The Honor able Ge org e Cara m Steeh, United States District Court for the Ea stern * District of Michig an, sitting by desig nation. Plaintiffs-Appellants ar e Te en Ranc h, I nc.; Matthew K och, its Chief Executive Offic er; 1 and Mitchell Koster , its Chi ef O perating Of fice r. De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s are Mari ann e Ud ow , D ir e c tor of the F IA; Mu se tte Mic ha e l, 2 I nterim Direc tor of the F I A; and De bora B uchana n, Manag er of

the Purcha sed Care Division of the FIA. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0042n.06 F iled: Janu ary 17, 2007 No. 05-2371 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT TEEN RA NC H, I NC ., M AT THEWK OC H, AND M ITCHEL L KOSTER, P lai nt iffs- App e lla nt s,

v. M ARIA NN E U DO W, M USE TTE M IC HA EL, AND DEBORA BUCHANA N, De fend ant s- App e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN

BEFORE: KEITH, COLE, Circuit Jud ges; and ST EEH, Dis tric t Judge. * DAMON J. K

EITH , Circuit Judge

. P l ai n t i ff s -A p p el l an t s , co l l ec t i v el y re fe rr edt o as “Te en Ranc h, ” a

pp e a l the dis tr ic t court ’s g ra nt of su mma

ry jud g e me nt in favo r o f D e fe nd ants -A pp e lle e s, 1 collectively

ref err ed to as the F amily

I ndepende n c e A g e n c y

( “ F I A ” ), on Tee n Ranch’s c onstitut ional 2 and statutory

relig ious discrimination claims. F or the followingrea sons, we AF F IRM the district court’s g rant of summar

y judge ment. I

.No. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 2 The F I A, a de partment of the Michig an state g overnme nt, is responsible for pr oviding c are and super vision to abused, neg lected, and delinquent children who have been c ommitt ed to or plac ed in i ts c are thr ou g h s ta te c ourt s. Th e F I A i s a uth or ize d to c on tr a c t w ithpr ivate or g anizatio ns to provide plac ement ser

vices. The FIA con t ra ct s with 96 private child-c are ag encie s to provide residential se rvice s to y outh for stay s aver ag ing f our to twelve months. At least 35 of the providers

are faith-ba sed org anizations. Once a child is place d in the car e of the FIA, a c omputerized g rid is then used to deter mine t h e b e s tp l a c e m e n t f

o r t h e c h i l d

. T h e c o mp u t e r s ys t e m c o n s i d e r s t h e c h i l d ’ s h i s t o r y, f a m i l y h i s t o r

y, any rele vant psy cholog ical or psychiatric information, and other information identifying the child’s tr e a tme nt n e e ds

. Th e c omp ute r the n se le c ts a se rv ic e pr ov ide r t hat be st m a tc he s th e c hil d’ s n e e ds

. Tee n Ranch, one of t he 35 faith-ba sed providers that contra ct wit h the FI A, i s an org anization that ha s p ro vid e d li c e ns e d a nd re sid e nti a l se rv ic e s f

or de lin q u e nt , n e g l e c t e d , a

bu se d, and

e mot ion a lly tr ou ble d y ou th b e tw e e n th e a g e s o f 1 1 a nd 17 sin c e 19 66 . T e e n Ra nc h ha s o pe nly

a dv e rt ise d it s

re lig iou s o ri e ntatio n, and ha s a dmi tte dly

inc or po rate d r e lig iou s p ro g ra

mmi ngint o th e se rv ic e s it provides under

the FIA contra ct. Howe ver, Te en Ranc h maintains that participation in the re ligious p r o g r a m m i n g i s v o l u n t ar

y s i n c e i t s p o l i c y d o e s n o t m an d a t e p art i c i p a t i o n i nan y r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t y, inc lud ingc hurc h s e rv ic e s. Spe c if ic a lly , it s p ro g ra

m in vo lve s v olu

nta ry pray e rs be fo re me a ls, voluntary devotions during t h e we ek, voluntary churc h attendanc e, and voluntar y discussions

conce rning the Christian faith betwe en staff and the c hildren. Be tween O ctober and November of 2003, the FIA conduc ted a “ Quality Assuranc e Review ” (“Q AR”) of

the Tee n Ranch prog ram. The QAR unveiled seve ral a re as o f co n trac t and policyNo. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 3 noncompliance

. There fore , on November 6, 2003, the FIA, throug h Debor a B u chana n (“B uchana

n”), se nt a letter to Te en Ranc h outlining “violations of par ticular sig nifi ca nce” and issuing a mor atorium on furthe r plac em ents at Tee n Ranch. The QAR also uncove red e vidence , which wa s later c onfirmed, in the f orm of y outh reports, intervie ws with residents, and Te en Ranc h’s brochur e, that T e e n

Ra n c h c oerc ed childre n into participating in relig ious activities. There afte r, Tee n Ranch’s incorporation of relig ious practice s into it s prog ramming beca me the F I A’s chie f conc ern. On Dec ember

2, 2003, the FIA issue d

a “ Q u a li ty Assuranc e Prog ram Review Report” to Te en Ranc h a nd re qu e ste d, wi thi n 30 day s, a “ Qu a lity I mpr ov e me nt Plan” a dd re ssi ng a ll of

the ir c on c e rn s. Tee n Ranch subseque ntly s u b m itted a “Corr ective A ction Plan” (“ CAP” or “plan” ), and on Dec ember 16, 2003, Buc hanan se nt a letter r esponding to Teen Ranc h’s plan. In addition to detailing the ar eas of

Tee n Ranch’s CAP that did not adequately ensure compliance , the l etter a lso addresse d T ee nR an ch ’s re p re s en t at i o nt h at y o u t h ar e n o tre qu i re d t o p ar t i ci p at e i nre l i gi o u s p ro gra m m i n g. B uc ha na n s ta te d, “ I t is no t only imp ro pe r to fo rc e y outh to part ic ipate in re lig iou s p ra c tic e s, bu t it is also improper to incorpor ate r elig ious teaching s into the on-go i n g d ai l y activities of y outh and t h e i r t r e a t m e n tp l an s . ” ( J

. A

. a t2 5 1 )

. O n D e c e m b e r 1 7 , 2 0 0 3 , a m e e t i n g w a s h e l d

b e t w e e nt h e F IA and Te en Ranc h wher e Teen R anch continued t o maintain its position of incorporatingits religious beliefs into treatment prog ramming

. At the conclusion of that meeting , and in re sponse to the FIA’s reque st for an a

mended CAP co ncer

ning the relig ious practice s, Teen Ra nch issued the f

ollowing state me nt, in p e rt ine nt p art : The mission statement of Tee n Ranch states, “ providing hope to young pe ople and families through li

fe changing relationships and expe rience s from a Chris tian perspec tive .” This mission, and our interpre tation of this mi ssion, will not chang e,No. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 4 be sac rifice d, nor will it be compromised. T ee nR an ch , as p o l i cy , d o es n o t “f o rc e” y o u t h t o at t en d

re l i gi o u s s er v i ce s , al t h o u gh it i s e nc oura g e d and we be lie ve to b e pa rt of an e ff e c tiv e tr e a tme nt p ro g ra

m. Al te rn a tiv e s are pr ov ide d fo r the c hil dr e n wh o wi sh no t to a tte nd re lig iou s se rv ic e s, s u c h a s a p e r s o n a l a c a d e mi c s tu dy time (i f d e s ir e d ) , le tt e r

w r it in g h o me [s ic ], re c re a tio na l ti me in the g y mna sium, o r w a tc h [si c ] te le vis ion un til the oth e r you th return home

. Howeve r, incorp o r a

ti n g r e li g io u s te a c h in g s into on- g oing da ily activities of y outh and their treatment plans touches at the core of why we we re f ounded, why

we a re he re today , and why

we will continu e t o i n cl u de such pr og ramming for c hildren in our car e. (J.A. at 640) (emphasis in orig inal). By ear ly J anuar y 2004, Tee n Ranch ha d submitt ed an ame nded CAP that addre ssed all of the vio la tio ns ide nti fi e d b y the F I A, wi th t he e xce pti on

of the inc or po ra tio n o f r e lig iou s p ra c tic e s in its pr og ra mmi ng . A c c or din g ly , on J anu ary 9, 20 04 , the F I A inf or me d Te e n Ran c h, by le tte r, tha t w hil e it s up po rt s th e imp or

tant r ole that f

a ith -b a se d o rg anizatio ns pla y in p ro vid ingqu a lity ser vi ces to Michig an y outh and famili es, “pr oviders re ceivingfede ral fundingmay not incorporate sec tarian worship, instruction, or

prosely tiz ation into the daily

treatment and servic e plan a ctivities.” (J.A. at 252). F urthermor e, it stated that “[t] he incor poration of faith specific tenets into treatment is not permitted by

state and f

eder al law[,]” and “if Te en Ranc h is unwilli ng to modify its curre nt prac tices

re g ard ingthe imp os iti on

of its re lig iou s bel ie fs int o the da ily tr e a tme nt a

nd se rv ic e pla

n a c tiv iti e s, [t he] FI A is unable to appr ove the corre ctive action plan and resc ind the m oratorium.” (J .A. at 252). On Janu ary 21 , 2 00 4, Te e n Ranc h, su

bmi tti ng fe de ra l and state law that pu rp or te dly su pp or ts its claim, issued a letter det ai l i n g its posit ion and deny ing a lleg ations of coe rce d relig ious participation. On J anuar

y 30, 2004, the FI A and Teen Ranc h met ag ain but to no avail. The pa rtiesNo. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 5

I n f

ull , s e c tio n 2 20 pr ov ide s: 3 1) In co n t rac ting with fa ith-based or g anizations for mentoring or supportive continued their discussion; howeve r, a solution r e g a r d in g th e in c o r p o r a ti o n o f r e li g io u s prog ramming was not rea ched. Ultimately , on Fe bruar y 20, 2004, Tee n Ranch filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleg in g v i o l at i o n s o f: (1) the Fr ee E x erc ise Clause of the F irst Amendment; (2) the F ree Spe e c h Cl a

us e of the F ir st A me ndme nt; (3 ) the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla us e of the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt; (4) the E qual Protection Clause of the Four teenth Amendme nt; and (5) 42 U.S.C. § 604a. On Fe bruar

y 23, 2004, Tee n Ranch moved f or a te mporary

restra ining or der, w hich was denied on the sa

me day . There afte r, Tee n Ranch moved f or a pr eliminary

injunction. At the advice

o f c o u n s el , t h e FI A b ri ef

l y l i ft ed t h e m o ra t o ri u m t o p re p ar e fo r t h e p re l i m i n ary i n j u n ct i o nh ea ri n g. On April 1, 2004, t he dis trict court de nied Tee n Ranch’s pr eliminary injunction moti on. Upon the denial o f th e mo ti o n , th e F I A r e in s tate d th e f u ll mo r a to r ium. O n F e b r u ar y 1 7 , 2 0 0 5 , b o th

parties filed cr oss-motions for summary judgme nt. On September 29, 2005, the district court issued an op ini on g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f t he F I A. Te e n Ra

nc h ti me ly

fi le d th e pr e se nt a

pp e a l. II. We review de novo a district cour t’s g rant of summar

y judgme nt. Ma

yv . F ra nk lin Cou nty Com m’ rs , 437 F.3d 579, 583 ( 6th Cir. 2006). The district court proper ly considere d Tee n Ranch’s constitutional and statutory claims, and

corr ectly g rante d judge ment in favor of the FIA. As a pre liminary matter, the district c ourt identified the applica

ble law at issue — § 220 of the Michig an State Ap p ro p ri at i ons Bill, 2003 P.A. 172 (“ Pub lic Ac t” ) — w hic h g ov e rn s c on tr a c ts be tw e e n the F I A a nd fa ith -b a se d o rg anizatio ns and a lso 3No. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 6

service s, and in all contra cts for se rvice s, the depa rtment shall ensure that no funds provided direc tly to instit utions or orga nizations to provide ser

vices a nd a d m i n i s t e r

p r o g r a m s s h a l l b e u s e d

o r e x p e n d e d

f o r an y s e c t ar i ana c t i v i t y, including se ctar ian worship, instruction, or prose ly tiz ation. (2) I f an individual re quests the service an d has an obje ction to the relig ious char acte r of the institution or org anization from which the individual re ceive s or wou ld r e c e iv e s e r

v ic e s o r a s s is ta n c e , th e d e p artm e n t s h a ll p r o v id e the ind ivi du a l w ith in a reas on a ble tim e a ft e r t

he date of

the ob je c tio n w ith assistance or service s and which ar e substantially the same a s the servic e the individual would have re ceive d from the or g anization. (3 ) T he de pa

rtme nt s ha ll e ns ur e that f

a ith -b a se d o rg anizatio ns are a ble to a pp ly and compe te for se rvice s, prog rams, or contra cts that they are qualified a

nd s u it a b le to f u lf il l. The depa

rtment shall not disqualify faith-ba sed org anizations solely on the basis of the r elig ious nature of t heir orga nization or their guiding principles or state ments of fa ith. (4) The depar

tment shall follow guide lines relate d to faith-base d involvement estab li s h e d

in s e c ti o n1 0 4 o f

ti tl e Io f th e p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s ib il it y an d w o rk opportunity

rec onciliation act of 1996, Public L aw 104-193, 42 U.S.C. § 604a. 2003 Mich. Pub. Acts 775. I n p e rt ine nt p art , 4 2 U .S. C. § 60 4a pr ov ide s th a t: 4 (b) . . . The purpose of

this section is to allow S tates to contra ct with relig ious org anizati o n s . . . o nth e s a me b a s is a s an y o th e r n o n g o v e r

n me n ta l p r o v id er without impairing the r elig ious chara cter of such or g anizations, and without diminis hing the relig ious fre edom of be nefic iaries of assistance funded unde r su c h p ro g ra

m. (c) . . . I n the eve nt a State exercises its authority

. . . relig ious org anizations are elig ible, on the s ame basis as any other private org anization . . . so long as the prog rams ar e implemented c onsistent with the Establishm ent Clause of the United States Constit ution. . . . (e)

. . . (1) .

. . I f an individual . . . has an obje ction to the relig ious chara cter of the organi z ation o r i ns tit uti on fr om w hic h th e ind ivi du a l r e c e ive s, or wo uld instructs the FIA to follow the g uidelines set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 6 0 4a, the fe dera l statute that 4No. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 7

rec eive, a ssistance .

. . the S tate in which the individual resides shall provide

su c h ind ivi du a l (i f oth e rw ise e lig ibl e fo r su c h a ssi sta nc e ) w ith in a

re a so na ble period of time a fter the date of such ob j ec t i on with assistance f rom an alternative provider that is acce ssible to the individual and the value of which i s not less than the value of the assistance which the individual would have rec eived f rom such org anization. . . . (i) . . . Any

party which see ks to enfor ce its rig hts under this section may asser t a civil ac tion for inju n ct i v e re lief exclusively in an appr opriate State c ourt ag ainst the entity

or ag ency

that alleg edly

commits such violation. (j)

. . . N o f

u n d s p r o v id e d d ir e c tl y to in s ti tuti o n s o r o r g an iz a ti o n s to provide service s and administer prog rams . . . shall be expended for se ctar ian worship, instruction, or prosely

tiz ation.

“ F or if nume ro us pr ivate c ho ic e s, ra the r t ha n th e sin g le c ho ic e of

a g ov e rnme nt, 5 de te rm ine the dis tr ibutio n o f a id p ur su ant t o n e utr a l e lig ibi lity c ri te ri a , th e n a

g ov e rnme nt c a nn ot, or at lea st cannot ea sily , g rant spec ial favor s that might lea d to a re ligious establishment.” Mi tc he ll , 530 U.S. at 810. g overns c ontrac ts betwee n states and char itable, religious or private org anizations. The district court pr op e rl y re c og nize d th a t th is c a se tur ns on wh e the r t

he F I A’ s f

undi ng of Tee n Ra

nc h is ind ir e c t,

rathe r t ha n d ir e c t, b e c a

us e the fu nd ingis “ a re su lt of the g e nu ine and ind e pe nd e nt c ho ic e s o f p ri vate individuals.” Ze lm an v . S

im mo ns -H

arris , 5 36 U. S. 639 , 649 (2 00 2) ; see also Mitche ll v. Helms , 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (Supre me Court stating that it has “repe atedly considere d whether any g ov e rnme nta l a id t

hat g oe s to a

re lig iou s in sti tut io n d oe s so ‘o nly a s a re su lt o f t

he g e nu ine ly independe nt and private choice s of individuals[ ]’” rathe r than “ th e u nme d ia te d w ill of gove rnment.”) (q u o t i n g Agostini v. Felton , 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997))

. Acc ording ly , the district court examined 5

“ wh e the r t

he a bil ity of y ou th t o o pt o ut o f t

he Te e n Ra

nc h p ro g ra

m pu rs ua nt t o § 22 0( 2) of

the Pub lic Act base d on its re ligious char acte r g ives the y outh true private choice so as to make the f unding ofNo. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 8 the relig ious pr og rams at Tee n Ranch indirect rathe r than dire ct.” Teen Ranc h v. Udow , 389 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834-35 (W.D. Mich. 2005). After a thoroug h analy sis, the district c ourt conclude d that the opt out provision of § 220(2) of the Pub lic Ac t di d n ot e qu a te to a “ tr ue pr ivate c ho ic e ,” sin c e “ the State se lec ts t he [y ou th’ s] residential plac ement, . . . [and the y outh’s] ability to opt out of place ment at a fa ith-based institution wi th re lig iou s pr og ra

mmi ng is no t su ff

ic ie nt to a vo id E sta

bli sh me nt C la

us e pr ob le ms b e c a

us e State place ments at Tee n Ranch would a dvance or endor se a pa rticular r elig ious viewpoint.” Id

. at 836. There fore , since the opt out provision does not g ive y outh “true pr ivate choic e,” the district court held that “the State c annot fund plac ements at Te en Ranc h [given its reli g ious pr og ramming ] wit hout running afoul of the Public Ac t a nd the Establishment Clause.” Id . at 83 7; se e als o M itc he ll , 530 U. S. at 81 6- 17 (h old ingthat “ [a]n y mon e y that ult imate ly we nt to re lig iou s ins tit uti on s . . . a s a

re su lt of the g enuinely independe nt and private choice s of i ndividuals” is valid. (interna l quotations and citation omitted)). I n addition, the district c ourt proper ly reg arde d the y outh a nd vulnera

bility of the class of c itiz ens at issue he re a s a re levant conside ration. See , e.g. , Lee v. W eisman , 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) ( “As we have obse rved be fore , there are heig htened concer ns with protecting fre edom of consc ience from subtle coe rcive pr e s s u r e in th e e le mentary

and sec ondary

public schools.”) ( citing School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp , 3 74 U. S. 2 03 , 30 7, (1 96 3) (G old be rg , J., c on c ur

ri ng ); Edwards

v . A gu illar

d , 4 82 U. S. 5 78 , 5 84 (1 98 7) ; Board of Ed. of W estside Community Schools ( Dist. 66) v. Merge ns , 496 U.S. 226, 261-262 (1990) ( Kenne dy , J ., concur ring ). F oll ow ingthe de te rm inatio n th a t § 2 20 (2 ) o f the Pub lic Ac t di d n ot p ro vid e a “ tr ue pr ivate choice ,” the district c ourt proce eded to a ddress Te en Ranc h’s five c laims. Rejecting Tee n Ranch’sNo. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 9 Fr ee E x erc ise Clause cla im, the district court distinguished Sherbert v. V erner , 374 U.S. 398 (1963),

an d t h e l i n e o f c as es fo l l o wi n g Sh e rb e rt , w hic h h e ld t hat th e g overnme nt c ou ld n ot d e ny a pu bli c be ne fi t ba se d on a wo rk e r’ s re lig iou s be lie fs , and c on c lud e d that “ [u]nl ike un e mpl oy me nt b e ne fi ts or the a bility to hold office, a

state contra ct for youth resident i al s er vices is not a public bene fit.” Teen Ranc h , 389 F. Supp. 2d at 838. In addition, relying on Locke v . Dave y , 540 U.S. 712 (2004), wh ic h h e ld t

hat a state sc ho lars hip pr og ra m that e xclu de d stu de nts purs uin g de g re e s in the olo g y did not violate the Fr ee E x erc ise Clause, the district cour t conclude d that the FI A’s fa ilure to fund Te en Ranch’s r elig ious prog ramming does not violate Tee n Ranch’s f ree exercise r ights. Id

. Turn ingto T e e n Ra

nc h’ s f re e sp e e c h c la im, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld t hat th e F I A’ s d e c isi on

to

co n tr a c t o u t it s c h il d s e r

v ic e s d id n o t c r e a te a f

o r u m f o r p r iv a te s p e e c h s in c e “ [t ]h e p u rpose of contra cting for these service s is to provide treatment for troubled y outh in a residential setting, not to pr omote the private spe ech of the provider s of that ca

re.” Id . at 840

. As to the du e pr oc e ss c la im, the district court disag ree d with Tee n Ranch because the FIA institut ed the moratorium acc ording to the standards set forth in the Public Act which “ g uide the F I A re g ardingcontra cts with faith-ba sed org anizations and restricts the F I A from dire ctly fund i n g s ecta

rian a ctivities.” Id . L ikewise, the district court re

jected Tee n R anch’s equal pr otection claim bec ause the re w as no evide nce of a sim ila rl y -s itu a ted pri vat e pla c e me nt f a c ili ty that “ inc or

po rate [d] r e lig ion

a s an in te g ra l pa

rt of its residential pr og ram.” Id . at 841. The district c ourt furthe r explained that, eve n if Tee n Ranch wa s sim ila rl y -s itu a te d, the F I A’ s “ de sir e to a vo id v iol a tin g the Es ta

bli sh me nt C la

us e . . . is su ff

ic ie nt t o meet the r ational basis test.” Id

. I n d e nyingTe e n Ra

nc h’ s f if th a nd fi na l c la im und e r 4 2 U .S. C. § 60 4a, the dis tr ic t c ourt ,No. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 10

c iti ng§ 6 04 a (i ), no te d th a t th e statut e do e s not cr e a te any pr ivate ri g hts e nf or c e a ble in f e de ra l c ourt
. The district cour

t also rec og nized that § 604a applies only to prog rams funde d under Titles I , I I , and I V-A of the Social Secur ity

Act, and the “F I A is funded f or a port i o n o f i t s foster c are place ment costs under Title-I V-E

. . . rathe r than Title I V-A.” Id

. at 841-42. Also, under its fifth cla im, Teen Ranch a lleg ed to have made a state law c laim under § 220 of the Public Act. Howeve r, the district court found insuff

i ci en t ev idence to support this allegation, and to the extent a state claim wa s alleg ed, the district “ [c] ourt decline[d] to exercise suppleme nt[ al] jurisdi ction . . . beca use the [c]ourt had dismissed all of the fe dera l claims over whic h it had orig inal jurisdiction.” Id . at 842. Af te r t ho ro ug hly

re vie wi ngthe reco rd , w e be lie ve tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s c or re c t in

rea ching its c onclusions a nd g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of the FIA. For

the same r easons identified by

the district court, we conclude that the opt out provision of the Public Act d i d not provide the c hildren plac ed in the ca re of the FIA with “true private c h o i ce . ” L ikewise, a fter

car efully consideringthe applica

ble law, we also reje ct all five of Tee n Ranch’s a rg uments for the

re a so ns art ic ulate d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt . T he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s o pi ni on was so un d, a s it c le a rl y articulated and pr ovided the re asoning for r ejec ting Te en Ranc h’s constitutional claims. Whil e we are satisfied with a ffirming on the basis of the district c o u rt ’s we ll-considere d op ini on , w e wi ll t a ke thi s opp or tun ity to furt

he r co ns ide r t

he via bil ity of Te e n Ra nc h’ s f if th c la im — a § 1983 ac tion alleg ing v i o l at ion of rig hts under 42 U.S.C. § 604a, a f eder al statute which provides a spe cific reme dy that require s “[a]ny party which seeks to e nforc e its rig hts . . . may asser t a civil ac tion for injunctive re l i ef e x clusively in an appr opriate State c ourt ag ainst the entity or

a g e nc y that a lle g e dly

c omm its su c h v iol a tio n. ” 42 U. S.C. § 604 a(i). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ,No. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 11

un de rs tand a

bly , d id n ot a dd

re ss t his iss ue . H ow e ve r, we be lie ve it warr ants c on sid e ra tio n s inc e bo th Tee n Ranch a

nd the FIA dedicate consider able e ffor ts to thi s claim. I t is settled that “[42 U.S .C.] § 1983 is available as a r emedy for violations of fe dera l statutes

as we ll as for c onstitut ional violations.” Suter v. Artist M. , 5 0 3 U. S

. 3 4 7 , 3 5 5 (1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g Maine v. Thiboutot , 448 U. S. 1 (1 98 0) ). Ho we ve r, “ § 198 3 doe s n ot p ro vid e an ave nu e fo r r e lie f e ve ry tim e a state a ctor violates a

fede ral law .” City of R a n ch o P a l o s Verdes v . Abrams , 544 U.S. 113, 119 (2005). F or example, “§ 1983 is not available to enforc e a vi o l at i o n o f a fede ral statute ‘ wher e Con g re ss h a s f

or e c los e d s uc h e nf

or c e me nt o f t

he statut e in t

he e na c tme nt its e lf

and wh e re the statut e did not cre ate enforc eable rig hts, privileg es, or immunit ies within the m eaningof § 1983.’” Suter , 5 0 3 U. S

. at 3 5 5 -5 6 (q u o t i n g W rig ht v . Ro an ok

e Re de v . & Ho us . A uth ., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)). “Ac cording ly , to sustain a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the fe dera l statute cre ates a

n individually

enfor cea ble right in the class of bene ficiar ies to which he be longs.” Abrams , 544 U.S. at 120. “Eve n afte r this show ing,

. . . [t ]he de fenda nt ma y defe at this presumption by demonstrating that Congr ess did not intend t hat re medy for a newly cre ated r ight.” Id

. “[C] ong ressional intent may be found dire ctly

in the statute cre ating the rig ht, or infer red f rom the statute’s cr eation of a

‘c o m p re h en sive enfor ceme nt scheme that is incompatible with indi vidual enfor ceme nt under § 1983.’” Id

. (q u o t i n g Blessing v. Free stone , 5 2 0 U. S . 329, 341 (1997))

. Mo re ov e r, “ [t]he pr ov isi on of an e xpre ss, pr ivate me ans of re dr e ss i n th e statut e its e lf is o rd ina ri ly an indication that Congr ess did not intend to le ave open a more expansive remedy under § 1983.” Id . at 121. Howe ver, “ [t ]he ordinary infere nce that the reme dy provided in the statute is exclusive

c an s ur e ly be ov e rc ome by te xtua l in dic a tio n, e xpre ss o r i mpl ic it, that th e re me dy is t o c omp le me nt,No. 05-2371

Teen Ranc h, Inc., e t al. v. Udow, et al. Pag e 12 rathe r than supplant, § 1983.” Id . at 122. The pa rty seekingto enforc e the f

eder al statutory

rig ht bear s the burden of

demonstrating t h at Cong ress intende d to cre ate the pr ivate fe dera l remedy soug ht. Suter , 503 U.S. at 363-64. I n the instant matter, 42 U.S.C. § 604a(i) e x pressly provides that a pla intiff’s re medy under § 604a re sides exclusively in state court. As suc h, we must conc lude that “Cong ress did not intend to leave ope n a mo re ex p an s i v e remedy under § 1983.” Abrams , 5 44 U. S. at 12 1. As no te d in Abrams , “‘the express provision of one method of e nforc ing a substantiv e rule sug g ests that Congr ess intended to pre clude other s.’” Id

. (q u o t i n g Alexande r v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001)) . L ikewise, 42 U.S.C. § 604a does not pr ovide a text ual indication, express or implicit, that the re medy

provided for

in state court is compleme ntary to the reme dies av ail able unde r § 1983. Tee n Ranch ha s failed to provide , as it must, any evidenc e indi catingthat § 604a(i) w as not intended to f or e c los e or

su pp lant t he a va ila ble re me die s und e r § 19 83 . A c c or dingl y , Teen Ranc h’ s r ig hts under 42 U.S.C. § 604a may be enfor ced only in state court; thus, a cause of ac tion under this fede ral statut e is n ot c og niza

ble in f e de ra l c ourt
. III . Acc ording ly , for the r easons state d in the distr i ct co u rt’s we ll-considere d opinion and the additional rea sons provided her ein, we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i n favor of the F I A.