass southwest of the Kenai Peninsula and northeast of Kodiak Island (Holdahl and 

Sauber, 1993; Christensen and Beck, 1994; Johnson and others, 1996; Ichinose and 

others, 2007; Suito and Freymueller, 2009). This pattern is also consistent with the 

aftershock distribution. Ichinose and others (2007) also subdivided the Prince William 

Sound patch into two subfaults and verified the trenchward Kodiak slip region. These 

findings and other considerations suggest that as a conservative approach, the northeast

limit of the SAFRR tsunami scenario source should not extend under the Kodiak 

subduction sector, because it represents rupture for a relatively recent earthquake.

The Mw 8.6 Unimak Island/Sanak Island Earthquake of 1 April 1946

This shock (see fig. 2a) was unusual in several related respects: it was generally 

deficient in high-frequency energy, its epicenter was very near the Aleutian Trench, and 

it had unusually high potency as a tsunami source both in the near and far fields 

(Kanamori, 1972; Johnson and Satake, 1997, Okal and others, 2002, 2003; Lopéz and 

Okal, 2006). Its tsunami magnitude was 9.3 (Abe, 1979). It was one of the first 

earthquakes identified as being of the “tsunami” earthquake category that produces 

outsized tsunami waves compared to their conventional moment magnitudes (Kanamori, 

1972). The average slip was about 8 m or more as estimated by López and Okal (2006).

The directivity of tsunami waves from this source toward Hawaii made it particularly 

destructive. There are similarities in the geologic frameworks of the southwest Alaska 

Peninsula continental slope where the 1946 earthquake occurred and the Semidi sector 
6

(Bruns and others, 1987) that suggest that a component of slow-rupture, high-near-trench 

slip could also occur in the Semidi sector (von Huene and others, 2012).

Regional Stored Slip Accumulations Based on GPS Observations.

Freymueller and Beavan (1999); Fletcher and others (2001); Fournier and 

Freymueller (2007), Freymueller and others (2008), and Cross and Freymueller (2008)

have described the results of Global Positioning System (GPS) observations in Alaska.

Their analyses indicate that the region northeast of the Shumagin Islands is presently 

“locked” and has been accumulating stored slip, In contrast, the southwest offshore sector 

of the Alaska Peninsula, which includes the Shumagin Islands, is probably creeping, 

although resolution is thought to be poor for the subduction boundary near the trench far 

from the nearest GPS instruments. However, we do not know whether this creeping 

condition represents the long-term way that subduction motion is accommodated in the 

Shumagin sector. These same locked versus creeping conclusions about these two sectors 

adjacent to the Semidi sector were adopted as inputs in the most current USGS 

probabilistic seismic hazard map for the State of Alaska (Wesson and others, 2007) and 

we adhere to their assessment.

Historical Record for Tsunamigenic Earthquakes in the Semidi Sector: the 1788 

Event and the Purported Tsunamigenic 1847–1848 Earthquake

Russian information on earthquake occurrence and seismic intensities and 

tsunami inundations in Alaska prior to the Territory’s purchase by the United States in 

1867 is typically fragmentary, mostly recorded long after the event by those who were 

not eyewitnesses and citing observations at sparse locations. Even event dates are unclear

from this incomplete record. 

July/August 1788.—A short few years after Russian long-term settlement began 

on the Alaska Peninsula and its offshore islands, two events occurred in that region. The 

sources of information (see Davies and others, 1981; Sykes and others, 1981) on these 

events are the following. (1) W. Merkul’ev (b.?; d.1828), a warehouse manager on 

Kodiak Island at the time of the 22 August 1788 earthquake and tsunami: He wrote a 

letter shortly after the events, describing them to his boss, Grigory Ivanovich Shelekhov 

(1747–1786), cofounder of the Shelekhov-Golikov Company. (2) G.I. Davydov, who was 

in Alaska in the first decade of the 19th century: His accounts were published in English 

in 1813. (3) Russian Orthodox priest Ioann (Father John) Veniaminov (1797–1879), who 

was in Alaska from 1824 to about 1840: His diary was published in 1840. (4) Geologist 

Pëtr Pavlovich Doroshin (1823–1875), who arrived in Russian Alaska in 1848 and wrote 

of his experience in a report that was published in 1870. Only Merkul’ev was an 

eyewitness. The others collected information decades after the events, and those 

impressions and descriptions were published decades after collection. Not surprisingly, 

there is confusion as to the exact dates of these events and which events preceded others. 

The experiences of Merkul’ev on 22 July (in the present-day Gregorian calendar) 

describing the strong earthquake ground motions and tsunami inundations at Three Saints 

Harbor, located in a fjord on the south coast of Kodiak Island, carry the most weight 

because they are first-hand and written shortly after the events. In reviewing all of these 

records, S.L. Soloviev (1968; English translation published 1990) implies in his figure 1 
7

that there was one giant earthquake that ruptured about 650 km of the Alaska Peninsula 

margin from south of Kodiak to Sanak Island. This source model seems very unlikely 

because of the insistence by Veniaminov, a keen interviewer and native-language 

interpreter, that big tsunami waves occurred on Unga and Sanak Islands on 7 August

(again according to the present-day Gregorian calendar), 16 days after the 22 July 

earthquake and tsunami waves reported by Merkul’ev. 

Another possibility was raised by Emile Okal (written commun., 2011) that a 

large earthquake occurred on 22 July somewhere along the subduction margin between 

the Gulf of Alaska and Sanak Island and that 16 days later, on 7 August,a large 

submarine landslide occurred near the southwest end of the Alaska Peninsula that was 

triggered as a delayed response by the ground motions of the earlier 22 July earthquake.

According to this model, it was this localized submarine landslide tsunami source that 

flooded the settlement on Unga and destroyed livestock on Sanak Island, both to levels 

up to a few tens of meters above sea level. Okal’s interpretation is strengthened by recent 

geophysical investigations of the continental slope southwest of the Shumagin Islands 

that reveal morphological evidence for large submarine slumps near the southern edge of 

the continental shelf (Roland von Huene, unpublished swath-map image, 2013). 

Okal’s hypothesis seems to satisfy most of the historical records that might be 

judged reliable, including the lack of evidence for strong earthquake ground motions on 7

August. We are left with a large earthquake occurring somewhere off the Alaska 

Peninsula on 22 July 1788 that was large enough to raise waves 3–10 m high at the old 

harbor in Three Saints Bay, Kodiak (a narrow fjord) and produced at least localized 

strong ground motions and sustained aftershocks at that locality. As to its seismic 

moment, area of rupture, and average slip, we lack adequate information to go further. 

Any assumption that the 1788 event(s) resulted in complete release of stored interplate 

slip is unsupported by the sparse evidence summarized above. Without such an 

assumption, the present-day state of stored interplate slip cannot be estimated. A 

continuing search for 1788 tsunami deposits on ocean-facing embayments along the 

Pacific side of the Alaska Peninsula and its islands may resolve some of the questions 

about this earthquake and the tsunami waves that it produced. 

1847/1848—This “event,” cited in Davies and others (1981), is extremely 

doubtful (Lander and Lockridge, 1989). It is based on an historical account of a strong 

“orphan” tsunami in Tahiti, the source of which is now unclear because Tahiti is not a 

plate-boundary tsunami source. The same authors suggest that tsunami waves of similar 

potency occurred in Hawaii in the mid-to-late 1840’s. Although earthquakes were felt in 

early morning of 15 April 1848 off the Alaska Peninsula at Chirikof and Unga Islands, no 

report of tsunami waves are known by the authors of the present report for that part of 

Alaska on any date in the years 1847 or 1848. Moreover, none of the other qualified 

compilers of tsunami events and large earthquakes in the modern era recognize this 

“event” as valid for Alaska (Lander, 1996; Novosibirsk Tsunami Laboratory, 2012; 

Pararas-Carayannis and Calebaugh, 1977; Brockman and others, 1988; Lander and 

Lockridge, 1996).

We conclude from this historical record of tsunamigenic earthquakes that an 

unknown amount of seismogenic slip occurred in July and possibly August 1788. The

lack of historical and instrumental evidence for a large area of tsunamigenic slip (>4 m)

since then suggests that cumulative historical seismogenic slip release has been small. 
8

Clearly information on prehistoric tsunamigenic earthquakes in the Semidi sector is 

needed for future guidance on the likelihood of a giant tsunamigenic earthquake.

The Paleogeologic Record.

Just a few short years ago, Gary Carver and George Plafker wrote that 

paleogeologic investigations of subduction earthquakes were largely restricted to the Gulf 

of Alaska subduction sector (Carver and Plafker, 2008). This situation has changed 

greatly in the past 5 years through partnerships between USGS scientists—largely 

supported by the USGS Multihazards Demonstration Project (MHDP), by SAFRR (the 

successor of MHDP), and by the Alaska Earthquake Hazards Project, and university 

scientists supported largely by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the USGS, 

and a geologist with the State of Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys. 

Over the last several summer seasons, field surveys have visited Chirikof Island, Sitkinak 

Island near Kodiak, and Simeonof Island in the southeast Shumagin Islands. 

Results from these surveys so far are preliminary and unpublished, and 

correlations between islands are not yet confidently identified. Alan Nelson (USGS,

Golden) and others have compiled what is known so far (unpublished report, 2012).

However, the initial findings are encouraging at two of these sites, one on Chirikof and 

one on Sitkinak. These investigators have dated possible and probable tsunami deposits 

and evidence for elevation changes possibly caused by large subduction earthquakes. 

Intervals between dated events vary greatly—from as little as one hundred to a few 

hundred years up to many hundreds to 1,300 years. At the long end of these interevent 

intervals, slip accumulations of many tens of meters are possible.

Preliminary findings from geologic field work on Simeonof Island in the 

Shumagin Islands imply little strain accumulation and release on the Aleutian-Alaska

megathrust beneath the Shumagin Islands in the past 3,400 years (Witter and others, 

2012). These initial paleogeologic results provide support for the interpretation of GPS 

observations summarized earlier in this report that the Shumagin sector is largely slipping 

aseismically and that the western limit of rupture for scenario models should not include 

the Shumagin sector.

As embayments, salt marshes, and tidal flats are investigated on more and more 

islands, such as Sanak Island southwest of the Shumagins and Unga Island in the 

Shumagins, and onshore along the Pacific coast of the Alaska Peninsula, we should have 

a fuller picture of the chronology of prehistoric megathrust earthquake occurrence in the 

offshore of the Alaska Peninsula. In the meantime, we see nothing in these preliminary 

results that vitiates the tsunami source that we posit in the next section.

A Plausible Tsunamigenic Source Location—the Semidi Subduction Sector: Rupture 

Dimensions and Geographic Placement

Our reasons for restricting the source area for the scenario tsunami to between the 

Shumagin Islands and Kodiak Island were given above. Thus, rupture length is limited to

about 400 km or less. The regional depth limit for interplate thrust earthquakes on the 

Alaska Peninsula is about 45 km and the down-dip dimension of the Slab 1.0 plate 
9

boundary model from the Alaska Trench to that depth is about 200 to 220 km (Hayes and 

others, 2012). These are the spatial limits within which our scenario source must be 

placed. This requires a relatively compact source with a large average slip for a Mw~9 

subduction earthquake. We show below that the source dimensions and moment 

magnitude of the 11 March 2011 Tohoku earthquake match these requirements and that 

there are many similarities in the geology and geophysics of these two subduction 

margins that make this application plausible.

Comparisons Between the Semidi and Tohoku Subduction Sectors

In table 2, we summarize the geologic and geophysical features in these two 

subduction-zone segments: relative plate motions, average age and sea-floor roughness of 

the incoming oceanic plate, average trench depths, forearc bathymetric morphologies, 

fault structures, average dip of the megathrust boundaries, the trench-to-shoreline 

distance, activities of the volcanic arcs, and other features. There is typically wide 

variability in these features among subduction zones of the world (Scholl and others, 

2013). As discussed more fully by Ryan and others (2012a, 2012b), there are remarkable 

similarities in the seismic images of structures in the Tohoku and Semidi margins (fig. 4). 

The major differences, such as the ages of the incoming plates and trench sediment 

thicknesses, are not directly relevant to the question of tsunami potential, because the 

instrumental and historical record shows that great and giant subduction earthquakes 

occur over wide ranges of incoming plate ages and trench sediment fill (Scholl and 

others, 2013). Moreover, the basic structural similarities between these two subduction 

margins are obvious. One important feature of the Tohoku margin in the vicinity of the 

region of highest slip in 2011 is the presence of a large landward-dipping normal fault 

that was evidently reactivated during the 2011 earthquake (fig. 5). Japanese scientists 

have called this a branch fault because it branches off the megathrust boundary (Kodaira, 

2012; Kodaira and others, 2012). This structure is thought to represent the dynamic 

adjustment of the offshore forearc to a steep gradient in coseismic slip on the subduction 

boundary. Such “branch” normal faults are seen in most seismic sections crossing the 

trench slope of the Alaska Peninsula (Bruns and others, 1987), but better resolution is 

needed to resolve such structures that cross the Semidi sector (fig. 4; Ryan and others, 

2012b). 

Characterizing the Scalar Seismic Moment of the 11 March 2011 

Tohoku Earthquake, Slip Models, and Development of a Synoptic 

Slip Distribution Model and Target Range of Model Parameters

Because of the density of GPS, seismic, and tide-gage networks in Japan, seafloor instruments offshore, and intense interest in using global tide-gage and seismic 

instruments, the 2011 Tohoku earthquake is the best-characterized subduction earthquake 

in history. The reported scalar seismic moments range from 3.8 to 5.7×1022 N⋅m, 

equivalent to an Mw of 9.0 to 9.1 (table 3), now among the five largest magnitudes in the 
10

instrumental record. We chose a scalar moment of 4.9×1022 N⋅m (Mw 9.1) as our target 

moment within this range of reported values. The Tohoku event has been extensively 

studied in the past 3 years. The resulting coseismic slip models vary greatly in the data 

that they use in their inversions, their methodologies, assumed subfault geometries, and 

other assumptions that went into these models. Naturally, there is a fairly wide diversity 

in the resulting models (table 4), including rupture lengths (160 to 440 km), down-dip 

dimensions (120 to 220 km), average slip (12 to 25 m), and peak coseismic slips (27 to 

85 m). In general, those models constrained by local and regional Japanese data have the 

best spatial resolution from stations on land but have limited geographic coverage and 

resolution for slips on the subduction boundary near the Japan Trench far from land. On 

the other hand, those models that only use far-field tide-gage and seismic data have better 

geographic coverage but more limited spatial resolution. It was the measurements from 

sea-floor GPS, pressure gages, and tethered tsunami gages that supplied the most 

convincing evidence that unprecedented slip, as much as 85 m, occurred near the Japan 

Trench. Because most of these sea-floor instruments were located along a narrow trenchnormal corridor, trench-parallel resolution was limited. In our opinion the most 

convincing models are the hybrid ones that incorporate far-field seismic and tide-gage 

data, onshore Japanese seismic, and onshore tide-gage data, as well as data from sea-floor 

instruments. Our expectation is that giant large-slip earthquakes like the 2011 Tohoku 

earthquake have occurred elsewhere in the past, but the lack of sea-floor data has 

prevented them from being identified. We posit that such an event could occur in the 

Semidi sector.

We abstract from such models the following simplified synoptic view of the 11 

March 2011 source:

· A compact source with the following dimensions: 300 to 440 km long parallel to 

trench, and 150 to 200 km downdip

· Maximum coseismic slip near the trench: 65 m

· Average slip: ~18 m

· Bilateral rupture from the main-shock epicenter 

· A rough along-strike symmetry, with peak slip along the trench segment midline 

and slip falloff toward the trench-parallel limits of rupture. 

Creating a Subfault Grid and Applying a Tohoku-Type Slip 

Distribution to the Semidi Sector

A 3-D Megathrust Boundary Geometry and the Construction of Subfault Segments

We constructed an approximation of a curviplanar subfault geometry by the 

following procedure: Using geographic information system (GIS) tools, a first row of 

25×50 km rectangular surface tiles was constructed with the southeast boundaries 

approximately coincident with a smoothed trench line and shared corners along this line. 

We then propagated this first row of tiles approximately perpendicular to the trench, 

producing an 8×8 array of surface tiles (fig. 6). Naturally, this array of tiles increasingly 

overlapped laterally with adjacent tiles interior to the array as new rows of tiles were 
11

created toward the volcanic arc. Those overlaps were graphically eliminated by creating 

shared lateral boundaries and corners (fig. 7). The trench-parallel subfault boundaries are 

approximately parallel to the lines representing depth contours in Slab 1.0 (fig. 2a).

Finally, these polygonal surface tiles were projected vertically onto the Slab 1.0 surface 

and the resultant subfault areas adjusted as A ́ = A/cos θ where A is the area of the 

surface tile, A ́ is the projected area of the plate-boundary subfault on the dipping plate 

boundary, and θ is the dip angle in the Slab 1.0 model at the centroid of the polygonal 

tile. Such a procedure produces subfaults of variable area, dip, and azimuths of line 

segments defining their boundaries and conforms to what we presently know about the 3-

D geometry of this subduction sector. 

Applying this Simplified Synoptic Slip Model for the 2011 Tohoku earthquake to the 

Semidi Sector Array

In adapting the foregoing abstraction from slip models of the Tohoku-Oki 

earthquake to the Semidi subduction sector, we imposed smoothly varying slip from 

subfault to subfault (figs. 8, 9, and 10). Abrupt changes in average slip distribution in 

subfaults are not considered justified and in any case should not affect the longwavelength approximation of tsunami models in the far field. Seismic reflection surveys 

crossing the Japan Trench after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake show that trench-fill

sediments and the outermost inner trench slope underwent distributed deformation by 

thrust faulting during the event (Kodaira and others, 2012). Accordingly, we expect that 

such distributed slip would represent an equivalent reduced maximum slip under the 

deformed soft sediments in the part of the Semidi frontal prism and trench-fill nearest the 

Aleutian Trench. The whole frontal prism in the Semidi sector is about 20 to 25 km wide, 

about the same width as in the Tohoku sector (von Huene and Cullota, 1989; von Huene 

and others 1994; Ryan and others, 2012b; von Huene and others, 2012). 

The Final Version of the Semidi Sector Source

The lateral and down-dip dimensions of the final array are 358 km and 205 km, 

respectively, close to the targeted Tohoku-source dimensions (compare summary in the 

section above on developing model parameters for Tohoku and tables 4 and 5). The 

average dip of our Semidi array is about 12°, compared to the slightly larger average dip 

of the seismogenic megathrust boundary of about 13° for Tohoku (table 2). Using a 

depth-varying shear modulus of 30, 40, and 50 gigapascals (GPa), consistent with rockphysics models, the slip distribution that we adopted produces a summed seismic moment 

of 4.9×1022 N⋅m, which is close to the average value for the Tohoku-Oki source 

investigations summarized in table 3. The latitudes, longitudes, and depths at each corner 

of the subfault grid and at the subfault geometrical centroids are documented in the 

appendix (table A, Supplementary Information).

Scaling of Average Slip During Seismogenic Rupture for Giant 

Earthquakes with Moment Magnitude: How Useful a Guide is it? 
12

Estimating source dimensions and moment magnitudes is difficult even in the 

digital era of seismology. Source dimensions estimated in the pre-digital era from

aftershock distributions are suspect, in view of the fact that for recent giant subduction 

earthquakes, aftershocks extend far beyond the areas of significant modeled seismogenic 

slip. For example, the aftershock zone for the 2011 Tohoku earthquake is roughly twice 

as large as the coseismic area of significant slip (Hayes, 2011). Also, recent earthquakes 

of comparable moment magnitude—2004 Sumatra Mw 9.15 (Chlieh and others, 2007) 

and 2011 Tohoku Mw 9.1 (this synopsis)—have estimated average slips that differ by 

more than a factor of three to four (5 m versus 15 to 20 m, respectively). There is a 

similar scale of variability in average slip for smaller subduction earthquakes, although 

modeling of events smaller than Mw 8.0 becomes increasingly uncertain with decreasing 

moment magnitude. With such intrinsic variability, one can question the utility of using 

the scaling of average slip versus scalar seismic moment as a tool for forecasting possible 

earthquake ground motions and the tsunami wave field.

Satake and Tanioka (1996) and Satake and others (2008), in reviewing what was 

then known about large tsunamigenic subduction earthquakes worldwide, speculated 

about the role of poorly consolidated sediments in the outer forearc prism closest to the 

trench in seismogenesis and tsunamigenesis. For most big interplate thrust earthquakes, 

significant coseismic slip probably does not occur under the prism but does occur deeper 

in the megathrust boundary. For certain less frequent giant earthquakes, large slip can and 

does occur under the prism, often in conjunction with slip deeper along the subduction 

boundary. The Tohoku earthquake in 2011 was such a compound-rupture earthquake. 

Satake (2011), following the 2011 Tohoku event, proposed that such compound-rupture 

events may be a part of a “supercycle” of subduction earthquakes in some subduction 

zones that occur on millennial time scales and hence are distinct from more typical 

centuries-scale great subduction earthquake cycles that have smaller average slip. In a 

way, such segmentation is the downdip counterpart of the along-strike segmentation of 

ruptures that allows for infrequent multi-segment ruptures leading to great and giant 

supercycle tsunamigenic earthquakes, such as the M 8.4–8.6 Hoei earthquake of 28 

October 1707 in the Nankai subduction zone (Ando, 1975). If such a view is correct, then 

the occurrence of supercycle earthquakes involving both up-dip/down-dip segmentation 

would lead to a different type of scaling than rupture just involving large but not

exceptional slip down-dip of a forearc frontal prism. Our challenge is to search for 

geological and geophysical features of subduction zones that may give us insights into 

whether a particular subduction zone is prone to such supercycle subduction earthquakes. 

Summary

Tsunami modeling has demonstrated that giant subduction earthquakes along the 

Pacific side of the Alaska Peninsula would produce more potent tsunami waves along 

California shorelines than would such earthquakes at any other distant location. GPS 

measurements indicate that the Semidi subduction sector between Kodiak Island and the 

Shumagin Islands is currently “locked” and has probably not experienced large 

seismogenic slip (>10 m) in centuries. In the search of a plausible coseismic slip source 

for a giant subduction earthquake in the critical Semidi sector of the Alaska subduction 

system, the USGS Tsunami Source Working Group for the SAFRR tsunami scenario 
13

used the source characteristics of the Mw~9 Tohoku earthquake as a proxy for a number 

of reasons: 

· Close examination of the megathrust geometry, geology, and geophysics of the 

Semidi subduction sector off the Alaska Peninsula and the Tohoku margin off 

Japan indicates that, although not identical twins, these subduction systems share 

many features that are probably relevant factors in governing the occurrence of 

damaging far-field tsunami waves.

· The 2011 Tohoku earthquake is the best -characterized giant earthquake and 

tsunami source in history, and its occurrence has prompted a reevaluation of 

subduction systems elsewhere for the potential of similarly potent tsunami 

sources.

· The compact nature of the Tohoku source also makes it an ideal “fit” to the spatial 

dimensions of the Semidi subduction sector as we define it between Kodiak Island 

and the Shumagin Islands. 

· When allowances are made for differences in methodologies, data used to 

constrain the models, and resolution limits, the parameters of our source model 

are consistent with the Tohoku model literature. We fitted a simple polygonal 

subfault array to the curviplanar shape of the plate boundary of the Semidi sector 

based on the USGS Slab 1.0 geometrical model for the sector. We then put 

forward a simplified synoptic slip distribution in this array to emulate the Tohoku 

earthquake based on our interpretations of the model literature for this event. 

· The immense seismic moment of the Tohoku earthquake of 2011 was not 

anticipated, in spite of a long historical record of earthquakes in Japan. This fact 

underscores the importance of paleogeologic investigations along the Alaska 

subduction margin to establish a long-term prehistoric record of the occurrence of 

great and giant subduction earthquakes and the tsunami waves that they spawn. 

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`
20

Table 1. Large instrumentally documented earthquakes and tsunami runups in the Semidi Sector and adjacent sectors of the Aleutian-Alaska 

subduction zone. [Dates given as year (YYYY), month (MM), day (DD), hour (hh), minute (mm), and second (ss.s); epicenters for events before 1920 generally have large 

uncertainties; NR, no tsunami runups or damage reports at this site for this event in online tsunami databases of the National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) 

and the Novosibirsk Tsunami Laboratory; X, no records or no instruments known to be in operation; s, shallow (<60 km), presumed or established; - , no data]

 

1. No reported runups in AK exceeding 0.1 m. Tsunami modeling suggests three small slip patches averaging ~ 1.1 m [Johnson and Satake, 1994, 1995]. 

Average slip ~2 m based on seismic waveform modeling (Estabrook and others.,1994). This weak tsunami source only had 9 sites reporting, probably all tide 

gauge stations; 2. Location: Sykes (1971). Mw: Estabrook and others (1994). No known tsunami observations (Not in NGDC tsunami source database); 3. Mw

(Harvard and Global CMT. Location; 4. Epicenter: Doser (2006); Ms: Pacheco and Sykes (1992); No known tsunami observations (Not in NGDC tsunami source 

database); 5. Epicenter: Boyd & Lerner-Lam 1988). Mw = Ms from Estabrook and Boyd, (1992). No known tsunami observations (Not in NGDC tsunami source 

database); 6. Doser (2006)*. Possible off trench location. No known tsunami observations (Not in NGDC tsunami source database); 7. Diane Doser (2006)*. 

Possible off-trench location. No known tsunami observations (Not in NGDC tsunami source database); 8. Epicenter and Mw: Lopez and Okal (2006); Epicenter 

near trench. Slow rupture. Far-field runup survey (Okal et al., 2003)/ Near-field survey (Okal et al., 2002). NGDC lists 508 tsunami record sites. Okal and others

(2003) adds another 54.; 9. Two patches of slip, one under Prince William Sound, another trenchward of Kodiak Island. NGDC lists 391 tsunami record sites.

YYYY MM DD HH MM SS.

S

Tsunami 

reports?

Latitude 

°N

Longitude °E Depth, 

km

Mw/Ms Max. 

tsunami 

runup, m 

San 

Diego, 

CA

Long 

Beach, 

CA 

Los 

Angeles, 

CA

Santa 

Monica, 

CA

Half 

Moon 

Bay, 

CA

Cres

-cent 

City, 

CA

Seward. 

AK

Hilo 

Harbor, 

HI

Largest 

far-field 

wave 

height

Largest 

near-field 

wave 

height

19381 11 10 20 18 41.2 Yes 55.18 -158.181 25 8.2-8.3 0.1 X NR 0.05 NR 0.18 0.08 0.3 0.3 0.1

19482 5 14 22 31 43.4 No 54.71 -160.880 s 7.2 X X X X X X X X - -

19893 9 4 13 15 0.2 No 55.63 -156.912 s 7.0 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR - -

19064 12 23 17 22 0.0 No 56.85 -153.900 s 7.2 X X X X X X X X - -

19175 5 31 8 47 20.0 No 54.93 -159.433 29 7.4 X X X X X X X X - -

19176 12 21 17 54 No 55.29 -152.350 s 7.3 X X X X X X X X - -

19177 12 28 21 14 No 55.59 -152.750 s >7 X X X X X X X X - -

19468 4 1 12 29 1.6 Yes 53.31 -162.880 s 8.6 0.2 0.2 0.34 X 3.5 0.9 0.1 8.8 20 42.0

19649 3 28 3 36 yes 61.04 -147.730 s 9.2 to 

9.3

0.5 NR 0.49 1.08 3.8 4.79 NR 3.0 4.8 34.4
21

Table 2. Geological and geophysical comparisons between the Semidi Sector of the Aleutian-Alaska subduction zone and the Tohoku Sector of the 

Japan-Trench subduction zone.

[mm/y, millimeters per year; Ma, millions of years ago; m, meters; km, kilometers; M, magnitude]

Feature Semidi Sector, Alaska Tohoku Sector, Japan Sources and Notes

Convergence rate , mm/y 60 (nearly trench-normal motion). Pacific: 

Alaska peninsula relative motion.

83 (nearly trench-normal motion). Pacific 

Plate: Okotsk Plate relative plate motion.

Bird, 2003; Freymueller and others, 

2008, Cross and Freymueller (2008). 

Both moderately fast rates. 

Age of incoming plate, Ma 48-58 120-140 M 8.5 to 9.5 strongly tsunamigenic 

events (instrumental and historical) 

show no apparent trend with incoming 

plate age, ranging from 10 (Cascadia) 

to 140 (Tohoku) Ma for such 

subduction sectors. 

Sea-floor roughness of trench fill 

bathymetery on incoming plate 

Relatively smooth (Fig. 2A) with some local 

trench sea-floor roughness partly muted by 

sediment fill.

Smooth except near Japan Trench cusps 

and ~500 m normal fault scarps offsetting 

sediment (Fig. 2B)

Smooth incoming sea-floor is often 

associated with Mw >8.7 earthquakes 

with long rupture runouts, presumably 

caused by fewer geometrical barriers to 

rupture (Scholl and others, 2013).

Thickness of trench fill, m 1.25 km [Shillington and others (2012)] 0.5 km (von Huene and others, 1994) Ryan, H. and Draut, A., 2012, 

unpublished map showing sediment fill 

in the Aleutian trench.
22

Feature Semidi Sector, Alaska Tohoku Sector, Japan Sources and Notes

Thickness of subduction channel 

sediments landward of frontal 

prism, km

~1.0 + 0.5 ~1.0 + 0.5 Ryan and others, 2012

Average trench depth, km 5 7 Depends on trench sedimentary fill. 

Maximum throws of off- trench 

normal faults, m

>250 m (Shillington and others, 2012). 

Scarps only cut abyssal sediments.

~500 m (Japan Coast Guard website). 

Scarps only cut abyssal sediments.

Scarps probably not strong barriers to 

interplate thrust faulting since only 

sediments need be deformed.

Off-trench seismicity and outerrise expression: seismicity rate 

and maximum magnitude

Rate: Low except south and southwest of 

Kodiak; Maximum magnitude: ~ 7

Rate: High; Maximum magnitude: 8.6 Differences in off-trench seismicity 

rates reflect differences in plate age and 

thickness. Doser (2006) relocated 

several large off-trench and near-trench 

events that occurrred in 1917 south of 

Kodiak Island, possibly in the Pacific 

Plate (See Table I).

Approximate regional depth limit 

of interplate thrust earthquakes 

offshore of Alaska Peninsula SW 

of Kodiak Island.

~55 ~50 Slab 1.0 model (Hayes and others, 

2012)

Average trench fill, km 1.5 + 0.5 0.75 + 0.5 Von Huene and others, 1994), Holly 

Ryan (personal communication, 2012)

Forearc bathymetric features Trench-parallel ridges in frontal prism Trench-parallel ridges in frontal prism 

Prominent ridge near transition between 

frontal prism and slope basins 

Muted ridge

Forearc sedimentary basins Forearc sedimentary basins
23

Feature Semidi Sector, Alaska Tohoku Sector, Japan Sources and Notes

Offshore forearc structure and 

tectonics

Frontal Prism and Transition: Thrust faults 

& folds extending into trench sediment fill. 

Downdip prism width: ~25 km .

Outer Prism and Transition: Thrust faults 

& folds extending into trench sediment 

fill. Down-dip prism width ~20 km.

Ryan and others (2012); Roland von 

Huene, unpublished data 2012.

Transition zone: Possible branch normal 

faults and thrust faults

Transition zone: Branch normal faults and 

thrust faults

Ryan and others (2012)

Shelf: Shumagin Basin revealed by 

bathymetry, seismic reflection and gravity 

lows and basin-bounding gravity gradients.

Shelf: Discontinuous basins revealed by 

seismic reflection and gravity lows and 

basin-bounding gravity gradients.

Bruns and others (1987); Wells and 

others (2003), Wells and others (2011), 

Ryan and others (2012) 

High-wave-speed "basement" rocks extend to 

within about 20-30 km of the Alaska trench.

High-wave-speed "basement" rocks extend 

to within about 20-30 km of the Japan 

trench.

Ryan and others (2012)

Average seaward forearc plate 

boundary dip and (dip range in 10 

km depth segments to ~50 km 

depth).

12° (5 to 20°) 13° (5 to 23°) Determined from Slab 1.0 model 

(Hayes and others, 2012) 

Average trench-to-shoreline 

distance, km

~240 ~220 Measured using Google Earth. Only 

appoximate given complex coastlines.

Average trench to volcanic arc 

distance, km

~290 ~290 Measured using Google Earth

Volcanic arc activity Vigorous arc including Holocene calderaforming eruptionsVigorous arc including Holocene calderaforming eruptionsSiebert, Simkin, and Kimberly (2011), 

Volcanoes of the World. 
24

Table 3. Estimates of the seismic moment and moment magnitude of the 11 March 2011 Tohoku earthquake.

[CMT, Centroid Moment Tensor Project ; USGS, U.S. Geological Survey]

Reference Method Moment, N-m*1022 Mw

Global CMT CMT 5.30 9.1

USGS CMT 4.5 9.0

Hayes (2011) Teleseismic waveform inversion 4.04 9.0

USGS website W phase inversion 3.9 9.0

UCSB (Shao and Ji (2011), 

fall 2011 AGU Abstract 

and presentation Seismic: teleseismic waveform inversion, strong motion, GPS (land and sea-floor) 5.36 9.1

Lay and others (EPS 2011) 

P-MOD2 model and fall 

2011 AGU presentation Teleseismic P-wave waveform modeling 3.84 9.0

Yagi and Fukuhata (2011) Teleseismic waveform inversion 5.7 9.1
25

Table 4. Models of slip distribution for the Mw 9.1 Tohoku earthquake.

[L, lengh of rupture; W, width of rupture; km, kilometers; Av., average; m, meters; PG, pressure gage; 

GPS, Global Positioning System; TG, tide gage; Wfs, waveforms; SM, strong motion; BB, broadband; *, 

circumscribed by resolution limits] 

Reference Data types L, 

km

W, 

km

Av. slip, 

m

Min. Slip, m Max. slip, m

Ito and others 

(2011)

Sea-floor PG GPS 80 

Iinuma and others 

(2012)

Sea-floor PG, 

GPS,tide and 

tsunami gages

160* 120* ~20 0 85

Fujii and others

(2011)

Tsunami model 350 200 ~20 2 40

Ozawa and others 

(2011)

Japan GPS 400 ~200 ~12 4 27

Pollitz and others

(2011)

Japan and regional 

GPS, sea-floor GPS

440 180 12-16 ~5 ~35

Shao and Ji

(2011); Shao and 

others (2011)

Broadband waveforms, GPS, TG330 180 25 4 70

Minson and others

(2011); Simons 

and others (2011)

Regional GPS 

teleseismic/tsunamic 

Wfs, GPS

160* 120* 20-25 ~10 65

Koketsu and

others (2011)

Teleseismic Wfs, 

SM, GPS, tsunami 

observations

310 180 ~18 ~5 ~40

Lay and others

(2011)

BB P-waveforms 320 220 15.9 4 62

Ide and others

(2011)

Teleseismic Wfs 330 220 ~15 0 30

Hayes (2011) Teleseismic Wfs ~300 150 ~15 ~4 32

Yagi and 

Fukuhata (2011)

Teleseismic Wfs ~350 175 ~20 ~5 50
26

Table 5. Summary table of properties for the Semidi Sector coseismic slip model.

Property Name Value Minimum Maximum

Number of subfaults 64

Total source length, L at trench, km 358

Range of summed subfault lengths along row, km 322 358

Total source downdip width, W, km 205

Total area of subfaults, km

2 73,396

Average subfault area, km

2 1147

Range of subfault areas, low/high, km

2 1,056 1,242

Average slip, m 18.6

Slip range, low/high, m 0 65

Total seismic moment, Mo, N⋅m 4.91×1022

Moment magnitude, Mw 9.13

Epicenter: latitude (°N) (d4 Centroid)1 55.8

Epicenter: longitude (°E) (d4 Centroid)1 -156.7

1 The centroid of an epicenter is the location of the weighted average of the earthquake slip.
27

Figures

Figure 1. Map of the Pacific region showing source disaggregation for Los Angeles for tsunami 

peak wave height at 475-year return period (courtesy of Hong Kie Thio, URS Corporation). 

Vertical bar heights show that subduction earthquakes along the Alaska Peninsula have the 

greatest impacts on Los Angeles shorelines for a give seismic moment of the source 

subduction earthquake.
28

Figure 2A

1946

1989

1938

1917c

1906

1948

1917a

Kodiak 

Island

Alaska Peninsula

Shumagin 

Islands

Sanak

Island

-Alaska Trench

20 km

40 km

60 km

80 km

Semidi 

Islands

Unimak

Island

164°W 162°W 160°W 158°W 156°W 154°W 152°W

58°N

56°N

54°N

0 37.5 75 150 Kilometers

Earthquake Magnitude

7.0

7.0 - 7.2

7.2 - 7.4

7.4 - 7.7

7.7 - 8.6

1:3,000,000
29

Figure 2. Maps showing locations of large earthquakes along the Aleutian-Alaska and the 

Tohoku, Japan, subduction margins. A, Summary map of the locations of large (Mw ≥ 7.0) 

shallow (<60 km) earthquakes along the southwest end of the Alaska Peninsula subduction 

sector since 1900 (filled black symbols are the epicenters of presumed interplate thrust 

earthquakes that have occurred since 1900). The yellow contours represent 20-km depth 

intervals from the Slab 1.0 model (Hayes and others, 2012), and the blue line is the axis of the 

Alaska-Aleutian trench at an average water depth of about 5 km. Earthquake data sources: 

Sykes (1971), Boyd and others (1988), Estabrook and others (1994), Engdahl and Villaseñor

(2002), Doser (2006), ISC-GEM catalogue of earthquake magnitudes (2012). B, Summary map 

of the locations of large (Mw ≥ 7.0) shallow (<60 km) earthquakes along the Japan Trench 

subduction sector that occurred since 1900 and before 2011 (filled orange and yellow symbols 

are the epicenters of presumed interplate thrust earthquakes). The epicenter and approximate 

area of significant rupture for the M9.1 Tohoku earthquake of 11 March 2011 are shown as a 

blue star and a blue closed line segment, respectively. The rupture area overlaps the 

epicentral areas of numerous M≥7.0 earthquakes. Note that the majority of the epicenters of 

large events occurred at depths between 20 and 40 km, as is the case for the Semidi sector of 

the Alaska Peninsula (shown in a). 

miles

km

200

400

Japan Trench

20 km

80 km

60 km

0 

4

m

k

300 km 

km km
30
31

Figure 3. Maps showing bathymetry and free-air gravity of a part of the Alaska Peninsula 

subduction margin. A, Color shaded relief map of the bathymetry of the southwest half of the 

Alaska Peninsula (data source, National Geophysical Data Center; map construction by Holly 

Ryan). Parallel ridges northwest of the otherwise flat-bottomed trench are largely a 

consequence of active thrust faulting, folding, and slumps in the outer prism. B, Free-air gravity 

reveals structural highs and lows (basins) along Semidi Islands segment and likely show the 

extent of framework basement rock southeastward to the strong gradient along the trench

(Wells and others, 2003). The locations where significant slip occurred in 1938 (white 

rectangles), average 1938 slip in meters (black labels), and high moment release in 1938 (red 

circles) are from Johnson and Satake (1994) and Estabrook and others (1994). These features 

suggest that not only was the slip release small in the 1938 event (~2 m, see text), but also the 

updip sector of the subduction boundary may not have ruptured significantly in 1938.
32

Figure 4. Map of the Alaska margin and cross sections of both the Alaska and Tohoku, Japan, 

subduction margins. (Figure and caption modified from Ryan and others, 2012a.) a, The 

Alaskan margin showing epicenters (stars), rupture zones (red and yellow outlines), and areas 

of largest slip (greater than 3 m, red and yellow cross-hatching) of instrumentally recorded 

large earthquakes. Black line with barbs shows the location of the Alaskan- Aleutian 

subduction zone’s main trench on the sea floor. b, Structure section across the similar Tohoku 

margin crossing the north end of the Tohoku earthquake rupture (after von Huene and others, 

1994). c, Structure section across the 1938 epicenter near Semidi Islands, located in figure 4a 
33

(from von Huene and others, 2012). In both profiles framework crust extends nearly to the 

trench. A transition zone between basement and frontal prism material is poorly imaged—

better characterization of these zones will help assess hazards. The dashed green lines show 

the border between the downward dipping subducting slab and the continental crust thrusting 

over it
34

Figure 5. Seismic-reflection survey cross-section image perpendicular to the Japan Trench near 

38°N acquired before the 11 March 2011 Tohoku-oki earthquake, with arrows showing the 

horizontal (red arrows) and vertical (blue arrows) motions of sea-floor instruments during the 

earthquake. Modified from Ito and others (2011). The motions of the sea-floor instruments are 

consistent with an average of 80 m of coseismic slip under the frontal prism. Note the normal 

fault branching off the plate-boundary fault that is thought to represent the kinematic 

accommodation of such a steep downdip gradient in slip on the subduction boundary. Angular 

scale in upper right shows the true dip angles.

Branch	normal	fault

Plate	boundary

TJT1

TJT2 GJT3

58	m

31	m 74	m

5.0	m

3.6	m

?	m

Frontal	

Prism

80	m
35

Figure 6. Map of the initial surface subfault grid of 25×50 km cells adapted to the Semidi 

subduction sector bathymetry off the Alaska Peninsula. Each subfault area is identified and 

labeled by the row and column in the subfault grid where it is located. Unwanted overlaps 

between adjacent subfaults are eliminated graphically in figure 7. Red dots indicate the 

boundary of the frontal prism as picked by Roland von Huene. Color shaded relief from 

National Geophysical Data Center.

25	km

50	km

a

b

c

d

f

e

g

h

Rows

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Columns

Kodiak

Shumagin	Islands
36

Figure 7. Map showing final surface projection of subfault grid in the Semidi sector, with subfault 

boundary overlaps removed and matrix subfaults labeled.
37

Figure 8. Map of the final 3-D subfault grid of the Semidi sector, with posited seismic-slip 

distribution in meters (red labels) based on a synoptic summary of the Mw 9.1 Tohoku 

earthquake slip models. Depth contours on subduction boundary (based on Slab 1.0) are 

shown in yellow.

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a1 

164°W 162°W 160°W 158°W 156°W 154°W 152°W 

58°N 

56°N 

54°N 

0 40 80 160 Kilometers 

Tohoku subfault source 

subfault corners 

! subfault centroids 

subfault grid 

1:3,000,000 

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Figure 9. Plotted trench-parallel profiles of seismic slip in subfault rows of the Semidi sector grid 

at increasing distances from the Alaska Trench (row “a” is closest to the trench).
39

Figure 10. Histogram showing average slip in subfault rows of the Semidi sector grid parallel to the 

Alaska Trench. SF is subfault. DD is downdip.
40

Appendix. Supplementary Information

Table A. Spreadsheet summarizing the subfault geometry and slip distribution for the SAFRR Southern California Tsunami Scenario

[See the accompanying file]. 
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U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–D

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

Modeling for the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario—Generation, 

Propagation, Inundation, and Currents in Ports and Harbors

60°

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COVER—Maximum tsunami amplitude of scenario tsunami throughout the northeast Pacific Ocean using the 

Method of Splitting Tsunami (MOST) model. Image courtesy Vasily Titov, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration/Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory.
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario

Stephanie Ross and Lucile Jones, Editors 

Modeling for the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario—Generation, 

Propagation, Inundation, and Currents in Ports and 

Harbors

By the SAFRR Tsunami Modeling Working Group 

Open-File Report 2013–1170–D 

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey 
iii

U.S. Department of the Interior

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2013

For product and ordering information:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov/pubprod

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth,

its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

Suggested citation:

The SAFRR Tsunami Modeling Working Group, 2013, Modeling for the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario—Generation, 

propagation, inundation, and currents in ports and harbors, chap. D, in Ross, S.L., and Jones, L.M., eds., The 

SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 

2013–1170, 136 p., http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/d/. 

Any use of trade, product, or firm names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply

endorsement by the U.S. Government.

Although this information product, for the most part, is in the public domain, it also may contain copyrighted 

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iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWNJR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD 

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION 

MARK NECHODOM 

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D. 

STATE GEOLOGIST
v 

Contents

Modeling for the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario—Generation, Propagation, Inundation, and Currents in Ports and 

Harbors ............................................................................................................................................................................ 1

Preface ............................................................................................................................................................................ 1

1. Effects of Subfault Discretization and Horizontal Displacement on Tsunami Generation ........................................... 2

Vertical Deformation Summation Effect Induced by Abruptly Changing Fault Dip ....................................................... 2

Influence of Initial Sea Level Profile by Horizontal Slip over Sloping Seafloor ............................................................. 4

2. Modeling Sea-Floor Deformation and Tsunami Generation using Dynamic Finite Element Analysis ......................... 6

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................................ 6

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 7

Method Part 1 ............................................................................................................................................................... 9

Method Part 2 ............................................................................................................................................................. 12

Results ....................................................................................................................................................................... 17

Homogeneous Stress and Friction ......................................................................................................................... 17

Western Frictional-Strengthening Zone Rupture .................................................................................................... 20

Updip Frictional-Strengthening Zone Rupture ........................................................................................................ 25

Heterogeneous Prestress Rupture ......................................................................................................................... 28

Discussion .................................................................................................................................................................. 33

3. Modeling of Tsunami Wave Excitation, Propagation, and Inundation ....................................................................... 35

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 35

Tsunami Modeling ...................................................................................................................................................... 37

Tsunami Excitation ................................................................................................................................................. 37

Tsunami Propagation ............................................................................................................................................. 38

Tsunami Model ....................................................................................................................................................... 42

Bathymetry ................................................................................................................................................................. 42

Results ....................................................................................................................................................................... 45

Ocean Propagation ................................................................................................................................................ 45

Nearshore and Onshore Results ............................................................................................................................ 48

Explanation of Data Files ....................................................................................................................................... 59

4. Numerical Modeling of Tsunami Effects in Southern California from a Hypothetical M9.1 Earthquake near the 

Alaska Peninsula ........................................................................................................................................................... 60

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 60

Earthquake Source Model .......................................................................................................................................... 61

Bathymetry Grids ....................................................................................................................................................... 66

Model Results ............................................................................................................................................................ 68

Summary and Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 77

5. Production of Inundation Line for SAFRR Tsunami Scenario .................................................................................... 78

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................................... 78

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 78

Verification of Model Results ...................................................................................................................................... 79

SAFRR Inundation Line Production ........................................................................................................................... 81

Comparison of SAFRR Inundation Line to State Inundation Line .............................................................................. 83

6. Modeling Tsunami Dynamics in the Port of Los Angeles, California ......................................................................... 84

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................................... 84

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 84

Methodology and Data ............................................................................................................................................... 85
vi

Grid Development .................................................................................................................................................. 85

Numerical Model of Tsunami Propagation and Runup ........................................................................................... 88

Modeling Results ........................................................................................................................................................ 89

Sources of Errors and Uncertainties ...................................................................................................................... 98

Summary .................................................................................................................................................................... 98

Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................................................... 98

7. Port & Harbor Hydrodynamics ................................................................................................................................... 99

Introduction and Background ..................................................................................................................................... 99

Hydrodynamic Modeling Approach and Results ........................................................................................................ 99

Modeling of Tsunami-Induced Sediment Transport ................................................................................................. 107

Theoretical Approach ........................................................................................................................................... 107

Model Validation and Calibration .......................................................................................................................... 108

Model Application to Santa Cruz Harbor, California ............................................................................................. 113

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................................ 115

References .................................................................................................................................................................. 115

Appendix A—SAFRR Tsunami Inundation Maps for Select Areas of California’s Coast ............................................ 122

Figures

1. Map-view diagram showing vertical displacement (Z, in meters) in the 2014 tsunami scenario computed 

 at the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WCATWC) . ....................................................... 3

2. Map-view diagram showing vertical displacement (Z, in meters) in the 2014 tsunami scenario computed .. 

 at WCATWC based on smoothed subfault dips and a splitting of each subfault into fifths (5 km x 50 km .... 

 subfaults). ..................................................................................................................................................... 3

3. Map-view diagram showing difference in vertical displacement (Z, in meters) between the original 64 ....... 

 subfault source and the 320 subfault source with smoothly varying dip. .................................................... 4

4. Map-view diagram showing total sea-floor vertical movement (Z, in meters) for the 2014 tsunami .............. 

 exercise computed using a smoothly varying dip on 320 source blocks and including vertical uplift ............ 

 induced by horizontal motion over sloping seafloor. ................................................................................... 5

5. Map-view diagram showing vertical sea-floor motion (Z, in meters) induced by horizontal slip over ............ 

 sloping seafloor. .......................................................................................................................................... 5

6. Rupture tunneling through a strengthening zone. Top: Map view of a frictional-strengthening zone 

 modeled in the middle of a homogeneous, planar, 2-D fault in a whole space using slip-weakening 

 (SW), rate-state ageing law (RS-AL), and rate-state slip law (RS-SL) friction parameterizations in finite 

 element code FaultMod. ............................................................................................................................ 10

7. Model approximation to a section of the Alaska-Aleutian megathrust. Top: Cartoon block diagram of ........ 

 fault geometry of the hanging wall using 3-D finite element code EQDyna .............................................. 13

8. Cross-sectional diagrams illustrating two models with frictional-strengthening zones in (top) the 

 westernmost portion and (bottom) the most updip portion of the fault. ..................................................... 16

9. Graphs of shear stress versus slip for a point in the weakening zone (red, left) and a point in the .............. 

 strengthening zone (blue, right), using time-weakening friction to model a 3-D megathrust earthquake ...... 

 within the Alaskan-Aleutian subduction zone. ........................................................................................... 16

10. Diagrammatic views of the fault surface showing snapshots of rupture propagation at 27, 512, and 70 .... 

 s for a homogeneous model (spatially constant prestress, dip angle, and frictional coefficients). .......... 18

11. Diagrams showing fault slip (top) and total vertical free surface deformation (bottom) for the 

 homogeneous model. .............................................................................................................................. 19
vii

12. Map showing peak tsunami amplitudes (color scale in m) resulting from the homogeneous earthquake 

 rupture model in the geographic region of interest. ................................................................................. 20

13. Diagrammatic views of the fault surface showing snapshots of rupture propagation at 27, 52, and 70 s ... 

 for a model with a frictional-strengthening zone from 100 to 179 km along-strike and over the entire ....... 

 downdip extent of the model (see fig. 8, top), motivated by GPS data showing an unlocked section of ..... 

 the fault that borders our study area to the west ..................................................................................... 22

14. Diagrams showing fault slip (top) and total vertical free surface deformation (bottom) for the western ...... 

 frictional-strengthening zone model. ....................................................................................................... 23

15. Map showing peak tsunami amplitudes (color scale in m) resulting from the western 

 frictional-strengthening zone model. ...................................................................................................... 24

16. Diagrammatic views of the fault surface showing snapshots of rupture propagation at 27, 52, and 70 s ... 

 for a model with a frictional-strengthening zone from 0 to −50 km downdip and across the entire ............ 

along-strike extent of the model .............................................................................................................. 26

17. Diagrams showing fault slip (top) and total vertical free surface deformation (bottom) for the updip .......... 

 frictional-strengthening zone model. ....................................................................................................... 27

18. Map showing peak tsunami amplitude (color scale in m) resulting from the updip frictional- . strengthening 

 zone model. ............................................................................................................................................. 28

19. Diagrammatic views of the fault surface showing snapshots of rupture propagation at 27, 52, and 70 s ... 

 for a heterogeneous prestress model. ..................................................................................................... 30

20. Diagrammatic views of the fault plane showing initial shear stress (top) and normal stress (bottom) for 

 the heterogeneous prestress model. ....................................................................................................... 31

21. Diagrams showing the slip distribution used in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario (top), as well as the fault 

 slip (middle) and total vertical free surface deformation (bottom) for the dynamic heterogeneous 

 prestress model. ...................................................................................................................................... 32

22. Map showing peak tsunami amplitudes (color scale in m) resulting from the heterogeneous prestress ..... 

 model. ...................................................................................................................................................... 33

23. Map of the northeastern Pacific Basin. .................................................................................................... 36

24. Map showing vertical deformation field of the earthquake source region, which is used as initial .............. 

 condition for the tsunami wave modeling. ................................................................................................ 37

25. Diagrammatic sketch showing the coordinate system for tsunami model. ............................................... 38

26. Map showing locations of the high-resolution grids (0.96 arc sec, ~ 30 m) along the California coast. .. 43

27. Map of maximum tsunami amplitudes. .................................................................................................... 47

28. Tsunami wave-height time series (marigrams) from the scenario tsunami for various locations along 

 the California coast. .................................................................................................................................. 49

29. Maps showing maximum amplitude (top) and maximum flow depth (bottom) in and around the Ports of 

 Los Angeles and Long Beach. ................................................................................................................ 50

30. Time series of velocity (east, top; north, center) and wave height (bottom) for the scenario tsunami ......... 

 waves in the Port of Los Angeles. ............................................................................................................ 51

31. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami around Crescent City, 

 California. ................................................................................................................................................. 52

32. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami around the San Francisco 

 shoreline just inside the Golden Gate. ..................................................................................................... 53

33. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami in Half Moon Bay,

 California. ................................................................................................................................................. 54

34. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami along the eastern shore of 

 Monterey Bay, California. ......................................................................................................................... 55

35. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami around Morro Bay, 
viii

 California. ................................................................................................................................................. 56

36. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami around Avila Beach, 

 California. ................................................................................................................................................. 57

37. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami at Ventura, California. ....... 58

38. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami at San Diego, California. ... 58

39. Map showing the source regions and potentially affected coasts in the ComMIT propagation model 

 database for tsunamis in the world’s oceans. ......................................................................................... 61

40. Map showing deformation data for the scenario tsunami provided by the USGS. .................................. 62

41. Map showing surface displacement computed by the MOST version of Okada's (1985) elastic 

 dislocation model. .................................................................................................................................... 62

42. Maps showing the ComMIT subfault segments (left) that most closely match the source region defined 

 for this study (right). .................................................................................................................................. 63

43. Maps showing surface deformation cause by a 16-segment fault model derived from 4-segment 

averages of the 64-segment fault model. ................................................................................................. 64

44. Map showing computed surface deformation created by an alternate version of the 16-segment fault 

 model for the tsunami source region. ...................................................................................................... 65

45. Maps and graph showing model results for San Pedro Bay, California. ................................................. 67

46. Map showing the sites of modeled tsunami effects in southern California covered by this study. ........... 68

47. Plot of modeled wave height at Marina del Rey, comparing the effects from tsunami source 1 and 

 tsunami source 2. ..................................................................................................................................... 69

48. Plot of modeled wave height at the entrance to Anaheim Bay from separate model runs with 

 overlapping model grids. Note that the model returns from the two grids are virtually identical. .............. 69

49. Time series outputs showing tsunami wave heights in each of the nearshore regions. ........................... 71

50. Maps showing maximum computed tsunami wave heights in the A-level (coarsest) grids along the 

 southern California coast. ........................................................................................................................ 72

51. Maps showing maximum computed tsunami wave heights (left) and current speeds (right) at Marina 

 del Rey, California. ................................................................................................................................... 72

52. Maps showing modeled maximum tsunami wave heights and current speeds in San Pedro Bay and 

 sites within the bay at different grid levels. .............................................................................................. 74

53. Maps showing modeled maximum tsunami height (left) and current speed (right) in Newport Bay. ....... 75

54. Maps showing modeled maximum tsunami height (left) and current speed (right) at Del Mar. ............... 75

55. Maps showing modeled maximum tsunami height (left) and current speed (right) at La Jolla. ................ 76

56. Maps showing modeled maximum tsunami height (left) and current speed (right) in Mission Bay. ......... 76

57. Map showing SAFRR modeled tsunami amplitude results near the outflow for the Santa Ana River in 

 Orange County. ....................................................................................................................................... 80

58. Map showing the SAFRR tsunami inundation line (blue) in the Port of Los Angeles (left part of image) .... 

 and the adjacent Port of Long Beach. ..................................................................................................... 82

59. Maps showing the vertical deformation of the ocean floor resulting from the hypothetical earthquake in 

 the Semidi Sector of the Aleutian megathrust. . ....................................................................................... 85

60. Map showing the coarsest grid (PA02) which covers the central and northern Pacific Ocean, and the 

 24-arc-second grid (SC24), which is centered at the Port of Los Angeles. ............................................. 86

61. Map showing telescoping embedded bathymetry/topography grids (SC24, SC08, LA55, and LA12) for 

 numerical modeling of tsunami propagation and runup along the southern California coast. ................. 87

62. Maps showing modeled wave heights and water flow depths in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long 

 Beach. ..................................................................................................................................................... 90

63. Map showing locations of time-series points (numbered red triangles) on the California coast near the 

 Port of Los Angeles. ................................................................................................................................. 91
ix

64. Time-series plots of modeled water level and velocity at the selected locations on the California coast .... 

 near Los Angeles. ................................................................................................................................... 94

65. Maps showing modeled flow depths from the scenario tsunami in Los Angeles Harbor with different 

 values of the Manning coefficient. ........................................................................................................... 96

66. Maps showing inundation and flow depths in Los Angeles Harbor under two different scenarios. ......... 97

67. Map showing maximum predicted water surface elevation from the scenario tsunami, relative to mean 

 high water datum, for Ventura harbor. .................................................................................................... 101

68. Map showing maximum predicted tsunami-induced currents (knots; 1 knot = 0.51 m/s) for Ventura 

 Harbor. ................................................................................................................................................... 102

69. Map showing maximum predicted tsunami-induced currents (knots; 1 knot = 0.51 m/s) for San Diego 

 Harbor. .................................................................................................................................................. 104

70. Map showing maximum predicted tsunami-induced currents (knots) for the Port of Los Angeles. ........ 105

71. Map showing maximum predicted tsunami-induced currents (knots) for the Port of Long Beach. ......... 106

72. Graphs comparing measured and simulated dam-break flows over a movable bed at different elapse 

 time after dam break. x=0: position of dam. Elevation = 0: initial bed surface elevation. ....................... 109

73. Diagrammatic cross section showing experimental setup for breaking solitary waves on a sloping sand 

beach. ..................................................................................................................................................... 110

74. Graphs comparing measured and calculated beach profiles for Kobyashi test. .................................... 110

75. Graphs comparing experimental (Exp.) and numerical (Num.) simulated temporal free surface elevations 

 at different locations (gauges G1 to G8) during the fifth wave in the simulated erosion of a beach profile. 

 ............................................................................................................................................................... 111

76. Diagrams showing side view (a) and plan view (b) of the experimental setup of a dam-break flow 

 through a partial breach over a moveable bed. ...................................................................................... 112

77. Graphs comparing measured (Exp) and calculated (Num) bottom profiles in the case of the partially 

 breached dam-break test (Xiao and others, 2010). ................................................................................ 113

78. Graphs comparing measured (Exp) and calculated (Num) (with backscatter model) bottom profiles in 

the case of the partially breached dam-break test . ..................................................................................... 113

79. Changes in bottom bathymetry from tsunami-induced currents in Santa Cruz Harbor, California. ....... 114

Tables

1. Model and material properties for all simulations in this study. .................................................................... 14

2. Initial shear stress τo, initial normal stress σo, the static friction coefficient μs, the dynamic friction .............. 

 coefficient μd, and the strengthening friction coefficient μd (strength) (if applicable) for all four models in .... 

 this study. ..................................................................................................................................................... 14

3. Maximum vertical free-surface displacements Zmax and average fault slip <S> for all four models in this 

 study. ........................................................................................................................................................... 17

4. Longitude and latitude of the boundaries of coarse and 1st nested grid ..................................................... 44

5. Longitude and latitude of the boundaries of the 2nd order grid (4.8 arcsec) ............................................... 44

6. Longitude and latitude of the boundaries of the highest resolution grids (.96 arcsec) ................................. 44

7. Slip amount (in meters) on each subfault segment of the original source model. ....................................... 63

8. A 16-segment subfault comprising 4-segment average slip amounts from the 64-segment model. ............ 64

9. An ad-hoc, trial and error, modified version of the 16-segment fault model used for the simulations. . ....... 65

10. Fault parameters for the 16-segment source based on the NOAA-ComMIT propagation database. ........ 66

11. Nested grids used to compute propagation of tsunamis generated along the Alaska Peninsula to the ....... 

 Port of Los Angeles. ................................................................................................................................... 88

12. Locations where the simulated water level and velocity in the scenario tsunami are recorded. ................ 95
x 

13. Differences in assumptions under the three considered tsunami scenarios: ............................................. 97
Modeling for the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario—Generation, Propagation, Inundation, 

and Currents in Ports and Harbors

By the SAFRR Tsunami Modeling Working Group1

Preface

By Eric L. Geist 

This U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Open-File report presents a compilation of tsunami 

modeling studies for the Science Application for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) tsunami scenario. These 

modeling studies are based on an earthquake source specified by the SAFRR tsunami source working 

group (Kirby and others, 2013). The modeling studies in this report are organized into three groups. The 

first group relates to tsunami generation. The effects that source discretization and horizontal 

displacement have on tsunami initial conditions are examined in section 1 (Whitmore and others). In 

section 2 (Ryan and others), dynamic earthquake rupture models are explored in modeling tsunami 

generation. These models calculate slip distribution and vertical displacement of the seafloor as a result 

of realistic fault friction, physical properties of rocks surrounding the fault, and dynamic stresses 

resolved on the fault. 

The second group of papers relates to tsunami propagation and inundation modeling. Section 3 

(Thio) presents a modeling study for the entire California coast that includes runup and inundation 

modeling where there is significant exposure and estimates of maximum velocity and momentum flux at 

the shoreline. In section 4 (Borrero and others), modeling of tsunami propagation and high-resolution 

inundation of critical locations in southern California is performed using the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Method of Splitting Tsunami (MOST) model and NOAA’s 

Community Model Interface for Tsunamis (ComMIT) modeling tool. Adjustments to the inundation line 

owing to fine-scale structures such as levees are described in section 5 (Wilson). 

The third group of papers relates to modeling of hydrodynamics in ports and harbors. Section 6 

(Nicolsky and Suleimani) presents results of the model used at the Alaska Earthquake Information 

Center for the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, as well as synthetic time series of the modeled 

tsunami for other selected locales in southern California. Importantly, section 6 provides a comparison 

of the effect of including horizontal displacements at the source described in section 1 and differences in 

 

1 Members of the working group (in alphabetical order): Bohyun Bahng (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 

West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center), José Borrero (University of Southern California and eCoast Ltd.), Eric L. 

Geist (U.S. Geological Survey; SAFRR Tsunami Modeling Coordinator), William Knight (National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration, West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center), Patrick Lynett (University of Southern 

California), Dmitry J. Nicolsky (Alaska Earthquake Information Center, Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska), David 

D. Oglesby (University of California Riverside), Kenny Ryan (University of California Riverside), Sangyoung Son 

(University of Southern California), Elena N. Suleimani (Alaska Earthquake Information Center, Geophysical Institute, 

University of Alaska), Costas Synolakis (University of Southern California and Hellenic Centre for Marine Research), Hong 

Kie Thio (URS Corporation), Vasily Titov (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Pacific Marine 

Environmental Laboratory), Paul Whitmore (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, West Coast and Alaska 

Tsunami Warning Center), and Rick Wilson (California Geological Survey).
2 

bottom friction on wave heights and inundation in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Modeling 

described in section 7 (Lynett and Son) uses a higher order physical model to determine variations of 

currents during the tsunami and complex flow structures such as jets and eddies. Section 7 also uses 

sediment transport models to estimate scour and deposition of sediment in ports and harbors—a 

significant effect that was observed in southern California following the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. 

Together, all of the sections in this report form the basis for damage, impact, and emergency 

preparedness aspects of the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 

Three sections of this report independently calculate wave height and inundation results using 

the source specified by Kirby and others (2013). Refer to figure 29 in section 3, figure 52 in section 4, 

and figure 62 in section 6. All of these results are relative to a mean high water (MHW) vertical datum. 

Slight differences in the results are observed in East Basin of the Port of Los Angeles, Alamitos Bay, 

and the Seal Beach National Wildlife Refuge. However, given that these three modeling efforts involved 

different implementations of the source, different numerical wave propagation and runup models, and 

slight differences in the digital elevation models (DEMs), the similarity among the results is remarkable. 

1. Effects of Subfault Discretization and Horizontal Displacement on Tsunami 

Generation

By Paul Whitmore, Bohyun Bahng, and William Knight

Vertical Deformation Summation Effect Induced by Abruptly Changing Fault Dip

A common practice in tsunami modeling is to break a fault source up into multiple subfaults and then 

use the Okada static dislocation formulae to compute the vertical displacement from each subfault and 

sum these together to determine the total uplift. A potential problem with this approach is noted when 

the dip angle changes abruptly between subfaults located updip or downdip from each other. The effect 

is for the trough produced by the updip subfault to decrease the uplift produced by the downdip 

subfault. An abrupt change in dip likely does not represent the actual situation; a smoothly varying dip 

would reproduce the event uplift more realistically. 

The 2014 Alaska Peninsula tsunami scenario (Kirby and others, 2013) was examined to see 

whether the abrupt change in dips influenced the resultant uplift. The 64 subfaults as defined by Kirby 

and others were first used to compute static vertical displacement in the traditional manner. Figure 1 

shows this uplift. 

The 64 subfaults used in the 2014 scenario are approximately 50 km long by 25 km wide 

(downdip). They are arranged in 8 rows with 8 subfaults in each row, producing approximately a 400-

km-long by 200-km-wide source zone. To test the influence of abrupt dip changes in the downdip 

direction, each subfault is divided into 5 units approximately 50 km long by 5 km wide (320 subfaults 

total). A spline fit is used to compute the subfault dips respecting the original dips. That is, each subfault 

(50 km x 5 km) is assigned a dip that smoothly interfaces with the next downdip subfault. The vertical 

displacement is computed for each of the 320 subfaults and summed. Figure 2 shows the summation 

based on the 320 subfaults with smoothly varying dips from farthest updip to farthest downdip subfault. 

Figure 3 shows the difference between the traditional approach of summing up 64 subfaults (fig. 

1) and the smoothly dipping approach (fig. 2). Note that the uplift in figure 2 has a longer spatial period 

and that figure 3 shows significant differences between the two approaches. 
3 

Figure 1. Map-view diagram showing vertical displacement (Z, in meters) in the 2014 tsunami scenario computed 

at the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WCATWC) based on 64-subfault summation. 

Degrees of longitude and latitude indicated for horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. 

Figure 2. Map-view diagram showing vertical displacement (Z, in meters) in the 2014 tsunami scenario computed 

at WCATWC based on smoothed subfault dips and a splitting of each subfault into fifths (5 km x 50 km 

subfaults). Degrees of longitude and latitude indicated for horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. 
4 

Figure 3. Map-view diagram showing difference in vertical displacement (Z, in meters) between the original 64 

subfault source and the 320 subfault source with smoothly varying dip. Degrees of longitude and latitude 

indicated for horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. 

Influence of Initial Sea Level Profile by Horizontal Slip over Sloping Seafloor 

Another factor not normally considered in determining sea-floor uplift given earthquake fault 

parameters is the contribution of the horizontal component of slip over an inclined seafloor. Several 

studies have shown that this contribution can be significant where the seafloor is inclined. We examine 

the 2014 tsunami exercise source to determine if the horizontal component of slip is important when 

determining sea-floor uplift. 

Figure 4 shows the sea-floor uplift using the 320 source zones of figure 2 and adding the vertical 

uplift induced by horizontal slip over inclined sea-floor surfaces. Note that the impact of including this 

type of motion is significant over the continental slope (which in this case happens to be where most of 

the horizontal motion occurs). The pixilation of this figure relates to the bathymetric data increment (5 

feet, 1.52 m) on which the horizontal slip influence was computed. While this is fairly coarse, the 

overall level of uplift is significantly greater when including this component. Note the difference in 

scale between figure 4 and figure 2. Figure 5 shows the difference between figures 2 and 4; that is, the 

vertical motion induced by horizontal slip. In this case, the induced vertical motion exceeds 8 m in some 

areas and will likely be an important factor to take into account when numerically generating the 

tsunami. 
5 

Figure 4. Map-view diagram showing total sea-floor vertical movement (Z, in meters) for the 2014 tsunami 

exercise computed using a smoothly varying dip on 320 source blocks and including vertical uplift induced by 

horizontal motion over sloping seafloor. Pixilation caused by grid increment used in the bathymetry data. 

Degrees of longitude and latitude indicated for horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. 

Figure 5. Map-view diagram showing vertical sea-floor motion (Z, in meters) induced by horizontal slip over 

sloping seafloor. Pixilation caused by grid increment used in the bathymetry data. Degrees of longitude and 

latitude indicated for horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. 
6 

2. Modeling Sea-Floor Deformation and Tsunami Generation using Dynamic 

Finite Element Analysis

By Kenny Ryan, David D. Oglesby, and Eric L. Geist 

Abstract

Motivated by the 2011 M9 Tohoku earthquake and potential earthquakes on the AlaskanAleutian megathrust, we use computational simulations to investigate the effects of fault-rupture 

dynamics on slip, free surface deformation, and resulting tsunami formation from scenario M9.1 

megathrust earthquakes. Unlike static dislocation models, dynamic models account for the force that the 

entire fault system exerts on each individual element of the model for each time step, so that earthquake 

rupture takes a path that is consistent with the physics of the model. To isolate the effects of different 

physical variables, we model four different dynamic rupture scenarios: a spatially homogenous 

prestress and frictional parameter scenario, two scenarios with rate-strengthening-like friction (for 

example, Dieterich, 1992), and one scenario with spatially heterogeneous prestress. Given geometric, 

material, and plate-coupling data along the Alaska-Aleutian megathrust assembled from the Science 

Application for Risk Reduction team (SAFRR) (Bruns and others, 1987; Johnson and Satake, 1994; 

Santini and others, 2003; Wells and others, 2003; Wells and others, 2011; Hayes and others, 2012), we 

are able to dynamically model rupture of an M9.1 earthquake. The homogeneous model shows an 

average fault slip of 18.6 m, with the same seismic moment as the source model used by the SAFRR 

team to investigate large-scale effects on western U.S. coastlines from a tsunami generated along the 

Alaskan-Aleutian subduction zone, and a maximum vertical free surface displacement of 5.77 m. 

However, adding a frictional strengthening zone to an along-strike region of the fault reduces average 

fault slip to 14.6 m and the maximum vertical free surface displacement to 5.74 m, while significantly 

reducing the maximum free surface displacement in the area updip from the strengthening zone. Adding 

a frictional strengthening zone to an updip region of the fault reduces average fault slip to 10.4 m and 

the maximum vertical free surface displacement to 2.86 m, while significantly reducing the maximum 

free surface displacement over the entire megathrust. A model with heterogeneous prestress results in a 

more heterogeneous slip distribution, relative to the homogeneous model; this slip distribution 

qualitatively matches the slip distribution of the source model used by the SAFRR team. The 

heterogeneous prestress model has the same average fault slip as the homogeneous model and a 

maximum vertical free surface displacement of 7.04 m. Corresponding tsunami models, which use a 

finite difference method to solve linear long-wave equations (Shuto, 1991; Satake, 2002), match 

temporally evolving seafloor deformation to the free surface deformation from the rupture simulations. 

Tsunami models show reduced peak amplitudes in the area above the frictional-strengthening zones, 

relative to the homogeneous case. A tsunami resulting from a heterogeneous fault prestress model 

results in peak amplitudes immediately above the hanging wall that are spatially more varied than in the 

homogeneous model, but the overall beaming pattern and maximum amplitudes along the local coasts 

are similar. All tsunami models also show the resultant gravity wave from the breakout of the 

earthquake rupture to the seafloor (Oglesby and others, 2000). Tsunamis generated along the AlaskaAleutian megathrust offshore of the Alaska Peninsula could have large adverse effects on Pacific coasts 

(Ryan and others, 2012).
7 

Introduction

Megathrust earthquakes in subduction zones are known generators of large, transoceanic 

tsunamis (for example, Kanamori, 1972). Ryan and others (2012) demonstrated that a tsunami resulting 

from a large megathrust earthquake on the Alaskan-Aleutian subduction zone (their figure 1) would 

propagate across the Pacific Ocean and strike the U.S west coast, potentially causing significant damage 

to ports and other populated areas. Because of its earthquake and tsunami hazards, the Alaskan-Aleutian 

subduction zone has been well studied seismically and geodetically (for example, Freymueller and 

others, 2008). Using Global Positioning System (GPS) measurements, Freymueller and Beavan (1999) 

show that the western Shumagin segment of the Alaskan-Aleutian subduction zone is creeping (figure 1 

of Ryan and others, 2012). They further suggest that the entire downdip extent of this section of the 

megathrust may be unlocked and thus slipping at the local plate-convergence rate. Surface deformation 

along the Alaskan-Aleutian megathrust is a complex process that results from different mechanisms, 

including postseismic deformation, spatial variations in plate coupling, and movement of large crustal 

blocks (Freymueller and others, 2008). Additionally, Freymueller and others (2008) find that both the 

width of the seismogenic zone and the distribution of locked and creeping zones vary substantially 

along strike throughout the Alaskan-Aleutian subduction zone. 

The distribution of locked and creeping sections along subduction zones is important for tsunami 

generation and coastline inundation. Kanamori (1972) notes that sediments in the trench could help 

produce a mechanism for some tsunami earthquakes—earthquakes that cause relatively small ground 

shaking but larger than expected tsunamis. Specifically, sediments could alter the frictional properties of 

the fault, making it a locally creeping (stable sliding) section, as well as producing slower rupture 

propagation during earthquakes. Hyndman and others (1997) point out that stable sliding regions can be 

caused by unconsolidated sediments in the updip section and by either high temperature or hydrated 

serpentinite at depth—and that global seismogenic zones typically lie at depths between 10 km and 40 

km., For 525 earthquakes around the circum-Pacific, including earthquakes along the Alaskan-Aleutian 

subduction zone, Bilek and Lay (2002) show longer rupture durations for shallow (<15 km) thrust 

events than for deeper (>15 km) thrust events. Furthermore, they suggest that conditionally stable and 

fully stable sliding zones located on the most updip section of a thrust fault can slow rupture velocity 

and increase duration.

Dynamic rupture models of dip-slip faults are extremely helpful in understanding the free 

surface deformation that leads to tsunami generation. Specifically, using sea-floor deformation from 

rupture dynamics as time-dependent boundary conditions for tsunami generation may provide insight 

into tsunami formation and local propagation. Standard dislocation models use a static slip distribution 

to model the resulting tsunami (Okada, 1985), whereas for dynamic models the slip distribution is not 

known beforehand but is rather a calculated result of the model. Dynamic models can validate existing 

dislocation models by using realistic friction parameterizations and fault geometry to match the slip 

distribution of the dislocation model and to analyze the resulting tsunami in time. Although dynamic 

modeling cannot replace the utility of standard dislocation modeling, it can be a useful complement. 

Numerical and experimental models show that dip-slip faults exhibit normal stress fluctuations 

from seismic-wave reflections off the free surface (Brune, 1996; Nielsen, 1998; Oglesby and others, 

1998; Oglesby and Archuleta, 2000; Oglesby and others, 2000). For nonvertical dip-slip faults, the free 

surface allows seismic waves to reflect back and hit the fault again, altering the stress field on the fault 

near the free surface. Oglesby and others (1998) show that as rupture approaches the free surface along 

a thrust/reverse fault, there is an increase in normal stress ahead of the crack tip and a decrease in 

normal stress behind the crack tip; this effect leads to amplified fault motion near the surface (relative to 

a normal or strike-slip fault rupture). Furthermore, when rupture travels updip along a dip-slip fault and 
8 

reaches the free surface, it produces a breakout phase (a slip pulse traveling back downdip) and a strong 

Rayleigh wave traveling along the surface (Burridge and Halliday, 1971; Oglesby and others, 1998), 

with reverse/thrust faults having stronger breakout phases than normal or strike-slip faults. The particle 

displacement is also greatly enhanced on the hanging wall relative to the footwall. In agreement with 

numerical models, Brune’s (1996) laboratory foam-block thrust models also produce these effects. 

Enhanced slip near the trench is capable of generating larger amplitude tsunamis than equivalent slip at 

depth (Geist, 1999; Geist and Bilek, 2001; Geist, 2002). 

In the first part of this work, we use the dynamic finite element code FaultMod (Barall, 2008) to 

show that simple slip-weakening friction (see, for example, Ida, 1972) can serve as a very accurate 

proxy for rate-strengthening friction as derived from the rate-state framework (Dieterich, 1978, 1979; 

Ruina, 1980, 1983; Linker and Dieterich, 1992). With this approach to friction thus validated, we then 

use the dynamic finite element code EQDyna (Duan and Oglesby, 2006) to model 3-D ruptures, using 

time-weakening friction (Andrews, 2004), along a megathrust approximating a portion of the AlaskanAleutian subduction zone. In order to model megathrust faults more realistically, it is important to 

simulate unstable and stable sliding zones (for example, outer boundaries of seismogenic zones); such 

models typically use a rate- and state-dependent (RS) friction parameterization (see, for example, 

Hyndman and others, 1997; Scholz, 1998) to capture the physics of slip under varying degrees of 

frictional stability. In particular, an increase in the steady-state friction coefficient with slip rate can 

characterize the stable sliding zones that border the seismogenic zones. 

The general form of RS friction is (Dieterich, 1978, 1979; Ruina, 1980, 1983): 

 (1) 

where μo represents a constant reference value for the coefficient of friction; a and b are constitutive 

parameters estimated from laboratory experiments; Vo and θo are reference values for slip rate and the 

state of the sliding surface, respectively, such that when V = Vo and θ = θo the friction coefficient is μo; θ

abstractly represents the average age of contacts at some sliding velocity; and σeff is the effective normal 

stress. Within the RS formulation, a positive rate-strengthening parameter (a–b), where a and b are 

experimentally determined (Dieterich, 1978, 1979) through observed stress drop, indicates velocity 

strengthening or stable slip, and a negative parameter indicates velocity weakening or the potential for 

unstable slip. For reverse/thrust faults it has been suggested that such rate-strengthening zones can 

simulate weak zones in the inner margin of the trenches, possibly characterized by large amounts of 

sediment. Sliding experiments on ultrafine-grained quartz (Chester and Higgs, 1992) suggest that rateweakening behavior occurs between 100 and 300 °C under wet conditions, while higher temperatures 

lead to a rate-strengthening parameter (a–b) of 0.03. Experiments on granite (Blanpied and others, 

1998) found rate-weakening at lower slip speeds (for example, 1 μm/s) with a rate-strengthening 

parameter of approximately 0.004 and rate-strengthening at higher slip speeds (for example, 1,000 

μm/s) with a rate-strengthening parameter of approximately 0.01. 

Real faults likely have heterogeneous stress regimes in addition to distributed frictionally stable 

and unstable sliding zones; these features can lead to complex stress interactions during rupture. In order 

to reproduce accurate slip distributions from real earthquakes, dynamic modeling studies incorporate 

heterogeneous prestress distributions (for example, Olsen and others, 1997; Peyrat and others, 2001; 

Guatteri and others, 2003; Olsen and others, 2009). However, the resulting total slip distributions 

typically are much smoother than prestress distributions, as a result of stress interactions from large 

portions of the fault slipping simultaneously. Beroza and Mikumo (1996) suggest that slip duration for a 

point on a fault can decrease in cases of high prestress heterogeneity through a self-healing mechanism. 

 

τ = μo + aln V

Vo

⎛

⎝

⎜

⎞

⎠

⎟ + bln θ

θ o

⎛

⎝

⎜

⎞

⎠

⎟

⎡

⎣

⎢

⎤

⎦

⎥σeff
9 

Thus, modeling earthquakes with heterogeneous prestress should result in both heterogeneous rupture 

propagation (that is, highly variable rupture speed) and heterogeneous slip distributions. 

Tsunami generation and propagation are influenced by the slip distribution, geometry, and 

material properties along the tsunami-generating fault (Geist, 1999; Geist and Dmowska, 1999; Geist 

and Bilek, 2001; Geist, 2002). These studies indicate that slip distribution near the trench most 

significantly affects tsunami generation, amplitude, and local runup, versus slip distribution further 

downdip. Geist and Dmowska (1999) show that dip-directed slip variations affect the maximum 

amplitude and steepness of the local tsunami, whereas along-strike slip variations result in strike-parallel 

amplitude changes in the tsunami that are conserved during local propagation, altering the beaming 

pattern of the tsunami. Geist and Bilek (2001) point out that estimates of initial tsunami size depend on 

estimates of shear modulus variation with depth. They analyzed 360 circum-Pacific subduction zone 

earthquakes and found that in order to match observed source time functions, both a relative reduction 

in shear modulus and an increase in slip near the trench are needed. 

Additionally, megathrust earthquakes can incorporate complex slip distributions on multiple 

fault segments. Thrust events involving rupture of a splay fault can greatly affect the distribution of seafloor deformation and the resultant tsunami (Cummins and Kaneda, 2000). DeDontney and Rice (2012) 

suggest that the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami may have resulted from two major areas of uplift, the main 

thrust and a splay fault, and further note that splay faults with steeper dip angles require less slip to 

produce the same vertical sea-floor deformation as the main thrust fault. Whether or not a rupture can 

propagate onto a splay fault can depend on the dynamics of the earthquake (Wendt and others, 2009). 

Wendt and others (2009) dynamically modeled the time-dependent earthquake and tsunami generation 

process on a large thrust fault with a connected, steeper splay fault. They show that if a barrier is 

introduced on the main thrust fault, rupture can propagate onto the smaller splay fault and produce 

larger vertical sea-floor deformation and correspondingly larger (local) maximum tsunami wave heights. 

Method Part 1

In this study we simulate zones of weak fault coupling for an updip portion and for an alongstrike portion of the Alaska-Aleutian megathrust (fig. 7). Although the primary finite element method 

(FEM) code EQDyna (Duan and Oglesby, 2006) used in this study can model 3-D, shallow dipping, 

megathrust ruptures, it does not incorporate rate-state friction. Thus, in order to approximate ratestrengthening frictional properties from rate-state friction using a simple slip-weakening-type friction 

formulation (for example, time-weakening friction, Andrews, 2004), we test three different friction laws 

using a secondary 2-D FEM code FaultMod (Barall, 2008) that does incorporate rate-state friction in the 

form of linear slip-weakening (SW) friction and two forms of rate- and state-dependent friction: ageing 

law (RS-AL), and slip law (RS-SL). We use results from the secondary code FaultMod to model mode 

II (slip parallel to rupture propagation) dynamic rupture, with a frictional interface, along a planar fault 

in a whole space (fig. 6, top). Generally, finite element codes divide a given continuum of mass (for 

example, the Earth’s crust) into a number of elements that can then be used to run computations on 

applied forces, assuming elasticity and a frictional parameterization. FaultMod has been validated in 

Southern California Earthquake Center/U.S. Geological Survey (SCEC/USGS) rupture benchmark 

problems (Barall, 2009; Harris and others, 2009, 2011). The code incorporates artificial viscous 

damping (Dalguer and Day, 2007), as well as algorithmic damping to help damp spurious oscillations 

and energy-absorbing boundary conditions along the mesh edges to avoid artificial reflections from the 

model boundaries. 
10

Figure 6. Rupture tunneling through a strengthening zone. Top: Map view of a frictional-strengthening zone 

modeled in the middle of a homogeneous, planar, 2-D fault in a whole space using slip-weakening (SW), ratestate ageing law (RS-AL), and rate-state slip law (RS-SL) friction parameterizations in finite element code 

FaultMod. The red star denotes the nucleation zone (1.5 km radius). We increase the size of the strengthening 

zone, for each friction formulation, until rupture cannot tunnel through the entire strengthening zone. Bottom: 

Bar graph showing that SW (green) and RS-AL (blue) models tunnel through similar maximum-sized 

strengthening zones with equivalent slip-weakening distances (solid bars), while SW (green), RS-AL (blue), 

and RS-SL (red) models tunnel through similar maximum-sized strengthening zones with equivalent fracture 

energy (dashed bars). For our models, the condition for strengthening using slip-weakening friction is equation 

8.

The criterion for linear slip-weakening friction is as follows (Ida, 1972): 

 (2) 

where the friction coefficient μ drops from a static value to a dynamic value over a slip-weakening 

distance do. 

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Strengthening Zone Length (km)

Rupture through Strengthening Zone

SW





Fault

strengthening zone

(mapview) 5 km

40 km

 

μ =

μd − μs

do

dδ + μs , dδ < do

 μd , dδ ≥ do

⎧

⎨

⎪

⎩

⎪
11

Following Barall (2009), we use a modified form of the bracketed term in equation 1 that does 

not become singular for very small slip velocities: 

 (3) 

This form of the RS law closely approximates equation 1 for slip velocities of seismological interest. 

Note that the right hand side of equation 3 has the form of the effective friction coefficient in equation 1 

with ψ = bln(θ/θo), or conversely, θ = θoexp(ψ/b). Conceptually, ψ represents the strength of contacts. 

For the RS-AL, the state variable evolves according to the equation: 

 (4) 

In the RS-SL, the state variable evolves according to the equation: 

 (5) 

Both the RS-AL (equation 4) and the RS-SL (equation 5) reduce to the standard formula for steady-state 

sliding: 

 (6) 

Rupture is constrained to take place on a 40-km fault (fig. 6, top). We add a frictional-strengthening 

zone to the center of the fault. For the rate-state simulations this is a rate-strengthening zone governed 

by the steady state equation: 

 (7) 

such that when constitutive parameter b is larger than constitutive parameter a, the steady state friction 

value decreases as velocity increases, and thus this represents a velocity-weakening zone. However, 

when constitutive parameter b is smaller than constitutive parameter a, the steady state friction value 

increases with increasing velocity, and this represents a velocity-strengthening zone. Dieterich (1978, 

1979) experimentally determined a and b values to be on the order of 0.01; we use values of 0.008 and 

0.012 for parameters a and b, respectively, to simulate rate-weakening. We use values of 0.016 and 

0.012 for parameters a and b, respectively, to represent a region of rate-strengthening. The length of 

strengthening zone is variable and allows us to determine the maximum length of strengthening zone 

that rupture can tunnel through for each of the three friction laws. We find that the friction coefficients 

in linear slip-weakening (SW) friction can be tuned to match the rate-state models, so that each friction 

law tunnels through a similar-sized strengthening zone. Specifically, by analyzing stress-versus-slip 

weakening curves for the rate-state models within the rate-strengthening zones and within the rateweakening zones (black segments in figure 6), we tune μs and μd so that the three friction laws have 

similar weakening curves. For equivalent slip-weakening distances, both SW friction and RS-AL 

models can tunnel through similar-sized strengthening zone lengths (fig. 6, bottom) and result in similar 

slip distributions. We note that the relatively nonlinear RS-SL tunnels though larger strengthening zones

but that, with equivalent fracture energy (Andrews, 1976; Guatteri and Spudich, 2000), all three models 

 

μ = arcsinh V

2Vo

exp μo +ψ

a

⎛

⎝

⎜ ⎞

⎠

⎟ ⎡

⎣

⎢

⎤

⎦

⎥ ≈ μo + aln V

Vo

⎛

⎝

⎜ ⎞

⎠

⎟ +ψ

 

dθ

dt = −1θss

( ) θ −θss

 

dψ

dt = −V

L ( ) ψ −ψss

 

ψss = −bln V

Vo

⎛

⎝

⎜

⎞

⎠

⎟

 

dμss

dlnV = a − b
12

tunnel through similar-sized zones and result in similar slip distributions. The general equation required 

by SW friction to match RS formulations in the strengthening zone is: 

 (8) 

where τo is the initial shear stress, μd is the dynamic friction coefficient, and σo is the initial normal 

stress. Thus, we have found a useful approximation for rate-strengthening friction using a simpler slipweakening formulation. Note that this not the same as slip-hardening, which requires the dynamic 

friction coefficient to be larger than the static friction coefficient. In this study, we simulate ratestrengthening behavior by altering μd within the strengthening zones. Under our configuration, shear 

stress will ultimately increase with slip, assuming no normal stress change. However, dip-slip faults 

involve dynamic normal stress fluctuations, including reductions that could result in a shear stress drop 

even in the presence of rate-strengthening. 

Method Part 2

In this study we use the 3-D finite element method (FEM) code EQDyna (Duan and Oglesby, 

2006) to model mode II dynamic rupture, with a frictional interface along a megathrust intersecting the 

free surface (fig. 7, top), and the corresponding free surface deformation. Rupture is constrained to take 

place only on the fault. The megathrust is 358 km along strike, 205.1 km downdip, and 35.6 km in 

depth, with a constant dip angle of 10o (as determined by the Earthquake Source working group in the 

SAFRR scenario). EQDyna also has been validated in SCEC/USGS rupture benchmark problems 

(Harris and others, 2009, 2011). The code incorporates artificial damping (Duan and Day, 2008) to help 

reduce spurious oscillations. Additionally, we implement a large enough buffer around the fault so that a 

P-wave cannot travel to the edge of the model and back to the fault within the model duration, 200 

seconds. We consider fault ruptures with model and material properties given in tables 1 and 2. 

We note that the nucleation zone (shown as a red star in figure 8) used in all models in this study 

has a radius of 16 km (as indicated by table 1). The nucleation zone is small relative to the size of the 

modeled megathrust and does not significantly affect the overall slip distribution in our models; for 

example, there are no obvious asymmetric slip patterns (for example, large amount of slip) near or 

around the nucleation zone in figure 11. Additionally, we implement a finite element size of 

approximately 2 km along the modeled fault. Decreasing the element size for our full model is not 

possible because of computational limitations. However, we have tested smaller fault models (34 km 

along strike and 20 km downdip)—with the same homogeneous input parameters used in this study—to 

determine whether our results are grid dependent. We found similar slip distributions, slip rates, and 

rupture velocities for these smaller earthquake models using 0.5-km, 1-km, 1.5-km, and 2-km element 

sizes. We therefore believe that a 2-km element size is reasonable and appropriate in this study of a 

much larger modeled fault, although we cannot directly test this. 

 

τ o < μdσ o
13

Figure 7. Model approximation to a section of the Alaska-Aleutian megathrust. Top: Cartoon block diagram of 

fault geometry of the hanging wall using 3-D finite element code EQDyna (Duan and Oglesby, 2006). We use a 

planar fault geometry with a constant dip of 10o, an along-strike distance of 358 km, a depth of 35.6 km, and a 

downdip distance of 205.1 km. The fault intersects the free surface. Each element along the fault surface is 

approximately 2 km along strike and 2 km downdip. Additionally, we implement a buffer zone around the fault 

to ensure waves do not reflect off the model boundary and return to the fault. Bottom: Map showing geographic 

region of interest with the section of the Alaska-Aleutian megathrust we are approximating (image from 

Earthquake Source working group in the SAFRR scenario) 

10°

205.1 km

358 km

35.6 km

Hanging Wall Geometry

Nucleation Epicenter
14

Table 1. Model and material properties for all simulations in this study. 

[km, kilometer; m, meter; GPa, gigapascal; s, second]

Density 2670 kg/m3

Shear Modulus 40.00 GPa

Bulk Modulus 66.67 GPa

S-wave speed 3.871 km/s

P-wave speed 6.704 km/s

Fault Area 73,426 km2

Nucleation Depth 15.50 km

Nucleation Radius 16.00 km

Nucleation Speed 2.000 km/s

Nucleation Location (along strike) 22.38 km

Nucleation Location (downdip) -89.26 km

Element Size (along fault) ≈2 km

Time Step 0.01 s

Distance Along-Strike 358.0 km

Distance Downdip 205.1 km

Dip Angle 10°

to 2.600 s

Hydrodynamic Grid Size 2 km

Hydrodynamic Time Step 0.1 s

Table 2. Initial shear stress τo, initial normal stress σo, the static friction coefficient μs, the dynamic friction 

coefficient μd, and the strengthening friction coefficient μd (strength) (if applicable) for all four models in this 

study. 

[MPA, megapascals]

τ o [MPa] σo [MPa] μs μd μd (strength)

Homogeneous Prestress/Friction 3.172 11.06 0.5630 0.1333

West Frictional-strengthening 3.172 11.06 0.5630 0.1333 0.3218

Updip Frictional-strengthening 3.172 11.06 0.5630 0.1333 0.3218

Heterogeneous Prestress 0 – 24.26 1.090 – 84.60 0.5630 0.1333

For simplicity we use a homogeneous material structure with average midcrustal material 

properties (see, for example, Harris and others, 2009), although future models may incorporate 3-D 

material structure heterogeneity. We use a time-weakening friction law (Andrews, 2004; Duan and Day, 

2008), in which the stress at a point drops from its static to sliding frictional level over a characteristic 

time. This friction law produces behavior similar to that of slip-weakening friction, with an effective 

slip-weakening distance do that is proportional to the square root of rupture velocity multiplied by the 

distance rupture has propagated: 

 (9) 

where Δτ is the stress drop, G is the shear modulus, Vrupt is the rupture velocity, to is the time over which 

the friction coefficient drops from its static value to its dynamic value, L is the distance rupture has 

€

do ∝ Δτ

G

Vrupt toL

k
15

propagated, and the value of k depends on the shape of the stress-slip weakening curve. As 

recommended by Andrews (2004), we use a time-weakening value to that is the amount of time it would 

take for an S-wave to traverse more than three elements (we use five elements) along the fault interface. 

This parameterization allows us to achieve accuracy and smoothness of the breakdown zone as the 

rupture front increases in speed and amplitude away from the nucleation zone. As noted above, the 

computer code EQDyna does not incorporate rate- and state-dependent friction, so we use timeweakening friction with equation 8 as a proxy for rate-strengthening-like zones. 

In this study we use four different rupture models: a spatially constant prestress and frictional 

coefficient model (hereinafter referred to as the homogeneous model), two models with frictionalstrengthening zones, and a spatially heterogeneous prestress model. For frictional-strengthening zone 

models, we use equation 8 with time-weakening friction to simulate rate-strengthening-like zones on 

updip and along-strike portions of the megathrust (fig. 8; see table 2 for friction coefficients). 

Specifically, we implement frictional-strengthening zones in either the westernmost portion of the fault 

(100 km to 179 km along strike) or the most updip portion of the fault (0 km to −50 km downdip). As an 

example of how time-weakening in these models corresponds to either rate-weakening or ratestrengthening, figure 9 shows stress-slip weakening curves for a point in a frictional-weakening zone 

and a point in a frictional-strengthening zone for the western frictional-strengthening zone model 

(locations marked in figure 13). There is a clear stress drop from the initial stress in the weakening zone 

and a stress increase in the strengthening zone. However, we note that a stress increase is not required 

for all points in our frictional-strengthening zone, because large dynamic reductions in normal stress can 

still result in a shear stress drop during sliding. For the heterogeneous prestress model, we divide the 

fault into 64 subfault sections, each section with a different prestress. The objective of this model is to 

qualitatively match the slip distribution used by the Earthquake Source working group within the 

SAFRR Tsunami Scenario team (Kirby and others, 2013). Previous studies show that scaling the 

prestress distribution in dynamic earthquake models is one way to match observed slip distributions (for 

example, Olsen and others, 1997; Olsen and others, 2009). 
16

Figure 8. Cross-sectional diagrams illustrating two models with frictional-strengthening zones in (top) the 

westernmost portion and (bottom) the most up-dip portion of the fault. Note that the point of view is from above 

the hanging wall, perpendicular to the fault surface. Stars indicate the nucleation zone, which is at the same 

location for all models. The strengthening areas are 16,203 km2 and 17,900 km2 for the top and bottom 

models, respectively. See table 2 for frictional coefficients. 

Figure 9. Graphs of shear stress versus slip for a point in the weakening zone (red, left) and a point in the 

strengthening zone (blue, right), using time-weakening friction to model a 3-D megathrust earthquake within the 

Alaskan-Aleutian subduction zone. Point locations are marked by red and blue stars in figure 13 (3rd panel 

down). Results show a decrease in shear stress within the frictional-weakening zone, and an increase in shear 

stress in the frictional-strengthening zone. Note that shear stress depends on both friction coefficient and 

normal stress during sliding. 













Downdip [km]




	

Western

Frictional-

-Frictional-Weakening Strengthening













Downdip [km]




	

Updip-Frictional-Strengthening

-Frictional-Weakening

South

0 1 2 3 4

2

3

4

5

6

 Slip [m]

Shear Stress [MPa]

	



0 1 2 3 4

2

3

4

5

6

 Slip [m]

Shear Stress [Mpa]

	





17

A dynamic finite element code does not just produce a rupture pattern on a fault; it also produces 

the full wave field and surface deformation. After dynamically modeling earthquake rupture, we feed 

the resulting time-dependent free surface (that is, seafloor) displacements into a hydrodynamic code 

using a 2-D finite difference method to solve linear long wave equations (Shuto, 1991; Satake, 2002). In 

this way, we can model the generation of a tsunami from our dynamic earthquake models. Specifically, 

time dependent 3-D sea-floor deformation from our earthquake models are used as a time-dependent 

boundary condition for our hydrodynamic models, assuming that the water surface is displaced by the 

combined effects from vertical and horizontal sea-floor displacement (Tanioka and Satake, 1996). The 

leap-frog, finite-difference method of computing of tsunami propagation, described by Satake (2007), is 

used with the ETOPO1 digital elevation model (http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/global/global.html). 

Incorporation of both dynamic codes allows us to simulate tsunami formation and local propagation in 

time. Hydrodynamic model parameters are given in table 1. 

Results

In this study we focus on rupture dynamics, fault slip distribution, free surface deformation, and 

the resulting tsunami for four different models: a homogeneous set of prestress and frictional 

conditions, a western frictional-strengthening zone, an updip frictional-strengthening zone, and a 

heterogeneous prestress condition (figs. 8 through 22). Both the homogeneous and heterogeneous 

prestress models match the seismic moment of the dislocation model determined by the Earthquake 

Source working group within the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario team. For each model, differences in the 

rupture dynamics ultimately result in different tsunami formations, local maximum water wave 

amplitudes, and tsunami beaming patterns. We note two key parameters for each model: the maximum 

vertical free surface displacement Zmax and the average fault slip <S> (table 3), which affect maximum 

tsunami height and the initial tsunami height distribution. 

Table 3. Maximum vertical free-surface displacements Zmax and average fault slip <S> for all four models in this 

study. 

Model Zmax [m] <S> [m]

Homogeneous Prestress/Friction 5.77 18.6

West Frictional-strengthening 5.74 14.6

Updip Frictional-strengthening 2.86 10.4

Heterogeneous Prestress 7.04 18.6

Homogeneous Stress and Friction

Figure 10 shows slip-rate snapshots of the homogeneous earthquake rupture at 27 s, 52 s, and 70 

s into the simulation. The fault experiences large slip rate pulses near the free surface due to dynamic 

unclamping of the fault and geometric asymmetry of the hanging wall/footwall (Brune, 1996; Nielsen, 

1998; Oglesby and others, 1998; Oglesby and Archuleta, 2000; Oglesby and others, 2000), resulting in a 

strong breakout phase and the generation of an oceanic Rayleigh wave. Rupture proceeds over the entire 

fault zone. Fault slip and total vertical free surface deformation for the homogeneous model are shown 

in figure 11. The largest amount of slip is near the surface, corresponding to large vertical displacement 
18

on the surface near the fault trace. Average fault slip is 18.6 m, and maximum vertical surface 

displacement is 5.77 m. Figure 12 displays local peak tsunami amplitude, resulting from the 

homogeneous earthquake rupture model, in the geographic region of interest. Water height corresponds 

well with free surface deformation, and the largest tsunami amplitudes are located closest to the trench. 

In the model, the Shumagin Islands, Alaska Peninsula, and Kodiak Island are hit with particularly large 

wave heights from the local tsunami. The tsunami amplitude has a strong southward beaming effect, 

indicating potential damage to coastlines in Hawaii and the western United States as well as other 

coastlines around the Pacific rim in the simulation. 

Figure 10. Diagrammatic views of the fault surface showing snapshots of rupture propagation at 27, 512, and 70 s 

for a homogeneous model (spatially constant prestress, dip angle, and frictional coefficients). Colors represent 

slip rate in m/s. Rupture shows large slip rate pulses nearest the free surface. Rupture proceeds over the entire 

fault zone (entire region shown), beginning at the nucleation zone (indicated in figure 8). 
19

Figure 11. Diagrams showing fault slip (top) and total vertical free surface deformation (bottom) for the 

homogeneous model. The largest amount of slip is near the surface, corresponding to large vertical 

displacement on the surface near the fault trace. Average fault slip is 18.6 m, and maximum vertical surface 

displacement is 5.77 m. 
20

Figure 12. Map showing peak tsunami amplitudes (color scale in m) resulting from the homogeneous earthquake 

rupture model in the geographic region of interest. The white line represents the Aleutian Trench. Water height 

corresponds well with free surface deformation (fig. 11, bottom). The Shumagin Islands, Alaska Peninsula, and 

Kodiak Island are struck with particularly large water height from the local tsunami. Additionally, the tsunami 

amplitude has a strong southward beaming effect. 

Western Frictional-Strengthening Zone Rupture

The homogeneous model discussed above assumes homogeneous frictional conditions along the 

entire extent of the fault. Realistically, however, faults are likely heterogeneous in frictional properties 

as well as in their initial stress conditions. GPS data show an unlocked section of the fault bordering our 

study area to the west (Freymueller and Beavan, 1999; Freymueller and others, 2008). In an effort to 

incorporate a more realistic frictional regime, we implement a frictional-strengthening zone in the 

westernmost 79 km of the megathrust (fig. 8, top). Figure 13 shows slip-rate snapshots of rupture 

propagation for a model with such a western frictional-strengthening zone. This model shows large slip 

rate pulses nearest the free surface as in the homogeneous model; however, the strengthening zone 

diminishes the slip rate pulse significantly relative to the homogeneous model. Note the difference in 

North
21

slip rates in the two models at 70 seconds. Rupture proceeds over the entire fault, including through the 

strengthening zone. The largest slip in the strengthening zone occurs near the free surface, most likely 

because of dynamic unclamping and the geometric asymmetry near the free surface. We note that the 

extent that rupture can penetrate a frictional-strengthening zone depends on fault geometry, friction 

coefficients, initial stress regimes, and location of the nucleation zone. While a strengthening zone in 

principle releases no seismic energy, slip can still occur, and is driven by seismic energy released on 

other (weakening) parts of the fault. Figure 14 illustrates fault slip and total vertical free surface 

deformation for the western frictional-strengthening zone model. Average fault slip is decreased by 4 m 

(18.6 to 14.6 m), relative to the homogeneous model. Surface deformation is substantially decreased in 

the region above the strengthening zone, relative to the homogeneous model; however, the maximum 

vertical surface displacement is decreased only marginally (from 5.77 to 5.74 m). The local peak 

modeled tsunami amplitudes resulting from the western frictional-strengthening zone model are shown 

in figure 15. Water height corresponds well with vertical free surface deformation, with the largest 

tsunami amplitude distributed above the frictional-weakening zone. Converting a western portion of the 

fault to a frictional-strengthening zone greatly reduces tsunami amplitude locally north of the 

strengthening zone in the Shumagin Islands region of the heterogeneous model, and it redirects the 

beaming pattern of the basin-propagating (far-field) tsunami slightly in a counterclockwise direction, 

but with similar maximum amplitude, relative to the homogeneous model. 
22

Figure 13. Diagrammatic views of the fault surface showing snapshots of rupture propagation at 27, 52, and 70 s 

for a model with a frictional-strengthening zone from 100 to 179 km along-strike and over the entire downdip 

extent of the model (see fig. 8, top), motivated by GPS data showing an unlocked section of the fault that 

borders our study area to the west (Freymueller and Beavan, 1999). Colors represent slip rate in m/s. Rupture 

shows large slip rate pulses nearest the free surface; however, the strengthening zone diminishes the slip rate 

pulse substantially, relative to the homogeneous model. Note the difference in slip rate between this model and 

the homogeneous model at 70 seconds. Rupture proceeds over the entire strengthening zone. The red and 

blue stars correspond to the sampling points for the stress weakening plots in figure 9. 
23

Figure 14. Diagrams showing fault slip (top) and total vertical free surface deformation (bottom) for the western 

frictional-strengthening zone model. Average fault slip is decreased by 4 m (18.6 to 14.6 m) in the 

strengthening model, relative to the homogeneous model. Surface deformation is substantially decreased in 

the region above the strengthening zone, relative to the homogeneous model; however, the maximum vertical 

surface displacement is decreased marginally (5.77 to 5.74 m). 
24

Figure 15. Map showing peak tsunami amplitudes (color scale in m) resulting from the western frictionalstrengthening zone model. Water height corresponds well with free surface deformation (fig. 14, bottom). 

Converting a western portion of the fault to a frictional strengthening zone greatly reduces tsunami amplitudes 

locally above the strengthening zone in the Shumagin Islands region and alters the beaming pattern of the 

basin-propagating (far-field) tsunami to a more counterclockwise direction, relative to the homogeneous model. 

Also, peak amplitudes are reduced near the coasts of the Shumagin Islands. 
25

Updip Frictional-Strengthening Zone Rupture

It has been suggested that subduction zones can have frictional-strengthening regimes close to 

the trench due to material and frictional properties (for example, Kanamori, 1972; Hyndman and others, 

1997). As a first-order effort to model such a frictional regime, we implement a frictional-strengthening 

zone in the most updip 50 km of the megathrust (fig. 8, bottom). Figure 16 shows slip-rate snapshots for 

this model. In contrast to the models discussed above, the fault experiences its largest slip rate pulses 

~100 km downdip from the free surface, and the slip rate pulse is dramatically reduced over the entire 

fault relative to the homogeneous model. Note the difference in slip rate between the homogeneous and 

updip frictional-strengthening models at 52 and 70 seconds. Rupture proceeds over the entire fault, 

including through the strengthening zone. Within the strengthening zone, the largest slip rates occur 

along the free surface. Figure 17 displays fault slip and total vertical free surface deformation for the 

updip frictional-strengthening zone model. Average fault slip is decreased by 8.2 m (18.6 to 10.4 m) in 

the updip strengthening model, relative to the homogeneous model. Surface deformation is decreased 

broadly along the free surface, relative to the homogeneous model, and the maximum vertical surface 

displacement is decreased (5.77 to 2.86 m). Adding an updip frictional-strengthening zone reduces slip 

across the entire fault more than a western strengthening zone with similar area and the same frictional 

coefficients. Local peak tsunami amplitudes resulting from the updip frictional-strengthening zone 

model are shown in figure 18. Water height corresponds well with vertical free surface deformation, 

showing a broad decrease in the local maximum tsunami height compared to the homogeneous model. 

Adding a strengthening zone to the updip portion of the fault greatly reduces tsunami amplitudes locally 

above the strengthening zone near the trench, and it reduces the maximum amplitude of the southward 

beam but does not change the beam direction of the far-field tsunami, relative to the homogeneous 

rupture. 
26

Figure 16. Diagrammatic views of the fault surface showing snapshots of rupture propagation at 27, 52, and 70 s 

for a model with a frictional-strengthening zone from 0 to −50 km downdip and across the entire along-strike 

extent of the model (see fig. 8, bottom). Colors represent slip rate in m/s. Rupture shows largest slip rate 

pulses ~100 km downdip from the surface, and the slip rate pulse is dramatically reduced over the entire fault, 

relative to the homogeneous model. Note the difference in slip rate between this and the homogeneous models 

at 52 and 70 seconds. Rupture proceeds through the entire strengthening zone. 
27

Figure 17. Diagrams showing fault slip (top) and total vertical free surface deformation (bottom) for the updip 

frictional-strengthening zone model. Average fault slip is decreased by 8.2 m (18.6 to 10.4 m) in the 

strengthening model, relative to the homogeneous model. Surface deformation is decreased broadly along the 

free surface, relative to the homogeneous model, and the maximum vertical surface displacement is 

significantly decreased (5.77 to 2.86 m). Note that adding an updip strengthening zone reduces slip across the 

entire fault—much more so than a western strengthening zone with similar area. 
28

Figure 18. Map showing peak tsunami amplitude (color scale in m) resulting from the updip frictional-strengthening 

zone model. Water height corresponds well with free surface deformation (fig. 17, bottom). Adding a 

strengthening zone to the updip portion of the fault greatly reduces tsunami amplitude locally above the 

strengthening zone as well as broadly above the free surface, relative to the homogeneous model, and it 

reduces the amplitude of the far-field beaming pattern. In addition, peak amplitudes are substantially reduced 

near the coasts of the Shumagin Islands, the Alaska Peninsula, and Kodiak Island. 

Heterogeneous Prestress Rupture

The three models discussed above assume homogeneous prestress conditions along the entire 

extent of the fault. However, observational data imply that earthquakes typically have strongly 

heterogeneous slip distributions that further imply heterogeneous prestress (for example, Olsen and 

others, 1997). Indeed, the SAFRR tsunami models use a heterogeneous slip model stimulated by the 

2011 Tohoku-Oki event and supported by seismic, geodetic, and geologic data along the AlaskanAleutian subduction zone (Kirby and others, 2013). Figure 19 shows slip-rate snapshots of rupture 

propagation for a heterogeneous prestress model designed to qualitatively match the SAFRR dislocation 

model. As in the case of the homogeneous stress distribution, the fault experiences large slip-rate pulses 
29

nearest the free surface. However, because of some high-stress areas downdip, it also experiences high 

slip rates in other locations. Additionally, the main slip pulse is spatially heterogeneous; it does not have 

rough elliptical symmetry, reflecting a rupture speed that varies across the fault. Note the difference in 

slip rate between the homogeneous model and heterogeneous prestress model for each snapshot. 

Rupture proceeds over the entire fault zone for the heterogeneous prestress model. Figure 20 shows 

shear prestress and normal prestress distributions. The limiting values are shown in table 2. Figure 21 

displays the slip distribution used in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario (Kirby and others, 2013), as well as 

fault slip and total vertical free surface deformation for the dynamic heterogeneous prestress model. 

Average fault slip is the same as in the homogeneous model (18.6 m), and the maximum vertical surface 

displacement is increased (5.77 to 7.04 m), relative to the homogeneous model. The heterogeneous 

prestress leads to a more heterogeneous slip distribution and vertical free surface deformation, compared 

with the homogeneous model. The slip distribution model from the Earthquake Source working group 

within the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario (Kirby and others, 2013) and the slip distribution from the 

dynamic model are qualitatively similar, indicating that the slip distribution used by Kirby and others 

(2013) is self-consistent from a physical standpoint: it is possible to obtain such a slip distribution using 

relatively rigorous physics from a heterogeneous prestress pattern. The total slip distribution is spatially 

much smoother (fig. 21, middle) than our initial stress configurations. We note that tuning initial 

prestress to get a certain slip distribution is an iterative process, and that further tuning would likely 

result in a slip distribution more closely matched to the top panel in figure 21, but with gradually 

diminishing returns. Figure 22 shows local peak tsunami amplitudes resulting from the heterogeneous 

prestress model. Water height corresponds well with vertical free surface deformation, showing peak 

tsunami amplitudes above regions of the fault nearest the trench with maximum slip. Although the peak 

amplitudes immediately above the hanging wall are spatially more varied than in the homogeneous 

model, the overall beaming patterns and maximum amplitudes along the local coasts are similar. 
30

Figure 19. Diagrammatic views of the fault surface showing snapshots of rupture propagation at 27, 52, and 70 s 

for a heterogeneous prestress model. Colors represent slip rate in m/s. The fault experiences large slip rate 

pulses nearest the free surface and for some areas downdip (in contrast to the homogeneous model). Note the 

difference in slip rate between the homogeneous model and heterogeneous prestress model for each 

snapshot. Rupture proceeds over the entire fault zone. 
31

Figure 20. Diagrammatic views of the fault plane showing initial shear stress (top) and normal stress (bottom) for 

the heterogeneous prestress model. The limiting values of stress are shown in table 2. The total slip distribution 

is spatially much smoother (fig. 21, middle) than our initial stress configuration. 
32

Figure 21. Diagrams showing the slip distribution used in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario (top), as well as the fault 

slip (middle) and total vertical free surface deformation (bottom) for the dynamic heterogeneous prestress 

model. Average fault slip is the same as in the homogeneous model (18.6 m), and the maximum vertical 

surface displacement is increased (5.77 to 7.04 m) relative to the homogeneous model. The heterogeneous 

prestress leads to a more heterogeneous slip distribution and vertical free surface deformation, compared with 

the homogeneous model. The dynamic slip distribution (middle panel) qualitatively resembles the top panel. 
33

Figure 22. Map showing peak tsunami amplitudes (color scale in m) resulting from the heterogeneous prestress 

model. Although the peak amplitudes immediately above the hanging wall are spatially more variable than in 

the homogeneous model, the overall beaming patterns and amplitudes along the local coasts are similar. 

Discussion

The four earthquake rupture models in this study generate four different tsunami models along a 

portion of the Alaskan-Aleutian subduction zone. How a tsunami is locally generated in this region 

affects inundation and runup on local coasts (that is, Alaska Peninsula) and could affect propagation 

across the Pacific Ocean onto coastlines along the Pacific rim. For the homogeneous model, there are 

large slip pulses near the free surface (fig. 10) that result from the dynamic unclamping of the fault and 

the geometric asymmetry of the hanging wall/footwall. In turn, this effect results in large slip near the 

free surface and therefore large vertical free surface deformation near the trench (fig. 11). The 

consequent modeled tsunami most significantly propagates northward and southward into and from the 

Alaska Peninsula (fig. 12). A completely homogeneous prestress and frictional parameter earthquake 

rupture model that produces the largest slip near the trench has important implications for the resulting 
34

tsunami, because sea-floor displacement is most sensitive to fault slip near the trench (Okada, 1985). 

Large-amplitude tsunamis can be generated by slip distributions localized near the trench. 

Including a frictional-strengthening segment (emulating rate-strengthening behavior) along the 

Shumagin sector in the model significantly affects the slip distribution and initial tsunami wavefield. 

The rupture propagates through the entire strengthening zone, but with greatly reduced slip rate, and this 

effect reduces the overall average slip on the fault commensurately (figs. 13 and 14). The surface 

deformation is consequently scaled downward in this zone of lower slip. Importantly, the beaming 

pattern of the far-field tsunami is shifted for the western strengthening rupture, relative to the 

homogeneous rupture (fig. 15). Therefore, far-field tsunami propagation can shift, potentially changing 

inundation and runup on coastlines along the Pacific rim. It is interesting to note that the 

computationally simulated rupture can penetrate a strengthening zone that is as large as 80 km wide 

along strike. The dynamic reduction of normal stress due to the dip-slip geometry may facilitate this 

rupture propagation near the free surface. In other words, in our models time-dependent normal stress 

induced by the free surface allows thrust rupture to more easily penetrate a rate-strengthening region 

near the surface. This result raises the prospect that rupture might be able to propagate through such a 

zone into another frictional weakening zone in future earthquakes, generating a larger earthquake and 

tsunami. 

Including a frictional-strengthening segment updip near the trench also significantly affects the 

slip distribution and initial tsunami wavefield (figs. 16 through 18). Adding a strengthening zone updip 

affects average fault slip to a greater degree than does adding a strengthening zone along strike. Without 

a frictional-strengthening zone updip (for example, the homogeneous model), rupture propagates 

energetically updip, sending radiation to the entire fault, promoting slip. Because it prevents the strong 

seismic radiation from the most updip section of a thrust fault during rupture, a frictional-strengthening 

zone updip broadly effects the slip and slip rate for the rest of the fault. As a result, we see a broad 

decrease in maximum tsunami amplitude, but with a similar beaming pattern when compared to the 

homogeneous rupture. Slip distributions near the trench are known to be important for tsunami 

generation (Geist, 1999; Geist and Dmowska, 1999; Geist and Bilek, 2001; Geist, 2002). Our results 

show slowed rupture propagation in frictional-strengthening zones with a lower peak slip rate, but these 

zones still have significant slip in those regions. This result hints at a possible mechanism for tsunami 

earthquakes (Kanamori, 1972).

We note that adding a frictional-strengthening zone along strike or updip does not preclude the 

ruptures from having static stress drops, particularly in the case of thrust earthquakes (Oglesby and 

others, 1998). Static stress drop depends on the dynamics of the rupture. It is possible to obtain a stress 

drop in a frictional-strengthening zone because of a large free-surface-induced reduction in normal 

stress (Kozdon and Dunham, in press), since the sliding frictional resistance is equal to the friction 

coefficient multiplied by the normal stress. 

A heterogeneous prestress model significantly affects the slip distribution and initial tsunami 

wavefield, with the largest peak tsunami amplitudes above portions of the fault with the largest slip (fig. 

21). Although average slip is the same in the homogeneous rupture and the heterogeneous prestress 

rupture, the latter has a larger maximum vertical free surface displacement because slip is more 

localized. Nonetheless, the beaming pattern of the far-field tsunami is similar for both models (figs. 12 

and 22). We match the seismic moment in the heterogeneous prestress model to the source model used 

by Kirby and others (2013) through a trial and error process. We also qualitatively match the slip 

distribution of the dynamic model to the source model (fig. 21). The total slip distribution is spatially 

much smoother than the initial stress configurations (figs. 20 and 21), in agreement with previous 

studies (Olsen and others, 1997; Olsen and others, 2009). Considering all four rupture models in this 
35

study, as well as previously studied and observed megathrust events in other parts of the world (for 

example, Ammon and others, 2011), the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario dislocation model appears to be 

self-consistent as a tsunami source, even when modeled as a complex rupture that involves frictionalstrengthening updip and (or) along strike as well as a heterogeneous prestress. Adding more precise 

source parameters in 3-D (for example, complex fault geometry, material properties, and stochastic 

stress fields) would further this study and help produce more realistic modeled sea-floor deformation. 

We use a simple planar fault geometry in this study; however, previous work by Oglesby and 

Archuleta (2003) suggests that fault slip and low-frequency ground motion are relatively unchanged for 

a nonplanar thrust fault with an abrupt change in dip when compared to a planar fault with an equivalent 

dip near the free surface. This result suggests that the shallow dipping rupture process is most important 

in producing ground motion. Combining this with the strong dependence of tsunami generation on slip 

near the trench (an area that generally has the shallowest dip for a subduction zone), we feel comfortable 

(at least to first order) using a planar fault with a small dip in this study to study effects on local tsunami 

generation. However, to better model the dynamics of the rupture process as well as the resultant 

tsunami, more accurate fault geometry should be used in future modeling efforts.

Using dynamic earthquake rupture models coupled, in time, with hydrodynamic models can be a 

very useful tool. We show that rupture dynamics on a megathrust can play an important role in tsunami 

generation and local propagation. It is true that tsunami formation is relatively insensitive to the 

temporal evolution of rupture. In other words, taking the final sea-floor deformation as an initial 

condition for tsunami generation would produce a tsunami not tremendously different from one 

produced by the time-dependent sea-floor deformation. However, this does not mean that the tsunami 

generation is insensitive to the spatiotemporal details of the rupture process. Indeed, the rupture path 

and overall slip distribution (which are first-order determinants of the tsunami) crucially depend on 

dynamic stress interactions (see, for example, Harris and Day, 1993), and thus on these spatiotemporal 

effects. For thrust faults in particular, it is very instructive to analyze results from dynamic models, 

because time-dependent normal stress fluctuations that arise from the free surface affect slip rates and 

slip distribution. Additionally, rupture propagation through stable-sliding zones can be accurately 

modeled dynamically, and may be used to simulate tsunami earthquakes. Thus, dynamic modeling may 

be an important complement to standard dislocation models for tsunami hazard analysis in the future. 

3. Modeling of Tsunami Wave Excitation, Propagation, and Inundation

By Hong Kie Thio 

Introduction

 This section presents the results of a numerical modeling analysis of tsunami propagation and 

inundation along the coast of California from the SAFRR Alaska scenario source model (Kirby and 

others, 2013) (fig. 23) as well as the dynamic rupture models (Ryan and others, section 2, above). 

Detailed runup and inundation modeling for areas along the California coast is performed where there is 

significant exposure. For all areas, I not only provide the maximum wave heights and inundation 

throughout the region but also the maximum velocity and momentum flux at the shoreline, which may 

be more appropriate parameters to estimate the impact of tsunami on engineered structures. An 

overview of my modeling effort and some examples of some of the high-resolution modeling is 
36

presented. For more detailed information, refer to the actual data files that have been produced and 

made available for this project. 

Detailed runup and inundation modeling was performed for areas along the California coast 

where there is significant exposure. For all areas, the results not only provide the maximum wave 

heights and inundation throughout the region but also the maximum velocity and momentum flux at the 

shoreline, which may be more appropriate parameters to estimate the impact of tsunami on engineered 

structures. The section presents an overview of our modeling effort and some examples of some of the 

high-resolution modeling. For more detailed information, please refer to the actual data files that have 

been produced and made available for this project. 

Figure 23. Map of the northeastern Pacific Basin. The scenario source location is indicated with a star; the area of 

high-resolution modeling (California) is indicated with the red box. 
37

Tsunami Modeling 

The simulation of tsunami waves consists of two steps. First, the sea-floor deformation resulting 

from slip on a fault plane is computed using elastic theory. Then, this static deformation field is used as 

the starting condition for the actual tsunami propagation and inundation calculations. Our particular 

implementation of the tsunami propagation and inundation model was developed by Satake (1995) and 

has been widely used since by many researchers (for example, Baba and others, 2004; Fujii and Satake, 

2006; Ichinose and others, 2007; Thio and others, 2007; Burbridge and others, 2008; Baba and others, 

2009). 

Tsunami Excitation

The tsunami excitation by earthquake sources is modeled by translating the vertical deformation 

field of the earthquake source (surface faulting) into a vertical displacement of the ocean surface. This 

method is commonly used in tsunami studies (for example, Satake, 1995; Titov and Synolakis, 1996) 

and has been shown to be valid for long-wavelength deformation (rupture extent >> water depth). The 

static displacement fields were computed from the slip distribution provided by Kirby and others (2013) 

using a frequency-wave-number integration technique (FK) with a simple layered crustal model (Wang 

and others, 2003, 2006). This method allows for an efficient computation of the static displacement field 

of a buried rupture using elastic theory. The ground deformation field is shown in figure 24. The pattern 

shown is typical for a shallow subduction thrust, with a very pronounced region of uplift (with a 

maximum of 14 m) near the trench and a broader area of subsidence in the back-arc region. 

Figure 24. Map showing vertical deformation field of the earthquake source region, which is used as initial 

condition for the tsunami wave modeling. 
38

Tsunami Propagation

An Eulerian approach is used to describe the particle motion of the fluid. This describes only the 

velocity changes of the fluid at some point and at some instant of time rather than describing its absolute 

displacement. Consider a wave that is a propagating disturbance from an equilibrium state. Gravity 

waves occur when the only restoring force is gravity. When the horizontal scale of motion is much 

larger than the water depth, then the vertical acceleration of water is much smaller than the gravity 

acceleration and thus negligible. This means that the whole water mass from the bottom to the surface is 

assumed to move uniformly in a horizontal direction. This kind of gravity wave is also known as a “long 

wave.” Long-wave approximations are appropriate when the water depth of lakes and oceans (< 5 km) 

is much smaller than the length of the disturbance (fault lengths ~ 10–1,000 km). This approximation 

gives an accurate description of tsunami wave propagation in the open ocean. In order to also model the 

propagation of tsunami waves in coastal areas, an approximation to the wave equation is used in which 

the low-amplitude linear long-wave requirements are relaxed, as shown below. 

General Linear Gravity Wave

The following is a derivation of the general case of gravity waves for two dimensions, where x is 

the horizontal direction and z is vertical direction (fig. 25). 

Figure 25. Diagrammatic sketch showing the coordinate system for tsunami model. 

We start from the Euler’s equation of motion that considers the conservation of momentum on a volume 

of water. The Newton equations can be simplified as 

where d/dt is the total derivative (∂/∂t is the partial derivative) with respect to time, g is the gravitational 

acceleration, V = (u,w) are the depth averaged velocities in the x and z directions, ρ is the density, and p

is the fluid pressure. Figure 25 shows that h is the tsunami wave height and d is the water depth. Next 

consider the conservation of mass to derive the equation of continuity, 

which for incompressible fluid becomes 

. 

From the Euler equation of motion the horizontal and vertical acceleration components are 

z

x

d

h

pgV dt

d = ∇−

ρ

1

+ ⋅∇ ( )= 0

∂

∂ V

t ρ ρ

⋅∇ V = 0
39

The relation between h and p is seen through the hydrostatic pressure equation, 

where h is the wave height, z is the water depth, and p0 is the pressure of one atmosphere at z = 0 and h

= 0. The horizontal and vertical pressure gradients given from the slope of the water surface, 

are combined with the Euler equation to give the horizontal and vertical components, 

For ocean tsunamis, the nonlinear advective term is small and can be ignored; therefore the equation of 

motion is, 

Next consider the conservation of mass for a region with a small length dx. Because the volume change 

per unit time must be equal to the flow rate of water going out of this region, we can therefore write 

which is the simplified equation of continuity when the amplitude of the wave is small compared to the 

water depth. The so-called small-amplitude, linear, long-wave assumption is valid for most of tsunami 

propagation paths except near coasts. 

z

p g dtdw

x

p

dt

du

∂

∂ = −−

∂

∂ = −

ρ

ρ

1

1

0 = ρ −− )( + pzhgp

gp dz

d

x

h

pgp

x

= −ρ

∂

∂ = ∂∂

= 0

∂

∂ = −

dt

dw

x

h

g dt

du

x

h

g

t

u

t

u

x

u

u

t

u

dt

du

∂

∂ = − ∂∂

∂

∂ ≈ ∂∂

+

∂

∂ =

)(

({ )}

{( ({}) )}

du

xt

h

dhu

xt

h

dhu dx

x

dh dx

t

∂

∂ = − ∂∂

+

∂

∂ = − ∂∂

+

∂

∂

=+ − ∂

∂
40

Nonlinear Gravity Waves and Shallow Water Waves

Linear theory is often sufficient to model the propagation of tsunami in open oceans. However, 

in the nearshore environment, and in particular for inundation, nonlinear effects become very important 

and need to be included as well. 

Without a viscous force to dissipate wave energy, the equations would have water motion 

continue forever. In order to include the viscous effect, we can add a term for viscous stress to the 

equation of motion. We only consider a shear stress at the water bottom, and the normal stress is already 

included and equal to the pressure. The shear stress in two dimensions is experimentally estimated as 

 

and the frictional force is 

, 

where νx and	νy	are	now	the	horizontal	components	of	velocity. 

Satake (1995) adopted two types of frictional coefficients from engineering hydrodynamics for 

including bottom friction for tsunamis. These are the De Chezy (C) and Mannings’s roughness (n) 

coefficients. These have different dimensions; therefore a nondimensional frictional coefficient Cf is 

related to these two coefficients by 

and 

. 

Manning’s roughness coefficient n is used for a uniform turbulent flow on a rough surface. It 

indicates that the bottom friction varies with water depth. We use an n of 0.03 m-1/3 s, typical for coastal 

waters. If n is translated to Cf, then n becomes 2.3×10-3 for a total depth of 50 m and 1×10-2 for a total 

depth of 0.6 m, which agree well with observational values of tidal flow and runup of solitary waves 

(see Satake, 1995). 

Because the Earth is rotating, there is a force apparently acting on a body of water. In an inertial 

reference frame (fixed on the rotating Earth), this force is called the Coriolis force. The derivation of 

this term is beyond the scope of this report and we refer the reader to textbooks on analytical mechanics. 

The vertical component of the Coriolis force is much smaller than gravity (3 cm/s2

 compared to 980 

cm/s2 at 4,000-m depth). In a local Cartesian coordinate system, the horizontal components are given by 

 

where f is the Coriolis parameter, and this force always acts to the right hand side of the motion in the 

northern hemisphere. 

22

yxxf

b

x τ ≈ + vvvC

 

Fx

b = Cf

vx vx

2 + vy2

d + h

2

2

c

f

C

g C =

3

1

2

hd )(

gn Cf

+

=

x

cor

y

y

cor

x

F fv

F fv

=

= −
41

The equations for general gravity waves are derived without making the small-amplitude, linear 

long-wave approximation appropriate when the wave height is much smaller than the water depth 

(h<<d). If we expand the hyperbolic tangent function using the Taylor series expansion and include the 

first and second order terms, then the corresponding equation of motion becomes 

which is also known as the Boussinesq equation. After relaxing the small amplitude assumption, the 

equation of motion and continuity are given as 

. 

These equations are for the finite-amplitude shallow water waves. For the linear case, the phase velocity 

is given by the following Taylor series expansion of the hyperbolic tangent function, 

, 

where l is the wavelength. In the nonlinear case the d-term in the phase velocity is replaced by the total 

height of the water column (d+h) which gives us a phase velocity of the form 

. 

Note that in the nonlinear case there appears a phenomenon of amplitude dispersion—the larger the 

amplitude, the faster the wave speed. As a consequence, peaks of a wave catch up with troughs in front 

of them, and the forward-facing portion of the wave continues to get steeper. This wave will eventually 

break. 

Including the bottom friction and Coriolis force, the equation of motion for shallow water waves 

can be written for a two-dimensional case as follows: 

and the equation of continuity is 

where the coordinate system is x=east y=south, f is the Coriolis parameter, Cf is a nondimensional 

frictional coefficient, and U and V are the depth-averaged velocities in the x and y directions, 

respectively. In the equation of motion, the first term on the left side is the local acceleration term, the 

second and third terms on the left are the advection terms, the first term on the right side is the Coriolis 

tx

u d

x

h

g

t

u

∂∂

∂

+

∂

∂ = − ∂∂

2

3

2

3

1

({ dhu )}

xt

h

x

h

g

x

u

u

dt

du

+

∂

∂ = − ∂∂

∂

∂ = − ∂∂

+















 



 



 = −

2 2

3

2 1

λ

π d gdc

 

c ~ g(d + h)

hd

VUV C

y

h fU g

y

V V

x

V U

t

V

hd

VUU C

x

h fV g

y

U V

x

U U

t

U

f

f

+

+ − ∂∂ = −− ∂∂

+

∂

∂

+

∂

∂

+

+ − ∂∂ = −− ∂∂

+

∂

∂

+

∂

∂

22

22

({ )} ({ )} =+ 0

∂

∂

++

∂

∂

+

∂

∂ dhV

y

dhU

xt

h
42

force, the second term on the right is the restoring force from gravitation acceleration, and the third term 

on the right is the bottom friction force. 

Tsunami Model 

The tsunami propagation has been modeled using a staggered grid finite-difference algorithm in 

the so-called shallow water approximation, where the wavelength of the tsunami is assumed to be much 

larger than the water depth. In these circumstances the only restoring force, when the water level is out 

of equilibrium, is gravity so that the whole water mass from the bottom to the surface is assumed to 

move uniformly in a horizontal direction. Shallow water (or “long wave”) approximations are 

appropriate when the water depth of lakes and oceans (0–10 km) is much smaller than the length of the 

disturbance (fault lengths ~ 50–1,000 km). 

The equations of motion and equation of continuity described above are solved in a spherical 

coordinate system by finite-difference method using the staggered leapfrog method (see, for example, 

Satake, 1995). For the advection terms, an upwind difference scheme is used (for example, Press and 

others, 2007). The land-sea boundary condition in the linear computation is total reflection, and in the 

nonlinear case there is a moving boundary condition and runup is considered. The time step of 

computation is determined to satisfy the stability condition (Courant condition) in the linear case and by 

trial and error for the nonlinear finite-difference computations. 

The nested grid setup consists of a master grid with a coarse grid spacing and a number of nested 

finer grids with decreasing grid sizes around areas of interest. The relations between the coarser and 

finer grids are referred to as parent (coarse) and child (fine), and every child grid can be a parent grid of 

an even higher resolution grid. Our finite difference scheme allows for more than one child for every 

parent, with the only condition that same-level child-grids do not overlap (or are separated by only a few 

grid points in the parent grid, and that the reduction in grid spacing from parent to child is an odd factor. 

In practice, the reduction is either 3 or 5, because larger reduction factors would introduce large 

numerical errors. 

In the current model, the deep ocean part is sampled at 120 arc seconds (~ 3.6 km). Because of 

the very long wavelength of the tsunami waves in the deep ocean, such a sampling is sufficient for 

accurate results and reduces the computation time and memory requirements considerably. Closer to 

shore, several nested grids step down to 0.96 arc sec (~ 30 m) at the sites of interest. The timestep for 

these runs is 0.2 s. Currently, the code uses a fixed timestep, which generally is controlled by the finest 

grid size.

Bathymetry

The bathymetry used for the open ocean propagation was derived from the SRTM30+ model by 

Becker and others (2009). This model (fig. 23) is based on a variety of data, but along the coast of North 

America, a significant source is the National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) coastal relief model. 

The higher resolution grids used for the inundation modeling were all provided through the NGDC 

Tsunami Inundation Gridding program. Most of these data are available in a resolution of 1/3 arc sec, or 

approximately 10 m. These data were resampled to a resolution of 1 arc sec (~30 m) for the final 

inundation grids, as well as even lower resolutions for the intermediate nested grids (fig. 26). 
43

Figure 26. Map showing locations of the high-resolution grids (0.96 arc sec, ~ 30 m) along the California coast. 

Also shown are the parent grids with a resolution of 4.8 arc sec (~150 m). 
44

Coordinates for the grids used are given in Tables 4 through 6. 

Table 4. Longitude and latitude of the boundaries of coarse and 1st nested grid 

Area West East South North

Pacific (120 arc sec) 120 250 (-110) 12 62

California (24 arc sec) -125 -116 31 43

Table 5. Longitude and latitude of the boundaries of the 2nd order grid (4.8 arcsec) 

Area West East South North

Crescent City -124.300 -123.900 41.440 42.000

Humboldt Bay -124.400 -124.000 40.400 41.400

Fort Bragg -124.920 -123.740 39.380 40.000

Arena Cove -124.000 -123.600 38.800 39.400

Marin County -123.260 -122.520 37.820 38.400

San Francisco -122.600 -121.880 37.400 38.300

Monterey Bay -122.120 -121.720 36.560 37.000

Port San Luis -120.920 -120.560 35.060 35.460

Santa Barbara -119.920 -119.480 34.360 34.440

Ventura -119.340 -119.140 34.080 34.300

Rincon -119.500 -119.300 34.200 34.380

Santa Monica Bay -119.140 -118.340 33.760 34.160

South Bay -118.340 -117.840 33.540 33.800

Catalina -118.520 -118.280 33.320 33.500

Oceanside -117.820 -117.300 33.100 33.600

San Diego -117.360 -117.060 32.540 33.100

Table 6. Longitude and latitude of the boundaries of the highest resolution grids (.96 arcsec) 

Area West East South North

Crescent City -124.280 -124.120 41.700 41.960

Klamath -124.120 -123.980 41.500 41.600

Orick -124.120 -124.040 41.260 41.320

Trinidad -124.180 -124.100 41.032 41.072

Humboldt Bay -124.380 -124.060 40.560 41.020

Fort Bragg -123.840 -123.760 39.400 39.620

Mendocino -123.860 -123.740 39.180 39.320

Arena Cove -123.760 -123.680 38.900 39.020

Stinson Beach -122.720 -122.560 37.840 37.960

Point Reyes -123.100 -122.800 37.960 38.360

Marin County -122.650 -122.500 37.700 38.200

San Francisco -122.540 -121.920 37.360 38.200

Golden Gate -122.480 -122.428 37.800 37.812

West Frisco -122.540 -122.480 37.700 37.780

Pacifica -122.540 -122.480 37.592 37.660

Half Moon Bay -122.540 -122.420 37.420 37.532

Santa Cruz -122.100 -121.900 36.940 36.988

Monterey Bay -121.824 -121.732 36.700 36.940

Monterey -122.000 -121.840 36.580 36.644

Morro Bay -120.912 -120.820 35.312 35.452

Avila Beach -120.780 -120.580 35.080 35.184

Santa Barbara -119.900 -119.500 34.380 34.424

Ventura -119.324 -119.144 34.108 34.288

Rincon -119.460 -119.340 34.300 34.372

Point Mugu -119.136 -119.060 34.084 34.140

Malibu -118.968 -118.816 34.000 34.060

Malibu -118.812 -118.540 34.000 34.044
45

Santa Monica -118.520 -118.420 33.948 34.032

Manhattan Beach -118.440 -118.380 33.880 33.932

Redondo Beach -118.408 -118.380 33.800 33.860

POLA/POLB -118.300 -118.000 33.700 33.788

Huntington Beach -118.048 -117.940 33.640 33.692

Newport Beach -117.984 -117.852 33.584 33.640

Avalon -118.336 -118.304 33.332 33.360

Isthmus -118.516 -118.484 33.420 33.456

Laguna Beach -117.800 -117.760 33.520 33.560

Dana Point -117.712 -117.632 33.432 33.480

San Clemente -117.628 -117.588 33.384 33.428

San Onofre -117.584 -117.540 33.356 33.384

Oceanside -117.420 -117.320 33.140 33.240

Encinitas -117.320 -117.228 32.924 33.096

San Diego -117.280 -117.080 32.560 32.800

La Jolla -117.300 -117.228 32.840 32.872

The original high-resolution grids were defined relative to mean high water (MHW). The 

expected highest tide on the day of the scenario is 20 cm above MHW, and we lowered the elevation 

models by this amount to simulate the tsunami waves arriving during high tide. 

Even though we used high quality elevation models that were specifically developed for tsunami 

inundation studies, there are still limitations to these data that can result in inaccurate inundation 

models. Different elevation datasets have been used to provide dense coverage for these areas, and these 

may have different uncertainties associated with them. Also, at a resampling to 30-m horizontal 

resolution it is possible that certain narrow features such as levees disappear or develop holes that can 

allow inundation to take place where in reality the levees would be sufficient to keep the water out. 

Results

The simulations were run on a computing cluster at the URS Corporation office in Los Angeles. 

We ran simultaneous runs for the different subregions, each of which consisted of several levels of child 

grids. The entire set of simulations typically would take a day and a half to complete. 

The results that are presented here come in different forms, such as maps of maximum 

amplitude, velocity, and momentum, as well as time series of wave height and velocity. The maxima are 

taken over the entire duration of the simulations (15 hours). The maps of maximum wave amplitudes 

show the maximum amplitude and extent of the inundation over the timespan of the computations. We 

also computed flow depth, which is the height of the water column at any place. The maps of nearshore 

and onshore maximum amplitudes are all taken from the 0.96 arc sec (~30 m) grids. In some cases, 

permeable structures such as jetties and breakwaters are represented as solid walls in the original 

models. The holes created by the resampling in these cases may (inadvertently) result in a more realistic 

modeling environment in those cases. 

Ocean Propagation

In figure 27, we show the maximum wave amplitudes across the northeastern Pacific, from the 

source in Alaska to the target areas along the California coast. Several characteristics of tsunami wave 

propagation are discernible on this map (with the annotations corresponding to the list below): 

· Source directivity—the amplitude patterns show a clear directional dependence, with the maxima in 

direction perpendicular to the strike of the fault plane (A). This is because the wavefront in that 

direction is linear in shape, which reduces the attenuation due to geometrical spreading. 
46

· Focusing due to ocean bathymetry—an example is the effect of the Cobb-Eickelberg seamount 

chain (B), which has a shallower bathymetry and thus lower propagation velocity, than the 

surrounding ocean and therefore acts as a waveguide, which can lead to areas of elevated tsunami 

amplitudes along the coast. 

· The Mendocino Fracture Zone—this feature (C) often acts as a waveguide, especially for tsunami 

arriving from sources farther to the west, such as the Kurile subduction zone and Japan. In the 

scenario case, we still see some effect as well, because it defines a significant contrast in 

bathymetry. 

· Shoaling—as the bathymetry becomes shallower, the amplitude of the tsunami waves increases, an 

effect called shoaling, and this is clearly visible along most of the coastline (D). This effect is even 

more pronounced when we look at the higher resolution inundation maps. 

· Coastline geometry—the shape of the California coast, bending east near Lompoc, causes the impact 

of tsunami from the north to be significantly reduced there compared to central California. The 

Continental Borderlands are in a kind of shadow zone (E) and in general the tsunami hazard there is 

smaller than elsewhere along the California coast. 
47

Figure 27. Map of maximum tsunami amplitudes. The letters mark locations referred to in the text. 
48

Figure 28 shows the water-level time series (marigrams) for selected points ordered from south 

at the top to north at the bottom. The move-out due to longer distances from north to south is very clear. 

Travel times to California range from 4 hours to Crescent City to almost 6 hours to San Diego. The 

waveforms are quite different in character. Although all the initial waves are up, only rarely is the first 

arrival the largest arrival (for example, Monterey Bay, Morro Bay). In most cases the largest waves 

arrive several hours, and sometimes more than 7 hours, after the initial arrival. Especially in southern 

California, the tsunami waves attenuate only slowly in time, which may be partly a result of trapped 

energy in the Continental Borderlands. 

Nearshore and Onshore Results

As mentioned before, as waves move closer to shore their amplitudes increase because of the 

shoaling effect. This is clearly visible in the high-resolution maps, such as the one for the Ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach, shown in figure 29. Whereas the amplitudes in deep water are on the order of 

1 m, they increase to more than 2 and even up to 4 m at the shoreline and inland. Our model predicts 

some significant inundation along the waterfront in Long Beach and Seal Beach, as well as in some of 

the inner harbor areas. The inundation flow depths, which are also shown in figure 29 (only for areas 

with elevation higher than MHW) reach up to 2 m in a few locations. As mentioned before, we should 

be careful to interpret these results directly without evaluating the detailed local topography, but it is 

clear that this scenario produces significant tsunami amplitudes in this area. The complete 3-component 

time series (east and north velocity and wave height) at a location within the harbor area (fig. 30) shows 

significant wave activity for more than 8 hours after the first onset of the tsunami. Here, depth-averaged 

peak velocities are on the order of 0.5 m/s, with the maximum amplitude at around 1 m. 
49

Figure 28. Tsunami wave-height time series (marigrams) from the scenario tsunami for various locations along the 

California coast. 
50

Figure 29. Maps showing maximum amplitude (top) and maximum flow depth (bottom) in and around the Ports of 

Los Angeles and Long Beach. The flow depths are only shown for areas where the elevations are above mean 

high water. Color bar refers to both amplitude and flow depth. 
51

Figure 30. Time series of velocity (east, top; north, center) and wave height (bottom) for the scenario tsunami 

waves in the Port of Los Angeles. 

In figures 31 through 38, we present similar maps for a few selected high-resolution areas along 

the coast. Crescent City (fig. 31) shows significant flooding of the harbor and downtown area, which is 

not unexpected given the severe damage that the city experienced after the 1964 Alaska earthquake. 

Judging from the large-scale tsunami pattern in figure 27, it appears that in addition to local resonance 

effects (Horrillo and others, 2008; Kowalik and others, 2008; Dengler and Uslu, 2011), the focusing due 

to the Cobb-Eickelberg seamount chain may contribute to the severity of the tsunami in this region. 

Tsunamis increase in height as they approach the shore. In southern California, the tsunami 

amplitudes would range from 1 to 3 meters near shore. In central California, from Lompoc through 

Marin County, they would range from 2 to 7 meters in amplitude. And in northern California, the range 

would be from 3 to 7 meters. Project modelers assumed high tide conditions, increasing the total 

tsunami height by about a meter. Note that the color scale in the figures saturates at 5 m, so the figures 

do not fully show the highest tsunami amplitudes. 
52

Figure 31. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami around Crescent City, 

California. 

Farther south, we find significant tsunami wave heights and some inundation all along the 

central California coast, such as at the Golden Gate entrance to San Francisco Bay (fig. 32), Half Moon 

Bay (fig. 33), Monterey Bay (fig. 34), Morro Bay (fig. 35), and Port San Luis (fig. 36). Entering the 

Continental Borderlands area in Southern California, the tsunami amplitudes decrease, as was already 

visible in figure 4 and can also be seen, for instance, on the maps of Ventura (fig. 37), the Los 

Angeles/Long Beach Ports (fig. 29), and the San Diego area (fig. 38). 
53

Figure 32. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami around the San Francisco 

shoreline just inside the Golden Gate. 
54

Figure 33. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami in Half Moon Bay, 

California. 
55

Figure 34. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami along the eastern shore of 

Monterey Bay, California. 
56

Figure 35. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami around Morro Bay, 

California. 
57

Figure 36. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami around Avila Beach, 

California. 
58

Figure 37. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami at Ventura, California. 

Figure 38. Maps showing maximum amplitude and flow depth of the scenario tsunami at San Diego, California. 
59

The locations of all these detailed maps are shown in figure 26, but they can also be found 

tabulated and referenced in tables 4 through 6. All the high-resolution maps have been made available in 

ASCII format as well as in the form of kmz files for viewing in Google Earth. The contents of the data 

files (both primary wave height/drawdown and velocity data, as well as derived products such as

momentum flux, are explained below. 

Explanation of Data Files 

The maps and other products derived using software of the URS Corporation show the results of 

the modeling of the scenario tsunami along different parts of the California coast. All maps are at a 

resolution of approximately 30 m and were derived from the database provided by the National 

Geophysical Data Center‘s Tsunami Gridding Project (http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/inundation/). 

The kmz files contain the following types of data (using the Oceanside grid as example): 

· Inundation-Oceanside.kmz—map of maximum tsunami amplitude. Units are meters, relative to 

reference level, which is high tide + 0.2 m (maximum tide level for that particular day). 

· Flowdepth-Oceanside.kmz—map of maximum height of the water level above the ground surface at 

any location. Derived from maximum tsunami amplitude minus the topography. 

· Velocity-Oceanside.kmz—map of maximum flow speed (m/s) in any direction. Note that the 

velocity is recorded for any flow depth, and large velocities beyond the shorelines may reflect 

movement of very thin layers of water during inundation. 

· Drawdown-Oceanside.kmz—lowest tsunami amplitude relative to the reference level (high tide + 

0.2 m). 

· Mindepth-Oceanside.kmz—map of minimum height of the water level relative to the solid ground 

(including seafloor). These maps are primarily useful to study the possibility of vessels running 

aground during drawdown. 
60

4. Numerical Modeling of Tsunami Effects in Southern California from a 

Hypothetical M9.1 Earthquake near the Alaska Peninsula

By José Borrero, Costas Synolakis, and Vasily Titov 

Introduction

The work presented here describes the hydrodynamic numerical modeling of tsunami-induced 

effects at several sites along the southern California coast. This modeling study is conducted in support 

of the U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) SAFRR: Science Application for Risk Reduction project. The 

objective of this study is to describe in detail, using the best available science, the effects on the coast 

and infrastructure of southern California of a hypothetical, but possible, large tsunami generated by a 

magnitude 9.1 earthquake offshore of the Alaska Peninsula. The results will enable researchers to better 

understand and prepare for natural disasters and can also be disseminated as educational material for the 

public. 

The model earthquake is defined to occur at 11:50 a.m. PDT (10:50 a.m. Alaska time) on 

Thursday March 27th, 2014, the 50th anniversary of the great 1964 Alaska earthquake, which generated 

California’s most destructive tsunami in recorded history. The simulations presented here should enable 

emergency responders, as well as port officials and engineers, to better understand the potential impact 

of this type of event. 

The numerical modeling presented here was carried out using the Community Model Interface 

for Tsunamis (ComMIT) numerical modeling tool. The ComMIT model interface was developed by the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Center for Tsunami Research (NCTR) 

following the disastrous December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami as a way to efficiently distribute 

assessment capabilities amongst tsunami prone countries. 

The backbone of the ComMIT system is a database of precomputed deep water propagation 

results for tsunamis generated by unit (for example, 1 m) displacements on fault plane segments (100 x 

50 km) positioned along the world’s subduction zones. Currently, there are 1,691 precomputed unitsource propagation model runs covering the world’s oceans included in the propagation database (fig. 

39). Using linear superposition, the deep ocean tsunami propagation results from more complex faulting 

scenarios can be created by scaling and (or) combining the precomputed propagation results from a 

number of unit sources (Titov and others, 2011). The resulting transoceanic tsunami propagation results 

are then used as boundary inputs for a series of nested nearshore grids covering a coastline of interest. 

The nested model propagates the tsunami to shore, computing wave height, velocity, and overland 

inundation. The hydrodynamic calculations contained within ComMIT are based on the MOST (Method 

Of Splitting Tsunami) algorithm developed by Titov and Synolakis (1995, 1998). 

During a real tsunami event, the ComMIT system can also be used in conjunction with real-time 

recordings of tsunami waveforms on one or more of the deep ocean tsunameter (DART) stations 

deployed throughout the oceans to fine-tune details of an earthquake source mechanism in real time. An 

iterative algorithm that selects and scales the unit source segments is used until an acceptable fit to the 

observed DART data is met. Because there are currently several DART stations in operation along the 

Aleutian trench, a tsunami emanating from this region would be recorded by the system and updated 

source models would be made available, allowing for an assessment of the potential tsunami impact 
61

before its arrival on the affected shores. This approach was used successfully to assess the impacts of 

the Tohoku tsunami in New Zealand (Borrero and others, 2012). 

Figure 39. Map showing the source regions and potentially affected coasts in the ComMIT propagation model 

database for tsunamis in the world’s oceans. Inset maps show the details of the source zone discretization into 

rectangular subfaults. 

Earthquake Source Model

The earthquake source model for this scenario was defined by the U.S. Geological Survey 

(USGS) (fig. 40). The source was defined by 64 subfaults, each approximately 25 x 50 km, for a total 

fault plane area of 400 x 200 km. The sources featured variable slip amounts and dip angles. Rake was 

assumed to be pure dip-slip, while strike angle varied across the segments to maintain alignment with 

the trench bathymetry. The rock rigidity values also varied with harder material at depth (50 GPa) and 

softer material near the surface (30 GPa). 
62

Figure 40. Map showing deformation data for the scenario tsunami provided by the USGS. Subfault epicenters are 

indicated by the red dots. 

To calibrate the initial condition for implementation into the ComMIT model, we used the 

subfault information provided by USGS to initialize a version of the Okada (1985) elastic dislocation 

model. Figure 41 shows the output from that exercise and suggests that this particular version of the 

elastic deformation model gives similar result to the defined source scenario. 

Figure 41. Map showing surface displacement computed by the MOST version of Okada's (1985) elastic 

dislocation model. Color scale in meters. 
63

Because the subfault size used in the ComMIT framework is larger than the subfaults used in the 

USGS source model, we adapted the 64-segment model into a 16-segment model compatible with the 

subfault geometry available via the ComMIT model interface as shown in figure 42. 

Figure 42. Maps showing the ComMIT subfault segments (left) that most closely match the source region defined 

for this study (right). 

To implement the source model into the ComMIT model, the 64-segment source model (average 

slip = 18.63 m) was compiled into four-segment clusters as indicated in table 7. The average of each 

four-segment cluster was then used as the slip over each of the 100 km x 50 km subfaults available to 

the ComMIT model. Slip amounts are indicated in table 8. The elastic deformation model was then used 

to compute the corresponding sea-floor deformation (fig. 43). 

Table 7. Slip amount (in meters) on each subfault segment of the original source model. Average slip is 18.6 m. 

The average slip over the four segments highlighted in red is 53 m. 

West East

North 0 2 4 7 5 3 1 0

2 5 8 10 8 6 4 3

4 10 15 20 15 10 8 6

5 10 20 35 25 18 13 11

8 15 25 47 35 25 20 18

10 20 35 55 42 32 27 25

15 30 50 65 50 40 35 33

South 0 10 22 38 28 20 13 11
64

Table 8. A 16-segment subfault comprising 4-segment average slip amounts from the 64-segment model. 

Average slip = 18.5 m. 

Figure 43. Maps showing surface deformation caused by a 16-segment fault model derived from 4-segment 

averages of the 64-segment fault model. Color scale in meters.

It is apparent that the deformation predicted by this representation of the slip distribution is 

somewhat different from that in the 64-segment model. However, the magnitude and areal extent of 

uplift and subsidence are comparable. In an effort to fine-tune the source to fit the deformation pattern 

produced by the 64-segment model, we used an ad hoc, trial and error approach to distribute slip across 

the segments with the goal of maintaining the overall average slip. In this process we noted that 

choosing the four segments highlighted with the red outline in table 7 yields an average slip of 53 m, 

which is larger than the average of any other grouping of four segments. We used this number simply as 

guidance as to what the highest allowable slip amount would be on one segment of the 16-fault model. 

While there are virtually an infinite number of possible slip distributions, we eventually chose 

one that somewhat approximates the deformation pattern indicated in the original 64-segment approach. 

The primary difference between the 16-segment and 64-segment fault models is the location of the 

maximum displacement relative to the trench axis. The more detailed 64-segment approach is able to 

push the deformation towards the southeast and into deeper water than is possible with the constraints 

imposed by the unit-source geometry used in the ComMIT modeling approach. For this study, we 

present model results based on the revised deformation model (tables 9 and 10, fig. 44). 

W E

N 2.3 7.3 5.5 2.0

7.3 22.5 17.0 9.5

13.3 40.5 33.5 22.5

S 13.8 43.8 34.5 21.6
65

Table 9. An ad-hoc, trial and error, modified version of the 16-segment fault model used for the simulations. 

Average slip = 18.6 m. 

Figure 44. Map showing computed surface deformation created by an alternate version of the 16-segment fault 

model for the tsunami source region. Color scale in meters. 

W E

N 5 7 7 3

10 23 25 12

15 30 48 15

S 10 32 40 15
66

Table 10. Fault parameters for the 16-segment source based on the NOAA-ComMIT propagation database. 

Segment Name Longitude (deg W) Latitude (deg E) Strike (deg) Dip (deg) Depth (km) Slip 1 

(m)

Slip 2 

(m)

acsz–28a 200.882 54.830 253.0 15 17.94 13.3 15.0

acsz–28b 201.108 54.400 253.0 15 5.00 13.8 10.0

acsz–28y 200.417 55.641 252.7 15 43.82 2.3 5.0

acsz–28z 200.636 55.225 252.9 15 30.88 7.3 10.0

acsz–29a 202.261 55.133 247.0 15 17.94 40.5 30.0

acsz–29b 202.565 54.720 247.0 15 5.00 43.8 32.0

acsz–29y 201.573 55.889 246.0 15 43.82 7.3 7.0

acsz–29z 201.880 55.491 246.2 15 30.88 22.5 23.0

acsz–30a 203.604 55.509 240.0 15 17.94 33.5 48.0

acsz–30b 203.997 55.120 240.0 15 5.00 34.5 40.0

acsz–30y 202.772 56.232 240.2 15 43.82 5.5 7.0

acsz–30z 203.152 55.853 240.5 15 30.88 17.0 25.0

acsz–31a 204.895 55.970 236.0 15 17.94 22.5 15.0

acsz–31b 205.340 55.598 236.0 15 5.00 23.0 15.0

acsz–31y 203.990 56.661 235.3 15 43.82 2.0 3.0

acsz–31z 204.432 56.302 235.7 15 30.88 9.5 12.0

Average 18.6 18.6

Bathymetry Grids

The ComMIT model uses a system of three nested numerical grids for the nearshore inundation 

part of the modeling process. Model grid bathymetry was obtained from the National Geophysical Data 

Center’s (NGDC) Tsunami Inundation Digital Elevation Models (DEM’s) (NGDC: 

http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/inundation/). The data are freely available for download, and for this 

project we worked from the Santa Monica and San Diego datasets. Each of these datasets is provided at 

a resolution of 1/3 arc sec, or approximately 10 m. Coarser model bathymetry grids of 9 arc sec and 2 

arc sec covering regional areas were constructed by downsampling the higher resolution source 

bathymetry. An example of the grid extents for sites in San Pedro Bay is shown in figure 45. Grid 

systems for a total of eight sites were produced for this study; these included Marina Del Rey in Santa 

Monica Bay, Long Beach, Seal Beach, Anaheim Bay, Newport Bay, Del Mar, La Jolla, and Mission 

Bay (Figure 46). The model datum is set to mean high water (MHW). 
67

Figure 45. Maps and graph showing model results for San Pedro Bay, California. (a) Examples of the grid 

coverage for sites in San Pedro Bay. Grid resolutions are 9 arc sec (upper left), 2 arc sec (upper right), and 1/3 

arc sec (three small maps). The location of the bathymetry transect (A-B) plotted in panel (b) is indicated with 

the red line. Red dots indicate location of time-series plots shown in Figures 47 and 48. (b) Bathymetry transect 

(A-B) across Terminal Island, the entrance channel, and the western breakwater segment. 
68

Figure 46. Map showing the sites of modeled tsunami effects in southern California covered by this study. 

Model Results

A sensitivity test was first performed to compare the model results between the two earthquake 

source models described above. This test was conducted only on the Marina del Rey bathymetry. The 

results presented in figure 47 show that the model output is relatively insensitive to differences in the 

slip distribution at the source. We also investigated the consistency of the model results over different 

model grid configurations. For this test, the same tsunami source was used and model output was 

compared from a point corresponding to the same location in two model grids with overlapping areas. 

This test compared the model output at the entrance to Anaheim bay, a location covered by both the 

Seal Beach and Anaheim Bay grids (see the location of the red dot in figure 45. The results shown in 

figure 48 show that the model results are consistent for each of those two grids, providing a first-order 

reality check on the model results. 
69

Figure 47. Plot of modeled wave height at Marina del Rey, comparing the effects from tsunami source 1 and 

tsunami source 2. 

Figure 48. Plot of modeled wave height at the entrance to Anaheim Bay from separate model runs with 

overlapping model grids. Note that the model returns from the two grids are virtually identical. 

The model was then run for the remainder of the nearshore grid regions using tsunami source 2. 

Model outputs in the form of maximum computed wave height and maximum current speed are 

presented in figures 49–54. Time-series outputs of wave height from a nearshore point (approximately

5-m depth) in each of the model grids are presented in figure 49. These plots show that the tsunami 

arrival times along the southern California coast would be just under 6 hours after the earthquake, with 

the wave reaching the northern sites (such as Marina del Rey) before the southern sites (such as Mission 

Bay). There is some discrepancy in this general rule, as indicated by the timing of the peak wave heights 

at the San Pedro Bay sites (Long Beach, Seal Beach, and Anaheim Bay). The shallow waters around 

these areas slow the tsunami arrival such that peak wave heights occur several minutes after peak wave 

heights at sites further south (that is, Newport through Mission Bay). Note also that the sites located in 

Santa Monica and San Pedro Bays have a very noticeable resurgence in tsunami wave heights occurring 

10.5 to 13 hours after the earthquake (4.5 to 7 hours after arrival). While this feature is evident at the 

other sites, it is not as large or long lasting as at Santa Monica or San Pedro Bay. This feature is an 
70

indication of the susceptibility of these areas to long-wave resonance, enhanced tsunami wave heights, 

and extended tsunami duration. 

Figure 50 presents the maximum computed water level over the coarsest (A-level) nearshore 

grids. These two plots show the maximum tsunami wave heights on a regional scale. The effect of 

seiching in Santa Monica Bay is evident, as well as the elevated wave heights in San Pedro Bay. Figure 

51 presents the maximum computed wave height and current velocity in the region around Marina del 

Rey. Although the wave heights predicted by the model are not extremely large, the currents induced by 

the tsunami are significant, particularly on the entrance channel to the marina basin and at the ends of 

each of the marina slipways. 

Figure 52 plots the model results for the scenario tsunami at the marine facilities located in San 

Pedro Bay, south of Los Angeles. This area is home to the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the 

recreational and residential marinas of Alamitos Bay and Huntington Harbor, and the military 

installation of Anaheim Bay and the Naval Weapons Station. This area is also one of the most strongly 

affected by a far field tsunami originating from Alaska. The model results predict maximum water 

levels of up to 2.5 m, with some significant overland flooding and coastal inundation. Inundation is 

predicted around the area of downtown Long Beach, as well as over the barrier beach at Belmont Shores 

and into the grounds around the Naval Weapons Station. Tsunami current speeds are also significant, 

particularly where the flows are constrained by coastal structures such as harbor training walls or jetties. 

The effects at Newport Bay (fig. 53) are not as significant. The predicted wave heights are small 

and the current speeds are slower. This is probably due to the generally southward-facing orientation of 

the shoreline here, which does not receive the full, head-on brunt of tsunami coming from the west and 

northwest. There is however evidence of some small-scale inundation on properties inside the Harbor. 

Farther south, the open coast sites of Del Mar (fig. 54) and La Jolla (fig. 55) do not show a 

strong tsunami signal. The maximum tsunami wave height is on the order of 1.25 m and does not induce 

any substantial inundation. A small amount of coastal inundation is evident at the entrance to the Del 

Mar lagoon (see fig. 54); however, it is not significant. 

Finally, at Mission Bay, more substantial tsunami effects are seen (fig. 56). Even though the 

tsunami wave heights are similar to the heights modeled at Del Mar and La Jolla, the lower topography 

along Mission Beach leads to some on-land inundation. There are also strong currents modeled to occur 

in the entrance channel to Mission Bay. 
71

Figure 49. Time series outputs showing tsunami wave heights in each of the nearshore regions.
72

Figure 50. Maps showing maximum computed tsunami wave heights in the A-level (coarsest) grids along the 

southern California coast. Grid resolution is 9 arc sec. 

Figure 51. Maps showing maximum computed tsunami wave heights (left) and current speeds (right) at Marina del 

Rey, California. 
73
74

Figure 52. Maps showing modeled maximum tsunami wave heights and current speeds in San Pedro Bay and 

sites within the bay at different grid levels. Wave heights are in centimeters and current speeds are in cm/sec. 

(a) Modeled maximum tsunami wave heights in the B-level (2 arc sec) grid covering the marine facilities in San 

Pedro Bay. (b) Modeled maximum tsunami wave heights in the C-level (1/3 arcsec) grids covering three 

important maritime installations—Port of Long Beach (left), Seal Beach and Alamitos Bay (middle), and 

Anaheim Bay, Naval Weapon Station (right). (c) Modeled maximum tsunami current speeds in the C-Level (1/3 

arcsec) grids covering the same regions as above. 
75

Figure 53. Maps showing modeled maximum tsunami height (left) and current speed (right) in Newport Bay. 

Figure 54. Maps showing modeled maximum tsunami height (left) and current speed (right) at Del Mar. The black 

line on land is the 5-meter topographic contour. 
76

Figure 55. Maps showing modeled maximum tsunami height (left) and current speed (right) at La Jolla. 

Figure 56. Maps showing modeled maximum tsunami height (left) and current speed (right) in Mission Bay. 
77

Summary and Conclusion

This modeling study has explored the effects on the coast of Southern California of a tsunami 

from a distant source. It investigated the effect of a very large (M9.1) event offshore of the Alaska 

Peninsula on several sites in Southern California. Study sites include Marina del Rey, the ports area of 

San Pedro Bay (Long Beach, Seal Beach, Alamitos Bay, and Anaheim Bay), Newport Bay, Del Mar, La 

Jolla, and Mission Bay. 

Tsunami waves from the Aleutian source region begin to affect the Southern California coast in 

approximately 6 hours, with the largest wave occurring within the first hour of the tsunami event. At 

sites in Santa Monica and San Pedro Bays, there is a resurgence in the tsunami energy that occurs 

approximately 4.5 to 7 hours after the tsunami first arrival. This resurgence is evident at the other sites; 

however, it is not as big nor as long lasting as in Santa Monica and San Pedro Bays. 

Overall, the strongest tsunami effects occur in the San Pedro Bay area, an area that coincides 

with some of the most significant infrastructure developments. Thus the strongest tsunami effects affect 

an area most vital to commerce and economy in southern California. The effects in this area include 

strong currents in the vicinity of coastal structures, as well as overland inundation and flooding. Open 

coast sites such as Newport, Del Mar, and La Jolla do not experience this and only see maximum 

tsunami wave heights of approximately 1.25 m, a wave height that is less than a typical tidal range for 

the area. Although only small-scale inundation is predicted for the Del Mar and La Jolla areas, Mission 

Beach and Mission Bay are shown to be susceptible to possibly more inundation on the heavily 

populated beach front, as well as being affected by strong currents in the bay entrance and some 

inundation on the land inside the bay. 
78

5. Production of Inundation Line for SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

By Rick Wilson 

Abstract

To help evaluate the impacts from the SAFRR scenario tsunami event, a line of potential 

tsunami inundation was produced that represents the flood limits to numerical modeling results. 

Numerical modeling was completed using digital elevation models (DEMs) with grid resolutions of 10 

m in select locations in southern California (see Borrero and others, section 4) and 30 m for most other 

parts of the California coast selected for modeling (see Thio, section 3). The DEMs were produced by 

the National Geophysical Data Center, which combined bathymetric and topographic data in a seamless 

dataset for tsunami modeling. Although models using these data are good for identifying general 

tsunami amplitudes, the DEMs and model results, because of resolution limitations, do not always 

accurately depict flooding where sudden topographic changes and manmade flood control structures 

exist. These types of problematic conditions include steep wave-cut beaches, port docks, and river 

levees. For this reason, recently collected (2009–2011), 1-m resolution lidar (light detection and 

ranging) DEMs were used to digitize an inundation line to identify where modeled flood limits would 

likely extend or be contained. In some locations, inundation maps were verified in the field or by use of 

orthoimagery and stereophotography, with an understanding of the limitations of the DEMs and imagery 

used. Because of the importance of the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to the SAFRR project, a 

detailed review of landfill plans was performed to check the inundation line in that area. A similar 

process of inundation-line production was used by the California Geological Survey (CGS) and the 

California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) during the completion of the State 

inundation line for emergency response planning. 

Introduction

Numerical tsunami modeling is a computationally complex method to demonstrate how 

tsunamis that are generated and propagated across the ocean inundate coastal regions of dry land. Most 

numerical model platforms have gone through validation exercises to demonstrate that the mathematical 

computations are verified (National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, 2012). For this reason, the 

accuracy of the numerical models is less likely to be questioned. In most cases, the accuracy of the 

modeled inundation is more dependent on the accuracy and resolution of the digital elevations models 

(DEMs) used. 

In 2009, a set of tsunami inundation maps were produced for emergency response statewide 

(Wilson and others, 2008; Barberopoulou and others, 2009). Numerical modeling was performed for a 

suite of large local- and distant-source tsunami scenarios, the results of which were combined into a 

single data layer that represented all potential areas that could potentially be flooded. This conservative 

approach was needed to make sure that during any large tsunami event, local evacuation plans would 

consider all areas of potential tsunami flooding. 

During the production of the inundation maps, errors in the numerical model results were 

discovered that could have impacted the accuracy of the resulting map. A thorough investigation of the 

results determined that the errors were a product of either errors in the 30-m and 90-m DEMs used or 

limitations of these DEMs to resolve higher resolution features, such as (1) steep wave-cut beaches, (2) 

rock-covered slopes along waterfront areas, (3) port docks and seawalls, and (4) river and flood control 
79

levees. Where these issues existed, a geographic information system (GIS) platform was used to 

incorporate 3-m and 5-m radar-interferometric DEMs and 10-m U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 

National Elevation Dataset (NED) DEMs to more accurately project where flooding could travel 

onshore. All DEMs were adjusted to mean high water tidal datums to accommodate potential worst-case 

inundation conditions. A preliminary line of potential inundation was generated, verified in the field 

with county emergency managers and other local map experts, and then finalized and released to the 

public. This method conformed to the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program’s guidelines and 

best practices for tsunami inundation modeling for evacuation planning (National Tsunami Hazard 

Mitigation Program, 2009).

Participants in the modeling and mapping aspect of the USGS SAFRR scenario project were 

cognizant of potential similar limitations to the modeling. Field investigations of the initial 10-m and 

30-m modeling results were performed to verify the accuracy of the modeling. Although the resolution 

and accuracy of this modeling were considerably higher than in the previous statewide inundation 

mapping project, errors were discovered. The following discussion addresses these errors and the 

methods that were used to create a more accurate tsunami inundation product. 

Verification of Model Results

Once the initial tsunami modeling results were produced, field teams consisting of USGS, CGS, 

and Cal OES personnel were formed to review the tsunami model products. In southern California, field 

team members visited a dozen coastal locations between Redondo Beach (Los Angeles County) and 

Newport Beach (Orange County). Although modeling results accurately portrayed the waterfront 

tsunami amplitudes in some areas, the modeled inundation areas were not always reflective of the 

topography and man-made structures inland. For example, figure 57 demonstrates how the 1-m tsunami 

runup flood level appears to overtop a river levee near the mouth of the Santa Ana River that was 

measured to be at least 3 m high. Because the levee is only 5 m wide, this manmade feature was not 

captured on the 10-m or 30-m DEMs used for tsunami modeling and, therefore, areas behind the levees 

showed erroneous flooding. Other areas where tsunami flooding was not accurately portrayed included 

steep, wave-cut beach fronts in Huntington Beach and underground parking garages in downtown Long 

Beach. 
80

Figure 57. Map showing SAFRR modeled tsunami amplitude results near the outflow for the Santa Ana River in 

Orange County. The red oval identifies the area of the photo showing the +3-m high levees. These levees 

(shown in the inset photo) should not be overtopped by the 1-m high tsunami flow. The blue line is the location 

of the 2009 state tsunami inundation line. Topographic map used as a base map for this figure. 

In the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, similar issues were found with the accuracy of 

model results. Several areas of recent artificially filled land were not included in the DEM used in 

modeling. In other cases, where tsunami modeling amplitudes overtopped waterfront piers by 1 to 2 m, 

modeled flooding appeared to stop at the piers despite areas behind the piers being at a lower elevation. 

Additional information helping to address some of these issues was requested from Moffett and Nichol, 

the engineering consultants for the Ports. 

Fieldwork was also initiated in northern California, specifically in the southwestern part of San 

Francisco Bay. Preliminary modeling results indicated that large sections of residential areas in 

Redwood City and Foster City could be inundated by a 1-m-amplitude tsunami. After looking closely at 

the levees bordering the edges of San Francisco Bay, the field team determined that tsunami inundation 

would not be anticipated to travel beyond these levees. Therefore, the residential areas in these cities 

should not be included in the inundation area for the project. 
81

SAFRR Inundation Line Production

Based on the recommendations from the field teams, it was determined that an inundation line 

should be produced to correctly define where tsunami flooding could inundate. CGS employed a 

method similar to the work performed on the 2009 State inundation maps. A GIS platform was used to 

digitize the inundation line, employing 1-m resolution DEMs to determine the extent of potential 

flooding (DEMs from California Coastal Conservancy: http://www.opc.ca.gov/2012/03/coastalmapping-lidar-data-available/). These DEMs, which are based on lidar data collected between 2009 and 

2011 using an airborne system, represent the most comprehensive and accurate coastal topographic data 

available. 

The initial fieldwork helped guide where problem areas needed to be addressed. For several 

locations in southern California, the inundation line extended inland where it was clear that beach and 

waterfront areas would not contain the modeled wave heights of the scenario tsunami. In northern 

California, inundation was confined by levees along the edge of San Francisco Bay. River levees 

throughout the State were also analyzed to determine if they would confine the flow of the tsunami. 

In the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, careful evaluation of the model results led to the 

production of a more consistent and accurate tsunami inundation line. Low-lying regions were 

incorporated into the inundation area beyond where tsunami flooding was projected to overtop the piers 

(fig. 58). Design plans for artificial land fill within the Ports were cross referenced with recent USGS 

orthophotographic imagery (circa 2011) to determine where tsunami inundation would occur. CGS 

coordinated closely with Moffatt and Nichol, the engineering consultant for the Ports, to adjust the 

limits for inundation where appropriate. Although significant work went into the production of the 

inundation line in the Ports, further detailed evaluation in the field would be needed to determine if 

more subtle manmade structures, such as small berms and retaining walls, would change the areas of 

inundation from the tsunami. Appendix A includes examples of inundation for selected areas of the 

California coast. 
82

Figure 58. Map showing the SAFRR tsunami inundation line (blue) in the Port of Los Angeles (left part of image) 

and the adjacent Port of Long Beach. A number of the waterfront areas around the ports show overtopping by 

the modeled tsunami surge. 
83

Comparison of SAFRR Inundation Line to State Inundation Line

To determine if evacuation plans for coastal communities should be updated, CGS compared the 

inundation line from the SAFRR scenario to that from the 2009 statewide product. The SAFRR scenario 

tsunami is considered a very large distant-source event for the California’s coast, comparable to some of 

the “worst-case” sources used during production of the 2009 statewide inundation maps. The modeling 

results produced for the SAFRR scenario are of higher resolution than those produced for the state 

inundation maps. The topographic lidar DEM used for the SAFRR line production is a higher 

resolution, more accurate DEM than what was available when the state inundation line was produced. 

This evaluation found that the state inundation line was equal to or more conservative (further inland) in 

almost all areas and under most conditions, with two exceptions: 

1. The higher resolution modeling results for SAFRR demonstrated that tsunamis could travel 

farther up large rivers feeding into the ocean. In some cases, modeled tsunami surges and bores 

traveled as far as 4 to 5 miles upriver. 

2. Higher resolution SAFRR models indicated that amplification of tsunami surges occurred in 

small inlets and harbors within San Diego and San Francisco Bays, producing tsunami wave 

heights approximately 0.5 m to 1 m higher than modeling for the 2009 state inundation maps. 

For these areas, CGS and Cal OES contacted the relevant emergency management agencies in the 

coastal jurisdictions to inform them of the situation, and evacuation plans were updated where it was 

appropriate. 
84

6. Modeling Tsunami Dynamics in the Port of Los Angeles, California 

By Dmitry J. Nicolsky and Elena N. Suleimani

Abstract

We have numerically modeled the extent of inundation in the Port of Los Angeles from a 

tsunami generated by a hypothetical Mw 9.1 earthquake in a segment of the Aleutian megathrust near the 

Alaska Peninsula. The result of this tsunami scenario is intended to provide assistance in tsunami hazard 

assessment, evacuation planning, and public education for reducing future casualties and damage from 

tsunamis. 

Introduction

Subduction of the Pacific Plate under the North American Plate along the Alaska-Aleutian 

subduction zone has resulted in numerous great earthquakes and still has a large potential to generate 

tsunamis threatening Alaska and other States and territories of the United States. The Aleutian 

megathrust, where the Pacific Plate is being subducted, is the most seismically active tsunamigenic fault 

zone in the United States. Several historical tsunamis generated by earthquakes along the AlaskaAleutian subduction zone traveled across the Pacific Ocean and struck exposed locations around the 

ocean, resulting in widespread damage and loss of life. 

Given the many similarities in tectonic and geologic settings between the Semidi Sector of the 

Alaska-Aleutian subduction zone and the Tohoku segment of the Kamchatka-Kuril-Japan subduction 

zone, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Tsunami Source Working Group proposed modeling a 

hypothetical earthquake similar in its slip distribution to the 2011 Tohoku event. The rupture zone of the 

hypothetical earthquake lies in the Semidi Sector, between Kodiak Island and the Shumagin Islands off 

the Pacific coast of the Alaska Peninsula (fig. 22; see fig. 12 for locations). Contours of the sea-floor 

deformation due to this hypothetical earthquake are displayed in figure 59. The proposed slip 

distribution was parameterized by multiple subfaults (Kirby and others, 2013), and the vertical and 

horizontal displacements at the seafloor are computed by the Okada (1985) formulae. The left plot in 

figure 59 shows the sea-floor deformation due only to the vertical displacements, while the right plot 

displays the vertical deformation that takes into the account both the vertical and horizontal 

displacements. At some parts of the ocean bottom with steep bathymetric gradients, the contribution to 

the sea-floor deformation by the horizontal displacements can be as much as 6 m. 
85

Figure 59. Maps showing the vertical deformation of the ocean floor resulting from the hypothetical earthquake in 

the Semidi Sector of the Aleutian megathrust. Left: the deformation is assumed to be equal to the vertical 

displacements. Right: the deformation is computed according to both the vertical and horizontal displacements. 

Methodology and Data

Grid Development

To simulate inundation in the Port of Los Angeles by a potential tsunami that can be triggered by 

the Mw 9.1 earthquake near the Alaska Peninsula, we employ a series of nested computational grids. A 

nested grid allows for higher resolution in areas where it is needed, without expending computer 

resources in areas where it is not. The extent of each grid used for modeling tsunami waves in the Port 

of Los Angeles is shown in figures 60 and 61 and listed in table 11. The coarsest grid, whose resolution 

is 2 arc minutes, spans the central and northern Pacific Ocean, while the highest resolution grid covers 

the Port of Los Angeles, including Anaheim Bay and a part of Bolsa Bay. The spatial resolution of the 

high-resolution grid satisfies National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) minimum 

recommended requirements for computation of tsunami inundation (National Tsunami Hazard 

Mitigation Program, 2010). We briefly summarize some of these requirements as follows. Modeling of 

inundation should be performed using numerical grids with cell sizes less than 3 arc seconds (~90 m), 

because cell sizes coarser than this tend to degrade inundation modeling results. The source elevation 

data in the grids should be thoroughly documented (see figs. 60 and 61). To resolve significant features 

that affect inundation, the computational grid should be fine enough that the feature covers more than 

three cells. We note that passages in the Port, between jetties and narrow channels in the wildlife refuge, 

are resolved with more than three grid cells. 
86

Figure 60. Map showing the coarsest grid (PA02) which covers the central and northern Pacific Ocean, and the 

24-arc-second grid (SC24), which is centered at the Port of Los Angeles. The data used to construct the 

embedded grids near the Port of Los Angeles are provided by the National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC), 

and their data extents are marked by different colors. 
87

Figure 61. Map showing telescoping embedded bathymetry/topography grids (SC24, SC08, LA55, and LA12) for 

numerical modeling of tsunami propagation and runup along the southern California coast. Extent of each 

embedded grid is marked by a gray rectangle. The data used to construct the embedded grids are provided by 

the National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC), and their data extents are marked by different colors. One-third 

arc second is approximately 10.3 m. 
88

Table 11. Nested grids used to compute propagation of tsunamis generated along the Alaska Peninsula to the Port 

of Los Angeles. 

[The high-resolution grid is used to compute the inundation. Note that the grid resolution in meters is not uniform and is used 

to illustrate grid fineness. The first dimension is the longitudinal grid resolution, while the second is the latitudinal grid 

resolution.] 

Grid name Resolution East–West

boundaries

South-North 

arc-seconds meters boundaries

PA02 120 × 120 3,100 × 3,700 120.00E – 100.00W 10.00N – 65.00N

SC24 24" × 24" 614 × 740 116.70W – 123.00W 32.00N – 35.90N 

SC08 8" × 8" 206 × 247 116.85W – 121.00W 32.20N – 34.60N 

LA55 8/3" × 8/5" 68.4 × 49.3 117.85W – 118.70W 33.25N – 34.05N

LA12 (high-resolution) 8/15" × 2/5" 13.7 × 12.3 118.03W – 118.33W 33.69N – 33.79N 

The bathymetry data for the 2-arc-minute resolution grid, whose partial extent is shown in figure 

60, is extracted from the ETOPO2 data set (NOAA, National Geophysical Data Center). Telescoping 

embedded bathymetry/topography grids (SC24, SC08, LA55, and LA12) are used for numerical 

modeling of tsunami propagation and runup. The extent of each embedded grid is marked by a gray 

rectangle (figs. 60 and 61). The data used to construct the embedded grids are provided by NGDC, and 

their data extents are marked by different colors. 

Numerical Model of Tsunami Propagation and Runup

NOAA recently published a technical memorandum that outlines major requirements for 

numerical models used in inundation mapping and tsunami forecasting and describes a procedure for 

model evaluation (Synolakis and others, 2007). There are two major components to this process. The 

first is model validation, which ensures that the model correctly solves appropriate equations of motion 

by comparing model results with known solutions. This is achieved through analytical and laboratory 

benchmarking. The second component is model verification, or testing the model, using observations of 

real events through field data benchmarking. 

The numerical model that is currently used by the Alaska Earthquake Information Center 

(AEIC) to model the hypothetical tsunami in the Port of Los Angeles has been validated through a set of 

analytical benchmarks and tested against laboratory and field data (Nicolsky and others, 2011; Nicolsky, 

2012). The model solves nonlinear shallow-water equations using a finite-difference method on a 

staggered grid. For any coarse–fine pair of computational grids, we apply a time explicit numerical 

scheme as follows. First, we compute the water flux within a coarse-resolution grid. These calculated 

flux values are used to define the water flux on a boundary of the fine-resolution grid. Next, the water 

level and then the water flux are calculated over the fine-resolution grid. Finally, the water level 

computed in the fine-resolution grid is used to define the water level within the area of the coarseresolution grid that coincides with the fine grid. Despite the fact that nested grids decrease the total 

number of grid cells needed to preserve computational accuracy within certain regions of interest, actual 

simulations are still time demanding if parallel computing is not implemented. Here, we use the 

Portable Extensible Toolkit for Scientific computation (PETSc), which provides sets of tools for the 

parallel numerical solution of shallow-water equations (Balay and others, 2004). In particular, each 

computational grid listed in table 11 can be subdivided among an arbitrary number of processors. The 

above-mentioned passing of information between the water flux and level is implemented efficiently 

using PETSc subroutines. 

To simulate tsunami dynamics caused by a sea-floor deformation due to an earthquake, we 

assume some simplifications. First, an initial displacement of the ocean surface is equal to the vertical 

displacement of the ocean floor induced by the earthquake rupture process. Second, the finite speed of 
89

the rupture propagation along the fault is not taken into account—we consider the ocean bottom 

displacement to be instantaneous. Third, the initial topography is modified to account for coseismic 

deformation of land due to the earthquake. 

At the end of a tsunami simulation, each of the grid points has either a value of 0 if no 

inundation occurs or 1 if seawater reaches the grid point at any time. The inundation line approximately 

follows the 0.5 contour between these 0- and 1-point values. Although the developed algorithm has 

passed through the rigorous benchmarking procedures (Nicolsky and others, 2011; Nicolsky, 2012), 

there is still an uncertainty in the placement of the inundation line. However, this uncertainty is to a 

great degree unknown because the inundation line is the result of a complex modeling process. 

Affecting the accuracy of the inundation line are many factors on which the model depends, including 

suitability of the earthquake source model, accuracy of the bathymetric and topographic data, and 

adequacy of the numerical model in representing the generation, propagation, and runup of tsunamis. In 

this study, we do not attempt to adjust the modeled inundation limits to account for these uncertain 

factors. 

We note that there are several limitations of the model. One of the important shortcomings is 

that it does not take into account the periodic change of sea level due to tides. We conducted all model 

runs using bathymetric data that correspond to the MHW tide level in the Port of Los Angeles. 

Modeling Results

We model propagation of the tsunami generated by the hypothetical earthquake in the area of 

Alaska Peninsula using the Alaska Tsunami Online Modeling (ATOM) interface 

(http://atom.giseis.alaska.edu). The tsunami dynamics were modeled for 12 hours, with the time step in 

the coarsest grid equal to 1 second. To preserve stability of the computations, the time step in the highresolution grid was set equal to 0.012 seconds. The initial water displacement is assumed to be equal to 

the vertical displacements by the Okada's formulae (the left plot in fig. 59), and the Manning roughness 

in all nested grids is set to be μ=0.01. The modeling results show that the first wave arrives at the Port of 

Los Angeles about 5 hours after the earthquake, and that the significant wave action starts 

approximately 6 hours after the earthquake. The maximum calculated wave height with respect to the 

MHW level is plotted in the top plot in figure 62. The bottom plot in the same figure illustrates the 

hypothetical flow depth above the dry land. 

In addition to the simulated maximum water level and flow depth, we display the computed 

water level and velocity at selected points along the coast of Los Angeles and inside the Los Angeles 

harbor. Locations of these points are marked by numbers and red triangles in figures 62 and 63. We plot 

the computed sea level and water velocity at all selected locations in figure 64. The geographic 

coordinates of the selected locations are listed in table 12. 
90

Figure 62. Maps showing modeled wave heights and water flow depths in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long 

Beach. Numbers mark locations for which data are given in figure 64 and table 12. Top: the maximum potential 

wave height above the mean high water (MHW) level. Bottom: the simulated water flow depth above the dry 

land. The DEM corresponds to the present-day MHW datum. 
91

Figure 63. Map showing locations of time-series points (numbered red triangles) on the California coast near the 

Port of Los Angeles. Locations of the points are given in table 12, and data obtained there appear in figure 64. 
92
93
94

Figure 64. Time-series plots of modeled water level and velocity at the selected locations on the California coast 

near Los Angeles. The modeled water height is given with respect to the mean high water (MHW) tide level. 

Red line: vertical displacement only at the source and μ=0.03. Blue line: vertical displacement only at the 

source and μ=0.01. Green line: vertical and horizontal displacement at the source and μ=0.01. 
95

Table 12. Locations where the simulated water level and velocity in the scenario tsunami are recorded. 

[Locations shown on figures 62 and 63; data from the locations presented in figure 64]

ID Lon Lat Label

1 -118.39889 33.83389 Redondo Beach

2 -118.41944 33.73389 Rancho Palos Verdes

3 -118.22250 33.73000 Port of LA

4 -118.08056 33.71250 Sunset Beach

5 -117.93889 33.60806 Newport Beach

6 -117.78917 33.53333 Laguna Beach

7 -117.74444 33.43806 Dana Point

8 -118.47167 33.96139 Marina Del Rey

9 -118.08111 33.73000 Wildlife Refuge

10 -118.19361 33.75722 Aquatic Park

11 -118.22361 33.76944 Inner Harbor

To assess sensitivity of the hypothetical inundation with respect to the bottom friction, we 

consider an additional scenario. As in the previous scenario, we assume that the initial deformation is 

equal to the vertical displacement computed by Okada's formulae, but now set the Manning roughness 

μ=0.03. The maps of computed flow depth for the two scenarios are compared in figure 65. Note that 

significant differences between the computed inundation zones occur inside the Los Angeles harbor 

(point 11) and near the Aquatic Center (point 10). The largest difference in the inundation extents is 

observed in flat areas, where the water flow can easily spread laterally and the bottom friction is 

important. In most of the flooded areas the difference in the simulated flow water depths is less than 0.2 

m. The difference in inundation can also be partially explained by the slightly larger wave heights that 

are modeled in the case of μ=0.01—compare the water level plots for points 10 and 11 in figure 64. We 

emphasize that the degree of inundation along the northern edge of the displayed extent, near the Los 

Angeles River (fig. 65), can be a numerical artifact due to the solid-wall boundary condition imposed 

along the northern edge of the high-resolution grid. 
96

Figure 65. Maps showing modeled flow depths from the scenario tsunami in Los Angeles Harbor with different 

values of the Manning coefficient. Top: the flow depth above the dry land in the case of Manning's coefficient 

μ=0.01. Bottom: the potential flow depth in the case of μ=0.03. The coseismic deformation is assumed to be 

equal to the vertical sea-floor displacement. The most significant differences in the simulated inundation occur 

in the completely flat areas. 

To analyze sensitivity of the hypothetical inundation to inclusion of the horizontal displacements 

into the sea-floor deformation, we consider another scenario. Here, the initial sea-floor displacement is 

computed with a contribution of the horizontal coseismic displacements, and the Manning roughness μ 

is set to 0.01. The differences in these parameters among all three considered scenarios are listed in 

table 13. The computed hypothetical inundation zones for the first and last considered scenarios are 

shown in figure 66. The difference in the maximum water level near the Aquatic Park and in the Inner 

Harbor can be as much as 0.25 and 0.15 meters, respectively, which is high enough to cause inundation 
97

in some flats regions. The time series of the water level dynamics at points 10 and 11 are shown in 

figure 64. 

Table 13. Differences in assumptions under the three considered tsunami scenarios: 

Sea-floor deformation Manning's coefficient

Scenario 1 Vertical displacement only μ=0.01

Scenario 2 Vertical displacement only μ=0.03

Scenario 3 Vertical and horizontal displacements μ=0.01

Figure 66. Maps showing inundation and flow depths in Los Angeles Harbor under two different scenarios. Top: 

the flow depth modeled under the assumption that the vertical coseismic deformation is equal to the vertical 

displacement of the seafloor during the earthquake. Bottom: the flow depth modeled under the assumption that 

the vertical coseismic deformation is a product of both the vertical and horizontal displacements of the seafloor 

during the earthquake. The Manning coefficient μ is assumed to be equal to 0.01 in both cases. 
98

Sources of Errors and Uncertainties

The hydrodynamic model used to calculate tsunami propagation and runup is a nonlinear fluxformulated shallow water model (Nicolsky and others, 2011). It passed the validation and verification 

tests required for models used to simulate the tsunami dynamics (Synolakis and others, 2007; National 

Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, 2012). This model is currently employed to simulate the 

hypothetical tsunamis along the coast of Alaska and was successfully applied to model the 1964 tsunami 

propagation and runup. The model is being verified to simulate historic tsunamis along the California 

coast. The source mechanism remains the biggest unknown in the problem of tsunami modeling. 

Because the initial condition for the modeling is determined by the displacement of the ocean bottom, 

the largest source of errors is the earthquake model. 

The horizontal resolution of the grid used for inundation modeling is about 12–13 m. This 

resolution is high enough to describe major relief features, but small topographic features, buildings, 

and other facilities cannot be accurately resolved. The San Pedro, Middle, and Long Beach breakwaters 

are resolved with one or two grid cells in the high-resolution DEM, while some smaller jetties might 

have some partial breaks in the DEM. 

Summary

In this study we present the results of numerical modeling of earthquake-generated tsunamis for 

the Port of Los Angeles, California. The results of our modeling (figs. 62, 64–66) have been based on 

the best information available and are believed to be accurate; however, their preparation required many 

assumptions. Actual conditions during a tsunami event may vary from those considered, so the accuracy 

cannot be guaranteed. The limits of inundation shown should be used only as a guideline and require an 

expert interpretation. Actual areas inundated will depend on specifics of the earth deformations, on land 

construction, and on tide level, and they may differ from areas shown on the figures. The numerical 

results are not intended for land-use regulation or building-code development. 

Acknowledgments

This project was supported in part by the Cooperative Institute for Alaska Research (CIFAR) 

with funds from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) under cooperative 

agreement NA08OAR4320751 with the University of Alaska, and in part by the California Geological 

Survey under agreement 1011–023. Numerical calculations for this work were supported by a grant of 

High Performance Computing (HPC) resources from the Arctic Region Supercomputing Center (ARSC) 

at the University of Alaska Fairbanks as part of the U.S. Department of Defense High Performance 

Computing Modernization Program. 
99

7. Port & Harbor Hydrodynamics

By Patrick Lynett and Sangyoung Son 

Introduction and Background

In coastal locations where flooding and inundation are not a significant tsunami hazard for a 

particular event, the strong and erratic currents induced by the tsunami can still lead to major damage. 

Areas that are particularly exposed to tsunami current hazards are ports, harbors, and marinas. The 2011 

Japan tsunami caused widespread damage to harbors along the California coastline; these effects were 

almost exclusively due to strong currents (Lynett and others, 2012). Also during the 2011 event, there 

was a remarkable occurrence at the Naval Harbor in Guam. Two nuclear submarines, tied side-by-side 

in series to the wharf, were pulled from their lines and floated briefly without control in the Harbor. The 

recorded tsunami amplitude (crest elevation) in this location was only 1 foot (0.3 m), and the hindcast 

modeled currents were 4 knots (2 m/s). 

During the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, damage to harbors was noted in a series of papers by 

Okal and others (2006a,b,c). The most remarkable of these events occurred in the Port of Salalah, 

Oman. About 90 minutes after tsunami first arrival, strong currents near the farthest offshore unloading 

berth broke all of the mooring lines on a 285-m ship, the Maersk Mandraki, and pulled it away from the 

terminal and out of the Port. The vessel then drifted on the currents for hours, spinning numerous times, 

before beaching on a nearby sandbar. Once the vessel was pulled from its berth, tugs were quickly 

dispatched to the ship. However, because of the complex and rapidly varying nature of the flow—

essentially a mess of large eddies and jets of current—the tugs were unable to control the motion of the 

Mandraki. At nearly the same time as the Mandraki parted its lines, the 292-m Maersk Virginia was 

approaching the Port entrance, and strong currents caused it to strike a breakwater. The Virginia 

experienced only minor damage due to this collision, and the Captain waited offshore of the entrance for 

7 additional hours until he deemed the currents safe enough to enter the Port. 

There were no direct measurements of the currents in the Port of Salalah, and we rely on 

numerical hindcasting of the event to provide flow speeds. Near the initial location of the Mandraki, 

numerically predicted currents are approximately 6 knots (3 m/s). For both the Salalah and Guam 

examples, the flow speeds would conventionally be thought of as not strong enough to pull a vessel 

from its lines; however, the highly sheared and rotational nature of the currents in these areas likely 

produced very irregular drag loading on the hull, including significant yaw, causing the vessel to act as a 

huge moment arm and leading to uneven loading of mooring lines. The goal of this modeling exercise is 

to perform highly detailed and resolved tsunami current simulations, such that the remarkable effects 

observed recently in harbors might be understood and evaluated for the SAFRR scenario. 

Hydrodynamic Modeling Approach and Results

With incident tsunami information provided by basin-scale propagation models, high-resolution 

simulations with a high-order physics model have been done for select locations. Specifically, the 

dispersive, rotational, and turbulent flow model of Kim and Lynett (2011) is applied at San Diego Bay, 

Ports of Los Angeles (POLA) and Long Beach (POLB), and Ventura Harbor. For these three coastal 

locations, a uniform spatial resolution of 5 m is used, and the tsunami signal is super-imposed over the 

tidal signal, such that the complete hydrodynamic forcing is included. The tsunami signal is taken from 

a 2-arc-min resolution, open-ocean propagation simulation of the entire Pacific Ocean basin using the 
100

COMCOT model (Liu and others, 1995), forced with the initial condition described in previous 

sections. The simulations presented in this section take the output from the propagation simulation at the 

25-m offshore depth; at this depth, the tsunami height (maximum crest-to-trough distance) is 1.1 m at 

POLA/POLB, 2.2 m at Ventura, and 2.1 m at San Diego, with wave periods of the leading waves in the 

range of 20-30 minutes. 

A weakly dispersive and rotational Boussinesq-type modeling approach is used for the 

simulations in this section. Recently, a number of nontraditional Boussinesq approaches have been 

developed, with the goal of including horizontal vorticity explicitly in the flow field. An attempt to 

include these dynamics under a breaking wave is found in Veeramony and Svendsen (2000), with 

further advances given in Musemeci and others (2005). A similar attempt, resulting in the model 

employed here, was made by Kim and others (2009), who included the viscous effects of a bottom 

shear, and the associated rotationality, directly in a Boussinesq-type derivation. Although this leads to a 

far more complex equation model, it includes the physics necessary to simulate boundary shear and the 

complete coupling of these effects with a nonlinear, dispersive wave field. This model can predict the 

friction-induced changes to the vertical profile of velocity under weakly unsteady flow, and it thereby 

can provide good estimates of internal kinematics. It is also able to translate the bottom-created 

horizontal vorticity into a vertical vorticity field. Most important to the harbor simulations provided 

here, results include highly localized current features, such as jets and whirlpools, which tend to exhibit 

the greatest flow speeds. Additionally, all of the numerical efforts here implement established aspects of 

Boussinesq-type modeling, developed by the lead author and other researchers. These aspects include 

wind wave breaking (Kennedy and others, 2000; Lynett, 2006) and accurate moving boundary schemes 

for shoreline motion (Lynett and others, 2002). Because Boussinesq-type models tend to be complicated 

sets of lengthy equations, usually requiring high-order numerical solution schemes, the computational 

cost of a solution is not insignificant. To lessen this burden, a parallel implementation based on message 

passing interface (MPI) has been used here (Sitanggang and Lynett, 2005), permitting the large-scale 

simulation (tens of square kilometers and tens of millions of grid points) in a reasonable duration of 

processing time. 

Figures 67 and 68 show the predicted maximum sea-surface elevations and current speed, 

respectively, for Ventura Harbor. Flood elevations are between 2 and 3 m in the area, with water 

overtopping the dune in a couple of locations. Maximum currents through the Ventura Harbor channel 

exceed 14 knots (7.2 m/s), with widespread maximum speeds greater than 8 knots (4 m/s). Under these 

conditions it would be reasonable to expect widespread damage to floating infrastructure throughout the 

harbor. 
101

Figure 67. Map showing maximum predicted water surface elevation from the scenario tsunami, relative to mean 

high water datum, for Ventura harbor. Color scale in meters. 
102

Figure 68. Map showing maximum predicted tsunami-induced currents (knots; 1 knot = 0.51 m/s) for Ventura 

Harbor. Color scale in knots. 
103

The maximum predicted currents in San Diego Bay are given in figure 69. In general, the 

modeled current speeds are not great. The Shelter Island area appears to be the most at-risk location in 

the Bay, but strong currents might also affect Point Loma. Farther inside the Bay, near the primary naval 

piers, currents are weak, and vessel complications here have a low probability. Debris from Shelter 

Island could plausibly cause obstructions in the main channel and hinder traffic in and out of the Bay. 

Figures 70 and 71 give maximum current speeds for the Port of Los Angeles (POLA) and the 

Port of Long Beach (POLB), respectively. Note that the numerical domain used here was continuous; 

the POLA and POLB were in fact simulated together because they are adjacent and contiguous. In the 

POLA, currents are strongest at Angels Gate, the Cabrillo Marina, the Boat Yard, and the old Navy 

Yard. Once the tsunami event is underway, navigation through the Gate would be very dangerous. In the 

Cabrillo Marina and Boat Yard, currents are likely strong enough to break apart floating docks, damage 

piles, and pull small vessels from their mooring lines. The strongest currents are found in the old Navy 

Yard; however there are no exposed floating assets in this immediate area. At the POLB, again strong 

currents are found at Queens Gate. Also in the POLB, strong and jet-like currents are predicted at the 

entrance to the main cargo container area (Pier J). Currents here may be strong enough to damage, and 

possible break, mooring lines. 
104

Figure 69. Map showing maximum predicted tsunami-induced currents (knots; 1 knot = 0.51 m/s) for San Diego 

Harbor. Color scale in knots. 
105

Figure 70. Map showing maximum predicted tsunami-induced currents (knots) for the Port of Los Angeles. 
106

Figure 71. Map showing maximum predicted tsunami-induced currents (knots) for the Port of Long Beach. 


109

Figure 72. Graphs comparing measured and simulated dam-break flows over a movable bed at different elapse 

time after dam break. x=0: position of dam. Elevation = 0: initial bed surface elevation. 

Recently, Kobayashi and Lawrence (2004) carried out laboratory experiments in a wave flume 

(length 30 m, width 2.4 m, and height 1.5 m) to study beach profile changes under breaking solitary 

waves, as shown in figure 73. A solitary wave of 0.216-m height was generated by wave paddle and 

propagated to the sloping beach composed of sand grains. The water depth beyond the base of the beach 

was 0.8 m. The beach has initial slope of 1:12 that is expected to be changed by the breaking solitary 

waves. The solitary wave was repeated eight times to consider the effects by multiple wave attacks. 

Bottom profiles after four and eight waves, as well as surface elevations at eight locations (G1 to G8) 

across the beach after four waves, were measured. The median grain diameter (d50), fall velocity (w0), 

specific gravity, and porosity (p) are 0.18 mm, 2.0 cm/s, 2.6, and 0.4, respectively. 

-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

0

0.05

0.1

t=0.505sec

-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

0

0.05

0.1

t=0.757sec

Bed and Surface Elevation(m)

-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

0

0.05

0.1

t=1.010sec

x(m)

Calculated FSE

Measured FSE

Calculated Bed Profile

Measured Bed Profile
110

Figure 73. Diagrammatic cross section showing experimental setup for breaking solitary waves on a sloping sand 

beach. 

To evaluate the accuracy and performance of the model, their experiment was recreated through 

numerical modeling using the same conditions as in the experimental setup. The simulation was 

performed using a uniform grid size of 0.1 m and varying time step with a Courant number of 0.4. For 

Manning’s coefficient (n) and empirical parameter (φ), 0.025 and 7.5×10!! are used, respectively. 

Additionally, to account for turbulent mixing and dissipation by wave breaking, the eddy-viscosity 

model proposed by Kennedy and others (2000) is adopted in the test. 

Calculated beach profiles compared with the measured data are shown in figure 74. Fairly good 

agreement is found in both results after four and eight waves. Significant erosion at the foreshore is 

observed in both measured and computed results, which may be explained by the strong backwash 

current caused when the solitary wave rushes back down. The entrained sediments are deposited on the 

seaward side. In figure 75, calculated surface elevations agree well with measurements, although some 

errors are seen in gauges G6–G8 for wave runup and rundown. This discrepancy is largely due to the 

errors in the simulated shoreline (fig. 74), which affects the water depth. 

Figure 74. Graphs comparing measured and calculated beach profiles for Kobyashi test. 

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

-0.5

0

0.5

Distance from Gauge 1 (m)

Bed elevation(m)

Bottom profile after 4 waves attack

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

-0.5

0

0.5

Bed elevation(m)

Distance from Gauge 1 (m)

Bottom profile after 8 waves attack

numerical

experiment

initial profile
111

Figure 75. Graphs comparing experimental (Exp.) and numerical (Num.) simulated temporal free surface 

elevations at different locations (gauges G1 to G8) during the fifth wave in the simulated erosion of a beach 

profile. 

Finally, the case of flow in a partially breached dam-break was used to test the present model. 

This test was conducted experimentally in Xiao and others (2010). Figure 76 depicts the experimental 

setup of the test, in which the middle of the channel has a moveable bed section composed of coal ash. 

The median diameter (d50) of the coal ash was 0.135 mm and the density was 2,248 kg/m3

. Initial water 

depths were 0.4 m and 0.12 m for upstream and downstream, respectively. Strong jet-like flow through 

the 0.2-m-wide gap caused significant erosion, and cross-sectional profiles of the bottom were measured 

at cs1 (x = 2.5 m) and cs2 (x = 3.5 m) after 20 seconds. 

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

ζ

1 (m)

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

ζ

2 (m)

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

ζ

3 (m)

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

ζ

4 (m)

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

ζ

5 (m)

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

ζ

6 (m)

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

h7 (m)

40 45 50 55 60 65 70

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

h8 (m)

Num. Exp.

Time(sec)
112

Figure 76. Diagrams showing side view (a) and plan view (b) of the experimental setup of a dam-break flow 

through a partial breach over a moveable bed. Cross-sectional profiles of the bottom were measured at 

locations cs1 and cs2. 

The identical situation to this experimental test has been reproduced numerically with a grid 

resolution of 0.025 m. As in previous tests, our time step varies and is based on a Courant number of 

0.3. Following Xiao and others (2010), Manning’s coefficient (n) is set to 0.015 while the empirical 

parameter (φ) is tuned to 5.0×10!! based on Kim and Lee (2011). Fall velocity can be approximated by 

an empirical formula (Ponce, 1989) because it is not given explicitly in the experimental description. 

Figure 77 compares the bottom profiles in the simulated and measured data. Reasonable 

agreement is seen at both profiles cs1 and cs2, but the simulation overestimates the peak erosion depth 

at cs1. As pointed out by Hinterberger and others (2007), in depth-averaged 2D modeling, turbulence 

backscattering needs to be considered when strong horizontal shear exists (as near the breached gap in 

this test). Through it, turbulence energy transfer from unresolved subdepth scale to the resolved 2D 

flows can be explained. Figure 78 shows the same results as in figure 77 but with the backscatter model 

used. Prediction of maximum erosion depth at cs1 is much improved by including backscatter model. 
113

Figure 77. Graphs comparing measured (Exp) and calculated (Num) bottom profiles in the case of the partially 

breached dam-break test (Xiao and others, 2010). 

Figure 78. Graphs comparing measured (Exp) and calculated (Num) (with backscatter model) bottom profiles in 

the case of the partially breached dam-break test (Xiao and others, 2010). 

Model Application to Santa Cruz Harbor, California

Some recent observations have shown that far-field tsunami events can lead to severe changes in 

bottom morphology, especially in the nearshore area (Lacy and others, 2012; Wilson and others, 2012). 

Because relatively small-amplitude tsunami waves (< 1–2 m) can create strong current fields near 

harbor basins (see, for example, Son and others, 2011; Lynett and others, 2012), tsunamis have great 

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6

-0.2

-0.15

-0.1

-0.05

0

distance from side wall(m)

Bed elevation(m)

Sectional Bottom Profile at X=2.5m

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6

-0.15

-0.1

-0.05

0

Sectional Bottom Profile at X=3.5m

distance from side wall(m)

Bed elevation(m)

Num

Exp

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6

-0.2

-0.15

-0.1

-0.05

0

distance from side wall(m)

Bed elevation(m)

Sectional Bottom Profile at X=2.5m

Num

Exp

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6

-0.15

-0.1

-0.05

0

distance from side wall(m)

Bed elevation(m)

Sectional Bottom Profile at X=3.5m

Num

Exp
114

potential to mobilize bed sediments. Needless to say, therefore, it is important to estimate tsunami 

currents accurately in the nearshore area in evaluating morphological changes near the shoreline. 

Traditional approaches to estimate sediment transport by tsunami waves are based on the shallow-water 

equation model (for example, Li and others, 2012). 

As a practical application of the present model to the coastal region, the 2011 Japan tsunami 

event is considered For precise estimations of current fields from far-field tsunami waves in the 

nearshore area, a multigrid and multiphysics model developed by Son and others (2011) was applied to 

2011 Japan event. A total of five nested layers were employed, with different levels of resolution. The 

final layer has the smallest domain focusing only on the Santa Cruz Harbor area, with relatively fine 

grid size (10 m), and is solved by Boussinesq equations to account for higher order effects by dispersive 

and turbulent processes. On the other hand, the rest of the layers, which generally cover a larger domain 

with deeper ocean rather than the shallow coastal region, are solved by shallow-water equations. The 

parametric values used in the sediment model are the median sediment diameter d50 = 0.15mm, 

Manning’s coefficient (n) = 0.025, and the empirical parameter (φ) = 5.0×10!!, which is an acceptable 

value for coastal sedimentation (see, for example, Kim and Lee, 2011). The Courant number of the 

Boussinesq model is set to 0.4. 

The simulation was performed for 14 hours of tsunami waves at the harbor to allow enough 

duration for the erosion and sedimentation processes. Resultant bathymetric change at the harbor 

entrance is shown in figure 79, compared with observed data. The overall pattern of sedimentation and 

erosion is quite well recreated by the numerical model. 

Figure 79. Changes in bottom bathymetry from tsunami-induced currents in Santa Cruz Harbor, California. Left: 

observed changes in the 2011 Japan tsunami event, excerpted from Wilson and others (2012). Right: 

computed bathymetric changes from the simulation. Color scale in meters (positive = deposition; negative = 

erosion).
115

Acknowledgments

The Science Application for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) Tsunami Modeling Working Group 

gratefully acknowledges the constructive and helpful comments of the following reviewers: Yong Wei 

(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory), David 

Dykstra (Moffatt & Nichol), Ruth Harris (U.S. Geological Survey, USGS), and Jessica Lacy (USGS). 

The SAFRR tsunami project and the modeling effort described in this report would not have been 

possible without the expert coordination and management efforts of Stephanie Ross (USGS). 

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Appendix A—SAFRR Tsunami Inundation Maps for Select Areas of California’s 

Coast

The Science Application for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) tsunami scenario would cause inundation 

of dry land along California's coast. The following maps provide examples of inundation for select areas 

of the coastline. These maps identify residential, business, and maritime areas and assets that could 

become flooded during a large tsunami event generated in the Pacific offshore the Alaska Peninsula. A 

GoogleEarth KML file provided on the U.S. Geological Survey and California Geological Survey 

SAFRR Web sites shows all areas mapped in California where inundation could occur from this 

scenario. The CGS SAFRR tsunami scenario web site provides access to the inundation maps and other 

information related to the scenario. This web site is found at 

http://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/geologic_hazards/Tsunami/Pages/SAFRR.aspx 

Figure A1 San Diego County – Ocean Beach: Peninsula is overtopped.
123

Figure A2 San Diego County – Del Mar: Several blocks and fairgrounds flooded. 

Figure A3 Orange County – Newport Beach: Complete and partial flooding of islands and near overtopping of 

Balboa Peninsula 
124

Figure A4 Orange County – Huntington Beach: Flooding overtops some levees and floods areas inland. 

Figure A5 Orange County – Huntington Beach (Sunset Beach): Flooding isolates and nearly overtops all 

parts of the community. 
125

Figure A6 Orange County – Seal Beach: Flooding occurs behind beach-front areas. 

Figure A7 Los Angeles County – Naples area: Significant flooding occurs in this area. 
126

Figure A8 Los Angeles County – Long Beach: Flooding of downtown area occurs where many 

Figure A9 Ventura County: Ventura and harbor: Several blocks and islands are inundated. 
127

Figure A10 Santa Barbara County – Carpinteria: Several blocks are inundated. 

Figure A11 San Luis Obispo County – Pismo Beach dunes and portions of the city are inundated. 
128

Figure A12 San Luis Obispo County – Portions of Avila Beach are flooded by a tsunami over 5m in height. 

Figure A13 San Luis Obispo County – Morro Bay: The Embarcadero is inundated. 
129

Figure A14 San Luis Obispo County – Cayucos: Several blocks of the town are inundated. 

Figure A15 Monterey County – Monterey: Flooding in the downtown and waterfront areas occurs. 
130

Figure A16 Monterey County – Moss Landing peninsula gets overtopped and inundated. 

Figure A17 Santa Cruz County – Santa Cruz: Flooding of area around Beach and Boardwalk and other inland 

areas.
131

Figure A18 San Mateo County – Princeton/Half Moon Bay: Flooding of all of Princeton and Half Moon Bay 

waterfront occurs. 

Figure A19 San Francisco: Flooding in parts of Marina District. 
132

Figure A20 Alameda County – Oakland: Large portions of Bay Farm Island and Oakland Airport are flooded. 

Figure A21 Contra Costa County – Areas around Port of Richmond are inundated. 
133

Figure A22 Marin County – Areas around Richardson Bay are inundated. 

Figure A23 Marin County – Belvedere and Tiburon: A large number of low-lying homes are flooded. 
134

Figure A24 Marin County – Stinson Beach: A large number of homes on the peninsula are flooded. 

Figure A25 Sonoma County – The Bodega Bay peninsula campground gets overtopped. 
135

Figure A26 Mendocino County – Low-lying areas within Noyo River harbor gets inundated. 

Figure A27 Humboldt County – Significant portions of Fields Landing and King Salmon get inundated. 
136

Figure A28 Del Norte County – All of the waterfront area in Crescent City gets inundated. 
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U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–E

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

The SAFRR Tsunami Scenario—Physical Damage in California
COVER: Tsunami damage to port buildings in Seward Alaska, March 1964. This tsunami 

caused severe damage in communities around the Pacific Rim, including Alaska, Hawaii, 

Washington, Oregon, and California. (Photograph: Karl V. Steinbrugge Collection, National 

Information Service for Earthquake Engineering, University of California, Berkeley. Photo 

credit: Mildred E. Kirkpatrick, courtesy of the National Information Service for Earthquake 

Engineering, EERC, University of California, Berkeley.
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami 

Scenario

Stephanie Ross and Lucile Jones, Editors 

The SAFRR Tsunami Scenario—Physical Damage 

in California

By Keith Porter, William Byers, David Dykstra, Amy Lim, Patrick Lynett, Jamie Ratliff, Charles 

Scawthorn, Anne Wein, and Rick Wilson 

Open-File Report 2013–1170–E 

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey
iii

U.S. Department of the Interior

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director 

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia: 2013

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Suggested citation:

Porter, K., Byers, W., Dykstra, D., Lim, A., Lynett, P., Ratliff, J., Scawthorn, C., Wein, A., and Wilson, R., 

2013, The SAFRR tsunami scenario—Physical damage in California, chap. E in Ross, S.L., and Jones, 

L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological 

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iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD 

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION

MARK NECHODOM 

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D. 

STATE GEOLOGIST
v 

Contents

Introduction—Chapter Objectives ................................................................................................................................... 1

Damage and Restoration of the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach ......................................................................... 2

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 2

Background .............................................................................................................................................................. 2

Historical Tsunami Events at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach ................................................................ 2

Damage and Restoration of Similar Ports During Tsunamis ....................................................................................... 4

Damage To and Caused by Vessels ....................................................................................................................... 5

Shoaling and Scour Caused by Currents .............................................................................................................. 10

Deformation of Wharves, Cranes, and Cargo ........................................................................................................ 12

Warehouse Flooding and Current Loads ............................................................................................................... 16

Damage to Liquid Bulk Terminals .......................................................................................................................... 16

Damage to Port Rail Facilities ............................................................................................................................... 16

Substation Damage ............................................................................................................................................... 21

Tsunami Hazard Assessment Models ................................................................................................................... 21

Tsunami Messages Related to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach ........................................................... 21

Tsunami Inundation Maps and Duration .................................................................................................................... 22

Distribution of Assets ................................................................................................................................................. 24

Displacement of maritime activities ....................................................................................................................... 25

Business-As-Usual Configuration .......................................................................................................................... 39

Physical Damage, Losses, and Logistics in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario ............................................................. 43

Impacts on Maritime Activities ............................................................................................................................... 44

Port of Long Beach ................................................................................................................................................ 45

Port of Los Angeles ............................................................................................................................................... 50

General Damage Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 55

Tsunami Impacts on Container Terminal Operations ............................................................................................ 55

Tsunami Impacts on Truck and Rail Movement ..................................................................................................... 56

Damage to Lifelines ............................................................................................................................................... 56

Damage to Other West Coast Ports ...................................................................................................................... 56

Damage to Other Southern California Ports .......................................................................................................... 56

Damage to the Port of San Francisco .................................................................................................................... 57

Damage to Port of San Francisco Headquarters Building ..................................................................................... 58

Damage to Other San Francisco Bay Ports ........................................................................................................... 63

Resilience Strategies ................................................................................................................................................. 65

Lessons for Ports from Hurricane Sandy ................................................................................................................... 67

Emergency Plans ................................................................................................................................................... 67

Physical Damage ................................................................................................................................................... 67

Recovery ................................................................................................................................................................ 69

Threats to Life Safety ............................................................................................................................................. 70

Damage to Large Vessels in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach ...................................................................... 70

Previous Instances of Vessels Breaking Their Moorings .......................................................................................... 70

Vessels at Risk .......................................................................................................................................................... 72

Damage to Large Vessels in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario .................................................................................... 73

Opportunities to Enhance Resilience ........................................................................................................................ 74

Damage and Restoration of Marinas and Small Craft ................................................................................................... 75
vi

Introduction and Purpose .......................................................................................................................................... 75

Assets Exposed to Loss ............................................................................................................................................ 75

Vulnerability ............................................................................................................................................................... 78

Historical Damage Data ......................................................................................................................................... 78

Fragility Functions for Velocity-Induced Damage .................................................................................................. 81

Repair Costs Conditioned on Damage ...................................................................................................................... 83

Damage Resulting from Overtopped Pilings .......................................................................................................... 84

Restoration Time ................................................................................................................................................... 84

Damage to Marinas and Small Craft in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario .................................................................... 85

Resiliency Opportunities ............................................................................................................................................ 88

Research Needs ........................................................................................................................................................ 89

Building Damage ........................................................................................................................................................... 90

Introduction and Purpose .......................................................................................................................................... 90

Estimating Assets Exposed to Loss .......................................................................................................................... 90

Forms of Building Damage ........................................................................................................................................ 92

Creating Tsunami Vulnerability Functions ................................................................................................................. 94

Building Damage in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario .................................................................................................. 99

Resiliency Opportunities .......................................................................................................................................... 101

Research Needs ...................................................................................................................................................... 101

Damage and Restoration of Roads and Roadway Bridges ......................................................................................... 102

Introduction and Purpose ........................................................................................................................................ 102

Assets Exposed to Loss .......................................................................................................................................... 102

Damage Modes ....................................................................................................................................................... 103

Estimating Damageability ........................................................................................................................................ 107

Repair Duration ....................................................................................................................................................... 108

Repair Costs ............................................................................................................................................................ 109

Damage to Roads and Bridges in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario .......................................................................... 109

Resiliency Opportunities .......................................................................................................................................... 111

Research Needs ...................................................................................................................................................... 112

Damage and Restoration of Railroads in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario ................................................................... 112

Agricultural Damages .................................................................................................................................................. 127

Types of Agricultural Damages from Tsunamis ....................................................................................................... 127

Historic Tsunamis and Agricultural Losses .............................................................................................................. 128

Potential Agricultural Damages in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario .......................................................................... 129

Methods ............................................................................................................................................................... 130

Agricultural Land Exposure .................................................................................................................................. 130

Soil and Crop Contamination ............................................................................................................................... 134

Livestock Exposure .............................................................................................................................................. 135

Summary of Agricultural Building and Content Damages .................................................................................... 135

Data and Research Needs ...................................................................................................................................... 137

Opportunities for Agricultural Resilience ................................................................................................................. 138

Fire Following Tsunami ............................................................................................................................................... 139

Review of Fires Following Historic Tsunamis and the Related Literature ............................................................... 139

1755 Lisbon Earthquake and Tsunami ................................................................................................................ 140

1964 Alaska Earthquake and Tsunami ................................................................................................................ 140

1964 Niigata Earthquake and Tsunami ............................................................................................................... 141

1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki Earthquake and Tsunami .......................................................................................... 142
vii

2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami ..................................................................................................... 145

2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami ............................................................................................................... 146

Summary ............................................................................................................................................................. 148

Fire in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario ..................................................................................................................... 149

Method ................................................................................................................................................................. 149

Humboldt Bay ...................................................................................................................................................... 153

San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Other Regions ................................................................................................ 156

Survey and Findings ................................................................................................................................................ 156

Fire Study Limitations and Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................... 162

Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................................................... 162

References Cited ........................................................................................................................................................ 163

Figures

1. Tide gage records at Port of Los Angeles Berth 60 for the 1960 Chilean Tsunami and the 

1964 Alaskan Tsunami ................................................................................................................................... 4

2. Photograph of Sri Lanka Port of Galle dredge grounded on wharf by a 5.3-meter tsunami 

wave during the 2004 Sumatra tsunami ......................................................................................................... 6

3. Photograph of MV Glovis Mercury displaced on top of wharf and damaged crane at Sendai 

Port, Japan, during 2011 Tohoku tsunami ...................................................................................................... 6

4. Photograph of Port of Colombo, Sri Lanka—A ship lost control in this entrance during the 

2004 Sumatra Tsunami ................................................................................................................................... 8

5. Photograph of broken back of coal carrier in navigation channel at Port of Shinchi, Japan, 

during the 2011 Tohoku tsunami .................................................................................................................... 8

6. Photograph of Port of Chennai, India—Vessel hitting shore crane during the 2004 Sumatra 

Tsunami .......................................................................................................................................................... 9

7. Photograph of Port of Chennai, India—two mooring dolphins missing after the 2004 Sumatra 

Tsunami .......................................................................................................................................................... 9

8. Photograph of hoppers destroyed by out of control vessel in Port of Chennai, India, during the 

2004 Sumatra Tsunami ................................................................................................................................. 10

9. Photograph of breakwater damaged in Chile 2010 Tsunami ........................................................................ 11

10. Photograph of seawall and road damaged in Chile Tsunami of 2010 ........................................................... 11

11. Photographs of damage from 2004 Sumatra Tsunami in Port Blair, India .................................................... 13

12. Photograph of utility and crane rail trench filled with debris and utilities damaged by the 2004 

Sumatra Tsunami in Port Blair, India ............................................................................................................ 13

13. Photograph of flooding of container wharf at Port of Chennai, India, in the 2004 Sumatra 

Tsunami ........................................................................................................................................................ 14

14. Photograph of damaged container crane motor in Port of Sendai, Japan, following the 2011 

Tohoku tsunami ............................................................................................................................................ 14

15. Photograph of container cranes collapsed due to tsunami current forces at Port of Shinchi, 

Japan, following the 2011 Tohoku tsunami ................................................................................................... 15

16. Photograph of undamaged steel at Port of Sendai, Japan, following the 2011 Tohoku tsunami .................. 15

17. Photograph of Sri Lankan Port of Galle warehouse damage during 2004 Sumatra Tsunami ...................... 17

18. Photograph of pier deck removed in Chile Tsunami of 2010 ........................................................................ 17

19. Photographs of damage by the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami .................................................................... 18
viii

20. Photograph of a fire at the Cosmo Oil Refinery in Ichihara after the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, 

tsunami ......................................................................................................................................................... 18

21. Photograph of pipes whose supports seem to have been undermined by tsunami scour in 

Ishinomaki, Japan, after the 2011 Tohoku tsunami ...................................................................................... 19

22. Photograph of tsunami-damaged tanks in Ishinomaki, Japan, after the Tohoku 2011 tsunami .................... 19

23. Photograph of tank floated off its foundation during the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami ............................... 20

24. Photograph of railroad-bridge deck removed during the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami .............................. 20

25. San Pedro Harbor, California, Middle Harbor marigram for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. .......................... 23

26. San Pedro Harbor, California, Turning Basin marigram for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. .......................... 23

27. Inundation map during the SAFRR tsunami for the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles ......................... 25

28. Map of maximum velocity for the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles during the SAFRR 

tsunami ......................................................................................................................................................... 26

29. Ranking of U.S. customs districts by value of cargo ..................................................................................... 27

30. Map of Port of Long Beach containerized terminals ..................................................................................... 28

31. Map of Port of Long Beach cargo types—dry bulk ....................................................................................... 30

32. Port of Los Angeles facility map .................................................................................................................... 34

33. Photograph of a modern container terminal .................................................................................................. 40

34. Diagram of San Pedro Bay loaded import container movement scenarios ................................................... 42

35. Port of Long Beach rail map ......................................................................................................................... 43

36. Marigrams in San Francisco Bay area for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. .................................................... 57

37. Wave amplitudes in the San Francisco Bay area for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. .................................... 59

38. Flooding along the San Francisco Embarcadero reaches 1 to 2 meters and wave velocities 

reach 5 to 10 meters per second (10-20 knots) in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. ........................................ 59

39. Inundation along the San Francisco Embarcadero in the SAFRR tsunami scenario .................................... 60

40. Velocities (left) and flow depth (right) at Port of San Francisco cargo piers in the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario. .......................................................................................................................................... 61

41. Velocities (A) and flow depth (B) at Port of San Francisco Pier 45 in the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario ........................................................................................................................................................ 62

42. Port of Oakland maritime facilities map ......................................................................................................... 64

43. Flow depths and inundation line at Port of Oakland in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. ................................. 64

44. Current velocities in the Port of Oakland in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. .................................................. 65

45. Photographs of damage from Hurricane Sandy at New York and New Jersey ports ................................... 69

46. Photograph of Drilling Vessel Chikyu, which was damaged in the 2011 Tohoku earthquake 

and tsunami .................................................................................................................................................. 71

47. A, Photograph of MV Rena aground on Astrolabe Reef, New Zealand, on October 13, 2011; 

B, Photograph of the Norfolk Express ........................................................................................................... 72

48. Image showing one location in the Port of Long Beach near a berth where tsunami currents 

exceed 6 knots (3 meters per second) in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. ...................................................... 73

49. Diagram showing motion of a particle representing a vessel in the Port of Long Beach moored 

at Pier J that parts its mooring lines and collides with nearby piers in the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario ........................................................................................................................................................ 74

50. Photograph of a concrete dock piling ............................................................................................................ 76

51. Photograph of boats sunk by the tsunami generated by the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake 

within Crescent City, California’s, small boat basin ....................................................................................... 79

52. Graph showing fragility model for boats and docks in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. .................................. 83

53. Graph showing restoration of damaged and destroyed docks after the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario ........................................................................................................................................................ 85
ix

54. Diagrams of paths of hypothetical floating debris from Port of Los Angeles marinas 3.5 to 6.5 

hours after the first arrival of the SAFRR tsunami. ........................................................................................ 87

55. Most of the losses to marinas in the SAFRR tsunami scenario are to the 10 marinas shown on 

this map, attributable to high current velocities or high wave heights. .......................................................... 88

56. Photographs of apparent effects of hydrodynamic pressure on buildings in Japan affected by 

the 2011 Tohoku tsunami ............................................................................................................................. 93

57. Photographs of wetting, soiling, and deposition of debris in buildings in Japan affected by the 

2011 Tohoku tsunami ................................................................................................................................... 94

58. Graphs of sample tsunami vulnerability functions for a large wood-frame building (W2) being 

used as a multifamily dwelling (RES3) of moderate-code construction ........................................................ 99

59. Map of coastal bridges and low-elevation roads in the SAFRR tsunami scenario study area .................... 103

60. Photographs of embankment scour at Route 45 bridge (Takada Bypass) over Route 141 

(Hamaiso Highway) due to the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. ............................................................................... 104

61. Photographs of tsunami damage from the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami .................................................. 105

62. Photographs showing a contrast in tsunami scour potential resulting from roadway elevation. ................. 105

63. Photographs of bridges whose superstructures were pushed or floated off their piers in the 

2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami ..................................................................................................................... 106

64. Photograph of example from the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami of how small craft represent a 

debris hazard for bridges ............................................................................................................................ 106

65. Photograph of damage from a barge impact on the Jokawa Bridge over the 

Higashimatsushima River in the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami that destroyed the middle span 

and damaged the other spans .................................................................................................................... 107

66. Map of SAFRRR tsunami scenario bridge and roadway damage locations ............................................... 110

67. Photograph of overturned passenger cars in Komagamine, Japan after 2011 Tohoku, Japan, 

tsunami ....................................................................................................................................................... 114

68. Photograph of overturned passenger train locomotive in Komagamine, Japan, after the 2011 

Tohoku tsunami. ......................................................................................................................................... 115

69. Photograph of displaced steel girder span near Rikuzen Takata after 2011 Tohoku, Japan, 

tsunami ....................................................................................................................................................... 116

70. Photograph of damaged piers of the JR Rail Viaduct crossing the Tsuya River, Japan, after 

the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. .......................................................................................................................... 117

71. Photograph of Coquimbo rail yard after 1922 Atacama, Chile, tsunami ..................................................... 118

72. Photograph of overturned locomotive at Seward after 1964 Alaska tsunami ............................................. 118

73. Photograph of Seward yard after 1964 Alaska tsunami. ............................................................................. 119

74. Photograph of open deck trestle damage from 1983 Hurricane Alicia in the United States ....................... 119

75. Photograph of track damage from 2008 Hurricane Ike in the United States ............................................... 120

76. Map of conditions, when SAFRR tsunami warning is received, at locations in ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach where inundation will be deep enough to damage cars left standing 

on track. ...................................................................................................................................................... 125

77. Satellite image annotated with details of location “A” (see fig. 76) at time of the SAFRR 

tsunami warning. ......................................................................................................................................... 126

78. Satellite image showing Eel River Delta, Humboldt County, land inundated in the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario. ........................................................................................................................................ 133

9. Satellite image showing land inundated in the SAFRR tsunami scenario around Moss Landing 

in Monterey County.. ................................................................................................................................... 134

80. Photograph of fire ignitions in the town of Aonae on the southern tip of Okushiri Island, Japan, 

following the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki earthquake and tsunami .............................................................. 142
x 

81. Photograph of tsunami and fire damage on southeast Okushiri Island in the community of 

Aonae, Japan, following the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki earthquake and tsunami ..................................... 144

82. Diagram of tsunami effects in the town of Aonae on the southern tip of Okushiri Island, Japan, 

following the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki earthquake and tsunami. ............................................................. 145

83. Photograph of Krueng Raya, Aceh, Indonesia, deep water port after the 2004 Indian Ocean 

tsunami ....................................................................................................................................................... 146

84. Photograph of MV Shiramizu aground in Shinchi following the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, 

earthquake and tsunami. ............................................................................................................................ 148

85. Map showing 111 California coastal petroleum facilities ............................................................................. 149

86. Map showing 46 California petroleum facilities sited in proximity to possible tsunami effects .................... 150

87. Images of example of small marina fueling dock not considered in this study of fire in the 

SAFRR tsunami scenario ............................................................................................................................ 153

88. Satellite image of Humboldt Bay, California, showing the three oil facilities in the area ............................. 154

89. Satellite image of Humboldt Bay, California, showing the three oil facilities in the area and 

annotated with tsunami flood depths for the SAFRR tsunami scenario ...................................................... 155

90. Satellite image of a Humboldt Bay, California, oil facility ............................................................................ 156

91. Photographs of Port of Los Angeles Berth 163 wood wharf and manifold and piping to storage 

tanks ........................................................................................................................................................... 158

92. Photographs of Port of Los Angeles Berth 163 ........................................................................................... 159

93. Photographs of Port of Los Angeles Berth 167-9 manifolding, piping, and secondary 

containment ................................................................................................................................................ 160

94. Cross-section diagram of a typical marine oil terminal (image from Charles Scawthorn). .......................... 160

95. Photograph of Los Angeles Fire department fireboat 2, the Warner L. Lawrence .................................. 161

96. Map image showing a random “snapshot” of Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach ship 

traffic—six tankers and 26 cargo vessels are inside the breakwater .......................................................... 162

Tables

1. Historical seismic events with tsunamis in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. ................................ 4

2. Port of Long Beach container terminal throughput values. ......................................................................... 29

3. Port of Long Beach dry bulk summary. ....................................................................................................... 31

4. Port of Long Beach liquid bulk summary. .................................................................................................... 32

5. Port of Long Beach break bulk/roll on-off summary. ................................................................................... 33

6. Port of Los Angeles container terminal throughput values. ......................................................................... 35

7. Port of Los Angeles dry bulk summary. ....................................................................................................... 36

8. Port of Los Angeles liquid bulk summary. ................................................................................................... 37

9. Port of Los Angeles automobile summary. .................................................................................................. 38

10. Port of Los Angeles break bulk summary. ................................................................................................. 38

11. Port of Los Angeles marinas and small craft slips. .................................................................................... 39

12. Assigning damage value to the Port of Long Beach and Port of Los Angeles. ......................................... 44

13. Port of Long Beach container terminal damage. ....................................................................................... 45

14. Port of Long Beach dry bulk damage. ....................................................................................................... 46

15. Port of Long Beach liquid bulk damage. .................................................................................................... 47

16. Port of Long Beach break bulk damage. ................................................................................................... 48

17. Port of Long Beach damage summary. ..................................................................................................... 49

18. Port of Los Angeles container terminal damage. ...................................................................................... 50
xi

19. Port of Los Angeles dry bulk damage. ...................................................................................................... 51

20. Port of Los Angeles liquid bulk damage. ................................................................................................... 52

21. Port of Los Angeles automobile damage. ................................................................................................. 53

22. Port of Los Angeles break bulk damage. .................................................................................................. 53

23. Port of Los Angeles marina damage. ........................................................................................................ 54

24. Port of Los Angeles damage summary. .................................................................................................... 55

25. Marinas in study area, from north to south. ............................................................................................... 77

26. Damage modes recorded by Wilson and others (2012). ........................................................................... 80

27. Building damage in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. ................................................................................. 100

28. Building and content value in California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services’ (Cal OES) .................. 

 maximum inundation zone. ..................................................................................................................... 101

29. SAFRRR tsunami scenario highway scour damage. ............................................................................... 110

30. SAFRRR tsunami scenario bridge embankment scour damage. ............................................................ 111

31. Tide gages near several coastal stretches of railway. ............................................................................. 122

32. County-level distribution of agricultural land in the SAFRR tsunami scenario inundation zone. ............. 132

33. Selected agricultural (HAZUS-MH AGR1) building loss statistics in the SAFRR tsunami 

inundation zone by county. ...................................................................................................................... 137

34. Burnt area given various size tanks, calculated using equation 25. ........................................................ 140

35. Summary findings for California petroleum facilities for fire following tsunami in the SAFRR ...................... 

 tsunami scenario. .................................................................................................................................... 151
The SAFRR Tsunami Scenario—Physical Damage in 

California

By Keith Porter,1 William Byers,2 David Dykstra,3 Amy Lim,3 Patrick Lynett,4 Jamie Ratliff,5 Charles 

Scawthorn,6 Anne Wein,5 and Rick Wilson7

Introduction—Chapter Objectives

By Keith Porter 

This chapter attempts to depict a single realistic outcome of the SAFRR (Science 

Application for Risk Reduction) tsunami scenario in terms of physical damage to and recovery of 

various aspects of the built environment in California. As described elsewhere in this report, the 

tsunami is generated by a hypothetical magnitude 9.1 earthquake seaward of the Alaska 

Peninsula on the Semidi Sector of the Alaska–Aleutian Subduction Zone, 495 miles southwest of 

Anchorage, at 11:50 a.m. Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on Thursday March 27, 2014, and 

arriving at the California coast between 4:00 and 5:40 p.m. (depending on location) the same 

day. Although other tsunamis could have locally greater impact, this source represents a 

substantial threat to the state as a whole. 

One purpose of this chapter is to help operators and users of coastal assets throughout 

California to develop emergency plans to respond to a real tsunami. Another is to identify ways 

that operators or owners of these assets can think through options for reducing damage before a 

future tsunami. A third is to inform the economic analyses for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. And 

a fourth is to identify research needs to better understand the possible consequences of a tsunami 

on these assets. The asset classes considered here include the following: 

· Piers, cargo, buildings, and other assets at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 

· Large vessels in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 

· Marinas and small craft 

· Coastal buildings 

· Roads and roadway bridges 

· Rail, railway bridges, and rolling stock 

· Agriculture 

 

1

University of Colorado at Boulder and SPA Risk LLC.

2

Private consultant.

3

Moffatt and Nichol Engineers.

4

University of Southern California.

5

U.S. Geological Survey.

6

SPA Risk LLC.

7

California Geological Survey.
2 

· Fire following tsunami 

Each asset class is examined in a subsection of this chapter. In each subsection, we 

generally attempt to offer a historical review of damage. We characterize and quantify the assets 

exposed to loss and describe the modes of damage that have been observed in past tsunamis or 

are otherwise deemed likely to occur in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. Where practical, we offer 

a mathematical model of the damageability of assets exposed to loss. Then, applying the 

damageability model and the velocity, wave amplitude, and inundation models discussed in other 

SAFRR chapters we offer a single realistic depiction of damage. Other outcomes are of course 

possible for this hypothetical event. Where practical we estimate repair costs and estimate the 

duration required to restore the assets to their pre-tsunami condition. We identify opportunities to 

enhance the resiliency of the assets, either through making them less vulnerable to damage or 

able to recover more quickly in spite of the damage. 

Finally, we identify uncertainties in the modeling where research would improve our 

understanding of the underlying mechanisms of damage and loss or otherwise improve our 

ability to estimate the future impacts of tsunamis and inform risk-management decisions for 

tsunamis. However, it is certain that the kinds of damages discussed here have occurred in past 

tsunamis, even in developed nations, and in a sufficiently large event, will occur in California. 

Our uncertainties can operate in either direction, either leading to an overestimate of damage or 

an underestimate. Therefore, losses in an actual future tsunami could be greater than depicted 

here. Furthermore this evaluation is not intended to be an exhaustive depiction of what could 

happen in this or similar tsunamis. Other impacts could occur that are not presented here. 

Damage and Restoration of the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach

By David Dkystra, Amy Lim, and Keith Porter 

Introduction

Background

The purpose of this section is to provide a detailed estimate of tsunami impacts in the 

Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (POLA/POLB) and a more general assessment of potential 

damage to other ports and harbors along the California coast. The detailed assessment of impacts 

to POLA/POLB is an engineering evaluation of the impacts to vessels and port structures, along 

with the resulting supply-chain impacts. 

For the purposes of estimating the impacts to POLA/POLB, it is assumed that vessel 

traffic and cargo inventories are as indicated in the Google Earth image dated March 7, 2011. 

The engineering evaluation presented in this section includes an estimate of physical impacts to 

the ports, damage costs, repair activities, other restoration activities, and resilience strategies. 

The impacts to shipping and infrastructure are based on conditions illustrated in the March 7, 

2011, Google Earth image. 

Historical Tsunami Events at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach

Prior to evaluating potential tsunami damage to POLA/POLB from the SAFRR scenario, 

it is useful to review the impacts associated with historical tsunamis. Although these historical 
3 

events are not necessarily equivalent to the SAFRR scenario, they do help inform the process of 

evaluating the potential damage from the proposed scenario based on engineers’ experiences 

during the events. Over the years, there have been measurements of significant water level 

fluctuations in the ports related to distant tsunamis from sources located in Alaska and Chile. 

Although tsunamis were generated from other sources, such as the 2004 Sumatra earthquake and 

2011 Tohoku earthquake, these events did not generate significant water level fluctuations in 

POLA/POLB. The significant historical events include the following: 

· 1922 Chilean tsunami 

· 1946 Aleutian tsunami 

· 1960 Chilean tsunami 

· 1964 Alaskan tsunami 

· 2010 Chilean tsunami 

These events and their associated seismic moments are summarized in table 1.The basic 

data for these tsunamis in Southern California are available from Wilson (1971), Raichlen 

(1972), Berkman and Symons (1964), and Spaeth and Berkman (1967). Note that because of the 

magnitude, proximity, and directionality of the tsunami scenario, effects in the Ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach from this tsunami would be greater than in these past events. 

An example of the tide gage records (marigrams) during the 1960 and 1964 events is 

presented in figure 1. The initial wave heights, as measured from peak to trough, reached as high 

as approximately 4.5 feet (ft) for the 1960 and 1964 tsunamis, as shown. It should be noted that 

the configuration of the harbor has changed over the years compared with what exists today in 

both ports, but the tsunami response has remained consistent over time and over varying 

locations within the Ports (Moffatt and Nichol, 2007). 

It is significant to note that tsunamis generated by distant seismic sources other than those 

listed above for Alaska and Chile do not produce inland inundation in southern California during 

the 20th Century. The most recent major 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan 

produced measured water level fluctuations on the order of 1 to 2 ft. The 2004 Sumatra 

earthquake and tsunami produced wave heights on the order of inches in POLA/POLB. There 

was no reported damage to any port facilities in either of these events. 

On the basis of discussions with engineers from POLA/POLB and review of available 

literature, the only historical tsunamis to generate significant damage were the 1960 Chilean and 

1964 Alaskan tsunamis. A Los Angeles Times articles at of 1960 suggests approximately $1 

million worth of damage and two deaths. The damage was limited to a small craft harbor area 

along the Cerritos Channel where strong currents damaged boats, floating docks, and guide piles. 

There was no impact to port facilities or infrastructure during the 1960 Chilean tsunami or any of 

the other tsunamis. During the 1964 Alaska tsunami, 100 boats were unmoored and six were 

sunk (Lander and others, 1993). During the most recent tsunami from the 2010 Chilean tsunami, 

port operations and vessel navigation were halted as a result of the advanced tsunami warning. 

Strong currents were observed by the port pilots in some of the constricted channels. The 

currents persisted for several days, making navigation somewhat more difficult. 

It should be noted that the port facilities at Los Angeles and Long Beach are extensively 

engineered and continually upgraded to conform to the latest codes, including increased seismic 

considerations. The facilities are also being continuously modified to provide efficient handling 

of cargo, increasing vessel traffic, and increasing vessel sizes. The improvements include the 

breakwaters, jetties, shoreline revetments, channel protections, and wharves. These continued 

improvements contribute toward minimizing risk of damage during tsunami events. 
4 

Table 1. Historical seismic events with tsunamis in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. 

[Mw, moment magnitude]

Source Date Magnitude MW

Chile November 10, 1922 8.5

Aleutian Trench April 1, 1946 8.1

Chile May 23, 1960 9.5

Alaska March 28, 1964 9.2

Chile February 27, 2010 8.8

Figure 1. Tide gage records at Port of Los Angeles Berth 60 for the 1960 Chilean Tsunami and the 1964 

Alaskan Tsunami (image from U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey). 

Damage and Restoration of Similar Ports During Tsunamis

Over the past decade, there have been three devastating tsunamis around the world: the 

2004 Sumatra tsunami, the 2010 Chilean tsunami, and the 2011 Tohoku, Japan tsunami. 

Following each of these tsunamis, many reconnaissance teams representing the engineering 

community were sent to review the damage at impacted sites and to learn about port design 

implications (American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Coasts, Oceans, Ports, and Rivers 

Institute, (COPRI), 2005, 2010, and ASCE, Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake 

Engineering (TCLEE), 2011). In addition, there is a PIANC (World Association for Waterborne 

Transport Infrastructure) Working Group 53 preparing a report on tsunami disasters in ports 

(PIANC, 2009). The reports from these reconnaissance teams and PIANC participants have 

provided a wealth of information on possible port damage mechanisms. In addition, several 

Moffatt and Nichol (M&N) personnel have participated in these reconnaissance teams and have 
5 

provided personal observations. The discussion in this section summarizes some of the damage 

mechanisms that have occurred in port facilities around the world during these most recent 

tsunami events. Not all these damage mechanisms are necessarily applicable to the ports. 

The three most recent tsunami events created the most damage near the coastline 

immediately adjacent to the seismic source. There was very little advance warning other than 

ground shaking during the earthquakes. The lack of warning time increased the vulnerability of 

nearby ports since there was little time to prepare or evacuate. Although southern California is a 

seismically active zone, the faults are predominantly strike slip faults, which are much less likely 

to generate major tsunamis compared to the subduction zone faults of the most recent extreme 

tsunamis. Earthquakes on these faults could still generate submarine landslides that could cause a 

large local tsunami with minimal warning time, but these events have a low occurrence 

probability. Thus, locally generated major tsunamis in southern California with the associated 

minimal warning time are unlikely. 

It was also noted by the reconnaissance teams that port facilities that were well 

engineered generally fared better than older, or less well-maintained, ports. This was particularly 

evident in Chile and Japan where tsunami events are relatively common and building codes are 

geared toward minimizing both the seismic damage and resultant tsunami damage. For the case 

of both the Chile 2010 and the Tohoku, Japan tsunamis, it was noted that the bulk of the damage 

was related to the extreme tsunamis rather than failures from the seismic event. This suggests 

that most of the observed damage to the port facilities following these events was the result of 

the tsunamis. 

Damage To and Caused by Vessels

The first class of port damage is related to vessels within the port, both navigating and 

moored vessels. The most commonly observed, and a dramatic phenomenon, is the displacement 

of vessels onto land by the rising water level and flooding. This requires substantial inundation 

exceeding the vessel draft. Examples of this type of damage are illustrated in figures 2 and 3. 

The Sumatra tsunami of 2004 deposited a dredge on a Sri Lankan wharf, damaging port 

buildings and other infrastructure (fig. 2). The vessel MV Glovis Mercury was deposited on a 

wharf in Sendai, shown in figure 3, damaging a crane and a port building. Removal of these 

vessels and repair to the facilities is typically on the order of a few months. Because of the 

shallow inundation depth and limited flooded area throughout POLA/POLB for the identified 

scenario, this damage mechanism is unlikely in the ports with the possible exception of small 

craft and floating debris. 
6 

Figure 2. Photograph of Sri Lanka Port of Galle dredge grounded on wharf by a 5.3-meter tsunami wave

during the 2004 Sumatra tsunami (photograph from American Society of Civil Engineers, Coasts, 

Oceans, Ports, and Rivers Institute, 2005). 

Figure 3. Photograph of MV Glovis Mercury displaced on top of wharf and damaged crane at Sendai 

Port, Japan, during 2011 Tohoku tsunami (photograph by Keith Porter). 
7 

The strong currents associated with tsunami propagation through port areas makes 

navigation extremely difficult and can result in vessels striking breakwaters and other port 

structures. If the vessels are damaged and sink within main shipping channels or harbor 

entrances, all vessel traffic will be halted until the channel is cleared. This type of vulnerability is 

illustrated in figures 4 and 5. Clearing the channel would normally be on the order of weeks, 

depending on the availability of equipment to remove the vessels. Repair of wharves or similar 

structures will take longer. If the damage is to a breakwater or jetty, the damage may not be 

immediately necessary for maintaining operations. Headland and others (2006) conducted 

vessel-maneuvering simulations for POLA/POLB during a hypothetical tsunami event. Their 

conclusions suggested difficult, but manageable maneuvering through Angel’s Gate during the 

peak currents of the hypothetical event. 

Strong currents can also have the potential to damage the mooring components for the 

vessels within the harbor due to excessive current drag on the vessels. This results in broken 

mooring lines, wharf bollards, or, in more extreme cases, broken mooring dolphins. Once the 

vessel is essentially freely floating within the harbor, there is a danger of striking port facilities. 

This type of damage is illustrated in figures 6 through 8. These examples are for the Port of 

Chennai, India as a result of the 2004 Sumatra tsunami. Despite the evident damage, the port was 

operating at significant capacity within days of the tsunami, because it is a fairly modern port. 

Vessels were rerouted to other undamaged berths and cleanup operations were optimized to 

restore minimally damaged facilities and reduce down time. Older, less well-engineered port 

facilities were reported to take significantly longer to return to capacity following the Chile 2010 

tsunami. 

In addition to current loads on moored vessels, there is evidence that vessels moving 

vertically due to the tsunami water level fluctuations can cause lines to part if the lines are not 

properly tended during the tsunami (Headland and others 2006). As the vessels rise with the 

water level, the lines become taut and potentially part. 

Water level fluctuations within ports can persist for days following the initial arrival of 

the tsunami with consequent unpredictable high currents. The persistence of these erratic 

currents is of concern because there may be the possibility of harbor resonance with the tsunami 

wave and possible impacts to port operations sensitive to currents, such as container wharves 

where excessive vessel motion may produce hazardous conditions during crane placement of 

containers (PIANC, 2009). 
8 

Figure 4. Photograph of Port of Colombo, Sri Lanka—A ship lost control in this entrance during the 2004 

Sumatra Tsunami (photograph from American Society of Civil Engineers, Coasts, Oceans, Ports, and 

Rivers Institute, 2005). 

Figure 5. Photograph of broken back of coal carrier in navigation channel at Port of Shinchi, Japan, 

during the 2011 Tohoku tsunami (photograph by Keith Porter). 
9 

Figure 6. Photograph of Port of Chennai, India—Vessel hitting shore crane during the 2004 Sumatra 

Tsunami (photograph by Martin Eskijian). 

Figure 7. Photograph of Port of Chennai, India—two mooring dolphins missing after the 2004 Sumatra 

Tsunami (photograph by Martin Eskijian). 
10

Figure 8. Photograph of hoppers destroyed by out of control vessel in Port of Chennai, India, during the 

2004 Sumatra Tsunami (photograph by Martin Eskijian). 

Shoaling and Scour Caused by Currents

The second class of damage is direct damage to port facilities and infrastructure from 

tsunami flooding. There is the potential for scour or shoaling due to substantial sediment 

movement during the tsunami. Sediment transport during the tsunami scenario, possibly resulting 

in scour or shoaling, was not simulated, but impacts can be significant. During the 2004 Sumatra 

tsunami, the Port of Galle in Sri Lanka experienced 2 meters (m) of shoaling within the harbor, 

which impacted vessel navigation within the port. A bathymetric survey would be required 

following the tsunami to identify this damage, which may not be immediately apparent. Either 

other viable channels would have to be identified or the port would be limited in operations. This 

could possibly be accommodated by restricting the draft of vessels accessing the port. The shoal 

material would have to be dredged prior to restoring normal port operations, which could take on 

the order of a few months depending on the availability of dredges. 

The scour resulting from the high current speeds could also result in scour around the 

base of rock armored slopes or breakwater and impact the stability of these types of structures. 

Damage to the actual slope armor is illustrated in figure 9 during the Chile tsunami of 2010. This 

damage actually occurred on the lee side of the breakwater where the tsunami overtopped the 

breakwater. The armor units were displaced down slope toward the toe of the breakwater. These 

displaced armor units could impact navigation if they are within the navigation channel. Another 

example of a damaged armor revetment is illustrated in figure 10, where a seawall and adjacent 

road were damaged from the overtopping during the Chile tsunami of 2010. Typically, damaged 

breakwaters or armored revetments would not impact port operations following the tsunami 

because they would remain fairly functional. 
11

Figure 9. Photograph of breakwater damaged in Chile 2010 Tsunami (photograph from American Society 

of Civil Engineers, Coasts, Oceans, Ports, and Rivers Institute, 2005). 

Figure 10. Photograph of seawall and road damaged in Chile Tsunami of 2010 (photograph from American 

Society of Civil Engineers, Coasts, Oceans, Ports, and Rivers Institute, 2005). 
12

Deformation of Wharves, Cranes, and Cargo

Tsunami damage to container wharves has also been observed at several ports. 

Displacement of the pile-supported wharf area relative to the backfilled land area is illustrated in 

figure 11A. The actual mechanism for this displacement is unclear, but it could be related to 

scour around the supporting piles, damage to the piles themselves, or excessive hydrostatic 

vertical load during the tsunami. It is possible that the displacement in this particular case at Port 

Blair was caused by seismic failure because the earthquake ground motions here were 

substantial. Container crane rails have also been misaligned, as illustrated in figure 11B, due to 

flow over the decks or pile damage from scour. The utility trenches and crane power supply 

trenches have been damaged by filling in with mud and debris, as illustrated in figure 12. 

There is a potential for empty containers to float off the container wharf if the inundation 

depth is great enough. These floating containers could cause damage to adjacent structures if 

currents are sufficiently high. In the case illustrated in figure 13 for the Port of Chennai, India, 

the flow depth was inadequate to displace the containers, as they were stacked sufficiently high. 

If full, it may be assumed that the contents of the bottom containers will be damaged beyond 

recovery. All impacts to containership facilities would likely take on the order of weeks to repair 

and restore operations. It should be noted that the cranes themselves were not damaged in Port 

Blair or the Port of Chennai, and were operational within days after the tsunami. 

Container crane damage can occur if the motors are submerged during the tsunami. This 

damage potential is illustrated in figure 14. Container cranes can also be damaged by strong 

currents at the base, as illustrated in figure 15. These types of damage to the container cranes will 

take several months to repair and restore the container berths to operation. Break bulk cargo, 

such as steel, is less vulnerable to tsunami damage, as shown figure 16. 
13

A B

Figure 11. Photographs of damage from 2004 Sumatra Tsunami in Port Blair, India. A, Differential 

settlement between pile supported wharf and backfill area in Port Blair, India. B, Container crane rail 

misalignment. (Photographs by Martin Eskijian). 

Figure 12. Photograph of utility and crane rail trench filled with debris and utilities damaged by the 2004 

Sumatra Tsunami in Port Blair, India (photograph by Martin Eskijian). 
14

Figure 13. Photograph of flooding of container wharf at Port of Chennai, India, in the 2004 Sumatra 

Tsunami (4.1-meter tsunami wave) (photograph by Martin Eskijian). 

Figure 14. Photograph of damaged container crane motor in Port of Sendai, Japan, following the 2011 

Tohoku tsunami (photograph by Keith Porter). 
15

Figure 15. Photograph of container cranes collapsed due to tsunami current forces at Port of Shinchi, 

Japan, following the 2011 Tohoku tsunami (photograph by Keith Porter). 

Figure 16. Photograph of undamaged steel at Port of Sendai, Japan, following the 2011 Tohoku tsunami 

(photograph by Keith Porter). 
16

Warehouse Flooding and Current Loads

Port warehouses adjacent to the waterfront may be damaged due to the flooding and 

current loads on the structures, as illustrated in figure 17. Floating debris, other than ships, such 

as vehicles, containers, and other equipment and structures can cause damage to otherwise 

undamaged facilities. Where there is warehouse damage, there is the possibility of igniting 

electrical fires. Where sheet pile walls exist within the ports, there is the possibility of damage to 

the walls from hydrostatic pressure from flooding, seafloor scour at the toe, and wave forces. 

Pier decks can be removed from the tops of the supporting piles, as shown in figure 18. This is 

likely due to wave uplift in conjunction with the high current speeds striking the side of the 

decks. Deck uplift with removal or damage can be significant if the tsunami wave period is short 

enough. For the case of the Chile tsunami of 2010, illustrated in figure 18, both mechanisms may 

have contributed because the tsunami event was a near field event, which typically contains 

shorter period waves than distant tsunami sources. Repair of these types of damage could take 

several months to a year. Tsunamis can flood cargo storage areas, wetting or floating vehicles 

and containerized cargo, as illustrated in figure 19. 

Damage to Liquid Bulk Terminals

Liquid bulk terminals may be susceptible to damage by rupturing pipelines. For example, 

as illustrated in figure 20, the Tohoku tsunami “caused multiple breaks of pipelines and many 

small hydrocarbon leakages from pipe connections which ignited. In two places, releases of 

heavy oil (4,400 and 3,900 m3

, respectively) were triggered due to connected pipe breaking by 

the tsunami.” (Kraussman and Cruz, 2013). Figure 21 shows how tsunami scour can undermine 

pipe supports. Tanks can be damaged by tsunami flows or debris, as shown in figure 22, and 

empty tanks can be floated away from their foundations, as illustrated in figure 23. These types 

of impacts could present significant environmental damage as the product is released into the 

flood waters and subsequently transported over a wide region. 

California oil terminals are currently designed and maintained to the latest standards 

provided in Marine Oil Terminal Engineering and Maintenance Standards (MOTEMS) 

(California State Lands Commission, 2010) incorporated in the California Building Code. The 

MOTEMS requirements incorporate mechanisms for rapidly shutting down oil pipelines to 

minimize the risk of an oil spill during a seismic event. A similar approach would be used during 

a tsunami event. 

Current practice within most ports of the world and specifically California is to construct 

a containment dike or wall around tank farms and pipelines. These containment dikes are 

designed to retain any leakage within the designated area, but could also easily be designed to be 

of sufficient height to reduce or eliminate tsunami overtopping. The tank farms within the ports 

are all contained within dikes or walls, which would reduce or eliminate the potential for floating 

tanks and damaging pipelines. 

Damage to Port Rail Facilities

Many modern ports include trains for transporting goods from the port facilities. There is 

the potential for train rails to be damaged similarly to container crane rails. Where rail bridges 

are included, there is the potential for the rail decks to be removed similarly to open piers, as 

illustrated in figure 24. Where rail links are crucial to port operations, this type of damage could 
17

result in significant downtime to the port following the tsunami because damage repair would 

likely be on the order of a few months. Rail is addressed more broadly elsewhere in this chapter. 

Figure 17. Photograph of Sri Lankan Port of Galle warehouse damage during 2004 Sumatra Tsunami 

(photograph from American Society of Civil Engineers, Coasts, Oceans, Ports, and Rivers Institute, 

2005). 

Figure 18. Photograph of pier deck removed in Chile Tsunami of 2010 (photograph from American Society 

of Civil Engineers, Coasts, Oceans, Ports, and Rivers Institute, 2010). 
18

 A B

Figure 19. Photographs of damage by the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami. A, Cars floated into a building by 

the 2011 Tohoku tsunami (photograph by Keith Porter). B, Cargo containers in Kashima after the 2011 

Tohoku tsunami (photograph from Wikimedia Commons). 

Figure 20. Photograph of a fire at the Cosmo Oil Refinery in Ichihara after the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, 

tsunami (photograph from Wikimedia Commons).
19

Figure 21. Photograph of pipes whose supports seem to have been undermined by tsunami scour in 

Ishinomaki, Japan, after the 2011 Tohoku tsunami (photograph by Keith Porter). 

Figure 22. Photograph of tsunami-damaged tanks in Ishinomaki, Japan, after the Tohoku 2011 tsunami

(photograph by Keith Porter). 
20

Figure 23. Photograph of tank floated off its foundation during the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami 

(photograph by Keith Porter). 

Figure 24. Photograph of railroad-bridge deck removed during the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami

(photograph from American Society of Civil Engineers, Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake 

Engineering, 2011). 
21

Substation Damage

Other potential damage to the ports is flooding of power substations, thus shutting down 

all port facilities. This damage is extremely significant in that custom-built transformers can take 

more than six months to replace. The likelihood of substation damage or impacts to port 

operations can be reduced by placement of the substations inland away from areas of expected 

inundation or construction of containment dikes or walls to reduce the risk of flooding. 

Substation damage also makes evacuation more difficult and hazardous. There was a case 

in the Chile tsunami of 2010 where the power was lost while a container crane was placing a 

container in the hull of the vessel. The container ship attempted to leave port to protect the vessel 

and destroyed the crane in the process (COPRI, 2010). The scenario suggests that the seismic 

event was responsible for the power loss because it was still possible for the vessel to 

successfully navigate. A more robust design of the power system for seismic sources may have 

eliminated this problem. 

Tsunami Hazard Assessment Models

Generalized tsunami hazard assessment models are currently very limited for use in the 

United States. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in conjunction with the 

National Institute of Building Sciences has developed a model for estimating losses from natural 

disasters. The primary purpose of the model, Hazards U.S.-Multihazard (HAZUS-MH), is to 

provide a methodology and software application to develop earthquake, flood, and hurricane 

losses at a regional scale. These loss estimates would be used primarily by local, State, and 

regional officials to plan and stimulate efforts to reduce risks from disasters and to prepare for 

emergency response and recovery. 

Although the HAZUS model proves to be a valuable source for loss estimation, the 

hazards estimation database is rather generic and not necessarily up to date. M&N has applied 

the model for a tsunami hazards assessment for POLA/POLB in a previous effort, but the 

damage assessment provided in this current SAFRR scenario is more accurate due to the use of a 

‘snapshot’ assessment on specific terminals and vessels on a particular day. 

Tsunami Messages Related to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 

In this scenario, a tsunami watch is issued for Coastal California shortly after the 

earthquake (11:54 a.m. on March 27, 2014), with a forecast start of the tsunami at San Pedro 

(and thus the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach) at 5:37 p.m. the same day. The watch is 

issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Weather 

Service (NWS) West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Palmer, Alaska. A tsunami 

watch means the warning center does not yet know the expected impact in the area addressed, 

and advises the reader to stay alert for further instructions. 

The watch is replaced at 2:05 p.m. on March 27, 2014, by a tsunami warning for the 

coastal areas of California from Alamitos Bay, 20 miles southeast of Los Angeles OregonCalifornia border (which includes the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach). For areas under 

tsunami warning, NOAA informs the reader that “Widespread dangerous coastal flooding 

accompanied by powerful currents is possible and may continue for many hours after tsunami 

arrival” and that “the first wave may not be the largest.” The reader in a warning area is advised 

to “move inland to higher ground,” not to “go to the coast to observe the tsunami” nor to “return 

to the coast until local emergency officials indicate it is safe to do so.” In the 2:05 p.m. tsunami 
22

message, NOAA advises the reader that the forecast start of the tsunami at San Pedro is 5:35 

p.m. with amplitudes of 1.6 ft ± 0.5 ft (0.5m ± 0.15 m) at San Pedro. In particular, this amplitude 

would be at NOAA National Data Buoy Center station 46222, at coordinates 33.618°N. 

118.317°W., about 6.4 nautical miles (11.8 kilometers, km) southeast of San Pedro harbor where 

the water is 457 m deep. Amplitudes would be greater in the harbor. Because NOAA’s tsunami 

messages provide amplitudes in U.S. units, we quote these and provide SI unit in parentheses. 

Thus it is 3.5 hours before the tsunami’s arrival that NOAA first warns the Ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach that a tsunami with powerful currents and widespread dangerous 

coastal flooding is coming in 3.5 hours. Note that as further tsunami messages arrive, the forecast 

tsunami arrival time does not change significantly, but forecast amplitude at San Pedro does 

increase, as follows. 

· 3:01 p.m.: estimated amplitude increased to 1.7 ft ± 0.5 ft (0.52 m ± 0.15 m) 

· 4:01 p.m.: estimated amplitude increased to 1.8 ft ± 0.5 ft (0.55 m ± 0.15 m) 

· 5:02 p.m.: estimated amplitude increased to 2.0 ft ± 0.6 ft (0.61 m ± 0.18 m) 

· 6:02 p.m.: estimated amplitude increased to 2.2 ft ± 0.6 ft (0.67 m ± 0.18 m), with an 

amplitude of 1.2 ft (0.37 m) already observed at the San Pedro buoy. 

· 7:01 p.m.: estimated amplitude increased to 2.3 ft ± 0.7 ft (0.70 m ± 0.21 m, 1.2 ft or 0.37 

m observed) 

· 8:01 p.m.: estimated amplitude increased to 2.4 ft ± 0.7 ft (0.73 m ± 0.21 m, 2.8 ft or 

0.85m already observed) 

· 9:01 p.m. the forecast amplitude has not changed but 3.1 ft (0.94 m) has been observed. 

· At 5:04 p.m. on Friday March 28, 2014, 29 hours after the earthquake, the warning for 

San Pedro is changed to an advisory 

· At 9:01 a.m. on Saturday March 29, 2014 (45 hours after the earthquake), the advisory is 

cancelled for the stretch of the California coast from a point 15 miles southeast of Santa 

Barbara to the California-Mexico border, which includes the Ports of Los Angeles and 

Long Beach. 

Tsunami Inundation Maps and Duration

The tsunami propagation modeling indicates that the first wave produces the maximum 

wave amplitude and associated maximum currents. The maximum drawdown and significant 

waves will have passed by 6:00 p.m. PDT, a little over an hour after initial arrival, but as shown 

in figures 25 and 26, significant wave activity continues for several hours after the arrival of the 

first wave. As the tsunami reflects around the Pacific Ocean, higher than normal current speeds 

and less severe water level fluctuations in POLA/POLB are predicted to occur over the following 

several days. The base water depth at time of the tsunami’s arrival is taken as 20 centimeters 

(cm) above mean high water (denoted here by MHW+20). 
23

Figure 25. San Pedro Harbor, California, Middle Harbor marigram for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 

Figure 26. San Pedro Harbor, California, Turning Basin marigram for the SAFRR tsunami scenario.
24

Basin-wide hydrodynamic modeling was conducted for the selected SAFRR tsunami 

source seaward of the Alaska Peninsula on the Semidi Sector of the Alaska–Aleutian subduction 

zone. Higher resolution and high-order modeling was conducted for selected ports and harbors 

including the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The hydrodynamic modeling resolution for 

inundation in the ports was 10 m. The limit of inundation (referred to here as the inundation line) 

was based on 2009–2011 topography from LIDAR DEM with 1-m resolution. 

The DEM used for the basis of the hydrodynamic modeling and creation of the 

inundation limits did not include some of the additional landfills and other modifications to the 

ports since the development of the DEM. Therefore, recent aerial photography (circa 2011) was 

used to check and update the inundation maps to reflect the newer landfills. These landfill areas 

included the Cabrillo Marina shoreline reconfiguration, Port of Long Beach Pier G, Middle 

Harbor, and Pier T dry dock landfills, and the Port of Los Angeles landfill in the dry dock area 

adjacent to the U.S. Coast Guard station. Two areas in the Port of Long Beach near Pier G and 

Piers E/F, where landfill work is currently ongoing, were not altered. The resolution of the DEM 

was insufficient to resolve containment dikes and containment walls surrounding tank farms. If 

these structures are adequately designed to withstand tsunami loads and depths, no inundation 

would occur there. In addition, maximum current speeds through the channel constrictions 

leading to basins where landfills are being constructed would be expected to be reduced, because 

the tsunami prism within the basins is reduced. Figure 25 depicts the resultant inundation limits 

for San Pedro Harbor. 

Figure 26 represents the maximum tsunami-generated current velocities. Maximum 

current speeds reach as high as 8 knots through Angel’s Gate and Queens Gate and some of the 

channel constrictions leading to specific basin areas such as Southeast Basin and West Basin in 

the Port of Long Beach. Maximum current speeds along the sides of the channels where vessels 

are moored are generally 2 to 3 knots. 

Distribution of Assets

The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach make up two of the busiest ports on the west 

coast. Together, they are the number-one container port in the United States. In 2011, the ports 

accounted for approximately 10 percent of the U.S. total volume of foreign waterborne cargo and 

22 percent of the U.S. total foreign value of cargo, as shown in figure 27. In the event of a 

tsunami, neighboring ports along the west coast that may serve as alternative vessel loading/ 

unloading locations include the Port of Seattle, the Port of Tacoma, the Vancouver-Prince Rupert 

ports in Canada, and possibly some ports in Mexico. Other closer alternate ports along the 

Pacific coast are expected to experience some damage and operational downtime during the 

tsunami scenario. These include Port Hueneme, the Port of San Diego, the Port of Oakland, and 

the Port of San Francisco. 
25

Figure 27. Inundation map during the SAFRR tsunami for the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles. 

Green line, maximum run-up. (Base map from Google Earth.) 

Displacement of maritime activities 

The following section summarizes the major cargo present at POLA/POLB during the 

tsunami scenario. The location and travel direction of vessels in the harbor during the tsunami 

were taken from the satellite imagery and Maritime Exchange information on March 7, 2011 

(figure 25). These particular vessels are listed under ‘Vessel Name’ in table 2. Quantities of 

cargo exposed to the tsunami were estimated from the 2011 annual throughput values. 

Throughput values for March 27, 2014, are assumed to take on the same throughput values of a 

typical day in 2014. 
26

Port of Long Beach 

Containerized

Containerized cargo includes any type of cargo moving within standard shipping 

containers. Such containers primarily contain finished goods such as clothing, toys, and 

furniture. Liquids and other unique cargoes may be shipped in specialized containers. Figure 28 

highlights the main container terminals at the Port of Long Beach and distribution of cargo types 

can be seen in figure 29. Projected annual and average daily throughput values for each terminal 

are presented in table 2. Column indicating “Projected throughout on March 27, 2014,” is 

assumed to be the same value at the location at 11:50 a.m. March 27, 2014. Vessel names are 

given at each location to provide some tangible detail on the day of the tsunami. At locations 

where no vessel name is listed, assume no particular vessel is present. 

Figure 28. Map of maximum velocity for the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles during the SAFRR 

tsunami. Green line, maximum run-up. (Base map from Google Earth.) 
27

Figure 29. Ranking of U.S. customs districts by value of cargo (data from U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). 
28

Figure 30. Map of Port of Long Beach containerized terminals (image courtesy Port of Long Beach). 
29

Table 2. Port of Long Beach container terminal throughput values. 

[TEUs, twenty-foot equivalent units]

Location

2011 

Throughput

(TEUs)

2014 

Projected

Throughput 

(TEUs)*

Projected 

throughput on 

March 27, 2014 

(TEUs)

Gantry 

Cranes Acreage Vessel Name

Pier T Berth 

T132-T140 1,358,000 1,561,700 4,290 14 385 Hanjin

Pier G: 

Berths 

G226-G236

743,000 854,450 2,347 17 246 CSAV LUMACO

Pier F: 

Berths F6-

F10

671,000 771,650 2,120 7 102 OOCL TOKYO—

Arrival 3:15 p.m.

Pier J: 

Berths J243-

J247, J266, 

J270

1,613,000 1,854,950 5,096 7 256 POS HONGKONG, 

departing

Pier A: 

Berths A88-

A96

1,340,000 1,541,000 4,234 10 200

SEA-LAND 

INREPID, arrived 

4:15 a.m.

Pier C: 

Berths C60-

C62

337,000 387,550 1,065 3 70 MAUNAMWILI, 

arrived 6:45 p.m.

Total 6,062,000 6,971,300 19,152 58 1,259

*Projected 5-percent annual container growth rate. 
30

Figure 31. Map of Port of Long Beach cargo types—dry bulk (image courtesy Port of Long Beach).
31

Dry Bulk

Dry bulk includes dry cargoes that are shipped in bulk and measured by weight or 

volume. Based on past dry bulk growth statistics, it is assumed 2014 throughput values are 

constant with 2011 throughput values, as presented in table 3. 

Table 3. Port of Long Beach dry bulk summary. 

[MTPH, metric tons per hour; --, no data]

Location Material Equipment/ 

Facilities

2011 

Throughput value 

(metric 

tons)

Projected 

throughput on 

March 27, 2014 

(metric tons)

Acreage Vessel Name

Pier D—

Berth D46

Gypsum Elevated receiving 

hopper served by an 

elevated electric belt 

conveyor system.

111,000 305 9 --

Pier DBerth D32Cement Silo capacity—50,000 

tons. Unloads conveyer 

system direct to silos.

2 --

Pier F—

Berth F211

Petroleum Coke, 

prilled sulfur

Receipt, storage, 

blending, and vessel 

loading of petroleum 

coke. Import/Export of 

prilled sulfur.

711,000 1954 7 --

Pier FBerth F208Cement 2 pneumatic ship 

unloaders with 800 

MTPH and 180 MTPH 

capacity.

4 --

Pier F—

Berth F210

Salt Movable incline 

elevated electric belt 

conveyor system with 

receiving hopper 

extending from wharf 

to stockpile area. 

Packing g plant 

adjacent.

5 --

Pier GBerths 

G212-G214

Petroleum coke, 

coal, potash, borax, 

sodium sulfate, 

soda ash, 

concentrates, and 

prilled sulfur.

2 electric traveling 

bulk ship loaders.

6,950,000 19,094 23 LEO 

ADVANCE, 

departing 

3/8/11

Pier BBerth B82Gypsum Adjustable, elevated 

receiving hopper 

served by an elevated 

electric belt conveyor 

system extending to 

40,000 ton capacity 

storage building.

137,000 377 19 --

Total 7,909,000 21,730 69
32

Liquid Bulk

Liquid forms of bulk cargo are measured by weight or volume. Commodities like crude 

oil, gasoline, and miscellaneous chemicals are common liquid bulk cargoes. Based on past liquid 

bulk growth statistics, it is assumed 2014 throughput values are constant with 2011 throughput 

values, as presented in table 4. 

Table 4. Port of Long Beach liquid bulk summary. 

[--. no data]

Location Cargoes 

Served

Equipment/

Facilities

2011 

Throughput 

values 

(metric tons)

Projected 

throughput 

on March 27, 

2014 (metric 

tons)

Acreage Vessel 

Name

Pier TBerth 

T121

Crude oil and 

petroleum 

products

Four 16-in. diameter 

articulated crude

unloading arms and one 

8” dia. Particular 

bunker/diesel loading 

arm

17,916,000 49,220 6 --

Pier B—

Berths 

B76-80

Petroleum 

products

Four 16-in. diameter 

articulated crude 

unloading arms and one 

8” dia. Particular 

bunker/diesel loading 

arm

10,649,000 29,300

6 --

Pier B 

Berth 

B82,83

Gasoline, 

ethanol, 

gasoline blend 

stocks, diesel, 

biodiesel

Two 8-inch dock hoses 

connecting into two 10-

inch dock lines capable 

of receiving up to 

12,000 BBLS per hour

6 --

Pier B—

Berth 

B84-B87

Crude oil, 

petroleum 

products, 

bunker fuel.

Discharge capacity: 

32,000 BBLS, 24 in 

pipeline to storage and 

tank farm. Storage 

capacity—245,000 

BBLS

11 --

Pier F—

Berths 

F209-211

Petroleum 

products and 

bunker fuel

Storage capacity—

425,000 BBLS. 

Pipeline system to 

handle ships, barges, 

trucks, railcars.

2,311,000 6,350 5 

PENN 91, 

departing 

3/9/11

Pier S 

Berth 

S101

Miscellaneous 

bulk liquid 

chemicals

Dedicated pump/piping 

system to transfer 

products to and from 

ships, barges, railcars 

and tank trucks. Storage 

cap. 15 million gallons.

2,030,000 5,580 10 --

Total: 31,826,000 90,450 44
33

Break Bulk and Roll On -Roll Off

Large or heavy items such as steel, lumber, machinery, and food products moved on 

pallets are Break Bulk cargoes. Roll On-Roll Off cargoes are items that are driven on and off a 

vessel. Based on past break bulk growth statistics, it is assumed 2014 throughput values are 

constant with 2011 throughput values, as presented in table 5. Automobile terminal will assume a 

capacity of 80 percent. 

Table 5. Port of Long Beach break bulk/roll on-off summary. 

[n/a, not applicable; --. no data]

Location Equipment/

Facilities

2011 

Throughput 

Values

Projected 

throughput 

on March 27, 

2014

Acreage Vessel Name

Pier F 

Berths 

F204-F205

Steel products, plywood, 

and lumber.

440,000 

metric tons

1,209 metric 

tons

21 --

Pier F—

Berth F206, 

F207

Steel products, plywood, 

lumber, project cargoes, 

and large machinery.

22 --

Pier F 

Berth F201 Standby berth 600 --

Pier D, 

Berth D50-

D54

Crescent Warehouse 

Company n/a n/a 13.3 --

Pier T, 

Berth T122

Lumber and Lumber 

products

904,000 

metric tons

2,484 metric 

tons

17

Pier T 

Berth T118

Recyclable metal and

steel products. 16

PANAMAX 

SUCCESS, departing 

3/8/11

Pier TBerth T122Lumber and lumber 

products. 18 --

Pier B 

Berth B82, 

B83

Automobiles, Office 

building, processing 

buildings, body shop and

car wash

121,000 

vehicles

2,000

vehicles 168 --

Total 875.3
34

Port of Los Angeles

Containerized

Figure 30 highlights the main container terminals at the Port of Los Angeles. Projected 

annual and average daily throughput values for each terminal can be seen in table 6. Column 

indicating “Projected throughout on March 27, 2014,” is assumed to be the same value at the 

location at 11:50 a.m. 27 March 2014. Vessel names are given at each location to provide some 

tangible detail on the day of the tsunami. At locations where no vessel name is listed, assume no 

particular vessel is present. 

Figure 32. Port of Los Angeles facility map (image courtesy Port of Los Angeles). 
35

Table 6. Port of Los Angeles container terminal throughput values. 

[TEUs, twenty-foot equivalent units; --. no data]

Location

2011 

Throughput 

(TEUs)

2014 

Projected

Throughput 

(TEUs)*

Projected 

throughput 

on March 27, 

2014 (TEUs)

Gantry 

Cranes Acreage Vessel Name

Berths 

100-102 401,000 461,150 1,270 8 91 --

Berths 

121-131 820,000 943,000 2,590 5 186 126—YM PINE, 

departing 3/9/11

Berths 

135-139 762,200 876,530 2,410 7 173 --

Berths 

206-209 380,000 437,000 1,200 7 86 --

Berths 

212-225 815,000 937,250 2,575 10 185 --

Berths 

226-236 904,000 1,039,600 2,860 3 205

227-EVER EAGLE, 

departing 3/8/11

Berths 

302-305 1,290,000 1,483,500 4,100 12 292

303- MOL 

EFFICIENCY, 

departing 3/8/11

304-APL Philippines, 

departing 3/9/11

Berths 

401-404 2,133,500 2,453,525 6,470 14 484

401-MAERSK 

WAKAYAMA, 

departing 3/8

402- MAERSK 

ALFIRK, departing 

3/8/11

403

404-HORIZON 

HAWK, departing 

3/8/11

Berths 

405-406 401,000 451,150 1,270 4 91

406—HYUNDAI 

UNITY, departing 

3/8/11

Total 7,900,000 9,085,000 25,000 70 1793

*Projected 5 percent annual container growth rate. 
36

Dry Bulk

Based on past dry bulk growth statistics, it is assumed 2014 throughput values are 

constant with 2011 throughput values, as presented in table 7. 

Table 7. Port of Los Angeles dry bulk summary. 

[--. no data]

Location Terminal 

features

2011 

Throughput 

(metric tons)

2014 Projected

Throughput 

(metric tons)

Projected 

throughput on 

March 27, 2014 

(metric tons)

Acreage Vessel Name

Berths 

165-166

Industrial 

borates 306,570 306,570 843 7 --

Berths 

210-211

Handles all 

grades of 

ferrous and 

non-ferrous 

scrap metals

1,169,340 1,169,340 3,212 26.7 --

Total 1,200,000 1,475,910 4,055 27.4
37

Liquid Bulk

Based on past liquid bulk growth statistics, it is assumed 2014 throughput values are 

constant with 2011 throughput values, as presented in table 8. 

Table 8. Port of Los Angeles liquid bulk summary. 

[--. no data]

Location Use: 2011 Throughput

(metric tons)

2014 

Projected

Throughput

(metric tons)

Projected 

throughput 

on March 27, 

2014 (metric 

tons)

Acreage Vessel Name

Berths 

118-120

Receiving 

exporting 

petroleum 

products

980,866 980,866 2,695 12.4 -- 

Berths 

148-151

Vessel 

unloading of 

partly or 

fully refined 

petroleum 

products

495,540 495,540 1,361 13.5 -- 

Berth 163 Marine oil 295,440 295,440 812 5.8 -- 

Berth 164 Fuels and 

lubricants 1,466,680 1,466,680 4,030 10.5 -- 

Berths 

167-169

Fuels and 

lubricants 1,906,238 1,906,238 5,237 9.1 -- 

Berths 

187-191

Liquid bulk 

chemical 

products

4,284,192 4,284,192 11,778 34.7

189- SUNSET 

BAY, depart 

3/7/11 p.m.

Berths 

238-240C

Fuels and 

lubricants 836,141 836,141 229 31.4 -- 

Total 10,265,097 10,265,097 117.4
38

Automobile 

From the satellite imagery, the automobile berth is estimated to be 80 percent full. 

Assuming 2011 vehicle storage is constant in 2014 (table 9), the number of vehicles present at 

the time of the tsunami can be projected. 

Table 9. Port of Los Angeles automobile summary. 

Location Terminal features

Projected

automobiles on 

March 27, 2014

Berth length Acreage

Berths 

195-199

Storage capacity up 

to 8,000 vehicles 6,400 2,250 feet 85

Break B ulk 

Large or heavy items such as steel, lumber, machinery and food products moved on 

pallets are break-bulk cargoes. Based on past break bulk growth statistics, it is assumed 2014 

throughput values are constant with 2011 throughput values, as presented in table 10. 

Table 10. Port of Los Angeles break bulk summary. 

[n/a, not applicable; --. no data]

Location Terminal 

features

2011 

Throughput

(metric tons)

2014 Projected

Throughput

(metric tons)

Projected 

throughput 

on March 27, 

2014 (metric 

tons)

Acreage Vessel Name

Berths 

49-53

Use: Break bulk 

steel n/a n/a n/a 24 --

Berths 

54-55

Imported meats, 

Chilean fruit, 

kiwis, apples

119,000 119,000 327 12 --

Berths 

174-181 Steel 1,950,000 1,950,000 5,357 40

176-Pacific 

Flores, 

departing 

3/8/11

Total 2,069,000 2,069,000 5,684 76
39

Small Craft Basins

Within the Port of Los Angeles, there are a total of 16 marinas containing 3,795 

recreational boat slips. There are 10 marinas located in Wilmington, five in San Pedro and one 

on Terminal Island, as summarized in table 11. 

Table 11. Port of Los Angeles marinas and small craft slips. 

Marina Name Location Slips

Al Larson's Marina Berth 258 128

Cabrillo Beach Yacht Club Berth 35 184

Cabrillo Way Marina Berths 42-43 697

California Yacht Marina-Cabrillo Marina Berth 29-33 885

California Yacht Marina Berth 202 266

Cerritos Yacht Anchorage Berth 205 90

Holiday Harbor-Fleitz Bros. Berth 34 300

Holiday Harbor Berth 201 169

Island Yacht Anchorage #1 Berth 205 22

Island Yacht Anchorage #2 Berth 200X 116

Leeward Bay Marina Berth 201 190

Lighthouse Yacht Landing Berth 205 70

Pacific Yacht Landing Berth 203 178

San Pedro Marina Berth 80 85

Yacht Centre-Newmarks Berth 204 250

Yacht Haven Marina Berth 202 165

Business-As-Usual Configuration

Modern container terminals are complex facilities designed to unload and load vessels 

and transfer containers to and from landside modes of transportation, that is, trucks and trains. 

Understanding how these facilities operate is important to understanding the potential changes or 

damages that may occur during and after a tsunami event. 

Typical Container Terminal Operations

Terminal Components

In general, a modern container terminal (see figure 33) integrates a variety of physical 

components and operational processes. The physical components consist of: 

· Dock structures or wharves with large, electric-powered gantry cranes; 

· Container storage areas, known as the container yard; 

· Entrance and exit gate complexes that include paperwork management facilities, physical 

screening facilities (for example, truck and chassis inspection areas, radiation monitors, 

and custom facilities), and truck queuing areas; 

· Maintenance buildings for terminal equipment and chassis; 

· Operations control buildings for marine and gate operations; 

· An administration building; 

· For terminals with intermodal capability, a rail yard and a rail operations control 

building; and 

· Cargo handling equipment, including yard tractors, chassis for containers, light trucks 

and utility vehicles, and several types of mobile cranes and container handling 

equipment. 
40

The operational processes include loading and unloading ships at the wharves, storing 

and handling containers in the container yard, managing in-terminal rail yard operations, 

dispatching containers to off-dock rail yards, and managing container delivery and pickup by 

trucks for local destinations. 

Figure 33. Photograph of a modern container terminal (photograph from Wikimedia Commons). 
41

Loading and Unloading of Vessels

Import containers arrive at and export containers depart from the terminals via container 

ships. Most container ships range from 700 to more than 1,100 feet in length and have cargo 

capacities from a few thousand to over 9,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). 

Once the vessel is tied at the wharf, the containers are loaded and unloaded by gantry 

cranes onto wheeled chassis. The cranes have steel wheels and are mounted on steel rails so they 

can move along the dock to serve multiple hatches and vessels. Each crane has a boom that is 

lowered over the vessel. The boom supports a container-lifting “spreader” with twist-locking 

corner devices that attach to the top corner castings of the containers to lift them. A crane 

operator rides in a cab above the spreader and controls the attachment and release functions. 

These cranes, which include specialized, highly computerized equipment that allows productive 

operations, can transfer 25 to 40 containers per hour. Typical modern gantry cranes stand 

approximately 150 feet high when the boom is outstretched and approximately 200 feet high 

when the boom is lifted, and mount on rails set 100 feet apart. 

The number of cranes simultaneously servicing one ship can vary from one to five, or 

even more, depending on the size of the ship, the number of other vessels berthed at the terminal 

crane site, the availability of cranes, and the ship’s scheduled port time. The amount of time a 

vessel spends at the berth varies with the amount of cargo to be unloaded and loaded and the 

number of cranes assigned to work the ship. Typical call durations range from 36 hours for small 

ships to five days for the largest vessels. Loading and unloading operations usually proceed 

around the clock. 

Container Handling

After import containers are unloaded, they undergo security inspection. Each container is 

sealed with a metal ribbon attached to the doors, allowing a customs officer to ensure the 

contents of the container were not tampered with during voyage. Most containers are screened 

with an X-ray device, but every day some containers are inspected manually. 

Once containers are off the vessel, they are taken to the container yard for temporary 

storage pending pickup by truck or train. Most of the export containers to be loaded are already 

stacked in the part of the container yard nearest the vessel berth and are transported to the crane 

via hostlers. 

Gate Operations

Containers arrive at and depart from the terminal through the gate complex. The gate 

interchange is the legal exchange of possession of the container from the terminal to the trucking 

company, or vice versa. 

Locally bound import containers are turned over to street-legal tractors (that is, 

semitrailer trucks) that arrive to pick up the cargo. The trucks arrive at the terminal either hauling 

export cargo or “bobtail” (that is, a tractor without a trailer) and, after presenting the appropriate 

paperwork, are directed to the container’s location. For stacked cargo, the truck may need to pick 

up a chassis and then wait for a crane to load the container onto the chassis. For wheeled cargo, 

the truck can hitch up to the loaded chassis and proceed to the exit gate. Trucks hauling import 

cargo are processed out of the terminal at the exit gate, which involves passing through a 

radiation portal monitor, being inspected for road readiness, and clearing customs and brokerage 

paperwork. 
42

Loaded export containers arriving from California, Arizona, Nevada, and some points 

farther east typically arrive at the gate on chassis pulled by trucks and are stacked or parked in 

the container yard to await their ship. Export cargo arriving from more distant locations typically 

arrive at the terminal via rail, either directly at the terminal’s on-dock rail yard or at another local 

rail yard from which it is trucked to the terminal gate for receiving. Cargo containers are 

transferred from the rail cars to chassis or bomb carts using mobile cranes or RTGs and hauled 

by yard tractors to preplanned locations in the yard, where the containers are either lifted to 

grounded spots by another crane or parked on their chassis. 

Truck Movement

Trucks fill the gap between the railcar and the shipper’s loading dock, hauling containers 

between the warehouses, factories, or docks and the intermodal rail yards. Trucks are the vital 

first and last link in the goods movement chain. Short-haul trucking of marine cargo containers is 

known as drayage. Containers may be drayed between a marine terminal and an intermodal rail 

yard or between a marine terminal and a local distribution center, store, or transloading 

warehouse (see fig. 34). 

Most of the population of the U.S. lives within 50 miles of the coast or of a major 

intermodal rail yard, and trucks excel at serving these markets because they can pick up a 

container and dray it to its destination the same day, with time remaining to return with a loaded 

or empty container (a movement not shown in fig. 34). 

Figure 34. Diagram of San Pedro Bay loaded import container movement scenarios (image courtesy of 

Port of Long Beach). 
43

Rail Movement

Five of the six container terminals at the Port of Long Beach are equipped with on-dock 

rail. On-dock rail allows containers to be loaded onto a train right at the terminal, minimizing 

travel time and costs. From a Port of Long Beach on-dock rail facility, a container can reach 

Chicago in about 72 hours. On average, about 60 trains depart from the on-dock rail facilities 

every week. The Port of Long Beach is served by two major trunk-line railroads: Union Pacific 

Railroad (UP) and BNSF Railway (BNSF), and a regional switching railroad, the Pacific Harbor 

Line (PHL). 

Figure 35. Port of Long Beach rail map (image courtesy Port of Long Beach). 

Physical Damage, Losses, and Logistics in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

Damage assessment has been quantified through careful analysis of each individual 

terminal at the time of the tsunami. A number of assumptions have been made in relation to 

damage assessment based on past tsunami experience and professional engineering judgment. 

With approximately four hours of warning time before the first wave arrives in the San Pedro 

Harbor, it has been estimated there will be at least 2 days in which port operations will come to a 

halt. The first day will consist of safely shutting down operations, beefing up moorings, 
44

deploying tug boats, removing vessels where possible, and generally preparing for the tsunami 

arrival and evacuation of personnel. The second day is allocated for inspection of facilities prior 

to restoring operations. Not all terminals will be restored to full capacity based on observed 

damage. All loading and unloading equipment will be disengaged to prevent damage. The 

following sections summarize these damages. 

Impacts on Maritime Activities 

The majority of the impact on maritime activities can be attributed to the container 

terminals and dry bulk facilities. An important assumption to note is that the gantry crane motors 

are above water level during inundation, leaving minimal to no damage to cranes during the 

tsunami. It is possible crane power supply trenches will be flooded as well as some substations. 

However, discussions with design electrical engineers suggest that long-term damage to these 

facilities is not likely if they are properly shutdown prior to tsunami arrival. These facilities 

should be able to power up as soon as they are dried out from flooding. 

The inundation levels for the tsunami scenario are insufficient to float any large vessels 

onto land so there will not be any damage related to this potential mechanism. 

When assigning a dollar value to damages, refer to 2011 average value of damages in 

table 12. Values were retrieved from USA Trade Online (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012b). To obtain 

damage values in tables 13 through 22, “Value of Damage ($/TEU)” or “Value of Damage 

($/Metric Ton)” from table 12 were multiplied by numbers in “Projected Throughput impacted 

on March 27, 2014.” Import and exports are noted where available. For container traffic, this 

information is not readily available. It is suggested that the damage value to containers be 

distributed based on overall ratio of container imports to container exports. 

Table 12. Assigning damage value to the Port of Long Beach and Port of Los Angeles. 

[US$, U.S. dollars; kg, kilograms; TEUs, twenty-foot equivalent units]

Values 2009 2010 2011

Sum of Containerized Vessel Value (US$) $228,372,241,028 $277,098,700,554 $309,743,852,223

Sum of Containerized Vessel SWT (kg) 56,871,671,800 65,776,161,955 68,793,600,118

Sum of TEUs (from kg) 7,393,931 8,660,123 8,959,111

Value of Damage ($/per TEU) 30,886.44 31,997.09 34,573.06

Value of Damage ($/per Metric Ton) 4,015.57 4,212.75 4,502.51
45

Port of Long Beach

Damage assessment for the Port of Long Beach is presented in table 13 through 16. 

Containerized

Table 13. Port of Long Beach container terminal damage. 

[TEUs, twenty-foot equivalent units; --, no data; %, percent]

Location

March 27, 

2014 

Throughput 

(TEUs)

Projected 

Throughput 

impacted on 

March 27 2014

(TEUs)

Value of 

Damage

(U.S. Dollar)

Damage Assessment

Pier T Berth 

T132-T140 4,290 0 -- No damage

Pier G: 

Berths G226-

G236 2,347 0 -- No damage

Pier F: Berths 

F6-F10 2,120 0 -- No damage

Pier J: Berths 

J243-J247, 

J266, J270 5,096 0 -- No damage

Pier A : 

Berths A88-

A96 4,234 635 $21,000,000 15% loss to daily throughput value

Pier C: Berths 

C60-C62 1,065 160 $6,000,000

15% loss to daily throughput value. 

Significant number of containers on 

wheels (chassis)

Total 19,152 795 $27,000,000
46

Dry Bulk

Table 14. Port of Long Beach dry bulk damage. 

[--, no data; %, percent]

Location Material

March 27 

2014* 

Throughput

(metric tons)

Projected 

Throughput 

impacted on 

March 27 2014

(metric tons)

Value of Damage

(U.S. Dollar) Damage Assessment

Pier D—

Berth D46 Gypsum 205 31 $140,000

15% loss to daily 

throughput value; imported 

material

Pier DBerth D32 Cement 100 -- -- No damage

Pier F—

Berth 

F211

Petroleum 

Coke, 

prilled 

sulfur

1,954

33 $148,000 5% loss to daily throughput 

value; imported material 

Pier FBerth 

F208

Cement -- No damage

Pier F—

Berth 

F210

Salt 65 $292,000

10% loss to daily 

throughput value; imported 

material

Pier GBerths 

G212-

G214

Petroleum 

coke, coal, 

potash, 

borax, 

sodium 

sulfate, 

soda ash, 

concentrate

s, and 

prilled 

sulfur.

19,094 -- -- No damage

Pier BBerth B82 Gypsum 377 metric 

tons -- -- No damage

Total 21,730 metric 

tons 129 $580,500
47

Liquid Bulk

Table 15. Port of Long Beach liquid bulk damage. 

[--, no data]

Location Cargoes 

Served

March 27 

2014 

Throughput 

(metric tons)

Projected 

Throughput 

impacted on 

March 27 

2014

(metric tons)

Value of Damage

(U.S. Dollar) Damage Assessment

Pier TBerth 

T121

Crude oil and 

petroleum 

products

49,220 -- $50,000 mooring 

damage

Damage to mooring 

hardware; crippled for 6 

weeks; imported crude oil

Pier B—

Berths 

B76-80

Petroleum 

products

29,300

-- --

No damage

Pier B 

Berth 

B82,83

Gasoline, 

ethanol, 

gasoline blend 

stocks, diesel, 

biodiesel

No damage

Pier B—

Berth 

B84-B87

Crude oil, 

petroleum 

products, 

bunker fuel.

No damage

Pier F—

Berths 

F209-211

Petroleum 

products and 

bunker fuel

6,350 -- -- No damage

Pier S 

Berth 

S101

Miscellaneous 

bulk liquid 

chemicals

5,580 -- $1,000,000

No damage to products, 

facility out of commission 

for a month, $1 million in 

building repair. Currently 

not in use. Most recently 

used as low-sulfur diesel 

import.

Total $1,050,000
48

Break Bulk

Table 16. Port of Long Beach break bulk damage. 

[n/a, not applicable; --. no data]

Location Equipment/

Facilities

March 27 2014 

Throughput

Projected 

Throughput 

impacted on 

March 27 

2014

(metric tons)

Value of Damage

(U.S. Dollar)

Damage 

Assessment

Pier F 

Berths 

F204-F205

Steel products, 

plywood, and

lumber.

1,209 metric tons

-- -- No damage

Pier F—

Berth F206, 

F207

Steel products, 

plywood, lumber, 

project cargoes, 

and large 

machinery.

-- -- No damage

Pier F 

Berth F201 Standby berth -- -- No damage

Pier D, 

Berth D50-

D54

Crescent 

Warehouse 

Company

n/a -- n/a

15% loss to daily 

throughput value. 

recently vacated.

Pier T, 

Berth T122

Lumber and 

Lumber products

2,474 metric tons

-- $50,000

Mooring damage, 1 

month down time. 

Import material.

Pier T 

Berth T118

Recyclable metal 

and steel 

products.

-- $50,000

Mooring damage, 1 

month down time. 

Export material.

Pier TBerth T122Lumber and 

lumber products. -- -- No damage

Pier B 

Berth B82, 

B83

Automobiles, 

Office building, 

processing 

buildings, body 

shop and car wash

2,000 vehicles 2,000 vehicles ($24,000/vehicle)

$48,000,000

100% vehicle 

damaged. Imported 

vehicles.

Total 2,000 vehicles $48,100,000

Notes: The average value lost for an automobile is taken to be $24,000/vehicle. The figure extrapolates from 2010 

retail values of import vehicles according to the U.S. Census Bureau (2012a), reduced by 13 percent for retail 

markup per Kelley Blue Book (2013) and TrueCar (2013). 
49

Port of Long Beach Damage Summary

Table 17. Port of Long Beach damage summary. 

[TEUs, twenty-foot equivalent units; --, no data]

Cargo Type

Projected 

Throughput 

impacted on March 

27 2014

Value of Damage

(U.S. Dollar)

Containerized 795 TEUs $27,000,000

Dry Bulk 129 metric tons $580,500

Liquid Bulk -- $1,050,000

Break Bulk 2,000 vehicles $48,100,000

Total $76,730,500
50

Port of Los Angeles

Damage assessment for the Port of Los Angeles is presented in tables 18 through 23. 

Refer to table 12 for average damage values per cargo type. 

Containerized

Table 18. Port of Los Angeles container terminal damage. 

[TEUs, twenty-foot equivalent units; --, no data; %, percent]

Location

Projected 

throughput on 

March 27, 

2014 (TEUs)

Projected 

Throughput 

impacted on 

March 27, 2014

(TEUs)

Value of 

Damage (U.S. 

Dollar)

Damage Assessment

Berths 

100-102 1,270 -- -- No Damage

Berths 

121-131 2,590 -- -- No Damage

Berths 

135-139 2,410 241 $8,314,500 10% loss to daily throughput value 

Berths 

206-209 1,200 -- -- No Damage, No longer used as terminal

Berths 

212-225 2,575 -- -- No Damage

Berths 

226-236 2,860 -- -- No Damage

Berths 

302-305 4,100 -- -- No Damage

Berths 

401-404 6,470 -- -- No Damage

Berths 

405-406 1,270 -- -- No Damage

Total 25,000 241 $8,314,500
51

Dry Bulk

Table 19. Port of Los Angeles dry bulk damage. 

[--, no data; %, percent]

Location Terminal 

features

Projected 

throughput on 

March 27, 2014 

(metric tons)

Projected 

Throughput 

impacted on 

March 27 2014

(metric tons)

Value of 

Damage Damage Assessment

Berths 

165-166

Industrial

borates 843 85 $382,000

10% loss to daily 

throughput, Out of 

commission for 2 weeks.

Off-line for 2 weeks for 

cleanup. Exported 

material. 

Berths 

210-211

Handles all 

grades of 

ferrous and 

non-ferrous 

scrap metals

3,212 -- -- No Damage

Total 4,055 27.4 $382,000
52

Liquid Bulk

Table 20. Port of Los Angeles liquid bulk damage. 

[--, no data]

Location Use:

Projected 

throughput on 

March 27, 

2014 (metric 

tons)

Projected 

Throughput 

impacted on 

March 27, 

2014

Value of 

Damage (U.S. 

Dollar)

Damage Assessment

Berths 

118-120

Receiving 

exporting 

petroleum 

products

2,695 -- -- No Damage

Berths 

148-151

Vessel 

unloading of 

partly or 

fully refined 

petroleum 

products

1,361 -- -- No damage. Containment walls 

or berms protect tanks

Berth 163 Marine oil 812 -- --

No damage to product. Facility 

50% capacity for 1 month. 

Imported material

Berth 164 Fuels and 

lubricants 4,030 -- --

No damage to product. Facility 

50% capacity for 1 month. 

Imported and exported material

Berths 

167-169

Fuels and 

lubricants 5,237 -- --

No damage to product. Facility 

50% capacity for 1 month. 

Imported and exported material

Berths 

187-191

Liquid bulk 

chemical 

products

11,778 -- --

No damage to product. facility 

down 50% capacity for 1 

month. Imported and exported 

material

Berths 

238-240C

Fuels and 

lubricants 229 -- $50,000

Damage to mooring equipment, 

no product damage. Imported 

crude. Alternate berth available

Total 21,428 -- $50,000
53

Automobile

The average wholesale value for automobile damage is taken to be $24,000/vehicle. The 

figure extrapolates from 2010 retail values of import vehicles according to the U.S. Census 

Bureau (2012a), reduced by 13 percent for retail markup per Kelley Blue Book (2013) and 

TrueCar (2013). 

Table 21. Port of Los Angeles automobile damage. 

[%, percent]

Location Terminal features

Projected 

automobiles on 

March 27, 2014

Automobiles 

impacted on 

March 27, 2014

Value of 

Damage (U.S. 

Dollar)

Damage Assessment

Berths 

195-199

Storage capacity 

up to 8000 

vehicles

6,400 650 $15,600,000 10% vehicles damaged. 

Imported vehicles. 

Break Bulk

Table 22. Port of Los Angeles break bulk damage. 

[n/a, not applicable; --, no data; %, percent]

Location Terminal 

features

Projected 

throughput on 

March 27, 

2014 (metric 

tons)

Projected 

Throughput 

impacted on 

March 27 2014

(metric tons)

Value of 

Damage 

(U.S. Dollar)

Damage Assessment

Berths 49-53 Use: break 

bulk steel n/a -- -- No damage

Berths 54-55

Imported 

meats, 

Chilean fruit, 

kiwis, apples

327 -- -- No damage

Berths 174-181 Steel 5,357 535 $2,408,850

10% product damage, 

Building out of 

commission for 2 

weeks. Imported 

material.

Total 5,684 535 $2,408,850

Small Craft Basins

All marinas located where the East Basin and Cerritos Channel meet will experience 

significant damage. The majority of the marinas will experience some damage, as they will be 

directly exposed to the current velocities. Damage to small craft basins marinas is addressed 

elsewhere in this chapter. 
54

Table 23. Port of Los Angeles marina damage. 

Marina Name Location Slips Slips Affected Value of Damage

Al Larson's Marina Berth 258 128 50

Addressed 

elsewhere in this 

chapter

Cabrillo Beach Yacht Club Berth 35 184 50

Cabrillo Way Marina Berths 42-43 697 100

California Yacht MarinaCabrillo Marina Berth 29-33 885 100

California Yacht Marina Berth 202 266 266

Cerritos Yacht Anchorage Berth 205 90 90

Holiday Harbor-Fleitz Bros. Berth 34 300 300

Holiday Harbor Berth 201 169 169

Island Yacht Anchorage #1 Berth 205 22 22

Island Yacht Anchorage #2 Berth 200X 116 116

Leeward Bay Marina Berth 201 190 190

Lighthouse Yacht Landing Berth 205 70 70

Pacific Yacht Landing Berth 203 178 178

San Pedro Marina Berth 80 85 20

Yacht Centre-Newmarks Berth 204 250 250

Yacht Haven Marina Berth 202 165 165
55

Port of Los Angeles Damage Summary

Table 24. Port of Los Angeles damage summary. 

[TEUs, twenty-foot equivalent units; --, no data]

Cargo Type

Projected Throughput impacted 

on March 27, 2014 Value of Damage

(U.S. Dollar)

Containerized 241 TEUs $8,314,500

Dry Bulk 27.4 metric tons $382,000

Liquid Bulk -- $50,000

Automobiles 650 metric tons $15,600,000

Break Bulk 535 metric tons $2,408,850

Small Craft Marina 2,000 slips (elsewhere in this chapter)

Total $26,755,350

General Damage Discussion

Mooring design of the terminals in POLA/POLB typically includes a mooring analysis 

for the proposed vessels that incorporates winds, waves, and current forcing to the moored 

vessels to compute loads on the mooring components, including mooring lines, bollards, and 

fenders. When mooring loads resulting from high currents representative of a tsunami are 

compared with the loads generated by design wind speeds, generally the loads resulting from the 

winds are the controlling factor for design purposes. This is particularly true for container vessels 

with high wind profiles due to the stacked containers. The currents can be more of a contributing 

factor for liquid bulk carriers, as their wind profile is less and the draft more significant. 

However, the bulk of the currents adjacent to the liquid bulk terminals in both ports do not 

generally appear to be sufficient to overload the mooring components to the extent that the 

vessels would become free floating. Some damage to the mooring components is expected and 

has been included in the assessment. Alternate moorings would be available to prevent loss of 

terminal function at Port of Long Beach Berths T118, 121, and 122. 

Where automobiles are indicated as being damaged, it is assumed that the damage will be 

limited to the vehicles and they will not become free-floating debris items in the navigation 

channel. This assumption is based on the limited water depth over the automobile storage 

facilities, relatively small currents, and the fact that the storage facilities are located some 

distance inland from the pier headline. Removal of the vehicles following the tsunami will entail 

shipping them inland in the normal manner to scrap yards. 

There is some commercial fishing activity in the Port of Los Angeles located within Fish 

Harbor and adjacent to Ports O Call. Damage to fishing vessels and other small craft is addressed 

elsewhere in this chapter. The inundation limits along the boundary of Fish Harbor are along the 

fringe of the basin and suggest some flooding of the waterfront area and possibly damaging some 

of the associated fish processing and shipping facilities. 

Tsunami Impacts on Container Terminal Operations

With approximately 4 hours of warning before the first wave arrives in the San Pedro 

Harbor, it is realistic that there will be at least 2 days in which port operations will come to a 

halt. The first day during the tsunami propagation will consist of strategically and safely shutting 

down operations. The second day will consist of inspections of the facilities to identify any 
56

damage. Some terminals may be up and running after the tsunami warning is cancelled on 

Saturday 29 March. Gate operations will cease and all personnel will follow evacuation 

procedures. All loading and unloading equipment will be disengaged to prevent damage. 

Tsunami Impacts on Truck and Rail Movement

With a warning time of 3.5 hours, teamsters will have time to remove trucks to an offsite 

location away from the inundation areas. (Rail is addressed elsewhere in this chapter) Continued 

truck movement may involve movement of vehicles away from inundation areas to prevent 

damage or relocation of other equipment that may potentially be harmed. Once the port is 

evacuated, all truck movement will come to a halt until the tsunami warning is cancelled. After 

the third day, it is believed that there will be minimal impact on truck and rail movement due to a 

tsunami of this magnitude. The simulated tsunami inundation at the rail and road bridge to Pier 

400 will come close to the soffit of the superstructure, but is not expected to impact the 

superstructure or damage the bridges. The high currents may dislocate some of the armor stone 

protecting the bridge abutments and channel area, but should not undercut the foundations. The 

armor stone was designed to accommodate expected high current speeds when constructed. 

Damage to Lifelines

All electrical wiring and equipment inside vaults and pull boxes are continuously 

submersible. At the first warning of a tsunami, substations will be powered down to prevent any 

possible damage to equipment and protective devices. Drying out of equipment should only take 

a few days to a week. There does not appear to be significant damage to major SCE power vaults 

from water levels and inundation limits. Water runoff should only take a few days to clear and 

should have minimal impact to POLA/POLB operations. 

Damage to Other West Coast Ports

The tsunami scenario impacts are modeled for other major ports along the Pacific coast 

including San Diego, Port Hueneme, San Francisco, Oakland, Richmond, and Redwood City. 

These are potential alternate ports where vessels could call when the Ports of Los Angeles and 

Long Beach are not available. However, these ports are not likely to be available during the 

tsunami event or possibly for days afterward. No detailed assessment of the tsunami damage to 

these other ports was conducted as part of this project. Some general observations are discussed 

in this section. 

Damage to Other Southern California Ports

The Port of San Diego operates two marine terminals, neither of which would be 

inundated by the tsunami. They would be expected to have minimal damage. However, there are 

a large number of navy piers that may be flooded and vessels may be present. Navy procedures 

typically call for vessels to leave port if possible. Remaining vessels may have some damage to 

the mooring components due to the water level fluctuation and/or high currents. Supplies on 

piers may be floated off causing debris issues. The major issue within the Port of San Diego area 

is the numerous small craft basins that will likely sustain significant damage due to the high 

currents and lesser design criteria compared to commercial and naval facilities. For example, 

strong currents damaged docks and boats around Shelter Island during the 2011 Tohoku and 

2010 Chile tsunamis (Wilson and others, 2012). Free-floating small craft are likely to create a 
57

significant debris problem following the tsunami. Note that marina damage in San Diego is 

addressed later in this chapter. 

Port Hueneme specializes in shipping break bulk cargo, palletized produce, and 

automobile imports and exports. The extent of the inundation is expected to cause damage to 

several warehouses and operations buildings. The automobile import/export terminal would not 

be flooded, and automobiles are not expected to be damaged. The detailed tsunami modeling 

indicates currents as high as 12 nautical miles per hour (kt) in the entrance channel, which is 

sufficient for possible scour of the channel and possible damage to the toe armor of the jetties. 

The scour will possibly deposit sediment in the interior of the harbor that will require 

maintenance dredging following the tsunami. 

Damage to the Port of San Francisco

Farther north along the California coast, the ports in the San Francisco Bay (San 

Francisco, Oakland, and Richmond, and Redwood City) would also be affected by the tsunami. 

They would have 30 minutes less warning time than the southern California ports. In this 

hypothetical event, NOAA posts a tsunami watch for the San Francisco Bay within a few 

minutes after the earthquake (here, 11:54 a.m. PDT on Thursday March 27, 2014), and upgrades 

it to a tsunami warning at 2:05 p.m., 3 hours before the first wave’s estimated arrival time at 5:02 

p.m. At 2:05 p.m., NOAA estimates wave heights in San Francisco of 2.1 ft ± 0.6 ft (0.64 m ± 

0.18 m; NOAA’s simulated tsunami messages use U.S. units, so these are repeated here first) and 

a duration of 9 hr. The estimated wave height at San Francisco increases with later tsunami 

messages, reaching 2.7 ft ± 0.8 ft (0.82 m ± 0.24 m) at 5:02 p.m., 2.9 ft ± 0.9 ft (0.88 m ± 0.27 

m) at 6:02 p.m., by which time a buoy at station 46026, 20 miles (17.4 nautical miles) west of the 

Golden Gate, has observed a maximum wave height of 3.4 ft (1.0 m), which ultimately reaches 

3.7 ft (1.1 m). The warning is downgraded to an advisory at 8:02 p.m. on Friday 28 March, 32 

hours after the earthquake. It is cancelled at 12 p.m. PDT on Saturday 29 March, 48 hours after 

the earthquake. 

The tsunami model used in this study estimates wave heights in excess of 2m (6 ft) at the 

Golden Gate in approximately the 3rd wave about 90 minutes after the 1st, around 6:30 p.m., as 

illustrated in figure 36. 

Figure 36. Marigrams in San Francisco Bay area for the SAFRR tsunami scenario (m, meters; ft, feet). 

Maximum wave amplitudes above MHW+20 vary throughout the San Francisco Bay 

area, reaching 5 m (15 ft) in along the Pacific Coast and parts of the bay’s shore, as shown in 

figure 37. The tsunami is expected to cause flooding along the San Francisco Embarcadero, with 

flow depths of 1–2 m (3–6 ft). Currents along the Embarcadero reach 5–10 m/sec (10–20 kt); see 

figure 38. 
58

Damage to Port of San Francisco Headquarters Building

The Port of San Francisco has its offices at Pier 1, which is estimated as being flooded to 

a depth of 1–2 m (3–6 ft). The 1st floor of the office would be heavily damaged by that level of 

inundation. Crucial computer equipment is on the upper level of the port headquarters and so 

would probably escape damage, but the two 300 kilowatt (kW) generators are on the 1st floor 

and would be damaged. Commercial space in lowrise reinforced concrete shearwall buildings 

can take 3 months to repair after experiencing 130 m3

/sec2 momentum flux (maximum depth 

does not occur at the same time as maximum velocity), so the headquarters would be inoperative 

for months during repair. The port does not have a backup operations facility, and would most 

likely operate at least temporarily out of the San Francisco Emergency Operations Center. 

Commercial Real Estate at the Port of San Francisco

The port derives much of its revenue from the rental of commercial real estate ($59 

million of $73 million total revenue in fiscal year 2011–2012), especially at Pier 39 and the Ferry 

Building, both of which are modeled as flooding to a depth of 1–2 m (3–6 ft, see figure 39) and 

maximum velocities of 5–10 m/sec (10–20 kt), and so would likely be inoperative for several 

months. Leases assign responsibility for cleanup, and may vary between tenants. It was unclear 

from conversations with port personnel whether the real estate division maintains emergency 

plans for such a contingency, although they do have radios for emergency communication and 

expect to warn tenants using their Cooper Industries notification system. Within the port’s 

commercial real estate, the largest impacts would be to Pier 39 and Fisherman’s Wharf, which 

are visited by 14 million tourists per year. The cruise terminal at Pier 27 is modeled as being 

vacant (no cruise ship there) at the time of the tsunami. Damage to the cruise terminal would 

likely displace cruise activities for up to a season. 
59

Figure 37. Wave amplitudes in the San Francisco Bay area for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 

 

Figure 38. Flooding along the San Francisco Embarcadero reaches 1 to 2 meters and wave velocities 

reach 5 to 10 meters per second (10-20 knots) in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 
60

 A B

 C D

Figure 39. Inundation along the San Francisco Embarcadero in the SAFRR tsunami scenario: A, Pier 39; 

B, Pier 27; C, Pier 1 and Ferry Building; and D, Pier 26. 

Ferry Operations 

It is unclear whether the tsunami could damage the access gangways for ferries. As long 

as the collars do not get damaged, port personnel believe that ferry operations would not be 

impacted by damage, although debris on the piers at ferry berths would have to be cleaned up 

before ferry operations could resume. 

Cargo Operations at the Port of San Francisco

The Port of San Francisco handles approximately 1 million tons of cargo annually (1.24 

million in calendar year 2012) from approximately 40 cargo vessel calls annually at Piers 80, 94, 

and 96. Because these piers are occasionally flooded simply by high tides, they would certainly 

be flooded in the tsunami scenario. Most of the cargo is imported breakbulk (1.21 million tons—

largely steel and aggregate) that port personnel believe would be undamaged by flooding. 

However, the cargo office would be damaged just as would be the headquarters building, along 

with equipment such as forklifts. There might be one or two cargo vessels berthed at the time of 

the tsunami. Port personnel believe that in the event of a tsunami warning, harbor staff would 

alert vessel masters to move their vessel to the southern part of the San Francisco Bay. As 
61

previously noted, there would be approximately 3 hours between the time NOAA issued a 

tsunami warning for the San Francisco Bay and the arrival of the 1st wave. With currents near 

the waterfront of 5–10 m/sec (10–20 kt; see fig. 40), vessels that were unmoored but still near the 

waterfront when the tsunami first arrived would be nearly impossible to control, so the timely 

movement of vessels would be crucial to avoiding damage to the vessels and piers. 

 

Figure 40. Velocities (left) and flow depth (right) at Port of San Francisco cargo piers in the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario. 

Commercial Fishing Fleet

There are approximately 180 boats in the commercial fishing fleet at Pier 45. Port 

personnel believe that active boats would be moved to the southern bay, but since March is 

largely an idle time for the commercial fishing fleet, that would amount to only approximately 40 

of the 180 boats. The inner lagoon, where 120 of the boats are berthed, is estimated to experience 

2 to 8 m/sec (4–16 kt) currents, enough to damage or sink commercial boats remaining there. 

(Port personnel expect that no more than 20 percent of the owners of boats in the recreational 

marinas would be close enough to move their boats during the available warning time. 

Recreational marinas are addressed later in this chapter.) Pier 45 also has a fish processing and 

distribution facility, which is estimated to experience 1–2 m (3–6 ft) of flow depth and 5 to 10 

m/sec (10–20 kt) velocity. This would be sufficient to cause heavy damage to the processing and 

distribution facility and render it inoperative for at least several months. Port personnel believe 

that dock repairs could render the fishing pier inoperative for a year, and that dock repairs might 

not be completed for as much as 2 years. 
62

 A

B 

Figure 41. Velocities (A) and flow depth (B) at Port of San Francisco Pier 45 in the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario. 
63

Seawall

The Port of San Francisco has a unique feature—an old seawall along much of its 

waterfront that is in various stages of structural integrity. We did not evaluate the potential for a 

tsunami to damage the seawall, but that may be worth investigating, especially at high-value 

locations or where crucial lifelines such as the Auxiliary Water Supply System, BART (Bay 

Area Rapid Transit), Muni (San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency), or 

telecommunications are located near the seawall and could be damaged by its collapse. 

Damage to Other San Francisco Bay Ports

The Ports of Oakland, Richmond, and Redwood City are also located within San 

Francisco Bay, which protects the ports from open coast swell conditions compared to the Ports 

of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Wave loads on structures and vessels are generally limited to 

shorter period, locally generated wind waves. Although these wind waves can be significant 

during storm activity, they have a significantly shorter wave period that generally decreases the 

loads. In general, design criteria are frequently controlled by currents and wind rather than 

waves. As such, the San Francisco Bay ports are likely better prepared for the current loads on 

vessels and structures during a tsunami. These commercial ports are also designed to the latest 

State engineering standards. 

Figure 42 shows the extent of the maritime facilities in the Port of Oakland. As shown in 

figures 43 and 44, flow depths at piers and other port facilities are generally less than 0.5 m, and 

maximum currents are generally 1–2 m/sec (2–4 kt). Flooding is limited to the edges of wharves 

with the exception of the Ben E Nutter and TraPac terminals, where significant numbers of cargo 

containers and truck trailers are stored or parked. 

Based on the inundation limits, it would be expected that a similar damage rate would 

occur as in the parts of the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach that are inundated. The total 

damage to these ports will generally be in proportion to their shipping volume compared to San 

Pedro Harbor, possibly somewhat higher in the Ben E Nutter and TraPac terminals where 

container yards and bulk areas are hypothesized to be flooded. There are also several small craft 

harbors throughout the area that are likely to experience more damage than the commercial 

facilities. These small craft will likely pose a significant debris and cleanup problem. 
64

Figure 42. Port of Oakland maritime facilities map (Port of Oakland, 2013). 

Figure 43. Flow depths and inundation line at Port of Oakland in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 
65

Figure 44. Current velocities in the Port of Oakland in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 

Resilience Strategies

On the basis of the somewhat limited overall damage to infrastructure in the Ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach, there are limited opportunities for improved engineering strategies. 

The most significant area of the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to be flooded is in the 

area of Pier A at the Port of Long Beach. There will be damage to imported vehicles and damage 

to containers. The Port of Long Beach is well aware of the low area and has made an economic 

decision to not raise the land area. Operations buildings in this area have raised foundations to 

limit the risk of flooding and associated damage to infrastructure. Personnel evacuation 

procedures need to be developed for the safety of people working in the area. Given the leadtime for the proposed scenario, there should adequate time to shut down operations in this area 

and safely evacuate all personnel. 

One design feature that could possibly be reviewed and improved on is the containment 

dikes around pipelines and tank farms. The crest of these containment dikes could be designed 

such that inundation will not occur within the contained areas. This will limit the damage to the 

facilities and reduce the likelihood of environmental damage from oil spills. Most of the tank 

farms are protected by containment dikes, but elevations should be confirmed against the 

proposed tsunami elevations. This may also entail more detailed modeling of hydrodynamics in 

the vicinity of the containment dikes and walls. 

The bulk of the resilience strategies consist of developing and exercising a response plan 

in the event of a tsunami warning. There are several procedures that could be implemented to 

mitigate damage from the provided scenario. The most crucial issue to be addressed is the safety 

of the vessels because any freely floating vessel or even any vessel underway during the 

extremely high currents presents a risk to the vessel and port facilities. The current operations 

plan developed by the U.S. Coast Guard and the port pilots is to keep any approaching vessels 

from entering the port following receipt of a tsunami warning. Any vessels that can be safely 

removed from the harbor should be removed. During the Chile tsunami of 2010, some vessels in 
66

Chilean ports were able to successfully leave port despite the tsunami arrival time of less than 30 

minutes after the seismic event. This should be incorporated in the plan. However, there needs to 

be a reasonably accurate estimate of the arrival time to minimize the risk of vessels being caught 

navigating during tsunami arrival. Priority for removing vessels should be given to bulk liquid 

vessels to minimize environmental risk of spills during the tsunami. 

In addition to removing vulnerable vessels during the tsunami-warning period, further 

investigations of vessel maneuvering during high currents should be conducted. Some work was 

conducted along these lines in Headland and others (2006) suggesting reasonable success in 

maneuvering vessels during a tsunami. 

Possibly the most important procedure to be developed is to shut down all operations as 

quickly as possible once the tsunami warning is received. This would include shutting down 

pumps to liquid bulk tankers and disconnecting hoses. Container cranes should be shut down and 

safely stored with arms up to minimize the possibility of vessels striking them. Power should be 

shutdown to reduce or eliminate damage to the power trenches or the cranes. Terminal 

substations should also be shutdown wherever possible to reduce or eliminate damage to these 

substations. For dry bulk terminals, the conveyors should be shut down to reduce damage to the 

motors, which can be flooded in some cases. Nonessential personnel should begin evacuation 

immediately. 

For those vessels remaining in POLA/POLB through the tsunami, tugboats should be 

deployed to assist in maintaining control of the vessels at their respective berths. Vessels should 

deploy additional mooring lines where possible. These mooring lines will have to be tended by 

ship personnel during the tsunami to allow the vessels to rise and fall with the water level so that 

mooring components such as bollards, mooring lines, and fenders are not overloaded or 

damaged. This can be accomplished by either manually controlling the shipboard winches or 

setting the shipboard winches to constant tension where possible instead of breaking the winches. 

For the tsunami scenario defined in this project, engineering judgment and experience with 

previous tsunami events within POLA/POLB suggests no damage to any of the vessels within 

the harbor other than small craft (with one exception discussed later). This conclusion was 

reached after extensive discussion of the scenario with senior engineers at the ports and senior 

engineers from design consulting firms. 

One additional opportunity to enhance resiliency: a plan to evacuate all nonessential 

personnel would need to be exercised. As discussed earlier, the ports would have 3.5 hours from 

the time NOAA first transmits it tsunami warning for San Pedro (at 2:05 p.m. PDT on Thursday 

Mar 27, 2014) until the forecast arrival of the tsunami at 5:35 p.m. In that time port operators, 

emergency response personnel and tenants would have to receive the message, understand its 

contents, and successfully take self-protective action such as shutting off power, removing or 

elevating crucial documents and other assets, and evacuating the port. Given experience in 

Hurricane Sandy (discussed next), that is not much time. The resiliency opportunity is to review, 

exercise, and enhance an evacuation plan as appropriate. The exercise could examine the 

potential for traffic congestion leaving the port, to check that all port personnel can safely 

evacuate in that period of time, and to think through potential delays or misunderstandings in 

decision-making and communication? We discuss policy issues more deeply elsewhere in this 

report. All of these preparedness, response and recovery plans would need to be regularly 

exercised to be reliable and effective. 
67

Lessons for Ports from Hurricane Sandy

In March 2013 representatives of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 

(PANYNJ) discussed with SAFRR personnel the port’s experience in Hurricane Sandy. They 

summarized emergency plans, physical damage and recovery activities, and major threats to life 

safety, focusing on PANYNJ port facilities in Port Newark, Port Elizabeth, Jersey City, 

Bayonne, Staten Island, and Brooklyn. 

Emergency Plans

PANYNJ maintains a contingency plan in accordance with both Federal standards and 

industry best practices. It has 25 to 30 annexes covering various perils. The plan for hurricane 

focuses on wind impacts. Preparations deal with lowering stacks of containers to 3 high, 

battening loose items, not accepting berth applications, tying cranes together, and maintaining 

tugs on standby. The hurricane plan did not address storm surge, although the port does possess 

maps showing expected extent of flooding color coded by Saffir-Simpson Intensity (SSI). The 

logic appears to be that each SSI increment corresponds to an expected degree of storm surge 

and therefore flooding. (Since 2010, SSI has been revised as the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind 

Scale to exclude flood ranges, storm surge estimations, rainfall, and location.) Hurricane Sandy 

produced greater storm surge than the model used to create the map predicted. In fact, until the 

day before landfall, the National Weather Service (NWS) estimated 6 to 7 ft of storm surge at the 

ports. At 11 a.m. Sunday October 28, 2012, the day before landfall, the NWS revised the 

estimate to 13 to 14 ft as a result of a change in the storm’s direction. The terminal operators had 

just reconfigured containers to be stacked lower so as to minimize wind forces, thus putting more 

containers at ground level and more containers in the flood zone. Because containers are moved 

by union labor, which requires significant advanced notice to mobilize, it was too late to 

reconfigure the container stacks. Note that the port personnel with whom we spoke did not have 

topographic maps or other maps that would show inundation as a function of storm surge. They 

relied on maps that relied on a model that underestimated flooding in storm surge. 

One relevant lesson for the Tsunami Scenario is that this scenario uses models that 

estimate earthquake magnitude, rupture area, hypocenter, rupture velocity, and various other 

parameters. Although it is useful for planning, it should not be considered to represent an upper 

bound of the environmental excitation, that is, the flow depths, currents, extent of inundation, 

and so on. Another lesson for emergency planning: port personnel indicated that Hurricane 

Sandy has reinforced the need to stay out of the habit of only reacting to the last event. They also 

advised that generally the only people who take flooding seriously are those who had personally 

experienced it in the past. Both of these observations seem relevant to operators of California 

facilities who do not have personal experience with tsunamis and flooding. 

Physical Damage

Flooding destroyed 16,000 vehicles and thousands of containers (see fig. 45). The truck 

fleet was heavily damaged: port personnel estimate that up to 20 percent of drayage truck fleet 

was lost, approximately 2,000 of 10,000 trucks in the New York and New Jersey region that 

serve the port, and the fleet has not yet fully recovered. In addition, approximately 15 percent of 

the chassis fleet was destroyed. Mechanical and electrical equipment associated with sewer lift 

stations were damaged, as were traffic signals and railroad crossing equipment, so much so that 

rail traffic is still using flares and flagmen in March 2013; PANYNJ described the power grid 
68

and electrical equipment as a “giant Achilles’ heel.” Some fuel tanks inside of earthen berms at 

the facilities along the Arthur Kill were emptied in advance of the storm to protect the stored 

product, but as a result when storm surge inundated them, the tanks floated off their foundations 

and were damaged. Tanks behind containment walls fared better. A buried propane tank floated 

to the surface but did not ignite. Container handling equipment was damaged, including straddle 

carriers, reach stackers, fork lifts, and electrical equipment on most gantries. Electrical 

equipment was repaired on enough gantry cranes and container handling equipment within 6 

days that the port was able to return to business, although some are still being repaired in March 

2013. These damages were the greatest hindrances to recovery. Note the resemblance between 

hurricane damage in figure 45 and tsunami damage shown in figure 19. 
69

A B

C D

E F

Figure 45. Photographs of damage from Hurricane Sandy at New York and New Jersey ports: A, flooding 

damaged 20 percent of the truck fleet, often by igniting fires and, B, destroyed 16,000 import vehicles. 

C, Flooding and wind damaged thousands of containers and much of the ports’ cargo handling 

equipment; D, electrical and computer equipment were flooded and damaged; E, scour damaged 

pavements; and F, Flooding destroyed product in port warehouses. (Images from Port Authority of New 

York and New Jersey). 

Recovery

Commercial power was available	from	the	public	utility	an	average	of	5	days	after	

landfall, though some tenants were not ready to receive power. However, power lines kept 

falling after the hurricane passed. As of March 2013, underground lines in	certain	locations	
70

were still being replaced. PANYNJ is still seeing impacts of damage to electric power. PANYNJ 

speculated that latent damage could be observed for years. Sewer and firefighting were restored 

after 6 days. Telecom was still being restored in March 2013; a Verizon phone facility still was 

being restored. Lack of fuel caught many people off guard, but the PANYNJ had its own gas 

resources, which port personnel found invaluable. Channels and berths were surveyed within 3 

days after landfall, and debris did not prevent ships from returning. Ships began to arrive 6 days 

after landfall, gates opened 7 days after landfall, and daylight-only restrictions were lifted 8 days 

after landfall. In that time, some ships diverted to Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Savannah. All 

facilities except the Brooklyn cruise terminal were in operation 8 days after landfall. 

The Brooklyn cruise terminal shed was damaged with rollup doors staved in, its security 

equipment destroyed, and fixed gangways damaged. The Brooklyn cruise terminal returned to 

operation in December 2012. No pier damage has been observed yet. Port personnel indicated 

that it would be valuable in the future to have alternative operating space on high ground to 

conduct business, along with a stockpile of emergency generators, mobile guard booths, and 

other equipment needed for emergency operations. The relevance of these observations here is 

that many of the same damages are posited to occur in the present scenario, especially flooding 

and loss of vehicles and damage to electrical equipment. PANYNJ’s advice regarding alternative 

operating space, mobile guard booths, fuel, and other emergency supplies may be relevant to 

California facilities. 

Threats to Life Safety

There were no injuries or deaths on port facilities, though port personnel indicated that 

some emergency service personnel raced floodwaters as they evacuated. Had power not been 

shut down, people could have been injured or killed by electrocution. The PANYNJ offered the 

following advice to other port operators faced with the potential for inundation: shut down 

power, know when you have done all you can, and focus on evacuation, not waiting until the last 

minute to remove personnel. 

Damage to Large Vessels in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach

By Keith Porter 

Previous Instances of Vessels Breaking Their Moorings

High wave amplitudes have lifted large vessels onto piers and breakwaters in past 

tsunamis, as discussed elsewhere in this report. Such amplitudes are not present in the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario in California ports. Another hazard exists: large vessels have broken their 

moorings in past tsunamis. For example, two U.S. Navy submarines moored in Guam parted 

their mooring lines when the tsunami from the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake caused currents 

there estimated to be less than 4 kt. In the 2004 Sumatra tsunami, the cargo vessel Maersk 

Mandraki broke its moorings and drifted for hours in the Port of Salalah, Oman. At 

approximately the same time as the Mandraki was pulled from its berth, the Maersk Virginia was 

hit by strong and erratic currents at the Port of Salalah entrance, pushing the vessel into a 

breakwater and causing minor damage. The captain of the Virginia waited for an additional 7 

hours for currents to subside before attempting to reenter the port. A number of similar examples 
71

of vessels parting their lines were recorded during the 2004 event in the Indian Ocean, with ships 

ranging from 50 to 290 m in length. Currents affecting the Mandraki are difficult to estimate but 

were likely in the range of 6–8 kt (Okal and others, 2006a,b,c). 

Once a vessel becomes unmoored in strong currents, it may be difficult to regain control. 

In the 2004 Sumatran tsunami, a vessel attempted to leave Port Blair, South Andaman Islands 

during a strong current and could not exit the port (Eskijian, written commun., March 2, 2013). 

In the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in the port of Hachinohe, Aomori, the 56,752-ton 

deep-sea scientific drilling vessel Chikyu was damaged when her crew lost control of the vessel 

(CDEX Web Magazine 2012; fig. 46). Her captain was informed that the tsunami wave 

amplitude would be 1m, and he decided to keep the Chikyu moored to its pier. He was then 

warned that the wave amplitude would be 9 m, not 1m, and he decided to depart. He had the 

crew cut the mooring lines. The vessel had just cut loose when the tsunami struck. Currents were 

too high and too erratic for the crew to control the vessel. The ship collided with piers and 

damaged one of its propulsion pods. For such an event to occur in the Ports of Los Angeles and 

Long Beach would require that vessels were still in the harbor or moored when the tsunami 

struck, and the currents there were substantial and adversely aligned with respect to vessels. 

Figure 46. Photograph of Drilling Vessel Chikyu, which was damaged in the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and 

tsunami (from Wikimedia Commons). 

Once its crew loses control of a ship, it can collide with other vessels or piers, it can 

become grounded, and possibly sink. There are 39 instances recorded at http://shipwrecklog.com

(accessed June 2013) during the period June 2011 through May 2013 of container vessels 

becoming grounded or colliding with piers, wharves, or docks. Among these instances, three 

were accompanied by leakage of oil or other pollution (Bareli March 16, 2012; Celina March 9, 

2012; and MV Rena October 5, 2011), and two of these sank (Bareli and MV Rena). So sinking 

of a container ship (as in the case of the MV Rena; fig. 47A) is rare, even when the ship runs 
72

aground or collides with other vessels or piers. Far more common is that the vessel is undamaged 

and or is quickly refloated, as in the case of the Norfolk Express (fig. 47B). 

 

A B

Figure 47. A, Photograph of MV Rena aground on Astrolabe Reef, New Zealand, on October 13, 2011 

(from Wikimedia Commons); B, Photograph of the Norfolk Express (from 

http://www.havariekommando.de). 

Would ships still be moored 4 hours after the tsunami warning is issued? The U.S. Coast 

Guard Vessel Dispersal Plan (Laferrierre, 2011) specifies procedures for the dispersal of vessels 

from the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach in emergency situations, including earthquakes 

and other natural disasters. It does not specify particular triggers or guidance in terms of tsunami 

warning time, wave amplitudes, or other factors. It calls on vessel masters to use pilots and 

tugboats to get underway whenever possible, but it also allows vessel masters to leave port 

without a tug or pilot if they deem it necessary. 

Vessels at Risk

The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach can routinely contain 30 to 40 large vessels at 

any time. With current pilot staffing and available tugs, port pilots estimate that they can remove 

5 to 8 ships per hour from the harbor, suggesting that it could take 4 to 8 hours to evacuate the 

port once decision is made, if all ordinary protocols are followed, and if vessel masters do not 

decide to leave port without tug or pilot. (Tugs are the limiting factor, rather than pilots.) Recall 

that the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach would have 3.5 hours of warning. It therefore 

seems plausible that vessels would still be moored when the tsunami struck. If such a vessel were 

then subjected to strong currents, it could part its moorings. 

It seems plausible that currents in excess of 6 kt would be sufficient to cause a ship to 

break its mooring lines. There is at least one berth at Pier J where tsunami currents exceed 6 kt 

(fig. 48), in a direction perpendicular to a moored vessel that ordinarily intrudes slightly into the 

channel near a constriction that would cause high currents. The situation is similar to the berth 

where the Maersk Madraki broke loose in 2004 (Okal and others, 2006a,b, and c). The scenario 

therefore hypothesizes that such an event occurs. We imagine either the U.S. Coast Guard 

decides not to disperse the port or it takes some time to decide to issue the order to disperse, and 

ship’s masters decide not to evacuate on their own accord. These conditions might exist because 

of limited guidance in the dispersal plan or the sense that the tsunami warning does not provide 

enough information to warrant dispersal. 
73

Figure 48. Image showing one location in the Port of Long Beach near a berth where tsunami currents 

exceed 6 knots (3 meters per second) in the SAFRR tsunami scenario (base image from Google 

Earth). 

Damage to Large Vessels in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

We hypothesize that a vessel in the Port of Long Beach moored at Pier J parts its mooring 

lines and its crew cannot regain control before it collides with nearby piers. We have performed 

a simulation of the trajectory of an object originating at that berth. The simulation shows the 

current exceeding 6 kt at that berth at 7:10 p.m. on Mar 27, 2014. The object, representing the 

imagined unmoored vessel, comes close to Pier J and Pier G several times during the next 20–30 

minutes, apparently close enough to damage the vessel and pier if the crew cannot regain 

sufficient control (fig. 49). The simulation is somewhat simplified: the vessel's inertia and 

dimensions are neglected, as are the effects of any remaining mooring lines. However, the 

simulation illustrates the potential for the vessel to impact Pier J or G or both, perhaps several 

times, and possibly impact other vessels still moored at Pier G. 
74

Figure 49. Diagram showing motion of a particle representing a vessel in the Port of Long Beach moored 

at Pier J that parts its mooring lines and collides with nearby piers in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. The 

particle released from the selected berth when the current exceeds 6 knots. The trajectory shown 

covers the time on March 27, 2014, from 7:10 p.m. (when first released) to 7:45 p.m. (by which time the 

vessel has either been brought under control or has already collided with one or more piers). (hrs, 

hours; m, meters.) 

It seems realistic therefore that the impact would damage the vessel, Pier J (a container 

berth), and a crane at Pier J. (The vessel, experiencing some combination of surge, sway, heave, 

and yaw, damages the crane, which is located within 1m of the edge of the pier and cannot be 

moved away from the edge of the pier). In this scenario, the vessel does not sink, and is removed 

once the tsunami warning is lifted. As a result, the vessel does not create any navigation issues 

that cannot be worked around beyond the 2 days during which the port is shut down. Nor does it 

experience a fuel spill or cause other pollution. That the vessel does not sink or cause a spill is 

consistent with 92 percent of groundings recorded by shipwrecklog.com during June 2011 

through May 2013, although clearly the possibility exists. After the tsunami, it could take two 

weeks for a structural engineer to certify the pier as safe (or several months to repair it if 

otherwise) and several months to repair or replace the damaged crane. The two adjacent berths 

are used with the remaining 6 cranes, producing a modest reduction in shipping capacity, and 

there are no other lingering effects of the vessel damage. 

Opportunities to Enhance Resilience

The foregoing scenario suggests an opportunity to enhance port resiliency by reviewing 

the U.S. Coast Guard Dispersal Plan, perhaps adding guidance for decision-making in the event 

of tsunami that varies with warning time and estimated wave amplitudes, and considering the 

berths that are likely to experience the highest velocities in an adverse direction. It might be 
75

valuable to test a procedure for dispersing major vessels from the ports within 3.5 or fewer hours. 

The test could include a tabletop exercise in which pilots, the U.S. Coast Guard, and a 

representative of other actors in the port dispersal plan imagine a warning has just been issued, 

and test their ability to carry out the plan. It could be with small craft standing in for major 

vessels, and could be incorporated into a regular exercise for tsunami preparedness. Such an 

activity might be particularly valuable if the scenario depicted here—a single vessel that does not 

sink and only damages one pier—might realistically be exceeded in a real tsunami. 

Damage and Restoration of Marinas and Small Craft

By Keith Porter, Patrick Lynett, and Rick Wilson 

Introduction and Purpose

This section presents an estimate of tsunami effects on small craft in the scenario. It is 

based on an inundation line and current velocities modeled by SAFRR scientists, knowledge of 

the locations of marinas drawn from remote sensing (Google Earth), and observations of historic 

tsunami damage to similar vessels. The objectives of this section are as follows: 

· Summarize the locations and sizes of marinas exposed to loss. 

· Identify the most common damage modes observed in past tsunamis. 

· Estimate the damageability of vessels and floating docks, that is, quantify the conditions 

under which damage is assumed to occur. 

· Describe repair activities and estimate the repair duration and repair costs for each mode 

of damage. 

· Combine the foregoing to identify particular locations where it is realistic for damage to 

occur in the scenario. Estimate repair costs, repair durations, and traffic delays. 

· Identify options for enhancing resiliency. 

· Identify research needs. 

Assets Exposed to Loss

There are approximately 58 coastal marinas and small craft harbors within the areas 

studied. We examined satellite imagery dated March 2011 to estimate the number of boats. In 

some cases we adjusted the estimates where harbor websites provided number of slips, in which 

case we factored number of slips by the apparent ratio of boats to slips in the satellite imagery. 

We provided the estimates to harbormasters by email and adjusted the numbers when corrected 

by the harbormasters. The Google Earth imagery does not show boundaries between adjacent 

marinas in the same harbor that are managed by distinct organizations, and we could find no 

other statewide map that distinguished between adjacent marinas, so the figure of 46 marinas 

refers to geographically distinct, as opposed to legally distinct, marinas. 

An estimate of the number of boats in harbor on March 27, 2014, is shown in table 25, 

along with an approximate range of maximum tsunami wave velocity in each marina (denoted 

“Max V” in the table), and maximum wave height above mean higher high water (“Max D”). 

The table shows that the marinas in the study area contain on the order of 43,000 boats, mostly 

tied to floating docks. Velocities are in m/sec (to convert to knots, multiply by 2). Heights are in 

meters above mean higher high water. Records noted “USC estimate” are those where a finer-
76

resolution model was used to estimate velocities. “Pilings overtop” means that the tsunami wave 

is estimated to overtop the pilings. If the dock floats up over the top of the piling, it is no longer 

restrained from lateral movement. Pilings are designed to be tall enough to restrain the dock 

under tidal fluctuations, but a tsunami can raise the dock higher and allow it to float free. See for 

example figure 50. In the present case, we have indicated that pilings are overtopped where any 

of the following is true: (A) wave amplitude exceeds 2.0 m above mean higher high water, (B) 

the harbormaster has indicated that the pilings will be overtopped, or (C) an examination of 

Google Earth Street View imagery suggests that the pilings are too short for the tsunami 

amplitude. 

Figure 50. Photograph of a concrete dock piling (from Wikimedia Commons). 
77

Table 25. Marinas in study area, from north to south. 

Name Latitude

°N 

Longitude

°E 

Boats Docks Max V

(m/sec)a

Max D, 

mb

Pilings

overtop

Crescent City Harbor 41.745 -124.187 100 2 5-10 3.0 Yes

Trinidad Harbor 41.054 -124.144 50 0 5-10 4.0 Yes

Humboldt Bay Harbor 40.808 -124.163 450 12 4-8 1.0 No

Dolphin Isle Marina 39.4297 -123.798 70 1 0-2 2.5 Yes

Noyo Harbor 39.4239 -123.8058 230 5 4-5 2.5 Yes

Porto Bodega Marina 38.3331 -123.0522 36 1 2-4 2.5 Yes

Spud Point Marina 38.3304 -123.0564 250 5 3-5 2.5 Yes

Inverness Yacht Club 38.1027 -122.8566 76 2 0-2 1.5 Yes

Marina Bay 37.916 -122.353 300 6 2-4 2.0 No

Point Richmond 37.908 -122.382 400 8 2-4 2.0 No

Clipper Yacht Harbor 37.870 -122.496 350 7 3-6 1.5 No

Berkeley Marina 37.866 -122.318 1,100 22 3-6 1.0 No

Sausalito Yacht Harbor 37.860 -122.482 900 18 2-4 1.0 No

Emeryville Marina 37.839 -122.313 700 14 3-6 2.0 No

Treasure Isle Marina 37.816 -122.371 100 2 4-8 2.0 No

Fisherman's Wharf, San 

Francisco

37.810 -122.417 300 6 4-8 2.0 No

Pier 39 San Francisco 37.810 -122.411 300 6 4-8 2.0 No

Ft Mason, San Francisco 37.807 -122.433 350 7 4-8 2.0 No

San Francisco Marina Yacht 

Harbor

37.805 -122.445 150 3 4-8 2.0 No

Alameda Grand Marina 37.782 -122.251 1,900 38 2-4 1.0 No

South Beach Harbor, San 

Francisco

37.781 -122.385 700 14 2-4 1.0 No

Mission Bay, San Francisco 37.772 -122.386 20 1 2-4 1.0 No

San Leandro Marina 37.703 -122.193 455 8 2-4 1.0 No

Sierra Point Marina, Brisbane 37.673 -122.384 500 10 2-4 1.0 No

Oyster Point Marina, Brisbane 37.667 -122.383 500 10 2-4 1.0 No

Coyote Point Yacht Harbor, 

Burlingame

37.589 -122.320 250 5 2-4 1.0 No

Pacific Shores Marina, 

Redwood City

37.513 -122.196 100 2 1-2 0.5 No

Port of Redwood City 37.508 -122.208 100 2 1-2 0.5 No

Bair Island Marina 37.502 -122.220 300 6 1-2 0.5 No

Pilar Point Harbor 37.496 -122.480 300 6 4-8 4.0 Yes

Santa Cruz 36.964 -122.002 1,000 20 3-6 3.5 Yes

Moss Landing 36.807 -121.785 610 12 1 1.0 No

Monterey Harbor 36.605 -122.892 200 4 4-8 3.0 Yes

Morro Bay Harbor—floating 

docks

35.366 -120.856 300 6 3-6 2.0 Yes

Morro Bay Harbor—moorings 

and piers

35.366 -120.856 200 0 3-6 2.0 No

Port San Luis 35.167 -120.742 40 1 3-6 4.5 Yes

Santa Barbara Harbor 34.404 -119.688 1,200 24 4-8 2.0 Yes

Ventura Harbor 34.246 -119.260 1,200 24 4-8c 2.5(c) Yes

Channel Islands Harbor 34.171 -119.209 4,000 80 3-6 1.5 Yes

Marina Del Ray 33.972 -118.452 4,000 80 2-4 1.0 No

Redondo Beach Marina 33.8469 -118.3983 1,480 30 1-2 1.5 Yes

POLA Berths 200-205 33.766 -118.248 1,516 30 1-2c 1.0 No

Downtown Marina 33.761 -118.193 85 10 1-2c 2.0 No

Long Beach Shoreline Marina 33.758 -118.184 1,764 32 1-2c 2.0 No

Alamitos Bay 33.747 -118.116 1,200 24 4-8 1.0 No
78

Table 25. Marinas in study area, from north to south.—Continued 

Name Latitude

°N 

Longitude

°E 

Boats Docks Max V

(m/sec)a

Max D, mb Pilings

overtop

Fish Harbor 33.734 -118.267 60 3 2c 2.0 No

Al Larson 

Marina

33.733 -118.268 128 3 2-3c 1.0 No

San Pedro 

Marina Port 

of Los 

Angeles

Berth 80

33.730 -118.275 80 11 1-2(c) 2.0 No

Surfside 33.724 -118.066 1,000 20 4-8 1.0 No

Cabrillo 

marinas 

(Port of Los 

Angeles

Berths 29–

43)

33.719 -118.275 2,066 41 2-4c 1.0 No

Newport 

Bay

33.598 -117.893 1,000 20 4-8 0.5 No

Dana Cove 33.456 -117.697 2,400 45 4-8 2.0 No

Oceanside 33.209 -117.396 9,00 18 5-10 3.0 Yes

Quivira 

Basin

32.762 -117.239 1,200 24 2-4 1.0 No

Harbor 

Island

32.726 -117.215 1,100 22 2-3c 1.0 No

Shelter 

Island

32.708 -117.236 1,300 26 2-4c 1.5 No

Embarcadero 

Marina

32.707 -117.169 450 9 3-6 1.0 No

Chula Vista 

Marina

32.623 -117.104 800 16 2-4 1.0 No

Total 11,593 258

a

Max V = maximum velocity, meters per second (m/sec). For knots, multiply by 2.

b

Max D = maximum wave amplitude, meters (m) above mean higher high water. Note 1 m ≈ 3 feet. 

c

USC (University of California) estimate from finer-resolution model. 

Vulnerability

Historical Damage Data

Wilson and others (2012) record the following damage modes were observed in 

California after the 2010 Chile earthquake and the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, generally boats 

were damaged or sunk and docks damaged or destroyed. Associated with each observation is 

some measure of the currents or wave amplitudes accompanying the damage. Although the 

relationship between strong currents and damage can vary greatly within and between harbors, 

the results in the table indicate that boat damage could occur when velocities reach 4 or 5 m/sec 

(8 to 10 kt). For some harbors, like Crescent City and Santa Cruz, 1 in 5 damaged boats sank 

when velocities were in the range of 4–8 m/sec (8–16 kt; see fig. 51). 
79

Figure 51. Photograph of boats sunk by the tsunami generated by the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake 

within Crescent City, California’s, small boat basin (photograph by Rick Wilson). 

Dock damage may also occur at about the same velocities depending on the location of 

the dock in the harbor, because currents vary throughout the harbor. Age matters because dock 

materials can degrade over time. Orientation of the docks matters, because the currents that flow 

parallel to a dock, impose lower bending moments (a sort of prying action) on its connections 

than do currents that flow perpendicular to it. Piling height matters because the tsunami can 

overtop short pilings, as previously mentioned. A detailed structural analysis of the docks and 

moored craft under the scenario currents could provide a better estimate of dock damage and an 

indication of which are most susceptible to tsunami damage. 
80

Table 26. Damage modes recorded by Wilson and others (2012). 

[m, meters; m/sec, meters per second]

Damage mode Example Tsunami effects

Vessel collision when vessels break free of moorings Santa Cruz 

2010

5 m/sec, 2.2 m tidal 

fluctuation

Vessels almost run aground while returning to harbor Santa 

Barbara 2010

4.5 m/sec, 0.9 m tsunami 

wave amplitude 

20 damaged docks, $300,000-500,000 repair cost Ventura 2010 6-7 m/sec

8m sailboat swamped, damaged beyond repair; rescue of passengers 

required

Mission Bay 

2010

3m standing wave at Bay 

entrance

Part of a dock destroyed. 25 m, 100-ton fishing vessel tore its dock 

from its moorings

Shelter 

Island, San 

Diego Bay 

2010

1m tsunami amplitude; 5 

m/sec current

All docks heavily damaged or destroyed ($20 million in damage), 16 

boats sunk, 47 damaged. Sediment removal took 10 months. Repair 

work ongoing after 15 months. Interestingly, post-Tohoku repairs 

upgraded the marina for an assumed surge of 2.5 m (Trenkwalder, 

2013, oral commun.). The present scenario estimates 3 m of surge 

above mean higher high water 

Crescent City 

2011

2.5 m tsunami wave 

amplitude, 4.5 m/sec 

Dock and infrastructure damage at openings to 2 harbors Noyo River 

2011 

No info

Minor damage to docks and boats San 

Francisco

Bay 2011

0.3—1.5 m wave 

amplitude

23 of 29 docks significantly damaged or destroyed. 14 boats sunk, 

dozens damaged. Repair work ongoing after 15 months.

Santa Cruz 

2011

1.6-1.9 m wave amplitude, 

7 m/sec currents

Docks sheared their wooden piles at metal ring connectors; $1.75

million repair costs. 

Moss 

Landing 

2011

2 m tsunami tidal 

fluctuation

Damaged to several boats, docks, and maritime infrastructure Morro Bay 

2011

1.6m peak tsunami 

amplitude, 2.5 m peak-totrough tidal fluctuation. 7

m/sec in confined parts of 

the harbor

Harbor personnel injured helping boaters to dock; $150,000 dock 

damage

Ventura 2011 1.3 m tsunami amplitude

Boat, dock, and harbor infrastructure damage $130,000. Four people 

knocked off shoreline rocks

Mission Bay 

2011

<1 m tsunami amplitude

Police pontoon boat dragged under a dock and sunk—$40,000. Minor 

hull damage to 2 other police boats whose moorings broke.

Shelter 

Island, San 

Diego Bay 

2011
81

Because wave heights in the SAFRR scenario event are 3 to 4 times larger than the 2010 

and 2011 events, especially north of Point Conception, marinas and harbors would likely face 

more significant tsunami hazards. Extreme fluctuations in water level caused by the tsunami 

could cause damage to boat keels and dock and boat connections. With significant flow depths 

and inundation of dry land around harbors expected, dock connections could float above the tops 

of piles causing docks (and attached boats) to float freely within the harbors. Free-floating boats 

and docks would become tsunami debris capable of additional damage to surrounding structures. 

Harbor infrastructure (for example, electrical lines, sewage, and petroleum pipelines) could also 

become significantly damaged by loose docks and boats. Offshore moorings could also 

conceivably be damaged, either by dragging the anchor (commonly a concrete block attached to 

a mooring line and buoy) or by parting (breaking) the mooring line. 

Testing and cleanup of hazardous materials could delay restoration of harbors. For 

example, after the 2011 tsunami, reconstruction efforts in Crescent City Harbor were delayed by 

over 10 months due to complications in permitting and sampling of the 150,000 cubic-meters of 

sediment deposited in the basin by the tsunami (Wilson and others, 2012). A larger tsunami 

scenario, like that of the SAFRR project, would cause similar damage and sediment movement to 

dozens of harbors in the State, would likely cause even longer delays because regulatory and 

recovery resources would be stretched very thin. Environmental problems are addressed in 

greater detail elsewhere in the scenario study. 

Fragility Functions for Velocity-Induced Damage

There is some standard practice in earthquake engineering on how to create a 

mathematical model of the damageability of an object subjected to seismic excitation. See for 

example Porter and others (2007). In that procedure, the objective is to create an idealized 

mathematical model of damageability. Typically (though not always) the model is a lognormal 

cumulative distribution function of the capacity of the object to resist a specified damage state, in 

terms of a scalar measure of environmental excitation, termed an intensity measure (IM). The 

damage state is commonly defined in terms of the observable evidence of damage and the repair 

required to restore the object to its pre-event condition. The evidence is commonly tabulated in 

terms observations either of the actual level of excitation causing each instance of damage to 

occur (type-A data, where A refers to actual excitation), or the number and fraction of instances 

where the damage state was exceeded, and the maximum excitation associated with each 

observation (type-B data, where B refers to bounding excitation). There are other kinds of 

damageability evidence described in Porter and others (2007) that are not relevant here. These 

include type-C (capacity) data, where specimens were subjected to varying levels of excitation 

but none were damaged; type-D (derived) fragility, which applies engineering first principles to 

estimate the excitation at which a modeled specimen fails; and type-E (expert opinion) data, 

which represents a last resort absent types A–D data. 

We assume vessel and dock damage can be modeled as a function of tsunami velocity 

using the convention of a capacity parameter idealized as a lognormal random variable with 

some reasonable logarithmic standard deviation; it is common to use 0.4, absent better data. The 

evidence offered by Wilson and others (2012) are insufficient to create a strongly defensible 

fragility function, but at least they suggest some reasonable parameter values. Only two set of 

observation are sufficient to plot damage (fraction of vessels damaged or sunk) versus intensity: 

Crescent City (2011) and Santa Cruz (2011). We estimated number of boats exposed to the 

tsunami from satellite imagery prior to the tsunami, and divided the reports of damaged or suck 
82

boats by the estimated number of boats exposed. For Santa Cruz, we interpreted “dozens” to 

mean 120; results are sensitive to this assumption. We fit fragility functions through points 

averaged from these data, as shown in figure 52. (A maximum-likelihood method could also be 

used to determine parameter values, but that approach seems excessively refined for such crude 

data.) The fragility functions for “boat at least damaged” and “boat sinks” are thus respectively: 

(1) 

(2) 

where P[D ≥ d|V = v] denotes the probability that any given boat reaches or exceeds damage 

state d (that is, d = 1 means damaged, d = 2 means sunk), V is the maximum tsunami wave 

velocity in the marina measured in m/sec, and Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function. 

Figure 52 illustrates these curves and a fragility function for dock damage, whose form is 

similar: 

(3) 

Equations (1) and (2) are used to estimate the probability that a boat is damaged but not sunk, as 

follows: 

(4) 

ln 6.5 ( ) 1

0.4 boat

v

PD V v ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ≥ ⎣ ⎦ = ⎤ = Φ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠

ln 9.9 ( ) 2

0.4 boat

v

PD V v ⎛ ⎞ ⎡

⎣ ⎦ = = ⎤ = Φ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠

ln 3.5 ( ) 1

0.4 dock

v

PD V v ⎛ ⎞ ⎡

⎣ ⎦ = = ⎤ = Φ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠

112 PD V v PD V v PD V v boat boat boat ⎡ = = ⎤ = ⎡ ≥ = ⎤− ⎡ = = ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
83

Figure 52. Graph showing fragility model for boats and docks in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. This model 

considers only current velocities. Elsewhere we recognize that boats secured to docks whose pilings 

are overtopped experience much greater damage. Dots represent data; curves are roughly fit to them. 

Though the data are sparse, the curves are plausible. (m/sec, meters per second.) 

Repair Costs Conditioned on Damage

Ideally each damage state is defined unambiguously, in quantitative terms of observed 

symptoms of damage and a clear set of repair measures required to restore the object to its preevent condition. Except in the case of “boat sinks,” the foregoing fragility functions lack that 

clarity. Qualifiers such as “slight,” “minor,” or “significant” still beg the question of what repairs 

are required and how much they cost, questions that are not answered by the available evidence. 

The following costs conditioned on damage state are therefore order-of-magnitude estimates. 

The replacement cost for a boat can be taken as approximately uniformly distributed between 

$25,000 and $75,000, although higher and lower prices exist, based on a sample of 2010–2013 

model-year boat listings within 50 miles of San Francisco at http://www.boattrader.com

(accessed May 15, 2013). We use Boat Trader’s average price of $50,000 for the same sample. 

Damage is assumed to cost 20 percent of the replacement cost. The average cost to repair a 

damaged dock is taken as $6,000, based on a reported $114,000 to repair 20 damaged docks in 

the Berkeley marina after the 2011 Tohoku tsunami (Hardinger, written commun., 2012). If the 

dock is damaged, one repair is required per 50 slips, again based on Berkeley’s experience in 

2011. Replacing concrete modular floats is estimated to cost $100 per square foot (ft2) 

(Trenkwalder, 2013, oral commun.). Each slip requires approximately 300 ft2 of dock, based on 

sample California marinas. Thus, destroyed docks are assumed to cost $30,000 per slip to 

demolish and replace. Replacement of a pile could also approach $10,000 to $15,000 

(Trenkwalder, 2013, oral commun.). 

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

0 2 4 6 8 10

Fraction	of	boats	or	docks	damaged

Maximum	current,	m/sec

Dock	damage

Boat	damage

Boat	sinks
84

Damage Resulting from Overtopped Pilings

With high tides and tsunami wave heights together sometimes exceeding 4m, a strong 

potential exists for docks to float off their pilings. Piling heights vary between marinas, and some 

are relatively short, so we queried harbormasters about piling heights, asking them whether the 

wave heights estimated by URS would cause docks to float off their pilings. Where 

harbormasters replied that docks would float off their pilings, or where harbormasters did not 

reply but wave heights were at least 2.5m above the reference water level, that is, above mean 

high water plus 20 cm (MHW+20), we assumed that pilings are overtopped. In such a case, all 

boats are assumed to be damaged, half of them sink, an assumption that several harbormasters 

agreed with and none disagreed with. We have also assumed that among docks that float off, 25 

percent can be salvaged, and the other 75 percent require replacement, as suggested by an 

engineer involved in post-Tohoku marina repairs (Trenkwalder, 2013, oral commun.), who says 

that floats would be damaged from impact from loose boats or other floats, cleats breaking wales 

(as a result of cross-grain bending), and utilities (potable water and power) would be damaged 

from loss of structural support. Repairs would typically consist of replacing timber wales, 

reusing salvaged floats, reattaching salvaged cleats, and reconnecting utilities. We estimate the 

cost to replace or repair freed docks at $80/ft2

· 300 ft2/slip, where we use $80 rather than $100 

because 25 percent of floats at freed docks could be salvaged with some cost, say $20/ft2

, for the 

salvage effort. 

Restoration Time

To assess restoration time, we inquired of 26 California harbormasters about restoration 

of damage under the scenario tsunami and about their experience in the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. 

Replies were limited, so the following restoration model is speculative, although consistent with 

four harbormasters’ experience in 2011. Harbormasters of marinas where the majority of docks 

were damaged but not destroyed reported repairs taking 1 to 2 months. They speculated that if all 

of their docks were destroyed, repairs could take 1 to 3 years, especially municipal marinas 

where repair funding would be an issue. Conceivably repair durations might be briefer in a future 

tsunami through streamlining of the regulatory process and by applying lessons learned from 

Tohoku, but we have assumed that the speed of recovery is similar to 2011. 

We therefore offer the following simple restoration model, illustrated in figure 53. In 

Equation (5), R(t) refers to the fraction of the marina operating normally t days after the tsunami 

alert or warning is lifted, f1 is the fraction of docks that are damaged but not destroyed by the 

tsunami, and f2 is the fraction of docks destroyed by the tsunami, meaning that they have to be 

demolished and replaced. Equation (6) says that damaged docks are restored linearly with time, 

and completely restored within 30 days. Equation (7) says that it takes 3 months to demolish and 

arrange financing to replace destroyed docks, and then the remainder of 2 years to complete the 

replacement. 

(5) 

(6) 

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 11 2 2 Rt f f f g t f g t = 1− − + ⋅ + ⋅

1 ( ) 30

30

1 30

t g t t days

t days

= ≤

= >
85

(7) 

Figure 53. Graph showing restoration of damaged and destroyed docks after the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario.

Damage to Marinas and Small Craft in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

Taking the exposed quantities and velocities shown in table 25 and the vulnerability 

relationship just proposed, one can estimate the following consequences: 

· 8,900 boats are damaged and are repairable. This amounts to 1 in 5 boats in the study 

area. 

· 6,600 boats sink (about 1 in 7). 

· 360 docks are damaged and are repairable (about 1 in 2; docks sizes vary, but a typical 

dock might comprise 50 slips). 

· 170 docks are destroyed and must be replaced (1 in 5). 

· The total expected value of loss is approximately $700 million, of which approximately 

$420 million is boat repair and replacement, $280 million in dock repair and replacement. 

This total represents approximately 20 percent of the estimated replacement cost of all 

small craft and floating docks in the study area. (Of this total, $20 million was already 

mentioned in the section on the Port of Los Angeles, so the total excluding this figure is 

$680 million.) 

· Note that we have not estimated the cost associated with sediment transport such as 

dredging and environmental remediation. These costs could be substantial, conceivably in 

the hundreds of millions of dollars. Nor does the tsunami modeling address all harbors 

throughout the State. 

Considering that perhaps 40 percent of boats in Crescent City and 80 percent of Santa 

Cruz’s docks were damaged in the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, these figures (1 in 3 boats damaged or 

2 ( ) 0 90

90 90 730

640

1 730

g t t days

t days t days

days t

= ≤

− = < ≤

= <

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

0 90 180 270 360 450 540 630 720

Fraction restored

Days after tsunami

Damaged docks

Destroyed docks
86

sunk) in a tsunami pointed more directly at California does not seem unrealistically high, and it 

may be low. These figures omit potential damage to offshore moorings. 

Using the foregoing model, it is estimated that two thirds of the loss comes from five 

large harbors with high enough waves that pilings are overtopped: Channel Islands Harbor (short 

pilings confirmed by harbormaster), Redondo Beach Marina (not confirmed, but pilings look 

shorter than the 1.5 m wave height above MHW+20 modeled here), Santa Barbara Harbor (short 

pilings confirmed by harbormaster), Ventura Harbor (not confirmed, but 2.5 m waves above 

MHW+20 strongly suggests overtopping) and Santa Cruz Harbor (not confirmed, but 3.5 m 

waves above MHW+20 strongly suggests overtopping). Channel Islands accounts for 1 in 4 of 

all of the damaged or sunk boats; and together with the next five (Redondo Beach, Santa 

Barbara, Ventura Harbor, Dana Cove, and Santa Cruz), these six harbors account for 2/3rd of all 

damaged or sunk boats. As shown in figure 55, this is not just a Northern California event: 

marinas from one end of the State to the other can be heavily damaged by a single tsunami. The 

figure shows the 10 marinas that contribute the most to the total economic loss postulated by the 

scenario because they are large and have high wave heights or velocities. 

Boat damage can pose a navigation hazard. The Cabrillo marinas (POLA Berths 29-43) 

and the marinas at POLA Berths 200-205 would have approximately 90 damaged boats and 5 

sunk. If any of the damaged or sunk boats broke loose from their slips, they could represent a 

navigation hazard to large ships in the Port of Los Angeles, as illustrated in figure 54. Shelter 

Island and Harbor Island similarly represent a potential threat to the Port of San Diego, 

contributing 30 damaged boats and 2 sunk. The Alameda Grand Marina near the Port of Oakland 

might have 45 damaged boats and 3 sunk. Marina Bay near the Port of Richmond is 

hypothesized to have 7 damaged boats, 1 sunk. 
87

 

Figure 54. Diagrams of paths of hypothetical floating debris from Port of Los Angeles marinas 3.5 to 6.5 

hours after the first arrival of the SAFRR tsunami. 

The most significant repair delays would be attributable to removing potentially 

contaminated debris and sediment, especially if testing and permitting were required, but we 

have not estimated sediment transport so no particular locations are identified here where this 

would be an issue. 
88

Figure 55. Most of the losses to marinas in the SAFRR tsunami scenario are to the 10 marinas shown on 

this map, attributable to high current velocities or high wave heights (base image from Google Earth).

Repair of breakwaters, rock slope protection, and dredging will add substantially to losses 

in the tsunami. In the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, the Crescent City Marina experienced 2.5 m 

surge and 12-kt velocities. This undermined rock slope protection and deposited close to 80,000 

cubic yards of sand and debris in the marina basin. The required dredging and rock slope 

protection repair costs totaled approximately $6 million, according to Trenkwalder (2013, oral 

commun.). We have not estimated sediment transport nor identified particular locations of likely 

damage to breakwaters and slope protection, but these are likely and could add $100 million in 

losses. 

Resiliency Opportunities

Boat and dock damage could be greatly reduced by increasing the heights of pilings; 

more than half the damage is attributed to docks floating off their pilings (though boats could be 

damaged by current velocities as well). It is practical to add height to most kinds of pilings, 

although doing so raises strength concerns. Boat damage could also be reduced by moving boats 
89

offshore or to safe anchorage during the warning period, or by removing them from the water 

onto trailers, but this seems impractical for more than a small number of boats in most 

recreational boating communities. Most boat owners would not likely be on or near their boats 

when the warning was issued. U.S. Coast Guard personnel voiced the opinion that moving large 

numbers of boats out of their harbors simultaneously would tend to cause more life-safety threats 

than warranted by the potential property savings. The boats would have to stay out of the harbor 

for at least 12 hours, which means until the morning of March 28, and which would be 

problematic for many boat owners with families to care for and require solid advance planning in 

terms of understanding the need for taking enough fuel, food, water, and having the navigational 

skill to remain at sea for extended periods. The Coast Guard would be hard pressed to support so 

many boats all hastily put to sea, all likely in a bunch, all night. In addition, damage within 

harbors could prevent boats from returning. 

Research Needs

Future tsunamis can be more severe than California’s recent experience in the Tohoku 

and Chile tsunamis, so absent significant changes to the vulnerability of boats and docks, 

California’s marinas will experience greater damage in more-severe tsunamis. The research 

needs discussed here are about refining models of that damage. That is, these research needs 

address improvements in our ability to estimate asset fragility, to better understand damage 

mechanisms, and to better inform risk mitigation decisions. 

There is a good deal of simplification in the marina damage model presented here. 

Fragility functions are based on only two observations. Standard procedures call for several 

more. We intend these fragility functions to represent plausible relationships for purposes of 

developing a scenario; they are not offered for other purposes. However, the paucity of data used 

to derive the fragility functions reflects limited literature, not limited experience: California 

marinas have recently enough experienced tsunamis that have caused such extensive damage to 

boats and docks that it should be practical to find sufficient data to produce high-quality fragility 

functions that could be used in loss estimation. It would also be worthwhile to quantify the 

damageability of offshore moorings for small craft. 

Repair costs for damaged docks are based on limited repair-cost data from Berkeley and 

from catalog prices of docks. An additional effort to collect more cost data on docks and boat 

repair would be desirable. Results are largely proportional to these guesses, by which we mean 

that if the estimate of the average repair cost for a damaged boat is high or low by a factor of 

two, so is the estimate of total loss. Velocity observations are aggregated, with single midrange 

values for entire marinas, despite that the velocity may vary significantly within a marina. Boat 

and dock orientation and interaction could relate to damageability in ways that are not reflected 

in these two observations. 

Piling heights are in many cases based on Google Earth Street View from nearby streets. 

It was necessary in these cases to judge the tidal stage from the photos and to estimate how much 

piling height would remain above the water at mean higher high water. Results are sensitive to 

these judgments. If we overestimated piling heights, and in fact they were uniformly half as tall 

above MHW+20 than we judged, then the property damage could be $400 million more ($1.1 

billion total property damage): 12,000 boats would be damaged and 11,000 sunk, meaning that 

half of California pleasure boats in the study area would be damaged or sunk. But lacking a highresolution velocity model and more-detailed harbor infrastructure and damage data, the 

foregoing is as much as is practical. 
90

More could be done. There has been a good deal of research on the tsunami fragility of 

buildings, but the authors could find none on the fragility of boats (in the sense of a mathematical 

relationship between tsunami wave velocity or amplitude and damage to small craft). Such a 

relationship would be valuable given the number of craft exposed and the hazard they may pose 

to navigation if damaged. Standard procedures exist for the derivation of earthquake-related 

fragility functions for building components; these have been easily adapted to boat damage due 

to tsunami. The data collection procedures for earthquake damage to building components could 

similarly be applied to boats damaged by the next tsunami. We have sought and received from 

California harbormasters anecdotal data on marina restoration times in past tsunamis, but it has 

been said that the plural of anecdote is not data. A more exhaustive survey with high response 

rates would be required to draw deeply defensible conclusions about the factors that affect repair 

time and to create a good mathematical model. 

Additional research and assistance regarding piling heights and boat movement or 

evacuation are also clear needs. The California State Tsunami Program is focusing on this type 

of work for maritime communities by studying safe depth and distance required for offshore 

evacuation and strong tsunami currents within harbors in order to provide consistent guidance 

from findings to harbor authorities, emergency planners, and the public. 

Building Damage

By Keith Porter 

Introduction and Purpose

This section presents an estimate of tsunami effects on buildings from the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario. It is based on a map of flow depths and momentum flux by URS Corp., 

modified by an inundation line produced by the California Geological Survey (CGS). Where the 

inundation line extends farther inland from the URS map, flow depth is estimated to be 1.5 ft. 

Where the inundation line is closer to the shore than the URS map, the URS map is clipped to 

exclude the portions that CGS believes are not inundated. It also draws on a preliminary tsunami 

vulnerability model developed for the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) as part of 

NIBS’ efforts to create a HAZUS-MH tsunami loss model. 

The objectives of this portion of the study are as follows: 

· Summarize the value and location of buildings exposed to loss 

· Summarize and illustrate common forms of building damage in tsunamis 

· Summarize the development of tsunami vulnerability functions from the HAZUS-MH 

draft damage model 

· Estimate the repair cost and repair duration of these assets 

· Identify options for enhancing resiliency 

· Identify research needs 

Estimating Assets Exposed to Loss 

HAZUS-MH offers a nationwide default building-stock inventory, but it can be difficult 

to use outside of HAZUS-MH (as is sometimes desirable): it is encoded in 15 tables in 2 

Microsoft Access databases for each of 50 States. A Microsoft Access database is developed 
91

here that links to the HAZUS-MH tables, and includes 54 scripted query language (SQL) 

queries, a macro to perform them all, and a number of supporting tables, for the purpose of 

extracting the HAZUS-MH inventory to a single de-normalized table, which is more practical for 

use in the present study. The table shows by Census block, tract, county or State: square footage 

of construction, building value, content value, and number of indoor occupants at 2 p.m., 2 a.m., 

and 5 p.m. The quantities are distributed by HAZUS-MH occupancy classification, structure 

type, and design level. 

Let us denote the quantities of square footage, building value, and content value by A, Vb, 

and Vc, respectively. We begin by distributing square footage, building value, add content value 

by census block, occupancy class, and material, as follows: 

(8) 

(9) 

(10) 

In these equations, Pctmatl|occ is used to distribute square footage and value equally. There 

does not appear to be any documentation to indicate whether the Pct values in the HAZUS-MH 

tables refer to square footage, building value, content value, or other factors, but HAZUS-MH 

does not appear to have any data to distinguish the percentage of one quantity, such as square 

footage, from that of another, such as building value. The same percentages are used regardless 

of which quantity is being distributed. This may be a somewhat crude assumption: fraction of 

area may be very different from fraction of value in highly disparate occupancies. However, it 

seems sufficient considering other sources of error in risk analyses. Once the area and values 

have been distributed to the level of block, occupancy class, and material, they are then further 

distributed to the level of structure type and design level as follows: 

(11) 

(12) 

Vcblock occ type design block occ matl ,, , Vc Pct , , type design matl , = ⋅ , (13) 

where Pcttype,design|matl denotes the fraction of square footage in the given material represented by 

the given particular structure type and design level. 

In a parallel effort, URS Corp staff estimated flow depth and momentum flux on a 30m 

gridded basis; these raster data were imported to a GIS for further analysis. U.S. Geological 

Survey (USGS) staff intersected the URS maps with census block boundaries and masked out 

water features, meaning that the portions of census block in water were removed from the 

portions on land. The USGS staff then calculated the remaining fraction of each census block 

with positive flow depth (“inundated fraction”), and estimated the average flow depth and 

momentum flux in the inundated fraction of each census block. The inundated fraction of each 

census block area was assumed to be the same fraction of building value with some inundation. 

This fraction was applied to building area, building value, content value and occupancy, to 

estimate the quantities of buildings and occupants with positive flow depth. 

A A Pct block occ matl block occ , , , matl occ = ⋅

Vb Vb Pct block occ matl block occ , , , matl occ = ⋅

, , , 100

matl occ

block occ matl block occ

Pct

Vc Vc = ⋅

A AP block occ type design block occ matl ,, , , , type design matl , = ⋅ ct

Vbblock occ type design block occ matl ,, , Vb Pct , , type design matl , = ⋅
92

By this process, it appears that the tsunami has positive flow depths in 1800 city blocks, 

affecting 100 million square feet of buildings valued at $13 billion (replacement cost new, only 

including the subset of buildings in the inundated portion of coastal census blocks) and $8 billion 

of contents (replacement cost new, same subset). See table 27 for inventory totals by county. 

These totals include only the scenario inundation zones in the study area, not areas that would be 

inundated in such a scenario but that fell outside the study areas. 

Buildings that are wetted by the tsunami in this scenario (and that are in the study area) 

represent approximately 37 percent of the inventory inside the maximum inundation zone 

developed by the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES). As noted 

elsewhere in this report, Cal OES’s maximum inundation zone represents an envelope of 

inundation from many large distant and local-source tsunamis that could affect California, not 

just a single tsunami. That fact accounts for part of the difference between this tsunami and the 

Cal OES maximum inundation zone. Much of the rest is because the Cal OES inundation zone is 

delineated for the entire California coast, whereas our model only examines a portion of the 

coast. See table 28 for our estimate of the inventory inside Cal OES’s maximum inundation 

zone. As shown in the table, this tsunami is a statewide event, not just a northern or southern 

California disaster: counties along the entire coast have significant inundation compared with the 

Cal OES inundation zone. 

Forms of Building Damage 

Buildings affected by tsunamis tend to be damaged by the following mechanisms, 

illustrated in figures 56 and 57: 

1. Hydrodynamic pressure of the moving water damages building finishes and structural 

members, potentially causing local pressure-related damage to building components or 

displacement of the entire building. This damage can be due to either the inflow or 

outflow of water. Figure 56 shows instances of damage from Japan in 2011 where 

buildings were completely swept away. 

2. Wetting of building and contents components that are subject to water damage, such as 

carpets, electrical wiring, wall finishes, computers and other contents. 

3. Soiling of building and contents by soil deposited by tsunami flows. 

4. Impact or deposition of water-borne debris. 

5. Fire or release of hazardous materials. These issues are addressed elsewhere. 

6. Buoyancy can lift and transport a building from its foundation. 

7. Scour can erode soil around the building, especially at corners. 
93

 

 

Figure 56. Photographs of apparent effects of hydrodynamic pressure on buildings in Japan affected by 

the 2011 Tohoku tsunami (photographs by Keith Porter). 
94

 

Figure 57. Photographs of wetting, soiling, and deposition of debris in buildings in Japan affected by the 

2011 Tohoku tsunami (photographs by Keith Porter). 

Creating Tsunami Vulnerability Functions 

Physical damage and repair costs for buildings and contents can be estimated as functions 

of tsunami loading, commonly measured in terms of momentum flux (m) and flow depth (f ). The 

result is referred to here as a vulnerability function. We considered two sources for these: a draft 

analytical model in development for the HAZUS-MH tsunami model (Kircher, written commun., 

2012) and recently published empirical relationships derived from experience in the 2011 

Tohoku tsunami (Suppasri and others, 2013). 

The model offered by Suppasri and others (2013) is based on a survey by the Ministry of 

Land, Infrastructure and Transportation of Japan, with more than 250,000 structures surveyed. 

The set of data has details on damage level, structural material, number of stories per building 

and location (town). It provides a set of fragility functions that depict the probability of reaching 

or exceeding each of six qualitatively defined damage states as a function of inundation depth. It 

offers the advantage of drawing on a very large survey of building damaged by tsunami flows. 

The HAZUS-MH draft model relates damage state, repair cost, and duration of loss of 

functionality to both depth (for nonstructural components and contents) and momentum flux (for 

structural components) for U.S. construction. It borrows from riverine and coastal flood damage 

models developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and others over several decades and 

supplements these with analytical models that use engineering first principles to estimate 

structural forces, resistance, damage, and loss. It offers the advantages of transparency, 

application of a great deal of U.S. domestic damage experience in floods, ability to estimate 

quantitative measures of performance (repair cost and loss of functionality), and consistency 

with developing U.S. codes. For these reasons, we employ the HAZUS-MH model here. Note 

that we do not use the HAZUS-MH vulnerability functions in HAZUS-MH; the software has not 

been distributed yet. Rather we use the vulnerability functions in a database outside of HAZUSMH. Note also that the HAZUS-MH Tsunami module is still under development, and that 

significant changes could occur prior to release of production software. 

In HAZUS-MH, a vulnerability function applies to a single combination of model 

building type (16 types related to construction material and lateral force resisting system), height 

(low rise, mid-rise, or high rise), code era (precode, low code, moderate code, high code), and 

occupancy type (33 varieties of residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, religion, 

government, and education). The vulnerability functions reflect an uncertain discrete damage 
95

state D for each building component (structural, nonstructural, and contents) and an expected 

value of repair cost conditioned on damage state. The probability mass function of the uncertain 

damage state is evaluated using fragility functions in the form of a lognormal cumulative 

distribution function that reflects the assumption that components have an uncertain capacity to 

resist each damage state, and that the capacity is lognormally distributed. The duration of loss of 

function (“downtime”) is assumed to be a function of structural damage state. The vulnerability 

functions for building, contents, and downtime are denoted here by MDFB, MDFC, and MDFT, 

respectively, and are evaluated as follows. 

( )

4

2

4

2

, BS S S

d

N N N

d

MDF m f P D d M m E L D d

P D dF f E L D d

=

=

= ⎡ = = ⎤⋅ ⎡ = ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦

+ ⎡ = = ⎤⋅ ⎡ = ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦

∑

∑

(14) 

( )

4

2

CC C C

d

MDF f P D d F f E L D d == ⎡ = = ⎤⋅ ⎡ = ⎤ ∑ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ (15) 

( )

4

2

, TS T S

d

MDF m f P D d M m E L D d == ⎡ = = ⎤⋅ ⎡ = ⎤ ∑ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ,

(16) 

where 

( ) ( ) { }

( )

, , 1

, , 1

,

,

ln ln

2,3

ln

4

S d S d

S

S d S d

S d

S d

m m

P D dM m d

m

d

θ θ

β β

θ

β

+

+

⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎡

⎣ ⎦ = = ⎤ = Φ −Φ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ∈

⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎛ ⎞ = Φ⎜ ⎟ =

⎝ ⎠

 (17) 

( ) ( ) { }

( )

, , 1

, , 1

,

,

ln ln

2,3

ln

4

N d N d

N

N d N d

N d

N d

f f P D dF f d

f d

θ θ

β β

θ

β

+

+

⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞

⎣ ⎦ ⎡ = = ⎤ = Φ −Φ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ∈

⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎛ ⎞ = Φ⎜ ⎟ =

⎝ ⎠

 (18) 

( ) ( ) { }

( )

, , 1

, , 1

,

,

ln ln

2,3

ln

4

C d C d

C

C d C d

C d

C d

f f P D dF f d

f d

θ θ

β β

θ

β

+

+

⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎡

⎣ ⎦ = = ⎤ = Φ −Φ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ∈

⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎛ ⎞ = Φ⎜ ⎟ =

⎝ ⎠

 (19) 

M = uncertain momentum flux (ft3/sec2) 

m = a particular value of M

F = flow depth (ft)
96

f = a particular values of F

DS = damage state of structural components, DS ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Only damage states 2, 3, and 4 are 

assumed to contribute to tsunami loss. 

DN = damage state of nonstructural components, DN ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Only damage states 2, 3, and 4 

are assumed to contribute to tsunami loss.

DC = damage state of contents, DC ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Only damage states 2, 3, and 4 are assumed to 

contribute to tsunami loss.

d = particular value of D

P[A|B] = probability that A is true given that B is true

E[A|B] = expected value of A is true given that B is true

E[LS|DS = d] = mean damage factor of structural component in damage state d (damage factor = 

structural repair cost as a fraction of building replacement cost new, where the building comprises the 

structural and nonstructural components), and d ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Estimates of E[LS|DS = d] are tabulated in 

NIBS and FEMA (2009). They vary by occupancy class. 

E[LN|DN = d] = mean damage factor of nonstructural components in damage state d (damage factor = 

nonstructural repair cost as a fraction of building replacement cost new), d ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Values are 

tabulated in NIBS and FEMA (2009) and vary by occupancy class. For tsunami, they are the sum of 

the nonstructural drift-sensitive and nonstructural acceleration-sensitive values from the earthquake 

methodology. 

E[LC|DC = d] = mean damage factor of contents in damage state d (damage factor = content repair cost 

as a fraction of content replacement cost new), d ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Values are tabulated in NIBS and FEMA 

(2009) and vary by occupancy class. Half the value of contents is assumed to be recoverable after 

earthquake shaking but not after tsunami, so these values are taken as double the earthquake-related 

quantities tabulated in NIBS and FEMA (2009). 

E[LT| DS = d] = mean duration of loss of function of a building whose structural component is in 

damage state d, d ∈ {2, 3, 4}. It is calculated as the product of repair time, denoted here by BCTd and a 

factor MODd between 0.0 and 1.0 that reflects the fraction the repair time after which the building is 

functional again, even if repairs are ongoing. Median values of BCTd and MODd are tabulated in NIBS 

and FEMA (2009) and vary by occupancy class. NIBS and FEMA (2009) does not suggest the form of 

the probability distribution of BCT conditioned on d. There is an information-theory justification for 

assuming that, given a damage state d, BCTd is uniformly distributed between two bounds. Under this 

condition, the median value of BCTd is also its mean value, which we denote here by E[BCT|DS=d]. 

The HAZUS-MH developers offer MODd as point estimates and do not suggest any distribution (or 

discuss uncertainty for that matter), so we treat it as a point estimate as well. Thus,

E L D d E BCT D d MOD T S S d ⎡ = ⎤ = ⎡ = ⎤ ⋅ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ (20) 

S,d = median capacity of structural component to resist damage state d, d ∈ {2, 3, 4}; values are 

estimated in Kircher (written commun., 2012) and vary by model building type, height, and code era 

S,d = logarithmic standard deviation of capacity of structural component to resist damage state d, d ∈

{2, 3, 4}; tabulated in Kircher (written commun., 2012) and vary by model building type, height, and 

code era

N,d = median capacity of nonstructural component to resist damage state d, d ∈ {2, 3, 4}; tabulated in 

Kircher (written commun., 2012) and varying by model building type and height, but not code era.

N,d = logarithmic standard deviation of capacity of nonstructural component to resist damage state d, 

d ∈ {2, 3, 4}; tabulated in Kircher (written commun., 2012) and varying by model building type and 

height, but not code era.
97

C,d = median capacity of contents to resist damage state d, d ∈ {2, 3, 4}; tabulated in Kircher (2012) 

and varying by model building type and height, but not code era.

C,d = logarithmic standard deviation of capacity of contents to resist damage state d, d ∈ {2, 3, 4};

tabulated in Kircher (written commun., 2012) and varying by model building type and height, but not 

code era.

The vulnerability functions were evaluated at 51 levels of momentum flux m ∈ {100, 

100.1, 100.2, ... 105

) cubic feet per second squared (ft3/sec2) and 51 levels of flow depth f ∈ {100, 

100.1, 100.2, ... 105

) ft for each combination of model building type, height, code era, and 

occupancy class, for a total of approximately 10,000 vulnerability functions (4008 each for 

structural and downtime, and 1002 each for nonstructural and contents, which do not vary by 

code era.). A sample set of vulnerability functions is shown in figure 58, for a large woodframe 

multifamily dwelling of moderate-code construction, such as a 1950s-era apartment building 

along the San Francisco Pacific shoreline. Here are some sample calculations for losses to a large 

woodframe building (W2) moderate code, multifamily dwelling (RES3) at m = 1,000 ft3/sec2 (for 

structural vulnerability) and h = 10 ft depth (for nonstructural and contents vulnerability). 

From Kircher (written commun., 2012), 

S,2 = S,3 = S,4 = 571 ft3/

S,2 = S,3 = S,4 = 0.83

N,2 = N,3 = 12 ft

N,4 = 24 ft

N,2 = N,3 = 0.78

N,4 = 0.65

C,2 = C,3 = 3 ft

C,4 = 15 ft

C,2 = C,3 = 0.78

C,4 = 0.65

m = 1000 ft3

/sec2 

h = 10 ft

From NIBS and FEMA (2009), 

E[LS | DS = 2] = 0.023

E[LS | DS = 3] = 0.117

E[LS | DS = 4] = 0.234

E[LN | DN = 2] = 0.05 + 0.027 = 0.077

E[LN | DN = 3] = 0.25 + 0.08 = 0.33

E[LN | DN = 4] = 0.5 + 0.266 = 0.766

E[LC | DC = 2] = 2 · 0.05 = 0.10 (that is, 2x the earthquake loss)
98

E[LC | DC = 3] = 2·0.25 = 0.50

E[LC | DC = 4] = 2·0.5 = 1.0

Evaluating Equation (17), 

P[DS = 2|M = 1000] = P[DS = 3|M = 1000] = 0

P[DS = 4|M = 1000] = 0.75

Evaluating Equation (18), 

P[DN = 2|F = 10] = 0

P[DN = 3|F = 10] = 0.32

P[DN = 4|F = 10] = 0.09

Evaluating Equation (19), 

P[DC = 2|F = 10] = 0

P[DC = 3|F = 10] = 0.67

P[DC = 4|F = 10] = 0.27

( ) ( ) { }

( )

, , 1

, , 1

,

,

ln ln

2,3

ln

4

N d N d

N

N d N d

N d

N d

f f P D dF f d

f d

θ θ

β β

θ

β

+

+

⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞

⎣ ⎦ ⎡ = = ⎤ = Φ −Φ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ∈

⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎛ ⎞ = Φ⎜ ⎟ =

⎝ ⎠

(21) 

Figure 58 shows for example that once depth reaches the top of the 2nd story of the 

building, the depth-sensitive contents are a complete loss, whereas nonstructural damage is about 

50 percent of the building value. Note that although content vulnerability applies to content 

value, both nonstructural vulnerability and structural vulnerability are expressed as a fraction of 

total building replacement cost new structural plus nonstructural, so they add. However, because 

they do not have the same intensity measure type—nonstructural is sensitive to flow depth, 

structural to momentum flux—the curves cannot be summed on a two-dimensional (2-D) chart. 

Once momentum flux exceeds approximately 1,000 ft3

/sec2—such as say 10 ft depth and 10 

ft/sec velocity, or 3m depth and 3m/sec or 6 kt velocity—the repairs take 18 months. 
99

Figure 58. Graphs of sample tsunami vulnerability functions for a large wood-frame building (W2) being 

used as a multifamily dwelling (RES3) of moderate-code construction. (ft3/sec2, cubic feet per second 

squared).

Building Damage in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

Vulnerability functions were applied to the estimates of value exposed using the mapped 

average flow depths and momentum flux by census block (masked to exclude water and portions 

of the census blocks not inundated). The tsunami affects approximately 1840 census blocks 

statewide, including 100 million square feet of buildings valued at $13 billion and $8.4 billion of 

contents. These estimates assume that building value is uniformly distributed over the normally 

dry portion of each census block. The scenario produces approximately $1.8 billion in building 

and content damage, mostly contents. These figures represent 2.2 percent of building value and 

18 percent of content value lost in wetted buildings. See table 27. 

The reader should bear in mind that the HAZUS-based analysis gives the expected value 

from a probabilistic estimate of loss, considering a variety of uncertainties. To illustrate, imagine 

that there were some buildings valued at $10 million and inundated such that they had a 1-

percent chance of $1,000,000 loss and 99-percent chance of $0 loss. The expected value of loss 

is $10,000. It is hard to imagine a particular outcome in which $10 million of building value is 

damaged by tsunamis and then is repaired for $10,000, but that is not what the $10,000 

represents. 

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

1 10 100 1,000 10,000

Mean	damage	factor

Flow	depth	(ft)	or	momentum	flux	(ft3 /sec2)

W2 RES3	contents

W2 RES3	nonstructural

(adds	with	structural)

W2 moderate	code	

RES3	structural	

(adds	with	nonstructural)

0

90

180

270

360

450

540

630

720

1 10 100 1,000 10,000

Mean	downtime,	days

Momentum	flux	(ft3 /sec2)

W2 moderate	code	RES3
100

Table 27. Building damage in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 

[M, million; ft2, square feet; %, percent]

County Wetted building 

area, million ft2 

Wetted building 

value, $M

Content value in 

wetted 

buildings, $M

Building 

loss, $M

Content 

loss, $M

Alameda 11.1 $1,453 $1,066 $20.0 $164.4

Contra Costa 1.3 $153 $128 $1.7 $19.0

Del Norte 1.2 $107 $66 $4.4 $17.2

Humboldt 4.9 $499 $331 $12.9 $62.1

Los Angeles 10.2 $1,294 $743 $23.4 $139.8

Marin 9.7 $1,526 $927 $33.6 $170.1

Mendocino 0.9 $97 $61 $0.9 $8.9

Monterey 2.9 $359 $228 $12.0 $51.9

Orange 17.4 $2,286 $1,293 $26.4 $206.6

San Diego 18.9 $2,205 $1,259 $60.9 $240.0

San Francisco 11.1 $1,651 $1,252 $55.1 $257.2

San Luis Obispo 0.8 $86 $49 $1.6 $8.4

San Mateo 5.3 $767 $505 $28.4 $91.2

Santa Cruz 4.8 $621 $355 $14.9 $69.2

Ventura 2.2 $241 $138 $2.3 $20.9

Total 103 $13,345 $8,401 $298.4 $1,526.9

% of wetted value 2.2% 18.2%
101

Table 28. Building and content value in California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services’ (Cal OES) 

maximum inundation zone. 

[M, million; %, percent]

County Wetted building 

area million ft2

Wetted building 

value $M

Content value 

in wetted 

buildings $M

Scenario building + 

contents value as % of 

value in Cal OES max. 

inundation zone

Alameda 52 $6,996 $5,053 21%

Contra Costa 3 410 315 39%

Del Norte 3 295 198 35%

Humboldt 13 1,436 996 34%

Los Angeles 21 2,738 1,633 47%

Marin 24 3,729 2,274 41%

Mendocino 1 139 94 68%

Monterey 6 822 495 45%

Orange 61 7,850 4,764 28%

San Diego 28 3,365 2,063 64%

San Francisco 16 2,547 1,954 64%

San Luis Obispo 2 215 128 39%

San Mateo 14 2,034 1,398 37%

Santa Barbara 0 42 24

Santa Clara 3 350 411

Santa Cruz 13 1,775 1,101 34%

Solano 1 80 52

Sonoma 1 117 60

Ventura 3 390 210 63%

Total 265 35,330 23,223 37%

Resiliency Opportunities

The figures in table 27 are fairly modest in the aggregate as California natural disasters 

go—less than $2 billion—but would undoubtedly be painful to those affected, especially those 

who are uninsured or underinsured and lack the resources to repair damage. One opportunity to 

enhance resiliency is to ensure that people living in or doing business in potentially inundated 

areas are aware of the National Flood Insurance Program or commercial flood insurance. 

Another opportunity is to provide coastal communities with the California Geological Survey’s 

maps of the potential extent of tsunami inundation, to inform those communities’ decisions about 

their zoning plans. The State is working on probabilistic inundation maps for land-use planning 

that might help to identify areas that are more susceptible to tsunami inundation. 

Research Needs

As with marinas, future tsunamis can be more severe than California’s recent experience 

in the Tohoku and Chile tsunamis, so absent significant changes to the protection and 

vulnerability of coastal buildings, they will experience greater damage in more-severe tsunamis. 

Just as with marinas, the research needs discussed here are about refining models of that damage: 

improving our ability to estimate building fragility, improving our modeling of damage and loss, 

and making better-informed risk-management decisions. 

It would be valuable to compare the HAZUS estimate of exposed building value with the 

finer-resolution database of businesses and dwellings prepared by others on this project. It would 

also be valuable to compare the developing HAZUS vulnerability model with an empirical one 

that was published after this study was complete. The HAZUS database reflects the census of 
102

population and housing, which publishes its data by census block, not by street address. Coastal 

development might not be uniformly distributed over the census block, as was assumed here. 

Buildings along waterfronts and in marinas might cluster near the shore, whereas coastal 

buildings that do not have a function related to the water might be located farther from the shore. 

Damage and Restoration of Roads and Roadway Bridges

By Keith Porter 

Introduction and Purpose

This section presents an estimate of tsunami effects on Caltrans (California Department 

of Transportation) highways and bridges from the SAFRR tsunami scenario. It is based on an 

inundation line and current velocities modeled by SAFRR scientists, knowledge of the locations 

and elevations of highways and coastal bridge embankments drawn from remote sensing (Google 

Earth), observations of historic tsunami damage to similar assets, and an approximate analysis 

that considers Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and Caltrans design guidelines. It 

draws on a half-day discussion between SAFRR staff and eight Caltrans engineers in Sacramento 

on Oct 3, 2012, and a review of this memo by Caltrans engineers (Mark Yashinsky and Steve 

Ng) and USGS staff (Ann Wein). The objectives of this memo are as follows: 

Summarize the State and local road and bridge assets exposed to loss. 

Identify the most common damage modes observed in past tsunamis. 

Estimate the damageability of these assets, that is, quantify the conditions under which 

damage is assumed to occur. 

Describe repair activities and estimate the repair duration and repair costs for each mode of 

damage. 

Combine the foregoing actions to identify particular locations where it is realistic for damage 

to occur in the scenario. Estimate repair costs, repair durations, and traffic delays. 

Identify options for enhancing resiliency. 

Identify research needs 

An important issue that is not addressed here is road closure of evacuation routes. This 

topic represents a gap that will be addressed in another part of the scenario study. 

Assets Exposed to Loss

There are approximately 54 coastal highway bridges and 12 stretches of low-elevation 

highway and local roadway (less than 5 meters or so) within the study area. These are clustered 

around Eureka, the San Francisco Bay, and along the south coast from Ventura to San Diego, as 

shown in figure 59. In the figure, bridges are colored yellow and roads are red. 
103

Figure 59. Map of coastal bridges and low-elevation roads in the SAFRR tsunami scenario study area. 

Only a subset are damaged in the scenario (base image from Google Earth). 

Damage Modes

The relevant damage modes that have been observed in past tsunamis or identified in 

Caltrans Memo to Designers 20-13 (2010) includes: 

Scour damage to embankments and erosion of fill. This is expected to occur where the 

embankment is located at or near channel banks, and the embankment obstructs the 

flow. According to FHWA (2011), vortices form near embankments and piers. See 

figure 60 for examples. 

Scour damage to roads. This is expected to occur where the roadway is on a levee or 

embankment and tsunami flows can form vertical vortices on the downstream side or 

horizontal vortices on the upstream side, especially near culverts. Even in locations 

with high flow depth and velocity, where the road is level with or below the adjacent 

ground and offers no soil embankment to scour, it seems to resist tsunami damage. 

See figure 61 for an illustration of a coastal road near Shinchi, Japan, scoured away 

by the Tohoku tsunami. See figure 62 for a road near the Port of Sendai that was not 

damaged by the tsunami. Similar to FHWA (2011) comments about vortices near 

piers and embankments, we hypothesize that the difference between these two sites 

was the presence or absence of a crown that would cause the road to intrude into the 

flow and thereby create scour-producing vortices. 
104

Hydrodynamic pressure on or buoyant uplift of bridge superstructures, as in figure 63. 

This damage mode is not expected to occur in the present scenario because no 

Caltrans or local bridge appears to be affected by waves reaching the bridge 

superstructure. 

Scour damage to bridge pier foundations. Caltrans engineers, especially Ng, expect that 

this damage mode is unlikely to occur in the present scenario. The expected tsunami 

waves are less than the design considerations for normal riverine discharge design. 

The events of Tohoku would appear to confirm this. 

Impact from debris. Floating debris (for example, boats, buildings, and trees) could strike 

bridge piers and might need to be cleared away. Vessels impacted bridges in the 

Tohoku tsunami, as shown in figures 64 and 65. Navy Way at the Port of Los Angeles 

is the location where there are large enough vessels nearby to cause damage 

significant enough to carry away a bridge superstructure. The ports, however, have 

stated that it is unlikely and perhaps unrealistic that large ships would become 

unmoored or lose control while underway, though they do not completely discount 

the possibility. Such an impact is considered here to be a possibility, but is not 

explicitly included as part of the scenario. 

Figure 60. Photographs of embankment scour at Route 45 bridge (Takada Bypass) over Route 141 

(Hamaiso Highway) due to the 2011 Tohoku tsunami (photographs by Charles Scawthorn). 
105

Figure 61. Photographs of tsunami damage from the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami: Left, About 1 mile of 

Route 38 north of Shinchi was washed away by the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. Right, Roads throughout the 

Port of Sendai were largely undamaged despite high currents and depths; they had no embankments 

that could generate scouring vortices. (Photographs by Keith Porter.) 

Figure 62. Photographs showing a contrast in tsunami scour potential resulting from roadway elevation. 

The left image is a view looking north from a commuter railway platform on the Sendai, Japan, plain. 

Before the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, it had had rail on both sides of the platform; now only a short stretch 

on the east (ocean) side and large scour pits on the west (landward) side. There is no sign of the 

railbed or rail. On the right is a nearby road, largely undamaged, on the seaward side of the rail line. 

The road is largely undamaged. (Photographs by Keith Porter.) 
106

Figure 63. Photographs of bridges whose superstructures were pushed or floated off their piers in the 

2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami (photographs by Charles Scawthorn). 

Figure 64. Photograph of example from the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami of how small craft represent a 

debris hazard for bridges; the Miyako Bridge across the Hei River in the City of Miyako (photograph by 

Junichi Hoshikuma).
107

 

Figure 65. Photograph of damage from a barge impact on the Jokawa Bridge over the Higashimatsushima 

River in the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami that destroyed the middle span and damaged the other 

spans (photograph by Junichi Hoshikuma). 

Estimating Damageability

The focus here is on damage modes 1 and 2. Let us begin with damage mode 1, scour 

damage to bridge abutments. Commercial and public scour models exist for the risk analysis or 

design of bridges, dams, and reservoirs, but they appear to be inappropriate for the present use. 

Some do not take event-specific input data (for example, HYRISK). Others require bridge and 

abutment geometry and materials data that are unavailable or prohibitively time consuming to 

analyze on a wide scale (for example, Flow-3D). The present project takes a more approximate 

approach to estimating damage. This level of detail seems appropriate to the task of estimating a 

realistic level of damage, which can then be used to determine whether and where detailed 

analysis is required. 

FHWA (2011) offers advice regarding design against this failure mode, stating that 

“Available technology has not developed sufficiently to provide reliable abutment scour 

estimates for all hydraulic flow conditions that might be reasonably expected to occur at an 

abutment. Therefore, engineering judgment is required in designing foundations for abutments.” 

This is an important modeling gap, but despite the gap it is still necessary to select a threshold 

current depth and velocity at which scour damage would reasonably occur. At a minimum, it can 

be seen as a first cut at a plausible level of damage. (If that damage potential seems to be 

substantial, the result can at least motivate the development of analytical models supported by 

field observation and laboratory testing.) 

For Froude number (V/gy) < 0.80, where V denotes velocity at the contracted section, g 

denotes acceleration due to gravity, and y denotes depth of flow, Federal Highway 

Administration (2011) recommends D50 (median stone diameter) of 

2

50

1 S

D K V

y S gy

⎛ ⎞ > ⎜ ⎟ − ⎝ ⎠ ,

(22) 
108

where K depends on abutment geometry but is approximately 1.0 and SS is the specific gravity of 

riprap, which we take as 2.4. We are not interested in design of riprap but in the analysis of the 

potential for scour damage knowing D50, y, V, and other factors. In equation 22, depths cancel. 

Let us assume as a first estimate a median stone diameter of 0.3 m. We substitute 0.3 for D50 and 

solve for V, which results in the following expression: 

( ) 50 1 S S gD V

K

−⋅⋅ < (23) 

It evaluates as 

( ) 2 2.4 1 9.81 0.3

sec

1.0

2 / sec

m

m

V

V m

−⋅ ⋅

<

<

(24) 

Which suggests that if D50 = 0.3 m, the design is sufficient to resist scour damage as long as Vmax

< 2 m/sec. Checking the Froude number at say V = 2 m/sec, (2/9.81) < 0.8 y limits the 

applicability of equation 24 to y > 0.25 m. For V = 5 m/sec, y > 0.6 m/sec, so the expression 

seems general enough for present purposes. That is, we do not need to consider the case of the 

Froude number exceeding 0.80. 

We assume that the design guideline is conservative, perhaps with a safety factor of 3, so 

the median capacity of an embankment with D50 = 0.3 m to resist scour might be V = 6 m/sec, 

meaning 50-percent chance of scour at 6 m/sec. The capacity scales with D50

0.5, meaning that 

with D50 1/4th the assume diameter, that is, 3-inch diameter stone, the median capacity is halved 

to 3 m/sec. This seems to be a reasonable threshold for such an approximate analysis, where we 

do not actually know whether there is any riprap at all on any given embankment. It also satisfies 

intuition; a 3-m/sec flow feels like it could scour an embankment with a cover of 3-inch diameter 

stones. 

Turning to damage mode 2, because roads are not necessarily armored in any way, let us 

assume soil conditions, say D50 = 0.01 m and SS = 1.2. This yields V < 0.14 m/sec. Even with 

some added conservatism, it suggests that any flow over an elevated roadway where vortices can 

form on the downstream side is likely to cause scour damage. 

To recap, for purposes of estimating realistic damage to bridge embankments and 

roadways in the SAFRR tsunami scenario, we assume that embankment scour occurs to bridges 

where the embankment obstructs the flow and V > 3 m/sec. Any flow over an elevated roadway 

(elevated in the sense that vortices can form on the downstream side) is assumed to cause scour 

damage. 

Repair Duration

The degree of damage and duration of repair is more problematic, especially here where 

we are limited to a very approximate analysis for a number of roads and bridges and little scope 

to consider site-specific information. Degree of damage would seem to depend on some integral 

involving velocity over duration of flow. For convenience, we assume that all cases are the same. 

Bridge embankment scour requires say 4 days to backfill and repave. Roadway scour requires 
109

say 1 day per 1,000 feet to repair in a rural area, say 1 day per 2,500 feet in an urban area with 

high traffic demand. In the case of a rural road with an alternate route and the existing alignment 

is at high risk to repeated tsunami damage, let us add 3 months for decision-making to select the 

new alignment 

Traffic disruption is likely to be briefer than repair duration, especially where alternate 

routes are available. Let us assume that, where an alternate route is available, traffic is merely 

slowed and not cut off, and that we need not quantify the delay. Otherwise, traffic is stopped for 

the duration of the repairs: 3 days for a bridge embankment and 2 days per 1,000 ft of roadway. 

Repair Costs

The General Accounting Office estimates the cost of highway construction at $1 to $9 

million per lane-mile, with costs varying widely (GAO, 2003). Let us assume that roadway 

repair costs on the order of $5 million per lane-mile. This figure was judged reasonable by 

Caltrans staff in a October 3, 2012, panel discussion, and further supported by construction cost 

statistics for new highway construction in Florida, adjusted for location. We assume the repair of 

a bridge abutment damaged by scour costs $150,000. (This assumes a crew of 12 working 32 

hours at a cost to the State of $150 per hour, the figure doubled to include material and 

equipment, and a 25-percent premium for urgency.) 

Damage to Roads and Bridges in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

We compared the criteria described above to the locations of highways and highway 

bridges and the modeled inundation line and current velocities estimated elsewhere in this study. 

Figure 66 shows damage locations; they are clustered near Eureka, in the San Francisco Bay, and 

along the south coast from Malibu to just north of San Diego. In the figure, damaged roads are 

shown in red and damaged bridge embankments are in yellow. This is a subset of the assets 

shown in figure 59. Table 29 details roadway damage at six locations where the scour conditions 

described above are met. Table 30 details the scenario’s hypothetical scour damage to bridge 

embankments. 

The total length of damaged roadway is approximately 5 miles. The width of the 

damaged road varies from place to place. The total damage is approximately 20 lane-miles. The 

repair cost is approximately $100 million. Traffic delays are none to 2 days, but two stretches of 

U.S. 101 might take 3–4 months to repair to allow for decisions about rerouting. Public 

assistance grants would probably provide $80 million from the Federal government to perform 

repairs, with the remaining $20 million borne by the State. 

As shown in table 30, bridge embankment scour damage is hypothesized to occur at 12 

locations, 7 of them on to CA1 between Malibu and Costa Mesa. The table shows velocities at 

each bridge location, which are generally in the range of 3–10 m/sec. It also shows wave heights 

for information purposes (generally 1–2 m), though these are not used to identify damage 

locations. Bridge embankments not listed in the table either do not intrude into the channel, or 

have velocities below 3 m/sec. The table also shows estimated repair costs. Total repair cost is $3 

million. All but one have alternate routes available. 

There are several stretches of highway and local roadway that are wetted, but not with the 

required scour conditions—elevated roadway with soil on upstream or downstream side that can 

be eroded by vortices. These include stretches of the Pacific Coast Highway, CA39, CA75, 

CA92, US101 and the San Francisco Great Highway. These stretches do not appear in table 29. 
110

There are a few bridges slightly inland of the coast where embankments intrude into the current 

(according to the inundation line), but the velocity model does not reach. 

Tables 29 and 30 note which hypothetical damage locations are part of the Strategic 

Highway Network (STRAHNET). STRAHNET is a network of highways deemed to be 

important to the United States' strategic defense policy and which provide defense access, 

continuity and emergency capabilities for defense purposes. They could be important to the 

supply chain for emergency supplies. As with other damage locations, where STRAHNET routes 

are damaged the traffic would be detoured to local roads. There is no program that distinguishes 

STRAHNET routes from any other route, so the fact that a route is STRAHNET would have no 

bearing on decisions to improve the tsunami resistance of the route before a disaster (called 

“betterment” by Caltrans). 

Figure 66. Map of SAFRRR tsunami scenario bridge and roadway damage locations. Road damage is 

shown in red, bridges in yellow. This is a subset of the assets shown in figure 59. (Base image from 

Google Earth.) 

Table 29. SAFRRR tsunami scenario highway scour damage.

[sn, Strategic Highway Network, STRAHNET; mi, miles; ft, feet; $M, millions of dollars]

Location Length LanemilesAlt 

route

Realign Delay Repair 

days

Cost, 

$M

US101 Eureka (sn) 1 mi, 4 lanes 4.0 Yes Maybe No 95 days $20

US101 King Salmon 

(sn)

1,000 ft, 4 lanes 0.8 No No 1 day 1 day $4

US101 S of King 

Salmon (sn)

1 mi 4 lanes 4.0 Yes Maybe No 95 days $20

I80 Emeryville (sn) 1 mi, 2 of 10 

lanes

2.0 Yes No No 2 days $10

I5 Camp Pendleton (sn) 2,000 ft, 4 of 8 

lanes

1.6 Yes No No 2 days $8

CA1 Costa Mesa 3,000 ft, 6 lanes 3.6 Yes No No 3 days $18

CA1 Sunset Beach 1 mi, 4 lanes 4.0 Yes No No 3 days $20

Total 4.6 mi 20 $100
111

Table 30. SAFRRR tsunami scenario bridge embankment scour damage. 

[sn, Strategic Highway Network, STRAHNET; mi, miles; ft, feet; $M, millions of dollars; m, meter; m/sec, meters 

per second. Wave heights are above mean high water plus 20 centimeters (MHW+20)]

Location Latitude °N, 

Longitude °W 

Velocity

m/sec

Wave

height, 

m 

Alternate

route

Delay

days

Repair 

days

Cost

$M

US101 Bucksport (2 ends) (sn) 40.7550, 

124.1903

5-10 1 No 3 3 $0.30

3rd St., San Francisco (2 ends) 37.7474, 

122.3874

8-10 1.5 Yes No 3 $0.30

Illinois St., San Francisco (north

end)

37.7475, 

122.3862

8-10 1.5 Yes No 3 $0.15

CA1 Malibu Lagoon (2 ends) 34.0346, 

118.6815

3-10 1.5 Yes No 3 $0.30

CA1 Marina (north end) 33.7630, 

118.1154

5-10 1 Yes No 3 $0.15

CA1 Anaheim Bay (2 ends) 33.7319, 

118.0849

4-10 1 Yes No 3 $0.30

CA1 Huntington Beach (north 

end)

33.6833, 

118.0357

5-7 2 Yes No 3 $0.15

CA1 Costa Mesa (2 ends) 33.6331, 

117.9610

5-7 1-2 Yes No 3 $0.30

CA1 Costa Mesa b (2 ends) 33.6310, 

117.9575

5-7 1 Yes No 3 $0.30

CA1 Costa Mesa c (north end) 33.6168, 

117.9047

7-10 0.5 Yes No 3 $0.15

I5 Camp Pendleton (south end) 

(sn)

33.2065, 

117.3940

3-5 2 Yes No 3 $0.15

US101 Cardiff (2 ends) (sn) 33.0161, 

117.2809

7-10 2 Yes No 3 $0.30

Total $2.85

Resiliency Opportunities

Caltrans has strategies for quickly restoring roads and bridges. As with previous disasters 

such as fires, earthquakes, and floods, Caltrans has contractors bid the days and cost for a repair 

or replacement. An economist determines the cost for each day the road is closed and the bidder 

with the lowest total bid is awarded the contract. Only a few contractors are asked to bid for each 

job to keep the process efficient. The governor declares a state of emergency so the contracting 

process is abbreviated and does not require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 

One other opportunity to enhance resiliency might be to review plans with local officials 

about changing the alignment or increasing the elevation of roads that are particular exposed to 

tsunami damage. Two such stretches were identified here. Discussions and planning before a 

disaster might reduce decision-making delays in the event of an actual tsunami. Another 

opportunity might be to examine bridge embankments like those identified here for future 

improvements. As noted earlier, this study does not address evacuation routes and road closures 

during the warning period. 
112

Research Needs

The scenario depicted here relies on simplifications about damageability, especially about 

threshold levels of velocity causing embankment scour. It suggests that a large Alaskan 

teletsunami could cause on the order of $80 million in damage affecting 16 lane-miles of 

highway and 13 bridges. These figures are offered to understand the order of magnitude of 

damage for such a tsunami and for design emergency response plans. They can inform 

community decisions about emergency planning, but they do not represent the results of a 

detailed engineering analysis. 

Caltrans and the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research (PEER) Center are pursuing 

such analyses. They are supporting tsunami hazard work being done by URS Corp. The CGS is 

preparing to make detailed maps of wave elevation and velocity for different return periods 

provided by URS. Caltrans will write bridge design procedures for tsunami loading, in part using 

computer modeling of fluid-structure interaction with the finite-element software LS-DYNA by 

researchers at Oregon State University’s (OSU) NEES facility. (NEES refers to Network for 

Earthquake Engineering Simulation, a program of the National Science Foundation). Caltrans 

will determine whether a Cascadia subduction event produces larger tsunami loads on bridges as 

part of its research program. 

PEER is considering a project or example to frame a new performance-based tsunami 

engineering (PBTE) methodology. The SAFRR tsunami scenario might be an ideal case study. 

Among the data needs for such a methodology would be detailed maps (perhaps by lidar) of 

existing bridges and coastal roads, necessary to apply scour models to roads and bridge 

abutments. Such an effort might also require a database of fragility and repair-cost data, along 

the lines of PEER’s prior work developing 2nd generation performance-based earthquake 

engineering (PBEE-2) methodology. 

Finally, note that the Federal Emergency Management Agency and California counties 

are developing an Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan for the West Coast, focusing on the 

consequences of a Cascadia subduction earthquake and tsunami. This study may address 

highway and bridge damage in northern California counties as well as Oregon and Washington. 

The FEMA effort and the present one share common concerns but address different scenarios. 

The interested reader is referred to the project Facebook page at 

https://www.facebook.com/RCTWG?filter=3 (accessed November 1, 2012). 

Damage and Restoration of Railroads in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

By William Byers 

Significant to extreme damage to railroads has been documented in 94 earthquakes and 

slight or minor damage in 20 others. The earliest of these was the 1859 magnitude 7.6 Copiapo, 

Chile, earthquake. There are doubtless other earthquakes that caused railroad damage for which 

documentation was not found or does not exist. In 11 of the 94 earthquakes, significant to 

extreme damage was caused by earthquake-generated tsunamis. These earthquakes were all in 

subduction zones and had magnitudes ranging from 7.3 to 9.5. Nine were inter-plate. One 

involved a normal rupture in the subducting slab. It is possible that the tsunami associated with 
113

this last-mentioned earthquake was caused by an under-ocean landslide. The tsunami in one 

other subduction zone earthquake of undetermined type caused some railroad damage. 

Most railroad damage from tsunamis was in the same area as other earthquake damage 

but the tsunami generated by the December 26, 2004, Sumatra earthquake caused severe railroad 

damage, including washing a train off the track at a location over 1,000 miles away in Sri Lanka. 

Four of the 94 earthquakes causing major railroad damage generated tsunamis which 

either did not affect railroads or caused only slight damage as there were no railroads in locations 

significantly impacted by the tsunamis. Of the 79 earthquakes that did not generate tsunamis, 

nine were inter-plate thrust earthquakes in subduction zones, 26 were in subduction zones but not 

identified as inter-plate. Seven of these were in the subducting slab and eight in the overriding 

plate. The locations, relative to the plate interface, of the other 11 fractures were not determined. 

On the basis of this sample, there is an appreciable risk of railroad damage from 

earthquake-generated tsunamis, including tsunamis generated by remote earthquakes. For 

comparable wave heights, damage from tsunamis can be expected to be similar to that from 

hurricane storm surges. Information on railroad damage is available for Hurricanes Alicia in 

1983, and Ike in 2008 (Byers, 2011) and Katrina in 2005. Storm surges at selected locations of 

railroad damage were estimated to be in the order of 9 feet (as much as 4 feet above the track 

over a distance of about 5 miles) for Alicia; 20 to 28 feet (up to 20 feet above the track over a 

distance of about 100 miles) for Katrina; and 14 feet (as much as 10 feet above the track over a 

distance of about 15 miles) for Ike. 

The tsunami associated with the March 11, 2011, Tohoku, Japan, earthquake provides 

extreme examples of the types of railroad damage normally associated with tsunamis. These are 

illustrated by figures 67 through 70. Similar, but in many cases less extreme, damage was caused 

by other tsunamis. Bridge spans were also washed off piers in the 1908 Messina earthquake 

(Davison, 1936). There was also, less severe, bridge damage in the 1946 Nankai earthquake 

(Okamoto, 1984). Rolling stock was overturned or derailed in the 1922 Atacama, Chile (Willis, 

1929), the 1964 Alaska (Sturman, 1973), the 2004 Sumatra and the 2010 Maule, Chile (Chile 

Railways, 2010) earthquakes. Tracks and embankments were submerged and/or washed out: in 

the 1908 Messina (12 miles) (Morris, 1909), the 1922 Atacama (Willis, 1929), the 1933 Sanriku 

(Okamoto, 1984), the 1946 Nankai (Okamoto, 1984), the 1964 Alaska (Sturman, 1973), the 1964 

Niigata (Kawasumi and others, 1968) and the 2010 Maule, Chile (Chile Railways, 2010), 

earthquakes. Debris was deposited on tracks in varying quantities and signal systems damaged in 

most, if not all, tsunamis. Railroad car ferry loading facilities were damaged in the 1964 Alaska 

(Sturman, 1973), and the 1968 Tokachi-oki (Okamoto, 1984) earthquakes. Damage from earlier 

tsunamis is shown in figures 71 through 73. Hurricane storm surge damage depended on both the 

height of the surge and the types of construction exposed. It included debris on tracks, washed 

out ballast, track washed out-of –line, track washed off bridges and moderate to extreme bridge 

damage. Examples of relatively limited damage are shown in figures 74 and 75. 
114

Figure 67. Photograph of overturned passenger cars in Komagamine, Japan after 2011 Tohoku, Japan, 

tsunami. Wave height at location unknown. (Photograph by Charles Scawthorn.) 
115

Figure 68. Photograph of overturned passenger train locomotive in Komagamine, Japan, after the 2011 

Tohoku tsunami (photograph by Charles Scawthorn). 
116

Figure 69. Photograph of displaced steel girder span near Rikuzen Takata after 2011 Tohoku, Japan, 

tsunami (photograph by Charles Scawthorn). 
117

 

Figure 70. Photograph of damaged piers of the JR Rail Viaduct crossing the Tsuya River, Japan, after the 

2011 Tohoku tsunami (photograph by Shideh Dashti). 
118

Figure 71. Photograph of Coquimbo rail yard after 1922 Atacama, Chile, tsunami. Run-up height is given 

as 26 feet but elevation of yard is not known. Estimated wave height in the yard is between 5 and 15 

feet. (Photograph from Willis, 1929.) 

Figure 72. Photograph of overturned locomotive at Seward after 1964 Alaska tsunami. Run-up height at 

Seward after the 1964 Alaska tsunami was about 40 feet. (Photograph from Sturman, 1973.) 
119

Figure 73. Photograph of Seward yard after 1964 Alaska tsunami. Estimated wave height in the Seward 

yard is between 25 and 35 feet (photograph courtesy of National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, National Geophysical Data Center).

Figure 74. Photograph of open deck trestle damage from 1983 Hurricane Alicia in the United States. Deck 

shifted by return flow. Surge depth was about 3 feet above track, about 5 feet above bottom of deck. 

(Photograph by William Byers.)
120

Figure 75. Photograph of track damage from 2008 Hurricane Ike in the United States. Surge depth was 

about 3 feet above track (photograph by Ross Ruckel). 
121

Tsunami damage is the result of one or more of three mechanisms that are shared to a 

greater or less extent by other types of flooding. Submergence to various depths occurs to the 

limit of inundation. Erosion of soil and other granular material requires a minimum depth but 

depends primarily on the velocity and duration of flow. Direct wave effects result from 

buoyancy, lateral pressure of the wave, upward pressure when the surface of the wave rises 

against exposed horizontal surfaces and impact from floating debris. 

It is impossible to know where trains will be at the time of the hypothetical tsunami, but 

for the sake of depicting a particular outcome it is useful to assume some particular location for 

trains. To that end, it is assumed here that, at the time the tsunami warning is issued, trains and 

other movable railroad equipment will be located as shown in a Google Earth image from March 

2012. However, with the amount of warning anticipated, there should be no trains in locations 

subject to damage. Article 1.2.2.4—Tsunamis in chapter 9 Seismic Design for Railway 

Structures of the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association Manual 

for Railway Engineering (AREMA, 2012) contains the following recommended practice: 

After a tsunami warning is issued to the railroad, train dispatchers shall notify all trains 

and engines within the areas vulnerable to the tsunami to move out of those areas before the 

estimated arrival of the tsunami. To the extent possible all other equipment should also be 

moved. The movement should be to the closest location at an elevation deemed to be safe. This 

movement may be in reverse of the train’s normal movement. 

For any remotely generated tsunami, train dispatchers would have plenty of time to get 

all trains moved to safe areas. However, damage to track and other fixed facilities and to any 

equipment remaining on inundated yard tracks or side tracks can be expected. The extent of 

damage depends on the depth of inundation, the velocity and, for erosion of ballast or 

embankment, the duration of the velocity. 

Removal of wave deposited debris will probably be required on a major portion of any 

tracks inundated to a depth of one foot or more. Ballasted track would probably not be 

significantly damaged if inundated to a depth of less than one foot. Ballast has been protected 

from erosion by hurricane storm surges with a depth in the order of 5 feet by asphalt injection but 

the cost would probably not be justified for tsunamis due to their low frequency of occurrence at 

vulnerable locations. Track alignment has been maintained well enough to allow limited 

operation under storm surges as great as 10 to 15 feet by anchoring to piles located on both sides 

of the track at about 300 foot spacing (Byers, 2011) but, again, the cost would not be justified. At 

the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and at some other locations, tracks are encased in 

concrete paving with its surface at the same level as the top of rail. Track in concrete paving 

would probably withstand inundation to a depth of several feet unless the pavement is 

undermined. At these locations, debris would be removed as part of clearing the paved area. 

However, it might be necessary to remove debris from the flangeways (the openings parallel to 

the rail that are made through platforms, pavements, track structures to permit passage of wheel 

flanges). This would probably be done by high-pressure flushing. 

Electrical/electronic components of signal systems are typically about 2 feet above the 

track. If the water depth significantly exceeds this value, it would damage or destroy the 

instrument cases in which these components are housed. Electric motors of switch machines 

would be submerged by near the top of rail. Unless struck by debris, signal masts would 

probably survive wave heights in the order of 5 to 10 feet. 

Damage to bridges will require a wave of appreciable amplitude. Very few railroad 

bridges have shallow foundations on erodible material. Typically they have deep foundations 
122

consisting of driven piles or reinforced concrete drilled piers or are founded on rock. Old timber 

bridges built in the early 1900s typically have pile depths of approximately 25-30 feet and may 

be subject to scour when currents exceed 6 to 8 kt. New bridges typically consist of concrete or 

steel superstructures supported by driven steel piles or reinforced concrete drilled piers, typically 

with sufficient depth to avoid scour. We examined bridges rail bridges along the entire coast in 

the study area and found one case where velocities were significant enough to cause scour: the 

Santa Margarita River (Trestle) bridge near Camp Pendleton. At this bridge, 10 kt currents could 

potentially cause scour around the 30-feet piles, though it seem unlikely to be sufficient to cause 

the failure of the bridge. Therefore, scour is an unlikely mode of failure along the Coastal Rail 

Corridor. We found no cases where the wave was high enough to impact the bridge soffit, and 

therefore superstructure displacement also seems unlikely. 

An open deck timber trestles trestle had its deck washed out of line by a relatively low 

hurricane storm surge with a maximum height of about 5 feet above the track. Attachment of the 

deck to the bents was probably broken during inward flow and final misalignment occurred 

during outward flow of the surge. Unanchored track was washed out under a surge estimated as 

being in the order of 3 feet over the track. Track anchored to piles at intervals of about 300 feet 

remained essentially in alignment after a surge of about 14 feet over the track (Byers, 2011). 

If water reaches a depth significantly greater than 3 inches above the top of rail, traction 

motors of locomotives are subject to damage. Locomotives, cars with loads of particularly high 

value or hazardous materials and other particularly important equipment would be moved to high 

ground. This is based on railroads’ policies for removing equipment from Galveston Island in 

advance of hurricanes during the period when Galveston was a major port and rail terminal. 

However, a number of both loaded and empty cars may still remain vulnerable in ports or low 

elevation yards and side tracks adjacent to the coast. If water reaches a depth significantly greater 

than 8 inches above the top of rail, bearings and brakes of cars are subject to damage. If the crest 

of the wave is over about 2 feet above the top of rail, lading in double stack container cars and 

hopper cars is subject to water damage. If the crest of the wave is over about 4 feet above the top 

of rail, lading in most cars is subject to water damage and there is a risk of derailing standing 

cars, particularly empty cars. At the crucial depths where a type of damage begins, a small 

change in water depth can cause a disproportionate change in total damage. 

In addition to the areas vulnerable to the scenario tsunami, there are near-by areas that 

would be vulnerable to greater wave amplitudes or to similar tsunamis arriving at a higher tidal 

stage. Tidal ranges for many of the vulnerable areas are appreciable. Data for several tide gages 

along portions of the California coast with adjacent railroads are shown in table 31. 

Table 31. Tide gages near several coastal stretches of railway. 

[max., maximum; min., minimum; ft, feet]

Location of Tide Gage

Difference between max. 

high and min. low tides

Typical Day Typical Year

Port Chicago (on Sacramento/San Joaquin River Delta) 5 ft 6.9 ft

Richmond 5 ft 9.6 ft

San Francisco 5 ft 9.5 ft

Monterey 4 ft 9.2 ft

Santa Barbara 4 ft 9.0 ft

Los Angeles 4 ft 9.2 ft

San Diego 4 ft 9.5 ft
123

Inundation limits and modeled flow depths given in the scenario are used to estimate 

damage. Even if there is no damage or inundation of railroad facilities, there will be interference 

with normal operation and associated costs during the period that the tsunami warning is in effect 

and while post-tsunami inspections of tracks are being performed. Damage will be discussed 

from north to south. 

There are no longer operated rail lines at vulnerable locations in California north of the 

San Francisco Bay area. (There is a vulnerable line in Washington along Puget Sound.) 

At Richmond, slightly more than one half mile of a rarely-used track to the former 

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway (AT&SF) car ferry slip would be inundated to a 

maximum depth of about two to three feet. Before reaching the BNSF Railway Richmond yard, 

the wave would have to pass through a short tunnel. Entrance and exit head losses, friction in the 

tunnel along with limited duration of the wave and a large area for dissipation upon leaving the 

tunnel would prevent inundation of any significant depth in the yard. (A 5-foot higher wave 

would inundate about 31⁄2 miles of additional track at 4 locations in Richmond and Oakland.) 

The Union Pacific (UP) operates a line from the San Francisco Bay area to Los Angeles 

that runs parallel to the coast at a number of locations from near Watsonville to Ventura. There is 

also a branch to Santa Cruz. At some locations, the line is very close to the coast and low enough 

to be vulnerable to tsunamis. The line carries both freight and passenger trains. Both the UP and 

BNSF have lines between the San Francisco Bay area and Los Angeles that run through the 

Central Valley, would not be affected by a tsunami, and would serve as detour routes. 

At Santa Cruz, about 0.1 mile of track in a concrete paved street would be inundated to a 

depth of less than one foot. (A 5-foot higher tsunami would increase the maximum depth by 5 

feet and the length involved by one half mile.) 

Near Carpinteria, there is a 0.9 mile stretch of main track with 3 ballasted deck bridges 

that would be inundated to a maximum depth of about 3 feet. Considerable washed out ballast, 

some track severely misaligned or washed off embankment, and insignificant bridge damage can 

be expected at this location. There would also be immersion damage to some signal system 

equipment. (A 5-foot higher wave would increase this segment by 0.8 mile and add 2.3 miles of 

main track in segments near Summerland and Ventura, including a 700 foot bridge that would 

not be damaged and a 152 foot open deck trestle which would have minor damage, as well as 1.8 

miles of tracks and the bearings on three cars at the U.S. Navy’s construction battalion facility at 

Port Hueneme.) 

In addition to freight trains, thirteen passenger trains, including 11 commuter trains, 

operate over the track near Carpinteria. Four of these are scheduled to pass the affected area 

between the time of the earthquake and the arrival of the tsunami. The first of these is scheduled 

to clear the area by 12:48 p.m. and would probably be allowed to proceed normally if running on 

time. Later trains would probably be held at safe locations until after the tsunami’s arrival. 

Freight trains, which do not have defined schedules, would be dispatched in a similar manner. 

Considering the time required for mobilization and performing the work, the line could 

be expected to be out-of-service for up to three days, depending on the availability of ballast and 

track surfacing equipment. Although through movements would be prevented during this period, 

intermediate points could be served from one end or the other. If equipment and train crews are 

available, separate sections of passenger trains could be run north and south of the damaged area 

and through passengers transferred between sections by bus. Freight could be moved through the 

connection on the appropriate side of the track closure. 
124

The area of greatest rail vulnerability involves tracks and equipment at the Ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach. Track damage would be limited as tracks in the areas of greater 

inundation depth and velocity are primarily in concrete slabs and not subject to damage from 

washed out ballast. Damage to containers and their contents should be considered as part of the 

damage to the ports unless the containers are loaded on cars. Damage to containers and contents 

on cars is a part of railroad damage. No estimate will be made of the value of lading in containers 

but it should, on average, be similar to that in other loaded containers in the ports. 

All movement of cars into the port would be stopped when the tsunami warning is 

received. There will be sufficient time to move all cars in the port area that are coupled to 

locomotives to safe locations as the locomotives are removed. Although they may not meet the 

requirements of the definition, these movements will be referred to as “trains”. Remaining cars 

are vulnerable to damage related to the depth of inundation. Significant inundation of tracks 

occurs at locations “A”, “B” and “C” in figure 76. 
125

Figure 76. Map of conditions, when SAFRR tsunami warning is received, at locations in ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach where inundation will be deep enough to damage cars left standing on track 

(base image from Google Earth). 

Details of the region at Location “A” with water depth great enough to cause wheelbearing damage are shown in figure 77. This depth is less than the depth that would cause track 

damage. Segments of track with inundation depth great enough to cause damage are colored—

green if unoccupied, red if occupied by either loaded or empty cars. This amounts to nearly five 

miles of track with about 1⁄4 mile on ballast and the rest in concrete slabs. Track repairs would be 

relatively light, involving cleaning flangeways after trash is removed from the slabs as part of 

general port cleanup and any necessary restoration of ballast, lining and surfacing of the track on 

ballast. 
126

Figure 77. Satellite image annotated with details of location “A” (see fig. 76) at time of the SAFRR tsunami 

warning (base image from Google Earth). 

Any car wheel bearings that are submerged must be reconditioned (or replaced) 

according to interchange rules. As a practical matter, this normally involves replacing the entire 

wheelset and shipping the damaged wheelset to a shop for reconditioning. Thirty two cars for 

transporting containers, including 4-axle cars, 8-axle articulated cars and 12-axle articulated cars, 

will require replacement of 316 wheelsets. Water depths will be great enough to damage 

vulnerable lading in 149 containers on loaded cars. The extent of damage depends on the nature 

of the lading that cannot be determined by viewing the exterior of the typical container. It can 

vary from a bulk commodity or other situation in which wetting of the bottom part of the 

contents destroys the value of all of the contents to material in water-tight drums that would be 

unaffected by partial immersion. It is reasonable to assume that no more than 10 to 20 percent of 

these containers would either be empty of have lading that would not be subject to water 

damage. Value of damaged lading will not be estimated but, on average, should be similar to the 

average value of lading in other containers at the ports. 
127

The “train” at Location “B” would be moved to a safe location but cars would remain at 

Location “C”. Seventeen cars at Location “C” would have water damage to the bearings of 68 

wheelsets. 

AMTRAK, Metrolink, and North County Transit District operate a line between Los 

Angeles and San Diego that follows the coast between San Clemente and San Diego owned in 

part by Metrolink in Orange County, by North County Transit District in Northern San Diego 

County, and by Metropolitan Transit System in Southern San Diego County. The line carries 

Amtrak and commuter trains during the day and BNSF freight trains at night. Except for short 

stretches of BNSF track in San Diego, which are a few feet above the tsunami run-up elevation, 

the tracks are NOT well above any tsunami inundation. No railroad damage is expected in this 

area. 

The estimated cost of repairs to fixed property—track, bridges and signals—is slightly 

over one million dollars. Repairs to cars will have a similar cost. The cost of train delays and less 

efficient operation during the repair period could equal the cost of repairs to railroad property. 

This is in addition to the damage to lading in 120 to 135 loaded containers. (Damage to 

containers is addressed in the section dealing with the ports.) 

Agricultural Damages

By Jamie Ratliff and Anne Wein 

With more than 25 million acres of active farmland National Agricultural Statistics 

Service (NASS) (2009), California is one of the largest agricultural producers in the United 

States. Tsunamis like the proposed scenario can potentially adversely impact agriculture. 

Agriculture in California, though mostly confined to the Central Valley and other interior areas 

of the State, is also practiced along the coast and therefore susceptible to tsunami inundation. 

Smaller coastal farms and enterprises could be disproportionately affected by a tsunami. The 

losses could be direct and immediate (destroyed crops, drowned/displaced livestock, obliterated 

farming equipment, and damaged/destroyed buildings). Longer-term losses could pertain to 

restoring the land from the effects of debris, salinization, and topsoil removal. Indirect impacts 

from contamination of the soils and food supply could result from tsunami damages to 

infrastructure housing hazardous waste (for example, chemical spills, manure, and pesticides 

stored on farms) or reworked marine sediments (Plumlee and others, 2013). Historically, events 

like the 2004 Indian Ocean and 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunamis caused enormous amounts of 

agricultural losses (for example, stock, revenue, and life) in many regions located closest to the 

tsunami’s origin. 

Types of Agricultural Damages from Tsunamis

Inundation causes various types of damages to agricultural enterprises. Low-lying terrain 

like deltas can be particularly susceptible to tsunami inundation due to wide expanses of flat land 

barely above sea level. Though tsunami waves are relatively slow-moving when they inundate 

the land compared to their speed in open water—wave speeds in open water can be as high as 

500 miles per hour (mph), whereas wave speeds near the coast reduce to less than 40 mph 
128

(International Tsunami Information Center, 2013)—the speed is still fast enough to tear up crops 

and pastures, displace or drown livestock, and damage infrastructure. 

The rapid movement of tsunami inundation waters across croplands can remove topsoil 

from the land along with any crops. Topsoil tends to be the more organic (and therefore nutrient 

rich) component of arable land, so scouring reduces the overall viability of the soil for crops. 

Replacing the topsoil is time-consuming and expensive, though it can sometimes be 

accomplished using biomass-rich crops. In addition, scoured topsoil can be deposited in other 

areas, modifying local topography and changing soil properties (Subagyono and others, 2005). 

Furthermore, debris carried by tsunami waves can also damage or destroy crops by cluttering up 

cropland or depositing silts and clays that form a more impermeable barrier and make water 

infiltration into soil more difficult (Subagyono and others, 2005). 

Salinization of crop soils is another destructive agricultural hazard caused by tsunamis. 

Tsunami inundation infiltrates crops and saturates soil, potentially rendering cropland useless. 

When too much salt is present in the soil, osmosis leads to water being leached out of instead of 

taken in by crops through their roots. In addition, sediment deposits can sometimes inhibit 

leaching—the removal of salt from soil by flushing it with freshwater. Generally unless heavy, 

consistent rainfall or persistent irrigation occurs to wash salt out of the soil, only deep-rooted or 

salt-tolerant crops can be grown on inundated land until the salt content is reduced sufficiently to 

permit more salt-sensitive crops to be grown again United Nations Food and Agriculture 

Organization (FAO)(2005a). 

Contamination of soil, food, and water supplies is a concern both economically and 

ecologically. For example, following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, Japanese agricultural 

products (such as rice and fish) from Fukushima Prefecture had their distribution restricted for 

fear that radiation from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant had contaminated 

the products (Kajitani and others, 2013); radiation from damage to nuclear power plants is not a 

concern in our tsunami scenario because coastal power plants are outside the modeled inundation 

zone. Livestock can also be adversely impacted by contamination—poor water supplies or 

radiation poisoning can kill livestock and cause defects in livestock products (for example, eggs, 

milk, and meat). 

All types of tsunami damages impact various aspects of agriculture. Crops can be 

damaged or destroyed. Infrastructure (for example, barns) can be flooded, damaged by debris, or 

simply broken by tsunami inundation. Other equipment like tractors can be washed away or 

damaged by water and debris. Lifeline and crucial services damages (such as transportation and 

electricity) can cause agricultural losses to farms (dairy farms, in particular) both in and outside 

the tsunami inundation zone. Farmers and their staff may suffer injuries, be displaced, or even 

lose their lives as a result of tsunami inundation; livestock may experience these same problems. 

Damages to crops may be affected by the amount of time the land remains inundated (Porter and 

others, 2010). Finally, the time of year the event occurs affects the severity of damages to crops 

and livestock. For example, seedlings and calves are more vulnerable than more established 

crops and livestock. 

Historic Tsunamis and Agricultural Losses

A number of tsunamis have resulted in varying levels of damage to agriculture (for 

example, crops, infrastructure, and livestock). In the past 10 years, the 2004 Indian Ocean 

tsunami and the 2011 Tohoku tsunami have recorded information about crop and livestock 
129

damages in various countries. Other tsunamis, such as the 2010 Chile, 2010 Sumatra, and 2009 

Samoa tsunamis, also had some impact on agriculture in their countries of origin. 

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, one of the most destructive tsunamis in recorded 

history, damaged or destroyed agricultural land in many Southeast Asia countries. India and 

Indonesia were some of the hardest-hit countries, with nearly 40,000 hectares (ha; 99,000 acres) 

of Indonesia’s field area destroyed and over 50,000 ha damaged and nearly 12,000 ha (30,000 

acres) of India’s crop lands damaged (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2005). 

In Thailand, where damages were less severe, approximately 100 ha (250 acres) of cropland and 

1,600ha (4,000 acres) of plantation land were affected, resulting in an estimated 376 million Baht 

($12.3 million U.S.) in damages and losses. Uprooted oil palms and coconut trees required 

replacement. More than 10,000 animals drowned, leading to an estimated 17.6 million Baht 

($570,000 U.S.) of livestock losses across six provinces (Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, 

2005). Nearly 40 percent of the arable land on the island of Sumatra in Indonesia was estimated 

to be unusable for at least a few years (FAO, 2005b). The Maldives and Sri Lanka also had 

relatively significant agricultural damages: around 50 percent of agricultural land in the Maldives 

was completely destroyed, and approximately 1/3 of Sri Lanka’s production in the peak cropping 

season was lost in the main paddy growing areas (International Fund for Agricultural 

Development, 2005). 

In Japan after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, agricultural damage was estimated at about 

950 billion Yen (¥) ($9.32 billion U.S.). About 23,500 ha (58,000 acres) of land including about 

20,000 ha [49,000 acres] of rice paddies and 3,500 ha [8,600 acres] of upland fields were washed 

away or flooded by tsunami inundation. After one year, less than half of fields damaged by 

salinization had been restored; over half of the damaged farms in the disaster zone were still 

inoperable (Japan Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012). After 2 years, 80 

percent of the rice fields in Sendai have been desalinated and some farmers are cultivating rice 

for the first time in three years (Hirama, 2013). 

The failure at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant following the tsunami 

introduced major concerns about radiation contaminating remaining crops in multiple prefectures 

surrounding the plant. Restrictions on export and consumption of leafy (lettuce, cabbage) and 

flowerhead (broccoli, cauliflower) vegetables from these prefectures was restricted for a short 

time pending more comprehensive testing. Dairy products like milk and eggs, as well as meat 

products, like pork, were also restricted pending further testing in Fukushima prefecture 

(Johnson, 2011). 

Although tsunamis can cause serious damage to agricultural land, reports on agricultural 

damages in California following tsunamis of record are non-existent. The 2010 Chile and 2011 

Tohoku tsunamis damaged marinas along much of the coast of Northern California without 

inundating land (CGS, 2012). Although no evidence of agricultural damages from the 1964 

Alaska tsunami could be found, similar to the SAFRR tsunami scenario, land and communities in 

California were inundated. 

Potential Agricultural Damages in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

Agricultural damages in the SAFRR tsunami scenario are summarized in terms of land 

exposure and crop income losses, soil and crop contamination sources; exposed livestock value, 

and damages to agricultural buildings and contents. We were not able to address field 

remediation costs and restoration times. 
130

Methods

To establish how much agricultural land is potentially exposed in the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario inundation zone, agricultural land cover data were intersected with the scenario 

inundation zone and wave velocity/flow depth data and summarized by county using geographic 

information systems software. “Cropland” and “agricultural land” are defined as follows: 

cropland refers to land that was cropped (for example, for wheat or strawberries) and agricultural 

land includes both cropland and land that was not (but could have been) used for crops or was 

used for livestock (such as fallow/idle cropland or pasture). 

Two different land use datasets were considered for the agricultural land exposure 

analysis. Vector land survey data from the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) 

and raster remotely sensed cropland data from NASS were both processed to provide a range of 

agricultural exposure values. DWR data collected through a series of land surveys and 

extensively ground-truthed are potentially more accurate. However, the surveys were completed 

between 1993 and 2006 and do not cover every coastal county (DWR, 2013). NASS Cropland 

Data Layer (CDL) data have complete coverage at 30-m resolution and are more current—CDL 

data are updated yearly—but are far more reliant on automated processes to complete the 

classification (NASS, 2013). 

An examination of the 2007 Census of Agriculture for California revealed that every 

county in the State has at least a nominal amount of farmland in use (NASS, 2009). Therefore, 

the decision was made to use the CDL for this analysis to capture exposed agriculture in counties 

not surveyed by DWR. The currency of the CDL data was also preferable because crops can 

change from year to year—the entire study area was included in the 2012 CDL, unlike the DWR 

data where different counties were surveyed in different years. The 2012 crop distribution is not 

intended to predict what the crop distribution will be in 2014; this analysis uses these data as a 

proxy to provide a general idea of what agricultural impacts could be possible for the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario. 

Other sources were used to address the other types of agricultural damages. DWR data 

was consulted for indications of livestock (poultry, feedlots, and dairy) in the inundation zone 

and confirmed using satellite imagery. Crude estimates of crop income loss and exposed 

livestock value relied on agricultural damage analyses conducted for the ARkStorm scenario 

(Porter and others, 2010). Sources of soil and crop contamination were extracted from the 

environmental and environmental-health implications in the SAFRR tsunami scenario (Plumlee 

and others, 2013). Finally, more detailed information about how building and content losses were 

calculated is provided in the Building Damage section of this report. 

Agricultural Land Exposure

Approximately 90,600 acres of land lie in the scenario inundation zone; around 9,600 

acres (11 percent) is agricultural land (based on the 2012 CDL). Alfalfa is the most common 

crop in the inundation zone, making up 42 percent of inundated agricultural land. Trucktransported crops (such as carrots and strawberries) and field crops are a distant second and third, 

only representing 0.5 and 0.4 percent of inundated agricultural land. Non-crop uses such as 

pastureland and fallow/idle land waiting to be rotated in the next growing season make up the 

majority of inundated agriculture at 57 percent of the total. 

At the county level, Humboldt County is by far the most exposed agriculturally to the 

SAFRR tsunami scenario: 23 percent of the 22,064 inundated acres in the county is agricultural. 

San Luis Obispo, Mendocino, and Sonoma Counties also have a relatively high percentage of 
131

inundated agricultural land relative to total inundated land (22, 18, and 15 percent, respectively), 

however the overall amount of inundated land in these counties is relatively small (1,972 acres, 

2,397 acres, and 758 acres respectively). The vast majority of potentially affected cropland lies 

in Humboldt County (94 percent of total inundated cropland), and 99 percent of the affected 

cropland in the county contains alfalfa-type crops (such as alfalfa and hay). Monterey County 

ranks a distant third for exposed cropland at only 59 acres (1 percent of total inundated 

cropland), but the county has the most non-alfalfa cropland in the inundation zone. Trucktransported crops and field crops are prominent in Monterey County. Table 32 presents the 

distribution of agricultural land in the inundation zone by county, figure 78 illustrates the 

dominance of grass- and pasturelands in the inundation zone in Humboldt County, and figure 79 

shows the wider variety of croplands in the inundation zone in Monterey County. 

Borrowing from the ARkStorm agricultural analysis (Porter and others, 2010) and 

assuming that production on inundated agricultural lands is lost for one year for annual crops and 

alfalfa and multiple years for vineyards, rough estimates of crop income losses amount to 

approximately $3.5 million in 2010 dollars. This calculation includes no revenue losses from 

non-crop lands. More than 90 percent of the income losses accrue from inundation of alfalfa 

croplands. Vineyards are potentially the next greatest source of losses if the crop has to be 

reestablished, a costly process that occurs over multiple years. Truck-transported crops register 

as the third highest category of crop income losses. 

Wave velocities and flow depths were modeled along with inundation for the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario. The maximum wave velocity on alfalfa croplands is 12 m/sec (27 mph) in 

Humboldt County and the maximum flow depth (the maximum height of the tsunami wave 

relative to the topography) is 5 m in Mendocino County. The overall maximum wave velocity on 

cropland is about 24 m/sec (54 mph) on grain cropland in Los Angeles County, whereas the 

greatest flow depth on cropland of around 6 m occurs on vineyards in Marin County. For the 

most part, however, wave velocities average around 2 m/sec (4 mph) and flow depths average 

around 1 m on cropland. 
Table 32. County-level distribution of agricultural land in the SAFRR tsunami scenario inundation zone.

Total (acres) Agricultural Breakdown by Crop Class (acres)

County Name Inundated Agricultur

al

County 

Total

Alfalfa

1

Grains

2

Field 

Crops3 Rice Truck5 Tomatoes Vineyards NonCrop6

Del Norte County 7,943 711 787,271 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 711

Humboldt County 22,064 5,151 2,552,467 3,861 0 14 1 1 0 0 1,274

Mendocino County 2,397 441 2,447,320 118 2 0 0 0 0 1 320

Sonoma County 758 116 1,016,190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 116

Marin County 7,264 627 513,906 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 622

Contra Costa County 1,692 3 325,809 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 

Alameda County 9,737 48 210,717 8 2 0 0 2 0 0 36

San Francisco County 1,617 59 148,323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59

San Mateo County 7,452 338 438,460 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 325

Santa Cruz County 795 67 313,973 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 63

Monterey County 4,741 442 2,366,171 12 0 14 0 24 8 1 383

San Luis Obispo 

County 1,972 428 2,239,106 32 0 2 0 4 0 1 389

Santa Barbara County 1,081 36 2,368,170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36

Ventura County 1,587 68 1,304,811 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68

Los Angeles County 6,274 331 2,336,717 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 328

Orange County 6,420 368 336,942 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 368

San Diego County 6,828 334 2,553,199 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 329

Study Area Total 90,621 9,570 22,259,552 4,031 13 34 1 45 8 8 5,429

1

Alfalfa crops include alfalfa, hay, and other pasture grasses.

2

Grains includes wheat, rye, oats, and triticale.

3

Field crops include corn, cotton, barley, safflower, beans, peas, and other non-staple grains/legumes.

4

Orchard crops include fruit and nut trees (such as apple, orange, almond, and walnut).

5 Truck crops include strawberries, carrots, cantaloupe, pumpkins, and other bush/bulb/vine (except grape)/tuber crops.

6 Non-crop land includes fallow/idle cropland, shrubland, barren land identified as agricultural land by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), and 

pasture grass for livestock.
133

Figure 78. Satellite image showing Eel River Delta, Humboldt County, land inundated in the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario (blue outline). Much of the inundated area in Humboldt County is pastureland (like

used for livestock) and land used for alfalfa-type crops.
134

Figure 79. Satellite image showing land inundated in the SAFRR tsunami scenario (blue outline) around 

Moss Landing in Monterey County. Although far less of Monterey County’s inundated land is 

agricultural relative to other affected counties, more of it is field crops and truck-transported crops. 

Soil and Crop Contamination

Although no hazardous waste facilities are located in the tsunami scenario inundation 

zone (for example, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant in San Luis Obispo County is on the 

coast but not found to be in danger of inundation in this scenario), several urban and industrial 

contamination sources are close enough to the coast to pose a threat to agriculture. The Eel River 

Delta in Humboldt County, the largest agricultural extent in the inundation zone, is also at risk of 

contamination due to reworked marine sediments from cities upriver. The agricultural land 
135

around Humboldt Bay north of the Eel River Delta is situated near a potential source of industrial 

contamination as well as reworked sediment contamination. In northern Monterey County, Moss 

Landing State Wildlife Area and Elkhorn Slough National Estuarine Sanctuary are at risk of 

being exposed to potential industrial contamination from the north (Plumlee and others, 2013). 

Some industrial facilities and processing plants (such as warehouses and chemical plants) can be 

found beyond but still close to the inundation zone (an example of this is the wastewater 

treatment facility just south of the airport in Oceano in San Luis Obispo County)—these facilities 

could pose contamination threats if the tsunami damage impacts operations or if inundation 

actually extends farther than modeled. For further detail and discussion regarding potential 

contamination and environmental hazards in general, refer to Plumlee and others (2013).

Livestock Exposure

Agricultural land includes land used to support livestock. Data from the California 

Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) (John Rowden, April 23, 2013, written commun.) 

suggested that some dairies were potentially located along the coast. DWR data indicated dairy 

land use in the inundation zone; the presence of two dairies in the inundation zone was 

confirmed by visually inspecting satellite imagery. The CDFA data also provided dairy herd 

numbers and sizes by county. Using the average herd size in Humboldt County and a value of 

$1,300/head (Porter and others, 2010) the exposed livestock value is approximately $250,000. 

Summary of Agricultural Building and Content Damages

Agricultural land is not the only asset that would be damaged by the scenario tsunami. 

Agricultural buildings (defined by NIBS and FEMA [2009] as agricultural facilities and offices, 

which may include, for example, barns and silos) are also of concern for tsunami damages. 

Selected census-block-level data falling in the scenario inundation zone were used to calculate 

building and content losses by HAZUS-MH building occupancy type. Given tsunami inundation 

and velocity and depth, HAZUS building loss estimates are derived from damage state 

probabilities for building types, repair and replacement costs per square footage, and building 

square footage. For a more detailed explanation of how building losses were estimated and what 

criteria were used to select areas for analysis, please refer to the Building Damage section of this 

report. Slightly more than $190,000 in building losses and $1.04 million in content losses are 

estimated to be incurred in the almost 200,000 ft2 of building area classified in HAZUS-MH as 

agricultural (code AGR1) in the tsunami inundation zone statewide. A maximum of 117 days is 

estimated to complete repairs to agricultural infrastructure statewide. 

At the county level, San Diego County has the highest estimated agricultural building and 

content losses in the analyzed census blocks even though the county has little agricultural land in 

the inundation zone. Around 39,000 ft2

 of San Diego County building area classified as 

agricultural in the HAZUS-MH building inventory are in analyzed census blocks in the 

inundation zone (20 percent of the agricultural building stock that is inundated statewide). 

Building losses in San Diego County are estimated at around $76,000 (40 percent of the total 

State AGR1 building losses), whereas content losses are estimated to be approximately $210,000 

(20 percent of the State total). The estimated building repair time in San Diego County of 117 

days is the State maximum. In contrast, Humboldt County, which has the most agricultural land 

in the tsunami inundation zone, is a distant second for building and content losses ($31,000 [16 

percent] and $180,000 [17 percent], respectively), while requiring an estimated maximum of 107 

days to complete building repairs. San Mateo County has truck-transported crops in the scenario 
136

inundation zone and agricultural building and content damages comparable to Humboldt County. 

A complete list of building damages by county is presented in table 33. Overall, crop income 

losses likely dominate agricultural building and content losses. Furthermore, if field remediation 

costs for a flood event (Porter and others, 2010) are an indication of tsunami inundation field 

remediation costs, these could be on a par with the crop income losses. 
137

Table 33. Selected agricultural (HAZUS-MH AGR1) building loss statistics in the SAFRR tsunami 

inundation zone by county. 

[ft2, square feet; $, 2010 U.S. dollars]

County Name Building 

Area (ft2) 

Building 

Value ($)

Building 

Loss ($)

Content 

Loss ($)

Maximum 

Repair Time 

(Days)

Del Norte County 591 46,728 260 3,110 0 

Humboldt County 38,918 3,121,972 31,659 181,452 104

Mendocino County 8,715 714,759 3,796 43,850 0 

Sonoma County 0 0 0 0 0 

Marin County 22,342 1,969,329 13,525 135,200 11

Contra Costa County 277 23,733 132 1,580 0 

Alameda County 27,881 2,408,096 9,982 129,177 5 

San Francisco County 1,318 122,373 681 8,145 0 

San Mateo County 20,213 1,816,089 41,028 157,314 26

Santa Cruz County 5,635 503,887 3,525 34,532 0 

Monterey County 944 77,568 567 6,071 0 

San Luis Obispo 

County 20,499 1,655,665 7,333 88,021 5 

Santa Barbara County 0 0 0 0 0 

Ventura County 4,208 338,718 1,539 19,581 0 

Los Angeles County 2,574 205,313 1,784 16,895 0 

Orange County 2,790 221,864 1,234 14,766 0 

San Diego County 39,213 3,101,084 75,877 209,591 117

Study Area Total 196,119 16,327,178 192,923 1,049,284 117

Note: Values are based on percentages of building stocks by census block identified as inundated by the tsunami 

scenario. Only areas where inundation was modeled were considered for the analysis, and only census blocks in the 

inundation zone meeting the criteria specified in Building Damage section of this chapter were used.

Data and Research Needs

Although this preliminary analysis covers the entire California coast, it is reliant on data 

that are processed remotely and only field-verified in some locations. The CDL data are intended 

to provide detailed information about cropland in the United States, but the data are less accurate 

than survey data like the DWR data. When classification or validation processes change for 

remotely-sensed data like CDL, the results can vary significantly from one year to the next: for 

example, the total cropland acreage in the inundation zone in 2010 is approximately 2,600 acres 

whereas around 4,100 acres are identified from the 2012 data. This may be a result of variations 

in training data for data classification because the major land cover class that changed between 

the two years according to the analysis was grassland. USGS National Land Cover Dataset 

(NLCD) land cover data are used to classify anything not identified as agricultural, so one 

possibility is that portions of grass-based classes in 2010 were reclassified as NLCD grassland in 

2012. Classifying cropland and pasture is extremely difficult because it tends to get confused 

with grassland when using automated classification methods (for an example, showing how 

grassland was the most inconsistently classified class between NLCD and the USGS Gap 

Analysis Program land-cover dataset, please refer to Wardlow and Egbert, 2003). The training 

data used from agricultural surveys and ground-truthing changed in 2011, which would have also 
138

had an impact on how data were classified and might partially explain the difference in cropland 

between 2010 and 2012 CDL data (NASS, 2013). The DWR data, on the surface, seem like a 

better data source because those data were extensively verified in the field, but the lack of 

complete coverage and the number of years spent to complete such surveys make the available 

DWR data less reliable. 

The available data for analyzing livestock impacts in the inundation zone was very 

limited. The resolution of agricultural census data is too coarse for strips of land along the coast. 

The CDL data only provides one class that is livestock-related and that is pasture grasses which 

neglects to identify herd sizes and feedlots. We were able to identify two dairies in the 

inundation zone using multiple sources from CDFA, DWR, and satellite imagery. Spatial 

livestock data is needed to better assess potential livestock exposure in the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario. 

Finally, although research has been conducted on economic losses in agriculture due to 

flooding (for example, Porter and others, 2010) this particular analysis did not have the requisite 

information to establish field rehabilitation costs and times (and related crop income losses) for 

tsunami inundated agricultural land. Costs for leaching salt out of soil, cleaning up debris, and 

reestablishing damaged crops after a tsunami are largely unavailable. Some additional proxy data 

for calculating tsunamigenic agricultural losses could be obtainable from rising climate change 

research concerned with salinity management on agricultural lands. Although it might be 

possible to coarsely approximate losses based on observations of the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, 

earthquake, uncertainty about the type and extent of damage to agriculture in each county 

remains a barrier. 

Opportunities for Agricultural Resilience

This analysis summarizes the types of agricultural damages possible in California from 

the SAFRR tsunami scenario. The 9,600 acres of inundated agricultural land may make up a very 

small portion of the approximately 25 million acres of agricultural land in the State. 

Consequently, the estimated crop, livestock, and building/content losses are not factored into the 

analysis of economic impacts in California. However, locally those acres support the livelihood 

of a number of farmers and employees. Salinization, debris deposition, soil scour, and 

contamination all present long-term issues that would need to be carefully and quickly dealt with 

in order to minimize productivity losses for affected farms. Given that most of these exposed 

agricultural acres are found in the poorer northern counties (California Department of Finance, 

2009) the distribution of agricultural damages raises concern about financing the recovery of the 

affected enterprises. Impediments to recovery may further impact farmers in these counties. 

The analysis assumes farmers do not mitigate any losses; warning of a far-field tsunami 

allows time for evacuation or protection of equipment, and livestock. Information specifically 

geared to dealing with livestock (for example, transportation and shelter) in California is posted 

(Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 1999). Although tsunami preparedness 

information directed specifically at farmers does not appear to be available, flood preparedness 

information can provide some basic guidelines. Taking precautions such as having disaster kits 

with food, water, and medical supplies readily available and tagging and recording livestock 

information will reduce losses. Web sites like http://www.prep4agthreats.org and 

http://awic.nal.usda.gov provide farmers with information regarding various aspects of disaster 

preparedness. However, less can be done to prevent field damages, putting the onus back on 

recovery to prevent further losses. 
139

Fire Following Tsunami

By Charles Scawthorn 

This section assesses the potential for fires following the scenario tsunami. We begin 

with a brief review of fires following historic tsunamis and the related literature to gain insight 

into ignition and fire spread mechanisms under post-tsunami conditions. The review reveals that 

tsunamigenic fires are typically fueled by spreading waterborne liquid fuels released from 

petrochemical facilities damaged by the tsunami. On the basis of this finding, we then examine 

the scenario affected area for petrochemical facilities, identifying 47 major tank farms and other 

facilities that might be impacted by the tsunami. This examination reveals two areas, the port of 

Richmond (in San Francisco Bay) and the port complex of Los Angeles/Long Beach, that 

contain petrochemical facilities that may be impacted by the tsunami, leading to spreading oil 

fires borne on the tsunami waters. Given the concentration of oil tank farms in the Ports of 

Richmond, and especially in the Port of Los Angeles/Port of Long Beach (POLA/POLB) 

complex, we feel it is possible but not very likely that a spreading fire will result from tsunami 

damage in at least one of these facilities. If such a fire were to occur, in the context of a tsunami 

and its attendant other damage, it is likely it would spread over water to other facilities, resulting 

in a common cause fire and possibly destruction of several of these facilities. Lastly, there are 

typically several tankers at berths in POLA/POLB—given the perhaps two to four hour warning 

for the scenario tsunami, it is quite possible that one or more oil tankers may be caught in the 

harbor and contribute to the size and severity of any spreading fire. 

Review of Fires Following Historic Tsunamis and the Related Literature

Tsunamis are sometimes followed by fires. The literature on tsunamigenic fires is 

sparse—Shuto (1987) was perhaps the first to systematically examine the phenomenon, 

concluding after a review of historical events and an examination of the physics of oil spread on 

water that the final burned area due to spreading oil on water correlates with the boundary 

between the gravity-viscous and surface tension-viscous regimes of empirical formulas. Shuto 

compares numerical methods such as Goto (1985), which include the effects of inertia, gravity 

and viscosity empirical formulas that only give the size of the spread of oil, finding the former 

more informative. Subsequently, (Shuto, 2006) provides an equation for estimation of the final 

size of a burning oil spill on water: 

324 A V B = ⋅ (25) 

where AB = Area burnt (square meters, m2) and V = volume of spilled oil (kiloliters, kL). Shuto’s 

equation is tabulated in table 34 for sizes of typical petroleum product tank sizes (small to very 

large)—for example, if the contents of a filled very large (50,000 kL) tank are completely 

released, the burn area is about 16 square kilometers (km2), or equivalent a square about 4 km on 

a side. 

 
140

Table 34. Burnt area given various size tanks, calculated using equation 25. 

[H/D, height divided by diameter; m, meters; AB, area burnt; m2, square meters]

Volume (kilo 

liters)

Equivalent tank 

diameter (m)

[H/D = 0.5]

Typical tank 

size

AB (m2) Dimension of equivalent 

square (m)

1,000 14 small 320,000 566

3,000 20 medium 960,000 980

10,000 29 large 3,200,000 1,789

50,000 50 very large 16,000,000 4,000

To gain insight into ignition and fire spread mechanisms under post-tsunami conditions, 

we next review selected tsunamis, and the fires they caused. 

1755 Lisbon Earthquake and Tsunami

The earthquake occurred on November 1, 1755, and was centered in the Atlantic Ocean, 

about 200 km west-southwest of Cape St. Vincent. Lisbon was heavily damaged. A very strong 

tsunami caused heavy destruction along the coasts of Portugal, southwestern Spain, and western 

Morocco. About 30 min after the quake, a large wave swamped the area near Bugie Tower on 

the mouth of the Tagus. The area between Junqueria and Alcantara in the western part of the city 

was the most heavily damaged by a total of three waves with maximum height estimated at 6 m, 

each dragging people and debris out to sea and leaving exposed large stretches of the river 

bottom. A devastating fire following the earthquake raged for five days and destroyed a large 

part of Lisbon. No information is available on the causes of the fires, but in central Lisbon they 

destroyed areas that had been damaged by the tsunami, so that some of the fires were likely 

caused by the tsunami. 

1964 Alaska Earthquake and Tsunami

The most complete treatment of fires associated with the March 27, 1964, magnitude 9.2 

Alaska earthquake and tsunami is the report by the National Board of Fire Underwriters 

(National Board of Fire Underwriters and Pacific Fire Rating Bureau, 1964). A number of 

communities were affected, in which almost all fires occurred in the waterfront areas and were 

associated with tsunami inundation. Specifically: 

· Anchorage was by far the largest affected community but was not affected by tsunami, 

and “fires were few and of a minor nature.” 

· Seward: tsunami waves “swept up into the town for a distance of l to 2 blocks in most 

areas and as far as 5 blocks in an area of small homes and trailer courts...An oil tanker 

had been loading gasoline and was in the process of loading diesel oil when the 

earthquake struck. Hose connections broke, oil and some residual gasoline from hose and 

pipe lines ignited, possibly from electrical sources or by friction, and a sea wave which 

quickly followed swept burning liquids along the waterfront and inland for several 

hundred feet. The fire involved 2 flammable liquid bulk plants and warehouses some 8 

blocks apart, 2 dwellings, and the city's standby electric power plant.” 

· Valdez: “Fires erupted at 2 waterfront tank farms from gasoline and oil leaking from 

tanks damaged by the earthquake and waves. The source of ignition at one plant was 

apparently power wires that dropped on a metal pump house roof. Burning liquids were 

carried along the waterfront, and the resulting fires involved parts of the 2 tank farms and 
141

destroyed 4 business buildings. Fires were left to burn themselves out as fire-fighters 

either could not reach the fires due to high water and debris or, when flooding subsided, 

could get no water from fire hydrants. Fortunately there was no strong wind to spread 

fires further.” 

· Whittier: “The earthquake, followed by seismic sea waves, destroyed pier facilities and 

an oil tank, spread flammable liquids along the waterfront, and a fire that followed 

destroyed several tanks and waterfront structures in 2 different locations.” 

· Crescent City, California: “There were 2 fires, both in areas outside the city, during the 

emergency. One, believed to have occurred when a tank truck was thrown by a wave into 

an automobile sales and service garage, was in an area without mains or hydrants . . . . 

The second fire was about 300 feet away in a bulk oil plant. It reportedly occurred by 

arcing from fallen electrical wires igniting leaking gasoline and oil after undiked tanks 

were knocked over by a large stump or log. Fifty-five-gallon drums stored nearby 

exploded and burned, contributing to the spread of the fire. Fire-fighters and apparatus 

were described as being virtually surrounded by burning liquids floating on the water and 

these factors together with another threatened sea wave, made fire-fighting extremely 

difficult. Although this plant was destroyed, a seriously exposed bulk oil plant nearby 

was saved with only slight damage, water being obtained from a hydrant nearby.” 

In summary, significant fires only occurred in tsunami inundated areas, even at great 

distance in Crescent City, and were generally associated with liquid fuel facilities which, once 

ruptured, resulted in spreading fires on water that caused sympathetic fires at other liquid fuel 

facilities. Of particular interest is the oil tanker-related fire at Seward, which might have been 

mitigated with some warning. 

1964 Niigata Earthquake and Tsunami

The June 16, 1964, magnitude 7.5 Niigata (Japan) earthquake is well known for two 

effects—the widespread occurrence of liquefaction and a large fire at the Showa oil refinery that 

burned for several days. As summarized by a recent report (Cruz and others, 2009): 

 “The oil refinery fires triggered by the 1964 Niigata earthquake and tsunami in Japan serve 

as an example of the potentially catastrophic effects of a tsunami when it affects a highly 

industrialized and urbanized area. During this event, a 4 m tsunami was triggered by the 7.5 

magnitude earthquake which initially caused fires in five storage tanks and oil spills in 

hundreds more at two oil refineries in Niigata (Iwabuchi et al., 2006). The tsunami hit the 

already earthquake stricken facility resulting in: 

· Additional damage to storage tanks and plant processing equipment by collision with 

tsunami-driven objects and by the hydrodynamic forces of the tsunami (Iwabuchi and 

others, 2006). 

· The spread of leaked oil by the tsunami current into the harbor and on inundated land 

(Iwabuchi and others, 2006). 

· The spread of burning crude oil carried by the flood waters causing the fires to extend to 

other parts of the plant including the heating furnace, the heat recovery boiler, the reactor 

of the catalytic conversion process, the hydrolysis treatment equipment, and the bottom 

of the hydrolysis reactor for the desulphurization process (Akatsuka and Kobayashi, 

2008) 
142

· The spread of ignited crude oil carried by the flood waters into residential areas and the 

destruction of 286 houses by the fire, 2006).” 

1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki Earthquake and Tsunami

The July 12, 1993, Hokkaido Nansei-oki, Japan, magnitude 7.7 earthquake and tsunami 

caused major damage on Okushiri Island, to the west of Hokkaido (figures 80, 81). As 

summarized in (Yanev and others, 1993): 

“The only known fire ignitions during the earthquake occurred in Aonae on the southern tip 

of Okushiri Island. Most of the town is oriented north-south and sited on or almost on the 

beach, only a few meters above sea level. The rest of the town is located on a central bluff 

about 20 m high where a lighthouse, the town offices, and the fire station are sited, as shown 

in (figure 80). The lower part of Aonae is densely built-up with narrow streets and typical 

building spacing of about 3 m. The buildings are generally one and two story, typically with 

Japanese wood post and beam construction, although some steel and concrete structures 

were also present. Exterior coverings are often noncombustible stucco or cement board over 

wood, with corrugated metal roofing. Large amounts of exposed wood trim, however, 

compromise the fire protection. Occupancies are generally commercial closer to the wharf 

area and residential behind (at the base of the bluff), although many buildings are mixed 

occupancies. 

Figure 80. Photograph of fire ignitions in the town of Aonae on the southern tip of Okushiri Island, Japan, 

following the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki earthquake and tsunami (photograph from Yanev and others, 

1993). 
143

The town is protected against fire by a 38-member trained volunteer fire department headed 

by a full-time professional. The apparatus consists of two engines of typical Japanese size 

and configuration-each pumper has a 2,000-liter booster tank and carries 10 lengths of 20-mlong 65-mm-diameter hose. The capacity of the pumps is approximately 2,600 liters per 

minute. Each engine also carries two 4-m lengths of hard suction hose equipped with 

bamboo strainer baskets. Relative to U.S. equipment, these fire engines are smaller in 

dimensions and capacity. This smaller size expedites passage through narrower Japanese 

streets, such as those in Aonae. A third fire engine was present in Aonae at the time of the 

earthquake; this engine was in poor condition, however, and was parked at the south end of 

town where it was destroyed by the tsunami. 

Fire hydrants are located around the town but are not used because the water mains are 

insufficiently sized and pressured to provide adequate water for fire control. Small fires are 

fought from engine booster tanks, while the main fire emergency water is stored in 

underground cisterns sited throughout the town. Individual cistern capacity is 40,000 liters, 

which is accessed through a concrete manhole cover. Shortly after the earthquake, the fire 

department made a circuit of the town looking for fires. Seeing none and concerned about a 

possible tsunami, they returned to the fire station. Within a few minutes following the 

earthquake, the tsunami swept through the lower area wrecking many buildings and 

scattering debris over a wide area. The tsunami also destroyed the main water line at its 

attachment point near a bridge. At approximately 10:40 P.M. the fire department received a 

citizen alarm of a fire in the lower area. A brigade of 10 men immediately responded and 

attempted to reach the fire by driving down the main street but found the street blocked by 

debris. They then returned to the top of the bluff and took a second route down the southern 

part of the bluff. 
144

Figure 81. Photograph of tsunami and fire damage on southeast Okushiri Island in the community of 

Aonae, Japan, following the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki earthquake and tsunami. Orientation is looking 

northeast. Numerous fires broke out following the tsunami, adding to the property loss and misery. 

More than 120 people were killed in Japan (Okushiri and Hokkaido Islands) by the tsunami. 

(Photograph by Dennis Sigrist.) 

The probable causes and the effects of the fire are illustrated in (figure 82). The fire began in 

a structure above the area directly affected by the tsunami, so it likely began as a result of the 

earthquake. The precise site of initial ignition is unknown, although the approximate location 

is shown in (figure 82). The initial source of the ignition is also unknown (at this time); 

however, villagers told of earthquake shaking turning over all of their furniture, so numerous 

ignition sources were available (e.g., cooking and heating appliances, and fuel storage 

tanks). At the time of ignition, wind was from the east at about 1.5 meters per second with 

gusts up to about 5 meters per second. 
145

Figure 82. Diagram of tsunami effects in the town of Aonae on the southern tip of Okushiri Island, Japan, 

following the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki earthquake and tsunami (from Yanev and others, 1993). 

Firefighting was from hand lines supplied from the pumpers on top of the bluff, drafting 

from the cisterns. Fire progress was southward (cross-wind) and relatively slow; suppression 

efforts significantly impeded fire progress, but the firefighters were unable to stop the fire. 

Fire progress was aided by flammables normally stored in each home, as well as the fact that 

almost all houses had outdoor 490-liter elevated kerosene tanks for heating [e.g., propane 

tanks (20 kg) for cooking]. The kerosene tanks were quite likely a principal factor in the fire 

spread. All such tanks were found empty after the fire, most having vented safely through 

the top vent pipe. The venting was most likely caused by radiant heat causing the kerosene to 

boil. Eight exploded propane tanks and two ruptured kerosene tanks were documented. 

Reportedly, every time the fire department seemed to be gaining headway, the fire would 

flare up again, probably due to successive involvement of these tanks. Additional materials 

fueling the spread of the fire were considerable scrap wood in and among the buildings, and 

numerous vehicles, which added gasoline, tires, and flammable interiors to the conflagration. 

Fire spread was southward at about 35 meters per hour, with firefighting on the downwind 

edge. Two hours into the fire, a second fire ignited behind the fire line. At about 4 A.M. (6 

hours after the earthquake), available water from the cisterns was exhausted. Citizen 

volunteers assisted in moving the hose over debris from the bluff top to the port, where the 

two pumpers drafted from the harbor. At this point, the advancing fire front was about 90 m 

wide. The fire department used equipment to move debris and two buildings, creating a 

firebreak. Leading four hand lines from the drafting pumpers, the fire was successfully 

stopped at about 9 A.M., saving several dozen houses that were in the path of the advancing 

fire.” 

2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami

The December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean magnitude 9.1 earthquake and tsunami caused 

major damage and loss of life in Sumatra, Indonesia and in Thailand, Sri Lanka and India. Only 
146

one minor fire is known to have been caused by the earthquake and tsunami (Scawthorn and 

others, 2006). Of more interest is the damage to the deep-water port at Kreung Raya, Aceh, 

Indonesia, (oil and dry cargo), which was inundated by the tsunami and lost half its piping and 3 

of 9 oil tanks (fig. 83). A ship was offloading at the port at the time of the earthquake—it 

immediately slipped its moorings, headed out to sea, and was undamaged by the tsunami. No fire 

was reported at the oil terminal. 

Figure 83. Photograph of Krueng Raya, Aceh, Indonesia, deep water port after the 2004 Indian Ocean 

tsunami. Three tanks (reported to have been empty or near empty) of nine tanks floated about 500 

meters. (Photograph from Aceh Province Office.) 

2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami

The March 11, 2011, magnitude 9.0 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake and tsunami caused 

extensive loss of life and damage in eastern Japan, and spawned 284 fires (Japan Fire and 

Disaster Management Agency, 2012) including two at major oil refineries. The tsunami was 

higher than expected and, despite warnings, was responsible for most of the life loss and damage, 

and about half of all the fires in the event. Analysis of all the significant tsunami-related fires is 

still underway and a full review is beyond the scope of this report so that only summary findings 

are provided: 

 “Nearly half of the . . . fires that occurred . . . resulted from the tsunami. Typical fires that 

occurred in the Sanriku coastal region arose from a lot of combustible materials, such as 

houses and vehicles, which were destroyed and swept away by the tsunami waves toward a 
147

mountain, caught fire from a source of fire (domestic and other various fuels) drifted there, 

and spread into town areas and forests. On the other hand, in plain areas where the 

population and industries were concentrated, a small number of fuels, such as household gas 

cylinders and vehicles scattered about the town, joined together into a mass of combustible 

materials, which are estimated to have made a great contribution to potential outbreak or 

spread of fires. In any region, it is estimated that tsunami fires were caused by a combination 

of various potential factors such as an electric leakage, a short circuit, and sparks from a 

crash, but most of them are accidental factors and it would remain difficult to investigate the 

true causes . . . . Finally, one of the similar characteristics in the regions where tsunami fires 

expanded is that the fires expanded as the local fire-fighting force was severely diminished 

due to the tsunami. The fires were left uncontrolled for about two days until emergency fire 

response teams arrived at the sites and started fire extinguishing activities . . . .” (Yamada 

and others, 2012) 

Regarding causes of tsunamigenic fires, (Sekizawa and Sasaki, 2012) concluded: 

1. Spillage, ignition, and flow of oil or LPG from upturned or collapsed storage tanks in 

industrial areas, and subsequent ignition of urban areas and buildings. 

2. Spillage from upturned kerosene tanks and LPG cylinders in residential buildings, or 

spillage from broken distribution pipes. 

3. Ignition of buildings by burning buildings or debris carried by the tsunami. 

4. Ignition of buildings by burning ships or cars carried by the tsunami. 

5. Acceleration of the oxidation of iron by salt contained in seawater, resulting in 

spontaneous ignition from heat trapped in mounds of debris containing iron. 

Two basic mechanisms for tsunamigenic fire spread were identified based on this event—

in the first phase, the fires are typically burning liquid fuels borne on the water surface, until the 

tsunami reaches its maximum runup. At that location, large amounts of building and other 

flammable debris are deposited by the tsunami, are ignited by the water borne fires, and burn for 

extended periods (Hokugo and others, 2012). 

Another aspect of note is the damage in this event to ocean-going vessels. The tsunami 

did not arrive until 20 to 30 minutes following the shaking, so that vessels in port had some 

warning and might have been expected to leave shallow waters and ride out the tsunami. 

However, a number of large vessels totaling about 500,000 dead-weight ton (DWT) were 

damage in ports, such as the 91,000 DWT MV Shiramizu, which was grounded in the port of 

Shinchi (fig. 84). 
148

Figure 84. Photograph of MV Shiramizu aground in Shinchi following the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake 

and tsunami (photograph by Charles Scawthorn). 

Summary

On the basis of the foregoing, it may be observed: 

1. Fires often, but not always, occur within the inundation zone of a tsunami. Notable 

tsunamis that are not recorded as causing numerous or large fires include the 1960 and 

2010 Chilean events. As a rule of thumb, it is conservative to assume that tsunamis will 

cause fires. 

2. Tsunamigenic fires are typically fueled by spreading water borne liquid fuels released 

from port or petrochemical facility piping or tanks damaged or floated by the tsunami. 

Sources of ignition are numerous and varied—investigating them in detail is probably 

less fruitful than conceding that, in the presence of such water borne fuels, that ignitions 

are very likely given the large extent of liquid fuels mingling with debris jostling and 

likely to generate sparks. 

3. Large ships such as oil tankers, even with tsunami warning, may not be able to evacuate a 

port. Strong currents and congestion of vessels all attempting to evacuate simultaneously 

are challenges that should be investigated. 
149

Fire in the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

This section assesses the study area based on the findings from the previous section, 

focusing on coastal petrochemical facilities storing significant amounts of flammable product. 

Method

To identify these facilities, an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) database 

(ftp://ftp.epa.gov/EmisInventory/emiss_shp2003/us/, accessed March 1, 2013) was employed that 

identified 111 such facilities in California (fig. 85). The database dates from 2003 and therefore 

may be expected to have some errors. Facilities significantly inland were eliminated from this 

initial list, resulting in 46 facilities requiring review (fig. 86 and table 35). Each of these 

facilities, almost all of which are tank farms, are reviewed next. 

Figure 85. Map showing 111 California coastal petroleum facilities (data from Environmental Protection 

Agency database: ftp://ftp.epa.gov/EmisInventory/emiss_shp2003/us/ accessed March 1, 2013) (base 

image from Google Earth). 
150

Figure 86. Map showing 46 California petroleum facilities sited in proximity to possible tsunami effects 

(data from Environmental Protection Agency database: 

ftp://ftp.epa.gov/EmisInventory/emiss_shp2003/us/, accessed March 1, 2013) (base image from 

Google Earth). 

The methodology employed is a close visual examination of aerial imagery (that is, 

Google Earth imagery) of the facilities vis-à-vis the anticipated tsunami inundation depth, to 

determine whether the tanks are likely to be subjected to flooding. If flooded, floating and 

possible rupture of connections is considered possible, leading to release of flammable product. 

Almost all tanks examined are protected by a secondary containment berm or wall, as required 

by regulations, and the presence and approximate height of this protection (as could be judged 

from the Google Earth imagery) was considered. Regarding the aforementioned regulations, 

40CFR112 requires “ . . . secondary means of containment for the entire capacity of the largest 

single container and sufficient freeboard to contain precipitation . . . .” [emphasis added]. Data 

on the largest tank in each facility is also listed in table 35, and this is used to calculate a burnt 

area based on Shuto’s equation (that is, equation 25). 
Table 35. Summary findings for California petroleum facilities for fire following tsunami in the SAFRR tsunami scenario.

[Function (Fct): T=Tank Farm, R=Refinery. AB, area burnt; m, meters; km2, square kilometers]

No. Name City Fct. Latitud

e Longitude No. tanks

Larges

t tank 

diamet

er (m)

Larg

est 

tank 

heig

ht 

(m)

Tsuna

mi 

height

(m) 

Protect

ed?

With

in 

floo

d 

zone

Flooded?

AB

(km2

) 

1 Unocal Eureka T 40.796 -124.183 no tanks found

2 Chevron Eureka T 40.778 -124.193 10 30 10 1.5 somewhat yes possible 2.3 

3 Oil Term Co. Eureka T 40.770 -124.194 no tanks found

4 Paktank Richmond T 37.958 -122.421 no tanks found

5 Richmond Richmond R 37.923 -122.368 outside tsunami zone no marine terminal 

6 Texaco Richmond T 37.923 -122.368 many 40 20 2 yes partial possible 8.0 

7 Unitank Richmond T 37.920 -122.369 many 13 13 3+ somewhat partial possible 0.6 

8 Time Oil Richmond T 37.920 -122.363 many 20 20 3+ somewhat partial possible 2.0 

9 Unocal Richmond T 37.918 -122.365 many 26 20 3+ somewhat partial possible 3.4 

10 Petromark Richmond T 37.912 -122.386 no tanks found

11 Arco Richmond T 37.913 -122.366 many 25 20 3+ somewhat partial possible 3.1 

12 Shell

South San 

Francisco

T 37.640 -122.398 3 30 20 1 yes no unlikely 

13 Shell San Jose T 37.395 -121.876 no tanks found

14 Southern Pacific P/L Milpitas T 37.374 -121.910 no tanks found

15 Arco Goleta T 34.423 -119.832 no tanks found (Goleta Sanitary District, but next to airport)

16 Shell Ventura T 34.308 -119.286 no tanks found

17 USA-Oil Ventura T 34.298 -119.301 no tanks found

18 Oxnard Oxnard R 34.125 -119.100 no tanks found

19 El Segundo El Segundo R 33.903 -118.395 many yes no no 

20 Wilmington Wilmington R 33.785 -118.263 outside tsunami zone

21 Texaco Wilmington T 33.788 -118.239 outside tsunami zone

22 Wilmington Wilmington T 33.789 -118.227 outside tsunami zone

23 Los Angeles Wilmington R 33780 -118262 outside tsunami zone
152

No. Name City Fct. Latitud

e Longitude No. tanks

Larges

t tank 

diamet

er (m)

Larg

est 

tank 

heig

ht 

(m)

Tsuna

mi 

height

(m) 

Protect

ed?

With

in 

floo

d 

zone

Flooded?

AB

(km2

) 

24 Wilmington Wilmington R 33.772 -118.288 outside tsunami zone

25 Bray Oil Co. Torrance T 33.765 -118.294 outside tsunami zone

26 Texaco Long Beach T 33.776 -118.221 9 45 10 1 yes yes possible 5.1 

27 Petro-Diamond Long Beach T 33.776 -118.219 no tanks found

28 Arco Long Beach T 33.777 -118.213 many 45 10 1~3m yes partial possible 5.1 

29 Time Oil San Pedro T 33.761 -118.292 outside tsunami zone

30 Wilmington Wilmington T 33.765 -118.258 many 31 10 3 yes partial possible 2.4 

31 Golden Eagle Wilmington T 33.761 -118.265 similar to no. 37 Shell possible 5.1 

32 Chevron Chem. Wilmington T 33.759 -118.266 similar to no. 37 Shell possible 5.1 

33 Union Pacific Wilmington T 33.759 -118.266 similar to no. 37 Shell possible 5.1 

34 Unocal Wilmington T 33.756 -118.271 many 45 17 2 yes partial unlikely 

35 Golden West San Pedro T 33.758 -118.258 no tanks found

36 Gatx Wilmington T 33.756 -118.265 no tanks found

37 Shell Wilmington T 33.755 -118.266 many 45 10 2+ yes yes possible 5.1 

38 Chevron Wilmington T 33.752 -118.275 no tanks found

39 Indies Terminals Terminal Island T 33.754 -118.260 no tanks found

40 Refiners Marketing Co. Terminal Island T 33.747 -118.265 no tanks found

41 Mobil San Pedro T 33.745 -118.264 7 yes no no 

42 C. Brewer Long Beach T 33.753 -118.205 no tanks found

43 Exxon Long Beach T 33.751 -118.207 6 45 12 3 yes yes possible 6.1 

44 Mobil Terminal Island T 33.736 -118.272 19 40 13 2 yes no unlikely 

45 C. Brewer Long Beach T 33.746 -118.189 1 yes no no 

46 Unocal San Pedro T 33.726 -118.282 many 24 17 2 yes partial possible 2.5 

47 Oakland Airport Oakland 3 24 24 1 yes yes unlikely 

48 Kinder Morgan Port of Los Angeles T 18 45 16 3 yes yes possible 8.1 

49 UNK Port of Long Beach Port of Long Beach T 6 16 13 1 yes yes possible 0.8 

50

Freeman, Chaffee, White 

Grissom Islands

Port of Long Beach T 33.741 -118.154 many 13 8 1 no yes possible 0.3
153

Not examined are facilities not in the database, except a few identified during this 

investigation (for example, a few tanks at Oakland airport). Power plants, military installations 

and small fueling docks at local marinas are not examined. Small fueling docks exist at almost 

all marinas (for example, fig. 87), and undoubtedly some of these will rupture and release modest 

amounts of flammable liquids, leading to localized fires. 

A B

C D

Figure 87. Images of example of small marina fueling dock not considered in this study of fire in the 

SAFRR tsunami scenario. Example is Berkeley Marina, California: A, marina and inundation 

boundaries; B, closeup of fueling dock; C, flood depths; and D, view of fueling dock from water level. 

(A–C base images from Google Earth; photograph by Charles Scawthorn.) 

This methodology is necessarily limited in accuracy, and it is possible that large facilities 

have been overlooked, tanks misidentified, and other errors introduced. Nevertheless, the method 

are overall reasonable and the findings probably overall robust. 

Humboldt Bay

Three facilities are listed in the EPA database for Humboldt Bay, as shown figures 88 and 

89 (the latter showing flood depths, determined by others in this report). Examination of aerial 

imagery indicated in fact only one facility in existence at the time of the Google Earth imagery 

(fig. 90), the tanks of which are protected by a wall that would appear to be overtopped given the 

2 to 3 m inundation expected at this site. The facility is therefore considered “possible” for 

flooding. Given the size of the largest tank, the resulting burnt area would be over 2 km2

. 
154

Figure 88. Satellite image of Humboldt Bay, California, showing the three oil facilities in the area (base 

image from Google Earth). 
155

Figure 89. Satellite image of Humboldt Bay, California, showing the three oil facilities in the area and 

annotated with tsunami flood depths for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. The approximate depth of 

inundation as determined by others in this report is shown in the explanation at upper left (base image 

from Google Earth). 
156

Figure 90. Satellite image of a Humboldt Bay, California, oil facility. In this image the approximate extent 

of inundation as determined by others in this report is shown by the red line (base image from Google 

Earth). 

San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Other Regions

The same methodology was employed for remaining facilities, as listed in table 35. The 

interested reader can find images for these remaining facilities in figures 19–62 of Scawthorn 

(2013), at http://www.sparisk.com/publications.html (accessed March 1, 2013). In general, 

Scawthorn (2013) provides two figures for most facilities—the first figure showing the facility 

and inland extent of flooding (denoted by the red line) and the second figure showing the same 

view but with shading indicating the depth of inundation. Table 35 summarizes the findings for 

each facility. 

Survey and Findings

As shown in table 35, 17 facilities are deemed as “possible” for release of flammable 

liquids, and a spreading fire. Five of the 17 facilities are in Port of Richmond, and in close 

proximity, and 11 are within the interconnected Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 

(POLA/POLB). 

To better understand the potential vulnerability of marine oil terminals to tsunami, a 

survey of several tank farms and oil terminals was conducted in the POLA/POLB on January 22, 

2013 (see figs. 91 through 93). In summary, observations and findings of the survey were: 

· A typical POLA/POLB marine oil terminal cross-section is shown in figure 94. Product 

flow is from the ship via flexible hosing to an on-wharf manifold, then via steel piping to 

an on-shore manifold. The steel piping may run on or under the wharf. Onshore, the 
157

product piping may (not always) be partially buried, and will often have a second onshore 

manifold prior to the piping entering the tank secondary containment. Interior to the 

secondary containment, each tank will typically have a valve just prior to the tank shell. 

Fire lines and monitors run outside the secondary containment, often supported on the 

exterior wall of the secondary containment, and are therefore vulnerable to damage if 

tsunami run-up reaches the height of the fire line. 

· Tanks are typically thin-walled steel tanks. In our observation, some tanks were bolted to 

their foundation but more often (especially larger tanks) were not fixed to their 

foundation, and thus susceptible to flotation. 

· Tanks invariably will have secondary containment—typically in POLA/POLB this is a 

concrete wall, typically cantilevered and sometimes buttressed. Some walls were cast-inplace reinforced concrete, whereas others were built of concrete masonry units. The wall 

height is calculated so as to contain the contents of the largest single tank, plus rainwater, 

and varied in our observations from about 6 to 20 ft. 

· In California, minimum engineering, inspection and maintenance criteria for marine oil 

terminals (MOTs) are established by Chapter 31F, Marine Oil Terminals, of the 

California Building Code. Chapter 31F establishes environment loading, including 

seismic, wind and tsunami, and specifies tsunami run-up at POLA/POLB as 8 ft (and 

7.5~7.9 ft at Port of Richmond). 

· Secondary containment walls are presumably designed so as to withstand lateral fluid 

pressure from the tank side. Chapter 31F does not specifically address secondary 

containment but, because tsunami run-up is specified, lateral fluid pressure appropriate to 

the specified tsunami run-up height should be a design condition for the secondary 

containment walls. Discussions with operators and POLA engineering staff could not 

confirm that this design condition was actually employed. 

· Several of the oil terminal wharves in POLA are of flammable older wood construction, 

and could be structurally damaged in a significant tsunami. Other fuel-related wharves in 

POLA/POLB are of concrete construction, less flammable but still susceptible to 

significant damage when subjected to a spreading-oil-on-water fire. 

· Displacements of wharf structures would likely break on-wharf product piping that in 

some cases run beneath the wharf decking (and therefore is more susceptible to tsunami 

damage). Most on-wharf and wharf-shore piping does not appear designed for tsunami 

currents (for example, lacked lateral support). 

· Industry practice appears to be to generally valve off wharf piping from onshore storage 

tanks when not transferring product, so that relatively little product (for example, tens to 

hundreds of barrels) would be spilled given wharf piping breakage under most 

circumstances. The only exception to this would be during product transfer (that is, 

offloading a ship) but, given even a few minutes warning, valves (which are manually 

operated) can be readily closed. 
158

Figure 91. Photographs of Port of Los Angeles Berth 163 wood wharf and manifold and piping to storage 

tanks (photographs by Charles Scawthorn). 
159

 A (b)

C

Figure 92. Photographs of Port of Los Angeles Berth 163: A, roadway leading between secondary 

containment leading to Berth 163, with fire lines external to containment (susceptible to tsunami 

damage); B, interior of secondary containment showing buttresses; and C, electrical equipment 

between wharf and secondary containment (photographs by Charles Scawthorn). 
160

Figure 93. Photographs of Port of Los Angeles Berth 167-9 manifolding, piping, and secondary 

containment. Long runs of pipe not laterally restrained. (Photographs by Charles Scawthorn.) 

Figure 94. Cross-section diagram of a typical marine oil terminal (image from Charles Scawthorn). 

Overall, given the tsunami heights predicated for the SAFRR tsunami scenario, on-wharf 

and onshore product piping exterior to the secondary containment would appear to be somewhat 

vulnerable to tsunami forces, such that the possibility of pipe breakage would appear likely in at 

least a few locations. A limited amount of flammable product would be released, and ignition 

sources are present (for example, electrical equipment). Combined with large lengths of 

flammable wood piers at several marine oil terminals, even a limited amount of flammable 
161

product release could lead to a major pier fire. However, the great majority of flammable product 

is held in tanks behind secondary containment. Structural integrity of the secondary containment 

under tsunami loading is unclear. On the basis of limited observation at POLA/POLB, we did not 

observe a containment or tank that appeared very likely to fail under the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario. However, we recommend that design for secondary containment integrity under 

tsunami loading should be verified, or the integrity confirmed by engineering analysis. 

Given the concentration of oil tank farms in the Ports of Richmond, and especially in the 

POLA/POLB complex, we feel it is possible but not very likely that a spreading fire will result 

from tsunami damage in at least one of these facilities. If such a fire were to occur, in the context 

of a tsunami and its attendant other damage, it is likely it would spread over water to other 

facilities, resulting in a common cause fire and possibly destruction of several of these facilities. 

As contrasted with Richmond, the POLA/POLB scenario is mitigated by the presence in 

the port of several Los Angeles City Fire Department fireboats (including one of the world’s 

largest and most modern fireboats, fig. 95). However, strong currents from the tsunami would 

greatly complicate fighting a spreading fire. 

Figure 95. Photograph of Los Angeles Fire department fireboat 2, the Warner L. Lawrence. One of the 

largest and most technologically advanced fireboats in the world, it has the capability to pump as much 

as 38,000 U.S. gallons per minute (2.397 cubic meters per second) as far as 400 feet (121.9 meters). 

(Photograph courtesy Los Angeles Fire Department.) 

Lastly, as was noted above, half a million tons of sea-going vessels were destroyed in the 

2011 Tohoku tsunami (including 17,000 fishing vessels, as well as two nuclear submarines 

damaged). Others in this project have emphasized the strong currents that will be generated in 

ports as a result of the SAFRR scenario tsunami, which will make ship handling unmanageable. 

Figure 96 is a random “snapshot” of the traffic in POLA/POLB, showing 32 major vessels inside 

the breakwater (major 50,000 or more DWT—the largest vessel in the snapshot is 160,000 

DWT), as well as many other vessels (and perhaps a thousand untracked pleasure craft). Given 

the perhaps 2 to 4 hour warning for the scenario tsunami, and possible difficulty in having 

sufficient pilots for all the large vessels, we feel that it is quite possible that one or more oil 
162

tankers may be caught in the harbor, and subjected to strong currents such as to break the ship 

loose (if moored) and send it careening about the channels and harbor. This situation could 

contribute to the size and severity of any spreading fire. 

Figure 96. Map image showing a random “snapshot” of Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach ship 

traffic—six tankers and 26 cargo vessels are inside the breakwater (base image from Google).

Fire Study Limitations and Acknowledgments 

Regarding the methodology employed in this study, it is possible that large facilities have 

been overlooked, tanks misidentified, and other errors committed. It is emphasized that these 

findings are based only on observation and qualitative methods and that greater accuracy would 

be achieved with more detailed, quantitative methods. Lastly, the assistance of personnel at 

several POLA/POLB berths and of POLA/POLB staff is gratefully acknowledged. 

Acknowledgments

The authors thank chapter reviewers: Frank Blackburn (San Francisco Fire Department, 

Ret.), Michael Burke (Port of Seattle), Mehmet Celebi (USGS), Laurene Eisele (Port of San 

Francisco), Martin Eskijian (University of Southern California), Stuart Fricke (Port of Los 

Angeles), Bill Graf (Imagecat, Inc.), John Headland (Moffatt and Nichol), Uday Prasad (Port of 

San Francisco), Steve Ng (Caltrans), Joe Roger (Port of San Francisco), Bethann Rooney (Port 

Authority of New York and New Jersey), Tom Shantz (Caltrans), Aaron Sherburne (Port 

Authority of New York and New Jersey), Bruce Smith (San Diego Association of Governments), 

Doug Thiessen (Port of Long Beach), Mara Tongue (USGS), Ted Trenkwalder (Ben C. Gerwick, 

Inc.), Zachary Whitman (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand), and Mark 

Yashinsky (Caltrans). SAFRR coordinators also provided some peer review of the damages 

chapter: Lucy Jones (USGS), Kevin Miller (California Governor’s Office of Emergency 

Services, Cal OES), Carl Mortensen (USGS), Geoff Plumlee (USGS), and Stephanie Ross 

(USGS). 

Thanks also to panelists, correspondents, and other participants: Robel Afewerki (Port of 

Los Angeles Engineering), Rich Baratta (Port of Long Beach), Richard Berman (Port of San 

Francisco), Roy Bibbens (Caltrans), Chris Brown (Port of Los Angeles), Sonia Brown (Cal 

OES), Damon Burgett (Port of San Francisco), Ed Byrne (Port of San Francisco), Eric Caris 
163

(Port of Los Angeles Business Development), Tom Carter (Port of San Francisco), Mo Chang 

(U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), Mike Christensen (Port of Los Angeles), Bent Christiansen 

(Port of Los Angeles), Ken Chu (Port of San Francisco), Tim Clark (Port of Los Angeles), 

Brandon Cowan (Port of San Francisco), George Cummings (Los Angeles Port Police), John 

Davey (Port of San Francisco), Sherban Duncan (Port of San Francisco), Lauren Eisele (Port of 

San Francisco), Eric Endersby (Morro Bay Harbor Director), Andrienne Fedrick (Port of Los 

Angeles), Desiree Fox (Caltrans), Stuart Fricke (Port of Los Angeles), Keith Garcia (Los 

Angeles Port Police), Rene Garcia (Caltrans), Tony Gioiello (Port of Los Angeles), Aaron 

Golbus (Port of San Francisco), Mike Graychik (Los Angeles Port Police), Ed Green (Port of 

Long Beach), Anne Hardinger (City of Berkeley), Anita Hayden (Los Angeles Port Police), Jack 

Hedge (Port of Los Angeles Real Estate), Suzie Howser (Port of Humboldt Bay and Woodley 

Island Marina), Radiah Jones (U.S. Coast Guard), Jill Lemon (U.S. Coast Guard), Dan Kane 

(Port of Long Beach), Kevin Keady (Caltrans), Michael Keenan (Port of Los Angeles Planning), 

Caryn Margita (U.S. Coast Guard), Joe Maldonado (Port of Los Angeles CBM Division), Kathy 

Merkovsky (Port of Los Angeles), Linda McIntyre (Moss Landing Harbor District), Steve Ng 

(Caltrans), Leon Nixon III (Los Angeles Port Police), Diane Oshima (Port of San Francisco), 

Tom Ostrom (Caltrans), Karl Pan (Port of Los Angeles), Scott Phemister (Port of Long Beach), 

Abbas Pourheidari (Caltrans), Uday Prasad (Port of San Francisco), Steven Reel (Port of San 

Francisco), Jeffrey Robinson (Area G Disaster Management), Joe Roger (Port of San Francisco), 

Petty Santos (Los Angeles Port Police), Shaun Shahrestani (Port of Los Angeles), Daryoush 

Tavatli (Caltrans), Karen Taylor (Port of San Francisco), Doug Thiessen (Port of Long Beach), 

Curtis Thompson (Los Angeles Port Police), Martin Villa (U.S. Coast Guard), Ronnie 

Villanueva (City of Los Angeles), David Walsh (Port of Los Angeles), and Jennifer Williams 

(U.S. Coast Guard). 

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U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–F

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

Potential Environmental and Environmental-Health 

Implications of the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario in California
COVER: On the left, a satellite image shows a portion of one of the densely built residential areas 

indicated to lie completely within the scenario tsunami inundation zone. On the upper right, a satellite 

image shows one of the marine oil terminals indicated to lie partially within the scenario tsunami 

inundation zone (transparent blue-green). On the lower right, a satellite image shows a wastewater 

treatment facility indicated to lie partially within the scenario inundation zone ((transparent blue-green).
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario

Stephanie Ross and Lucile Jones, Editors 

Potential Environmental and Environmental-Health 

Implications of the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario in 

California

By Geoffrey S. Plumlee, Suzette A. Morman, and Carma San Juan 

Open-File Report 2013–1170–F 

California Geological Survey Special Publication 229

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey 
iii

U.S. Department of the Interior

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2013

For product and ordering information:

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For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth,

its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

Suggested citation: 

Plumlee, G.S., Morman, S.A., and San Juan, C., 2013, Potential Environmental and EnvironmentalHealth Implications of the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario in California, chap. F, in Ross, S.L., and Jones, 

L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological 

Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170, 34 p., http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/f/.

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iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD 

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION

MARK NECHODOM 

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D. 

STATE GEOLOGIST
v 

Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................................ 1 

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................... 2 

Background ...................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

Overview of the Approach ............................................................................................................................................... 5 

Limitations of This Analysis .......................................................................................................................................... 9 

Potential Contamination from Inundation of and Damage to Ports, Naval Yards, Harbors, and Marinas ....................... 9 

Review of Damages to Ports ....................................................................................................................................... 9 

Debris ......................................................................................................................................................................... 12

Potential Releases of Petroleum or Petroleum Products ........................................................................................... 13

Potential Releases of Liquid Cargo ............................................................................................................................ 14

Potential Releases of Dry Bulk Cargo ........................................................................................................................ 14

Potential Impacts from Inundated Shipbuilding and Boat Repair Yards .................................................................... 15

Scour and Redistribution of Contaminated Harbor Sediments .................................................................................. 16

Potential Contamination from Inundation of and Damage to Residential and Commercial Areas ................................. 17

Potential Contamination from Significant Point Sources ............................................................................................... 19

Wastewater Treatment Plants .................................................................................................................................... 22

Power Plants .............................................................................................................................................................. 22

Airports and Military Air Stations ................................................................................................................................ 22

Landfills ...................................................................................................................................................................... 23

Potential Non-Point Source Contamination ................................................................................................................... 25

Urban Areas and Highway Corridors ......................................................................................................................... 25

Agricultural Fields ...................................................................................................................................................... 26

Tsunamigenic Fires ....................................................................................................................................................... 26

Plausible Environmental Impacts of Damages, Debris, and Contamination .................................................................. 27

Potential Human Health Implications ............................................................................................................................. 27

Post-Tsunami Environmental Cleanup and Recovery ................................................................................................... 28

Actions to Enhance Resilience to Tsunamis .................................................................................................................. 29

Summary ....................................................................................................................................................................... 30

References Cited ........................................................................................................................................................... 31

 

 
Potential Environmental and Environmental-Health 

Implications of the U.S. Geological Survey Science 

Application for Risk Reduction California Tsunami 

Scenario

By Geoffrey S. Plumlee, Suzette A. Morman, and Carma San Juan 

Abstract

The California Tsunami Scenario models the impacts of a hypothetical, yet plausible, 

tsunami caused by an earthquake offshore from the Alaska Peninsula. In this chapter, we 

interpret plausible tsunami-related contamination, environmental impacts, potential for human 

exposures to contaminants and hazardous materials, and implications for remediation and 

recovery. 

Inundation-related damages to major ports, boat yards, and many marinas could release 

complex debris, crude oil, various fuel types and other petroleum products, some liquid bulk 

cargo and dry bulk cargo, and diverse other pollutants into nearby coastal marine environments 

and onshore in the inundation zone. Tsunami-induced erosion of contaminated harbor bottom 

sediments could re-expose previously sequestered metal and organic pollutants (for example, 

organotin or DDT). 

Inundation-related damage to many older buildings could produce debris containing lead 

paint, asbestos, pesticides, and other legacy contaminants. Intermingled household debris and 

externally derived debris and sediments would be left in flooded buildings. Post tsunami, mold 

would likely develop in inundated houses, buildings, and debris piles. Tsunamigenic fires in 

spilled oil, debris, cargo, vehicles, vegetation, and residential, commercial, or industrial buildings 

and their contents would produce potentially toxic gases and smoke, airborne ash, and residual 

ash/debris containing caustic alkali solids, metal toxicants, asbestos, and various organic 

toxicants. Inundation of and damage to wastewater treatment plants in many coastal cities could 

release raw sewage containing fecal solids, pathogens, and waste chemicals, as well as chemicals 

used to treat wastewaters. 

Tsunami-related physical damages, debris, and contamination could have short- and 

longer-term impacts on the environment and the health of coastal marine and terrestrial 

ecosystems. Marine habitats in intertidal zones, marshes, sloughs, and lagoons could be damaged 

by erosion or sedimentation, and could receive an influx of debris, metal and organic 

contaminants, and sewage-related pathogens. Debris and re-exposed contaminated sediments 

would be a source of sea- or rain-water-leachable metal and organic contaminants that could 

pose chronic toxicity threats to ecosystems. 

If human populations are successfully evacuated prior to the tsunami arrival, there would 

be no or limited numbers of drownings, other casualties, or related injuries, wounds, and 

infections. Immediately after the tsunami, human populations away from the inundation zone 
2 

could be transiently exposed to airborne gases, smoke, and ash from tsunamigenic fires. Cleanup 

and disposal, particularly of hazardous materials, would pose substantial logistical challenges 

and economic costs. Given the high value of the coastal residential and commercial properties in 

the inundation zone, it can be postulated that there would be substantial insurance claims for 

environmental restoration, mold mitigation, disposal of debris that contains hazardous materials, 

and costs of litigation related to environmental liability. 

Post-tsunami cleanup, if done with appropriate mitigation (for example, dust control), 

personal protection, and disposal measures, would help reduce the potential for cleanup-worker 

and resident exposures to toxicants and pathogens in harbor waters, debris, soils, ponded waters, 

and buildings. A number of other steps can be taken by governments, businesses, and residents 

to help reduce the environmental impacts of tsunamis and to recover more quickly from these 

environmental impacts. For example, development of State and local policies that foster rapid 

assessment of potential contamination, as well as rapid decision making for disposal options 

should hazardous debris or sediment be identified, would help enhance recovery by speeding 

cleanup. 

Introduction

The tsunami scenario, developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Science 

Applications for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) Project, models the generation, hydrology, and 

impacts on the California coast of a hypothetical yet plausible tsunami triggered by an 

earthquake in the subduction zone offshore of the Alaska Peninsula. A primary goal of this 

scenario is to help educate emergency planners, businesses, universities, government agencies, 

and other stakeholders about plausible effects of future tsunamis, so that they can be better 

prepared for and their impacts can be better mitigated. 

In the scenario tsunami, seismologists designed a scientifically plausible earthquake 

event off the Alaska Peninsula. Using information generated by the seismologists for the 

earthquake, other experts in marine and coastal hydrology modeled the propagation of tsunami 

waves from the source area to the target region along the California coast, with high resolution 

modeling of inundation along the California coast and in selected harbors. Based on the 

inundation and current modeling, other experts provided input on plausible damages that would 

result from the scenario tsunami (Porter and others, 2013). 

In this report, we interpret plausible tsunami-related environmental impacts and 

contamination, plausible human exposures to contamination and hazardous materials, 

implications for human health impacts, and implications for post-tsunami remediation and 

recovery. Our study integrates (1) information on environmental and health impacts of past 

tsunamis, (2) a qualitative analysis of plausible environmental impacts that would result from 

tsunami-related damages modeled by other scenario colleagues, and (3) a qualitative GIS-based 

analysis of areas likely to be inundated by either the scenario tsunami or any future tsunamis that 

reach the full extent of historical tsunami inundation zones mapped by the California Emergency 

Management Agency (Cal OES). 

This analysis is similar to ones conducted for the ShakeOut earthquake and ARkStorm 

winter storm scenarios (Plumlee and others, 2012, 2013). Our results indicate that the inundation, 

resulting damages, and debris from scenario tsunami on the California coasts and ports could (1) 

cause adverse impacts on the environment as a direct result of the tsunami, (2) pose challenges 

for debris cleanup and environmental restoration following the tsunami, and (3) plausibly cause 

some exposures of local populations to chemical and pathogen contaminants. 
3 

Background

Tsunamis caused by submarine subduction zone earthquakes, coastal or submarine 

volcanic eruptions, or submarine landslides can cause massive damage to the natural and built 

environments in low-lying coastal areas. This can, in turn, lead to widespread environmental 

contamination and potential health impacts on affected ecosystems and exposed human 

populations. Damages and resulting environmental and health impacts are greatest when the 

tsunami source is close to the affected land areas, such as the damages caused in Indonesia and 

Thailand by the 2004 Indonesia earthquake and tsunami (Basnayake and others, 2005; Srinivas 

and Nakagawa, 2008), and the damages in Japan from the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami 

(Bird and Grossman, 2011; Shibata and others, 2012). 

Due to their generally lower wave heights and energy, damages from distant sourced 

tsunamis (termed “teletsunamis”) typically are less intense and spatially extensive than those 

produced by tsunamis from nearby sources, but nonetheless can cause substantial damages. 

Recent examples include the damages to several California ports from the 2010 Chilean 

earthquake and the 2011 Tohoku earthquake (Wilson and others, 2012, 2013a). 

Tsunamis can cause contamination of nearshore marine and onshore coastal 

environments by introducing diverse debris, organic and inorganic chemicals, and pathogens. 

Examples include (1) remobilization of previously contaminated sediments from harbor bottoms 

(Wilson and others, 2012, 2013a); (2) release of contaminants or toxicant-bearing debris from 

damaged port facilities, berthed ships or small watercraft, and inundated coastal communities or 

industrial/commercial facilities (fig. 1; Ratnapradipa and others, 2012; Shibata and others, 2012; 

Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2013); (3) tsunami-triggered fires (Yamada and others, 

2011); and (4) sewage releases from damaged wastewater-treatment infrastructure (Bird and 

Grossman, 2011; Tanabe and Subramanian, 2011; Shibata and others, 2012). Shallow aquifers in 

the areas of tsunami inundation can be contaminated by seawater, and transient salinization of 

agricultural fields and die offs of terrestrial vegetation because of saltwater poisoning have been 

noted in tsunami inundation areas (fig. 1; United Nations Environment Program, 2007; Yoshii 

and others, 2012; Chagué-Goff and others, 2012). The types and amounts of environmental 

contamination will vary according to the source. 

The recent earthquake-driven tsunamis in Indonesia and Japan underscore the types of 

direct impacts on public health that major tsunamis can cause (Keim, 2011). In addition to large 

numbers of drownings, large tsunamis can cause various other health impacts that are uncommon 

in other types of disasters. These include fatalities, trauma, penetrating injuries, and wounds 

resulting from tsunami-borne debris, and the post-disaster development of wound infections and 

tetanus cases. Another unusual impact is the development of tsunami lung in large numbers of 

people who nearly drown in tsunami floodwaters. Tsunami lung is a necrotizing lung infection 

caused by pathogens commonly associated with seawater aspiration, and possibly other 

uncommon pathogens not associated with seawater (Keim, 2011). Tsunami-triggered fires also 

could result in fatalities. 
4 

Figure 1. Photograph of the damages caused by the massive tsunami generated by the March 2011 

Tohoku earthquake that devastated the northeastern coast of Japan, taken in May 2011 in the Sanriku 

area. Few buildings were left standing, and extensive debris deposits were left behind. Also note the 

dying trees at the base of the hills in the background, which were closest to the tsunami inundation 

area—these were presumably suffering the effects of salt water poisoning. The California scenario 

tsunami would not cause nearly as extensive or complete devastation as seen in Japan, but would 

likely cause some damage to buildings in the inundated areas, and leave behind debris. Photograph by 

Bruce Jaffe, U.S. Geological Survey. 

In the days and months following a tsunami, additional health impacts can develop. As 

with other types of natural disasters, outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as cholera, most 

commonly occur in overcrowded refugee camps where refugees lack access to adequate medical 

care and cannot practice good hygiene. Lack of accessible medical care also can exacerbate 

preexisting medical conditions. Another substantial concern is the development of psychosocial 

illnesses, such as post-traumatic stress disorder. As with other flood-related disasters, posttsunami mold development may be a substantial health concern for people cleaning up and 

reoccupying flooded buildings (Manuel, 2013). Particularly in developed countries, loss of 

electrical power commonly results in the widespread use of gas-powered generators, which can, 

in turn, increase the potential for carbon monoxide poisoning. 

The number of people who suffer direct health impacts from tsunamis is strongly 

influenced by many factors, including the type of the triggering event, proximity to tsunami 

source, offshore and onshore coastal topography, prevailing currents, tidal stage at the time of 

impact, population magnitudes in inundated areas, presence or absence of wave mitigation 

seawalls, building practices in the inundated areas, and the effectiveness of advance tsunami 

warnings and evacuation efforts prior to tsunami arrival. For example, the 2004 Indian Ocean 
5 

tsunami triggered by the earthquake in Sumatra caused more than 225,000 deaths (U.S. 

Geological Survey, 2013) in nearby coastal areas, and tens of thousands of deaths in coastal Sri 

Lanka (900 mi away) and coastal India (more than 1,200 mi away). The tsunami triggered by the 

2011 Japan Tohoku earthquake resulted in more than 15,000 fatalities in nearby coastal areas 

(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2013). The 1946 Aleutian Island 

teletsunami (which occurred prior to the implementation of the Pacific Ocean tsunami warning 

system) killed more than 150 people in Hawaii. In contrast, teletsunamis from the 2010 Chile 

earthquake and the 2011 Japan Tohoku earthquake combined caused zero deaths and one death, 

respectively, when they hit the western coast of the United States. 

Although a number of studies have summarized environmental impacts from recent 

tsunamis, health impacts that resulted from exposures to environmental contaminants (other than 

the pathogen-related infections noted previously) generally have not been identified or described 

in detail. This may be because (1) there have been relatively few modern tsunamis with extensive 

environmental impacts, (2) the heaviest exposures are transient, (3) contamination-related health 

impacts are small in magnitude compared to the much more visible direct health impacts, (4) it 

may take years after the disaster for adverse health impacts to develop, and (or) (5) adverse 

health impacts that are discovered may not be conclusively linked to tsunami-related 

environmental contamination causes. 

Overview of the Approach

Based on the locations, types, and nature of the plausible damages to ports, harbors, 

marinas, and built areas described by Porter and others (2013) and other chapters in this full 

report, coupled with information on environmental impacts from past tsunamis, we inferred 

likely environmental consequences and potential for human exposures to scenario tsunamitriggered damages, debris, and contamination. We used Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 

analysis software ARC GIS to understand coastal areas where tsunami inundation could affect 

various potential sources of contamination. For the extent of inundation, we considered the 

plausible extent of inundation modeled by the tsunami scenario and the Cal OES zone of 

maximum inundation (Wilson and others, 2008, Barberopoulou and others, 2009), which was 

mapped based on the extent of flooding from all maximum considered, local and distant tsunami 

sources (fig. 2). The Cal OES inundation zone extends farther inland than the predicted SAFRR 

scenario inundation zone except for a few places; because of the higher resolution modeling, the 

SAFRR scenario shows inundation traveling further up some rivers and further onshore in areas 

of sudden topographic change. Examining both inundation zones allowed us to consider the 

scenario impacts and potential impacts from more extensive tsunamis similar to some that have 

occurred in the past. Where available, we also incorporated information on tsunami currents and 

wave height modeled by the scenario. This was particularly useful, for example, to evaluate 

where in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach high currents could lead to substantial 

redistribution of contaminated harbor bottom sediments. 

Using ARC GIS, we digitally overlaid tsunami inundation extent and depth maps on 

satellite/geography coverages to determine locations and sizes of both potential sources of 

contamination in the inundation zone and important features that could be adversely affected by 

inundation or tsunami-related contamination. Examples include: (1) harbors, marinas, and boat 

yards; (2) residential, commercial, or industrial areas; agricultural fields; (3) facilities such as oil 

refineries, power plants and wastewater treatment plants; and (4) lagoons, sloughs, or estuaries. 

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Facilities Registry System database (U.S. 
6 

Environmental Protection Agency Facilities Registry System, 2011) was used to further identify 

and locate environmentally significant facilities (for example, wastewater-treatment plants, oil 

refineries, chemical manufacturing plants, gas stations, hospitals, schools) that would occur 

within or near the scenario or State inundation zones (fig. 3). State GIS coverages were used to 

identify critical species habitats in nearshore marine areas that could be affected by the tsunami 

(fig. 2). The mapping feature of various commercial web sites, which list county or municipal 

assessors data on individual mapped properties, were used to understand general ranges in age 

and value of residences located within the scenario and State inundation zones. Knowing the age 

of a building provides key insights into the potential contaminants that could be released: for 

example, buildings older than the late 1970s to early 1980s have a greater likelihood of 

containing legacy building materials, such as asbestos and lead-based paint, and legacy 

pesticides (Plumlee and others, 2012). 

The general types of contamination that can be released from various potential sources in 

the inundation zone are relatively well understood (Plumlee and others, 2013). Once the potential 

sources and their plausible types of environmental contaminants were identified, we applied a 

general knowledge of contaminant transport, fate, and impacts to develop a qualitative 

understanding of how tsunami-related environmental damages and contamination might vary 

along the California coast. We then evaluated plausible contaminant exposure pathways to 

human populations. 
7 

Figure 2. Map showing extent of the scenario predicted inundation zone and, where the coverage is more 

extensive, the California Emergency Management Agency (Cal OES) maximum tsunami inundation 

zone (Wilson and others, 2008; Barberopoulou and others, 2009). Significant marine areas (Areas of 

Special Biological Significance, State Marine Life Refuges, and State Marine Protected Areas) are also 

shown. 
8 

Figure 3. Map showing locations of environmentally significant facilities from the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency Facilities Registry System database (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Facilities Registry System, 2011) indicated to fall within the predicted scenario inundation zone or the 

California Emergency Management Agency (Cal OES) maximum tsunami inundation zone. 
9 

Limitations of This Analysis

As noted by other chapters in this volume, there are uncertainties in the results of the 

modeled scenario tsunami inundation results. There also are uncertainties in the databases and 

other information available for our environmental analysis. Examples of these uncertainties 

include (1) incorrect locations or other incorrect information on environmentally significant 

facilities; (2) lack of detailed knowledge of potential cargos transported through ports that could 

be released as a result of tsunami damages; (3) lack of detailed information on the specific 

contaminants that are present in buildings, commercial facilities, or industrial facilities; (4) lack 

of information on the vulnerability of specific facilities, warehouses, or buildings to tsunami 

impacts and damages; and (5) lack of information on the magnitude of possible contaminant 

releases that could result from specific sources if they were to be damaged. As a result, this 

approach should only be considered as the first of multiple steps toward a more quantitative, 

predictive approach to understanding the potential sources, types, environmental behavior, and 

environmental and health implications of contaminants that could be released into the 

environment by coastal tsunamis. 

Potential Contamination from Inundation of and Damage to Ports, Naval 

Yards, Harbors, and Marinas

Both the scenario and State inundation zones extend well into major coastal ports (San 

Diego, Los Angeles, Long Beach, Hueneme, San Francisco, Redwood City, Oakland, Richmond, 

Benicia, Humboldt Bay), major active or former naval yards or ports (San Diego, San Francisco, 

Vallejo), and harbors (for example, Huntington Beach, Newport Bay, Crescent City). Marinas in 

nearly every coastal city and town are also in both inundation zones. 

Review of Damages to Ports

Porter and others (2013) detail the potential damages that the scenario tsunami could 

cause to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (fig. 4), and provide general overviews of 

potential damages to other ports (San Diego, San Francisco, Oakland, Richmond, and Humboldt 

Bay), several harbors, and a number of coastal marinas. Plausible impacts they identified at the 

Port of Long Beach (POLB) included: 

· Inundation of specific dock areas and structures, such as administration buildings; 

· Damages to docks, piers, and pilings; 

· Some damages to containerized cargo and to dry bulk cargo (gypsum, petroleum coke, 

prilled sulfur, salt), but no damages to liquid bulk cargo; 

· Damage to 2000 import vehicles, forklifts, dryage trucks, and other vehicles parked on 

docks; and 

· Possible unmooring of large cargo vessel or tanker, but without release of oil. 

Plausible impacts identified by Porter and others (2013) at Port of Los Angeles (POLA) include 

· Inundation of specific dock areas; 

· Limited damages to containerized cargo; 

· Some damages to dry bulk cargo (industrial borates); 

· No damages to bulk cargo; 

· Damages to about 650 import cars on the docks; 
10

· Sinking of and(or) extensive damages to thousands of small watercraft, as well as damages to 

facilities at 16 port marinas. 

The scenario model predicted sufficiently high currents in some parts of both POLA and 

POLB to result in significant sediment scour and redeposition. 

Figure 4. Satellite image of the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, with map overlays showing: (a) 

boundaries of the scenario (cyan) and California Emergency Management Agency (Cal OES) 

maximum (magenta) inundation zones; (b) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Facilities 

Registry System sites (yellow dots, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Facilities Registry System, 

2011) within the inundation zones; (c) DDT concentrations (blue dots) exceeding 16 nanograms per 

gram (8 times the numeric target concentration) in samples of harbor sediments collected and analyzed 

by Weston (2009a,b); and (d) open yellow circles showing areas of highest current velocity predicted 

for the scenario tsunami by Lynett and Son in The SAFRR Tsunami Modeling Working Group (2013).

The Port of San Diego was predicted by the scenario to not experience inundation of its 

two marine terminals, but a large number of Navy piers were predicted to be inundated (Porter 

and others, 2013). Many different marinas within San Diego Bay and Mission Bay to the north 

were predicted to sustain significant damages as part of the scenario tsunami. 

At Port Hueneme, some docks and warehouses were predicted to be inundated by the 

scenario tsunami, but the automobile import terminal was not. Significant sediment scour also 

was predicted to occur. 

At San Francisco, a number of the piers, including Port Hueneme headquarters, 

substantial amounts of commercial real estate (particularly pier 39 and Fisherman’s Wharf), and 
11

piers that receive predominantly break bulk cargo (such as steel, lumber, and other large objects) 

were predicted to be in the scenario inundation zone (Porter and others, 2013). Substantial 

damage to the commercial fishing fleet, docks, and a fish processing facility also was deemed 

plausible. 

At the ports of Oakland, Richmond, and Redwood City, a number of docks, piers, 

container yards, bulk cargo areas, and some import auto offloading areas were expected to be 

inundated by the scenario tsunami. Multiple small craft marinas around San Francisco Bay also

were likely to be inundated and damaged. A high concentration of oil storage tanks was noted in 

the scenario inundation zone at the port of Richmond (Porter and others, 2013; Scawthorne, 

2013). 

Scawthorn (2013) and Porter and others (2013) identified 17 large petroleum facilities 

(mostly tank farms) along the California coast (see example in fig. 5) where inundation-related 

damage (such as floating of large oil tanks from their foundations or breakage of piping) could 

potentially cause significant releases of flammable petroleum liquids that would float on the 

water surface. The scenario model indicates that artificial islands hosting oil-drilling platforms 

adjacent to the Port of Long Beach (White, Grim, Chaffee, Freeman) could plausibly be 

inundated (R. Wilson, Cal OES, written comm., 2013). This could lead to possible oil releases 

from damage to oil tanks and piping. Damage to gasoline storage tanks and transfer piping at 

many marinas could plausibly result in the release of smaller quantities of flammable gasoline. If 

ignited (most plausibly by electrical sparks), oil or gasoline releases could turn into waterborne 

fires that could then engulf wood piers, ships, and small watercraft, as well as buildings, 

vehicles, cargo, and vegetation in the inundation zone. Porter and others (2013) and Scawthorne 

(2013) identified a number of measures implemented at many California ports that have helped

mitigate or prevent oil releases; these include installing oil storage tanks within secondary 

containment units, and installing rapid valve turnoffs that restrict oil flow through vulnerable 

piping when a potentially damaging tsunami, earthquake or other disaster is anticipated. 

Our analysis indicates that the scenario tsunami and any tsunami reaching the full extent 

of the Cal OES inundation zone in the various ports, harbors, and marinas could release a variety 

of debris and potential contaminants into the marine environment and the onshore inundation 

zone. Depending on the materials released and the processes by which the releases occur, these 

materials could (1) become airborne as gases or particulate matter; contaminate onshore soils, 

beaches, paved surfaces, or inundated buildings; (2) contaminate harbor bottoms and nearshore 

marine sediments; (3) form immiscible liquid plumes that float or sink in seawater; (4) have 

contaminants that leach into seawater or rainfall; and (or) (5) have materials that could either 

coat or be ingested directly by terrestrial or marine organisms. 
12

Figure 5. This satellite image shows port facilities, including a marine oil terminal, indicated to lie partially 

within the scenario tsunami inundation zone (transparent blue-green). The entire area of the image lies 

within the California Emergency Management Agency (Cal OES) maximum inundation zone. 

Debris

Physical damages to piers, buildings, large and small watercraft, import automobiles 

parked on docks, drayage trucks, and other vehicles on docks could produce substantial 

quantities of debris containing a wide range of organic, metal, and other contaminants. A few 

examples include: 

· Ammoniacal copper zinc arsenate (ACZA)-, chrome-copper-arsenate (CCA)- or creosotetreated wood from pier pilings and wood docks; 

· Asbestos-containing insulation or lead paint released into the waters, air, and dock areas from 

damaged older facilities; 

· Materials found in or used to construct ships and small watercraft of varying ages (for 

example, antifouling paints with copper or other metals; fiberglass; plastics; asbestos 

insulation; Styrofoam; rope; fishing nets; motor parts; electronics; batteries; lead ship 

ballast); and 

· Various debris types such as automobile glass, concrete dusts and debris, mercury from 

fluorescent lights or older thermostats in buildings, and containers of paints and other 

chemicals. 
13

It is not clear whether damage to large cargo containers would be sufficient to cause 

releases of their contents, but if so, then a potentially wide range of container cargo could also be 

released. 

The debris could either be deposited on land or remain in the ocean. Heavier debris 

would sink to the harbor bottoms, but many of the debris types noted above would float and 

could be carried by currents to coastal areas outside the ports. 

Debris will pose a range of potential environmental hazards. Rainwater and seawater can 

leach a variety of inorganic and organic toxicants. For example, hexavalent chromium, copper, 

zinc, and arsenic are readily leached from AZCA-treated wood, and polycyclic aromatic 

hydrocarbons (PAHs) are readily leached from creosote-treated wood by both rain water and sea 

water (Stratus, 2006a, 2006b). This leaching could be accelerated by tsunami-induced wood 

breakage that exposures fresh wood surfaces for leaching. Metals, such as copper and organotin, 

could be leached from watercraft debris. Seawater corrosion could release a wide range of metals 

from steel, electronics, wiring, and other debris. As shown by the Tohoku tsunami, many types 

of floating debris are combustible, and so can be ignited (most likely by burning petroleum 

products) and burn. Accelerated oxidation of iron metal in debris piles by seawater salts also can 

trigger spontaneous ignition (Sekizawa and Sasaki, 2011). Freshly broken concrete can react 

with water to produce transient, locally significant caustic alkalinity in any waters it encounters; 

this alkalinity would likely diminish substantially over time. Small debris could become 

available for ingestion by animals or fish, and land and sea animals could become entangled in 

debris, such as ropes or fishing nets. 

Potential Releases of Petroleum or Petroleum Products

Porter and others (2013) concluded that there would likely not be releases of petroleum 

liquid bulk cargo from the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, nor would there be sufficient 

damage to the predicted one unmoored major vessel to produce an oil spill. Nonetheless, the 

number of potential sources for crude oil or petroleum products in the scenario and State 

inundation zones raises the likelihood that tsunamis could trigger multiple spills in California 

ports, Navy yards, harbors, and marinas having a range of sizes and compositions. These spills 

could come from tsunami-damaged marine oil terminals (fig. 5), refineries, small watercraft, 

chemical facilities, automobiles, dryage trucks, and other vehicles or equipment in the zone of 

inundation. Bulk petroleum cargo types that could be released in potentially large volumes 

include unrefined crude oil and various types of jet, bunker, and diesel fuel. Damage to fuel 

tanks in watercraft or vehicles would release small volumes of various vehicle-dependent fuel 

types. 

The environmental behavior of oil and petroleum spills is well known. The more toxic 

fuel components (benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes) primarily volatilize following 

spills, which could create a potential inhalation exposure for cleanup workers, other people, and 

terrestrial organisms in the area. There also could be some dissolution of these components into 

seawater, with possible impacts on aquatic organisms that contact the affected seawater. Less 

toxic but stable heavier petroleum components would form emulsions by wave action and slowly 

degrade over time through photodegradation and biodegradation. Eventually, the heaviest, most 

tar-rich fractions could be deposited on beaches or settle to the bottom of harbors or nearshore 

marine environments, where they would cement bottom sediments. 

Spill remediation approaches include skimming, intentional burning, and (or) application 

of chemical dispersants. Burning produces large amounts of smoke and leaves behind some 
14

residual oil ash material that can be enriched in the metals found in oils, most commonly nickel 

and vanadium. The application of dispersants is intended to promote dispersion of oil into 

smaller droplets that are more readily sorbed onto fine sediment particles that settle out. 

A number of natural oil seeps from the sea floor are present along the southern California 

coast. These result in a natural baseline contribution of oil to the marine environment, and the 

baseline accumulation of tar and oil residues on local beaches (U.S. Geological Survey Seeps, 

2013). 

A broad range of impacts has been noted on organisms that contact spilled oil, petroleum 

products, or chemical dispersants applied to help disperse spilled oil. These can include 

(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service, 2013): 

· Oiling of bird feathers, which would inhibit flight and disrupt temperature regulation; 

· Oiling of sea mammal fur, which would inhibit temperature regulation; 

· Inhalation of vapors, which could lead to irritation of the respiratory tract; ingestion, which 

could cause injuries to the gastrointestinal tract and affect the animals’ ability to digest or 

absorb foods; 

· Dermal contact, which could cause skin irritation, chemical burns, and infections; 

· Toxicity effects from absorption, such as liver, kidney, and brain damage; 

· Chronic effects such as decreased reproductive success; and 

· Dermal contact with and ingestion of water containing dissolved oil components. 

Potential Releases of Liquid Cargo

Porter and others (2013) concluded that, based on locations of the specific piers predicted 

to be or not be inundated, no liquid cargo would be released as a result of the tsunami in the ports 

of Los Angeles, Long Beach, or San Diego, but it is unclear whether that is the case for other 

ports. As a result, some discussion is warranted here as to the types of liquid cargo that pass 

through the ports, and potential environmental concerns if there were to be tsunami-related 

releases of these liquid cargos. 

In addition to the cargo types identified by Porter and others (2013) to pass through 

POLA and POLB, information on liquid cargo types passing through other California ports can 

be gleaned from their web sites. Cedre (2013) provided a general overview of liquid and solid 

bulk cargo types that have been associated with releases around the world, as well as an 

overview of their potential environmental impacts. In addition to crude oil and petroleum 

products, examples of other liquid bulk cargo types in transit through California ports (and 

possibly manufactured at the ports) that have been noted include liquid chemicals (for example, 

fertilizers and ethanol), milk, juice, and vegetable oils. The environmental behavior of a released 

cargo will depend on characteristics, such as how it interacts with seawater (for example, its 

solubility or immiscibility), and the volatility of its components. Although many of these liquid 

cargo materials are not toxic, large volume releases of some types can still have adverse 

environmental impacts. For example, vegetable oils can cause oiling of birds’ feathers, 

asphyxiate benthic fauna, form polymers that cement beach sands and sediments, and generate 

noxious odors as they are biodegraded (Cedre, 2004). 

Potential Releases of Dry Bulk Cargo

The scenario indicated that several types of dry bulk cargo would be affected by 

inundation at POLA and POLB, including industrial borates, gypsum, prilled sulfur (small 

pellets of elemental sulfur), and petroleum coke (Weston, 2009a, 2009b; Porter and others, 
15

2013). A variety of other dry bulk cargo types have been indicated to pass through various 

California ports, such as cement, coal, salt, metallurgical coke, solid fertilizers, sand, gravel, 

aggregate, rice, cottonseed, and bauxite (Tioga, 2002; Porter and others, 2013). 

If dry cargo storage facilities are damaged by the tsunami, then there could be some 

potential for dispersal of the cargo into the environment. Tsunami waters could redistribute the 

cargoes within the inundation zone, or carry them into the marine environment. Damages to 

containment structures could expose remaining cargo to wind dispersion, rainfall, and rainfallinduced runoff. 

Different dry cargo types will have substantial differences in their environmental 

behavior if they are released. For example, cement can react initially with rainwater or seawater 

to produce runoff containing caustic alkalinity; however, the alkalinity in runoff would diminish 

over time as the caustic solids in the cement are neutralized by carbonic acid in the rainwater. 

Depending on the cement type, various metals, such as hexavalent chromium and zinc, could be 

leached from the cement into the waters. Prilled sulfur could react over time with rainfall to

produce sulfuric acid-rich runoff. Further, prilled sulfur is an easily ignitable, combustible solid 

that will produce sulfur dioxide and other toxic sulfur oxide gases when burned. Petroleum coke, 

a carbon- and ash-rich solid produced as a residual of refining processes, can, depending on the 

source oil composition, contain low to high levels of sulfur, nickel, vanadium, iron, and other 

metals or metalloids that may be leachable into water. Its dusts can become flammable and 

explosive. Prilled sulfur and petroleum coke dusts, if inhaled, could result in respiratory tract 

irritation. 

Further work is needed to understand whether these dry cargos would be released, and if 

so, released in sufficient quantities for these impacts to be substantial in more than just the areas 

immediately adjacent to cargo handling and storage facilities. 

Potential Impacts from Inundated Shipbuilding and Boat Repair Yards

A substantial number of active and closed shipbuilding and boat repair yards (which we 

will refer to as boatyards) occur within the scenario and (or) Cal OES inundation zones. 

Boatyards have been identified as the one of the many potential sources for metal and organic 

contaminants in POLA and POLB harbor sediments, such as copper, zinc, lead, organotin, 

polychlorinated biphenyls, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (Weston, 2009a, 2009b). A 

2006 study found that Puget Sound boatyards could be a substantial source of lubrication oil, 

copper, zinc, lead, various organotin forms, PAHs, phenols, methylphenols, and phthalates in 

stormwater runoff into harbors (Johnson and others, 2006). 

These contaminants were used in topside paints, antifouling hull paints, paint removal, 

oil-based products used as fuels or in engine or equipment lubrication (Johnson and others, 2006; 

Weston 2009a, 2009b). Zinc also is sourced from sacrificial metals used to protect propellers, 

shafts, and other metal parts. In addition to its past use in legacy paints, lead is still used in 

ballast keels. Phthalates are used in plasticizers and adhesives. 

Both copper and organotin were designed to leach from antifouling hull paints, so that the 

paints would be toxic to barnacles or other marine organisms trying to grow on the hulls. As a 

result, antifouling paints also can be a source of seawater contamination. Organotin was used 

extensively in antifouling bottom paints prior to the mid-2000s, but its use has been banned in 

the United States since 2008 due to its adverse environmental impacts. Copper is still in use as a 

component of antifouling paints, although various port jurisdictions are investigating ways to 

diminish its usage and resulting impacts. 
16

As described for POLA and POLB (Water Resources Action Plan, 2009; Weston, 2009a, 

2009b), a number of ports and boatyards are implementing measures to reduce runoff and other 

contamination into harbors. However, it is plausible that some inundated boatyards could serve 

as sources of contaminant-bearing debris (for example, lead from ballast manufacture, hull 

pieces, insulation, others) and water-borne dissolved or suspended particulate contaminants in 

the tsunami waters. Some of these contaminants, such as organotin or organotin-bearing woods, 

would be legacies from past practices at the boatyards. 

Scour and Redistribution of Contaminated Harbor Sediments

The 2010 Chilean and 2011 Tohoku tsunamis triggered extensive scour and redistribution 

of sediments in the Crescent City and Santa Cruz Harbors (Wilson and others, 2012, 2013a). It is 

likely that the stronger and more spatially damaging scenario tsunami would lead to similar 

issues in a number of coastal harbors. 

A review of the literature indicates that contaminated harbor bottom sediments are a 

substantial concern at many California ports (for example, see Water Resources Action Plan, 

2009 and Weston 2009a, 2009b, for discussions about the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach) 

(fig. 4). The contamination includes a variety of metals (for example, lead, zinc, copper, arsenic, 

mercury, nickel, vanadium, organotin), metal sulfides (in anoxic sediments), many different 

organic chemicals (crude oil components, PAHs, PCBs, DDT and other pesticides, phthalates, 

and others), and diverse debris. There are many different sources to which this contamination has 

been attributed, and has resulted through intentional practices, accidental releases, or (in some 

areas) natural processes. Examples of potential sources include (for example, van Geen and 

Luoma, 1999; Water Resources Action Plan, 2009): 

· Shipbuilding or boat repair yards; 

· Spills from petroleum storage, transfer, or refinery facilities; 

· Releases from ships or smaller watercraft; 

· Releases from cargo storage or handling facilities; 

· Releases from pesticide or other chemical manufacturing plants; 

· Wastes from manufacturing or fabricating activities; 

· Military bases; 

· Wastewater-treatment plants; 

· Fish-processing plants; 

· Stormwater runoff inputs from docks, industrial areas, and major highways adjacent to the 

ports; 

· Inputs of contaminated waters and sediments from rivers at some ports; 

· In the Bay area, contamination from upstream historical mining operations (for example, 

mercury mining and mercury amalgamation gold extraction in the Coast Ranges and Sierra 

Nevada foothills); 

· Atmospheric deposition; 

· Sediments from outside the harbors carried into the harbors by marine currents; and 

· Natural oil seeps. 

The ports are actively pursuing policies and practices to minimize ongoing 

contamination. Examples include (for example, Water Resources Action Plan, 2009): 

· Working with port tenants and nearby municipal entities to implement practices that reduce 

contamination; 
17

· Implementing better practices to manage storm waters and fugitive dust emissions from port 

facilities; 

· Working with marinas to minimize discharges from small watercraft and reduce other 

potential sources of contamination; 

· Improving port trash collection programs; and 

· Enhancing sustainability programs in port facilities. 

A variety of activities have been undertaken, are ongoing, or are planned to locate and 

remediate the most heavily contaminated sediment accumulations in key parts of many harbors. 

Examples of remediation methods used include: (1) dredging of contaminated sediments, with 

onland storage of the removed sediments in secured disposal areas, and (2) capping of 

contaminated underwater sediment deposits with uncontaminated sediments. 

Tsunami-triggered sediment erosion and redistribution (fig. 4) could undo remediation 

efforts by re-depositing contaminated sediments in previously remediated parts of harbors, or by 

re-exposing capped sediment deposits. It also could complicate ongoing remediation efforts by 

commingling contaminated sediments with sunken debris, diluting contaminants by 

commingling contaminated sediments with uncontaminated sediments, or altering the previously 

mapped distribution of contaminated sediments in need of remediation. 

Resuspension of sediments from the harbor bottoms into the water column would 

enhance their exposure to aquatic organisms, which could directly ingest the sediment particles. 

Sediment resuspension also would likely result in chemical transformations, such as oxidation 

(for example, of metal sulfides, metal(loid)s of variable oxidation state, such as arsenic), 

desorption of contaminants from particles, and volatilization of volatile components brought to 

the water-atmosphere interface. Past tsunamis also have transported marine sediments onto land 

in the inundation zone. Any contaminated sediment deposits left behind in the inundation zone 

also could undergo a variety of transformations, such as sulfide oxidation (and resulting 

formation of acidic, metal-rich drainage waters; Plumlee, 1999), oxidation of other organic 

compounds, and volatilization of methylmercury and other volatile components. Dusts from 

dried, disturbed sediment deposits could expose broader populations to contaminants in the 

sediments. 

Potential Contamination from Inundation of and Damage to Residential

and Commercial Areas

There are many residential and commercial areas along low-lying portions of the coast 

that occur within the scenario and (or) Cal OES inundation zones (figs. 6 and 7), and that could 

be variably destroyed, damaged, or flooded by the tsunami. In some areas, most notably San 

Clemente, southern Dana Point, and Malibu Beach, only the most beachward row of residences 

or commercial buildings is in the scenario or Cal OES inundation zones. However, a number of 

residential and adjacent commercial areas are indicated to be more extensively inundated. 

Significant examples include Balboa Island in Newport Bay (fig. 6, completely inundated, with 

more than 1,300 single- and multi-family residences), other parts of Newport Bay, Venice, 

Oxnard, and Ventura Harbor. 

Particularly in southern California, residential areas that fall within the scenario and (or) 

Cal OES inundation zones are dominated by high-value properties (the vast majority are from $1 
18

million to $4 million, with some $20 million or more). Many of the residences in the inundation 

zones are listed in online property information databases as having been built prior to the 1970s 

and 1980s. If damaged by a tsunami, these older buildings could produce debris containing 

legacy contaminants, such as lead paint, asbestos, creosote-treated landscape timbers, mercurybearing thermostats, and chlordane and other pesticides (Plumlee and others, 2012; Australian 

Broadcasting Corporation, 2013). Debris from younger buildings could include fragments of 

CCA-treated landscape timbers and more recently used pesticides (for example, fipronil). Debris 

from buildings of all ages could include fragmented electronics, plastics, mercury from 

fluorescent lightbulbs, fabrics and other materials containing some metal colorants (for example, 

hexavalent chromium), fire retardants (PBDEs), and containers of household chemicals or 

products, such as paints, drain cleaners, pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers (Plumlee and 

others, 2012; Manuel, 2013). 

For buildings that are inundated but not heavily damaged, the ground floors would likely 

be left with deposits of intermingled household furnishings/products, debris, containers of 

household chemicals, and externally derived small debris and sediments transported into the 

buildings by the tsunami floodwaters. 

Following the tsunami, mold would likely develop in inundated houses and buildings, 

and debris piles (Barbeau and others, 2010; Manuel, 2013). 
19

Figure 6. Satellite image (from appendix A of The SAFRR Tsunami Modeling Working Group, 2013), 

showing the extent of inundation of residential areas within Newport Bay. 

Potential Contamination from Significant Point Sources

Analysis of the EPA facilities registry system database (U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency Facilities Registry System, 2011), satellite imagery, and other GIS coverages indicates 

that a number of larger, environmentally significant facilities occur partially or fully within the 

scenario and (or) Cal OES inundation zones (fig. 3). In addition to the marine oil terminals (fig. 

5), petroleum storage facilities, boat yards, and other port facilities noted in previous sections of 

this report, these facilities include: 

· Wastewater-treatment plants; 

· Non-nuclear power plants; 

· Naval or coast guard facilities; 

· Transportation maintenance facilities; 

· Chemical manufacturing plants; 

· Other types of manufacturing plants (for example, that manufacture metal products, 

electronics, cement, or concrete products); and 

· Railroad yards, paper mills, scrap yards, big box retail stores, food-processing facilities, 

and several airports. 
20

Many of these facility types may have some potential to release various types of 

contaminants. These include stored fuel (for example, from airports), anhydrous ammonia (for 

example, from refineries, chemical manufacturing plants, food-processing plants or cold food 

storage plants), processing chemicals (for example, acids, alkalis, solvents), manufactured 

chemicals (for example, borates), food products, trash, and contaminant residues from paved 

surfaces or soils. Some small facilities, such as dry cleaners, gasoline stations, auto dealerships, 

or auto body shops in the inundation zones could be localized source of contaminant releases. 
21

 

Figure 7. Satellite image showing a closeup of Balboa Island, which falls completely within the scenario 

and California Emergency Management Agency (Cal OES) inundation zones. Of the approximately 

1,300 single- and multi-family residences are on the island, many are of older construction (for 

example, prior to the 1970s and 1980s), and almost all are valued in excess of $1 million U.S. 

currency. 
22

Wastewater Treatment Plants

Wastewater-treatment plants (WWTPs) occur partially or fully within the scenario or Cal 

OES inundation zones in a number of coastal cities (figs. 8 and 9), and so present a substantial 

potential for environmental contamination from the tsunami. These include Alameda, Arcata, 

Avalon, Burlingame, Cardiff, Crescent City, El Granada, Eureka, Goleta, Half Moon Bay, 

Hercules, Huntington Beach, Manila, Mill Valley, Morro Bay, Oakland, Oceano, Pacifica, Palo 

Alto, Pinole, Pismo Beach, Richmond, San Buena Ventura, San Francisco, San Leandro, San 

Lorenzo, San Pedro, Santa Cruz, and Tiburon. These WWTPs and their feeder sewer systems, if 

inundated and damaged, could release: (1) raw or partially treated sewage or other contaminated 

wastewater; and (2) wastewater-treatment chemicals, such as disinfectants, pH control 

chemicals, and oxidants. It also is possible that sewer systems outside the inundation zone that 

feed into damaged or shutdown WWTPs could experience backups and release raw sewage into 

the environment outside the inundated areas. 

Many different organic and inorganic contaminants can be present in sewage and 

wastewater. Examples include solid fecal matter, human hormones and metabolic wastes, 

components of pharmaceuticals and personal care products, detergents, fire retardants, home use 

pesticides and rodenticides, dissolved metals, and emulsions (Plumlee and others, 2013). 

Pathogens that can be present include bacteria (for example, Escherichia coli or Salmonella), 

protozoa, enteric viruses, and parasitic worms. There also are growing concerns that some of the 

bacteria present in sewage and wastewater discharges may have enhanced resistance to 

antibiotics. 

Power Plants

Non-nuclear power plants are indicated to occur partially within the scenario or Cal OES 

inundation zones in the following cities—Carlsbad, Eureka, Hayward, Huntington Beach, Long 

Beach (several), Morro Bay, Oakland, Samoa, San Francisco, and Wilmington. Based on 

databases available from the California Energy Commission, nearly all these power plants use 

natural gas or gas from municipal solid waste as their fuel. Hence, we infer that they likely do 

not pose a risk for the release of large volumes of environmentally detrimental chemicals or 

wastes. 

Neither the Diablo Canyon nor the inoperative San Onofre nuclear powerplants are 

indicated to occur within the scenario or Cal OES maximum inundation zones. Several 

peripheral buildings in the San Onofre facility (which is scheduled to be retired and 

decommissioned) do appear to fall within the Cal OES maximum inundation zone. 

Airports and Military Air Stations

Airports in several coastal cities (Eureka, Santa Barbara, Alameda/Oakland, and Oceano) 

and several Navy or Coast Guard air stations are indicated to fall partially or completely within 

the scenario or Cal OES inundation zones. There is the potential for some compromise of fuel 

storage tanks (where they occur in the inundation zone), damage to aircraft and aircraft 

maintenance/repair facilities, and runway runoff that could release some environmental 

pollutants, such as petroleum or tire residues. 
23

Landfills

Landfills are indicated to occur partially or completely within the scenario or CA OES 

inundation zones in the following cities—Corte Madera (Marin), Huntington Beach, Long Beach 

(multiple), Los Angeles, Mill Valley, Newport Beach, Oakland, San Leandro, San Mateo, San 

Pedro, Sausalito, and Venice. In a number of cases, these are historical landfills that are currently 

not in use. Further investigation is needed to determine whether these landfills could be 

compromised sufficiently by the tsunami to cause the release of stored wastes or waste 

degradation products. A wide range of possible organic and inorganic chemicals can be present 

in landfill leachates, such as dissolved organic matter, ammonium, solvents, organohalogen 

compounds (PCBs, carbon tetrachloride, etc.), pesticides, phenols, plasticizers, metals or 

metalloids (Mn, Hg, Pb, Cr, Cd, Cu, As, Ni, etc., some organo-complexed or colloid-bound), and 

organic and inorganic acids. Leachates can vary as a function of the age of landfill. Damage to 

containment structures can cause release of gases, such as methane, hydrogen sulfide, and 

volatile organic compounds. 
24

Figure 8. Map showing locations of wastewater treatment plants (data from U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency Facilities Registry System, 2011) indicated to occur partially or completely in the 

scenario or California Emergency Management Agency (Cal OES) inundation zones. 
25

Figure 9. This satellite image shows a wastewater treatment plant indicated to lie partially within the 

scenario tsunami inundation zone (transparent blue-green). The entire area of the image lies within the 

California Emergency Management Agency (Cal OES) maximum inundation zone. 

Potential Non-Point Source Contamination

There are various types of potential non-point sources from which contamination could 

be redistributed onland and into the nearshore marine environment by the tsunami. Examples 

include: 

· Paved/unpaved surfaces and storm drains in urban, residential, and commercial areas; 

· Inundated agricultural fields in coastal lowlands along river mouths; 

· Wetlands and other areas that receive stormwater runoff from urban areas or major 

coastal highways (such as I-5 north of San Diego); and 

· Large military bases with firing ranges, fuel storage areas or other coastal facilities that 

have not undergone environmental remediation. 

Urban Areas and Highway Corridors

It is possible that tsunami flood waters could redistribute a variety of potentially 

hazardous surface chemicals (for example, petroleum or metal-rich residues from paved 

surfaces), contaminated soils, trash, storm drain sediments, and other materials from inundated 

urban and industrial areas and highway corridors. This would be somewhat analogous to 

stormwater runoff from urban areas and major highway corridors, which has long been 

recognized as a source of contamination with cumulative detrimental environmental effects. 
26

Agricultural Fields

Somewhat greater areas of agricultural fields are indicated to be inundated in the northern 

parts of the State (for example, in the Eel River lowlands) than in the southern parts of the State. 

Most of these are fields in which alfalfa, hay, or other pasture grasses are grown (Ratliff, 2013). 

A wide range of insecticides, herbicides, and fertilizers may be applied to alfalfa and pasture 

grasses in California, and the types applied can vary according to many factors, such as 

geographic location, time of year, stage of crop growth, maturity of the field, type of insect or 

weed present, and nutrient status of the alfalfa (Canevari and others, 2007; Meyer and others, 

2007; Summers and others, 2007; University of California Integrated Pest Management Program, 

2010). Many different practices can be implemented to ensure that such chemicals are applied in 

ways to minimize their release into the environment by overspray, runoff, and other mechanisms. 

However, further investigations are needed to understand what insecticides, pesticides, and 

fertilizers are permitted and used in agricultural areas within the tsunami inundation zones, how 

they are applied, and what their potential is to be transported by the tsunami either inland or into 

the ocean. 

Tsunamigenic Fires

As noted by Porter and others (2013) and Scawthorne (2013), oil or petroleum spills can 

be ignited by electrical sparks, friction, or other mechanisms. As a result, they concluded that oilspread tsunamigenic fires would be possible in the Ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach, and 

Richmond, and that small, more localized fires could result at some marina fueling docks. Other 

flammable liquid bulk cargo, such as vegetable oil, if released, also might contribute to fires. 

Movement of spilled oil on water or on land would spread these fires to structures, berthed 

automobiles, cargo, and other port facilities. As noted by Tanaka (2012) for the Tohoku tsunami, 

and Porter and others (2013) for New York City port facilities flooded by Hurricane Sandy storm 

surge, a substantial number of fires also could be triggered by inundated vehicles, such as 

automobiles, forklifts, and drayage trucks at the ports, most likely due to electrical shorts. 

Similarly, electrical shorts in residences or commercial/industrial areas, and tsunami-downed 

power lines also could cause fires if electricity were not shut off prior to inundation. Analogous 

fires were caused by the Hurricane Sandy storm surge in New York and New Jersey—for 

example, 122 homes in the Breezy Point subdivision of Queens, New York, were burned as a 

result of a sea water-triggered electrical short at one residence (Gothamist, 2012), and other 

dwellings along the coast suffered fires from sparks caused by falling power lines. 

Tsunamigenic fires in spilled oil, debris, cargo, vehicles, vegetation, and residential, 

commercial, or industrial buildings and their contents could produce potentially significant 

volumes of complex smoke, gases, airborne ash, residual ash, and debris. These materials could 

have a wide range of potential toxicants depending on the material being combusted. Potentially 

asphyxiant or irritant gases include carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen chloride, 

sulfur dioxide, hydrogen fluoride, hydrogen bromide, nitrogen oxides, and ammonia. Smoke, 

airborne ash, and residual ash/debris from the fires could contain, depending on the material 

being burned, various mixtures of (Plumlee and others, 2013): (1) caustic alkali solids; (2) lead, 

hexavalent chromium, arsenic, nickel, vanadium and other heavy metal(loid)s; (3) asbestos; and 

(4) various organic toxicants such as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, formaldehyde, formalin, 

dioxins, and polychlorinated biphenyls. 
27

Plausible Environmental Impacts of Damages, Debris, and Contamination

Tsunami-related damages, debris, and contamination could have a variety of short-term 

and long-term impacts on the environment and the health of coastal marine and terrestrial 

ecosystems. Details of potential ecological impacts are have been studied by D. Brosnan (written 

commun., 2013) of University of California, Davis. 

Marine habitats in near-shore and intertidal zones along the coast and ecosystems in 

many coastal estuaries, marshes, sloughs, and lagoons could be damaged by physical erosion or 

sedimentation. These areas near inundated ports, harbors, coastal cities, and coastal agricultural 

areas could receive an influx of debris and contaminants. Examples of ecologically important 

areas near cities include the San Diego and Sweetwater Marsh National Wildlife Refuges in San 

Diego Bay, Seal Beach National Wildlife Refuge, Salinas River National Wildlife Refuge, Pilar 

Point State Marine Conservation Area/James V. Fitzgerald Marine Reserve between San 

Francisco and El Granada, San Francisco Bay, and Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge. 

Some ecologically sensitive areas are fisheries for seafood such as oysters (for example, Drakes 

and Tomales Bays) and crabs, and so could possibly suffer damage- or contaminant-related 

impacts on seafood supply or quality. 

Shallow aquifers in the areas of tsunami inundation could plausibly be contaminated by 

seawater. Transient salinization of inundated agricultural fields and salt water-triggered die offs 

of terrestrial vegetation in or immediately adjacent to tsunami inundation areas could also occur. 

Agricultural fields in the inundation zone could receive debris and sediments brought in by the 

tsunami. 

Spilled oil and petroleum products would add to the elevated baseline of crude oil from 

natural seeps already present along some parts of the coast. Spilled oil and petroleum products 

degrade through dissolution and volatilization of more toxic components, photolytic degradation, 

and biodegradation. However, oil and oil-seawater emulsions could coat birds and mammals that 

came into contact with it, with resulting impacts on birds’ flight ability and the internal heat 

regulation of birds and mammals. Inhalation of toxic volatile oil components, as well as dermal 

absorption or ingestion of oil or waters with dissolved oil components, could be toxic to marine 

and terrestrial organisms that contact spilled oil. 

Debris and re-exposed contaminated sediments would be a source of sea- or rain-waterleachable metal and organic contaminants that could potentially pose chronic toxicity threats to 

marine life (for example, copper, organotin) and(or) that are bioaccumulative (for example, 

mercury, legacy pesticides). Atmospheric weathering of metal sulfides in exposed marine 

sediment deposits could generate locally acidic waters with elevated levels of potentially toxic 

metal(loid)s such as copper, zinc, nickel, and arsenic. 

Wildlife could become entangled in debris and could ingest small debris. Ingestion, 

dermal absorption, or inhalation of various contaminants by aquatic, terrestrial, and avian 

organisms has the potential to result in short-term, acute toxicity effects, or longer-term, chronic 

toxicity effects. 

Potential Human Health Implications

If the scenario’s expected evacuation of populations from the inundation zone were to be 

successful, there could plausibly be few or no drownings or other tsunami-related casualties, 

crushing injuries, puncture wounds, or infections. 
28

Immediately after the tsunami, human populations outside the inundation zone might be 

transiently exposed to airborne gases, smoke and ash from tsunamigenic fires. The intensity and 

duration of these exposures would be dependent on the size of the fire, weather conditions, wind 

direction, and other factors. Exposures to high levels of irritant gases and particulate matter in 

smoke could exacerbate respiratory diseases (for example, asthma, bronchitis, chronic 

pulmonary obstructive disease), and cause increased cardiovascular problems, such as heart 

attacks and strokes. The potential for longer-term health impacts from transient exposures to 

toxicants contained in airborne gases, smoke, and ash has not been clearly documented (or even 

studied) in prior fire disasters. 

If widespread power outages result from the tsunami, then increased incidences of carbon 

monoxide poisoning from the use of portable power generators would be possible. 

Infectious disease outbreaks following the tsunami would likely be prevented or 

mitigated by ready access of local populations to emergency relief efforts that provide clean 

drinking water supplies, unspoiled food, vaccinations, and other medical care. 

Post-tsunami cleanup of ports, harbors, and inundated on-land areas would help reduce 

the potential for long-term human exposures to toxicants and pathogens in harbor waters, debris, 

soils, ponded waters, and buildings. Exposures to cleanup workers and people returning to 

inundated areas could be reduced by the use of proper personal protective equipment (such as 

respirators, gloves, steel-toed rubber boots, and protective clothing) and appropriate exposure 

mitigation practices (for example, dust control) during cleanup. 

There would be some potential for increased cases of vector-borne diseases, such as 

mosquito-transmitted West Nile virus, but this could be mitigated by pest control measures that 

thwart growth of mosquito populations in ponded tsunami waters, and growth of insect and 

rodent populations in debris and damaged buildings. Monitoring of seafood would prevent 

human consumption of pathogen- or toxicant-contaminated seafood obtained from tsunamiaffected areas along the coast. 

Post-Tsunami Environmental Cleanup and Recovery

Debris and contamination cleanup and disposal would pose substantial logistical 

challenges and economic costs following the tsunami. Deposits of small debris and contaminated 

sediments would be a challenge to identify, access, and clean up across all affected coastal 

marine and estuarine environments, and so could pose a long-term source of potential 

contamination in sensitive ecological areas. 

Based on recent past disasters, the cleanup of debris, damaged buildings, contaminated 

sediments, and other potentially hazardous materials in ports, harbors, and inundation areas 

could be expected to vary considerably in its pace from area to area—a function of economic 

pressures, the insurance claim process, building and cleanup regulations, the extent of damage, 

and other factors. Characterization of debris for the presence of asbestos, lead paint, pesticides, 

and other potentially hazardous materials would be required to determine if these materials 

would require enhanced dust mitigation and other exposure mitigation measures during cleanup, 

and disposal into isolated landfills. 

Similarly, characterization of tsunami sediment deposits (both onshore deposits and 

deposits dredged to clear harbor channels) would be needed to determine whether the sediments 

are contaminated and therefore require more costly disposal in isolated landfills. As with the 

debris, the sediments would need to be characterized for contaminants such as asbestos, heavy 

metals, or organic toxicants. In addition, any sediments being considered for on-land disposal, 
29

particularly in areas in contact with the atmosphere or oxygenated waters should be evaluated for 

their acid-generating potential (see net acid production tests outlined in Plumlee and others, 

2007). 

Although such assessments are needed environmentally, they could add significant time 

to the post-disaster cleanup and recovery if not accomplished quickly. The specialized removal 

and disposal measures for hazardous materials also would add substantially to cleanup costs. 

Actions to Enhance Resilience to Tsunamis

There are actions that can be taken by companies, individuals, and governments to help 

prepare for and mitigate environmental impacts of a coastal tsunami. 

All businesses large and small can benefit from an analysis of their facilities’ location(s) 

within the scenario or CA OES tsunami inundation zones, and the vulnerability of their facilities 

to tsunami-related or surge-related damages. Once vulnerabilities are understood, then ways to 

mitigate these vulnerabilities can be evaluated from a cost/benefit standpoint, recognizing the 

potential costs stemming from environmental liability should damage and contaminant release 

occur. Recognition of the impacts of coastal tsunamis and storm surges also should be accounted 

for in business emergency operation plans. Even small businesses can take these steps to help 

minimize potential impacts and liability from their own facilities, and impacts on their facilities 

from tsunami-related contamination. 

Families or individuals that live or work in the tsunami inundation zones could benefit by 

developing a tsunami-related emergency plan that helps them evaluate the potential hazards, and 

understand how and where to evacuate prior to a looming tsunami. Steps can be taken by 

individuals to mitigate potential environmental impacts in and adjacent to residences in the 

inundation zones. These could include, for example, maintaining only minimal amounts of 

pesticides, fertilizers, and other household chemicals in residences, and storing potentially toxic 

chemicals in watertight, tethered containers. Post tsunami, it is important for residents returning 

to inundated homes to be aware of, prepare for, and appropriately address the potential 

environmental hazards that could exist. Such hazards could include, for example, mold, 

contaminated sediments, and toxicant-bearing debris. If present, these hazards would necessitate 

use of appropriate respiratory and other personal protection to prevent exposure, and likely 

would require specialized cleanup and proper disposal practices. 

Porter and others (2013) recommend that residents and businesses in the inundation zone 

should be aware of flood insurance through the National Flood Insurance Program or 

commercial sources. An additional consideration, particularly for owners of older buildings, will 

be whether the flood insurance adequately covers the extra costs for removal and disposal of 

toxicant bearing debris. 

Given the high value of the coastal residential and commercial properties in the 

inundation zone, it can be postulated that there would be substantial insurance claims for 

environmental restoration, mold mitigation, disposal of debris that contains hazardous materials, 

and costs of litigation related to environmental liability. These costs would likely add to the 

economic costs estimated by Rose and others (2013) for the scenario tsunami. 

The previous section outlined the need for timely characterization of tsunami debris and 

sediment deposits for the potential presence of contaminants. In past tsunamis, such assessments 

have led to delays in cleanup and recovery (R. Wilson, Cal OES, oral comm., 2013). 

Development of State and local policies that plan for and facilitate rapid assessment of potential 

contamination, and that facilitate rapid decision making for disposal options should hazardous 
30

debris or sediment be identified, would help enhance resilience following the tsunami. 

Additionally, local jurisdictions with substantial residential and commercial areas within the 

inundation zone can utilize information in their own property databases on the age, square 

footage, and construction type of buildings to better plan for the amounts and types of debris that 

could be generated by a tsunami. Jurisdictions can work with owners of large, environmentally 

significant facilities (including, for example, their own wastewater treatment plants) to help 

assess vulnerabilities and mitigate potential damages that could otherwise lead to the release of 

large volumes of contaminants during a tsunami. 

Summary

This study has described a number of ways by which the SAFRR scenario tsunami could 

produce contamination, adversely affect the nearshore marine and coastal environments, and 

result in human exposures to potential tsunami-generated contaminants. There are a number of 

uncertainties in this type of analysis. As a result, our approach and general findings should only 

be considered as the first of multiple steps toward a more quantitative, predictive approach to 

understanding the potential sources, types, environmental behavior, and environmental and 

health implications of contaminants that could be released into the environment by coastal 

tsunamis. For example, more detailed, site-specific analyses are needed of significant industrial, 

commercial, and residential areas that occur in the inundation zone to assess their vulnerabilities 

to tsunami inundation and damage, and the specific types and volumes of resulting contaminants 

and debris that could be released should such damage occur. 

The highest potential for inundation-related damages and resulting release of significant 

amounts of contaminants into the inundation zone and coastal environments would likely occur 

in the major ports, in inundated and damaged residential and commercial areas, and from some 

large facilities, such as wastewater-treatment plants. A wide range of debris types and 

contaminants could potentially be released, depending on the source. Potential concerns include, 

for example: 

· Complex debris; 

· Crude oil, various fuel types, and other petroleum products; 

· Some liquid bulk cargo and dry bulk cargo types; 

· Heavy metals such as lead, arsenic, organotin, mercury, nickel, and vanadium; 

· Raw sewage and chemicals used to treat wastewater; 

· Organic contaminants, such as paints, legacy pesticides, current use pesticides, 

herbicides, and fertilizers; and 

· Smoke and ash from tsunamigenic fires. 

Tsunami-related physical damages, debris, and contamination could have short- and longterm impacts on the environment and the health of coastal marine and terrestrial ecosystems. If 

human populations are successfully evacuated prior to the tsunami arrival, there would be no or 

limited numbers of drownings, other casualties, or related injuries, wounds, and infections. 

Immediately after the tsunami, human populations outside the inundation zone could be 

transiently exposed to airborne gases, smoke, and ash from tsunamigenic fires. 

Post-tsunami cleanup, if done with appropriate mitigation (for example, dust control), 

personal protection, and disposal measures, would help reduce the potential for cleanup-worker 

and resident exposures to toxicants and pathogens in harbor waters, debris, soils, ponded waters, 

and buildings. A number of other steps can be taken by governments, businesses, and residents 
31

to help reduce the environmental impacts of tsunami and to recover more quickly from these 

environmental impacts. 

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U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–H

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

Economic Impacts of the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario in 

California
COVER—The California coastal economy depends on activities served by ports, marinas, and, 

development, all of which are vulnerable to tsunamis. (top) satellite image of Marina del Rey, California, 

(image: USGS); (bottom) Port of Los Angeles, California (photo: Port of Los Angeles)
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario

Stephanie Ross and Lucile Jones, Editors 

Economic Impacts of the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario in 

California

By Anne Wein, Adam Rose, Ian Sue Wing, and Dan Wei 

Open-File Report 2013–1170–H 

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey 
iii

U.S. Department of the Interior

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2013

For product and ordering information:

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its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

Suggested citation: 

Wein, A., Rose, A., Sue Wing, I., and Wei, D., 2013, Economic impacts of the SAFRR tsunami scenario 

in California, chap. H, in Ross, S.L., and Jones, L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk 

Reduction) Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170, 50 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/h/.

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Although this information product, for the most part, is in the public domain, it also may contain 

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iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD 

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION

MARK NECHODOM 

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D. 

STATE GEOLOGIST
v 

Contents

Figures ............................................................................................................................................................................. v

Tables ............................................................................................................................................................................. vi

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1

Overview of Economic Impacts ....................................................................................................................................... 2

Direct Economic Impacts ................................................................................................................................................. 4

Estimation of Direct Economic Impacts ....................................................................................................................... 6

Results (Without Resilience) ........................................................................................................................................ 6

1. Import Disruptions ................................................................................................................................................ 7

2-Day Port Shutdown ........................................................................................................................................... 7

Cargo Losses ....................................................................................................................................................... 7

Facility Downtime ................................................................................................................................................. 7

2. Export Disruptions ................................................................................................................................................ 8

3. Direct Gross Output Losses Associated with Marina- Slip Damages at POLA .................................................... 8

4. Gross Output Losses to POLA Commercial Fishing ............................................................................................ 9

5. Capital Losses of Building and Content Damages ............................................................................................... 9

6. Direct Gross Output Losses Associated with Marina Damages in California Coastal Counties .......................... 9

Summary of Direct Economic Impacts (Without Resilience) ........................................................................................ 9

Total Economic Impacts ................................................................................................................................................ 10

Estimation of Total Economic Impacts—Computable General Equilibrium Modeling ................................................ 10

Total Economic Impact Results (Without Resilience) ................................................................................................ 11

Resilience ...................................................................................................................................................................... 15

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................................... 25

Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................................................... 26

References Cited ........................................................................................................................................................... 26

Appendix A. Methodology and Data ............................................................................................................................. 29

Appendix B. Tsunami Port Direct Impacts Without and With Resilience ...................................................................... 32

Appendix C. CGE Model Description ............................................................................................................................ 33

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 33

Production .................................................................................................................................................................. 33

Trade and Commodity Supply ................................................................................................................................... 34

Final Demands and Commodity Market Closures ..................................................................................................... 35

Intersectoral Factor Mobility and Static Income Closures .......................................................................................... 36

The Impacts of a Tsunami on the Economy .............................................................................................................. 37

Model Calibration, Formulation and Solution ............................................................................................................. 37

Appendix D. Calculation of Inventory Availability for Resilience ................................................................................... 41

Appendix E. Production Recapture Factors .................................................................................................................. 49

Figures

Figure 1. Estimating total economic impacts of a port disruption, cargo damages, and terminal downtime. 

 .................................................................................................................................................... 5
vi

Tables

Table 1. Summary of the direct impacts of the SAFRR tsunami scenario (without resilience)(in millions of 

2010 dollars and percentage changes). ....................................................................................................... 10

Table 2. Summary of business interruption from the SAFRR tsunami scenario, without resilience and 

reconstruction (in millions of 2010 dollars of Gross Domestic Product losses). ........................................... 12

Table 3. Sectoral Gross Domestic Product losses from the SAFRR tsunami scenario. ........................... 14

Table 4. Methodology for direct resilience for disruptions to port related activities from the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario. .......................................................................................................................................... 18

Table 5. Direct impact estimates for the SAFRR tsunami scenario before and after resilience. .............. 22

Table 6. Property damage resilience through recapture for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. ..................... 24

Table C1. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) model sectors for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. ...... 38

Table C2. Elasticities of substitution, transformation, and supply or the SAFRR tsunami scenario. ........ 40

Table D1. Real manufacturing inventories for the United States, by stage of fabrication, seasonally 

adjusted, end of 2011 (data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2013). ...................................................... 43

Table D2. Inventories by stage of fabrication for manufacturing industry in southern California region (in 

millions of 2010 dollars). ............................................................................................................................... 44

Table D3. Availability of raw material inputs computed from materials and supplies inventory for the 

southern California region (in millions of 2010 dollars). ................................................................................ 46

Table D4. Finished goods held by sector for the southern California region (in millions of 2010 dollars). 46

Table D5. Available inventory in the southern California region (in millions of 2010 dollars). .................. 47
Economic Impacts of the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario in 

California

By Anne Wein,1 Adam Rose,2 Ian Sue Wing,3 and Dan Wei2

Introduction 

This study evaluates the hypothetical economic impacts of the SAFRR (Science 

Application for Risk Reduction) tsunami scenario to the California economy. The SAFRR 

scenario simulates a tsunami generated by a hypothetical magnitude 9.1 earthquake that occurs 

offshore of the Alaska Peninsula (Kirby and others, 2013). Economic impacts are measured by 

the estimated reduction in California’s gross domestic product (GDP), the standard economic 

measure of the total value of goods and services produced. Economic impacts are derived from 

the physical damages from the tsunami as described by Porter and others (2013). The principal 

physical damages that result in disruption of the California economy are (1) about $100 million 

in damages to the twin Ports of Los Angeles (POLA) and Long Beach (POLB), (2) about $700 

million in damages to marinas, and (3) about $2.5 billion in damages to buildings and contents 

(properties) in the tsunami inundation zone on the California coast. The study of economic 

impacts does not include the impacts from damages to roads, bridges, railroads, and agricultural 

production or fires in fuel storage facilities because these damages will be minimal with respect 

to the California economy. The economic impacts of damage to other California ports are not 

included in this study because detailed evaluation of the physical damage to these ports was not 

available in time for this report. 

The analysis of economic impacts is accomplished in several steps. First, estimates are 

made for the direct economic impacts that result in immediate business interruption losses in 

individual sectors of the economy due to physical damage to facilities or to disruption of the flow 

of production units (commodities necessary for production). Second, the total economic impacts 

(consisting of both direct and indirect effects) are measured by including the general equilibrium 

(essentially quantity and price multiplier effects) of lost production in other sectors by ripple 

effects upstream and downstream along the supply chain. An appropriate measure of the 

economic impacts on the California economy for the SAFRR tsunami scenario is the reduction in 

GDP. 

The economic impacts are first calculated without resilience, the ability of the economy 

to adjust to disruptions in ways that mute potential negative impacts. There are many types of 

resilience, including using existing inventories of materials, using unused capacity, conserving 

inputs, substituting for disrupted supplies, recapturing production after the disruption is restored, 

and many others. A method for estimating resilience, identified in the port system and sectors 

affected by property damages, is applied to indicate potential reductions of direct and total 

economic impacts. In this SAFRR tsunami scenario analysis of economic impacts to California, 

 

1

U.S. Geological Survey; SAFRR Tsunami Scenario Economic Impact Coordinator. 2

University of Southern California.

3

Boston University.
2 

we implement established techniques used to model the economic impacts for two previous U.S. 

Geological Survey (USGS) scenarios: the southern California Shakeout earthquake (Rose and 

others, 2011) and the California ARkStorm severe winter storm (Sue Wing and others, written 

commun., 2013). 

For the SAFRR tsunami scenario, we reviewed the relevant studies that assess economic 

impacts from previous tsunami events affecting California and elsewhere and estimate the 

economic impacts of potential tsunami and other threats to POLA and POLB. To our knowledge, 

assessment of impacts to the California economy from distant source tsunamis does not exist. 

Previous tsunamis, including those from the 1960 Chile earthquake, the 1964 Alaska earthquake, 

the 2008 Chile earthquake and the 2011 Japan earthquake, had only relatively minor or very 

localized severe damage (such as that in Crescent City in 1964), and no studies of the economic 

impacts were completed. A rare study of the economic impacts of a tsunami event has recently 

been produced for the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami (Kajitani and others, 2013). Quarterly 

declines in Japan’s GDP are observed to peak at −1.63 percent in the second quarter after the 

event and stagnate for the rest of the year. The majority of the economic impacts are attributed to 

the tsunami rather than the earthquake. The hardest hit sectors are identified as agriculture, 

fisheries, manufacturing, retail, and tourism. 

Other relevant studies have focused on the economic impacts of threats that close POLA 

and POLB. We find one analysis of a potential tsunami scenario affecting the California 

economy through disruption of port operations. Borrero and others (2005) estimated economic 

impacts to the southern California economy of $7 to $40 billion from a locally generated tsunami 

that closes POLA and POLB for as much as 1 year. There have also been several studies of the 

economic impacts of non-tsunami events affecting POLA and POLB. Analyses of an 11-day 

labor lockout produced a range of estimated national impacts of as much as $1.94 billion/day 

(Park and others 2008, Martin Associates 2001). Examination of a potential terrorist attack that 

closes the San Pedro port for 1 month yielded a $29 billion impact to the California economy 

(Park, 2008). 

These studies have reinforced the importance of recognizing economic resilience in 

economic impact analyses. Hall (2004) criticized the upper-end estimate of national economic 

impacts from the labor lockout based on model shortcomings that neglected short-run 

substitution behavior and fixed the long-run economic behaviors. Following the 2011 Japanese 

tsunami, resilience was observed in the forms of rapid recovery of manufacturing sectors, energy 

conservation, and insurance (Kajitani and others, 2013). 

Overview of Economic Impacts

The total economic impacts (both direct and indirect) of the tsunami will be transmitted 

through the damages and disruption of POLA and POLB, including damage to cargo on ships 

and at the ports. Other economic impacts will result from tsunami damage to buildings and 

contents as well as marinas along the California coast. These other economic impacts can be 

estimated in a rather straightforward manner as explained in the following section. The port 

disruptions are more complex and are explained in detail here. Figure 1 displays the major 

linkages in tracing a port disruption beginning with direct economic impacts through short-run 

and long-run impacts at five analytical time stages of a disaster scenario (see also Rose and Wei, 

2013). 
3 

The scenario begins with the Tsunami Event, which first translates into a risk of a port 

shutdown, cargo damage, and isolated terminal downtime for extended periods of time. At the 

port level, this leads to: 

· Disruption of imports. 

· Disruption of exports. 

· Disruption of port onsite activities and operations. 

Various resilience tactics would be implemented to mute impacts at the outset. Such 

responses would include rerouting the traffic to other ports, diversion of exports to be used as 

import substitutes, use of inventories by port customers, relocating activities within the ports, and 

rescheduling of activities once the port reopens by working overtime or extra shifts. 

The next stage occurs at the macroeconomic level. Impacts stem from three aspects here 

as well: 

· Intermediate goods shortfalls. 

· Final goods shortfalls. 

· Reduction in final demand associated with reduction in exports. 

Both supply-side and demand-side considerations are taken into account in the total 

economic impact evaluation. The supply-side relates to impacts on customers of the imported 

goods down the supply chain, and the demand-side captures the impacts on suppliers to these 

customers up the supply chain. Both supply and demand considerations are needed on the import 

side to address disruptions of intermediate and final goods. Businesses using the imports as 

intermediate inputs in their production processes and their successive rounds of downstream 

customers are subject to supply shortfalls. In addition, the reduction in production of importusing businesses also reduces the demand for the goods produced by successive rounds of 

upstream suppliers within a region or nation. Because the “final” (finished) goods shortfalls to 

end-users (consumers, government, and purchasers of capital equipment) do not generate any 

forward or backward linkage effects, they are simply added to the total macroeconomic effects 

directly. 

The shutdown of port operations preventing the shipments of exports are only estimated 

in terms of impacts on suppliers up the supply chain, because the downstream customers are out 

of the region and thus do not affect the region’s GDP. Production of exports requires another 

perspective on the problem. Here, the disruption of port activity through the cessation of exports 

will reduce the demand for inputs in their production. First-round suppliers will in turn reduce 

their demand, thereby starting a chain reaction of production activity decreasing upstream, 

analogous to the case on the import side. The sum total of all of these impacts is a multiple of the 

original shock; hence, the term “multiplier effect” characterizes these reactions to yield the 

macroeconomic impacts. Disruption to port on-site operations and related activities, including 

marina rentals and commercial fishing, generate their own demand-side effects. There are a 

number of resilience tactics applicable here, and at other junctures shown in figure 1, which will 

be discussed in detail below. 

The total-impact stage represents a summing up of all the various types of supply-side 

and demand-side impacts. In a linear model, all of these various boxes in figure 1 are additive, 

and can be calculated and presented separately to identify the relative influence of the various 
4 

and offsetting factors. In more complex models, such as the one used in this study, there are 

some important interactions, such as substitution effects, between these various components, that 

cannot be readily decomposed. 

There is also the potential of long-run effects. These could arise from permanent loss of 

business for the port due to advantages of newly established logistical patterns or from stigma 

that stems from the fear of vulnerability to a repeated disaster. In addition, economic impacts can 

stem from: 

· Economic costs of environmental damage. 

· Costs of shipping delays to the intended port. 

· Costs of resilience (including of rerouting shipping to other ports, substitution of less 

efficient inputs into production activities down the supply chain, and other factors).

The costs of the first two options are likely to be relatively small except in the case of 

environmental damage such as a major oil spill, for example, which extends the duration of the 

port closure (see Rose and Wei, 2013). If the cost of delays of shipments to the intended ports 

(that is, until they or terminals are reopened) becomes extremely high, then rerouting will be 

pursued more aggressively. Although the costs of some resilience tactics can be significant, the 

benefits, in terms of avoided business interruption, are likely to more than offset the cost.

Figure 1 focuses on general port and port-related activities. It does not explicitly depict 

the roles of some areas of the regional economy impacted by the tsunami, such as cargo, marinas 

and commercial fishing. However, both of these can be readily related to the figure. Cargo enters 

through the disruption of imports and disruption of export boxes. The operation of marinas and 

commercial fishing are analogous to the disruption of port activities in terms of their placement 

at the microeconomic level. Of course, resilience tactics will differ between these objects of 

disruption, as well as differing from port-level resilience. 

Direct Economic Impacts

This section summarizes the estimation and results for the direct economic impacts 

associated with the SAFRR tsunami scenario, including impacts associated with POLA and 

POLB, coastal marinas, and buildings and contents within the tsunami inundation zone in 

California. The direct economic impact calculations omit damage to other ports, agricultural 

production, transportation infrastructure, lifeline infrastructure, and nonbuilding assets such as 

vehicles. These omissions were deemed minor except for the case of the other ports, where the 

scale of damages is largely unavailable at this time. On the other hand, the direct economic 

impacts are inflated in the absence of resilience. Therefore, the analyzed direct economic impacts 

represent a lower bound on impacts without resilience to California. The analysis of the direct 

impacts with resilience is conducted in the resilience section to demonstrate the effectiveness of 

resilience and potential for further enhancement. 
5 

Figure 1. Estimating total economic impacts of a port disruption, cargo damages, and terminal downtime. 
6 

Estimation of Direct Economic Impacts

The analysis of direct economic impacts uses a combination of data provided by the 

Tsunami Research Team members (Porter and others, 2013), outside contacts, and publically 

available data. Analysis of the physical damages at POLA and POLB (Dykstra and others, 2013) 

was used extensively except for damages to the Crescent Warehouse and Berth S101 in POLB 

that were determined to be recently vacated or not in use, respectively. Much of the data were 

refined by the authors for inclusion in the report (see appendix A for details). Part of the 

refinement was to make the results compatible with a 65-sector computable general equilibrium 

(CGE) model that is used to determine the total economic impacts of the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario, as described below 

Appendix B provides details of our calculations of port direct economic impacts. This

appendix is in the form of an Excel spreadsheet (“Tsunami_Port_Direct Impacts without and 

with Resilience” and is available online at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/H/). The “base 

case” sheet contains four tables of direct impacts of the SAFRR tsunami scenario to the twin 

ports without any resilience adjustments. The tables are: 

· Import disruption. 

· Export disruption. 

· Direct revenue losses due to marina slip damages. 

· Direct revenue losses to commercial fishing. 

For both import disruption and export disruption, the impacts are calculated for the 

following three categories in both dollar values and percentage impacts: 

· Impacts of a 2-day port shutdown. 

· Impacts of cargo losses. 

· Impacts of facility downtime 

In addition, the direct import/export disruption impacts are presented for both the 

southern California five-county region (including Ventura, Los Angeles, Orange, San 

Bernardino, and Riverside) and for the rest of California. The direct impacts of slip damages at 

the marinas and loss to the commercial fishing industries in POLA are presented as direct 

revenue losses to the relevant sectors. They only pertain to the southern California region. 

Besides the direct impacts resulting from disruptions to the port-related activities, direct impacts 

also stem from capital damages to buildings and contents in California’s coastal counties due to 

flooding (Porter, 2013). In addition to slip damages in the marinas within the port complex, 

damages to marinas occur along the coast of California (Porter and others, 2013). 

Results (Without Resilience)

In this section we present the direct economic impacts of the tsunami scenario without 

resilience. Note that the results are presented in terms of the most accessible measure of loss 

available—values of imports and exports that would be affected by downtime and cargo 

damages, buildings and contents that would be damaged, and gross output (business revenue) 

losses for sectors related to marina activities and fishing industry. Consequently, the direct 

impacts cannot be summed. Please note that these measures differ from GDP, which is the more 

appropriate measure for total economic impacts economy-wide. 
7 

1. Import Disruptions

Import disruptions are measured as the values of imports destined for southern California 

and the rest of California that are affected by the 2-day port shutdown, cargo losses, and terminal 

downtime. For southern California they are presented in the left-hand partition of table B1 under 

the three categories of disruption: 

 2-Day Port Shutdown

Dykstra and others (2013) concluded that the twin ports would be shut down for two 

days. The resulting direct impacts in southern California are a disruption of $417.3 million (in 

2010 dollars) of import goods from more than half of the 65 sectors. The major types of 

disrupted import commodities are machinery manufacturing, other transportation equipment 

manufacturing, and apparel-manufacturing products related to container activities. In relative 

terms, the major disruptions, however, are for plastics and fishing products, each representing 

slightly more than 0.5 percent of annual imports of these commodities. 

Cargo Losses

Cargo losses are related to inundation of terminals, as well as the nature of the cargo (for 

example, perishable goods). Losses of cargo destined for southern California total $60.8 million. 

The major imported cargo losses are automobiles, which consist of nearly 83 percent of the total 

value of cargo damages. These losses also represent 0.64 percent of the annual imports of this 

commodity in the year 2010. 

Facility Downtime

Several port facilities (cargo handling terminals) would be damaged in the tsunami 

scenario. For example, several marine oil terminals of POLA would only be able to operate at 50 

percent capacity for 1 month due to the damage to the terminal operating systems. A few other 

terminals are considered unusable during debris clean up. Due to the reduced handling capacity 

of several terminals, the total estimated import disruption is $197 million. Affected commodities 

include steel, petroleum refineries goods, and chemical products (such as caustic soda), which 

correspond to iron and steel manufacturing, petroleum refining, and chemical manufacturing 

sectors, respectively, in our 65-sectoring scheme. The latter represents only a trivial amount, 

whereas the former two represent approximately 65 percent and 35 percent of the total impacts to 

imports, respectively, in this category. 

The total import disruption to the southern California region is more than $675 million, 

or 0.214 percent of total annual imports to the region. Direct economic impacts from imports 

destined for the rest of California are presented in the right-hand partition of table B1 for the 

same categories of import disruptions as for southern California. All three categories of losses 

are lower for the rest of the state because on average a higher proportion of the affected imports 

are delivered to users in the southern California region than to the rest of California. The lower 

value is most pronounced for cargo losses, which are only $5.8 million for the rest of California 

versus $60.8 million for the southern California region alone. This result follows from the 

damages to automobiles that make up the majority of cargo losses. According to the data we 

obtained from the port expert, more than 90 percent of the imported automobiles are delivered to 

the southern California region. 
8 

The total import disruption to the rest of California region is about $325 million, or 0.061 

percent of total annual imports to the region. As explained above, the difference in import 

disruptions (in dollar values) for different commodities/sectors between the two geographic 

regions are determined by the proportion of these imports that have destinations within the 

southern California region or in the rest of California. The percentage impact is also affected by 

the proportion of each type of import commodities that are imported into the region through the 

twin ports (versus through other modes of import). 

2. Export Disruptions

Direct export disruptions are measured as the values of exports destined for southern 

California and the rest of California that are affected by the 2-day port shutdown, cargo losses, 

and terminal downtime. They are presented in table B2. For southern California (left-hand 

quadrant of table B2), the 2-day shutdown results in a total export disruption of $91.7 million. 

Major types of affected exports are chemical manufacturing, machinery manufacturing, and food 

manufacturing products, each exceeding $10 million. Cargo losses on the export side amount to 

only $2.8 million, with the largest damage to exports of the same three sectors. Facility down 

time, as related to exports, is $37.2 million, confined primarily to petroleum refining and 

chemical manufacturing (industrial borate) exports. The total export disruption to the southern 

California region is about $132 million, or 0.034 percent of total annual exports from the region. 

Total export disruptions for the rest of California are presented in the right-hand partition 

of table B2. The total direct impacts of the 2-day shutdown are $58.0 million. Total facility 

downtime is $18.9 million. Cargo losses are only $1.8 million. The total impacts are about $78.2 

million, or 0.017 percent of the total annual exports from the region. Overall, the export 

disruptions are significantly smaller than their import counterparts presented in table B1. 

3. Direct Gross Output Losses Associated with Marina- Slip Damages at POLA

Direct losses from damages to POLA marinas are measured as gross output (revenue) 

losses to the marina activity related sectors defined by Martin Associates (2007). The sectors 

include retail trade, scenic and sightseeing transportation, other amusement and recreation 

industries, and food services and drinking places related to marina operations. The results are 

calculated in table B3 according to the following steps: 

1. Total revenues of POLA marina-related activities in 2006 were $48.2 million (Martin 

Associates, 2007). The marina-slip utilization roughly remains the same between 2006 

and 2010. Converting $48.2 million to 2010 dollars, we obtain a total revenue of $51.8 

million in 2010 dollars. 

2. Of the $51.8 million, about $3.6 million is the rental revenue to the ports. For the 

remaining $48.2 million, we assume that the revenues are distributed evenly among the 

four marina-related sectors of retail trade, scenic and sightseeing transportation, other 

amusement and recreation industries, and food services and drinking places. 

3. To compute the revenue losses to the affected sectors, we next divide the above revenues 

by 3 because 1/3 of the POLA marina slips are damaged. 

4. In addition, Porter and others (2013) determined that it would take 1 month to repair the 

damaged slips at a linear rate. Therefore, we further divide the revenues by 12 to account 

for the loss in 1 month and then divide the result by 2, based on the linear repair rate to 

obtain the revenue losses for each sector related to marina-slip damages. 
9 

The total estimated gross output loss to the marina-related sectors is $0.72 million. 

4. Gross Output Losses to POLA Commercial Fishing

Table B4 presents the results for direct revenue losses to POLA commercial fishing. 

Outcomes of the tsunami scenario would include perished fish on board the vessels at sea and 

lost fishing days—we assumed 25 percent of a day’s fish haul would perish and 4 fishing days 

would be lost. In addition, 5 percent of the fishing fleet is assumed damaged due to vessels left in 

the harbor. We note that there is a lack of fragility curves for vessels tied to fixed piers, AlThese 

estimates should be treated as illustrative. \.) On the basis of conversations with fishermen, we 

assumed that it would take about 2 months on average to repair or replace the damaged boats. 

The direct revenue losses to the fishing industry of the above individual components are: 

· 25 percent of one day’s fish loss: $25,890. 

· 5 percent of fishing fleet damage (2-month repair time): $315,000. 

· 4 fishing days lost: $393,534. 

· Total fishing industry revenue loss: $734,425. 

5. Capital Losses of Building and Content Damages

The direct impacts of building and content damages (loss of capital stock) are represented 

by repair and replacement costs. The first row under section B in table 1 summarizes the building 

and content damages in coastal counties. In the southern California region, the building and 

content related property losses are $52 million and $367 million, respectively, representing about 

0.004 percent and 0.047 percent of the total capital stock in this region. The building and content 

related property losses in the rest of California are $246.4 million and $1.16 billion, respectively. 

They represent 0.016 percent and 0.124 percent of the total capital stock in the rest of California. 

6. Direct Gross Output Losses Associated with Marina Damages in California Coastal Counties

The damages to docks at marinas are translated into gross output (revenue) losses to three 

sectors related to marina activities (restaurants, retail stores, and marina-related activities) in two 

steps: (1) we use the estimate of $13,649 total annual revenues per slip and the assumption that 

one dock has an average of 50 slips to translate the number of docks that have lost functionality 

into total revenue losses; (2) we distribute the revenue losses evenly among restaurants, retail 

trade, and marina-related activities sectors. The total direct revenue losses to the three marina 

activity related sectors in the southern California region are $71.4 million. The total direct 

revenue losses are $50.8 million in the rest of California. 

Summary of Direct Economic Impacts (Without Resilience)

We provide a summary of the direct economic impacts of the SAFRR tsunami scenario in 

southern California and the rest of the State without resilience in table 1. In terms of percentage 

impacts, the impacts are dominated by the disruption to imports, especially from the 2-day 

shutdown of the twin ports and damages to building content. How the production of each sector 

would be affected by the import disruption is largely influenced by the dependence on these 

imports as production inputs, taking into account the sectors’ ability to substitute disrupted 

import goods with other inputs. The total economic impacts stemming from the various direct 

impacts include the ripple effects transmitted through upstream and downstream supply-chain 
10

linkages, as well as the spending of wages/salaries and capital-related income and the ripple 

effects these induce. 

Table 1. Summary of the direct impacts of the SAFRR tsunami scenario (without resilience)(in millions of 

2010 dollars and percentage changes1). 

[%, percent; n.a., not applicable; $, dollars] 

Impacted category Unit of measurement Southern California

region Rest of California Total California

A. Direct impacts related to ports

Import disruption Import value $675.2 (0.21%) $312.1 (0.06%) $987.3 (0.12%)

2-day Shutdown Import Value $417.3 (0.13%) $208.2 (0.04%) $625.4 (0.08%)

Cargo losses Import value $60.8 (0.02%) $5.8 (0.00%) $66.6 (0.01%)

Facility downtime Import value $197.1 (0.06%) $98.2 (0.02%) $295.2 (0.04%)

Export disruption Export value $131.8 (0.03%) $78.2 (0.02%) $210.0 (0.03%)

2-day Shutdown Export Value $91.7 (0.02%) $57.5 (0.01%) $149.2 (0.02%)

Cargo losses Export value $2.8 (0.00%) $1.8 (0.00%) $4.6 (0.00%)

Facility downtime Export value $37.2 (0.01%) $18.9 (0.00%) $56.1 (0.01%)

Marina slip damages Gross output $0.7 (0.00%) n.a. $0.7 (0.00%)

Commercial fishing Gross output $0.7 (0.00%) n.a. $0.7 (0.00%)

B. Direct impacts along other parts of the California coast

Building damages 

Content damages

Capital stock

Capital stock

$73.8.0 (0.004%)

$521.7. (0.047%)

$349.9.4 (0.016%)

$1,646.5 (0.124%)

$423.7 (0.011%)

$2,168.2 (0.089%)

Marina damages Gross output $71.4 (0.005%) $50.8 (0.003%) $122.2 (0.004%) 

1

Percentages for output, import value, and export value are measured as proportions of annual flows; percentage of 

capital stock loss is measured with respect to capital stock in place.

Total Economic Impacts

This section summarizes the estimation and results for the total economic impacts (or 

business interruption) from the SAFRR tsunami scenario. The total economic impacts (consisting 

of both direct and indirect effects) are the general equilibrium (essentially quantity and price 

multiplier effects) of lost production in other sectors by ripple effects upstream and downstream 

along the supply chain. Similar to the direct impacts, total economic impacts are associated with 

damages and disruption at POLA and POLB, coastal marinas, and buildings and contents within 

the tsunami inundation zone in California. Likewise, the total economic impacts do not include 

resilience.

Estimation of Total Economic Impacts—Computable General Equilibrium Modeling

A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is a stylized computational 

representation of the circular flow of the economy (see, for example, Sue Wing, 2009, 2011). It 

solves for the set of commodity and factor (intermediate inputs as well as labor and capital) 

prices and the set of activity levels of firms’ outputs and households’ incomes that equalize 

supply and demand across all markets in the economy. The model developed for this study 

divides California’s economy into two regions (the five-county southern California region—Los 

Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura—and the remainder of the State), each of 

which consists of 65 industry sectors and households in nine different income categories. 

The industry aggregation is matched with occupancy classes in HAZUS, FEMA’s expert 

loss estimation system, which was employed by another research team member to calculate the 

building and content losses caused by the tsunami’s physical impacts. Each sector is modeled as 
11

a representative firm characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) among 

combinations of inputs to produce a single good or service. The households in each income class 

are modeled as a single representative agent with CES preferences and a constant marginal 

propensity to save and invest out of income. Government is represented in a simplified fashion, 

its role in the circular flow of the economy being passive—collecting taxes from industries and 

passing some of the resulting revenue to the households as lump-sum transfers, in addition to 

purchasing commodities to create a composite government good that is consumed by the 

households. Two primary factors of production are represented within the model: (1) labor, 

whose endowment is fixed but whose allocation among sectors responds to changes in the wage 

rate, and (2) capital, which is treated as sector-specific and immobile among industries or regions 

during the short-run period relevant to the tsunami simulations. These factors are owned by the 

representative agents, who “rent” them out to the firms in the agents’ county of residence in 

exchange for factor income. Each region is modeled as an open economy that engages in trade 

with the rest of California, the rest of the United States, and the rest of the world according to an 

assumption in which imports from other counties, States, and the rest of the world are imperfect 

substitutes for goods produced locally (known as the Armington specification). 

The model is static, computing the prices and quantities of goods and factors that 

equalize supply and demand in all markets in the economy, subject to constraints on the external 

balance of payments, over a single 6-month period. The impacts of a tsunami are modeled as 

exogenous negative shocks to the productivity of import and export activities, damage to capital 

stocks in sectors sustaining direct physical damage (with concomitant reductions in endowments 

of sector-specific capital input), and negative shocks to the productivity of marine-related 

industries (fishing and marinas). The model is formulated as a mixed complementary 

programming problem using the Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium 

analysis (MPSGE) subsystem for the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software 

(Rutherford, 1999; Brooke and others, 1998) and is solved using the PATH solver (Ferris and 

others, 2000). A more detailed and technical description of the model is presented in appendix C. 

The model is calibrated using an IMPLAN (IMpact analysis for PLANning) social accounting 

matrix for the State of California for the year 2010 (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc., 2012). The 

key parameters of the model are summarized in appendix C, which also provides the sectoring 

scheme. The model has been successfully applied to other disaster scenarios. This includes a 

study of the economic impacts of a San Francisco Bay area earthquake closing off the California 

Aqueduct water supplies to Los Angeles County (Rose and others, 2012) and the USGS 

California ARkStorm severe winter storm scenario (Sue Wing and others, 2013). 

Total Economic Impact Results (Without Resilience)

The two-region CGE model was applied to the tsunami's direct economic impacts 

presented in table 1 to estimate the total economic impacts of the event. The direct impacts are 

entered as a combination of import/export disruptions, capital stock damages, and direct gross 

output (revenue) losses, depending on the component of the economy affected (see Section III 

for a discussion of the methodology). The results are presented in table 2 for the five-county 

southern California region, the rest of California, and for California as a whole. The results are 

also presented for each conduit of the shock. Overall, the impacts on GDP (in 2010 dollars) are: 

$3.2 billion for the five-county southern California region, $2.8 billion for the rest of California, 

and $6.0 billion for California as a whole. These impacts represent only 0.383, 0.244, and 0.303 

percent of annual GDP of the three regions, respectively. 
12

Table 2. Summary of business interruption from the SAFRR tsunami scenario, without resilience and 

reconstruction (in millions of 2010 dollars of Gross Domestic Product losses). 

[%, percent; $, dollars; POLA, Port of Los Angeles] 

Impacted category Southern California region Rest of California Total California

San Pedro import total $1,847 (0.222%) $1,327 (0.116%) $3,173 (0.161%)

2-day port shutdown $956 (0.115%) $780 (0.068%) $1,736 (0.088%)

Cargo loss $57 (0.007%) $21 (0.002%) $78 (0.004%)

Facility downtime $828 (0.099%) $522 (0.046%) $1,350 (0.068%)

San Pedro export total $479 (0.058%) $621 (0.055%) $1,100 (0.056%)

2-day port shutdown $357 (0.043%) $439 (0.039%) $795 (0.040%)

Cargo loss $11 (0.001%) $14 (0.001%) $25 (0.001%)

Facility downtime $112 (0.013%) $169 (0.015%) $281 (0.014%)

California coast property damage 

total

$846 (0.102%) $819 (0.072%) $1,665 (0.084%)

Buildings $54 (0.006%) $51 (0.005%) $105 (0.005%)

Contents $792 (0.095%) $767 (0.067%) $1,559 (0.079%)

Other Impacts Total $19 (0.002%) $14 (0.001%) $33 (0.002%)

California coast marinas $17 (0.002%) $14 (0.001%) $30 (0.002%)

POLA fishing $2 (0%1) $02 (0%1) $2 (0%1) 

Grand total3 $3,189 (0.383%) $2,782 (0.244%) $5,971 (0.303%)

1

Less than 0.0005%.

2

Less than $500,000.

3

Totals may not add due to rounding.

Import disruption impacts are the largest component of the negative economic shocks in 

all three regions, totaling $3.2 billion. The total economic impacts of import disruptions 

represent nearly 50 percent or more of the predicted declines in total GDP in each region. The 

category that represents the largest share is the shutdown of the ports themselves, and the 

smallest by far stems from the loss of cargo. One interesting feature of import losses, in contrast 

to export losses to be discussed next, is that the former are higher for the southern California 

region than for the rest of the State. The reasons for this result are the lower direct import 

disruption impacts and the greater substitution stimulus from the reduced flow of imports for the 

rest of the State relative to the same for the southern California region. 

Export disruptions are estimated to incur $1.1 billion in GDP losses for California, with 

port shutdowns by far being responsible for the largest component. Again, cargo losses are by far 

the smallest component. Export shutdowns do not stimulate any offsetting effects, like the case 

of imports, because it wouldn't pay to produce more goods for export if they cannot be shipped. 

Building and content damage in coastal California due to flooding is predicted to amount 

to $1.7 billion in GDP losses, with the vast majority being due to content damage. Here the CGE 

analysis is a straightforward price and quantity multiplier effect extension of the direct impacts, 

and the total impacts for the two subcategories have similar proportions as the direct impacts. 

Other impacts of the tsunami stemming from marina damages and fishing losses are very small, 

totaling only $33 million, or only 0.002 percent of State annual GDP. By far, the largest share 

stems from damage to marinas. 
13

Reductions in the value of GDP are shown in table 3 for the five most affected sectors, 

when losses are expressed as a percentage of annual GDP. Disruption of imports and exports 

incur the largest output losses in manufacturing industries (leather products, primary and 

fabricated metal products, machinery and ship building/repair). The pattern of losses is broadly 

similar for both the five-county and rest of California regions, with the former experiencing 

larger losses in both absolute and percentage terms. The overall magnitude of the losses affecting 

hardest-hit manufacturing industries is small in both absolute and percentage terms over the 6-

month assessment period, totaling 0.4 to 2 percent of annual output or $302 million in the fivecounty region and $110 million in the rest of the State. The overall change in gross output due to 

trade disruption is slight (0.2 percent for the five-county and 0.1 percent for the rest of 

California), accounting for losses of $2.7 billion in the five-county region and $1.6 billion in the 

rest of California. 

Direct damage to capital stocks has its largest impact on a different slate of industries, 

and the associated output losses are at an order of magnitude smaller in percentage terms than in 

the imports/exports disruption case. In the five-county region the output of service sectors is 

most affected (healthcare, real estate, retail trade, education, and transportation), whereas in the 

rest of California adverse impacts are more concentrated in accommodation services, oil seed 

and grain farming, pipeline transportation and gas distribution, and health care services. The 

larger baseline GDP of these sectors in the rest of California means that the dollar value of losses 

is larger despite being smaller in percentage terms. The overall change in GDP due to direct 

destruction of buildings and contents is slight (0.01 to 0.2 percent), accounting for losses of $710 

million in the five-county region and almost $2 billion in the rest of California. 

Finally, looking at the combined impact of all conduits of shock, the sectors that are most 

affected on a percentage basis are dominated by the ones that face the largest exposure to losses 

from trade, with the notable exception of fishing—which is both small and hardest hit in the fivecounty region. Although fishing damages were not evaluated in the rest of California, the impact 

is traceable to demand reductions and price responses in the food-manufacturing and service 

industries. On the whole, losses for both regions are similarly small, 0.2 percent of output, 

totaling around $3.5 billion. 

The results are miniscule compared to the devastation of the Japanese coast in the 2011 

tsunami and ensuing cascading disasters. The main reason is that the SAFFR tsunami scenario 

produces smaller waves and less inundation along the California coast than what occurred along 

the Japanese coast. The estimates in table 2, even before we make any resilience adjustments, are 

very much lower than those for the two previous USGS disaster simulations, where GDP losses 

(in 2010 dollars) were about $70 billon for the ShakeOut (Rose and others, 2011) and a couple of 

hundred billion dollars for ARkStorm (Sue Wing, 2013). 

Note that the results are presented in terms of business interruption relative to projected 

GDP. Because this assumes the economy of the southern California region and the rest of the 

State will continue to grow, the impacts are relatively larger than if they were compared to preevent (static or constant levels of production). However, this distinction is not likely to be great 

because we are only considering one 6-month forecast period. 
14

Table 3. Sectoral Gross Domestic Product losses from the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 

[mfg, manufacturing; $, dollars; POLA, Port of Los Angeles]

Five-county region Rest of California

Mill $ % Mill $ % 

From San Pedro import and export disruption

Other primary metal mfg -4.5 -3.6 Leather and allied product mfg -2.2 -3.4

Fabricated metal product mfg -29.7 -3.3 Other primary metal mfg -14.2 -2.8

Leather and allied product mfg -243.8 -3.2 Automobile and light duty motor 

vehicle mfg

-26.9 -2.5

Automobile and light duty motor 

vehicle mfg

-93.2 -2.9 Fabricated metal product mfg -74.9 -1.9

Iron and steel mills and steel 

product mfg

-0.8 -2.9 Machinery mfg -7.7 -1.2

Other sectors -2,270.2 -0.3 Other sectors -1,506 -0.2

Total -2,642.1 -0.3 Total -1,632 -0.2

From California building and content damage

Health care and social assistance -109.7 -0.2 Accommodation -12.5 -0.3

Educational services -211.1 -0.2 Oilseed and Grain Farming -17.2 -0.2

Retail trade -58.1 -0.2 Pipeline transportation -1.5 -0.2

Transit and ground passenger 

transport

-16.3 -0.2 Natural gas distribution -0.9 -0.2

Real estate and rental and leasing -25.5 -0.1 Health Care and Social 

Assistance

-12.5 -0.2

Other sectors -132.7 -0.02 Other sectors -1,066 -0.1

Total -553.4 -0.07 Total -1,111 -0.1

Total including California marina and POLA fishing damages

Fishing -1.4 -4.2 Leather and allied product mfg -2.3 -3.6

Other primary metal mfg -4.5 -3.6 Other primary metal mfg -14.1 -2.8

Fabricated metal product mfg -29.0 -3.3 Automobile and light duty motor 

vehicle mfg

-27.7 -2.6

Leather and Allied Product Mfg -241.9 -3.2 Fabricated metal product mfg -77.7 -2.0

Automobile and light duty motor 

vehicle mfg

-92.4 -3.0 Machinery mfg -1.2 -1.3

Other sectors -2,846.7 -0.3 Other sectors -2,633 -0.3

Total -3,215.9 -0.4 Total -2,756 -0.3

A couple of critical economic-impact modeling closure assumptions include the savingsinvestment balance and labor supply elasticities. The static model that we have implemented 

cannot address the savings-investment relation, but, given the small impacts relative to the 

California economy, we would not expect a negligible effect on the savings-investment balance. 

However, a sensitivity analysis of the labor market elasticities reveals a significant effect on 

estimated economic impacts.

In the original fairly inelastic formulation (0.05), the economy-wide average wage fell by 

0.4 percent, and the supply of labor remained essentially constant. In the second ,more elastic 

formulation (0.5), the wage fell by 0.3 percent and the supply of labor contracted by 0.1 percent. 

In this analysis, the wage rate varies to clear the market (equilibrate supply and demand). In the 

Keynesian formulation, with the wage fixed at the baseline level and labor in perfectly elastic 

supply so as to be able to equilibrate the labor market, labor decreases by 0.3 percent. The 

consequent reduction in the economy's endowment of productive factors results in an 

amplification of output and GDP losses. The magnitude of losses rises as the elasticity of labor 

supply increases. Increasing the labor supply elasticity by an order of magnitude in the original 
15

formulation exacerbates losses by 22 to 26 percent, whereas in a full Keynesian closure the 

losses jump by 61 to 72 percent.

Note that the original formulation is more consistent with empirical evidence on labor 

elasticities (McClelland and Mok, 2013). However, none of the studies reviewed takes into 

account the effect of a disaster. Even so, we surmise that the Keynesian estimates are 

implausible. For a comparatively small disaster such as this, we expect that it would be more 

likely that individuals will keep working through the recovery period at slightly lower 

compensation levels rather than reduce their hours or quit their jobs. 

Resilience

In this section we analyze the effect of resilience on the economic losses from the 

SAFRR tsunami, especially the port related disruptions or damages. Resilience refers to various 

tactics that can mute losses by using existing resources more efficiently (static resilience) and 

recovering more quickly (dynamic resilience) (Rose, 2009). We analyze only the former 

category in this report. Detailed notes on the data, assumptions, and methodology used in the 

resilience analysis are presented in table 4. Results of the application of the resilience tactics on 

the direct impact estimates are presented in table 5. (See the resilience tactic worksheets in 

appendix B workbook “Tsunami_Port_Direct Impacts without and with Resilience,” available 

online at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/H/, for details on the port direct economic impacts 

by sector and by region.) Production and sales recapture (for example, catching up on lost 

production time) is applied to total economic impacts from port damages and disruption and 

property damages. 

· Conservation—We assume a 2-percent level of conservation for businesses to cope with the 

import disruptions. This resilience tactic have the effect of reducing the direct import 

disruption impact from $675.2 million to $661.7 million, or from 0.214 to 0.210 percent for 

the southern California region; and from $312.1 million to $305.9 million, or from 0.061 to 

0.059 percent, for the rest of California region. 

· Excess Capacity—Documented in table 5, this resilience tactic is applicable to facility 

downtime at the port and for the marina damages at POLA. This resilience tactic has the 

effect of reducing the direct import-disruption impact from $675.2 million to $581.2 million, 

or from 0.214 to 0.184 percent for the southern California region; and from $312.1 million to 

$265.6 million, or from 0.061 to 0.052 percent, for the rest of California region. For marina 

damages, the availability of excess capacity at the Cabrillo Marina can help reduce the direct 

revenue losses to the marina-activity related sectors from $719,000 to $561,000, or from 

0.00005 to 0.00004 percent on an annual basis. 

· Ship Rerouting—Based on a consultation with Capt. Dick McKenna (Marine Exchange; oral 

commun., 2013) we have assumed that ships will not be rerouted for a 2-day port shutdown. 

As for longer facility downtimes taking place in a few terminals, there is only evidence of 

possible ship rerouting for the industrial borate export. If rerouting occurs within southern 

California, ship rerouting can help reduce the total direct export disruption from $131.8 

million to $105.4 million, or from 0.034 to 0.027 percent, for the southern California region; 

and from $78.2 million to $65.0 million, or from 0.017 to 0.014 percent, for the rest of 

California region. However, if exports are diverted out of other States the impact remains the 

same for the State of California. 
16

· Export Diversion (Substitution for Imports)—Export diversion refers to using goods that 

were intended for export as substitutions for the lack of availability of imports. Therefore, the 

application of this resilience tactic relies on export and import disruptions for the same types 

of commodities in order for exports to substitute for disrupted imports. We assume that 

during the 2-day port shutdown, import/export shipments will wait until the resumption of 

the port operation, and no export will be diverted for domestic use. For extended port-facility 

downtime, there is only limited potential for export diversion of petroleum products, because 

there are disruptions to these products on both the import and export sides. All the disrupted 

industrial borate is exported, and all the disrupted steel is imported. Therefore, export 

diversion is not applicable to either of them. According to table 5, on import side, this 

resilience tactic has the effect of reducing the direct impact from $675.2 million to $664.3 

million, or from 0.214 to 0.211, percent for the southern California region; and from $312.1 

million to $306.5 million, or from 0.061 to 0.060 percent, for the rest of California region. 

On the export side, export diversion can help reduce the export disruption impact from 

$131.8 million to $120.9 million, or from 0.034 to 0.031 percent, for the southern California 

region; and from $78.2 million to $72.6 million, or from 0.017 to 0.016 percent, for the rest 

of California region. 

· Inventory Use—Use of the available inventories by the producing sector has the greatest 

potential to reduce the impact from import disruption. As shown in table 4, this resilience 

tactic has the effect of reducing the direct import disruption impact from $675.2 million to 

$30 million, or from 0.214 to 0.010 percent for the southern California region; and from 

$312.1 million to only $1,833, or from 0.061 to 0.000 percent for the rest of California 

region. More details of inventory utilization are presented in appendix D. 

· Production or Sale Recapture from Port Disruption—This resilience strategy refers to the 

ability of businesses to recapture lost production by working overtime or extra shifts once 

their operational capability is restored and their critical inputs are available. Recapture 

applies to total economic impacts. On the export side, a similar concept is sale recapture. At 

the ports, production or sale recapture applies to the import and export disruptions from the 

2-day port shutdown because no ships would be rerouted. Imports and exports would likely 

be delayed for 1 to 2 days on average for a week or so. We assume that the import and export 

disruptions would be recaptured with the exception of perishable (agricultural) products. 

Recapture can also be applied to import and export disruptions from the 2-week to onemonth facility downtime. This is because for a short duration of time (less than 3 months) 

most customers do not cancel their orders. Production recapture would not apply to lost 

marina slip fees, but catching up on lost days of fishing could reduce total impacts by about 

75 percent. Appendix E presents the recapture factors for the other sectors served by the 

ports. Manufacturing sectors have the highest potential (at about 98 percent) to recapture 

their interrupted productions. The recapture factor for agriculture, forestry, and fishing 

industries is at the level of about 75 percent. The recapture factors for the service sectors 

range between 51 and 80 percent. The potential for recapture would be smaller for longer 

periods as customers begin looking elsewhere for their source of supply. Recapture can 

greatly reduce the total impact from import and export disruptions. For the 2-day port 

shutdown, recapture can reduce the total economic impact to the State from $1,736 million to 

$314 million for import disruption and from $795 million to $112 million for export 

disruption, or reductions of potential losses by 82 and 86 percent, respectively. For the 

facility down time, recapture can help mute the potential total economic losses to the State 
17

from $1,350 million to $196 million for import disruption and from $281 million to $34 

million for export disruption. 

· All Resilience Combined for Port Damage and Disruption—After calculating the effects of 

the resilience measures separately, we simulate all the above resilience adjustments together. 

Note, however, that the individual resilience tactics cannot be summed. We apply excess 

capacity and ship rerouting first, followed by export diversion. The 2-percent conservation is 

applied after the above three resilience adjustments. Inventories are used to deal with any 

remaining import disruptions. Applying all these resilience tactics can help reduce the direct 

import disruption impact from $675.2 million to $28.9 million, or from 0.214 to 0.009 

percent, for the southern California region; and from $312.1 million to $1,797 or from 0.061 

to 0.000 percent, for the rest of California region. On the export side, the combined resilience 

has the effect of reducing the export disruption impact from $131.8 million to $93.89 million, 

or from 0.034 to 0.024 percent, for the southern California region; and from $78.2 million to 

$59.0 million, or from 0.017 to 0.013 percent, for the rest of California region. Please note 

production or sale recapture can be applied after all the above resilience tactics. As indicated 

above, production and sale recaptures have the potential to reduce the total economic impacts 

by about 80 to 85 percent. Sector recapture factors can also be applied to the total economic 

impacts from the building and content damages. This procedure reduces those total economic 

impacts to the California economy by 80 percent. See table 6. 
Table 4. Methodology for direct resilience for disruptions to port related activities from the SAFRR tsunami scenario. [Data, green; major assumptions, red; methods, blue. Note that we assume input and import substitution resilience tactics are already incorporated into the 

computable general equilibrium (CGE) model as inherent resilience; no further adjustment is made to capture adaptive versions of these two tactics. %, percent; 

n.a., not applicable]

Direct impact 

type

Conservation Excess capacity Ship rerouting Export diversion 

for domestic use

Inventories Production 

recapture

2-day port 

shutdown

Assume 2%. 

Applicable only 

to the import 

side. 

Reduce percent

import 

disruption by 

2%.

n.a. 

Because the entire port is 

shut down, excess 

capacity will not be 

applicable during this 

time.

n.a.

Assume ships 

will not be 

rerouted within 

2 days.

For a 2-day 

shutdown, we 

assume 

import/export 

shipments will 

wait until the 

port operation 

resumes, and no 

export will be 

diverted for 

import use. 

For marine oil: there is 

a 50% inventory buffer 

for a month taking into 

account the inventories 

both at the parts and at 

customers. 

For other commodities: 

use Bureau of 

Economic Analysis

manufacturing 

inventory data. 

Applicable only to the 

import side. 

See appendix D for a 

summary of method.

Ports recapture 

nonperishable 

cargo handling 

because no ships 

are rerouted in 2 

days.

HAZUS recapture 

factors. 

Applicable to both 

import user and 

exporter sides, and 

port on-site 

activities.

Recapture factors 

are not applied 

directly on the 

input side of the 

economic 

modeling; rather 

they are applied 

directly to the 

economic impact 

results (no 

resilience “base 

case”).
19

Table 4. Methodology for direct resilience for disruptions to port related activities from the SAFRR tsunami scenario.—Continued 

[Data, green; major assumptions, red; methods, blue. Note that we assume input and import substitution resilience tactics are already incorporated into the 

computable general equilibrium (CGE) model as inherent resilience; no further adjustment is made to capture adaptive versions of these two tactics. %, percent; 

n.a., not applicable]

Direct impact 

type

Conservation Excess capacity Ship rerouting Export diversion 

for domestic use

Inventories Production 

recapture

Cargo damages Same as in 

row 1

n.a. n.a. n.a. Same as in row 1 HAZUS recapture 

factors 

Applicable to both 

import user and 

exporter sides, and 

port on-site 

activities.

Recapture factors 

are not applied 

directly on the input 

side of the 

economic modeling; 

rather they are 

applied directly to 

the economic 

impact results (no 

resilience “base 

case”).
20

Table 4. Methodology for direct resilience for disruptions to port related activities from the SAFRR tsunami scenario.—Continued 

[Data, green; major assumptions, red; methods. Note that we assume input and import substitution resilience tactics are already incorporated into the computable 

general equilibrium (CGE) model as inherent resilience; no further adjustment is made to capture adaptive versions of these two tactics. blue; %, percent; n.a., 

not applicable]

Direct impact 

type

Conservation Excess capacity Ship rerouting Export diversion 

for domestic use

Inventories Production 

recapture

Facility 

downtime

Same as in 

row 1

Marine oil: Vopak and Valero 

terminals are short of 40% 

capacity to handle their 

throughput even after using 

excess capacity; other 

terminals have enough 

capacity to handle regular 

throughput after using excess 

capacity. 

Steel: various available 

alternatives at POLA/POLB 

can help reduce impacts of 

downtime at steel break bulk 

terminal by 50%. 

Industrial borate: no other 

industrial borate terminal in 

San Pedro. 

Use the excess capacity info to 

adjust import/export 

disruption; for example, if 

excess capacity of handling 

steel import at undamaged 

terminal is x% of the capacity 

of damaged steel terminal, 

reduce steel import disruption

by x%.

Assume no ship 

diversions for

imports; assume 

100% export 

rerouting for 

Borate. 

Reduce 

import/export 

disruption level 

by percentage of 

ships that can be 

rerouted

Rerouting cost 

needs to be 

reported 

separately.

Examine the 

disrupted export 

and import 

commodities at 

the 4-digit 

Harmonized 

System code 

level. Export 

diversion is 

applicable if 

same type of 

import and

export 

commodities are 

disrupted.

Same as in row 1 Same as in row 2 
21

Table 4. Methodology for direct resilience for disruptions to port related activities from the SAFRR tsunami scenario.—Continued 

[Data, green; major assumptions, red; methods, blue. Note that we assume input and import substitution resilience tactics are already incorporated into the 

computable general equilibrium (CGE) model as inherent resilience; no further adjustment is made to capture adaptive versions of these two tactics. %, percent; 

n.a., not applicable]

Direct impact 

type

Conservation Excess capacity Ship rerouting Export diversion 

for domestic use

Inventories Production 

recapture

Marina slips 

damaged

n.a. Cabrillo Marina Phase II: 

increase the total capacity by 

11%, but all currently still 

vacant; therefore, can be used

as excess capacity; when we 

consider Cabrillo as the excess 

capacity, we also take into 

consideration that 1/3 of this 

marina is damaged (at the 

average damage rate of 

marinas at the port).

If the excess 

capacity/alternative locations 

represent x% of total capacity, 

we reduce revenue losses to 

marina related sectors by x%.

n.a. n.a. n.a. Same as in row 1

Impacts to 

commercial 

fishing

n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Same as in row 1
22

Table 5. Direct impact estimates for the SAFRR tsunami scenario before and after resilience. [M 2010$, millions of; %, percent; n.a., not applicable]

Direct 

Impact Type

Base Case 

Without 

Resilience

Conservation Excess Capacity Ship Rerouting Export Diversion Inventories Combined 

Resilience

 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Southern California five-county region

Import 

disruption

$675.2 0.214% $661.7 0.210% $581.2 0.184% assume no 

rerouting for 

imports

$664.3 0.211% $30.0 0.0095% $28.9 0.0092%

Export 

disruption

$131.8 0.034% n.a. $127.4 0.033% $105.4 0.027% $120.9 0.031% n.a. $93.8 0.024%

Marina 

slips 

damaged

$0.7 0.000% n.a. $561.2 0.000% n.a. n.a. n.a. $0.6 0.000%

Impacts to 

commercial 

fishing

$0.7 0.000% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. $0.7 0.000%

Rest of California region

Import 

disruption

$312.1 0.061% $305.9 0.059% $265.6 0.052% assume no 

rerouting for 

imports

$306.5 0.060% $0.002 0.0000% $0.002 0.000%

Export 

disruption

$78.2 0.017% n.a. $76.0 0.017% $65.0 0.014% $72.6 0.016% n.a. $59.0 0.013%
23

Table 5. Direct impact estimates for the SAFRR tsunami scenario before and after resilience. —Continued 

[M 2010$, millions of 2010 dollars; %, percent; n.a., not applicable]

Direct 

Impact Type

Base Case 

Without 

Resilience

Conservation Excess Capacity Ship Rerouting Export Diversion Inventories Combined 

Resilience

 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Value 

(M 

2010$) % 

Total California

Import 

disruption

$987.3 0.119% $967.5 0.117% $846.8 0.102% assume no 

rerouting for 

imports

$970.8 0.117% $30.0 0.004% $28.9 0.003%

Export 

disruption

$210.0 0.025% n.a. $203.4 0.024% $170.4 0.020% $193.5 0.023% n.a. $152.8 0.018%

Marina slips 

damaged

$0.7 0.000% n.a. $0.6 0.000% n.a. n.a. n.a. $0.6 0.000%

Impacts to 

commercial 

fishing

$0.7 0.000% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. $0.7 0.000%
24

Table 6. Property damage resilience through recapture for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 

[$M, millions of 2010 dollars; %, percent]

Impacted category

Base case After recapture

Southern 

California

Rest of 

California

California

Total

Southern 

California

Rest of 

California

California

Total

Buildings Value ($M) 54 51 105 12 10 22

% 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001

Contents Value ($M) 792 767 1,559 164 139 303

% 0.095 0.067 0.079 0.020 0.012 0.015

Given the high potential for resilience in the port system and property damages identified 

above, and the relatively low total economic impacts from the SAFRR tsunami in the first place, 

we do not deem it necessary to apply the CGE model any further for the case of import 

disruptions, which would approach zero at the direct level. This is also the case for damages to 

POLA marinas. 

Resilience in the California coast marinas is more challenging to determine at this time. 

We could assume that lost slip fees cannot be recaptured from destroyed vessels that would not 

occupy slips until replaced. However, we lack an assessment of excess marina capacity along the 

coast and an investigation of alternate and temporary mooring options. After the 2011 Japanese

tsunami, Crescent City, California, boats were redirected to Eureka, but we have not attempted to 

identify the potential to relocate boats to remaining slips along the California coast or even along 

inland water bodies. Also, after the Japanese tsunami, some boat owners in Crescent City 

moored on buoys and rowed out to their boats as a result of fierce competition for available slips 

(Brett Fahning, oral commun., 2013). In such a case, the full services of a slip (with power and 

water) are not provided, but some of the marina-related activities could continue. Resilience of 

the marina sector, defined as four sectors, will also depend on other coastal recreational pursuits 

that could be substituted for marina activities to maintain marina-related restaurant and retail 

activity. 

Note, of course, that the full potential resilience of the various resilience tactics will not 

necessarily be implemented effectively. Hence, the estimates presented above are an optimistic 

reduction in the SAFRR tsunami scenario direct economic impact estimates for the considered 

resilience strategies. Moreover, at this stage we have not included any stimulus from 

reconstruction that will be partially funded by disaster funds and insurance (financial forms of 

resilience). Therefore, it is possible that the losses in directly impacted sectors that depend on 

coastal locations and possess more limited resilience options (for example, marinas and small 

harbors) will be counterbalanced somewhat by the gains from reconstruction and related 

activities, similar to our simulation results on the economic impacts from the ARkStorm scenario 

(Sue Wing and others, 2013). Locally, this was the experience of Crescent City harbormaster, 

who observed other businesses profiting from the damage of the harbor after the 2011 Tohokuoki tsunami (Richard Young, oral commun., 2013). Also, delays in Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) reimbursements have impeded recovery of Crescent City Harbor, 

and streamlining the FEMA process presents an opportunity to increase resilience in future 

disasters.

Given that resilience tactics are potentially very effective at reducing economic impacts 

for the SAFRR tsunami scenario, goods movement delay costs and impacts from environmental 

damages may become relatively more important. Also, the likely over evacuation of people from 
25

coastal areas that will affect economic activity in areas beyond the inundation area may be of 

interest. 

Conclusion

We have estimated the direct and total economic impacts of the SAFRR tsunami scenario 

hitting the California coast. The results follow from the selection of the tsunami source (Kirby 

and others, 2013), the modeling of wave propagation and the damaging current velocities and 

inundation (SAFFR Tsunami Scenario Modeling Working Group, 2013), the assessment of 

damages (Porter and others, 2013a); and the economic impact modeling and incorporation of 

economic resilience. Although uncertainties at each stage propagate throughout the analysis of 

the scenario in forms of both under and over estimation, the potential for a tsunami to inundate 

land along the coast of California is firmly established (Wilson and others, written commun., 

2013). An integrated analysis culminating with an estimation of economic impacts exposes 

vulnerabilities of sectors and the California economy. Most importantly, it emphasizes the 

potential effectiveness of resilience when planning for future tsunami events.

Losses stem from a combination of import and export disruptions at POLA and POLB, 

property damage to coastal buildings and contents, other losses related to marina damages in 

coastal counties, and POLA commercial fishing losses. Our estimate of total impact to GDP 

without resilience for California is just less than $6.0 billion. By far the largest share of these 

losses, comprising more than 50 percent of the total, stems from import disruptions, due to a 2-

day port shutdown, loss of cargo, and port facility downtime. More than half of these losses 

apply to southern California. Without resilience, there would be some positive shift in economic 

activity to the rest of California, as production of import substitutes is needed, but still not 

enough to offset the negative stimulus in that region. National-scale impacts still remain to be 

investigated, but the results for California indicate that the impacts will be small relative to 

previously studied port shutdowns of weeks, months, and years. 

Without resilience, $4.3 billion of the potential total economic impacts to California stem 

from the 2-day port shutdown and $100 million of physical damages to terminals and cargo at 

the POLA and POLB through import and export disruptions. Damages to cargo and facilities are 

responsible for $1.7 billion of port impacts. Coincidentally, these port damage economic impacts 

are matched by $1.7 billion of economic impacts from $2.5 billion of coastal property damages. 

This result highlights a hypersensitivity of economic impacts to port damages, suggesting that it 

could be worthwhile investigating the effects of the SAFRR tsunami scenario on other California 

ports, including the Ports of Oakland, Richmond, San Diego, and Hueneme.

However, economic resilience tactics greatly reduce the total economic impact to the 

California economy. The ports’ ability to sustain the 2-day shutdown by clearing the back log of 

ships in the harbor and the awaiting exports nulls most of the import and export disruption. The 

month-long reduced capacity at numerous marine oil terminals could be compensated for by 

excess capacity at a terminal and inventories at a port, off-site, and at major customers. 

Resilience would have a greater effect on reducing direct impacts on the import side ($1 billion 

reduced by $30 million) than the export side ($200 million reduced to $150 million). The most 

effective resilience tactic on the import-disruption side is inventory use, a tactic that is not 

applicable to the export-disruption side. However, inventories have a limited term, such that a 

longer period of reduced capacity at the marine oil terminals will eventually result in fuel supply 

challenges for southern California. 
26

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank the many members of the SAFRR project research team for 

their contributions to this report. Foremost is Keith Porter, the physical damage analysis 

coordinator, who supplied us with the majority of the direct property damage and output loss 

estimates. Moffat and Nichol Engineers extended their San Pedro damage analysis to mesh with 

the economic impact inputs. We are also grateful to Larry Cottrill (POLB), Michael Keenan 

(POLA) and Captain Dick McKenna (Marina Exchange) for access to some data and their sound 

advice. Terminal capacity information was provided by Roger Wu (POLB), Eric Caris (POLA), 

Michael Galvin (POLA), and Christopher Chase (POLA). Funding for this research was 

provided by the U.S. Geological Survey’s Land Change Science Program. We appreciated the 

input of port tenants and refineries that engaged in questioning to inform aspects of resilience in 

their operations to withstand damages and disruptions. However, the authors are solely 

responsible for any errors or omissions in this report. 

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California tsunami scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170–E, 183 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/e/.

Porter, K., Byers, W., Dykstra, D., Lim, A., Lynett, P., Ratliff, J., Scawthorn, C., Wein, A., and 

Wilson, R., 2013a, Physical damage in the SAFRR California tsunami scenario: U.S. 

Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170–E, 183 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/e/. 

Porter, K., Lynett, P., and Wilson, R., 2013b, Damages and restoration of marinas and small 

craft, in Porter, K., Byers, W., Dykstra, D., Lim, A., Lynett, P., Ratliff, J., Scawthorn, C., 

Wein, A., and Wilson, R., Physical damage in the SAFRR California tsunami scenario: U.S. 

Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170–E, 183 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/e/.

Rose, A., 2009, Economic resilience to disasters: Community and Regional Resilience Institute 

Research Report 8, 40 p., accessed August 13, 2013, at 

http://research.create.usc.edu/published_papers/75.

Rose, A., Sue Wing, I., Wei, D., and Avetisyan, M., 2012, Total regional economic losses from 

water supply disruptions to the Los Angeles County economy: Final Report to Los Angeles 

Economic Development Corporation, 66 p. 

Rose, A., and Wei, D., 2013, Estimating the economic consequences of a port shutdown—The 

special role of resilience: Economic Systems Research, v. 25, no. 2, p. 212–232. 

Rose, A., Wei, D., and Wein, A., 2011, Economic impacts of the ShakeOut scenario: Earthquake 

Spectra, v. 27, no. 2, p. 539–557. 

Rutherford, T.F., 1999, Applied general equilibrium modeling with MPSGE as a GAMS 

subsystem—An overview of the modeling framework and syntax: Computational Economics, 

v. 14, p. 1–46. 

SAFRR Tsunami Scenario Modeling Working Group, 2013, Modeling for the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario—Generation, propagation, inundation, and currents in ports and harbors: U.S. 

Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170–D, 127 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/d/.

Sue Wing, I., 2009, Computable general equilibrium models for the analysis of energy and 

climate policies, in Evans, J., and Hunt, L.C., eds., International handbook on the economics of 

energy: Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, p. 332–366. 

Sue Wing, I., 2011, Computable general equilibrium models for the analysis of economyenvironment interactions, in Batabyal, A., and Nijkamp, P., eds., Research tools in natural 

resource and environmental economics: Hackensack, World Scientific, p. 255–305. 
28

U.S. Census Bureau, 2012, 2010 U.S. export and import data for Port of Los Angeles and Port of 

Long Beach: U.S. Census Bureau, USA Trade Online website, accessed December, 2012, at

https://usatrade.census.gov/.
29

Appendix A. Methodology and Data

[Data, green; major assumptions, red; methods, blue. POLA, Port of Los Angeles; 2010$, 2010 dollars; CGE, computable general equilibrium; M, million; K, 

thousand; %, percent] 

Direct 

impact 

type

Data/major 

assumptions/estimation 

method

Direct 

economic 

impact

Further 

conversion 

Applicable 

resilience Comments

2-day port 

shutdown

U.S. Census Bureau, 2012; 

Dykstra and others (2013). 

Assume essentially no ship 

diversions. 

Import and export 

disruption to all trade 

commodities for 2 days.

1. Percent

import 

disruption by 

sector. 

2. Percent

export 

disruption by 

sector.

Inventories; 

conservation; input 

substitution; 

production 

recapture.

Import disruption means a disruption of import input to the 

producing sectors. For a 2-day port shutdown, it is 

reasonable to believe that it is just a delay of shipping the 

imports to the domestic importers. Therefore, most of the 

economic losses should be able to make up by use of 

inventories and production recapture.

Export disruption means a disruption or demand reduction 

to exporters because of the interruption of the port 

transportation. However, for a 2-day port shutdown, it is just 

a delay of shipping out of the export commodities. It is 

unlikely that the foreign buyers will cancel the order within 

2 days. The majority of the service disruption can be made 

up by the port by working overtime (production recapture) 

after the port reopened. 
30

Appendix A. Methodology and Data—Continued

[Data, green; major assumptions, red; methods, blue. POLA, Port of Los Angeles; 2010$, 2010 dollars; CGE, computable general equilibrium; M, million; K, 

thousand; %, percent] 

Direct impact 

type

Data/major assumptions/estimation 

method

Direct economic impact Further 

conversion

Applicable resilience Comments

Cargo damages Damage data provided by Dykstra 

and others (2013). 

1. Map cargo damage data to CGE 

sectors. 

2. For imports, aggregate the data for 

POLA and POLB and then calculate 

percent import input disruption by 

sector. 

3. For exports, aggregate data for 

POLA and POLB and then calculate 

export demand reduction by sector.

1. Percent import 

disruption by sector. 

2. Percent export 

disruption by sector.

Inventories; conservation; input 

substitution; production recapture. 

Cost of cleanup 

of the damaged 

cargos is not 

included in the 

analysis. 

Facility 

downtime: 

1. POLA berths 

165–166 

(industrial 

borates). 

2. POLA berths 

163, 164, 167–

169, 187–191 

(marine oil and 

fuels). 

3. POLA berths 

174–181 (steel)

Downtime data provided by Dykstra 

and others (2013). 

1. Berths 165–166 downtime is 

translated into export disruption for 

borate for 2 weeks 

2. Berths 163, 164, 167–169, 187–191 

downtime is translated into 50% 

reduction in capacity for 1 month for 

marine oil and fuels (import and/or 

export) 

3. Berths 174–181 downtime is 

translated into import disruption for 

steel for 2 weeks

1. Percent direct export

disruption to sector 28 

(chemical 

manufacturing) 

2. Percent import 

disruption or Percent 

direct export disruption

of sector 26 (petroleum 

refineries). 

3. Percent import 

disruption of sector 31 

(iron and steel mills/steel 

product manufacturing). 

Excess capacity; ship rerouting; 

inventories; conservation; export 

diversion (only in cases of import 

and export disruption of same 

commodity at same time); input 

substitution; production recapture. 
31

Appendix A. Methodology and Data—Continued

[Data, green; major assumptions, red; methods, blue. POLA, Port of Los Angeles; 2010$, 2010 dollars; CGE, computable general equilibrium; M, million; K, 

thousand; %, percent] 

Direct impact 

type Data/major assumptions/estimation method Direct economic impact Applicable resilience

Marina: 1/3 POLA 

marina slips 

damaged

According to Martin Associates (2007), direct revenue of marina tenants 

estimated to be $48.2 M in 2006. Although there has been a capacity 

increase of about 11% because new capacity is still vacant; Convert $48.2 

M to 2010$, we get a total revenue of $51.8M in 2010$. The monthly 

rental revenue to the port is $300K. 

Assume marina tenants would lose 1/3 of their business during slip repair 

time; it will take 1 month to repair the damaged slips at a linear rate. 

We distribute the total revenue losses (excluding the rental revenue to the 

port) evenly among restaurant, retail, and marina-related activities sectors.

$300K revenue loss to POLA. As 

for the remaining direct revenue 

losses, we distribute them to 

marina recreation industries, 

restaurants, and retail trade. 

Excess capacity 

of marina; 

production 

recapture. 

Impacts to 

commercial 

fishing

Economic impacts pertain to perished fish on board of the vessels at sea 

and lost fishing days: 25% of a day’s fish haul will perish. In addition, 5% 

of fishing fleet will be damaged, and 4 fishing days lost. 

It will take about 2 months on average to repair or replace the damaged 

boats, so it will lead to a 5% of 2-month total revenue loss to the fishing 

industry.

These are converted to direct 

revenue loss to the fishing sector. 

Production 

recapture. 

Miscellaneous:

A. Cruise ship

No POLA cruise ships affected during the 2-day time period of the 

scenario. 
32

Appendix B. Tsunami Port Direct Impacts Without and With Resilience

[This appendix is provided online only as an Excel spreadsheet (Tsunami_Port_Direct Impacts 

without and with Resilience) at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/H/] 





38

complementarity problem using the MPSGE subsystem for GAMS (Rutherford, 1999; 

Brooke and others, 1998) and is solved using the PATH solver (Ferris and others, 2000).

Table C1. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) model sectors for the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario.

[NAICS, North American Industry Classification System; mfg, manufacturing]

Description NAICS Code HAZUS

occupancy class1

1 Oilseed and grain farming 1111 AGR1

2 Vegetable and melon farming 1112 AGR1

3 Fruit and tree nut farming 1113 AGR1

4 Other crop farming 1114, 1119 AGR1

5 Animal production and aquaculture 112 AGR1

6 Forestry and logging 113 AGR1

7 Fishing 1141 AGR1

8 Hunting and trapping 1142 AGR1

9 Support activities for agriculture and forestry 115 AGR1

10 Oil and gas extraction 211 IND4

11 Other nonmetallic mineral mining and quarrying 21239 IND4

12 Other mining 212 (ex. 21239) IND4

13 Electric power generation, transmission and

distribution 2211 COM4

14 Natural gas distribution 2212 COM4

15 Water and sewage 2213 COM4

16 Nonresidential construction 23 IND6

17 Residential construction 23 IND6

18 Food mfg 311 IND3

19 Beverage and tobacco product mfg 312 IND3

20 Textile and textile product mills 313, 314 IND1

21 Apparel mfg 315 IND2

22 Leather and allied product mfg 316 IND2

23 Wood product mfg 321 IND1

24 Paper mfg 322 IND1

25 Printing and related support activities 323 IND2

26 Petroleum refineries 32411 IND3

27 Other petroleum and coal products mfg 324 IND3

28 Chemical mfg 325 IND3

29 Plastics and rubber products mfg 326 IND2

30 Nonmetallic mineral product mfg 327 IND1

31 Iron and steel mills and steel product mfg 3311 and 3312 IND4

32 Other primary metal mfg 331 (ex. 3311), 3312 IND4

33 Fabricated metal product mfg 332 IND4

34 Machinery mfg 333 IND1

35 Computer and electronic product mfg 334 IND5

36 Electrical equipment, appliance and component mfg 335 IND2

37 Automobile and light duty motor vehicle mfg 33611 IND1
39

Table C1. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) model sectors for the SAFRR tsunami scenario.—Continued

[NAICS, North American Industry Classification System; mfg, manufacturing] 

Description NAICS Code HAZUS

occupancy class1

38 Ship and boat building and repairing 3366 IND1

39 Other transportation equipment mfg 336 (ex. 33611), 3366 IND1

40 Furniture and related product mfg 337 IND2

41 Miscellaneous mfg 339 IND2

42 Wholesale 42 COM2

43 Retail trade 44-45 COM1

44 Air transportation 481 COM4

45 Rail transportation 482 COM4

46 Water transportation 483 COM4

47 Truck transportation 484 COM4

48 Transit and ground passenger transport 485 COM4

49 Pipeline transportation 486 COM4

50 Scenic and sightseeing transport & support activities 487, 488 COM4

51 Couriers and messengers 492 COM4

52 Warehousing and storage 493 COM2

53 Information 51 COM4

54 Finance and insurance 52 COM4; COM5

55 Real estate and rental and leasing 53 COM4

56 Professional, scientific and technical services 54 COM4

57 Admin support and waste management and

remediation

56 COM4

58 Educational services 61 EDU1; EDU2

59 Health care and social assistance 62 COM6; COM7

60 Arts, entertainment and recreation 71 (ex. 71391-3), 

71399

COM8

61 Other amusement and recreation, including marinas 71391-3, 71399 COM8

62 Accommodation and food services 721 RES4

63 Food services and drinking places 722 COM8

64 Other services (except public administration) 55, 81 COM3

65 Government and non-NAICS 92 GOV1; GOV2

1

Key: AGR1 Agriculture; IND1 Heavy Industry; IND2 Light Industry; IND3 Food/Drugs/Chemicals; IND4 

Metals/ Minerals Processing; IND5 High Technology Industry; IND6 Construction; COM1 Retail Trade; 

COM2 Wholesale Trade; COM3 Personal and Repair Services; COM4 Professional/Technical Services; 

COM5 Banks/Financial Institutions; COM6 Hospitals; COM7 Medical Offices/Clinics; COM8 

Entertainment & Recreation; EDU1 Schools; EDU2 Colleges/Universities; RES4 Temporary Lodging for 

Accommodation; GOV1 General Government Services; GOV2 Emergency Response.

41

Appendix D. Calculation of Inventory Availability for Resilience

In disaster impact analysis, inventories of raw materials and finished goods used as inputs 

or intended for final customers through wholesale and retail markets can cushion the blow of a 

supply disruption, such as those associated with the port shutdown in this study. We summarize 

the methods, assumptions, and data sources we use to compute the available inventory in the 

southern California region that can be used to deal with supply disruptions. 

Our major data source of inventories is the real inventories and sales in the national 

economic accounts released by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 

Analysis (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2013). The data used here are only for manufacturing 

sectors. Table D1 presents these data for the United States for the year 2011 for three fabrication 

stages of inventories—materials and supplies, work-in-process, and finished goods. In the last 

three columns in table D1, inventory to annual sale ratios are computed. 

For each of the three individual stages of fabrication, the data pertain to the total amount 

of inventories held by each manufacturing sector. There is no reference to the types of input in 

the first two categories. To disaggregate the inventories of materials and supplies into different 

types of raw material inputs available for each manufacturing industry, we make use of the 

regional input-output table. For inventories of finished goods, we create a matrix that shows the 

amount of own output each sector holds. 

Below, we use the five-county southern California region as an example to illustrate the 

steps in the inventory calculation. In table D2, the first column presents the annual sectoral sales 

in the southern California region. Applying the national level inventory to sales ratios in the last 

three columns of table 1 to the annual sales of the southern California region, we estimated the 

inventories in the fabrication stages in the region for the manufacturing sectors (the last three 

columns in table D2). 

For inventory of materials and supplies, we disaggregated the total value in the second 

column of table D2 for each sector into various raw material inputs based on the column (input) 

coefficients in the regional input-output table. Note that we include the following sectoral inputs 

as raw material inputs: agriculture, fishing, and forestry, mining, utility (except for electricity), 

and all manufacturing sectors. In other words, we did not count the production inputs from the 

electric power generation, construction, and service sectors as raw materials. Table D3 presents 

the calculation results, with each row representing different types of raw material inputs, and 

each column representing different sectors. Because we only have the inventory data for 

manufacturing sectors, we have omitted other sectors in the table. 

For inventory of work-in-process products, because they are midway between finished 

commodities and raw material inputs and difficult to disaggregate on a sectoral basis, we do not 

include this category of inventory in our calculation to obtain the commodity inventory buffers 

that can help reduce the impacts of import disruptions. Table D4 shows the amount of “own” 

outputs that are held by each sector as finished goods inventory for the southern California 

region. 

Finally, for each commodity in table D5, we add up the numbers over the corresponding 

rows in tables D3 and D4 to obtain the total amount of inventories that are available in the 

southern California region to be used to reduce the impact from import disruptions. 

Our calculation of inventory availability is conservative from three perspectives. First, we 

only count for the inventories that are held by the manufacturing sectors in the region. However, 

the inventories held by the other sectors are likely to be small compared with those held by the 
42

manufacturing sectors. Major inventories of the agriculture sector may include water, gas, 

pesticide, and feed. The inventories for the transportation sectors may include oil, gas, and water. 

Most of the service sectors may only possess limited inventories. Second, we did not take into 

consideration the consumer goods held by the wholesalers and retailers in the region that can 

help cushion the supply disruption impacts to the end users. And finally, again we did not 

include the work-in-process inventories in our calculation. 
43

Table D1. Real manufacturing inventories for the United States, by stage of fabrication, seasonally adjusted, end of 2011 (data from Bureau of 

Economic Analysis, 2013). 

[M 2005$, millions of 2005 dollars; %, percent] 

Sector

 

2011 

annual 

sales (M 

2005$)

End of 2011 inventories 

(M 2005$) Inventory to sale ratio

Materials 

and

supplies

Work-inprocessFinished 

goods

Materials 

and 

supplies

Work-inprocessFinished 

goods

Manufacturing industries 4,283,928 182,015 172,059 194,142 4% 4% 5%

Durable goods manufacturing industries 2,205,444 109,907 134,751 92,847 5% 6% 4%

Wood product manufacturing 70,596 4,025 1,456 3,474 6% 2% 5%

Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 79,236 4,263 1,123 5,260 5% 1% 7%

Primary metal manufacturing 213,444 8,835 7,838 7,686 4% 4% 4%

Fabricated metal product manufacturing 251,196 14,113 11,830 12,939 6% 5% 5%

Machinery manufacturing 300,228 18,333 12,806 15,134 6% 4% 5%

Computer and electronic product manufacturing 371,904 22,995 20,365 16,956 6% 5% 5%

Electrical equipment, appliance, and component 

manufacturing 93,468 5,871 4,938 2,908 6% 5% 3%

Transportation equipment manufacturing 632,496 20,699 69,019 15,138 3% 11% 2%

Motor vehicle and parts manufacturing 451,224 12,179 6,103 8,046 3% 1% 2%

Other transportation equipment manufacturing 183,024 8,534 62,992 7,103 5% 34% 4%

Furniture and related product manufacturing 53,448 3,643 1,307 2,377 7% 2% 4%

Miscellaneous durable goods manufacturing 136,980 7,789 4,451 11,532 6% 3% 8%

Nondurable goods manufacturing industries 2,079,984 72,604 38,329 101,612 3% 2% 5%

Food manufacturing 531,648 10,942 5,653 22,589 2% 1% 4%

Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 113,916 5,812 2,842 5,321 5% 2% 5%

Textile mills 24,156 1,635 921 1,979 7% 4% 8%

Textile product mills 19,836 1,272 573 1,517 6% 3% 8%

Apparel manufacturing 15,528 1,745 984 3,474 11% 6% 22%

Leather and allied product manufacturing 5,196 426 248 779 8% 5% 15%

Paper manufacturing 134,256 7,873 1,643 6,314 6% 1% 5%

Printing and related support activities 74,640 2,137 827 2,671 3% 1% 4%

Petroleum and coal product manufacturing 433,716 10,523 8,941 15,692 2% 2% 4%

Chemical manufacturing 552,840 21,286 13,223 31,137 4% 2% 6%

Plastics and rubber product manufacturing 163,764 9,056 2,146 9,725 6% 1% 6%
44

Table D2. Inventories by stage of fabrication for manufacturing industry in southern California region (in 

millions of 2010 dollars).

[Data in second column from Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc. (2012). Numbers in the remaining three columns 

computed by the authors] 

Sector 2010 Annual 

sales

Materials 

and supplies

Work-inprocessFinished 

goods

Oilseed and grain farming 6.81 

Vegetable and melon farming 820.83 

Fruit and tree nut farming 1,491.43 

Other crop farming 1,447.33 

Animal production and aquaculture 895.13 

Forestry and logging 67.38 

Fishing 70.43 

Hunting and trapping 1.68 

Support activities for agriculture and forestry 799.21 

Oil and gas extraction 4,447.24 

Other nonmetallic mineral mining and 

quarrying

40.22 

Other mining 1,132.62 

Electric power generation, transmission, and 

distribution

10,436.73 

Natural gas distribution 15,205.43 

Water, sewage and other systems 192.19 

Nonresidential construction 40,214.90 

Residential construction 21,728.61 

Food manufacturing 25,194.47 518.53 267.89 1,070.48

Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 7,228.67 368.81 180.34 337.65

Textile mills and textile product mills 2,902.35 191.79 98.57 230.65

Apparel manufacturing 8,897.59 999.89 563.83 1,990.61

Leather and allied product manufacturing 335.53 27.51 16.01 50.30

Wood product manufacturing 1,380.90 78.73 28.48 67.95

Paper manufacturing 5,318.06 311.86 65.08 250.11

Printing and related support activities 4,956.64 141.91 54.92 177.37

Petroleum refineries 29,523.18 716.30 608.62 1,068.16

Other petroleum and coal products 

manufacturing

1,415.89 34.35 29.19 51.23

Chemical manufacturing 41,590.96 1,601.38 994.79 2,342.48

Plastics and rubber products manufacturing 8,850.26 489.41 115.98 525.57
45

Table D2. Inventories by stage of fabrication for manufacturing industry in southern California 

region (in millions of 2010 dollars).—Continued 

[Data in second column from Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc. (2012). Numbers in the remaining three 

columns computed by the authors]

Sector 2010 Annual 

sales

Materials 

and 

supplies

Work-inprocessFinished 

goods

Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 3,519.98 189.38 49.89 233.67

Iron and steel mills and steel product 

manufacturing

2,114.57 87.53 77.65 76.14

Other primary metal manufacturing 3,620.23 149.85 132.94 130.36

Fabricated metal product manufacturing 17,220.63 967.51 811.00 887.03

Machinery manufacturing 9,722.29 593.68 414.70 490.08

Computer and electronic product 

manufacturing

44,222.52 2,734.30 2,421.57 2,016.21

Electrical equipment, appliance, and

component manufacturing

5,715.18 358.99 301.94 177.81

Automobile and light duty motor vehicle 

manufacturing

1,280.57 34.56 17.32 22.83

Ship and boat building and repairing 110.11 5.13 37.90 4.27

Other transportation equipment 

manufacturing

29,020.87 949.73 3,166.80 694.58

Furniture and related product manufacturing 4,223.61 287.88 103.28 187.84

Miscellaneous manufacturing 13,535.31 769.65 439.81 1,139.50

Wholesale 70,405.20 

Retail trade 67,965.42 

Air transportation 5,447.77 

Rail transportation 1,935.02 

Water transportation 1,691.02 

Truck transportation 10,576.43 

Transit and ground passenger transport 1,528.19 

Pipeline transportation 1,119.28 

Scenic and sightseeing transportation and 

support activities for transportation

7,164.95 

Couriers and messengers 3,854.49 

Warehousing and storage 3,959.39 

Information 107,126.54 

Finance and insurance 127,450.38 

Real estate and rental and leasing 184,545.94 

Professional, scientific, and technical 

services

118,419.85 
46

Table D2. Inventories by stage of fabrication for manufacturing industry in southern California 

region (in millions of 2010 dollars).—Continued

[Data in second column from Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc. (2012). Numbers in the remaining three 

columns computed by the authors]

Sector 2010 Annual 

sales

Materials 

and 

supplies

Work-inprocessFinished 

goods

Administrative and support and waste 

management and remediation services

38,541.13 

Educational services 14,022.91 

Health care and social assistance 85,694.17 

Arts, entertainment, and recreation 25,645.11 

Other amusement and recreation industries 

including marinas

1,407.32 

Accommodation and food services 6,838.84 

Food services and drinking places 35,200.46 

Other services (except public 

administration)

40,667.72 

Government and non-NAICS 103,768.70 

Total 271,900.35 12,608.67 10,998.50 14,222.90

Table D3. Availability of raw material inputs computed from materials and supplies inventory for 

the southern California region (in millions of 2010 dollars). 

[Table D3 is provided online only as an Excel spreadsheet at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/h/] 

Table D4. Finished goods held by sector for the southern California region (in millions of 2010 

dollars). [Table D4 is provided online only as an Excel spreadsheet at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/h/] 
47

Table D5. Available inventory in the southern California region (in millions of 2010 dollars). 

Sector Value

Oilseed and grain farming 0.41

Vegetable and melon farming 11.46

Fruit and tree nut farming 29.21

Other crop farming 53.21

Animal production and aquaculture 64.90

Forestry and logging 13.23

Fishing 1.03

Hunting and trapping 0.00

Support activities for agriculture and forestry 0.00

Oil and gas extraction 416.10

Other nonmetallic mineral mining and quarrying 3.54

Other mining 71.54

Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 0.00

Natural gas distribution 455.08

Water, sewage and other systems 1.54

Nonresidential construction 0.00

Residential construction 0.00

Food manufacturing 1,509.86

Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 393.06

Textile mills and textile product mills 945.02

Apparel manufacturing 2,190.44

Leather and allied product manufacturing 53.80

Wood product manufacturing 186.75

Paper manufacturing 789.98

Printing and related support activities 264.58

Petroleum refineries 1,715.41

Other petroleum and coal products manufacturing 105.17

Chemical manufacturing 4,616.41

Plastics and rubber products manufacturing 1,206.19

Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 454.95

Iron and steel mills and steel product manufacturing 566.26

Other primary metal manufacturing 748.73

Fabricated metal product manufacturing 2,279.40

Machinery manufacturing 691.09

Computer and electronic product manufacturing 3,766.17

Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing 406.03

Automobile and light duty motor vehicle manufacturing 23.07

Ship and boat building and repairing 4.32

Other transportation equipment manufacturing 1,178.37
48 

Table D5. Available inventory in the southern California region (in millions of 2010 dollars).—

Continued 

Sector Value

Furniture and related product manufacturing 259.18

Miscellaneous manufacturing 1,356.08

Wholesale 0.00

Retail trade 0.00

Air transportation 0.00

Rail transportation 0.00

Water transportation 0.00

Truck transportation 0.00

Transit and ground passenger transport 0.00

Pipeline transportation 0.00

Scenic and sightseeing transportation and support activities for transportation 0.00

Couriers and messengers 0.00

Warehousing and storage 0.00

Information 0.00

Finance and insurance 0.00

Real estate and rental and leasing 0.00

Professional, scientific, and technical services 0.00

Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services 0.00

Educational services 0.00

Health care and social assistance 0.00

Arts, entertainment, and recreation 0.00

Other amusement and recreation industries including marinas 0.00

Accommodation and food services 0.00

Food services and drinking places 0.00

Other services (except public administration) 0.00

Government and non-NAICS 0.00
49

Appendix E. Production Recapture Factors

Sector Description 1–90 days 91–180 days

1 Oilseed and grain farming 0.75 0.56

2 Vegetable and melon farming 0.75 0.56

3 Fruit and tree nut farming 0.75 0.56

4 Other crop farming 0.75 0.56

5 Animal production and aquaculture 0.75 0.56

6 Forestry and logging 0.75 0.56

7 Fishing 0.75 0.56

8 Hunting and trapping 0.75 0.56

9 Support activities for agriculture and forestry 0.75 0.56

10 Oil and gas extraction 0.98 0.74

11 Other nonmetallic mineral mining and 

quarrying

0.98 0.74

12 Other mining 0.98 0.74

13 Electric power generation, transmission, and 

distribution

0.90 0.68

14 Natural gas distribution 0.90 0.68

15 Water, sewage and other systems 0.90 0.68

16 Nonresidential construction 0.95 0.71

17 Residential construction 0.95 0.71

18 Food manufacturing 0.98 0.74

19 Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 0.98 0.74

20 Textile mills and textile product mills 0.98 0.74

21 Apparel manufacturing 0.98 0.74

22 Leather and allied product manufacturing 0.98 0.74

23 Wood product manufacturing 0.98 0.74

24 Paper manufacturing 0.98 0.74

25 Printing and related support activities 0.98 0.74

26 Petroleum refineries 0.98 0.74

27 Other petroleum and coal products 

manufacturing

0.98 0.74

28 Chemical manufacturing 0.98 0.74

29 Plastics and rubber products manufacturing 0.98 0.74

30 Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 0.98 0.74

31 Iron and steel mills and steel product 

manufacturing

0.98 0.74

32 Other primary metal manufacturing 0.98 0.74

33 Fabricated metal product manufacturing 0.98 0.74
50

Appendix E. Production Recapture Factors—Continued

Sector Description 1–90 days 91–180 days

34 Machinery manufacturing 0.98 0.74

35 Computer and electronic product 

manufacturing

0.98 0.74

36 Electrical equipment, appliance, and

component manufacturing

0.98 0.74

37 Automobile and light duty motor vehicle 

manufacturing

0.98 0.74

38 Ship and boat building and repairing 0.98 0.74

39 Other transportation equipment manufacturing 0.98 0.74

40 Furniture and related product manufacturing 0.98 0.74

41 Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.98 0.74

42 Wholesale 0.87 0.65

43 Retail trade 0.87 0.65

44 Air transportation 0.90 0.68

45 Rail transportation 0.90 0.68

46 Water transportation 0.90 0.68

47 Truck transportation 0.90 0.68

48 Transit and ground passenger transport 0.90 0.68

49 Pipeline transportation 0.90 0.68

50 Scenic and sightseeing transportation and 

support activities for transportation 

0.90 0.68

51 Couriers and messengers 0.90 0.68

52 Warehousing and storage 0.87 0.65

53 Information 0.90 0.68

54 Finance and insurance 0.90 0.68

55 Real estate and rental and leasing 0.90 0.68

56 Professional, scientific, and technical services 0.90 0.68

57 Administrative and support and waste 

management and remediation services

0.90 0.68

58 Educational services 0.60 0.45

59 Health care and social assistance 0.60 0.45

60 Arts, entertainment, and recreation 0.60 0.45

61 Other amusement and recreation industries 

including marinas

0.60 0.45

62 Accommodation 0.60 0.45

63 Food services and drinking places 0.60 0.45

64 Other services (except public administration) 0.51 0.38

65 Government and non-NAICS 0.80 0.60
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U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–I

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

Population Vulnerability and Evacuation Challenges in 

California for the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario
COVER—Photograph of Huntington Beach, California, from the City of Huntington Beach (2012), which states that all 

of its website content is public information.
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario

Stephanie Ross and Lucile Jones, Editors 

Population Vulnerability and Evacuation Challenges in 

California for the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

By Nathan Wood, Jamie Ratliff, Jeff Peters, and Kimberley Shoaf 

Open-File Report 2013–1170-I 

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey 
iii

U.S. Department of the Interior

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2013

For product and ordering information:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov/pubprod

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth,

its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

Suggested citation: 

Wood, N., Ratliff, J., Peters, J., and Shoaf, K., 2013, Population vulnerability and evacuation challenges in California 

for the SAFRR tsunami scenario, chap. I in Ross, S.L., and Jones, L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science Application for 

Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170, 53 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/i/. 

Any use of trade, product, or firm names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply 

endorsement by the U.S. Government.

Although this information product, for the most part, is in the public domain, it also may contain copyrighted materials 

as noted in the text. Permission to reproduce copyrighted items must be secured from the copyright owner.
iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION

MARK NECHODOM

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D.

STATE GEOLOGIST
v

Contents

Abstract............................................................................................................................................................................1

Introduction......................................................................................................................................................................2

Public-Health Implications of a Distant-Source Tsunami.................................................................................................3

Geographic Scope of Analysis.........................................................................................................................................4

Magnitude and Hotspots of Population Exposure............................................................................................................6

Residents .....................................................................................................................................................................6

Employees ...................................................................................................................................................................7

Business Customers ..................................................................................................................................................10

Community-Support Businesses................................................................................................................................13

Dependent-Care Facilities .........................................................................................................................................15

Evacuation Challenges of Healthcare Facilities .....................................................................................................17

Potential Impacts Due to Loss of Healthcare Services ..........................................................................................18

Homeless Population .................................................................................................................................................18

Public Venues ............................................................................................................................................................19

Park and Beach Visitors.............................................................................................................................................23

Composite Index of Population Exposure..................................................................................................................26

Demographic Sensitivity to Evacuations........................................................................................................................28

Race and Ethnicity .....................................................................................................................................................28

Age.............................................................................................................................................................................32

Family Structure.........................................................................................................................................................34

Housing Tenancy .......................................................................................................................................................34

Group Quarters ..........................................................................................................................................................36

Composite Index of Population Sensitivity.................................................................................................................38

Magnitude and Challenges of Tsunami Evacuations.....................................................................................................41

Sheltering Requirements ...............................................................................................................................................45

Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................................................47

Future Research Needs.................................................................................................................................................47

References Cited...........................................................................................................................................................48

Appendix A. Estimation of Sheltering Needs .................................................................................................................52

Figures

1. A, Map of coastline, counties, and incorporated communities with land in the SAFRR scenario tsunamiinundation zone. ..........................................................................................................................................5

2. Plot showing number of residents in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone for the California coast. ..........8

3. Plot showing number of employees in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone for the California coast. .......9

4. Plot showing percentage of employees, by business sector, in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone, 

California coast...........................................................................................................................................11

5. Plot showing percentage of employees at businesses in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone, California 

coast. .........................................................................................................................................................12

6. Plot showing number of community-support businesses and organizations in the SAFRR tsunamiinundation zone, California coast. .............................................................................................................14

7. Plot showing number of dependent-care facilities in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone, California 

coast...........................................................................................................................................................16

8. Map of estimated number of homeless people in Service Planning Areas (SPA) of Los Angeles county, 

California. . .................................................................................................................................................19
vi

9. Plot showing number of public venues in the SAFRR scenario tsunami-inundation zone, California coast.

...................................................................................................................................................................22

10. Plot showing estimated daily number of visitors (in thousands) for the SAFRR scenario to coastal 

California city and county beaches, State parks, and National Park Service locations............................25

11. Plot comparing normalized amount indices for incorporated California cities and towns with land in the 

SAFRR scenario tsunami-inundation zone. ............................................................................................27

12. Plot showing percentage of residents in the California counties located in the SAFRR tsunamiinundation zone who identify themselves as Hispanic or Latino. ............................................................30

13. Plot showing percentage of residents in the California counties located in the SAFRR tsunamiinundation zone who identify themselves as Asian. .................................................................................31

14. Plot showing percentage of residents in the California counties located in the SAFRR tsunamiinundation zone who are more than 65 years old. ..................................................................................33

15. Plot showing percentage of households in the California counties located in the SAFRR scenario 

tsunami-inundation zone that are renter occupied. .................................................................................35

16. Plot showing percentage of residents in the California counties located in the SAFRR tsunamiinundation zone who are in noninstitutionalized group quarters. ............................................................37

17. Plot comparing normalized demographic-sensitivity indices for incorporated cities and towns for 

California counties with land in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone. . ..................................................40

18. Plot showing cumulative number of residents in the SAFRR tsunami scenario and California tsunamiinundation zones. ....................................................................................................................................43

19. Photograph showing inundation zones for the SAFRR tsunami scenario and the statewide maximum 

zone, as well as estimated residential population counts for island communities in Newport Beach, 

California. . ...............................................................................................................................................44

20. Plot showing number of residents listed by California counties and cities estimated to use public shelters

in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. .............................................................................................................46

Tables

1. Relative modification factors used to estimate sheltering needs .................................................................53
Population Vulnerability and Evacuation Challenges in 

California for the SAFRR Tsunami Scenario

By Nathan Wood1, Jamie Ratliff1, Jeff Peters1, and Kimberley Shoaf2

Abstract

The SAFRR tsunami scenario models the impacts of a hypothetical yet plausible tsunami 

associated with a magnitude 9.1 megathrust earthquake east of the Alaska Peninsula. This report 

summarizes community variations in population vulnerability and potential evacuation challenges 

to the tsunami. The most significant public-health concern for California coastal communities 

during a distant-source tsunami is the ability to evacuate people out of potential inundation zones. 

Fatalities from the SAFRR tsunami scenario could be low if emergency managers can implement 

an effective evacuation in the time between tsunami generation and arrival, as well as keep people 

from entering tsunami-prone areas until all-clear messages can be delivered. This will be 

challenging given the estimated 91,956 residents, 81,277 employees, as well as numerous public 

venues, dependent-population facilities, community-support businesses, and high-volume beaches 

that are in the 79 incorporated communities and 17 counties that have land in the scenario tsunamiinundation zone. 

Although all coastal communities face some level of threat from this scenario, the highest 

concentrations of people in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone are in Long Beach, San Diego, 

Newport Beach, Huntington Beach, and San Francisco. Communities also vary in the prevalent 

categories of populations that are in scenario tsunami-inundation zones, such as residents in Long 

Beach, employees in San Francisco, tourists at public venues in Santa Cruz, and beach or park 

visitors in unincorporated Los Angeles County. Certain communities have higher percentages of 

groups that may need targeted outreach and preparedness training, such as renters, the very young 

and very old, and individuals with limited English-language skills or no English-language skills at 

all. Sustained education and targeted evacuation messaging is also important at several highoccupancy public venues in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone (for example, city and county 

beaches, State or national parks, and amusement parks). Evacuations will be challenging, 

particularly for certain dependent-care populations, such as patients at hospitals and children at 

schools and daycare centers. We estimate that approximately 8,678 of the 91,956 residents in the 

scenario inundation zone are likely to need publicly provided shelters in the short term. Information 

presented in this report could be used to support emergency managers in their efforts to identify 

where additional preparedness and outreach activities may be needed to manage risks associated 

with California tsunamis.

 1 U.S. Geological Survey

2 Center for Public Health and Disasters, Fielding School of Public Health, University of California, Los Angeles
2

Introduction

The California coast is a prime location for residents, recreational opportunities, tourismrelated businesses, and other commerce. In the event of a large tsunami, thousands of individuals 

will need to evacuate low-lying areas along the California coast and remain out of harm’s way until 

public officials believe it is safe to return. For the SAFRR (Science Application for Risk 

Reduction) scenario tsunami associated with a magnitude 9.1 megathrust earthquake east of the 

Alaska Peninsula, California emergency managers and public-safety officials will have several 

hours between tsunami wave generation and arrival to initiate and coordinate evacuations. The 

hypothetical tsunami-producing earthquake is designed to occur at 11:57 AM PDT on Thursday 27 

March 2014, which is 50 years after the 1964 Mw 9.2 Good Friday earthquake and tsunami that 

occurred in the Prince William Sound region of Alaska (U.S. Geological Survey, 2012). Tsunami 

wave travel times to California after the initial earthquake are estimated to range from 4 hours in 

northern California to almost 6 hours in southern California. This timing means that the tsunami 

warnings and wave arrivals would occur during a workday afternoon (Ross and others, 2013).

Although 4–6 hours may seem to be sufficient time to evacuate potential tsunamiinundation zones, there have been deaths in California from previous distant tsunamis (for example, 

1946, 1960, 1964, and 2011). Evacuations will be challenging given the scale of the evacuation 

along the entire California coast, the size and dispersed nature of the populations in inundation 

zones, and the unique needs of the varied populations. Evacuation messages will need to be 

delivered repeatedly by multiple actors over multiple channels to a highly diverse audience with 

varying levels of tsunami-risk knowledge, such as residents, employees at a range of business 

types, patrons of local stores, tourists at public venues and beaches, and individuals at dependentcare facilities. Although consistent evacuation messages may be delivered, comprehension of the 

message and actions taken by at-risk individuals will vary because of language or cultural barriers, 

differences in risk tolerances, inconsistent understanding of what actions to take, and evacuation 

limitations due to personal mobility and timing (National Research Council, 2010).

The immediate concern of emergency managers will be the safety of the at-risk population 

over the duration of the tsunami waves. The first tsunami wave of this scenario may garner the 

most attention, but subsequent waves may be just as threatening, or more so depending on local 

conditions. The one death in California that resulted from the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami 

occurred after the first tsunami waves had come and gone (Barnard, 2011). In addition to concerns 

about survival and staying safe, the quality of life of individuals may be impacted by tsunamis. 

Closed beaches and shorefront businesses reduce recreational opportunities and revenue. Closed 

roads increase commuting times. Closed dependent-care facilities, such as schools and hospitals, 

directly impact children or patients and affect others who would need to become caregivers, such as 

the parents who cannot go back to work because their child’s daycare center is closed.

To better understand the range of evacuation challenges that may arise from a tsunami 

associated with the SAFRR scenario earthquake east of the Alaska Peninsula, we assessed the 

geographic variations in exposure for populations in the scenario inundation zone. We focus on 

three questions:

· How many people may need to evacuate, and which communities have the highest numbers of 

people in the tsunami-inundation zone? 

· Which individuals and population groups may have greater difficulty in preparing for and 

responding to a tsunami?

· How many people may need to use public shelters after the tsunami?
3

We focus on determining the number and types of various population groups in the SAFRR 

scenario tsunami-inundation zone, including residents, employees, visitors at public venues, 

dependent-care populations, business customers, and beach visitors. We also compare communities 

based on their at-risk populations and potential sheltering needs. Subsequent sections include an 

overview of potential public-health issues related to tsunamis, the geographic scope for our 

analysis, and results that address our three questions.

Public-Health Implications of a Distant-Source Tsunami

The potential loss of life from this scenario tsunami is low in California given the estimated 

amount of time before waves arrive, but it is possible if individuals choose not to evacuate 

hazardous areas, do not understand tsunami warnings, are unable to evacuate for various reasons, or 

are indirectly impacted owing to the loss of healthcare services. Direct impacts to individuals 

include injuries and illnesses that result from contact with tsunami waves, such as drowning and/or 

trauma from being struck by debris in the tsunami flow. Indirect impacts include secondary 

infections resulting from injuries or from living conditions following the disasters, such as an 

increase in pneumonia from water aspiration, as well as cellulitis from exposure of breaks in the 

skin to contaminated water (Doocy and others, 2009; Nagamatsu and others, 2011). Other indirect 

impacts to individuals include emotional and psychological effects, such as anxiety, depression, or 

other psychological pathologies (Shoaf and Rottman, 2000). In addition, any disruption to the 

healthcare system will impact an individual’s health by introducing complications to preexisting 

conditions (Shoaf and Rottman, 2000; Nagamatsu and others, 2011). Healthcare-service disruptions 

can result from direct damage to facilities, flooding that shuts down certain floors of facilities, or 

loss of the surrounding lifelines, such as power and water.

Coastal communities will have approximately 4 hours in northern California and almost 6

hours in southern California after initial ground shaking begins in Alaska to evaluate the situation 

and evacuate tsunami-prone areas for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. Based on past distant tsunamis 

that have struck California, this may be sufficient time to evacuate most people in low-lying areas. 

The SAFRR distant-source tsunami scenario involves larger waves than those that have been 

recorded for historical tsunamis. Future evacuation success will be determined by the efficiency of 

the warning-message communication network, the effectiveness of emergency decisionmaking at 

the local level, and the ability of local public-safety officials to effectively engage the public to 

evacuate. However, even with well-executed evacuations, loss of life is possible and has happened 

during distant tsunamis in the following situations:

· Individuals in remote areas fail to evacuate because they do not receive warning messages, such 

as the drowning of a family camping on an Oregon beach during the 1964 Good Friday 

tsunami.

· Individuals return prematurely to hazardous areas because they do not realize there are multiple 

waves, such as the drowning in California near the Klamath River during the 2011 Tohoku 

tsunami and several deaths in Crescent City, Calif., during the 1964 Good Friday tsunami.

· Individuals are struck by falling equipment while trying to secure boats or other assets, which 

happened to one man in Morro Bay, Calif., during the 1960 Chilean tsunami and to another 

man in the Port of Los Angeles, Calif., during the 1964 Good Friday tsunami.

· Individuals have limited mobility, such as the drowning of an elderly man in Santa Cruz, Calif., 

who was unable to move quickly to high ground during the 1946 Aleutian tsunami.
4

· Individuals with preexisting health complications become overly stressed, such as one woman 

who died of a heart attack in Seaside, Ore., after waves associated with the 1964 Good Friday 

tsunami struck her home (all examples from Lander and others, 1993).

Additional evacuation challenges will exist for those considered to be “at-risk populations,” 

which are defined as individuals who may have additional functional needs related to 

communication, medical care, maintaining independence, supervision, or transportation. These 

functional needs may make it more difficult to evacuate the inundation zone in a timely manner. 

At-risk populations include children, senior citizens, and pregnant women, as well as individuals 

who have disabilities, live in institutional settings, are from diverse cultures, have limited English 

proficiency, lack transportation options, have chronic medical disorders, or have pharmacological 

dependencies. These populations will warrant additional evacuation time and unique response and 

relief procedures (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012).

Geographic Scope of Analysis

This analysis focuses on comparing population vulnerability to the scenario tsunami among 

the 77 incorporated cities, 2 incorporated towns, and 17 California counties that intersect the 

scenario tsunami-inundation zone (fig. 1) as discussed by the SAFRR Tsunami Modeling Working 

Group in this report. Incorporated cities and counties are delineated by 2010 census place 

boundaries (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The coastal counties also contain 52 unincorporated 

communities, as delineated by census-designated place boundaries, which intersect the scenario 

tsunami-inundation zone. Because emergency services in these areas are provided by county 

offices, results for these places and for other county land not in incorporated cities are aggregated 

and reported as “remaining land” for a given county. 

The scenario tsunami-inundation mapping was limited to the significant population and 

economic centers along the California coast and does not represent potential inundation along the 

entire coastline, as was also the case with the statewide maximum tsunami-inundation zone 

summarized by Wilson and others (2008) and Barberopoulou and others (2009). Percentages 

related to remaining county lands in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone might have been larger if 

the whole coast was mapped; however, we believe this difference is not substantial based on a 

visual inspection of the scenario-inundation zone and satellite imagery of the California coast. 

Unmapped areas are primarily places with low populations owing to their ruggedness or 

remoteness. Differences in estimated amounts and percentages in each jurisdiction and the 

remaining unincorporated county land for the area mapped in the SAFRR tsunami scenario versus 

the entire California coastline are likely less than 1 percent.
5

Figure 1. A, Map of coastline, counties, and incorporated communities with land in the SAFRR scenario 

tsunami-inundation zone. B, Enlargement of the San Francisco Bay area. C, Enlargement of Los Angeles 

and Orange counties. Geospatial boundaries for maps acquired from Cal-Atlas Geospatial Clearinghouse 

(2013). Scenario tsunami-inundation zone courtesy of the California Geological Survey.
6

This analysis is based on the presence of populations and businesses in the scenario 

tsunami-inundation zone using various datasets and is tallied using geographic information system 

(GIS) tools. Results are not engineering-based loss estimates for any particular facility. Instead, the 

analysis focused on determining if geospatial points (for example, businesses) or polygons (for 

example, census blocks) are inside the inundation zone. If population polygons overlapped hazard 

polygons, final population values were adjusted proportionately by using the spatial ratio of each 

sliver within the tsunami-inundation zone. Third-quartile values are identified throughout this 

report to more easily identify communities that are in the top 25 percent of any one category. 

Inventories cannot be considered mortality estimates because aspects of individual perceptions and 

preparedness levels before a tsunami, and the adaptive capacity of individuals during a response, 

are excluded from this analysis (Turner and others, 2003). Potential mortality would only match 

reported inventories if all at-risk individuals were unaware of tsunami risks and what to do after 

being warned of an imminent threat, and if they failed to take protective measures to evacuate. This 

assumption is unrealistic, given the current level of tsunami-awareness efforts in California 

(California Emergency Management Agency, 2012) and recent distant-tsunami experiences in 2010 

and 2011. Exposure counts for the various population groups also should not be combined because 

of the likelihood of overlap; for example, the young resident who attends daycare also may be a 

customer at a local store and a visitor of a local beach. This analysis is intended to help emergency 

managers understand where evacuations may be most challenging along the California coast and 

where evacuation messages and approaches may need to be tailored to address local needs.

Magnitude and Hotspots of Population Exposure

Residents

The scenario tsunami-inundation zone is home to an estimated 91,956 residents in 40,120 

households, each total representing less than 1 percent of the residents and households in the 17 

counties. This estimate is based on an overlay of geospatial data representing the scenario tsunamiinundation zone, community boundaries, and block-level population counts compiled for the 2010 

census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). The number of residents in the tsunami-inundation zone varies 

greatly across the 17 counties (fig. 2). The cities of Long Beach and San Diego have the greatest 

number of residents in the tsunami-inundation zone (12,933 and 12,751 residents, respectively). 

There are 14 communities and unincorporated land in four counties that each have more than 1,000 

residents in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone. For most communities, the scenario inundation 

area directly affects less than 10 percent of the residential population; however larger percentages 

exist in the cities of Belvedere, Del Mar, and Coronado (40, 15, and 11 percent, respectively). 

Eleven percent of the at-risk residents live in unincorporated areas, indicating a need for education 

and preparedness planning in less developed areas. 

One residential group of particular concern in this scenario estimate is made up of residents 

living on boats in the various marinas. It is highly likely that these vessels would be damaged, 

representing life-safety issues during the tsunami and sheltering needs after the event. Many vessels 

used as residences may not be seaworthy. Live-aboard residents who can go offshore to protect 

themselves and their boats during a tsunami may have insufficient food, water, and fuel to use 

while they wait for all-clear messages to return to shore; therefore, relief efforts will be needed to 

care for these individuals.
7

Employees

Employees present an evacuation challenge because they may be unaware of tsunami 

hazards or proper evacuation strategies, especially if they do not live in tsunami-inundation zones. 

They also may rely on business owners for information if they lack social connections to the 

community. The scenario tsunami-inundation zone contains an estimated 81,277 employees at 

7,343 businesses in the 17 counties. This is based on an overlay of the tsunami-inundation zone and 

the 2011 Infogroup Employer Database (Infogroup, 2011). Our counts serve as approximations 

because we were unable to field-verify locations for each of the 1,001,413 businesses from the 

Infogroup Employer Database used in our 17-county study area. Visual interpretation of imagery, 

including Google Maps and 1-meter 2010 National Agriculture Imagery Program imagery (CalAtlas Geospatial Clearinghouse, 2013), was used to verify and correct business locations in the 

tsunami-inundation zone. 

The greatest numbers of employees working within the scenario tsunami-inundation zone 

are in the cities of Long Beach (11,127), San Francisco (9,176), Newport Beach (7,967), and San 

Diego (6,726), reflecting the active ports and (or) waterfront tourism in each city (fig. 3). For most 

communities, the scenario inundation area directly affects less than 20 percent of the employee 

population. Exceptions include Belvedere (77 percent), Sausalito (56 percent), Tiburon (41 

percent), and Crescent City (33 percent), where much larger percentages of the local workforce will 

need to evacuate.

The number of estimated employees in the scenario-inundation zone is likely to be low in 

the larger ports because of the dynamic nature and magnitude of employees that are associated with 

multiple port-related companies. For example, our economic data identifies each business location 

as a point (typically the primary mailbox), but employees at a port-related business could be 

distributed across a large area within a port complex. In addition, foreign or domestic ships may be 

docked in the ports during the tsunami, but onboard crew members are not accounted for in this 

analysis of employee exposure.
8

Figure 2. Plot showing number of residents in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone for the California coast. 

Co., county.
9

Figure 3. Plot showing number of employees in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone for the California 

coast. Co., county.
10

Business Customers

The primary business sectors in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone along the California 

coast are accommodation and food services (32 percent) and retail trade (12 percent), suggesting 

that a high number of customers also will need to evacuate (fig. 4). This analysis is based on the 

number of employees associated with North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 

codes for businesses in the 2011 Infogroup Employer Database (see appendix A of Wood, 2007, for 

a listing of the codes; Infogroup, 2011). The number of employees associated with each business is 

considered a better indicator of business sectors and market trends than the number of businesses 

(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). 

To identify community hotspots for business customers or visitors, we subjectively grouped 

the multiple NAICS classes based on customer potential. We considered businesses with high 

onsite customer potential to include NAICS classes for accommodation and food services; arts, 

entertainment and recreation; educational services; healthcare and social assistance; and retail trade. 

We consider businesses with low onsite customer potential to include NAICS classes for 

administrative support and waste management; agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; 

construction; finance and insurance; information; management of companies; manufacturing; 

mining; professional, scientific, and technical services; public administration; real-estate rental and 

leasing; transportation and warehousing utilities; wholesale trade and other, nonclassified 

businesses. 

The majority of employees (67 percent) across the entire study area work for businesses that 

we think have a high customer potential (represented by the dotted line in figure 5). The stacked bar 

graphs in figure 5 reflect only the relative percentage of employees among the two business groups 

and not the absolute number of employees in the various groups. The lack of a stacked bar graph 

for a community (for example, Trinidad, Albany, and Torrance) indicates that there are no 

employees, according to our regional economic data, in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone of 

these communities.

Several communities, such as San Francisco and Corte Madera, have percentages similar to 

the statewide trend (fig. 5). In other communities, onsite customer potential at businesses in the 

tsunami-inundation zone is higher. For example, we estimate that all businesses in the tsunamiinundation zones of Point Arena, Burlingame, Seaside, Santa Monica, Laguna Beach, and Carlsbad 

have a high customer potential. In communities where at-risk businesses have a high customer 

potential, tsunami evacuations may be more difficult because evacuees may be unaware of the 

tsunami threat and unaware of what to do in the event of a tsunami. Successful tsunami-outreach 

efforts before an event and evacuations during an event will require emergency managers to 

collaborate with the private sector to reach visitor and tourist populations. This is especially 

important if emergency managers are to reach tourists, who traditionally are difficult to engage in 

long-term education, at beaches near waterfront businesses. 

Although not as frequent, there are communities where the majority of the employees in the 

tsunami-inundation zone are at businesses have low onsite customer potential, including Fort 

Bragg, Menlo Park, and the unincorporated areas of Humboldt and Alameda Counties (fig. 5). In 

these types of communities, pre-event outreach and evacuation messaging to employees could 

leverage local knowledge and could be delivered through business meetings, neighborhood 

associations, and community fairs. If at-risk businesses are industrial, further discussions could 

help determine if employee evacuations would be hindered by the presence of hazardous materials, 

heavy machinery, seasonal equipment (for example, crab pots in a harbor), or other materials (for 

example, timber).
11

Figure 4. Plot showing percentage of employees, by business sector, in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation 

zone, California coast.
12

Figure 5. Plot showing percentage of employees at businesses in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone, 

California coast, with low and high customer or visitor potential. Co., county.
13

Community-Support Businesses

To provide further insight into the number of people in the scenario inundation zone, we 

used NAICS codes in the 2011 Infogroup Employer Database to identify certain types of businesses 

with customers or visitors, specifically community-support businesses, dependent-care facilities, 

and public venues. The high number of businesses and the dynamic nature of populations at these 

locations preclude our ability to determine exact visitor counts at each business; therefore, 

discussions of these locations are limited to the number of venues and facilities. The first 

category—community support—includes businesses that attract significant populations throughout 

a workday because they provide basic necessities, primarily to residents (although visitors may use 

them also). These community-support businesses include

· Banks or credit unions;

· Civil or social organizations, including social clubs, after-school programs, and lodges;

· Retail, including grocery stores, wholesale warehouse stores, and home-improvement stores;

· Government offices, including Federal, State, and local government offices, police and fire 

departments, courts and legal offices, and international-affairs offices;

· Libraries, including city, Federal, institutional, public, and State libraries;

· Mailing and shipping services, including U.S. Post Offices and commercial shipping facilities; 

and

· Religious organizations, including churches, church organizations, mosques, mediation 

organizations, clergy, convents and monasteries, retreat houses, spiritualists, synagogues, and 

places of worship (nontheistic). 

There are many businesses that primarily provide community support in the tsunamiinundation zone, including 81 civil or social organizations, 34 religious organizations, 11 libraries, 

139 government offices, 29 banks and credit unions, and 2,706 retail businesses (fig. 6). The 

greatest numbers of community-support businesses in the tsunami-inundation zone are in the cities 

of Newport Beach, Long Beach, San Diego, San Francisco, Sausalito, and Monterey. The majority 

of community-support businesses in the tsunami-inundation zone are retail businesses. 

As discussed earlier in this report, tsunami warnings for this scenario will likely come 

during the workday, with first waves arriving approximately 4 hours later. Because many people 

are at community-support businesses or organizations during the workday, they will likely receive 

warning information while at these locations. This may complicate evacuations because customers 

may be aware of tsunami threats only from the perspective of their homes and, therefore, are not 

fully aware of evacuation procedures, or even tsunami potential, when they are out running errands 

or attending a religious service. Pre-event education of business owners on how to coordinate 

evacuations out of their stores to high ground will be important for minimizing any potential 

confusion during an evacuation.
14

Figure 6. Plot showing number of community-support businesses and organizations in the SAFRR tsunamiinundation zone, California Coast. Co., county.
15

Dependent-Care Facilities 

Dependent-care facilities contain individuals who would require assistance to evacuate and 

include

· Medical centers, including hospitals, psychiatric and substance-abuse hospitals, mental-health 

services and psychiatric treatment facilities, and clinics;

· Eldercare services, including adult-care facilities, hospices, nursing homes, rest homes, 

retirement communities, adult homes, senior citizens’ services, residential care homes, and 

adult daycare centers;

· Child services, including group homes, foster care, childcare centers, preschools and nursery 

schools (both public and private), and after-school recreational facilities; 

· Schools, including religious schools, public and private schools, schools with special 

academics, and home-schooling centers; 

· Correctional institutions, including State and Federal facilities; and

· Medical and health services, including offices for general practitioners, pediatricians,

obstetricians and gynecologists, chiropractors, and acupuncturists.

A substantial number of dependent-population facilities are in the tsunami-inundation zone, 

including 29 schools and education-related facilities, 30 child-service facilities, 7 eldercare 

facilities, 415 offices of physicians or other medical personnel, and 17 medical centers (fig. 7). 

Most of the dependent-population facilities in the tsunami-inundation zone are in the city of Long 

Beach, the majority of which are medical- and health-service providers. Other communities with 

numerous dependent-care facilities in the tsunami-inundation zone include Mill Valley, Sausalito, 

and Newport Beach (with the primary type of facility providing medical and health services in each 

community). The majority of schools or school-related educational facilities in the tsunamiinundation zone are in Marin County (14 of the 29 education facilities in the inundation zone). The 

majority of medical centers in the tsunami-inundation zone are in Marin and Orange Counties (6 

and 5 facilities, respectively).

Additional evacuation planning may be required in communities with large numbers of 

dependent-population facilities because of the limited mobility of certain groups at these facilities, 

such as those in schools and nursing homes. Parents may attempt to enter tsunami-prone areas to 

retrieve children from schools and daycare centers or adult children may attempt to enter tsunamiprone areas to retrieve their parents from eldercare facilities, and both situations present additional 

evacuation issues for facility managers. In addition to unique evacuation and relief issues, many 

dependent-population facilities represent critical social services that, if lost, could slow community 

recovery following an extreme event. For example, the loss of daycare centers could keep parents 

at home, thereby slowing business recovery.
16

Figure 7. Plot showing number of dependent-care facilities in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone, 

California coast. Co., county.
17

Evacuation Challenges of Healthcare Facilities

Hospitals in the tsunami-inundation zone may have difficulty evacuating some patients in 

the 4 – 6 hour window before wave arrival. Emergency evacuations out of unsafe buildings to 

nearby open areas have been completed in 30–90 minutes, but this has been in situations where 

imminent danger to patients is greater than that faced by moving them (for example, fires). 

However, a well-coordinated evacuation that removes patients from unsafe conditions to a new 

hospital can take 6 – 8 hours or more. 

Several recent evacuations illustrate the difference between simply evacuating the building 

and getting patients appropriate care elsewhere. Following the Northridge earthquake, one hospital 

felt that their patient population was in immediate danger from the building damage, and they 

evacuated 334 patients, including intensive-care patients, out of the building to an open area outside 

of the hospital in 2 hours (Schultz and others, 2003). Comprehensive evacuations that included 

moving patients to new facilities took between 9 and 19 hours to complete for the 6 hospitals that 

completely evacuated their facilities following the same earthquake (Schultz and others, 2003). 

Similar evacuations took place during Tropical Storm Allison in 2001, when the Texas Medical 

Center evacuated a great number of patients quickly out of the building, but then took more than 12 

hours to transport them to definitive-care facilities (Parson, 2002). With a great deal of planning 

and coordination, the University of California, Los Angeles, Medical Center transferred 350 

patients from an old building to a new facility across the street in 8 hours. This was accomplished 

by not admitting any new elective patients either the day before or the day of the transfer and by 

having a full staff at both facilities to maintain levels of care, ensure full functionality at both 

facilities, and provide additional transport staff (Groves, 2008). During Hurricane Charley in 2004, 

evacuating 120 patients from a Florida hospital to another facility took more than 6 hours and took 

more than a day at another facility to move 10 patients (Kuba and others, 2004). 

The time needed to complete an evacuation is highly dependent on the level of 

coordination, the availability of appropriate transportation, and the availability of qualified 

personnel for transferring patients. Coordination during evacuations is critical to ensure that no 

single facility is overloaded with transfer patients, as well as for centralized tracking of patients so 

that family members can find them following the event. Transportation options may include buses 

or vans for those who are ambulatory, wheelchair-adaptable vans for some patients, and 

ambulances with basic or advanced life-support capacities for critical or intensive-care patients. 

Without the proper level of onboard medical support, a patient’s health is jeopardized. For 

example, 4 ventilator-dependent patients died during hospital evacuations during Tropical Storm 

Allison, and 2 additional patients died within 24 hours (Rother, 2001). In addition, some patients 

may not be able to be moved immediately, such as patients undergoing dialysis (typically a 3–5 

hour procedure) or undergoing surgery, either in a hospital or outpatient surgical center. 

Staffing during evacuations is a significant challenge because many patients cannot simply 

walk out of a building to safe areas. This is an issue at hospitals where staff-to-patient ratios are not 

equal. It is also an issue at assisted-living facilities and senior citizen complexes where residents 

have fewer health needs than those in hospitals, but facilities have fewer full-time staff onsite at 

any one time. Nursing-facility residents are also at risk of not being able to evacuate in a timely 

manner because, although skilled nursing facilities are required to have an evacuation plan by 

regulation, many nursing facilities have not exercised those plans (Kuba and others, 2004). It is 

highly probable that most California nursing facilities have not contemplated a tsunami evacuation, 

and that the most likely scenario envisioned is a fire.
18

Potential Impacts Due to Loss of Healthcare Services

The impact of the tsunami on the healthcare and community infrastructure also can have a 

significant effect on the health of the population. Healthcare services that are in the tsunamiinundation zone will not be available to provide health services to the population for a significant 

period of time following the event. Following Tropical Storm Allison, the University of Texas 

Medical Center had power restored in less than 3 weeks, but the facility was not fully functional for 

more than 6 weeks (Parson, 2002). The potential loss of hospitals, doctors’ offices, clinics, and 

dialysis centers can have a significant impact on the accessibility of healthcare services for the 

entire region. Although the tsunami-inundation zone is a small percentage of the region, the 

California healthcare system functions at full capacity practically every day; therefore, any 

reduction of capacity can have an impact on the entire system. 

Health services also are a personal matter, and many people may forgo care until their 

preferred provider is available. For at-risk populations, any delay in seeking medical care may have 

a detrimental effect on their health status. Following the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, it was estimated 

that at least 282 people died from deteriorating chronic disease conditions due to a lack of access to 

medical care. The Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare reported that 500 deaths could have 

been prevented if regular healthcare services, as delivered under normal circumstances, had been 

promptly provided (Nagamatsu and others, 2011).

Loss of infrastructure, such as transportation routes, electricity, and water, can impact the 

health of the population. Although power may not be disrupted in a significant way, loss of power 

in parts of the community can still impact the health of the population. Any power loss in excess of 

4 hours can have an impact on the health of certain parts of the population. Four hours is the 

timeframe in which food that is not kept at temperature begins to present a health risk (U.S. 

Department of Agriculture, 2012). Individuals who rely on medical equipment (for example, 

ventilators, powered wheelchairs, and oxygen condensers) are also at significant risk when the 

power fails. Many energy-dependent pieces of equipment have an internal battery to keep them 

functioning for some period of time, but this time period runs from about 45 minutes to a few 

hours. External batteries provide additional time, but generally less than 8 hours. Without back-up 

power, failure of this equipment is a life-threatening event (Kailes, 2009).

Homeless Population

The homeless population is another dependent population that would be at risk from future

tsunamis and would likely need assistance to evacuate. There is limited data on homeless 

populations for the entire California coast, therefore, a complete inventory is not possible for this 

tsunami scenario. To provide some insight on emergency-management issues related to homeless 

people, we highlight data from a 2011 homeless-count report produced by the Los Angeles 

Homeless Services Authority for the greater Los Angeles area. The smallest unit of analysis in this 

report is a service planning area (SPA), and coastal areas in Los Angeles County that are at risk to 

future tsunamis are part of the West Los Angeles SPA and South Bay SPA (fig. 8), which were 

estimated to have approximately 6,788 and 3,512 homeless people, respectively. It is not known 

how many of these individuals would be in tsunami-inundation zones at the time of the scenario; 

however, it is likely there will be some homeless individuals on the beach or in nearby coastal 

parks when future tsunamis occur. Preexisting mental and physical conditions of some homeless 

individuals in the South Bay SPA and West Los Angeles SPA may present additional evacuation 

challenges to public safety officials, such as substance abuse (41 and 31 percent, respectively), 

mental illness (15 and 48 percent), physical disabilities (15 and 31 percent), or some combination 
19

of all of these attributes (Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, 2011). In addition, once they 

are evacuated, homeless individuals may have nowhere to go and may require public shelters. 

Shelter volunteers may not be trained for meeting with the needs of the homeless population. Some 

homeless people may need to stay in the public shelters for longer periods of time than people who 

are part of other populations.

Figure 8. Map of estimated number of homeless people in Service Planning Areas (SPA) of Los Angeles 

county, California (based on Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, 2011).

Public Venues

Tourists and other nonlocal populations are a significant element in coastal communities 

and often can outnumber residents and employees in tsunami-prone areas (Wood and Good, 2004). 

No consistent census count for visitors exists; therefore, the locations of public venues based on 

NAICS codes in the 2011 Infogroup Employer Database are used as an indicator of visitor 

populations. For this analysis, we consider public venues to include
20

· Entertainment centers, including aquariums, botanical gardens, casinos, theaters (including live 

and cinematic), and amusement parks;

· Colleges, including community colleges, private universities, and public universities;

· Marina and ferries, including recreational and fishing, vessel repair and storage, and yacht 

clubs; and

· Overnight accommodations, including hotels, inns, resorts, hostels, cabin rentals, bed and 

breakfasts, and student housing.

Many public venues are in the tsunami-inundation zone, including 167 overnight 

accommodations, 6 colleges, 79 marinas, and 311 entertainment centers (fig. 9). The highest 

numbers of public venues in the tsunami-inundation zone are in the cities of San Diego, Long 

Beach, Newport Beach, Sausalito, and Santa Cruz. As discussed earlier, visitors may not be fully 

aware of evacuation procedures, or even the potential for tsunamis, especially if they are coming 

from areas with no history of tsunamis. 

The number of public venues and facilities in tsunami-prone areas of each community 

provides some insight about visitor populations, but does not capture the range in magnitudes. To 

better understand the number of visitors that may need to be evacuated during the scenario event, 

we estimated onsite visitor populations for certain public venues. To do this, we took visitor 

numbers provided by business owners (typically provided as annual or monthly counts) and 

adjusted them to represent a daily estimate for a Thursday in March using methods described by 

Dwight and others (2007). Their study of southern California beach attendance suggests that 5.2 

percent of yearly visitors come in March and that 10 percent of visits occur on Thursdays. Because 

we are not aware of similar work for coastal businesses, we used these percentages to estimate 

attendance at the following public venues on a Thursday in March: 

· Monterey Bay Aquarium, 2,437 people (Barret and others, 2012); 

· Santa Cruz Beach Boardwalk, 3,900 people (Season Pass/Group Sales Office, oral commun., 

October 1, 2012);

· Santa Monica Pier, 9,095 people (Westman, 2011); 

· The Long Beach Convention Center, 2,454 people (Convention Center Controller, oral 

commun., October 2, 2012); and

· Aquarium of the Pacific in Long Beach, 2,879 guests (Aquarium Vice President of 

Communications, oral commun., October 1, 2012).

Examples of other high-occupancy public venues in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone are

· Public piers with high-volume tourist populations in Santa Cruz, Redondo Beach, Santa 

Barbara, and Pismo Beach;

· The Catalina Casino in Avalon, which includes a 1,184-seat theater and a ballroom with a 

capacity of 1,400 people (Catalina Island Chamber of Commerce and Visitors Bureau, 2012); 

· Waterfronts that serve as ports of call for cruises, such as the city of Avalon on Catalina Island, 

which receives tourists from five international cruise lines, including up to 2,000 passengers on 

a weekly basis from a single ship (Catalina Island Chamber of Commerce and Visitors Bureau, 

2012);

· Del Mar Fairgrounds, which includes a racetrack and holds events year-round; and
21

· The Queen Mary ship in Long Beach, a popular tourist attraction that holds special events and 

has overnight accommodations.

Other high-occupancy public areas, such as SeaWorld theme park in San Diego and 

Cannery Row in Monterey, are near, but not in, the landward extent of the predicted scenario 

tsunami inundation zone. Whether or not evacuations would be called at these locations and others 

like them is a subject for further discussion between emergency managers and the business owners, 

given the uncertainty inherent in the tsunami modeling and the need to have sufficient time to 

evacuate before receiving full knowledge of the event.

Another category of public venues in the study area that attracts thousands of tourists are 

port terminals that serve cruise ships, including the World Cruise Center at the Port of Los Angeles 

that serves 12 different cruise lines (Pacific Cruise Ship Terminals, 2012) and the Long Beach 

Cruise Terminal that primarily serves Carnival cruises. Together, these cruise terminals see more 

than 300 cruise departures every year (Cruisetimetables, 2012). Thousands of tourists could be 

streaming through the port, either embarking on a cruise or returning from one. For example, a 

Carnival Inspiration cruise is scheduled to arrive at the Port of Long Beach on March 28, 2014 

(Cruisetimetables, 2012), which is the day after our scenario earthquake and a time when port 

infrastructure will be damaged and waterways will still be experiencing heightened currents. There 

is also a scheduled departure later that day for another Carnival Inspiration cruise, which has a 

maximum occupancy of 2,052 passengers and 920 onboard crew (Carnival, 2012). Thus, in 

addition to local residents and port employees dealing with the aftermath of the tsunami, there 

could be 5,000 more people attempting to come into the area, based on the 920 crew members, 

2,052 people leaving the arriving cruise and 2,052 people boarding the departing ship.
22

Figure 9. Plot showing number of public venues in the SAFRR scenario tsunami-inundation zone, California 

coast. Co., county.
23

Park and Beach Visitors

In addition to public venues, residents and tourists are drawn to the tsunami-inundation zone

by the multiple recreational opportunities along the 1,200-mile California coastline (Visit 

California, 2012), including city, county, State, and national beaches, as well as parks and 

waterways. Estimating the magnitude of population exposure to tsunamis for these groups is 

difficult given their dynamic nature. The boating community is especially difficult given the large 

range of their locations throughout the day and the uncertainty of their points of entry to and 

departure from waterways. For example, sailboats in San Francisco Bay could have originated from 

nearby marinas in the bay or from marinas elsewhere, such as Half Moon Bay or other points on 

the West Coast. Because the California maritime community is vulnerable to even minor tsunamis, 

the State tsunami program is developing boater-preparedness information (California Geological 

Survey, 2012). Gauging the extent of maritime activity in coastal California waters is beyond the 

scope of this assessment, and subsequent discussion is limited to visitors to beaches and parks.

Analysis of visitor data from California’s State parks (California State Parks, 2010) and 

national parks (National Park Service, 2011) indicates that 95 parks are in the scenario tsunamiinundation zone. For the 2009–2010 fiscal year, the average number of visitors to the 95 coastal 

parks was 60,707,359 people. This annual total equals 166,322 day-use visitors, on average, every 

day, assuming an equal distribution of visitors throughout the year. This average number of visitors 

is likely to be too low during the summer and on holidays, but too high for our scenario because of 

less favorable weather in March. National and State parks were coded by the primary county in 

which they are located to gauge the potential impact to communities. Although the State and 

national park visitors are outside of county jurisdictions, grouping the parks by county provides 

insight on where there may be significant tourist issues after a tsunami. When a National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) tsunami alert is issued, adjacent county and city publicsafety officials will be called on to evacuate populations at coastal parks. In addition to dealing 

with residents and employees during an evacuation, these counties may have to contend with a 

substantial number of visitors at nearby parks being directed into their jurisdictions.

Attendance numbers for city and county beaches were retrieved from the United States 

Lifesaving Association (USLA), where they are collected annually from beach lifeguards on a 

volunteer basis. Beach attendance is defined by the USLA as the “people recreating in the water or 

on the sand, and at adjacent picnic areas, parking lots, recreation concessions and bike paths...[but] 

does not include people that merely transit on bikes or in cars” (United States Lifesaving 

Association, 2012). Because estimates are provided by lifeguards on a volunteer basis, not all 

beaches on the California coast have data for every year, or at all in many cases. Data on annual 

beach attendance were compiled for 2010 and not 2011 because (1) 2010 data contained a greater 

number of beaches, and (2) 2010 beach data allows for comparisons with residential data from the 

2010 census population count. This analysis yielded 27 beach jurisdictions that included city and 

county properties and were primarily in southern California (the city of Santa Cruz being the 

northern-most unit). Data was not available for beaches north of Santa Cruz, suggesting that the 

lifeguards there do not participate in the national data-collection effort or, more likely, that the 

smaller numbers of visitors to beaches in northern California do not merit government-supported 

lifeguard agencies (Kevin Miller, California Emergency Management Agency, oral commun., May 

28, 2013).

Statistics on 2010 annual beach attendance indicate that California city and county beaches 

had 140,452,280 visitors, with the greatest number visiting beaches in Los Angeles County (59 

million visitors) and San Diego (24 million visitors). Other beaches with high beach attendance are 
24

those in Long Beach (6.6 million), Huntington Beach (8.0 million), Newport Beach (7.1 million), 

Orange County (6.7 million), Laguna Beach (3.9 million), and Oceanside (3.8 million). 

To translate annual numbers to estimates for this scenario, we relied on visitor-proportion 

values by Dwight and others (2007), who studied annual beach-attendance variability at 75 

southern California beaches. Their work suggests that 5.2 percent of all visits occur in March, and 

10 percent occur on a Thursday (with four Thursdays occurring in our scenario month). After 

accounting for this variability in beach attendance, and using these percentages, we estimate that 

261,508 visitors would be at city, county, State, or Federal beaches and parks for our scenario 

tsunami on Thursday March 28, 2014 (fig. 10).
25

Figure 10. Plot showing estimated daily number of visitors (in thousands) for the SAFRR scenario to coastal 

California city and county beaches, State parks, and National Park Service locations grouped by city and 

county jurisdictions.
26

Composite Index of Population Exposure

To provide a regional snap-shot of population exposure, we developed a composite index to 

compare community exposure to the SAFRR tsunami scenario for 95 geographic units—77 

incorporated cities, 2 incorporated towns, and the remaining land in 16 counties3

. The composite 

index was created by first normalizing values in each community for various population attributes 

to the maximum value in the category. Categories used for the index were the number of (1) 

residents, (2) employees, (3) public venues, (4) dependent-care facilities, (5) community-support 

businesses, and (6) beach and park visitors in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone. Normalizing 

data to maximum values creates a common data range of zero to one for all categories and is a 

simple approach for comparing disparate datasets. The normalized values in each community were 

added and, because there are six categories, the resulting scores ranged from zero to six (fig. 11). 

This unitless index allows us to compare the relative exposure levels for the 95 geographic units at 

regional or State levels. Because they are relative metrics, the numbers are meant for comparative 

purposes and do not provide much meaning for individual communities. In addition, this 

comparative index of population exposure simply reflects the magnitude of potential at-risk 

populations and does not incorporate the population density within a community, or potential 

limitations in egress options for evacuations.

Figure 11 illustrates the composite index for the 95 areas, where higher values indicate 

higher amounts. For example, the city of Long Beach has the highest composite amount value 

(4.6), indicating that this community consistently has one of the highest number of populations in 

the scenario tsunami-inundation zone. Other communities with high relative population exposure 

include Newport Beach, San Diego, San Francisco, and Sausalito. The dominant type of at-risk 

population varies somewhat in the cities and towns. For example, Long Beach has high relative 

exposure across all of the categories, except for beach and park attendance, whereas in Sausalito, 

population exposure is highest among employees, community-support businesses, and public

venues.

 3 San Francisco is both a city and a county. Therefore, there are technically 17 counties in the scenario tsunamiinundation zone but we chose to discuss San Francisco as a city in the composite indices of population exposure and 

demographic sensitivity. This decision results in 16 counties for the comparative analysis.
27

Figure 11. Plot comparing normalized amount indices for incorporated California cities and towns with land in 

the SAFRR scenario tsunami-inundation zone. Communities with the highest final scores have the highest 

numbers of residents, employees, community-support businesses, dependent-care facilities, public 

venues, and estimated beach and park visitors in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone. Although not 

observed, a final score of six would indicate that a community always had the highest number for each of 

the six categories.
28

Demographic Sensitivity to Evacuations

Demographic factors, such as age, ethnicity, and housing tenancy, can amplify an 

individual’s sensitivity to hazards (Morrow, 1999; Cutter and others, 2003; Laska and Morrow, 

2007; Ngo, 2003). In addition to general population counts, we calculated the number of residents 

in tsunami-prone areas based on census block-level data of ethnicity (Hispanic or Latino), race 

(American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian and 

other Pacific Islander, and White—either for each race or in combination with one or more other 

races), age (individuals younger than 5 and older than 65 years in age), gender with particular 

family structures (female-headed households with children under 18 years of age and no spouse 

present), and housing tenancy (renter-occupied households). Categories to discuss demographic 

sensitivities are not based on extensive studies of residents in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone, 

but instead are based on past social-science research of all types of disasters (for example, 

earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes). It is not implied that all individuals of a certain group will 

exhibit identical behavior. The extent of these demographic sensitivities will be influenced by 

variations in local physical and social context, level of preparedness before a tsunami, and ability to 

respond during an event (for example, access to a car for evacuation). Similar data are not available 

for employees or tourists, so our discussion of demographic sensitivity is limited to residential 

populations in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone.

Race and Ethnicity

Tsunami-warning and evacuation messages may be difficult for some at-risk individuals to 

understand and act upon because of language barriers. In the Los Angeles–Long Beach–Santa Ana 

metropolitan statistical area (MSA), approximately 14 percent of households are considered to be 

linguistically isolated, which means that no one age 14 or older speaks English “very well”. Of 

those who are linguistically isolated, the primary languages spoken in households in the Los 

Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana MSA include Asian and Pacific Island languages (31 percent), 

Spanish (25 percent), other Indo-European languages (23 percent), or some other language (18 

percent) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).

The distribution of populations with limited English skills is available in the U.S. Census 

Bureau’s American Community Survey five-year estimates. However, the data are available only 

for census tracts, which are geographic units used by the U.S. Census Bureau to designate 

homogeneous subdivisions in counties and typically include between 1,500 and 8,000 people (U.S. 

Census Bureau, 2000). Because of the small spatial extent of potential inundation related to the 

SAFRR tsunami scenario and the much larger size of the census tracts, we determined that use of 

tract-level demographic data to describe characteristics of the population in the scenario-inundation 

zone could result in inaccurate conclusions (an example of ecological fallacy). We therefore 

decided to use only census data available at block level. Census blocks are the smallest geographic 

unit used by the U.S. Census Bureau; they often correspond to a city block and can range in 

population from none to several hundred people.

Because census blocks lack data on limited English skills, we cannot fully comment on 

demographic issues related to warning-message receipt. We do, however, examine race and 

ethnicity data that are available at the block level to provide some insight on potential language 

barriers, as well as any cultural differences in warning-message receipt and evacuation efforts. Our 

discussion of race and ethnicity and its relation to evacuation challenges for a distant-source 

tsunami is, however, a subset and simplification of how this topic is typically covered in the social 
29

science literature on societal risk, natural hazards, and disaster management. In this larger 

literature, race and ethnicity are treated in a broader context for their association with variations in 

socioeconomic status and access to resources that may constrain hazard preparedness, mitigation, 

response, and recovery (Mileti, 1999). Our discussion of race and ethnicity as a proxy for language 

or cultural barriers during tsunami evacuations, therefore, should be interpreted as preliminary 

comments to initiate community-level discussions and not as exhaustive or definitive statements on 

the topic.

One demographic group along the entire California coast that may warrant targeted tsunami 

education owing to potential language barriers or cultural differences is individuals that identify 

themselves as Hispanic or Latino. This problem was exhibited during the March 11, 2011, tsunami 

when Spanish-speaking residents over-evacuated many miles inland to the tops of coastal mountain 

ranges in several central coastal counties in California (Wilson and others, 2012). For the scenario 

tsunami, 15 percent of residents in the inundation zone consider themselves to be Hispanic or 

Latino. At the community level, the percentage of residents in the scenario inundation zone who are 

Hispanic or Latino ranges from 0 to 78 percent (city of San Rafael), and this percentage is high in 

other communities as well, such as East Palo Alto, Avalon, Seaside, and Santa Cruz (fig. 12). 

With regard to differences in race, residents in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone 

identify themselves as White (81 percent), Black or African American (5 percent), Asian (10 

percent), American Indian and Alaska Native (2 percent), and Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific 

Islander (less than 1 percent). Although the regional percentage is low for at-risk individuals who 

considered themselves to be Asian (10 percent), there is a substantial range of at-risk individuals at 

the community level from 0 to 74 percent (Hayward). Other communities with high Asian 

populations in the scenario inundation zone are in Alameda and San Mateo Counties, and include 

San Leandro, Daly City, Foster City, and Redwood City (fig. 13). As is the case regarding high 

concentrations of Hispanic or Latino populations, targeted outreach that acknowledges high 

concentrations of Asian populations may be warranted in some communities, such as evacuation 

messaging in multiple languages.
30

Figure 12. Plot showing percentage of residents in the California counties located in the SAFRR tsunamiinundation zone who identify themselves as Hispanic or Latino. Co., county.
31

Figure 13. Plot showing percentage of residents in the California counties located in the SAFRR tsunamiinundation zone who identify themselves as Asian (either alone or in combination with other races). Co., 

county.
32

Age

The very young and very old are considered to be more vulnerable than other age groups to 

sudden-onset hazards because of potential mobility and health issues (Morrow, 1999; Balaban, 

2006; McGuire and others, 2007; Ngo, 2003). The very young (defined here as individuals less than 

5 years in age) are considered to have heightened vulnerability because they often require direction 

and assistance to evacuate owing to their immaturity and size. They are also prone to developing 

post-traumatic stress disorders, depression, anxieties, and behavioral disorders as a result of their 

inability to comprehend and process the effects of a disaster (Balaban, 2006). Individuals less than 

5 years in age represent a small percentage of residents in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone, 

specifically 4 percent across the State as a whole, and a typical range of 0 to 5 percent within 

individual communities4. Because of the low values and the small range in values among 

communities, we do not provide a bar graph to compare communities; however, data for individual 

communities are available for those interested.

The first tsunami wave of the SAFRR scenario is predicted to arrive on a Thursday 

afternoon; therefore, most children will be at school or at daycare centers. Schools often have 

evacuation plans, but like hospitals, rarely fully exercise them. Schools will have practiced vacating 

the building because of fire drills, but they may not know how to move students away from the 

school. Because there will be more than 4 hours between tsunami warning and arrival, school 

officials may dismiss students and staff before the tsunami is predicted to occur. This situation may 

add to the existing challenge of evacuating all residents safely because increased traffic will likely 

impede evacuation or school buses may not be readily available for people who need to evacuate. 

For example, other schools near, but outside of, the tsunami-inundation zone may be used for 

evacuation sites, which could further complicate evacuations (Rick Wilson, California Geological 

Survey, oral commun., May 28, 2013). Daycare centers for younger children also may have 

evacuation challenges. These centers are often private businesses and may not be included in 

official warning protocols of emergency personnel. They may not have a system in place to receive 

official warnings, are unlikely to have a television or radio on, and therefore, may not receive 

warnings in a timely manner. These centers are unlikely to have the capacity to transport multiple 

small children away from the tsunami-inundation zone and would most likely depend upon parents 

coming to the site to retrieve the children. As discussed earlier, parents may have difficulty getting 

to daycare centers if evacuation traffic clogs the roads. 

The distribution of individuals older than 65 years has greater variability across the study 

area. This population is considered to have heightened vulnerability due to decreased mobility and 

health issues, reluctance to evacuate, the need for special medical equipment at shelters (McGuire 

and others, 2007), and the lack of social and economic resources to recover (Morrow, 1999; Ngo, 

2003). Individuals older than 65 years represent 15 percent of all residents in the tsunamiinundation zone for the State as a whole, with a range from 0 to 44 percent (Mill Valley) within 

individual communities (fig. 14). The high percentages of at-risk individuals who are more than 65 

years in age in Manhattan Beach, Pacific Grove, and Chula Vista, are due to a low number of 

residents in the tsunami-inundation zone (1, 2, and 6 residents, respectively). For those 

communities with large elderly populations in the inundation zone, unique evacuation procedures 

and sheltering protocols may be warranted.

 4 Approximately 20 percent of residents in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone of unincorporated San Diego County 

are less than 5 years in age. This higher percentage is because of the low number of total residents in the tsunamiinundation zone (247 residents) and does not reflect the regional trend.
33

Figure 14. Plot showing percentage of residents in the California counties located in the SAFRR tsunamiinundation zone who are more than 65 years old. Co., county.
34

Family Structure

Female-headed households with children under the age of 18 and no spouse present (that is, 

single-mother households) may be more vulnerable to future tsunamis than other households 

because of potential mobility issues during an evacuation and fewer financial resources to draw on 

when preparing for natural hazards and recovering from disasters (Enarson and Morrow, 1998; 

Laska and Morrow, 2007). Approximately 4 percent of households in the scenario tsunamiinundation zone are single-mother households. The highest percentages of households in the 

tsunami-inundation zone that are female-headed, have children under the age of 18, and have no 

spouse present are in Berkeley (17 percent), East Palo Alto (16 percent) and Arcata (14 percent). 

The high percentages of single-mother households in these communities are due to a low number of 

households in the tsunami-inundation zone (8, 197, and 64 households, respectively), which is 

apparent in the low third-quartile value of 5 single-mother households among communities in the 

tsunami-inundation zone. Because of the low values and the small range in values among 

communities, we do not provide a bar graph to compare communities; however, data for individual 

communities is available for those who are interested.

Housing Tenancy

Another group considered more vulnerable to and less prepared for extreme natural hazard 

events is renters (Morrow, 1999; Burby and others, 2003). This lack of preparation may result from 

(1) higher turnover rates for renters may limit their exposure to outreach efforts, (2) preparedness

campaigns may pay less attention to renters, (3) renters typically have lower incomes and fewer 

resources to recover, and (4) renters may not be motivated to invest in mitigation measures for 

rented property (Burby and others, 2003). After a disaster, renters also have little control over the 

speed with which rental housing is repaired or replaced (Laska and Morrow, 2007). 

Approximately 53 percent of the occupied housing units in the scenario tsunami-inundation 

zone for the State as a whole are renter occupied. This ranges from 0 percent in some communities 

up to 100 percent in others (fig. 15), although high values in many communities reflect a small total 

number of occupied households in the tsunami-inundation zone, such as Costa Mesa, Manhattan 

Beach, Port Hueneme, and the unincorporated parts of San Diego County (10, 1, 6, and 76 

households, respectively). For many of the remaining communities, renter-occupied households 

represent the majority of households in the tsunami-inundation zone. In the top 25 percent of the atrisk communities, renter-occupied households constitute at least 60 percent of the households.
35

Figure 15. Plot showing percentage of households in the California counties located in the SAFRR scenario 

tsunami-inundation zone that are renter occupied. Co., county.
36

Group Quarters

Another group of residents who will require special attention during and before a tsunami 

are those in group quarters, either institutionalized (for example, adult correctional, juvenile 

correctional, and nursing facilities) or noninstitutionalized (for example, college/university student 

housing and military quarters) (fig. 16). The SAFRR scenario tsunami-inundation zone contains 

199 residents in institutionalized group quarters, with most of them in Alameda, San Diego, Mill 

Valley, and Santa Cruz (51, 43, 37, and 35 residents, respectively). Where these institutionalized 

populations do exist in the tsunami-inundation zone, emergency managers and public-safety 

officials may need to develop structured evacuations and continued supervision to ensure the safety 

of both the institutionalized populace and the neighboring communities. Because of the low values 

and the small range in values among communities, we do not provide a bar graph to compare 

communities; however, data for individual communities are available for those who are interested.

Some correctional institutions, such as Federal Correctional Institution on Terminal Island 

near the Port of Los Angeles and San Quentin State Prison in Marin County, are close to the 

landward extent of predicted tsunami inundation for this scenario, but not technically in the 

inundation zone. However, emergency managers still may decide to call for evacuations from these 

facilities given the uncertainty inherent in the tsunami modeling and local landscape conditions, the 

need to have sufficient time to evacuate before they receive full knowledge of the event, and the 

consequences of not evacuating these facilities.

There are 9,911 residents in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone that are in 

noninstitutionalized group quarters (fig. 16). Approximately 82 percent of this population is in San 

Diego (5,544 residents), Coronado (231 residents), and National City (2,342 residents), all likely 

reflecting military quarters associated with the naval bases near those communities. Warning these 

populations may be challenging to local officials because the at-risk population may not be familiar 

with local hazard issues, may not have experienced or have knowledge of past disasters in the area, 

and may not have been exposed to tsunami-awareness efforts if such efforts are geared for 

homeowners. There also may be military evacuation protocols that may or may not reflect local 

emergency-management plans.
37

Figure 16. Plot showing percentage of residents in the California counties located in the SAFRR tsunamiinundation zone who are in noninstitutionalized group quarters. Co., county.
38

Composite Index of Population Sensitivity

Throughout this section, we have highlighted various demographic attributes that may make 

preparing for and responding to tsunamis more challenging for at-risk residents. Parsing out 

individual demographic attributes provides some insight in evacuation challenges, but it is 

somewhat simplistic because individuals and the communities they live in are not one-dimensional. 

For example, renters, small children, and or non-English-speaking residents all present evacuation 

challenges on their own and these difficulties are compounded when all three attributes are found in 

the same neighborhood.

To provide some insight on the multidimensional nature of the neighborhoods in the 

SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone, we developed a composite index similar to the one described 

earlier for population exposure. We again compared the 77 incorporated cities, 2 incorporated 

towns and the remaining land in the 16 counties by normalizing values in each community for 

various demographic attributes to the maximum value in the category and then added these 

normalized values to yield a final aggregated number. For this composite index, we focused on the 

percentages of residents (or households in some cases) in the SAFRR scenario tsunami-inundation 

zone of each community who are in the following categories:

· Hispanic or Latino,

· Black or African American (either alone or in combination with other races),

· American Indian and Alaska Native (either alone or in combination with other races),

· Asian (either alone or in combination with other races),

· Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander (either alone or in combination with other races),

· Some Other Race (other than White, Black or African American, American Indian and Alaska 

Native, Asian, or Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander), 

· Residents less than 5 years in age,

· Residents more than 65 years in age,

· Occupied households that are female-headed with children under the age of 18 and no spouse 

present,

· Occupied households that are renter occupied,

· Residents that are in institutionalized group quarters, and

· Residents that are in noninstitutionalized group quarters.

These attributes of block-level census data were chosen because of potential language 

barriers or cultural differences (race and ethnicity attributes), mobility issues (age and family 

structure attributes and institutionalized populations), or potential issues in warning dissemination 

(group quarters and renters) that may influence the ability of at-risk individuals to effectively 

receive or respond to a tsunami warning. Our previous discussion of these various demographic 

attributes is a subset of how these attributes are typically covered in the social-science literature on 

societal risk and natural hazards. This simple composite index of demographic sensitivity should be 

interpreted as preliminary comments to initiate community-level discussions on the types of people 

that are in tsunami-inundation zones and not as exhaustive or definitive statements on any one 

demographic attribute.

Figure 17 illustrates variations in the composite demographic-sensitivity index for the 95 

areas, where higher values indicate higher sensitivity. Although not observed, a final score of 12 

would indicate that one community always had the highest percentage in each of the 12 categories. 

The city of East Palo Alto has the highest sensitivity value (5.4), indicating that this community 
39

consistently has high percentages of residents in several of the demographic categories. Other 

communities with high relative sensitivity include San Rafael, San Mateo, Fort Bragg, and Arcata, 

as well as the unincorporated parts of San Diego County. 

Various reasons lead to high values for different communities. Of the 95 geographic units, 

19 have high relative values (we chose a normalized value of 0.66 or higher) in 1 category, 10 units 

have high values in 2 categories, San Rafael has high values in 3 categories, and East Palo Alto has 

high values in 4 categories. The high composite sensitivity value in East Palo Alto (5.4) is primarily 

due to the high percentages of residents who identify themselves as Hispanic or Latino, Native 

Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander, and some other race, and as single-mother households. In 

unincorporated San Diego County (4.2), higher sensitivity values are because of high percentages 

of residents who are less than 5 years in age; in San Rafael (4.0), the higher values result from high 

percentages of residents who identify themselves as Hispanic or Latino, some other race, and as 

renter-occupied households. In Fort Bragg and Arcata (both 3.4), higher sensitivity values are the 

result of high percentages of households that are occupied by renters or by single mothers. 

The primary point of this exercise is to demonstrate that the type of residents in the SAFRR 

tsunami-inundation zone is not consistent among the at-risk communities and counties; therefore, 

general tsunami education and preparedness efforts that do not address local conditions or needs 

may not be as effective as those that do target efforts. Tsunami warning and education efforts may 

need to reflect a mix of certain language or cultural issues in one community, but acknowledge a 

mix of renters and children in another community.
40

Figure 17. Plot comparing normalized demographic-sensitivity indices for incorporated cities and towns for 

California counties with land in the SAFRR tsunami-inundation zone. Communities with the highest final 

scores have the highest percentages of various demographic attributes that suggest greater sensitivity to 

preparing for and responding to extreme events. Co., county.
41

Magnitude and Challenges of Tsunami Evacuations

When tsunamis occur, emergency managers do not have the luxury of knowing which areas 

will flood prior to calling for evacuations. Instead, they must make evacuation decisions based on 

existing knowledge of potential tsunami-inundation zones, discussions with representatives of the 

NOAA tsunami-warning centers and other emergency managers, and their own level of risk 

tolerance. To help this process and to support other tsunami risk-reduction efforts in California, a 

set of statewide tsunami-inundation maps have been developed and released by the California 

Tsunami Hazard Mitigation and Preparation Program, which is a collaboration of the California 

Geological Survey and the California Emergency Management Agency (California Geological 

Survey, 2012). These maps were created for the most significant population and economic centers 

on the California coast and are based on cumulative modeling efforts that incorporate a variety of 

large distant-source and local tsunamigenic earthquake scenarios and local landslide sources that 

can also generate tsunamis. 

If the SAFRR scenario tsunami were to occur, emergency managers would likely use the 

statewide tsunami-inundation zone, or their own local evacuation zones, which are more 

conservative, to determine which areas to evacuate. To provide some insight on how well the 

statewide zone reflects potential inundation from our scenario event, we compared the number of 

residents in the two different zones and report results at the community level (fig. 18). Results are 

cumulative in figure 18; therefore, the total number of residents in the scenario inundation zone is 

shown in blue, and the total number of residents in the maximum tsunami-zone is the sum of the 

blue and orange bars. The statewide maximum tsunami-inundation zone was mapped for a slightly 

greater area than the SAFRR tsunami scenario. This is not an issue in the communities listed in 

figure 18, which are included in both mapping efforts, but may slightly affect comparisons of 

estimates for the unincorporated portions of each county (noted as “remaining land”).

The scenario tsunami-inundation zone contains approximately 91,956 residents, who 

represent 34 percent of the estimated 267,381 residents in the statewide maximum tsunamiinundation zone (Wood and others, 2012). In most communities, such as Emeryville, Alameda, 

Oakland, Oxnard, Los Angeles, and Huntington Beach (fig. 18), residential exposure in the 

scenario inundation zone is substantially smaller than that for the maximum tsunami-inundation 

zone. In these communities, evacuations for our scenario event would require more residents than 

necessary to leave their homes. This should not be considered an “over-evacuation” because more 

precise information is not available, and real-time tsunami-inundation modeling is not currently 

operational at NOAA tsunami-warning centers. However, emergency managers in these 

communities should be prepared to communicate why the extensive evacuations were taken, 

namely the interest in saving lives, low-risk tolerance for responding to the event, the lack of moreprecise inundation areas, and the inherent uncertainty of tsunami generation, propagation, and 

inundation. These moments, which were once communicated as false alarms, provide outreach 

opportunities to discuss tsunami science, monitoring, and preparedness. There are several 

communities, such as Long Beach and San Diego, where the scenario event is a close 

approximation of the statewide tsunami-inundation zone. In 26 of the communities in our analysis, 

resident exposure to the scenario inundation zone is 75 percent or more, which is equal to the 

exposure to the maximum tsunami-inundation zone. In these communities, emergency managers 

will be able to leverage any preexisting public outreach or training that has occurred in relation to 

the maximum tsunami-inundation zones. Results also show that although the scenario tsunami is 

not the primary tsunami threat to most California coastal communities, it is a substantial threat to 

several communities, particularly in southern California.
42

This comparison demonstrates the utility of having tsunami-scenario catalogs prior to 

events to help guide evacuation decisionmaking (for example, Wilson and Miller, 2012), instead of 

only relying on maximum tsunami-inundation zones. It also demonstrates the utility of real-time 

inundation modeling during actual events, such as the Short-term Inundation Forecasting for 

Tsunamis (SIFT) system currently under development for operational use in NOAA Tsunami 

Warning Centers (Titov and others, 2001).

Evacuations may be particularly difficult in areas with limited egress options, such as island 

and peninsula communities. If all at-risk individuals on an island attempt to evacuate by car, then 

traffic congestion is likely, and even a four-hour evacuation window before wave arrival (6 hours in 

southern California) for the USGS tsunami scenario may be inadequate. To illustrate this issue, 

figure 19 shows a collection of islands in Newport Beach with substantial residential populations, 

several of which have thousands of residents in areas where egress to the mainland is limited to one 

road, such as Balboa Island and Lido Isle (2,756 and 1,626 residents, respectively). In addition, 

more than 8,000 residents would also be asked to evacuate Balboa peninsula because it is 

completely within the statewide maximum tsunami-inundation zone.

In addition, more than 8,000 residents would also be asked to evacuate Balboa peninsula 

because it is completely within the statewide maximum tsunami-inundation zone. To date, we are 

not aware of any traffic studies for Balboa peninsula or the other islands in the Newport Beach area 

to determine the amount of time necessary for complete evacuations; therefore, it is unclear how 

long it would take to evacuate these areas in response to the USGS tsunami scenario (Anthony 

Brine, City of Newport Beach Public Works Department, oral commun., February 12, 2013). 

Although it was beyond the scope of this scenario assessment, an analysis of time requirements for 

complete evacuations may be warranted to assist with future tsunami-response planning efforts.
43

Figure 18. Plot showing cumulative number of residents in the SAFRR tsunami scenario and California 

tsunami-inundation zones. Co., county.
44

Figure 19. Photograph showing inundation zones for the SAFRR tsunami scenario and the statewide 

maximum zone, as well as estimated residential population counts (based on 2010 U.S. Census Bureau 

data) for island communities in Newport Beach, California.

The Newport Beach collection of islands also bolsters the case for scenario-specific 

evacuation maps instead of a maximum tsunami-inundation zone that drives evacuation 

decisionmaking. In this study area, scenario-specific inundation maps may reduce the likelihood of 

potentially unnecessary complete evacuations of Balboa Peninsula, Lido Isle, Linda Island, and 

Harbor Island, where the maximum inundation zones cover the locations entirely, but the scenario 

zone does not. In each of these areas, at-risk populations would have areas on the islands or the 

peninsula that are outside of likely inundation from the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 

The islands and peninsula within Newport Beach are not the only places where evacuations 

may be challenging because of limited egress options and substantial populations on islands. We 

highlighted the Newport Beach area to illustrate the issue of island communities simply because of 

the high concentration of islands in this area. Other areas along the California coast with potential 

tsunami-evacuation challenges that may warrant discussions between emergency managers and 

traffic engineers include

· Treasure Island in San Francisco (2,880 residents);

· Bay Farm and Alameda Islands in Alameda (12,588 and 60,212 residents, respectively);

· Naples Island and Alamitos Park Peninsula in Long Beach (3,435 and 1,448 residents, 

respectively);

· Seabridge (1,053 residents), Sunset Beach (3,378 residents), Trinidad Island (881 residents), 

Humboldt Island (784 residents), and Davenport Island (511 residents) in Huntington Beach;
45

· Mission Beach in San Diego (4,700 residents); and

· Silver Strand Boulevard connecting the City of Coronado peninsula to the mainland (4,799 

residents).

Sheltering Requirements

The scenario tsunami could damage many homes along the California coast, forcing some 

residents to find shelter in the short term. Residents could also be displaced because of lack of 

access due to flooded roadways or because of long-term disruption damage to services (for 

example, water, wastewater, or electricity). Some residents may have friends and family to help 

them out, and others may have the financial resources to afford temporary housing or to move. 

Some people, however, may need to rely on publicly provided shelters, at least in the short term, 

while damaged homes are repaired. To gauge the potential sheltering needs in the aftermath of the 

scenario tsunami, we used equations contained in the Hazus-MH 2.1 flood loss-estimation 

methodology (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013). 

Estimated sheltering needs are based on the magnitude of the displaced population and then 

modified by their income levels and age distributions. Individuals with lower incomes will be more 

likely to use publicly provided shelters. Age also plays a role, where younger, less established 

families and elderly families will be more likely to use shelters. A full description of the method of 

estimating sheltering needs can be found in appendix A.

Analysis was completed with population-count and age-distribution data available at the 

census-block level. Income distributions are available for census block groups; therefore, incomedistribution values were assigned to each block based on the larger block group value. Because of 

the small area likely to be inundated by the scenario tsunami, estimating sheltering needs at the 

census block was considered more accurate than the block group. The displaced population based 

on block-group-level data is 128,906 residents, which is 40 percent higher than the value using 

block-level data. Calculation errors in sheltering needs, therefore, could be off by 40 percent of the 

actual value if we used data at the block group level. We decided assigning block-group-level 

income distributions to census-block boundaries would result in fewer errors than using blockgroup boundaries with associated data on total residents and age distributions. 

Based on the number of estimated residents in the tsunami-inundation zone and their age 

and income distributions, we estimate 8,678 individuals may require publicly provided shelters 

after the scenario tsunami (fig. 20). This number reflects 9 percent of the estimated number of 

residents in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone. The low percentage is likely a reflection of the 

typically higher incomes for households along the California coast. The communities with the 

highest number of people with sheltering needs include San Diego (1,095 residents), Long Beach 

(1,060 residents), Newport Beach (711 residents), Santa Cruz (522 residents), and National City 

(498 residents). Sheltering needs in National City likely will be provided by the military, rather 

than by city or county organizations, because 99 percent of the at-risk residents in that community 

are in noninstitutionalized group quarters which include military quarters. High resident demand 

for public shelters after the scenario tsunami may occur in San Diego (2,121 residents), Orange 

(1,482 residents), Los Angeles (1,418 residents), and Marin (876 residents) Counties. The length of 

time displaced people may need publicly provided shelters is unknown because estimating the 

extent of damage to individual homes is beyond the scope of this project. Some people may 

evacuate to shelters while tsunami waves are arriving during the predicted 12 or more hours, but 

then return to their homes after the event.
46

Figure 20. Plot showing number of residents listed by California counties and cities estimated to use public 

shelters in the SAFRR tsunami scenario. Co., county.
47

Conclusions

The most significant public-health concern for California coastal communities during a 

distant-source tsunami is the ability to evacuate people out of the predicted inundation zone. 

Fatalities from the SAFRR tsunami scenario could be low (and possibly zero) if emergency 

managers can implement an effective evacuation in the time between tsunami generation and 

arrival, as well as keep people from entering tsunami-prone areas until all-clear messages can be 

delivered. This will be challenging given the 91,956 residents, 81,277 employees, as well as 

numerous public venues, dependent-population facilities, community-support businesses, and highvolume beaches that are in the 79 communities and 17 counties intersected by the scenario tsunamiinundation zone. These evacuation challenges mean that fatalities are possible from the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario, as well as secondary fatalities, such as vehicular accidents or heart attacks, 

associated with an evacuation. Although all coastal communities face some level of threat from this 

scenario, the highest concentrations of people in the tsunami-inundation zone are in Long Beach, 

San Diego, Newport Beach, Huntington Beach, and San Francisco. Communities also vary in the 

prevalent categories of populations that are in tsunami-prone areas, such as residents in Long 

Beach, employees in San Francisco, tourists at public venues in Santa Cruz, and beach or park 

visitors in unincorporated Los Angeles County.

Certain communities have higher percentages of groups that may need targeted outreach 

and preparedness training, such as renters, the very young and very old, residents in 

noninstitutionalized group quarters (for example, military housing and university dormitories), and 

individuals with limited English-language skills or no English-language skills at all. Sustained 

education and targeted evacuation messaging is also important at several high-occupancy public 

venues in the tsunami-inundation zone (for example, city and county beaches, State or national 

parks, and amusement parks). Education efforts and evacuation coordination for each group should 

address conditions and needs of the local at-risk population. 

Evacuations will be challenging, particularly for certain dependent-care populations, such as 

patients at hospitals and children at schools and daycare centers. Moving some patients out of a 

hospital to another facility can take hours to complete, given their existing health conditions. 

Evacuating schools and childcare centers is easier than evacuating hospitals, but still requires 

substantial coordination among school officials, parents, and the transportation sector. People 

living in the tsunami-inundation zone who do not have transportation or who are home-bound need 

to be identified prior to a tsunami, and plans, including practice drills, should be made for 

facilitating their evacuation in a timely manner.

In the aftermath of the scenario tsunami, many people may find themselves with damaged 

homes or businesses. We estimate that approximately 8,678 of the 91,956 residents in the scenario 

inundation zone are likely to need publicly provided shelters in the short term. In addition, 

damaged healthcare facilities will impact the public health of the surrounding communities as they 

seek out other services in the short term. This is also true for any damaged schools or childcare 

centers, and parents may be unable to return to work until suitable arrangements can be made for 

their children.

Future Research Needs

Information presented in this report could be used to support emergency, land-use, and 

resource managers, as well as the coastal communities, in their efforts to identify where additional 

preparedness and outreach activities may be needed to manage risks associated with California 
48

tsunamis. Comparing the number and type of various populations in tsunami-prone areas of 

California coastal communities is a first step in discussing population vulnerability, but is not an 

exhaustive statement on the topic because variations in individual sensitivity and adaptive capacity 

are not fully addressed (Turner and others, 2003). The ability of individuals in a coastal community 

to prepare for future tsunamis, respond to an event, and recover from an event affects their overall 

vulnerability to extreme events. Despite similar population distributions, the same extreme natural 

event would mean a short-term crisis to some and a longer-term disaster to others. 

Potential follow-up studies based on results presented here could focus on the adaptive 

capacity of individuals and communities with regard to their ability to prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from a damaging tsunami. The current study offers insight into the magnitude of population 

exposure in the scenario tsunami-inundation zone, and the next steps could focus on the ability of 

these individuals, as well as the managers and officials responsible for public safety, to manage and 

reduce their tsunami risks. For example, a gap analysis of local capabilities and capacities could 

provide emergency managers with a blueprint for where additional training and response planning 

may be warranted, such as hospitals, schools, childcare centers, and popular tourist destinations. 

For the healthcare industry, further work may be warranted to determine if vertical evacuation 

within a building at specific sites is possible, instead of requiring a complete evacuation. With 

regard to warning-message dissemination, further work may be warranted on determining 

alternative methods for serving hard-to-reach populations, such as non-English speakers, renters, 

institutionalized populations, and tourists. Traffic studies for large population centers and for island 

communities may be warranted to determine whether full evacuations are possible in four hours or 

less for a distant tsunami. Finally, the substantial difference in the size of at-risk populations in the 

statewide maximum tsunami-inundation zone and the SAFRR scenario zone suggests a need for a 

tsunami-scenario catalog to help guide local evacuation decision making efforts.

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52

Appendix A. Estimation of Sheltering Needs

The number of people using publicly provided shelters is estimated in the Hazus-MH MR5 flood 

loss-estimation methodology (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013) by

 #STP = !

!!!

!

!!! ( αkm * DP * HIk * HAm), Equation 1

where

#STP is the number of people using established shelters, 

αkm is a constant (see below), 

DP is displaced population, 

HIk is percentage of population in the kth income class, and

HAm is percentage of population in mth age class. 

Modifying factors based on income and age is represented by the αkm constant and is defined as: 

 αkm = (IW x IMk) + (AW x AMm), Equation 2

where

IW is Shelter Category Weight for Income (default value is 0.80),

AW is Shelter Category Weight for Age (default value is 0.20),

IMk is Relative Modification Factor for Income (values in table A1), and

AMm is Relative Modification Factor for Age (values in table A1).
53

Table 1. Relative modification factors used to estimate sheltering needs

Category Class Description

Default for Communities with 

60% or More of Households 

with Income >$35,000

Income IM1 Household income < $10,000 0.46

Income IM2 $10,000 < Household income < $15,000 0.36

Income IM3 $15,000 < Household income < $25,000 0.12

Income IM4 $25,000 < Household income < $35,000 0.05

Income IM5 $35,000 < Household income 0.01

Age AM1 Population less than 16 years old 0.05

Age AM2 Population between 16 and 65 years old 0.2

Age AM3 Population more than 65 years old 0.5
U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–J

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

80°

60°

40°

20°

0°

-20°

-40°

-60°

-80°

120

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

120° 160° 200° 240°

Height above sea level, in centimeters

280°

Emergency Management Response to a Warning-Level 

Alaska-Source Tsunami Impacting California
COVER: NOAA's modeled tsunami energy maps can highlight coastal areas of heightened concern to 

decision-makers. Protecting the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach requires extensive planning and 

coordination. 
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami 

Scenario 

Stephanie Ross and Lucile Jones, Editors 

Emergency Management Response to a WarningLevel Alaska-Source Tsunami Impacting California By 

Kevin M. Miller and Kate Long 

Open-File Report 2013–1170–J 

California Geological Survey Special Report 229 

 

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey 
iii

U.S. Department of the Interior

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2013

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Suggested citation:

Miller, K., and Long, K., 2013, Emergency management response to a warning-level Alaska-source 

tsunami impacting California, chap. J., in Ross, S.L., and Jones, L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science 

Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 

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iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD 

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION

MARK NECHODOM 

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D. 

STATE GEOLOGIST
v 

Contents

The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario ...................................................................... ii

Contents .......................................................................................................................................................................... v

Introduction and Purpose ................................................................................................................................................. 1

Top Down: Information Flow during Tsunami Alert and Warning .................................................................................... 2

Federal Role in Threat Identification and Alert Dissemination ..................................................................................... 3

State Role in Alert and Warning Dissemination: Cal OES ........................................................................................... 4

County Role in Alert and Warning Dissemination ........................................................................................................ 5

Local Role in Alert and Warning Dissemination ........................................................................................................... 5

Bottom Up: Emergency Management Protocol in Response to Tsunami ........................................................................ 6

All Disasters Are Local ................................................................................................................................................. 6

Across Time: The Emergency Management “Life” of a Tsunami in Seven Periods, a Timeline of Tsunami 

Warning and Response ................................................................................................................................................... 6

Period 1: Initial Earthquake Event and Notification ...................................................................................................... 7

General Description of Period 1 (Bulletins 1–3: Thursday March 27th 11:54 a.m. until 2:05 p.m. PDT; 

0—2 hours after earthquake) ................................................................................................................................... 7

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and Challenges 

during Period 1 ......................................................................................................................................................... 9

Key Considerations during Period 1 ....................................................................................................................... 11

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 1 ........................................................................ 11

Period 2: First NOAA-Verified Alert Message at Warning Level ................................................................................ 13

General Description of Period 2 (Bulletins 4–7: Thursday March 27th 2:05 p.m. through 6:01 p.m.; 2—

6 hours after earthquake) ....................................................................................................................................... 13

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and Challenges .............. 14

Key Considerations during Period 2 ....................................................................................................................... 17

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 2 ........................................................................ 17

The Map Gap ...................................................................................................................................................... 18

Decision Making as Information Unfolds ............................................................................................................ 20

Seaward Evacuation Guidance Specifics ........................................................................................................... 21

Period 3: During the Event ......................................................................................................................................... 23

General Description of Period 3 (Bulletins 8–25: Thursday March 27th 6:01 p.m. through Friday March 

28th 12:02 p.m.; 7–24 hours after earthquake) ...................................................................................................... 24

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and Challenges .............. 24

Key Considerations during Period 3 ....................................................................................................................... 26

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 3 ........................................................................ 26

Incomplete Land Evacuations ............................................................................................................................ 26

Keeping People From Returning to Evacuated Areas Prematurely .................................................................... 26

Incomplete Water Evacuation ............................................................................................................................. 27

Period 4: Warning Cancelled for Specific Areas ........................................................................................................ 28

General Description of Period 4 (Bulletins 26–33: Friday March 28th 12:02 p.m. through Friday March 

28th 8:02 p.m.; 24–32 hours after earthquake) ...................................................................................................... 28

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and Challenges .............. 28
vi

Key Considerations during Period 4 ....................................................................................................................... 30

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 4 ........................................................................ 30

The Pressure is on (to Open the Ports) .............................................................................................................. 30

Wild Card: Fire Following Tsunami ..................................................................................................................... 31

Media Control—Information Flow ....................................................................................................................... 31

Period 5: Evacuation ALL CLEAR as Determined by Each Coastal Jurisdiction ....................................................... 31

General Description of Period 5 (Bulletins 34–49: Friday March 28th 8:02 p.m. through Saturday March 

29th 12:00 p.m.; 32–48 hours after earthquake) .................................................................................................... 31

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and Challenges .............. 32

Key Considerations during Period 5 ....................................................................................................................... 33

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 5 ........................................................................ 33

Not so Fast! (Making the “All Clear” Call) ........................................................................................................... 33

Phased Reentry .................................................................................................................................................. 33

Wild Card: Blockage in a Major Port Channel ..................................................................................... 33

Period 6: Advisory CANCELLATION for Coastal Waterways .................................................................................... 34

General Description of Period 6 (Bulletin 50: Saturday March 29th 12:00 p.m.; 48 hours after 

earthquake) ............................................................................................................................................................ 34

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and Challenges .............. 34

Key Considerations during Period 6 ....................................................................................................................... 35

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 6 ........................................................................ 35

Survey and Salvage in the water ........................................................................................................................ 35

Period 7: Transition: Response to Recovery ............................................................................................................. 35

General Description of Period 7 ............................................................................................................................. 36

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and Challenges .............. 36

Key Considerations during Period 7 ....................................................................................................................... 36

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 7 ........................................................................ 37

Quick and Accurate Damage Assessments are Important ................................................................................. 37

Potential Recovery Issues within Ports .............................................................................................................. 37

Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................................... 39

Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................................................... 39

Selected References ..................................................................................................................................................... 40

Appendix A—NOAA Tsunami Alert Level Definitions .................................................................................................... 42

Appendix B—NOAA WCATWC Tsunami Scenario Alert Bulletins ................................................................................ 44
Emergency Management Response to a WarningLevel Alaska-Source Tsunami Impacting California

By Kevin M. Miller1 and Kate Long1

Introduction and Purpose

This chapter is directed towards two audiences: Firstly, it targets nonemergency 

management readers, providing them with insight on the process and challenges facing 

emergency managers in responding to tsunami Warning, particularly given this “short fuse” 

scenario. It is called “short fuse” because there is only a 5.5-hour window following the 

earthquake before arrival of the tsunami within which to evaluate the threat, disseminate alert 

and warning messages, and respond. This action initiates a period when crisis communication is 

of paramount importance. An additional dynamic that is important to note is that within 15 

minutes of the earthquake, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 

the National Weather Service (NWS) will issue alert bulletins for the entire Pacific Coast. This is 

one-half the time actually presented by recent tsunamis from Japan, Chile, and Samoa. Second, 

the chapter provides emergency managers at all levels with insights into key considerations they 

may need to address in order to augment their existing plans and effectively respond to tsunami 

events. 

We look at emergency management response to the tsunami threat from three perspectives: 

· “Top Down” (Threat analysis and Alert/Warning information from the Federal agency 

charged with Alert and Warning) 

· “Bottom Up” (Emergency management’s Incident Command approach to responding to 

emergencies and disasters based on the needs of impacted local jurisdictions) 

· “Across Time” (From the initiating earthquake event through emergency response) 

We focus on these questions: 

· What are the government roles, relationships, and products that support Tsunami Alert 

and Warning dissemination? (Emergency Planning and Preparedness.) 

· What roles, relationships, and products support emergency management response to 

Tsunami Warning and impact? (Engendering prudent public safety response.) 

· What are the key emergency management activities, considerations, and challenges 

brought out by the SAFRR tsunami scenario? (Real emergencies) 

· How do these activities, considerations, and challenges play out as the tsunami event 

unfolds across the “life” of the event? (Lessons) 

 

1 California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES)
2 

Top Down: Information Flow during Tsunami Alert and Warning 

Certain potentially life-threatening or damaging emergency/disaster events, such as 

earthquakes and terrorist attacks, are referred to as “no notice” or sudden-onset events by 

emergency managers. These events do not provide advance warnings. Other threats, such as

hurricanes—and a “distant source” tsunami like the one discussed in this scenario—provide 

emergency managers with the opportunity to warn the public and provide life-safety instructions. 

For “advance notice” events such as distant source tsunamis, Alert and Warning dissemination is 

the initial key emergency-management-related function, central to minimizing loss of life, injury 

and, to some extent, property damage. Timely Warning notification to all potentially affected 

areas is undertaken using a central information source and delivered through multiple, redundant, 

backup communication channels as illustrated by figure 1. 

Figure 1. Flow diagram showing how Alert and Warning dissemination is “top down,” from Federal to 

State to local. Courtesy of Ben Green, California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. 
3 

Federal Role in Threat Identification and Alert Dissemination

The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is the federally 

designated agency responsible for official alert and warning for a tsunami, generated anywhere 

in the world, that may impact U.S. states and territories. The Tsunami Warning and Education 

Act of 2006 (TWEA) was passed by Congress following the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami. 

The purpose of this law was to authorize and strengthen the tsunami detection, forecast, warning, 

and mitigation program of NOAA, to be carried out by its component agency, the National 

Weather Service (NWS). This is done by the agency’s two Warning Centers through their alert 

and notification responsibilities. For the U.S. West Coast, including California, these alerts are 

issued by NOAA’s West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WCATWC) in Palmer,

Alaska. The WCATWC has most of North America under its Area Of Responsibility (AOR), 

while NOAA’s Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Hawaii provides alerts to the 

remainder of the Pacific Basin (see fig. 2). TWEA also vested NOAA and the Warning Centers 

with responsibilities for international coordination for detection, warnings, and outreach for 

tsunamis. The full responsibilities of the Warning Centers include (A) continuously monitoring 

data from seismological, deep ocean, and tidal monitoring stations; (B) evaluating earthquakes 

that have the potential to generate tsunamis; (C) evaluating deep ocean buoy data and tidal 

monitoring stations for indications of tsunamis resulting from earthquakes and other sources; and 

(D) disseminating forecasts and tsunami Warning Bulletins to Federal, State, and local 

government officials and the public. 

Figure 2. World map showing Areas of Responsibility (AOR) of the two Tsunami Warning Centers of the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Courtesy NOAA. 

NOAA uses four levels of tsunami alert in the United States; they are, in order of 

decreasing urgency: Warning, Advisory, Watch, and Information Statement. Each has a distinct 
4 

meaning relating to local emergency response (fig. 3). For a more detailed explanation of alert 

levels, see appendix A 

Alert Level Threat Action

WarningWarning

Inundating wave possible Full evacuation suggested

AdvisoryAdvisory

Strong currents likely Stay away from the shore

Watch

Danger level not known yet Stay alert for more information

Information

Minor waves at most No action suggested

Figure 3. Table of the NOAA tsunami alert levels, each with distinct meaning relating to local emergency 

response.

State Role in Alert and Warning Dissemination: Cal OES 

The California State Warning Center (CSWC), operated by the California Governor’s 

Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), is the designated “Warning Point” agency for 

dissemination of alerts issued by the WCATWC. CSWC is notified of the potential tsunami by 

WCATWC, simultaneously through various, redundant notification systems initiated at the 

Federal level, and this notice is then forwarded by the State to local level Warning Points (figure 

1). 

For alert and warning for potential tsunami, Cal OES’s primary roles as designated State 

Warning Point are to (1) receive Tsunami Information Bulletins from WCATWC; (2) relay the 

messages to potentially impacted Operational Areas (counties); and (3) provide ongoing liaison 

between the WCATWC and potentially impacted California counties. CSWC is only authorized 

to communicate the original WCATWC tsunami alert; it does not undertake any threat analysis 

and will not advise local governments regarding response issues, such as Emergency Operations 

Center (EOC) activations or evacuations. 

Upon receipt of WCATWC’s initial Alert Bulletin, CSWC forwards the information to 

the Cal OES Earthquake and Tsunami and regional duty officers and to county emergency 

management offices. The CSWC also notifies the Cal OES Regional Duty Officer for all active 

Watch and Warning alerts issued in their area of responsibility. The Cal OES Regional Duty 

Officer will verify that counties, unincorporated areas, and special districts within their area of 

responsibility have received the CSWC Watch/Advisory/Warning alerts. All information from 

the WCATWC is passed directly to the county via redundant methods. 
5 

County Role in Alert and Warning Dissemination

Counties receive information from Cal OES through their designated Warning Point, and 

they provide threat notification to jurisdictions within. The Warning Point agency designated by 

each county may vary. County governments are responsible for notifying their constituent cities 

and special districts through multiple, redundant means. In addition, they notify county 

departments (sheriff, fire, medical, harbor, and so forth) as appropriate. Examples of county 

departments with Warning-response and event-response roles include Emergency 

Operations/Management Departments; local police dispatch centers (coastal cities’ police 

agencies and coastal sheriff substations); County Fire Emergency Command and Control 

Centers; Department of Public Works Dispatch Centers; Department of Health Services; 

Departments of Beaches and Harbors; Airport Police; and Ports. 

In the case of a Warning-level tsunami alert, evacuation within each city is the 

responsibility of that local jurisdiction; however the county may assist cities and special districts 

in evacuation and provide wider traffic control. In addition, for unincorporated county areas, the 

county is the “local authority” ordering evacuations. The county will use the Emergency Alert 

System (EAS) through local radio and television stations to deliver tsunami Warning and 

evacuation messages. Additional methods used to evacuate the public may include emergency 

service units using public alert systems, door-to-door notification, media announcements; 

announcements on Travelers Information Service; and sounding of sirens (for example, a steady 

blast indicates peacetime emergency), if available. 

Local Role in Alert and Warning Dissemination

This chapter highlights issues presented by the SAFRR (Science Application for Risk 

Reduction) tsunami scenario to the Port of Los Angeles (POLA) and Port of Long Beach 

(POLB), both in Los Angeles County. We use the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach as an 

example of local entities and how they might respond to this scenario. This is by no means 

intended to represent all possibilities in California, because there are many types of communities, 

small marinas, coastal cities, beaches, parks, and so on along the State’s 1,100-mile coastline. 

We describe this particular community’s response as a way to demonstrate the flow of 

information and manner of operational response by the emergency management system from 

Federal to State to county to local level, addressing needs at all levels during an ongoing tsunami 

emergency, from beginning to end. The local level is where the public will be most influenced by 

emergency actions designed to protect lives and property. 

All orders for evacuation within a given local jurisdiction are under the authority and 

responsibility of that jurisdiction. The local role is not only disseminating warnings, but 

executing all evacuation orders and related public safety actions. In Los Angeles County, 

immediate alert notification is made by the County Warning Point to the Los Angeles County 

Department of Beaches and Harbors, the U.S. Coast Guard Los Angeles Command Center/Los 

Angeles Station; the Port of Los Angeles Police, and the Port of Long Beach Police. The Port of 

Los Angeles is within the City of Los Angeles, which has civil authority over evacuation. The 

Port of Long Beach is within the City of Long Beach, which has civil authority over its 
6 

evacuation. The roles of the Cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach and Port Authority in Alert 

and Warning dissemination cross over into response actions resulting from the Warning, and 

they will be discussed further in the next section. 

Bottom Up: Emergency Management Protocol in Response to Tsunami

All Disasters Are Local

Although Alert and Warning (identification of a tsunami threat and dissemination of that 

threat) described in the previous section cascade “top down” from the WCATWC, the actual 

emergency management response activities undertaken to save lives and protect property—both 

during the WARNING period and event response operations—are “bottom up” from the local 

jurisdiction. Both legal authorities and the actual way agencies are organized to coordinate 

delivery of emergency management services acknowledge a basic concept: “All disasters are 

local.” 

From car accidents to crime scenes to freeway closures, most emergencies are 

“manageable” enough to be resolved by the local authority. Emergency services organizations, 

including police, fire, ambulance, and emergency management, successfully address such daily 

emergencies as their normal routine. However, some emergency events become so large or 

complex that local resources are exhausted and external resources must be brought to bear. In 

emergency management parlance, when available response resources are insufficient, local 

authorities are unable to effectively stabilize life-safety and property protection threats, and an 

emergency transitions to a “disaster.” However, it is important to note that even when an 

emergency becomes a disaster that requires multiagency management, the emergency services 

community still adheres to the “All disasters are local” concept, meaning local governments 

remain in charge. That is, official response to all emergencies is determined by local need, at 

local direction. When a local jurisdiction requests help from other entities, be they county, State 

or Federal, the assisting jurisdictions and resources are provided in support of the affected 

jurisdiction; the affected jurisdiction retains its authorities, responsibilities, and command of the 

incident. 

The complexity of emergency management coordination comes as disaster events impact 

multiple jurisdictions and more than one individual “incident” occurs. The example provided by 

the SAFRR tsunami scenario has broad impacts on coastal counties across California. Such an 

event exponentially increases the number of agencies needed to respond and the need for 

prioritization of scarce resources across jurisdictions in need. 

Across Time: The Emergency Management “Life” of a Tsunami in Seven

Periods, a Timeline of Tsunami Warning and Response

The following sections discuss key emergency management considerations and issues 

raised in this SAFRR tsunami scenario, with emphasis on how they relate to the Ports of Los 

Angeles and Long Beach as an example of a local response, affecting those on the immediate 

coast. During recent tsunamis affecting California, the course of action in activating and 
7 

operating the emergency management system has followed a timeline that, for the purposes of 

this chapter, is described via seven general time periods. 

Period 1: Initial Earthquake Event Notification 

Prior to NOAA verification of tsunamigenic hazard, via Alert Bulletin at a level 

considered actionable by emergency managers (Advisory or Warning). State and local 

government notification of earthquake from U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) via pager or 

California Integrated Seismic Network (CISN) Display 

Period 2: First NOAA-verified Alert Message at Warning Level 

From first verified NOAA Alert-level Bulletin through the arrival of first waves in 

California. Includes local government actions in issuing Evacuation Orders and other 

pronouncements. 

Period 3: During the Event 

From first wave arrival in California through Warning cancellation 

Period 4: Warning cancelled for specific areas 

Advisory still in place in those areas 

Period 5: Evacuation ALL CLEAR as determined by each coastal jurisdiction 

Advisory still in place for those jurisdictions 

Period 6: Advisory CANCELLATION 

Emergency Response Actions continue 

Period 7: Transition: Response to Recovery 

Period 1: Initial Earthquake Event and Notification

When a large, undersea earthquake occurs, it is the responsibility of the Federal 

government through NOAA’s Tsunami Warning Centers to notify states within their area of 

responsibility of potentially imminent danger and assess, evaluate, and confirm any threat. 

General Description of Period 1 (Bulletins 1–3: Thursday March 27th 11:54 a.m. until 2:05 p.m.

PDT; 0—2 hours after earthquake) 

Immediately following the identification of an earthquake around the Pacific Ocean with 

tsunamigenic potential on the west coast, NOAA’s West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning 

Center (WCATWC) begins preliminary evaluation to determine whether a tsunami has actually 

been generated and what areas are forecasted for impact. Databases of preexisting numerical 

tsunami model results are matched against the location and magnitude of the earthquake, and 

historical data are analyzed. Pending this assessment, initial alert bulletins from WCATWC can 

often be limited to an Information Statement. If the earthquake event warrants, the initial 

bulletin(s) may immediately place potentially impacted areas of the State at the Watch or 

Warning level. Particularly for areas very close to the origin of the earthquake, a Warning level 

of alert will be immediate, weighing the need to have urgent timely advice over the need for 

increased confidence through additional data and analysis. Both Advisory and Warning level 
8 

alert bulletins will trigger response actions by emergency managers. The WCATWC begins 

initial conference calls with State-level Warning Points and National Weather Service-Warning 

Forecast Offices (WFOs). As California’s Warning Point, Cal OES makes initial contact with the 

impacted coastal counties to prepare for subsequent briefings as situation emerges. 
9 

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and 

Challenges during Period 1

On Thursday, March 27, 2014, a large earthquake occurs offshore at 11:50 a.m. PDT

(local California time) offshore the Alaska Peninsula region of Alaska. The earthquake is located 

in the vicinity of a known subduction zone, under the Aleutian trench, which is capable of 

producing dangerous tsunamis with potential to seriously impact the coastline of California. 

Initially, the only information known is a magnitude and location of the earthquake. Preliminary 

earthquake information relayed by automated alerting systems (Advanced National Seismic 

System, USGS, CISN, and the WCATWC) indicates an unverified magnitude of 8.2. 

· Immediately following identification of an earthquake around the Pacific Ocean of the size 

and location that might generate a tsunami on the west coast, NOAA’s West Coast and 

Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WCATWC) begins preliminary evaluation to determine 

whether a tsunami has actually been generated and which areas are forecasted for impact. At 

the WCATWC, databases of preexisting numerical tsunami model results are matched 

against the location and magnitude of the earthquake. In the case of this SAFRR scenario 

earthquake, the initially identified size and location of the event make it of immediate 

concern. 

· Based on seismic information alone, NOAA/NWS Bulletin #1 is issued by WCATWC within 

3 minutes after the earthquake. Bulletin #1 projects first wave arrival in Los Angeles at 5:35 

pm, 5 hours 45 minutes from issuance of this message. 

· Bulletin #1 initiates a Watch-level alert for the entire coastline of California, Oregon, and 

Washington States. A Watch activates the Emergency Alert System, which automatically and 

simultaneously relays notifications about the possible tsunami to emergency management 

systems and personnel, television, and radio stations. TV Stations begin scrolling a crawler 

message across their video programming “TSUNAMI WATCH FOR CALIFORNIA.” 

· The information in the initial WCATWC Bulletin is based solely on seismic readings and 

provides early information about estimated initial tsunami surge arrival times for points on 

the coast of California. In the SAFRR tsunami scenario Bulletin #1, arrival time estimates are 

provided (as with all bulletins) within an expected accuracy of plus or minus 15 minutes.
10

ESTIMATED ARRIVAL TIMES FOR CALIFORNIA

CRESCENT CITY 4:12 p.m PDT MAR 27

SAN FRANCISCO 5:06 p.m. PDT MAR 27

SANTA BARBARA 5:21 p.m. PDT MAR 27

SAN PEDRO 5:37 p.m. PDT MAR 27

LA JOLLA 5:48 p.m. PDT MAR 27

Figure 4. NOAA/NWS/WCATWC Bulletin #1: estimated initial tsunami surge arrival times

· At the local level, the Cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach, each responsible for 

determining the local need for evacuation orders, must stand by for WCATWC’s next alert 

bulletins for determination that a tsunami has actually been generated. Evacuation may be 

considered costly monetarily, in terms of public safety, and in terms of public confidence. 

However, Bulletin #1 indicates that if a tsunami has been generated, it will arrive in less than 

6 hours. In the case of a subsequent Warning-level alert, extensive evacuations could be 

triggered that could take as long as 6 hours. The time window to take appropriate action is 

already abutting Bulletin #1; the jurisdictions must poise senior decision makers to be able to 

order evacuations quickly once WCATWC confirms the threat, and they wait anxiously for 

additional information. 

· The State Warning Center and all Warning Points in California coastal counties, the U.S. 

Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy, and the public, including the media, are automatically notified 

of the WATCH simultaneously through the variety of existing systems and backup 

notification systems described earlier in this chapter. During this period, the WCATWC 

begins evaluation based on forecast models to determine whether the WATCH status will be 

upgraded, cancelled, or remain the same upon issuance of the next Alert Bulletin #2. 

· Bulletin #2 is issued and California remains in WATCH status pending continued evaluation 

of forecast models. Bulletin #2 arrives at 12:31 p.m. PDT and indicates an updated 

magnitude—the earthquake has now been adjusted to magnitude 8.6. Any earthquake above 

magnitude 7.5 on a submarine thrust fault has a strong potential to generate a tsunami. 

· WCATWC initiates its first West Coast conference call conducted to provide state Warning 

Points and weather forecast officers with the latest available forecast analysis, as well as 

observed information, as available. Geographic areas of heightened concern are called out 

and discussed, each state is polled for attendance and concerns, and a question/answer 

exchange provided. Participants include the Cal OES Earthquake and Tsunami Duty Officer, 

California State Warning Center, and coastal NWS Weather Forecast Meteorologists. 

Counterparts are on the line from Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and British Columbia. 

Technical information received from WCATWC calls includes specific areas/locations of 

heightened concern based on initial wave arrival times, forecast wave heights, and normal 

tide conditions. 

· The Cal OES Executive Duty Officer, Earthquake and Tsunami Duty Officer, and California 

State Warning Center confer and agree on the need to initiate the first statewide conference 
11

call to 20 coastal county emergency managers. These counties are (from north to south): Del 

Norte, Humboldt, Mendocino, Sonoma, Marin, Napa, Solano, Contra Costa, San Francisco, 

Alameda, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Monterey, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, 

Ventura, Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego. 

· Bulletin #3 is issued, and California remains in WATCH status pending continued evaluation 

of forecast models. Bulletin #3 is issued at 1:03 p.m. and indicates another updated 

magnitude of the earthquake to M9.0. Depending on depth and earthquake mechanism, a 

large tsunami can easily be expected from an earthquake of this magnitude. The possibility of 

its adversely affecting California’s entire coast is now a strong possibility. 

· The most important actions during this period are (1) notifications and (2) information flow 

and exchange from WCATWC to the State, to the counties, and to coastal cities. 

Key Considerations during Period 1 

Key emergency management considerations during this period include: 

1.1 Confirm receipt and notification of initial information from WCATWC across entities responsible for 

public safety at Federal (for example, Coast Guard), state, county, and local jurisdictions.

1.2 Focus on prioritized areas of highest concern, based on wave amplitude and arrival time. 

1.3 Analyze tide conditions at arrival times. Prepare for proper response and protective measure actions. 

1.4 For Port Captains, assess which vessels will be at high risk during tsunami or carry cargo that could create 

a hazardous condition in the event of vessel damage (especially liquid bulk, including petroleum). 

Evaluate timing necessary and prioritize potential vessel evacuation.

1.5 Ensure private entities with responsibility in ports and marinas are included in the information loop; 

establish contacts for coordination between port and local jurisdiction emergency managers with 

jurisdictional responsibility for land evacuations.

1.6 Within potentially impacted jurisdictions, use WATCH period to review emergency plans, identify areas 

in danger with highest priority, and be poised to initiate immediate action should an Advisory or Warning 

be issued.

1.7 Assess local offshore (storm) conditions. Consider compounding factors: Darkness and high tide—sunset 

is at 1815; high tide builds and peaks at 2000, 2 hours and 30 minutes after initial wave arrival in Los 

Angeles/Long Beach. (High tide will be occurring atop continued, worsening tsunami surges in the initial 

arrival of this event). Build in conservative interpretation for potential errors in forecasted amplitudes and 

arrival times.

1.8 Begin coordination with media; disseminate correct information about Watch and how public should

respond if Alert Level moves to Advisory or Warning. Ensure media are briefed on how to disseminate 

evacuation information based on local jurisdiction authority.

1.9 Contend with public perception and possible traffic issues where those in coastal areas begin to selfevacuate based on WATCH information and media coverage. 

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 1

This scenario tsunami would be the most serious tsunami event in the United States since 

Alaska 1964. In fact, a similar actual tsunami hitting the same areas today could become the 

worst in U.S. history, given increased development in low-lying areas along the coasts of 

California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and Hawaii. Emergency managers across California 

have extensive and well exercised emergency plans, but the potential need to fully address landbased and ocean-based evacuations as well as infrastructure protection within a short number of 

hours will present challenges that may only become apparent as the disaster unfolds. This 
12

scenario provides an opportunity to raise and examine consequential issues that have not been 

understood nor addressed through previous experience. 

The Warning level tsunami from Alaska will provide specific challenges to ensuring that 

port authorities, harbormasters, ship and boat owners and operators, and terminal operators are 

all properly notified. Evacuation considerations must address appropriate groups with potentially 

differing recommendations based on ship size, which ships are appropriate to send to sea, and 

how much time is available and needed by each vessel to do so. Large military, container, and 

cruise ships have different requirements and capabilities when it comes to going to the open 

ocean from mid-size fishing vessels and from small recreational, private yachts and boats. Who 

you send to sea will depend on weather conditions. Small operators must consider having enough 

fuel for extended periods (2–4 days for this event) and whether they have the seagoing ability to 

get to distant ports if the home port is destroyed. This may sound far-fetched, but it is exactly 

what happened to Crescent City Harbor in the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, tsunami. For large ships, the 

time needed to get crew aboard to allow the vessel to depart may be more critical than seagoing 

capability. How much time is required to board and move to an offshore depth safe from 

dangerous tsunami currents and whether this time fits within the 3–4 hour window of safety 

becomes critical. 

The public’s primary source of information during a disaster is not directly from 

emergency management personnel, but rather from the media. The automated NOAA alerts 

available to emergency managers are simultaneously available to the media, and they constitute 

“breaking news”—meaning the media will voraciously seek information. It is important for 

emergency managers to coordinate messaging and be able to provide the media with accurate 

public safety information, in order to give the public correct instructions about what they need to 

do to protect themselves. California media outlets largely understand that the correct safety 

information for the west coast is coming out of the West Coast Alaska Tsunami Warning Center 

(WCATWC), but this understanding may not be universal, especially at the level of the national 

media. In addition to providing information, emergency management organizations must monitor 

the media to correct misinformation, hearsay, and self-appointed experts. 

Initial focus in the media in recent events has been on expected first-wave arrival times 

and projected wave height, provided in the Warnings. A vital point not typically addressed by 

media is the dangerous tsunami activity that occurs after the first wave. Since the public will get 

their information from the media, rather than from emergency managers directly. It is important 

for the media to understand that the first wave is almost never the largest, that waves may last for 

many hours (47 in this event). People’s returning after the first wave, thinking it is safe and that 

danger has passed, accounts for many unnecessary deaths in tsunamis. Additionally, tsunamis are 

not surfable. There is generally no breaking wave face, they are driven by a push of water 

hundreds of miles long, they create strong, unpredictable currents, and they carry sediment and 

dangerous, deadly debris. An additional key element of information is the time of expected high 

tide. This can make a huge difference in whether a section of coast is inundated or not by simply 

the timing of tsunami surges with respect to low or high tide. 

Additional topics for emergency management education and coordination with media 

include explanations of how to respond to NOAA-issued Tsunami Alerts (WATCH, Warning, 

and Advisory; contextual historical tsunami information relative to the current tsunami and 

geographic areas affected; explanations of warning signs that a tsunami is coming (official vs. 

natural warning); definitions of tsunami terminology; provision of Web resources; and 

information about tsunami detection and forecasting. The media must also be provided timely 
13

information on what emergency-response safety measures are being undertaken and where, 

including information about evacuation areas, routes, shelters, and real-time updates of important 

developments as they occur. 

Period 2: First NOAA-Verified Alert Message at Warning Level

During Period 2 the state is responsible for disseminating and clarifying actionable 

information coming from NOAA/WCATWC, and for offering assistance to local governments. 

Local governments must notify their affected populations and secure their safety, through 

evacuation and other measures, during this period. 

Figure 5. Annotated map of northeast Pacific Ocean and adjacent lands constituting Bulletin #4 Alert 

Status of West Coast: Warning. Courtesy WCATWC. 

General Description of Period 2 (Bulletins 4–7: Thursday March 27th 2:05 p.m. through 6:01 p.m.; 

2—6 hours after earthquake)

Bulletin 4 has been received and, based on observed readings from deep ocean buoys and 

coastal tide gauges, the WCATWC confirmed that a tsunami had been generated and issued an

alert bulletin placing the entire California coastline in a Warning. 

The Warning message in the Bulletin 4 now reads: 

“Tsunami warning in effect for the coastal areas of California from the California-Mexico border 

to the Oregon-California border impacts for tsunami warning areas. 
14

Impacts for tsunami warning areas: 

· Widespread dangerous coastal flooding accompanied by powerful currents is possible 

and may continue for many hours after tsunami arrival. 

· The first wave may not be the largest. 

Recommended actions: 

· If you are in a warning area - move inland to higher ground. 

· Be alert to instructions from your local emergency officials. 

· Do not go to the coast to observe the tsunami. 

· Do not return to the coast until local emergency officials indicate it is safe to do so.” 

During the time between Warning for California and first wave arrival, the WCATWC 

continues to acquire additional information as the tsunami passes successive deep ocean buoys or 

coastal tide gauges, adjusts the initial modeling forecasts, and continues to use sequentially 

numbered bulletins to update not only the alert level, but forecasts for first-wave arrival times 

and projected wave amplitudes. Schedules for periodic briefing calls are initiated between the 

WCATWC and State Warning Points. Cal OES initiates a similar schedule for communication 

with State agencies and all 20 potentially impacted counties on the coast. Counties in turn ensure 

communication is continued with their city jurisdictions, special districts, and especially to

impacted sectors such as ports and marinas. The California Geological Survey deploys tsunami 

observation teams to predetermined locations to provide updates to Cal OES and the impacted 

counties after the tsunami arrives. 

Emergency Operations Centers begin to activate at the port, local jurisdiction, county, 

and state level. The U.S. Coast Guard activates its protocol for Planned Response to a tsunami. 

This includes provision of mutual aid to the Ports and affected jurisdictions statewide to support 

eventual search and rescue operations, launch of coast guard air asset support according to 

policy, notification of commercial vessels and applicable facilities of the tsunami Warning, 

closing of ports to all inbound vessel traffic and encouraging vessels to move to a safe location, 

and conducting of patrols of waterways within the affected zone to ensure maritime security. The 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) activates its Regional Operations Center. 

Local emergency managers initiate plans, including evacuation if warranted, and recommended 

protective measures as necessary. City and/or county emergency managers are responsible for 

determining if land evacuations are necessary in the ports. Harbormasters determine efficacy and 

timing for allowed departure of vessels from harbors and marinas, or recommend that boats do 

not leave if their owners are not prepared to stay offshore for an extended period of time. All 

evacuations and protective emergency measures must commence quickly and be completed or 

established prior to first wave arrival. Based on need, local jurisdictions may request Mutual Aid, 

or state assistance using established assistance request processes. 

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and 

Challenges
15

Approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes after the earthquake, at 2:05 p.m., (2 hours and 9 

minutes after the initial WCATWC WATCH Bulletin), Bulletin #4 puts California into a 

Warning with approximately 3 hours and 30 minutes remaining to the start of tsunami, at 5:35 

p.m., along the Los Angeles coast. The challenge now becomes enacting all decisions to quickly 

engender desired response actions to adequately inform and protect the public within this 

remaining window of time.

· At all levels of emergency management, Emergency Operations Centers are fully activated. 

Trained emergency personnel are called in to staff functions of the incident command 

structure. Cooperating State, Federal, and local agencies assume liaison roles upon request. 

· To convey situational information, Cal OES convenes its first statewide conference call with 

the 20 coastal county emergency managers and establishes a schedule for subsequent hourly 

update calls. The purpose of these calls is to relay technical information received on the 

WCATWC call with Cal OES as the State’s Warning Point, as well as address concerns, 

answer questions, focus on any specific areas of heightened concern based on information 

provided in the bulletins or otherwise, and receive information from county emergency 

managers on the coast. Each county will in turn conduct information exchange among its 

cities and districts. 

On the statewide call, participating counties include all 20 of California’s coastal 

counties. Also in attendance are: regional agencies (for example, Metropolitan Transportation 

Commission), State agencies (for example, California Geological Survey, California State Parks, 

Department of Fish and Wildlife, Caltrans, Department of Health Services, Department of Water 

Resources, CalFire), Federal agencies (for example, USGS, NOAA, USCG, U.S. Navy) and 

NOAA Weather Forecast Meteorologists from the Eureka, Monterey, Oxnard, San Diego, and 

Sacramento offices. 

· Hourly WCATWC calls with West Coast Warning Points and Cal OES statewide conference 

calls continue. Statewide coordination calls progressively focus on specific areas or locations 

of heightened concern based on initial wave arrival times, forecast wave heights, and normal 

tide conditions. 

· Additional discussions on statewide calls include exchange of information regarding 

protective measures and emergency response actions being taken by counties (cities, ports, 

terminals), consistency of public information messaging and media coordination, whether 

State assistance is needed or being received (for example, reconnaissance flights, changeable 

message road signs, responders), evacuations being conducted (City of Long Beach, Ports, 

Los Angeles), and shelters being opened. This information will also be provided via 

situational reports from each operational area (county) for each 12-hour staffing period. 

· Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) at all jurisdictional levels develop their strategic 

plans (objectives, course of action) and a staffing pattern for the following 12-hour period. 

The California Geological Survey sends observers to safe locations along the coast to provide 

real-time, trusted, subject matter expert observations back to the State. Public Information is 

coordinated through the Office of Public Information at Cal OES Headquarters. Staff from 

various State and Federal agencies continue to arrive at the State Operations Center in 

Sacramento and Regional Emergency Operation Centers in the Bay Area and Southern 

California and may then be deployed to the field to begin assisting with response activities 

and damage assessment in the most affected coastal counties. 
16

· According to Bulletin #4, first-wave arrival time at San Pedro in the Port of Los Angeles is 

projected to be as little as 31⁄2 hours away. The decision to begin evacuations must be 

executed so that evacuations can begin immediately. For cities on the coast with local 

geographic public safety responsibility, the change from Watch to Warning has triggered the 

need for the important evacuation decision within the entity’s area of jurisdiction. This 

includes all areas within the city limits, unincorporated county, and county and state beaches. 

For the Port of Los Angeles, the jurisdiction responsible for ordering evacuation is the City 

of Los Angeles. For the Port of Long Beach, the jurisdiction responsible for ordering 

evacuation is the City of Long Beach. Decision makers have to act quickly to approve 

evacuation and publicize these orders. Public safety officials (police and fire) responsible for 

the actual evacuation must immediately begin its implementation. The 3 hour and 30 minute 

window will continue to shrink as the evacuation order goes out and people begin to move 

away from the coast. 

· As a result of the short timeframe prior to first-wave arrival, local jurisdictions may not have 

time to completely evacuate areas within the designated inundation zone and will need to 

prioritize. Automated telephone notification systems are activated to notify residents within 

evacuation areas (for example, Reverse-911). The Cities will notify their respective ports, 

which will in turn notify tenants and initiate their emergency plans. Public venues near the 

coast and beaches will present particular challenges, as will dependent care facilities (such as 

schools, hospitals, and convalescent care facilities), where evacuation may be slower and 

require vehicles for nonambulatory patient transport. 

· County and local agencies also have responsibility for area security and area reentry. First 

responders are deployed to traffic checkpoints at the edge of the evacuation zone to direct 

traffic out and restrict traffic from coming back in to dangerous areas. Traffic control points 

are set up at strategic locations to reduce traffic flow toward the coast and to restrict sightseer 

traffic to the coast, as required. 

· As each area is evacuated, public safety agencies will set up Traffic Control Points consisting 

of roadblocks, barricades, and (or) a system of patrols to secure evacuated areas. Traffic 

Control Points require multiagency coordination and many personnel for extended periods of 

time. Public safety agencies will be using their auxiliaries and volunteers to staff traffic 

control points and requesting mutual aid assistance from inland communities. 

· The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach must consider evacuation and safety and 

protection of populations and assets on the water as well as on land. On land, employees 

working throughout individually managed port terminals and other facilities must be notified 

and evacuated. A Federal Border Patrol detention facility within the Port of Los Angeles 

houses some 1,200 detainees and will implement its secure, independent plan to take 

appropriate protective measures. 

· The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has ultimate authority over vessel traffic. Authority to close 

the port lies with the Captain of the Port, under jurisdiction of USCG Sector Commander of 

USCG District 11, Sector Los Angeles. (This is one of three sectors in California, the others 

being San Francisco and San Diego). The 11th Coast Guard District encompasses the States 

of California, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah, the coastal and offshore waters out more than a 

thousand miles, and the offshore waters of Mexico and Central America down to South 

America. The USCG Captain of the Ports will take charge of determining and prioritizing 

evacuation of large ships in the ports and determining which and how many will have time to 

leave port for deeper, safe water depths, beyond the high-velocity tsunami surge. The port 
17

must also notify incoming vessels to remain at sea. Port Authorities and vessel owners must 

assess whether liquid bulk vessels can (have enough time to be) successfully depart from the 

port during the Warning period, prior to the start of tsunami, and when the cutoff time for 

departure will be. For vessels that cannot make it out in time, moorings may be manned from 

onboard or other measures taken to secure ships as best as possible. 

Key Considerations during Period 2 

2.1 “Short fuse” event for evacuations: The 3.5-hour window to order, initiate, and complete evacuations is very 

short; in some cases it could be shorter than the anticipated time required to clear dangerous areas and 

address special needs of various populations (see following section, “Decision Making on a Short Fuse”). 

2.2 Activate automated telephone notification systems and other local protocols to ensure rapid notification of 

residents/workers/visitors within the zone regarding evacuation.

2.3 Coordinate with port and marina authorities regarding disparate maritime communities (vessels = large, 

medium, small). Evacuate different-sized boats and ships to open ocean or not? Consider offshore 

conditions, timing of event, and ability of members of maritime community to stay offshore for extended

time before recommending maritime evacuation. Determine if it is appropriate to leave personnel on ships 

during the event or evacuate to safety on land. Threats to life-safety should overrule consideration of damage 

to ships/boats/docks.

2.4 Need to direct people away from the zone safely via designated routes and methods. (Implement evacuation 

plan. Pre-identify/designate/sign optimum evacuation routes.) . If evacuation time is short, evacuation on 

foot instead of by vehicle may be recommended, especially in areas of limited egress, such as the ports.

2.5 Identify refuge/staging areas with the capacity to shelter the evacuated population.

2.6 Need to secure road entry/exit points. (Need to alert key first responders at the local level, if warranted by 

situation. Need to assist with first responders deployed to evacuation sites.) Need to keep those who want to 

“watch” away from shore. 

2.7 Given the widespread impact of the tsunami along the coast, collaboration and coordination will be required 

to secure a vast evacuation perimeter up and down Los Angeles County and the State. 

2.8 Is there an adequate number of first responder staff, informed of proper protocol for this type of scenario, 

and available for rapid deployment? Just-in-time training for out of region mutual aid may be required.

2.9 Need to stage/move emergency equipment outside of inundation area. Need to establish ingress/egress 

routes for emergency vehicles and evacuation buses and establish evacuation routes. 

2.10All first responders must be out of danger zones at least 30 minutes prior to first wave arrival. (at 5:05 p.m.) 

They must remain out until all-clear for first responders is issued.

2.11Determine and request need for mutual aid/outside resources to initiate evacuation, secure evacuation area, 

and prepare for response.

2.12Need to coordinate with media (to ensure they have accurate local information on which locations and 

people require evacuation and information to both zone-inhabitants and public regarding need to stay away 

for prolonged period). In addition, areas to be evacuated will be based on pre-identified evacuation plans, 

maps, and (or) maximum mapped inundation zone. However, the tsunami may not inundate all mapped 

areas. This will be an ongoing education and public information issue as the event progresses. 

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 2

Once the Warning is provided by WCATWC, local jurisdictions must approve evacuation 

orders. Evacuations are not ordered lightly, and in the City of Los Angeles, for example, the 

order must be agreed upon by the Police Chief, Fire Chief, Director of Emergency Services, and 

Mayor. This can further truncate the window between evacuation initiation and first wave 

arrival. The evacuation time window may be desperately short, depending on the size and 

character of areas within the inundation zone to be evacuated within the short 3.5-hour window 
18

remaining. Emergency managers must consider the estimated time needed to thoroughly 

evacuate an area, including limited egress areas (islands/peninsulas); populations more difficult 

to reach (for example, people with language barriers or people in group housing, at public 

venues, and beach and coastal visitors); those that may require extended evacuation time (in 

areas at a far distance to high ground); those requiring additional time to evacuate (such as 

schools, care facilities, hospitals); and those with special evacuation limitations (such as 

jails/prisons). They must consider accommodation of special populations (elderly, those with 

access and /functional needs). There may be a recommendation to identify structures that can be 

used for vertical evacuation structures for areas that cannot be adequately evacuated within the 

remaining timeframe allotted (for example, concrete and steel frame structures, three stories or 

higher). Note that vertical evacuation is a last resort and moving to higher ground if readily 

available is always a safer option. 

The Map Gap

There is a significant issue illustrated by the SAFRR tsunami scenario. There will be 

areas evacuated on the basis of the scenario that will not ultimately be inundated by the tsunami. 

However, during an actual event, this information would not be available to emergency 

managers as the tsunami event unfolds (knowing this in advance is a scenario “artificiality”). In 

other words, you won’t know what areas will actually be inundated by water until the tsunami 

happens. Therefore, you must evacuate based on previous projections. In this case, given the 

short time allowed, and availability of worst-case inundation line maps from the State of 

California, recommendations will be made for full evacuation of this entire zone. Inundation 

zone mapping information currently available to emergency managers uses a “maximum 

inundation zone” that will not be reached during every Warning level tsunami event, yet is the 

best (and only) available information in advance of a tsunami (see figs. 6 and 7). 
19

Figure 6. Tsunami inundation maps for emergency planning: Los Angeles and Long Beach Harbor area. 
20

Figure 7. Map of Los Angeles and Long Beach Harbor area showing expected SAFRR Scenario 

Inundation Line compared to State Maximum Inundation Line. Note: This information WOULD NOT be 

available during any ongoing real tsunami. Red line is the inundation line for this Alaska tsunami 

scenario. Blue area is the maximum inundation from State maps used for pre-planning emergency 

response.

Decision Making as Information Unfolds

NOAA’s WCATWC provides three key pieces of information that are central to 

providing emergency managers with the data they need in order to make crucial and immediate 

Warning response decisions. The first of these is initial wave arrival times at various locations 

along the coast. The second element of information is NOAA’s forecast wave heights 

(amplitudes) at various locations. Arrival times and amplitudes are provided for as many as 30 

locations with existing tide gauges along the coastline of California. These are updated as the 

tsunami progresses, and as the scope of the threat is revealed, State and local emergency 

managers can begin to ask more detailed questions to gain a clear picture of what may be 

expected regarding specific coastal areas of heightened concern. This is important information 

that ongoing conference calls with the WCATWC, the State, coastal counties, and coastal cities 
21

and communities provide a critical opportunity to discuss and clarify as an event unfolds. The 

third type of information is the normal tide conditions across the expected wave-arrival period. 

This piece of the picture is key because the difference in wave height if the highest wave surges 

are coming in at high tide or low tide can mean the difference between dry-land inundation and 

no inundation. 

Seaward Evacuation Guidance Specifics

There are several issues regarding tsunami response of specific concern to the maritime 

community, defined as ports, harbors, marinas, and the vessels and people who make use of 

them. There is little time following a Tsunami Warning to make informed decisions regarding 

seaward evacuation of vessels, nor to determine who is appropriate (vessels, people) to send to 

the open ocean (considering prevailing weather, oceangoing capabilities, length of time to 

remain evacuated, fuel, food, speed of the vessel, and distance to alternative ports). The 

California Tsunami Program, comprising Cal OES and the California Geological Survey, in 

coordination with county emergency managers and port/harbor authorities, has highlighted these 

concerns, observed recent events, undertaken a work plan to make recommendations for 

mitigating tsunami risk to ports, harbors, and marinas, and actively solicited input, feedback and 

participation of those affected communities. The State of California Tsunami Program has 

research underway to inform and provide consistent statewide policy, including the following 

overarching recommendations: 

· a single depth contour for offshore evacuations, 

· hazard thresholds defined and addressed for harbor facilities, 

· hazard thresholds defined and addressed for vessels and best practices for ship 

(re)positioning, and 

· protocol recommendations of minimum times required for evacuate vs. do not evacuate 

(depending on type of vessel). 

SPECIAL NOTE: The Alamitos Breakpoint 

The SAFRR tsunami scenario, using modeled data and simulated bulletins, was able to 

bring to light a previously unrealized potential issue with regard to existing NOAA Breakpoints 

and a possible need for a change of protocol of how Alert delivery classifies specific coastal 

areas of Southern California during tsunamis. This issue was important for state officials to be 

aware of and discuss with county officials and was discussed with NOAA officials at the 

WCATWC. The results were (1) the scenario bulletins were changed to more accurately reflect 

what would be issued by existing protocol/practice during an actual event and (2) the option of 

moving the Alamitos Breakpoint further south was discussed. 

Note: Warning, Watch and Advisory extents are set based on distance from epicenter, tsunami 

travel time, or pre-computed threat estimates, and are listed in the messages as extending from X 

to Y (along a coastline). 

Issue #1 (Affects how bulletins were developed for this scenario): 

As the SAFRR scenario originally stood, areas from Alamitos Bay to the Mexico border 

started in an Advisory (non-evacuation situation) and were upgraded to a Warning level 

(evacuation situation) an hour-and-a-half after the first wave arrived. This encompassed the 

coastlines of Orange and San Diego Counties. Initially the bulletins developed for this scenario 
22

placed areas south of Alamitos Bay in an Advisory while those to the north were placed in a 

Warning (as of 2pm, Bulletin #4, fig. 8). At 7pm (as of Bulletin #9), areas to the south of 

Alamitos Bay transitioned from an Advisory to Warning. This was subsequent to the "start of 

tsunami" for this entire southern California section of coastline. 

Figure 8. Annotated map of northeast Pacific Ocean and adjacent lands constituting previous SAFRR 

Scenario Bulletin #4 Alert Status of West Coast: Warning/Avisory. Courtesy WCATWC. 

Under this scenario, areas where inundation would likely occur (Huntington Beach, 

Newport Beach, Dana Point, and Coronado) would not have been officially evacuated before the 

tsunami arrived because they were in an Advisory. If this had been the case, government 

decision makers in the areas in and around Orange and San Diego counties would have been in a 

dangerous and difficult situation because they would not have called evacuations during an 

Advisory but by the time they were upgraded to a Warning... inundation would likely have been 

occurring and no one would have been officially evacuated. With upgrade to a Warning, this 

would have turned from an evacuation issue into a life-safety issue for the newly alerted areas. 

This issue was identified by the State of California (California Geological Survey and 

California Emergency Management Agency) and discussed with the WCATWC. It was noted 

that bulletins developed for the scenario were based on a variety of modeled data with different 

variations of the same source and released somewhat differently than would be done during an 

actual event. The Bulletins developed by the WCATWC for SAFRR relied strictly on this 

modeled data and followed protocol within the WCATWC guidelines, without applying three 

important inputs that would occur during an actual event before bulletins are released widely to 

the public: 

1. Consultation among the scientific team in the WCATWC, 

2. Real data coming from DART Buoys, and 

3. West Coast conference calls with state/province emergency managers and Warning 

Coordination Meteorologists with the National Weather Service, regional Weather 

Forecast Offices. 

The above inputs and discussion would help confirm and guide decisions before bulletins 

were released during an actual tsunami event. 
23

As a result, Bulletin #4 through Bulletin #9 were adjusted, as they would be during a real 

event, to place the coastline south of Alamitos Bay to the Mexican Border into a Warning – thus 

reflecting the same threat level for the similar coastal settings to the north and south of this 

breakpoint (fig. 9). 

Figure 9. Google image map of Southern California coastline showing Alamitos Breakpoint location. 

Issue #2 (Should the Breakpoint be moved from the Alamitos Bay to the Orange County-San 

Diego County line?) 

The SAFRR scenario has raised a potentially important long-term issue: Should a break 

point exist with potentially differing levels of alert (for example, Warning/Advisory) between 

very similar flat, low-lying, densely populated geographies of southern Los Angeles and northern 

Orange counties? This includes low-lying, highly populated areas like Long Beach (Belmont 

Shore, Naples Island), Seal Beach, Huntington Beach, and Newport Beach (Islands in Newport 

Bay and the Balboa Peninsula). 

This issue was also discussed, and protocol may be changed based on this discussion and 

continued follow up with the Weather Forecast Offices in San Diego and Oxnard. This could 

result in a permanent adjustment, but retain the existence of a breakpoint between the Ports of 

Los Angeles/Long Beach and San Diego, possibly at the Orange and San Diego county border. 

Period 3: During the Event

During Period 3 the first tsunami waves begin to progressively hit the coast of California from north to south. Areas 

within mapped tsunami inundation zones will be dangerous during this time. Impacts are observed via remote means 

by the media and emergency managers; post-event reconnaissance is planned/staged.
24

General Description of Period 3 (Bulletins 8–25: Thursday March 27th 6:01 p.m. through Friday 

March 28th 12:02 p.m.; 7–24 hours after earthquake)

Regularly scheduled conference calls exchanging updated information flow among all 

affected jurisdictions, continuing at multiple levels: WCATWC-to-States/WFOs, State-toCounties, and County-to-Cities/Cities-Port/Marina Authorities and maritime communities. 

Assessment and reporting of local jurisdiction actions may include evacuations conducted, 

shelters opened, and remote intelligence gathering of evacuation shortfalls and damage or 

casualties sustained. Tactics for impact assessment, rescue, and response are refined as observed 

impacts are reported remotely. Mutual aid needs are projected by impacted jurisdictions. County 

and State level support activities continue and may include coordination of the mutual aid 

requests, coordination of public information messaging, assessment and provision of State 

assistance needed, and coordination of resources through mission tasking. 

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and 

Challenges

At 5 hours and 45 minutes after the earthquake the first tsunami surges begin to arrive at 

the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The time is 5:35 p.m., and it is 40 minutes before 

sundown. High tide will continue to build for another 2.5 hours following estimated first surge 

arrivals, peaking at around 8:00 p.m. As demonstrated by recent tsunamis around the world, this 

is a time when the highest waves and most extreme currents can occur; the first surge is almost 

never the worst. Thus, worsening tsunami surges are hitting the outer coast and funneling into 

the ports atop increasing tidal conditions. 

In the harbor, successive tsunami surges may be increasing in height. Although the 

greatest inundation danger may be at high tide, extreme fluctuations, both positive waves that 

inundate normally dry land and negative waves that expose the sea floor and threaten large 

vessels in port, will extend for many hours. 

As the event progresses through the Warning period, areas experience flooding 

inundation approaching the maximum state-mapped inundation zone. These include the City of 

Long Beach downtown area, below the bluff. Some areas in the Port of Long Beach will also be 

inundated. However, much of POLB and POLA will experience substantially smaller amounts of 

inundation than the maximum mapped inundation zone (see “The Map Gap” section above and 

fig. 7). 

· Hourly calls with the WCATWC continue to collect and provide the latest available technical 

support information. In addition to estimated wave height information, observations from 

deep ocean assessment buoys and tide gauge readings from around the Pacific Ocean already 

experiencing the tsunami are being reported. Information about current and projected status 

of subsequent alert bulletins is provided: whether or when Warning level is expected to be 

downgraded, expected length of time before downgrade (if available), which areas of 

coastline remain in which alert level, and answers to any pertinent questions from locally 

affected communities. 

· Statewide calls continue every other hour alternating with WCATWC multistate conference 

calls to relay technical updates and maintain updated situation status of affected communities 

as the event unfolds up and down the coast. Evaluations of evacuation status, assessment of 
25

local resource needs from the State, reporting of local damage sustained, and State personnel 

deployment are also provided to the Regional Emergency Operations Center (REOC) and 

State Operations Center (SOC) by counties . Primary information flow is from affected 

coastal areas to the REOCs to the SOC and eventually to the Governor’s office. 

· The scenario tsunami will impact all 20 coastal counties in California. At this time the State’s 

Emergency Operations Centers (SOC and REOCs) are fully staffed and working to support 

impacted counties by working with unaffected counties and state resources to coordinate and 

support local needs/requests for assistance. The SOC and REOCs house a variety of 

organizational representatives, which may include expert staff from FEMA, the U.S. Coast 

Guard, California Geological Survey, California State Parks, CalTrans, Regional 

Transportation Authorities (MTC, LA Metro, BART), Department of Water Resources, 

National Weather Service, American Red Cross, Utilities (PG&E, SCE, SDG&E), American 

Red Cross, and private sector business continuity groups. 

· At the local EOCs, critical, ongoing actions include assessing the success of evacuation and 

planning for post-Warning reentry into the evacuation zone and rescue, as well as perimeter 

security for the evacuation areas. Implementation of these actions may be assisted by 

personnel from adjacent, unaffected jurisdictions or facilitated through use of State resources. 

· During the period while the tsunami is in progress with damaging waves, currents, and 

inundation, a challenge for authorities will be to ensure public safety by maintaining security 

of an extensive perimeter. Access will only be provided once an “all clear” has been declared 

by local civil authorities. The evacuation in Los Angeles County will span not only the Ports, 

but residential, business, beach, and commercial areas. Beyond the damage to Los Angeles 

County, the tsunami will impact the entire California coast, requiring a secure perimeter on 

the coastline of most of California’s 20 coastal counties. Police/responder personnel requests 

to staff perimeters and assist with other response activities could stress even Mutual Aid 

resources from inland counties. POLA and POLB have their own police and fire resources, 

but may also request personnel resources from their cities, and the County of Los Angeles 

may need to request State augmentation of first responder personnel (for example, California 

Highway Patrol, California National Guard). This function will need to be turned over to 

private security providers in each county as soon as feasible, because law mutual aid (police; 

sheriff) and the California National Guard are not sustainable long-term solutions. 

· Reception centers, feeding operations, and sheltering for evacuated residents will be 

operational, including care for people and animals and those with access and functional 

needs. This will be a function of the American Red Cross, California National Guard, NGOs 

and faith-based organizations 

· The harbor district may experience power outages due to localized tsunami flooding, as well 

as intentional shutdown to preserve facility operational integrity. 

· In the Los Angeles County coordination of public information will take place at the county 

level, with the Sheriff’s Department responsible for media coordination, including 

preparation of daily County Emergency Operation Center press briefings, assisting in the 

preparation of press announcements for key elected officials, and responding to inquiries 

from the media in conjunction with appropriate departmental subject-matter experts. The 

Sheriff will make every attempt to coordinate emergency public information releases with 

impacted jurisdictions and agencies in order to ensure consistency. All press briefings and 

media releases will follow the policies and procedures outlined in the Los Angeles County 

Emergency Public Information Plan. 
26

Key Considerations during Period 3

3.1 Continue communication with State and Federal tsunami forecast experts and field 

observation teams. 

3.2 Assess effectiveness of evacuation efforts to prepare for initial search and rescue operations 

upon all-clear. Consider alternatives for safe evacuation of stranded populations (such as 

aerial). 

3.3 Receive evacuees at refuge/staging areas with the capacity to shelter the evacuated 

population.

3.4 Continued need for securing evacuation zone and keeping people away from shore who want 

to go down and watch.

3.5 Continued need to stage emergency equipment outside of inundation area. Need to establish 

ingress/egress routes for emergency vehicles and evacuation buses and establish evacuation 

routes. 

3.6 Continued need to coordinate with media (rumor control, continued correct information 

regarding evacuation zone and need to stay away for prolonged period). For consistency in 

messaging, information will be coordinated across emergency public affairs offices at the 

county level regarding evacuation areas and at the NOAA/State level for questions about 

additional forecast information.

3.7 Consider and plan for the length of the event through multiple 12-hour staffing periods, which 

may fatigue emergency decision-making and response personnel. Dangerous tsunami activity, 

especially in maritime communities, may last for days. Make sure there are adequate 

personnel available for sustained operations of local, county, regional and State emergency 

operations functions. 

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 3

Incomplete Land Evacuations

The Cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach will use standing evacuation plans based on 

the maximum mapped inundation line to determine areas to be evacuated. In spite of redundant 

communication methods, there are likely to be those who do not hear the order, those who decide 

not to leave, and those who may not have time to evacuate during the 3.5-hour evacuation 

window prior to first wave arrival. Examples within the latter group could include vulnerable 

groups such as those in dependent care or with mobility or functional and access needs. For their 

own safety, it is important that first responders themselves avoid re-entering dangerous areas 

until cleared to do so. 

Keeping People From Returning to Evacuated Areas Prematurely

Tsunami waves are expected to continue to arrive on land, and evacuation orders will 

stay in force, for some 47 hours. Local authorities will have used the best available 

information—maximum mapped inundation zones—to establish and maintain evacuation 

perimeters. As the tsunami event period continues, there will be areas where observed inundation 

does not reach all areas evacuated. This is likely to create pressure from residents to lift 

evacuation orders – perhaps prematurely. 
27

Maintaining security around the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach could be one of 

the most challenging undertaken in the region because of the scope and geographic complexity 

of the area. 

The expense and regional economic impact of interrupted commercial activities within 

the ports creates strong port-tenant need to lift evacuation orders as soon as possible. There will 

be pressure to reopen the on-land portions of the port—or even to keep it open throughout to 

allow movement of goods and commerce already in the port and arriving from inland. 

In addition to these pressures, continued maintenance of safety perimeters across the 47-

hour life of the tsunami Warning will include the problem of those who want to “go see” or 

“surf” the tsunami. All of these issues with the public wanting and in some cases demanding to 

return to potentially unsafe areas will need to be met with education, both in advance of a 

tsunami and during the event. Elected officials and emergency responders must understand the 

nature of the ongoing threat. The media will be another powerful partner, and to ensure coverage 

of the appropriate safety message, emergency managers should be prepared to provide continued 

availability of educated spokespersons. 

Incomplete Water Evacuation

Using preestablished priorities and judgment about timing and relative dangers within the 

ports waterways, the U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port will have evacuated commercial 

vessels prior to first wave arrival. Within the Port, remaining vessels will be secured, in many 

cases with their crews aboard. 

In previous Advisory-level tsunamis in California there have been examples of smaller 

vessels that have become caught in strong tsunami currents as they make a late attempt to leave 

harbor. No two tsunamis are alike, and currents and surges during this scenario event would be 

on the order of three times as bad as recent actual events. However people may base decisions on 

their own experience in POLA and POLB with recent tsunamis from Chile and Japan. Mariners 

who refuse to heed the Warning and attempt to leave or enter the harbor during the extreme 

currents of tsunami surges will likely require rescue. Should these situations arise, decisions will 

need to be made about whether to attempt rescue and risk lives of response personnel. During the 

recent Japanese tsunami in 2011, harbor personnel in Santa Barbara were injured assisting 

mariners attempting to dock during ongoing tsunami surges. Numerous vessels had difficulty 

entering and leaving harbor entrances in the midst of tsunami surges. 

The “short fuse” nature of this event may exacerbate the above situations because of the 

short time window to make decisions, prepare, and leave should a mariner decide to do so. 

Problems have occurred with late entering/exiting vessels at the seaward entrances to harbors 

during recent tsunamis. Given less time to try to make it out within the reduced Warning period, 

less informed citizens may make the wrong decision and ultimately not make it out in time. In 

the 2011 event, a vessel in Crescent City, the Amanda B nearly foundered trying to make it out 

while tsunami surges were beginning to occur. There appears to be significant potential for 

dangerous behavior by boat owners in POLA and POLB. Boat owners expecting to trailer their 

boats should expect congested boat ramps and must remember that they have to get their boat to 

the trailer, out of the water, and out of the tsunami zone before the tsunami arrives. 
28

Period 4: Warning Cancelled for Specific Areas

General Description of Period 4 (Bulletins 26–33: Friday March 28th 12:02 p.m. through Friday 

March 28th 8:02 p.m.; 24–32 hours after earthquake)

Figure 10. Annotated map of northeast Pacific Ocean and adjacent lands constituting Bulletin #31 Alert 

Status of West Coast (Warning/Advisory). Courtesy WCATWC. 

Where a Warning was in effect and then cancelled (compare fig. 9 to fig. 10), local 

authorities may begin safety assessment of impacted land-based areas to determine a schedule 

for lifting of evacuation orders, allowing re-entry into inundated and nonimpacted evacuation 

areas. Initial “Windshield Surveys” assess life-safety and damage in preparation for search and 

rescue operations and other response efforts. Closure of or limited access to harbors, marinas, 

and beaches remain in place. Access to evacuation areas remain limited to response personnel 

until deemed safe for the public to return; shelters remain open. 

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and 

Challenges

At 32 hours after the earthquake, the Warning ends for California. This indicates that the 

danger of continuing dry-land inundation from incoming surges has passed. The alert is 

downgraded by the WCATWC to Advisory status, which is conveyed via alert Bulletin 34. 

Advisory status indicates continued strong, dangerous currents in the ports. It is still not safe to 
29

go in or near the water, nor to allow vessels to enter and leave the port. The U.S. Coast Guard 

will maintain closure of all dangerous waters until at least the Advisory level threat is lifted. 

· At this time, the WCATWC is unable to determine when danger has passed in many areas. 

Local conditions, particularly strong currents in channels and harbors, can cause wide 

variations in tsunami wave action. Consequently, local emergency management officials, and 

not the WCATWC, will make all-clear determinations. 

· The WCATWC will issue a cancellation in either of the following situations: (1) an 

evaluation of sea level data has confirmed that a destructive tsunami will not impact the 

affected area; or (2) following a destructive tsunami when data indicate that the threat has 

largely subsided to nondestructive levels. Following a destructive tsunami, the WCATWC 

provides guidance to local officials regarding when they can consider the threat to have 

passed based on local conditions. 

· In general, after receipt of a Tsunami Warning, agencies can assume all-clear status when 

their area is free from damaging waves for two hours, unless the WCATWC has announced 

expected times of arrival (ETAs) for additional waves or local conditions warrant 

continuation of the Tsunami Warning status. This requires that the local government, or 

scientific staff from the California Geological Survey, are able to observe the waves from a 

safe distance and height. 

· Hence, if no wave or only insignificant waves occur, local agencies may assume “all clear” 

status two hours after the latest ETA announced by WCATWC, unless the presence of strong 

currents in channels and harbors has been noted, which may warrant continuation of the 

Tsunami Warning. The public should not return to low-lying areas until the tsunami threat 

has passed and local authorities announce “all clear.” 

· At 12 hours (approximately 23:00) “B-Shift” staff comes on duty for Tsunami Duty Officer, 

State Operations Center, and Regional Emergency Operations Center. A briefing is held to 

transfer information about critical issues and activities occurring during the previous 12 

hours and convey objectives, priorities, and a strategic course of action established by the 

management team for the incoming staff. 

· Hourly West Coast calls between WCATWC and State Warning Points and Cal OES

statewide conference calls with coastal counties and State agencies continue as long as the 

Advisory is in place. Statewide calls continue to focus on updated status of continuing 

dangerous conditions (strong, damaging, dangerous currents within the port and ocean 

waters), information about current and projected status of subsequent alert bulletins, whether 

observations indicate when Advisory level is expected to be downgraded, expected length of 

time before downgrade (if available), which areas of coastline remain in which alert level, 

and answers to any pertinent questions from locally affected communities. 

· It is important for the emergency management community to understand that tsunamis, 

including this one, are long-duration events, in which unpredictable, dangerous conditions 

exist for many hours. This requires development and planning for multiple staffing periods at 

the outset of the event. If local and county jurisdictions do not have enough staff to maintain 

this capacity, there may be a need to call on assistance from other, unaffected jurisdictions. 

· As the Advisory continues, staffing at City, County, and State EOCs will rotate back to AShift” at 11:00 on March 28, then back to “B-Shift” at 23:00 for another 12-hour work 

period. 
30

Key Considerations during Period 4

4.1 Maintain appropriate and consistent tsunami evacuation and response planning. Due to the 

length of the event, there may be pressure to allow people and businesses to “return to 

normal.” Consider all life safety issues and protocols before allowing return to normalcy.

4.2 Maintain emergency response and evacuation protocol in and along the waterfront areas.

Strong tsunami currents will likely continue during this time period.

4.3 Localized initial safety assessment for search and rescue, emergency medical attention, and to 

determine continuing hazards (debris fields, fires, fuel leaks, hazardous material spills, 

damaged, unsafe structures).

4.4 Localized determination and implementation of strategy for reopening of evacuated and 

inundated areas, including phased or facilitated reentry where damage or continuing hazards 

exists. 

4.5 Localized assessment of ongoing need to provide services to those displaced by home 

damage/destruction. 

4.6 Begin response operations, including rescue, stabilization of ongoing hazard conditions, 

debris removal for emergency egress.

4.7 Assess need for equipment and response personnel staging areas near, but outside, damaged 

and affected areas.

4.8 Begin county and statewide assessment of overall unmet needs and requirements for outside 

resources through mutual aid, State resources and request for Federal assistance. 

4.9 Continued need to coordinate with media (rumor control, continued correct information 

regarding Advisory and continued maritime danger, status of evacuation order).

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 4

The Pressure is on (to Open the Ports)

During Periods 4 and 5 the port remains closed based on scientific advice and tide gauge 

readings by the NOAA WCATWC, conveyed by Cal OES to county emergency managers. The 

California Geological Survey will also have observers stationed near the coast to provide 

scientific observations and advice relevant to emergency management and locally important 

decisions. Hard data and observed information, supported by qualified, trusted expertise will 

become increasingly important the longer the event lasts and the longer the port remains closed, 

as pressure to reopen will be coming from a variety of different sources. There may be pressure 

from the ports themselves, because lengthy disruption will be costly to port tenants and 

customers. The stature of the San Pedro Port Complex is well recognized due to the large volume 

of commerce that flows through it and its importance to the local, regional, State and national 

economies. There will also be political pressure at all levels, as well as media scrutiny of 

emergency operations. The decisions being made and actions taken to protect lives and property 

could be questioned. The jurisdictions and agencies responding may be well advised to proclaim 

local, county, and State emergencies through their political leaders (Boards of Supervisors, 

Governor) to support decisions and allow needed emergency operations to continue undeterred 

by outside influences. A coordinated plan for reopening and provision of public information 

about how this will be implemented may be a good strategy for alleviating public concern. 
31

Wild Card: Fire Following Tsunami

Overall, infrastructure impact on the ports is not catastrophic, based on the Moffat and 

Nichols section of Porter and others (2013). However, Charles Scawthorn’s contribution (in 

Porter and others, 2013) includes concern about potential “fire following” if flooding damaged 

petrochemical tank farms within the ports. Considering the history of similar ports in the past 50 

years and the quantity of petrochemicals stored at these ports, one or more fires would likely 

result. For example, if a tank were to rupture and a fire were to ignite on Mormon Island in the 

Port of Los Angeles, a 5-square-kilometer fire could cause the loss of product, tanks, control 

systems, and other assets at 7 berths housing 28 million barrels of stored petroleum products in 

48 tanks, plus 350,000 tons of industrial chemicals. This would present significant problems in 

terms of fire agency resources, air deployment, access to potentially flooded areas, and 

management of a tsunami-threat-compounded conflagration. Porter and others (2013) also 

highlights the possibility that many minor to small individual incidents will arise as a result of 

this event. The combined effect of managing response and communication and coordinating 

response to all of these possible fires at the same time will tax the resources and capabilities of 

any singly affected jurisdiction or responding agency. The importance of staff support for full 

and rapid implementation of the emergency management system at all levels will become 

increasingly paramount. 

Media Control—Information Flow

A lesson learned during the 2011 Tohoku tsunami for California is that once the broad 

scope of the tsunami event becomes clear, the State will open a Joint Information Center (JIC) 

along with coordinating agencies, to facilitate information exchange with the media. As the JIC 

very often becomes the "face" of an incident, it would allow press releases to be made available 

as well as be a coordinated location for broadcast media outlets to interview incident publicinformation-office staff and receive important information. Given the unprecedented scope of 

this event—that is, in placing the entire coast in a Warning—coordinating common and 

consistent messaging information across agencies through the JIC is warranted and 

advantageous. The importance of accurate public safety messaging underscores the need for 

high-level media coordination and timely briefing of emergency operations and strategic 

planning to restore normalcy to the ports and harbor community. 

Period 5: Evacuation ALL CLEAR as Determined by Each Coastal Jurisdiction

General Description of Period 5 (Bulletins 34–49: Friday March 28th 8:02 p.m. through Saturday 

March 29th 12:00 p.m.; 32–48 hours after earthquake)

Once local authorities in affected areas have assessed safety issues to the extent they are 

able to begin search and rescue operations and other response efforts, they may reopen areas to 

the public. Authority is seated at each coastal jurisdiction. Reopening areas may include phased 

or facilitated reentry where damage or continuing hazards exists (debris fields, fires, fuel leaks, 
32

hazardous material spills, damaged or unsafe structures). Shelters remain open. However, shelter 

populations begin to drop as those evacuated from areas that were not inundated return home. 

While the threat of dry-land inundation has ended, waterways, ports, piers, and beaches remain 

closed due to dangerous currents affecting areas in and near the water, with people recommended 

to stay away from the shoreline. 

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and 

Challenges

· Evacuated areas must remain closed to the public until after the threat of a tsunami no longer 

exists and local authorities announce an “all clear.” Local authorities can reopen risk areas 2 

hours after the last observed wave, or 2 hours after the estimated time of arrival has passed 

without a wave coming ashore. The risk-area incident commander, in consultation with the 

County EOC, will make the decision to allow reentry following short-term evacuations. For 

long-term evacuations, local authorities, in conjunction with health and safety agencies, make 

the decisions for reentry. Reentry criteria, for both short-term and long-term evacuations, will 

account for public needs, and for public and response personnel safety. Residents should 

enter through control points to ensure that safety and sanitary precautions are provided. 

· Local authorities will control reentry via media releases, evacuation/staging area 

coordination, and modification of closure levels at Traffic Control Points. Coordination 

between the County EOC, local EOCs, and all primary and support agencies involved is 

critical in controlling reentry. 

· Emergency response actions continue at the local level depending on circumstances, whether 

damage has occurred and life safety or rescue situations exist. Upon all-clear, emergency 

personnel can now get back into the hazard area and begin rescue and evacuation of any 

injured. 

· Damage is expected to be modest in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, especially if 

liquid bulk vessels have been successfully evacuated from the port during the Warning 

period. Overall, it is expected that the ports’ land commerce will return to service within a 

day or two following the tsunami, with the exception of a few terminals where flooding is 

expected to damage operations buildings and some warehouses. Maritime transportation 

could take longer, since no assessment of underwater damage will begin until the Advisory is 

lifted. 

· At the State level, monitoring and reporting activities continue, including providing or 

closing out missions and continuing to assist local officials with collection of damage 

information needed for a Preliminary Damage Assessment document necessary to request 

State and Federal assistance. Public information and media relations at the State level 

continue to be coordinated via Cal OES Headquarters Public Information Office, with 

possible establishment of a Joint Information Center(s) near affected areas. 

· Calls with WCATWC continue, with focus on expected duration of the Advisory and 

whether continued localized areas of heightened concern exist or will remain in place 

following cancellation of the Advisory. Statewide Cal OES calls with coastal counties 

continue, focusing on status of evacuations, status of EOC activations, preliminary damage 

assessments, and beginning to address recovery issues, including whether local 

proclamations will be sought. 
33

Key Considerations during Period 5 

5.1 Maintain emergency response and evacuation protocol in and along waterfront areas. Strong 

tsunami currents will likely continue during this time period.

5.2 Rescue/evacuation of those in damaged areas/facilities that were not evacuated before the 

event.

5.3 Managing response and egress in areas of damage or where continuing hazards exist (debris 

fields, fires, fuel leaks, hazardous material spills, damaged, unsafe structures, egress issues). 

5.4 Facilitating orderly reentry while continuing response operations.

5.5 Addressing needs of those with long-term displacement due to damage. Assess need for field 

offices and phone numbers for affected populations. 

5.6 Continued need to coordinate with media (rumor control, continued correct information 

regarding Advisory and continued maritime danger, varied status/limitations of local “all 

clear” orders).

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 5

Not so Fast! (Making the “All Clear” Call)

Affected areas must be thoroughly inspected for safety issues before providing the “all clear” allowing residents and 

employees back in. The “all clear,” like evacuation, is under the authority of the most local, incorporated 

jurisdiction. Assessments of the impacted area, following significant flooding, must be conducted before permitting 

public reentry. These assessments include the extent of damage to public infrastructure on land and over water, as 

well as safety of roads, bridges, buildings, machinery, and other facilities. The presence of public health risks in 

water, broken sewer lines, downed utility lines, animal or human remains, must be determined and addressed, and 

the presence of hazardous materials or other risks must be ascertained.

Phased Reentry

Specific procedures for limited reentry, following a damaging tsunami, can be established based on the situation. If 

the tsunami causes significant flooding and damage, the area may be hazardous and the potential for looting of 

damaged homes and businesses exists. Public reentry will need to be limited to residents and business owners and 

may be limited in duration. A valid driver’s license or other form of government-issued identification (copy of a 

business license for a business owner), indicating residency inside the restricted area, will be required for entry. Reestablishment of electricity may be a consideration but will not necessarily preclude reentry.

Wild Card: Blockage in a Major Port Channel 

Although deep, wide main channels in POLA and POLB are not projected to require long port-wide closure

by Moffat and Nichol (in Porter and others, 2013), it is notable that a single large ship attempting to move in the 

ports during the tsunami could complicate recovery if it were to lose control. While the port is officially closed, 

priority would be to stop any unauthorized ship that could cause problems from moving. Barring this, an out-ofcontrol vessel would pose a serious challenge for the Coast Guard and other water authorities to the safety of their 

own personnel. They would need to make an informed decision about whether they could safely stop a large vessel 

loose in the harbor from causing damage to itself (sinking, causing hazardous spillage) and damaging other port 

structures and infrastructure. This would involve coordination and assessment of the situation with tug and pilot 

personnel. 
34

Period 6: Advisory CANCELLATION for Coastal Waterways

General Description of Period 6 (Bulletin 50: Saturday March 29th 12:00 p.m.; 48 hours after 

earthquake)

Dry-land response operations continue. Additionally, WCATWC cancellation of the 

Advisory allows port authorities and private marinas to begin assessment of damage to vessels 

and infrastructure in and near the water. Where vessels have sunk or become beached, fuel spills 

may have occurred, or other significant hazards to navigation may exist; portions of the ports 

may remain closed to vessel traffic until appropriate measures can be taken to clear hazards. 

Debris clearance, contamination clean up, and dredging typically include permitting issues and 

require assistance from a variety of State and Federal agencies with cooperation by private 

entities. These activities could take days or even weeks to complete. 

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and 

Challenges

At 48 hours after the earthquake, the Advisory is cancelled. This indicates the end of 

dangerous wave surges and currents. It is March 29 at about 11:02 a.m., two days after initial 

notification. 

· Under this SAFRR tsunami scenario, in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the level 

of inundation, hardened infrastructure and relatively deep, wide main channels are expected 

to result in damage that should not require long port-wide closure. The Moffat and Nichol 

analysis (in Porter and others, 2013) indicates that the ports should not remain completely 

shut down for more than two days. In many areas of the POLA and POLB, land operations 

can resume alongside cleanup and repair. Many terminals and docks should be able to 

quickly resume operations and goods movement. 

· Inspection of harbor channels for hazards to navigation in the form of sunken vessels or other 

debris is finally able to begin, now that the Advisory is lifted. The amount and location of 

debris will impact reopening of the ports’ waterways, and closure may be further extended 

beyond the two days projected for port operations to resume if significant navigational 

hazards or hazardous materials spills exist. Sunken and damaged boats may be carried and be 

deposited as debris from small boat marinas into larger channels by strong tsunami currents. 

There may also be sediment movement; however, POLA’s and POLB’s deep, wide shipping 

lanes mean that debris and sediment may be isolated—although they could limit some traffic, 

they should not interrupt the bulk of maritime transportation. 

· At the local level, response operations continue, including sheltering of displaced 

populations, land-based debris removal, and restoration of utilities. If a Federal disaster was 

declared by the President during the event, Cal OES and FEMA recovery personnel will be 

prepositioned to begin quantifying damage to determine State and Federal recovery program 

availability; however, these Federal/State/local joint Preliminary Damage Assessments 

(PDAs) will not begin until local governments address life-safety and property protection 

issues. 
35

Key Considerations during Period 6

6.1 Continued response issues and coordination of scarce response resources; status of local 

emergencies, State emergency proclamations, and Federal emergency declarations. 

6.2 Full maritime safety assessment to determine in-water infrastructure and debris/dredging 

issues that will impact port and marina reopening. 

6.3 Priority of commercial port reopening and coordination among jurisdictional entities with 

authorities within ports. 

6.4 Continued need to coordinate with media (rumor control, continued status/limitations of “all 

clear” orders based on severe damage). 

6.5 Local, county, State, and Federal coordination of resources for response activities and 

continued emergency management operations. 

6.6 Expediting completion of Preliminary Damage Assessments by State and Federal partners 

while they continue to address response. 

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 6

Survey and Salvage in the water

It is important to note that following the ports’ expected 2-day closure by the Coast 

Guard Captain of the Port, based on 48 hours of dangerous waves during the Tsunami Warning 

and subsequent Advisory, there will be an additional period in which port waters could be closed 

due to hazards to navigation. This could be an additional period of days or longer (perhaps 

weeks) to allow for surveying for sunken and floating debris, as well as an unknown time 

(weeks, months) to coordinate salvage (removal, movement) of wreckage, sunken small boats, or 

other fragments and remains in portions of the ports. Surveying under water is neither 

straightforward nor easy, and safe conditions, in terms of both currents and weather, would need 

to exist before either divers or survey vessels could be allowed in the water. 

There could be hazardous material spills, which would require cordoning off areas of the 

ports. Modeling indicates that debris from the small-boat marinas in the Port of Los Angeles 

would likely travel into the main channel. In addition, surveys must confirm that no hazards to 

navigation from sediment transport and other material from the seafloor had been deposited in 

shipping channels to such a degree that they posed hazards to navigation. 

The permitting and removal process has significant, potentially lengthy, regulatory and 

environmental hurdles to overcome and involves permits, Federal and State agency approvals, 

followed by logistics and coordination of activities. In Crescent City, following the 2011 Tohoku 

tsunami, it took 6 months before all permits could be cleared to begin sediment removal in the 

middle of the harbor, and it was a year before the harbor was cleared, largely because of the 

complexity of regulations surrounding removal of debris. Major issues surrounded whether the 

debris contained contaminants and whether the grain size would allow disposal of the sediment 

further out to sea or would require it to be transported to landfills on land. Financial difficulties 

were also a factor. 

Period 7: Transition: Response to Recovery
36

General Description of Period 7

During the post-event response period, threats to life-safety and loss of property are 

assessed, confirmed, or addressed to resolution, including egress and hazardous materials issues. 

With this resolution begins recovery, including reopening of facilities and repair of damage. Cal 

OES Recovery Branch personnel and often FEMA representatives are deployed to affected 

coastal jurisdictions, assisting with preliminary damage assessment. If proclamations of local 

emergency have not already been initiated, these assessments will accompany local requests for 

State and Federal assistance. In cases where a State proclamation or Federal declaration is 

approved, various loan and reimbursement grant programs may be made available. Transition 

activities may take weeks; recovery activities extend for many months and in some cases, years. 

Scenario-Informed Situation, Emergency Management Activities, Key Considerations and 

Challenges

· Staff from various State and Federal agencies are in the field assisting with cleanup and 

damage assessment, assisting with local proclamations, and assisting local governments and 

port authorities with coordination among regulatory agencies. All affected county 

departments, agencies, and coastal cities are responsible for submitting status and damage 

assessment reports to the county emergency management agency following an actual tsunami 

occurrence according to the county’s Disaster Information Reporting Procedures. Damage 

assessment includes damage resulting from both tsunamis and earthquakes, if applicable. The 

Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management will use damage assessment 

information to initiate standard disaster response and recovery procedures outlined in the 

County Emergency Operations Center Standard Operating Procedures. The county is 

responsible for submitting preliminary damage assessments to the State.

· Full assessment begins of hazards to navigation, sunken vessels, damage to on-land 

structures or piers and water-related infrastructure; whether material deposited on the 

seafloor will require dredging begins to be coordinated. Depending on what has occurred as a 

result of the tsunami, this could be a lengthy and arduous process. 

· Emergency Proclamations will be made by local jurisdictions based on the scale of impact 

and the internal assessment that the event has exceeded the jurisdiction’s capacity to respond. 

As this “disaster” event unfolds regionally, subsequent proclamations will most assuredly 

expand to the county and then the state level. Because of the severity and widespread impacts 

of this tsunami there will be a designation of a number of counties as disaster areas. This is 

done via Gubernatorial Disaster Proclamation and, beyond that, via a Federal Disaster 

Declaration by the President. Depending on the severity and clear impacts of the event, such 

designations may be made while the event is still underway, or they may be done postevent 

as the extent of damage is quantified. State and Federal disaster designations can trigger 

funding programs addressing both response and recovery costs. 

Key Considerations during Period 7 
37

7.1 Expediting debris clearance and dredging permit issues to expedite port commercial restoration. (Clear 

coordination among Federal/State regulatory agencies needed to fast-track a streamlined recovery 

process and lessen local burdens.)

7.2 Recovery planning to assess consequences and coordinate handling of complex incident-specific, 

complicated issues. Examples: 

7.2.1 State assistance with local preliminary damage assessments.

7.2.2 State assistance with proper completion of applications for securing local proclamations.

7.2.3 Federal/State staffing, including divers to assess underwater damage and hazards to 

navigation.

7.2.4 Federal/State agency assistance with regulatory and permitting issues related to dredging 

and debris removal assessment and process.

7.2.5 Upon need, establish localized incident management offices (for example, Incident 

Operations Center, Disaster Field Office, Joint Information Center).

7.3 Address long-duration emergency management staffing patterns (EOC/Activation and all operations 

for multiple days/weeks).

7.4 Continued need to coordinate with media (rumor control, response/recovery progress).

7.5 Expediting and facilitating of recovery/rebuilding effort, including emergency regulations permit 

waivers. 

7.6 Pressure on emergency management will be based on public and commercial demand to reopen ports 

and address cost of port damage/closure. 

7.7 Pursuance of Gubernatorial Proclamation.

7.8 Pursuance of Major Presidential Disaster Declaration.

Highlighted Emergency Management Challenges during Period 7

Quick and Accurate Damage Assessments are Important

If a Federal declaration of major disaster is sought, as it most likely would be with a 

natural disaster of this severity, speed, accuracy, and completion of information about locally 

incurred damage and associated costs are important. For this reason, State officials (Cal OES, 

Governor’s Office) are asking questions about response activities, damage incurred, shelters 

opened, populations affected, and other details every step of the way. State-level field 

coordinators and recovery experts will be dispatched to affected coastal communities to ensure 

that preliminary damage assessment forms to be submitted are as complete and accurate as 

possible. Each county, as well as the State as a whole, must meet specific monetary loss 

thresholds in order to facilitate assistance that will be important and possibly necessary for a full 

recovery and return to normal operations for all affected areas. It is the mission of all emergency 

management agencies to ensure that, if needed, this aid is sought. This assistance also requires 

the signature and approval of elected officials; therefore it is generally important to request 

assistance as quickly as possible. Expediting applications for assistance is important not only to 

meet statutory deadlines, but also while the political pressure is on to provide assistance to those 

who need it. 

Potential Recovery Issues within Ports
38

The following insights are taken from recent experience with FEMA Pubic Assistance 

Program-funded recovery from damages to smaller harbors (Crescent City and Santa Cruz) 

during the recent Chile and Japan tsunamis: 

As with all disaster events, saving lives and protecting property is always the top priority. 

Once the response phase of the disaster winds down, State and local government agencies 

affected by a tsunami should begin assessing damage and compiling a list of projects that require 

immediate or permanent (long-term) repairs. When the assessment is complete, public agencies 

should begin the process of determining whether any permits, approvals, consultations, or 

authorizations (collectively called permits for this article) are needed to perform the repairs. 

Although exemptions exist for disaster repair projects under the National Environmental Policy 

Act and the California Environmental Quality Act, other Federal or State laws or executive 

orders may not contain such exemptions and require approval by one or more regulatory 

agencies. In some instances emergency permits are available with expedited processing 

procedures, or regulatory agencies may allow the repair work to proceed while the permit(s) are 

being processed. 

Damages suffered by public agencies in Major Disaster Declaration “California Tsunami 

Waves” declared by President Obama, through FEMA, on April 18, 2011, fell into several broad 

categories including: 

· Debris removal including sunken vessels and damaged docks, 

· Replacing damaged piles, 

· Replacing or repairing damaged docks, 

· Repairing breakwaters, 

· Rock slope protection within the harbor, and 

· Dredging. 

All of these types of projects are regulated by one or more of the following agencies: 

· The Army Corp of Engineers (404 permit), 

· U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Approval of dredging plan and disposal of 

sediment), 

· U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Consultation if threatened or endangered species may be 

affected), 

· National Marine Fisheries Service (Consultation if native fish may be affected); 

· Regional Water Quality Control Board (401 Water Quality Certification), 

· California Coastal Commission (Coastal Development Permit), 

· State Lands Commission (Dredging in state-owned tidelands or submerged waters), or 

· National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Marine Sanctuary (Review of 

dredging plan). 

Permitting a dredging operation within a harbor can be a complicated process requiring 

the preparation and approval of a dredging plan, collecting sediment samples, laboratory 

analysis, and finally dredging and disposal. Each step takes time to perform, and other repair 

projects may hinge on the dredging to occur first. For this reason, agencies should provide 

updates to decision makers and the public on their progress in repairing tsunami related damage 

so they are not left with the impression that nothing is being done. 

Recommendations for future tsunami events: 

4. Affected jurisdictions should know in advance which agencies may have permitting 

jurisdiction and know how to contact them. 
39

5. When applying for permits from State or Federal agencies, subgrantees should determine 

if permits can be issued on an emergency basis or if the permitting agency will allow the 

subgrantee to proceed with the condition that a permit will be secured in the immediate 

future. 

6. Permitting agencies should be made aware of the time frames in which repairs must be 

made to meet any critical deadlines or events such as the start of a fish or crab season. 

7. At the applicant briefing(s), it should be made very clear that subgrantees cannot start 

permanent repair work until all required permits have been obtained. 

8. Decision makers and the public should be provided updates on the progress of repairing 

tsunami damage so they are aware of the progress being made. 

Smaller harbor districts have limited resources and may need the assistance of consultants 

to help complete the permitting process. Cal OES and FEMA should be ready to help pay the 

cost of these services if required. 

Conclusions

This tsunami would be worse than any experienced in historical time by the State of 

California, and by the United States as a nation. It would be worse than the 1964 tsunami from 

Alaska, which resulted in the destruction of much of Crescent City’s downtown and 12 deaths 

statewide. It would be 4 to 5 times worse in California than the Tohoku tsunami from Japan in 

2011, which resulted in $100 million in damage to 27 harbors and marinas down the length of 

the State’s coast. 

Such an event would stretch the State’s emergency response system up to and beyond its 

limits. However, the system is built to expand beyond its limits, with cities calling upon the State 

and the State asking the Federal government when its resources and personnel capabilities have 

been reached. And California has had plenty of experience putting its emergency management 

practices into play over recent decades—during earthquakes, wildfires, and flooding events. 

The trick will be to understand the nature of the tsunami to come, its impacts, and what 

the public needs to know ahead of time to understand what to do to save their lives and protect 

their property when the warning comes. While we may have a warning window on the day (or 

night) of the tsunami, it can be years between damaging, life threatening events. Sustaining 

public preparedness and government capabilities to respond to this specific threat is key. When 

the next tsunami comes from Alaska, we will have only five and one-half hours to prove we 

know what to do. 

The analysis and expertise brought to bear by this scenario report can provide the basis 

for ever-increasingly informed emergency response and evacuation planning. 

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Jim Goltz, Rich Eisner and Johanna Fenton (Cal OES, retired), Jeff 

Terry (Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management), and Anne Wein (USGS) for 

thoughtful reviews that improved the report. 
40

Selected References

California Emergency Management Agency, 2012, [March 2011 California tsunami after 

action/corrective action report] Japan tsunami marine debris (JTMD) concept of operations: 

California Emergency Management Agency, 32 p. (Available online at 

www.calepa.ca.gov/Disaster/Documents/2012/JapanTsunami.pdf.) 

California Integrated Seismic Network, 2013, California integrated seismic network. (Available 

online at http://www.cisn.org/.) 

City of Los Angeles, 2008, Tsunami response plan annex, in Emergency operations master plans 

and procedures: City of Los Angeles, 51 p. (Available online at 

http://emergency.lacity.org/stellent/groups/departments/@emd_contributor/documents/contrib

utor_web_content/lacityp_013228.pdf.) 

Dengler, L.A., Fenton, J., Goltz, J.D., Miller, K.M., and Wilson, R.I., 2011, Building tsunamiresilient communities in the United States—an example from California: Seventh International 

Workshop on Coastal Disaster Prevention, Tokyo, Japan, January 26-27, 2011, Proceeding, 14 

p. 

Miller, K.M., and Wilson, R.I., 2012, A culture of tsunami preparedness and applying knowledge 

from recent tsunamis affecting California: American Geophysical Union, Fall Meeting 2012. 

(Available online at http://fallmeeting.agu.org/2012/eposters/eposter/nh33a-1641/.) 

Long Beach Fire Department, 2013, Long Beach Fire Department Disaster Management Bureau: 

City of Long Beach Emergency Management (Available online at 

http://www.longbeach.gov/fire/emergency_prep.) 

Lynett, P., Wilson, R.I., and Miller, K.M., 2012, Maritime Hazard Analysis And Map Production 

In California: American Geophysical Union Fall Meeting 2012. (Available online at 

http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/2012tsuhazworkshop/abstracts/LynettCAmaritime_abs.pdf.) 

Miller, K.M., Wilson, R.I., Goltz, J.D., Fenton, J., Long, K., Dengler, L., and Rosinski, A., 2011, 

State emergency response and field observation activities in California (USA) during the 

March 11, 2011, Tohoku Tsunami: American Geophysical Union Fall Meeting 2011. 

(Available online at http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2011AGUFMNH11A1346M.) 

Moffatt & Nichol, 2007, Tsunami hazard assessment for the Ports of Long Beach and Los 

Angeles: Moffatt & Nichol, Engineers, Final Report prepared for Port of Long Beach and Port 

of Los Angeles, M&N File 4839-169. (Available online at 

http://www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/REPORT_Tsunami_April_2007.pdf.) 

National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration, 2013a, National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation 

Program: (Available online at http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/index.html.) 

National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration, 2013b, Tsunami.gov. (Available online at 

www.tsunami.gov.) 

Porter, K., Byers, W., Dykstra, C., Lim, A., Lynett, P., Ratliff, J., Scawthorn, C., Wein, A., and 

Wilson, R., 2013, Physical damage in the SAFRR California tsunami scenario: U.S. 

Geological Survey open-File Report 2013–1170–E, 183 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/E/. 

United States Coast Guard, 2013, Port directory: United States Coast Guard, Homeport 

(Available online at http://homeport.uscg.mil/lalb.) 

United States Congress, 2006, Tsunami warning and education act (H.R. 1674): 109th Congress, 

accessed June 1, 2013, at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr1674. 
41

Wilson, R.I., and Miller, K.M., 2011, Tsunami hazard mapping activities in Northern California: 

United States Geological Survey Northern California Hazards Workshop. 

Wilson, R.I., Dengler, L.A., Legg, M.R., Long, K., and Miller, K.M., 2010a, The 2010 Chilean 

tsunami on the California coastline: American Geophysical Union Fall Meeting. (Available 

online at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1152/presentations/of2010-1152_poster_e_wilsonchile.pdf.) 

Wilson, R.I, Barberopoulou, A., Borrero, J.C., Bryant, W.A, Dengler, L.A., Goltz, J.D., Legg, 

M.R., McGuire, T., Miller, K.M., Real, C.R., Synolakis, C.E., and Uslu, B., 2010b, 

Development of new databases for tsunami hazard analysis in California: U.S. Geological 

Survey Open-File Report 2010–1152, p. 31. (Available online at 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1152/.) 

Wilson, R.I., Barberopoulou, A., Miller, K.M., Goltz, J.D., and Synolakis, C.E., 2010c, New 

maximum tsunami inundation maps for use by local emergency planners in the State of 

California, USA: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2010–1152, p. 32. (Available 

online at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1152/.) 

Wilson, R.I., Miller, K.M., and Rosinski, A.M., 2011a, California’s pre- and post- tsunami field 

observation team and clearinghouse: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute Annual 

Meeting, 2011. 

Wilson, R.I., Dengler, L.A., Goltz, J.D., Legg, M.R., and Miller, K.M., 2011b, Emergency 

response and field observation activities of geoscientists in California (USA) during the 

September 29, 2009, Samoa tsunami: Earth Science Reviews, v. 107, p. 193–200. (Available 

online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0012825211000195.) 
42

Appendix A—NOAA Tsunami Alert Level Definitions

• A Tsunami Warning is issued when a tsunami with the potential to generate widespread 

inundation is imminent, expected, or occurring. Warnings alert the public that dangerous 

coastal flooding accompanied by powerful currents is possible and may continue for 

several hours after initial arrival. Warnings alert emergency management officials to take 

action for the entire tsunami hazard zone. Appropriate actions to be taken by local 

officials may include the evacuation of low-lying coastal areas and the repositioning of 

ships to deep waters when there is time to safely do so. Warnings may be updated, 

adjusted geographically, downgraded, or canceled. To provide the earliest possible alert, 

initial Warnings are normally based only on seismic information. Warnings are issued 

when the earthquake information or tsunami forecasts indicate that a wave height over 1 

meter (or over 3 feet) in amplitude is expected, possible, or ongoing. 

• A Tsunami Advisory is issued when a tsunami with the potential to generate strong 

currents or waves dangerous to those in or very near the water is imminent, expected, or 

occurring. The threat may continue for several hours after initial arrival, but significant 

inundation is not expected for areas under an Advisory. Appropriate actions to be taken 

by local officials may include closing beaches, evacuating harbors and marinas, and the 

repositioning of ships to deep waters when there is time to safely do so. Advisories are 

normally updated to continue the Advisory, expand/contract affected areas, upgrade to a 

Warning, or cancel the Advisory. Advisories are issued when the tsunami wave height 

forecast is in the range of 1/3 to 1 meter (or 1–3 feet). 

• A Tsunami Watch is issued to alert emergency management officials and the public of an 

event which may later impact the WATCH area. The WATCH area may be upgraded to a 

Warning or Advisory—or canceled—based on updated information and analysis. 

Therefore, emergency management officials and the public should prepare to take action. 

Watches are normally issued based on seismic information without confirmation that a 

destructive tsunami is underway. 

• A Tsunami Information Statement is issued to inform emergency management officials 

and the public that an earthquake has occurred, or that a tsunami Warning, Watch, or 

Advisory has been issued for another section of the ocean. In most cases, Information 

Statements are issued to indicate that there is no threat of a destructive tsunami and to 

prevent unnecessary evacuations as the earthquake may have been felt in coastal areas. 

An Information Statement may, in appropriate situations, caution about the possibility of 

destructive local tsunamis. Information Statements may be reissued with additional 

information, though normally these messages are not updated. However, a Watch, 
43

Advisory, or Warning may be issued for the area, if necessary, after analysis and (or) 

updated information becomes available. 
44

Appendix B—NOAA WCATWC Tsunami Scenario Alert Bulletins

Bulletin # NOAA Alert 

Level(s) Bulletin Time/Date Geographic Breakpoint

Period (in this 

Chapter)

Bulletin 1 Watch 1154 AM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 1 

Bulletin 2 Watch 1231 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 1 

Bulletin 3 Watch 103 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 1 

Bulletin 4 Warning 205 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 2 

Bulletin 5 Warning 301 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 2 

Bulletin 6 Warning 401 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 2 

Bulletin 7 Warning 502 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 2 

Bulletin 8 Warning 601 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 9 Warning 701 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

10 Warning 801 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

11 Warning 901 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

12 Warning 1001 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

13 Warning 1100 PM PDT THU MAR 27 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

14 Warning 1201 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

15 Warning 100 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

16 Warning 201 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

17 Warning 300 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

18 Warning 400 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

19 Warning 500 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

20 Warning 600 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

21 Warning 701 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

22 Warning 800 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

23 Warning 901 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

24 Warning 1001 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

25 Warning 1101 AM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 3 

Bulletin 

26 Warning/Advisory 1202 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 @ Alamitos 4 

Bulletin Warning/Advisory 100 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 @ Alamitos 4 
45

27

Bulletin 

28 Warning/Advisory 201 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 @ Alamitos 4 

Bulletin 

29 Warning/Advisory 300 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 @ Alamitos 4 

Bulletin 

30 Warning/Advisory 400 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 @ Alamitos 4 

Bulletin 

31 Warning/Advisory 504 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 @ Concepcion 4 

Bulletin 

32 Warning/Advisory 601 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 @ Concepcion 4 

Bulletin 

33 Warning/Advisory 701 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 @ Concepcion 4 

Bulletin 

34 Advisory 802 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

35 Advisory 902 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

36 Advisory 1000 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

37 Advisory 1100 PM PDT FRI MAR 28 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

38 Advisory 1200 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

39 Advisory 100 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

40 Advisory 201 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

41 Advisory 300 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

42 Advisory 401 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

43 Advisory 500 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

44 Advisory 600 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

45 Advisory 701 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

46 Advisory 801 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 All 5 

Bulletin 

47 Advisory/Cancel 901 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 @ Rincon 5 

Bulletin 

48 Advisory/Cancel 1002 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 @ Rincon 5 

Bulletin 

49 Advisory/Cancel 1101 AM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 @ Rincon 5 

Bulletin 

50 Cancel 1200 PM PDT SAT MAR 29 2014 All 6 
46

WEAK51 PAAQ 271854 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 1 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1054 AM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

...A TSUNAMI WARNING IS NOW IN EFFECT... 

...A TSUNAMI WATCH IS NOW IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE 

 NORTH TIP OF VANCOUVER ISLAND BRITISH COLUMBIA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

TSUNAMI WATCH IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON AND 
47

 BRITISH COLUMBIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO BORDER TO THE 

 NORTH TIP OF VANCOUVER ISLAND BRITISH COLUMBIA 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 8.2 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WATCH AREAS 

------------------------------- 

 * EXPECTED IMPACT IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. 

 * THE WATCH WILL BE UPGRADED OR CANCELED AT LEAST TWO HOURS 

 BEFORE EXPECTED IMPACT. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS - UPDATED

----------------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND.

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WATCH AREA - STAY ALERT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 
48

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST 

 START OF 

SITE OF TSUNAMI 

---- ---------- 

 * ALASKA 

SAND POINT 1213 AKDT MAR 27 

KODIAK 1228 AKDT MAR 27 

DUTCH HARBOR 1231 AKDT MAR 27 

SEWARD 1253 AKDT MAR 27 

COLD BAY 1254 AKDT MAR 27 

ELFIN COVE 1255 AKDT MAR 27 

ADAK 1256 AKDT MAR 27 

YAKUTAT 1303 AKDT MAR 27 

SITKA 1303 AKDT MAR 27 

VALDEZ 1313 AKDT MAR 27 

CORDOVA 1322 AKDT MAR 27 

SHEMYA 1340 AKDT MAR 27 

HOMER 1346 AKDT MAR 27 

CRAIG 1404 AKDT MAR 27 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1413 PDT MAR 27 

TOFINO 1540 PDT MAR 27 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1552 PDT MAR 27 

WESTPORT 1608 PDT MAR 27 

 * OREGON 

CHARLESTON 1603 PDT MAR 27 

SEASIDE 1606 PDT MAR 27 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1612 PDT MAR 27 

SAN FRANCISCO 1706 PDT MAR 27 

SANTA BARBARA 1721 PDT MAR 27 

SAN PEDRO 1737 PDT MAR 27 

LA JOLLA 1748 PDT MAR 27 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 
49

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 30 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 

WEAK51 PAAQ 271931 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 2 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1131 AM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

THIS MESSAGE INCREASES MAGNITUDE TO 8.6. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...A TSUNAMI WATCH IS NOW IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE 

 NORTH TIP OF VANCOUVER ISLAND BRITISH COLUMBIA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

TSUNAMI WATCH IN EFFECT FOR... 
50

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON AND 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO BORDER TO THE 

 NORTH TIP OF VANCOUVER ISLAND BRITISH COLUMBIA 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WATCH AREAS 

------------------------------- 

 * EXPECTED IMPACT IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. 

 * THE WATCH WILL BE UPGRADED OR CANCELED AT LEAST TWO HOURS 

 BEFORE EXPECTED IMPACT. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WATCH AREA - STAY ALERT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST 

 START OF 

SITE OF TSUNAMI 

---- ---------- 

 * ALASKA 

SAND POINT 1207 AKDT MAR 27 
51

KODIAK 1221 AKDT MAR 27 

DUTCH HARBOR 1226 AKDT MAR 27 

SEWARD 1246 AKDT MAR 27 

COLD BAY 1247 AKDT MAR 27 

ELFIN COVE 1248 AKDT MAR 27 

ADAK 1251 AKDT MAR 27 

YAKUTAT 1256 AKDT MAR 27 

SITKA 1256 AKDT MAR 27 

VALDEZ 1305 AKDT MAR 27 

CORDOVA 1315 AKDT MAR 27 

SHEMYA 1334 AKDT MAR 27 

HOMER 1339 AKDT MAR 27 

CRAIG 1357 AKDT MAR 27 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1406 PDT MAR 27 

TOFINO 1533 PDT MAR 27 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1545 PDT MAR 27 

WESTPORT 1601 PDT MAR 27 

 * OREGON 

CHARLESTON 1558 PDT MAR 27 

SEASIDE 1600 PDT MAR 27 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1608 PDT MAR 27 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 

SAN PEDRO 1734 PDT MAR 27 

LA JOLLA 1745 PDT MAR 27 

FORECAST MODELS PROJECT THAT 22 FOOT/6.7 METER WAVES COULD DEVELOP 

ALONG THE COAST OF ALASKA. WAVES OF THIS SIZE ARE KNOWN TO CAUSE 

INUNDATION AND DAMAGE TO COASTAL STRUCTURES. IN ALASKA THE 

TSUNAMI 

IS EXPECTED TO REACH PEAK SIZE 30 MINUTES TO TWO HOURS AFTER THE 

EXPECTED ARRIVAL TIME. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

DEEP OCEAN PRESSURE SENSOR DATA INDICATES A TSUNAMI WAS GENERATED. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS - UPDATED

------------------------------------------- 
52

 * MAGNITUDE 8.6 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 30 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
53

WEAK51 PAAQ 272003 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 3 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1203 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

THIS MESSAGE INCREASES MAGNITUDE TO 9.0 AND EXPANDS THE 

WARNING AREA. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...A TSUNAMI WATCH IS NOW IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF OREGON - WASHINGTON AND BRITISH 

 COLUMBIA FROM THE OREGON-CALIFORNIA BORDER TO THE NORTH TIP 

 OF VANCOUVER ISLAND BRITISH COLUMBIA 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE 
54

 NORTH TIP OF VANCOUVER ISLAND BRITISH COLUMBIA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

TSUNAMI WATCH IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO THE OREGON-CALIFORNIA BORDER 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WATCH AREAS 

------------------------------- 

 * EXPECTED IMPACT IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. 

 * THE WATCH WILL BE UPGRADED OR CANCELED AT LEAST TWO HOURS 

 BEFORE EXPECTED IMPACT. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WATCH AREA - STAY ALERT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST FORECAST FORECAST OBSERVED 

 START OF TSUNAMI MAX TSUNAMI TSUNAMI 

SITE OF TSUNAMI DURATION HEIGHT HEIGHT 
55

---- ---------- -------- ------------- ------- 

 * ALASKA 

SAND POINT 1157 AKDT MAR 27 4.5 FT 

KODIAK 1213 AKDT MAR 27 

DUTCH HARBOR 1215 AKDT MAR 27 

COLD BAY 1232 AKDT MAR 27 

SEWARD 1239 AKDT MAR 27 

ADAK 1240 AKDT MAR 27 

ELFIN COVE 1240 AKDT MAR 27 

YAKUTAT 1248 AKDT MAR 27 

SITKA 1248 AKDT MAR 27 

VALDEZ 1258 AKDT MAR 27 

CORDOVA 1308 AKDT MAR 27 

SHEMYA 1323 AKDT MAR 27 

HOMER 1332 AKDT MAR 27 

CRAIG 1351 AKDT MAR 27 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1400 PDT MAR 27 

TOFINO 1527 PDT MAR 27 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1540 PDT MAR 27 

WESTPORT 1556 PDT MAR 27 

 * OREGON 

SEASIDE 1555 PDT MAR 27 

CHARLESTON 1555 PDT MAR 27 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1606 PDT MAR 27 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 

SAN PEDRO 1735 PDT MAR 27 

LA JOLLA 1746 PDT MAR 27 

FORECAST MODELS PROJECT THAT 22 FOOT/6.7 METER WAVES COULD DEVELOP 

ALONG THE COAST OF ALASKA. WAVES OF THIS SIZE ARE KNOWN TO CAUSE 

INUNDATION AND DAMAGE TO COASTAL STRUCTURES. IN ALASKA THE 

TSUNAMI 

IS EXPECTED TO REACH PEAK SIZE 30 MINUTES TO TWO HOURS AFTER THE 

EXPECTED ARRIVAL TIME. A 4.5-FOOT TSUNAMI HAS BEEN REPORTED AT 

SAND POINT AK. 

FORECAST MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED WATER LEVEL 
56

ABOVE THE TIDE. 

FORECAST TSUNAMI DURATION IS THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH 

THE TSUNAMI MAY PRODUCE DANGEROUS CURRENTS AND WAVE ACTIVITY. 

OBSERVED TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 DEEP OCEAN PRESSURE SENSOR DATA INDICATES A TSUNAMI WAS 

GENERATED. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS - UPDATED

------------------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
57

WEAK51 PAAQ 272105 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 4 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

105 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

THIS MESSAGE EXPANDS THE WARNING/ADVISORY AREA AND REMOVES 

THE WATCH. FORECAST TSUNAMI HEIGHTS ARE ADDED BELOW. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...A TSUNAMI ADVISORY IS NOW IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO THE OREGON-CALIFORNIA BORDER 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF OREGON - WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA 

 AND ALASKA FROM THE OREGON-CALIFORNIA BORDER TO NIKOLSKI 

 ALASKA
58

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS - UPDATED

----------------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 
59

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST FORECAST FORECAST OBSERVED 

 START OF TSUNAMI MAX TSUNAMI TSUNAMI 

SITE OF TSUNAMI DURATION HEIGHT HEIGHT 

---- ---------- -------- ------------- ------- 

 * ALASKA 

SAND POINT 1157 AKDT MAR 27 48 HRS 12.0FT +/- 3.6 4.5FT 

KODIAK 1213 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 4.5FT 

DUTCH HARBOR 1215 AKDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.1FT +/- 0.6 0.8FT 

COLD BAY 1232 AKDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.1FT +/- 0.6 

SEWARD 1239 AKDT MAR 27 9 HRS 1.8FT +/- 0.6 3.2FT 

ADAK 1240 AKDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.4FT +/- 0.4 0.6FT 

ELFIN COVE 1240 AKDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.3FT +/- 0.4 1.3FT 

YAKUTAT 1248 AKDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.0FT +/- 0.6 

SITKA 1248 AKDT MAR 27 15 HRS 3.3FT +/- 1.0 2.6FT 

VALDEZ 1258 AKDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.1FT +/- 0.3 

CORDOVA 1308 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 

SHEMYA 1323 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 

HOMER 1332 AKDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.3FT +/- 0.7 

CRAIG 1351 AKDT MAR 27 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1400 PDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.1FT +/- 0.3 

TOFINO 1527 PDT MAR 27 12 HRS 2.3FT +/- 0.7 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1540 PDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.4FT +/- 0.4 

WESTPORT 1556 PDT MAR 27 9 HRS 1.7FT +/- 0.5 

 * OREGON 

SEASIDE 1555 PDT MAR 27 18 HRS 4.1FT +/- 1.2 

CHARLESTON 1555 PDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.0FT +/- 0.6 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1606 PDT MAR 27 21 HRS 4.9FT +/- 1.5 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.1FT +/- 0.6 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 9 HRS 1.9FT +/- 0.6 

SAN PEDRO 1735 PDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.6FT +/- 0.5 

LA JOLLA 1746 PDT MAR 27 12 HRS 2.5FT +/- 0.7 

A 4.5-FOOT TSUNAMI HAS BEEN REPORTED AT KODIAK AK. KING COVE AK HAS 

REPORTED A 4.3-FOOT TSUNAMI, AND CHIGNIK AK HAS REPORTED 

A 21.8-FOOT TSUNAMI. 
60

FORECAST MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED WATER LEVEL 

ABOVE THE TIDE. 

FORECAST TSUNAMI DURATION IS THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH 

THE TSUNAMI MAY PRODUCE DANGEROUS CURRENTS AND WAVE ACTIVITY. 

OBSERVED TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 
61

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 

WEAK51 PAAQ 272201 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 5 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

201 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

THIS MESSAGE IS UPDATED WITH NEW OBSERVATIONS. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 
62

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST FORECAST FORECAST OBSERVED 

 START OF TSUNAMI MAX TSUNAMI TSUNAMI 
63

SITE OF TSUNAMI DURATION HEIGHT HEIGHT 

---- ---------- -------- ------------- ------- 

 * ALASKA 

SAND POINT 1157 AKDT MAR 27 48 HRS 12.5FT +/- 3.8 11.6FT 

KODIAK 1213 AKDT MAR 27 15 HRS 3.0FT +/- 0.9 4.5FT 

DUTCH HARBOR 1215 AKDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.2FT +/- 0.6 1.4FT 

COLD BAY 1232 AKDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.2FT +/- 0.7 

SEWARD 1239 AKDT MAR 27 9 HRS 1.9FT +/- 0.6 3.2FT 

ADAK 1240 AKDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.4FT +/- 0.4 0.9FT 

ELFIN COVE 1240 AKDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.4FT +/- 0.4 1.3FT 

YAKUTAT 1248 AKDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.1FT +/- 0.6 1.7FT 

SITKA 1248 AKDT MAR 27 15 HRS 3.4FT +/- 1.0 2.6FT 

VALDEZ 1258 AKDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.1FT +/- 0.3 

CORDOVA 1308 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 

SHEMYA 1323 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 0.3FT 

HOMER 1332 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 2.3FT +/- 0.7 

CRAIG 1351 AKDT MAR 27 2.8FT 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1400 PDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.2FT +/- 0.4 

TOFINO 1527 PDT MAR 27 12 HRS 2.4FT +/- 0.7 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1540 PDT MAR 27 6 HRS 1.5FT +/- 0.4 

WESTPORT 1556 PDT MAR 27 9 HRS 1.7FT +/- 0.5 

 * OREGON 

SEASIDE 1555 PDT MAR 27 21 HRS 4.3FT +/- 1.3 

CHARLESTON 1555 PDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.0FT +/- 0.6 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1606 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 5.1FT +/- 1.5 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.2FT +/- 0.7 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 9 HRS 2.0FT +/- 0.6 

SAN PEDRO 1735 PDT MAR 27 9 HRS 1.7FT +/- 0.5 

LA JOLLA 1746 PDT MAR 27 12 HRS 2.6FT +/- 0.8 

FORECAST MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED WATER LEVEL 

ABOVE THE TIDE. 

FORECAST TSUNAMI DURATION IS THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH 

THE TSUNAMI MAY PRODUCE DANGEROUS CURRENTS AND WAVE ACTIVITY. 

OBSERVED TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 
64

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
65

WEAK51 PAAQ 272301 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 6 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

301 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

THIS MESSAGE IS UPDATED WITH NEW OBSERVATIONS AND FORECAST 

DURATIONS. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 
66

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 
67

 FORECAST FORECAST FORECAST OBSERVED 

 START OF TSUNAMI MAX TSUNAMI TSUNAMI 

SITE OF TSUNAMI DURATION HEIGHT HEIGHT 

---- ---------- -------- ------------- ------- 

 * ALASKA 

SAND POINT 1157 AKDT MAR 27 48 HRS 13.5FT +/- 4.0 11.6FT 

KODIAK 1213 AKDT MAR 27 48 HRS 3.2FT +/- 1.0 4.5FT 

DUTCH HARBOR 1215 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.3FT +/- 0.7 1.4FT 

COLD BAY 1232 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.4FT +/- 0.7 

SEWARD 1239 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.0FT +/- 0.6 3.2FT 

ADAK 1240 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 1.5FT +/- 0.5 0.9FT 

ELFIN COVE 1240 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.5FT +/- 0.5 1.3FT 

YAKUTAT 1248 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.3FT +/- 0.7 1.7FT 

SITKA 1248 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.6FT +/- 1.1 3.7FT 

VALDEZ 1258 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 1.2FT +/- 0.4 

CORDOVA 1308 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 0.9FT 

SHEMYA 1323 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 0.3FT 

HOMER 1332 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 2.5FT +/- 0.8 

CRAIG 1351 AKDT MAR 27 2.8FT 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1400 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.3FT +/- 0.4 1.6FT 

TOFINO 1527 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.6FT +/- 0.8 2.4FT 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1540 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.6FT +/- 0.5 

WESTPORT 1556 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.9FT +/- 0.6 

 * OREGON 

SEASIDE 1555 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 4.6FT +/- 1.4 

CHARLESTON 1555 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.2FT +/- 0.6 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1606 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 5.4FT +/- 1.6 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.4FT +/- 0.7 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.1FT +/- 0.6 

SAN PEDRO 1735 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.8FT +/- 0.5 

LA JOLLA 1746 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.8FT +/- 0.8 

FORECAST MODELS PROJECT TSUNAMIS UP TO 15.0-FOOT HEIGHT COULD 

DEVELOP 

ALONG THE COASTS OF CANADA - WASHINGTON - OREGON AND 

CALIFORNIA. WAVES OF THIS SIZE ARE KNOWN TO CAUSE INUNDATION AND 

DAMAGE TO COASTAL STRUCTURES. TSUNAMIS ARE EXPECTED TO REACH 

PEAK 
68

SIZE ONE TO THREE HOURS AFTER THE EXPECTED ARRIVAL TIME. 

FORECAST MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED WATER LEVEL 

ABOVE THE TIDE. 

FORECAST TSUNAMI DURATION IS THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH 

THE TSUNAMI MAY PRODUCE DANGEROUS CURRENTS AND WAVE ACTIVITY. 

OBSERVED TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 ADAK AK 2142 UTC 3-27 0.86 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2152 UTC 3-27 2.79 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2252 UTC 3-27 4.92 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 
69

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 

WEAK51 PAAQ 280002 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 7 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

402 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

THIS MESSAGE IS UPDATED WITH NEW OBSERVATIONS. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA
70

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST FORECAST FORECAST OBSERVED 

 START OF TSUNAMI MAX TSUNAMI TSUNAMI 

SITE OF TSUNAMI DURATION HEIGHT HEIGHT 

---- ---------- -------- ------------- ------- 
71

 * ALASKA 

SAND POINT 1157 AKDT MAR 27 48 HRS 15.2FT +/- 4.5 11.6FT 

KODIAK 1213 AKDT MAR 27 48 HRS 3.6FT +/- 1.1 4.5FT 

DUTCH HARBOR 1215 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.6FT +/- 0.8 1.4FT 

COLD BAY 1232 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.7FT +/- 0.8 

SEWARD 1239 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.3FT +/- 0.7 4.1FT 

ADAK 1240 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 1.7FT +/- 0.5 0.9FT 

ELFIN COVE 1240 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.7FT +/- 0.5 1.3FT 

YAKUTAT 1248 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.6FT +/- 0.8 1.7FT 

SITKA 1248 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 4.1FT +/- 1.2 3.7FT 

VALDEZ 1258 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 1.3FT +/- 0.4 

CORDOVA 1308 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 0.9FT 

SHEMYA 1323 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 0.3FT 

HOMER 1332 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 2.8FT +/- 0.8 

CRAIG 1351 AKDT MAR 27 3.9FT 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1400 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.4FT +/- 0.4 1.6FT 

TOFINO 1527 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 2.4FT 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1540 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.8FT +/- 0.5 2.0FT 

WESTPORT 1556 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.1FT +/- 0.6 2.1FT 

 * OREGON 

SEASIDE 1555 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 5.2FT +/- 1.6 

CHARLESTON 1555 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.5FT +/- 0.7 1.6FT 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1606 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 6.1FT +/- 1.8 5.9FT 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.7FT +/- 0.8 2.4FT 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.4FT +/- 0.7 

SAN PEDRO 1735 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.0FT +/- 0.6 

LA JOLLA 1746 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.1FT +/- 0.9 

FORECAST MODELS PROJECT TSUNAMIS UP TO 15.0-FOOT HEIGHT COULD 

DEVELOP 

ALONG THE COASTS OF CANADA - WASHINGTON - OREGON AND 

CALIFORNIA. WAVES OF THIS SIZE ARE KNOWN TO CAUSE INUNDATION AND 

DAMAGE TO COASTAL STRUCTURES. TSUNAMIS ARE EXPECTED TO REACH 

PEAK 

SIZE ONE TO THREE HOURS AFTER THE EXPECTED ARRIVAL TIME. 

FORECAST MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED WATER LEVEL 

ABOVE THE TIDE. 
72

FORECAST TSUNAMI DURATION IS THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH 

THE TSUNAMI MAY PRODUCE DANGEROUS CURRENTS AND WAVE ACTIVITY. 

OBSERVED TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 2314 UTC 3-27 2.76 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 2344 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 2347 UTC 3-27 1.74 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 
73

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 

WEAK51 PAAQ 280101 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 8 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

501 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

THIS MESSAGE IS UPDATED WITH NEW OBSERVATIONS. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA
74

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST FORECAST FORECAST OBSERVED 

 START OF TSUNAMI MAX TSUNAMI TSUNAMI 

SITE OF TSUNAMI DURATION HEIGHT HEIGHT 

---- ---------- -------- ------------- ------- 
75

 * ALASKA 

SAND POINT 1157 AKDT MAR 27 48 HRS 16.1FT +/- 4.8 11.6FT 

KODIAK 1213 AKDT MAR 27 48 HRS 3.8FT +/- 1.2 4.5FT 

DUTCH HARBOR 1215 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.8FT +/- 0.8 1.4FT 

COLD BAY 1232 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 

SEWARD 1239 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.5FT +/- 0.7 4.1FT 

ADAK 1240 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 1.8FT +/- 0.6 1.0FT 

ELFIN COVE 1240 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.8FT +/- 0.5 1.3FT 

YAKUTAT 1248 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.7FT +/- 0.8 2.4FT 

SITKA 1248 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 4.4FT +/- 1.3 3.7FT 

VALDEZ 1258 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 1.4FT +/- 0.4 

CORDOVA 1308 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 0.9FT 

SHEMYA 1323 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 0.3FT 

HOMER 1332 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 3.0FT +/- 0.9 

CRAIG 1351 AKDT MAR 27 3.9FT 

 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1400 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.5FT +/- 0.5 1.6FT 

TOFINO 1527 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.1FT +/- 0.9 2.4FT 

 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1540 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.9FT +/- 0.6 2.0FT 

WESTPORT 1556 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.2FT +/- 0.7 2.1FT 

 

 * OREGON 

SEASIDE 1555 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 5.5FT +/- 1.7 

CHARLESTON 1555 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.6FT +/- 0.8 2.7FT 

 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1606 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 6.5FT +/- 2.0 6.7FT 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 3.4FT 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.6FT +/- 0.8 1.9FT 

SAN PEDRO 1735 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.2FT +/- 0.6 1.2FT 

LA JOLLA 1746 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.3FT +/- 1.0 

 

FORECAST MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED WATER LEVEL 

ABOVE THE TIDE. 

FORECAST TSUNAMI DURATION IS THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH 

THE TSUNAMI MAY PRODUCE DANGEROUS CURRENTS AND WAVE ACTIVITY. 

OBSERVED TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 
76

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 2344 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0029 UTC 3-28 1.12 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0022 UTC 3-28 5.58 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0044 UTC 3-28 2.43 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
77

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 

WEAK51 PAAQ 280201 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 9 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

601 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA
78

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST FORECAST FORECAST OBSERVED 

 START OF TSUNAMI MAX TSUNAMI TSUNAMI 

SITE OF TSUNAMI DURATION HEIGHT HEIGHT 

---- ---------- -------- ------------- ------- 

 * ALASKA 
79

SAND POINT 1157 AKDT MAR 27 48 HRS 17.0FT +/- 5.1 11.6FT 

KODIAK 1213 AKDT MAR 27 48 HRS 4.1FT +/- 1.2 4.5FT 

DUTCH HARBOR 1215 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 1.4FT 

COLD BAY 1232 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.0FT +/- 0.9 

SEWARD 1239 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.6FT +/- 0.8 4.1FT 

ADAK 1240 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 1.9FT +/- 0.6 1.0FT 

ELFIN COVE 1240 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.9FT +/- 0.6 1.3FT 

YAKUTAT 1248 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 2.4FT 

SITKA 1248 AKDT MAR 27 24 HRS 4.6FT +/- 1.4 3.7FT 

VALDEZ 1258 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 1.5FT +/- 0.5 

CORDOVA 1308 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 0.9FT 

SHEMYA 1323 AKDT MAR 27 Less than 1 FT 0.3FT 

HOMER 1332 AKDT MAR 27 12 HRS 3.2FT +/- 1.0 

CRAIG 1351 AKDT MAR 27 3.9FT 

 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1400 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.6FT +/- 0.5 1.6FT 

TOFINO 1527 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.2FT +/- 1.0 2.4FT 

 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1540 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.0FT +/- 0.6 2.0FT 

WESTPORT 1556 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.4FT +/- 0.7 2.1FT 

 

 * OREGON 

SEASIDE 1555 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 5.8FT +/- 1.7 

CHARLESTON 1555 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.8FT +/- 0.8 2.7FT 

 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1606 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 6.9FT +/- 2.1 7.1FT 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.0FT +/- 0.9 3.7FT 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.7FT +/- 0.8 1.9FT 

SAN PEDRO 1735 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.3FT +/- 0.7 1.2FT 

LA JOLLA 1746 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.5FT +/- 1.1 1.5FT 

 

FORECAST MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED WATER LEVEL 

ABOVE THE TIDE. 

FORECAST TSUNAMI DURATION IS THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH 

THE TSUNAMI MAY PRODUCE DANGEROUS CURRENTS AND WAVE ACTIVITY. 

OBSERVED TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 
80

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0120 UTC 3-28 1.44 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
81

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 

WEAK51 PAAQ 280301 

TSUAK1 

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 10 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

701 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

THIS MESSAGE IS UPDATED WITH NEW OBSERVATIONS. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA
82

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST FORECAST FORECAST OBSERVED 

 START OF TSUNAMI MAX TSUNAMI TSUNAMI 

SITE OF TSUNAMI DURATION HEIGHT HEIGHT

---- ---------- -------- ------------- ------- 
83

 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1400 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.7FT +/- 0.5 1.6FT 

TOFINO 1527 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.4FT +/- 1.0 2.4FT 

 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1540 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.1FT +/- 0.6 2.0FT 

WESTPORT 1556 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.5FT +/- 0.7 2.1FT 

 

 * OREGON 

SEASIDE 1555 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 6.1FT +/- 1.8 

CHARLESTON 1555 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 2.7FT 

 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1606 PDT MAR 27 48 HRS 7.3FT +/- 2.2 7.1FT 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.2FT +/- 1.0 3.7FT 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 2.6FT 

SAN PEDRO 1735 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.4FT +/- 0.7 2.8FT 

LA JOLLA 1746 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.7FT +/- 1.1 2.3FT 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 48 

HOURS 

ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA COASTS EAST OF NIKOLSKI. 

MUCH DAMAGE HAS BEEN REPORTED ALONG THE OREGON COAST FROM 

LINCOLN CITY 

TO NESKOWIN. WAVES HAVE ERODED THE BEACHES AROUND CASCADE HEAD 

DAMAGING 

LOCAL RESERVES. LOS ANGELES CA REPORTED A 1.2-FOOT/0.4-METER

TSUNAMI AND THERE ARE CONCERNS THAT THE SUDDEN RISE IN WATER LEVEL 

MAY

PART MOORING LINES IN THE HARBOR. 

FORECAST MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED WATER LEVEL 

ABOVE THE TIDE. 

FORECAST TSUNAMI DURATION IS THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH 

THE TSUNAMI MAY PRODUCE DANGEROUS CURRENTS AND WAVE ACTIVITY. 

OBSERVED TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 
84

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 
85

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
86

WEAK51 PAAQ 280401 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 11 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

801 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

THIS MESSAGE IS UPDATED WITH NEW OBSERVATIONS. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA
87

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI WITH SIGNIFICANT WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS 

 EXPECTED. 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST FORECAST FORECAST OBSERVED 
88

 START OF TSUNAMI MAX TSUNAMI TSUNAMI 

SITE OF TSUNAMI DURATION HEIGHT HEIGHT 

---- ---------- -------- ------------- ------- 

 * BRITISH COLUMBIA 

LANGARA 1400 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 1.7FT +/- 0.5 1.6FT 

TOFINO 1527 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.4FT +/- 1.0 2.4FT 

 

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1540 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.1FT +/- 0.6 2.0FT 

WESTPORT 1556 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.5FT +/- 0.7 2.1FT 

 

 * OREGON 

SEASIDE 1555 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 6.1FT +/- 1.8 

CHARLESTON 1555 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 2.7FT 

 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1606 PDT MAR 27 48 HRS 7.3FT +/- 2.2 7.1FT 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.2FT +/- 1.0 3.7FT 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 3.3FT 

SAN PEDRO 1735 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 2.4FT +/- 0.7 3.1FT 

LA JOLLA 1746 PDT MAR 27 24 HRS 3.7FT +/- 1.1 3.2FT 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 48 

HOURS 

ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA COASTS EAST OF NIKOLSKI. 

PT REYES REPORTS HEAVY SURF AND STRONG CURRENTS. 

APPROXIMATELY 50 FEET OF SHORELINE HAS BEEN ERODED FROM POINT 

REYES BEACH SOUTH AND 35 FEET FROM POINT REYES BEACH NORTH. 

FORECAST MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED WATER LEVEL 

ABOVE THE TIDE.

FORECAST TSUNAMI DURATION IS THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH 

THE TSUNAMI MAY PRODUCE DANGEROUS CURRENTS AND WAVE ACTIVITY. 

OBSERVED TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 
89

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 
90

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
91

WEAK51 PAAQ 280501 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 12 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

901 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

THIS MESSAGE IS UPDATED WITH NEW OBSERVATIONS. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA
92

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

FORECASTS AND/OR OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY 

------------------------------------------------- 

 FORECAST FORECAST FORECAST OBSERVED 

 START OF TSUNAMI MAX TSUNAMI TSUNAMI 

SITE OF TSUNAMI DURATION HEIGHT HEIGHT 

---- ---------- -------- ------------- ------- 

 
93

 * WASHINGTON 

NEAH BAY 1540 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 2.1FT +/- 0.6 2.0FT 

WESTPORT 1556 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 2.5FT +/- 0.7 2.1FT 

 

 * OREGON 

SEASIDE 1555 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 6.1FT +/- 1.8 

CHARLESTON 1555 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 2.7FT 

 

 * CALIFORNIA 

CRESCENT CITY 1606 PDT MAR 27 48 HRS 7.3FT +/- 2.2 7.1FT 

SAN FRANCISCO 1702 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 3.2FT +/- 1.0 3.7FT 

SANTA BARBARA 1718 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 2.9FT +/- 0.9 3.3FT 

SAN PEDRO 1735 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 2.4FT +/- 0.7 3.1FT 

LA JOLLA 1746 PDT MAR 27 36 HRS 3.7FT +/- 1.1 3.5FT 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 48 

HOURS 

ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA COASTS EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND IN BRITISH 

COLUMBIA. 

FORECAST MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST EXPECTED WATER LEVEL 

ABOVE THE TIDE. 

FORECAST TSUNAMI DURATION IS THE APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH 

THE TSUNAMI MAY PRODUCE DANGEROUS CURRENTS AND WAVE ACTIVITY. 

OBSERVED TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 
94

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
95

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 

WEAK51 PAAQ 280600 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 13 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1000 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

IN THIS MESSAGE THE FORECAST CHART HAS BEEN REMOVED AND ALL 

OBSERVATIONS ARE CONTAINED IN THE OBSERVATION TABLE. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED FOR MANY LOCATIONS 

ON THE WEST COAST FOR UP TO 48 HOURS. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 
96

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS.

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 
97

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 
98

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
99

WEAK51 PAAQ 280701 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 14 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1101 PM AKDT THU MAR 27 2014 

NO NEW INFORMATION IS CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 
100

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 
101

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 
102

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
103

WEAK51 PAAQ 280800 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 15 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1200 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

NO NEW INFORMATION IS CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 
104

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 
105

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 
106

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
107

WEAK51 PAAQ 280901 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 16 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK

101 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 
108

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 
109

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 
110

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
111

WEAK51 PAAQ 281000 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 17 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

200 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 
112

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 
113

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 
114

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
115

WEAK51 PAAQ 281100 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 18 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

300 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 
116

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 
117

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 
118

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
119

WEAK51 PAAQ 281200 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 19 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

400 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 
120

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 
121

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 
122

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
123

WEAK51 PAAQ 281300 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 20 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

500 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 
124

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 
125

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 
126

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
127

WEAK51 PAAQ 281401 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 21 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

601 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 
128

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 
129

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 
130

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
131

WEAK51 PAAQ 281500 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 22 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

700 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 
132

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS.

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 
133

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 
134

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
135

WEAK51 PAAQ 281601 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 23 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

801 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 
136

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 
137

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 
138

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
139

WEAK51 PAAQ 281701 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 24 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

901 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 
140

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 
141

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 
142

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION.

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
143

WEAK51 PAAQ 281801 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 25 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1001 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE REDUCES THE WARNING FOR SOME AREAS IN SOUTHERN 

CALIFORNIA TO AN ADVISORY. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM ALAMITOS BAY 

 CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF L.A./ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO ALAMITOS BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF 

 L.A./ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU 

 ALASKA
144

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

48 HOURS AFTER THE WAVES INITIAL ARRIVAL ALONG SOUTHERN ALASKA 

COASTS 

EAST OF NIKOLSKI AND ALONG THE US AND CANADIAN WEST COAST. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED
145

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 
146

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
147

WEAK51 PAAQ 281902 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 26 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1102 AM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE REDUCES THE TSUNAMI WARNING TO A TSUNAMI ADVISORY 

FOR AREAS OF SOUTHERN ALASKA/ BRITISH COLUMBIA AND WASHIGTON. 

THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY FOR THE WESTERN ALEUTIANS IS CANCELLED. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM ALAMITOS 

 BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF L.A./ TO THE 

 OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO ALAMITOS BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF 

 L.A./ 
148

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA AND 

 ALASKA FROM THE OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER TO KENNEDY 

 ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ 

CANCELLATIONS 

------------- 

 * THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY IS CANCELED FOR THE COASTAL AREAS OF 

 ALASKA FROM NIKOLSKI ALASKA TO ATTU ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 
149

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

24 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 
150

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
151

WEAK51 PAAQ 282000 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 27 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1200 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM ALAMITOS 

 BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF L.A./ TO THE 

 OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO ALAMITOS BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF 

 L.A./ 
152

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA AND 

 ALASKA FROM THE OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER TO KENNEDY 

 ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 
153

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

24 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 
154

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
155

WEAK51 PAAQ 282101 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 28 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

101 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM ALAMITOS 

 BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF L.A./ TO THE 

 OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO ALAMITOS BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF 

 L.A./ 
156

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA AND 

 ALASKA FROM THE OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER TO KENNEDY 

 ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 
157

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

24 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 
158

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
159

WEAK51 PAAQ 282200 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 29 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

200 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM ALAMITOS 

 BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF L.A./ TO THE 

 OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO ALAMITOS BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF 

 L.A./ 
160

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA AND 

 ALASKA FROM THE OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER TO KENNEDY 

 ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS.

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 
161

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

24 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 
162

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
163

WEAK51 PAAQ 282300 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 30 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

300 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM ALAMITOS 

 BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF L.A./ TO THE 

 OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO ALAMITOS BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF 

 L.A./ 
164

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA AND 

 ALASKA FROM THE OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER TO KENNEDY 

 ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 
165

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

18 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 
166

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
167

WEAK51 PAAQ 290004 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 31 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

404 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE DOWNGRADES THE TSUNAMI WARNING TO AN ADVISORY FOR 

SOME AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM POINT 

 CONCEPTION CALIFORNIA TO DOUGLAS-LANE COUNTY LINE OREGON/10 

 MILES SW OF FLORENCE/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO ALAMITOS BAY CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF 

 L.A./ 
168

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM ALAMITOS BAY 

 CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 20 MILES SE OF L.A./ TO POINT CONCEPTION 

 CALIFORNIA 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF OREGON FROM DOUGLAS-LANE COUNTY LINE 

 OREGON/10 MILES SW OF FLORENCE/ TO THE OREGON-WASHINGTON 

 BORDER 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA AND 

 ALASKA FROM THE OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER TO KENNEDY 

 ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 
169

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

18 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 
170

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
171

WEAK51 PAAQ 290101 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 32 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

501 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM POINT 

 CONCEPTION CALIFORNIA TO DOUGLAS-LANE COUNTY LINE OREGON/10 

 MILES SW OF FLORENCE/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO POINT CONCEPTION CALIFORNIA 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF OREGON - WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA 
172

 AND ALASKA FROM DOUGLAS-LANE COUNTY LINE OREGON/10 MILES SW 

 OF FLORENCE/ TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW 

 OF HOMER/ 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 
173

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

18 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 
174

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
175

WEAK51 PAAQ 290201 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 33 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

601 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM POINT 

 CONCEPTION CALIFORNIA TO DOUGLAS-LANE COUNTY LINE OREGON/10 

 MILES SW OF FLORENCE/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO POINT CONCEPTION CALIFORNIA 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF OREGON - WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA 
176

 AND ALASKA FROM DOUGLAS-LANE COUNTY LINE OREGON/10 MILES SW 

 OF FLORENCE/ TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW 

 OF HOMER/ 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 
177

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

18 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 
178

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
179

WEAK51 PAAQ 290302 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 34 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

702 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE DOWNGRADES THE TSUNAMI WARNING TO AN ADVISORY FOR 

ALL AREAS IN CALIFORNIA AND OREGON WHICH WERE IN A WARNING. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO POINT CONCEPTION CALIFORNIA 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM POINT 

 CONCEPTION CALIFORNIA TO DOUGLAS-LANE COUNTY LINE OREGON/10 

 MILES SW OF FLORENCE/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF OREGON - WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA 
180

 AND ALASKA FROM DOUGLAS-LANE COUNTY LINE OREGON/10 MILES SW 

 OF FLORENCE/ TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW 

 OF HOMER/ 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 
181

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

15 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 
182

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT.

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
183

WEAK51 PAAQ 290402 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 35 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

802 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE DOWNGRADES THE TSUNAMI WARNING TO AN ADVISORY FOR 

SOME REGIONS IN THE EASTERN ALEUTIAN ISLANDS. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 
184

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

15 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 
185

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 
186

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
187

WEAK51 PAAQ 290500 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 36 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

900 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 
188

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

12 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED
189

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 
190

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
191

WEAK51 PAAQ 290600 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 37 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1000 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 
192

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

12 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 
193

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 
194

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
195

WEAK51 PAAQ 290700 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 38 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1100 PM AKDT FRI MAR 28 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 
196

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

12 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 
197

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 
198

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
199

WEAK51 PAAQ 290800 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 39 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1200 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 
200

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

12 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 
201

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 
202

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
203

WEAK51 PAAQ 290901 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 40 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

101 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 
204

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

9 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 
205

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 
206

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
207

WEAK51 PAAQ 291000 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 41 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

200 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 
208

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

9 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 
209

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 
210

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
211

WEAK51 PAAQ 291101 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 42 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

301 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 
212

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

9 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 
213

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 
214

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT.

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
215

WEAK51 PAAQ 291200 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 43 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

400 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 
216

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

6 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 
217

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 
218

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
219

WEAK51 PAAQ 291300 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 44 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

500 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 
220

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS.

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

6 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 
221

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 
222

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
223

WEAK51 PAAQ 291401 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 45 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

601 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 
224

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

6 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 
225

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 
226

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
227

WEAK51 PAAQ 291501 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 46 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

701 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CONTINUES THE WARNING AND ADVISORY AS IN THE 

PREVIOUS MESSAGE. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES 

--------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO 

 BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 
228

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

3 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 
229

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 
230

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
231

WEAK51 PAAQ 291601 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 47 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

801 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CANCELS THE ADVISORY FOR AREAS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. 

...THE TSUNAMI WARNING REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI WARNING IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA - OREGON - WASHINGTON - 

 BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM RINCON POINT 

 CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 15 MILES SE OF SANTA BARBARA/ TO KENNEDY 

 ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 

 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

CANCELLATIONS 

------------- 

 * THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY IS CANCELED FOR THE COASTAL AREAS OF 

 CALIFORNIA FROM THE CALIFORNIA-MEXICO BORDER TO RINCON 

 POINT CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 15 MILES SE OF SANTA BARBARA/ 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 
232

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI WARNING AREAS 

--------------------------------- 

 * WIDESPREAD DANGEROUS COASTAL FLOODING ACCOMPANIED BY POWERFUL 

 CURRENTS IS POSSIBLE AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER 

 TSUNAMI ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN A WARNING AREA - MOVE INLAND TO HIGHER GROUND. 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

3 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 
233

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 
234

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
235

WEAK51 PAAQ 291702 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 48 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

902 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE DOWNGRADES THE PREVIOUSLY WARNED REGION IN ALASKA 

TO

ADVISORY AND CANCELS THE ADVISORY FOR PORTIONS OF ALASKA/ BRITISH 

COLUMBIA AND WASHINGTON. 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA AND OREGON FROM RINCON 

 POINT CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 15 MILES SE OF SANTA BARBARA/ TO 

 THE OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

CANCELLATIONS 

------------- 

 * THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY IS CANCELED FOR THE COASTAL AREAS OF 

 WASHINGTON - BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA FROM THE 

 OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER TO KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 

 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ 

 * THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY IS CANCELED FOR THE COASTAL AREAS OF 

 ALASKA FROM UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH 

 HARBOR/ TO NIKOLSKI ALASKA 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 
236

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS - UPDATED

----------------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

3 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 
237

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 
238

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
239

WEAK51 PAAQ 291801 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 49 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1001 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

THIS MESSAGE CANCELS THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY FOR TE CAST OF OREGON. 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY REMAINS IN EFFECT... 

WARNINGS/ADVISORIES/WATCHES - UPDATED

------------------------------------- 

TSUNAMI ADVISORY IN EFFECT FOR... 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF CALIFORNIA FROM RINCON POINT 

 CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 15 MILES SE OF SANTA BARBARA/ TO THE 

 OREGON-CALIFORNIA BORDER 

 * THE COASTAL AREAS OF ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS 

 ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH HARBOR/ 

CANCELLATIONS 

------------- 

 * THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY IS CANCELED FOR THE COASTAL AREAS OF 

 OREGON FROM THE OREGON-CALIFORNIA BORDER TO THE 

 OREGON-WASHINGTON BORDER 

 * FOR OTHER US AND CANDIAN PACIFIC COASTS IN NORTH AMERICA - 

 THIS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. 

IMPACTS FOR TSUNAMI ADVISORY AREAS 

---------------------------------- 

 * A TSUNAMI CAPABLE OF PRODUCING STRONG CURRENTS OR WAVES 

DANGEROUS 

 TO PERSONS IN OR VERY NEAR THE WATER IS EXPECTED. 

 * CURRENTS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO SWIMMERS... BOATS... AND COASTAL 

 STRUCTURES AND MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY HOURS AFTER THE TSUNAMI 

 ARRIVAL. 
240

 * THE FIRST WAVE MAY NOT BE THE LARGEST. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 

------------------- 

 * IF YOU ARE IN AN ADVISORY AREA - MOVE OFF THE BEACH AND OUT OF 

 HARBORS AND MARINAS. WIDESPREAD INUNDATION OF LAND IS NOT 

 EXPECTED FOR ADVISORY AREAS. 

 * BE ALERT TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS. 

 * DO NOT GO TO THE COAST TO OBSERVE THE TSUNAMI. 

 * DO NOT RETURN TO THE COAST UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

SIGNIFICANT TSUNAMI ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR UP TO 

3 MORE HOURS FOR AREAS STILL IN A LEVEL OF ALERT. 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

----------------------------------------------------- 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 
241

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

 

PRELIMINARY EARTHQUAKE PARAMETERS 

--------------------------------- 

 * MAGNITUDE 9.0 

 * ORIGIN TIME 1050 AKDT MAR 27 2014 

 1150 PDT MAR 27 2014 

 1850 UTC MAR 27 2014 

 * COORDINATES 55.2 NORTH 156.7 WEST 

 * DEPTH 11 MILES 

 * LOCATION 100 MILES SE OF CHIGNIK ALASKA 

 485 MILES SW OF ANCHORAGE ALASKA 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS MESSAGE WILL BE UPDATED IN 60 MINUTES. 
242

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL RESIDENTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS 

 EVENT AT PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
243

WEAK51 PAAQ 291900 

TSUAK1

BULLETIN 

PUBLIC TSUNAMI MESSAGE NUMBER 50 

NWS WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER PALMER AK 

1100 AM AKDT SAT MAR 29 2014 

...THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY IS CANCELLED... 

CANCELLATIONS 

------------- 

 * THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY IS CANCELED FOR THE COASTAL AREAS OF 

 CALIFORNIA FROM RINCON POINT CALIFORNIA/LOCATED 15 MILES SE 

 OF SANTA BARBARA/ TO THE OREGON-CALIFORNIA BORDER 

 * THE TSUNAMI ADVISORY IS CANCELED FOR THE COASTAL AREAS OF 

 ALASKA FROM KENNEDY ENTRANCE ALASKA/LOCATED 40 MILES SW OF 

 HOMER/ TO UNIMAK PASS ALASKA/LOCATED 80 MILES NE OF DUTCH 

 HARBOR/ 

IMPACTS - UPDATED

----------------- 

 * TSUNAMI ACTIVITY HAS SUBSIDED ALONG THE COASTS OF THE U.S. 

 WEST COAST STATES... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA. 

 * ONGOING ACTIVITY MAY PERSIST IN SOME AREAS CAUSING STRONG 

 CURRENTS DANGEROUS TO SWIMMERS AND BOATS. 

 * THE DETERMINATION TO RE-OCCUPY HAZARD ZONES MUST BE MADE BY 

 LOCAL OFFICIALS. 

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS - UPDATED

----------------------------- 

 * DO NOT RE-OCCUPY HAZARD ZONES UNTIL LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICIALS 

 INDICATE IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. 

OBSERVATIONS OF TSUNAMI ACTIVITY - UPDATED

------------------------------------------ 

 TIME OBSERVED MAX 

 SITE OF MEASUREMENT TSUNAMI HEIGHT 

 ---------------------------- --------------- -------------- 
244

 SAND POINT AK 1945 UTC 3-27 11.60 FT 

 KING COVE AK 2023 UTC 3-27 4.33 FT 

 CHIGNIK AK 2026 UTC 3-27 21.82 FT 

 NIKOLSKI AK 2054 UTC 3-27 1.61 FT 

 UNALASKA AK 2056 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 KODIAK AK 2100 UTC 3-27 4.50 FT 

 SEWARD AK 2110 UTC 3-27 4.11 FT 

 ADAK AK 2145 UTC 3-27 1.03 FT 

 ELFIN COVE AK 2133 UTC 3-27 1.32 FT 

 YAKUTAT AK 2132 UTC 3-27 2.44 FT 

 PORT ALEXANDER AK 2114 UTC 3-27 1.41 FT 

 CORDOVA AK 2235 UTC 3-27 1.82 FT 

 SHEMYA AK 2245 UTC 3-27 0.34 FT 

 SITKA AK 2222 UTC 3-27 3.74 FT 

 CRAIG AK 2255 UTC 3-27 3.88 FT 

 LANGARA BC 2300 UTC 3-27 1.60 FT 

 TOFINO BC 2334 UTC 3-27 2.41 FT 

 NEAH BAY WA 2234 UTC 3-27 2.02 FT 

 LAPUSH WA 2241 UTC 3-27 3.15 FT 

 WESTPORT WA 2302 UTC 3-27 2.11 FT 

 PORT ANGELES WA 2354 UTC 3-27 1.38 FT 

 GARIBALDI OR 2259 UTC 3-27 1.05 FT 

 NEWPORT OR 2309 UTC 3-27 2.46 FT 

 CHARLESTON OR 2333 UTC 3-27 2.74 FT 

 PORT ORFORD OR 2355 UTC 3-27 6.76 FT 

 CRESCENT CITY CA 0100 UTC 3-28 7.11 FT 

 ARENA COVE CA 2313 UTC 3-27 5.58 FT 

 EUREKA CA 0006 UTC 3-28 4.23 FT 

 POINT REYES CA 0142 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN FRANCISCO 0155 UTC 3-28 3.71 FT 

 ALAMEDA CA 0141 UTC 3-28 1.84 FT 

 MONTEREY CA 2338 UTC 3-27 3.97 FT 

 PORT SAN LUIS CA 0108 UTC 3-28 14.30 FT 

 SANTA BARBARA CA 0145 UTC 3-28 2.64 FT 

 SANTA MONICA CA 0157 UTC 3-28 3.38 FT 

 SAN PEDRO CA 0230 UTC 3-28 3.11 FT 

 LA JOLLA CA 0222 UTC 3-28 3.5 FT 

 SAN DIEGO CA 0214 UTC 3-28 1.74 FT 

 MIDWAY IS 2304 UTC 3-27 1.44 FT 

 NAWILIWILI HI 2323 UTC 3-27 2.20 FT 

 HALEIWA HI 2338 UTC 3-27 4.99 FT 

 HONOLULU HI 2338 UTC 3-27 2.23 FT 

 KAHULUI HI 2341 UTC 3-27 7.15 FT 

 KAWAIHAE HI 0014 UTC 3-28 2.89 FT 

 WAKE ISLAND 0052 UTC 3-28 0.33 FT 

 GUAM 0321 UTC 3-28 0.30 FT 
245

 PAGO PAGO AM SAMOA 0433 UTC 3-28 0.46 FT 

 

 HEIGHT - OBSERVED MAX TSUNAMI HEIGHT IS THE WATER LEVEL ABOVE THE 

 TIDE LEVEL AT THE TIME OF MEASUREMENT. 

NEXT UPDATE AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

-------------------------------------- 

 * THIS WILL BE THE LAST WEST COAST/ALASKA TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER 

 BULLETIN ISSUED FOR THIS EVENT.

 * REFER TO THE INTERNET SITE WCATWC.ARH.NOAA.GOV FOR MORE 

 INFORMATION. 

 * PACIFIC COASTAL REGIONS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA... OREGON... 

 WASHINGTON... BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALASKA SHOULD REFER TO THE 

 PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER MESSAGES FOR INFORMATION AT 

 PTWC.WEATHER.GOV. 

$$ 
U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–K

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

Communication Products for the Science Application for 

Risk Reduction (SAFRR) Tsunami Scenario
COVER: Image from the prototype mobile device game app, "Splash," developed by students at Art 

Center College of Design game. A player can only survive and win "Splash" by running uphill and away 

from the tsunami.
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario

Stephanie Ross and Lucile Jones, Editors 

Communication Products for the Science Application 

for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) Tsunami Scenario

By Suzanne Perry 

Open-File Report 2013–1170–K 

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey 

 
iii

U.S. Department of the Interior

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2013

For product and ordering information:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov/pubprod

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth,

its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

Suggested citation: 

Perry, S., 2013, Communication products for the Science Application for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) 

tsunami scenario, chap. K, in Ross, S.L., and Jones, L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science Application for 

Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170, 12 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/k/.

Any use of trade, product, or firm names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply 

endorsement by the U.S. Government.

Although this information product, for the most part, is in the public domain, it also may contain 

copyrighted materials as noted in the text. Permission to reproduce copyrighted items must be secured 

from the copyright owner.
iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD 

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION

MARK NECHODOM 

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D. 

STATE GEOLOGIST
Communication Products for the Science Application 

for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) Tsunami Scenario

By Suzanne Perry 

Product Development Overview

Science Application for Risk Reduction (SAFRR), like its predecessor the Multi-Hazards 

Demonstration Project, has a mission to increase the use of science by decision-makers of all 

kinds. Thus, an important part of any SAFRR scenario is development of products that enhance 

usability of the science. In this tsunami scenario, the focus has been on development of three 

kinds of products: 

· products that augment typical outputs of scientific studies, such as reports, to make the 

results of the scenario more relevant and usable to nonscientists; 

· products that distill local impacts and allow users in specific locales to identify which 

aspects of the broad regional study apply to their local area; and 

· products that effectively deliver disaster preparedness messaging to one group of people 

who are not usually interested in disaster preparedness—those ages 18 to 34. 

Products that Augment Typical Outputs

A motion graphics animation movie, 4 to 5 minutes in length, will be created by a 

professional artist or designer to summarize the principal scenario results. This movie is 

scheduled for production in late 2013, when all project research has been completed. Similar 

movies were created previously for the ShakeOut and ARkStorm scenarios. Figure 1 shows a 

frame from the movie “Preparedness Now” (2008, 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opXZY1zZ8xk). In 4 minutes, that movie summarizes the 

key results of the ShakeOut scenario and basic earthquake mitigation practices. The movie has 

had multiple uploads to YouTube, with nearly 200,000 hits overall, and has been adapted several 

times for use in ShakeOut drills around the United States. It has been shown a very large but 

uncounted number of times to raptly attentive audiences in high school and college classrooms, 

as well as in meetings with local governments and communities. In addition, as part of the final 

report for the current scenario, we intend to develop an infographic-style timeline to 

communicate what happens from the time the tsunami is generated until the last of the damage is 

restored, to indicate the events, decisions, and uncertainties that arise as the disaster unfolds. 
2 

Figure 1. A still frame from the motion graphics movie “Preparedness Now,” metaphorically visualizing 

lifeline disruption caused by the ShakeOut scenario earthquake. 

Products that Distill Local Impacts from the Regional Study

In previous SAFRR scenarios, this author has worked closely with local governments to 

develop additional documents that extract the parts of the larger regional study applicable to their 

locales and, where necessary, make reasonable extrapolations from the study. For this scenario, 

we intend to develop an interactive, map-based Web product that allows users to select a location 

and see which scenario datasets and results pertain to that location. Over time, we intend to 

extend this product to include results from previous scenarios. 

Products that Deliver Effective Tsunami Messaging 

The existence of the scenario helps to shine a spotlight on tsunami issues more generally. 

It also provides an opportunity to experiment with novel methods of communicating tsunami 

safety in ways that may be outside the scope of ongoing preparedness programs with fixed 

budget and purview. During the 2 years of scenario development, we polled and compiled 

experience from a large number of emergency managers, first responders, tsunami educators, and 

coordinators of this scenario, as well as reviewing existing products—especially the brochure 

“How to Survive a Tsunami” (California Emergency Management Agency, 2009)—and tsunami 

eyewitness accounts and newspaper reports. This effort was made to identify aspects of tsunamis 

and tsunami safety that are misunderstood in ways that compromise public safety. Table 1 

contains the compiled list of important aspects of tsunamis where dangerous misunderstanding is 

common. It represents the results of the gathered experience and in particular was shaped by the 

repeated input of Tsunami Program leads Kevin Miller and Kate Long of the California 

Emergency Management Agency (now the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, 

or Cal OES), Earthquake/Tsunami/Volcano Program Manager John Schelling of the State of 

Washington, and psychology Ph.D. candidate Katherine Thompson of the Center for Research 

on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University.
3 

The compilation in table 1 served as the foundation of a project to create prototype 

tsunami education materials that are engaging, entertaining, and compelling as well as 

informative. Another important guide in development of materials was the summary of pertinent 

findings from social and behavioral sciences (table 2). The materials produced are targeted to 

reach 18–34-year-olds, an audience that has been difficult to engage through traditional 

preparedness messaging (for example, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009; Hawai'i 

Disaster Preparedness, 2012; Partnership for a Healthy Durham, 2012). One of the materials, a 

short animated movie, is being developed with the additional intent that the movie will serve as a 

“calling card” to the hospitality industry. The intent is that the movie, by demonstrating that 

tsunami information products can be positive, enjoyable, and nonthreatening as well as 

informative, will increase the hospitality industry’s willingness to discuss broader distribution of 

tsunami information for hotel guests and staff. 

After this movie is completed, Liesel Ritchie at the University of Colorado, Boulder, will 

conduct an evaluation. The purpose of the evaluation study is to ascertain what information the 

movie successfully conveyed and whether the intended tsunami information is conveyed to and 

retained by people 18 to 34 years old. 

For this scenario's messaging products, we collaborated with the Designmatters program 

at Art Center College of Design in Pasadena, California, one of the premier schools in the Nation 

for marketers, advertisers, graphic designers, and product designers. Designmatters is unique in 

the Nation and perhaps the world because its students conduct research and class practicum 

projects in which they apply their creativity, skills, and expertise to social causes. The 

Designmatters approach is to educate while entertaining and to attract attention to serious issues 

using methods that may be lighthearted and fun. For each of its scenarios, SAFRR has had a 

Designmatters class focus on scenario issues. The movie “Preparedness Now” (fig. 1) was the 

result of one such class. 

For the tsunami scenario, a Designmatters class developed prototypes for a tsunami 

education and awareness campaign after close interaction with SAFRR scenario coordinators and 

partners. They instructed the class in the basics of tsunami science, described the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) system of official warnings, and provided 

insights from sociology, psychology, and anthropology (table 2) about how to motivate action 

and how to communicate about rare events with large uncertainties of occurrence (see, for 

example, Wood and others, 2011; Shome and Marx, 2009). 

Table 1 summarizes those tsunami concepts that are poorly understood, with reduced 

public safety as a consequence. These concepts form the basis of an awareness campaign that 

includes a suite of short animated movies in planning and development by Art Center College of 

Design. 
4 

Table 1. Tsunami concepts that are not well understood by the public, with consequently reduced public 

safety. 

___________________________________________________________________

1. A tsunami is a kind of wave but not the typical ocean wave we know. A tsunami:

- often looks like a wall of water;

- sometimes looks like a fast-rising flood;

- has multiple surges of waves.

- Each wave keeps flowing in for many minutes.

- Waves can keep coming for 24 hours or longer.

- Waves will vary in height.

- Big waves can arrive after smaller ones and a large, dangerous wave could come at any time—at the 

beginning, middle, or end of the tsunami. 

- Even when the water looks calm or shallow, it can be deadly dangerous with powerful, unpredictable 

currents and whirlpools.

2. Sometimes you will know a tsunami is coming because you hear a warning from an official source like an 

announcement on television or a lifeguard with a bullhorn. (Official sources include loudspeaker, siren, 

lifeguard, television, Internet, radio, automated phone call, and door to door visit by hotel staff or police.)

3. Often you will have to rely on yourself to recognize signs that a tsunami is coming:

- if you feel earthquake shaking while you are on a beach

- if you see the water pull away from shore like a very sudden, very low tide

- if you see a wall of water coming toward shore

- if you hear a sound like a freight train coming from the water

... a tsunami could be coming. Get to higher ground immediately.

4. Many people, if they see, hear, or feel a tsunami warning sign, won't take action immediately

- Instead they will look around, see what other people are doing, wait and see what happens next.

- But with a tsunami, every minute can be critical. So take action immediately with the first sign, even if 

you aren't certain it means “tsunami.” 

- Don't wait for a second sign. You can't outrun a tsunami.

5. To protect yourself and your loved ones in a tsunami:

- get to higher ground and get away from the water 

-tsunamis move with incredible force but they can't go far uphill and they eventually lose power as they 

move over land

- if you can't get to higher ground, as a last resort go high up in a tall, sturdy building but ONLY do this as 

a last resort. 

6. Get away from the water, not just the beach. 

- Tsunamis come into rivers, bays, marinas, and harbors too

7. Stay away from the water until officials say it is okay to return (because of all the properties of tsunamis in 

point 1). 

8. NEVER move closer to the water to watch the tsunami (because of all the properties of tsunamis in point 

1). 

9. Never try to surf a tsunami (because of all the properties in point 1).

10. Possible Topics for Additional Modules:

• Tsunami facts and earth science
5 

• Social science about human behavioral response to tsunami signs and warnings

• What to do if there is no higher ground (vertical evacuation)

• How to know where the safe zones are (note: will address overevacuation issues)

• Why you can't surf a tsunami and it can be deadly to try

• Tsunami currents—tsunamis in harbors

• Where to get more information

• Real life examples of survival and death by following or not following these guidelines

_______________________________________________________________________________

To guide development of the messaging movie, Thompson of CRED and Perry of USGS 

provided the Art Center class with a summary of precepts from the social and behavioral 

sciences that are relevant to tsunami messaging. Table 2 presents this summary. 

Table 2. Results from social and behavioral sciences pertinent to tsunami messaging. ______________________________________________________________________________________

· In many ways, motivating people to pay attention to tsunami safety is the same as 

motivating them to watch a commercial. However, there are important differences 

because of the way people deal with rare dangers. 

· In our culture, people are reluctant to take action (like fleeing a beach) if nobody 

else is taking action. There are two effective ways to confront this. Point out that this 

will be their likely reaction; and apply “monkey see, monkey do”—show others taking 

the desired action. 

· It is very hard for people to imagine themselves in rare situations, so just saying 

“remember these warning signs” won't work. People won't internalize or remember 

the information because they do not believe it will ever apply to them. People ignore 

messages that they think don't pertain to them. Best strategy is to acknowledge their 

feeling that this is not going to happen. You want to give the sense that a tsunami is rare 

but is going to happen to someone, and if you listen to this message, then you will be 

ready if you are the one. 

· Connect what you want people to do with why they should do it. Don't just give orders 

or instructions. The why needs to tap the emotions and values that are most important to 

people. In this context, the keys are control (there is an action I can take), survival (if I 

do this I will be safe), confidence (I can protect people who matter to me), and peace of 

mind (by watching this movie, I am taking the right step). 

· Don't show misconceptions, because that reinforces the misconception. People will 

remember that they saw something but not remember that what they saw was wrong. 

Only show what is true, not a myth or misunderstanding. If you need to show the wrong 

kind of wave (“most people think a tsunami is like a common ocean wave”), best to show 

a wave that is clearly not real, such as the famous old Japanese painting of a tsunami. 

· Repetition of the message helps. The repetition can be with visuals or words or both. 

For example, it will help cement the message “get to higher ground” if multiple people 

are seen doing this, and in different situations—such as moving uphill from a beach, and 

from a river, and from a harbor. 
6 

· The visuals and the narration don't have to be identical. Messages, emotions, and 

values can be conveyed using graphics or words. For example, the graphics can show the 

characteristics of a tsunami wave—you don't need to list them all. 

· Don't try to catch attention by being too vivid, hyperbolic, or scary. This will only 

cause backlash, and people will tune out the message. Everyone has a different threshold 

for what is too vivid. For most people it should be okay to hear “because he went down to 

watch the tsunami, he died” but not to watch the victim struggling and drowning. 

· Most people are motivated to act if it will improve their situation and they respond 

to messages framed in a positive way. Do this to be safe... Do this to protect your loved 

ones... Here is what to do to be protected. In such a short movie, there may only be time 

for a single approach, and if that is the case, use this kind of positive wording. 

· However, not everyone is reached by this positive approach. A large minority of 

people are instead motivated to act to avoid things getting worse. Those people instead 

need to hear If you don't do this you could get hurt... or If you return to the beach you will 

get hurt. 

· A single example is more persuasive than saying “this affects many people.” That is 

why journalists focus on one individual within a big story. Charities get more donations if 

they show a single starving orphan in Africa—with personal details about that orphan—

than if they show an entire group of kids in Africa who all need help. If possible, it would 

be good to add some examples of what happened to particular individuals in particular 

tsunamis. 

______________________________________________________________________ 

Prototype products of the Art Center campaign include: 

· Twitter feeds from identities created for two NOAA dart buoys, one a crabby old buoy 

that complains a lot, the other an enthusiastic young buoy. The buoys will occasionally 

dispense tsunami science and safety information and issue warnings and advisories, but 

will gain followers because of the jokes, wisecracks, and entertaining tweets they make 

the rest of the time.

· “Splash,” a simple, chase style game app for mobile devices, in which a tsunami chases 

a cartoon icon representing the player (fig. 2). The player can only win the game by 

avoiding the tsunami, that is, by running to higher ground and away from the water. 

Those playing the game learn correct response to a tsunami, probably without realizing 

that they have just been educated about getting to higher ground. 
7 

Figure 2. A still frame from the proposed tsunami game app “Splash.” The player can only survive and 

win the game by running uphill and away from the water. 

Public billboards, posters, advertisements on buses, t-shirts, tote bags, temporarily 

erected statues, Web pages, and more are the pieces of an awareness campaign called “The Next 

Wave: Know the Tsunami (Empower Yourself).” The campaign focuses on educating people 

about safe and unsafe areas in their community in the event of a tsunami. It culminates in a day 

of public events, which include a triathalon and an Internet-connected treasure hunt called a 

geocache (fig. 3), a hunt that leads participants from a beach to areas that are safe from tsunami 

inundation and that delivers players to a music festival finale. Along their way, participants pass 

walls painted in temporary chalk to indicate areas that would be underwater in a tsunami. 

Figure 3. Photograph showing street setup for part of the geocache event, during the proposed public 

awareness campaign called “The Next Wave.”
8 

The logo for this campaign (fig. 4) uses symbols common in tsunami inundation and 

evacuation signs around the world (fig. 5). The background is red, rather than the blue of the 

tsunami signage, to make clear that this campaign is related to but separate from those signs and 

to emphasize the urgency in increased awareness and danger in tsunamis. The “V” in the word 

Wave has a second arm that is higher than the first, a subtle reminder to move to higher ground 

during a tsunami. 

Figure 4. Logo for the tsunami public awareness campaign, in two color schemes 

Figure 5. For comparison, this photograph shows a sample tsunami evacuation route sign in Thailand. 
9 

The campaign uses two visual languages. One is a beautiful, serene ocean image (fig. 6) 

to impart a sense of familiarity and safety. The other is a collection of cartoon pictograms (fig. 

7), to instill a sense of community and fun. 

Figure 1 Figure 6. Photograph showing a bus-stop billboard in one visual language (using 

a serene ocean image) for the public awareness campaign “The Next Wave.”
10

Figure 2 Figure 7. Poster in the other visual language (cartoon pictograms) for the public 

awareness campaign “The Next Wave.” 
11

Response to the Proposed Campaign

The prototype campaign has been presented to scenario coordinators, partnering agencies, 

and emergency managers, with mostly positive response—but also a large minority of negative 

reactions. The positive responses have expressed excitement about the creativity of the ideas and 

enthusiasm that this stands a good chance of reaching some who are difficult to reach with 

traditional messaging. The negative reactions dislike the logo and the name and reveal concern 

and frustration within the tsunami mitigation community about how to reduce widespread and 

persistent misunderstanding that affects tsunami safety. 

The campaign logo shows “hooked” waves, and the perceived problems with this are that 

representing tsunamis with cresting waves perpetuates misconceptions about what tsunamis are 

like and will encourage surfers to try to surf tsunamis. It is reasonable to propose that a new and 

separate effort needs to be made to convince surfers that tsunamis provide a poor and potentially 

deadly surfing experience. However, given the widespread—international—use of similar 

hooked waves in tsunami signage and information materials, it is reasonable to use a logo that 

makes visual reference to those materials. Nonetheless, it also makes sense to experiment with 

logos that still make visual connection to existing tsunami images, but help to evolve the images 

to communicate additional and more correct tsunami properties. 

The campaign name raised objections because it uses the word “wave,” and some in the 

tsunami community wish to eradicate the word “wave” from tsunami discussion and use only the 

words “surge” or “tsunami.” This approach would be difficult for tsunami scientists to accept 

because a tsunami is, in fact, a type of wave. Far more importantly, those who are not tsunami 

scientists already think of tsunamis as waves, and changing the terminology could result in 

messaging that is less likely to reach its target audiences. 

The Art Center students initially conducted an informal research survey in which they 

asked participants “what is a tsunami?” Every answer included reference to a tsunami as a wave. 

Art Center's conclusion was that it would be confusing and would reduce transmission of 

important messages to avoid use of “wave” when discussing tsunamis. The campaign instead 

focuses on raising awareness that the tsunami is a different kind of wave than people expect or 

know. A number of tsunami messaging professionals have indicated to us that they prefer this 

tactic.

As this report is being published, scenario coordinators continue to work closely with the 

tsunami mitigation community and Art Center to adapt the prototype campaign so that it will be 

of use to the preparedness and mitigation community while also effectively communicating with 

the target audience. Meanwhile, the conflicting reactions to the Art Center campaign indicate a 

need for consensus among tsunami messaging professionals. Thus, SAFRR has offered 

completion funding and impetus to reestablish and conclude an effort originally begun by NOAA 

to develop consensus tsunami messaging. That effort will resume in late 2013. 
12

References

California Emergency Management Agency, 2009, How to survive a tsunami: California 

Emergency Management Agency Earthquake and Tsunami Program, 2 p. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2009, Personal preparedness in America—

findings from the 2009 Citizen Corps national survey: Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, 91 p. 

Hawai'i Disaster Preparedness, 2012, Hawai'i Disaster Preparedness Statewide Survey Results: 

Accessed June 12, 2013, at http://www.getreadyhawaii.org/index.php/media/hawaii-disasterpreparedness-statewide-survey-results. 

Partnership for a Healthy Durham, 2012, 2011 Durham County community health assessment: 

Durham County, North Carolina Department of Public Health, 512 p. 

Shome, D., and Marx, S., 2009, The psychology of climate change communication: Columbia 

University, Center for Research on Environmental Decision Making, 54 p. 

Wood, M.M., Mileti, D.S., Kano, M., Kelley, M.M., Regan, R., and Bourque, L.B., 2011, 

Communicating actionable risk for terrorism and other hazards: Risk Analysis, v. 32, p. 601–

615.
This page intentionally left blank
U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–L

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

Tsunami Mitigation and Preparedness Activities in California
COVER—Top: Warning signs guide people to safe, high ground as a tsunami approaches King Salmon, Humboldt County, California. Middle: 

Buildings and infrastructure adjacent to beaches are common on the coast, and an important target of tsunami education and mitigation. 

Coronado, San Diego County, California. Bottom: Fixed piers, infrastructure, and boating vessels of all varieties provide ample opportunity and 

challenge for mitigating the effects of tsunamis, here at Ventura Harbor, California. Photos by Rick Wilson.
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario

Stephanie Ross and Lucile Jones, Editors 

Tsunami Mitigation and Preparedness Activities in

California

By Rick Wilson and Kevin Miller 

Open-File Report 2013–1170–L 

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey 
iii

U.S. Department of the Interior

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2013

For product and ordering information:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov/pubprod

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth,

its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

Suggested citation: 

Wilson, R., and Miller, K., 2013, Tsunami mitigation and preparedness activities in California, chap. L in

Ross, S.L., and Jones, L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami 

Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170, 10 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/l/.

Any use of trade, product, or firm names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply 

endorsement by the U.S. Government.

Although this information product, for the most part, is in the public domain, it also may contain 

copyrighted materials as noted in the text. Permission to reproduce copyrighted items must be secured 

from the copyright owner.
iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION

MARK NECHODOM

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D.

STATE GEOLOGIST
v

Contents

Abstract............................................................................................................................................................................1

Introduction......................................................................................................................................................................1

California Tsunami Preparedness and Hazard Mitigation Program.................................................................................2

Ongoing Activities............................................................................................................................................................3

New Activities and Products ............................................................................................................................................4

Conclusions .....................................................................................................................................................................9

References Cited...........................................................................................................................................................10

Figures

1. January 2012 tsunami evacuation drill in King Salmon, Humboldt County..................................................2

2. Tsunami flow-regime map for Crescent City harbor.....................................................................................5

3. Map showing draft tsunami current velocity hazard zones using 2011 Tohoku event modeling in 

Crescent City................................................................................................................................................6

4. Draft map showing offshore bathymetric depths off the coast of San Diego Bay. .......................................7

5. Draft playbook tsunami evacuation for the Imperial Beach area..................................................................8
Tsunami Mitigation and Preparedness Activities in

California

By Rick Wilson1 and Kevin Miller2

Abstract

Scenario planning and final results associated with the U.S. Geological Survey Science 

Application for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) tsunami project are providing great benefits to the 

ongoing tsunami risk-reduction efforts of the California Tsunami Preparedness and Hazard 

Mitigation Program. This program, led by the California Governor’s Office of Emergency 

Services and the California Geological Survey, works with coastal communities to improve 

tsunami preparedness and mitigation at the local level through various efforts, such as improving

tsunami hazard analysis, establishing consistent evacuation communications and planning, and 

leveraging national risk-reduction efforts associated with the National Tsunami Hazard 

Mitigation Program.

The recent 2010 Chilean and 2011 Tohoku tsunamis did not cause notable inundation of 

dry land in California, but dozens of harbors sustained damages totaling nearly $100 million

(Wilson and others, 2012a). Estimates associated with the SAFRR distant tsunami scenario 

suggest socioeconomic and environmental losses could be even larger. Information gathered 

from these events and the SAFRR scenario is guiding the development and implementation of 

new strategies for emergency response, maritime planning, and land-use planning, including

· a reassessment of the tsunami threat along the California coast;

· scenario-specific, tsunami evacuation “playbook” maps and guidance;

· in-harbor hazard maps and offshore safety zones for potential boat evacuation during future 

distant source events;

· “probability-based” products for land-use planning under the California Seismic Hazard 

Mapping Act; and

· an expansion of real-time and post-tsunami field reconnaissance teams and information 

sharing through a state-wide clearinghouse.

The state tsunami program has benefitted greatly from participation in the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario process, and hopes to continue this relationship with the U.S. Geological Survey to help 

improve tsunami preparedness in California.

Introduction

The 2013 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Science Application for Risk Reduction 

(SAFRR) tsunami scenario project provides a broad analysis of the impacts from a large distantsource tsunami event along the entire California coast. Like with previous SAFRR scenarios (for 

 1 California Geological Survey

2 California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services
2

example, the 2008 ShakeOut earthquake and 2011 ARkStorm flood scenarios), the State of 

California has acquired useful information that will help it prepare for future large-scale 

disasters. The State and Federal partnership through the SAFRR project has improved the 

understanding of physical events (for example, tsunami source mechanisms and sediment 

deposition), potential socioeconomic and environmental losses, and challenges to an effective 

response and recovery for a significant state-wide tsunami event. The purpose of this chapter is 

to summarize current tsunami risk-reduction efforts of the California Tsunami Preparedness and 

Hazard Mitigation Program (referred to as the “state tsunami program” herein) and to discuss 

how results from the SAFRR tsunami scenario will support these ongoing efforts.

California Tsunami Preparedness and Hazard Mitigation Program

The state tsunami program is a hazard-reduction program managed by the California 

Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), with assistance from the California 

Geological Survey (CGS), and in cooperation with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration’s (NOAA’s) National Weather Service and other Federal, State, and local 

agencies. The program promotes tsunami planning, preparedness, and hazard mitigation among 

California’s coastal communities (fig. 1), and participates in the National Tsunami Hazard 

Mitigation Program (NTHMP), which is responsible for setting U.S. policy and guidance for 

tsunami warning and long-term planning. Within the state, the program works through the 

California Tsunami Steering Committee with its 20 coastal and San Francisco Bay Area county 

emergency management partners and other State and Federal agencies with tsunami hazard 

responsibilities.

Figure 1. January 2012 tsunami evacuation drill in King Salmon, Humboldt County (photograph by Rick 

Wilson, California Geological Survey). Tsunami evacuation drills, exercises, and workshops are vital to 

sustaining community-level tsunami preparedness.
3

Ongoing Activities

The State tsunami program has first sought to identify and characterize the tsunami 

hazard in California, and then integrate this knowledge into the state’s emergency management 

system and hazard mitigation efforts. The program promotes tsunami planning, preparedness,

and mitigation in California’s coastal communities, and applies the latest scientifically vetted 

information to improve emergency management through the following activities:

1. Tsunami scenario modeling;

2. Inundation zone maps/Evacuation zone mapping;

3. State/Local emergency response and evacuation planning;

4. Exercises and training;

5. Warning system testing; and,

6. NTHMP coordination and support.

The progress and completion of these activities have been implemented through several specific 

tasks. The following paragraphs summarize each of these tasks.

Development and completion of tsunami inundation maps for the entire California 

coast for the purposes of local tsunami evacuation planning.—Definition of the hazard zone 

is vital to guiding emergency response through the unknowns of any incoming tsunami. The state 

completed tsunami inundation modeling and 130 maps for all low-lying, populated sections of 

the California coast (Wilson and others, 2008; Barberopoulou and others, 2009). Maps noting 

zones of maximum tsunami inundation from a variety of local and distant tsunami sources were 

developed to assist coastal jurisdictions to: (1) identify areas likely to be inundated in a tsunami;

(2) facilitate the development of plans for evacuating vulnerable populations; and (3) place

tsunami-evacuation signs.

Collaboration and coordination to assure that all coastal operational areas have 

tsunami response plans and the capability to implement plans.—The state tsunami program 

works with communities on their response planning to Tsunami Alert messages (Warnings, 

Advisories, Watches, and Information Statements) issued by the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami 

Warning Center (WC/ATWC). This assistance is in accordance with plans and procedures 

developed in cooperation with the California State Warning Center and Cal OES Executive staff.

During events, especially prior to the arrival of a tsunami, the state program transfers information 

about expected arrival times and wave heights from the WC/ATWC to the communities, and 

provides feedback to the communities regarding evacuation. On an annual basis, the Cal OES

works with the NOAA Weather Forecast Office in Eureka and with the Redwood Coast Tsunami 

Work Group to conduct a multi-county test of the Emergency Alert System. This test is 

important to the region as it faces a significant local threat from the Cascadia subduction zone 

just offshore. Considerable planning goes into this “live-code” warning communications test, 

including gaining approval from the Federal Communications Commission and coordinating 

California Civil Air Patrol-supported activities. The program also provides assistance on the use 

of new rapid notification and situational awareness technologies for earthquake and tsunami 

emergencies.

Communication with local emergency managers and the public to maintain ongoing tsunami preparedness in coastal communities.—Cal OES convenes and chairs the 

California Tsunami Steering Committee, which includes representatives of all coastal counties, 
4

the National Weather Service, and several State agencies. The state program also supports

planning and technical assistance guidance to local government in the form of workshops, 

exercise facilitation, review of local tsunami response plans, and guidance in the use of tsunami 

inundation maps. As an example, the state tsunami program held more than 90 meetings, 

workshops, and community forums with local planning partners and the public from August 

2011 to August 2012. Sharing new ideas and obtaining feedback during these meetings are the 

keys to sustaining state-to-federal and state-to-local communication, and to improving 

preparedness and outreach. Sustained activities that work toward the overall goal of preparing 

government officials, first responders, emergency planners, and the public include development 

and dissemination of outreach materials (for example, brochures, pamphlets, DVDs), educational 

workshops, support of exercises and evacuation drills, participation in National Tsunami 

Preparedness Week, and support of regional work groups.

Collaboration between NOAA National Weather Service and the state tsunami 

program to assist jurisdictions in the planning, preparedness, and mitigation activities that 

qualify them for TsunamiReadyTM.—TsunamiReadyTM is a NOAA designation recognizing 

tsunami preparedness activities at a community level. To help these communities achieve 

TsunamiReadyTM status, the state tsunami program assists communities in the development of 

tsunami evacuation plans, the purchase of tsunami hazard signs, and the development of tsunami 

sign placement plans. California has 34 communities (counties, cities, and other entities) that 

have qualified for TsunamiReadyTM (National Weather Service, 2013), more than any other state 

in the nation.

Updates of the tsunami source and deposit databases produced by CGS.—The 

tsunami source database catalogs the input parameters applied to the tsunami model simulations 

for tsunami hazard map production. The tsunami deposit database has been completed for the 

northern region of the state, adjacent to the Cascadia subduction zone, and will be used to 

validate the probabilistic analysis needed to create land-use planning maps for tsunamis. These 

databases are being updated with the tsunami source and deposit information collected during the 

SAFRR project.

Representation of California in the NTHMP regional and national meetings that 

address budgeting, policy, and procedural issues.—Emergency management and science 

representatives from Cal OES and CGS, respectively, represent the state on the NTHMP 

Coordinating Committee and the three subcommittees that address national issues related to 

mapping and modeling, mitigation and education, and warning coordination. The participation of 

the state tsunami program in the NTHMP is important for coordinating effective and consistent

tsunami preparedness activities with partners in Federal agencies and other States. The NTHMP 

also provides Federal funding support for state tsunami programs to maintain and improve 

tsunami planning at a local level.

New Activities and Products

Although significant accomplishments have been achieved by the state tsunami program, 

the SAFRR scenario and the 2010 Chile and 2011 Tohoku tsunamis have helped identify areas 

where improvements in tsunami hazard analysis and emergency response planning are needed

(Lynett and others, 2012; Miller and others, 2012; Wilson and others, 2012a, 2012b). Post-event 

survey teams and questionnaires were used to gather information on both the physical effects and 

emergency response lessons (Wilson and others, 2012a). The 2010 tsunami caused 

approximately $3million in damage to 12 harbors in California, while the 2011 tsunami caused 
5

more than $100million in damage to 27 harbors (fig. 2). During both events, people on docks and 

near the ocean were at risk to injury; one fatality occurred during the 2011 tsunami at the mouth 

of the Klamath River. In addition, the significant sediment deposition and damage within 

Crescent City and Santa Cruz Harbors during the 2011 event caused long delays in recovery of 

those harbors because of regulatory and reconstruction issues (Wilson and others, 2012b).

Figure 2. Tsunami flow-regime map for Crescent City harbor (from Wilson and others, 2012a). Current 

directions and velocities and areas of sediment erosion and deposition are based on observations of 

the various (30) ground-level and aerial video, pre- and post-tsunami bathymetry, and sediment 

analyses.

The SAFRR project also provides a framework for evaluating the statewide impacts from 

a much larger, distant-source tsunami. The potential loss of life and projected billions of dollars 

in damage and recovery costs in the SAFRR scenario demonstrates the importance of sustained 

and improved tsunami preparedness and mitigation for the State of California (Porter and others, 

2013; Wein, 2013).

Based on the analysis of these recent events in Chile, Japan, and California, and the 

information provided by the SAFRR scenario, the state tsunami program is enhancing existing 

products and developing new products that will improve tsunami preparedness and mitigation

statewide. These products will help: (1) the maritime community better understand tsunami 

hazards within their ports and harbors, as well as if and where boats should go offshore to be 

safe; (2) emergency managers to develop evacuation plans for smaller ‘‘Warning’’ level events 

where extensive evacuation is not required; and (3) coastal land-use planners, engineers, and 

policymakers better understand the tsunami hazard from a probabilistic (risk-based) approach.
6

The ultimate goal of these improvements is to save lives and reduce immediate and long-term 

impact to coastal communities.

Maritime communities in California were impacted the most during the 2010 and 2011 

tsunamis, and could be impacted again, as demonstrated by the SAFRR tsunami scenario.

Although millions of dollars were lost during the 2010 and 2011 events, the eyewitness accounts 

and video information collected after each event provided a resource for improving tsunami 

hazard analysis in harbors and bays. Through a Co-operative Technical Partnership developed 

between the State and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), observed strong 

tsunami currents and damage are being used to validate/calibrate numerical tsunami model 

currents. Using validated modeling, the state tsunami program has initiated a plan to develop 

three sets of products for these maritime communities: (1) detailed maps identifying in-harbor 

tsunami hazards, such as strong currents and eddies, peak amplitude surges, and large tidal 

fluctuations (fig. 3); (2) offshore safety zones where ships can evacuate to and safely gather 

during a tsunami (fig. 4); and (3) preparedness, mitigation, and recovery/continuity plans to help 

maritime communities be more resilient to tsunami hazards. Harbor-specific guidance will be 

created to help maritime communities better prepare for, respond to, and recover from future 

tsunamis. Most of this mapping and guidance work with the maritime communities will be 

completed by the year 2015.

Figure 3. Map showing draft tsunami current velocity hazard zones using 2011 Tohoku event modeling in 

Crescent City (from Lynett and others, in press).The colors are water velocity groupings related to 

anticipated damage levels to harbor facilities and boats: 3–6 knots (blue) for minor damage; 6–9 knots 

(yellow) for moderate damage; and greater than 9 knots (red) for severe damage.
7

Figure 4. Draft map showing offshore bathymetric depths off the coast of San Diego Bay. Maps similar to 

this are used to help maritime communities plan for offshore evacuation of ships prior to a tsunami’s 

arrival. Additional modeling is being used to determine if ships can evacuate closer to shore than the 

NOAA-recommended 100-fathom (600-foot) depth.

The state program also has been involved in improving statewide and local emergency 

response planning activities. New information available from the 2011 Japan event, a recently 

created tsunami deposit database, and new paleotsunami and paleoseismic work being done in 

Oregon, is being evaluated to determine if the existing tsunami hazard analysis for the Cascadia 

subduction zone is adequate. California also has been in discussions with the State of Nevada to 

develop tsunami inundation maps for the Lake Tahoe region so that evacuation planning and 

tsunami sign placement can be done in an accurate and consistent manner. Real-time and posttsunami field teams also have been expanded to capture additional detailed information that can 

be shared in a timely manner during and after an event through a state-wide clearinghouse. These 

new products and related efforts will result in more accurate and efficient emergency response by 

coastal communities, potentially reducing the loss of lives and property during future tsunamis.

Recent moderate to minor tsunami events have challenged existing evacuation protocols. 

During the 2011 tsunami in California, the arrival of significant tsunami activity, which was only 

forecasted to be between 1 and 2.5m for areas within a “Warning” along the coast, coincided 

with low tide conditions and, therefore, was not expected to inundate dry land. Considerable 

inconsistencies between communities conducting evacuation and response were noted. Only a 

few communities in the state called full evacuations and, in most cases, no evacuations were 

initiated. Many emergency managers indicated that secondary evacuation lines for smaller 

Warning-level events would have been useful, reducing the potential for under- or overevacuation, and alleviating the need for an “all or nothing” decision. As a result, scenariospecific, tsunami evacuation “playbook” maps and guidance recommendations are being 

produced detailing inundation from tsunamis of various sizes and source locations (fig. 5).
8

Figure 5. Draft playbook tsunami evacuation for the Imperial Beach area. The lines represent secondary 

evacuation zones based on various land elevations that can be used by communities for less-thanmaximum tsunami events.

In addition, a formula that incorporates forecasted tsunami amplitudes (wave heights),

tidal conditions, storm activity, and site-specific tsunami run-up potential into a “maximum 

predicted tsunami run-up height” is being developed to determine which evacuation scenario is 

most appropriate and conservative to use. These products, expected to be available by the end of 

2013, will help coastal emergency managers prepare local response plans when minor distantsource tsunamis, or larger tsunamis from local and regional sources are generated.

Along with improvements to evacuation planning and maritime planning, the state 

tsunami program has made progress towards the development of products for the coastal landuse planning, engineering, and policymaking communities. Because the existing state-wide 

tsunami inundation maps are based on maximum inundating maps, and not a time- or risk-based 

approach, they should not be used for making land-use planning decisions. As with other flood

and seismic hazards, a probabilistic tsunami hazard analysis (PTHA) should be completed and 

utilized. Maps and associated products based on PTHA methods will be similar to other 

probabilistic flood- and seismic-hazard maps by representing standard risk levels (average return 

periods) for tsunami hazards that can be used in not only land-use planning, but possibly also in 

implementing building design criteria, producing more consistent inundation maps for 

evacuation planning, and setting flood insurance rates. The initial phase of PTHA and land-use 

planning product development, which has been funded by the NTHMP, includes: (1) 

development of a technical work group to evaluate existing PTHA methods; (2) determination of 

the adequacy of the PTHA methods for land-use planning and other uses; (3) acceptance and 
9

improvements made to the PTHA methods; (4) determination of the appropriate risk levels for 

PTHA-based map production; and (5) initiation of development of PTHA-based maps for the 

California coast. The process and products of this PTHA in California also will form the basis 

for the NTHMP to implement nationwide. With this initial work being completed by autumn

2013, the state tsunami program is collaborating with other entities interested in developing 

PTHA maps for the entire State.

In addition to working on the SAFRR project, the state tsunami program also has 

partnered with the USGS to improve tsunami planning and preparedness in California in other 

ways. The USGS completed a vulnerability analysis based on the existing state tsunami 

inundation maps. The study, titled “Community Exposure to Tsunami Hazards in California,”

(Wood and others, 2013), provides first responders, emergency planners, and other stakeholders, 

with valuable new information about the people who live in, work in, and visit each of the 20 

counties and the more than 150 incorporated and unincorporated communities located along the 

state’s coast. The state program will work with the report authors to provide individual 

information sheets to each community for incorporation into their local hazard mitigation plans.

In order to help guide, develop, and improve future tsunami preparedness and mitigation 

activities, the state tsunami program formed the California Tsunami Policy Work Group

(CTPWG) in 2011 (Johnson and Real, 2013). Comprised of members from Federal, State, and 

local agencies, as well as private organizations, the CTPWG works closely with the state tsunami 

program to understand the state of tsunami preparedness in California. The CTPWG was formed 

to help identify gaps and issues in current tsunami hazard mitigation, to make recommendations 

that will work to eliminate these impediments, and to advise on the development and 

implementation of effective tsunami hazard products to improve community resiliency. This 

report should be available by autumn 2013.

Conclusions

The California Tsunami Preparedness and Hazard Mitigation Program will continue to 

provide support to communities at risk of tsunami hazards. Evaluations of recent tsunamis have 

resulted in the development of new products to help evacuation planning, maritime planning, and 

land-use planning. “Playbooks” for less-than-maximum tsunami events will allow communities 

to more accurately identify and plan for the areas to evacuate in minor to moderate tsunamis.

Tsunami-current hazard maps within harbors and offshore safety zones will provide maritime 

communities a foundation for developing and improving emergency response plans. New 

tsunami maps developed using probabilistic-based methods will assist in community land-use 

planning and site evaluations.

The state program also has benefitted from detailed knowledge developed through the 

range of multi-disciplinary expertise brought to bear by the U.S. Geological Survey to analyze 

the Science Application for Risk Reduction (SAFRR) tsunami scenario. The SAFRR project 

provides the framework for evaluating the statewide impacts from a single, large, distant-source 

tsunami. The potential loss of life, and projected billions of dollars in damage and recovery costs 

that this scenario estimates, underscores the importance of sustained investment in tsunami 

preparedness and mitigation for the State of California. Recommendations within this SAFRR 

report will be carried forward through sustained activities mentioned above to continue to 

prepare state emergency managers, scientists, the maritime and coastal land-use policy 

communities, and the public for the next tsunami.
10

References Cited

Barberopoulou, A., Borrero, J.C., Uslu, B., Kalligeris, N., Goltz, J.D., Wilson, R.I., and 

Synolakis, C.E., 2009, Unprecedented coverage of the Californian coast promises improved 

tsunami response: Eos, American Geophysical Union Transactions, v. 90, no. 16, p. 137–138.

Johnson, L.A., and Real, C.D., 2013, Public-policy issues associated with the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013-1170-M, 44 p.

Lynett, P., Borrero, J., Weiss, R., Son, S., Greer, D., and Renteria, W., 2012, Observations and 

modeling of tsunami-induced currents in ports and harbors: Earth and Planetary Science 

Letters, v. 327–328, p. 68–74.

Lynett, P.J., Borrero, J.C., and Song, S., in press, Numerical simulations of tsunami-induced 

maritime hazards in Crescent City, California: University of Southern California Viterbi, 

School of Engineering, report for State of California, 52 p.

Miller, K.M., and Wilson, R.I., 2012, A culture of tsunami preparedness and applying emergency 

response lessons from recent tsunamis affecting California: San Francisco, American 

Geophysical Union Fall meeting poster.

National Weather Service, 2013, TsunamiReadyTM website: National Weather Service, 

http://www.tsunamiready.noaa.gov/ts-communities.htm.

Porter, K., Byers, W., Dykstra, D., Lim, A., Lynett, P., Ratliff, J., Scawthorn, C., Wein, A., and 

Wilson, R., 2013, Physical damage in the SAFRR California tsunami scenario: U.S. 

Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170–E, 183 p.,

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/e/.

Wein, A., Rose, A., Sue Wing, I., Wei, D., 2013, Economic impacts of the SAFRR tsunami 

scenario in California: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170–H, 56 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/h/.

Wilson, R.I., Barberopoulou, A., Miller, K.M., Goltz, J.D., and Synolakis, C.E., 2008, New 

maximum tsunami inundation maps for use by local emergency planners in the state of 

California, USA [abs]: Eos, American Geophysical Union Transactions, v. 89, no. 53, Fall 

meeting supplement, abs. OS43D-1343.

Wilson, R.I., Admire, A.R., Borrero, J.C., Dengler, L.A., Legg, M.R., Lynett, P., Miller, K.M., 

Ritchie, A., Sterling, K., McCrink, T.P., and Whitmore, P.M., 2012a, Observations and 

impacts from the 2010 Chilean and 2011 Japanese tsunami in California (USA): Pure and 

Applied Geophysics, accessed August 23, 2013, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00024-012-

0527-z.

Wilson, R., Davenport, C., and Jaffe, B., 2012b, Sediment scour and deposition within harbors in 

California (USA), caused by the March 11, 2011 Tohoku-oki Tsunami: Sedimentary Geology, 

v. 282, p. 228–240, doi:10.1016/j.sedgeo.2012.06.001.

Wood, N., Ratliff, J., and Peters, J., 2013, Community exposure to tsunami hazards in California: 

U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2012–5222, 49 p.
U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Geological Survey

Open-File Report 2013–1170–M

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

Public Policy Issues Associated with the SAFRR Tsunami 

Scenario
COVER—Public policy for the tsunami risk management is an amalgamation of national, State, and local 

government laws, programs, and plans. Photos clockwise from top: California State Capital Building 

(photo: California Geological Survey); Santa Cruz, California, harbor (photo: santacruzharbor.org); 

shoreline, San Clemente, California (photo: California State Parks); festival at Ventura Harbor (photo: 

venturaharborvillage.com); tsunami information sign, Tsunami Ready Program, National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); logo, California Governor's Office of Emergency Services; logo, 

California Geological Survey; logo, National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program; sign, tsunami hazard 

zone, NOAA.
The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) Tsunami Scenario

Stephanie Ross and Lucile Jones, Editors 

Public-Policy Issues Associated with the SAFRR 

Tsunami Scenario

By Laurie A. Johnson and Charles R. Real 

Open-File Report 2013–1170–M 

California Geological Survey Special Report 229

U.S. Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey 
iii

U.S. Department of the Interior

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary

U.S. Geological Survey

Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director

U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2013

For product and ordering information:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov/pubprod

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth,

its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment:

World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov

Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS

Suggested citation: 

Johnson, L.A., and Real, C.R., 2013, Public-policy issues associated with the SAFRR tsunami scenario, 

chap. M, in Ross, S.L., and Jones, L.M., eds., The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) 

Tsunami Scenario: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 2013–1170, 39 p., 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1170/m/.

Any use of trade, product, or firm names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply 

endorsement by the U.S. Government.

Although this information product, for the most part, is in the public domain, it also may contain 

copyrighted materials as noted in the text. Permission to reproduce copyrighted items must be secured 

from the copyright owner.
iv

 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

GOVERNOR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY

JOHN LAIRD 

SECRETARY FOR RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION

MARK NECHODOM 

DIRECTOR

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 

JOHN G. PARRISH, Ph.D. 

STATE GEOLOGIST
v 

Contents 

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1

Policymaking Overview .................................................................................................................................................... 1

U.S. and California Tsunami and Disaster Management Policy Framework ................................................................... 2

Overarching Policy Consideration ................................................................................................................................. 11

Priority Policy Issues: Mitigation and Preparedness ...................................................................................................... 12

Need for a Robust Policy Framework for Tsunami Hazard Assessment and Mitigation Planning ............................. 12

The Tsunami Scenario Would Have Severe Impacts ................................................................................................ 19

Priority Policy Issues: Response ................................................................................................................................... 20

Onshore/Offshore Evacuations and Emergency Response Will Be Challenged by Existing 

Warning/Evacuation Protocols and Disruptions To Communications ........................................................................ 21

Lack of Experience in Dealing With the Complexity of a Major Tsunami Evacuation, Sheltering, and 

Extended Security of Evacuated Areas ..................................................................................................................... 22

Response Effectiveness Will Depend on Cooperation and Coordination at All Levels of Government ..................... 25

Priority Policy Issues: Recovery .................................................................................................................................... 27

Unprecedented Recovery Challenges for Hardest Hit Coastal Communities, Ports and Harbors, and 

Fishing and Agriculture Sectors ................................................................................................................................. 27

Challenges in Rebuilding More Resiliently For a Historically Infrequent Hazard, Like Tsunami ................................ 31

Priority Policy Issues: Risk Awareness .......................................................................................................................... 31

Building the Awareness of At-Risk Communities to Tsunami and Their Potential Damaging and Fatal 

Effects ........................................................................................................................................................................ 32

Building Constituencies that can Carry a Common Message Forward Over Time is a Key Policy 

Challenge ................................................................................................................................................................... 33

Strengthening Tsunami Risk Awareness Among Key Professionals is Also a Key Policy Issue ............................... 33

Possible Courses of Action ............................................................................................................................................ 34

Ensure Continued Funding and Support for the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, 

TsunamiReady and Affiliated State and Local Programs .......................................................................................... 34

Recruit and Assist All California Coastal Communities and Ports and Harbors to Become TsunamiReady ............. 34

Develop a Coordinated and Sufficiently Robust Policy Framework for Tsunami Hazard Assessment and 

Mitigation Planning for California Coastal Communities and Ports and Harbors ....................................................... 34

Explore Opportunities to Advance Multi-Hazard Mitigation Planning Along California’s Coast and Bays ................. 35

Encourage Responders and Government Managers to Conduct Self-Assessments, Devise Exercises, 

and More Carefully Consider the Geographic Scale of This and Other Tsunami Scenarios ..................................... 35

Work to Address Recovery Challenges ..................................................................................................................... 36

Develop and Consistently Communicate Common Messages About Tsunami Risk ................................................. 36

References Cited ........................................................................................................................................................... 36

Tables

1. Generalized framework for U.S. tsunami disaster policy. .............................................................................. 8

2. Status of tsunami hazard assessment and mitigation planning in California coastal counties and ................ 

 incorporated cities. ....................................................................................................................................... 15

3. Status of tsunami hazard assessment and mitigation planning for California’s major ports and .................... 

harbors. ........................................................................................................................................................ 16
Public-Policy Issues Associated with the SAFRR Tsunami 

Scenario

By Laurie A. Johnson1 and Charles R. Real2

Introduction

The SAFRR (Science Application for Risk Reduction) tsunami scenario simulates a tsunami 

generated by a hypothetical magnitude 9.1 earthquake that occurs offshore of the Alaska Peninsula 

(Kirby and others, 2013). In addition to the work performed by the authors on public-policy issues 

associated with the SAFRR tsunami scenario, this section of the scenario also reflects the policy 

discussions of the State of California’s Tsunami Policy Work Group, a voluntary advisory body formed 

in October 2011, which operates under the California Natural Resources Agency (CNRA), Department 

of Conservation, and is charged with identifying, evaluating, and making recommendations to resolve 

issues that are preventing full and effective implementation of tsunami hazard mitigation and risk 

reduction throughout California’s coastal communities. It also presents the analyses of plans and hazard 

policies of California’s coastal counties, incorporated cities, and major ports performed by the staff of 

the California Geological Survey (CGS) and Lauren Prehoda, Office of Environmental and Government 

Affairs, California Department of Conservation. It also draws on the policy framework and assessment 

prepared for the ARkStorm Pacific Coast winter storm and catastrophic flooding (Topping and others, 

2010). This chapter was peer-reviewed by Robert Olson, Robert Olson and Associates, and Martin 

Eskijian, consulting engineer. 

Policymaking Overview

In the United States, public policymaking is the responsibility of elected bodies, such as city 

councils, State legislatures, and the U.S. Congress. Managers of cities, counties, and special districts, as 

well as regional, State and Federal agencies also participate in policymaking, helping conceptualize and 

create policies. The policymaking process tends to evolve in response to societal or community 

problems perceived by citizens, interest groups, and political leaders. A rational description of the 

policymaking process can be described as a cycle (Newell, 2004, p. 153) of: 

· Agenda setting, when issues are brought to the attention of policymakers. 

· Policy formulation, when options are considered and a course of action is adopted. 

· Implementation, when adopted policies are put into action. 

· Evaluation, when a policy assessment is performed and ways to modify or improve policies are 

provided. 

 

1 Laurie Johnson Consulting Research.

2

California Geological Survey.
2 

Within this cycle, this tsunami policy assessment largely corresponds with the agenda and policy 

formulation stages. However, as Birkland (1997) and others have aptly documented, policy agenda 

setting and policy transformations rarely occur in such a rational, staged way. For U.S. disaster policy, 

much of the formulation and implementation have occurred mostly during relatively brief periods of 

time—usually following disastrous events (Birkland, 1997; Birkland, 2006; Rubin, 2012). As Birkland 

advises, “a disaster can often do in an instant what years of interest group activity, policy 

entrepreneurship, advocacy, lobbying, and research may not be able to do” (Birkland, 2006, p. 5). This 

is what occurred in aftermath of the catastrophic 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when Congress passed the 

Tsunami Warning and Education Act of 2006—a key piece of Federal legislation aimed at strengthening 

the tsunami detection, warning, education, and preparedness efforts in the U.S. (U.S. Congress, 2005; 

U.S. Congress, 2006). 

This policy assessment considers the priority issues raised by the SAFRR tsunami scenario, with 

particular emphasis on the modeled physical, social, and economic impacts on California’s coastal 

communities, ports, and harbors. Issues of tsunami science, modeling techniques, and national tsunami 

forecasting are not major components of this assessment. The priority policy issues are organized 

around the basic functions of disaster management—mitigation and preparedness, response, and 

recovery—as well as risk awareness, which is a major behavioral factor in disaster management. In 

addition, this assessment also identifies overarching policy considerations and possible courses of 

action. 

U.S. and California Tsunami and Disaster Management Policy Framework

In the United States, most governance and policymaking works as a shared system in which, 

according to May and Williams (1986, p. 21), “common or overlapping responsibilities are apportioned 

among layers of government.” “Federal shared governance creates an intergovernmental partnership for 

which noteworthy decision-making power about program or regulatory design and/or operations is 

exercised by both those in the Federal Government and those in subnational governments” (May and 

Williams 1986, p. 21). In the modern U.S. disaster management system, local governments, special 

districts, and tribal governments have primary responsibility for supplying disaster-related resources; 

regional, State, and Federal agencies are to provide support as requested (Federal Emergency 

Management Agency [FEMA], 2005). This shared system is triggered from the “bottom-up.” Local 

governments are aided as needed by States, and both are aided, in turn, by the Federal Government. By 

design, the system requires extensive coordination and cooperation among all levels of government, as 

well as the many private organizations involved in disaster management. It is also a system of 

incentives, in that States and localities are encouraged, but not required, to participate. 

Table 1 generalizes the current disaster policy framework in the United States for the basic 

disaster management functions, combining preparedness and mitigation, and adding risk awareness, 

with an emphasis on tsunami-related policy. The fundamental roles and responsibilities of each level of 

public policymaking—Federal, State, regional, county, and localities, as well as the private sector, are 

briefly described. 

The Federal Government is primarily responsible for the Nation’s tsunami alert and warning 

system, providing response and recovery assistance following major disasters, promoting risk awareness 

and preparedness, and encouraging State, local, and private mitigation and preparedness efforts, in some 

cases through the use of incentives. Major Federal legislation and programs include the following: 

· Tsunami Warning and Education Act of 2006 designates the National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) through the National Weather Service (NWS) to provide continued 
3 

tsunami alert and notification responsibilities for a tsunami, generated anywhere in the world, that 

may impact U.S. States and territories. For the West Coast, including California, these alerts are 

issued by NOAA’s West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WCATWC). The WCATWC 

has most of North America under its area of responsibility, whereas NOAA’s Pacific Tsunami 

Warning Center (PTWC) provides alerts to the remainder of the Pacific Basin. 

· National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP). The NTHMP was first formed by 

Congressional action in 1995 and strengthened by the Tsunami Warning and Education Act of 2006. 

The NTHMP is a partnership between NOAA, the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the 

28 U.S. coastal States, territories, and commonwealths. It is focused on reducing the impact of 

tsunamis through hazard assessment, warning guidance, and mitigation (NOAA, 2013a). It also sets 

the standards for tsunami source identification, numerical modeling, and inundation and hazard 

mapping.

· TsunamiReady Program is led by the NWS at NOAA, and is part of the NTHMP. It is designed to 

help cities, towns, counties, universities, and other large sites in coastal areas reduce the potential for 

disastrous tsunami-related consequences (NOAA, 2013b). To be designated “TsunamiReady,” a 

community must meet certain criteria for (1) communications and coordination, (2) receipt of 

tsunami warnings, (3) local warning dissemination, (4) preparedness, and (5) administration of a 

formal tsunami hazard operations plan. As of May 22, 2013, there were 144 TsunamiReadyTM sites 

in 11 States, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and one 

international site (NOAA, 2013b). Thirty-five of those sites are located in California, 21 of which 

are localities, seven are counties, three are government sites, two are Indian tribes, one is the 

University of California at Santa Barbara, and one is San Francisco airport. None of California’s 

ports have been designated TsunamiReady, but some, such as the Port of Los Angeles, are located in 

cities or counties that have achieved this status.

· National Response Framework (NRF) is a guide to how the Nation responds to all types of disasters 

and emergencies (FEMA, 2013). It is built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in 

the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to align key roles and responsibilities across the 

country. The NRF describes specific authorities and best practices for managing response that 

include actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, stabilize communities, and meet 

basic human needs following an incident, as well as the execution of emergency plans and actions to 

support short-term recovery. Under the NRF, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal 

Federal official for domestic incident management and FEMA leads Federal response to incidents in 

which Federal assistance is provided under the Stafford Act. 

· Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) provides for 

individual and household post-disaster assistance, Public Assistance grants to restore damaged 

public facilities and infrastructure, and mitigation grants that fund both local hazard mitigation 

planning and projects to help strengthen communities against future disaster losses (FEMA, 2007). 

Interacting with Stafford Act programs are the National Incident Management System (NIMS), 

which provides a standardized nationwide protocol for managing response at each level of 

government, and the NRF (FEMA, 2008) and the National Disaster Recovery Framework (FEMA 

2011), which coordinate disaster response and recovery activities among Federal agencies. 

· National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) is a guide that enables effective recovery support 

to disaster-impacted States, tribes, and territorial and local jurisdictions (FEMA, 2011). It also 

defines a coordinating structure that can be activated and scaled as appropriate depending on the size 

and nature of the disaster and defines some key positions—Federal, State, and Tribal Disaster 
4 

Recovery Coordinators (FDRC, SDRC, and TDRC) and Local Disaster Recovery Managers 

(LDRMs)—as well as six recovery support functions (RSF)—community planning and capacity 

building, economic, health and social services, housing, infrastructure systems, and cultural and 

natural resources. FEMA is designated as the lead Federal agency to facilitate and coordinate RSF 

activities and recovery planning at the national level, and a series of RSF annexes further define the 

scope of each RSF and designate a Federal agency as the RSF coordinator along with a number of 

primary agencies and supporting organizations. The NDRF timeframe can extend for months, even 

years, following a major disaster. 

· U. S. Coast Guard has incident response responsibility for the coastal zone, which includes all U.S. 

waters subject to tides, as well as specified ports and harbors. In tsunami response, the U.S. Coast 

Guard would provide mutual aid to the ports and affected jurisdictions statewide to support search 

and rescue operations, launch air support according to policy, notify commercial vessels and 

applicable facilities of a tsunami warning, close ports to all inbound vessel traffic and encourage 

vessels to move to a safe location, and conduct patrols of waterways within the affected zone to 

ensure maritime security. 

· Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) requires State and local adoption of FEMA-approved 

Hazard Mitigation Plans (HMP) as a precondition for receipt of Federal mitigation project grant 

funding. It also provides a competitive Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant program to fund local 

hazard mitigation planning efforts and mitigation projects. Local HMPs typically contain maps 

showing areas of potential natural hazards, as well as a discussion of historic occurrences, an 

assessment of exposure and risk to infrastructure, proposed policies to mitigate the impact of future 

occurrences, and an Action Plan that must indicate priorities for mitigation activities that become 

formally adopted by the local governing body. Mitigation actions are commonly evaluated and 

prioritized using a tool from FEMA that evaluates strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 

constraints of proposed actions through a series of questions considering the following aspects: (1) 

social (community acceptance and effect of differing segments of population), (2) technical 

(feasibility, long-term solution, secondary impacts), (3) administrative (staffing requirements, 

funding needs, necessary maintenance and operations), (4) political (necessary support, local 

champion, public support), (5) legal (State authority, existing local authority, potential for legal 

challenge), and (6) economic (expected benefit, cost of implementation, contribution to economic 

goals, outside funding needs). 

· National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) provides flood insurance through the private sector, with 

backing by the Federal Government. Insurance is also reinforced by 100-year and 500-year 

floodplain mapping, together with rate reductions in relation to local government mitigation actions. 

Various types of flood mitigation and project grants are also administered. Tsunami losses are 

covered under the NFIP. However, the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) do not, as of yet, model 

tsunami risk as part of coastal flood mapping. The program requires communities to adhere to strict 

flood-resistant building codes in designated flood zones to qualify for the program. For coastal 

communities, such standards recognize hazards of coastal storm surge and hurricane-driven flood 

waters and provide specifications for building materials, design, and construction, which also help to 

provide resistance against low amplitude tsunami inundation. The NFIP represents the national 

position on “shared-risk.” The Federal Government will help, but it aims to encourage local 

governments and individuals to share flood risk. 

· Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 is administered by NOAA's Office of Ocean and Coastal 

Resource Management (OCRM) which works with States and territories to operate a system of 

National Estuarine Research Reserves, implement the National Coastal Zone Management (NCZM) 
5 

Program, and develop a system of marine protected areas. The NCZM program is a voluntary StateFederal partnership which encourages States to adopt their own management programs to meet the 

Federal goals of protection, restoration, and appropriate development of coastal zone resources. The 

OCRM has a modest annual budget that it primarily uses to match State funds for implementing 

resource improvements, enhancements, and pollution control in the designated coastal zone and 

national estuarine research reserves. The State of California is a participant in the NCZM Program 

and the California Coastal Commission and Bay Conservation and Development Commission are 

two designated State agencies responsible for developing and implementing the State’s Coastal Zone 

Management Plan (CZMP). 

The State of California participates in the national tsunami preparedness and risk awareness 

programs and also provides response and recovery assistance following major disasters, and encourages 

local and private mitigation and preparedness efforts, in some cases through the use of incentives. Major 

State legislation and programs include the following: 

· California Tsunami Preparedness and Hazard Mitigation Program (TPHMP). The program is 

funded by NOAA under the NTHMP and managed by the California Governor’s Office of 

Emergency Services (Cal OES) with assistance from the California Geological Survey (CGS). It 

provides leadership and guidance, as well as financial support, for many tsunami preparedness, 

planning and hazard mitigation activities in the State. These include tsunami scenario modeling, 

preparation of tsunami inundation zone maps and evacuation zone maps, development and 

implementation of State and local emergency response and evacuation plans, tsunami-related 

exercises and training, and testing of the tsunami warning system. In 2009, the State TPHMP 

released a series of “Tsunami Inundation Maps for Emergency Planning,” which have provided the 

basis for preparedness, planning, and education activities in California. These activities have 

including the preparation of evacuation and emergency response plans, production of multilanguage 

brochures, development and support of tsunami scenario-driven exercises and drills, development of 

workshops to educate both emergency managers and public, and establishment of a comprehensive 

information Web site (see http://www.tsunami.ca.gov), a preparedness Web site (see 

http://myhazards.calema.ca.gov/), and a Web service to assist in preparation of local hazard 

mitigation plans (see http://myplan.calema.ca.gov/). Activities are coordinated through the 

California Tsunami Steering Committee, comprised of representatives from the four regional NWS

offices, all relevant State agencies, and each of the 20 coastal and San Francisco Bay area counties. 

· California Coastal Act of 1976, established the California Coastal Commission (CCC) as an 

independent, quasi-judicial State agency to protect, conserve, restore, and enhance environmental 

and human-based resources of the California coast and ocean for use by current and future 

generations. The CCC, in partnership with the State’s 60 coastal cities and 15 coastal counties, 

regulates the use of land and water in the coastal zone—an area specifically mapped by the 

California Legislature that varies in width from several hundred feet in highly urbanized areas to as 

much as 5 miles in certain rural areas and extends offshore in a 3-mile-wide band. The act requires 

all local governments within the coastal zone to develop local coastal plans (LCPs) that are then 

reviewed and certified by the CCC. Although the LCPs are primarily focused on environmental 

protection and public coastal access issues, these plans must also consider public safety issues. It is 

at this time that the CCC transfers permitting authority for most new development to the local 

government. The CCC retains appellate authority over development within 300 feet of the high tide 

line or the first public road, whichever is landward. About 90 percent of the State's coastal zone falls 

into an LCP. Development activities are broadly defined by the California Coastal Act to include 
6 

(among others): construction of buildings, divisions of land, and activities that change the intensity 

of use of land or public access to coastal waters. These activities generally require a coastal permit 

from either the CCC or the local government. The Coastal Commission is one of California's two 

designated coastal-management agencies for the purpose of administering the Federal Coastal Zone 

Management Act. Following the 2011 Tohoku Oki tsunami in Japan, the California Coastal 

Commission added a requirement for the assessment of tsunami hazards for proposed development 

located in designated Coastal Zone and for recertification of LCPs. Most coastal counties and cities 

have not yet completed their LCP plan updates and the CCC’s recertification process. 

· California State Lands Commission, established in 1938, has jurisdiction over State lands, 

waterways, and resources. Public and private entities may apply to the commission for leases or 

permits to use, or conduct activities on, State lands for many purposes including marinas, industrial 

wharves, tanker anchorages, dredging, mining, and oil and gas (California State Lands Commission, 

2013). For example, owners and developers of marinas along the State's bays are required to acquire 

a lease for use of the State's land at the marina site. The State Lands Commission also issues 

dredging permits to both public and private parties for work in harbors and waterways. After the 

1994 Northridge earthquake, the State Lands Commission was funded through FEMA’s Hazard 

Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) to develop standards for marine oil terminals. In 2005, the 

Marine Oil Terminal Engineering and Maintenance Standards (MOTEMS) became an enforceable 

chapter in the California Building Code (chapter 31F), and more than 30 marine oil terminals along 

California’s coast were mandated to comply with a comprehensive inspection program, along with 

updated requirements for mooring, berthing, seismic vulnerability and other mechanical systems. 

Mooring and berthing requirements have since been updated to consider the largest vessels calling at 

a terminal. Also, each marine oil terminal is now required to have a “tsunami plan,” for shutting 

down operations, vacating the terminal, and doing whatever else is deemed necessary. Sea-level rise 

is also required to be considered under the standards. 

· Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC), established by the McAteer-Petris Act of 

1965, is the Federally designated State coastal-management agency for the San Francisco Bay 

segment of the California coastal zone. This designation empowers the commission to use the 

authority of the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act to ensure that Federal projects and activities 

are consistent with the policies of the San Francisco Bay Plan and State law. It is the only regional 

agency with any direct authority to regulate land use. BCDC issues permits for filling, dredging, and 

changes in use in San Francisco Bay, including salt ponds, managed wetlands, and the shoreline. 

BCDC makes these permitting decisions in concert with the policies in its long-term guidance 

document, the San Francisco Bay Plan, which, among other things, specifies which areas along the 

shoreline should be used for ports, recreation, wildlife refuges, and other purposes. BCDC’s 

shoreline jurisdiction to regulate development only extends to 100 feet upland from the Bay. Local 

governments in the San Francisco Bay area have the most comprehensive authority over land use. 

· State Seismic Hazard Mapping Act of 1990 provides for a statewide seismic hazard mapping and 

technical advisory program to assist cities and counties in fulfilling their responsibilities to protect 

public health and safety by reducing and mitigating the effects of strong ground shaking, 

liquefaction, landslides, or other ground failure and other seismic hazards caused by earthquakes. 

The State Geologist, and thus the California Geological Survey, is charged with preparing the 

statewide maps and managing the technical advisory program. The act also directs cities and 

counties to take the seismic hazard map information into account in the preparation of the safety 

element of their general plans and in formulating land-use management policies and regulations. The 

act also requires the disclosure of State-specified natural hazards to prospective buyers of residential 
7 

property at the time of sale. The act also explicitly states that the State Geologist may also map the 

potential effects of tsunami and seiche when information becomes available from other sources and 

the State Geologist determines the information is appropriate for use by local government. 

· Safety element in local General Plans. All counties and incorporated cities in California are required 

to prepare safety elements to be included in local General Plans (California Government Code 

Section 65302, subdivision (g)) and are subject to the requirement for consistency with the general 

plan of zoning, subdivision, and capital improvements decisions. The safety element must include 

mapping of known seismic and other geologic hazards, as well as flood hazard zones. It also must 

address evacuation routes, military installations, peak-load water supply requirements, and 

minimum road widths and clearances around structures, as those items relate to identified fire and 

geologic hazards. Cities and counties may adopt their local hazard mitigation plan (LHMP) as a part 

of the safety element of their general plans. 

· California Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990, led to the establishment of the Office of 

Oil Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) in the California Department of Fish and Wildlife 

(CDFW) with primary authority to direct prevention, removal, abatement, response, containment, 

clean up, and mitigation of oil spills in the marine waters of California. The act created harbor safety 

committees for the harbors and adjacent regions of San Diego Bay; Los Angeles/Long Beach 

Harbor; Port Hueneme; San Francisco, San Pablo, and Suisun Bays; and Humboldt Bay. Committee 

membership is prescribed in the act and draws from the range of stakeholders—both public and 

private—involved with ports and harbors. Each harbor safety committee is required to plan “for the 

safe navigation and operation of vessels within its geographic region of responsibility . . . (by 

preparing a) . . . harbor safety plan which encompasses all vessel traffic within its region and 

addresses the region’s unique safety needs” (State of California, 2005). Plans are required to address 

regional harbor conditions and include “existing and expected conditions of weather, tidal ranges, 

tidal currents (directions and velocities), and other factors which might impair or restrict visibility or 

impact vessel navigation” (State of California, 2005). The act also gave the State Lands Commission 

authorities over marine terminals. 

· California Building Standards Code is published in its entirety every 3 years by order of the 

California legislature, with supplements published in intervening years. The current code adopted in 

2010 (California Code of Regulations, title 24, volume 1 of part 2) is derived in large part from the 

2009 International Building Code (California Building Standards Commission, 2010). The 

California legislature also delegates authority to various State agencies, boards, commissions and 

departments to create building regulations to implement the State's statutes. These building 

regulations or standards have the force of law and take effect 180 days after their publication unless 

otherwise stipulated. A city, county, or city and county may establish more restrictive building 

standards reasonably necessary because of local climatic, geological, or topographical conditions. 

Findings of the local condition(s) and the adopted local building standard(s) must be filed with the 

California Building Standards Commission to become effective and may not be effective sooner 

than the effective date of the latest edition of California Building Standards Code. 

In addition to these key policies programs, State and local emergency planning is guided by the 

Incident Command System (ICS)/Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) to coordinate 

response and recovery activities statewide. Counties serve as operational areas under the State’s 

emergency response framework.
8 

Table 1. Generalized framework for U.S. tsunami disaster policy. 

[Adapted from Topping and others, 2010]

Mitigation and Preparedness Response Recovery Risk Awareness

Federal Implement National Tsunami 

Hazard Mitigation Program 

(NTHMP) working with Statelocal agencies to improve 

tsunami detection, warning, 

preparedness and response, and 

including management of the 

TsunamiReady program. 

Manage Tsunami Warning 

Centers and Deep-Ocean 

Assessment and Report of 

Tsunamis (DART) sensor 

network. 

Require State-local adoption of 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA)-approved 

hazard mitigation plans for 

mitigation grant eligibility. 

Provide State-local pre- and 

post-disaster mitigation project 

grants. 

Provide Federally backed private 

flood insurance, 100- and 500-

year floodplain maps, rate 

reductions linked to adoption of 

flood provisions in building 

codes other mitigation actions, 

and mitigation grants. 

Make building-site mitigation 

improvements reducing risks to 

Federal infrastructure. 

Activate the national tsunami 

alert and warning system and 

dissemination protocols. 

Implement National Response 

Framework (NRF) and National 

Incident Management Systems 

(NIMS). 

Determine if a Presidential 

disaster declaration is warranted

U.S. Coast Guard implements 

tsunami protocol of Planned 

Response overseeing port and 

harbor evacuation and maritime 

movements. 

Provide mutual aid and State and 

local assistance as requested

Provide training and technical 

support for preparedness and 

response, including local 

response planning through the 

Tsunami Ready program. 

Establish and support 

communication and information 

mechanisms. 

Provide State and local assistance 

to State and local governments, 

Indian tribes or authorized tribal 

organizations, and certain 

specified private nonprofit 

organizations for eligible 

emergency work and the repair, 

restoration, and replacement of 

damaged public facilities and 

infrastructure. 

Provide grant and loan assistance 

to individuals, families, and 

businesses for damages and 

economic losses. 

Provide limited resources for 

long-term recovery planning. 

Fund post-disaster mitigation to 

reduce future losses. 

Provide residential and 

commercial resources for 

recovery via the National Flood 

Insurance Program (NFIP). 

Create and administer public 

education programs to promote 

risk awareness that work at a 

national level, and also fund 

State, regional, and locally 

specific efforts. Example: 

National Tsunami Preparedness 

Week. 

Provide limited funding for 

research and outreach on risk 

communication. 
9 

Table 1. Generalized framework for U.S. tsunami disaster policy.—Continued

[Adapted from Topping and others, 2010]

Mitigation and Preparedness Response Recovery Risk Awareness

State Implement State Tsunami 

Hazard Mitigation Program 

(NTHMP) working with 

Federal-State-local agencies to 

improve tsunami detection, 

warning, preparedness and 

response. 

Prepare State Hazard Mitigation 

Plan. 

Require cities and counties to 

adopt general plans, including 

safety elements, Local Coastal 

Plans, and official hazard zones 

issued as part of the Seismic 

Hazard Mapping Act. 

Require cities and counties to 

approve developments consistent 

with general plans. 

Adopt the State building code 

and mandate local adoption and 

enforcement. 

Make building-site and 

infrastructure mitigation 

improvements reducing risks to 

State-owned facilities and 

infrastructure. 

Initiate California State Warning 

Center (CSWC) as the 

designated Warning Point 

agency for dissemination of 

tsunami alerts and warnings.

Implement State Emergency 

Plan framework and 

Standardized Emergency 

Management System (SEMS). 

Issue emergency proclamations 

and make Federal disaster 

declaration request. 

Coordinate requests for Federal

assistance; utilize mutual aid

regions and operational areas to 

support and coordinate local and 

Federal response. 

Provide training and technical 

assistance to local agency 

response organizations. 

Coordinate nongovernmental 

organization support for State

and local response. 

Provide and coordinate the flow 

of information internally and 

externally to the public. 

Provide State financial assistance 

to affected local governments and 

other eligible entities for the 

repair, restoration, and 

replacement of damaged public 

facilities and infrastructure. 

Administer Federal recovery 

programs to repair public 

facilities and infrastructure and 

provide necessary additional 

funds. 

Coordinate Federal assistance 

available for individuals, 

households, and businesses. 

Help administer Federal programs 

for post-disaster mitigation. 

Administer State-mandated 

planning, zoning, subdivision, 

environmental review, and 

building related requirements. 

Participate in national tsunami 

risk awareness programs. 

Create and administer public 

education programs to promote 

risk awareness, and also fund 

locally specific efforts. 
10

Table 1. Generalized framework for U.S. tsunami disaster policy.—Continued

[Adapted from Topping and others, 2010]

Mitigation and Preparedness Response Recovery Risk Awareness

Local Make building-site mitigation 

improvements to reduce risks to 

local infrastructure. 

Prepare and adopt Statemandated city and county 

general plans, including safety 

elements, Local Coastal Plans, 

hazard zones, and building 

codes. 

Prepare and adopt FEMAapproved Local Hazard 

Mitigation Plans. 

Have primary responsibility for 

evacuation and disaster 

response. 

Establish priorities for allocation 

of personnel and resources. 

Provide information and locally 

based assessments. 

Request assistance and mutual 

aid using tiered relationships. 

Obtain and disseminate 

information to the local public. 

Coordinate laterally with local 

nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), community-based 

organizations (CBOs), faithbased organizations (FBOs),

medical providers, other local 

agencies, and private sector. 

Coordinate vertically with State

and Federal agencies/ responders

Primary responsibility for 

recovery; request State and 

Federal assistance as necessary. 

Review and approve permits for 

repairs and reconstruction in 

accordance with local plans, 

zoning and subdivision 

regulations, the California 

Environmental Quality Act, the 

California Coastal Act, and 

building codes. 

Participate in national and State

risk awareness programs. 

Create and administer local 

tsunami risk awareness 

programs. 

Disclose coastal flooding risk

(and tsunami information as 

available) as part of land 

development and other locally 

controlled development review. 

Private Buy NFIP and other hazards 

insurance and business 

interruption insurance

Make building-site mitigation 

improvements reducing risks to 

privately owned infrastructure 

Make building-site mitigation 

improvements reducing risks to 

private property. 

Coordinate with local agency 

responders. 

Provide resources for support of 

local and regional response 

efforts. 

Provide information to 

emergency responders. 

Coordinate communication with 

local businesses and 

organizations. 

Coordinate vertically with 

corporate parent and partner 

entities and organizations. 

Repair and rebuild according to 

codes and regulations. 

Businesses and individuals 

provide resources for recovery via 

insurance, grants, and reserves. 

Nongovernmental and 

philanthropic organizations 

provide resources for recovery 

through donations, services and 

grants. 

Mortgage lenders disclose 

tsunami risk when it is consistent 

with NFIP mapped coastal 

flooding areas. 

Private insurance promotes risk 

awareness as part of the 

underwriting process. 

Create nonprofit organizations to 

promote two-way risk 

communication for their 

particular hazard. 
11

Overarching Policy Consideration

The disaster management policy framework for tsunami hazards and impacts is not as well 

developed as it is for other hazards and disaster management policy areas in both the State of California 

and the United States. The lack of experience, risk awareness, and institutionalized planning and 

implementation practices for tsunami mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery could amplify 

impacts and losses from this scenario, even beyond what has been estimated as for coastal government, 

maritime, business, and tourism sectors and the general public. 

This scenario hypothesizes a disaster that can be adequately managed within existing national 

and State disaster policies. However, there will be gaps—areas where mitigation and preparedness 

activities were not heeded or fully achieved; areas where the warnings, evacuations, and response 

activities will not be well executed and coordinated; and areas where the recovery challenges may be 

significant and take years to resolve. There are also significant gaps in tsunami risk awareness that 

potentially undermine the effectiveness of the existing disaster policy framework and can negatively 

influence the response activities and recovery challenges posed by this scenario. 

In practice, the U.S. disaster management policies and programs tend to work reasonably well in 

moderate and localized disasters. However, they are not well equipped to address large-scale or 

catastrophic events that stretch societal resources. Also, with few modern tsunami experiences in the 

United States and California, the vast majority of the U.S. disaster policy framework reflects learning 

from other peril-related events (that is, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes), which, in comparison with this 

scenario, were more moderate in terms of their spatial extent and likely impacts. 

The SAFRR tsunami scenario would affect the entire Pacific coastline of the United States and 

require a significant multi-State mobilization of response-related resources. The tsunami would begin 

striking the California coast about 4 to 5 hours after the magnitude 9.1 earthquake occurs offshore of the 

Alaska Peninsula, and it would inundate California coastal areas unlike any tsunami in recent history. 

Although State and local agencies would have time to activate emergency operations centers and begin 

evacuating low-lying coastal areas, harbors and marinas, and reposition boats and ships safely offshore, 

this would still be a relatively short timeframe to fully evacuate and secure highly populated and 

congested areas, including public beaches and ports, harbors, and marina facilities. The scenario damage 

assessment assumes that all the port, business, and governmental entities made timely and correct 

decisions and actions on saving assets ahead of the scenario tsunami’s arrival. Delayed or incorrect 

decisions/actions, especially with regard to heavily populated areas, marine oil facilities, and tankers 

and other large ships could significantly increase the potential for escalated losses or cascading impacts. 

There is an overarching risk awareness challenge to reach the general public, as well as the 

special interest sectors, such as the maritime community, and to adequately train and prepare the 

multiple levels and types of governments needed to mitigate tsunami hazards and prepare to manage the 

impacts and consequences of this scenario and other potential tsunamis that threaten the State. After all, 

the SAFRR tsunami scenario is not the “worst case” for a vast part of California’s coastline. A major 

near-field tsunami on the Cascadia Subduction Zone would have a far shorter warning time and could 

cause far greater devastation, especially in northern California. 

The National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP), first formed by Congressional 

action in 1995 and strengthened by the Tsunami Warning and Education Act of 2006, is the major 

source of Federal support for the Nation’s tsunami warning system, the TsunamiReady program that 

promotes community preparedness for tsunamis, and hazard assessment, mitigation and readiness 

activities in 28 U.S. coastal States, territories, and commonwealths. Federal funding for the NTHMP is 

scheduled to end in 2013. Unless the Tsunami Warning and Education Act of 2006 is reauthorized, the 
12

foundation of the Nation’s and California’s tsunami policy framework will be significantly diminished 

and the future of the TsunamiReady program and State leadership for local tsunami hazard assessment, 

mitigation and preparedness will be at significant risk. 

Priority Policy Issues: Mitigation and Preparedness

Hazard mitigation is a disaster management function ideally preceding and lessening the impacts 

o, disasters (pre-event mitigation) or helping to reduce repetitive future losses after disasters (post-event 

mitigation). FEMA defines hazard mitigation as “sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate longterm risk to people and their property from hazards” (FEMA, 2012a). Preparedness is a disaster 

management function that works to ensure efficient and effective emergency management and response 

activities during times of crisis. It is “achieved and maintained through a continuous cycle of planning, 

organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action” (FEMA, 2012b). In 

a sense, mitigation and preparedness are two sides of the same coin. Mitigation works to prevent future 

losses, whereas preparedness helps to maintain a state of readiness to deal with the expected residual 

response demands. 

Primary Federal legislation fostering tsunami-related mitigation and preparedness includes the 

National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP), the Stafford Act, the Disaster Mitigation Act 

of 2000 (DMA 2000), and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). National mitigation laws and 

authorities generally authorize financial support to State and local governments and, in the case of flood 

insurance, to the private market supporting mitigation actions. In turn, these tend to be mirrored in State

laws and programs, such as the California Tsunami Preparedness and Hazard Mitigation Program 

(TPHMP), and in some cases, local mitigation laws and policies. Additional State legislation and 

mandates fostering mitigation and preparedness include the safety element requirement of local General 

Plans, the California Coastal Act (1976), Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act (1990), and permitting 

requirements of the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) for San Francisco Bay. 

Some key mitigation and preparedness policy issues are (1) lack of a coordinated and sufficiently robust 

policy framework for tsunami hazard assessment and mitigation planning and (2) disproportionate levels 

of mitigation and preparedness among California’s coastal communities, ports, and harbors. 

Need for a Robust Policy Framework for Tsunami Hazard Assessment and Mitigation Planning

California coastal communities and ports and harbors lack a coordinated and sufficiently robust 

policy framework for tsunami hazard assessment and mitigation planning. California has 20 counties, 

100 incorporated and 52 unincorporated cities, 7 major port regions, and more than 100 additional 

smaller ports, harbors, and marinas that border the Pacific Ocean and San Francisco Bay and are 

therefore exposed to threats posed by the SAFRR tsunami scenario.

Coastal Communities

Table 2 summarizes the status of tsunami hazard mitigation and planning among Californian’s 

20 coastal counties and 101 incorporated cities based on a review of their (1) participation in 

TsunamiReady, (2) participation in NFIP, and (3) demonstrated comment to toward lessening the 

impact of tsunamis as indicated in Local Hazard Mitigation Plans (LHMP). 

The review found that all the coastal counties and incorporated coastal cities participate in the 

NFIP, whereas, only 35 percent of counties and 16 percent of incorporated cities along California’s 

coastline are designated “TsunamiReady.” The number of TsunamiReady communities has been 
13

steadily increasing since the 2011 Japanese tsunami. Participation in these two programs provides a 

rough indication of how risk averse a community is to tsunamis and floods in general. 

The LHMPs of coastal counties and incorporated cities were also reviewed to determine if the 

LHMPs considered tsunami hazards and also whether their Action Plans include mitigation actions 

specific to tsunami hazard. The results are summarized in three categories: N—the LHMP did not 

address tsunami hazard; P—the LHMP Action Plan passively addresses the tsunami hazard (broad, 

general actions that address a multitude of natural hazards including tsunami); and A—the LHMP 

Action Plan actively and specifically addresses tsunami hazard. 

In general, the concern for tsunami hazard appears to increase from the southern to the northern 

part of the State, which is consistent with the known degree of hazard and experience from historical 

occurrences. Counties also appear to be more aggressive in addressing tsunami hazard than cities. Onequarter of the county and 44 percent of the incorporated city LHMPs that were reviewed were prepared 

before 2010 and prior to the Maule, Chile, and Tohoku, Japan, tsunamis. The profiling of tsunami 

hazard, connectivity with the local safety element and emergency operations plans, and inclusion of 

tsunami mitigation in action plans has also generally improved in the updated plans. 

There is considerable variability in the tsunami hazard mitigation actions planned or undertaken 

by the majority of coastal counties and incorporated cities. Most are focused on improvements in 

emergency management with a common action calling for the designation of the community as 

TsunamiReady. Only a few communities identified significant structural mitigation, such as building a 

new bridge to facilitate evacuation or improving walk ramps from the beach to higher ground, as 

priority mitigation actions. This may be partly due to the higher cost of structural mitigations but is most 

likely due to a priority for life safety, considering the high exposure of existing development, as well as 

beach populations during summer months. 

The review did not evaluate safety elements or local coastal plans (LCPs), which also contain 

such information. A cursory review of the safety elements for coastal communities found that they 

contain descriptions of tsunami hazard and history; however, other than general statements regarding the 

need for new development to avoid areas subject to natural hazards, they do not detail hazard mitigation 

specifically for tsunami, nor indicate the level of commitment to take action. For most communities, this 

is likely due to their lack of tsunami experience and also that most safety elements predate recent 

tsunamis that have caused significant damage in California and elsewhere in the world. Following the 

2011 Tohoku Oki tsunami in Japan, the California Coastal Commission added a requirement for the 

assessment of tsunami hazards for proposed development located in the designated coastal zone and for 

recertification of LCPs. However, only a few communities have begun the recertification process and 

only a few plans were available for this review. 

Coastal Ports and Harbors

As noted by Wilson and Miller (2013), dozens of California’s harbors sustained damage totaling 

nearly $100 million from the 2010 Chile and 2011 Japan tsunamis even though there wasn’t significant 

inundation of any of California’s coastal land from either of these events. Table 3 summarizes the 

results of a review of the status of tsunami hazard assessment and mitigation planning for the seven 

major harbor regions identified in the California Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990—(from 

south to north) San Diego Port and Harbor; Port of Los Angeles (considers both City of Los Angeles 

and Los Angeles County); Port of Long Beach; Port Hueneme; San Francisco Bay (includes Port of San 

Francisco, Port of Oakland, County of San Francisco and Alameda County); San Pablo Bay (includes 

Port of Richmond and Marin, Sonoma, Napa, Solano, and Contra Costa Counties and the Association of 

Bay Area Government’s multijurisdictional multi-hazard plan); Suisun Bay (includes Solano and Contra 
14

Costa Counties); Humboldt Bay; and Crescent City Harbor (a small harbor with heightened concern for 

tsunami hazards and shown for comparison). 

This review considered whether a port commissioned a special tsunami-hazard analysis or risk 

assessment that would indicate a heightened awareness and concern about tsunami hazard and risk to 

operations. To what extent the results of such studies triggered mitigation was not assessed. Outside 

studies, such as those conducted by a university were noted but did not typically evaluate risk to 

facilities. The review considered the following factors as proxies to assess the status of tsunami risk 

awareness, mitigation, and planning for ports and harbors (posed as questions in order of importance): 

· Did the LHMP for the county or city where the port is located specifically include tsunami hazard 

mitigation? Do the mitigation goals/objectives specifically include tsunami hazard? Is there a harbor 

annex that considers tsunami hazard? 

· Is the city or county where the port is located certified as TsunamiReady? Currently none of the 

major port and harbors are in California are certified as TsunamiReady but some of the cities or 

counties in which they are located are certified. 

· Does the port’s harbor safety plan explicitly recognize tsunami threat?

· Does the city or county emergency operations plan explicitly recognize tsunami threat to the 

port/harbor? 

This analysis found that the tsunami hazard has been assessed for all principal ports/harbors 

except for Port Hueneme, for which the U.S. Navy may have commissioned an evaluation. Overall, 

perception of the hazard as moderate or serious appears to highest in the northern part of the State and 

less in the southern part of the State, which is consistent with the known degree of hazard. Exceptions 

are the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, which have commissioned tsunami hazard and risk 

studies. Harbor safety plans rarely mention specific natural hazards, including tsunamis, or reference the 

LHMP and county/city emergency operation plans. Humboldt Bay is an exception. The Humboldt Bay 

Harbor Safety Plan has a tsunami annex that is also part of the county emergency operations plan. Only 

Crescent City’s LHMP has a port/harbor annex.
15

Table 2. Status of tsunami hazard assessment and mitigation planning in California coastal counties and incorporated cities. 

[LHMP, Local Hazard Mitigation Plan. N, tsunami hazard not addressed in the LHMP Action Plan; P, tsunami hazard passively addressed in the LHMP Action 

Plan; A, tsunami hazard actively addressed in the LHMP Action Plan. %, percent]

Coastal Jurisdiction Local Hazard Mitigation 

Plan (LHMP)

Tsunami in LHMP Action Plan Designated 

“TsunamiReady”

Participates in 

N P A NFIP

Counties 100% 25% 30% 45% 35% 100%

Incorporated cities 93% 48% 21% 31% 16% 100%
16

Table 3. Status of tsunami hazard assessment and mitigation planning for California’s major ports and harbors. 

[Y, yes; N, no; n.a., not applicable; LHMP, Local Hazard Mitigation Plan]

Port/Harbor San 

Diego

Los 

Angeles

Long 

Beach

Port 

Heuneme

San Francisco 

Bay

San Pablo 

Bay

Suisun 

Bay

Humboldt 

Bay

Crescent City 

Harbor

1. Tsunami risk or hazard 

assessment?

Y1 Y2 Y2 N Y3 Y3 Y3 Y4 Y 

2a. LHMP-harbor annex? N N N N N N N Y Y 

2b. LHMP-tsunami 

goals/objectives?

Y Y Y N Y Y5 N Y Y 

2c. LHMP-Tsunami in action plan? N Y Y N Y Y5 N Y Y 

3. Is city/county TsunamiReadyTM? Y Y N Y Y N N N Y 

4. Harbor Safety Plan mentions 

tsunami?

N N6 N6 N N N N Y7 n.a. 

5. Emergency plan mentions 

tsunami?

Y Y Y8 N Y Y Y Y Y 

1

University of Southern California Tsunami Research Center completed new assessment in 2011. 

2

Tsunami hazard/risk assessment done (Uslu and others, 2010; Moffatt and Nichol, 2012). 

3

Special tsunami study done for San Francisco Bay (Borrero and others, 2006). 

4

Tsunami hazard assessment has been done for Humboldt Bay (Uslu and others, 2008). 

5

Marin, Sonoma, and Contra Costa County Local Hazard Mitigation Plans; Association of Bay Area Governments assessment. 

6

Los Angeles County Tsunami Response Plan includes port area.

7

Humboldt Bay harbor safety plan has extensive annex for tsunami and cross-references to emergency plan.

8

Harbor safety training includes earthquake safety but not tsunami.
17

In general, the documents reviewed indicate that the majority of California’s coastal 

communities and ports and harbors more often consider tsunami hazards to be an emergency 

management issue rather than a land use or development policy issue. There is also a lack of 

connectivity on tsunami policy issues between various plans in a given community. A more robust and 

integrated planning framework would help to reinforce knowledge of hazards and the potential impacts, 

mitigation actions that could be taken to reduce community vulnerability, and improved and more 

coordinated response efforts across all responsible government agencies during a disaster. The overall 

policy question raised is what tools, information, and potential legislative actions could help strengthen 

California’s tsunami hazard assessment and mitigation planning policy framework? 

How Can Tsunami Hazard Assessment Models and Mapping Be Improved? 

CGS, in partnership with the University of Southern California’s Tsunami Research Center, has 

developed a series of tsunami inundation maps for parts of the California coastline to assist emergency 

managers in developing community evacuation plans (State of California, 2009). The potential tsunami 

hazard inundation areas shown on these maps are based on the maximum area extent of potential 

inundation derived from an ensemble of maximum credible events that could occur on near and distant 

tsunami sources. 

The National Research Council’s 2011 assessment of the U.S. tsunami program called for more 

consistent and comprehensive risk mapping and vulnerability nationwide—a national tsunami risk 

assessment (National Research Council, 2011). Pilot projects funded by NTHMP and FEMA are 

underway in California to develop more probabilistic approaches to tsunami hazard assessment that 

account for the likelihood of occurrence and estimates of potential inundation area, flow depth, velocity, 

and other physical parameters which all could more appropriately support the land-use planning, zoning, 

and construction related mitigation planning and actions of coastal communities and maritime facilities. 

Modeling advances made as part of these pilot projects and the SAFRR tsunami scenario can help to 

better characterize the probabilities of tsunami hazard (for example, at 100-, 500-, 1,000-, and 2,500-

year return periods) along California's coast. However, the complexity of such modeling and 

uncertainties in the model results can present some challenges for public policymaking. To serve as a 

basis for public policy, advanced tsunami hazard assessment models need to be open and transparent 

and peer-reviewed or otherwise professionally recognized as “standard-of-practice.” Guidelines may 

also be needed for their testing, evaluation, and use. 

How Can Tsunami Hazard Zones Be Defined and Implemented For Community Land-Use Planning, 

Zoning, and Construction Related Mitigation Planning and Actions? 

The California Seismic Hazard Mapping Act explicitly provides for the State Geologist to also 

map the potential effects of tsunami and seiche when information becomes available from other sources 

and is deemed appropriate for use by local government. Under the act, an official tsunami hazard zone 

would trigger tsunami design requirements for proposed construction and existing statutes would also 

require a site-specific investigation of associated geotechnical hazards and a plan to mitigate identified 

hazards before a building permit is issued. 

An expert advisory committee could provide guidance on the development of the tsunami hazard 

mapping criteria and other products necessary to support its implementation. The zonation work may 

also benefit from close consultation with those entities responsible for developing the tsunami resilient 

codes that are currently under development. Guidelines may also be needed for local agencies 

responsible for integrating the hazard zones into local land use, zoning, subdivision and development 

permitting processes as well as LHMPs, LCPs, and the safety elements of local general plans. 
18

Legislative changes may also be needed to ensure better integration of the tsunami hazard zones in State

and local planning and development requirements and consistency with any tsunami-resilient building 

design code provisions that are adopted. Areas subject to policy inconsistencies could include areas 

where the tsunami hazard zones extend inland beyond the coastal zones and regulatory authorities 

offered by the California Coastal Act. Communities may want to avoid confusion about tsunami hazard 

reduction efforts and strive for consistent standards within a jurisdiction’s general plan throughout the 

areal extent of officially designated tsunami hazard zones. 

How Can Tsunami Hazard Zones Be Defined and Implemented For Ports and Harbors Related Mitigation 

Planning and Actions?

CGS is currently developing hazard products tailored for the maritime community that are based 

on detailed hydrodynamic modeling of harbors to assist in identifying vulnerable port and harbor 

infrastructure and designating offshore safety zones for evacuation planning and response. More 

detailed tsunami hazard maps of harbors and channel areas are needed statewide to help identify highhazard areas (such as areas of high current velocity, turbulence, and eddies) and safer locations for 

facilities and passageways to reduce the risk of damage to harbor infrastructure and abandoned vessels. 

Consistent statewide guidelines for maritime tsunami response and recovery are needed and it would be 

useful to have their development guided by a statewide advisory committee comprised of key State 

agencies (for example, Cal OES, CGS, CCC, Department of Fish and Wildlife), military (including the 

U.S. Coast Guard), NOAA, local port harbor authorities, maritime organizations, and key stakeholders. 

The guidelines could include standards for a more appropriate depth contour for offshore evacuations; 

hazard thresholds for harbor facilities and vessels; best practices for ship (re)positioning in a tsunami; 

and recommended protocols for evacuations—when not to evacuate and when to issue an “all clear” 

following a harbor evacuation. Such information could be distributed to harbor authorities along with 

guidance or training on their use. Coastal charts and maps could also be revised to be consistent with the 

new information, and broad communication and dissemination efforts could work to reach various 

interest groups and stakeholders (for example, military/transport/cruise ships, commercial fishing boats, 

and recreational boaters, as well as port, wharf/dock, and marina managers). 

How Can Tsunami Resilient Building Design Provisions Be Adopted and Implemented? 

California’s Building Code and the International Building Code (IBC) contain provisions for 

weather-related flood-resilient design, and all coastal communities participate in the National Flood 

Insurance Program that requires adherence to specified flood design standards. However, these design 

standards do not consider the unique characteristics of tsunami-induced flooding. Tsunami resilient 

design standards are currently under development by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 

Subcommittee on Tsunami Loads and Effects and anticipated for release in 2016. Given this schedule, 

they would be incorporated into the 2018 edition of the IBC at the earliest. These standards will only 

address new construction that is initiated once the new building code is in place. 

Opportunities may exist to adopt interim provisions once the ASCE standards are released in 

2016 or to expedite adoption of the IBC provisions once available. Incentives to encourage local 

adoption and implementation may also be needed. For example, the Building Code Effectiveness 

Grading Schedule (BCEGS), which assesses and rates both local building code adoption and 

enforcement practices, could collaborate in monitoring local implementation and increase community 

ratings once tsunami resilient building provisions are adopted and enforced. 

As coastal engineering codes and standards become more formalized, the State could consider 

requiring that engineers performing site-specific tsunami inundation and engineering analyses as part of 
19

coastal development projects to be a “diplomate” with Coastal Engineering certification from the ASCE 

Academy of Coastal, Ocean, Port, and Navigation Engineers (COPNE) (American Society of Civil 

Engineers, 2013). The State might also consider developing its own certification for civil engineers 

specializing in coastal engineering. 

The Tsunami Scenario Would Have Severe Impacts

The tsunami scenario would severely impact communities and ports and harbors that have made 

sustained tsunami mitigation and preparedness efforts, as well as those that have not. This could result 

in varying levels of impacts, potentially including significant life losses and demands for response and 

recovery resources. Most of California’s coastal neighborhoods, businesses and industries, and 

infrastructure have not been built to withstand tsunami forces. Under such conditions, life safety is of 

paramount importance, which puts mitigation and preparedness planning at the forefront of risk 

reduction strategies. But, as the planning analyses have shown, tsunami hazard awareness, mitigation 

and preparedness planning, and actions vary considerably across California’s communities and ports 

and harbors. 

Funding for predisaster mitigation, under the Stafford Act and Disaster Mitigation Act is 

infinitesimally small relative to the nationwide need and it has historically tended to reward good 

mitigation performance through additional funding (Topping and others, 2010). And, the TsunamiReady 

program, as a voluntary program, is more apt to attract better mitigation performers seeking this 

designation. And, thus in the SAFRR tsunami scenario or another major tsunami affecting the West 

Coast, there will likely be areas with significant damage and potential life loss, whereas other areas will 

emerge relatively unscathed. 

There are both funding and engagement challenges in getting the most vulnerable and 

unprepared coastal communities and ports and harbors to voluntarily undertake mitigation and 

preparedness actions ahead of a tsunami disaster. More coastal communities need to be encouraged to 

participate in the TsunamiReady program. There also needs to be enhanced coordination and 

information sharing among coastal communities on tsunami mitigation and preparedness plans and 

actions, which might be a State-led program activity. This includes promoting better sharing of best 

practices and developing multi-jurisdictional evacuation and response plans. 

The community planning analysis also found that coastal county and city participants in the 

TsunamiReady program did not meet the program guidelines equally effectively. A review of standards 

for program designation and development of a process for ongoing maintenance of the TsunamiReady 

designation may also be useful in ensuring that TsunamiReady designated communities are indeed 

ready for the impacts of a future tsunami. 

Coastal communities and regional government associations might also need to be more strongly 

encouraged to work more collaboratively on tsunami hazard mitigation and preparedness planning. 

Neighboring communities could also be encouraged to integrate their local hazard mitigation plans into 

a multi-jurisdictional plan that would help qualify as an enhanced plan and be eligible for the associated 

disaster recovery assistance benefits under the Stafford Act and the Disaster Mitigation Act. The State 

Hazard Mitigation Plan could also be strengthened to provide more direction to coastal communities by 

addressing broad regional issues and helping to shape tsunami hazard mitigation strategies for local 

communities to follow. Alternative sources of funding for advance planning and mitigation are also 

needed, especially if Federal or State support for the NTHMP ends. 

Additional emphasis needs to be placed on ensuring that the State’s many ports, harbors, and 

maritime facilities also undertake mitigation and preparedness planning and actions. Currently, there is 

limited data available on marina damage and tsunami loss modeling for marinas is just in its infancy. As 
20

described in Wilson and Miller (2013), the State, through the NTHMP, has been working to enhance the 

information and resources available for the maritime community on tsunami preparedness and response 

planning and preparedness planning is underway at some of the State’s largest ports. Harbor authorities 

could be further encouraged to prepare tsunami preparedness, response, and recovery plans for their 

facilities. State guidelines for maritime tsunami response and recovery, along with a robust 

dissemination and training program, also could be developed. 

Priority Policy Issues: Response

For tsunamis, emergency response begins when a potential tsunami threat is identified and the 

threat analysis and notification protocols are initiated. These functions are Federally led by NOAA’s 

national tsunami warning centers which issue Alert Bulletins designating a tsunami WATCH, 

ADVISORY or WARNING. There are standardized templates for the series of alert bulletins that also 

contain information regarding first wave arrival times and projected wave amplitudes for specified 

locations. The alert bulletins are disseminated using many redundant communication paths, including 

the NOAA Weather Wire Service, NOAA Weather Radio (NWR), Emergency Managers Weather 

Information Network (EMWIN), email/cell phone text messaging, Emergency Alert System (EAS), 

U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy, and the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS). 

The California State Warning Center (CSWC) is the designated Warning Point agency 

authorized to transmit the national tsunami alert bulletins statewide. The CSWC forwards information it 

receives to Cal OES and county emergency management offices. It does not, however, independently 

designate alert levels; only the national tsunami warning center can designate the alert level. All 

information from the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WCATWC) is passed directly 

to the counties by redundant methods as well. The public and media get this information almost 

simultaneously through the variety of communications systems. 

Once a credible tsunami threat is confirmed, Cal OES regional and State operation centers 

initiate a series of conference call briefings for California’s coastal counties and State agencies. Under 

California’s Standard Emergency Management System (SEMS), each county in California is an 

operational area (OA) and responsible for notifying and coordinating with their local jurisdictions (cities 

and special districts) and unincorporated areas through multiple, redundant means. 

Local jurisdictions are responsible for ordering evacuations within their geographic limits; 

counties are the “local authority” for unincorporated county areas. Local jurisdictions and port 

authorities, where they exist, generally share civil authority over evacuations of low-lying coastal areas. 

Port authorities, harbor masters, and the U.S. Coast Guard are responsible for offshore evacuation and 

directing the movement of boats and ships out of harbors to deep waters. Depending on the alert level, 

and local vulnerability, past experience, and plans, initial decisions may range from waiting for further 

information, initiating a phased evacuation, or ordering a total evacuation. Most counties and local 

jurisdictions in California have developed local methods for disseminating emergency messages, 

including the Emergency Alert System (EAS), residential telephone emergency notification system 

(TENS; similar to Reverse 911), sirens, local radio communications, media announcements, and others. 

As noted by Brosnan and others (written commun., 2013), some of California’s fishing communities 

have also developed emergency communication systems and protocols. 

Some key response policy issues are (1) challenges with existing warning dissemination and 

evacuation information and protocols and localized disruptions of communications systems; (2) lack of 

experience and gaps in policy and guidelines for handling a major tsunami evacuation, sheltering, and 

extended security of evacuated areas; and (3) significant demands on different levels of government and 

the need for cooperation at each tier and within every organization involved in the response. 
21

Onshore/Offshore Evacuations and Emergency Response Will Be Challenged by Existing 

Warning/Evacuation Protocols and Disruptions To Communications

The coordination and effectiveness of both onshore and offshore evacuations and emergency 

response activities will be challenged by existing tsunami warning dissemination and evacuation 

information and protocols and localized disruptions to communications systems. In the SAFRR tsunami, 

a large earthquake occurs offshore of the Alaska Peninsula, at 10:50 Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on 

Thursday, March 27, 2014. NOAA issues the first tsunami alert bulletin within 3 minutes of the 

earthquake’s occurrence. The bulletin activates a WARNING for the coastal areas of British Columbia 

and Alaska and a WATCH for the coastal areas of Washington, Oregon, and California. Initial arrival 

times are estimated to range from 16:02 PDT at Crescent City, California (a little more than 5 hours) to 

17:38 PDT at La Jolla, California (about 61⁄2 hours). The Emergency Alert System is also activated at 

this time and begins relaying the notifications to emergency management systems and personnel, 

television, and radio stations. 

Local emergency managers are immediately faced with a dilemma—wait for the next alert 

bulletin which will confirm the tsunami and better estimate the arrival time or begin evacuations and 

response activities immediately to ensure that evacuations and infrastructure protection are completed in 

a timely and safe manner? The managers at the seven major ports and more than 100 smaller marinas 

and harbors also face similar evacuation decisions as soon as they hear the news. This will likely be the 

first tsunami experience for much of the maritime community, which also may not have emergency 

plans or may have limited experience with offshore evacuations. Few California residents, especially in 

the San Francisco Bay area and Southern California, have much experience with tsunamis or mass 

evacuations. 

In the SAFRR tsunami scenario, the first official notification that puts California into the 

WARNING stage and offers the first information about estimated wave heights and duration comes at 

12:05 PDT. It forecasts the tsunami reaching Crescent City at 15:58 PDT (less than 4 hours), San 

Francisco at 16:55 PDT (less than 5 hours), San Pedro at 17:27 PDT, and La Jolla at 17:38 PDT (less 

than 51⁄2 hours). The maximum tsunami heights are forecast to reach 10.1 feet (+/- 3.0 feet) in Crescent 

City, 5.0 feet (+/- 1.5 feet) in San Francisco, 3.7 feet (+/- 1.1 feet) in San Pedro, and 8.4 feet (+/-2.5 

feet) in La Jolla. The durations are forecast to range from 18 to 48 hours. 

Reliable and redundant communications systems will be crucial to evacuation decision makers 

and emergency responders, as well as the evacuees (both onshore and offshore). Responders will need 

to communicate with each other to manage both onshore and offshore evacuations and response 

activities, and individuals and vessel operators will need to receive updates of the tsunami 

warnings/alerts and notifications of when it is safe to return. 

The public’s primary sources of information during a disaster are the media and landline phones 

and cellular networks. The phone and cellular communication networks may be overwhelmed during the 

initial evacuation period and more remote and significantly impacted coastal areas, particularly in 

Northern California, are likely to experience system disruptions once the tsunami begins. What will 

happen when elements of the communication network are broken or diminished in capacity? What will 

be the “workarounds” necessary for the coordination to take place? What if the disruptions continue for 

long periods of time, such as weeks or months? 
22

What Alert Dissemination Protocols and Communication System Improvements are Needed to Ensure 

Safe and Timely Evacuations? 

In this scenario and for other near-source tsunamis, waiting for WARNING alert leaves very 

little time to complete safe and timely evacuations. Since the 2011 Japan tsunami, the national tsunami 

warning centers have been improving and standardizing how warnings are disseminated to State and 

local agencies in order to address some of the warning confusion, problems with Web access, and other 

issues reported at the time. The SAFRR tsunami scenario provides a useful source of information to test 

revised protocols and see what improvements could be made to alert dissemination protocols. 

In recent tsunamis, alert notifications have also triggered inappropriate reactions by parts of the 

public, especially those who are unfamiliar with the tsunami hazard and what the alert levels mean. 

Additional explanations of how to respond to NOAA-issued Tsunami Alerts (WATCH, WARNING, 

and ADVISORY) could also be part of emergency management education and coordination with the 

media.

Once the tsunami has subsided, local response agencies are responsible for issuing “all clear” 

messages and allowing reentry into evacuated areas. Similarly, port authorities, harbor masters, and the 

U.S. Coast Guard will be determining when to allow vessel operators to return to shore. These decisions 

are often made with little to no scientific information. The tsunami warning centers could be encouraged 

to develop guidelines and protocols for providing hazard updates/information to help local response 

agencies decide when to issue the “all clear.” 

On an annual basis, Cal OES collaborates with the NOAA Weather Forecast Office in Eureka 

and the Redwood Coast Tsunami Work Group to conduct a multicounty test of the EAS. Considerable 

planning goes into this “live-code” warning communications test, and such tests need to be continued 

and expanded to other parts of the California coast. Development and full implementation of the 

FEMA-Federal Communications Commission wireless-carrier partnership for the Commercial Mobile 

Alert System (CMAS), Next Gen 911, Reverse 911 and regional broadband public safety networks in 

California needs to be continued. These systems need to develop the capability to focus messages to 

specific regions to prevent unnecessary disruption in unaffected areas. 

Experience in Japan demonstrated the potential effectiveness of broadcasting evacuation 

warnings through cellular networks to the general public using mobile phone applications. 

Implementation in the United States and California would require formal agreements between 

government agencies that issue warnings and cellular network providers, and the development of mobile 

phone applications for the general public to use to receive tsunami evacuation warnings. 

Lack of Experience in Dealing With the Complexity of a Major Tsunami Evacuation, Sheltering, and 

Extended Security of Evacuated Areas

There is a lack of experience among California’s State and local emergency responders, port and 

government managers as well as gaps in policy and guidelines for dealing with the complexity of a 

major tsunami evacuation, sheltering, and extended security of evacuated areas. Local jurisdictions are 

responsible for developing tsunami evacuation and response plans but, as the community planning 

analysis showed, there are varying levels of tsunami hazard awareness and preparedness included in 

local plans and policy. The short fuse nature of this evacuation scenario is going to present some crucial 

challenges for evacuation management, especially for public venues, critical facilities, schools, 

hospitals, and dependent-care facilities near the coast and beaches. 

Many local emergency managers are likely to rely on the maximum tsunami hazard zones 

published on California’s tsunami inundation maps, because the likely extent of the tsunami will not be 
23

known until it arrives. What also will not be known until later is that the inundation area for the SAFRR 

scenario tsunami directly impacts far fewer residents (91,956) and business employees (81,277) than 

those located in the State’s tsunami inundation maps (267,347 residents and 168,565 employees). Being 

too quick or overly conservative in determining which areas to evacuate can be costly for coastal 

businesses, public safety, and public confidence, but being too late or limiting the evacuation area can 

be catastrophic. 

There are also some “hot spots” where the concentrations of residents and employees at risk of 

inundation are quite high. These include Huntington Beach, Newport Beach, Los Angeles, and Long 

Beach in southern California; Oakland, Alameda, Emeryville, and Belvedere in the San Francisco Bay 

area; and Crescent City in northern California. Also, as noted by Wood and others (2013), some of these 

areas are further challenged by access limitations, with few roads, bridges, or pedestrian pathways off 

island or out of low-lying areas. 

The ports planning analysis showed that there are also varying levels of tsunami hazard 

awareness and preparedness at California’s major ports; smaller ports and harbors may have done little 

planning because none is currently required. Port authorities, harbormasters, the U.S. Coast Guard and 

others involved in evacuation decision making must consider safety and protection of populations and 

assets on the water as well as on land. On land, employees working at port terminals and other facilities 

must be notified and evacuated. In the water, decisions must be made about vessels currently in the port 

and harbor areas as well as those attempting to enter. 

Vessel-related decisions will likely involve differing recommendations based on vessel size and 

weather and ocean/tide conditions —which vessels to evacuate offshore and how much time is available 

and needed by each vessel to do so? Small craft marinas are especially vulnerable to the high currents 

associated with tsunamis, and offshore evacuations of recreational vessels are rarely feasible and not 

encouraged by State emergency managers. Also, unlike onshore evacuees, offshore evacuation decision 

makers and the vessel operators must carefully consider prolonged safety issues—having enough food, 

water, and fuel for extended periods (an estimated 2 to 4 days for this tsunami scenario) and whether 

their vessels can get to more distant harbors if their home port is destroyed. Many operators may not get 

the message in time, or have time to get a crew aboard to allow the vessel to safely depart before the 

tsunami’s arrival. As described in Brosnan and others (written commun., 2013), decisions will also need 

to be made about whether it is appropriate to leave personnel onboard vessels during the tsunami event 

or evacuate them back to shore. 

After coastal areas and ports have been evacuated, local responders will also have to manage 

security and re-entry. Traffic checkpoints will need to be established at the edge of the evacuation zones 

to direct and restrict traffic from coming back into dangerous areas. Additional traffic control points 

may also need to be established at strategic locations further inland to reduce traffic flow toward the 

coast. Emergency equipment will need to be staged outside the inundation area. Maritime security will 

similarly need to be provided and likely to involve waterway patrols. Loose or unauthorized large 

vessels moving in a closed port could cause significant damage. Some people will inevitably be unable 

to make it out in time before local responders begin to leave the danger zones before the tsunami’s 

arrival. Air rescues are likely to be carried out by the U.S. Coast Guard and other qualified agencies and 

personnel. Given the widespread and complex of impacts along the coast and ports, there will be 

significant staffing requirements to secure the vast evacuation perimeter up and down the State. This 

will all require multiagency coordination. Often, cooperating agencies develop a Multiagency 

Coordination System (MACS) to better define how they will work together and to work together more 

efficiently; however, multiagency coordination can take place without established protocols. 
24

Any people who do not evacuate will need to be instructed to seek opportunities for “vertical” 

evacuation and resist the urge to evacuate during the tsunami inundation. Typically, the first tsunami 

wave is not the highest, and tidal variations could increase the risk of the later waves. Local responders 

will also be instructed to remain outside the danger zones until an “all clear” for responders is issued, 

but they too will be pressured to help before the tsunami recedes. 

The extended duration of this tsunami scenario will mean that many evacuees will need 

overnight shelter and, for the most heavily impacted communities, evacuations may turn into protracted 

displacements. It is estimated that 8,489 people will require shelter for the SAFRR tsunami scenario. 

However, relying on the State’s tsunami inundation maps, emergency managers would be collectively 

responding to provide shelter for a much larger number of displaced people than may be necessary. In 

addition to shelters, reception, refuge, feeding and staging areas will be needed. As Wood and others 

(2013) reveal, there will also be special needs issues with impacted populations including tourists, nonEnglish speakers, very old or very young people, and people from group quarters and dependent care 

facilities, including schools, colleges and jails. 

In this scenario, the WARNING is cancelled at 12 to 14 hours after the earthquake’s occurrence; 

however, in and along waterfront areas, strong tsunami currents will likely continue. Once they are 

given the “all clear,” local responders begin “windshield surveys” and initial safety assessments to 

determine search and rescue and other response needs and plan for an orderly reentry. Areas that were 

not inundated will likely be given the “all clear” quickly, whereas a phased or facilitated reentry may be 

needed where damage or continuing hazards exist. 

According to Porter and others (2013), there will be at least two days in which operations at 

major ports will be halted in the SAFRR scenario. The first day will consist of safely shutting down and 

securing operations, deploying tug boats, removing vessels where possible, and generally preparing for 

the tsunami arrival and evacuation of personnel. The second day would be focused on inspections of 

facilities prior to restoring operations. All loading and unloading equipment will be disengaged to 

prevent damage from tsunami waves and currents, as well as any sudden power losses. 

As Plumlee and others (2013) and Brosnan and others (written commun., 2013) describe, debris 

fields, fires, fuel leaks, hazardous material spills, and damaged and unsafe structures all may exist in 

flooded coastal and port areas. Sunk or beached vessels may affect port and harbor navigation. Debris 

clearance, contamination clean up, and utility restoration could take days to weeks to complete, 

especially if the damages are significant. Helping displaced residents and vessel operators to return will 

also require coordination. There may be public health issues to consider as contaminated water could 

impact soils and structures inundated by flooding. For some areas, sheltering of displaced populations 

may also continue for some time. 

What Additional Plans, Policies, and Guidelines Are Needed to Deal With the Complexity of Both Onshore

and Offshore Tsunami Evacuation, Sheltering, and the Extended Security of Evacuated Areas?

For most coastal communities, the SAFRR scenario inundations will not extend as far inland as 

the maximum inundation line shown on the State’s tsunami inundation maps. The State TPHMP is 

currently developing tsunami evacuation “playbooks” that will provide more detailed models of 

potential inundation areas for a number of different tsunami scenarios. Playbook maps will show 

expected areas of flooding for tsunamis of various wave heights, such as one, two, three and four meters 

above the Mean High Water (high tide) line. Other scenarios in the playbooks will provide modeled 

inundation lines for a magnitude 9.2 eastern Aleutians tsunami; worst-case tsunami scenarios for 

specific local sources, such as submarine faults and landslides, that might arrive on shore within 10 

minutes; and a magnitude 9+ Cascadia scenario that will arrive on shore within about 10 minutes along 
25

the northern California coast and within 2 hours along the rest of the California coast. According to 

Wilson and Miller (2013), a formula that incorporates forecasted tsunami amplitudes (wave heights), 

tidal conditions, storm activity, and site-specific tsunami run-up potential into a “maximum predicted 

tsunami run-up height” is being developed to determine which evacuation scenario is most appropriate 

and conservative to use. These products are expected to be available by the end of 2013. They are 

intended to assist coastal emergency managers in preparing local evacuation response plans that are 

more tsunami source specific.

Only a few of California’s ports, harbors, and marinas, have conducted detailed studies of 

potential tsunami in-harbor hazards and risks to facilities. To help address the information gap, the State

TPHMP is also developing a set a products for maritime communities: (1) detailed maps identifying inharbor tsunami hazards, such as potential harbor areas with strong currents and eddies, peak amplitude 

surges, large tidal fluctuations; (2) offshore safety zones where ships can evacuate to and safely gather 

during a tsunami; and (3) planning guidelines for evacuations, response and recovery. The maritime 

mapping and guidelines are expected to be completed by 2015. 

The SAFRR tsunami scenario will ultimately serve as a useful tool for emergency management 

training and exercises and for testing and improving existing policies and plans. It provides important 

justification of the need for both the community playbooks and maritime planning products and the need 

for robust dissemination and training efforts associated with their release. More coordination in tsunami 

preparedness and response planning could be encouraged among adjacent coastal communities. 

Communities could also be encouraged to share evacuation plans and maps and collaborate on key 

public education and training messages. The State TPHMP and regional associations of governments 

along the coast could play a critical in helping promote and facilitate multi-community collaboration. 

The scenario also raises some additional policy issues that might be considered in existing or 

future national and State tsunami program efforts. How to provide more time-based guidance on 

evacuations in a variety of potential inundation areas and harbor areas? How to manage multimodal 

evacuations (for example, on foot, by boat, by private car or truck, and using public transportation), as 

well as the suitability of vertical evacuations? Many of the California’s coastal areas, particularly ports, 

islands and peninsulas, such as in Newport Beach, have limited egress options. Adding pedestrian 

bridges or vertical evacuation sites could provide significant life safety benefits. Another issue is how to 

effectively maintain security during a protracted evacuation of both communities and port areas? 

Given the broad geographic nature of the SAFRR tsunami scenario, it will be important to 

provide clear and consistent information to the media and public throughout the response period and to 

also tailor messaging as needed to different communities, regions, and response issues. The SAFRR 

scenario provides a good opportunity to test State, local, and Federal communications plans and 

coordinate with the media on appropriate public-safety messaging during various stages of the tsunami 

response—notification, evacuation areas and routes, sheltering, reentry and other real-time updates on 

developments as they occur. 

Response Effectiveness Will Depend on Cooperation and Coordination at All Levels of 

Government

The widespread nature of this large-scale West Coast tsunami scenario would place significant 

demands on different levels of government. Response effectiveness will depend on cooperation and 

coordination of operations at each tier and within every organization in the system. For the tsunami 

scenario, local, State, and Federal level emergency and disaster proclamations are likely to be made 

quickly. The U.S. response framework will be initiated as defined at the Federal level by the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Framework (NRF) and carried forward 
26

by State, county, and local agencies. FEMA will likely activate its National Operations Coordination 

Center and its Regional Operations Centers. State emergency management agencies, including Cal OES, 

will activate their State operations centers as well as any regional operations commands. Local 

emergency managers will activate their emergency operations centers and depending on the need may 

request mutual aid or State assistance using established processes. 

The U.S. framework is predicated on the principles of (FEMA, 2013): 

· “Engaged partnership” both vertically and horizontally among various agencies, both public and 

private. 

· “Tiered response” to recognize local primacy for response and to overlap and establish lines of 

authority and communication along the vertical continuum from the local up to the Federal level. 

· “Scalable, flexible, and adaptable response” so that roles and relationships are clearly outlined and 

remain the same in any scale of disaster, even though the amount of resources may vary according to 

the needs of the event. 

· “Unity of effort/unity of command” to avoid duplication in effort, confusion, and 

overlapping/overstepping actions. 

· “Readiness to act,” train, and prepare so that the emergency responders understand the system at 

their own level and are prepared to coordinate through the chain of coordination envisioned in the 

“Engaged Partnership.” 

A fundamental assumption embedded in the response framework is that, in fact, the system 

structure can be effectively scaled up to a disaster of any size, and coordination, information flow, and 

communication are the fundamental building blocks of this multi-governmental and multiorganizational style of response. Although well proven in more limited emergency events, there have 

been few tests of the system in dealing with a widespread event, like the SAFRR tsunami scenario. The 

system will only be as strong as its weakest link. FEMA and Cal OES and other West Coast State

emergency management agencies, as well as the multitude of local and maritime emergency responders, 

have limited experience with tsunamis, and most tsunami in the recent past have come from distant 

sources allowing some lead time for evacuations and preparations. FEMA and California counties are 

working on an Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan for the West Coast, focusing on the 

consequences of a Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake and tsunami (see Redwood Coast Tsunami 

Work Group Facebook page, accessed August 23, 2013 at 

https://www.facebook.com/RCTWG?filter=3). 

A second key element is the high level of responsibility delegated to the local agencies to 

manage the disaster, in effect the “bottom up” approach that the system is built on. This means that 

response effectiveness depends first and foremost on the capacity and capability of the local actors on 

the scene. Will local governments and port and harbor facilities have functional capacity to effectively 

activate and operate the local emergency response, communication, and coordination protocols? Will 

there be sufficient numbers of knowledgeable personnel to handle emergency operations functions 

through the tsunami’s duration? How will State and Federal actors determine when and how to respond 

in a situation where there is wide unevenness in the capacity and capabilities of various local actors? 

When and how will county and State agencies initiate their assessments of unmet needs and identify 

outside resources through mutual aid, State resources and requests for Federal assistance? How will 

resources (equipment, supplies, personnel—all potentially scarce or not matched to need 

geographically) be allocated among multiple and competing needs? Will State and Federal response 

structures be stretched by the breadth and duration of the event that their effectiveness is compromised? 
27

How will the need to reach far outside the impacted areas to mobilize and obtain needed resources affect 

the timing and delivery of support? 

Experience has shown that in some disasters, the responders defined in an emergency response 

plan are not always the ones who take on key roles and responsibilities. In these instances, ad hoc 

organizational structures were created by local leadership because for any number of reasons that proves 

to be the most effective way to proceed. How will the United States’ and California’s premise of unity 

of command be affected when people less trained are substituted into the response roles and systems? 

How will ad hoc structures be tethered to the command structure and tiered response system? What are 

effective ways of utilizing ad hoc community or private structures to take advantage of the capacities 

they provide? 

Priority Policy Issues: Recovery

Once the tsunami subsides, and threats to life-safety and property are stabilized, the recovery 

process along California’s coast will begin. Because this scenario will likely trigger a Presidential 

disaster declaration, Federal assistance for individuals and families, government agencies, tribal 

organizations, and private nonprofit organizations will be available under the Stafford Act. The National 

Disaster Recovery Framework (FEMA, 2011) would also begin to guide Federal agency coordination 

and assistance, and Cal OES’s Recovery Branch would deploy, along with FEMA and other Federal 

personnel, to affected coastal areas. Early recovery activities would include damage assessment, 

restoration of utilities and community services, and addressing short-term housing and business needs. 

Long-term repairs, rebuilding and other recovery activities would then likely continue for many months 

and even years, especially in the most heavily impacted coastal areas. 

This section presents two key policy issues: (1) post-disaster recovery challenges for the hardest 

hit coastal communities, ports and harbors, and parts of the State’s fishing and agriculture sectors and 

(2) challenges of rebuilding more resiliently for a historically infrequent hazard, like tsunami. 

Unprecedented Recovery Challenges for Hardest Hit Coastal Communities, Ports and Harbors, and 

Fishing and Agriculture Sectors

The tsunami scenario would generate unprecedented recovery challenges for the hardest hit 

coastal communities, ports and harbors, and parts of the State’s fishing and agriculture sectors. The 

tsunami scenario would affect approximately 1,840 Census blocks statewide and produce an estimated 

$1.8 billion in building and content damage (roughly 2.2 percent of building value and 18 percent of 

content value in these census blocks). Areas where tsunami building damage would be concentrated 

could require long-term access limitations, which, unless well secured, could lead to looting and 

extensive blight. There would also be significant needs for both short-term and long-term housing and 

business facilities. Any long-term population and business relocations could negatively affect 

community recovery. In addition to buildings, coastal roads, bridges, and railroads will also sustain 

damage. Building and infrastructure damage clusters would likely exist in pockets along the entire 

California coast and around San Francisco Bay. 

According to Porter and others (2013), damage is expected to be modest in most of California’s 

major ports, especially if large vessels were successfully evacuated. Two of Southern California’s major 

ports—the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach—are expected to sustain direct damages amounting to 

$113 million, mainly to imported vehicles, containers, and some waterfront facilities. Land-based 

commerce for most major ports would likely return to service within one or two days following the 

tsunami scenario with a few facility exceptions where tsunami-related flooding damages buildings and 
28

other maritime facilities. Maritime transportation could take longer to restore due to debris and 

sedimentation issues in the navigation channels or a lengthy cleanup caused by an oil spill into port 

waters. Rose and others (2013) estimate that direct economic impacts to southern California and the rest 

of California caused by a 2-day shutdown at major ports as well as facility downtime and cargo losses, 

could amount to $1.2 billion. 

Other harbors and marinas across the State would likely sustain damage estimated at about $600 

million. According to Porter and others (2013), more than 5,600 smaller watercraft would sink (about 1 

in 7), 7,900 smaller watercraft would be damaged but repairable (about 1 in 5), 140 docks would be 

destroyed (1 in 6), and 5,350 docks would be damaged but repairable (about half). Small craft that are 

damaged and become free floating will be a debris issue during and after the tsunami. Some of these 

may sink in the center of the navigation channels and may pose a navigation issue for other vessels until 

they are removed. 

For those ports, harbors, and marinas that have significant sediment deposition and damage, the 

permitting process for sediment removal, as well as the complexities of the removal and reconstruction 

processes, could prolong their recovery for a year or more. Major issues include whether the debris 

contains contaminants and whether the sediment can be disposed in the ocean or has to be transported to 

landfills. An underwater inspection may be required before port channels can be reopened. There could 

be potentially lengthy Federal and State agency approvals, followed by logistical and coordination 

issues. 

As Brosnan and others (written commun., 2013) describe, the fishing industry statewide is also 

vulnerable to damage to boats and infrastructure (for example, docks, processing plants) from tsunami 

waves, currents, and debris and other factors. Damage to harbors and onshore fishing facilities and 

protracted boat repairs could also result in losses and extended impacts to the fishing industry. 

According to Ratliff and Wein (2013), approximately 9,600 acres of agricultural land lies in the 

scenario inundation zone; this is a very small part of the approximately 25 million acres of agricultural 

land in the State. Non-crop uses such as pastureland make up the majority of inundated agriculture, at 

57 percent of the total. Alfalfa farming occupies 42 percent of inundated agricultural land, and trucktransported crops and field crops represent 0.5 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively, of inundated 

agricultural land. Humboldt County has the highest percentage of inundated agricultural land; San Luis 

Obispo, Mendocino, and Sonoma Counties also have relatively high percentages. Salinization, debris 

deposition, soil scour, and contamination all present long-term issues that would need to be carefully 

and quickly dealt with in order to minimize downtime for affected farms. Most of the exposed 

agricultural acres lie in the poorer northern counties of the State, and recovery costs could be extensive, 

slowing recovery and further impacting farming businesses and employees in these counties. 

What Recovery Financing Resources and Gaps Are Likely for the Tsunami Scenario?

In California, more than 10,000 people would likely register for FEMA Individual Assistance 

which would provide funds for emergency housing, housing repairs, and contents replacement. There 

would likely be significant recovery financing challenges for all impacted residential properties and 

tenants that do not have National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) or other insurance coverage. Higher 

valued residential properties (for example, condominiums, apartment complexes, properties owned by 

real estate investment trusts) tend to have excess-NFIP insurance coverage. Ensuring that people living 

in the mapped tsunami inundation zones also have flood insurance could help close the residential 

recovery funding gaps. 

Similarly, impacted small commercial and industrial business owners and property owners, 

including fisherman, private marina owners, and fishing and harbor facility owners, without NFIP or 
29

other insurance coverage would also face recovery financing challenges and could be encouraged to 

carry NFIP or other commercial flood insurance. Small Business Administration (SBA) post-disaster 

loans would be a critical recovery resource for impacted small businesses and apartment owners, but 

these sectors would be challenged to accept additional debt burdens. Private insurance is more likely to 

be carried by medium and large commercial and industrial businesses and would provide resources for 

structural and contents related losses related to flooding (that is, excess NFIP). Many businesses in the 

hardest hit areas would be challenged to sustain themselves over a prolonged recovery period of time 

with limited resources (both funds and supplies) and displaced markets. As described by Wein and 

others (2013), long-term business and economic interruptions are not expected to be significant, but 

these losses would largely be unfunded. 

FEMA Public Assistance (PA) is designed to cover emergency response costs and repair costs 

for public facilities and infrastructure, including publicly owned port, marina, and harbor facilities. 

Thousands of claims would be likely in California alone from qualifying State and local governments, 

nonprofits, and utility providers. However, given that the tsunami scenario would affect the entire West 

Coast of the United States, it is important to consider that the PA program would simultaneously be 

addressing losses in Alaska and other West Coast States, which could delay the distribution of these 

funds by a year or two into the recovery. 

Also, the Public Assistance program is essentially a reimbursement-based program, and State

and local government agencies and other qualifying entities would need to front-end the costs until 

reimbursements are made. They also would need to provide the required 25 percent match of the 

Stafford Act programs. Although reimbursement is the preferred method for funding Public Assistance 

costs, regulations give FEMA the authority to provide advances for immediate needs. Similarly, FEMA 

has the regulatory ability to waive the local share and provide 100 percent funding for a limited period 

of time, usually for a designated emergency period. 

The tsunami scenario could also result in a fiscal crisis for local governments and special 

districts struggling to meet the response and recovery needs of such a scenario, while simultaneously 

facing significant sales and property tax revenue reductions due. This would be especially true in coastal 

communities that depend heavily on tourism, agricultural, and maritime activities or face significant 

housing losses or declining home values in the aftermath of the tsunami scenario. The impacts could 

have cascading effects, as localities and special districts turn to county and State levels for financial 

assistance. Local governments and utility providers do typically carry some levels of private insurance, 

although the coverage may not be sufficient. 

Private insurance would also provide some resources to the medium and large ports that carry it. 

However, recovery financing would likely be an issue for those that are uninsured as well as smaller 

ports, harbors, marinas, and other maritime and fishing businesses that are unlikely to be insured. 

Agricultural business recovery would also face long-term term financial challenges in restoring losses 

caused by floodwaters, addressing soil pollution and hazard materials issues, and any longer-term delays 

in crop restoration and maturity. Post-disaster agricultural assistance programs would be critical to this 

sector’s recovery, but these often come in the form of loans requiring repayment and having rather 

stringent rules. 

There would likely be significant pressure placed on Congress to pass supplemental disaster 

funding legislation to collectively address the multi-State and Federal recovery needs posed by both the 

Alaska Peninsula earthquake and tsunami. Supplemental disaster funding approved by Congress after 

recent disasters, such as Hurricanes Sandy and Katrina, funded a multitude of needs, including housing 

repair programs, additional funding for community facilities and infrastructure restoration, private 

property buyouts in hazardous areas, and economic restoration and development projects. However, 
30

given current Federal fiscal challenges, such political action may be difficult in future disasters, and 

California could also be competing with Oregon, Washington, and Alaska for allocations. States would 

need to cooperate in advocating for and allocating any resulting funds. 

What Additional Plans, Policies, and Guidelines Assist the Recovery of California’s Coastal Communities 

and Ports and Harbors Following a Major Tsunami? 

California’s State and local emergency management agencies and other agencies normally 

involved in environmental review, land use, development, and construction have limited experience 

dealing with a large-scale, statewide recovery and rebuilding effort like the one posed by the SAFRR 

tsunami scenario. The National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) provides guidance on how 

Federal agencies will coordinate to support key recovery support functions of: community planning and 

capacity building, economics, health and social services, housing, infrastructure systems, and natural 

and cultural resources (FEMA, 2011). It also calls for the appointment of Federal and State disaster 

recovery coordinators as well as local disaster recovery managers (LDRM) with post-disaster 

responsibilities to (1) lead in the creation of recovery organizations and initiatives and to coordinate 

their activities and (2) to work with State and Federal recovery partners in damage and impact 

assessments, prioritizing recovery issues and needs, identifying recovery funding sources, measuring 

recovery progress, and ensuring effective and consistent communication with stakeholders and the 

public (FEMA, 2011).

A statewide or regional coordinating, or advising, body may be needed to help craft policy and 

coordinate financing and long-term recovery technical assistance to impacted coastal communities, 

businesses, and individuals. The State currently has some legal mechanisms in place (for example, State

redevelopment legislation, geologic hazard abatement districts, and the Disaster Recovery and 

Reconstruction Act) that could aid in these kinds of efforts. Regional associations of governments could 

also provide leadership to coastal counties, cities, special districts, and unincorporated areas to 

collaborate and coordinate in advance recovery planning, especially on issues of resource sharing and 

regional concern. Such planning might use the SAFRR scenario or consider the likely impacts, 

particularly on regionally shared transportation, water, power and other essential facilities and lifelines, 

for larger and/or more localized tsunamis that are expected to impact the region. In turn, coastal cities, 

counties, and special districts (including school, water, and port and harbor districts) could be 

encouraged to prepare operational recovery plans utilizing findings from the tsunami scenarios. State 

and local governments may need to take special efforts to involve the maritime and coastal agricultural 

communities in understanding their potential losses and planning for post-tsunami recovery. 

Plans, policies and guidelines that are used in normal times to guide land use, development, and 

construction will inevitably need modifications to deal with the time-compressed, decision environment 

of post-disaster recovery (Olshansky and others, 2012). As reported by Plumlee and others (2013), port 

dredging and disposal and debris removal, both onshore and offshore, are crucial post-disaster problems 

with potentially complex regulatory and permitting processes. Streamlining these post-disaster 

processes while also ensuring environmental protection could substantially benefit local community 

recovery. Policies and programs may also need to be developed to address the removal of contaminated 

top soil, desalinization of soils, and the detoxification of concrete and other affected building materials. 

Although regulatory exemptions exist for disaster repair projects under the National Environmental 

Policy Act and the California Environmental Quality Act, other Federal or State laws or executive 

orders may not contain such exemptions and require approval by one or more regulatory agencies. In 

some instances, emergency permits are available with expedited processing procedures, or regulatory 

agencies may allow the repair work to proceed while the permit(s) are being processed. Post-disaster 
31

recovery planning and procedures—addressing issues like preparation of a dredging plan, collecting 

sediment samples, laboratory analysis, and dredging and disposal—could be included in any future State

guidance for maritime tsunami response and recovery. 

Challenges in Rebuilding More Resiliently For a Historically Infrequent Hazard, Like Tsunami

Recent tsunamis in Chile and Japan have repeatedly shown that most structures receiving two or 

more meters of tsunami-induced flooding will likely be destroyed or need to be demolished. In this 

scenario, there will be pockets of catastrophic damage in communities all along the California coast. 

Under NFIP, properties that are more than 50 percent damaged are supposed to have flood risk 

mitigation as part of rebuilding. Policies would need to be developed by State and local agencies to 

address standards for rebuilding areas of heavy damage as well as moderately damaged buildings and 

enforce the NFIP requirements for 50 percent or greater damaged structures. This may be politically 

challenging if tsunami resilient design standards have not yet been adopted as part of the CBC. 

Local governments (for example, city and county) may be pressured to make less than 50 

percent damage determinations so that people can rebuild to pre-disaster conditions. There may also be 

pressure to modify State and Federal policies and make exceptions for the tsunami disaster because 

tsunami has historically been a relatively infrequent hazard. The State TPHMP’s plans to develop 

probabilistic tsunami hazard maps would provide an important resource to assist State and local 

agencies in managing post-disaster land-use planning, zoning, and rebuilding actions. Furthermore, 

creation of an official tsunami hazard zone under California’s Seismic Hazard Mapping Act would also 

trigger tsunami design requirements for local post-disaster land use planning, zoning and rebuilding, 

including requirements for more site-specific investigation of associated geotechnical hazards and a plan 

to mitigate identified hazards before a building permit is issued. Local coastal counties and cities, as 

well as key reviewing and permitting agencies, such as the CCC, might need additional planning and 

technical assistance and guidelines to assist in implementing such an integrated mitigation policy 

framework post-disaster. 

There could also be opportunities to advance multi-hazard mitigation planning post-disaster and 

address issues of future tsunami risk, sea level rise and future coastal flooding and erosion, and 

earthquake-induced liquefaction. Multi-hazard mitigation options could include relocation and 

redevelopment of buyout areas, structural elevations, or retrofitting of slab-on-grade foundations. 

Mitigation incentives could be provided through a variety of planning and recovery financing 

mechanisms. For example, California Assembly Bill 2140, passed in 2006, provides an option for the 

State to increase its part of the local match for FEMA Public Assistance grants that it provides to 

disaster-impacted counties and cities, if they have a FEMA-approved LHMP that has also been adopted 

(by reference or incorporation) into the safety element of their general plan. This requirement could be 

strengthened post-disaster and also linked with Local Coastal Plan requirements. The SAFRR tsunami 

scenario provides an opportunity for State agencies, including Cal OES, CGS, the CCC, and BCDC to 

explore where mitigation policies and programs for dealing with different hazards might be combined 

and strengthened. 

Priority Policy Issues: Risk Awareness

An important function of risk awareness is to enhance the capacity of a person, household, or 

governmental unit to make informed resource allocation choices (Topping and others, 2010). As each 

becomes more aware of the tsunami risk that California faces, the greater the likelihood that they may 

decide to invest in resiliency actions. 
32

This section presents three key policy issues: (1) building awareness of tsunami risk; (2) 

building constituencies that can carry a common message forward over time; and (3) educating and 

training key professionals working in engineering, planning, maritime industries, and emergency 

management along California’s coast. 

Building the Awareness of At-Risk Communities to Tsunami and Their Potential Damaging and 

Fatal Effects

Since the mid-1990s, California’s emergency management community has been engaged in 

tsunami planning as part of multi-hazard planning. The catastrophic sequence of recent global tsunamis, 

starting with the December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami, have heightened tsunami risk awareness in 

the United States and California, and brought expanded funding to support the National Tsunami 

Hazard Mitigation Program as well as State and local tsunami emergency preparedness and public 

education programs. 

The California Tsunami Steering Committee oversees the State’s TPHMP, and its 

representatives come from all the coastal California counties, the NWS, and several State agencies. 

State program activities that are particularly focused on tsunami risk awareness include development 

and dissemination of outreach materials (brochures, pamphlets, DVDs), conducting educational 

workshops, supporting exercises and evacuation drills, participating in National Tsunami Preparedness 

Week, supporting regional work groups, purchasing tsunami hazard signs and developing tsunami sign 

placement plans, and coordinating with the NWS to support coastal communities in achieving 

TsunamiReady recognition. California currently leads the Nation in the number of communities 

(counties and cities) that have been recognized as TsunamiReady. 

As the analyses for the SAFRR tsunami scenario have shown, however, there are significant 

gaps in tsunami risk awareness among the general public, at-risk populations, key responders, and State

and local policymakers. Some key opportunities for building awareness, particularly of California’s 

most at-risk populations include: 

· Amending California’s natural hazards disclosure law (California Civil Code sec. 1103 et seq.) to 

require that real-estate purchasers be notified by the seller or seller’s agent when the property for 

sale is located in a tsunami hazard zone. 

· Expanding “Tsunami Preparedness Week” to “Tsunami Preparedness Month.” More time would 

allow for a more comprehensive public education and outreach program including school activities, 

fairs, town-hall meetings, evacuation exercises, live code tests of warning systems, and other special 

events. 

· Expanding California’s annual earthquake exercise and outreach effort known as the “Great 

California ShakeOut” to include tsunami education and preparedness in the program’s goals and 

objectives, Web site, distributed material, and activities. Since its advent in 2008, California’s 

ShakeOut program has dramatically increased community awareness and preparedness for 

earthquake hazards in California. In 2012, more than 9.4 million Californians registered for the 

Great California ShakeOut (Southern California Earthquake Center, 2013). 

· Adding TsunamiReady awareness into the Great California ShakeOut activities. 

· Promoting tsunami education and preparedness materials to hotel emergency coordinators who can 

share it with hotel guests. 

· Ensuring that the “Risk Awareness” part of FEMA’s Risk MAP (Mapping, Assessment, Planning) 

Program includes map-based information on tsunami risk. The Risk MAP theme to “clearly and 

effectively inform the public of their flood risk and impacts” exists but awaits implementation and 
33

offers an opportunity to better link tsunami hazards into coastal flooding risks (see 

http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3587, accessed August 23, 2013). 

Building Constituencies that can Carry a Common Message Forward Over Time is a Key Policy 

Challenge

Few of California’s coastal communities, businesses, and residents have experienced a 

significant tsunami and understand, first hand, the risks. To raise risk awareness, there need to be 

constituencies that support clear and consistent messaging over the long-term. 

Effective messaging needs to be consistent, unrelenting, and come from trusted sources 

(Topping and others, 2010). Most people respond better to graphic images than numerical data 

regarding risk and most also have difficulty dealing with probabilistic information; low probability 

events become “zero probability events” in people’s minds (Daniels and others, 2006). The basic 

tsunami risk awareness message needs to resonate with the core survival values of at-risk local 

governments, special districts, businesses, residents along California’s coast and stimulate them to 

advocate for action and take preparedness and mitigation actions themselves (for example, through 

training, obtaining insurance, knowing how to evacuate, having survival supplies at hand, and being 

able to communicate with local authorities following a disaster). 

Such efforts especially need to focus on areas where the greatest chance of isolation might occur 

and making sure that neighbors are capable first responders to the event. This requires a variety of 

partnerships of awareness. Community-based disaster response training programs like Community 

Emergency Response Training (CERT) may be a good vehicle for risk awareness promotion and 

communication at the neighborhood level. Similar efforts within the maritime community also could be 

developed and promoted. The Redwood Coast Tsunami Work Group is a form of coalition building for 

a common tsunami hazard (see Redwood Coast Tsunami Work Group Facebook page, accessed August 

23, 2013 at https://www.facebook.com/RCTWG?filter=3) and a model that might be promoted in other 

regions of the State, such as the San Francisco Bay area, the central coast, and southern California. 

The NTHMP provides a valuable multilevel coordination framework. Federal agencies working 

in partnership with the States and their communities to collect, interpret, and disseminate information on 

tsunami; promote public hazard awareness; and provide national, State, and local leadership and 

incentives to engage communities in tsunami preparedness and mitigation (for example TsunamiReady). 

For California’s tsunami risk message to be delivered with one unified political voice (at a Federal, 

State, or regional level) sustained funding for the NTHMP and its State counterpart is needed, and some 

new programmatic efforts will be required. Champions may need to be developed among locally elected 

officials, possibly through the California League of Cities, the California State Association of Counties, 

the State Legislature, and California’s Congressional delegation. West Coast States could also work as a 

coalition to advocate for sustained funding. 

Educating the media (including media meteorologists) can also build pre-event alliances as part 

of the message delivery system. The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center has had some success in working 

with the media on tsunami risk awareness that may yield lessons for California (see 

http://www.weather.gov/ptwc/, accessed August 23, 2013).

Strengthening Tsunami Risk Awareness Among Key Professionals is Also a Key Policy Issue

Tsunami hazard assessment, and mitigation and response planning are still relatively “young” 

fields for engineering, emergency management, and scientists. Educational elements of the NTHMP and 

State TPHMP may need to be strengthened to reach key professionals working in engineering, as well 

as land-use, hazard mitigation, and response planning along California’s coast. 
34

In engineering, for example, college curriculums, licensing, and continuing education in coastal 

engineering, structural engineering, and civil engineering could include the broad topic of tsunami 

hazard, including source generation and propagation, hydrodynamic inundation modeling and its 

limitations, and sources and treatment of uncertainty. Similar curricula and continuing education might 

also be developed and promoted in college urban planning and emergency management programs across 

the State. 

The maritime community also may need more focused training and education efforts. These 

might include incorporating a tsunami hazard component into harbor master guidebooks and ship-pilot 

licensing and boater-safety training programs. This might include information on basic tsunami 

characteristics, flow dynamics, the tsunami warning process, vessel evacuation procedures, designated 

harbor and offshore safety areas, and response planning for fuel, food, communications, and other 

supplies. 

Possible Courses of Action 

The SAFRR tsunami scenario aims to use science to inform decisions that enhance community 

resiliency, in this case resiliency against a tsunami that affects the entire West Coast of the United 

States. To actually enhance resiliency, however, significant disaster policy changes, programmatic 

adjustments, and organizational and individual behavioral adaptations will be required to face the 

immense challenges that such an extreme event poses. Some possible courses of actions that this 

assessment offers follow: 

Ensure Continued Funding and Support for the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, 

TsunamiReady and Affiliated State and Local Programs

Federal funding for the NTHMP is scheduled to end in 2013. Unless the Tsunami Warning and 

Education Act of 2006 is reauthorized, the foundation of the Nation’s and California’s tsunami policy 

framework will be significantly diminished and the future of the TsunamiReady program, and State

leadership for local tsunami hazard assessment, mitigation, and preparedness will be at significant risk. 

Recruit and Assist All California Coastal Communities and Ports and Harbors to Become

TsunamiReady

The TsunamiReady program, as a voluntary program, is more apt to attract better mitigation 

performers seeking this designation. Mechanisms are needed to encourage the most vulnerable and 

unprepared coastal communities and ports and harbors to voluntarily undertake mitigation and 

preparedness actions ahead of a tsunami disaster. The TsunamiReady program could help enhance 

communication, coordination, and information sharing among coastal communities on tsunami 

mitigation and preparedness plans and best practices. The standards for TsunamiReady designation 

might also be reviewed and a process for maintaining TsunamiReady designations over time might also 

be developed to help ensure that TsunamiReady designated communities and ports and harbors are 

indeed ready for the impacts of a future tsunami. 

Develop a Coordinated and Sufficiently Robust Policy Framework for Tsunami Hazard Assessment 

and Mitigation Planning for California Coastal Communities and Ports and Harbors

A more robust and integrated planning framework would help to reinforce knowledge of hazards 

and their potential impacts, improve mitigation actions that could be taken to reduce vulnerability, and 
35

result in improved and more coordinated response efforts across all responsible government agencies 

during a disaster. Adoption of official State tsunami hazard zones under the State Seismic Hazard 

Mapping Act could provide a strong foundation for such an integrated framework. Guidelines could link 

the hazard zones into State and local land use, zoning, subdivision and development permitting 

processes as well as LHMPs, LCPs, and the safety elements of local general plans. Legislative changes 

may be needed to ensure better integration of the tsunami hazard zones in State and local planning and 

development requirements and consistency with any tsunami-resilient building design code provisions 

that are adopted. Similarly, consistent statewide guidelines for maritime tsunami response and recovery 

could be developed for use in harbor safety planning; evacuation, response and recovery planning by 

port, harbor and marina management; and pilot licensing and boater training programs. 

Explore Opportunities to Advance Multi-Hazard Mitigation Planning Along California’s Coast and 

Bays

The SAFRR tsunami scenario provides an opportunity to advance multi-hazard mitigation 

planning along California’s coast and bays to more holistically address issues of future tsunami risk, 

sea-level rise and future coastal flooding and erosion, and earthquake-induced liquefaction. State

agencies, including Cal OES, CGS, the CCC, and BCDC, could explore where mitigation policies and 

programs for dealing with different hazards might be combined and strengthened. Multi-hazard 

mitigation options could include relocation and redevelopment of buyout areas, structural elevations, or 

retrofitting of slab-on-grade foundations. 

Encourage Responders and Government Managers to Conduct Self-Assessments, Devise 

Exercises, and More Carefully Consider the Geographic Scale of This and Other Tsunami 

Scenarios

Emergency responders and government managers at all levels could be encouraged to conduct 

self-assessments, devise exercises, and more carefully consider how the short-fuse intensity and wide 

geographic scale of the SAFRR and other tsunami scenarios could challenge current assumptions in 

warning and evacuation protocols, emergency response and planning documents, organizational 

structures and systems, and their abilities to scale up and meet the needs of such events and overcome 

the relative lack of experience that most managers and the general public will have with tsunamispecific issues. Such assessments and exercises could help to create more locally and regionally specific 

scenarios of impacts and also identify gaps in public and private sector resources available to respond to 

and recover from a large-scale tsunami. Political leaders, policymakers, and administrators could be 

involved in such assessments and exercises, and the level of emergency complexity and testing could be 

increased over time. An ongoing cycle of activities to account for normal staff turnover, provide 

refresher training, and update plans and operating procedures is needed to maintain an effective state of 

readiness. Tsunami evacuation “playbooks” under development by the State TPHMP will provide more 

detailed models of potential inundation areas for a number of different tsunami scenarios. Coastal 

emergency managers can then use them in preparing local evacuation response plans that are more 

tsunami source specific. Similarly, the State TPHMP maritime mapping and guidelines will help 

California’s ports, harbors, and marinas to better plan for evacuations, response, and recovery. The 

SAFRR tsunami scenario provides important justification of the need for both the community playbooks 

and maritime planning products and the need for robust dissemination and training efforts associated 

with their release. The SAFRR tsunami scenario also provides a useful source of information to test 
36

national tsunami warning protocols and see what improvements could be made to alert dissemination 

protocols. 

Work to Address Recovery Challenges

Work should be considered to address recovery challenges likely for the most vulnerable coastal 

communities and ports and harbors, as well parts of the State’s fishing and agriculture sectors. The 

SAFFR tsunami scenario could also result in a fiscal crisis for coastal local governments and special 

districts struggling to meet the response and recovery needs of such a tsunami disaster, while 

simultaneously facing significant sales and property tax revenue reductions. This would be especially 

true in coastal communities that depend heavily on tourism, agricultural, and maritime activities 

impacted by the tsunami. The impacts could have cascading effects. All California coastal counties and 

cities could be encouraged to become participate communities in the National Flood Insurance Program. 

Similarly, NFIP coverage could be promoted to coastal residents and businesses to offer some additional 

protection from tsunami-induced flooding. Efforts could also be encouraged to streamline regulatory 

and permitting processes that would be required for port dredging and disposal and debris removal, both 

on- and offshore, after a tsunami disaster. Policies and programs may also be needed to address the 

removal of contaminated topsoil, desalinization of soils, and the detoxification of concrete and other 

affected building materials. 

Develop and Consistently Communicate Common Messages About Tsunami Risk

It is essential to develop and consistently communicate common messages to educate the general 

public, at-risk populations, and businesses, State and local policymakers, and key professionals about 

tsunami risk. Federal, State, and local models exist for crafting and executing a robust tsunami risk 

awareness and education program for a major tsunami striking California and the rest of the West Coast. 

Multilevel, multifactor involvement needs to be a core component of such an effort. Opportunities for 

building awareness, particularly of California’s most at-risk populations, include amending California’s 

natural hazards disclosure law (California Civil Code sec. 1103 et seq.) to require that real estate 

purchasers be notified by the seller or seller’s agent when the property for sale is located in a tsunami 

hazard zone and expanding California’s annual earthquake exercise and outreach effort known as 

“ShakeOut” to include tsunami education and preparedness. Because tsunami hazard assessment, and 

mitigation and response planning are still relatively “young” fields tsunami education and training needs 

to be strengthened to reach key professionals working in engineering, as well as land-use, hazard 

mitigation, and response planning along California’s coast. 

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