Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1501-CR-003 | July 15, 2015 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. Burns

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Karl M. Scharnberg 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ariel Kennedy, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

July 15, 2015 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A02-1501-CR-003 

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court, Criminal Division 7 

Cause No. 49G07-1408-CM-038551 

The Honorable David E. Cook, 

Judge 

Friedlander, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1501-CR-003 | July 15, 2015 Page 2 of 4

[1] Ariel Kennedy appeals her conviction for Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury,1 a 

class A misdemeanor. She presents the following issue for review: Did the 

State present sufficient evidence to support the conviction? 

[2] We affirm. 

[3] On August 6, 2014, Courtney Walker was riding on a city bus when Kennedy 

boarded and sat across the aisle about eight feet from him. Walker observed 

what he believed to be unusual behavior by Kennedy while he continued 

listening to his music. At some point during the ride, Walker stated out loud, 

“this must be some-some lesbian stuff”. Transcript at 7. This statement upset 

Kennedy, so she texted her mother. 

[4] A few stops later, Kennedy’s mother, Audrita, boarded the bus and sat with 

Kennedy. Audrita eventually told Walker to remove his headphones, and she 

demanded to know what he had said to her daughter. After indicating that her 

daughter was a lesbian, Audrita pushed Walker’s face toward the window and 

started hitting him. Kennedy joined in on the attack, as Audrita pulled out a 

metal spoon and began striking him on the head with it. Kennedy used her fists 

to hit Walker on the head. The beating continued until the bus driver stopped 

the bus and a passenger intervened. Walker sustained injuries and lacerations 

to his head. Kennedy and Audrita were arrested as they exited the bus. 

 

1

 Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-1 (West, Westlaw current with all 2015 First Regular Session of the 119th General 

Assembly legislation effective through June 28, 2015). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1501-CR-003 | July 15, 2015 Page 3 of 4

[5] At the bench trial in this case, Walker testified to the events as set forth above. 

Audrita then testified on Kennedy’s behalf. She admitted that after having a 

verbal altercation with Walker, she (Audrita) punched and then struck him in 

the head with a spoon.2

 Audrita testified that Kennedy never touched Walker. 

Kennedy also testified consistently with her mother. 

[6] At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court expressly found credible 

Walker’s testimony that Kennedy struck him several times in the face. 

Accordingly, the court found Kennedy guilty of battery. 

[7] On appeal, Kennedy invokes the incredible dubiosity rule in arguing that the 

State failed to present sufficient evidence. Kennedy directs us to the probable 

cause affidavit in which Walker “stated the order of events differently.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 6. We observe, however, both in his report to police and his 

trial testimony, Walker consistently indicated that Kennedy punched him and 

Audrita attacked him with a spoon. 

[8] Our Supreme Court has recently reiterated the limited scope of the incredible 

dubiosity rule, which requires that there be: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) 

testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; 

and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 27 

N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). While the standard is not impossible to meet, it is 

difficult and “one that requires great ambiguity and inconsistency in the 

 

2

 Audrita pleaded guilty prior to Kennedy’s trial. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1501-CR-003 | July 15, 2015 Page 4 of 4

evidence.” Id. (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)). In 

other words, the sole witness’s testimony “must be so convoluted and/or 

contrary to human experience that no reasonable person could believe it.” Id. 

(quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d at 622)). 

[9] Walker’s testimony in the instant case was unequivocal and not inherently 

contradictory. He consistently testified that Kennedy and her mother physically 

attacked him on the bus, and his account was not contrary to human 

experience. Further, the minor inconsistencies between his trial testimony and 

his statement to police did not render his trial testimony incredibly dubious. See 

Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2001). The incredible dubiosity rule is 

not applicable here. 

[10] The trial court was presented with conflicting accounts regarding Kennedy’s 

involvement in the attack, and the court indicated it believed Walker. This was 

the trial court’s prerogative, and we reject the invitation to reweigh the evidence 

and judge witness credibility. See Maxwell v. State, 731 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2000) (“[i]t is the function of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in 

testimony, and to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the 

witnesses”), trans. denied. Kennedy’s conviction was supported by sufficient 

evidence. 

[11] Judgment affirmed. 

Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.