ARI Research Note 86-91

ANALYSIS OF CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE

BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE COMMANDERS COURSE

Mike S. Perkins and Robert L. Rollier

Litton Systems, Incorporated,

TMellonics Systems Development Division

I

for

ARI Field Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia

Seward Smith, Chief

TRAINING RESEARCH LABORATORY

Jack H1. Hiller, Director

DTIC 7,EEGTE B

NOV 2 0 986D

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

October 1986

Approved for Public rleSse; diotr:butlon unlimited.

-,. 94
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

WM. DARRYL HENDERSON

EDGAR M. JOHNSON COL, IN

Technical Director Conunding

Research accomplished under contract for

the Department of the Army Acession For

!:ITS C, &l

Litton Systems, Incorporated, D V0 TA3

Mellonics Systems Development Division d

Technical review by , , tur'Kt Code

i Avii!.iit ', Codes

Thomas J. Thompson , nd/or

This report. as submitted by the contractor, has been cfeared fe, release to Defense Technical Information Center

(OTIC) to comply with regulato requirement%. It has been given no primary distribution other than to DTIC

Gnd will be available only threwugh DTIC or other reference services such as the National Technical Information

Service (NTIS). The vitws. c-pini-,ns. aor/o, findings contained in this report are those of the author(st and

should not be constru%; et an oflcia; C 'paitneri, of the Army position. policy, or decision, unless to designated

by other ofiScial documentation.
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ARI Research Note 86-91 . .)

4. TITLE (and Subtitle) S. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

ANALYSIS OF CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE Final Report

BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE COMMANDERS COURSE January 85 - December 85

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(.) S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(e)

Mike S. Perkins and Robert L Rollier MDA 903-83-C-0545

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK

Litton Systems, Incorporated AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

Mellonics Systems Development Division 2Q263744A795

P.O. Box 3407, Sunnyvale, CA 94088-3407

11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE

ARI Field Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia October 1986

P.O. Box 2086, 13. NUMBER OF PAGES

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1. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Seward Smith, contracting officer's representative

John C. Morey, technical monitor

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reveree aide if neceery and Identify by block number)

Bradley Commanders Course Leadership

Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Tactics

Infantry Fighting Vehicle Training

20. AI T1ACT (Cie m rev' e&h ff ncoeeyeary a" Idenrtify by block number)

-This research note reports the results of detailed analysis of the Bradley

Commanders Course, conducted at the U.S. Army Infantry School. The analysis

supports the conclusion that the overall quality of the course is high, considering its scope, and the relatively short period since its inception. There are

areas, however, where constructive interventions could have high payoff potential. These fall, generally, into the categories of changes or augumentations of

course content, course administration, and student evaluation practices. (OVER)

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ARI Research Note 86-91

20. Abstract (continued)

-To be specific, the research note recommends that the overall quality of

instruction received by the students being trained as Bradley commanders be

improved. The maximum class size should be 30 students. The live fire annex of

the Program of Instruction (POI) should be revised to reflect accurate descriptions of both the live fire and concurrent training objectives. A Bradley

Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) tactics test (with a passing grade required for

graduation) should be administered, and the tactics portion of the instruction

should be augmented by use of guest speakers who are knowledgeable about

critical BIFV operational issues. Finally, certain blocks of instructional

content (particularly in the areas of tactics and gunnery) that could be added

to the course without increasing course length were identified.

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ii
ANALYSIS OF CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE

BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE COMMANDERS COURSE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Requirement:

To critically review the content and organization of the Bradley Commanders

Course administered by the U.S. Army Infantry School and to determine the

degree to which the present form of the course is responsive to the needs of

Bradley units.

Procedure:

Background information was obtained by review of relevant field manuals and

other Army publications pertaining to Bradley operations. On-site observations

obtained during field exercises conducted by Bradley units contributed

additional information. Review of the POI, lesson plans, training schedules,

student hand-outs and other course materials was conducted. Researchers

* participated in several iterations of the course.

Findings:

*Areas where constructive interventions would have high payoff potential

were identified. Augmentations of course content blocks to improve

instruction in gunnery fundamentals and tactics, and integration of related

course content to reflect the interactions among separable tasks, should be

implemented. The importance of tactics instruction can be emphasized by

incorporating additional exercises and adding presentation of critical tactical

issues by guest instructors. The present course length can be maintained

through efficient use of concurrent training time during the present live fire

block. Class size should be maintained at 32 students to preserve a 3-to-l

student/instructor ratio. Detailed recommendations in these areas were

formulated.

Utilization of Findings:

Implementation of the recommendations by the appropriate action agency will improve the institutional training of individuals about to be assigned to

*. command of the Bradley vehicle.

iii
ANALYSIS OF CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE

BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE COMMANDERS COURSE

CONTENTS

Page

BACKGROUND .................................

PURPOSE. ................................. 2

APPROACH .................................. 3

DESCRIPTION OF THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT .. ................ 4

Gunnery and Skill Level 1 Training Evaluation .. ........... 4

Course Content and Training Sequence in Class 1-85. ......... 5

Course Content and Training Sequence Changes After Class 1-85 ... 7

Administrative Aspects of Class 1-85 .. ............... 7

Tactics Training. .......................... 10

CONCLUSIONS .. ............................. 16

Factors Affecting Gunnery Training And Evaluation. .. ....... 17

Course Content. ........................... 21

RECOMMENDATIONS .. ............................ 24

SUMMARY .. ............................... 29

BIBLIOGRAPHY. .............................. 31

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Potential Areas of Analysis Presented by WGMD, USAIS . . . . 2

2. Hours Assigned to Hardware Oriented and Overall Training

for the BIFV Commanders Course. ................ 8

3. Training Objectives Listed in POI for Tactics .. ........12

iv
BACKGROUND

Since August, 1983, the Fort Benning Field Unit of the Army Research

Institute (ARI) and its resident contractor, Mellonics Systems

Development Division, Litton Systems, Inc., have been conducting a research

program to develop training and improve operational effectiveness of the

Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) under all visibility conditions.

The first year of a two year work effort focused on the identification of

required improvements while research was conducted during the second year to

determine equipment, techniques, and training to improve BIFV operations.

Two major areas of focus during the first year of effort were tactics and

gunnery. Analysis of gunnery included a review of gunnery programs of

instruction (POI), lesson plans, training literature and manuals, and

observation of all U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) courses (BIFV Gunners,

Master Gunners, and Commanders Courses) that conducted gunnery training. The

analysis of tactically related issues included observation of mechanized

infantry (M113 and BIFV) field exercises and a review of mechanized and BIFV

related instruction provided by USAIS. Observations of field performance

occurred in Fort Hood, Texas and with the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division in

the Federal Republic of Germany during conduct of formal unit evaluations

(Army Training and Evaluation Program). Observers remained with squads,

platoons, and companies on a 24 hour a day basis to allow a comprehensive

analysis of performance. Analysis of USAIS mechanized infantry tactical

training focused on a review of POIs for all commissioned and

noncommissioned career development courses in addition to the BIFV

Commanders Course.

The BIFV Commanders Course trains squad leaders, platoon leaders and

company commanders for BIFV operation and maintenance. Attendance is based on

either designation for or current assignment to a BIFV unit. Students

graduate from the six week course with a 1IM Military Occupational Specialty

(MOS). Course content consists primarily of 1IM MOS Skill Level 1 tasks,

gunnery, and tactics. Tactical instruction is provided by the Tactics

Division, Combined Arms and Tactics Department (CATD), USAIS. Gunnery and

Skill Level I instruction was provided by the Weapons, Gunnery, and

Maintenance Division (WGMD), USAIS prior to December, 1984 at which time the

29th Infantry Regiment assumed responsibility. The course content and

instructor staff did not undergo significant changes during this

reorganization.

In August, 1984, WGMD met with ARI to present a list of problem areas

associated with the BIFV Commanders Course. These problems are summarized in

Table 1. A major source of concern as indicated by items I through 4 was the

impact of large classes on overall training effectiveness. Certain classes

had a student size that far exceeded recommended numbers; this had a negative

impact on both training and the morale of the students and instructors. The

WGMD also was interested in the feasibility of reducing the length of the

course if class size were restricted to the recommended maximum.

-- %

% A,.. ..
Table 1

Potential Areas of Analysis Presented by WGMD, USAIS

1. Optimal training techniques and time required to achieve training

objectives

2. Optimal student-to-instructor ratio

3. Optimal and maximum number of students per class

4 4. Optimal course length with current POI

5. Adequacy of gunnery related tests

6. Adequacy of graduation standards

7. Requirement for end-of-course examination

8. Requirement for live-fire qualification exercise

9. Effectiveness of training and utilization of time during prefire and live

fire gunnery

10. Training with U-COFT

The WGMD's concern over current testing and its impact on student

graduation from the course was indicated by items 5 through 8. Item 9

reflects the perception that prefire gunnery training is not as effective as

possible and that live fire training creates noticeable problems in effective

and efficient use of training time. The Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (U-COFT)

fielded at Fort Benning in mid-1985, lacked guidelines for implementation.

The WGMD sought guidance in the integration of this full task training device

into existing institutional courses.

PURPOSE

.- The purpose of this analysis was to further investigeas

* °presented by WGMD. The Fort Benning Field Unit of ARI had independently

• -identified many of the problems cited by WGMD so subsequent analysis to

determine improvements in potential problem areas was consistent with ARI's

second year work effort. The issues expressed by WGMD pertained almost

exclusively to instruction in gunnery and Skill Level 1 training. However,

tactics instruction was included in the present analysis because of ARI's

prior review and knowledge in that area.

2
NAPPROACH

A comprehensive analysis of the issues of interest would have taken

considerable time and resources. Three man months were dedicated to this task

excluding time spent on first year efforts which provided meaningful and

critical background information.

Primary sources of information for analysis were the Program of

Instruction (POI); lesson plans; student advance sheets; content of advanced

reading assignments; copies and results of tests; unstructured conversations

with students, instructors, and course administrators; and information gained

from observing the course. The POIs, lesson plans, and training schedules

were examined prior to course attendance to obtain information on tasks

taught, conditions under which tasks were performed, performance standards,

techniques for training the tasks, resources required for training, time

devoted to each task, integrated training of related tasks, sequence of

training, and type of training (e.g., lecture, practical exercise). Advance

sheets, including literature sources, indicated the preparation required of

students prior to a particular class or block of training.

Observation of course conduct was critical for issues related to studentto-instructor ratios, actual versus POI-specified time devoted to a task,

number of times a task was performed, performance feedback, use of concurrent

training when required, and classification of student participation during

training. Student participation was categorized as follows:

1. Performing a scheduled task.

2. Observing performance of a scheduled task.

3. Performing a POI task not scheduled for that time period.

4. Performing a BIFV related activity not listed in the POI.

5. Neither participating in nor observing training.

The most beneficial source of information was gained from attending and

participating in the BIFV Commanders Course. The primary purpose of class

observation was to obtain information on student performance and the effect of

course organization on training effectiveness and efficiency. Observations

were obtained in a manner that did not disrupt class activities. The observer

performed required tasks only if all students had completed their training for

that task.

Class 1-85 of the BIFV Commanders Course was observed in its entirety. A

major portion of training provided by WGMD occurred with one assistant

instructor (AI) dedicated to a particular group of usually three and, at the

most, four students. The observer usually remained with one group during a

particular class or block of instruction to minimize disruption. However,

given the location of the primary group of observation, it was often possible

to observe training received by several groups.

3

. . . . . . .
Gunnery training is very similar for both the BIFV Gunners and Commanders

Courses. In addition to Class 1-85, entire or major portions of prefire and

live fire gunnery have been observed in a total of 6 iterations of the BIFV

Gunners and Commanders Course. One complete BIFV Gunners Course was attended.

The tactics portion of the BIFV Commanders Course was observed in Classes

3-84, 1-85, and 3-85. A description of tactical training prior to Class 3-84

was obtained from interviews conducted with instructors who had previously

taught the classes.

Student reading assignments of Class 1-85 (BIFV Commanders Course) were

reviewed for the following: the technical manuals for the hull (TM 9-2350-

252-10-1) and turret (TM 9-2350-252-10-2), the soldier's manuals for Skill

Levels 1 through 4, the BFV gunnery manual (FM 23-1) and the field manual for

the Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (FM 7-7J). Additional review was

conducted on unassigned portions of FM 7-7J, FM 23-1, and TM 9-2350-252-10-2

to determine those aspects of BIFV operations not covered in training.

A major source of information on training requirements and problems was

obtained from observations of conduct of field exercises in BIFV units in

Germany and Fort Hood, Texas in addition to an exercise (Operation Eagle)

conducted at Ft. Benning by USAIS to evaluate operational concepts associated

with Company Team operations involving BIFVs and the Abrams tank. Problems

observed in these environments identified aspects of BIFV operations that may

need greater focus in USAIS courses.

DESCRIPTION OF THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

The analysis focuses on a description of content of training and factors

in the training environment that affect training effectiveness and efficiency.

Alternative training approaches were not tested by ARI; however, alternative

methods and organization of training have been utilized by USAIS over the past

two years. Observations and information recorded over this period by ARI will

contribute to the data base on which recommendations are formulated. This

section of the report will describe separately the training provided for (a)

Skill Level 1 and gunnery tasks and (b) tactics. Summary statements,

conclusions, and identified problems related to this data base will be

presented in the subsequent major section entitled Conclusions.

Gunnery And Skill Level 1 Training And Evaluation

Minor changes occur in almost every iteration of gunnery-related and Skill

Level 1 training for the BIFV Commanders Courses. However, Class 1-85 of the

BIFV Commanders Course was a good representation of training so the description

of Skill Level 1 and gunnery training will begin with that class. This will

be followed by a description of changes in course organization occuring after

Class 1-85. The first two subsections will describe content and sequence of

training. The last subsection will describe administrative aspects of

instruction to include student-to-instructor ratios, the type of student

participation, and other factors.

4

%p P. F N% % ,. .~%
Course Content And Training Sequence In Class 1-85

Week One. The first week of training focused on Skill Level 1 tasks and

turret operation. Training began with a demonstration of BIFV firepower and

maneuverability, a lecture on safety, a demonstration of many of the items

included in a combat load, and a brief "walk" through the BIFV. Preventive

maintenance, checks, and services (PMCS) of the hull was provided on day two

along with training on starting and stopping the BIFV. Driving during the day

and night using the driver's night viewer (AN/VVS 2) was the emphasis of day

three; concurrent training consisted of communications, tow and tow-starting

the BIFV, and use of hand and arm signals. Turret operations training

occurred on the morning and early afternoon of day four. Maintenance of the

firing port weapon (FPW) was taught during late afternoon of day four and the

weapon was fired on the morning of day five.

The Comprehensive Hands-On Test (CHOT) for Skill Level 1 tasks was

administered on the afternoon of day five. Communications, hull PMCS,

starting and stopping the BIFV and driving were tested. The latter involved

driving forward, turning, and moving in reverse. Pivot steers and reverse

turns were not required. The PMCS test required identification of problems

while checking Items 1 through 13 of the vehicle hull technical manual. For

communications, the student had to properlyconnect the driver's and

commander's stations and set up the radio to perform an operational test.

Week Two. The second week was dedicated to (a) turret PMCS and (b)

operational and maintenance aspects of all turret-mounted weapon systems in

addition to the grenade launcher. Day one was spent on maintenance of the

7.62mm coaxial machine gun with tasks on assembly/disassembly, clearing,

procedures for a runaway gun, misfire procedures, lubrication, and

loading/unloading ready boxes. Days two and three consisted of similar tasks

involving the 25mm gun. Day four covered operational aspects of the M257

grenade launcher (e.g., load, unload, and stow) followed by turret PMCS.

The Gunners Skill Test 1 (GST I) was conducted on day five. Six stations

were used during the morning. Three separate stations tested assembly and

disassembly of the 7.62mm machine gun, the 25mm gun, and the FPW. Stations

also existed for grenade launcher operations (load, unload, and stow),

performing misfire procedures on the coaxial MG and the 25mm gun, and TOW

-. related tasks (inspection of missles, loading into and unloading of missles

from the launcher, and conducting misfire procedures). Three stations were

used for late morning and afternoon testing. They were: turret PMCS,

N:: loading and unloading the 25mm feeder and feed chutes, and loading and

' unloading 25mm ready boxes.

Week Three. Swimming the BIFV and prefire gunnery were trained and

Gunners Skill Test II (GST II) was administered. Swimming occured on the

morning and early afternoon of day one. The remainder of the day was spent

reviewing and practicing tasks that had not been passed during GST I.

% Preliminary or prefire gunnery training occurred on days two through four.

Boresighting of turret-mounted weapons was taught on the morning and early

505
afternoon of day two. At lunch time, students failing portions of the GST I

were retested. A lecture on BIFV range card construction was given that

afternoon.

On the second morning of prefire gunnery, concurrent training stations

were used for range estimation and construction of range cards. Separate

stations existed for use of the binoculars and the stadia line of the

integrated sight unit (ISU) for range estimation. Following lectures on fire

commands, target tracking, gun lay and aerial target engagement, concurrent

training stations were used during the afternoon for (a) simultaneous

execution of fire commands and gun lays, (b) tracking exercises, and (c)

boresighting of turret-mounted weapons.

The last day of prefire gunnery involved concurrent training stations for

(a) turret-gun tracking exercises using the snake board and (b) a dry fire

exercise with a moving BIFV. A 30-minute lecture covered target acquisition,

scanning techniques, identification of target signatures, target

classification (most dangerous, dangerous, and least dangerous), precision and

battlesight gunnery with the 25mm gun, lead required for moving target

engagements, target engagement with the coaxial machinegun (MG), and use of

the auxiliary sight. Concurrent training continued in the afternoon with (a)

the dry fire exercise with a moving BIFV and (b) training in loading and

unloading the 25mm feed chutes and boresighting turret-mounted weapons.

Gunners Skill Test II was administered on day five. Testing began with a

written test covering prefire gunnery topics. The remainder of testing was

conducted in three stations. These were for: (a) boresighting; (b) range

determination using binoculars and the WORM (Width over Range in Mils)

formula; and (c) construction of a BIFV range card.

Weeks Four And Five. The primary training for weeks four and five was

live fire gunnery. The class was split into two groups which alternated

training days on the firing range and a non-firing range facility. The group

not engaged in firing on the range received concurrent training at a location

other than the firing ranges. The first day of concurrent training away from

the range consisted of instruction (primarily lecture) on the types and

operation of subcaliber 25mm gunnery training devices, 25mm ammunition

ballistics, and more extensive treatment of advanced gunnery techniques

required for engagement of moving targets and firing from a moving BIFV.

Training during the second day of concurrent training concentrated on breaking

and joining tracks and more extensive review of the turret technical manual.

Other concurrent training included characteristics and use of the thermal mode

of the ISU; a review of master gunner training and the role of the master

gunner in the unit; and a scaled target range for practice of target

acquisition, gun lay and fire commands. One day of concurrent training during

live fire included a range card station and a thermal viewing station for

observing BIFV firing on the move.

The sequence of training for live fire was 25mm gun baseline, moving

engagements using the 7.62mm coaxial MG, and stationary and moving

engagements as part of the vehicle team combat exercise (VTCE). Baseline

firing involved untimed presentation of stationary and moving vehicle

silhouette targets for engagement with the 25mm gun. The moving coaxial MG

6
engagements were an attempt to train integrated individual and crew tasks

during moveout engagements while using ammunition that is less expensive than

25mm. The VTCE involved engagement of 7.62mm coaxial MG and 25mm gun type

targets in day and thermal modes of operation with the ISU. Students were

also given the opportunity to fire from both the gunner's and commander's

stations.

ACourse Content And Training Sequence Changes After Class 1-85

Beginning during Class 1-86, weeks one and two were reorganized to allow

completion of training and student performance evaluation of hull-related

operations prior to initiation of turret and weapons maintenance training. As

part of this change, swimming was shifted from week three to the day after

driving during week one. In addition, firing of the FPW during week one was

eliminated from the course since commanders do not fire the weapon. FPW

maintenance training was shifted to week two with weapons training for the 25

mm gun, the coaxial MG, the TOW missle system, and smoke grenade launcher.

Another significant change was the addition of 4 hours (total of 12 hours) to

turret operations which now begins in the afternoon of the last day of week

one.

Introduction of the U-COFT at Ft. Benning has changed concurrent training

during live fire training (weeks four and five). As in Class 1-85, one group

received live fire training while the other underwent concurrent training at

training facilities away from the range. Groups alternated daily between the

range and non range facilities. Scheduled concurrent training included 25mm

ballistics and familiarization on the Standardized Test Equipment (STEMI/FVS). The majority of remaining concurrent training time was devoted to

the U-COFT. Firing from a stationary position at night with the aid of a

range card will be executed on an experimental basis.

Administrative Aspects Of Class 1-85

*The technique or methodology that produces the most effective and

efficient training is determined largely by the training requirement.

Presentation of some information can be performed effectively using a

classroom lecture. However, operation of equipment and weapons (Skill Level I

and gunnery tasks) is hands-on oriented as illustrated in Table 2. Total

hours in the POI are compared aith that portion spent in practical exercise

training that requires hardware or equipment. Of the 226 hours of training

time devoted to gunnery, 89% (201.5 hours) required either BIFVs or weapons.

Hands-on training typically requires low student-to-instructor ratios.

The current analysis examined actual student participation or activity during

training with emphasis on periods when training required either BIFVs or

weapons. When student to instructor/hardware ratios exceed a ratio of 1 to I

then a certain number of students will not be able to perform the primary

tasks.

7

% .
Table 2

Hours Assigned To Hardware Oriented and Overall Training for the BIFV

Commanders Course

Task Cluster Annex Total Hardware-oriented

Vehicle Introduction 2.0 0.0

Hull Operations and Maintenance 26.0 20.1

Turret Operations and Maintenance 11.0 9.5

Weapons System Training 29.0 23.5

Prefire Gunnery 23.0 19.7

Target Engagement 135.0 128.7

Tactics 31.0 26.0

Student Evaluation 20.0 19.1

.4

TOTAL 285.0 246.6

-Student-to-instructor ratios and training related participation during

scheduled training was determined for Class 1-85 during major periods of

training where either BIFVs or weapons were required. Class 1-85 had 32

students organized into groups of three or four each (eight groups had three

students and two groups had four students). Each of 10 assistant instructors

trained a particular group throughout the course except when a classroo

lecture was given and when training occurred in small groups with a committee

instructor. The following summarizes major findings concerning student-toinstructor ratios and student participation.

During the first large practical exercise (P.E.), hull PMCS (week one, day

two), each group of students had one vehicle and instructor for training. One

student with a group typically performed an activity while others watched.

Organization for the driving (week one, day three) was more complex. The

driving course itself was supported by four BIFVs. Consequently, during the

daytime portion of training, the class was split into three squads to allow

concurrent training stations for driving, communications, and a combination

of towing and tow-starting the BIFV and hand-and-arm signals. One and onehalf hours was scheduled for each station. Each student drove for about 20

minutes while one rode in the gunner's position, another rode in the troop

8
compartment, and the committee instructor occupied the commander's position.

While at the driving concurrent station, each student actually drove about

one-third of the training time.

Prior to night driving, students received instruction and operational

experience with the driver's night viewer. Four vehicles were again used for

night driving; however, no other concurrent stations were used.

Much of weapon systems training and FPW maintenance training (a total of

about 3.5 to 4 days) required hands-on experience with a weapon. A sufficient

number of weapons were available to allow one weapon per group. Consequently,

one student performed tasks while the other two watched.

Nearly all of the remaining hardware oriented hands-on training involved

some use of the BIFV turret. Turret operation and maintenance (1.5 days),

prefire gunnery (3 days), and target engagement (10 days) are all turret

oriented. The turret imposes stringent restrictions on training organization.

While it varies with task, there are generally four positions on the BIFV to

train, to observe, and to instruct. The gunner's and commander's positions

are prime areas; however, student observation and instructional guidance can

also be provided while sitting on the opened gunner's and commander's hatch

covers.

With one BIFV and AI per group, students were either participating in or

observing training during turret operation and maintenance. Typically, one

student performed task retudents observed. However,

there were variations in training procedures. For example, one instructor

trained the first student in the group, and then that student trained another

while the AI supervised.

During the first day of prefire gunnery, boresighting training was

conducted with a higher level of student partication. Two students are

required to conduct boresighting and each group had a BIFV for training.

The last two days of prefire gunnery relied almost entirely on concurrent

training stations. During the morning of the second day, three squads rotated

through one hour stations: range card construction, range determination using

the stadia lines, and range determination using binoculars and the WORM

formula. The latter did not require a vehicle and there were enough

binoculars for all students so that all students were occupied for the entire

hour. Student participation was also high with range card construction since

there were two students per vehicle. By contrast, only one of six students

was occupied at the stadia line training station. In the afternoon, three

squads were again used for concurrent training for gun lay and fire commands,

tracking using the snake board, and boresighting. One half of the students in

the gun lay and fire command station participated while the other half either

observed or practiced without a vehicle. Snake board tracking allowed

training-related participation for only one of four students at any point.

Manipulation training on the last day of prefire gunnery involved dry fire

moving engagements with students in the driver's, gunner's and commander's

* -~ 9

%%V %
positions. Four BIFVs were used. Concurrent training consisted of snake

board tracking in the morning. In the afternoon, concurrent training stations

covered 25mm feed chute-related tasks and boresighting.

For the first three weeks of the course, training during a particular day

corresponded very closely to the training objectives listed under problems

being trained. Furthermore, actual training time corresponded closely to that

listed in the POI. By contrast, correlation between training objectives, and

particularly training time, was widely disparate for actual training and POI

listings for live fire gunnery. Excluding the FPW exercise, the POI lists 130

hours for live fire gunnery. Actual training for live fire occurred over a 10

day period which would require an average of 13 hours of training per day.

Students spent half of the live fire training days away from live fire ranges

in concurrent training. When on the range, students occupied the driver's,

gunner's and commander's positions.

The number of students involved in live fire training depended on whether

firing was from the stationary position or while moving. Typically, there

were four or five BIFVs on the firing line during stationary engagements.

Anywhere from one to four vehicles would be firing at any one time. During

engagements from moving BIFVs, there were usually three other BIFVs on line

awaiting the opportunity to fire while one vehicle was firing. Overall, it is

estimated that the typical student spent about three hours actually firing

during the 10 days of live fire. However, additional time spent in

preparation of fire included hull and turret PMCS, installation of feed

chutes, installation of the coaxial machine gun, and ammunition uploading.

Actual time spent in these activities was difficult to estimate because of

variations in time from day to day and vehicle to vehicle.

The training objectives listed in the POI for live fire gunnery did not

coincide with actual training. The objectives were written to describe

gunnery qualification engagement scenarios wheras the training is conducted

more as a familiarization to BIFV gunnery.

'Tactics Training

Training for tactics in the BIFV Commanders Course varies more from class

to class than does gunnery and Skill Level 1 training. For that reason, it

was not possible to give a typical or representative description of training

based on that received in one particular class. The following summarizes

training as it occurred prior to Class 3-84, and during Classes 3-84, 1-85,

and 3-85.

Training Prior To Class 3-84. Tactical training occurred over three

consecutive days. A four hour classroom lecture or presentation was

followed by four hours of simulated tactical training using terrain models.

A field-oriented tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) consisted of 31 POI

hours covered during the second and third day of training.

Training methodologies were sequenced to provide a logical progression of

training. Students received fundamental information in the classroom. The

terrain model exercise allowed application of fundamentals of tactics in a

10
controlled environment devoid of many field-related distracting influences

(e.g., weather). Use of terrain model exercises allowed a logical transition

between fundamentals and use of this data in a field environment. The TEWT

focused on planning and execution of tactical operations. Realism of

execution was limited by lack of subordinate troops and an opposing force.

The initial block of classroom instruction consisted of four separate

topic areas lasting one hour each. Topics were Introduction, Offense,

Defense, and Specialized Missions. The tasks and training objectives for the

last three topics are presented in Table 3.

The terrain model exercise was equally divided between offensive and

defensive operations. A five paragraph platoon level operations order (OPORD)

was given for each scenario and each student was given 30 minutes to prepare

his plan. Selected students presented the plan to the class and the plan was

critiqued by instructors.

The first day of the TEWT began with a road march to an area used to

practice hand and arm signals in conjunction with BIFV movement formations.

Students were then given an OPORD for a movement to contact and had to develop

paragraph 3, Execution. Some students conducted a mounted reconnaissance

patrol to the line of departure while others illustrated their plan using a

sand table. One student's plan was selected for execution.

In mid-afternoon of the first day of the TEWT, one to one and one-half

hours were dedicated to planning for, and conduct of, an antiarmor ambush.

Both near (Dragon) and far (TOW) antiarmor capabilities of the BIFV squad were

emphasized. The remainder of day one was spent on planning for, and conduct

of, a mounted night assault. Map overlays designated the point of departure,

release points, probable line of deployment, the objective, and the limit of

advance. All students prepared a plan; plans were discussed by the group; and

the best plan was selected for actual conduct. The operation was usually

completed by 2300 hours. Students were free of training requirements until

morning (about 0600 to 0700 hours) of the next day.

A defensive OPORD was given on the morning of the second day of the TEWT.

A platoon "battle position" had high speed avenues of approach and a wooded

area more favorable for a dismounted Threat approach. Students developed a

plan that included fire planning for primary and secondary weapons, primary

and secondary engagement areas, and priority of fire. Missions for individual

squads included assisting engineers; setting up antiarmor ambushes;

emplacement of mines; designation of primary, alternate, and supplementary

positions; plans for combat service support (e.g., fuel point and ammunition

request contingencies); leadership assignments, and signals. The operation

was usually completed between 1100 and 1200 hours. Students returned to the

motor pool after the operation.

Actual training time was considerably less than that listed in the POI.

Training usually extended from 0900 to 2300 hours on day one and from 0700 to

1200 hours on day two for a total of 19 hours of training.

11
Table 3

Training Objectives Listed In POI For Tactics

Operation Training Objective

Defense Prepare a BIFV squad defensive position

Prepare a BIFV range card

Insure operational security (OPSEC) of a BIFV squad

Insure OPSEC of a BIFV platoon

Prepare a BIFV platoon defensive position

Direct BIFV platoon fires in defense

Employ a BIFV on battle positions

Conduct a disengagement

Offense React to direct fire while mounted

React to enemy antiarmor fire

Direct dismount of a BIFV

Control dismount element formations

Control mounted BIFV platoon formations

Direct fire and maneuver of a BIFV platoon

Direct actions on contact

Conduct a mounted assault

Plan a movement to contact

Consolidate and reorganize BIFV platoon following contact

Specialized Employ a BIFV platoon in the air defense role

Organize an antiarmor ambush

Conduct an antiarmor ambush

Conduct defensive operations in urban terrain

Control movement through urban terrain

12
Training during Class 3-84. The introduction and MOUT portions of classroom

instruction were eliminated and time used for these topics was divided between

offense and defense. The major portion of the introduction had primarily

consisted of presentation of a videotape entitled Second to None; however,

this tape was shown earlier in the course during gunnery training.

The majority of the classroom instruction was applicable to both M113 and

BIFV tactical units; however, instructors included BIFV-peculiar techniques as

they apply to the fundamentals of tactics. During instruction on defensive

operations, the BIFV was stated to have a primary mission of supporting the

infantry. The BIFV has greater armor protection than the M113, but it was

clearly stated that the BIFV is not to be used as a tank. Other comparisons

between the BIFV and to the M113 were the smaller size of the dismount

element; the ability to kill BMPs and tanks at long range; ability to perform

in a combined arms team; longer overwatch capability; problems of 360 degree

security for soldiers in the troop compartment because of failure to observe

through the vision blocks; and the BIFV's greater speed and maneuverability.

Training during the afternoon of the first day also differed from previous

classes. The first hour was an opportunity for students to ask questions.

Interestingly, nearly all of the issues discssed related to dismounted

aspects of BIFV operations. These included:

1. The BIFV has greater ground to cover with fewer dismount troops.

2. If the Platoon Sergeant is the commander of a BIFV, what does the

squad leader of that vehicle do?

3. Under what conditions do either the squad leader or assistant squad

leader dismount?

4. With all the weapon systems on the BIFV, where will the platoon leader

usually have the greater impact on the battle?

5. What are the speed and vulnerability problems associated with the

squad leader getting out of the turret for dismounted operations?

6. The dismount element has a wide range of dismount weapons to select

from, but because of fewer dismount troops, firepower is decreased for

dismount operations.

7. Is there utility in modifying the BIFV to allow dismount of the TOW?

An offensive operation for the terrain model exercise began after the one

hour discussion. Following a company level OPORD given for a movement to

contact mission, students developed a plan focusing on Paragraph 3 of the

OPORD. Movement techniques and formation, weapons ready posture, and

leadership positions were to be considered. Students were organized in groups

so that each one had different levels of rank and past mechanized experience.

Each group had students that played the role of a company commander, platoon

leader, and squad leader for the two BIFV platoons. Fifteen minutes were

given to develop plans and each group presented its solution. A total of two

hours were spent on this exercise.

13

, ...
A defensive operation using the terrain board was not conducted. Instead,

the Principal Instructor discussed issues considered more critical. Student

comments and questions during the course of the class indicated disbelief that

M113 and BIFV tactics were as similar as indicated in the class. Furthermore,

the attitude of many students during the terrain board exercise had not been

optimal for learning. Students not in leadership roles were not occupied with

meaningful activities. The instructor's presentation stressed and reemphasized the necessity for knowledge of the fundamentals of mechanized

infantry tactics, especially since some students in the class had no prior

mechanized experience. It was further stated that refresher training for

leaders with mechanized experienced was also considered critical.

Nine BIFVs were available for the 49 students during the TEWT: four BIFVs

each were used in two platoons and one BIFV was used as the Company

Commander's vehicle. Because of the large number of students in the class,

two to three students rode in the troop compartment while two were in the

turret.

Movement formations, control of movement, and the daytime movement to

contact were conducted as in the past. The antiarmor ambush was not

conducted. Problems indicated in the After Action Review of the movement to

contact were land navigation, no planning for either action on contact or on

the assault, and BIFVs were too close to each other during movement. Leaders

expressed extreme navigational problems even though 1:25,000 scaled maps were

used. On several occasions, a platoon would have or did go in the wrong

direction but the situation was remediated by the Principal Instructor. The

final assault occurred without dismount contingencies even though BIFVs were

usually fully exposed while moving onto the final objective. While not

mentioned in the critique, fire control and planning were minimal or nonexistant.

The movement to contact mission was conducted a second time because of the

problems experienced on the first iteration. New leadership was assigned.

Land navigation was no longer a problem; however, there were was still no

planning for action on contact and at the assault. BIFVs essentially overran

the objective with no considerations for security of the vehicle and crew.

During the critique, the PI emphasized that the armament of the BIFV is not

like that of a tank and that security measures to include terrain driving are

a necessity for survival on the battlefield.

A mounted night assault was planned and executed. The speed of operation

was hindered by non-availability of night vision goggles (AN/PVS 5) for the

commanders. The exercise emphasized movement control measures considerably

more than fire control measures.

The defensive operation of the TEWT was conducted much like in past

classes. A platoon of tanks were used to form a company team. Primary tasks

scheduled for this operation were designation of fighting positions;

preparation of range cards and sector sketches; development of fire plans;

positioning of antiarmor positions; positioning of BIFVs, tanks, and

the company commander's vehicle; and routes and methods of disengagement.

14

Zc
Training during Class 1-85. Significant training related

organizational changes occurred during this class. At the onset of tactics

instruction, the Branch Chief of Tactics Division, CATD, USAIS presented a

15 minute introduction on topics and the sequence of training over the next

three days. Among other things, he mentioned that students of widely varied

ranks, source of commission, and mechanized experience presented instruction

difficulties for organization of a suitable training environment.

A one and one-half hour lecture on defense was followed by a different

practical exercise than used in previous classes. The terrain model exercise

was replaced by an exercise that required planning of a simulated defensive

operation conducted on Ft. Benning terrain using a 1:50,000 scaled map. All

students below the rank of captain were organized into groups of four to five

that had members with varied ranks. These groups were given a company level

OPORD and had to develop Paragraph 3 of a platoon-level OPORD. All captains

were placed into a single group and were given a batallion-level task force

OPORD and had to develop a company level order to be delivered to the three

platoons. Planning time of one hour was allowed and plans were presented to

the entire class for about an additional hour.

Another class format change in Class 1-85 was a 30 minute presentation

delivered by the Chief of Tactics Division, CATD. Content of the presentation

focused on BIFV-specific aspects of mechanized operations and differences

between the M113 and BIFV.

The classroom lecture on offense was cut to 15 minutes to allow sufficient

time for conduct of the offensive operation practical exercise. About one and

one-half hours was spent on a map-oriented offensive operation practical

exercise conducted in a manner similar to that used for defense. The first

day of training contained a discussion of the most recent, unpublished

positions of the Infantry School and TRADOC on critical tactically relevant

issues.

There were no major changes in conduct of the TEWT when compared to Class

3-84. Primary activities consisted of a road march, moving in formation using

* hand and arm signals, preparation of an OPORD for a mounted assault and

execution of the mission, and movement to an assembly area under limited

visibility conditions. Training was concluded on the first day by about 1900

hours. The defensive operation conducted on the morning of day two of the

TEWT was similar to that of past classes.

After students had finished cleaning vehicles and completed

adminstrative details in the motor pool, they received concluding remarks

from, and had tactically related questions answered by, the Chief, Tactics

Division, Combined Arms and Tactics Department. Primary topics of

discussion were fire control (e.g., weapons ready posture) as related to

offensive operations, span of control with BIFVs and dismount elements on

separate battle positions, and the importance of keeping squad members

informed.

15
CONCLUSIONS

It can be concluded without reservation that instructors and

administrators involved in the BIFV Commanders Course are highly competent and

motivated in providing the most efficient instruction possible. It is evident

that course personnel are doing more than a job; they do whatever is necessary

to provide the best possible training. There has been an enormous improvement

in training efficiency over the two years of observation. Furthermore, the

cooperation provided by Tactics Division and 29th Infantry Regiment (formerly

WGMD) during the conduct of this analysis indicates the desire to further

improve the course.

Training effectiveness and efficiency were extremely high during the first

two weeks of the course when instruction focused on Skill Level 1 and weapons

maintenance tasks. Efforts to optimize training effectiveness and efficiency

in this portion of the course are in progress as instructors and course

administrators are implementing minor changes in training sequence, amount of

time devoted to each training objective, and student performance evaluation.

The third week of training was primarily preliminary gunnery. Potential

areas of training improvement are elaborated in a ARI-Litton Mellonics gunnery

report that will be completed January, 1986. It will recommend training

techniques and methods to improve BIFV gunnery. This should ultimately impact

on organization and sequence of training, time devoted to training, and

training resource requirements.

Training effectiveness and utilization of time for prefire and live fire

gunnery was a primary concern of WGMD resulting in this analysis.

Observations confirmed problems in training effectiveness and efficiency of

the live fire portion of the course. While modifications in training

sequence and techniques would improve training effectiveness, a major source

of problems is related to the need for extensive hands-on training, the number

of BIFVs required to perform hands-on training, considerable range resources,

and regulation of the number of students allowed to attend the course.

Operation and firing of the BIFV is taught during the first five weeks of

the course while the final three days are dedicated to training the leader to

effectively use the BIFV in combat. The BIFV is still relatively new to the

infantry and tactics have always been one of the most difficult areas to train.

Restructuring of the training environment has continually occurred as

instructors and adminstrators attempt to deal with problems created by limited

time and resources. The limited time available for tactical training, the

occurrence of training after the student has completed graduation

requirements, the lack of student evaluation, difficulties in determining

techniques and methodologies that most effectively train tactics, and the

occurrence of excessively large class sizes have created problems in tactical

training.

The remainder of this section is divided into three sections: Factors

Affecting Gunnery Training And Evaluation, Factors Affecting Tactics Training

And Evaluation, and Course Content. The first two subsections cover factors

that include student-to-instructor ratios, course length, and other

16
organizational and administrative considerations. The content section covers

content areas either in need of improvement or which need to be added to the

POI.

Factors Affecting Gunnery Training And Evaluation

Optimal course length and number of students is determined by factors that

include optimal student-to-instructor ratios, number of training objectives,

time required to train these objectives, and training resources.

Determinination of optimal student-to-instructor ratio for BIFV training is

severely complicated by hardware and range requirements. While the original

question related to optimal number of students per instructor, results

indicated that constraints imposed by required equipment are an even more

important consideration. Training for Skill Level I tasks, gunnery, and

portions of tactical training, require hands-on experience and much of this

occurs in or around the turret which has limited space for training. There

are two seats inside and two locations outside the turret (the gunner's and

commander's hatches) that are suitable for occupancy by participating

students, observing students, and instructors. Many of the turret-related

tasks can not be performed, or even observed in most cases, from locations

other than these four specified positions. And even with three students

and one instructor in these positions, all students are not necessarily

participating in the primary training objective.

Observations indicate that the number of vehicles used for training were

frequently less than required by the POI. Equipment-related problems were the

typical cause of this unanticipated reduction in training resources.

Equipment problems not identified in the motor pool often would be detected

after movement to the training area and after vehicle use by students.

Placement of the equipment and instructors under the same chain of command has

seemed to lessen the negative impact of maintenance-related problems.

Statements on maintenance problems are not intended to reflect negatively on

the quality of maintenance by 29th Infantry Regiment since many of the

problems are a result of the inherent nature of the equipment and not the

people who maintain it. However, it is important to recognize that there are

upper level limits on the number of vehicles that can be managed for effective

training on the range, while there are a minimum number of vehicles required

to insure effective training as well.

The number of BIFVs that can be managed in the field also limits optimal

class size. Based on observation of training over the last two years, the

maximum number of BIFVs availble at one time for training has not exceded 10.

One TDA platoon is usually dedicated to a particular class and each platoon

has 14 vehicles.

Live fire training constraints have a major impact on training efficiency. Range

limitations and restrictions during live fire gunnery create an incredible

bottle-neck in training management. Numbers of students and vehicles that

could be employed effectively prior to live fire can no longer be used. While

as many as 10 BIFVs can be effectively utilized in training prior to live fire

engagements, training for target engagement from moving BIFVs typically

involves four vehicles which fire one at a time on a rotational basis.

17
Stationary BIFV engagements usually involve four to six vehicles on the firing

line with usually one or two firing at a time. Because these limitations

restrict the actual number of students that can fire at one time, the studentto-instructor ratio does not accurately reflect student participation in the

primary training objectives.

It was estimated by observers that any one student receives only about 3

hours of training in actual live fire during the 130 training hours listed in

this 10 day block of training for live fire. The range is scheduled longer

than actually required for conduct of training to allow for unscheduled events

like check fires unrelated to BIFV operations, VIP demonstrations, and

weather. Students spend time in other BIFV training (e.g., PMCS, ammunition

uploading) in preparation for live fire; however, this by no means fills the

entire training period.

The potential for limitations on student participation during live fire

gunnery creates the need for extensive concurrent training if students are to

be meaningfully occupied. Effectiveness and efficiency of concurrent training

has increased enormously in the last two years. Little concurrent training

existed during the initial periods of observation (i.e., Winter, 1983), and

when it was used students often were performing tasks in which they had

already received considerable experience (e.g., tracking using the snake

board). Students were noticeably bored, frustrated, and angered at the lack

of meaningful activities. However, very substantive improvements have

occurred in the use of concurrent training as illustrated by the description

of Class 1-85. Alternation of groups of students on and off the range on

successive days had noticeable benefits. First, by training off the firing

range, facilities and resources were often more suited for the type of

training being conducted. Secondly, student motivation and interest seemed to

remain at a higher level. When students remain on the range while not

firing, boredom and frustration quickly ensue. Students alternating on and

off the range enjoy firing more because they spend a greater percentage of

their actual range time on the firing line.

Optimal class size will be limited by the capability to maintain

effective and efficient concurrent training during live fire training since

live fire occurs on 35% of the training days. The student load for Class 1-85

was 32. Both gunnery and concurrent training were conducted effectively and

efficiently with this class. The two groups of 16 students alternated range

time. Four to five vehicles were typically in use and most students were in

a BIFV for the majority of range time. In non-firing exercises, as many as

10 BIFVs were effectively utilized.

Concurrent training during Class 1-85 allowed training in content areas

which are important for commander training but that were not a formalized part of the POI at this time. Critical tasks either trained or scheduled for

training in future classes include 25mm ammunition ballistics, gunnery

training devices, extended target engagement information, familiarization on

the role and training of the master gunner, more extensive information on the

content of technical manual for the turret, and use of the Standardized Test

Equipment for troubleshooting turret operations. Present plans for using any

additional concurrent training time center around the U-COFT.

18

'5,,
The negative impact of a large class on training effectiveness and

efficiency was clearly illustrated in Class 3-84 when 49 students created an

average student-to-instructor ratio of about 5 to 1. Student participation

and observation of training was dramatically reduced throughout the course.

Moreover, student dissatisfaction reached its peak during live fire gunnery.

Students outwardly expressed their dissatisfaction with the minimal levels of

training partication. These negative feelings continued into the tactics

instruction and the level of dissatisfaction was explicitly stated in endof-course evaluations. While student opinions were not a formal part of

this analysis, it was clear that both students and instructors had strong

negative opinions concerning USAIS and Department of the Army personnel

policies for their role in creating this nonproductive training environment.

Student testing and evaluation were topics in this analysis. Two concerns

'1 were the need for live-fire qualification and end-of-course evaluation.

Review of the POI indicated that performance requirements were not noticeably

different from qualification. However, instructors emphasized that gunnery

training is presently familiarization and not qualification. Insufficient

time and resources are the typical reasons given for not conducting BIFV

gunnery qualification in the BFV Commanders Course. Training objectives did

not cover fundamental skills and techniques to include application of

appropriate lead and reverse lead, using shot control to achieve firing of

sensing rounds and three to five round shot groups, target tracking before and

during engagement, and burst on target adjustments. Potential areas of

training improvement are recommended in a separate gunnery report (see

Bibliography). After the fundamentals of gunnery have been trained, then it

is feasible to consider gunnery qualification in the BIFV Commanders Course.

If USAIS can not achieve qualification training during conduct of the course,

then guidelines need further development to insure that units can train BIFV

Commander Course graduates to qualify.

The BIFV Commanders Course is the only USAIS course that trains the BIFV

leader to use and maintain his BIFV weapons and to plan and execute the

fundamentals required to command his unit. Yet, the BIFV Commanders Course

neither qualifies the student as a BIFV gunner nor evaluates his tactical

* capabilities. Students are aware of this, particularly as it pertains to

tactical instruction. Since students are not required to demonstrate their

tactical knowledge, it is not surprising that a number of students develop

negative attitudes about tactical instruction. They question the utility of

the training, particulary since it occurs toward the end of the class at a

time when they would rather graduate and leave.

The title "BIFV Commanders Course" misrepresents the training emphasis.

The term commander implies that a significant portion of instuction is related

to commanding the BIFV. However, five weeks are dedicated to Skill Level I

and gunnery training while only three days are devoted to tactics. This

training occurs late in the course and student performance of training

objectives are not evaluated. From the student's point of view, the tactical

instruction is viewed as an afterthought. Graduation requirements have been

met by the onset of tactical instruction so there is a low level of motivation

to perform the required tasks.

1'
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Techniques used to train tactics vary with the intent of instruction.

Background information, concepts and fundamentals can be presented effectively

in classroom instruction. Much of the difficulty in tactical training begins

with the techniques and methods required to apply the fundamentals. Practical

exercises that require planning while minimizing the complexity of problems

associated with execution are a necessary prerequisite to full scale tactical

training exercises.

In tactical instruction, there is a transition from classroom instruction

to practical exercises or simulations that require planning for tactical

operations. The structure of the simulation has undergone a number of

changes. The exercise always begins with operations orders being delivered to

students who must then develop Paragraph 3 of the OPORD. Students used a

terrain model for this practical exercise prior to Class 3-84. The terrain

was represented by a three dimensional molded model of the terrain and scaled

models were used to represent friendly and enemy vehicles. Use of this

terrain model exercise was modified because it was difficult to conduct it

with class sizes over about 20 students.

For Class 3-84, the molded terrain model was replaced by a cloth terrain

model" that students could stand around and walk on if necessary. Terrain

relief was created by "stuffing" the hills and ridgelines with cloth and other

materials. A large class size (i.e. 49 students) contributed to a nonfavorable training environment for this form of simulation since there were

too many students with too few roles to be played on a single representation

*Of the terrain.

The terrain model simulation was replaced by a map exercise in Class 3-85.

Mission planning was based on the OPORD delivered to the students and planning

required use of standard 1:50,000 scale military maps. This type of

simulation is scheduled for continued use in Class 1-86.

A TEWT has been a part of the BIFV Commanders Course since the beginning.

It will be eliminated in Class 1-86 in favor of a game board exercise called

Dunkirk. The TEWT has been plagued with many problems to include (a)

scheduling after graduation requirements have been fulfilled; (b) no

evaluation of student performance and knowledge; (c) insufficient course

length to permit coverage of all training objectives; (d) too many students

to allow each to assume a leadership role; (e) student reluctance to playing

leader or nonleadership roles below their duty position upon graduation; (f)

lack of opposing forces; (g) students feeling they already know the training

objectives; (h) very negative end of course student evaluations; and (i) the

exorbitant cost of field exercises.

Despite all the problems associated with the TEWT, it had one major

advantage over terrain model, map-oriented, and game type exercises. The TEWT

required the leader to plan, based on realistic terrain considerations. The

other previously mentioned exercises create unrealistic depiction of terrain.

Maps and terrain boards do not provide the detail for leaders to determine

fields of fire and fields of intervisibility. As a result many of the plans

developed in the indoor simulation environment would not apply in the real

world. Utilization of the terrain has always been a key to success for the

infantry. However, it undertakes a new dimension with the BIFV. In the past,

20
infantry weapons dealt with fields of fire that could be measured in hundreds

of meters. Now the BIFV demands fields of fire of two to over three thousand

meters to maximize weapon effectivenes.

The POI for tactical instruction states that training is on those

capabilities peculiar to BIFV operations. However, a major portion of

classroom instruction is devoted to mechanized infantry operations in general.

In certain iterations of the course, students have expressed dissatisfaction

with instruction that was redundant with training received in other courses.

Arguments for presenting the fundamentals focus on the need for refresher

training. Yet, instructors face a dilemma because a significant number of

students had no prior mechanized infantry experience.

With regard to the application of fundamental of tactics to the BIFV,

students are generally told that the fundamentals of tactics have not changed,

just the techniques. This may be valid, but it also seems to oversimplify the

additional responsibilities associated with the BIFV. The fundamentals may

have not changed to any measureable extent. However the infantry leader is

now responsible for fundamentals for which he has had no training experience.

Integration of BIFV firepower will be a unique challenge to leaders and

commanders. Along with enhanced lethality available to the leader, is the

security problem created by having this potential. Fundamentals have not

changed, but the wide span of lethality of the BIFV requires the infantry

leader to know and use techniques in which he has little or no past

experience. He must acquire mastery of armor aand armored cavalry

fundamentals which are now appropriate to his more mobile and lethal

battlefield role.

Training tactical fundamentals can be achieved with techniques other

than lectures. For example, the Principal Instructor in one class conducted

an open-ended question and answer session. The types of questions asked by

students was described earlier in the report. It is obvious from student

questions that many critical tactical-related issues were still not covered

by the current POI. Another effective instructional technique was a

presentation by. the Chief, Tactics Division, CATD, USAIS of current and

critical BIFV-related issues. Tactical employment of the BIFV is an

evolutionary process and only a higher level officer involved in tactical

literature development is knowledgeable of the many critical issues.

Course Content

Course content was not a major study area requested by WGMD for this

analysis. However, determination of optimal course length is dependent upon

the task requirements. It was not possible to perform a formal task analysis

given the time and resources dedicated to this analysis. But, given the

knowledge and expertise gained in the areas of gunnery and tactics over the

past two years, it was possible to determine content areas and tasks receiving

insufficient training or no training at all. These are presented below along

with the rationale for considering the task to be critical.

1. Practical exercises in use of the thermal mode of the ISU.

21
2. Practical exercises in target acquisition, identification, and

classification.

3. Use and preparation of range cards and sector sketches.

4. Range estimation.

5. Execution of fundamental gunnery skills and techniques.

6. Execution of fire commands at squad and platoon level.

7. Knowledge of 25mm ammunition ballistics characteristics.

8. Combat loading and familiarity with Basic Issue Items and the

Additional Authorization List.

9. Techniques required for mounted land navigation.

10. Relationship between communication hook-up alternatives and their

impact on command and contrrol.

11. Integration of surveillance, target acquisition and night observation

(STANO) devices and the BIFV into a limited visibility surveillance

plan.

12. Combined arms operation.

The importance of items 1 through 7 will be discussed in the ARI gunnery

report but will be summarized below. With regard to Item 1, there are no

practical exercises in the interpretation of thermal images. Training is

required since thermal images are not replicas of what is seen with unaided

optics. Use of the thermal mode will be the norm in combat because of a

visually obscured battlefield and since darkness occurs about half of each 24

hour day. Target detection, identification, and classification will be

complicated by differences in the appearance of unaided daytime and thermaltype images.

Training for target detection, identification, and classification has been

reduced from minimal to nothing since the onset of the course. Target

identification training in the earlier classes involved classification of

vehicular and aerial targets as either friend or foe. Time was devoted to beth

training and testing during the initial iterations of the course up to about

the middle of 1984. Class 1-85 conducted only a pretest of identification of

friend or foe and all students passed, so no training was given.

Training for identification of friend or foe does not occur at target

ranges that are anticipated in combat. Target presentation typically

consisted of 35 mm slides, line drawings, and 1:35 scaled targets; binoculars

are used with the latter. Targets rarely simulate ranges of over 2000 m. With

a maximum engagement range of 2700m for APDS 25mm ammunition and either

3000 or 3750m for the TOW, it is obvious that students are not being

challenged with the types of conditions that will occur in combat. Target

identification training, when it did occur, did not cover all required

22
aspects. For example, classification of a target as only friend or foe does

not enable the BIFV crew to select the correct ammunition for killing either

tanks or personnel carriers. Furthermore, the course has also to train and

evaluate knowledge of the lethality (e.g., maximum effective range) of

critical threat weapons. Students are informed of the classification of

targets as most dangerous, dangerous, and least dangerous but the specific

information on enemy weapons lethality is not provided as background

information.

Students are not adequately trained on the operational capabilities of the

range card. This is best illustrated by a student's comment the morning after

he had recieved the range card classroom instruction during Class 1-85. He

said that a group of students had discussed the range card and could not come

up with a good reason for preparing one. Very basically, the range card is a

drawing that represents the location and range to man-made and natural terrain

features in a BIFV sector of fire. This range information is critical for

both daylight and limited visibility gunnery since the range must be indexed

into the fire control system. The range card should not have to be referred

to on every engagement. In the process of preparing the range card and by

using it during target acquisition, the gunner becomes familiar with the

terrain. A drawing or representation of the terrain provides the gunner

with a working knowledge of the terrain.

The range card is also critical for scanning and target acquisition during

use of the thermal sight. Particularly during darkness, it is difficult for

the user to remember and determine reference points for scanning. Objects and

features marked on the range card allow reference points for identification of

the location of where the user is observing, serve as a guide for the start of

scan pattern, and provides data for indexing range for target engagement as

reference for the start of scan patterns.

Four major training problems exist for the range card. First, the

functions and utility of range cards are not clearly defined in instruction or

in tactical training literature. Second, students are not required to

produce a drawing or representation that even closely approximates the

terrain. Third, without adequately constructed range cards, it is not

possible to practice the construction of platoon level sector sketches.

Finally, until Class 3-85, students had not been required to use range cards in

training. Class 3-85 used range cards for night fire; however, range cards

can be equally important for daytime engagements.

Closely related to problems in thermal imagery interpretation and use of

range cards for thermal scanning is the lack of an integrated platoon limited

visibility surveillance plan. Class 3-85 conducted the defense during the

night; however, the only limited visibility equipment available was the

thermal mode of the ISU. Platoon surveillance planning was not part of the

operation.

Range estimation is taught in the course, but as discussed in the

ARI gunnery report, current techniques have many inadequacies particularly in

the combat environmemt. Problems in estimation of range are especially

evident during conduct of live fire with 25mm training ammunition at Fort

Benning.

23

_." - ~l_ :.- '- .._ - J ' ""0%v .
Armor-type fire commands are a relatively new language for the infantry.

Training for fire commands begins two days before live fire gunnery. Students

usually have not mastered the commands prior to the onset of live fire.

Recommendations for improving training are presented in a separate report (see

Bibliography). Execution of platoon level fire commands is not a part of the

course.

Ballistics data for 25mm ammunition will be scheduled as concurrent

training in Class 1-86. Ballistics information was not initially taught to

commanders because it was believed that a commander did not require an

understanding of ballistics. It is now realized that a soldier has to

thoroughly understand his weapon system. Understanding of the ballistics

table is critical for construction of firing fans during training. An

understanding of ballistics is equally important for other live fire

applications. Superelevation data provides the gunner and commander with

information on drop of the projectile at varied ranges. Flight time to round

impact is the cornerstone for calculating and understanding lead requirements

for engaging moving targets.

Major combat loading problems have been noted in field exercises.

Technical manuals do not adequately or realistically designate the location of

cold weather equipment, NBC equipment, and load bearing equipment. And

because of the location and disorganization of equipment like this,

observations indicated that ammunition uploading and firing port engagements

would have been virtually impossible. Some units have SOPs for equipment

stowage; however, accessibility to equipment stowed in vehicles is a

significant administration problem for the commander. Commanders must

understand how to combat load before they can supervise it.

Mounted land navigation techniques are not taught in the course. Problems

in this area were obvious during road marches and offensive operations during

the TEWT. In addition, ARI has observed land navigation difficiencies during

ARTEPs in both Germany and Fort Hood, Texas. Problems occurred even over

terrain familiar to many of the troops.

A primary mission of the BIFV is to fight along with the Ml Abrams tank.

Classroom tactical instruction discusses aspects of combined arms operations;

however, the presentation is made by an infantryman. The role, capabilities,

and fighting techniques of fighting with the tank needs more extensive

treatment. One TEWT incorporates a section of tanks into a defensive exercise

and planning by infantry leadership left much to be desired in terms of

optimal utilization of the firepower of the tank and security for the tanks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations will be restricted to the BIFV Commanders Course even

though some may be partly or totally applicable to the BIFV Gunners and Master

Gunners Courses. Recommendations do not include those previously made in

other ARI reports, particularly those that will be listed in the BIFV gunnery

report. Content areas covered in that report include target acquisition and

identification, range estimation, preparation of range cards, and fire

commands.

24

.%
Recommendation 1. Set maximum class size at 30 and closely regulate it.

Student-to-instructor ratio and class size are interdependent with given

time and resources. Student-to-instructor ratio is affected as much by

hardware/equipment considerations and range requirements as the number of

students that one instructor can effectively train. It is estimated that a

maximum of 10 BIFVs can be managed in a training environment. This number is

reduced to four to six during live fire exercises and all of these BIFVs can

not fire at once. A large proportion of hands-on BIFV training has an upper

limit of three students per instructor plus BIFV combination. The

recommendation of a maximum class size of 30 assumes 10 operational BIFVS with i. a typical arrangement of three students per vehicle. It should be emphasized

that a three to one ratio of students to instuctors is a maximum and not an

optimal number. Even with this ratio it is common for actual student

participation in the training period to be 33 percent. Larger student-toinstructor ratios for hands-on training not only decreases the percentage of

participation but makes it impossible for additional students to even observe

training because of space limitations within and around the BIFV.

One of the most critical problems with the course is that the number of

students admitted to the class is not strictly regulated. The recommended

class size is 30 students; however, considerable variation occurs in the

number actually attending the course. Thirty-two students attended Class I85 while 49 students participated in Class 3-84. The size of the latter was

53 percent over the recommended student load.

An excessive number of students are often admitted to the course because

of the length of time until the subsequent class. However, it should be noted

that students with prior New Equipment Training Team (NETT) training have

attended the course, and a common reason cited by these students for attending

the course is to get gunnery training. These students should receive lower

priority for admittance to the class than those who have not received any BIFV

training.

A Recommendation 2. Maintain the current course length.

Time should not be subtracted from the course until time and resource

requirements have been determined for all necessary training objectives. Live

fire gunnery results in considerable periods of student inactivity if

concurrent training is not integrated into the training period. However, a

smaller class size results in considerablely less requirement for concurrent

training during live fire. The WGMD mentioned the possibility of strictly

enforcing the class size at the recommended number which would result in

considerably higher training time efficiency for live fire gunnery. Students

could then finish live fire in a shorter period than specified in the POI and

more classes could be conducted per year. However, the current POI does not

provide all the training necessary for a BIFV commander or leader. Use of

concurrent training during live fire gunnery provides a means to add required

content areas without adding to course length.

25

4.'M
Recommendation 3. Rewrite the live fire annex of the POI to allow an

accurate description of both live fire and concurrent training objectives.

The POI needs to provide a more accurate description of training during

the two weeks of live fire gunnery. The number of hours listed on the

training schedule and in the POI for live fire gunnery do not reflect the

amount of time that students actually fire the BIFV. The long training days

listed on the training schedule insure that a "normal" day of training could

be obtained even if training was interrupted by non scheduled events (e.g.

poor weather, check fires). Since Class 1-85, live fire gunnery has been

split between the firing ranges and concurrent training areas. This type of

training needs to be specified within the POI as it relates to the training

objectives. Recommendation 4 specifies tasks and topics that need to be

included as concurrent training during the the "live-fire" annex of the POI.

Recommendation 4. The following tasks should be added to the POI and

taught concurrently during live fire gunnery.

1. Ballistic characteristics of 25mm ammunition.

2. Mounted land navigation techniques.

3. Simulated gunnery training using the U-COFT.

4. Familiarization on the training and role of the Master Gunner.

5. Combat loading.

6. Competitive uploading exercise for 25mm ammunition.

The recommended course size and structure allows concurrent training

during approximately one half of live fire training during weeks four and five

of the course. It is recommended that the preceding topics and tasks be

formally added to the POI and included as concurrent training during live fire

training. The rationale for ballistics and mounted land navigation was

stated in the Conclusions section. Familiarization with the role

and training of the Master Gunner is critical since this position is new to

the infantry. The success of gunnery training in the unit will greatly depend

on the Master Gunner; therefore, leaders and commanders must understand his

assets and capabilities if they are to be effectively utilized. The U-COFT

training should focus on those aspects of training that can not be easily

covered in the live fire annex of gunnery (e.g., TOW engagements, 25mm

engagements with HEI-T ammunition, back-up sight engagements, and limited

visibility engagements). Combat loading and competitive ammunition uploading

could be conducted sequentially. A complete ammunition upload (70 rounds of

APDS-T and 230 rounds of HEI-T) would be performed in a combat loaded vehicle

with ammunition stowed in locations specified by the load plan. Small groups

of students would compete for the shortest upload time. This extended

uploading training would compensate for the less rigorous conditions that

exist during current 25mm ammunition upload and download training and

testing. The competition would also set the atmosphere for individuals and

small groups to develop time-effective techniques for ammunition uploading

under conditions expected in combat.

26
A.

Recommendation 5. Develop and implement a BIFV tactical test and make

passing of the test mandatory for graduation.

Based on the graduation requirements for the course, the BIFV Commanders

Course could be relabeled the BIFV Gunners Course. Students in the BIFV

Commanders course fire more ammunition that do students in the BIFV Gunners

Course. The BIFV Gunners Course does not provide the tactical instruction

provided in the BIFV Commanders Course; however, students in the latter are

not held accountable for the tactical information presented to them. Reading

assignments for tactics are not given until three days before the end of the

course by which time the students have completed all graduation requirements.

A tactics test could be administered during the first week of live fire

gunnery and a retest could be adminstered on the second week. Advance reading

assignments covering testable material should be given on day one of the

course.

It is often stated that mechanized infantry tactics are similar for both

the M113 and BIFV; however, the BIFV creates unique challenges in the use of

firepower. The test should focus heavily on BIFV-unique considerations in

planning for and control of firepower. Included in this would be

considerations for (a) the lethality of BIFV weapons in relation to target

type and ranges and (b) the threat posed by different enemy weapon systems at

different ranges. While the latter may be classified as gunnery information in

certain situations, it is important to recognize that tactics and gunnery are

not so distinctly classified in a combat environment. Gunnery and tactics are

too "cleanly" separated in the BIFV Commanders Course. The tactical test

should not separate gunnery-related techniques and information that impacts on

tactical operations. The course currently does not require the student to

demonstrate his capability to plan for and use BIFV firepower at the platoon,

or even the squad, level.

Recommendation 6. During tactical training, have the Chief, Tactics

Division, CATD, USAIS present and discuss current, critical tactically related

BIFV issues.

With the evolution of tactically related BIFV developments, it is critical

that newly qualified commanders are knowledgeable of and understand the latest

BIFV issues. The person with the most knowledge in these areas is the Chief,

Tactics Division, CATD, USAIS. This would emphasize the importance of

tactical training in the course. Furthermore, while an NCO or a captain

could present a prepared presentation, it is critical to recognize that

captains attend the course. With the assumption that every soldier

considers himself to be an expert in tactics, then it adds a higher level

of authority to the presentation if the presenter outranks the students.

Recommendation 7. During tactical training, have the Armor Liaison

Officier to the Infantry School present and discuss the role of armor in

company team operations.

Prior to introduction of the BIFV, mechanized infantry in combined arms

operations served primarily as a local security element for tanks. With the

capability of the BIFV to kill both light skinned vehicles, personnel

carriers, and tanks, the combined role of company team operations becomes even

V 27

and cmbind he roe o
more complex. The infantry leader, more than ever before, must think as both

an infantryman and an armor officer. The infantry leader may have to lead or be led

by armor. Infantry must understand the capabilities and missions of armor so

that their actions can be anticipated and planned with the same level of

competence as infantry operations. A credible presentation of the role,

capabilities, and techniques of armor should come from quality armor personnel

having armor experience and an understanding of infantry fundamentals.

Recommendation 8. At the conclusion of the course, the Commander of the

29th Infantry Regiment delivers a presentation on critical considerations,

situations, and problems that exist in BIFV units.

Unless a student had prior experience in a BIFV unit, he will be

confronted with a unique environment in his new unit. Maintenance, tactics,

training, and personnel considerations have taken on new dimensions.

Potential topics of discussion during the class could include the following:

1. Major maintenance and equipment-related problems.

2. Impact of personnel turbulance.

3. Relationship between the Master Gunner and squad and platoon level

leaders.

4. The criticality of unit gunnery sustainment since neither NETT nor

BIFV courses provided at USAIS qualify gunners.

5. Current and potential changes to BIFV doctrine, tactics, and

techniques under consideration by USAIS.

6. The importance of unit tactical SOPs (squad, platoon, and company

level) to facilitate unit tactical operations.

Recommendation 9. Develop and implement a night defense practical

exercise where range cards and sector sketches are used for target acquisition

and fire planning and control.

This recommendation involves tasks taught by both the 29th Infantry and

the Tactics Divsion; and here lies a major source of problems in the course.

Tactics and gunnery training are separated even though they will occur

together in combat. Range cards and target acquisition are taught as gunnery

subjects while the principle tactically related tasks include sector sketches,

fire planning and control, and platoon level surveillance under limited

visibility conditions. Technically, these gunnery and tactics tasks could be

separated in training but their relatedness in combat would be more lucidily

illustrated if they were joined in a single exercise. An effective training

scenario would require as primary tasks: (a) preparation of range cards, (b)

preparation of squad and/or platoon level sector sketchs, and (c) preparation

of a limited visibility surveillance plan. A critical element would be

placement and movement of target vehicles in the defensive sector. Probing

by dismounted personnel would also occur.

28
A noticeable problem in tactical field exercises as conducted by the

Tactics Division has been an insufficient number of Assistant Instructors for

each vehicle. Training problems are conpounded since student motivation

during the TEWT has been insufficient to achieve task performance without

supervision by instructors. It is recommended that instructors from the

1/29th Infantry provide assistance to the Tactics Division in this exercise.

.1|

Determination of terrain suitable for this type of exercise is a major

concern. Carmouche Range has several features making it well-suited for the

exercise. A combination of long field of view with intervening dead spaces

created by valleys and sporadic wooded areas make this range very similar to

much of Germany. Dug-in defensive positions do not exist; however, the

primary intent of the exercise is not the execution of a defense against an

OPFOR, but to prepare for an attack by the enemy under limited visibility

conditions.

The TEWT has always been scheduled at the end of the course. It attempted

to accomplish too much in a short period at a time when student graduation

requirements had been met. Negative opinions from students concerning the

TEWT were fresh in their minds for the end of course critique. The exercise,

as structured in Recommendation 8, would not have to occur at the end of the

course. The student has been taught all necessary BIFV gunnery operations

required for this exercise by the completion of prefire gunnery. The

recommended exercise could be placed between prefire and live fire gunnery.

Student experience gained from use of the range card and additional

familiarization with turret operations, experience under limited visibility

conditions could enhance his capability and further prepare him for live fire.

From a tactical standpoint, live fire gunnery should be performed after the

student becomes more familiar with the tactical aspects of gunnery.

SUMMARY

The BIFV Commanders Course trains leaders from squad through company

levels to operate and tactically employ the BIFV. Training is extensive in

its scope covering Skill Level I tasks, gunnery, and tactics. Unique and

challenging training requirements are created by the wide range of student

ranks and prior mechanized experience, the comprehensiveness of training

requirements, the relatively short time the infantry have had the BIFV, and

the impact of the latter on tactical employment. The course itself has

quickly passed the stage of infancy because of the quality of personnel

dedicated to it.

Enormous improvements have been observed in training effectiveness and

efficiency during the past two years. The overall quality of the course is

very high considering its scope and the short period since its inception.

Most of the training has achieved a level of quality where minimal

improvement can be expected. The greatest areas of improvement can now be

achieved in areas that include stricter administrative regulation of class

size, addition of content areas not covered and/or included in the POI, and

a greater degree of interaction between gunnery and tactics instruction.

29

* 3k
The latter is a major weakness in the course which will require a much closer

relationship between instructional divisions responsible for gunnery and

tactical instruction.

The current analysis resulted in a number of recommendations for course

improvement. It should be recognized that the role of ARI in training goes

well beyond problem identification. The expertise and knowledge gained over

the 2 years of research on the BIFV makes ARI well suited to cooperate with

designated proponents in the development and implementation of any or all

recommendations.

30

.%
BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARI Bradley Research Project Reports

The accomplishments of the project to date are documented in a series

of publications, of which the present report is one. Other publications in

the series are listed below for reference.

Graber, J. G., Rollier, R. L., and Salter, J. A. (1985). Continuous

Operations SOP for BIFV units. (ARI Research Note).

Graber, J. G., Rollier, R. L., and Salter, J. A. (1985). Training for night

and limited visibility operations. (ARI Research Note).

Morey, J. C., Rollier, R. L., Graber, J. G., Salter, J. A., and Salter, M. S.

(1985). Through-the-sight video: Equipment and concepts for gunnery

training. (ARI Research Note).

Morey, J. C., Rollier, R. L., Salter, J. A., and Salter, M. S. (1985). Scaled

vehicles and ranges: Development of a scaled, reactive, mobile target and

range. (ARI Research Note).

Perkins, M. S. (1985). Analysis of BIFV gunnery with emphasis on factors

affecting first-round hit capability of the 25-mm gun. (ARI Research

Report).

Perkins, M. S., and Rollier, R. L. (1985). Analysis of content and

organization of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle commanders course.

(ARI Research Note).

Rollier, R. L., Roberson, P. R., Salter, J. A., Graber, J. G., and Harbin, K. W. (1985). BIFV squad and platoon leader span of control. (ARI Research

Note).

Rollier, R. L., Salter, J. A., Graber, J. G., Roberson, P. R., Harbin, K. W.,

Wilkinson, C. S., Morey, J. C., and Salter, M. S. (1985). Bradley Fighting

Vehicle System combat effectiveness: Evaluations of developments in

tactics, training and equipment. (ARI Research Note).

Rollier, R. L., Salter, M. S., Morey J. C., and Roberson, P. R. (1985).

Effects of revised Bradley infantry fighting vehicle ammunition

reloading procedures. (ARI Technical Report).

Rollier, R. L., Salter, M. S., Morey, J. C., Salter, J. A., and Graber, J. G.

(1985). Exploration of techniques for Bradley infantry fighting vehicle

thermal sight training. (ARI Technical Report).

Rollier, R. L., Salter, M. S., Perkins, M. S., Bayer, G. C., Strasel, H. C.,

Lockhart, D. C., Kramer, A. J., and Hilligoss, R. E. (1984) Review and

analysis of BIFV operations under all visibility conditions. (ARI Working

Paper FB 85-01; to be reissued as an ARI Research Note).

31
* Rollier, R. L., Wilkinson, C. S., and Salter, J. A. (1985). Improved BIFV

troop compartment visibility: Development of a transparent, bulletproof dome. (ARI Research Note).

Salter, M. S. (1984). Bradley infantry fighting vehicle procedures guides:

Commander and gunner (ARI Research Product 84-04). Alexandria, VA: U.S.

-j2 Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. AD A147208.

Salter, M. S. (1984). Bradley infantry fighting vehicle procedures guides:

Driver (ARI Research Product 84-03). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Salter, M. S. (1984). Bradley infantry fighting vehicle procedures guides:

Evaluation (ARI Research Note 84-61). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Salter, M. S., Rollier. R. L. and Morev, J. C. (1985). Task analysis of

tactical leadership skills for Bradley infantry fighting vehicle leaders

(ARI Research Report). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Strasel, H. C., Lockhart, D. C., Hilligoss, R. E., and Fusha, J. A. (1984).

Anavsis of gunnery training for Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. (ARI

Working Paper FB 85-02; to be reissued as an ARI Research Note).

32

V.