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Filed 6/30/14 Koskinen v. Mendocino County Employees Retirement Assn. Bd. of Retirement CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

KIMBERLY KOSKINEN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MENDOCINO COUNTY EMPLOYEES’

RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION BOARD 

OF RETIREMENT,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A138926

 (Mendocino County

 Super. Ct. No. SCUKCVPT1260584)

INTRODUCTION

Kimberly Koskinen sought service-related disability retirement after an on-the-job

automobile accident which she claimed resulted in a permanent psychiatric disability. 

Mendocino County Employees’ Retirement Association, Board of Retirement (Board)

denied her a service-related disability retirement but approved a nonservice-related 

disability retirement. Koskinen challenged that determination by petition for writ of

mandate in the superior court, which was denied. She appeals from that denial, asserting 

only that the court failed to exercise its independent judgment. We disagree and affirm. 

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We set forth only those facts relevant to the single issue raised on appeal. Because 

no issue of substantial evidence has been raised, we set forth the summary of the factual 

background taken from the superior court’s order.

“[Koskinen] was employed by the County of Mendocino as an Eligibility Worker 

from 1993 until 2007. By all accounts, she was a diligent and productive employee. On 
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September 12, 2007 [Koskinen] was involved in a two car collision on Highway 20 while 

traveling to work in Ukiah. [Koskinen] unsuccessfully tried to return to work part time 

after the auto accident. Her last day of work with the County of Mendocino was 

October 16, 2007.” 

“[Koskinen] has acknowledged throughout this litigation that she suffers from 

psychological and medical conditions which are unrelated to the automobile accident of 

September 12, 2007. Her request for a service connected disability retirement is based on 

the aggravation of her preexisting psychiatric condition following the automobile 

accident.” 

“[Koskinen] filed her application for a service connected disability retirement on 

or about October 3, 2008. [The Board] referred the matter to Hearing Officer Robert 

Murray. Mr. Murray conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 20, 21, August 12 and 

December 13, 2011 which involved taking live testimony, review of deposition testimony 

and voluminous document review. Mr. Murray’s April 4, 2012 report recommended that 

[the Board] find that [Koskinen] was disabled from working as an Eligibility Worker for 

psychiatric and emotional reasons but deny [her] application for a service connected 

disability retirement. On April 19, 2012, [the Board] adopted the Hearing Officer’s 

recommendation.” 

Koskinen filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. The court 

denied the petition after reviewing “the complete Administrative Record.” 

DISCUSSION

Koskinen raises only one issue in this appeal—“whether the Superior Court 

applied the correct standard of review.” She claims the court did not exercise its 

independent judgment in reviewing the administrative record and, instead, incorrectly 

applied the substantial evidence standard. Whether the trial court applied the correct 

standard of review is a question of law we review de novo. (Alberda v. Board of 

Retirement of Fresno County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 426, 

434 (Alberda).)
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Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 sets out the procedure for obtaining 

judicial review of a final administrative determination by writ of mandate. “The inquiry 

in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the [agency] proceeded without, or in 

excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any 

prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the [agency] has not 

proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the 

findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. [¶] (c)Where it is claimed 

that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is 

authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of 

discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the 

weight of the evidence. In all other cases, abuse of discretion is established if the court 

determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the 

whole record.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subds. (b)–(c).)

“[I]f the order or decision of the agency substantially affects a fundamental vested 

right, the court, in determining under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 

whether there has been an abuse of discretion because the findings are not supported by 

the evidence, must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an abuse 

of discretion if the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence.” (Strumsky 

v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 44.) An agency’s 

decision regarding work-related disability retirement substantially impacts a fundamental 

vested right. (Alberda, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 433.) “In exercising its independent 

judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the 

administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the 

burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight 

of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817 (Fukuda).) 

“[T]here is no inconsistency in a rule requiring that a trial court begin its review with a 

presumption of the correctness of administrative findings, and then, after affording the 

respect due to these findings, exercise independent judgment in making its own findings.” 

(Id. at p. 819.)
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Koskinen acknowledges the trial court stated it was applying the correct 

independent judgment standard. However, she contends other language in the court’s 

order and deficiencies in the court’s discussion of the evidence indicate it actually applied 

the substantial evidence standard. 

The court’s order denying Koskinen’s petition for writ of mandate stated at the 

outset: “The superior court exercises its independent judgment when reviewing the 

administrative decision of a retirement board to grant or deny a service connected 

disability retirement. (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass’n[,

supra,] 11 Cal.3d 28, 34.) ‘[A] trial court [must] begin its review with a presumption of 

correctness of administrative findings, and then, after affording the respect due to these 

findings, exercise independent judgment in making its own findings.’ (Fukuda[, supra,] 

20 Cal.4th 805, [819].)” 

At the conclusion of its order, however, the court stated: “After conducting an 

independent review of the entire Administrative Record, the court finds that substantial 

credible and reliable evidence supports the Board’s decision. [¶] The court finds that 

[Koskinen] has not met her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 

her work-related automobile accident . . . aggravated her pre-existing psychological 

condition or otherwise substantially contributed to her present disability. MCERA’s 

decision to deny [Koskinen] a service related disability retirement is supported by 

substantial evidence. For these reasons, the petition for writ of mandate is denied.” 

Koskinen maintains these latter statements demonstrate the trial court actually applied the 

wrong standard, the substantial evidence standard, relying on Alberda.

Alberda also involved a petition for writ of mandate to set aside a Board of 

Retirement’s denial of an employee’s application for service-connected disability

retirement. (Alberda, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) The trial court’s statement of 

decision in that case “began with stating the standard of review was independent 

judgment.” (Id. at p. 432.) The court, however, also stated: “ ‘ “[w]e recognize at the 

outset these two well-settled principles,” ’ ” including “ ‘ “(1) factual determinations of 

the board must be upheld if there is substantial evidence in their support and the relevant 
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and considered opinion of one physician, though inconsistent with other medical 

opinions, may constitute substantial evidence . . . .” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 432–433.) Then, in 

addressing the substantive merits, the court went on to use the phrase “substantial 

evidence” five times (“the issue was whether there was ‘ “ substantial evidence of some 

connection between the disability and the job” ’ ”; “ ‘substantial evidence supports the 

hearing officer’s decision’ ”; “ ‘substantial evidence supported the . . . injury . . . did not 

contribute substantially to [Alberda’s] incapacity’ ”; “ ‘substantial evidence supports that 

the 2003 assignment . . . did not contribute substantially to [Alberda’s] incapacity’ ”;

“ ‘Substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s finding.’ ”) (Ibid.) The Court of 

Appeal concluded that, although the trial court initially recited the proper standard of 

review, its analysis raised a “serious question” as to whether it had actually erroneously 

applied the substantial evidence standard of review. (Id. at p. 435.) 

In contrast here, the trial court clearly set forth the appropriate standard of review, 

and never indicated other “well-settled principles” applied—i.e., that “ ‘ “factual 

determinations of the board must be upheld if there is substantial evidence in their 

support” ’ ” and “ ‘ “the relevant and considered opinion of one physician, though 

inconsistent with other medical opinions, may constitute substantial evidence’ ’ ”—as the 

trial court erroneously did in Alberda. (Alberda, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 432–433.) 

While the court here used the phrase “substantial evidence” twice in the conclusion of its 

order, it did not employ the phrase throughout its decision, as the trial court did in 

Alberda. On the contrary, throughout its discussion of the evidence, the trial court here 

repeatedly made specific findings as to the credibility of the witnesses and assessed the 

weight and persuasiveness of their testimony—actions taken by a court engaged in 

utilizing its independent judgment as to the import of the evidence. Furthermore, in its 

conclusion, the trial court also stated: “The court finds that Petitioner has not met her 

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her work-related automobile 

accident on September 12, 2007 aggravated her pre-existing psychological condition or

otherwise substantially contributed to her present disability”—the precise conclusion a 

court would make employing independent judgment and as the finder of fact. In sum, 
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read in its entirety, the trial court’s decision here is markedly different than the that of the 

trial court in Alberda and reflects the court actually applied the independent judgment 

standard, as it stated it did. 

In any case, the fact the trial court twice used the phrase “substantial evidence” in 

the conclusion of its decision at most renders the decision ambiguous. For the reasons we 

have explained, the entirety of the opinion resolves any such ambiguity. Furthermore, 

under well-established appellate principles, any ambiguity is resolved in support of the 

decision. “[A] judgment is presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions are 

indulged in its favor, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.” (Hirshfield v. 

Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 765–766, citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 

2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 

631.) “It is a basic presumption indulged in by reviewing courts that the trial court is 

presumed to have known and applied the correct statutory and case law in the exercise of 

its official duties.” (People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032.) Accordingly, 

we must presume the trial court both recited and applied the independent judgment 

standard.

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At oral argument, counsel asserted the trial court failed to address evidence 

supportive of Koskinen’s claim to work-related disability and this also showed that, 

contrary to what the court said, it did not review “all” the evidence and thus did not 

actually apply the independent judgment standard. The only witness counsel identified as 

not mentioned by the trial court was Dr. Ronald J. Lowell. Dr. Lowell was the “agreed 

medical examiner” in connection with her disability claim and issued three reports. 

When he first examined Koskinen, he requested a neuropsychological assessment and 

therefore “defer[red] a final opinion on causation.” After this assessment was performed 

by Dr. Mark Kimmel (whose testimony the trial court discussed and credited), and in his 

final report, Dr. Lowell concluded he was “unable to conclude that actual events of her 

 

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 Koskinen, moreover, did not bring the ambiguity to the attention of the trial 

court in order to avoid this interpretation of the decision. (See In re Marriage of 

Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1136.)
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employment have been predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury.” 

We therefore do not view the trial court’s choice not to discuss Dr. Lowell’s testimony as 

indicative of any employment of the substantial evidence standard, rather than utilization 

of its independent judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.

_________________________

Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Dondero, Acting P. J.

_________________________

Becton, J.

 



 Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.