Independent Assessment of

The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

April 2011

Report of the 

Defense Science Board 

Permanent Task Force on 

Nuclear Weapons Surety 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to 

the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in 

this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of 

Defense. 

The Task Force completed its information gathering in November 2010. The report was 

in security review from 17 Dec 2010 until 4 March 2011. 

This report is unclassified and cleared for public release.

4
Contents

Tasking ..........................................................................................................................................................7

Some Root Causes and Unintended Consequences..................................................................................... 8

The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.................................................................................................................. 9

Figure 1: The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Before 2008* ................................................................. 9

Figure 2: The Current Air Force Nuclear Enterprise*....................................................................... 10

Bottom Lines...............................................................................................................................................12

New Leadership Attention ...................................................................................................................... 12

Divided Authority and Accountability..................................................................................................... 13

Oversight and Inspection ........................................................................................................................ 14

Enlisted Personnel Management............................................................................................................ 15

The Personnel Reliability Program.......................................................................................................... 15

New Senior Leadership Attention............................................................................................................... 16

Focus.......................................................................................................................................................16

Changes in Organization ......................................................................................................................... 16

Air Force Global Strike Command........................................................................................................... 16

Impact of Other Changes in Organization............................................................................................... 17

Figure 3: The Logistics Issue Resolution Chain as Seen by the Wing Commander..........................19

Oversight and Inspection ............................................................................................................................ 21

Table 1: Days of Special Effort at Minot AFB .................................................................................. 22

Operations and Maintenance ..................................................................................................................... 26

Logistics and Maintenance......................................................................................................................26

Table 2: Logistics Support Organizations........................................................................................ 26

Figure 4: Re‐Entry System/Re‐Entry Vehicle (RS/RV) Engineering Requests...................................27

Operations – Missile Wings..................................................................................................................... 27

Operations – Bomb Wings...................................................................................................................... 28

Maintenance and Sustainment – Missile Wings and Munitions Support Squadrons (Europe)..............29

Table 3: Migration of Senior Nuclear Weapons Maintenance (2W2) NCOs...................................29

ICBM Warhead Sustainment............................................................................................................... 30

Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS)............................................................................................... 32

Some Common Bottom Lines for ICBMs and MUNSS’ ........................................................................ 32

U.S. Air Forces in Europe............................................................................................................................. 34

Guidance versus Direction .......................................................................................................................... 36

Enlisted Personnel Management................................................................................................................ 37

The Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) .................................................................................................... 38

5
Summary of Recommendations..................................................................................................................42

Logistics...................................................................................................................................................42

Organization and Guidance..................................................................................................................... 42

The Inspection Regime............................................................................................................................ 43

Operations ..............................................................................................................................................43

Personnel and Morale............................................................................................................................. 44

Personnel Reliability Program................................................................................................................. 44

Appendix A: Terms of Reference ................................................................................................................ 46

Appendix B: Task Force Members .............................................................................................................. 48

Appendix C:  Findings from Prior Reports on the Incidents........................................................................ 49

U.S. Air Force Blue Ribbon Review (BRR) on Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures (February

2008). ......................................................................................................................................................49

DSB Permanent Task Force Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons (February

2008). ......................................................................................................................................................49

Investigation into the Shipment of Sensitive Missile Components to Taiwan (May 2008)....................49

Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management (September 2008). ............50

Appendix D: Acronyms................................................................................................................................51

6
Tasking

Some two years after major changes to the structure of the Air Force nuclear enterprise and the

level of attention to the Air Force to the enterprise, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of

Defense for Nuclear Matters and the Secretary of the Air Force tasked the Permanent Task

Force to conduct an independent assessment of progress towards the goal of reinvigorating the

Air Force nuclear enterprise in support of the strategic nuclear deterrent mission. The Task

Force began the task in August 2010 and completed the task in November 2010.  

On each visit to nuclear mission‐related activities, it was clear to the Task Force that the

nuclear enterprise leadership at every level had encouraged their people to be open and candid

and their people responded accordingly.  

7
Some Root Causes and Unintended Consequences

The need for increased attention to the Air Force nuclear enterprise was highlighted by the

August 2007 unauthorized transfer from Minot AFB to Barksdale AFB and the inadvertent

shipment of nuclear weapon components to Taiwan in 2008. While these incidents demanded

urgent corrective action, a number of earlier decisions had an important negative impact on the

overall enterprise.  Dealing with these impacts required and will continue to require a broader

enterprise systems approach.  

The earlier decisions impacting logistics support continue to have significant negative impacts

on that support. For example, prior to execution of the 1995 BRAC recommendations, expertise

and experience for Air Force nuclear logistics sustainment had been vested in the Special

Weapons Directorate (SWD) at the San Antonio Air Logistics Center (SA‐ALC). The Directorate

had served the enterprise with experience and expertise for several decades. With BRAC

implementation of the decision to close the SA‐ALC, the SWD functions were spread among six

Air Force organizations based on perceived compatibility with their other mission assignments.

Very little of the special expertise in the SWD was preserved in the system.

Management and maintenance of the ICBM re‐entry system components were transferred and

consolidated with other missile system components at the Air Logistics Center in Ogden, Utah.

Among the casualties was specialized management for nuclear weapon components.  

Other nuclear‐related components fell under general commodity management systems in the

Air Force and in the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Again, elimination of the SWD and its

special attention led to applying standard supply chain processes to Nuclear Weapons‐Related

Materiel (NWRM). This practice included eliminating stock listings for special components

based on a scope of demand criteria being used for other supply items. As a consequence,

satisfying the need for these components can now require a two‐year acquisition process.

There were also significant impacts on operations that required system wide corrective action.

With the disestablishment of Strategic Air Command, the operating forces were first assigned

to Air Combat Command and then the ICBM force was reassigned to Air Force Space Command.

The end result was two major air commands responsible for segments of the strategic nuclear

operating forces.

To regain the needed focus on logistics support for the nuclear enterprise, the Air Force

leadership elected to focus activity at the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland AFB.

The Center, created in March 2006, has authority over ICBM and nuclear warhead support

activities at Hill AFB and ALCM sustainment support activities at Tinker AFB.  The intended

functions were to encompass much of the former function of the SA‐ALC’s SWD. The Center

also inherited a range of other responsibilities to include Air Force nuclear weapons

modernization and life extension programs.

The Air Force decision in October 2006 to consolidate cruise missiles further exacerbated a

strained storage and integrated maintenance facility.  

To regain focus on the strategic nuclear deterrence mission, the Air Force stood up Global Strike

Command with responsibility for Air Force strategic nuclear forces.

8
The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise

The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise is composed of the Air Force nuclear forces, supporting

logistics structure, command and control organizations, weapons sustainment and

modernization activities, and activities of relevant headquarters, agencies, and centers. The

enterprise and the recent changes are illustrated in the following figures and narrative.

Figure 1: The Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Before 2008*

                

Strategic Forces 

PEO 

A3 Operations 

Air Force 

Inspection Agency 

8th 20 Air Force Air Logistics Centers th 3 Air Force rd Air Force 

Nuclear Bomb Wings Wings ICBM Wings Air Force Nuclear 

Weapons Center Engineering 

Support Group Munitions Group 

Munitions Support 

Squadrons 

Weapons 

Storage Sites 

Weapons 

Storage Sites Weapons 

Depots 

Air Force 

Safety Center 

Air Combat 

Command 

Air Force 

Materiel Command 

Air Force 

Space Command 

US Air Forces 

Europe 

Secretary of the 

Air Force 

Chief of Staff 

* Not comprehensive, e.g. 55th Wing, AF Global Logistics Support Center 

Figure 1 above shows the Air Force nuclear enterprise as it evolved from the disestablishment

of Strategic Air Command in 1992 to 2008 when the Air Force leadership initiated significant

organizational changes. Before the changes, nuclear forces were assigned to three major air

commands and supporting logistics responsibilities were assigned to Air Force Materiel

Command.  The principal staff oversight in Headquarters Air Force was an element within DCS

Operations (A3).

In addition to the nuclear bomber mission, Air Combat Command was responsible for two

conventional bomber wings and some 20 fighter, reconnaissance, command and control,

electronic warfare, and other wings. They were also the gaining command for Air Force Reserve

and Air National Guard units. In addition to the three ICBM wings, Air Force Space Command

was responsible for acquiring, launching, and operating military space systems, and providing

the supporting ground systems. Consequently, in terms of people and resources, nuclear

operations were not predominant in either command. Further, in addition to the three nuclear

bomb wings, 8th Air Force was responsible for conventional bomber operations and cyber

operations.  

Three CONUS major air commands had responsibilities for weapons storage and maintenance

on operating bases. Within the operating wings, the wing commander was responsible and

accountable for all activity on the operating base required to meet mission requirements. In the

9
case of the dual‐wing base (Minot), the bomb wing commander was responsible for storage

and maintenance for both the ICBM and bomber assets.

Two logistics centers provided the principal support of the enterprise. The Ogden ALC

supported ICBM forces and the Oklahoma City ALC supported bomber forces. The Air Force

Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland was established in 2006 to provide more focused oversight

of the CONUS weapons storage sites along with other nuclear systems support responsibilities.

In Europe, the munitions support squadrons provided maintenance in support of NATO. Fighter

Wings also supported the NATO mission.  

The supporting air refueling forces were transferred to Air Mobility Command on

disestablishment of Strategic Air Command. There were and are other elements of the nuclear

enterprise not shown on the chart such as the 55th Wing at Offutt AFB, but those listed were

principal elements of the structure that had day‐to‐day nuclear forces and support

responsibilities.  

Figure 2: The Current Air Force Nuclear Enterprise*

  

Figure 2 above shows the current Air Force nuclear enterprise. New organizations are shown in

red. In addition, A10 staff agencies focusing on nuclear matters have been created at Air Force

Materiel Command and Air Education and Training Command headquarters. The most

significant change in command of forces is the creation of Air Force Global Strike Command

(AFGSC) and assigning all Air Force strategic nuclear forces to that command.

The two principal logistics changes are the assignment of weapons storage and maintenance

responsibilities at the operating bases for CONUS nuclear forces to the Air Force Nuclear

Weapons Center (AFNWC). Other additional responsibilities have also been assigned to the

AFNWC. The conventional bomber forces (B‐1B) remain assigned to Air Combat Command.

* Not comprehensive, e.g. 55th Wing, AF Global Logistics Support Center 

Strategic Forces 

PEO

A10-ACS for Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear 

Integration 

Air Force 

Inspection Agency

8th 20 Air Force Air Logistics Centers th 3 Air Force rd Air Force 

Nuclear Bomb Wings Wings ICBM Wings Air Force Nuclear 

Weapons Center 

Engineering 

Support Group 

Munitions Group 

Munitions

Squa

 Support 

drons 

Air Force 

Safety Center 

Air Force 

Materiel Command 

Air Force 

Global Strike Command

US Air Forces 

Europe

Secretary of the 

Air Force

Chief of Staff 

Weapons 

Storage Sites 

Munitions 

Wing/Group/

Squadrons

10
Requirements for dual‐capable aircraft (DCA) have been adjusted in the nuclear enterprise

structure in Europe, but the U.S. DCA mission and relationship to NATO has not changed.  

The impact and consequences of this structure are discussed in subsequent sections of this

report.  

11
Bottom Lines

New Leadership Attention

The Task Force visited the three major air command headquarters, the Nuclear Weapons

Center and other activities at Kirtland, activities at Hill AFB including the Ogden Air Logistics

Center (OO‐ALC), four of the six strategic nuclear‐mission wings and had discussions with the

commanders of the other two wings. The Task Force also visited a Munitions Support Squadron

(MUNSS) and the DCA Fighter Wing. After extensive discussions and observing operations and

logistics, the Task Force believes the Air Force leadership can have high confidence that, with

few exceptions, the operating and direct support forces understand their mission and the

demands of their mission, and are a professional, disciplined, and committed force.   

The Air Force leadership instituted and has to date sustained a set of extraordinary measures to

deal with the issues highlighted by the 2007 unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons and the

2008 accidental shipment of nuclear weapons‐related materials. While there are continuing

challenges, the extraordinary measures have been effective in correcting many of the

deficiencies in the operating forces and in rebuilding the culture appropriate to the nuclear

weapons enterprise.

However, some of these measures, appropriate to the situation over the past two years, are

not sustainable for the long term and are becoming counterproductive in that they create an

extraordinary burden on the operating forces rather than focusing sharply on areas still

requiring additional attention. The current inspection regime is a prime example.  There are

areas still requiring special attention and the inspection regime should be focused on these

areas. These areas include logistics support and personnel support appropriate to the priority of

the nuclear deterrence mission.

Accounting for Nuclear Weapons‐Related Materiel (NWRM) is greatly improved, but remains

challenging. Consolidation of NWRM, adapting the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) data system

for Air Force NWRM, and extraordinary vigilance at the operating level has greatly improved

the situation. The current state of progress is the result of what has been properly

characterized as a heroic effort. With the progress to date, the leadership can have high

confidence in accounting for and controlling the NWRM that are in the system. However, given

the state of accountability in 2008 and the magnitude of NWRM, the Air Force leadership

should not yet assume that NWRM accounting is flawless.   

Recommendation: The Air Force leadership should maintain realistic expectations regarding

the state of accounting for NWRM.  

The Air Force leadership has stated clearly that sustaining an effective nuclear deterrent force is

first priority and several tangible actions reinforce that declaration.  Given this commitment,

the Task Force had extensive discussions at multiple locations to discover the impact of

reinvigoration on the operating forces.  The following is a widely held set of views at the

operating force and direct support levels regarding the current state.

• Reinvigoration has produced:

12
o Increased attention to the nuclear enterprise at senior levels.

o A return to high standards of professionalism in the nuclear operating forces.

o More coherent operational focus under a single major air command.

o New organizations directing more and more focused attention to the nuclear

mission.

• The “priority one” declaration by the senior leadership is yet to be reflected in:

o An environment of trust on the part of the leadership appropriate to the dedication

and professionalism of the operating forces.

o Budget and program priority impacting the fielded forces.

o Replacement or upgrade of old support equipment central to the mission.

o Directives and technical orders providing the level of detail appropriate to nuclear

operations.

o Personnel policies and actions more tailored to the special demands of the nuclear

mission.

Each of the items listed as “yet to be reflected” is discussed in this report with specific

recommendations. One of the issues impacting perceptions in the operating forces is the gap

between the sense of time urgency in higher headquarters and that in both the operating

forces and the supporting workforce at the air logistics centers. The perceived business‐as‐usual

approach in planning and acquisition is inconsistent with the state of long‐term neglect of

logistical support for the nuclear weapons enterprise as experienced in the operating forces.

This is important for the effectiveness of the mission and for the morale of the workforce.  

Recommendations:  

The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct that:

The needs of the nuclear enterprise to sustain the force are given priority and the choices

for corrective action are oriented to long‐term sustainment rather than the lowest near‐

term cost path.

The Air Staff and Air Force Materiel Command should give:

Funding and program priority to logistics support essential to the nuclear deterrence

mission commensurate with the priority of the nuclear deterrence mission.  

Urgent attention to replacing 40‐+ year‐old warhead and missile maintenance support and

test equipment at the operating wings and the air logistics centers and to replacing the

Weapons Maintenance Trucks at the Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS) sites (Europe).

Divided Authority and Accountability

The complexity of the logistics chain can impede the pace of resolving emerging or long‐

standing logistics limitations on supporting the operating wings ability to perform their mission.

A unique logistics and maintenance organization was introduced at the wing level in the

strategic forces as part of the increased focus on the nuclear enterprise. This structure,

centralized under the Nuclear Weapons Center, was appropriate when the operating forces

were assigned as additional missions to two major air commands. With the formation of Global

13
Strike Command, this structure is now adding complexity and confusion without commensurate

added value.

The bifurcation at the operating base level of responsibility for the mission between the

operational wing and the munitions organization is contrary to important principles of Air Force

organization which assigns mission responsibilities within a clear chain of command. This

bifurcation is creating unintended complexity and negative perceptions.

Recommendation: The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct that

action be initiated to assign all base‐level operations and logistics functions to the strategic

Missile and Bomb Wings reporting through the numbered air forces to the Air Force Global

Strike Command.

Oversight and Inspection

A rigorous inspection program remains essential to safe, secure, and effective operations.

However, excesses have developed that are becoming counterproductive. The inspection

program needs to be more sharply focused on areas where issues persist. The continuing

intense and across‐the‐board level of inspection and exercise activity is perceived by some in

higher headquarters to be a continuing need until a zero‐defect culture can be reestablished.

When overdone, the level of inspection and exercises are counterproductive and lead to an

unrealistic zero‐risk mindset.  

The continued level of oversight and the broadly applied inspection regime is creating a

perception that the higher headquarters leadership believes they can and must inspect in

quality. It also creates a climate of distrust. It leads to a perception in the operating forces that

the leadership does not trust them to perform professionally. This leads them to question the

motives of the higher headquarters leadership. Further it is creating a leadership mindset

where satisfying a Nuclear Surety Inspection team, for example, can supplant, or at least

compete with, focus on readiness to perform the assigned nuclear mission.

Recommendations:  

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct that:

The intense inspection regime is sharply refocused on areas of continuing concern rather

than serving as a substitute for chain of command leadership and management.  

Action begin for a phased return to a normal schedule for the operating forces – a single

Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) each 18 months and a Nuclear Operational Readiness

Inspection (NORI) each 18 months. DNSIs as needed to meet the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff direction, conducted with NSIs.  

The Commanders of Global Strike Command and Air Force Materiel Command should direct

that follow‐up re‐inspections and special inspections are conducted only to address

unsatisfactory ratings or significant negative trends. For other discrepancies, the wing

commander or the munitions squadron (MUNS) commander is accountable for closing out the

discrepancies.

14
The Commander of USAFE should direct that follow‐up re‐inspections and special inspections

are conducted only to address unsatisfactory ratings or significant negative trends. For all

other discrepancies the wing commander or the MUNSS commander is accountable for

closing out the discrepancies in communication with the appropriate inspection agency.

Enlisted Personnel Management

The intersection of multiple issues impacting munitions, missile maintenance, and bomber

maintenance career fields calls for increased attention and flexibility to meet the needs of the

operating forces.

The career fields which are critical to maintaining the strategic nuclear deterrent seem to be

largely managed in a business‐as‐usual fashion with assignment policies that do not take full

advantage of special experience identifiers in meeting the special needs of the nuclear

enterprise.

Of special interest are the numbers and assignment of Master Sergeants (MSgt‐E7) and Senior

Master Sergeants (SMgt‐E8) in critical career fields. On average, it takes about 16 years to

produce a qualified MSgt and 19 years to produce a qualified SMSgt. Hence, there are long‐ 

term consequences related to the management of this resource.

Recommendation: The Headquarters Air Force A1 should direct special attention to providing

the needed qualified people to the operating forces in the career fields that are both fragile

and critical to the nuclear mission.

The Personnel Reliability Program

The DoD guidance on the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) has improved significantly since

2004. In contrast, the practice in the Air Force has continued to deteriorate.

Recommendation: The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct an

immediate adjustment to Air Force guidance/practices to remove PRP‐based restrictions and

monitoring demands that exceed those required by DoD direction.

15
New Senior Leadership Attention

Focus

The Air Force leadership at multiple levels has taken decisive action to correct deficiencies,

reinvigorate, and further strengthen the Air Force nuclear enterprise. These actions include

changes in priorities, organization, authorities, and processes. There is a clear message from the

Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff that they consider nuclear deterrence to be the

Air Force’s first priority mission. This is reflected in the Air Force statement of priorities with

“Continue to strengthen the Nuclear Enterprise” as the first priority. It is also reflected in the

Air Force Core Functions with “Nuclear Deterrence Ops” as the first listed function. These

actions have generally produced the intended results in the operating forces. They have been

less successful in providing logistics and personnel support commensurate with the mission

priority.

Changes in Organization

Three organizational changes were intended to bolster both the fact and perception of

restoring the priority accorded the nuclear enterprise:

• Creating an Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration

(A10) in Headquarters Air Force (HAF),  

• The formation of Air Force Global Strike Command as a major air command responsible

for  Air Force strategic nuclear forces, and

• Creating and strengthening the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland AFB, New

Mexico, and a set of subordinate organizations, responsible for nuclear sustainment to

include activities inside CONUS weapons storage areas (WSAs) and for a broad range of

additional nuclear enterprise responsibilities.  

Air Force Global Strike Command

The formation of Air Force Global Strike Command has produced a nearly universally positive

response in the nuclear operating forces. The potential negative aspect is the fact that while

the mission responsibilities of the command are declared first priority, it has been commanded

by a lieutenant general while all but one of the other operational and support commands are

commanded by four star officers. This is widely noted in the strategic operating forces.

The Air Force Global Strike Command commander and staff have a clear understanding of their

responsibilities and are taking a broad range of steps to include:

• Clarifying and expanding direction to make it more appropriate to the demands of the

nuclear mission,  

• Daily oversight of operations and maintenance to ensure the readiness of the force, and  

• Addressing long‐neglected logistics issues.  

The command is transmitting a clear set of values:

• Individual responsibility for mission success,

• Critical self‐assessment of performance,

16
• Uncompromising adherence to directives,

• Superior technical and weapons system expertise,

• Pride in nuclear heritage and mission,

• Respect for the worth and dignity of every airman,

• Safety in all things large . . . and small.

The Task Force lists this set of values as a contrast to the implications of some other approaches

to strengthening the nuclear enterprise discussed in this report.

In contrast to the skip‐echelon organization that broke chain of command responsibility for

operations and training in the bomber force up to 2008, 8th Air Force and Air Force Global Strike

Command are clearly responsible for daily operations and training in the B‐2 and B‐52 forces.

The AFGSC Command Center interfaces with 8th Air Force and 20th Air Force and their units on a

24/7 basis. The philosophy is micro‐informed, not micro‐management.  Authorities and

accountability are clear.  

Impact of Other Changes in Organization

The changes in organization have contributed significantly to the intended increased emphasis

on the nuclear enterprise and these were valuable in addressing the urgent issues. At the same

time, some have the potential for negative impacts when continued beyond the period of

urgent need. Extraordinary measures appropriate to an urgent situation may not be

appropriate or sustainable for long‐term mission accomplishment.

The Headquarters, Air Force A10 organization was stood up on November 1, 2008 to provide a

singular focus on nuclear matters in the Air Force headquarters. This organization has served

the intended purpose and has been effective in increased focus on the nuclear enterprise. The

potential negative impact is the possibility that key Deputy Chiefs of Staff with nuclear

enterprise responsibilities could feel less obligated to place the needed emphasis on those

responsibilities. The Task Force met with the Air Force A1, A3/5, A4/7, A8, and people from the

A9 and discussed this issue. Any such tendency is currently countered by the continuing

attention of the Secretary and the Chief of Staff. It is not clear that this will continue to be the

case or that the A10 should be a permanent fixture.  The continued success of this overlapping

arrangement is dependent on personal attention and is not a normal Air Force institutional

arrangement.  In any case, it creates confusion in subordinate organizations as to who has the

responsibilities and authorities to address their issues.

A second consequence is major air command mirror imaging of HAF as reflected in the A10

functions at AFMC and Air Education and Training Command (AETC). This is not the case at Air

Force Global Strike Command where all aspects of the staff are focused on the nuclear

enterprise. There is a long‐standing arrangement in USAFE that concentrates nuclear expertise

and attention in a directorate in the USAFE A3. Again, support of the nuclear enterprise

requires the attention of the major staff agencies. This issue is further complicated by

responsibilities assigned the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) with the stated intent

to clear up previously ambiguous chains of command. The advertised function of the AFNWC is

sustainment, that is, logistics support of the operating wings. That is also a key role of the

17
AFMC/A4. Our discussions with the A4 and staff and with the AFNWC leadership made it clear

that both understand their responsibilities for sustaining the nuclear enterprise.  

In addition to the role and authorities of the AFMC/A4 and the AFNWC Commander, there is

the role of the AFMC A10. Given that the A10 is a colonel, the A4 is a major general and the

Commander, AFNWC is a brigadier general, the role and authority of the A10 must depend

heavily on the AFMC Commander. Again, this is not a normal institutional arrangement. At this

level, the A10 position could add confusion rather than value in spite of the quality and

experience of the people in the A10. This is also quality and experience that is needed

elsewhere in the nuclear enterprise.

The AFNWC has been staffed with quality people with important and relevant objectives and

has made significant contributions to restoring an appropriate level of professionalism in the

operating forces. The issue for the AFNWC, the AFMC/A10, and the AFMC/A4 regarding the

nuclear enterprise is clarity in roles. Related to that issue is the scope of responsibilities that

AFMCI 90‐204 ascribes to the AFNWC. It could be interpreted as devolving responsibilities to

AFNWC that would logically be assigned to the major air command headquarters ‐ Air Force

Global Strike Command and Air Force Materiel Command. The described scope of those

responsibilities is well beyond a reasonable expectation for the center. Before the

disestablishment of Strategic Air Command, many of these responsibilities were shared

between Strategic Air Command Headquarters and Air Force Logistics Command Headquarters

requiring a significant part of the attention of both commanders and key staff.

A related issue is the complex chain of command from the maintenance units in the field to the

authority and capability to address their needs. The chain of command for the workforce in the

munitions squadron (MUNS) – key players in the readiness of the nuclear forces ‐‐ passes

through four levels en route to access the authority and resources to provide support needed

to perform its mission. The chain is from the munitions squadron to the group to the wing to

the AFNWC to the System Program Office (SPO). Even beyond that chain, it is likely that action

by AFMC/A4 will be required to resource solutions. In addition, the Strategic Forces Program

Executive Office has yet another reporting chain. This long and complex chain of command

would be less of a concern if the maintenance operations had been well supported before the

new organizations were created. A subsequent section of the report will provide evidence that

this has not been the case. Hence, there is a need for rapid response.  

The organizational changes have had the intended effect of increased attention in many of the

right places. Long‐standing neglect in important areas is being addressed. However, the

operating forces have seen only limited positive impact to date and significant negative impact.

The Task Force heard expressions of disappointment from multiple levels – most notably

among the enlisted force maintaining the nuclear weapons. Part of the problem is the apparent

difference in timeliness expectations. It has been two to four years since organizational changes

were put in place. The facts are that higher headquarters have been working to address the

issues that concern the workforce whose mission is sustaining the weapons. Further, people at

the higher headquarters believe they have made important strides in addressing the problems.

Since the solutions to many of the problems require development, a multi‐year timeframe

seems reasonable to higher headquarters. It seems less reasonable to the workforce because

18
they have been dealing with the problems for a longer time. One Senior Master Sergeant

expressed what the Task Force perceived to be a view held by many when he said: “They have

been admiring problems for two years that we have been living with for ten years.”  

The division of responsibility at the wing level is not at the root of the shortfalls in logistics

support. These issues have developed over a period of at least a decade and a half. Further, the

Task Force found no evidence that the current division of responsibility between AFGSC and

AFMC at the operating base is creating conflict or tension in the operating wings. In practice,

the wing commander and the munitions squadron commander relate as though the MUNS is

part of the wing.  

Still, the complexity of the organization and confusion about roles and relationships can

complicate and delay action to address the issues. Figure 3 below is one view of the

organization and relationships.

Figure 3: The Logistics Issue Resolution Chain as Seen by the Wing Commander

                                

This is not the only view since the actual flow of information and authority depends on

individual personalities and relationships. For example, wing commanders treat the munitions

squadron as an integral part of the wing. They seek to ensure that the same information moves

through both the operational command chain to Air Force Global Strike Command and the

logistics chain to the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. Further, it is not clear that there are

separate chains to the AFMC/A4 and the AFNWC. Still, the operational and logistics chains are

separate chain of command structures. Bypassing any part of the structure would require a

subordinate commander to bypass his immediate commander which is not a normal military

process. In any case, the ICBM or bomber SPO is often the locus of the expertise needed to

address issues. Hence, the simplest, shortest path to involve the SPO would seem to be

desirable.

A more central issue is that the arrangement is contrary to at least two principles that govern

Air Force operational unit organization elsewhere in the Air Force. The first is unity of command

at multiple levels – maintenance group, missile and bomb wing, and major air command. The

second is clear accountability. The Air Force culture is that the wing commander has “buck‐

stops‐here” accountability for the performance of all mission assets on his or her base. This is

not true of the current organization in the strategic nuclear wings. The wing commander is not

19
accountable for the maintenance and storage of the weapons that are central to the mission.

Without that accountability, it is difficult to see how the wing commander is accountable for

the most basic demand of his mission ‐ meeting nuclear alert and response requirements.

The arrangement also creates unintended perception issues. AFGSC and the wing commander

can be perceived as inferior in scope and responsibility to other operational major air

commands and wings. For the munitions squadron, the chain of command moves them from

being an integral part of the operational unit to an appended support organization. These

perceptions are not desirable in what is declared to be the first priority operational mission of

the Air Force.

Recommendations: The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct:

An action to assign base‐level operations and logistics functions to the strategic Missile

and Bomb Wings reporting through the numbered air forces to the Air Force Global Strike

Command.

A reexamination of the continued utility of the set of special headquarters organizations.

A revision of the set of responsibilities ascribed to AFNWC in AFMCI 90‐204 to sharply focus

on the sustainability of the nuclear enterprise with other responsibilities assigned to

Headquarters Air Force, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, and Air Force Global

Strike Command.

20
Oversight and Inspection

Regarding the two incidents that highlighted the need for intense attention to the nuclear

enterprise, as stated earlier in the report, the changes in priority and processes are having the

desired effect. The risk of an unauthorized transfer of a nuclear weapon is now near zero and

will remain so as long as there is leadership attention and clear direction.  The solution has

been, for the most part, a return to the processes, discipline, and culture that served the nation

well for more than half a century.  

There is also intense attention to the issue of accountability and control of Nuclear Weapons‐

Related Materiel. Increased attention has improved the NWRM situation greatly, but the

condition of the system in 2008 and the scope, magnitude, and distribution of NWRM make this

a continuing work in progress. The leadership can have confidence in the organization and

attention to NWRM. The leadership can also have confidence in accounting and control of

NWRM that has been identified as NWRM.  

This progress is evidence of the value of an extraordinary level of oversight and inspection

activity appropriate to address the urgent need identified from the 2007 and 2008 incidents.

The types of inspections include:

• Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI)

• Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI)

• Joint Nuclear Surety Inspection (JNSI)

• Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI)

• Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection (NORI)

• Maintenance Standardization Evaluation (MSE)

• Operations Standardization Evaluation   

• Logistics Capability Assessment Program (LCAP) or Team (LCAT) evaluation/inspection

• Nuclear Staff Assistance Visit (NSAV)

• Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit (NSSAV)

NSAVs/NSSAVs were not intended as inspections. They are listed here because they have

evolved into inspections by any definition. The only distinction is that the unit is not given a

formal grade. In general, the SAV team is not, as intended, chartered to respond to the unit

commander’s stated need. Instead, it assesses areas identified by the SAV team or higher

headquarters. An NSAV occurs six months prior to a unit’s scheduled NSI. In both Air Force

Global Strike Command and USAFE, the results are reported to higher headquarters and unit

commanders are required to respond to write‐ups just as they do with an NSI. Several

commanders expressed the view that NSAVs have become the higher headquarters staff

defense against the possible embarrassment of a unit in their command failing an NSI.  

As noted, the Task Force saw and heard convincing evidence that the level of oversight and

inspections has been successful and has served the intended purpose in the operating forces.

Further, there is no question about the importance of a rigorous inspection program. But, the

current intense and pervasive regime seems to have been institutionalized as the accepted

approach to producing quality work. An unintended consequence of the increased oversight is

21
the workload in the wings – both the operating and logistics wings.  A particularly compelling

example is Minot with two operational wings.  Table 1 below portrays the impact on the

leadership and people performing the mission at Minot.

Table 1: Days of Special Effort at Minot AFB

Year High Level of 

Special EffortMajor Inspection, 

Congressional Visit 

Significant Level of 

Special Effort - 

Major Exercise, 

Higher 

Headquarters Visit 

Medium Level of 

Special Effort 

White Space 

Including Weekends & Holidays 

2008 190* 98 72 69 total 

2009 204 192 73 65 total 

2010 

thru 

Aug 

168 114 75 25 total 

* For all categories, there are multiple activities, sometimes three or four on many of the days.  

The white space situation (the last column) at Barksdale and in USAFE units is similar in impact

to that portrayed in Table 1. There are few days, to include weekends and holidays, when the

wing commanders can focus on just their missions. The Task Force noted a similar level of

inspection and exercise activity at the 2nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale and in the 748th Supply

Chain Management Group (SCMG) at Hill AFB. There are multiple causes of this excessive

activity:

• Multiple headquarters and centers with overlapping responsibilities and lack of clarity,  

• Continued focus on past problems, and

• Wing and group commanders’ preoccupation with dealing with inspections.  

The Task Force did not attempt to rank order the causes. In the case of the third cause, the Task

Force noted that, at one wing, the commander expressed the goal of a generation exercise a

month. To the extent there is excessive unit‐generated exercises, the unit commanders receive

a steady drum beat of exhortations to do more self inspection. Self inspection is clearly

important to quality. Still, self inspection should reduce the need for higher headquarters

inspection rather than becoming another subject for evaluation and exhortation during

inspections.   

A common complaint in both the operational and logistics units is that the inspections are so

frequent that the unit has neither enough time nor resources to correct deficiencies. In this

case the resource issue is people. The same people who prepare for inspections are occupied

by the inspection and must carry out the corrective action after the inspection. Their perception

is that they are on an activity wheel driven by inspections, not by the demands of their mission.

The Task Force saw evidence that this perception is justified.

A perception (and frustration) among USAFE units is that LCAP inspections are unnecessarily

duplicative since nuclear maintenance is thoroughly inspected during an NSI. USAFE munitions

22
support squadrons cannot understand the requirement for a separate nuclear logistics

inspection given the extent of the NSI.

Furthermore, the level of inspection and exercise intensity is having an adverse effect on the

readiness of the B‐52 wings as they interfere with aircraft maintenance activity at the same

time the wings are experiencing significant shortages in experienced crew chiefs and rapid

turnover in other experienced maintenance people.  

It is useful to note, once again, that the rigorous corrective action to deal with the unauthorized

transfer has been effective and the current situation is not in need of anything like the level of

oversight indicated in Table 1.  Also, as noted, effective action to preclude a repeat of the

Taiwan shipment error is underway and making impressive progress from what is correctly

characterized as a superhuman effort. They need better data systems and resources, not more

inspections.  

This continued intense and broad scope system of inspections and higher headquarters visits

can be interpreted as a philosophy of inspecting in quality. In fact, the Task Force heard

comments from some higher headquarters’ flag officers indicating the view that inspecting in

quality will be necessary until the culture of special attention to nuclear operations is

reestablished at the operating wings. The Task Force saw and heard evidence that this culture

has been largely reestablished in the operating forces. In contrast, the supporting system has

not yet fully recovered the capabilities and culture that existed in the Special Weapons

Directorate at the San Antonio Air Logistics Center nor has a satisfactory level of logistics

support been reestablished. Further, the Task Force did not detect a sense of urgency

commensurate with the oversight activity shown in Table 1 and described for other units.

The most positive interpretation of the continued broad and pervasive level of special oversight

and inspection of the operating forces is that the leadership does not yet trust the operating

forces to perform effectively under the authority of a normal Air Force chain of command. The

most negative interpretation would be that some levels of the leadership are more concerned

with the risk to their professional careers than with supporting the operating forces. The Task

Force heard both interpretations from NCOs of all ranks and from company grade officers.

Regardless of the interpretation, the Task Force concludes that continuing the broad, pervasive

level of inspection and exercises has become counterproductive. The pervasiveness of the

inspection activity stands in the way of the wings establishing the operating rhythm essential to

an effective operation. The operating forces understand the demands of the mission. They do

not understand the demands of the inspection and exercise regimes. They also understand they

must do everything possible to ensure that they do not fail an NSI regardless of the impact of

such a focus on the operational mission and sometimes regardless of the impact on the unit’s

people.

One of the consequences of the pervasive inspection impact on unit operations was

characterized at two locations as nuclear paranoia, the perception being that good people

(particularly civilian employees) are avoiding assignments that subject them to the inspection

and oversight regime that has become institutionalized in nuclear operations and logistics

activities. Nuclear paranoia may also be impacting the attitude towards being identified as

having nuclear expertise though the evidence of this was anecdotal and limited.

23
The Task Force also heard discussion of the role of the Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA). That

role has evolved to both a core augmentation to major command inspection teams and an

oversight and quality control role on virtually every NSI/DNSI. The AFIA role seems appropriate

and useful. Still, the combination of major command inspectors, AFIA inspectors and observers,

DTRA inspectors and observers, AF Safety Center observers, combatant command observers,

and, in Europe, NATO observers grows the inspection teams. It is not unusual to have eight or

ten inspectors from the multiple agencies observing a technical operation carried out by two

technicians.  In the case of a NSI/DNSI for a Munitions Support Squadron in Europe, it is not

uncommon to have 80 to 90 inspectors examining a unit with a total unit manning of less than

150.   

Further, the level of detail in the inspection, the judgment about what is major and what is

minor, and a number of new and seemingly illogical rules raise credibility issues. Four examples

illustrate the trend towards excess.

• A recent new safety rule demands that no technician in a WMT be closer than one inch

from a wall when the fire set cables are exposed on an asset lest an unknown source of

electrical current leap to the firing set. This rule applies to a WMT which, itself, is a

faraday cage, enclosed in a lightning protected aircraft shelter. This is particularly

difficult to comply with in a work area designed for four people when they are being

observed by multiple inspectors, all declaring that they must actually see the technician

perform each step of the procedure.

• There is an Air Force requirement for the Supply Chain Management Group at the ALC

to maintain two years of paper printouts of usage factors. Since all this information is

available electronically, the printouts have no practical use. This requirement produces

about 400,000 pages of printout each quarter demanding storage cabinets for eight

quarters worth of virtually worthless paper. Still the Logistics Compliance Assessment

Team religiously checks to be certain that the full eight quarters of printouts are

properly maintained. Missing paper data can be a major write‐up. The unit’s answer to

why the inspectors do that is “because they can.”

• Inspections of technical operations in USAFE are conducted on training assets (not war

reserve assets). These assets have seen heavy use and have numerous nicks and

scratches. The inspection team typically requires that the technician go through the

process of inspecting, assessing with reference to tech data, and recording each of the

defects. This alone can consume more than an hour at the outset of an operation where

the total task execution time is normally about 30 minutes. It is difficult to explain to the

technician why he has to repeatedly demonstrate during a single operation that he

knows how to correctly identify and characterize defects on a worn training munition.

This is an issue at the nuclear bomber bases in CONUS as well.

• There is also the matter of the most basic trust. The complaint of several technicians is

that if the inspectors do not actually see the technician perform a particular step

because the inspectors are conversing among themselves or otherwise distracted,

inspectors will not accept that the technician performed the step. In at least one case, it

caused the failure of an NSI. This sort of attitude is interpreted by the working

technician as evidence that the official direction given the inspector is to assume that

24
those they are observing are not doing the task properly until proven to the inspector.

Since these are nuclear operations, there are always at least two technicians at work

and there is no reasonable basis for inspectors automatic discounting of the word of a

trusted technician team.  

• An additional price of the numbers of observers/inspectors that insist on physically

observing technical operations is a level of interference and artificiality that calls into

question the validly of the entire inspection process. As an example, for USAFE

operations it can take an hour and a half when using the proper procedure to clear an

inspection and observer party into an aircraft shelter to observe a technical or loading

operation.  

• The issue of groups of inspectors also applies to non‐technical operations. In the case of

a recent NSI at a MUNSS in Europe, there were nine inspectors examining the PRP

records of a unit with 142 people on PRP with one PRP monitor in the unit.

Recommendations:  

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct that:

The intense inspection regime is sharply refocused on areas of continuing concern rather

than serving as a substitute for chain of command leadership and management.  

Action begin for a phased return to a normal schedule for the operating forces – a single

Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) each 18 months and a Nuclear Operational Readiness

Inspection (NORI) each 18  months. DNSIs as needed to meet the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff direction, conducted with NSIs. For the logistics units subject to Logistics Capability

Assessment Team inspections, the normal frequency should be 18 months.  

The numbers of inspectors from multiple organizations is tailored to the size and

complexity of the operations of the unit.

The numbers of inspectors physically observing technical and loading operations in

controlled facilities is the minimum required to verify the proper performance of the task.

The Commanders of Air Force Global Strike Command and Air Force Materiel Command

should direct that follow up re‐inspections and special inspections are conducted only to

address unsatisfactory ratings or significant negative trends. For other discrepancies, the

wing commander or AFMC MUNS commander is accountable for closing discrepancies.

The Commander of US Air Forces in Europe should restrict the total size and complexity of an

inspection team to that which is appropriate to the size and complexity of the nuclear

operations of the inspected unit.

25
Operations and Maintenance

Logistics and Maintenance

The Task Force elected to visit the Ogden ALC since many of the logistics issues identified on

visits to other organizations were focused on the support for ballistic missiles and ballistic

missile warheads. There are a number of organizations relevant to the support of ballistic

missile sustainment. Some are located at Hill AFB and some at Kirtland AFB. There is a variety of

reporting channels ‐ directly to the OO‐ALC, to the AFNWC, or to AFMC’s Air Force Global

Logistics Support Center. Table 2 lists some of the relevant organizations.

Table 2: Logistics Support Organizations

Organization Reports to Location Function 

ICBM Systems Division AF Nuclear Weapons 

Center 

Hill AFB System Program Office 

Engineering Support 

498th Nuclear Systems 

Wing (NSW) 

AF Nuclear Weapons 

Center 

Kirtland AFB KUMMSC Support 

Munitions Sqds 

708th Nuclear Sustainment 

Sqd (NSUS) 

498th NSW Kirtland AFB Stockpile management of 

DOE support to DoD 

309th Missile Mx Group 

(MMXG) 

Ogden Air Logistics Ctr Hill AFB Depot repair for RS/RV 

Minuteman III Mk12/Mk21 

748th Supply Chain 

Management Group 

AF Global Logistics 

Support Center 

Hill AFB 

component 

Supply Support 

NWRM management 

With the exception of the 708th NSUS, the issues with the maintenance and logistics

organizations impacting either the strategic forces or those in Europe were similar:

• Aging equipment central to their mission with little or no urgency in plans to replace the

equipment.

• Low priority in spite of the declaration of the primacy of the nuclear mission. Plans to

provide the needed support to include such seemingly mundane needs as connecting

cables repeatedly frustrated by demands to find cheaper solutions. Hence the usual

response is stretched or delayed programs such as the replacement for the Re‐entry

System Test Set (RSTS), a 40+‐year‐old piece of essential test gear with a currently

planned replacement date of 2017.  The Task Force noted that it took only about this

length of time to develop and field the F‐15 and F‐16 fighter aircraft.

• Reductions in manpower at the same time as increases in workload. Figure 4 offers one

illustration of the increase in workload.

             

26
         Figure 4: Re­Entry System/Re­Entry Vehicle (RS/RV) Engineering Requests

                     

There are multiple reasons for the escalating growth in demand for engineering support from

the ICBM Systems Division:

• Continued aging of systems being supported and support equipment.

• Reduced experience in the units maintaining the equipment.

• Inadequate and outdated technical data with manpower as a prime reason for technical

data backlog.  

• An environment of risk avoidance leading to referrals for engineering judgments

formerly made by maintenance supervisors.

Virtually all of these causes of increased workload and reduced efficiency are evident across the

maintenance and logistics activities in the operating wings and the logistics wings and groups.

Recommendation: The Air Force A1 should direct a zero‐base assessment of the logistics

center and operating unit engineering and maintenance manpower requirements considering

the aging of the equipment.  

Additional recommendations relevant to this discussion are found in the following sections on

operating wings.

Operations – Missile Wings

Missile operations crews are committed to their mission, but most were not volunteers for

missile duty. They perceive a lack of knowledge of and respect for their mission from within the

larger Air Force. This perception is reinforced by both large and small signals. Many of the

current crews experienced the trauma of having their Strategic Missile Wing renamed “Space

Wing” and replacing the distinctive missile badge with a space badge. Further, as they attend

professional military education at all levels, they note that there is little in the curriculum about

27
their mission and they perceive that their classmates attach little value to that mission. As a

seemingly small but still irritating matter, as a missile crew watches the computer display for

their mission briefing before starting each period of duty, they see the official classified Air

Force screen saver which features a single weapons system – an F‐22. They also note that Air

Force recruiting ads and posters, defense industry advertising, and other forms of Air Force

public relations activity seem to ignore the ballistic missile mission. This combination makes it

difficult for the leadership in the operational forces to convince the crews that their service is

valued commensurate with the declared priority of their mission.

Recommendations:  

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct that Air Force public

relations and promotional messages include the nuclear forces in portraying the Air Force

mission and focus.

The Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and commanders at all levels should

frequently reinforce the primacy of the nuclear deterrence mission with communications to

Headquarters Air Force, the Major Air Commands, and the nuclear operational forces and

logistics support organizations.

Operations – Bomb Wings

The attitude in the Bomb Wings is generally positive. Their mission demands a high ops tempo,

but they seem to deal with it effectively. Still, the effort to refocus the wings on the nuclear

mission is challenging ‐‐ it remains difficult for aircrews to be truly immersed in the nuclear

mission. No single wing can meet the rapid reaction nuclear requirement. Consequently, the

commitment is shared on an ad hoc and piecemeal basis between Bomb Wings. This may be

the best approach given the current force distribution, but it makes it difficult in a selected part

of the unit to maintain a high degree of focus on operational readiness to perform the strategic

nuclear mission.

In order to be ready to assume the nuclear commitment, crews must retain some level of focus

on the nuclear mission while deployed elsewhere for commitment to continuous presence. In

spite of senior leadership focus, many crews value these deployments and the conventional

mission above the nuclear mission. Again, part of this attitude stems from what they perceive

as the wider Air Force attitude towards the nuclear bomber mission. This is exacerbated by the

widely reported internal debates in the Pentagon about the future of the bomber leg of the

nuclear triad. The internal Pentagon debate is well known in the operational bomber units. As

in the case of the Missile Wings, B‐52 crews are subjected on a daily basis to the F‐22 Air Force

classified screen saver which reinforces their perception that the fighter aircraft mission

dominates Air Force attention and priorities. And, there is a general perception that the nuclear

mission is ancillary to the crews other demanding missions. This combination of factors is a

continuing obstacle to convincing the B‐52 force that the nuclear mission is first priority.  

Recommendation: The Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command should direct moving

from the ad hoc approach to meeting the nuclear bomber commitment to a formal program

that is insulated from other demands.

28
Maintenance and Sustainment – Missile Wings and Munitions Support Squadrons

(Europe)

The workload for missile and weapons maintenance has increased significantly with the

reductions in manpower, reductions in experienced NCO supervisors, failures of support

equipment, and inadequate technical data. These conditions are not the result of

reorganization nor will further reorganization be the solution to the need.  

With the formation of new higher headquarters organizations, nearly 48% of the MSgts and

SMSgts in the Nuclear Weapons Maintenance (2W2) career field (nuclear munitions

maintenance) are at higher headquarters creating policies for or inspecting the 52% that

provide NCO leadership in the operating wings. This number is well known among the 52%.

Table 3 shows the staff positions manned from field resources as of August 2010. Due to

reduced overall numbers, this is a fragile career field and requires special attention to ensure

the needed level of expertise and quantity of qualified people in the operating force.                

Table 3: Migration of Senior Nuclear Weapons Maintenance (2W2) NCOs    

Organization Current  Authorization

HAF/A10 1 SMSgt

AFIA 2 MSgt

AFGSC 1 SMSgt; 4 MSgt

AFSC 2 MSgt

DTRA 2 MSgt

EUCOM 1 MSgt

STRATCOM 2 MSgt

USAFE/A3NM 1 MSgt

USAFE/IG 1 MSgt

AFMC/IG 3 MSgt

AFMC/A10 1 SMSgt; 1 MSgt

AFMC/A4 3 MSgt

AFNWC/LG 1 MSgt

ICBM SYSTEMS DIVISION (HILL) 2 MSgt

49TH T&E Sqd 2 MSgt

708 NSUS 1 SMSgt; 6 MSgt

709 NSS 1 MSgt

710 NSS 1 MSgt

Recommendation: The Air Force A1 should initiate a program to ensure a priority balance

such that the operating forces have the needed senior NCO leadership from the 2W2 career

field to include immediate action to address the mismatch between senior NCOs supervising

29
work in the units and senior NCOs overseeing and inspecting the performance of operational

and logistics units.

ICBM Warhead Sustainment

The slow response to inadequate technical data increased the ICBM nuclear munitions

maintenance workload. Munitions components are received at the missile wings from the

weapons depot and from other sites. Before assembling components for loading on a

Minuteman missile, the technician must inspect the condition of the component.  The

inspection frequently reveals small defects (nicks and scratches, mostly cosmetic in nature) that

are not addressed in the technical data. On discovering these defects, the munitions

maintenance organization has no choice but to document the defects, return the asset to

storage, and send the paperwork to the ICBM Systems Division for an engineering judgment.  

Since it takes about a half day to prepare an item for inspection and another half day to

document the defects and return the item to storage, each such incident costs a day’s

productivity for a crew. This had occurred 55 times May 2010 through August 2010 at the 15th

MUNS.  In 52 of those cases, the engineering judgment ultimately rendered was that the item

was serviceable. This means 52 days of needless lost productivity in a single missile wing in the

period noted.   

The AFNWC has been working this situation for two years. While the options for correcting this

deficiency are well understood – pre‐inspection and documentation before shipment, rapidly

changing the tech orders, and/or on‐site judgment – there seemed to be time‐consuming

obstacles to any of the solutions. With this condition as a contributor, munitions maintenance

people work excessive shifts and weekends to meet the need for warheads for deployed

missiles.   

Recently, the AFNWC identified four technical orders (tech orders) that cover the areas making

up over two‐thirds of the cases where inadequate tech data necessitated engineering

assessment. Two of these tech orders have been expanded and re‐issued. At the time of this

report, the other two were still in work. This action should significantly reduce this particular

obstacle to efficient munitions maintenance in the missile wings.

An all‐too‐common response from junior airmen to senior master sergeants to questions about

their future plans was that they had enough of the working conditions and state of logistics

support and they were leaving either the career field or the Air Force. Several declared that it

wasn’t the long hours of work that bothered them; it was the long hours when they could not

do their work because of tech orders, support equipment issues, and inspections.  

There is a more fundamental cause of this situation. In the past, the judgments regarding the

cosmetic defects causing some of this problem were rendered by experienced munitions

maintenance people in the WSA. With the drive for zero defects, this became unacceptable to

some levels of nuclear enterprise leadership. The fallacy is the goal of zero cosmetic defects in

30‐year‐old weapons. This is neither achievable nor necessary. If the standard is peer‐reviewed

engineering assessment for cosmetic defects, then the system has crossed the threshold to zero

risk. In the worst case, there could be some slight risk that a faulty judgment regarding a small

30
nick or scratch could cause a warhead to fail on re‐entry. Again, this issue contributes to the

perception of distrust of the professional qualification of the workforce.

Recommendations: The Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center should:

Direct immediate action to reestablish risk management and trust in the technician’s

judgment versus risk avoidance on cosmetic defects with the needed technical data and

training program to support that judgment.

Provide on‐site engineering support until processes are in place to separate the cosmetic

defects in RV components requiring engineering analysis.

Support equipment for ICBM munitions and missile maintenance is old and at the end of its

useful life. The Re‐entry System Test Set (RSTS) was delivered in the 1960s and includes 1950s

technology. There are plans to replace it with a Full Operational Capability but not until 2017.

Given all the other needs across the Air Force, the decision has been that this is the right

priority. However, this is the test set that verifies MM III re‐entry systems (Mk12, Mk12A, and

Mk21) and re‐entry vehicle integrity. Maintenance technicians perceive this 2017 replacement

date as a mismatch between stated mission priorities and logistics support priorities.

Failure to replace seemingly simple pieces of support equipment such as connecting cables is a

major irritant and obstacle to productivity. The same is true of support equipment for missile

maintenance.  Again, over the past two years this has received attention with a contract that

was to deliver new cables in late 2010. While the Task Force heard complaints about this

problem from each of the missile wings, there was no indication that the workforce knew that

help is on the way. This illustrates the need for a more proactive approach to informing the

troops.

Vehicles essential to transporting and removing/installing missiles and post‐boost vehicles in

the silos provide an example of acquisition decisions that seem to lack meaningful consultation

with the people who perform the mission. At least this is a perception among people who use

this vital equipment. The tractors are modern 2003 and 2009 models. Since cab‐over tractors

are no longer produced in the U.S. for commercial trucking use, the decision was to change new

procurement to the industry standard tractors. The problem is that the additional length of the

industry standard tractor reduces maneuverability making them difficult to impossible to

maneuver on some of the launch sites. The new tractors were procured as a commodity item

with no consideration of special demands of the nuclear support mission.  

Further, while the transporter erector trailers have been upgraded, the most essential piece of

equipment, a complex hoist, is 40‐years old with no known plans for replacement.  When the

transporter erectors were refurbished some 20 years ago, the envisioned refurbishment

included a new hoist. The added expense of the new hoist led to direction that a cheaper

program be developed. This is another example of a lowest cost, stop‐gap approach to support

equipment essential to the Air Force’s first priority mission. There is still no program to replace

the hoists.

31
Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS)  

At the MUNSS sites, weapons maintenance must be performed inside the protective aircraft

shelter. The central piece of support equipment to provide this maintenance capability is the

Weapons Maintenance Truck (WMT). These trucks were designed for a 20‐year life more than

20 years ago. While it is common for systems to be used beyond their design life, the wear and

tear on these trucks has far exceeded the design operating environment. For example, they

were designed to deliver the needed capability in the aircraft shelter, not for extensive road

travel. In practice, these trucks must travel some distance to a main operating base for routine

maintenance. Further, the WMTs were procured and delivered with no planned sustainment

package. The MUNSS sites often depend on temporary WMT loans from other sites.  

The Task Force heard mostly positive comments about the performance of the engineering

detachment, Det 1, responsible for maintenance/sustainment of the weapons vaults and

portions of the WMT (hoist, electrical systems). However, the operating units also described

how Det 1 was undermanned for the sustainment demands placed upon it. Det 1, under the

498th Munitions Maintenance Group at Ramstein, comprises 21 personnel, mostly engineers, to

service all of these aging systems.  

The maintenance issue is further exacerbated by the failure to plan for and procure a

sustainment package for these systems. Hence, parts and support can take an extended period

for routine needs. As an example, a WMT from one of the sites has been under repair at

Ramstein for more than a year. At the time of our visit, it was awaiting tires to complete the

work. These are standard heavy truck tires.

The current plan is to replace the WMTs with the Secure Transportable Maintenance System in

2014. A prototype has been in existence for some two years. When MUNSS people take their

20‐year‐old essential equipment to a main operating base for repair, they notice the fleet of

relatively new fuel trucks populating the flight line supporting the conventional tactical fighter

mission.

An issue common to other nuclear operations is the lack of supply priority. Part of the issue is

infrequent demand for some parts and the failure to plan for a sustainment package. But part

of the issue is priority. It is not difficult to understand that when there is competition for assets

between the forces in combat and everyone else, the priority will properly go to forces in

combat. Still there should be at least sensitivity to the needs of the nuclear enterprise which

are often small compared to others. For example, an inquiry about the status of an order for a

small number of night vision goggles for the security forces assigned to the nuclear mission was

answered by the item manager with the information that the units need was priority 2 with

more than 200 priority 2 orders ahead of these security forces.

Some Common Bottom Lines for ICBMs and MUNSS’  

There are other examples, but the examples above demonstrate three key points:

• Slow response to tech order and equipment issues sends a negative message and adds to

the workload of munitions maintenance personnel, requiring extraordinary efforts to

sustain the mission.   

32
• The “lack of a nail” syndrome is real. Paying attention to all the bits and pieces of support

equipment needed to sustain the mission is as important as major pieces of equipment.

• The process of designing and procuring new support equipment whether it be large

tractors or the need for connecting cables should be made on the basis of long‐term

effectiveness rather than the immediate cost. Decisions should also include consulting the

people who use the equipment to support the mission at the operating units. Consulting

people in the headquarters is not a substitute.  

Recommendations:

The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct that:

The needs of the nuclear enterprise to sustain the force are given priority and the choices

for corrective action are oriented to long‐term sustainment rather than the lowest near‐

term cost path.

The Air Staff and Air Force Materiel Command give funding and program priority to

logistics support essential to the nuclear deterrence mission commensurate with the

priority of the nuclear deterrence mission.  

The Air Staff and Air Force Materiel Command give urgent attention to replacing 40+‐ year‐

old warhead and missile maintenance support and test equipment at the operating wings

and the air logistics center and to replacing the Weapons Maintenance Trucks at the

MUNSS sites.

The Commander, AFGSC and Commander, AFNWC should direct a greatly increased

communications effort to keep the operating forces informed about actions underway to

address their support issues.

The Commander, AFGSC should ensure that equipment peculiar to support of nuclear

operations is treated as specialized equipment before reverting to a commodity approach.  

33
U.S. Air Forces in Europe

USAFE nuclear forces have a set of special challenges to include:

• The operations are unique.  

o The Munitions Support Squadrons each support and are supported by a different

allied air force.  

o There is a key US NATO Dual‐Capable Aircraft (DCA) tasking.

• The units are subject to both USAF and NATO directives. These directives are sometimes

in conflict due to varied update cycles or due to unresolved conflicts.

• The units are subject to USAF, DTRA, and NATO inspections and inspection criteria.

• There is high turnover in essential personnel, sometimes with most of the senior

leadership changing over a short period.

The unique nature of the NATO DCA tasking raises some issues with readiness criteria and with

inspection teams. The requirement is to be capable of bringing a required DCA squadron to the

required readiness within a specified time. To meet this requirement, it is clear that the wing

must sustain certain capabilities at constant readiness, e.g., security forces, systems

maintenance and control, and command and control systems and capabilities. At the same time

there is time to bring other capabilities from a lower state of readiness to the required level.

The issue is the need for clear definition of what is required on a daily basis. This leads to

concerns about the difference between what the wing commander believes is required to meet

the NATO DCA capability and timing requirement, and the desire of an NSI team to assess

capabilities that the wing does not need to keep at a constant state of readiness. Additionally,

the wing must continuously meet its ongoing combat operations requirements leading to

constant change in forces assigned to meet the NATO requirement.

The mismatch between USAF and NATO directives and inspection requirements can have an

adverse impact on NATO strike evaluation (STRIKEVAL) operations. For example, USAF

directives permit towing a nuclear loaded aircraft only as a last resort in an emergency while

NATO rules permit such towing as needed to meet the generation requirements. Given the

distribution of aircraft and munitions at some locations, this can result in NATO STRIKEVAL

scenarios that are difficult if not impossible to meet with USAF directed limitation. In such

cases, the wing commander must comply first with USAF directives.  

The impact of the rapid turnover in Europe is exacerbated by at least two personnel policies or

practices. The need is to maintain a high level of nuclear operations and maintenance

experience and competence. However, it at least appears that assignments to the key DCA

Fighter Wing are made with attention to factors than can override attention to nuclear

experience. There is a reluctance to allow people to extend in Europe when they volunteer and

their experience is important to DCA operations. Part of the reason for the reluctance is that

many assigned to an unaccompanied tour at a specific base overseas are promised that at the

end of this unaccompanied tour they will be assigned to fighter units in USAFE. The end result is

a flow of people who have no nuclear experience into the key DCA wing in Europe. This same

set of policies impacts the MUNSS sites. This is particularly important at these sites since they

34
are small (typically less than 150 total assigned) and sometimes are one deep in critical

experience.

Recommendations:

The Commander, US Air Forces in Europe should:

Direct the USAFE A3 to provide clarity on the elements of the DCA mission that require

continuous readiness and those that can be brought to the needed level within the

prescribed time.

Identify the disconnects between NATO and USAF directives that impact nuclear operations

and establish a working body with NATO to resolve the differences.

The Air Force A1 should direct a reexamination or clarification of the policy or practice

opposing voluntary extensions for nuclear‐experienced people in Europe and the criteria for

assignments from non‐nuclear missions to the DCA mission units.

35
Guidance versus Direction

A continuing issue in the nuclear forces is the adequacy of direction. The Air Force move to the

philosophy of the Air Force Instruction versus the Air Force Regulation probably achieves its

intended purpose in other activities. The philosophy seems to be to describe what is to be

done, to give guidance, and to leverage the experience and talents of Air Force people to do the

job more effectively and efficiently. It would be difficult to fault that proposition were it not

contrary to the demands of the nuclear mission where the premium is on doing things exactly

right and as prescribed every time. There is little room for ad hoc innovation in the nuclear

operations and maintenance business.  

A common answer by senior NCOs in the nuclear enterprise to a question about the difference

between an instruction and a regulation is that the first provides guidance (some say

suggestions or philosophy), the second provides direction. One of the difficulties with guidance

versus direction is different interpretations by unit supervisors, staff assistance teams, and

inspectors. In the nuclear business, room for interpretation, innovation, and increased

efficiency is more likely to be an obstacle than an enabler. One such innovation, simultaneously

inventorying the storage facility while preparing the load for transport to the flight line, was a

factor in the unauthorized transfer incident in 2007. Another factor was a different

interpretation of what constituted verification of the payload in the cruise missiles being

transported. In these areas the concept of guidance has now been replaced with clear direction

to include processes that neither require nor allow interpretation. In other areas, clearer

direction is still needed.  

Global Strike Command is in the process of providing that direction. The command is nearing

completion of work to bring some 190 documents that provide guidance and direction up to

the standard needed in the nuclear enterprise.  

Recommendations:

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct review of the approach to

guiding nuclear operations to ensure it is direction with adequate detail vice guidance that

leaves the details open to interpretation.  

The Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command should complete the ongoing AFGSC work

to supplement AFIs as needed to provide clear direction for nuclear weapons operations.

36
Enlisted Personnel Management

There are a number of intersecting issues that could lead to a perfect storm in critical NCO

leadership and supervision in the maintenance fields. Specifically, there are four issues:

• The draw on experienced MSgts and SMSgts to man oversight organizations,

• High year tenure (HYT),

• Inflexible enlisted assignment policies and practices for all ranks below E‐9, and

• Some MSgts and SMSgts departing for greener pastures.

The draw on experienced senior NCOs is addressed elsewhere in this report. The issue in the

operational units with high year tenure is inflexibility. The purpose of HYT to prevent stagnation

in the senior NCO population is understood and is not, in itself, an issue. The issue is that the

operating forces assume there will be no waivers and are reluctant to ask for them. In a small

career field like the 2W2 field, a single, experienced MSgt or SMSgt may be unusually important

to the mission for some period of time until a replacement is on board and up to speed. The

issue on enlisted assignment policies is the perception and perhaps the fact that the system

does not pay adequate attention to special experience identifiers. Hence, base of preference or

some other assignment policy factor may send a C‐17 crew chief to a B‐52 wing without

appreciation for the very different demands for the B‐52 crew chief.  The greener pasture in the

fourth bullet above is almost anywhere except the current working conditions and demands.

The end result of the senior NCO assignment issues is that in one of the bomber wings, the

turnover rate for MSgts in the nuclear maintenance career field in a single year was 70%.  For

SMSgts, it was 100%.  

At the same wing, turnover rate in weapons loaders was 30%. Crew chief manning was at 75%.

The Nuclear Issue Resolution and Integration (NIRI) Board is aware of the consequences of

these intersecting issues and provides the following assessment of critical skills:

• Nuclear Weapons Maintenance (2W2) – at a critical point

• Missile and Space Maintenance (2M0) – at a level of concern

• Aerospace Maintenance/Heavy Crew Chiefs (2A5) – at a level of concern

• Munitions, Missile Maintenance (21M) (a munitions officer AFSC) – at a level of concern  

The most optimistic assumption expressed to the Task Force was that, over time, these career

fields will be manned in the operating forces to the same level as the rest of the Air Force

(85%).  

Recommendation: The Air Force A1 should develop and implement a process for special

management of nuclear career fields – those in which small numbers create special

challenges.  

37
The Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)

The following discussion, findings, and recommendations are similar to those included in the

2004 Permanent Task Force (then called the Joint Advisory Committee) report on Air Force

Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI). The DoD guidance on PRP has improved significantly since

2004. In contrast, the practice in the Air Force has not improved. The importance of this

program dictates that it be coherent, well managed, and reasonably attainable.  The program

continues to suffer, in some cases increasingly so, from fundamental deficiencies that work

against the program’s purpose and importance.

According to the DoD 5210.42 Regulation and Air Force Manual 10‐3902, the purpose of the

PRP is “to ensure that each person selected and retained for performing duties associated with

nuclear weapons or nuclear command and control systems and equipment is emotionally stable

and physically capable, and has demonstrated reliability and professional capability.”1 In

identifying potentially disqualifying or decertifying information the guidance states that in

evaluating certain traits or conduct (such as alcohol use, drug use, medical condition, poor

attitude, lack of motivation), “certifying and reviewing officials shall ensure there is no

reasonable doubt of an individual’s reliability . . .”2 This is a high but attainable standard. Earlier

language called for reliability beyond any doubt ‐‐ an unattainable standard.  

Discussions with commanders and PRP monitors make it clear that there has been continuing

escalation in pursuit of absolute goals. In fact, when commanders were asked specifically about

the DoD described standard for PRP reliability, none quoted the DoD guidance. This continued

focus on absolute assurance of reliability has produced important dysfunctional aspects in the

program to include the use of suspension and decertification actions as risk avoidance

measures.  Risk avoidance permeates the structure and practice of the program.   

Current practices produce an environment of distrust, implying that the people selected and

qualified for demanding nuclear duties and who are critically important to the mission are not

sufficiently trustworthy to live an acceptable daily life. It then follows that they must constantly

reestablish reliability.  Even the possibility of Potentially Disqualifying Information (PDI) leads to

temporary decertification until it is established that there has been no compromise of

reliability.  Based on this fundamentally flawed assumption, the PRP repeatedly reexamines the

history of each individual.    

As one example of the consequences of this attitude, personnel are automatically suspended

from PRP duties when referred by Air Force medical authorities to off‐base medical treatment

regardless of the nature of the referral.  The individual must then report to base medical

authorities to be reinstated.  The DoD guidance does not require automatic suspension but

instead requires follow‐up after treatment. Individuals should be suspended only for cause, not

for the possibility of cause. Hence, for off‐base medical referrals and other situations where

there is the possibility of compromise of reliability, suspension should come only after a

determination that there is a reasonable likelihood of such compromise.  

                                                           

1 DoD 5210‐42 Regulation/AFMAN 10‐3902, incorporating through Change 2, 2 November 2010, Nuclear Weapons

Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), Chapter 1, C1.1. PURPOSE 2 Ibid., Chapter 5, C5.1. POTENTIALLY DISQUALIFYING OR DECERTIFYING CRITERIA

38
This automatic suspension practice is an example of the zero‐risk approach practiced in Air

Force implementation of the guidance.  This practice is a clear demonstration of distrust, is

costly in productivity, and generates an enormous amount of additional and unproductive work

for the unit, for medical personnel, and for inspectors. Given that maintaining our nuclear

capabilities is totally dependent on the commitment of individuals in the PRP, this approach is

wasteful and counterproductive.  

The overall impact of unnecessary suspensions is added to other factors impacting availability

of qualified people. For example, the typical unit is manned at 90% or less though there are

exceptions. Added to this, it is not unusual to have another 10% suspended for PRP with a

significant part of that 10% due to suspensions for authorized off‐base medical care. The end

result is security forces and maintenance people working extended and added shifts to

compensate.  This means that the risk of overworked people, including security forces, making

an important error in judgment or performance is accepted while the risk of something

disabling taking place during a dental appointment for a tooth filling is not.

A fallacy of the zero‐risk approach is that it places a far too heavy and unnecessary burden on

PRP. There are supervisors who observe people in PRP positions every day. Every nuclear

operation requires the presence of two PRP‐certified individuals. PRP should be an added aid to

the commander to ensure reliability beyond a reasonable doubt. It should not and cannot be

the guarantor of zero risk.

Recommendations:

The Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and commanders at all levels should provide:

Clear direction that ensures understanding in all relevant communities that commanders

are leading and managing a valuable human resource that is dedicated to performing the

first priority mission of the Air Force and should be treated accordingly.

Clear direction that reinforces PRP is a commander’s program intended to assist the

commander in ensuring that people in PRP positions are capable of reliably and safely

performing their duties.  

Education and direction that the proper standard is to ensure reliability that leaves no

reasonable doubt and that the PRP is one of the several tools available to the commander

to meet that standard.

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct an immediate adjustment to

Air Force guidance/practice to remove PRP‐based restrictions and monitoring demands that

exceed those required by DoD direction.

Some medical personnel who must provide advice to commanders state that the guidance is

too vague leading to worst case assumptions in providing that advice. In contrast, the guidance

on what constitutes a medically disqualifying condition for a pilot is clear, requires minimum

interpretation, and serves the force well.  

39
The vagueness of the medically disqualifying condition guidance (for temporary suspension or

decertification) leaves PRP open to continuing interpretation by NSI inspectors and medical

authorities, resulting in ratcheting of standards as information in inspection reports passes from

unit to unit becoming de facto additions to standards.  This practice has progressed to the point

that the enormous effort required to meet standards has become counterproductive to

ensuring a reliable workforce.  Literally thousands of man‐hours are expended to go beyond no

reasonable doubt to seeking to meet a standard of total confidence, particularly total

confidence that the records are perfect as demanded by the evolution in NSI standards.

It is unlikely that this consumption of additional man‐hours makes a commensurate

contribution to safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons operations. Still,

commanders believe it is needed for confidence that NSI inspectors will give the PRP a

satisfactory rating.  Further, the personnel authorizations to perform this work are not

consistent with the demands of the uncontrolled escalation of PRP standards.  

As noted earlier, the stated standard for PRP reliability judgment is a high standard establishing

reliability of an individual beyond reasonable doubt. The practice still seeks absolute

confidence.

Recommendations:  

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct a task force be convened,

made up of wing, group, and squadron commanders, senior enlisted supervisors, and

competent medical authorities, to examine the current state of the PRP guidance and policies

on criteria for suspension and decertification. The purpose is to provide a set of guidelines less

subject to interpretation that support the standard of no reasonable doubt versus no doubt.

The Air Force A1 should provide a zero‐base assessment of the PRP workload and provide the

needed manning.

PRP was conceived and is repeatedly described as a program to help commanders ensure the

continued reliability of the workforce. Hence it is a commander’s program. In practice the PRP

program has become dominated by medical considerations.  This approach indicates an implicit

assumption that personnel reliability is primarily a medical issue.  This attitude is peculiar to the

PRP and is clearly misguided. Medical considerations do not play this kind of dominant role

anywhere else in the world of security and reliability.  Further, the direction of medical

orientation is often risk avoidance rather than intended to improve the quality of commanders’

judgments.   

For example, guidance (both DoD and Air Force) directs that use of authorized over‐the‐counter

drugs beyond the manufacturer’s recommended safe dosage could be considered drug abuse.

With current direction, if the commander as certifying official suspects such improper use, he

must suspend the individual from PRP duties and must consult the Competent Medical

Authority (CMA).  In response to that direction, an individual could be permanently decertified

for taking three over‐the‐counter pills when the direction on the package specifies two.

   

At present, disparate pieces of information that could impact reliability are all treated as

medical matters – from the determination of alcohol dependence, to the distinction between

40
juvenile marijuana experimentation and abuse, to the relation of traffic tickets to respect for

authority.

At the wing and geographically separated unit, medical personnel are involved with much more

than the medical aspects of the program.  While PDI includes mental, physical, financial, legal,

traffic, and domestic violence information, most PDI passes through the medical authorities.  

While non‐medical records are maintained in the personnel world, the major burden for PRP

records management resides in the medical function.  This creates a burden for the base

medical staff for which there is no manning and that has little relation to medical matters.  

Further, it replaces the responsibility of supervisors and commanders whose experience and

knowledge make them the most qualified to make those judgments.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and commanders at all

levels should provide clear direction that  the role of medical support is to provide medical

advice when appropriate. The commander bears final responsibility and accountability for the

reliability of people in his or her command.

The practice of repeated reviews of PRP candidates’ history by different individuals using

different standards contributes to the continuing escalation of standards and criteria.  It also

places PRP‐covered personnel at continuing risk of arbitrary judgments based on long‐past

history.  The Task Force has heard enough anecdotes over more than a decade from reliable

people to consider this a critical problem.  In contrast, for even the most sensitive security

clearances, the review reaches back to the last review or, in some exceptional circumstances as

much as 10 years.  The PRP re‐certification examination can and has reached back to a high

school football injury.  Further, inspectors quiz unit commanders about the records of people

cleared under a previous commander, criticizing them for not having personally validated past

certifications.   

Recommendation:  The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should direct that the

guidance for PRP re‐certification specify that look‐back is limited to the period since the last

certification unless there is specific and documented reason to suspect an individual problem.

  

41
Summary of Recommendations

The Air Force leadership should maintain realistic expectations regarding the state of

accounting for NWRM.  

Logistics

The Secretary and Chief of Staff should direct that:

• The needs of the nuclear enterprise to sustain the force are given priority and the

choices for corrective action are oriented to long‐term sustainment rather than the

lowest near‐term cost path.

The Air Staff and Air Force Materiel Command should give:  

• Funding and program priority to logistics support essential to the nuclear deterrence

mission commensurate with the priority of the nuclear deterrence mission.  

• Urgent attention to replacing 40+‐year‐old warhead and missile maintenance support

and test equipment at the operating wings and the air logistics center and to replacing

the Weapons Maintenance Trucks at the MUNSS sites (Europe).

The Commanders, AFGCS and AFNWC should direct a greatly increased communications effort

to keep the operating forces informed about actions underway to address their support

issues.

The Commander, AFGSC should ensure that equipment peculiar to support of nuclear

operations is treated as specialized equipment before reverting to a commodity approach.

The Commander, AFNWC should:

• Direct immediate action to reestablish risk management and trust in the technician’s

judgment versus risk avoidance on cosmetic defects with the needed technical data

and training program to support that judgment.

• Provide on‐site engineering support until processes are in place to separate the

cosmetic defects in RV components requiring engineering analysis.  

Organization and Guidance

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff should direct:

• An action to assign all base‐level operations and logistics functions to the strategic

Missile and Bomb Wings reporting through the numbered air forces to the Air Force

Global Strike Command.

• A reexamination of the continued utility of the set of special headquarters

organizations.

• A revision of the set of responsibilities ascribed to AFNWC in AFMCI 90‐204 to sharply

focus on the sustainability of the nuclear enterprise with other responsibilities

assigned to Headquarters Air Force, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, and

Air Force Global Strike Command.

42
• A review of the approach to guiding nuclear operations to ensure it is direction with

adequate detail vice guidance that leaves the details open to interpretation.

The Commander, AFGSC should complete the ongoing AFGSC work to supplement AFIs as

needed to provide clear direction for nuclear weapons operations.  

The Inspection Regime

The Secretary and Chief of Staff should direct that:

• The intense inspection regime is sharply refocused on areas of continuing concern

rather than serving as a substitute for chain of command leadership and

management.

• Action begin for a phased return to a normal schedule for the operating forces:

– A single Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) each 18 months.

– A Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection (NORI) each 18 months.

– DNSIs as needed to meet the CJCS direction conducted with NSIs.

– Logistics Capability Assessment Team or Program inspections each 18 months.

• The numbers of inspectors from multiple organizations is tailored to the size and

complexity of the operations of the unit.

• The numbers of inspectors physically observing technical and loading operations in

controlled facilities is the minimum required to verify the proper performance of the

task.

The Commanders of AFGSC and AFMC should direct that follow‐up re‐inspections and special

inspections are conducted only to address unsatisfactory ratings or significant negative

trends. For other discrepancies, the wing commander or the Munitions Squadron (MUNS)

commander is accountable for closing discrepancies.

The Commander of USAFE should:

• Direct that follow‐up re‐inspections are conducted only to address unsatisfactory

ratings or significant negative trends. For all other discrepancies the wing commander

or the MUNSS Commander is accountable for closing out the discrepancies in

communication with the appropriate inspection agency.

• Restrict the total size and complexity of an inspection team to that which is

appropriate to the size and complexity of the nuclear operations of the inspected unit.

Operations

The Commander, USAFE should:

• Direct the USAFE A3 to provide clarity on the elements of the DCA mission that require

continuous readiness and those that can be brought to the needed level within the

prescribed time.

43
• Identify the disconnects between NATO and USAF directives that impact nuclear

operations and establish a working body with NATO to resolve the differences.

The Commander, AFGSC should direct moving from the ad hoc approach to meeting the

nuclear bomber commitment to a formal program that is insulated from other demands.

Personnel and Morale

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff should direct that Air Force public relations and

promotional messages include the nuclear forces in portraying the Air Force mission and

focus.

The Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and commanders at all levels should

frequently reinforce the primacy of the nuclear deterrence mission with communications to

Headquarters Air Force, the Major Air Commands, and the nuclear operational forces and

logistics support organizations.

The Headquarters, Air Force A1 should:

• Direct special attention to providing the needed qualified people to the operating

forces in the career fields that are both fragile and critical to the nuclear mission.

• Direct a reexamination or clarification of the policy or practice opposing voluntary

extensions for nuclear‐experienced people in Europe and the criteria for assignments

from non‐nuclear missions to the DCA mission units.

• Direct a zero‐base assessment of the logistics center and operating unit engineering

and maintenance manpower requirements considering the aging of the equipment.

• Initiate a program to ensure a priority balance such that the operating forces have the

needed senior NCO leadership from the 2W2 career field to include immediate action

to address the mismatch between senior NCOs supervising work in the units and senior

NCOs overseeing and inspecting the performance of operational and logistics units.

• Develop and implement a process for special management of nuclear career fields –

those in which small numbers create special challenges.

• Provide a zero‐base assessment of the PRP workload and provide the needed

manning.  

Personnel Reliability Program  

The Secretary, the Chief of Staff, and commanders at all levels should provide

• Clear direction that:

– Ensures understanding in all relevant communities that commanders are

leading and managing a valuable human resource that is dedicated to

performing the first priority mission of the Air Force and should be treated

accordingly.

44
– Reinforces that PRP is a commander’s program intended to assist the

commander in ensuring that people in PRP positions are capable of reliably and

safely performing their duties.

– The role of medical support is to provide medical advice when appropriate. The

commander bears final responsibility and accountability for the reliability of

people in his or her command.

• Education and direction that the proper standard is to ensure reliability that leaves no  

reasonable doubt and that the PRP is one of the several tools available to the

commander to meet that standard.

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff should direct that:

• An immediate adjustment to Air Force guidance/practice to remove PRP‐based

restrictions and monitoring demands that exceed those required by DoD direction.

• A task force is convened, made up of wing, group, and squadron commanders, senior

enlisted supervisors, and competent medical authorities, to examine the current state

of the PRP guidance and policies on criteria for suspension and decertification. The

purpose is to provide a set of guidelines less subject to interpretation that support the

standard of no reasonable doubt versus no doubt.

• The guidance for PRP re‐certification specify that look‐back is limited to the period

since the last certification unless there is specific and documented reason to suspect an

individual problem.  

45
Appendix A: Terms of Reference

46
   

47
Appendix B: Task Force Members

CHAIRMAN

General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret.), Institute for Defense Analyses

MEMBERS

Dr. Ted Gold, Institute for Defense Analyses

Mr. James Gosler, Sandia National Laboratories

Dr. James Tegnelia, Sandia National Laboratories

SPECIAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Dr. G. Peter Nanos, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory

Dr. Robert L. Selden, Independent Consultant

DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL

Mr. David B. McDarby, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DSB REPRESENTATIVE

Mr. Brian Hughes, OUSD (AT&L)/Defense Science Board

   

48
Appendix C:  Findings from Prior Reports on the Incidents

U.S. Air Force Blue Ribbon Review (BRR) on Nuclear Weapons Policies and

Procedures (February 2008).

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force established the BRR and its observations led to the following

general conclusions:  

• Nuclear surety in the USAF is sound, but needs strengthening,

• USAF focus on the nuclear mission has diminished since 1991,

• The nuclear enterprise in the USAF works despite being fragmented; declining USAF

nuclear experience has led to waning expertise, and  

• USAF nuclear surety inspection programs need standardization.  

DSB Permanent Task Force Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear

Weapons (February 2008).

Tasked by the USD (AT&L) and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. The DSB PTF

articulated the need for:

• Uncompromising adherence to processes and procedures,  

• Clear focus on the unique demands of the nuclear enterprise at multiple levels, and  

• An environment that attracts, nurtures, and guides the right numbers of the best and

brightest people as stewards of nuclear forces.

Investigation into the Shipment of Sensitive Missile Components to Taiwan (May

2008).  

This Secretary of Defense‐directed investigation found that the specific cause of the event was

the Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency’s sole reliance on, and lack of compliance with,

existing supply system procedures to provide positive control of the four Mk12 forward‐section

re‐entry vehicle assemblies. Other critical findings were:  

• The ICBM engineering  community lacked a clear major command owner resulting in the

deterioration in the exercise of technical authority,

• Changes to Air Force policies and processes had degraded the level of control for sensitive

missile components,

• Dispersed authority and responsibilities had created an environment ill‐suited for setting

and maintaining standards necessary for nuclear weapons,

• Lack of a culture that is internally driven to address systemic weaknesses had resulted in

degraded performance, and  

• The declining trend of Air Force nuclear expertise had not been effectively addressed.   

In response, the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force, Navy, and Defense Logistics

Agency to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all nuclear weapons and related materials,

and to complete a comprehensive review of materiel management procedures and processes in

order to reestablish positive control of sensitive classified components.  

49
Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management (September

2008).

The findings of this task force included:

• The Air Force had failed to establish adequate procedures and technical orders related to

nuclear operations and support, and

• Air Force streamlining efforts along with personnel reductions and allocation decision had

led to significant degradation in the nuclear mission.

The Task Force called for:

• An overhaul and standardization in the Air Force’s nuclear inspection process,

• Steps to ensure that the staff assistance program is adequately resourced, realistic, and

staffed,  

• A focus on developing and managing nuclear‐experienced personnel, particularly in

maintenance and security, and

• Organizational changes within the Air Force to restore attention and readiness for the

nuclear mission.  

These independent and Air Force‐generated reviews/reports echoed common themes and

systemic issues:

• Decline over the decade in attention to the nuclear mission at multiple levels, to include

the most senior leaders,

• Waning nuclear experience, leading to lack of expertise in nuclear leadership positions,

• Issues with Air Force procedures and technical orders,

• Lack of standardization across the inspection process, and

• Failures to attract, nurture, and track those in nuclear‐related career fields.  

Some of these issues were addressed quickly by the newly appointed Secretary of the Air Force

and Chief of Staff. Actions to address the others have been underway for the succeeding two

years. However, the pace of progress in some areas is slower than should be expected given

the stated priority of the mission.  

50
Appendix D: Acronyms

2M0 – Missile and Space Maintenance Technician

2W2 – Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Technician  

A1 – Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel

A2 – Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

A3/5 – Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

A4/7 – Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Installations and Mission Support

A6 – Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications

A8 – Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs

A9 – Deputy Chief of Staff for Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned

A10 – Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration

AFGSC – Air Force Global Strike Command

AFIA – Air Force Inspection Agency

AFMC – Air Force Materiel Command

AFNWC – Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center

ALC – Air Logistics Center

ALCM – Air Launched Cruise Missile

BRAC – Base Realignment and Closure

CMA – Competent Medical Authority

DCA – Dual‐Capable Aircraft

DLA – Defense Logistics Agency

DNSI – Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection

DoD – Department of Defense

DSB PTF – Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety

DTRA – Defense Threat Reduction Agency

HAF – Headquarters Air Force

Hq. – Headquarters

HYT – High Year Tenure

ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

51
ICBMSD – ICBM Systems Division

KUMMSC ‐ Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex

LCAP – Logistics Compliance Assessment Program (USAFE) Inspection

LCAT – Logistics Compliance Assessment Team (AFMC) Inspection

Mk12 – Minuteman III Re‐Entry Vehicle with the W‐78 Warhead

Mk21 – Minuteman III Re‐Entry Vehicle with the W‐87 Warhead

MMXG – Munitions Maintenance Group

MSE – Maintenance Standardization Evaluation

MSgt – Master Sergeant – E7

MUNS – Munitions Squadron (CONUS)

MUNSS – Munitions Support Squadron (Europe)

MX – Maintenance

NCO – Non‐Commissioned Officer

NORI – Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection

NSAV – Nuclear Staff Assistance Visit

NSI – Nuclear Surety Inspection

NSS – Nuclear Support Squadron

NSSAV – Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit  

NSUS – Nuclear Sustainment Squadron

NSW – Nuclear Support Wing

NWC – Nuclear Weapons Center

NWRM – Nuclear Weapons‐Related Materiel or Nuclear Weapon Related Materiel

PDI – Potentially Disqualifying Information

PRP – Personnel Reliability Program

RSTS – Re‐Entry System Test Set

RV – Re‐Entry Vehicle

SAV – Staff Assistance Visit

SCMG – Supply Chain Management Group

SecDef – Secretary of Defense

SMSgt – Senior Master Sergeant – E8

SPO – Systems Program Office

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STRIKEVAL – NATO Strike Evaluation

SWD – Special Weapons Directorate

USAF – United States Air Force

USAFE – United States Air Forces in Europe

USD (AT&L) – Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics

WSV – Weapons Storage Vaults