Supreme Court of Florida

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No. SC17-653

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ARAMIS DONELL AYALA, etc.,

Petitioner,

vs.

RICK SCOTT, GOVERNOR,

Respondent.

[August 31, 2017]

LAWSON, J.

Aramis Donell Ayala, State Attorney for Florida’s Ninth Judicial Circuit, 

petitions this Court for a writ of quo warranto, challenging Governor Rick Scott’s 

authority under section 27.14(1), Florida Statutes (2016), to reassign the 

prosecution of death-penalty eligible cases in the Ninth Circuit to Brad King, State 

Attorney for Florida’s Fifth Judicial Circuit. We have jurisdiction. See article V, § 

3(b)(8), Fla. Const. For the reasons below, we deny Ayala’s petition. 
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BACKGROUND

At a March 15, 2017, press conference, Ayala announced that she “will not 

be seeking [the] death penalty in the cases handled in [her] office.” Several times 

during the same press conference, Ayala reiterated her intent to implement a 

blanket “policy” of not seeking the death penalty in any eligible case because, in 

her view, pursuing death sentences “is not in the best interest of th[e] community 

or in the best interest of justice,” even where an individual case “absolutely 

deserve[s] [the] death penalty.”

In response to Ayala’s announcement, Governor Rick Scott issued a series 

of executive orders reassigning the prosecution of death-penalty eligible cases 

pending in the Ninth Circuit to King. In support of these orders, the Governor 

cited his duty as Florida’s chief executive officer under article IV, section 1(a), of 

the Florida Constitution to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” and his 

authority under section 27.14(1), Florida Statutes, to assign state attorneys to other 

circuits “if, for any . . . good and sufficient reason, the Governor determines that 

the ends of justice would be best served.” The reassignment orders do not direct 

King to pursue the death penalty in any particular case, and in a statement filed in 

this Court, King has sworn that the Governor made no attempt to influence his 

decision as to whether the circumstances of any of the reassigned cases warrant 

pursuing the death penalty.
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After unsuccessfully seeking a stay of the reassignment orders in the Ninth 

Circuit, Ayala filed this petition for a writ of quo warranto challenging the 

Governor’s authority to reassign the cases at issue to King. The record reflects that 

Ayala and her office have abided by the lower courts’ denial of her motion and 

fully cooperated with King.

ANALYSIS

Ayala argues that the Governor exceeded his authority under section 27.14 

by reassigning death-penalty eligible cases in the Ninth Circuit to King over her 

objection because article V, section 17, of the Florida Constitution makes Ayala 

“the prosecuting officer of all trial courts in [the Ninth] [C]ircuit.” While quo 

warranto is the proper vehicle to challenge the Governor’s authority to reassign 

these cases to King, see Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 

607 (Fla. 2008), Ayala is not entitled to relief because the Governor did not exceed 

his authority on the facts of this case.

As Florida’s chief executive officer, the Governor is vested with the 

“supreme executive power” and is charged with the duty to “take care that the laws 

be faithfully executed.” Art. IV, §1(a), Fla. Const. Florida law facilitates the 

Governor’s discharge of this duty, among other ways, through state attorney 

assignments. Specifically, section 27.14(1), the constitutionality of which Ayala 

concedes, provides:
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If any state attorney is disqualified to represent the state in any 

investigation, case, or matter pending in the courts of his or her circuit 

or if, for any other good and sufficient reason, the Governor 

determines that the ends of justice would be best served, the Governor 

may, by executive order filed with the Department of State, either 

order an exchange of circuits or of courts between such state attorney 

and any other state attorney or order an assignment of any state 

attorney to discharge the duties of the state attorney with respect to 

one or more specified investigations, cases, or matters, specified in 

general in the executive order of the Governor. Any exchange or 

assignment of any state attorney to a particular circuit shall expire 12 

months after the date of issuance, unless an extension is approved by 

order of the Supreme Court upon application of the Governor showing 

good and sufficient cause to extend such exchange or assignment.

§ 27.14(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added).

This Court has previously recognized that the Governor has broad authority 

to assign state attorneys to other circuits pursuant to section 27.14:

It is the duty of the Governor under Fla. Const. F.S.A., art. IV, 

§ 1(a) in the exercise of his executive power to “take care that the 

laws be faithfully executed.” The exercise of this power and the 

performance of this duty are clearly essential to the orderly conduct of 

government and the execution of the laws of this State. An executive 

order assigning a state attorney is exclusively within the orbit of 

authority of the Chief Executive when exercised within the bounds of 

the statute. See Kirk v. Baker, 224 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1969). The 

Governor is given broad authority to fulfill his duty in taking “care 

that the laws be faithfully executed,” and he should be required to do 

no more than make a general recitation as to his reasons for assigning 

a state attorney to another circuit.

Finch v. Fitzpatrick, 254 So. 2d 203, 204-05 (Fla. 1971); see also Austin v. State 

ex rel. Christian, 310 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1975) (“The statutes authorizing 

assignments of state attorneys should be broadly and liberally construed so as to 
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complement and implement the duty of the Governor under the Constitution of the 

State of Florida to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’ ” (quoting art.

IV, § 1(a), Fla. Const.)). 

Accordingly, this Court reviews challenges to the Governor’s exercise of his

“broad discretion in determining ‘good and sufficient reason’ for assigning a state 

attorney to another circuit,” Finch, 254 So. 2d at 205, similar to the way in which it 

reviews exercises of discretion by the lower courts. Compare Johns v. State, 197 

So. 791, 796 (Fla. 1940) (“If the Governor should abuse [the assignment] power, 

by arbitrarily and without any reason whatsoever [for] making such an assignment, 

it might be that his action could be inquired into by writ of quo warranto . . . .”); 

with McFadden v. State, 177 So. 3d 562, 567 (Fla. 2015) (“Discretion is abused 

only when the trial court’s decision is ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.’ ”

(quoting Gonzalez v. State, 990 So. 2d 1017, 1033 (Fla. 2008))).

Applying this well-established standard of review to the facts of this case, 

the executive orders reassigning the death-penalty eligible cases in the Ninth 

Circuit to King fall well “within the bounds” of the Governor’s “broad authority.” 

Finch, 254 So. 2d at 204-05. Far from being unreasoned or arbitrary, as required 

by section 27.14(1), the reassignments are predicated upon “good and sufficient 

reason,” namely Ayala’s blanket refusal to pursue the death penalty in any case 
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despite Florida law establishing the death penalty as an appropriate sentence under 

certain circumstances. See generally § 921.141, Fla. Stat. (2017).

Notwithstanding the Governor’s compliance with all of the requirements of 

section 27.14(1), however, Ayala and her amici urge this Court to invalidate the 

reassignment orders by viewing this case as a power struggle over prosecutorial 

discretion. We decline the invitation because by effectively banning the death 

penalty in the Ninth Circuit—as opposed to making case-specific determinations as 

to whether the facts of each death-penalty eligible case justify seeking the death 

penalty—Ayala has exercised no discretion at all. As New York’s high court 

cogently explained, “adopting a ‘blanket policy’ ” against the imposition of the 

death penalty is “in effect refusing to exercise discretion” and tantamount to a

“functional[] veto” of state law authorizing prosecutors to pursue the death penalty 

in appropriate cases. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (N.Y. 1997). 

Although Johnson applied New York law, the standards to which this Court

holds its own judicial officers establish that Ayala’s actions have the same impact 

under Florida law. For example, our trial judges may not “refuse to exercise 

discretion” or “rely on an inflexible rule for a decision that the law places in the 

judge’s discretion.” Barrow v. State, 27 So. 3d 211, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), 

approved, 91 So. 3d 826 (Fla. 2012). Instead, exercising discretion demands an 

individualized determination “exercised according to the exigency of the case, 
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upon a consideration of the attending circumstances.” Barber v. State, 5 Fla. 199, 

206 (Fla. 1853) (Thompson, J., concurring). 

Thus, under Florida law, Ayala’s blanket refusal to seek the death penalty in 

any eligible case, including a case that “absolutely deserve[s] [the] death penalty” 

does not reflect an exercise of prosecutorial discretion; it embodies, at best, a 

misunderstanding of Florida law. Cf. Doe v. State, 499 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 1986) (holding “the trial court failed to exercise its independent sentencing 

discretion” in light of its erroneous view of the law); see also Taylor v. State, 38 

So. 380, 383 (Fla. 1905) (recognizing that “a failure of the state’s interests” occurs 

where “the regular state attorney is unwilling or refuses to act”).1

Moreover, while Ayala’s blanket prohibition against the death penalty 

provided the Governor with “good and sufficient reason” to reassign the cases at 

issue to King, also important to our holding is that the Governor did not attempt to 

decide which cases are deserving of the death penalty. The Governor’s orders do 

 

1. Similarly untenable is Ayala’s position that she has the authority to pick 

and choose (by consenting to reassignment in some cases but objecting in others)

when she is the prosecuting officer for the Ninth Circuit. While the Ninth Circuit 

voters elected Ayala as their state attorney, she holds that position subject to 

Florida law, including section 27.14, by which the Governor effectuates his 

constitutional duty to ensure the faithful execution of the law through time-limited 

state attorney assignments. See Finch, 254 So. 2d at 205 (“The purpose of the time 

limitation in the [assignment] statute is to prevent the Chief Executive from 

frustrating the will of the voters of a judicial circuit by replacing an elected state 

attorney with one chosen by the Governor from another circuit.”).
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not direct King to seek the death penalty in any of the reassigned cases, and King 

has sworn that the Governor has not attempted to interfere with his determination 

as to whether to pursue the death penalty in any case. Rather, consistent with the 

Governor’s constitutional duty, effectuated pursuant to his statutory assignment 

authority, the executive orders ensure the faithful execution of Florida law by 

guaranteeing that the death penalty—while never mandatory—remains an option in 

the death-penalty eligible cases in the Ninth Circuit, but leaving it up to King, as 

the assigned state attorney, to determine whether to seek the death penalty on a 

case-by-case basis. 

On these facts, the Governor has not abused his broad discretion in 

reassigning the cases at issue to King.2

 

2. Because the power to prosecute, including whether to seek the death 

penalty, is a purely executive function, see State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 

1986), we also reject Ayala’s argument that the executive orders violate the 

separation of powers doctrine of article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution by 

impermissibly encroaching upon the judiciary. See Fulk v. State, 417 So. 2d 1121, 

1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (“Although state attorneys, like all attorneys, are 

officers of the court, the execution of criminal statutes by enforcement, including 

prosecution, is an executive function of government. The state attorney, when 

acting as a prosecuting officer under Article V, section 17, of the Florida 

Constitution and under chapter 27 of the Florida Statutes, is performing an 

executive function and not a judicial function.”) (Cowart, J., concurring specially) 

(footnote omitted).
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CONCLUSION

The executive orders reassigning death-penalty eligible cases in the Ninth 

Circuit to King do not exceed the Governor’s authority on the facts of this case. 

Therefore, we deny Ayala’s petition.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 

PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs. 

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

PARIENTE, J., dissenting.

This case is about the independence of duly elected State Attorneys to make 

lawful decisions within their respective jurisdictions as to sentencing and 

allocation of their offices’ resources, free from interference by a Governor who 

disagrees with their decisions. The issue before this Court is whether a duly 

elected State Attorney’s choice to forgo seeking one potential penalty in a class of 

criminal cases, in favor of seeking another penalty authorized by statute, 

constitutes “good and sufficient reason” for the Governor to exercise his removal 

power under section 27.14(1), Florida Statutes (2017). I dissent because the State 

Attorney’s decision to prosecute first-degree murder cases but not seek the death 

penalty at this time does not provide a basis for the Governor to remove State 

Attorney Aramis Ayala. 
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Article V, section 17, of the Florida Constitution, which was adopted in 

1972, provides for an elected state attorney “[i]n each judicial circuit,” who “shall 

be the prosecuting officer of all trial courts in that circuit and shall perform other 

duties prescribed by general law.” Art. V, § 17, Fla. Const. As to the role of 

elected State Attorneys, this Court made clear in Austin v. State ex rel. Christian, 

310 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1975), that “the office of State Attorney is a constitutional 

office,” stating:

State Attorneys are constitutional officers, charged with the 

responsibility of prosecutions in the circuit in which he [or she] is 

elected and with the performance of such other duties as are 

prescribed by general law. . . . Being an elected official he [or she] is 

responsible to the electorate of [the] circuit, this being the traditional 

method in a democracy by which the citizenry may be assured that 

vast power will not be abused. . . . The Legislature, in its wisdom, has 

empowered the Governor to exchange and assign State Attorneys 

between judicial circuits within the confines of its enactments.

Id. at 293-94 (emphasis added). The Court also established that “[a] statute 

enacted by the Legislature may not constrict a right granted under the ultimate 

authority of the Constitution.” Id. at 293. 

Specifically at issue in this case is the decision of Aramis Ayala, the duly 

elected State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, to exercise her prosecutorial 

discretion not to seek the death penalty in cases in which she sought and obtained 

indictments for first-degree murder. It is well established in our case law that “the 

decision to seek the death penalty,” as allowed by statute, “is within the 
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prosecutor’s discretion.” Freeman v. State, 858 So. 2d 319, 322 (Fla. 2003). 

Nowhere in the Florida Statutes does the Legislature mandate that a prosecutor 

seek the death penalty in capital prosecutions. See § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2017); 

§ 775.082(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2017). Florida’s capital sentencing scheme affords a 

duly elected State Attorney the discretion to pursue either of two possible 

sentences “[u]pon conviction or adjudication of guilt . . . of a capital felony”: 

“death or life imprisonment” without the possibility of parole. § 921.141(1). 

Section 775.082 states that “a person who has been convicted of a capital felony 

shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according 

to the procedure set forth in [section] 921.141 results in a determination that such 

person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life 

imprisonment” and shall be ineligible for parole. § 775.082(1)(a). Either way, 

upon a conviction of first-degree murder, Florida law requires a minimum sentence 

of life imprisonment without parole. 

Likewise, Florida’s most recently amended capital sentencing scheme 

further affirms that it is the prosecutor’s decision whether to seek death in each

capital prosecution, stating: “If the prosecutor intends to seek the death penalty, the 

prosecutor must give notice to the defendant and file the notice with the court 

within 45 days after arraignment. . . . The court may allow the prosecutor to 

amend the notice upon a showing of good cause.” Ch. 2017-1, Laws of Fla., § 4. 
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Although the amicus brief of the House of Representatives asserts that the State 

Attorney is obligated to seek the death penalty in each prosecution where the State 

can prove at least one aggravating factor, the Governor disagrees with that 

position, acknowledging that the decision to seek death is a matter of prosecutorial 

discretion.

In his executive order removing State Attorney Ayala, Governor Scott 

referenced article IV, section 1(a), of the Florida Constitution, and section 27.14, 

Florida Statutes (2017). See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 17-66 (Fla. Mar. 16, 2017). 

Article IV, section 1(a), of the Florida Constitution, states in pertinent part: “The 

governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, commission all 

officers of the state and counties, and transact all necessary business with the 

officers of government.” Art. IV, § 1(a), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). However, 

as Amici Curiae Former Judges argue,3the fact that the Governor is charged to 

faithfully execute the laws does not supplant the constitutional authority of the 

independently elected State Attorney to prosecute crimes and to exercise his or her 

discretion in deciding what punishment to seek within the confines of the 

applicable laws. See Amici Curiae Former Judges Br. at 13 (The Governor’s 

 

3. Amici Curiae Former Judges, along with Current and Former 

Prosecutors, and Legal Community Leaders, filed a Brief in support of Ayala’s 

petition. For ease of reference, they are referred to cumulatively here as “Amici 

Curiae Former Judges.”
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constitutional duty to “ ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ . . . cannot 

empower the governor, contrary to the Florida Constitution’s express provision 

that state attorneys ‘shall’ be ‘the’ prosecutor within their circuits, to usurp 

prosecutorial duties.” (quoting art. IV, § 1(a), Fla. Const.)). Indeed, every day 

State Attorneys are tasked with making tough choices as to which crimes to 

prosecute and which penalties to pursue in consideration of their offices’ limited 

resources. Such decisions include whether to accept a plea to a lesser degree of the 

charged offense, whether to prosecute certain classes of crimes, and, of course, 

whether to seek the death penalty in capital prosecutions. 

The Governor’s only constitutional authority to remove State Attorneys 

comes from article IV, section 7, of the Florida Constitution. That provision 

provides that “the governor may suspend from office any state officer not subject 

to impeachment . . . for malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, 

incompetence, permanent inability to perform official duties, or commission of a 

felony.” Governor Scott has not claimed that any of these grounds for exercising 

his constitutional removal authority applies in this case. Therefore, because 

Governor Scott does not have the constitutional authority to remove Ayala from 

her position under article IV, section 7, the Governor relies on section 27.14,
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Florida Statutes.4 

When State Attorney Ayala announced that her office would not seek the 

death penalty in capital prosecutions, she acted well within the bounds of Florida 

law regarding the death penalty. She did not announce a refusal to prosecute the 

guilt of defendants charged with first-degree murder. Rather, State Attorney Ayala 

announced that she would not seek a sentence that produces years of appeals and 

endless constitutional challenges and implicates decades of significant 

jurisprudential developments, many of which have emanated over the years from 

the United States Supreme Court.5 Despite assertions to the contrary, State 

 

4. Section 27.14 traces its origin back to chapter 5399, Laws of Florida, § 2 

(1905), in which the Legislature authorized the Governor to exchange or reassign a 

State Attorney in the event of the disqualification of a State Attorney, “or if for any 

reason the Governor of the State thinks that the ends of justice would be best 

subserved.” In 1969, the Legislature amended the law to require this Court’s 

approval for exchanges or assignments lasting longer than sixty days, and inserted 

the phrase “good and sufficient” to qualify the reason for acting. Ch. 69-1736, 

Laws of Fla.

5. In fiscal year 2015-2016, Florida courts sent 498 people to prison for 

homicide offenses ranging from manslaughter to first-degree murder, but only 

seven to death row. Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, Annual Report 2015-2016, at 37, 

49, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1516/FDC_AR2015-16.pdf. As to the 

delay that State Attorney Ayala cited in finality for the victims of violent crimes, 

the unfortunate statistic is that the average time between offense and execution is 

17.4 years. Id. at 36; see Interview of Aramis Ayala, WFTV Channel 9 (Mar. 15, 

2017), at 6. 

According to DOC, there are currently 365 defendants on death row. Fla. 

Dep’t of Corrections, Offender Information Search, 

http://www.dc.state.fl.us/OffenderSearch/deathrowroster.aspx (July 17, 2017). 

Amici Curiae state that since the United States “Supreme Court approved the 
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Attorney Ayala did not make her decision based on personal opposition to the 

death penalty or “emotion.”

State Attorney Ayala’s decision was well within the scheme created by the 

Legislature and within the scope of decisions State Attorneys make every day on 

how to allocate their offices’ limited resources. Because State Attorney Ayala’s 

decision was within the bounds of the law and her discretion, Governor Scott did 

not have “good and sufficient reason” to remove her from these cases.

For these reasons, I would grant the petition for a writ of quo warranto and 

allow State Attorney Ayala to proceed in her constitutional role as the elected State 

Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit. The Governor’s decision in this case 

fundamentally undermines the constitutional role of duly elected State Attorneys. 

Accordingly, I dissent.

QUINCE, J., concurs. 

 

reinstatement of Florida’s death penalty in 1976 . . . less than half (only 33 of 67) 

of the counties [in Florida] have had executions, and 20 of Florida’s 67 counties 

currently have no representation among Florida’s death row.” Amici Curiae Br. of 

the Am. Civil Liberties Union Found., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., 

Florid[i]ans for Alts. to the Death Penalty, The Sentencing Project, & the NAACP 

Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. in Support of Pet’r Aramis Ayala, at 5. Further,

“well over 40%” of the individuals currently on death row in Florida “were 

sentenced to death over twenty years ago,” and “ over 60 %—were sentenced to 

death over 15 years ago.” Id. at 13 (citing Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, Death Row 

Roster, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/activeinmates/deathrowroster.asp.) “Fifteen of 

the 23 death-row prisoners prosecuted in Ayala’s circuit (comprising of Orange 

and Osceola Counties) were sentenced 15 years ago, or more.” Id.
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Original Proceeding – Quo Warranto 

Marcos E. Hasbun and Mamie V. Wise of Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP, Tampa, 

Florida; and Roy L. Austin, Jr., and Amy E. Richardson of Harris, Wiltshire & 

Grannis, LLP, Washington, District of Columbia,

for Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, Jordan E. 

Pratt, and Jonathan L. Williams, Deputy Solicitors General, Office of the Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Daniel E. Nordby, General Counsel, and John P. 

Heekin, Assistant General Counsel, Executive Office of the Governor, Tallahassee, 

Florida,

for Respondent

Shayan Elahi of Shayan Elahi, P.A., Winter Park, Florida,

for Amici Curiae The Dream Defenders, Florida Immigrant Coalition, Let 

Your Voice Be Heard, Inc., Florida State Conference of the National 

Association for the Advancement of Colored People, The New Florida 

Majority, SEIU Florida State Council, Color of Change, and Advancement 

Project

Adam S. Tanenbaum, General Counsel and J. Michael Maida, Deputy General 

Counsel, Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Amicus Curiae The Florida House of Representatives

Arthur I. Jacobs, Richard J. Scholz, and Douglas A. Wyler of Jacobs, Scholz & 

Associates, LLC, Fernandina Beach, Florida,

for Amicus Curiae Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association

Mark Herron and Robert J. Telfer III of Messer Caparello, P.A., Tallahassee, 

Florida,

for Amici Curiae Senator Oscar Braynon, Senator Jeff Clemens, Senator 

Perry Thurston, Senator Gary Farmer, Representative Janet Cruz and 

Representative Sean Shaw
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Daniel J. Gerber of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, Orlando, Florida,

for Amici Curiae Family Members of Victims

Sharon L. Kegerreis of Berger Singerman, Miami, Florida; Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.,

Chad I. Golder, and Sarah G. Boyce of Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP, 

Washington, District of Columbia; and Mark B. Helm, and John F. Muller of

Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP, Los Angeles, California,

for Amici Curiae Former Judges, Current and Former Prosecutors, and Legal 

Community Leaders

Nancy G. Abudu and Jacqueline Nicole Azis of ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc., 

Miami, Florida; and Brian W. Stull, Senior Staff Attorney of American Civil 

Liberties Union Foundation, Durham, North Carolina,

for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Capital Punishment 

Project, the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Floridians for 

Alternatives to the Death Penalty, the Sentencing Project, and the NAACP 

Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.

Seth Miller, President of Innocence Network, Innocence Project of Florida, 

Tallahassee, Florida; Norman Adam Tebrugge of Tebrugge Legal, Sarasota, 

Florida, and James C. Dugan of Willkie, Farr & Gallagher, LLP, New York, New 

York,

for Amici Curiae The Innocent Network and Witness to Innocence

Ashley M. Litwin of Seitles & Litwin, P.A., Miami, Florida,

for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

Sonya Rudenstine, Gainesville, Florida,

for Amici Curiae Victims’ Service Providers and Homicide Victims’ Family 

Members