JSOU Report 13-8 Strategic Culture Russell D. Howard

Strategic Culture

Russell D. Howard

JSOU Report 13-8

December 2013

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Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director

Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Director of Research

Mark Moyar, Ph.D., History; William Knarr, Ed.D., Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Richard Rubright, 

Ph.D., Strategic Studies; Jason Quirin, Ph.D., Chemical Engineering; Joanna Gutierrez Winters, 

M.A., International Relations and Diplomacy, M.A., Economics, Resident Senior Fellows

Anna-Marie Wyant, M.A., English, JSOU Press Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Joseph D. Celeski

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Chuck Cunningham

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 

Professor of Strategy, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School and JSOU Distinguished 

Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies, Air University and 

JSOU Associate Fellow 

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Thomas Sass

Ph.D., International Relations

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Francisco R. Wong-Diaz

J.D., Ph.D., Political Science

Professor of international affairs and law and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow
On the cover. 

Top left: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Photo courtesy 

U.S. Institute of Peace. 

Top right: Chinese troops stand in formation during former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld’s visit to the Ministry of Defense in Beijing. Armed 

Forces Press Service photo by Donna Miles. 

Bottom left: Masked al-Qaeda sponsored militants conduct training exercises in an ungoverned Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Photo used by 

permission of Newscom. 

Bottom Right: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un gives a New Year speech 

January 1, 2013. Photo used by permission of Newscom. 

JSOU Report 13-8

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2013

Strategic Culture

Russell D. Howard
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.

socom.mil. Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are 

invited and should be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, 

Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, 

FL 33621.

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The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please 

contact the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for 

your interest in the JSOU Press. 

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This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN: 978-1-933749-82-2
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or 

position of the United States Government, Department of 

Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the 

Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment, 

November 2013

Piracy: The Best Business Model Available, November 2013, John Alexander

The Terrorist Trafficking Nexus: Scourge of the World or so Much Hype?, 

October 2013, Russell D. Howard and Colleen Traughber

Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual, September 2013

Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform, September 2013, 

Richard Shultz

Hybrid Warfare, August 2013, Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson

Special Operations Research Topics 2014

Smart Power and U.S. National Strategy, August 2013, Francisco Wong-Diaz

Retooling for the Future, May 2013, Francisco Wong-Diaz

21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations, April 2013, 

Harry R. Yarger

Irregular Warfare: The Maoist Threat to India’s Internal Security, December 2012, 

Prakash Singh

Iran: Illusion, Reality, and Interests, September 2012, Roby Barrett

Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces, 

August 2012, Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

2012 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, July 2012
vii

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................ix

About the Author ....................................................................xi

Acknowledgement ................................................................xii

1. Introduction........................................................................ 1

2. The American Way of War and Strategic Culture ................. 7

3. Chinese Strategic Culture.................................................. 11

4. Strategic Culture of Iran .................................................... 27

5. North Korean Strategic Culture ......................................... 41

6. Strategic Culture of al-Qaeda ........................................... 55

7. Common Characteristics of Chinese, Iranian, 

 North Korean, and al-Qaeda’s Strategic Cultures .............. 65

8. Conclusion ...................................................................... 83

Endnotes............................................................................... 89

ix

Foreword

Brigadier General (retired) Russ Howard presents an argument that 

traditional methods of International Relations Theory, such as realism and liberalism, are not good predictive tools in an effort to forecast the 

behaviors of state and non-state actors. These theoretical explanations were 

originated and fostered in an almost exclusively state centric international 

system. Today’s international system is more complex and diverse than could 

have been envisaged in the 19th and 20th centuries. The complex web of 

religious ideologies, globally connected information technologies, and the 

interdependence of a globalized economy are some examples of driving 

forces that confound traditional International Relations Theory.

General Howard presents a substitute for the traditional theories by 

asserting that strategic culture analysis of states and non-state actors or 

groups is a better predictor of behavior. Specifically, General Howard posits 

that studying and understanding the strategic cultures of threatening 

states and non-state actors might be a more useful mechanism for analyzing potential adversaries’ proclivity to using force to further their strategic 

security objectives. General Howard applies a definition of strategic culture 

as referring to a nation’s (or group’s) traditions, values, attitudes, patterns 

of behavior, symbols, achievements, and particular ways of adapting to the 

environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force. 

In this monograph, General Howard defines and reviews strategic culture 

to present a clear and concise frame of reference. The author then delves into 

the strategic cultures of The United States, China, Iran, North Korea, and 

al-Qaeda before analyzing commonalities among the four. This foundation allows General Howard to then develop and provide actionable policy 

guidelines to contextualize an end state which strategic cultural analysis can 

provide. Yet, the author recognizes and advocates for further study on the 

subject. Identifying the need for expertise in understanding what strategic 

culture represents is a long way from understanding the strategic cultures 

of all state and non-state actors.

General Howard’s definition of strategic culture and its substitution for 

International Relations Theory presents a challenge to Special Operations 

Forces (SOF); but not an insurmountable problem or anathema to the SOF 
x

culture. Rather, General Howard’s advocating for strategic culture analysis 

is quite in line with the SOF emphasis on the human domain. Considerable 

effort will have to be made to not only hire expertise, but to incorporate the 

analysis within the SOF community. This strategic culture analysis is not just 

a realm for the strategic planner; rather, it can be beneficial to all echelons, 

from the SOF operator in a village who must understand and work within 

the strategic culture of the operational environment, to the policymakers 

who must decide National Strategy.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
xi

About the Author

Brigadier General (retired) Russ Howard is an 

Adjunct Professor of Terrorism Studies and 

Senior Research Fellow at the Monterey Institute of 

International Studies. He is also a Senior Fellow at 

JSOU and a Senior Adviser to Singapore’s Home Team 

Academy. Previously, General Howard was the founding Director of The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 

the Head of the Department of Social Sciences and the 

founding director of the Combating Terrorism Center 

at West Point. 

His previous Army positions include chief of staff fellow at the Center 

for International Affairs, Harvard University and commander of the 1st 

Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington. Other recent 

assignments include assistant to the Special Representative to the Secretary 

General during United Nations Operations in Somalia II, deputy chief of staff 

for I Corps, and chief of staff and deputy commander for the Combined Joint 

Task Force, Haiti/Haitian Advisory Group. Previously, he was commander of 

3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg. 

He also served as the administrative assistant to Admiral Stansfield Turner 

and as a special assistant to the commander of U.S. Southern Command.

As a newly commissioned officer, he served as an “A” team commander in 

the 7th Special Forces Group from 1970 to 1972. He left the active component 

and then served in the U.S. Army Reserve from 1972 to 1980. During this 

period he served as an overseas manager, American International Underwriters, Melbourne, Australia and China tour manager for Canadian Pacific 

Airlines. He was recalled to active duty in 1980 and served initially in Korea 

as an infantry company commander. Subsequent assignments included classified project officer, U.S. Army 1st Special Operations Command at Fort 

Bragg, and operations officer and company commander, 1st Battalion, 1st 

Special Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan. 

General Howard has a B.S. in Industrial Management from San Jose State 

University and B.A. in Asian Studies from the University of Maryland. He 
xii

also has an M.A. in International Management from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a Master of Public Administration from 

Harvard University. He was an assistant professor of Social Sciences at the 

U.S. Military Academy and a senior service college fellow at The Fletcher 

School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. His previous JSOU Press 

publications are Intelligence in Denied Spaces: New Concepts for a Changing 

Security Environment (2007) and Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders 

for a Complex Security Environment (2009), and Cultural and Linguistic 

Skills Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, Acceleration, and Potential 

Alternatives (2011), and The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of 

the World or So Much Hype? (2013).

Acknowledgement

The author would like to acknowledge his research assistant Ms. Cleo Haynal 

for her contributions to this monograph. Ms. Haynal holds an M.A. in 

Nonproliferation and Terrorism from the Monterey Institute and a B.A. in 

Political Science from the University of California - Berkley. Ms. Haynal is 

currently an associate with the McChrystal Group in Alexandria, Virginia.
1

Howard: Strategic Culture

1. Strategic Culture: Introduction

Why Strategic Culture?

The author of this monograph taught the International Relations (IR) core 

course at West Point for two years and was the head of the department 

responsible for teaching the IR course for five. A frequent question from 

students in the course (and professors too) was, “Can IR theory predict 

conflict?” The answer was, “Not really.” At best, the two major IR schools of 

thought (realism and liberalism) hedge their bets “by offering both a pessimistic and an optimistic variant—a tacit admission that, on the most burning issue of the day, the predictive value of IR theory is close to nil.”1

 While 

some suggest that realism, liberalism, and other IR theories do have some 

analytical “predictive power,” this study posits that examining the strategic 

cultures of threatening states such as Iran and North Korea, possible peer 

competitors such as China, and non-state actors such as al-Qaeda might be 

a more useful mechanism for analyzing potential adversaries’ proclivity to 

using force to further their strategic security objectives. 

This monograph is in eight sections. First, the strategic culture concept is 

defined and reviewed. Next the strategic cultures of the United States, China, 

Iran, North Korea, and al-Qaeda are presented, in that order. Those chapters 

are followed by an analysis of the main commonalities among the four entities’ strategic cultures and derive actionable policy guidelines. Finally, the 

monograph concludes by summarizing the findings and suggesting more 

study on the topic. 

Defining Strategic Culture

A standard definition of strategic culture has proven elusive2—so elusive, 

in fact, that an enterprising master’s degree candidate at the University of 

Northern British Columbia made defining strategic culture her thesis topic.3

Canadian Naval Lieutenant Melanie Graham spent more than two years 

of study and more than a hundred well-researched pages to develop the 

following definition: “Strategic Culture is the shared, culturally embedded 

social, economic, and political values and priorities of a society, relevant to 
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security preferences, as historically shaped by successful interaction with 

and adaptation to their prevailing bio-physical and strategic environment.”4

Another recent definition derives from a 2006 Monterey, California conference on “Comparative Strategic Culture” sponsored by the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency. Unfortunately, the conference members did not achieve 

consensus on a definition, but the following was accepted by the majority: 

“Strategic Culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of 

behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both 

oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other 

groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving 

security objectives.”5

Perhaps a definition penned decades ago, when strategic culture was 

trumpeted as new analytical approach for national security policy, is most 

useful for the purposes of this monograph: strategic culture “refers to a 

nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, 

achievements, and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force.” According to this 

definition, strategic culture is derived from a nation’s history, geography, 

and political culture, and represents the aggregate of attitudes and patterns 

of behavior employed by a nation’s most influential political and military 

elites. Thus, when employing strategic culture, one studies a set of patterns 

that divulge a nation’s behavior on issues of conflict, use of force, and war 

and peace.6

 All of the definitions presented are useful, but the real point is 

that similar security variables—geography, history, power, size of military, 

et cetera—can be applied differently because of a nation’s strategic culture—

which is the underlying importance of the concept. 

First Use of the Strategic Culture Concept 

In 1977, RAND Corporation researcher Jack Snyder advanced the strategic 

culture argument into the realm of modern security studies. His analysis 

attempted to answer the question, “Can cultural analysis tell us anything 

significant about strategic outcomes?” He believed strategic culture could 

be used to interpret Soviet military and nuclear strategy. The preamble to 

his monograph: “The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications Limited Nuclear 

Operations,” starts with a disclaimer stating that he makes no attempt to 
3

Howard: Strategic Culture

predict Soviet reactions; he wrote that the paper instead “seeks the more 

modest objectives of providing context for a better understanding of the 

intellectual, institutional, and strategic cultural determinants that would 

bound the Soviet decision-making process in a crisis and speculating on 

the dominant behavioral propensities that would motivate or constraint the 

Soviet leaders.”7 Specifically, Snyder contended that because of a uniquely 

Russian socialization process, the Soviets developed a set of general beliefs, 

attitudes, and behavior patterns with regard to nuclear strategy, which 

achieved a state of cultural semi-permanence beyond mere policy.8 Snyder 

applied strategic culture concepts to interpret the development not only of 

Soviet but also American nuclear doctrines and decided both were products 

of different organizational, historical, and political contexts and technological constraints.9

 Following his example, IR scholars have increasingly 

sought to supplement their historical studies with anthropological and ethnographic research to better understand how strategic culture varies among 

nations.

While Snyder is generally recognized as the first to advance strategic 

culture’s contemporary value, in truth the notion of strategic culture has 

a much longer history. Traces of strategic culture thinking are “discerned 

in the classic works of strategy, including the works of Thucydides and Sun 

Tzu.”10 Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War shows an understanding of the political and cultural differences between Sparta and Athens before 

and during the titular conflict.11 In an interesting article titled “The Use and 

Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations,” Laurie Johnson explains 

that the national character, including “Spartan reticence and inwardness, and 

Athenian boldness and lust for glory [...] and the individual characters of the 

leaders (the abrasive personality of the Spartan general Pausanias, the statesmanship of Themistocles and Pericles, the personalities of Alcibiades and 

Nicias) play an important role in Thucydides’ History.”12 Johnson concludes 

that Thucydides’ explanation of the Peloponnesian War was more about the 

differences in national character and individual leaders than the traditional 

IR explanations, which focus on the distribution of power between Athens 

and Sparta. In a similar vein, strategic studies theorists such as Sun Tzu, 

with his emphasis on the wisdom of knowing oneself and the enemy, point 

to the importance of understanding culture in explaining national security 

behavior.13
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More recent examples of strategic culture predating Snyder include Julian 

Corbett’s distinction between the German (continental) and British (maritime) schools of strategic thought, with the former capitalizing on its location 

in central Europe and focusing on war between land powers, and the latter 

leveraging conflict between a sea power and a land power.14 British military 

historian Basil H. Liddell-Hart “refined Corbett’s argument, noting that 

Britain had historically followed a distinctive approach to war by avoiding 

large commitments on land and using sea power to bring economic pressure 

to bear against its adversaries.”15 Other nations’ strategic cultures similarly 

reflect geographic and contextual realities. For example, “Israel’s lack of geographic depth, its small but educated population, and technological skill has 

produced a strategic culture that emphasizes strategic preemption, offensive 

operations, initiative, and—increasingly—advanced technology.”16

Not surprisingly, the United States has a perceived strategic culture that 

includes taking advantage of its productive capacity and technological superiority to attrite an adversary into submission. However, there is much more 

to American strategic culture than such simplistic generalizations. Thus, a 

more detailed description—important for understanding adversaries’ strategic cultures—is provided in the next section.

Usefulness of Strategic Culture

There is a good deal of debate regarding the usefulness of strategic culture. 

Some believe the concept is helpful in determining the structure and process 

of decision-making and has the potential for being a predictive tool in the 

future.17 Others see strategic culture as a modern-day enigma, admitting 

that the concept has utility but ultimately viewing it as difficult to quantify 

and poorly suited to traditional Western debate or reasoning.18 Still others 

contend that strategic culture may produce tendencies or create predispositions, but it cannot determine policy. In other words, they believe strategic culture can be an important factor in developing attitudes and shaping 

behavior, but cannot by itself fully explain outcomes.19 They argue that other 

variables, such as technology, the media, divergent opinions among security 

elites, and public opinion (particularly in democracies) also affect policy 

and may be more dominant influences. Another perspective views strategic 

culture as useful in providing greater awareness of the complex interplay of 
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Howard: Strategic Culture

influences on strategic decision making and provides greater clarity of past 

actions while enhancing flexibility for the determination of those in the 

future.20 Furthermore, some question the explanations of causality between 

strategic culture and strategic decisions. Most notable in this area is the 

prolific debate between strategic culture scholars Colin S. Gray and Alastair 

Iain Johnston (in the name of what they call first generation and third generation ideas of cultural strategists) over the analysis of cultural context to 

understand or to explain strategic decisions. Johnston, arguing for more 

rigorous analytic methodology, seeks to draw causality patterns between the 

defined dependent variable (strategic behavior) and the isolated independent 

variables (strategic culture).21 Gray resists this attempt by warning against 

the unavoidable oversimplification of this method.22 Finally, some believe 

strategic culture is a useful tool for historical and policy analysts but may be 

most useful as an analytical concept for avoiding mirror imaging.23

This study agrees with those who discount strategic culture’s predictive 

qualities and sides with those who contend that it is one of many useful tools 

to analyze other states’ (and in the case of al-Qaeda, other entities’) strategic thinking and proclivity for the use of force. Studying strategic culture 

encourages analysts to examine trends through historical, cultural, and 

geographical lenses and to avoid mirror imaging. Finally, applying strategic 

culture analysis to practice makes it possible to understand the many critical aspects of a specific enemy’s approach to the use of armed force, not as 

the actions of some “generic, rational man”24 but in the light of a distinctive strategic culture, thereby putting, as Bernard Brodie advocated, “good 

anthropology and sociology” into practice.25

What is clear from these debates is that there is seldom a unitary opinion 

within a nation or institution about strategy. For example, as our understanding of jihadist ideology deepens, we learn through analysts such as 

Thomas Hedgehammer26 about the often-rich debate within terrorist circles 

over strategy and tactics. Past ideas about al-Qaeda and the global jihadist 

network now seem simplistic and even misleading—something policymakers 

should consider when formulating courses of action for counterterrorism.

Heretofore, strategic culture has been used to measure the national objectives and policy of state actors,27 so using strategic culture in an al-Qaeda 

context requires some explanation. Al-Qaeda, despite its dreams of a reestablished caliphate, is neither a state nor a nation. Instead, it is a transnational non-state actor with international ambitions. So, the question is, would 
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al-Qaeda be a candidate for strategic culture analysis? The answer, according 

to strategic culture analyst Jerry Mark Long, is a qualified “yes.”28 Long contends that other factors such as religion account for al-Qaeda’s nation and 

state-like characteristics. According to Long, a nation is a group of people 

who strongly identify with an overarching, shared cultural narrative—a key 

focus in strategic culture analysis that has historically applied to state entities. Religion can replicate a state by serving “as a powerful ethnic marker; 

a critical element constitutive of identity.”29 In the case of Islam, says Long, 

“the appeal that Salafi jihadists make is that the bond of religion trumps state 

identification. This replicates the pattern of early Islam, wherein the forefathers claimed that loyalty to the Ummah, the Islamic community, superseded 

any loyalty to a kinship group or notion of a state.”30

China, Iran, North Korea, and al-Qaeda each possess distinct strategic cultures. Commonalities of cultural traits and categories can be found 

among all four, but the strategic cultural peculiarities of each—if properly 

understood and addressed—could assist security specialists in achieving 

more optimal policy decisions.31
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Howard: Strategic Culture

2. The American Way of War and 

American Strategic Culture

An oft-cited Sun Tzu quote, “Knowing yourself and knowing your enemy 

will win you a thousand battles,” is an apt introduction to this paper’s 

discussions. In that vein, some basic knowledge of American strategic culture—or cultures—will enable the reader to better understand and assimilate 

the Chinese, Iranian, North Korean, and al-Qaeda strategic cultures central 

to this study. At the national and strategic levels, both geography and history have shaped American strategic culture. Historically, North America’s 

insular position bracketed by large oceans and relatively peaceful borders 

to the north and south combined to provide the United States free security. 

Add the protection provided by the British Royal Navy, and the U.S. was 

basically a free rider in an otherwise complex international security environment. As one scholar notes, “American insularity and the existence of 

free security bred the view that war is a deviation from the norm of peace. 

American strategic culture was shaped by long periods of peace punctuated 

by generational conflicts—the War of 1812, the Civil War, World War I, and 

World War II—defined as a crusade of good versus evil.”32

Indeed, Americans have tended to cast their wars as crusades against 

evil; as Samuel Huntington described, “For the American a war is not a 

war unless it is a crusade.”33 Thus Americans traditionally thought of war 

in absolute terms in which the enemy was demonized, the fight was to the 

finish, and absolute victory was the ultimate objective. George W. Bush’s 

post-9/11 speeches are representative of this perspective as he referenced the 

fight against al-Qaeda as a crusade, proclaimed to both enemies and allies 

that “you are either with us or against us,”34 and taunted Osama bin Laden 

by declaring him, in the words of the old west, “wanted: dead or alive.”35

The first discussion of a distinct American strategic culture can be linked 

to Russell Weigley’s much-quoted tome, The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy. Written in 1973, Weigley’s book 

noted that achieving a “crushing” military victory over an adversary, “either 

through a strategy of attrition or one of annihilation,” was the American way 

of war.36 According to Weigley, U.S. military and political leaders typically 

viewed the total destruction of an opponent’s military capability and the 
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occupation of its capital as marking 

the end of war and the beginning 

of postwar negotiations.37 

The author of this monograph 

has shared the following view with 

perhaps a thousand West Point 

cadets and students in multiple 

venues around the world: “Traditional American strategic culture is easy to understand: we take a straight 

shot to the chops, pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, mobilize by maximizing all of the elements of national power, deploy and dominate, prevail, celebrate with a parade, and then demobilize—that is America’s way of war.”38

The ability to maximize all elements of power—military, economic, diplomatic, and communications—has been America’s comparative advantage 

and very much a part of its strategic culture. 

However, many critics disagree. What about “bear any burden and pay 

any price?” What about strong moral obligations and constraints and the 

high value placed on human life? Also, while the model described above 

might be relevant to World War II, some would argue that it does not explain 

Vietnam, and that it certainly does not explain adventures in Somalia past 

and present.

The truth is that America’s strategic culture entails much more than the 

so-called American way of war. In fact, the concept of strategic culture is 

much more refined than the simplistic concept of a cultural “way of war” 

ascribed to certain nation, ethnic group, or region, as it encompasses a combination of several mostly sociological factors that interact with each other 

in a complex and dynamic manner. Some seemingly contradictory tenets 

of American strategic culture, such as the model explained above, do coexist with the idea of a responsibility to liberty and a sense of greater duty to 

protect a typically American way of life. 

Often missing from discussions of a particular nation’s strategic culture 

are the contextual constraints on using force. In this regard, the United 

States is at a disadvantage when compared to al-Qaeda or the rest of the 

countries in this study. While U.S. leaders contemplating the use of force are 

heavily constrained by legal and moral considerations, these are often not 

applicable to other leaders, who are relatively unconstrained in their own 

considerations. For example, in his book Asymmetric Warfare, Roger W. 

The ability to maximize all elements 

of power—military, economic, diplomatic, and communications—has 

been America’s comparative advantage and very much a part of its 

strategic culture.
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Howard: Strategic Culture

Barnett explains in detail what he categorizes as the four major constraints 

against the American use of military force: operational, organizational, legal, 

and moral.39 All create an impediment to waging war, but for the United 

States, legal and moral constraints are more dominant than in any other 

entity described in this paper. Thus, in order for the United States to pursue 

war, the threat must be directly related to the survival of the country or be 

characterized as “evil incarnate”—as was fascism in World War II, communism in the Cold War, and terrorism during the current war on terror.40

Moreover, strategic culture is not unitary. Brian McAllister Linn’s work 

on the respective intellectual traditions of the Army shows that even a single 

institution can have multiple contrasting perspectives.41 For example, the 

recent debate concerning the relevance of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine to today’s security environment is instructive. COIN advocates experienced a renaissance as they updated a COIN doctrine that was applicable—at 

least in their view—not just to conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to 

the types of conflict they envisioned the U.S. facing in the future. Iraq hero 

and Ph.D. General David Petraeus and COIN guru and Ph.D. Lieutenant 

Colonel John Nagl were among an impressive cohort of advocates that put 

COIN theory, as articulated in Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, into 

practice.42 Fast forward a few years, and COIN naysayers published a series 

of articles declaring COIN obsolete and criticizing Field Manual 3-24.

43 Led 

by West Point history professor and Iraq War veteran Colonel Jian Gentile, 

the COIN advocates argue that the U.S. military places undue emphasis on 

counterinsurgency at the expense of preparedness for conventional warfare.44

Declaring a victor in the COIN debate is not the purpose of this paper. What 

is important is the notion that there can be differing strategic visions within 

a nation’s security establishment, particularly in a democracy. Likewise, a 

nation’s strategic culture can change over time, and dichotomies can exist 

within a strategic culture—a theme that will resonate throughout the body 

of this work. 

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Howard: Strategic Culture

3.Chinese Strategic Culture

Chinese culture is based on one of the oldest continuing civilizations 

in the world45—one that initiated many political, technological, and 

military firsts. However, despite its long history, China’s complex and multifaceted strategic culture has remained relatively constant and true to its 

historical roots. As Chinese strategic culture expert Tony Corn explains, 

“Chinese historical experiences and collective memories such as the Warring 

States period (475-221 BC) and the Sino-Japanese Wars (1894-95 and 1937-45) 

define China’s strategic cultural thought.”46 In addition to those historical 

events, literary works such as Sun Tzu’s Art of War, written in the 6th century BC, and writings on Confucian and Legalist philosophies serve to both 

contextualize and immortalize historical Chinese strategic culture. Also of 

importance is the Maoist ideology that created the communist regime in its 

own specifically Chinese variation. The unique experience of Maoist communism reinforces certain cultural traits that were already present in Chinese 

society to create a deeply hierarchical, homogeneous, and closed society.47

Most agree on several points relative to China’s evolving strategic culture. 

For example, China is a continental power, has a long history of internal alliances based on familial relationships and kinship, is a hierarchical society, 

bases international alliances purely on self-interest, and uses several different asymmetric warfare tactics to achieve strategic objectives. Indeed, Chinese strategic culture is unambiguously unique. However, there is a debate 

among China experts about whether China’s strategic culture is predicated 

on defense and deterrence or is more offensive in nature. 

The Debate over China’s Strategic Culture Contradictions 

Like the American strategic culture discussed in this monograph, China’s 

strategic culture has more than one variant; however, in the case of Chinese 

strategic culture, experts disagree on the number of variants and variant 

terminology. For example, Australian Justin Arnold believes there are two 

variants of Chinese strategic culture: one traditional (Confucian) and the 

other modern (Marxist-Leninist and Mao Zedong-thought). According to 

Arnold, the traditional variant is defensive and the more recent Maoist variant has militaristic and expansionist aspirations. Arnold further adds that 
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the two variants are not mutually exclusive, and are debated within China’s 

security elite. He posits that China would be better off internationally if it 

applied both simultaneously: 

China, if it wants to return to its rightful place as a global power, 

needs a government that is both willing and able to not only define, 

but implement a culture of strategy that is both modern and traditional so that its regional neighbors, global economic partners and 

its own citizens can predict how it will respond to conflict situations both at home and around the Asia Pacific Region.48

Christopher Twomey discusses Chinese strategic culture in terms of 

themes, suggesting that there are six apparent themes in Chinese strategic culture that are not necessarily contradictory. However, in general, the 

themes are conceived as independent from each other in the forces that they 

apply on the Chinese strategic culture.49 They do also range from defensive to 

expansionist and from domestically focused to internationally ambitious.50 

This chapter will explain some of the dualities and complexities of Chinese 

strategic culture. 

Political Geography

China’s political geography has had a major impact on its strategic culture. 

China acts as, and is, a continental power. Drawing its strength from its large 

population and land mass, its strength is also its vulnerability; China has 

traditionally focused on its long borders and protecting the heartland from 

invasions from the northern steppes.51 China’s formidable land mass has 

more contiguous neighbors than any other country except Russia. Furthermore, those neighbors “include five countries with which China has fought 

wars in the past 70 years (India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Vietnam) 

and a number of states ruled by unstable regimes.”52 Understandably, this 

creates a deeply defensive strategy and has kept the focus historically more 

on the country’s immediate borders rather than far conquests.

Despite having a 9,000-mile coastline bordering the Pacific Ocean,53

China’s leaders did not perceive a seaborne threat until 1840, when China 

was defeated by the British in the first Opium War:54

Historically, the security threat that preoccupied China’s leaders 

was exposure to raiding or invasion by the steppe nomads of Inner 

Asia. This threat was always latent and sometimes lethal: More than 
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one Chinese dynasty succumbed to the horsemen of the north. The 

strategic culture formed by this history and political geography was 

therefore a profoundly continentalist one.55

With one notable exception, throughout China’s long history its leaders 

have traditionally emphasized land power over sea power. The one exception 

was a series of voyages undertaken by the Muslim eunuch Admiral Zheng 

He in the early 15th century (1405–1433):

Under the patronage of the Ming Emperor Yongle, Admiral He 

undertook an ambitious program of ship construction and maritime infrastructure development. Zheng commanded seven major 

ocean-going expeditions, typically consisting of hundreds of ships 

and tens of thousands of men. These expeditions showed the Ming 

banner in the Strait of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf 

and even East Africa.56

The fleet included warships mounting cannon as well as “treasure ships,” 

of which the largest may have been 440 feet in length and displaced more 

than 20,000 tons; vessels on this scale dwarfed anything known in the West 

at that time. Nevertheless, this was a momentary effort—a blip on the Chinese historical radar screen—that was lost on subsequent dynasties, all of 

which reemphasized continental strategic culture.

An interesting change within the last decade is that, with its increasing 

export market, China has made stunning advances in global shipbuilding 

markets and immense inroads in expanding its merchant marine.57 China 

has also been rapidly modernizing its navy. These factors together suggest 

that China is becoming an outward-looking maritime state.58 In August 

2012, China acquired its first aircraft carrier. Although a sign of increased 

interest in building a blue water navy, the Chinese aircraft carrier, which was 

originally intended to be the Soviet Union’s second main battle carrier, is 

approximately two-thirds the size of the U.S. Navy’s newest aircraft carriers.59

There may be an increased emphasis on building a maritime force, but two 

millennia of distinctively continental strategic culture indicate that Chinese 

land borders will most certainly remain the country’s primary concern. 
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Hierarchy and Patriarchy: The Legacy of Confucianism 

and Legalism 

Hierarchy and political control is deeply ingrained in the main philosophies that have influenced Chinese strategic culture. Both Confucianism and 

Legalism developed during the China’s Warring States period (471-221 BC). 

While Confucianism is attributed to the scholar bureaucrat Confucius (551-

479 BC), it was Mencius (372-289 BC), a Confucian disciple, who is credited 

for first codifying Confucianism. Han Fei Zi (280-233 BC), a well-connected 

philosopher and aristocrat, is most recognized in Chinese history for developing the School of Law, or Legalism. Both traditions favored governmental 

hierarchical bureaucracies and the importance of history. Confucianism 

advocated ruling benevolently by example and held an optimistic view of 

human potential. Still, Confucianism emphasized the need for an elite class, 

emphasizing that “a true civilization is to be achieved under the leadership 

of an elite educated in its ideals and dedicated to the service of those under 

them.”60 Conversely, Legalists considered humans to be inherently unreliable. Unlike Confucians, Legalists believed attempts to improve the human 

situation by noble example, education, and ethical precepts were useless. 

Instead, their philosophy suggests that people require a strong government 

and a carefully devised code of law that would stringently and impartially 

enforce rules and severely punish even the most minor infractions.61 Legalists believed wealth was derived from agricultural production, a disciplined 

hierarchy, and strong armies.62 While it would be convenient to equate a 

defensive strategic culture to Confucianism and offensive to Legalism, as 

with most things Chinese, it is not quite that simple. Most importantly, 

both philosophies emphasize hierarchy and structure, and are focused on 

internal affairs and social order. 

John Fairbank, the prominent American historian of China, argued that 

despite Mao Zedong’s revolution, China did not free itself from its hierarchical Confucian past.63 Indeed, Mao continued to pursue the rigid hierarchy 

of society that was familiar to the Chinese. Furthermore, Mao’s cult of personality was based on the Chinese popular predisposition to look toward 

a father-like figure to spearhead the reunification of China and restitute 

national pride.64 This notion is based on one of the five relationships presented as most important to the Confucian ideal “duty between ruler and 

subject,” which is the second only to the father-son relationship in Confucian 
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doctrine.65 Cultivating these two most important Confucian relationships 

under the guise of communist revolution, Mao used his cult of personality to 

instill a national identity among a long suppressed Chinese population that 

accepted his increasingly rigid dictatorship. His successors have continued 

to cultivate this rigid hierarchy to support their authoritarian regimes, which 

allows them to minimize social unrest and possibilities of regime change.

Furthermore, this pyramidal view of human society extends to international relations. Until the 19th century and the Western intervention in Asian 

affairs, there was a history of rather formal hierarchy between Asian states, 

with China as the dominant state.66 Ancient China’s tributary system from 

the 14th to the 19th century (under the Ming and Qing dynasties) was based 

on the belief of Chinese superiority over potential adversaries.67 Thus, Chinese strategic culture is ingrained with the desire to return to a time when 

other states must pay tribute to the dominant China. The perspective of a 

hierarchy of nations with China at the center is still an important concept 

in the Chinese psyche. Increased military might, a more adventurist navy, 

and spearheading regional agreements like the Association of South East 

Asian Nations free-trade area project could be perceived as a continuation 

of China’s pursuance of regional and global hegemony.68 Chinese strategic 

culture is thus based on an important cultural ego resulting from centuries 

of idealized hegemony.

Collectivism: Inherited from Chinese History and Reinforced by Communism

The 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics will always stay in the mind of its spectators as an unparalleled demonstration of synchronous collective grandiosity. 

This ceremony was a poignant visual metaphor of both how China views 

itself and how China wants the world to see it. The 15,000 performers, whose 

every movement were prescribed and timed for grand general effect,69 can be 

seen as a metaphor for the Chinese political ideal. China has been a large and 

populous country for most of its history, and has therefore developed some 

unique hierarchical collectivist characteristics to maintain social order. It is 

easy to trace collectivism back to Confucianism, which emphasizes sacrificing personal interest for the community and placing family above self.70 In 

her monograph on “Chinese Strategic Culture,” Major Kimberly A. Crider 
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describes archeological evidence that points to unique collectivist arrangements in China dating back to the Neolithic age.71 She posits that survival 

under harsh conditions required family members and neighbors to work 

closely together, and thus the “agrarian-based family tradition established 

a strong collective bias in Chinese culture and was also the basis for China’s 

autocratic social structure.”72

Several events led to Mao’s rise to becoming leader of the Republic of 

China. One cannot discount the importance of Mao’s opposition to the 

Japanese, particularly in light of the ineffectiveness of the Chinese Nationalist Party against the Japanese invasion of 1931 (known as the Mukden 

or Manchurian incident).73 However, Mao’s opportunistic restructuring 

of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which he achieved by adapting 

a Marxist-Leninist thought model to an agrarian-based Chinese model, 

also contributed to making possible the Chinese communist revolution.74

In the 1960s and 1970s, it was Mao’s followers who further developed the 

party propaganda based the great leader’s themes.75 Even today, studies about 

public outcries and rebellions in China (obviously the data is restricted due 

to the strict governmental censorship) note that most grievances are raised 

against local governments and still give the central leadership “the benefit 

of the doubt, assuming that the central government would fix the problem 

if it knew about it.”76 This decreases the potential of a widespread revolution 

and increases the country’s propensity to fall in line behind the CCP leadership in the belief that it is for the greater good of the kin and of the nation. 

Thus, the government can act without needing the population’s acquiescence, 

particularly with regards to the use of the military and force.

Nationalism and Global Ambitions

A Wall Street Journal analysis of a diplomatic trip former U.S. Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton made to China remarks that it is “worth remembering that China has fanned the flames of nationalism in the past, making 

de-escalation difficult. The leaders who run the Party’s security apparatus 

are ascendant, and they are using appeals to nationalism as a way to bolster 

social stability.”77 Indeed, in this election year—which determines the party 

leader for the next decade—the CCP contenders have increased their nationalist rhetoric and policies in hopes of courting the masses.78
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China’s long history and its many remarkable achievements such as “The 

Four Great Inventions” (gunpowder, paper, printing, and the compass)79

reinforce the Chinese notion of cultural superiority. In the last three decades, 

unprecedented commercial growth in China80 has renewed nationalist pride. 

Unlike in the West, where corporations are clearly separate from the government, the CCP and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remain very involved 

in all aspects of the pseudo-liberalization of the Chinese economy.81 This 

monograph will not delve into the intricacies of China’s hybrid economy, 

but it is important to understand that all victories of individual enterprises 

are seen as national achievements.82

Hyper-nationalism and an authoritarian communist regime enable abundant resources to be allocated to a continuing Chinese military build-up to 

further what most Chinese see as China’s rightful place in the international 

hierarchy. The single most influential thinker in Maoism was Li Dazhao, 

who managed to combine Chinese nationalist pride with Marxist-Leninism and initiated a voluntary inclination that became a Maoist trademark: 

anything the Chinese want to do can be achieved through collective will.83

Indeed, after building up its nuclear arsenal in 1964, Chinese leader Deng 

Xiaoping focused the same energy on China’s economy in the 1980s. The 

“Four Modernizations” (agriculture, industry, science and technology, and 

national security, in that order of priority) were launched in 1979 and were 

prioritized as a national effort to stimulate the Chinese economy.84 However, 

the first three received the bulk of the attention, 85 and China has only begun 

to pursue a new round of military modernization since 1999, with China 

likely to surpass the U.S. in military spending within the next 15 years.86 In 

fact, actual military spending might be as much as double the official figure 

given by the Chinese government.87 Therefore, although military spending 

as a symbol of national emphasis is important, the comparison with the 

United States can be treacherous, as the allocated funds and their direct 

purpose—as well as the calculations of purchasing power parity—are much 

less transparent in China than in the U.S. What is certain is that, since 1999, 

China has emphasized military technological modernization. 
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The Elaboration of a Complex Defensive Strategy: Sun 

Tzu, Confucianism, and Mao-Zedong 

Chinese and many other analysts contend that Chinese strategic culture 

has been, is now, and will continue to be defensive in nature. According to 

them, the country’s history strongly suggests that China’s past use of force 

has been largely limited to efforts to keep outsiders from taking Chinese 

territory, and to maintain social order throughout a large and populous 

country. General Li Jijun, a noted post-Maoist-era Chinese strategist, supports his view of China as a defensive power by noting that China has never 

had colonial-power or expansionist aspirations—unlike the United States, 

which has 761 military bases in 156 countries.88 The claim that China has 

never been a colonial power is a bit of an exaggeration; although quickly 

expelled, China conquered both Vietnam (three times between the second 

and tenth centuries) and Korea (in the second century).89 The main difference between those territorial expansions and actual colonies is that China 

always fought at its borders. Agreeing with the idea that China has traditionally been a defensive state, China experts Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross 

view China’s foreign policy to be based on several key features: “the notion 

of China as a central place with a self-sufficient civilization [and] a tendency 

to advise others to resolve disputes peacefully combined with frequent uses 

of force near or on home ground.”90

Others see decidedly offensive traits in the Chinese strategic culture. Most 

notably, Alastair Iain Johnston agrees there is a Confucian ideal of defensive 

warfare in Chinese strategic culture, but also sees a very self-interested element to China’s strategic culture that proscribes the use of force whenever in 

China’s self-interest.91 Johnston’s analysis of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) 

shows a clear use of what could be defined in international relations theory 

as “realpolitik” or realism.92

Realism is quite evidently a central element of the Chinese strategic 

culture. Johnston cites the Ming 

Dynasty as an era of realist military strategy to prevent recurring 

Mongol attacks. In fact, a century 

earlier, the writings of Sun Tzu had 

already laid the ground for a realist war strategy. Perhaps the biggest 

Perhaps the biggest influence on 

Chinese military strategy, Sun 

Tzu’s The Art of War, has been 

and remains a seminal philosophy 

underpinning Chinese strategic 

culture.
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influence on Chinese military strategy, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, has been 

and remains a seminal philosophy underpinning Chinese strategic culture. 

Sun Tzu was an advocate of the indirect, asymmetrical application of warfare. Yet, the link between the realist and the offensive is not obvious. For 

example, according to Sun Tzu, “the highest form of generalship is to balk 

the enemy’s plans.”93 Much of The Art of War describes how to avoid getting 

into force-on-force battles in which an army’s size alone can determine the 

result. However, Sun Tzu also understood the utility of preemption if the use 

of force was unavoidable: “whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming 

of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and 

has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted.”94 Depending on perspective, 

preemption can be seen as offensive “adventurism.”95 However, this author 

believes that Sun Tzu would argue what has become a common Chinese 

belief: that preemption to be part of a winning defensive strategy.96

The line between a sound defensive strategy and an offensive one can 

become blurred in times of peace. It has been over 50 years since China 

has made new inroads into neighboring countries, and there has been no 

evidence of its ever having a political stake in countries beyond its direct 

neighbors. China has always been focused on maintaining its territory and 

protecting its borders, and they justify any expansionist tendencies in a 

territorial protection context. However, and make no mistake, China will 

attack first and will rationalize a surprise attack as a part of an active defense. 

Beijing likes to camouflage offense as defense. “The history of modern 

Chinese warfare provides numerous case studies in which China’s leaders 

have claimed military preemption as a strategically defensive act,” the Pentagon said in a 2010 report to Congress. The report cited a long list of examples, 

including the 1962 war, 1969 (when China provoked border clashes with the 

Soviet Union), the 1979 invasion of Vietnam, and even 1950, when China 

intervened in the Korean War. Beijing called its 1962 invasion a “defensive 

counterattack,” a term it subsequently used for the invasion of Vietnam and 

the seizure of the Paracel Islands, Johnson Reef, and Mischief Reef.97
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Asymmetric Components of China’s Modern-Day Strategic Culture: Unrestricted Warfare, Preemption, Surprise, 

Deception, Cyber War, and Ambiguity

While China may be increasing its conventional military capability, at its 

core it still strongly features asymmetric strategy; the way the Chinese 

seem to use their conventional forces is unconventional. One example is the 

deeply engrained emphasis on surprise—upon which preemption relies. As 

explained in a Wall Street Journal analysis, “Chinese strategists have always 

valued the element of surprise ... At the start of all major conflicts of the 

last 60 years—in Korea, Tibet, India and Vietnam—Chinese forces struck 

without warning.”98

Although China is a nuclear power possessing ballistic missiles, Beijing 

maintains a layer of evasiveness about China’s true nuclear capability, presumably to retain the advantage of surprise if it were to deploy a military 

attack and to deter any potential aggressors.

Historically, China has practiced Sun Tzu’s advice to “take [the enemy] 

unaware by surprise attacks where he is unprepared” and to hit “suddenly 

with shock troops.”99 As in the 2009 case, the PLA navy employs disguised 

fishing boats in South China Sea conflicts, which makes its moves stealthier 

and also more difficult to defend without risking civilian casualties.

This makes neighboring nations fear China, since as long as disputes 

are unresolved, it is impossible to discount the possibility that the PLA will 

strike. Public statements are not a reliable guide to intentions; when threats 

and provocations stop, that could be the most dangerous time. The Wall 

Street Journal analysis notes that “China has also taken advantage of periods 

when the superpowers were drawing down in the region: “The PLA Navy 

invaded islands held by the Vietnamese in 1974, after the U.S. withdrew from 

South Vietnam, and in 1984, after the Soviets left Cam Ranh Bay.”100

China’s neighbors remember the Chinese propensity for a surprise first 

strike. That is why most of China’s neighbors mistrust Beijing and request 

that the U.S. continue to be the guarantor of peace in the region, as it has 

been in recent decades.101 In private meetings, Southeast Asian nations urge 

that the U.S. strengthen its diplomatic and military ties in Asia.102
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Asymmetric Warfare 

When it comes to wars of choice, Chinese have traditionally favored an 

indirect, asymmetrical approach. Winning by outsmarting, rather than 

by outfighting, has remained “the acme of skill.”103 Indeed, Sun Tzu wrote 

that “the highest form of military leadership is to overcome the enemy by 

strategy”104 and that “war is mainly a game of deception.”105 The Chinese 

have thus perfected games of smoke and mirrors, and have never thought 

about military might and armament in terms of direct arms races; instead, 

they think in strategically complementary and asymmetric ways. Chinese 

strategic culture favors guerilla warfare, cyber warfare, nuclear power as an 

asymmetric bargaining tool, and the overall use of ambiguity. 

In 1999, Two PLA colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, wrote a comprehensive manual entitled Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to 

Destroy America, which was systematic outline of how weaker powers can 

use methods of warfare transcending all limitations and boundaries to defeat 

stronger powers.106 In a related Foreign Policy article, Georgetown University 

professor Rosa Brooks emphasizes how the authors’ “description of likely 

changes in warfare was strikingly prescient”107 mostly because it addressed 

the rise of terrorist tactics and increase in unconventional warfare. The two 

colonels write that “the three indispensable ‘hardware’ elements of any war 

... soldiers, weapons and a battlefield ... have changed so that it is impossible 

to get a firm grip on them.” Instead, they argue, asymmetric warfare tactics 

should be predominant.108 They are only two colonels in a powerful, topdown military, but their “prescient” book reflects the fundamental Chinese 

awareness of asymmetric warfare strategy. 

Guerilla Warfare 

Mao Zedong’s victory against Chiang Kai-shek was partly due to his mastery 

of asymmetrical warfare techniques. His 1937 pamphlet, Guerilla Warfare,

explains the manner in which smaller forces can fight and vanquish larger 

enemies. He denounced the U.S. as a potential enemy for all those in Asia 

who would take up the fight and reiterated that even the giants can be vanquished.109 The PLA began as a true guerilla force in the 1930s and 1940s, but 

Mao transitioned it into a more conventional army.110 Deng Xiaoping later 

restructured the PLA to have a more traditional military unit framework. 
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However, the PLA continues to integrate guerilla warfare culture into its 

military strategy.111 The memories of the success of guerrilla warfare techniques used by Mao Zedong remain part of the general strategic culture of 

Chinese leadership.

Cyber Warfare

In the mind of Chinese strategists, there is no point in entering an arms race 

with a stronger adversary. Instead, finding and exploiting vulnerabilities—

particularly those of the United States—is their strategic focus.112 Aware of 

this, U.S. intelligence has been intent on preventing the potential threat of 

Chinese cyber attacks.113 In the Chinese cyber attacks launched on Taiwan 

in June 2006, which suggested that China would employ asymmetric cyber 

aggression, hackers “were able to electronically send a series of fraudulent 

press releases that appeared to originate from Taiwan’s Ministry of National 

Defense.”114 In July of the same year, the U.S. State Department was victim 

of a cyber attack on one of its East Asian offices. The hackers allegedly “stole 

sensitive information and passwords, and implanted ‘back doors’ in unclassified computers to allow them to return.”115 This created significant alarm 

in security circles about the potential Chinese asymmetric attack on cyber 

information centers.116 The impacts were primarily economic and psychological—replacement of breached computers and a sense of vulnerability among 

the nations attacked.117 The attack illustrated that the Chinese government 

encourages and maybe even supports teams of young hackers whose goal is 

to develop “anything and everything against the U.S. government infrastructure.”118 Some have even declared that “many attempts to penetrate the [U.S. 

national security network] appear to come from China,”119 prompting the 

creation of a U.S. Cyber Command in 2009. Such attacks include: the 2004 

“Titan Rain” Chinese cyber espionage episode, which apparently accessed 

“information from military labs, NASA, and the World Bank;”120 the 2009 

“Ghostnet” attacks on organizations supportive of Tibetan independence; 

and the 2009 break into the Pentagon’s $300 billion Joint Strike Fighter 

project.121 So far the U.S. has not openly condemned the Chinese government for those attacks, but there is little doubt among experts that, even if 

not outright supported by the Chinese government, the attacks were at the 

very least convenient for the Chinese strategic agenda.122
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Nuclear Power and Deceptive Ambiguity

China’s possession of nuclear weapons adds weight to its leadership role 

in the United Nations (UN) and the world. The country’s 1964 nuclear test 

was its opening salvo on a quest for recognition as an aspiring great power. 

Although China, as a nuclear weapon-holding state, is a member of the 

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons—and therefore theoretically agrees to work toward disarmament—Beijing’s leadership has retained 

a significant weapons stockpile as a deterrent safeguard and for reputational 

purposes.123 China takes seriously the possession of nuclear weapons, but 

more as a strategic deterrent option rather than an offensive, first-strike 

weapon; as a result, Beijing has been content with a modest nuclear capability and has focused more on refining its conventional military capabilities. 

China believes that deterrence is relatively unaffected by changes in the size, 

configuration, and readiness of nuclear forces.124

Bigger is not necessarily better, but having some nuclear capability is 

enough of a deterrent to dissuade the U.S. and Russia from nuclear adventurism targeting China. Furthermore, nuclear weapons feed into the game of 

deceptive ambiguous strategy that was first recommended by Sun Tzu and 

has since permeated Chinese strategic culture.

A Burgeoning Military Space Strategy 

An important facet of Chinese strategic culture is the desire to quickly 

advance; hence, the country has gone from trailing behind other global 

powers in technological military capabilities to emphasizing military space 

strategy. China’s January 2007 direct-ascent Anti-Satellite Weapon Test signaled a turning point in Chinese space ambitions, illustrating that Chinese 

leadership views space as a new and important dimension of future warfare.125 Many Western countries, including the United States, the United 

Kingdom, and France, quickly condemned this test.126 Yet, it is important to 

note that, at the United Nations General Assembly meetings in October and 

December 2006, the U.S. was the only country voting against a resolution 

to prevent an arms race in outer space.127 This enabled a PLA senior colonel 

to declare, “outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime ... and if 

there is a space superpower it will not be alone.”128 This seems to indicate 
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that China is keen on making sure that the United States will not be the only 

space superpower. 

China’s concern about developing military space capabilities is a response 

to the United States’ clear dominance in the sector and the Chinese belief 

that the U.S. military program is driven by missile defense and may threaten 

China’s nuclear deterrence.129 Several Chinese military studies point to the 

belief that using space weapons to attack ballistic targets (nullifying the 

nuclear threat) is a central goal of military space weapon development.130

However, the Chinese military space weapon development rhetoric 

appears to be softening. PLA air force general Xu Qiliang retracted a brazen 

2010 comment that “military weaponization of space was a historical inevitability.”131 Furthermore, former President Hu Jintao was careful to reiterate 

that cooperation and peaceful exploration of space are China’s priorities.132

The bottom line is that Chinese military space capability is increasing, and 

most likely will continue to do so. 

Conclusion

Just as China’s strategic culture does not mirror other strategic cultures, 

neither do China’s national security interests. The United States has friendly 

neighbors to the north and south and large oceans to the east and west. 

China’s neighbors are a rich and powerful Japan, the rising South Korea and 

Vietnam, the giants India and Russia, and a host of failed or failing states in 

Central and Southeast Asia. Some of them are friendly; most of them are not. 

China’s long history, innovative society, and dominance in the region 

reinforce its aspirations to be a great power and its desire for prominent 

status in the world’s state hierarchy. China has combined a tradition of a 

strict patriarchal hierarchy with that of collectivism in a unique, autocratic 

regime that strives to maintain an internal status quo and to advance the 

aspiration of regional hegemony. Its 

military tradition is that of stratagems and indirect approaches; rather 

than seeking parity with other global 

military forces, its strategy is to 

understand and exploit weaknesses 

in the enemy’s defenses. China’s 

China’s strategic culture is predicated on a preference for winning 

without having to fight, and thus 

deception, ambiguity, and secretiveness are important components of Chinese strategic culture.
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strategic culture is predicated on a preference for winning without having 

to fight, and thus deception, ambiguity, and secretiveness are important 

components of Chinese strategic culture. However, history suggests that 

China will aggressively use military force, including surprise attacks, when 

it is in its perceived strategic interest. The ability and willingness to do so is 

made possible by other elements of Chinese strategic culture, which include 

an autocratic government that can make quick decisions without fear of 

criticism from it public, a large continental land mass that makes invasions 

prohibitive, and a centuries old nationalistic pride that can produce public 

support at the suggestion of one op-ed piece in an efficient, state-run media.

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4. Strategic Culture of Iran

Iranian strategic culture is based on the dichotomy of nationalist pride 

and insecurity. Iranians have a very long and complicated history of 

alternatively dominating or being dominated. The importance of their 30 

centuries of history to the Iranian people cannot be overemphasized. One of 

the few modern theocracies, Iran is also a brutally repressive authoritarian 

regime officially called the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Since the removal 

of Iran’s Shah in 1979, the IRI has become aggressively anti-Western and 

defies international laws, invests in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 

and ostentatiously sponsors terrorist groups. The legacy of Grand Ayatollah 

Sayyed Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini’s vision for Iran is still omnipresent but 

the impact of subsequent Ayatollahs and successive presidents as well as the 

very powerful Revolutionary Guard makes this autocratic regime a complex 

and elusive political entity. More than 2,500 years of history, the grandiose 

rhetoric of Iranian leaders, the use of unconventional methods of warfare, 

and the importance of Shi’a Islamic historical symbols are symptomatic of 

Iran’s complex strategic culture.

Over 2,500 Years of History

Many Iranians still name their sons Cyrus after the founder of the Achaemenid Empire, in reverence to his place in Persian history more than 25 

centuries ago. Iranians are immensely proud of their rich political, economic, 

scientific, and religious history, but this pride also exacerbates a bitterness 

related to waves of invasions and colonization. On one hand, Iran was at the 

center of the Silk Road, home of one of the most ancient religions (Zoroastrianism), and host of important holy sites of Shi’a Islam. On the other hand, 

the ancient Persians were defeated by Alexander the Great and successively 

conquered by Arabs and Mongols before having to bow down to the British, 

the ever-encroaching Russians, and eventually the U.S.-British coup that 

installed Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. Graham Fuller, former vice chair 

of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, describes the Iranian culture as 

“deeply schizophrenic: an ingrained sense of cultural superiority is constantly eroded by feelings of insecurity and inferiority in the Persian state’s 

historic inability to order its own destiny.”133 It is thus of utmost importance 
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to Iranians to feel that Iran is self-sufficient and independent. Discourse 

about autarchic pursuits bodes well in a country where self-sufficiency is a 

central aspect of strategic culture. Hence, when former President Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad declared they needed uranium enrichment facilities to cut 

dependence on the import of enriched uranium, it resonates positively in the 

Iranian psyche—regardless of the potential ulterior motives of the discourse. 

Having a long history also affects Iran’s vision for the future. The idea of 

permanence and continuity is important in Iranian strategic culture. Despite 

Ahmadinejad’s claims that the return of the Hidden Imam (and hence the 

end of the world) is near,134 the Iranian leadership has long-term plans for 

Iran. Hence, Iran’s strategy comports a real long-term component that should 

not be dismissed. Although it is a contested claim, Iran is often credited with 

the invention of chess or at least the development of the game.135 In chess, the 

key to winning is thinking several steps ahead and considering all the pieces 

on the board. Similarly, Iranian strategy stresses the importance of planning for potential later moves and keeping several key pieces in the game.136

The Iranian attitude toward conflict is less goal-oriented than that of 

Western countries. The struggle itself for a cause is seen as a long-term laudable goal. This emphasis on continuing the struggle against injustice and 

oppression brings a high tolerance for strategic collective pain.137 Indeed 

the term jihad, often translated as “holy war” literally means “struggle.” 

The English expression “the end justifies the means” would be turned on its 

head in Iran because there the means themselves carry more weight than 

the end.138 Long, drawn-out conflicts are a result of Iranian strategic culture 

that is especially antithetical to U.S. strategic culture, which wants quick 

solutions to complex security problems. 

The Persian ethnic identity—as opposed to identification as an Arab or 

Turk—is another important feature of the Iranian persona. Although ostensibly bound by Islam, the Arab-Iranian rivalry is rooted in a long history 

that dates back to the 7th century and the Arab invasion of Persia. In the 

13th century, Iran experienced a political and linguistic revitalization139 that 

exemplifies the strength and resilience of the Persian identity. The word Iran 

itself was long used in Farsi by Persians to refer as themselves. (For the sake 

of this study Iranian will be used to define citizens or former citizens of Iran 

and Persians will be used to describe the ethnic identity.) The increasingly 

strong rhetoric of the Iranian regime against Israel can be seen as an attempt 
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at courting the Arab support against both Israel and the West.140 However, 

the Arab-Persian rift remains significant and affects Iran’s strategic alliances. 

Iran at the Center

Iran’s geopolitical situation is crucial to its strategic culture. Protected by 

mountains in the west and in the north, it has access to the Persian Gulf in 

the south and to the Caspian Sea in the north; only the eastern borders lack 

real geological definition. Dr. Shireen Hunter posits that this relative natural 

enclosure has enhanced “a sense of physical unity, which has enabled it to 

absorb the ethnic and cultural shocks of recurring foreign incursion and to 

develop a unique cultural identity.”141 This unique identity also comes at the 

price of a lack of natural allies in the region. To the west are Arabs that are 

ethnically different but share a common religion, and to the east the populations that are closer kin, but who differ in much of their religious culture. In 

1978, Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini vocally deplored 

the lack of support that he was getting from other Muslim countries in his 

revolutionary pursuit. This idea of geographical and ethnical uniqueness 

has helped to generate the idea of national particularism142 and comes at the 

price of relative isolation.143

To the north is Russia, with which Iran has a complex and evolving relationship. During the Cold War, Iran’s position as a neighbor of the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) made it an important partner in U.S. 

containment policy, thus affecting relations with the USSR. But the fall of 

the Shah, who was seen as a puppet of the U.S., led way to a regime extremely 

hostile to the West, which might have opened the door for better relations 

with the USSR. However, the Ayatollah Khomeini’s new regime pursued a 

policy of non-alignment, and the Revolutionary Guard actively persecuted 

all communists and communist sympathizers in Iran, who were (correctly) 

viewed as the most organized internal opposition to Iran’s newly established 

Islamic Republic. 

After the fall of the USSR, there was a significant rapprochement between 

Tehran and Moscow, which culminated in commercial and political alliances. Iran soon began buying weapons from Russia. Presently, with the 

increase in U.S. and European pressure against Iranian nuclear proliferation, 
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Iran has been trying to further strengthen its relationship with not only 

Russia, but China too.144

The complexities of Iran-Russian relations are also rooted in history. The 

19th century expansion of Russia into territories formerly controlled by Iran 

as well as its control of the Caspian Sea still embitters Iranians, who remain 

guarded against Russia’s potential expansionist ambitions. The loss of territories settled by the 1828 treaties of Gulistan and Turkmanchai (know in 

Iranian as “the shameful treaty”) after the Persian defeat of the Russo-Persian 

wars of 1804-1828 still humiliates Iranians. Today, Russia no longer borders 

Iran. Although sometimes ambiguous, both countries seem to want relative regional stability to enable trade to flourish vice imperialist dominance 

of those relatively unstable neighboring countries.145 Iran and Russia have 

periodically come together for issues such as regional security and keeping 

U.S. influence out of the region.146 For example, in 2007, the members of the 

Caspian Sea summit led by Iran and Russia, which also included Azerbaijan, 

Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, made a joint declaration that the participating states hold exclusive rights to the Caspian Sea resources.147 The Russians 

have mitigated sympathies for Iran, a regime whose fanatic ideology they 

have trouble understanding. Additionally, in the last decade, Russia has 

tried a policy of rapprochement with the West, which led to some cooling 

in Iranian-Russian relations.

What some call a Russo-Iranian alliance is actually a marriage of convenience for economic and strategic reasons and is made on an issue-by-issue 

basis.148 After the collapse of the USSR, Moscow was desperate to find sources 

of revenue, and the IRI was eager to buy more conventional weapons and 

develop its nuclear power capacity. Hence in 1992, as part of a larger trade 

agreement Russia agreed to help Iran build a nuclear reactor, which had been 

commenced under the Shah in the city of Bushehr.149 The nuclear reactor 

was damaged by Iraqi airstrikes in 1988, and in 1995 Russia signed a contract 

that would commit it to help bring the project to completion. After endless 

delays, it was finally tested in 2011. Built on mistrust, the relationship has 

wavered—especially as Russia has tried to balance the international pressure 

against nuclear proliferation in Iran while continuing to build a project that 

is lucrative for Russia and strategically important for Iran.150

Contracts and cooperation have also taken on a controversial strategic 

dimension, as many in Moscow try to balance this lucrative relationship 

with a budding U.S.-Russian relationship.151 Therefore, the concern regarding 
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Russian support for Iran must be understood in the context of the economic 

desperation of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin years152 and the steadily increasing 

import-export relationship between Russia and Iran until today. According 

to the Russian Federal State Statistics Service, Iran is now the single biggest 

importer of Russian goods, with a record of $3.7 billion of imports in 2008.153

In 2009, and unlike Western countries’ reactions to the Iranian Presidential 

election, Moscow called shortly after the votes were tallied to congratulate 

Ahmadinejad on his controversial reelection.154

For Iran, the Russian relationship is a convenient way to circumvent 

Western pressure against Tehran. Russia’s rapprochement with the U.S. 

and its efforts to distance itself from a “strategic relationship” with Iran 

chilled Iranian-Russian collaboration. Still, Tehran has kept using Russia as 

a diplomatic shield, enabling Iran to evade the International Atomic Energy 

Agency’s (IAEA) warnings.155 For the Iranian leadership, Russian support of 

Iran in international organizations minimizes the opportunity for the U.S. 

to impose international sanctions on Iran.156 Iran looks at its neighbors with 

cold pragmatism and mistrust. It is important to understand that it is part of 

Iranian strategic culture to use neighboring alliances for political purposes 

without any real emotional investment. 

Iran’s geographical position between Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan 

make it an important country in a very volatile neighborhood where the 

U.S. has been waging war in an attempt to eventually stabilize the region 

and reduce the terrorist safe havens. Iran’s geographical situation increases 

the pressure on the U.S. to contain the Iranian regime and address its bellicose interests. Since the Iraq war, the U.S. has been particularly careful 

to reduce the possibility of other states in the region allying with Iran. In 

2009, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted the importance 

of containing Iran in a meeting with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) representatives, telling them their “interests are aligned ... in the necessity to 

limit Iranian influence and meddling nationally and regionally, a meddling 

that has already cost far too many lives.”157

The World as their Playground

Iran’s geography and history placed it at the center of international trade 

routes and the international relations of the day. Iran’s historical self-image 
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as central international player still shapes its strategic culture. Situated at the 

frontier between Europe and Asia, Iran has historically been along important 

trade routes, including the Silk Road connecting Europe and Asia. Now, its 

position on the Straight of Hormuz, through which an estimated 20 percent 

of the world’s oil is transported, gives Tehran increased power in contemporary affairs. It believes itself to be leader of the Muslim world, superior 

to Arab and Turkic populations, and a world player.158 In comparison to 

U.S. military and economic power, Iran is far from being a world power, yet 

Tehran’s disproportionate belief in its self importance in world affairs shapes 

its strategic decisions. 

Due to its long and prestigious history, Iran has global ambitions in addition to its dreams of regional hegemony. In its confrontation with the U.S. 

it now seeks to create alliances with all U.S. adversaries. To circumvent 

sanctions, Iran has sought a policy of rapprochement with South American 

and African states antagonistic to the U.S. government. Iran also pursues 

cooperation with states on the geographic and strategic periphery of U.S.-Iranian competition. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 

emphasized in its 2012 report about U.S.-Iranian strategic competition:

 In the past decade, Iran has increased its diplomatic missions to 

states critical of the U.S. like Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and 

Ecuador, but also to self-declared non-aligned states like Argentina 

and Brazil. Iran has built 17 cultural centers in Latin America and 

it currently maintains ten embassies, up from six in 2005.159

In addition to its increased diplomatic efforts in South America and 

Africa, Iran has courted relations with China, its second-largest trading 

partner. Iran sees its relationship with China as a counterweight to U.S. pressure. China’s 

interest, on the other hand, is 

ultimately energy security. Like 

the Iran-Russia relationship, the 

Iran-China relationship is not 

based on sincere mutual amity, 

and China has been careful to 

balance U.S. pressures against 

Iran with its own energy interests. China has been able to maintain positive 

if somewhat strained relationships with both the U.S. and Iran by selectively 

... in strategic culture terms, the U.S. 

can expect Iran to leverage its important geographic position and oil 

reserves to maximize its pursuit of 

both local and out of area strategic 

partnerships to counter U.S. containment policies.
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supporting each side based on Beijing’s strategic interests.160 This relationship 

should be viewed as another example of Iranian’s interest in seeking alliances beyond its immediate neighborhood. Iran’s self-aggrandizing image 

sees itself as a major power deserving more respect and a substantive role 

in international affairs. Therefore, in strategic culture terms, the U.S. can 

expect Iran to leverage its important geographic position and oil reserves 

to maximize its pursuit of both local and out of area strategic partnerships 

to counter U.S. containment policies. 

Leader of Shi’a Islam

The Shi’a-Sunni rift is well known and dates back to the beginning of the 

Muslim faith centuries ago. However, in modern terms, the Iran-Iraq war 

and rise of anti-Shi’a Wahhabism and of pan-Shi’a rhetoric has exposed the 

severity of the rift.161 Many Shi’a will self-identify as Muslim before Shi’a, 

but there is no doubt that the difference between Shi’a and Sunni has been 

leveraged for political purposes. The distribution of Shi’a and Sunni populations in Iran and neighboring countries has significantly affected alliances, 

conflicts, and territorial claims. In the 1970s, Khomeini claimed his ambition 

was Islamic unification.162 The reality has been drastically different. Iran 

is a Shi’a theocracy which is populated by 40 percent of the World’s Shi’a 

Muslims.163 Hence, it considers itself the leader of all other Shi’a populations. 

This was particularly critical during the Iran-Iraq war when Saddam Hussein 

claimed to want to help the Sunni populations of southern Iran, and Iran 

had an eye on two important holy sites of Shi’a Islam located in Iraq.164 The 

cities of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq contain very important Shi’a relics and 

are considered the holiest sites of Shi’a Islam after Mecca. 

Shi’a allegiances play a role in Iran’s support of the Alawite regime of 

Syria and of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Tehran views the Syrian regime as well 

as the Khomeini-inspired guerilla group in Lebanon as part of its zone of 

influence in the region. Hezbollah is indicative of Iran’s penchant for irregular warfare, which is compatible with Iranian military doctrine and its 

strategic culture. Indeed, when IRI leadership became aware of Hezbollah’s 

increasing strength, it quickly decided to finance, arm, and train them. For 

the most part, it was the Revolutionary Guards of the IRI that trained Hezbollah recruits.165
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Khomeini’s Political and Theological Doctrine 

Khomeini’s interpretation of Islam and his teachings play a central role in 

the strategic culture of the IRI. Although the IRI was only created in 1979, 

the strength and stability of this regime for the last 33 years is due in part 

to the comprehensive nature of Khomeini’s ideology. Khomeini was born 

over a century ago and spent much of his early life studying and teaching 

the Koran, Sharia law, Islamic Gnosticism (called erfan) and ethics. By the 

time of the Islamic Revolution, his published works contained very little 

real direction for the management of a state other than that of following 

the Sharia laws. It is believed that he solidified and shared his ideas for a 

new republic during his time teaching in Qom and then in exile.166 Notably, 

Khomeini elaborated on three concepts of Islam that would become central 

the Islamic Republic regime. The study of erfan, the elaboration of Tauhid 

and the idea of martyrdom became more prominent with the IRI regime. 

First, the influence of erfan enabled Khomeini to justify the vanguard and 

mobilize followers. Erfan, although purely Shi’a, is rather similar in nature 

to Sufism for its asceticism and its belief in oneness. Erfan also provided “the 

ideal of an ordinary believer that could rise to become a perfect man, saint 

or erif.”167 Middle East historian Vanessa Martin compares this notion of erif 

to Plato’s philosopher King. And as in The Republic, the ruler is surrounded 

by guardians with whom he can discuss or consult. 

Second, Tauhid (or oneness), is another concept that was aggrandized in 

the Iranian Revolutionary ideology. One of Khomeini’s key disciples, Ayatollah Murtaza Motahhari, was instrumental in elaborating on the concept 

of Tauhid. This idea of oneness that puts the Ulama before the individual 

was also used to counter the rising appeal for socialist and Marxist ideologies in pre-revolutionary Iran. His theory was collectivist and emphasized 

a strong state.168

Third is the concept of martyrdom, which can be most easily be traced 

back in Shi’a Islam to the martyrdom of Hussein Ibn Ali, who was the grandson of Muhammad and the Second Shi’a Imam. Each year the celebration 

of Ashura reminds the people of this great figure of Shi’a religious history 

and the importance of his example as a religious martyr. In his speeches, 

Khomeini strove to make martyrdom for the cause of the revolution and as 

a cause to aspire to. Leading by example, in his April 1963 speech at Qum 

in honor of the martyrs killed by the Shah’s forces when protesting against 
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the Shah, he declared: “The ulama of Islam, the religious leaders and pious 

people of Iran, together with its noble army, are the brothers of the Muslim 

states ... if [the agents of Israel] wish, let the them come and put an end to my 

life!”169 Rhetoric like this and his subsequent references to Iran as a “nation 

of martyrs” reinforced the notion that the good would fight to the end and 

never fear their own death. There is thus a form of glorification of death in 

Iranian strategic culture. Those who lose a son at war are honored, and those 

fighting to the death are heroes.

Fourth, an important concept of the Khomeini ideology is the idea that all 

citizens of Iran are children that must be taken care of by the leadership.170 It 

is based, in theory and in practice, on a Muslim concept known as velayat-e 

faqih, or “guardianship of the jurist.” In its original phrasing, this can mean 

that the clergy assumes responsibility for orphans, for the insane, and for 

abandoned or untenanted property.171 In practice, it gives the government 

a justification for its role as guardian of the society. This shapes strategic 

culture by legitimizing the leadership even when ruthless and frees its hands 

to worry more about foreign policy.

Hyperbole and Ambiguity: Tools of Soft Power 

Persian visual art is one of the most complex and rich in world history. It 

combines architecture, painting, drawing, ceramics, calligraphy, metalworking and, of course, the famous Persian rugs. Persian art has evolved with time 

but remains focused on intricate patterns, geometrical shapes, and the use 

of bright colors to grandiose effect. This art form can serve as a metaphor 

for Iranian rhetoric and foreign policy. Persian prose emphasizes intricate 

allegories and metaphors and cultivates hyperbole and embellishments. Even 

under periods of austerity that punctuated the long Iranian history, calligraphy and prose remained of upmost importance. This extravagance of 

style has sometimes led Iranians to follow their ambitious rhetoric in policy 

and outrun their capacities.172 In addition, most often this extravagant and 

complex rhetoric is a tool of psychological manipulation. 

Iranians embrace contradictions and ambiguities better than most 

nations.173 Contrasts and contradictions are a means of thickening the fog 

of war and create doubt as to whether there even is a war. Iranians are experts 

at exploiting inconsistencies and paradoxes in propaganda and psychological 
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warfare. It often calibrates violence and concessions to achieve particular 

psychological effect on the opposition. According to the Washington Institute’s director of security studies, Michael Eisenstadt, “policy makers in the 

IRI consider information activities as their decisive line of operations”174 and 

embrace long intervals of times and contradictions that go directly against 

the U.S. way of war. RAND scholar Fuller describes the Iranian diplomatic 

negotiating style—an inherent strategic culture component—in which the 

key elements are “dissimulation, deception, indirection, the partially empowered emissary, the mixed personal and official agenda of the intermediary, 

and the use of foreign contacts to gain marginal personal advantage.”175 The 

recent negotiations between Iran and the IAEA on the topic of Iran’s unclear 

nuclear proliferation intentions have reflected most of the above descriptions. 

Meetings after meetings, empty promises and backtracking have stalled any 

significant advances on the topic.176

A Collection of Irregular Warfare Techniques

Iranian forces’ propensity to develop unconventional means to wage war is 

evident. While Iran has access to the Gulf and to a sea, it lags in developing 

a navy worthy of “sea power” status, choosing instead to develop and depend 

on Naval Guerillas who capitalized.177 Iran has also been one of the leading 

financiers of terrorist and guerrilla groups and has engaged in development 

of various types of WMDs.

Historically, most countries with imperialist dreams and sea access have 

developed robust naval capabilities. Although the Ancient Greeks already 

called the body of water near Iran the Persian Gulf, history reveals no single 

country controlled the Gulf until the 20th century, when the British controlled those waters. Traditionally, Iran has not been a naval power, and 

during the 1987 naval confrontations in the Gulf with the United States, Iran 

mostly confronted its enemy with “naval guerillas.” The lack of sophistication 

in Iranian naval ships, electronic systems, and radars pushed the Revolutionary Guard to employ deceit and intimidation tactics instead of confronting 

U.S. warships with naval power. Iran’s naval guerilla hit-and-run attacks 

seldom did much damage, but were meant to terrorize merchant shipping 

and get the U.S. to withdraw from the Gulf.178 The most direct harm to the 

U.S. navy was caused by anti-ship mines, rockets, and missiles. During the 
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Iran-Iraq war the use of irregular naval warfare tactics pushed the U.S. to 

rethink its naval strategy in the Gulf. The so-called “Tanker War” started in 

1984 and Kuwaiti and Saudi ships were damaged through mining attacks by 

the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy. Initially, when Kuwaitis asked 

for protection from the U.S., the Pentagon and the U.S. Central Command 

believed that the presence of a carrier and of a demonstrative escort of the 

Kuwaiti tankers by U.S. ships would deter the Iranians from further mining 

attacks. This proved fatally wrong and led to the U.S. to change its tactics to 

be much closer to land-based counterinsurgency operation than traditional 

fleet-to-fleet operation.179 This meant establishing water-borne patrol bases 

and deploying helicopters to detect and prevent Iranian from laying mines. 

“Operation Praying Mantis” was the culmination of this naval conflict that 

confronted and neutralized the irregular means employed by the Iranian 

forces. For example, 14 April 1988, the frigate USS “Samuel B. Roberts” was 

almost sunk by Iranian mines. This major attack on a U.S. ship provoked U.S. 

retaliation on 18 April 1988, which destroyed the Iranian frigates “Joshan” 

and “Sahand.”180

The Iranian strategy had been to inflict enough casualties on the U.S. to 

discourage U.S. warships from staying in the Gulf, but not enough to provoke 

full-blown retaliation. The strong U.S. retaliation decreased the number of 

mining attacks and precipitated the end of the Iran-Iraq war. By the end of 

the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian forces had attacked 190 ships from 31 countries, 

and killed at least 63 sailors.181

Tehran’s use of terrorism is an important part of the government’s strategic and tactical modus operandi, and can be attributed to Iranian strategic culture. Historically, various Persian and Iranian dynasties have used 

auxiliary-type terrorist forces to maintain plausible deniability. For example, 

Herodotus described the presence of a strangler faction in the Persian forces 

that was using terrorism as a tool of warfare182 and other Iranian dynasties` 

use of bandits as instruments of politics.183

Today, the U.S. Department of State considers Iran the world’s most active 

state sponsor of terrorism.184 Iran believes that the more effective way to build 

up its strategic strength is through irregular warfare. Using terrorism is an 

effective, inexpensive means of asymmetrical warfare that enables a weaker 

adversary to confront a major power. Iran exercises its asymmetrical warfare 

capability through Hezbollah, which is effectively an arm of the Iranian military and is well trained, well financed, and strategically placed in Lebanon 
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and around the world. Iran finances Hezbollah at the rate of an estimated 

$100 million U.S. dollars per year, although some analysts estimate this figure 

to be as low as $60 million and as high as $200 million.185 The $100 million 

estimate represents approximately half of Hezbollah’s annual budget and 

therefore ties Hezbollah strongly to Iran.186 When tensions started escalating between Iran and Israel in late 2011, the Lebanese Hezbollah were told 

to stand ready to retaliate in case of an attack by Israel on Iran.187 Reliance 

on proxies such as Hezbollah for military operations gives Iran plausible 

deniability and lessens the chance of a U.S. retaliation on Iranian soil. 

Other irregular warfare techniques include supplying arms to insurgent 

groups to undermine the government or U.S. efforts in that country. There 

is evidence that Iran supports insurgents in neighboring Iraq, thus waging 

a war of attrition and making sure that Iraq remains unstable.188 In addition, Iran provides arms to the southern fighters in Afghanistan and thus 

undermining the U.S. and the Afghan National Army’s efforts. There is 

evidence that the IRI has been involved in shipping arms to Hamas and the 

Palestinian Islamic Jihad.189

Designated in 2007 by the U.S. Congress as terrorist organization,190

the most powerful entity in Iran is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

(IRGC). A branch of the military, the IRGC is a hybrid between a special 

operations force and a terrorist group. The IRGC was originally created to 

counterbalance the power of Iranian the army and reduce the threat of a 

potential coup but has evolved into an organization involved in most areas 

of Iranian domestic and foreign affairs. In the same manner as the IRGC 

naval arm works in parallel with the conventional—and weak—Iranian Navy 

the IRGC ground force adds unconventional capabilities to other Iranian 

military forces by specializing in training terrorist insurgent cells all over 

the Middle East and Southern Europe. 

Another way that the IRI is striving to build up its deterrent capability is by increasing its WMD capability. The use of chemical weapons was 

widespread during the Iran-Iraq war, and Iran now wields the threat of the 

development of a nuclear bomb as an irregular deterrent capability.191 While 

Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapons capability, the IRI benefited from 

its rapprochement with Russia to procure weapons and build its capacity. It 

seems that all conventional military efforts are overshadowed by the potential unconventional use of this force. Since its extensive experimentation 

with chemical weapons at the end of the Iran-Iraq war and in the 1990s, 
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the Iranian forces have developed capabilities of producing a wide range of 

chemical weapons, including blood and blister agents, and possibly nerve 

agents.192

Iran has been interested in nuclear power since the era of the Shah. 

Indeed, the Pahlavi regime signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 

1960 with a view to developing a civil nuclear capability. Since then, with 

Russian help, it built the Bushehr nuclear reactor and has been developing 

more medium size reactors. In November 2011, the IAEA issued a report condemning the enrichment activities in Iran. Building up its nuclear capability 

keeps the other regional powers on their toes and is a shortcut to becoming 

a key world player that is a status that the IRI believes it deserves. This also 

derives from the need for self-reliance and playing up ambiguity as a means 

of soft power.193

Iranian leadership overwhelmingly believes in the psychological power 

of ambiguity and playing up the hard dilemma of a low chance of a very 

terrible thing. Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and 

ratified it in 1997, declaring two facilities previously used to produce chemical weapons. The ambiguity and repeated demand for extension in the IRI’s 

process of neutralizing its chemical weapons capability leads many to doubt 

that chemical weapons are completely eradicated from Iran.194 Even more 

ambiguous is Iran’s biological weapons capability; unlike chemical weapons, Iran has denied ever possessing biological agents, although different 

intelligence reports throughout the 1990s have identified the purchase and 

development of dual use agents. For example, the 2008 analysis from CSIS 

about Iranian biological weapons concludes that “Iran continued to deny 

that it had such programs, but its imports continued to raise intelligence 

concerns.”195 This report provides an extensive list of contradictions about 

the Iranian biological weapons program. Such misdirection and confusion 

is another example of how Iran uses ambiguity to prompt Western observers 

to endlessly debate its intentions. 

A Strategic Culture That Predicts the Long Rough Road 

Ahead

Iran’s strategic culture is a predictor of a complex and long-winded effort for 

U.S. diplomatic policy. Due to its long history based on the duality between 
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the ideals of a glorious past and frustrations of decline, its savvy for complex 

and ambiguous strategic moves,196 and its propensity for making alliances of 

convenience197such as those with Russia and China, it is likely that Iran will 

continue to try to fight above its weight in world affairs. The present leadership uses a collective ethos and religious proselytism to justify its grandiose 

rhetoric. Ambiguous and ambitious rhetoric also guides Iran’s foreign policy 

alliances, which should be closely watched. Indeed, central to Iran’s strategic culture is a reliance on alliances of convenience, with the idea that “the 

enemy of my enemy is my ally.” This allows the IRI surprising resilience in 

making new alliances with former foes or geographically remote countries, 

and makes it more difficult to enact successful sanctions and embargoes 

against the Tehran regime.198 Unfortunately, Iran’s application of its strategic 

culture, including ambiguity, irregular warfare, alliances of convenience, and 

irreverence for international norms, are so antithetical to the U.S. strategic 

culture and way of war that it is difficult for U.S. policymakers to understand 

and counter Iran’s adventurism. Once before, during the Iran-Iraq war naval 

conflict, the U.S. underestimated the irregularity of the IRGC tactics and 

learned from it.199

As the Middle East is shaken by the changes stemming from the Arab 

Spring and the potential exacerbation of sectarian divides, the Iranian regime 

will doubtless have an ingrained sense of duty Shi’a leaders to retain support 

for the Syrian Alawi regime and Hezbollah. The extent to which Iran will 

increase or maintain its arming of minority factions throughout the region 

remains to be seen. Iran believes it is playing the long game, viewing the 

whole world as its chessboard. However, in reality, the regime is not playing 

chess as much as it is playing poker, where the ability to cheat and bluff are 

winning strategies.
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5. North Korean Strategic Culture

Officially called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 

North Korea is also known as the Hermit Kingdom, a term once used 

for the entire Korean peninsula. While North Korea is, in reality, neither 

democratic nor a republic, the nation’s official and unofficial names are 

meaningful, providing a glimpse into North Korea’s “strategic culture.” 

After surviving the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and 

witnessing the opening of China’s economy, North Korea has remained a 

totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist, isolated, bellicose, and extremely secretive 

state. President George W. Bush named North Korea as one of the three 

“Axis of Evil” countries, along with Iran and Iraq, because of its aggressive 

behavior, its atrocious humanitarian record, and its possession of and threat 

to use WMD. Despite the recent change in North Korea’s leadership, the 

country remains hostile to the West, and particularly toward the United 

States. Analyzing North Korea’s strategic culture is difficult because so many 

factors come in to play. North Korea’s isolationist history and unitary culture are important strategic culture variables, as is its political geography, 

which positions North Korea in the midst of three strong and ambitious 

neighbors. Other variables unique to North Korea’s strategic culture are 

Korean nationalism, Chinese-influenced Confucianism, and more than a 

half-century of hyped ideology influenced by Soviet communism. Finally, 

perhaps the most important factor affecting North Korean strategic culture 

is the Kim family dynasty, which has had two remarkably consistent goals: 

survival of the dynasty and survival of the state. 

A Long History of Isolationism: A Fertile Ground for 

Indoctrination 

Korea first became known as the Hermit Kingdom when the Chosun dynasty 

ruled the peninsula from the 14th to the 19th centuries. Its extreme isolationism surfaced in the 17th century as a defense against nearly simultaneous 

wars with the Japanese Shogun state and China’s Manchus. This defensive 

and isolationist behavior persists today in what North Korea analyst Merrily 

Baird describes as a country ruled by a leadership that is “secretive, xenophobic, and convinced that only overwhelming military strength can guarantee 
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the nation’s survival.”200 Furthermore, such policies have fostered a culture 

of fear and isolationism that is cultivated by the North Korean regime and 

sold to its propagandized population as a continuation of Korea’s unique 

history and strategic culture. 

This isolationism contributes in two additional ways to the DPRK’s 

strategic culture. First, isolation from the international community creates 

ideal terrain for indoctrination. Second, the secretive nature of the secluded 

regime renders analysis of the motives and operating background of DPRK 

leadership difficult at best.201 North Korea’s secretive, hostile and deceptive 

regime bars foreigners from having a true understanding of Pyongyang’s 

strategic intent and the extent to which the people of North Korea have been 

indoctrinated. 

Kim Il Sung, his son, and now his grandson have kept North Koreans isolated from outside contacts and influence with a degree of success 

that dictators and autocrats around the world might envy. Accounts from 

North Korean defectors are the best gauge of the populations’ real sentiments toward the Kim regime, and the accounts are striking. For example, 

in 2002, South Korean social scientists surveyed 163 defectors regarding 

their views of the North Korean regime. In the survey, only “38 percent of 

defectors thought North Korea’s choice of socialism as an economic system 

had been a mistake ... 48 percent believed that the North Korean economy’s 

trouble could be attributed to government mismanagement and 47 percent 

blamed the Americans for trying to crush the economy.”202 Almost by definition, this defector population sample should provide perspectives of those 

most disgruntled with the regime—those dismayed or famished enough to 

undertake the dangerous escape to South Korea. The lukewarm responses 

and only mild dissatisfaction with the leadership are surprising, and reflect 

either the extent of North Korean indoctrination (exemplified by the high 

percentage blaming the United States for its woes) or the pervasive fear of 

saying something that could lead to personal or family persecution or death. 

Thus, pervasive indoctrination and fear factors into the country’s strategic 

culture in that the low level of popular resistance or dissent directed toward 

the government enables the leadership to pursue whatever foreign and security policy goals it deems desirable without consideration for the opinions 

of the population at large—and with virtually no chance of resistance. More 

importantly, unlike other democratic heads of state, Pyongyang’s leaders 
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can commit their military and use force without the scrutiny of the nation’s 

citizenry.

Korean Geopolitical History and the Unitary State

Korea has a long discrete history as a unitary state.203 In its early history, 

Korea was divided into three Kingdoms: Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla. However, since the 10th century AD, Korea has been a unified nation-state. Since 

then, dynasties have come and gone, and Korea’s borders with China have 

changed slightly. Yet a unified, single Korean state existed for nearly a millennium until the end of World War II. Interestingly, even after more than 

50 years of a divided (and heavily fortified) border, both North and South 

Korean governments refer to their territory as part of a nation that will be 

reunified in the future.204 Whether in official statements from Seoul or propaganda from Pyongyang, neither leadership acknowledges a permanent 

division. Interestingly, all North Korean refugees escaping to South Korea are 

given citizenship and Republic of Korea passports.205 Similarly, each Korea 

advocates for an independent and unified Korea under its own terms. The 

ultimate unification rhetoric, albeit currently unrealistic, influences both 

countries’ strategic decisions.206 The objective of regaining lost territory in 

order to make the state whole—not an unusual objective for any state—is 

very much an important element of North Korea’s strategic culture.

Geopolitical History: Powerful Neighbors

The nationalist sentiments and isolationist tendencies expressed throughout 

North Korea’s geopolitical history can be characterized as a reaction to many 

centuries of being coveted and colonized by China and Japan.207 In fact, the 

Korean peninsula is surrounded by three strong and expansionist neighbors: 

China, Japan, and Russia. These three powers have all played roles in shaping 

North Korean strategic culture, but for different reasons. China’s influence 

has important strategic culture implications for three reasons: First, Chinese 

suzerainty over Korea during the Chosun dynasty required Korea to pay 

tribute to China. Second, Korea’s adoption of elements of Chinese Confucianism inculcated the notion of a rigid hierarchical caste system. Third, the 

Chinese Communist Party supported the formation of the North Korean 
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Communist Party, and hence influenced North Korean political ideology. 

The first two factors will be outlined in more detail below.

Under the Chosun dynasty, which spanned the period from 1392 to 1897, 

Korea was a vassal state of China. As a vassal, Korea had to pay tribute 

to Chinese emperors, and large delegations of Korean officials traveled to 

Chinese capitals bearing gifts and swearing allegiance on a regular basis.208

Reversing the tribute role, Kim Young Il liked to point out that, during his 

reign, foreign dignitaries brought gifts to the North Korean leader, which 

were then publicly displayed as a propaganda tool to highlight the superiority of the North Korean state.209 The memory of being a Chinese vassal state 

still plays painfully on North Korea’s national consciousness, fostering the 

desire for independence that greatly influences the leadership’s strategic 

decisions.210 Independence is highly prized, as the prospect of subordination 

to powerful neighbors recalls the humiliation at the hands of the Chinese 

and Japanese. Humiliation is an emotion that often inspires some type of 

retribution to even the score—a behavior that is very much a North Korean 

strategic culture trait.

China’s Confucian influence facilitated the creation of a rigid hierarchical 

system with the Supreme Leader as metaphorical father.211 In Confucianism, 

paternalism is a central concept that is transposed from the family unit to a 

rigidly hierarchical state system. Korea’s Confucian past partially explains 

why the caste system, present to some degree in all dictatorships, is omnipresent in North Korea.212 North Korea’s particular caste system emerged 

in the late 1950s, when the regime began dividing the citizens into three 

groups: core (also known as loyal), wavering, and hostile. Ratings were given 

to individuals based on their family’s history with the regime. This ranking 

determined access to higher education, jobs, and living quarters. A recent 

study by author and researcher Robert Collins determined that this system 

places about a third of the population in a form of slave labor.213 Well organized and all encompassing, North Korea’s caste system permeates society 

to such a degree that most members of the lower castes are unaware of just 

how much their family histories determine the possibilities for advancement. 

Children are raised with the belief that hard work for the country will lead 

them to a better life; they only slowly discover that social mobility based on 

hard work is almost nonexistent. Instead, the role of a person’s parents and 

grandparents during the war against the Japanese and the Korean War affects 

life outcomes more than personal merit.214 In the last decade, the regime 
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seems to have loosened some restrictions based on societal predetermination. However, there is still little upward mobility for those whose roots are 

in South Korea or whose family members have fled to China or elsewhere. 

Also, demotions for crimes—even petty crimes—are much more widespread 

for those whose family members have escaped than for others.215

The Confucian value of unquestioned submissiveness by family members 

(or citizens of a nation-state) is just one more limitation to civil protest. 

The close-knit institutionalized elite—whose status is determined by family 

standing and proximity to the emperor-like Kim—suppresses all civil discourse, including any discussion of the appropriate use of military force to 

achieve national security objectives.216

Like its history with China, North Korea’s relationship with Japan has had 

a lasting impact on DPRK strategic culture, and has influenced its relationships with other great powers. Japan’s occupation of the Korean peninsula 

from 1910 until the end of World War II shaped two important aspects of the 

North Korean strategic culture: it destroyed any semblance of civil society 

through brutal repression217 and gave an easy basis for the present demonization of Japan as a symbol of all that is evil in capitalist societies. Japan’s 

occupation of Korea was brutal, as was its imposition of its imperial power. 

Korean response to Japan’s brutality was orchestrated by, the underground 

communist party in North Korea, which garnered much popular support for 

its efforts to oppose Japanese imperialism. Beginning in the late 1920s and 

gaining momentum in the 1940s, North Korea’s communist party received 

monetary and ideological support from the Manchurian Communists218 and 

Russian Bolsheviks, both of which were expanding their zone of influence 

in Siberia at the time.219

Interestingly, when the Korean Communist Party was formed in the 

1920s, it actually had more members than its Manchurian counterpart. However, the Korean communists lacked the bourgeois intellectuals who led the 

expansion of other communist parties of the same era. Instead, the North 

Korean communist party gained supporters by resisting the hated Japanese 

occupiers.220 Eventually, after World War II, North Korea’s communist party 

became the strongest faction in Korea, and the Soviet liberation of North 

Korea led to a Leninist-influenced communist regime. The brutal Japanese 

rule gave way to a country that had a nonexistent civil society, and any remnants of opposition (such as the Christian minority) had fled south during 

the Korean War.221 This lack of opposition facilitated the establishment of 
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an all-encompassing dictatorial regime familiar with, and in some ways 

beholden to, the communist ideology of its Chinese and Soviet mentors. 

Presently, there is still no organized civil society in North Korea and certainly no recognizable civil discontent that would challenge or inhibit the 

North Korean leadership from aggressive foreign policy or warlike behavior—a legacy that stems, at least indirectly, from Japanese involvement in 

the peninsula.

The former Soviet Union’s influence in the creation of the DPRK is 

another important element contributing to North Korea’s unique strategic 

culture, and the relationship between North Korea and the former USSR 

has evolved with Russia’s changing political climate. The North Korean 

regime has portrayed its ties to Russia in ways that benefit its leadership. For 

example, North Korean propaganda asserts that Kim Il Sung was a leader of 

guerilla warfare against the Japanese and emerged as the uncontested leader 

of independence.222 The truth is that until the end of the Korean War there 

was competition among the top communist leaders in North Korea, including Kim Il Sung, Southern Communist party leader Pak Hongyong, Workers’ Party propaganda chief Kim Changman, and novelist and communist 

intellectual Hong Myonghui all having aspirations of leading the Korean 

Communists in the 1940s.223 However, Kim Il Sung emerged as sole leader for 

two reasons, both of which were related to the former USSR: first, because of 

his affiliation with the Soviet regime, which supported him in the early days 

of post-WWII state formation; and second, because of his adroit political 

maneuvering during the Korean War.224 Following the Korean War, Kim 

took advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift by playing China and the USSR against 

each other to gain independence from both powers and increase domestic 

support through an increased nationalist rhetoric of self-sufficiency.225

Although North Korean distortions of history have attempted to distance 

the regime from Russian influence, history still plays a role in today’s North 

Korean alliance with Russia. During the Cold War, the 1961 Mutual Defense 

and Cooperation Treaty defined the relationship between North Korea and 

the Soviet Union. However, the post-Soviet relationship was tenuous. Even 

after Russian President Vladimir Putin became the first among the Big Four 

to make an official visit to North Korea,226 Kim Jung Il stopped acknowledging the help of the Russians in freeing Korea from the Japanese for the sake 

of nationalism and self-aggrandizement,227 and changed the location of his 

birthplace from Russia, where he was born, to Korea.228
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Still, the ideological influence of the now-defunct Soviet Union is important to North Korean strategic culture, as the DPRK and the former USSR 

share many characteristics. North Korea expert Adrian Buzo details at least 

three strategic culture parallels common to North Korean and Soviet security doctrine: the permeating of political language with military imagery; 

the pursuit of creating a “new man” (in North Korea it is the Juche-type 

man [described in the next section], while in the USSR it was the New Soviet 

Man); and the highly centralized, planned economy in which the communist 

party exercises a monopoly over resource allocation.229 Despite the discussions about the extent to which North Korea is really allied with present-day 

Russia, the relationship should still be viewed in the context of the historical 

similarities between the DPRK and the former USSR. In his analysis of the 

former USSR’s strategic culture, Jack Snyder, USSR strategic culture expert, 

highlights its difference from the U.S. in its unilateral (vice cooperative for 

the U.S.) damage limitation strategies. His analysis shows that the Soviets 

had a preference for unilateral damage prevention through unrestrained 

counterforce nuclear strikes—or at least the threat of unrestrained counterforce strikes.230 Soviets liked the idea of major power threats, and this partially explains the Kim Dynasty’s emphasis on acquiring nuclear weapons, 

and forecasts how they might order them used.

An All-Encompassing Ideology: Juche, Suryong, and 

Military First 

The possibility for intense indoctrination of the population and totalitarian 

ruling by the country’s leadership are variables rooted in North Korea’s isolationist geopolitical history, and to a minor extent its religious history. Based 

on these variables, the well-established North Korean ideology includes three 

main ideas central to its propaganda, all of which are and important elements 

of the strategic culture informing its national security policy and activities.

The most evident of these variables is the Party’s self-image and persona. For example, on 7 September 1948, when the DPRK was established, 

the country declared itself a Marxist-Leninist state, in the same manner as 

the existing Soviet Union and soon to be Communist-ruled China. Similar to what occurred in China and Russia, the North Koreans adapted the 

Marxist-Leninist ideology to fit North Korean culture. For example, in 1955 
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Kim Il Sung first introduced the Juche doctrine, which quickly became the 

official ideology of the DPRK.231 Juche was compatible with Marxist-Leninist 

doctrine and can most simply be understood as a nationalist application of 

self-reliant communism. In fact, Juche is most often literally translated as 

“self-reliance,” policy, but its application has led some North Korea scholars 

to translate it to a “Korea First” policy232 to better convey the nationalism 

that Juche represents. Juche was used by Kim Il Sung to differentiate his 

regime from the two neighboring great communist powers and to establish 

his cult of personality. In the 1970s, his son Kim Jong Il was said to have 

further refined Juche by introducing the concept of suryong, or vanguard 

party, an idea that he borrowed from (but did not attribute to) Lenin. His 

suryong decree stated that the vanguard party, which the masses are required 

to unquestionably obey, is necessary in order to organically transform the 

country into a communist and self-reliant entity.233

Doctrinally, combining Juche and suryong was a way both to enforce 

Kim Jong Il’s and his sycophants’ political leadership and to reinforce the 

idea of unwavering obedience as a precondition for North Korea’s success.234

Moreover, Juche’s acceptance by the North Korean population was leveraged 

to maintain faith in the system when applied communism—most notably 

in applied economic policy—failed. Juche doctrine justified North Korean 

adaptations to Communist doctrine when the USSR and other European 

communist states failed. Pyongyang could explain that although communism and socialism had not succeeded everywhere, North Korea’s Juche

adaptation of the Marxist-Leninist thought will still be a winning ideology. Not surprisingly, in 1992, the words Marxist-Leninist were removed 

from the constitution, and only Juche remained.235 Many would agree that 

North Korea is not communist in the Marxist sense of the term. However, 

its early ties to Marxist-Leninist doctrine are still important because they 

were the basis for its later relationships with China and Russia. Even though 

Russia’s communist days are past, China is now as much capitalist as communist, and both Russia and China have recognized South Korea, remnant 

alliance behaviors still persist. For example, Russia and China consistently 

vote against significant condemnation of North Korea by the UN Security 

Council.236

The principle of autarchic nationalism is central to understanding the 

strategic decisions of North Korea. The ideal of self-reliance is central to 

Pyongyang’s propaganda, but it has been altered for the sake of survival. 
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The North Korean economy is in a terrible state, and has been for more 

than 30 years. In 1970, the North and South Korean gross domestic products were almost equivalent. However, by the late 1970s, there was a sharp 

decline in the North’s economy relative to the South.237 In the 1990s, the great 

famine, called “the arduous march” by Pyongyang’s euphemistic propaganda 

machine, killed between 1 and 3.5 million North Koreans.238 Indeed, the 

economy was so bad that many scholars, international observers, and academics predicted the imminent collapse of the regime.239 Because of the size 

of the famine, North Korea relied heavily on international aid. In 1995, North 

Korea set a pattern for acquiring and distributing international assistance, 

which greatly favored the image of the regime. After receiving international 

help, Pyongyang’s leaders kept very tight control on how and where the food 

could be distributed, often favoring the military with preferred food distribution.240 Because the North Korea’s stated policy is Juche, or self-reliance, one 

might expect that the food aid—which came mostly from the U.S., South 

Korea, and China—might be difficult for Pyongyang to accept and explain.241

However, Pyongyang, ever masterful of propaganda, has sometimes declared 

the aid to be loans from other countries, or tribute given by other countries to 

honor North Korea. Pyongyang also continues to often blame the bad state of 

the economy on U.S. embargos and points out that lack of U.S. cooperation 

is just one more reason for people to unite behind Juche.

242

The Kim Jong Il regime’s Military First doctrine also has important strategic culture implications. Kim officially launched the policy after he ascended 

to power, but the idea had actually evolved during the previous decade. The 

Military First doctrine is a method to enlist the support of North Korean 

citizens and to ward off internal and 

external threats to the regime.243 It is 

another ideological concept sustaining 

regime survival.244 Keeping the population worried about foreign invaders 

decreases their ambition to overthrow 

political leaders, who are portrayed as 

the only ones able to save them. In fact, 

the Military First doctrine is reinforced in the DPRK constitution as the 

“supreme duty and honor of citizens to defend the country and serve in the 

army as required by law.”245 The Military First policy is a strategic necessity 

The Military First doctrine is a 

method to enlist the support of 

North Korean citizens and to 

ward off internal and external 

threats to the regime.
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in that it justifies the state maintaining a robust conventional defense capability and developing a WMD capability. 

Given North Korea’s financial difficulties (which make the cost of maintaining large conventional forces difficult to justify), the absence of the protection earlier provided by the Soviet nuclear umbrella, and a noncommittal 

Chinese ally, developing a nuclear capability makes sense from both a Military First and strategic culture perspective. Despite a declining conventional 

capability and the lack of guaranteed military assistance from former closeknit allies, the nuclear capability keeps Military First relevant.246 Unfortunately for the rest of the world, from a strategic culture perspective and 

given fewer “use of force” options, the North Koreans may be inclined to 

use their nuclear capability during a jingoistic, bellicose, and threatening 

moment. As an extremely paranoid and defensive country with few other 

options, Pyongyang could tout its nuclear weapons capability not as a deterrent second strike capability (like the USSR and the U.S. during the Cold 

War), but as a tool of survival.247

Openly, Kim Jong Il justified the Military First doctrine as a way to 

ensure independence from foreign powers in North Korea.248 The flaunting 

of WMD and seemingly erratic military behavior were all ploys to keep the 

international community on its toes. From a game theory perspective, North 

Korea’s unpredictable behavior is a foil to create strategic opacity and hide 

patterns.249 Although Kim Jong Il’s erratic and dangerous behavior was undeniable, none of the analysts and scholars who studied him thought him to 

be crazy.250 His strategy had ambiguous deterrent value, which appears to be 

accepted by his son Kim Jong Un as well. Within months of being in power, 

the new leader offered to reenter nuclear negotiations by announcing that he 

would let the IAEA inspectors verify North Korean enrichment activities, 

and then proceeded to schedule a rocket launch and make a show of shortrange missile tests.251 This seemingly contradictory behavior continues a 

strategic culture family tradition of unpredictable security policy behavior.

A Rigid Family Cult 

A primary difference between North Korea’s strategic culture and that of 

neighboring Russia and China is the importance of the Kim family cult. The 

myth of Kim Il Sung has been strongly cultivated, first while he was alive, 
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and then by his descendants. Certain changes were made to his personal 

history to make him shine first as a liberator of Korea from the Japanese 

occupiers, and subsequently a defender of the fatherland against U.S. occupation of the South during the Korean War. Posthumously he was declared 

“Eternal President” and “Great Leader,” and he became deified in North 

Korean propaganda.252 The importance of the North Korean family cult, 

versus the Soviet or Maoist style cults of personality, is twofold. First, the 

cult of the Kim family has been important in assuring smooth transition of 

power,253 from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jung Il, and most recently to Kim Jong 

Un. In cult of personality regimes, transitions are rarely smooth and there is 

always the risk of a major upheaval during times of succession. Transforming a dictatorship that is based on what Max Weber called “charismatic 

authority” into a hereditary dictatorship based on “traditional authority” 

guarantees easier transitions of power.254 The calculating foresight of Kim 

Il Sung in bringing Kim Jung Il to the center of the government almost 20 

years before his death assured a smooth transition after his death and set 

the precedent and conditions for future uncontested transitions—as long as 

a Kim family member is in the line of succession. 

Second, the Kim family cult allowed Kim Jung Il to use the saintly image 

of his father to justify his rule.255 Although reverence for Kim Il Sung remains 

high in surveys of defectors, Kim Jong Il generated less reverent support. 

Given North Korea’s increasingly devastated economy and ravaging famines, 

Kim Jong Il’s lavish lifestyle was completely disconnected from the realities of the population.256 However, Kim Jong Il’s behavior did not end the 

regime, because the Kim family connection resonated (and still resonates) 

with North Koreans. North Korean experts Ralph Hassig and Kongdon Oh 

describe the resilience of the Kim dictatorship like this: “it would be a gross 

exaggeration to say that the people support Kim Jong-Il; rather it does not 

occur to them to oppose him.”257 The Kim dynasty’s new leader, Kim Jong 

Un, ascended to power without any resistance. He uses images and legends 

of his father and grandfather to justify his rule. However, having not had 

the benefit of a 20-year period of transition like his father, Kim Jong Un has 

been much less exposed and deified in the eyes of his people. Conveniently, 

the centennial of Kim Il Sung’s birth should give the new leader several occasions to show his filial piety, while also demonstrating that he is in charge.258

Maintaining the status quo is important during times of transition. From a 
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U.S. perspective, the third Kim’s acceptance of the status quo is an important indicator that North Korea’s strategic culture will continue unchanged. 

A Strategic Culture Defying Change

The DPRK’s rigid strategic culture is rooted in several elements that create 

an opportune environment for a totalitarian dictatorial regime and predict 

longevity of this regime, despite its innumerable shortcomings and severe 

economic challenges. Its history, geopolitical situation, and the custom-made 

communist ideology adapted by the Kim family and its close advisors to fit 

the North Korean experience are important components of North Korea’s 

unique strategic culture. First, the regime can distort the reality of international motives and actions due to its isolationist history reinforced by the 

doctrine of self-reliance. Second, the fear of compromised sovereignty is 

rooted in its geopolitical history. Many North Koreans thus would rather 

live in a draconically poor country than lose national independence. Third, 

there is a complete absence of a robust civil society power center that could 

counter the Kim family’s bellicose behavior and adventurism. North Korea’s 

unique political system, which is based on a rigid, hierarchical, and Confucian model and justified by a glorified but fabricated history of the ruling 

Kim family, further explains DPRK’s strategic decision-making process. In 

the past several decades there has never been the hint of a contender to the 

Kim family regime, which has succeeded in remaining isolated, resilient, and 

unpredictable. Despite economic hardship and terrible human rights violations,259 but absent any civil discourse, the Kim cult of personality maintains 

strict control over all elements of power in North Korea and its strategic 

behavior, particularly when it comes to the use of force. 

Consequences for the Future 

The North Korean regime has managed to fabricate an ideology based on 

an interpretation of North Korean history and traditions to justify its rule. 

Unless there is a change in North Korea which allows civil society to participate in strategic decision making and absent any a significant foreign 

intervention, the DPRK will remain isolationist, rigidly autocratic, and unresponsive to international legal norms. Without a civil society infused with 
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some policy-making powers, the leaders of North Korea (particularly the 

Kim cult) will be able to continue disregarding its neglected society while 

investing in threatening weaponry for nefarious purposes. In 2010, then 

Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted that “the administration’s policy 

of strategic patience on North Korea had failed.”260 Waiting may not play 

out in our favor when there is such a rigid strategic structure that predicts 

endurance of this ruthless regime.

President Barack Obama seems to be leaning toward tougher measures 

on North Korea. The U.S. President’s immediate cancellation of the “leap day 

agreement” to help feed North Koreans after the failed North Korea rocket 

launch 261 is an indicator of future policy. Furthermore, the “Asia Pivot” and 

former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emphasis on developing the Asia 

Pacific Naval presence and revitalizing friendships with the Japanese and 

other Asian allies may change the equilibrium in East Asia.262

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6. Strategic Culture of al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda (AQ) is neither a state nor a nation; instead, it is a transnational 

non-state actor with a relatively recent genesis and loose geographical 

attachments. However, AQ was founded on deep-rooted and complex beliefs, 

culture, and history that inform its strategic consciousness and decisions. 

AQ has existed in name since 1988. It draws its ideology from Islam’s rich 

history and on what former leader Osama bin Laden considered a common 

perspective of all Muslims. During his life, bin Laden rarely spoke of Arabs, 

but almost always of the Ummah,

263 the Islamic community of faithful that 

he saw as his people and forming an entity akin to that of a nation with 

bonds stronger than those of kinship or nationality. Bin Laden’s AQ doctrine 

was built on Sunni Muslim traditions, centuries of perceived humiliation 

at the hands foreign invaders, memories of past glory, and present political 

grievances of the Muslim inhabitants of the Middle East. The organization’s 

outlook is supported by a strategic culture that promotes symbolic violence 

on infidels and dismisses modern national boundaries in favor of attachment 

to holy sites and strategic historical locations such as the Greater Caliphate, a swath of territory stretching from Spain to Indonesia. AQ’s strategic 

culture is complex in that it has two main variants: one for leadership and 

another for foot soldiers. However, members share the same fanatical drive 

that is expressed through what they view as a religious battle to restore a 

pious earthly society and righteously prepare for afterlife.264

Reconciling the Strategic Culture of AQ Leadership and 

Operatives

AQ’s strategic culture is a dichotomy as seen through the eyes of its leadership and its foot soldiers. Drawing on the work of London School of Economics Professor of International Relations Christopher Coker, terrorism 

expert Jeffrey Cozzens argues that religion, culture, and ideology all shape 

the violence of AQ and the sympathetic groups that occupy its universe. 

In other words, for members of AQ and associated movements (AQAM), 

violence expresses who they are: the mujahedeen, slaves to God, seekers of 

martyrdom. For them, as for many others in history, “even suicide can be 

life affirming.”265 Cozzens suggests that all members of AQAM share similar 
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tendencies, including a view of themselves as mujahedeen who thirst for martyrdom. A retrospective justification of al-Qaeda’s violent jihadism is found 

in the early days of Islam. The depictions of the battles between Medina and 

Mecca have led to an immense literature of interpretations of that important 

time. After being attacked by a strong army of Meccans in Medina, Muhammad retaliated, was victorious and won Mecca in the process. Jerry Long, 

director of the Middle East Center at the University of Texas, traces the roots 

of the moral justification to go to war in Islam to the many battles waged 

during the Abbasid Caliphate.266 The Abbasid Caliphate era, known as a 

Golden Age of Islam lasting from 750 CE to 1257 CE, was the third Islamic 

Caliphate and was remarkable for the significant cultural, scientific, and territorial expansion it achieved—as well as its victorious battles against rival 

Arab tribes, the Byzantines, and the Persians.267 The results of the Abbasid 

battles have been interpreted by bin Laden and others as the hand of God 

helping Muslims to spread the just cause. The Caliphate was first weakened 

by the Crusaders in the 11th century and then collapsed when conquered 

by the Mongols in 1256. The 13th century philosopher Ibn Taymiyyah, who 

witnessed the end of the Abbasid Caliphate, first introduced the idea returning to a time of theocratic Muslim rule based on the teachings of the Koran. 

Taymiyyah’s nostalgia for the Golden Age of Islam has become part of the 

Sunni—and AQ—ethos.268 So much so that in the information found in the 

bin Laden compound after his death was his idea of changing the name of 

al-Qaeda to “The Restoration of the Caliphate Group.”269

The concept of a defensive war for the sake of advancing the cause of 

Islam is central to the belief of AQ foot soldiers as they strive, through their 

martyrdom, to recreate the Caliphate. The notion that warfare is necessary 

to return to the glory days of Islam identifies martyrdom as a component of 

AQ’s strategic culture, in which the suffering of the present is irrelevant from 

the perspective of the collective glory awaiting pious Muslims.270

However, within the ranks of AQ leadership, many have chosen to adopt 

a more functionalist, instrumentalist, strategic approach to the international 

struggle to establish the Caliphate. They are known as strategist jihadists.271

Like their foot soldiers, AQAM’s strategists believe they are individually 

obligated to undertake jihad and they long to attain martyrdom to reap 

all the heavenly rewards. However, “while they are on earth, they strive to 

attain victory, which entails uniting the Ummah and restoring the Caliphate.”272 These are the leaders and thinkers that produce what Bryngar Lia and 
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Thomas Hegghammer call “Jihadi Strategic Studies,”273 the reflections and 

writings about AQ’s mission. They do little actual field fighting and value and 

justify their lives as important elements for organization and propagation 

of the jihad. Those producers of “Jihadi Strategic Studies” contend that AQ 

is an intellectual organization that relies on careful research and reflective 

discussion before engaging in violence and warfare. An impressive body of 

literature written or promoted by the AQ leadership further reinforces the 

organization’s common strategic culture promoting martyrdom, transnational attacks, worldwide proselytism, and rejection of the Western way of 

life while placing a greater emphasis on the importance of their own fight to 

reinstitute a Sunni-Muslim Caliphate.274

Interestingly, AQ’s strategic leadership spends much time studying the 

West to prepare against counterterrorism tactics. For example, in response 

to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, AQ strategic thinker Abu Musad al Suri 

argued that the organization would be more resilient if it decentralized both 

its structure and its attacks.275 AQ strategists understand they are engaged in 

both an intelligence and an information war.276 Therefore, not only have they 

studied Western history, institutions, management principles, and military 

doctrine, but also current political trends and counterterrorism tactics. In 

true Sun Tzu fashion, understanding the enemy is very important to AQ 

strategic culture.277

Religious Ideology as Backbone of AQ’s Strategic Culture

AQ strategists and theorists have intensely debated Islam’s dictates on violence, death, and suicide and how to justify the organization’s tactics. Islam’s 

teachings about violence are ambiguous at best. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, both bin Laden’s and President Bush’s rhetoric depicted 

Islam as a violent religion. However, moderate Muslims have opined that 

Islam is a peaceful religion and that the Koran condemns violence.278 Moderates most often will point to the command in the Koran that implores, 

“slay not the life that God 

has made sacred.”279 However, the Koran also contains 

commandments that open 

the door to more violent 

Hence, AQ’s interpretations of the Koran 

serve as justification for the organization’s 

goals and objectives and the violent tactics used to achieve them.
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interpretations of the religion, such as “whoever killed a human being except 

as punishment for murder or other villainy in the land, shall be deemed as 

having killed all mankind.”280 Hence, AQ’s interpretations of the Koran serve 

as justification for the organization’s goals and objectives and the violent 

tactics used to achieve them. In his study of AQ, journalist Abdel Bari Atwan 

notes, “without Islam there would be no al-Qaeda.”281 In the same vein, 

the Egyptian revolutionary and theorist Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj 

wrote a pamphlet called “The Neglected Duty” explaining that the defense 

of Islam should include struggles against political and social injustice. Faraj 

is one of the first to validate the use of violent jihad against nonbelievers.282

Although the focus of his particular grievance was local secular states (the 

near enemy), his justification of the importance of jihad was a stepping-stone 

for AQ’s violent ideology. Thus, violence has become an important tenet of 

AQ strategic culture. Considering the asymmetric military balance between 

AQ and its adversaries, al Zawahiri, the organization’s post-bin Laden leader, 

has commented there is now “no solution without jihad.”283

Suicide Bombing: Rationalized “Personal” Violence

Suicide attacks are a predominant AQ tactic despite the fact that Islam condemns suicide.284 Also, Gallup Poll analyses suggest that the more religious 

the country, the lower the suicide rates—and Muslim countries top the lists 

as being most religious. 285 Yet, suicide operations are an AQ trademark. 

The reason for this contradiction is what AQ perceives to be a theological 

differentiation between martyrdom and suicide. Martyrdom is the supreme 

selfless act that guarantees posthumous respect and an entry into paradise. Unlike egoistic suicide, martyrdom is an altruistic and religious act. 

Martyrdom is obtained through suicide with a political end. The justification for the distinction between suicide and martyrdom is expressed by 

Islamist thinker Abdullah Azzam,286 who greatly influenced bin Laden. More 

recently, a young Palestinian woman who committed a suicide attack wrote: 

“The human bomb provides an example of that selflessness [...] that no 

life can be considered more valuable than the future of our people. This is 

emphatically not the act of someone committing suicide. Suicide is a selfish 

act.”287 Hence, a suicide attack loses negative connotations for AQ followers, 

instead becoming the greatest act of martyrdom and selfless service. AQ 
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followers aspire to die in combat at the hands of the enemy or through a 

suicide mission. In al Zawahiri’s eyes, trying to preserve one’s life at the risk 

of not accomplishing the mission is considered shameful and selfish. Thus, 

suicide bombing, a martyr’s way of ensuring mission accomplishment, is an 

important AQ strategic culture tactic. This concept is clearly very antithetical 

to U.S. strategic culture, in which every casualty potentially decreases public 

support for continued combat. AQ supporters view death as a necessary part 

of its mission success. 

The Roots of bin Laden’s Ideology

Bin Laden was greatly influenced by Sunni Scholars Abdullah Azzam and 

Sayyid Qutb, who were part of a strong movement calling for a defensive 

jihad. Qutb argued that religious war was the only form of killing that was 

morally sanctioned.288 Bin Laden’s followers in turn share a view of history 

that requires a forceful resurrection of Islam’s power and prestige. Their long 

and short-term historical perspectives reflect victimization and humiliation and justify a defensive, asymmetrical strategy in pursuit of their ideal 

world. This historical perspective recalls the persecution of Muhammad by 

the Meccans, the decline and loss of the Abbasid Caliphate in 1257, and the 

loss of the Iberian Peninsula in the 15th century. 

To AQ supporters and operatives, 20th century history is characterized 

by three major events: the Great Betrayal (the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 

that divided the Middle East and North Africa among British, French, and to 

a lesser extent Russian spheres of influence), the Disaster (Israeli statehood), 

and the other Disaster (the war of 1967 between Israel and the neighboring 

Arab States).289 More recently, the radicalization of Saudi Arabia led by the 

Wahhabi sect and the Afghan-Soviet war were formative experiences for 

bin Laden, convincing him to wage his own war partially inspired by the 

Afghan Mujahedeen and the Saudi Wahhabis.

290 More importantly, the first 

Gulf War, with subsequent U.S. intervention and perceived occupation of 

the Arabian Peninsula, were described by bin Laden’s biographers as the 

catalyst that cemented his passion for waging religious war. Bin Laden told 

reporter Abdel Atwan that he was shocked that “the house of Saud could 

welcome the deployment of ‘infidel’ forces within close proximity of holy 

places of Islam.”291 To bin Laden, Saudi Arabia was the home and ideological 
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foundation for the largest Salafi population.292 Salafi Muslims are militant 

radical Sunni Muslims whose strict interpretation of Islam shaped bin Laden’s ideology. While pockets of Salafi Muslims exist within the Middle East 

and North Africa, the center of this creed is in the Arabian Peninsula. For 

all its strict Salafist Muslim rhetoric, bin Laden was surprised—actually 

horrified—that Saudi Arabia welcomed U.S. troops, triggering betrayal and 

humiliation, and causing him to further develop his concept of the near 

enemy. The near enemy is any secular regime not following the strict rules 

of radical Islam (as defined by bin Laden and his followers) and hence is 

apostate and deserving of death—and Saudi Arabia and its leadership were 

quickly identified as a prime example.293 As a result, antipathy toward secular 

traitor regimes and the West are important factors defining AQ strategic 

culture. Bin Laden, al Zawahiri, and their followers viewed the U.S. presence 

as an extension of past colonial transgressions and humiliation. Remedying these transgressions, and targeting both the near and far transgressors, 

requires violence in the form of terrorism—another important component 

of AQ strategic culture. 

A Transnational Organization is Not Without 

Geographical Ties 

Classical strategic culture theory likes to relate strategic behavior to territorial constraints or advantages, which one would assume a non-state entity 

lacks. However, even though AQ lacks territory, its strategic culture and 

behavior are also influenced by geography. Many of AQ’s members come 

from Saudi Arabia and support bin Laden’s condemnation of the Saudi 

regime294 because of its support for the U.S. and the West. While virtually 

all U.S. military personnel withdrew from Saudi Arabia in 2003,295 AQ and 

its followers remained indignant because of the regional presence of the U.S. 

5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf296 and other U.S. military bases on the Arabian 

Peninsula, including in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and 

Qatar.297 U.S. military presence in the region makes it easy to justify AQ’s 

declaration of defensive war to liberate Muslims from the West. Therefore, 

geography is important, not because AQ possesses sovereign territory, but 

because the organization rejects the 20th century borders of the modern 
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Middle Eastern and North African states that were imposed by colonial 

powers.

AQ is a transnational, non-state entity. The organization has sovereignty 

over no territory and its members come from many countries. However, AQ’s 

strategic culture is affected by several geographical variables. AQ’s claims 

to Sunni Islam’s three holiest sites in the Middle East (Mecca, Medina, and 

Jerusalem) attach special importance to that region of the world. Hence, in 

addition to declaring war on the U.S., bin Laden declared a “Jihad against 

the Americans Occupying the Land of Two Holy Places” in 1996298 and 

condemned the apostate Saudi Arabian regime for collaborating with the 

“Zionist-Crusaders alliance.”299 In several subsequent declarations, bin Laden 

increased his rhetoric about liberating Jerusalem from the Zionists, a rallying cry that stirs the emotional passion of most Muslims in the Middle 

East.300 The plight of the Palestinians at the hands of Israelis supported by 

the Americans also stirs passions in Muslims partly because of Palestinians’ proximity to the third holiest site in Islam and partly because of the 

pan-Arab mentality that still permeates the region.301 Regardless of the poor 

treatment heaped on Palestinians by fellow Arabs in Middle-East countries, 

Palestinians are portrayed as Muslim kin suffering at the hands of infidels 

who occupy the third most important Muslim holy place. 

Geography is an easily explained strategic culture variable for states, but 

it is clearly also important to AQ, a non-sovereign entity with no proprietary 

territory, in a strategic culture context. From the organization’s perspective, 

the humiliation of imposed borders on Muslim lands, the occupation of holy 

sites by infidels, Saudi Arabia’s acquiescence to that occupation, and its belief 

in the Israeli occupation of Palestine are all geography-related phenomena 

affecting its strategic sensitivities and culture.

Foreign Fighters

Foreign fighters are important to AQ strategic culture and are defined either 

as foreign nationals or expats going abroad to fight the cause of the global 

jihad or local nationals who have acquired their fighting skills and experience in foreign conflicts.302 The idea of foreign fighters has expanded from 

regional to international proportions. Foreign fighters are not reluctant to 

travel thousands of miles to fight and consider traveling to be a pilgrimage 
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to wage a holy war.303 The concept of hijra, or holy pilgrimage, is a central 

concept of Islam that usually refers to reenacting Muhammad’s trip from 

Mecca to Medina. AQ recruits believe the pilgrimage extends beyond the 

traditional journey to the holy cities but includes any travel in the quest of 

fulfilling a higher calling by engaging in holy war.304

An important lower-level AQ operative subgroup, the so-called Arab 

Afghans, were bin Laden supporters during the Soviet-Afghan war.305 They 

flocked to Afghanistan from several different Arab countries to fight the 

Soviets; after they successfully defeated the Soviets, many were unable to 

return to their home countries, becoming prime examples of foreign fighters 

because of their dedication to the global jihad.306 Remaining in Afghanistan, they “established bonds of solidarity that outlived the conflict and they 

became an international brigade for carrying out the global jihad.”307 These 

so-called Arab Afghans were marginalized by the pre-9/11 Taliban society 

in Afghanistan and remain stuck in a sectarian religious logic that made 

them politically and socially sidelined.308 The combination of marginalization, disappointment, Muslim passion, and advanced military training made 

these foreign fighters ideal jihadists to support AQ. 

The concept of foreign fighters became ingrained in AQ strategic culture. One of the newer members of AQAM, Somalia-based al-Shabaab, relies 

greatly on foreign fighters to fill its ranks, not only at the foot-soldier level 

but also in its leadership. Many of al-Shabaab’s foreign fighters were trained 

abroad before joining the jihad in Somalia.309 The most hard-line followers 

of the al-Shabaab movement depend on Saudi sympathizers backing their 

efforts and seem to see Somalia as a stepping-stone for their participation 

in the greater global jihad.310

Therefore, AQ’s penchant for international travel and mobility is an 

important element of its strategic culture. For leadership, foreign fighters 

allow flexibility in filling the ranks of regional affiliates and provide important enhancements to AQ’s physical presence globally. In return, AQ fighters 

believe that it is their pious duty to make the journey far from home to fight 

the infidels and that God will reward them for it.311
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A New Organization Based on an Old Strategic Culture

AQ’s strategic culture is based on several centuries of history, a particular interpretation of religion by a now deceased charismatic leader, and 

a response to emotional political and geographical grievances of today’s 

Middle East. Bin Laden’s message still resonates because he based his organization’s ideology on an existing tradition and a trifecta of enemies: the 

Jews, the West, and the apostate regimes. Bin Laden’s charisma, financial 

resources, political and economic ties in the region, and combat experience 

in Afghanistan combined to make him the ideal father figure for the creation and sustainment of AQ. Much like the Abbasid Caliphate victories of 

previous centuries, the 9/11 attacks represented a symbolic success that drew 

in radical Islamists from all over the Arab world. Presently, and probably 

because of bin Laden’s death, U.S. officials view not AQ Central, but AQAM’s 

franchises and affiliates, as the most prominent clear and present danger. The 

most prominent and threatening entities within AQAM include al-Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula,312 al-Qaeda in Iraq,313 al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb, and al-Shabaab (perhaps soon to be renamed al-Qaeda in Somalia). 

Most of AQ Central’s core strategic culture elements are interchangeable 

with those of the geographic franchises. However, one important difference 

must be noted: AQ franchises tend to have national or irredentist claims and 

therefore focus more of their efforts on near enemy (secular states) than the 

far enemy (the U.S. and the West). Indeed, some of the documents found at 

bin Laden’s compound revealed his real concern for the growing divergences 

of tactics and ideology between AQ Central and the franchises.314 However, 

the main ideas of purging the Middle East of infidels, rebuilding a caliphate 

or powerful Islamic state through a violent battle, striving for martyrdom, 

and traveling lengths of the world as a pilgrimage for war remain central to 

AQ’s strategic culture.

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7. Common Characteristics of Chinese, 

Iranian, North Korean, and al-Qaeda’s 

Strategic Cultures

Dreams of Past Glory

China, Iran, North Korea, and al-Qaeda all recount histories that run the 

gamut from periods of glory to ignominy. China and Iran boast of strong 

empires and rich cultures. Al-Qaeda recalls the glory of the Abbasid Caliphate. North Korea evokes the triumphs of the Chosun dynasty that ruled the 

Korean peninsula from the 14th to the beginning of the 20th centuries.315 In 

all cases, the memories of glorious histories inform ambitious present and 

future states. For each, hubris derives from a notion of past glory that must 

be restored—by extreme measures if necessary.

For Iranians, the Persian Empire was a glorious time that separates them 

from people of other nations. The combination of pride in Iranian culture 

and a historic sense of victimization have created a fierce sense of independence and a culture of resistance to domination by foreign powers. As 

explained in more detail in the chapter about Iran, the nation’s sense of 

superiority is based on a perception of a glorious past anchored in the continuity of Iran’s cultural identity, the notion that Persia has been a state-like 

entity for more than 2,500 years, and that the country is the stronghold of 

Shi’a Islam. According to one analyst, “Most Iranians, be they Islamist or 

secular, believe that Iran is a great civilization that deserves to be treated as 

a regional hegemon, if not a great power. For example, Arabs, Afghans, and 

the Turkic peoples of Central Asia complain that Iranians treat them with 

disdain and as cultural inferiors. Iran’s sense of superiority is a constant 

irritant between Iran and its neighbors.”316

Similarly, China also believes that it was the world’s first nation-state 

and empire and points to millennia of history to justify its legacy.317 Today, 

China points to its economic success as evidence of its superior culture. 

Given the current demoralized, divided, and introspective climate of Western nations, some Asian countries, including China’s traditional enemies, 

are turning to the lessons of Beijing’s state-directed capitalism instead of 
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liberal democracy.318 Hence, China believes that its glorious past can and 

must be resurrected in its future. 

China and Iran share common ambitions: becoming traditional superpowers319 and regaining their past glories. However, al-Qaeda and North 

Korea have more ambiguous ambitions based on their interpretations of 

their own histories.

North Korea sees itself as the surviving half of the Chosun Dynasty 

kingdom. Its grandiose dreams may be less apparent than those of China 

and Iran, but North Korea’s leadership believes that both its survival and 

the survival of the North Korean state depend on its being feared—if not 

respected—by the international community.320 Indoctrinated by the Kim 

family’s interpretation of Korean history and related propaganda, North 

Korean citizens have bought in to the imperative of regaining past glory. 

For example, gifts brought by foreign dignitaries are publically displayed 

as tribute to the North Korean regime in a propaganda ploy indicating the 

superiority of the North Korea and a desire for the return to a time when 

the Korean kingdom was thriving.321 Al-Qaeda bases its dreams of past glory 

on the Abbasid Caliphate, which was a time of conquest, great learning, and 

power. Al-Qaeda leadership often refers to restoring the Caliphate to appeal 

to Arab Muslims yearning for a return to past glories. 

All across the Middle East and North Africa, Sunnis idealize the Abbasid 

Caliphate, commonly known as the Golden Age of Islam. In view of today’s 

Middle East woes, this deep nostalgia evokes, in its more extreme cases, 

a passionate desire to do whatever it takes to restore the Golden Age. It is 

upon this premise that al-Qaeda partially bases its recruitment strategy.322

Iran, China, North Korea, and al-Qaeda have clear ideas of what success 

looks like, and it is based on collective memories of an idealized past. This 

greatly affects each entity’s strategic culture, particularly the notion that a 

strong military is required to return to past grandeur. Each therefore requires 

its military capabilities to match its past, rather than being proportionate to 

what the rest of the world might see as their present security requirements.323

Hence, any condescension from the United States or other countries 

during diplomatic relations strikes a chord at deep seated sentiments of selfworth. What we see today when we superficially look at a country or entity’s 

military, ideological, and commercial influence does not match up to the 

ideas that the leadership and citizenry have of themselves. 
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Humiliation 

The strategic cultures of the three states and one non-state actor explored in 

this piece are deeply rooted in their specific historical narratives, but they 

nonetheless share many similarities, particularly with regard to humiliation.324 Each entity recalls humiliations suffered at the hands of foreigners, who exploited internal instability to end former empires and times of 

greatness. 

For example, explains Tony Corn in the Small Wars Journal, the Opium 

Wars were a critical experience in the Chinese collective memory, which 

the Chinese see as the beginning of what they view as a “century of humiliation.”325 “In truth, what must have been particularly humiliating was that 

China was in essence ‘out-Suntzued’ by foreign devils that opted for the ultimate indirect approach: the weaponization of opium,” says Corn.326

This irregular warfare technique 

resulted in the contamination of 

four million members of the Chinese elite and weakened the country to such a degree that it allowed 

a subsequent military takeover.327

Since then, China has reverted to 

being very wary of all foreign intervention and remains guarded against repeat humiliations. In Chinese terms, 

previous humiliation justifies a defensive strategic culture and significant 

investments in deterrent force.328

Iranians also feel they have been oppressed and humiliated by foreign 

powers throughout their history. They recall that Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, 

Turks, and most recently Saddam Hussein’s forces have all invaded their 

homeland. According to one analyst, “Iranians also remember that the 

British and Russian empires exploited them economically, subjugated them 

politically, and invaded and occupied their country in two World Wars.”329

From the Iranian perspective, the West looked on—in fact, effectively aided–

Saddam Hussein as Iraq waged a long and costly war aimed at repressing 

the Shi’a. This warfare included the use of WMD against Iran in the form 

of chemical weapons.330Ayatollah Khomeini made independence from foreign intervention and influence a significant part of political rhetoric that 

The strategic cultures of the three 

states and one non-state actor 

explored in this piece are deeply 

rooted in their specific historical 

narratives, but they nonetheless 

share many similarities, particularly 

with regard to humiliation.
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increased his popular support. Indeed, this played into Iranians need to feel 

empowered to control their own destiny.331 Presently, Iran’s ability to defend 

itself from foreign invasion and untoward influence and its ability to be at 

least as strong as the other major powers in the region are absolute strategic 

imperatives and core features of its strategic culture. The leadership sees 

Iran as both oppressed (religiously and physically) and challenged by the 

increasing U.S. presence in the Middle East during the second half of the 

20th century.332

With regard to North Korea, the Japanese invasion of 1910 resulted in the 

defeat and end of the Chosun Dynasty. This humiliation at the hands of the 

Japanese remains a lasting memory that fuels the bellicose rhetoric of the 

North Korean leadership. Having to resist Chinese, Japanese, and Russian 

advances throughout its history has made North Korea greatly xenophobic 

and weary of foreign invasions.333 Therefore, the constant threat of attack 

permeates North Korea’s collective consciousness and is easily manipulated 

by the country’s leadership to advance its Military First policy. Centuries 

of foreign invasions and humiliation are used by Pyongyang as propaganda 

fodder to incite retribution rhetoric and to justify bombastic behavior.334

Al-Qaeda sees itself as the ultimate avenger of foreign humiliation such 

as the defeat of Abbasid Caliphate, European colonization, and, as explained 

in more detail in the al-Qaeda chapter, the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 

and Israeli statehood.335 To al-Qaeda, the most recent humiliation is the 

American military presence in Saudi Arabia. The writings of al-Suri, touted 

as al-Qaeda’s foremost strategic thinker, emphasize how Islam has weathered centuries of assaults from the West,336 and the Saudi invitation to the 

Americans to establish military bases in the country is one of the most egregious of these humiliations. Inviting an infidel army into the Middle East 

was considered a sacrilegious act in bin Laden’s eyes, considering that the 

Prophet Mohammed reportedly said, “two religions shall not co-exist in the 

Arabian Peninsula.”337 Furthermore, as explained in the al-Qaeda chapter, 

bin Laden’s rejected offer to help the Saudis during the first Gulf War was 

considered another humiliation.338

The two quests—to reclaim past glory and to protect against future 

humiliation—are prevalent in the strategic writings of China, Iran, North 

Korea, and al-Qaeda. These changes profoundly influence how they perceive 

the world and react to the foreign policies of Western states, particularly that 

of the United States, a country that is perceived by all four as their primary 
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adversary. National security scholar Samantha Ravich’s description of Iran 

and China is applicable to all four of the entities covered in this monograph: 

each [entity] remembers a time when its empire was vast and its 

culture widespread. The two quests spawned from these narratives—to reclaim past glory and to guard against future humiliation—are ubiquitous in these countries’ strategic writings, and 

they influence how their current leaderships act in the world and 

in relation to the United States.339

The collective consciousness of past humiliation is important to remember when engaging in diplomatic talks with China, Iran, and North Korea 

and when making public statements about al-Qaeda. The rhetoric of any 

U.S. or Western administration should be mindful not to exacerbate that 

sense of humiliation. Furthermore, due to the ubiquity of worldwide media, 

including satellite television and the Internet, it is important for officials to 

remember that statements intended purely for domestic audiences will likely 

have international impact. Overly belligerent, threatening, or condescending rhetoric will simply feed into popular paranoia and the perception of 

U.S. intent to be dominant. Word choice is important, too. Using the term 

crusade to describe America’s quest to defeat al-Qaeda may have played well 

in Peoria, but was perceived very differently by the Muslim world.

Self-Reliance and Distrust of Foreign Powers 

Common to all three states and to al-Qaeda is a strategic culture that stresses 

self-reliance and mistrust of strategic alliances. In the U.S., the choice to 

enter conflicts has more often been an active decision made by leadership 

rather than a defensive obligation sparked by direct encroachments on U.S. 

territory. Hence, U.S. strategic culture is based on the premise that the isolationist debate is about whether to actively take part in foreign conflicts or 

stay home.340 This is a unique perspective that does not translate to other 

countries, where defending against foreign encroachment is usually the clear 

and present danger. For China, Iran, North Korea, and al-Qaeda, the cultural pride that comes from a notion of past grandeur, the fear of invasion, 

and subsequent humiliation has led to a belief that economic, cultural, and 

political autarchy and minimum foreign alliances are important in defending independence mechanisms. 
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In Iran, the present leadership stresses the unreliability of past foreign 

alliances in order to promote its economic and regional security agenda. The 

Russian delays in building the Buesher reactor have reconfirmed Iranian 

fears that the country cannot depend on others for support. Thus, Iran’s 

development of a civil nuclear capability and desire to have uranium enrichment proficiency might be understood as a way to reduce or eliminate dependence on imports and to keep foreign powers on their toes. Seeking civil 

nuclear capabilities also plays well domestically; it shows an emphasis on 

self-reliance both in energy creation and in the potential power nuclear arms 

might afford.341 Iran’s self assessed cultural, ethnic, and religious superiority 

also reinforces self-reliance policies. Despite entertaining strategic, political, 

and economic cooperation with other countries, Iran ultimately views itself 

to be alone and never fully trusts alliances.342

Because of its Hermit Kingdom legacy, North Korea is the most conscious 

proponent of self-reliance of all the states and non-state actors covered in 

this monograph. It is also the most isolationist. Where China and Iran have 

regional, if not global, ambitions that force alliances of convenience and 

a certain degree of economic openness, North Korea strives to be as isolated, secretive, and as self-reliant as possible. As explained in the chapter 

about North Korea, the Juche doctrine, one of the oldest core precepts of the 

Kim regime, literally means self-reliance, which conveniently reinforces the 

Korean belief that from abroad can only come intervention and humiliation.343 Scholar Andrew Scobell defines Juche as “the opposite of tributary 

status,”344 in that outside powers pay tribute to North Korea because of its 

greatness. This plays well to the public, particularly during times of famine, 

when North Korea depends on outside assistance to feed its people. Juche also 

helps to justify why Pyongyang strictly controls aid distribution.345 North 

Korea’s people and its leadership do not believe that they live in a friendly 

region or a friendly world; hence, North Korean strategic culture emphasizes 

self-reliance, military deterrence, and isolation as a defense against outside 

encroachment and interference. 

Al-Qaeda does not retain sovereignty within physical borders, but it 

does object to foreign encroachment on Middle East and North African 

territories, particularly in the area of the former Abbasid Caliphate, which 

stretched from Morocco in the West to the edges of Afghanistan in the 

East.346 According to al-Qaeda doctrine, these borders should encompass 

the new caliphate and center of the Muslim world. This same area, in its 
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opinion, should thus be rid of infidels. Opposition to foreign invaders and 

the idea of self-reliance is central to al-Qaeda’s ideology. Al-Qaeda distinguishes itself from other Middle Eastern radical Islamic terrorist groups 

by focusing on the far enemy—the so-called imperialist powers meddling 

with local affairs—rather than just the near enemy, the corrupt or secular 

local regimes.347 Although al-Qaeda has contempt for both near and far 

enemies, the main focus of its hatred is foreign incursion into local politics 

and Muslim life. Therefore, al-Qaeda’s strategic culture is similar to that of 

China, Iran, and North Korea in that they all advocate self-reliance, reject 

foreign incursions and influence, and engage in international alliances only 

as marriages of convenience that serve their own self-interest, rather than 

long-term, mutually beneficial partnerships. 

Authoritarian Popular Control 

The strategic cultures of China, Iran, North Korea, and al-Qaeda take for 

granted the pervasive autocratic control leaders have over their citizens and 

followers. The top-down structures of each state’s government enable leaders to quickly make calculated strategic decisions unhindered by potential 

popular dissent. Time wise, this is a comparative strategic advantage in that 

decisions—particularly in committing military power and using force—can 

be nearly instantaneous, unlike in the U.S., where most strategic decisions 

must be viewed in the light of their acceptance by citizens. 

Because of the increased liberalization of the Chinese economy, it is convenient to forget that China is still an autocracy. There is no room for dissent, 

and the few that have tried to criticize the regime have paid dearly for it.348

The U.S. Department of State, upon releasing its 2011 report on human rights 

abuse, noted a worsening of the Chinese human rights record. The report 

also stresses the oppressive and controlling nature of Beijing’s leadership and 

the degree to which real power resides with only 25 top Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) members. China’s president, Xi Jinping, “holds the three most 

powerful positions as CCP general secretary, president, and chairman of the 

Central Military Commission.”349 Repression and coercion are ubiquitous in 

China and ensure that the center of power–including all military strategies 

and operations—lies with Hu and the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. 
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Any strategic security decisions can therefore be made without regard to 

public opinion or dissent. 

The Iranian regime has a rather complex political system with unique 

institutions (the president and the supreme religious leader, for example, 

are two different distinct authorities).350 In Iran, professional advancement 

is tied to a person’s relationship to the regime; only through unilateral support of the regime can people prosper and gain power. This creates an allencompassing, self-sustaining system. Therefore, just as in China, Iran’s 

government has strong repressive tools to ensure that voices of dissent are 

dealt with quickly and harshly and that the leadership can make quick, independent decisions about the use of the military and application of force.351

In North Korea, a key element of the Kim regime is its oppressive control 

of the North Korean people, which results in submission.352 Historically, 

North Korea was a deeply hierarchical, authoritarian society. During the 

crushing Japanese occupation, authoritarian rule continued to the extent 

that any semblance of civil society disappeared.353 Presently, the totalitarian 

rules of the North Korean regime, reinforced by an omnipresent military 

and propaganda, have effectively destroyed any potential for opposition to 

the Kim family regime.354 Therefore, Kim Jung Un is free to make quick and 

radical strategic decisions without having to be concerned with popular 

dissent or even discontent. 

Al-Qaeda’s doctrine is built on the faith of radical fighters advancing 

the cause of restoring the golden age of Islam. Unlike a state, in which there 

is a potential for rebellion or the creation of an opposition, only those who 

agree with the cause advanced by bin Laden join al-Qaeda. During his life, 

bin Laden had the final say on all of al-Qaeda central’s strategic decisions 

and, since his death, al Zawahiri has sought to take on this role.355 In documents found in his Pakistan compound, bin Laden did express concerns for 

al-Qaeda franchise operations behaving in ways not approved by the leadership.356 Yet, the actions of possible rogue franchises such as al-Qaeda in Iraq 

and disputes within al-Qaeda’s central leadership can hardly be compared to 

opposition groups hindering strategic actions of a government. There may be 

some dissent within the ranks of al-Qaeda and with its franchise operations, 

but none that significantly affect al-Qaeda’s core group’s strategic decisions.357
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High Regard for Martyrs 

Iran and al-Qaeda have elevated the status of martyrs and made dying for 

the cause the mark of ultimate bravery. The ideologies of these three entities 

include justifications for the ultimate individual sacrifice for the cause, and 

each posthumously glorifies those who willingly fight to their deaths.358 In 

the U.S., while there are numerous monuments for the fallen and the celebration of Memorial Day is respected and celebrated irrespective of political or religious creed, the country’s reverence for life makes it difficult for 

Americans to comprehend intentional suicide for the good of a cause, state, 

or leader. Other cultures view life as a transitional state prior to attaining 

paradise. Supporters of al-Qaeda and Iran view giving their lives as their way 

into paradise. Americans view each and every war casualty with sadness; 

they see the number of friendly dead as symbols of defeat, not as enviable 

acts of heroism.

In Iran, however, Khomeini idealized martyrdom in his rhetoric and 

in his teachings, and the concept became a central tenet of his ideology. In 

Shi’a Islam, the martyrdom of Hussein Ibn Ali (who was the grandson of 

Muhammad and the second Shi’a Imam) and the celebration of Ashura are 

well-known and venerated examples of religious martyrdom.359 Khomeini 

strove to make martyrdom a tactic of the revolution by using grandiose 

rhetoric about his willingness to fight to the death.360 His characterization 

of Iran as a “nation of martyrs”361 was as much a prescription as it was a 

description. This concept resonated with his followers; to be a true supporter 

of the IRI means to accept to sacrifice oneself for the cause or proudly see 

one’s son die at war.362

Suicide operations are a well-known al-Qaeda tactic. Indeed, members of 

AQAM aspire to conduct suicide operations in order to achieve martyrdom. 

For them, giving their life for the fight against the infidels is a ticket into 

heaven.363 Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda strategists contend that Islamist 

literature differentiates between forbidden suicide364 and revered martyrdom.365 The notion that warfare is necessary to return to the glory days of 

Islam condones martyrdom as a component of al-Qaeda’s strategic culture. 

For followers, the suffering of the present is irrelevant in perspective of the 

collective glory awaiting pious Muslims.366 Hence there should be no attachment to living as an end in itself, only a sustained effort at all costs to defend 

Islam and to restore the Caliphate.367 Showing more attachment to one’s 
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life than to the accomplishment of the battle is considered cowardly and 

shameful. All al-Qaeda operatives aspire to die for the glory of martyrdom.

Lack of Blue Water Naval History

Interestingly, while China, Iran, and North Korea all border major bodies of 

water, none have a history of being major ocean powers. With the exception 

of China, during a brief period of its long history, none have had blue water 

navies. Similarly, al-Qaeda has mostly restricted its operations to land and 

air. Despite being strong empires at one point, Persia and China had predominantly land-based militaries. North Korea’s lack of naval power is interesting in light of the fact that Japan, its primary regional threat, advanced 

from the sea. At two points in Korean history, the country defeated Japanese 

armadas with turtle boats—small armored craft resembling the iron-clads 

of the civil war—using guerilla tactics368 very much like those tactics used 

by the Iranians in the Gulf.369 As for Iran, despite claims to large areas of the 

Persian Gulf, it has also eschewed building blue water capable ships, depending instead on seaborne guerilla warfare tactics in confronting tankers and 

laying mines to attempt to discourage commercial craft and American warships from plying the Gulf.370

Traditionally, China was a weak sea power, which is one reason the British so easily defeated the Qing Dynasty during the Opium Wars.371 Until 

recently, Chinese military doctrine advocated land and asymmetrical warfare to deter foes. Historically, China has used its large land mass to draw 

adversaries into China until they outdistance their lines of communication 

and supply. Mao was the master of asymmetric guerilla warfare, and long 

after his death, doctrinal concepts such as “People’s War” and “People’s War 

under Modern Conditions” continued the asymmetric land warfare theme. 

However, in April 2010, Chinese Rear Admiral Zhang Huachen declared 

that the country’s naval strategy had changed, announcing, “we are going 

from coastal defense to far sea defense ... With the expansion of the country’s 

economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of our major sea-lanes.”372 This announcement 

may signal a fundamental change in China’s strategic culture.
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Notable Differences

While there are many strategic warfare similarities among the three states 

and one non-state actor addressed in this monograph, there are also many 

differences. The fact that three of the monograph’s subjects are states and 

one is a non-state actor is an obvious difference. Also, unique ideologies and 

outlooks contribute to profound differences among the strategic cultures of 

all four. 

Ideological Differences—One Religious, One Not

The strategic cultures of China, Iran, North Korea, and al-Qaeda are supported by different ideologies. Interestingly, two ideologies are based on 

religious doctrine and two are decidedly anti-religious and communist. Iran 

and al-Qaeda base their ideology on two different sects of Islam, while China 

and North Korea are based on two different variations of communism. Both 

Islam and communism seek converts or adherents but are quite different in 

approach. 

Communism is an economic and sociological precept, while Islam is a 

religion, and there is no commonality between the two. In fact, communism by definition is an atheist doctrine—as Karl Marx famously declared, 

“religion is the opium of the people”373—and the state communist parties of 

China and North Korea have effectively purged religions of all types from 

their systems. According to communist doctrine, there is no higher authority 

than the state, which is an anathema to Muslims as well as to people of other 

faiths. In 1980, this author attended a secret Catholic mass in Shanghai in a 

packed warehouse. Since then, much has changed. Thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism, China began to tolerate religious freedom as long as it was 

not overdone. In fact, according to a state-run Chinese newspaper survey, 

31.4 percent of Chinese adults are religious—a figure which is three times 

higher than government estimates.374 However, while China’s constitution 

specifically allows “freedom of religious belief,” the CCP is officially atheist. 

Religious discrimination still exists, and experts contend that Tibetan Buddhists, unregistered Christians, and particularly Uighur Muslims are still 

persecuted and repressed.375

Contrary to those changes in Chinese communism, religious freedom is 

completely absent in North Korea. The Pyongyang regime severely represses 
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public and private religious activities and enforces a policy of actively discrimination against religious believers.376 According to a report prepared 

by the U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom, the North Korean regime 

has “arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and sometimes executed North Korean 

citizens who were found to have ties with overseas Christian evangelical 

groups operating across the border in China, as well as those who engaged in 

unauthorized religious activities such as public religious expression and persuasion.”377 In addition, North Korean leadership actively persecutes Christianity because it has the biggest potential of creating a cohesive opposition. 

Historically, Korean Christians were the strongest opponents to the Japanese 

occupation378 and today, South Korea-based Christian groups are among the 

most successful facilitators of defectors across the border.379

Chinese and North Korean communisms differ in implementation as well 

as in ideology. As explained in more details in the North Korean chapter, the 

North Korean communist party had aligned itself with the Russian ideology 

until the fall of the USSR, when it erased all references to Marxist-Leninism 

and stressed Juche instead.380 Maoist communism created a peasant-based 

economy since the mid-20th century and quickly parted not only from 

Marxism but also from the Leninist adaptation of communism.381 From 

a Muslim perspective, communism is an alien concept. Recall this monograph’s reference to how communists were treated after Khomeini came to 

power in Iran and how bin Laden organized an international army against 

the Soviets in Afghanistan. Communism by definition has no afterlife, which 

is counter to all Islamic teachings. Additionally, communism is completely 

antireligious and hence a direct threat to Iran’s theocracy and al-Qaeda’s 

aspirations. The USSR’s attempts to forcefully secularize the Islamic republic 

of Tajikistan were unsuccessful and exemplified the incompatibility of atheist 

communism and Islam.382

Importantly, from a Muslim perspective, the religious ideologies of Iran 

and al-Qaeda are not aligned. True, both are viewed by many as following extremist religious ideals. However, Iran is a Shi’a theocracy populated 

by Persians, while al-Qaeda is a predominantly Sunni organization whose 

membership is largely Arab.383 As discussed in detail in the chapter about 

Iran and, to a lesser extent, in the one about al-Qaeda, there are clear and 

fundamental antipathies between Persians and Arabs384 and between Sunnis 

and Shi’as.385
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States versus Non-State Actors

Another notable difference is that China, Iran, and North Korea are all states 

recognized as such by the UN and the international community. Al-Qaeda 

is not a state, but is instead a transnational non-state actor. While al-Qaeda 

had some state-like features when it had sanctuary in Afghanistan, it is now 

very much a decentralized, networked, and cellular organization. Al-Qaeda 

has no diplomatic corps, no finance minister, and no territorial boundaries. 

This makes al-Qaeda’s strategic culture more difficult to evaluate and counter in that there is no ministry to negotiate with when things get rough.386

New Axis of Evil or Alliances of Convenience?

This study by no means supports the idea that there is a multilateral “axis of 

evil” plus China alliance. Yet evidence suggests several incidences of bilateral 

and multilateral cooperation between and among China, Iran, North Korea, 

and al-Qaeda. The most flagrant from a U.S. perspective is Chinese-Iranian 

economic and strategic cooperation. Also, China and North Korea have 

cooperated on security and economic issues since the founding of North 

Korea. Iran and North Korea have cooperated, mostly for nefarious nuclear 

or conventional weapons procurement related reasons. To an extent, there 

have been significant suspicions that al-Qaeda had or sought weapon trading 

relationships with North Korea and China and that North Korea was willing to sell its weapons.387 Additionally, there is an ambiguous relationship 

between al-Qaeda and Iran in that bin Laden’s son and several close associates have been under house arrest in Tehran since shortly after 9/11.388 Interestingly, the three states known for emphasizing self-reliance have “used” 

each other in marriages of diplomatic, economic, and security convenience. 

China is Iran’s second largest trading partner; about 20 percent of Iranian oil goes to China.389 Iran’s relationship with China is important as a 

counterweight to U.S. economic embargos and sanctions. Without Chinese 

support, the UN Security Council cannot take serious action against Iranian 

uranium enrichment, and so far China has used its Security Council vote 

to resist more drastic sanctions against Iran.390 China’s interests are mainly 

about energy security, as Iran is China’s third largest source of oil; it is estimated that China imports 500,000 barrels per day from Iran.391 Yet, China 

has been careful to balance U.S. and European pressures against Iran with 
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its own energy interests. So far, China has been able to maintain positive, if 

somewhat strained, relationships with both the U.S. and Iran by selectively 

supporting each side’s positions based on Beijing’s strategic interests.392

In the last 50 years, China has been North Korea’s most consistent ally 

and trading partner, providing aid,393 arms, commodities, and political support. The Chinese government dreads a North Korean regime collapse, which 

would certainly trigger a flood of refugees to cross its border.394 China has 

been the North Korean regime’s only supporter in international diplomacy, 

but this support dramatically decreased after the North Korean nuclear test 

of 2006. Following that nuclear test, China agreed to sign UN Resolution 

1718, which imposed sanctions on Pyongyang.395 However, despite signing the 

resolution, rumors persist that China has shipped arms to North Korea. For 

example, in 2009 China failed to stop an arms shipment from North Korea 

to Iran, thus facilitating the transaction,396 and reports of direct trading 

between China and North Korea have surfaced as recently as June 2012.397

What is certain is that China has long held convictions that the West is 

hostile to its political values and wants to contain its rise.398 Therefore, many 

Chinese newspapers and websites advocate increased Chinese alignment 

with countries that are antagonistic to the U.S. and Europe, which include 

North Korea and Iran.399

In 2010, a UN report suggested that North Korea had supplied Iran with 

banned items that could be used in Tehran’s nuclear weapons program.400

Since then there have been increasing suspicions that Iran has indeed turned 

to North Korea to circumvent international sanctions and that the rogue, 

isolated and extremely impoverished North Korea would see no qualm at 

selling Iran forbidden nuclear materials.401 There is also talk about China 

willingly turning a blind eye on the North Korean-Iranian trade and even 

being used as a port for the transfer of the arms from North Korea to Iran.402

Al-Qaeda has had few direct engagements with China, Iran, or North 

Korea. Since it is not a state, al-Qaeda does not have a functioning commerce 

or diplomatic corps whose actions with other states can easily be analyzed. 

However, there is a suspected commercial link between al-Qaeda and North 

Korea, with al-Qaeda possibly purchasing ground-to-air missiles from North 

Korea. The principal concern for U.S. policy is the willingness with which 

North Korea sells weapons and possibly nuclear weapons fabrication tools to 

other state and non-state actors.403 The threat of a nuclear capable al-Qaeda 

was a central issue in a recent summit in Seoul, in which North Korea was 
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identified as a culprit for transferring dual use nuclear equipment.404 U.S. 

President Barack Obama had sought the support of former Chinese President 

Hu Jintao in increasing the pressure on and control of North Korean arms 

deals. Other than perhaps turning a blind eye to North Korea’s suspected 

support to al-Qaeda, there is no evidence of an al-Qaeda-China relationship.

The relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran is complex. Both bin Laden 

and Khomeini preached that unified Muslims should fight against infidel 

non-Muslims.405 Nevertheless, the deep divide between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims dominates the allegiances of the foot soldiers and followers of both sects; 

the al-Qaeda operatives and followers of bin Laden view Shi’as as heretics 

and Iran as apostate, while Iranian followers of Khomeini see Sunni power 

as a threat to Shi’a and Persian hegemony.406 Overall, Iranian leadership has 

found an interesting way to subtly accommodate al-Qaeda. Seth G. Jones, 

an expert in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, has done extensive 

research on the al-Qaeda outpost in Iran and writes, “Iran is in many ways 

is a safer territory from which al-Qaeda can operate. The U.S. has targeted 

al-Qaeda in Pakistan, Iraq, [and] Yemen but has limited operational reach 

in Iran.”407 Discretely, Iran has held key al-Qaeda leaders under house arrest, 

including the strategist and thinker Yasin al-Suri and the Egyptian head 

of al-Qaeda’s security committee Saif al Adel. By holding them captive but 

refusing to extradite them to the U.S., Iran has attempted to offer moderate 

support to al-Qaeda without giving the U.S. cause for war.408 Furthermore 

there has been some evidence that, while under house arrest, the al-Qaeda 

leaders have still been able to communicate with their organization and 

possibly even travel and fundraise.409

Asymmetric Warfare

All three states and al-Qaeda have a propensity for asymmetric warfare, 

which compensates for their relative military weakness against the 

U.S. and the West. With regards to 

international relations and foreign 

policy, asymmetric warfare capabilities create an illusion of power that 

All three states and al-Qaeda have 

a propensity for asymmetric warfare, which compensates for their 

relative military weakness against 

the U.S. and the West.
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deters outside foreign involvement and furthers independent clandestine 

and covert actions. 

As a terrorist organization, al-Qaeda by definition wages asymmetric 

warfare. Using terrorist tactics to achieve strategic objectives epitomizes 

asymmetric warfare doctrine. Terrorism creates enormous international 

impact at a relatively low expense—more bang for the buck in military lexicon. Al-Qaeda sees itself in a two-front war against near and the far enemies,410 and asymmetric attacks work well against both secular state (near) 

targets and U.S. and other Western (far) targets, where their impact is felt 

well beyond al-Qaeda’s traditional areas of operation. 

Most do not consider the threat of nuclear weapons in asymmetric terms. 

However, China’s application of its small nuclear capability can be likened 

to an asymmetric force. The People’s Republic of China’s first nuclear test 

in 1964 was a signal to the international community that Beijing had the 

ambition to be a force to be reckoned with. This test created intense anxiety 

in the Western community and precipitated the creation of the international 

Non-Proliferation Treaty.411 Since then, China has at times presented a proliferation concern due to its suspected transfer of nuclear arms to Pakistan 

and its suspected involvement in the nuclear arms trade between Iran and 

North Korea.412 According to IAEA reports, China has the least advanced 

nuclear arsenal of the five declared nuclear weapon states, which also include 

the U.S., Russia, France, and the United Kingdom.413 Therefore, in an asymmetric way, China maintains a minimum nuclear deterrent to keep potential 

adversaries at bay. 

Possibly learning from the Chinese example, Iran understands that possessing nuclear weapons, even if just a few, would complement its asymmetric 

capabilities against the U.S. and the West.414 Iran’s quest for nuclear power 

and its strategic culture have caused Iranian leadership to overwhelmingly 

rely on its asymmetric warfare capabilities to make up for a weaker conventional military force. The regime thus depends on terrorism and the 

development of weapons of mass destruction to counter U.S. military superiority. Center for Security and International Studies CSIS scholars Alexander 

Wilner and Anthony Cordesman wrote, “Iran’s asymmetric capabilities 

interact with its nuclear weapons development efforts to compensate for 

the limitations to its conventional forces. Going nuclear provides a level 

of intimidation that Iran can use as both a form of terrorism and to deter 

conventional responses to its use of asymmetric warfare.”415 This could be a 
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serious motivation for Iran to acquire such weapons. Similarly, North Korea 

is well known today for its possession of nuclear weapons. This not only gives 

Pyongyang leadership asymmetric capabilities against the West, but also 

affords a huge conventional advantage against its main regional adversaries, South Korea and Japan. The celebration of guerilla warfare tactics used 

against the Japanese has led to the regime’s elevation of Kim Il Sung’s role 

as a leader of that movement,416 an important component of party’s narrative. North Korea also has one of the world’s largest special forces organizations, with more than 600,000 soldiers intent on infiltrating the South in 

the early stages of any conflict. That North Korea will continue to invest in 

asymmetric warfare capability is a given; how much they invest in nuclear, 

special operations, and propaganda efforts might signal their intentions as 

well as their capabilities.417

China, Iran, North Korea, and al-Qaeda share common strategic culture 

elements that should be taken seriously; they present immediate threats to 

the U.S., and it is important to recognize common behaviors that might 

affect national security interests. In sum, China, Iran, North Korea, and 

al-Qaeda are unconstrained by public opinion or alternative power centers, 

which enable them to be faster and more aggressive in their strategic decisions. All place little value on individual freedoms including life, with some 

even advocating suicide as a weapon. All use asymmetric warfare tactics 

to achieve their strategic results, with all four including nuclear weapons 

in their calculus. There are also differences. Structurally, China, Iran, and 

North Korea are states; al-Qaeda is not. Ideologically, China and North 

Korea are communist states and Iran and al-Qaeda are Muslim. However, 

the communist ideologies of China and North Korea are quite different, as 

are the Islamic ideologies of Iran and al-Qaeda. 

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8.Conclusions

While this work’s approach to strategic culture does not produce a 

predictive model of behavior, it does clearly suggest which outcomes 

are more likely than others—and why. It provides historical context and a 

framework upon which to hang logical and evidentiary support, both of 

which can be tested and subject to revision. Moreover, the findings from 

this type of approach can be challenged in the way that stereotypes—even 

culturally informed ones—cannot.

This study is meant to enlighten and inform U.S. strategists and policymakers who follow Chinese, Iranian, North Korean, and al-Qaeda security 

policies and actions. Each of the four entities observed in this monograph has 

a unique history and strategic culture. However, all four also share common 

denominators, not least of which is their antipathy toward the U.S., as well 

as the reciprocal perception by the U.S. that each, in its own way, is evil. In 

a February 2012 Gallup Poll, Americans most frequently named Iran as the 

country posing the greatest threat to the U.S.; China was second, and North 

Korea third.418 Al-Qaeda wasn’t mentioned because the poll focused solely on 

states, which al-Qaeda is not. However, the Obama administration’s National 

Security Strategy is clear in identifying al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups as 

the clear and present danger to the United States.419

No “Hotline,” but Still a Need for International 

Diplomatic Efforts 

The threats emanating from Iran, North Korea, al-Qaeda, and possibly China 

are nontraditional because of their asymmetric component, but also because 

of the great power given to rumor, perception, and rhetoric. This is indeed a 

reason to reinforce multilateral diplomatic pressure on all states—and particularly on those overtly supporting al-Qaeda—to reduce the potential of 

disastrous conflicts. As observed, none of the four entities studied have the 

pressures of real civil societies or of a powerful electorate to curb extreme 

military decisions. Yet all three states and even al-Qaeda operate or trade 

across national lines. This is where the strength of the Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT) and the United Nations Security Council must be reemphasized. As the nuclear threat remains a powerful asymmetric warfare risk, 
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the international community should prioritize strengthening the NPT to 

control the commerce of know-how, tools, and materials necessary to create 

nuclear weapons.420 Additionally, when dealing with countries that have a 

history of humiliation at the hands of imperial powers, multilateralism can 

alleviate cultural sentiments of victimization. 

U.S. strategic culture recognizes that there are many influence groups 

and power centers that affect strategic decisions, particularly decisions on 

the use of military force. However, autocratic regimes—whether they are 

states or transnational non-state actors—have an advantage when it comes 

to quick decision-making. Within 

China, Iran, North Korea, and 

even al-Qaeda, leaders can make 

strategic decisions without having 

to worry about popular discontent, 

criticism from opposition parties, 

or other domestic power centers. 

Hence, North Korea’s sinking of a South Korean warship on 26 March 2010421

and shelling of a South Korean Island in November 2010 met with no internal 

domestic resistance.422 Similarly, al-Qaeda did not hesitate to attack New 

York’s Twin Towers twice despite the fact that many Muslims were killed 

in the second strike. Different Beijing administrations were unhampered 

by public opinion when launching surprise attacks against Korea in 1950, 

India in 1962, and Vietnam in 1979. Iran’s support for Hezbollah, arguably 

a more dangerous terrorist organization than al-Qaeda or Hamas, does not 

prompt so much as an unfavorable comment from Iran’s press or citizenry. 

The intense aspiration for martyrdom in Iran’s and al-Qaeda’s cultures 

and the lack of the importance of human life in North Korean culture are 

important from a mirror-imaging perspective. In the U.S., war casualties 

are almost inversely proportional to popular support for the war, and this 

strongly shapes this country’s strategic decisions.423 On the contrary, the 

casualty count is a sign of accomplished missions in North Korea, Iran, and 

al-Qaeda; this loss of life often increases popular passions for the conflict. 

As the U.S. shapes policy toward and monitors military conflict with these 

states, the number of victims should not automatically be equated to a low 

morale. In fact, high body counts can carry much greater significance, and 

even become an effective recruitment tool. 

U.S. strategic culture recognizes that 

there are many influence groups 

and power centers that affect strategic decisions, particularly decisions 

on the use of military force.
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Ideology is one of the fundamental drivers of strategic culture in China, 

Iran, North Korea, and al-Qaeda. However, all four entities are quite different, and their ideologies highlight these core dissimilarities. For example, 

communist and Islamist ideologies are non-compatible, competitive, and 

have been a cause of conflict.424 Second, Iran’s and al-Qaeda’s Islamist ideologies are based on two different versions of the Muslim faith and have 

been politically competitive since the rift between Sunni and Shi’a began.425

Third, China’s and North Korea’s communist ideologies—once as “close as 

lips and teeth”—have evolved in starkly different directions over the past 

three decades.426 The U.S. should be prepared to take advantage of these 

ideological cleavages by at least avoiding the prospect of preventing new 

coalitions of rogue states and actors hostile toward the U.S. and—even 

better—manipulating the ideological cleavages so the adversaries turn on 

each other. For example, U.S. pressure on China to condemn North Korean 

belligerent actions should remind Beijing of recent hostile action against 

Chinese businesses in North Korea.427

Mostly because of past colonial transgressions and U.S. anti-Communist 

policies, Iranian, Chinese, North Korean, and al-Qaeda’s strategic cultures 

fear incursions by foreign powers and seek alliances, or marriages of convenience, for very specific interests. When cooperating with others, each 

assumes that the other party has only its own interest in mind and may turn 

on a promise of cooperation quickly. This leads to a propensity to distrust 

international alliances and see them as elusive, which creates an additional 

challenge when trying to leverage international organizations and treaties 

to contain belligerent ambitions and defenses. The states discussed in this 

monograph and al-Qaeda would be hard-pressed to believe that, for example, 

the NPT would offer a real protection against nuclear threats from other 

countries. 

The Propensity for Asymmetrical Warfare Demands a 

Counter Asymmetrical Warfare Strategy

In this post-Cold War world, the greatest danger to U.S. security does not 

stem from conventional war, but from those using asymmetrical warfare 

strategies and tactics. The United States’ conventional warfare dominance 

has led its weaker and more belligerent enemies to seek asymmetric means 
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to overcome its superiority. Asymmetrical warfare is a key component of 

the strategic cultures of China, Iran, North Korea, and al-Qaeda, which 

increases their propensity for use of terrorist and guerrilla tactics as well as 

seeking nuclear capacity as part of a threatening rhetoric of ambiguity and 

unpredictability.428 All four should be expected to use asymmetric warfare 

against the United States. Therefore, U.S. policymakers must strengthen the 

country’s primary counter-asymmetric warfare forces and organization, 

which include U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), under the domain of 

U.S. Special Operations Command. 

Four Unique Security Challenges that should be Central 

to U.S. Foreign Policy Planning and Strategy

China. Despite the short-term nature of confidence-building measures, the 

United States would do well to increase regional and international pressure 

on Beijing to remove the opaqueness and uncertainty around Chinese foreign 

and national security decision-making processes. The People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) will resist, since Chinese leadership views that opaqueness as a 

strategic asset. The answer, then, will be to hold civilian leaders responsible 

for the actions of the PLA.429

Of the three states studied for this monograph, China has the best diplomatic relationship with the U.S. but that is of minimal strategic comfort. 

U.S. diplomatic efforts have pressured China to cease its overt and covert 

support of both Iran and North Korea. Unfortunately, this strategy has not 

been very successful in enlisting China as an ally that could pressure Iran 

or North Korea to cease acrimonious behavior toward the United States. 

Furthermore, China’s position on the UN Security Council puts it in a key 

position to impose and enforce multilateral sanctions on Iran and North 

Korea. In fact, the principal reason then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 

visited China in May 2012 was to seek Beijing’s support against Iran and 

North Korea.430 Unfortunately, the support was not forthcoming.

Clearly, China’s geography, economy, and population make it a state 

worthy of increased U.S. attention. The historical Chinese predilection for 

asymmetric warfare and surprise attacks warrants watching Beijing closely, 

lest U.S. analysts fall victim to this overtly defensive national security policy. 

Mirror imaging is dangerous when looking at the Chinese, because China’s 
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definition of defense is much different than Washington’s. Surprise attacks 

in China’s strategic culture are examples of defensive strategy; thus, any 

perceived threats to China’s borders—real, imagined, or contrived—may 

result in a preemptive attack PLA attack. 

Iran. According to a 2012 Gallup Poll, 32 percent of Americans believe that 

Iran is the United States’ greatest enemy.431 This is caused in part by the 

increased attention on Iran’s budding nuclear capability combined with 

former President Ahmadinejad’s antagonistic rhetoric. Iranian officials’ 

acrimonious rhetoric and military activity must be analyzed in the context 

of Iranian strategic culture. Also, to avoid inflating discontent, U.S. policymakers, who are mused to being rewarded for making their point clearly 

and succinctly, must understand the importance of debate, and even grandiose eloquence, in Iranian culture. U.S. diplomats need to take in account 

the inflated pride derived from an idealized time of Persian hegemony and 

the sensitivities linked to real and perceived humiliations inflicted by the 

West and the United States. Furthermore, U.S. military strategists must be 

cognizant of the Iranian propensity for using several components of irregular warfare, including terrorism, to achieve Tehran’s strategic objectives. 

SOF are the best equipped, trained, and deployed to countering asymmetric 

warfare—and with a limited U.S. footprint that reduces the opportunity for 

escalation. 

North Korea. The North Korean regime has managed to justify its rule by 

fabricating an ideology based on an interpretation of the country’s history 

and traditions. Absent any changes in North Korea, such as civil society 

reforms allowing popular participation in strategic decision making or a 

successful foreign intervention, the DPRK will remain isolationist, rigidly 

autocratic, and irreverent of international legal norms. Without a civil society infused with some policymaking powers, the Kim cult will be continue 

to invest in threatening weaponry and inflated military units for nefarious purposes. In 2010, then U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted 

that “the administration’s policy of strategic patience on North Korea had 

failed.”432 Waiting may not be in America’s favor, because North Korea’s 

strategic culture is entirely focused on keeping the Kim dynasty—one of the 

most ruthless in the world—in power. 

President Obama seems to be considering tougher measures toward 

North Korea. His immediate cancelation of the “Leap Day agreement” to 
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help feed North Koreans after a failed North Korea rocket launch433 may 

be an indicator of future policy. Furthermore, the “Asia Pivot” and former 

Secretary Clinton’s emphasis on developing the Asia- Pacific Naval presence 

and revitalizing friendships with the Japanese and other Asian allies may 

change the equilibrium in East Asia.434

Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda’s strategic culture as expressed by Osama bin Laden 

draws on ideas that have roots in historical Islam. Despite bin Laden’s death 

in 2011, the organization retains its principal objectives of restoring the 

Caliphate, eradicating infidels from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli 

state, and ending all foreign incursions in the Islamic world. To achieve these 

objectives, al-Qaeda Central still advocates a far target strategy that includes 

the U.S. and the West. While successful U.S. drone attacks eliminating alQaeda leaders435 have reduced the organization’s direction of its affiliates and 

franchise groups, in the absence of a strong central headquarters, al-Qaeda’s 

affiliates and franchise operations have become increasingly important. This 

shift in significance may potentially translate into the affiliates’ adopting 

a near enemy strategy, which yields easier targets and is more lucrative. 

Bin Laden’s death was a significant blow to al-Qaeda, and the concern he 

expressed about the increasing independence and extreme practices of his 

affiliates436 may go unheeded. Since his death, the U.S. has continued to 

destabilize al-Qaeda through the successful targeted killings of its central 

leadership, along with increased diplomatic and economic pressure on entities supporting local franchise groups, such as the Somali government, the 

Iranian government, and individuals linked funding of terrorism.437 The U.S. 

should also reemphasize SOF in challenging environments, such as Somalia, 

as al-Qaeda’s affiliates become a greater threat.438
89

Howard: Strategic Culture

Endnotes

1. Tony Corn, “Peaceful Rise Through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with 

Chinese Characteristics,” Small Wars Journal, June 2010, p. 1. Available at: http://

smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/449-corn.pdf (accessed June 1, 

2012. See also: Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict 

Inevitable?” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005). Available at: http://

belfercenter.ksh.harvard.edu/files/is 3002_pp007-45_friedberg.pdf (accessed 

July 1, 2012). 

2. Elizabeth Stone, Christopher P. Twomey, and Peter Lavoy, “Comparative Strategic 

Culture,” conference report, from the Center for Contemporary Conflict, Monterey, California (September 21-25, 2005), p. 2. Available at: www.au.af.mil/au/

awc/awcgate/nps/ccc_comp_strat_culture_sep05_rpt.pdf (accessed June 14, 2011). 

3. Melanie Graham, “Defining Strategic Culture,” thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in interdisciplinary studies, University of Northern British Columbia (April 2011). Available at: 

http://mywrdwrx.com/Defining%20Strategic%20Culture%20MA%20Thesis%20

Graham%20April%2010%202011.pdf (accessed July 9, 2012). 

4. Ibid., 101. 

5. Jeannie Johnson and Jeffrey Larson, “Comparative Strategic Cultures Syllabus,” 

report prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (November 20, 2006), 

p. 3. Available at: www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/syllabus.pdf (accessed June 

14, 2011).

6. Miriam D. Becker, “Strategic Culture and Missile Ballistic Defense,” Air and 

Space Power Journal (Special Edition, 1994). Available at: www.airpower.au.af.

mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/spe94/becker.html (accessed June 14, 2011). 

7. Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, RAND Report R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation, 1977). 

Available at: www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R2154.html (accessed July 9, 2012).

8. Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture from Clausewitz to Constructivism,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, No. 10 (October 2005). Available at: http://asrudiancenter.

wordpress.com/2008/11/04/strategic-culture-from-clausewitz-to-constructivism 

(accessed June 18, 2011).

9. Ibid.

10. Rashed Uz Zaman, “Strategic Culture: A Cultural Understanding of War,” Comparative Strategy, February 10, 2009. Available at: http://tandfprod.literatumonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495930802679785 (accessed July 9, 2012).

11. Ibid., 70. 

12. Ibid., 71.
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13. Ibid., 72.

14. Thomas Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, November 13, 2006, p. 1. 

available at: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dtra/mahnken_strat_culture.pdf 

(Accessed June 21, 2011). See also: Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime 

Strategy (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1911), p. 38. 

15. Ibid. See also: Basil H. Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (New York: 

MacMillan, 1933). 

16. Ibid.

17. James Smith, Jerry Mark Long, and Thomas H. Johnson, “Strategic Culture and 

Violent Non-state Actors: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Asymmetrical 

Operations and Cases,” INSS Occasional Paper No. 64 ( February 2008), p. 20. 

Available at: www.usafa.edu/df/inss/docs/StrategicCulture.pdf (accessed July 

9, 2012).

18. Colleen Holmes, “What the Chinese Learned from Sun Tzu,” U.S. Army War 

College Strategy Research Project (April 10, 2000), iv. Available at: www.iwar.

org.uk/military/resources/sun-tzu/Holmes_S_L_01.pdf (accessed July 9, 2012).

19. Ibid.

20. James Stratford, “Strategic Culture and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: 

Conceptual Changes and Policy Opportunities,” Security Challenges, Vol. 1, 

No. 1 (November 2005), p. 124. Available at: www.securitychallenges.org.au/

ArticlePDFs/vol1no1Stratford.pdf (accessed July 9, 2012). 

21. Alastair Johnston, “Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 

Chinese History,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (April 1999).

22. Colin Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes 

Back,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 1999), p. 51.

23. Adam Elkus, “Strategic Culture Dos and Don’ts,” Rethinking Security, 

March 16, 2010. Available at: http://rethinkingsecurity.typepad.com/

rethinkingsecurity/2010/03/strategic-culture-dos-and-donts.html (accessed July 

9, 2012).

24. Ken Booth and Russell Trood, “Strategic Culture,” in Ken Booth and Russell 

Trood, eds., Strategic Cultures in the Asia Pacific (New York: St. Martins Press, 

1999), p. 4.

25. Colin Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes 

Back,” p. 51.

26. Thomas Hedgehammer, various blog entries, Jihadica.com. Available at: www.

jihadica.com (accessed March 1, 2012).

27. Jerry Mark Long, “Strategic Culture, al-Qaeda, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” report prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced 
91

Howard: Strategic Culture

Systems and Concepts Office (November 2006), p. 6. Available at: www.fas.org/

irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-aq.pdf (accessed July 9, 2012).

28. Ibid., 7.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 6. 

31. Elizabeth Stone, Christopher P. Twomey, and Peter Lavoy, “Comparative Strategic Culture,” p. 2.

32. Thomas G. Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture.” 

33. Ibid., 9. See also: Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and 

Practice of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), p. 152. 

34. “You are either with us or against us,” CNN.com, November 5, 2001. Available 

at:http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror (accessed July 9, 

2012).

35. Toby Harnden, “Bin Laden is wanted: dead or alive, says Bush,” The Telegraph 

(UK), September 18, 2001. Available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/

asia/afghanistan/1340895/Bin-Laden-is-wanted-dead-or-alive-says-Bush.html 

(accessed July 9, 2012).

36. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Toward an American Way of War, Strategic Studies 

Institute Monograph, March 2004, 2. Available at: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

.9awcgate/ssi/american_way_of_war.pdf (accessed June 23, 2011).

37. Ibid.

38. Russell D. Howard, direct quote from various lectures at West Point from 

1997-2005.

39. David Du, “The American Way of War: The Four Constraints,” Nationsmith. 

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40. Ibid.

41. Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army Way of War (Cambridge, 

MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

42. John A. Nagl, “Constructing The Legacy of Field Manual 3-24,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, Issue 58 (Third Quarter 2010). Available at: www.ndu.edu/press/lib/

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43. Jian Gentile, “Coin is Dead: U.S. Army Must Put Strategy Over Tactics,” Small 

Wars Journal, November 22, 2011. Available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/

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44. Ibid.

45. Kimberly A. Crider, “Strategic Implications of Culture: Historical Analysis of 

China’s Culture and Implications for United States Policy,” Maxwell Air Force 

Base Air Command and Staff College White Paper No. 8 (1999), p. 12.
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JSOU Report 13-8

46. Tony Corn, “Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with 

Chinese Characteristics,” Small Wars Journal (June 2010), 16. Available at: http://

smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/449-corn.pdf (accessed November 2, 2012). 

47. Ibid.

48. Justin Arnold, “Is China’s Strategic Culture Anti-Militaristic?” Independent 

Media Australia, June 12, 2011. Available at: https://indymedia.org.au/2011/06/12/

is-chinas-strategic-culture-anti-militaristic (accessed June 12, 2012).

49. Christopher Twomey, “Chinese Strategic Cultures: Survey and Critique,” Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency – Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, October 31, 2006, p. 5. Available 

at: www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/chinese.pdf (accessed November 2, 2012). 

50. Ibid. 

51. Christopher R. Bullock, “China’s Bluewater Ambitions: The Continental Realities of Chinese Naval Strategies,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

(Summer/Fall 2002), p. 60.

52. Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell. “How China Sees America,” Foreign 

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29, 2012).

53. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 

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American Interest, May/June 2010. Available at: www.the-american-interest.

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55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid. 

58. Ibid.

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60. Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture (New York: 

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68. Ibid.

69. “2008: Opening Ceremony,” NBC.com, August 8, 2008. Available at: 

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70. Andrew J. Nathan, “Confucius and the Ballot Box.” 

71. Kimberly A. Crider, Strategic Implications of Culture: Historical Analysis of 

China’s Culture and Implications for United States Policy. See also John King 

Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 1992), p. 25.

72. Kimberly A. Crider, Ibid.

73. Robert H. Ferrell, “The Mukden Incident: 18-19 September 1931,” The Journal of 

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74. Rene Goldman, “Mao, Maoism and Mao-logy,” p. 561.

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85. Ibid.

86. “The Dragon’s New Teeth: A rare look inside the world’s biggest military 

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87. Ibid. 

88. Tony Corn, “Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with 

Chinese Characteristics,” p. 29. 

89. Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress

(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), pp. 21-22.

90. Ibid.

91. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in Peter 

J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 

Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 220. 

92. Ibid.

93. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1971). 

94. Ibid.

95. Matthew Flynn. First Strike: Preemptive War in Modern History (New York: 

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96. Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 389.

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98. “Asia’s Mistrust of China.”

99. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. 

100. “Asia’s Mistrust of China.” 

101. Ibid. 

102. Ibid.
95

Howard: Strategic Culture

103. Tony Corn, “Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare,” p. 16.

104. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 17.

105. Ibid., 10.

106. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to 

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108. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to 

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109. Mao Zedong, Guerilla Warfare trans. Samuel Griffith (Champaign, IL: University 

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110. Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty fortress, 

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111. Ibid., 135-144.

112. Ehsan Ahrari, “China’s Preoccupation with Asymmetric War: Lessons Learned 

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116. Mac William Bishop. “China’s Cyberwarriors.”

117. Ibid.

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220. Ibid.

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225. Ibid., 40-46.

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239. Ibid.

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246. Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields or Swords?” 

pp. 218-220.

247. Ibid.

248. Hassig and Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, p. 179.
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256. Hassig Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, p. 62.

257. Ibid.

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263. Abdel B. Atwan. The Secret History of Al-Qaeda (Berkeley, CA: University of 

California Press, 2006), 30.

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265. Ibid.

266. Jerry Mark Long, “Strategic Culture, al-Qaeda, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” SAIC report prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced 

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agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-aq.pdf (accessed July 8, 2012).

267. Ibid.

268. Michael Doran, “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al-Qaeda,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 2 (Summer 2002), 179. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/798179 

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269. Peter L. Bergem. Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden—From 9/11 to 

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270. Michael Doran, Ibid., p. 178.

271. Mark Stout, Jessica Huckabey, John Schindler, and Jim Lacey, The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of al Qaida and Associated 

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272. Ibid.

273. Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged 

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274. Michael Doran. “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al-Qaeda,” pp. 180-188.

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Framework for Assessing al-Qaeda and the Global Jihad Movement, JSOU Report 

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276. Jerry Mark Long, Strategic Culture, Al Qaida and Weapons of Mass Destruction

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277. Ibid., 18.

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279. The Holy Koran, 6:152. 

280. The Holy Koran, 5:32 (emphasis added).

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282. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious 

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290. Thomas Hegghamer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 8-14.

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292. Thomas Hegghamer. Jihad in Saudi Arabia, p. 10.

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304. Ibid.

305. Richard. H. Schultz, Strategic Culture and Strategic Studies: An Alternative 

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326. Ibid., 16. See also: W. Travis Hanes and Frank Sanello, The Opium Wars: The 

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327. Ibid.

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331. Graham E. Fuller, The Center of The Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder, 

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335. Jerry Mark Long.

336. Donald J. Hanle, “Understanding the al-Qaeda Enemy in Three Volumes,” Small 

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337. Imam Malik, Al-Muwatta (almuhaddith.org), Book 45, Number 45.5.18

338. Abdel Bari Atwan, The Secret History of Al-Qaeda (Berkeley, CA: University of 

California Press, 2006), 45.

339. Samantha Ravich. “Playing the Long Game.” 

340. Robert W. Tucker, “A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, No. 4 (December 1973), 1457-1458. Available at: www.

jstor.org/stable/1956644 (accessed July 25, 2012).

341. Michael Eisenstadt, “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 

Marine Corps University Middle East Studies Monograph No. 1 (August 2011). 

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342. Ibid.

343. Young Whan Kihl, “The Staying Power of the Socialist ‘Hermit Kingdom’,” from 

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Survival (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), pp. 3-33.

344. Andrew Scobell, North Korea’s Strategic Intentions, p. 14.

345. Marcus Noland, “Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,” Foreign Affairs, 

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347. Jason Burke, “Al-Qaeda,” Foreign Policy, No. 142 (May/June, 2004), 18-26. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/4147572 (accessed July 25, 2012).
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Howard: Strategic Culture

348. Isaac Stone Fish, “Dissents to watch in 2012,” Foreign Policy, February 3, 2012. 

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349. Country Report on Human Rights Abuses for 2011: China, U.S. Department of 

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352. Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea (New York: 

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353. Charles K. Armstrong, “Beyond the DMZ,” from Charles K. Armstrong, ed., 

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354. Andrew Scobell, North Korea’s Strategic Intentions), p. 14.

355. “Al-Qaeda is Down but Far from Out,” The Economist, April 21, 2012. Available 

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356. Jason Burke, “Osama Bin Laden Considered Rebranding Al-Qaeda, Documents 

Reveal,” The Guardian (UK), May 3, 2012. Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/

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2012).

357. Seth G. Jones, “Al-Qaeda is Far from Defeated,” RAND Corporation, April 29, 

2012. Available at: www.rand.org/commentary/2012/04/29/WSJ.html (accessed 

July 25, 2012).

358. Martyn Williams, “English Transcript of Kim Jong Un’s Speech,” North Korea 

Tech, April 18, 2012. Available at: hwww.northkoreatech.org/2012/04/18/englishtranscript-of-kim-jong-uns-speech (accessed July 15, 2012); see also Bill Roggio, 

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359. Navid Kermani, “Roots of Terror: Suicide, Martyrdom, Self-Redemption and Islam,” OpenDemocracy.net, February 20, 2002. Available at: 

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360. Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, “In Commemoration of the Martyrs at Qum (1963),” 

in Hamid Algar, ed., Islam and Revolution (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981), 

p. 176.

361. Ibid.

362. Navid Kermani, “Roots of Terror: Suicide, Martyrdom, Self-Redemption and 

Islam.”
110

JSOU Report 13-8

363. Christopher Coker, Waging War without Warriors: The Changing Culture of 

Military Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2002), 9; see also: Ryan Thornton, 

“Changing the Game: Assessing al-Qaeda’s Terrorist Strategy,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall 2005), 36-37; see also: Jeffrey B. Cozzens, 

“Approaching al-Qaeda’s Warfare: Function Culture and Grand Strategy,” in 

Magnus Ranstorp, ed., Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and 

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364. Bill Braniff and Assaf Moghadam, “Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda’s Strategic, Ideological and Structural Adaptations since 9/11,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 

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view/braniff-towards-global-jihadism (accessed June 15, 2012).

365. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words (Cambridge, 

MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 100.

366. Michael Doran, “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al-Qaeda,” p. 178. 

367. Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors: The Changing Culture of 

Military Conflict, 9.. See also: Ryan Thornton, “Changing the Game: Assessing 

al-Qaeda’s Terrorist Strategy,” 36-37; see also: Jeffrey B. Cozzens, “Approaching 

al-Qaeda’s Warfare: Function Culture and Grand Strategy,” 126-63.

368. Allan R. Mille, “Introduction to the Korean War,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 65 (October 2001), 921.

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370. Ibid.

371. Brantly Womack, “China Between Region and World,” The China Journal. No. 

61 (January 2009), 5. Available at www.jstor.org/stable/20648043 (accessed July 

25, 2012).

372. Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Game Changer,” Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2010. 

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2, 2012).

374. Preeti Bhattacharji, “Religion in China,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, May 16, 2008. Available at: www.cfr.org/china/religion-china/p16272 

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375. Ibid.
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376. Peter Kenny, “Religious Freedom Non-Existent in North Korea Religious Panel 

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377. Ibid.

378. Charles K. Armstrong, “Beyond the DMZ,” pp. 187-200.

379. Tony Carnes, “Christians on the Frontlines Help Refugees Escape a Nightmare,” 

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380. Andrew Scobell. North Korea’s Strategic Intentions, p. 16.

381. Brendan Koerner, “What’s a Maoist Anyways?” Slate.com, February 5, 2004. 

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383. Michael Doran, “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al-Qaeda,” pp. 179.

384. M. Khonsari, “Iran-Arab Relations: A Persian Perspective,” in Michael Korinman and John Laughland, eds., Shia Power: Next Target Iran? (Portland, OR: 

Vallentine-Mitchell, 2007), pp. 294-298.

385. Ahmad Rasem Al-Nafis, “Iranian-Egyptian Relations: The Shiite Factor and the 

Muslim Brotherhood,” in Michael Korinman and John Laughland, eds., Shia 

Power: Next Target Iran? (Portland, OR: Vallentine-Mitchell, 2007), 331. Hamid 

Algar, “Thirty Million People Have Stood Up,” in Hamid Algar, ed., Islam and 

Revolution (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981), pp. 176.

386. Rohan Gunaratna, “Defeating Al-Qaeda—The Pioneering Vanguard of the 

Islamic Movements,” in Russell D. Howard, Reid Sawyer, and Natasha Bajema, 

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388. Seth G Jones, “Al-Qaeda in Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January 29, 2012. Available at: 

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389. Minxin Pei, “Viewpoint: China’s Iran Dilemma,” BBC News, January 19, 2012. 

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25, 2012). 

390. Associated Press, “Iran Focus of Russian President’s Visit,” Fox News, June 25, 

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JSOU Report 13-8

391. Minxin Pei, “Viewpoint: China’s Iran Dilemma.”

392. Brandon Fite, U.S.-Iranian Strategic Competition: Peripheral Competition Involving Africa and Latin America (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), p. 5.

393. Mark Manyin and Mary Nikitin, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress No. R40095 (April 26, 2012).

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395. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. Adopted 14 October 2006. 

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397. Julian Ryall, “Chinese Firms Break U.N. Embargo on North Korea,” The Telegraph (UK), June 12, 2012. Available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/

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399. Ibid.

400. “Security Council Gets North Korea Nuke Report,” Fox News, November 10, 

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405. Hamid Algar, “Thirty Million People Have Stood Up,” p. 176. See also: Abdel B. 

Atwan. The Secret History of Al-Qaeda, p. 30.

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Michael Korinman and John Laughland, eds., Shia Power: Next Target Iran?

(Portland, OR: Vallentine-Mitchell, 2007), 279-280.

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June 26, 2012).

408. Ibid.

409. Ibid.

410. Michael Doran. “The Pragmatic Fanaticism of Al-Qaeda,” p. 180.

411. Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfstahl, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsensals: 

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412. Ibid., 165-166. 

413. Ibid., 166.

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416. Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, The Hidden People of North Korea, p. 19.

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