UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; KRISTINE AULEPP, MD,DO, Clinical Director for the BOP, USP-Leavenworth, in her individual and official capacity; JUSTIN BLEVINS, Health Service Administrator, USP-Leavenworth, in his individual and official capacity; SHANNON PHELPS, Associate Warden, USP-Leavenworth, in his individual and official capacity; JOHN JOHNSON, Unit manager, USP-Leavenworth, in his individual and official capacity; MICHAEL MANLEY, Food Service Official, USP-Leavenworth, in his individual and offi cial capacity; SCOTT STANLEY, Food Serv ice Administrator, USP-Leavenworth, in his individual and official capacity; CAROL WITT, Correctional Officer, US P-Leavenworth, in her individual and official capacity; JARAD HERBIG, Special Investigative Services, USP-Leav enworth, in his individual and offi cial capacity; GLENNA CREWS, Disciplinary Hearing Officer, USP-Leavenworth, in his individual and official Capacity; CLAUDE MAYE, CEO, Warden, USP-Leaven worth, in his individual and offi cial capacity; BUREAU OF PRISONS; PAUL LEONHARD,Special Investigation Service, USPLeavenworth, in his individual and official capacity, No. 19-3047 (D.C. No. 5:16-CV -03044-JWB-JPO) (D. Kan.) FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 27, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 Defendants - Appellees, and (FNU) CLARK, USP-Leavenworth, in his individual and official capacity; LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, in her individual and official capacity; CHARLES E. SAMUELS, Director of the Federal Bureau of Pris ons, in his individual and official capac ity; I. CONNORS,National Inmate Administrator, USPLeavenworth, in his individual and official capacity; JOHN/JANE DOES, Unit Team or Other, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , BALDOCK , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Anthony D. Williams, a federa l prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks to appeal from the district court’s November 2018 judgm ent in favor of the United States and

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Mr. Williams is representing himself, we construe his pleadings liberally, but we do not act as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).3 numerous federal prison employees in his civil suit. Conte nding he failed to file a timely notice of appeal as to that judgment, the appellees move the court to dismiss the appeal. We agree with the appell ees and grant the motion to dismiss. A timely notice of appeal is a jurisdic tional requirement in a civil case. See Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007). Because it is a matter of jurisdiction, the requirement cann ot be forfeited or waived. See id. ; Alva v. Teen Help , 469 F.3d 946, 950 ( 10th Cir. 2006). The district court entered judgment on November 6, 2018. Mr. Williams had 60 days from that date to appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). The sixtieth day was Saturday, January 5, 2019, so hi s deadline became Monday, January 7. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C) (providing that if a deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the deadline is the next busines s day). On December 31, 2018, Mr. Williams depos ited into the prison’s mail system a motion for extension of time to file a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) mo tion. The appellees opposed the motion, and on January 22, 2019, Mr. Williams deposited into the prison’s mail system a reply in support of his motion. On February 14, 2019, the district court denied the motion for an extension on the ground that it lacked authority to extend the period fo r filing a Rule 59(e) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). It further declin ed (1) to construe the moti on for an extension as the functional equivalent of a no tice of appeal from the Nove mber 6 judgment, and (2) to entertain Mr. Williams’s request , made for the first time in his reply, for an extension4 of time to appeal. Mr. Williams then depo sited into the prison’s mail system a notice of appeal, which the district court filed on March 1, 2019. Because the notice of app eal was untimely as to the November 6 judgment, it did not confer jurisdiction on this court to review that judgment. The notice was timely as to the February 14 order. Bu t because Mr. Williams’s opening brief does not make any arguments challenging the Fe bruary 14 order, he has “forfeit[ed] appellate consideration” of issues arising from that decision. Bronson v. Swensen , 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 ( 10th Cir. 2007). We can review the argumen ts in the opening brief if some document filed within the appeal period serv es as the functional equivale nt of a notice of appeal. See Smith v. Barry , 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992) (“ If a document file d within the time specified by [Fed. R. App. P.] 4 gives the notice required by [F ed. R. App. P.] 3, it is effective as a notice of appeal.”). Mr. Williams doe s not argue that his motion for an extension meets this standard. Instea d, he urges the court to treat his reply in support of that motion as th e functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. Because that document was placed into the prison’ s mail system two week s after the appeal deadline, however, it was not timely to appeal from the November 6 judgment. 2

2 Mr. Williams mistakenly calculate s his appeal peri od as starting on December 6, 2018, when he received the November 6 judgment, and he therefore believes that the reply was mailed timely u nder the prison mailbox rule. The rule is clear, however, that the appeal period is triggered by the date the judgment was entered, not the date a party rece ives a copy of the judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B).5 Mr. Williams further suggest s that this court apply th e “unique circumstances” doctrine or find excusable negl ect in light of his diffic ulties in accessing his legal materials and the prison’s law library durin g the federal government shutdown that started in December 2018. But the “uniqu e circumstances” doctrine no longer exists. See Bowles , 551 U.S. at 214 (“Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the ‘unique circumstances’ doctrine is illegitimate.”). And the ab ility to grant an extension based on excusable neglect rests with the district c ourt, not this court. See Alva , 469 F.3d at 950; see also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). The district court denied an extensi on of time to file a notice of appeal as part of the February 14 order, and Mr. Wi lliams’s opening brief did not challenge that decision. Further, contrary to Mr . Williams’s assumption, the district court clerk’s accepta nce for filing of his March 1 notice of appeal did not constitute a finding of excusa ble neglect by the court. Finally, Mr. Williams notes that he fi led a notice of appeal on February 6, 2017. That appeal involved the dismissal of claims ag ainst the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and Mr. Williams’s opening brief does challenge the dismissal of his FTCA cl aims. The 2017 notice of appeal, however, does not save this appeal. Th e 2017 appeal was dismissed, see Williams v. United
States , No. 17-3025, slip op. at 2 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 2017) (u npublished order), leaving Mr. Williams the oppor tunity to appeal the dism issal of the FTCA claims after entry of a final judgment. See Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co. , 850 F.2d 641, 645-46 (10th Cir. 1988) (en ba nc) (recognizing that a premat ure notice of appeal may6 be dismissed if there is no Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certi fication or a final judgment by the time the court addresses the appeal). Further, the 2017 notice of appeal did not encompass the subsequent Nove mber 6, 2018, judgment. See Nolan v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice , 973 F.2d 843, 846 (10th Cir. 1992). The appellees’ motion to dismiss the app eal is granted, and this appeal is dismissed. Mr. Williams’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. He is reminded of his obligation to continue making partial payments until the entire appellate filing fee is paid. Mr. Williams’s motions for appointment of counsel and for an extension of time to file his reply brief are denied as moot.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge