IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsLILLIAN UNGARETTI, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

-, 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of iss sou la, 

The Honorable James Wheelis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Gregory A. Jackson; Jackson & w ice, Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Marc ~acicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Elizabeth S. Baker, Asst. Atty. General, Helena 

Robert Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula, 

Montana; Craig Friedenauer, Deputy Co. Atty., Missoula 

Submitted on Briefs: Aug. 31, 1989 

Decided: September 27, 1989 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from a felony conviction in the District 

Court of the Fourth Judicial ~istrict, Missoula County, Montana. 

Appellant Lillian Ungaretti appeals her conviction on one count of 

possession with intent to sell a dangerous drug. We affirm. 

Appellant raises the following issues for review: 

1. Whether the District Court erred in denying appellant's 

motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that there was 

insufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony? 

2. Whether the ~istrict Court erred in admitting prejudicial 

evidence of other crimes? 

3. Whether the District Court erred by inadequately providing 

cautionary instructions to the jury on the introduction of "other 

crimesn evidence? 

Appellant Lillian (Topsy) Ungaretti was charged in Missoula 

County, along with her daughter Mia Grenfell and son Darrell 

Grenfell, with felony possession with intent to sell a dangerous 

drug. Appellant and Mia were arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, in 

December of 1986 for the attempted sale of nearly three pounds of 

marijuana to undercover police officers. After their arrests, a 

Las Vegas police officer notified Missoula County law enforcement 

officials that the appellant had informed them she had a marijuana 

farm in the basement of a Missoula residence. She gave the 

officers a street address and a specific description of this 

residence which was owned by Forest (Pappy) Tupper. 

Based upon this information, Missoula officers checked the 

address and compared the description given, then obtained and 

executed a search warrant at the Tupper residence. Tupper, a 

seventy-two-year-old retired University employee, expected the 

officers when they arrived and led them to the basement where the 

marijuana was growing. 
The officers discovered in the Tupper residence a large and 

sophisticated marijuana growing operation. The basement was 

divided into three rooms, each containing marijuana plants in 

certain stages of development. In all, 108 marijuana plants and 

various plastic and paper sacks containing marijuana leaves and 

stems were seized. The operation was equipped with special grow 

lights, heaters, carbon dioxide tanks, and a marijuana growers 

handbook. Numerous fertilizers and soils were also in the 

basement. Found on the wall of the basement were handwritten 

instructions for the daily and weekly care and harvesting of the 

plants. Additionally, the wiring to the electricity meter had been 

altered in order to hide the large amount of electricity being 

consumed by the grow operation. 

At trial, Tupper testified that he originally found two sickly 

marijuana plants on his property near Lolo, Montana, and that he 

attempted to revive them. One plant survived and seeds from that 

plant were used to grow other plants. Appellant's son, Darrell 

Grenfell, was acquainted with Tupper from the University and spent 

much time at his house. Tupper claimed it was Darrell who 

confirmed that the original plants were in fact marijuana and from 

whom he received assistance in growing the plants. Tupper further 

testified that appellant became involved in the operation and 

expanded it in size with seeds she claimed were from Hawaii. 

Tupper stated that appellant, Darrell and Mia would spend much time 

together working in the basement. He claimed that while he was 

involved in growing the marijuana, his involvement was limited to 

operating the lights and fans and watering the plants at the 

appellant's instructions. He claimed it was not his operation, and 

he never received any money from the marijuana. 
Issue No. 1 

Did the District Court err when it denied appellant's motion 

for a directed verdict on the grounds that there was insufficient 

corroboration of the accomplice testimony? 

Section 46-16-213, MCA, provides: 

A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of 

one responsible or legally accountable for the 

same offense, as defined in 45-2-301, unless 

the testimony is corroborated by other evidence which in itself and without the aid of 

the testimony of the one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense tends to 

connect the defendant with the commission of 

the offense. The corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the 

offense or the circumstances thereof. 

Appellant contends there was no corroborating evidence to 

support the testimony of accomplice Tupper. We disagree. Officer 

Cordell Pearson of the Las Vegas police department testified at 

trial that, while undercover, he met with the appellant inside the 

Sahara Hotel on December 29, 1986. According to Pearson's testimony, appellant represented to him that 'Ishe had a marijuana farm 

with a friend of hers in Missoula, Montana . . . that she had 

excellent marijuana, that she did not spray it with any type of 

chemicals, that it was all THC . . . that she made several trips 

from Missoula to Phoenix, Arizona, where she transported marijuana 

in gutted out TV sets . . . [and] that her marijuana was Maui." 

Pearson was introduced to appellant in Las Vegas by a 

"confidential informant1' whom appellant knew from Missoula. This 

informant brought the appellant and Pearson together in the Sahara 

Hotel, where they discussed the sale of marijuana. Pearson stated 

that the appellant told him the marijuana belonged to her and her 

daughter, who was in the car with it. They then arranged to meet 

in the parking lot of the hotel. Pearson testified that he and 

another officer drove to the appellant 's car and were there greeted 
by appellant and Mia. The appellant and Mia got into his vehicle 

with three wrapped packages which contained nearly three pounds of 

marijuana . Pearson testified that he arrested the two women after he paid 

$7,000 to the appellant for the marijuana. He further stated that 

he and other officers questioned the appellant about the drugs and 

were told by her that the marijuana "came from her connection in 

Missoula, Montana, a person by the name of Forest Tupper." 

Appellant gave Pearson the address of Tupper and described the 

house as "a light colored house,It that "there was some TV's on the 

porch and there was also a light colored vehicle parked in front." 

Pearson relayed this information to Missoula County deputy sheriff 

Terry Lambert, who confirmed after investigation that the description given by the appellant was accurate. 

Whether evidence is sufficient to corroborate the testimony 

of an accomplice is a question of law. The evidence must do more 

than show the crime was committed or the circumstances of its 

commission. It must raise more than a suspicion concerning 

defendant's involvement in the crime. However, it need not be 

sufficient, by itself, to support a prima facia case against the 

defendant. The independent evidence need not extend to every fact 

to which the accomplice testifies. State v. Price (Mont. 1988), 

762 P.2d 232, 45 St.Rep. 1798; State v. Miller (Mont. 1988), 757 

P.2d 1275, 45 St.Rep. 790. Further, the evidence may be circumstantial and it may come from the defendant or his witness. State 

v. Cain (1986), 221 Mont. 318, 718 P.2d 654. 

Tupper claimed that appellant was the owner of the marijuana, 

that she expanded the entire operation and purchased much of the 

equipment in Spokane, Washington. He stated that appellant, 

Darrell and Mia would come and go as they pleased, at all hours of 

the day. He further claimed that even though he was expecting the 
police officers after the appellant was arrested, he chose not to 

dispose of the marijuana because he considered it belonged to 

appellant. We conclude that appellant's statements to the Las 

Vegas authorities sufficiently corroborate the testimony of Tupper. 

The District Court properly exercised its discretion when it denied 

appellant's motion for directed verdict. 

Issue No. 2 

Did the District Court err when it allowed introduction of 

evidence of other crimes? 

Appellant argues the District Court committed reversible error 

when it allowed the State to introduce evidence at trial relating 

to the charges against her in Nevada. Appellant claims Rule 

404(b), M.R.Evid., prohibited the introduction of any evidence at 

trial relative to her arrest in Las Vegas. Rule 404 (b) , M. R. Evid. , 

states: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 

not admissible to prove the character of a 

person in order to show that he acted in 

conformity therewith. It may, however, be 

admissible for other purposes, such as proof 

of notice, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident. [Emphasis added.] 

Appellant argues that the introduction of her arrest and 

charges against her in Nevada were unfairly prejudicial and require 

that her conviction be reversed. Appellant further claims that 

this ''other crimes1I evidence also violated the requirement of State 

v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957, because she received 

no notice that this evidence would be introduced and no cautionary 

instructions were given to the jury before the introduction of the 

evidence. However, appellant's attorney made no objection at trial 

to the introduction of this evidence. 

The State argues that, even though objection to introduction 

of this evidence has been waived by a failure of counsel to state 
an objection at trial, it was nonetheless properly submitted as 

part of the corpus delicti. We agree. Rule 404 (b) , M.R.Evid., 

provides that evidence of other crimes may be admitted for other 

purposes. One purpose accepted by this Court has been when the 

other crimes, wrongs or acts introduced are inextricably or 

inseparably related to the crime charged. State v. Gillham (1983), 

206 Mont. 169, 670 P.2d 544. In such a case, "other crimest1 

evidence does not apply. State v. Romero (1986), 224 Mont. 431, 

730 P.2d 1157; State v. Riley (1982), 199 Mont. 413, 649 P.2d 1273. 

We conclude there is no question but that the activities of 

the appellant which resulted in her arrest in Nevada were 

inseparable and formed much of the basis of the crime charged here. 

It is not disputed that the marijuana which appellant attempted to 

sell to the undercover officer was the same as that grown in 

Tupperls basement. It was the appellantvs statement to Pearson, 

whom she believed to be a potential buyer of the marijuana, that 

she grew the marijuana with a friend in a residence in Missoula. 

It additionally was appellantfs claim after her arrest that the 

marijuana was grown in Missoula, and that her connection was Forest 

Tupper . 

In Gillham and Riley, supra, this Court held that the State 

is entitled to "present the entire corpus delicti of the charged 

offense including matters closely related to the offense and 

explanatory of it." The events which took place in Nevada supported and explained the State's position at trial: that appellant 

had constructive possession of the marijuana while she was in 

Montana. Additionally, appellant used these events to support her 

theory of defense to the charge: that she was unknowingly given the 

marijuana by Tupper as a ~hristmas gift to deliver to his grandson 

in Arizona, and that when the grandson was not to be found, Tupper 

told her to unload the marijuana in Las Vegas. We conclude that 
the "other crimesw evidence was introduced merely as part of the 

corpus delicti and thus did not constitute reversible error. 

Issue No. 3 

Did the District Court err by inadequately providing cautionary instructions to the jury on the introduction of "other crimes" 

evidence? 

In light of our conclusion that the evidence of the events and 

charges in Nevada were part of the corpus delicti, and were not 

subject to the Just requirement that cautionary instructions be 

given to the jury, we will only briefly comment on this issue. In 

Gillham, we stated: 

Although the District Court did not violate 

Just, we encourage trial courts to apply the 

safeguards of Just liberally. Even though the 

procedures of Just may not be required in a 

given case, their use may be proper and wise. 

Especially in close cases, use of the Just 

procedures would assure fairness to 

defendants. The procedural safeguards were 

designed to protect those accused of crime 

from unfair surprise or double punishment. 

They should be liberally applied to that end. 

Gillham, 206 Mont. at 179, 670 P.2d at 440. 

During the trial of this case, the District Court orally 

warned the jury, although after introduction of evidence of certain 

of the events in Las Vegas, that they should not consider that 

testimony as evidence of the crime charged here. Additionally, at 

the close of the defendantst case, the court read the following 

instruction to the jury: 

Testimony has been offered as to statements 

and acts of the Defendants with witnesses in 

Nevada. You are not to be concerned with 

whether the Defendants committed a crime in 

Nevada. You are not to convict them of the 

crime charged here because you conclude they 

are guilty of a crime committed elsewhere. You 
are to consider this testimony, only as to 

whether it tends to show guilt or innocence of 

the crime to be considered by YOU. 

The District Court's warning and instruction to the jury 

protected the appellant from any unfair inferences the jury might 

have made with respect to the introduction of the Nevada charges. 

We commend the court for the care exercised and encourage other 

courts to follow our recommendation in Gillham. 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 

We concur: 

/ Justices \ 

1'